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+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks
+By William C. Ashmore *
+During a two week period in April and May of 2007 Estonia was the
+victim of a sustained massive cyber attack on its information infrastructure.
+While the cyber attack was not the first nor was it the largest, it was the
+first cyber attack that was directed at the national security of a country.
+(Davis, 2009)
+The significance of a cyber attack on a small country can be difficult to
+measure for a casual observer. Estonia is a small country that can be seen
+as a model for the future. Estonians have developed and used internet
+technology for voting, education, security and banking (ninety-five percent
+of banking operations are done electronically) (Collier, 2007). It is not
+uncommon to see a sign for free Wi-Fi internet access at a pub, restaurant
+or on public transportation. 1
+Imagine going to an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), while on a
+business trip, to get money for meals and lodging and the system is down.
+Restaurants and hotels are unable to process your credit card. You try to
+send a message to your bank, your work, and your family but the computer
+servers are all down. The government is unable to communicate with the
+public and its different departments. News agencies are having difficulties
+publishing information. The aftermath of a cyber attack can impact anyone
+that uses the internet, whether it is an individual, business, or government
+that has been affected. By investigating the attack, how it happened, and
+Estonia
+s reaction, states can decide whether their internet defences and
+strategies are adequate. 2
+The cyber attacks on Estonia have implications for both its allies and
+adversaries. This article is not meant to establish a complete strategy for
+cyber defence but to create a better understanding of how a cyber attack
+can have far reaching consequences beyond the immediate aftermath of a
+targeted infrastructure. What are the implications for Estonia? Is the
+framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
+appropriate for cyber defence? Is an attack against one really an attack
+* William C. Ashmore is a Major in U.S. Army.
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+against all? Does the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
+Europe (OSCE) have the ability to react to cyber attacks? Lastly, does the
+Russian Federation have a coherent cyber strategy that it is willing to use
+and what have been the consequences for Russia?
+Any country that uses the internet as part of its infrastructure needs to be
+aware of the vulnerabilities and consequences of a cyber attack on their
+system. A coherent strategy must include internet defences that are set-up
+in conjunction with technical defences. Currently, legal definitions for
+cyber crimes do not exist in all countries. The international community
+must examine treaties and update them to better define assistance and
+common defence in the event of a cyber attack. Russians have shown the
+ability and the desire to use cyber warfare. Cyber strategy by, in defence of,
+or against Russia affects more than computer networks. Although, attacks
+that originate in China, Japan or the United States may have similar
+implications they are outside of the scope of this article.
+Internet attacks occur on a daily basis throughout the world. How nations
+prepare themselves for an internet attack will determine the impact of a
+cyber attack on their infrastructure. The aim of this article is to achieve a
+greater understanding of the possible Russian cyber strategy and to
+understand the counter measures that can be used to prevent or mitigate
+cyber attacks. This awareness could possibly prevent a tactical defeat
+during conflict when a cyber attack targeting command and control and
+communications infrastructure is blocked.
+1. The media accounts
+Internet trade magazines and mass media reports were used to gather
+evidence on the events surrounding the cyber attack on Estonia. Internet
+sources were a major source of information on the subject of cyber
+security because of the amount of information that is new and has not yet
+been published in books. Several Estonian government officials have
+spoken on the issue of cyber attacks at great lengths. Estonian government
+documents were also used to analyze the Estonian response to the cyber
+attack. Media accounts along with documents from the North Atlantic
+Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were used to analyze the aftermath of the
+Estonian cyber attack on organizations and other states. Analysis of
+Russian involvement was conducted using western documents.
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+In order to understand the reasons behind the Estonian cyber attack this
+article will explore the social tensions and the cyber attack itself. The
+impact that the attack had on the different actors will also be noted. The
+reality of the attacks indicates some important implications for Estonia and
+other former Soviet satellites to work with NATO to develop a coherent
+cyber strategy. Russia
+s cyber strategy also has considerable significance for
+the United States. This article will conclude with a summary of possible
+countermeasures to a cyber attack.
+2. Cyber attack on Estonia
+The social tensions between Estonians and Estonia
+s Russian minority are
+key to understanding why there was a cyber attack. Estonia is made up of
+1.3 million people where 25.6 percent of the population is Russian (Central
+Intelligence Agency, 2008). In 1918, the Estonians gained their
+independence from Russia, and in 1940 they were forced into the Soviet
+Union. From 1940 until they regained their independence in 1991 Estonia
+viewed Russia
+s presence as an illegal occupation. Mass deportations were
+made, people were summarily executed, and the population was resettled
+by ethnic Russians. Russians on the other hand view the Estonians as
+ungrateful because they were saved by Russians from the Nazi German
+fascists. Today there exists significant animosity between the Russians and
+the Estonians that permeate personal relationships and political
+interactions within the country and between the two nations. (Vesilind,
+2008) 3
+The actual events that occurred in Estonia centred on the Soviet Bronze
+Soldier monument. The Bronze Soldier monument is a World War II
+Soviet War memorial which memorialized the graves of Soviet Soldiers
+who died during World War II. However, over time ethnic Russians had
+used the memorial as a rallying site for demonstrations and other forms of
+protest against the Estonian government. This led to a decision by the
+Estonian government to move the monument to an area that was less
+public. (Davis, 2009)
+The decision to move the statue led to actual riots in the capital city of
+Tallinn on April 27th, 2007. The demonstrations degraded into criminal
+activities involving looting and the destruction of private and public
+property. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, most of whom were
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+ethnic Russians. The civil unrest was contained, order was restored to the
+streets by the Estonian government, and most of the physical damage was
+repaired by the next morning. (Davis, 2009)
+During this period of civil unrest computers in the Estonian government
+and the Estonian national media were hacked into with significant affect.
+Some of the attacks on the system were vandalism of sites and some were
+distributed denial of service attacks (a cyber attack that disrupts internet
+service so that a user cannot access a given computer service). The attacks
+started small with a major attack culminating on the Estonian internet
+system on May 9th, 2007. This date coincidentally corresponded to the day
+the Russians celebrate their victory over the Germans in World War II.
+During this time a Russian youth-group conducted protests against the
+Estonian ambassador to Russia and against the Estonian Embassy in
+Moscow. The protests against the ambassador and the embassy did not
+end until the ambassador left the country as part of a deal that was
+negotiated by Germany. The Russian government even suspended
+passenger rail services between Tallinn and St. Petersburg. The riots, the
+protests, the stopping of rail service, and the cyber attacks led to an
+increasingly tense relationship between Estonia and Russia. (Davis, 2009;
+Kampmark, 2003: 288-293)
+The Estonians were able to respond to the cyber attacks in a very
+proficient manner, as they were able to coordinate responses that only
+caused relatively short term outages instead of any permanent damage to
+their IT infrastructure. The Estonian government was able to employ its
+Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which coordinated IT
+responses among government and civilian specialists. However, due to the
+ambiguous nature of the internet and the use of fake internet protocol (IP)
+addresses the Estonian
+s were unable to conclusively prove who initiated
+the cyber attacks. (Collier, 2007)
+The cyber attacks themselves were not very sophisticated as the attackers
+used techniques that had been in existence for several years. The focus of
+the cyber attack was to completely shut down the IT structure of Estonia.
+The cyber attackers used botnet attacks to perform a distributed denial of
+service rendering systems that use the internet useless. Botnets are hijacked
+computers that send out mass amounts of information which overwhelm
+an internet server. The increase in internet traffic will cause a server to
+exceed its bandwidth capabilities and cause it to shut down. The botnets
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+can be installed well in advance of a planned cyber attack, and they can be
+placed in any computer anywhere in the world. If the computer user has
+not installed appropriate protective software on their computer they will
+not even know that they have been hijacked and that they are participating
+in a cyber attack. The botnet attacks on the Estonian IT structure ended as
+abruptly as they began leading Estonian officials to conclude that the
+attack was a planned and coordinated. (Davis, 2009)
+The cyber attacks on Estonia illustrates the vulnerability of IT structures
+that rely on the internet. The use of technology can improve personal,
+business, and government interactions but it is still vulnerable to attacks
+and interruptions. The next section of this article will concentrate on the
+implications for Estonia in the aftermath of the cyber attacks.
+3. Implications for Estonia
+After the cyber attacks in 2007, there were several implications for Estonia
+as the country recovered from the cyber wake-up call. Some implications
+had an immediate impact on the people and the government of Estonia,
+while others were more long term and required a deliberate strategy. The
+immediate implication for Estonia was the loss of services for government,
+communication, and banking. What emerged from the attack was Estonia
+ability to counter and minimize the effects of the attack. There was no
+permanent damage to the information technology (IT) structure and
+financial losses were minimal, but the significance was frightening. (Collier,
+2007)
+One of the long term implications is the continued strain on Estonia
+relationship with Russia. Members of the Estonian government and
+outside observers believe that the attacks originated in Russia, but that fact
+remains unproven. The finger pointing between Estonia and Russia began
+immediately after the attacks and continues today. Dmitry Peskov, Deputy
+Press Secretary for the Russian President said, 
+Russia can no way be
+involved in cyber terrorism and all claims to the contrary are an absolute
+ (The Baltic Times, 2007a). Andrus Ansip, the Estonian Prime Minister,
+and others have accused the Russian government because of the
+identification of Russian internet protocol (IP) addresses used in the attack.
+To date, Russian involvement has never been proven, but the implications
+and belief that they were involved continues to influence and affect the
+relationship between Russia and Estonia. (The Baltic Times, 2007b)
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+After the attacks and recovery, Estonia has been heralded as a leader in
+technological security. According to Alexander Ntok, head of Corporate
+Strategy at the International Telecommunication Union, 
+it was
+imaginative responses that allowed Estonia to emerge from the spring
+cyber attack relatively unscathed
+ (Collier, 2007). As a result Estonia has
+capitalized on the internet security market. They are called upon to assist
+during attacks and to speak to different business and IT groups on internet
+security issues. Estonian government leaders have spoken to allies, regional
+organizations and international organizations to improve IT security and
+cooperation. (Ibid.)
+When Georgia
+s IT infrastructure was attacked in August 2008 specialists
+from Estonia
+s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) travelled to
+Georgia and assisted response efforts to counter the attacks (DPA, 2008).
+This example demonstrates how Estonia has established itself as a major
+player in an emerging field, as they are too small to make a large impact on
+the international scene through the use of economic or military power.
+Estonia has been able to establish itself as a major player in Europe and
+among NATO members as an expert in cyber security and cyber war.
+Their expertise has allowed them to lobby for increased IT awareness and
+for increased cooperation to defeat or deter future cyber attacks.
+(Nikiforov, 2008)
+In 2003 Estonia proposed a cyber excellence centre in Tallinn even before
+it became a member of NATO. In light of Estonia
+s expertise in IT the
+NATO Cyber Defence Centre was approved. In May 2008 the centre
+opened in Tallinn with Estonia providing the leadership and personnel to
+man the centre. Estonia emerged as a leader within NATO and leads the
+effort to protect the IT structure of NATO. (Socor, 2008)
+The continuous threat of cyber attacks against its IT structure, and the
+dedication of public officials to improve IT security resulted in a
+comprehensive national cyber security strategy. This strategy, developed by
+the Ministry of Defence, was adopted by the Estonian government in May
+of 2008, just over a year after the attack on its IT systems. The main
+measures of its strategy included IT security measures that strengthened
+their defensive posture, as well as developed their expertise and awareness
+in the IT field. Estonia now looks to strengthen the international legal
+framework to ensure that the IT system is protected by laws, and that
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+violators of the law will be prosecuted. Estonia has also taken the charge
+of increasing international co-operation not just to protect their systems
+but to protect the global cyber system. (Estonian Ministry of Defence,
+2008)
+4. Cyber concerns for former Soviet satellites
+What do the countries of Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan have
+in common? They are all former Soviet satellites and have all been allegedly
+cyber attacked by Russia.
+4.1. Georgian cyber attack
+On July 20th, 2008 the website of the Georgian president came under a
+denial of service cyber attack. The attack shut the website down for 24
+hours and was a precursor to a larger cyber attack that would come less
+than a month later (Melikishvili, 2008/2009). On August 8th, 2008 a
+coordinated distributed denial of service attack was made against the
+Georgian government websites at the same time that Russian forces were
+engaged in combat with Georgian forces. As the ground attacks increased
+so did the cyber attacks. This was the first time that a cyber attack was
+done in conjunction with armed conflict. (Ibid)
+The cyber war between Georgia and Russia focused on shaping public
+opinion on the internet. Georgian and Russian supporters used a variety of
+cyber techniques including distributed denial of service attacks and the
+creation of fake web sites to control how their version of the 
+truth
+ was
+delivered to the public. (Thomas, 2009:55-59)
+Georgia
+s IT infrastructure was not very advanced so the disruption of
+service was not as complicated as it was in Estonia. Banking, media and
+government websites were blocked disrupting the flow of information
+throughout Georgia and to the outside world. The websites of the Ministry
+of Foreign Affairs and the National Bank were vandalized by adding
+pictures of the Georgian President and Adolf Hitler (Melikishvili,
+2008/2009). The cyber attacks against Georgia were different from the
+cyber attacks on Estonia, as these attacks included distributed denial of
+services using botnets, but they also included SQL injection attacks that are
+harder to identify than a botnet attack because they require less computers
+than a botnet attack. The SQL injection attack shows a greater expertise in
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+the ability to conduct a cyber attack than the cyber attacks on Estonia
+s IT
+infrastructure. (Secure Works Press Release, 2008)
+Georgia received considerable assistance in countering the cyber attacks
+and in communicating internally and internationally. Google provided
+domain space to protect the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
+and Civil.ge, a Georgian Daily online news service. A private American
+internet service provider (the head of the company is an ethnic Georgian)
+assisted the Georgian government by hosting the Georgian President
+website. The President of Poland also assisted the Georgian government
+by placing official press releases on his website. Estonia even sent two
+information security specialists from its Computer Emergency Response
+Team to assist Georgia in countering the cyber attacks. According to
+outside investigators there is no direct proof of any Russian government
+involvement in the cyber attacks. But what is undeniable is that even
+without proven Russian government involvement it remains clear that the
+Russian government benefited from the cyber attacks. (Melikishvili,
+2008/2009)
+4.2. Lithuanian cyber attack
+Lithuania faced its own attacks in June 2008 three days after it passed a law
+outlawing the use of Soviet and communist symbols; over 300 websites
+were attacked. Some were denial of service attacks while other sites were
+vandalized with the Soviet hammer and sickle. Prior to the attacks and the
+passage of the law, Russian and Lithuanian ties had deteriorated because of
+Russia
+s refusal to compensate Lithuanian victims of Soviet labour camps,
+and Russia
+s leveraging of energy resources for political gain. Lithuania also
+blocked talks on an EU-Russia partnership. The animosities between the
+two countries have provided observers with a clear motive that the attacks
+were by the Russians. The reason for the cyber attacks against Lithuania
+was similar to the cyber attacks against Estonia, both attacks were in
+response to a government action that was unpopular to the Russian
+people. (McLaughlin, 2008)
+4.3. Kyrgyzstan cyber attack
+The latest country that has come under a cyber attack from computers in
+Russia is Kyrgyzstan. On January 18th, 2009 Kyrgyzstan
+s two main
+internet servers came under a denial of service attacks shutting down
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+websites and email within the country. The originators of the attacks were
+traced back to Russia (Rhoads, 2009). The attacks occurred on the same
+day that the Russian government was pressuring Kyrgyzstan to stop U.S.
+access to the airbase at Bishkek at Manas. The airbase is a key logistics
+centre that supports the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan. According to Don
+Jackson, a senior security researcher at SecureWorks 4, the distributed denial
+of service attacks are believed to be directed towards any opposition that is
+not in favour of the closure of the airbase. While it is unproven whether
+the government was behind the attacks the implication is that cyber attacks
+will be used against any opposition to the Russian government (Bradbury,
+2009).
+The cyber attacks on Georgia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan have two
+characteristics in common. The first characteristic is that the cyber attacks
+were initiated because of opposition to the Russian government and
+secondly that there is no proof that the Russian government was involved
+in the cyber attacks. Regardless of who is initiating the attack it is clear that
+opposition to the Russian government could result in a cyber attack which
+could disrupt critical government infrastructure.
+5. Compelling realities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
+Cyber defence is a critical issue for NATO. U.S. General James Mattis,
+NATO
+s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, articulates the
+importance of cyber defence for NATO by stating, 
+We cannot say that
+we are not going to defend the Web that everybody needs
+ (Tanner &
+Peach, 2008). Nations that are party to the North Atlantic Treaty agree on
+Article 5 
+that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
+North America shall be considered an attack against them all
+ (The
+North Atlantic Treaty, 1949). Does a cyber attack fit the requirement of an
+armed attack? A senior NATO official asked, 
+If a member state
+communications centre is attacked with a missile, you call it an act of war.
+So what do you call it if the same installation is disabled with a cyberattack?
+ (The Economist, 2007). However, the current political reality is
+that they are not the same. Prior to the cyber attacks on Estonia, NATO
+cyber strategy was focused on NATO
+s ability to protect its own IT
+infrastructure. Now, the current reality is, is that the NATO
+s strategy
+must focus on assisting allies as they protect their own IT infrastructure
+during an attack (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated a).
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+Members of NATO have taken several steps in defining a cyber strategy
+and implementing a cyber defence. As early as 2002, at the Prague Summit,
+cyber defence appeared on NATO
+s agenda. At the Prague Summit
+NATO leaders agreed to the implementation of a NATO Cyber Defence
+Program. The program consisted of a NATO Computer Incident
+Response Capability and for NATO to use the latest cyber defence
+measures (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated a). In the spring of
+2006 cyber defence was made a priority for NATO during the Riga
+Summit. The issue of cyber security gained even more attention when
+Estonia, a NATO member, was cyber attacked in 2007 (EU News, Policy
+Positions & EU Actors online, 2008).
+NATO conducted a thorough assessment of its IT structure and how it
+would defend itself against a cyber attack. This assessment led to an
+October 2007 report on cyber defence that was issued to the Allied
+Defence Ministers. The report recommended measures to improve
+protection against cyber attacks (North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
+undated a). What followed was a cyber defence policy in early 2008 and the
+creation of a NATO Centre of Excellence for cyber defence in May 2008
+(North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2008a). In April 2008, during the
+Bucharest Summit, cyber defence was part of the summit declaration. The
+declaration emphasizes the need to protect key information systems, the
+sharing of best practices, and for Allied nations to provide assistance to
+counter a cyber attack (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2008b).
+Even though not all NATO nations are part of the Cyber Defence Centre
+the centre works to enhance the cyber defence capabilities of all NATO
+members. The centre itself is not even funded by NATO but by the
+nations that participate in the running of the centre of excellence. The
+centre has been charged with doctrine and concept development,
+awareness and training, research, development, analysis, and lessons
+learned. The experts at the centre also serve as cyber defence consultants
+for NATO members North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated b).
+The compelling reality for NATO is that cyber warfare has affected
+member nations and continuous to be a realistic threat for the organization
+and for its members. NATO members are continuing to develop ways to
+counter future threats by sharing best practice information, information on
+technical cyber defences, and by agreeing to assist member nations in
+countering a cyber attack.
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+6. Multilateral initiatives
+Only a few international treaties on cyber security exist making
+international cooperation to prevent cyber attacks extremely difficult. Even
+finding and then holding accountable a person that commits a cyber crime
+is almost impossible without some international cooperation (Organization
+for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 2008). In the aftermath of the
+cyber attacks on Estonia the European Union commissioned a study to
+examine the issues concerning cyber security facing members of the
+European Union. This section will examine the European Union study and
+other multinational initiatives that have an impact on the cyber security of
+former Soviet satellites and Russia. (Cornish, 2009)
+6.1. Convention on Cybercrime
+The Council of Europe has established a treaty on cyber crime that entered
+into force 5 in 2004. Twenty-two Council of Europe member nations, along
+with the United States, have ratified the treaty agreeing to international
+cooperation concerning cybercrime issues. The Russian Federation has not
+agreed to the treaty making it difficult for states to resolve issues with
+Russia concerning cyber crimes in an international forum (Council of
+Europe, undated a). This treaty is still significant because it is the first
+international treaty on crimes committed on the internet (Council of
+Europe, undated b).
+The main goal of the convention, as stated in the preamble, is to protect
+nations against cybercrime, by adopting laws and regulations, and fostering
+co-operation internationally. The states that become a party to the
+Convention on Cybercrime agree to adopt laws that create criminal
+penalties for committing crimes on the internet. The convention outlines
+several areas that states have agreed to make criminal statutes on issues
+such as illegal access of computer systems, system and data interference,
+and other computer related fraud. Nations that are party to the convention
+also agree to cooperate with investigations, to provide mutual assistance
+concerning cyber crimes, and to pursue the collection of evidence. The
+extradition of alleged cybercriminals is also agreed to by parties to the
+treaty. Disagreements between states that have ratified the treaty include
+direct negotiations, settlement in front of the European Committee on
+Crime Problems (CDPC), a tribunal for arbitration or adjudication in front
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+of the International Court of Justice. The Convention on Cybercrime gave
+a framework for cooperation among member states for the prosecution of
+cyber criminals by removing safe havens for the cyber criminals. (Council
+of Europe, 2001)
+However, Russia does agree to the convention and it protects citizens who
+engage in cyber misconduct by preventing their extradition out of Russia.
+Failing to sign the convention agreement also prevents Russia from having
+any legal standing to prosecute trans-national cyber criminals who attack
+Russia
+s IT infrastructure.
+6.2. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
+The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has a
+tradition of promoting the security and stability of Europe. This tradition
+of promoting security and stability since 2004 has included cyber security.
+The OSCE
+s initial focus on cyber security concerned the use of the
+internet for recruiting, fundraising, and communication by terrorist
+organizations. In 2006 the OSCE
+s efforts began to focus on protecting
+vital information infrastructures against cyber attacks. Debate in the OSCE
+has not led to great change but has been a forum for further cooperation
+in cyber security in Europe. In June 2008, the Estonian Defence Minister,
+Jaak Aaviksoo, in an address to members of the OSCE, said there is 
+immense amount of work to be done [concerning cyber security].
+Minister Aaviksoo used the forum of the OSCE to use his nation
+experience in defending against cyber crime to increase international
+cooperation in Europe. This statement by the Estonian Defence Minister
+sums up OSCE
+s efforts concerning cyber defence, they are still in the
+talking phase and have at least recognized the importance of cyber defence
+(Cornish, 2009:20-21). The OSCE will continue to be a forum to publicize
+grievances for European nations that have had their IT infrastructures
+attacked by Russian hackers. European nations will judge Russia on its
+cooperation with the OSCE in finding and prosecuting individuals who
+engage in cyber attacks.
+6.3. The European Union
+Estonia continues to lobby for improved international cooperation in
+cyber security as it calls on the European Union (EU) to pass legislation
+concerning crimes committed on the internet. While addressing the
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+European Parliament, Toomas Hendrik, the Estonian President, called
+upon the EU to pass legislation that make cyber attacks against public and
+private web sites a criminal act (Jones, 2008). The EU has several initiatives
+involving different agencies but lacks an overall cyber security strategy. The
+European Commission has the Information Society and Media Directorate
+General, the European Network and Information Security Agency
+(ENISA), and the Contact Network of Spam Authorities that deal with
+different aspects of cyber security. The Information Society and Media
+Directorate has a program to improve the content of the internet by
+protecting people from child pornography, racism, and other harmful
+online content. The ENISA is an agency that was created in 2004 to raise
+awareness of cyber security issues and to promote best practices by
+member nations with the EU. The Contact Network of SPAM authorities
+is an initiative to counter SPAM and share information on best practices
+between EU member nations. (Cornish, 2009:24-27)
+The European Parliament has established several standing committees
+concerned with cyber security issues. The Committee on Industry,
+Research, and Technology (ITRE) is concerned with establishing
+information technology networks within the EU. The Committee on Civil
+Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) is responsible of the
+protection of personal information on the internet for members of the
+EU. The Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for the Security and
+Security policies of the EU which includes internet security policies.
+(Cornish, 2009:26)
+The European Police Office (EUROPOL) is an agency of the Police and
+Judicial Co-operation (PJC) that has more of a direct role in EU cyber
+security in the context of combating terrorism, organized crime, and
+financial crime (Cornish, 2009:25). Although cyber security is addressed by
+the EU there is no organization within the EU to ensure that there are no
+contradictions in cyber security policy among all of the various EU
+agencies, commissions, and co-operations. The European Parliament
+commissioned a study on cyber security published February 2009 that
+examined security challenges concerning the internet for the EU. The
+study recommended that clear roles should be defined for cyber security
+responses with the many EU organizations, including the establishment of
+the post of cyber security coordinator and the establishment of a common
+operating vision for cyber security in order to achieve operational
+consistency across the EU (Cornish, 2009:31). The EU and Russia work
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+together on different challenges including drug and human trafficking,
+organized crime, and counter-terrorism. Russia is also the EU
+s third
+largest trading partner (European Commission, 2009). The EU
+s cyber
+security organizations can offer a framework for increased cooperation to
+defeat cyber attacks that originate from or are directed at Russia.
+6.4. The United Nations
+The main purpose of the United Nations (UN) is to maintain international
+peace and security among the different nations of the world (United
+Nations, 1945). The focus for cyber security for the UN, through the UN
+Security Council, has been on countering terrorism. Debates among the
+UN General Assembly started in 2002 highlighted the growing dependence
+on IT use. Out of discussions came a warning that law enforcement
+activities would not be sufficient but that more efforts in cyber security
+need to be made on prevention. (Cornish, 2009:17)
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the main
+organization that is responsible for cyber security within the UN
+framework. The ITU
+s goal is to enhance cyber security in order for
+individuals, businesses and nations to have confidence in the use of
+cyberspace. The ITU uses its Global Cyber Security Agenda, which began
+in 2007, to promote its goals of increased cyber security. The ITU has not
+been an agency for the enforcement of legislation and international
+agreements concerning cyber security but has focused on assisting in
+building nation
+s capabilities for cyber security (Cornish, 2009:17-18).
+Former Soviet satellites can cooperate with the ITU to improve their cyber
+defences against cyber criminals from Russia or any other nation. The UN
+will continue to be a forum for Russia to voice grievances or defend
+themselves against world opinion in matters involving international peace
+and security including cyber security.
+6.5. Relevance of multilateral initiatives
+Although the Russian government cooperates with Europe and other
+nations on a variety of economic and security issues, individuals,
+organizations, and governments are able to exploit the weaknesses of the
+international system in order to use the internet for criminal activities
+without fear of any major reprisals. Significant effort has been made
+towards cyber security since the cyber attack on Estonia in 2007, but much
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+more needs to be done among national and international organizations to
+ensure genuine cyber security. The framework for increasing cyber security
+exists, but it will take the cooperation of many nations, including Russia, to
+make a difference in cyber security.
+7. Implications for the United States
+The cyber attack on Estonia should be considered a significant wake-up
+call for the United States. Even though the attacks had no direct impact on
+the U.S., Estonia is a NATO ally and the attack clearly showed aggressive
+intent seeking advantage. When the attacks occurred the U.S. sent experts
+to assist and help Estonia with its cyber defences. Jaak Aaviksoo, the
+Estonian Defence Minister, was told by U.S. officials that Estonia coped
+better than the U.S. is likely could in responding to a cyber attack. The
+Estonian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was able to
+concentrate on protecting vital sites by coordinating government and
+public efforts. They were also able to create diversions which caused
+hackers to attack sites which were already disabled or not very important.
+(Collier, 2007)
+The cyber attack on Estonia demonstrated the importance of legal
+obligations for the U.S. in rendering support to its allies during a cyber
+attack (Gee, 2008). The cyber attack also showed the vulnerability of an IT
+system, raising the question, if it could happen to Estonia could another
+trans-national cyber attack of this magnitude happen in the U.S. (Griggs,
+2008)? The convention on cybercrime, which the U.S. is a party to,
+outlines principles for providing mutual assistance regarding cybercrime
+(Council of Europe, 2001). The convention does not mention cyber
+attacks or cyber war but treats such activities as crimes (Korns &
+Kastenberg, 2008/2009). Because only 23 countries have agreed to this
+treaty, its force in the international community is limited (Gee, 2008).
+Several members of NATO are participating in the Cyber Defence Centre
+of Excellence that was established in Estonia, but the U.S. only agreed to
+the creation of the cyber defence centre as an observer. The cyber defence
+centre is working on issues of cyber security that affect NATO along with
+the U.S (The Associated Press, 2008). What will the U.S.
+s response be if a
+cyber attack destroys infrastructure and kills citizens in an allied country,
+and then that ally declares war because of the attack? The plausibility of
+such an attack was demonstrated in 2007 when scientists from the Idaho
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+National Laboratory demonstrated how a cyber attack could cause a power
+plant to overload its system, begin to smoke, and then break down which
+caused physical damage to equipment. Currently, both international law
+and NATO
+s framework lack coherent responses that are legal in the event
+of such an attack. The cyber attackers could limit options for the U.S.
+under such a scenario by routing their cyber attack through countries
+which do not have laws or agreements to cooperate with the U.S. The
+cyber attacker could remain completely anonymous if the country where
+the attack was routed through refused to hand over information identifying
+the cyber attackers. (Gee, 2008)
+Cyber attacks on the U.S. government IT infrastructure are not new. In
+March 1998 a cyber attack was launched against computer systems of the
+U.S. government, private universities and research labs computer systems
+that lasted for over three years. Government investigators named the
+attacks 
+Moonlight Maze.
+ The cyber attacks targeted gaining access to
+sensitive but unclassified information (Abreu, 2001). John Adams, a
+National Security Agency (NSA) consultant says that government
+investigators have identified seven internet addresses involved in the cyber
+attacks that originated in Russia. Dion Stempfley, a former Pentagon
+computer analyst, believes that the U.S. prove that the Russian Federation
+government is sponsoring the attacks but there is evidence that they are
+allowing or otherwise permitting the cyber attacks. The cyber attacks
+which resulted in the theft of technical defence information were serious
+enough that the U.S. State Department issued a formal complaint to the
+Russian Federation. (Loeb, 2001)
+In Global Trends 2025, a study conducted by the National Intelligence
+Council, states over the next two decades non-military aspects of warfare,
+including cyber, will be prominent (National Intelligence Council, 2008).
+According to Secure Works, a cyber security company, in 2008 over 20
+million attacks originated from computers within the United States (Secure
+Works Press Release, 2008). In 2008 the U.S. Department of Homeland
+Security created the National Cybersecurity Centre to counter these threats
+(Griggs, 2008). The threats to the U.S. infrastructure and technology are
+moving at a much faster pace than the creation of government structures
+to counter the threat.
+Even a casual observer can see that there is a cyber threat to the U.S., but
+how is that connected to any Russian involvement in cyber attacks? There
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+are three recent examples of how cyber attacks, that may have allegedly
+originated in Russia, that demonstrate danger for U.S. and Russian
+relations. These examples show how attacks against an IT structure were
+used as cyber pressure to influence nations or organizations.
+The first example is when Radio Free Europe
+s internet sites in April 2008
+in Eastern Europe were shut down because of a denial of service attack.
+The attack lasted two days and coincided with the planned coverage of the
+anniversary of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The attacks effectively shut
+down the websites which stopped the flow of information from Radio
+Free Europe, a U.S. sponsored program (America.gov, 2008).
+Another example is the malware (malware is a term used to identify illegal
+computer access including computer viruses) attack on U.S. Department of
+Defence computer systems in November 2008. According to WMD
+Insights 6 the computer attacks are thought to have originated from Russia.
+The attacks seemed to target military computer systems and affected the
+U.S. central command along with computers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
+attacks led to a ban on the use of external computer flash drives on
+military computers throughout the world. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
+The latest example of an attack that may have originated in Russia is the
+January 2009 denial of service attack that was directed at the government
+websites of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. One theory on why the attack was
+started was because of Kyrgyzstan
+s support of the U.S. in its war on terror
+in Afghanistan. This shows the significance of a cyber attack not directed
+against the U.S. but against one of its allies. (Rhoads, 2009)
+One senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in
+Washington, D.C. believes there is no adversary that can defeat the U.S. in
+cyber space. A spokesman for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
+commented that the U.S. government is able to protect itself from cyber
+attacks, but the U.S. IT system is not completely impenetrable. The
+director of a non-profit research institute, the United States Cyber
+Consequences Unit, stated that because the U.S. controls so much internet
+bandwidth that most of the people that want to harm the U.S. lack the
+capabilities to shut down U.S. servers. (Griggs, 2008)
+The U.S. faces a wide variety of challenges in protecting its own IT
+structure along with facing the reality of the challenges of its allies
+ cyber
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+defences. In the future the U.S. may face cyber attacks that could cause the
+deaths of its or its allies
+ citizens due to the effects of a cyber attack on an
+electrical system. The U.S.
+s bilateral agreements with countries that hold a
+strategic U.S. interest could be affected by the use of a cyber attack to
+influence leaders. The cyber threats to the U.S. are real and continued
+attention by the leaders must focus on this threat.
+8. The weakest link 
+ the computer user
+As you read this article you could be an accomplice to a cyber criminal
+without even knowing that your computer is conducting a worldwide
+distributed denial of service attack. The actions or lack of action of
+computer users have contributed to the ability of hackers in Russia and
+elsewhere to conduct their attacks in relative anonymity. 7 The internet has
+vulnerabilities and the individual computer user contributes to the
+vulnerabilities of private and government IT systems.
+In 1997 the National Security Agency (NSA) conducted an exercise to find
+out how vulnerable government IT systems were to external cyber attacks.
+They named the exercise 
+Eligible Receiver.
+ Thirty-five IT specialists
+were given the mission to hack into government systems. They could use
+any software programs that were available on the internet and they were
+only given a few limitations. The IT specialists couldn
+t use any classified
+hacking software that belonged to the NSA and they could not violate U.S.
+law. The IT specialists were also confined to U.S. government computer
+systems. (Verton, 2003:32-33)
+What they discovered was how easy it was to hack into government
+systems, into both classified and unclassified networks. With the free
+software that they downloaded from the internet, the NSA specialists were
+able to conduct distributed denial of service attacks, delete or modify
+sensitive information and shut down or reformat systems. Along with the
+software they used, personal contact methods were also used to gain access
+into the systems. The NSA computer specialists would use telephone calls
+or emails to gain passwords or entry into a system by posing as a
+supervisor or technician. The IT specialists were surprised at how easily
+government and military members delivered their passwords without
+question. Even though the exercise was conducted in 1997, and may seem
+dated, it gives us a great example of how a dedicated effort can disrupt any
+IT system. (Verton, 2003:32-33)
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+As noted earlier, external flash drives were banned from use with military
+computer systems. Authorized users unknowingly passed intrusive
+malware files from computer to computer infecting IT systems throughout
+the U.S. Central Command. The ban on flash drives complicated the
+sharing of information throughout the theatre. The malware file was even
+found on a classified network. This is one more example of how an
+individual can spread malicious software infecting multiple computer
+systems because of a lack of computer security protocols. (Melikishvili,
+2008/2009)
+One vulnerability that is associated with computer users is that some
+people who become hackers are former employees with a grievance against
+their former employer. Such people may be motivated by a personal
+grudge against the U.S. government because they were fired or lost their
+job due to a reorganization or downsizing. Their actions as hackers are
+usually malicious in nature as such people steal or corrupt data, deface
+websites, or shut down systems. (Conway, 2007:82)
+Even more dangerous than an angry former employee is a case of cyber
+espionage. This is where an individual who is motivated by money or
+ideology sells highly sensitive IT security information. One such case
+involves Herman Simm and his wife, Heete Simm, from Estonia
+(Melikishvili, 2008/2009). Mr. Simm was arrested in September 2008 for
+allegedly passing highly classified information on cyber security and missile
+defence to members of the Russian foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Mr.
+Simm was the head of the State Secret Protection Office where he was
+responsible for protecting Estonia
+s classified information. Mrs. Simm was
+a lawyer who was previously employed at the Estonian national police
+headquarters. Mr. Simm had access to classified information concerning
+NATO and allies of Estonia including the operational information of the
+NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre based in Tallinn. If the
+Estonian government had access to a secret so did Mr. Simm. The amount
+of classified information that was compromised is unknown, but may be
+quite large. Mr. Simms allegedly became a Russian spy in the mid-1990
+and was paid millions of dollars from the Russian Government. Regardless
+of how secure a country
+s IT structure is, it is still vulnerable because some
+people will compromise sensitive cyber security information for personal
+gain. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+Along with the vulnerabilities already mentioned there are always problems
+with software products. Some software is easy for hackers to take
+advantage of because of security deficiencies. Computers may be infected
+before the user or software company has identified the problem. Then it
+will take time for the software company to produce a security patch. It will
+take even more time to get the patch to the computer program user and
+for the security patch to be installed. During this time the infected
+computer program may have already infected other computers in a system
+or throughout the internet. (Wilson, 2006:15-16)
+A major vulnerability for any IT system is the computer user. Whether the
+computer user is a military member, a government employee, or just a
+computer user sitting in front of his computer at home, their practices can
+cause serious damage to a computer system. Normal computer users
+receive little or no training in the best security practices. (Wilson, 2006:14)
+The cost of poor security practices can be high. Along with the loss of data
+or the disruption of service there is also the physical cost associated with
+malware and viruses. For example, in 2007 the Federal Bureau of
+Investigation (FBI) uncovered a botnet campaign that caused losses of
+over 20 million dollars (Cornish, 2009:9). One of the botnet hackers that
+was caught by the FBI and sentenced to prison used botnets to steal
+peoples
+ identities and bank account information. After gaining access to
+personal information and passwords he made on-line purchases and
+transferred money from the bank accounts. Another cyber attacker used a
+phishing scheme where he collected information through infected emails
+(Wired Staff, 2009). This section highlighted how the computer user has
+made IT structures even more vulnerable and the Simm affair
+demonstrates how cyber espionage adds to that vulnerability. If countries
+like the U.S. and Estonia that have highly developed IT infrastructure can
+be attacked, it is not hard to imagine the vulnerabilities less developed
+former Soviet satellites have in their IT development phase.
+9. The Russian Federation
+In this article study several cyber attacks have been attributed to Russia.
+Regardless of whether the government of Russia is responsible for the
+attacks, or merely sanctioned them, for many the perception remains that
+Russia was behind the cyber attacks. I will examine Russia
+s use of cyber
+warfare against former Soviet satellite states. (Davis, 2009)
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+The Russian government views itself as the victim in the case of the cyber
+attacks on Estonia in 2007. According to sources in the Kremlin the
+website of the President of Russia came under a cyber attack. This was
+supposedly the largest attack the Russians have faced and it appeared that
+the servers used to originate the attack were located in the Baltic States.
+The Deputy Press Secretary of the Russian President, Dmitry Peskov,
+countered accusations from Estonia with the fact that Russian government
+websites are under attack every day from all over the world. (The Baltic
+Times, 2007a)
+Even as cyber attacks occurred against Georgia, Russians said that they
+were also the victims of cyber attacks. Russia Today 8, a major media source
+in Russia, was shut down because of a denial of service attacks directed
+towards its websites. IT security specialists that work for Russia Today
+believe that the denial of service attacks originated from Tbilisi, the capital
+of Georgia. (Watson, 2008)
+In the aftermath of the cyber attacks on Estonia, Georgia, and other
+attacks mentioned in this article, the Russian response was to deny any
+involvement in any cyber attack. When confronted with evidence that
+some of the attacks originated from Russian government computers
+members of the Russian government countered with the fact that
+computers from all over the world were hijacked and used to attack
+different computer systems. (The Baltic Times, 2007a)
+Another fact that Russian officials are quick to point out is that the only
+person arrested for the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia was an Estonian.
+Dmitri Galushkevich, a 20 year old ethnic Russian, who was convicted for
+the cyber attacks. Some members of the Estonian government have issued
+statements doubting the involvement of the Russian government in the
+cyber attacks. (Greenberg, 2008)
+With the finger pointing that ensues after a cyber attack it is still unclear
+who was behind the attacks. The actions of cyber activist groups, or
+hactivists, will be examined in the case of the cyber attacks on Estonia and
+Georgia. Hactivists are individuals that use cyber attacks to take a patriotic
+or political stand on a political or international issue. (Melikishvili,
+2008/2009)
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+During the protests in Estonia, increased chatter and postings on how to
+conduct and participate in denial of service attacks were found on Russian
+internet chat sites (Melikishvili, 2008/2009). Along with the denial of
+service attacks, some of the Estonian government websites were hacked in
+order to deface the site. The sayings on the websites were very pro Russian
+and very anti Estonian. Joshua Davis in Wired Magazine supports the view
+that the reason behind the attacks was nothing more than Russian pride.
+(Davis, 2009)
+In March of 2009 a member of a Russian pro-Kremlin youth group,
+Konstantin Goloskokov, publicly took responsibility for creating the 2007
+cyber attacks on Estonia. Goloskokov is a leader of the youth movement
+Nashi that has routinely conducted cyber attacks and intimidation
+campaigns on behalf of the Russian government. The government of the
+Russian Federation is able to maintain separation from the youth group
+because it does not directly fund their activities. The youth groups are
+funded by pro-government business owners who are trying to gain favour
+from the Russian government (Shachtman, 2009). Goloskokov believes
+that his actions were not illegal but were, 
+an act of civil disobedience
+organized within the confines of virtual space
+ (Buranov, Vodo &
+Yegikyan, 2009). The cultural aspects or belief that actions in the cyber
+world are beyond the law is a consequence for the Russian government
+and how cyber attacks affect their international relationships.
+An assistant to Sergei Markov, a member of Russia
+s State Duma lower
+house, has also admitted to using his own initiative to conduct cyber
+attacks against Estonia (Baltic News Service, 2009). Rein Lang, the
+Estonian Justice Minister, is contemplating issuing a European arrest
+warrant for individuals who have admitted to taking part in the attack. The
+idea for the warrant is not to send law enforcement officials into Russia,
+but to have the alleged perpetrators arrested whenever they leave the
+country (Baltic News Service, 2009). Aleksandr Gostev, director of the
+Kaspersky Lab
+s Global Research and Analysis Team, explains that hackers
+who participate in a distributed denial of service attack violate the Russian
+Criminal Code (Article 274, Violation of the Rules Governing the Use of
+Computers, Computer Systems, or Networks Thereof) and can be imprisoned for
+four years for violating the code. But he also states that the article is rarely
+used (Buranov, Vodo & Yegikyan, 2009). The examples of Russian citizens
+admitting to participating in the Estonian cyber attacks are grounds for
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Russian citizens to be arrested in other parts of Europe if Russia fails to
+uphold its own laws.
+Similar actions occurred in the Georgian cyber attacks. Messages were
+posted on Russian hacker forums on how to participate in shutting down
+Georgian websites. The website StopGeorgia.ru was also established as a
+private forum to coordinate the denial of service attacks. Jeff Carr, a
+network security expert and cyber analyst, established an all volunteer
+group to investigate the cyber attacks. Throughout the course of the
+investigation, which they named Project Grey Goose, no evidence was found
+to implicate the Russian government. This was just another example of a
+hactivist movement which had the collective power to conduct a cyber
+attack against a government. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
+The Project Grey Goose investigation has looked at hactivists and how they
+can independently conduct cyber attacks. It also focused on a criminal
+gang known as the Russian Business Network (R.B.N.). The R.B.N. is based
+in St. Petersburg and engages in criminal cyber activities. According to
+Don Jackson, the director of threat intelligence at Secure Works, some of
+the cyber attacks used against Georgian websites originated from
+computers under the control of the R.B.N. As is the case with any cyber
+attacks it is very difficult to establish who is completely responsible or if
+there is any Russian government sanctioned involvement. (Markoff, 2008a)
+This article has already noted that there are other groups involved with
+cyber attacks against former Soviet satellites. The evidence of Russian
+government involvement will now be investigated (Davis, 2009). Indeed,
+some statements made by Russian government officials suggest Russian
+government involvement in cyber attacks. Prior to the cyber attacks in
+Estonia the Russian government protested the movement of the Russian
+memorial, the Bronze Soldier, to the Estonian government. The Russian
+government warned how disastrous the move would be to Estonia. What
+followed were the protests and the cyber attacks. (Davis, 2009)
+The head of the Russian Army Centre for Military Forecast, Colonel
+Anatoly Tsyganok, made comments to the Russian news outlet, Gazeta,
+about the cyber attacks on Estonia. He believes that there was nothing
+wrong with the attacks because there are no international agreements
+established. Colonel Tsyganok also believes that NATO couldn
+t do
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+anything to stop the attacks, and that they were highly successful.
+(prygi.blogspot.com 9, 2008)
+The most telling example of Russian government involvement in cyber
+warfare was with Herman Simm selling IT secrets to the Russian Foreign
+Intelligence Service that was discussed earlier in this article. This examples
+shows that the government of the Russian Federation is actively seeking
+information on cyber defences and is willing to pay large sums of money
+(Mr. Simm is accused of selling cyber security secrets for millions of
+dollars) to receive information on cyber security. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
+There are also cases where cyber attacks were used against people who are
+in opposition to the Russian government. One such example is with Gary
+Kasparov, Russian opposition party leader, had his website shut down for
+two weeks due to denial of service attacks during the Russian presidential
+campaign. John Palfrey, a researcher at Harvard Law School, believes that
+several organizations in Russia who plan to protest, or act in opposition to
+the Russian government, are subjected to cyber attacks in an attempt to
+control the information that is getting to the public. (Greenberg, 2008)
+Another example of Russian government complicity is the lack of
+assistance or interest in tracking down those responsible for the cyber
+attacks against governments of former Soviet satellites (Davis, 2009). The
+evidence of government involvement remains circumstantial, but certain
+facts are clear concerning cyber security and former Soviet satellites. If
+there is opposition to Russian Federation policy than that country that is in
+opposition is likely to be subject to a cyber attack and it has been shown
+that the Russian Federation actively collects information on other
+countries cyber defences.
+10. The future of Russian cyber warfare
+The perception exists among different nations (some of those nations have
+been discussed earlier in this study) that the government of the Russian
+Federation has been involved in cyber attacks. This section will examine
+future trends concerning the use of cyber attacks by, or sanctioned by, the
+Russian Federation government. The cyber attacks against Estonia and
+Georgia have forced Russia to evaluate its future cyber strategy. In
+examining the Russian focus on improving its cyber strategy some
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+conclusions can be drawn about the future of Russian cyber warfare.
+(Panarin, 2008)
+As with many countries that have an advanced IT system, a sub-culture of
+hacking has developed. Even though the state sponsored university in St.
+Petersburg produces computer programmers that are highly regarded it is
+believed that most of the hackers are young and not educated at the
+university level. The reason behind the growth of Russian computer
+hackers is the prestige and monetary reward that hacking garners in a
+growing IT infrastructure. (Varoli, 2000)
+The criminal organization, R.B.N., has been able to conduct its cyber
+activities with little interference from the Russian Federation government.
+The R.B.N. is very difficult to track on the internet as they are able to
+locate their activities from several different locations. The group has been
+involved in several different types of criminal cyber activities such as the
+use of malware, identity theft, and child pornography. Without any
+concerted effort to stop the R.B.N., and their ability to operate anywhere,
+R.B.N. is an organization that is positioned in Russian cyber activities now
+and in the future. (Markoff, 2008a)
+One example of latitude and scope created by Russian indifference, a
+group identified by a computer security firm as a Russian gang conducted a
+botnet based computer operation operating in Wisconsin. The Russian
+gang was controlling as many as 100000 computers in an effort to steal
+passwords and information. As soon as the system was shut down the
+Russian gang moved its host computer system to a site in the Ukraine. This
+shows how resilient these gangs are when they can relocate their operating
+systems to countries that are out of reach of law enforcement of the
+country that they are targeting. (Markoff, 2008b)
+The Russian responses to the recent cyber attacks are a guide to how they
+will react in the future. Valery Yashenko, vice director of the Institute of
+Information Security Issues at Lomonosov Moscow State University,
+advises the Russian government on the issues of cyber terrorism.
+Yashenko believes that there should be greater international cooperation
+concerning cyber security but does not think that the cyber attack on
+Estonia was of any real consequence. Yashenko indicates that the Russian
+Federation government is only concerned with cyber security matters that
+affect his own government. (Davis, 2009)
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+Not surprisingly, the Russian Federal Security Service (F.S.B.) is believed
+to employ its own hackers (Varoli, 2000). The manner of recruiting is a
+little different than normal ways of looking for employees. When an IT
+specialist or hacker is caught committing a cyber crime they may receive an
+offer to work for the F.S.B., or face criminal charges. According to a
+Russian computer security specialist hackers that were working for the
+F.S.B. attacked pro-Chechen web sites. According to the same computer
+security specialist the F.S.B. hackers have hacked into opposition
+newspapers in order to control information about the Russian Federation
+government and its leaders. The recruitment of hackers for offensive cyber
+attacks vice cyber defences is an indication of the future Russian
+Federation government cyber strategy. (Varoli, 2000)
+The Russian Federation government has shown the capability for law
+enforcement in cyber space. Laws exist in Russia that make crimes
+committed on the internet punishable under the law. Russia has even
+established a computer crime unit, which it called Department 
+ which
+operates under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation
+(MVD). Department 
+ is responsible for the detection, prevention,
+suppression, and solving crimes involving information technology. In
+2008, Department 
+ was able to identify 158 computer crimes and shut
+down seven illegal internet operations. The MVD is currently conducting
+Project 
+Clean Network
+ aimed a combating illegal uses of the internet
+(Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, undated). It
+remains to be seen whether the efforts of Department 
+ will have any
+negative impact on the R.B.N. or the cyber gangs that support the Russian
+government.
+The Russian Federation Public Chamber 10 organized a discussion on
+Russian information warfare in September 2008 and Just Russia 11 political
+party hosted an international conference on information warfare in
+October 2008. The conclusions of the meeting were that Russia has grossly
+underestimated the role of information warfare and failed to 
+champion
+their goals and interests in the world media. (Panarin, 2008)
+Dr. Igor Panarin, the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations of the
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, used the
+information warfare discussions to make several recommendations to the
+Russian government concerning information and cyber warfare. Dr.
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Panarin proposes that Russia develop specialized management and
+analytical structures to counter information threats. Dr. Panarin proposes a
+system that has eight key components. (Panarin, 2008)
+The first component is the creation of a Council for Public Diplomacy that
+will develop a single point of view for both the Russian government and
+Russian businesses. Government and business leaders are to be included
+on the council in order to ensure that all activities concerning foreign
+political media are coordinated. The second component is to create an
+advisor to the President of Russia for Information and Propaganda
+Activities in order to coordinate the foreign political information activities
+of the administration of the President, the government, different
+ministries, and the Russian Security Council. (Panarin, 2008)
+The third and fourth components are to create state holding companies,
+one for foreign media affairs and one for the internet. The holding
+companies would be combined between business and government to see
+that Russian political positions were broadcast to the world. The
+information would not just be focused towards ethnic Russians but would
+be focused globally towards economic partners, future partners,
+adversaries, and overall world opinion. (Panarin, 2008)
+The fifth component would be the creation of an information crisis action
+centre in order to ensure that Russia maintains the initiative when
+delivering the state message to the world. The information crisis action
+centre would be responsible for developing talking points and themes that
+would support the government in any crisis. (Panarin, 2008)
+The sixth component would create an information countermeasures
+system that would counter enemy information operations. The information
+countermeasures system would include assets from business and the
+government. The seventh component focuses on a system on
+nongovernmental organizations that would operate throughout the world.
+(Panarin, 2008)
+The final component would consist of a system for training information
+warfare specialists. This system would use existing educational institutions
+and academies to train specialists that would be able to operate at the
+diplomatic, management, or individual level. The training system would
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+also include the creation of an Information Special Forces that are highly
+trained to for conducting information operations in a crisis. (Panarin, 2008)
+Along with the creation of the information warfare system Dr. Panarin
+believes that financing for information warfare needs to be increased by
+both the Russian government and by Russian businesses. The increased
+attention on information warfare is designed to increase Russia
+s image
+throughout the world and ensure that Russia is prepared for future conflict
+in the cyber and information arenas. (Panarin, 2008)
+Statements by Russian government officials have been very similar to Dr.
+Panarin
+s position which makes the future of cyber warfare in Russia
+offensively poised. Colonel Aleksandr Drobyshevskiy, head of the Russian
+Federation Ministry of Defence Directorate for Press Service and
+Information, stated that Georgia won the information war during the
+conflict in South Ossetia and there is a need for the development of
+information and telecommunications technologies within the Ministry of
+Defence. Colonel Drobyshevskiy further advocates the creation of an
+information warfare system. (Svobodnaya Pressa, 2009)
+Another clue to the future of Russian cyber warfare is the development of
+a new information warfare defensive strategy by the Russian Armed Forces
+General Staff. Colonel-General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, Deputy Chief of the
+General Staff, stated that leading world powers will be able to conduct fullscale information warfare and that Russia must be prepared (Usov, 2009).
+General Nogovitsyn believes that Russia will be involved in a large-scale
+information war within two to three years that will be fought in the cyber
+world (Litovkin, 2009).
+The existence of hackers that support the Russian government and
+information specialists within the Russian government have created an
+asset that will be used during future cyber conflicts. The Russian
+government
+s emphasis on developing cyber strategies will enable Russia to
+be prepared for future cyber conflict.
+11. Countermeasures
+We need to examine what can be done to counter cyber crimes and protect
+a nation
+s IT structure. Cyber countermeasures can be taken at the
+international level, followed by cyber defences at the national level, and
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+ending with actions that an individual computer user can make to improve
+cyber defence.
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the organization
+within the UN that is responsible for the international oversight of the
+world
+s telephone system, is developing a system for oversight of the
+internet. The ITU is working towards a convention against cybercrime that
+will provide international cooperation on issues concerning internet
+communications (Schrank, 2007). Members of the international
+community will need to work together in order to track and prosecute
+cyber criminals that operate outside of the country that is being attacked.
+Nations will also have to work together to share technical data to maintain
+cyber defences to keep up with the newest and ever changing cyber
+attacks. Hackers routinely share information on new techniques that can
+penetrate IT defence structures. Nations need to do the same to protect
+their own IT infrastructure, the same IT structure that affects the entire
+globe (Lipson, 2002:47-48).
+Individual countries can improve their cyber defences within their own
+boundaries which would also improve the cyber security of the
+international IT system. Countries can make laws making cyber crimes
+illegal with punishments and programs that will deter potential cyber
+criminals. Governments can create a system that increases co-operation
+between the government, businesses, and academic institutions in order to
+improve their cyber defences. This co-operation could lead to an IT
+infrastructure that is resilient and able to withstand and recover from a
+cyber attack with little or no permanent damage to a country
+s IT structure.
+(Schrank, 2007)
+In 8th section the computer user was identified as the weakest link in an IT
+system. Some individual countermeasures are easy to accomplish for any
+computer user. Actions like keeping antivirus and anti-spyware software up
+to date along with updating your web browser and operating system can
+greatly enhance your own computer security. Even following safe
+computer practices of not opening unknown attachments on emails that
+may carry viruses or malware are very instrumental in making the cyber
+environment more secure (Secure Works Press Release, 2008). The U.S.
+Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has tips for computer users
+posted on their website to increase internet security. The main points of
+the DHS website are to promote personal responsibility for increasing
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+Volume 11, 2009
+cyber security and to promote best practices for safe computer usage. The
+best practices that DHS advertises are to make cyber security a habit by
+following three core practices. The three core practices are to 
+install antivirus and anti-spyware programs and keep them up to date, install a
+firewall and keep it properly configured, and to regularly install updates on
+your computer
+s operating system
+ (Homeland Security, 2008). Computer
+users are the first line of defence in cyber security and their actions can
+help protect the cyber infrastructure that is used by all.
+Conclusion
+The international system is lacking in its ability to effectively manage issues
+of cyber security. The Russian Federation is perceived by the international
+community as a country that engages in or supports groups that are
+involved in cyber crime. International and regional organizations along
+with countries that interact with the Russian Federation have to deal with a
+reality that they may be the target of a cyber attack if they are in opposition
+to the government of the Russian Federation.
+The issue of cyber security is ongoing. As more of the former Soviet
+satellites become more developed with an advanced IT structure they will
+have to face the realities of cyber attacks. Regardless of whether the
+government of the Russia Federation has been involved in any cyber
+attacks, or will be in the future, the reality remains that nations, groups, or
+individuals that are in opposition to Russia may face a cyber attack. The
+cyber attacks will be used to influence public opinion or to influence
+government leaders through the use of cyber pressure. Future conflicts
+that involve the use of force will also see cyber attacks in conjunction with
+combat operations. Currently international agreements and laws are
+inadequate which allows cyber attackers to take advantage of the lack of
+such laws and can conduct acts of civil disobedience on the internet.
+The conflict in Georgia has been a motivator for military reform which
+includes reform in the cyber arena. The Russian government and the
+Russian military will continue to develop systems to improve both their
+offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Russia will continue to capitalize
+on their diaspora present throughout the world to support their political
+positions but will have to realize that some of that diaspora will be in
+opposition to them and provide private support to organizations and
+nations that have received cyber attacks. Russia
+s active collection of cyber
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+defence secrets will also be a combat multiplier for them in future conflicts
+either alone in the cyber world or as part of a ground conflict.
+Organizations and nations will be best served by creating a resilient
+defence in depth while educating users and managers of IT systems in best
+practices to counter the threat of a cyber attack. This defence in depth
+includes technical responses to counter the threats while ensuring that their
+IT systems are resilient and become effective after an attack. President
+Bush remarked in 2001 that, 
+s time to work together to address the new
+security threats that we all face. And those threats are not simply missiles
+or weapons of mass destruction in the hands of untrustworthy countries.
+Cyber-terrorism is a threat, and we need to work on that together
+(Verton, 2003:248).
+References:
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+Baltic Security & Defence Review
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+2008).
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+on Estonia, The Baltic Times. http://www.baltictimes.com /news/articles/17908/;
+(accessed December 19th, 2008).
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+(accessed
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+(accessed Oct. 24th, 2008 and Feb. 14th, 2009).
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+Times. A1.
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+s Service. Tallinn
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+18th, 2009).
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+April 5th, 2009).
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+cyber
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+defense
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+(accessed February 24th, 2009).
+The Russian Federation Public Chamber Website, undated. About the House: On the
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+ru/, (accessed April 10th, 2009).
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+March 7th, 2009).
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+McGraw-Hill/Osborne. 32-33; 248.
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+1 Personal recollection of the author who lived in Estonia from July 2007 to June
+2008.
+2 Multiple sources were used along with the author
+s personal recollections of
+living in Estonia. Three of the main sources that describe the attack are: Davis,
+Joshua, 2009. Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe. Wired
+Magazine. Issue 15; Kampmark, Binoy, Autumn 2003. Cyber Warfare Between
+Estonia And Russia. Contemporary Review. pp. 288-293; Aaviksoo, Jaak, 2007 (Nov.
+28th) Address by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Estonia at The Centre
+for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D.C.
+Volume 11, 2009
+Baltic Security & Defence Review
+3 This reference offers an Estonian view of its history and underlines the reasons
+behind the friction between Russia and Estonia.
+4 SecureWorks is an internet security firm based out of Atlanta. The company
+tracks suspicious activities throughout the internet.
+5 Entered into force refers to the date that the treaty becomes enforceable
+according to the provisions of the treaty by the members that have agreed to the
+treaty.
+6 WMD Insights is a journal sponsored by the U.S. Defence Threat Reduction
+Agency.
+7 Idea based on comments used by Jaak Aaviksoo in 2007. Minister Aaviksoo used
+this technique to show that some members of the audience may unknowingly be
+helping cyber-terrorists. Jaak Aaviksoo, Address by the Minister of Defence of the
+Republic of Estonia delivered to the Centre for Strategic & International Studies,
+Washington, D.C., November 28, 2007.
+8 Russia Today is a globally broadcast news channel broadcast in the English
+language and owned by the Russian government news agency RIA-Novosti.
+Similar in programming to CNN and BBC but with a Russian perspective on
+events in the world news.
+9 Information from a Russian and English language blog that discusses issues
+concerning Russia.
+10 The Russian Federation Public Chamber is an organization created in 2005 to
+oversee all aspects of government and to act as a consultant to the heads of the
+Russian government. The Russian Federation Public Chamber Website, About the
+House:
+Public
+Chamber
+Russian
+Federation,
+http://translate.google.ru/translate?hl=en&langpair=ru|en&u=http://www.oprf.
+ru/. (accessed April 10th, 2009).
+11 A Just Russia is a Russian political party created as an opposition party but still
+supports the power of the Russian executive branch (Abdullaev, 2006).
+JR02-2009
+Tracking GhostNet:
+Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network
+Information Warfare Monitor
+March 29, 2009
+http://www.infowar-monitor.net/ghostnet
+http://www.tracking-ghost.net t
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD
+March 29, 2009
+Foreword
+Cyber espionage is an issue whose time has come. In this second report from the Information Warfare
+Monitor, we lay out the findings of a 10-month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against
+Tibetan institutions.
+The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more.
+The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries.
+Up to 30% of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located
+at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The
+Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began,
+were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to
+potentially sensitive information.
+But the study clearly raises more questions than it answers.
+From the evidence at hand, it is not clear whether the attacker(s) really knew what they had
+penetrated, or if the information was ever exploited for commercial or intelligence value.
+Some may conclude that what we lay out here points definitively to China as the culprit. Certainly
+Chinese cyber-espionage is a major global concern. Chinese authorities have made it clear that they
+consider cyberspace a strategic domain, one which helps redress the military imbalance between
+China and the rest of the world (particularly the United States). They have correctly identified
+cyberspace as the strategic fulcrum upon which U.S. military and economic dominance depends.
+But attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or targeted intelligence gathering operations by
+the Chinese state is wrong and misleading. Numbers can tell a different story. China is presently
+the world
+s largest Internet population. The sheer number of young digital natives online can more
+than account for the increase in Chinese malware. With more creative people using computers, it
+expected that China (and Chinese individuals) will account for a larger proportion of cybercrime.
+Likewise, the threshold for engaging in cyber espionage is falling. Cybercrime kits are now available
+online, and their use is clearly on the rise, in some cases by organized crime and other private actors.
+Socially engineered malware is the most common and potent; it introduces Trojans onto a system,
+and then exploits social contacts and files to propagate infections further.
+Furthermore, the Internet was never built with security in mind. As institutions ranging from
+governments through to businesses and individuals depend on 24-hour Internet connectivity, the
+opportunities for exploiting these systems increases.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD
+This report serves as a wake-up call. At the very least, a large percentage of high-value targets
+compromised by this network demonstrate the relative ease with which a technically unsophisticated
+approach can quickly be harnessed to create a very effective spynet
+These are major disruptive
+capabilities that the professional information security community, as well as policymakers, need to
+come to terms with rapidly.
+These are major disruptive capabilities that the professional information security community, as well
+as policymakers, need to come to terms with rapidly.
+Ron Deibert, Director, the Citizen Lab,
+Munk Centre for International Studies,
+University of Toronto.
+Rafal Rohozinski, Principal and CEO,
+The SecDev Group,
+Ottawa, Canada.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
+Acknowledgements
+This investigation was prepared by a dedicated team of professionals.
+Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research in India, Tibetan Missions
+abroad, and Europe. Greg is a SecDev Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor
+website. He is currently a SecDev Fellow at the Citizen Lab. The Indian portion of the field work
+benefited from the expertise of Dr. Shishir Nagaraja, Security Laboratory, Cambridge University.
+Dr. Nagaraga visited Dharamsala for a period of five days in September to assist on aspects of the
+technical data collection.1
+The technical scouting and computer network interrogation was carried out by Nart Villenueve. Nart
+is the CTO of Psiphon Inc, and the Psiphon Fellow at the Citizen Lab. His investigations included the
+discovery and exploration of the GhostNet control servers. He led the data analysis research, which
+included log files gathered in the field, as well as data obtained through technical scouting of the
+GhostNet control servers.
+This report represents a collective effort. The drafting team consisted of the following individuals
+(listed in alphabetical order). Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab), Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group),
+Rafal Rohozinski (SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc.), Nart Villeneuve (Psiphon Fellow, Citizen Lab)
+and Greg Walton (SecDev Fellow, Citizen Lab). Layout and design was led by Jane Gowan (Psiphon
+Inc. and Citizen Lab). Belinda Bruce (Blurb Media) and James Tay (Citizen Lab), provided additional
+support to the team.
+Countless others also contributed to the research effort. This includes individuals in India and Tibet,
+who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Private Office of his Holiness
+the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the missions of Tibet in London, Brussels, and New
+York, and Drewla (a Tibetan NGO).
+Aspects of the research carried out by Dr. Nagaraga focusing on socially engineered malware are published in a separate study.
+See, The snooping dragon: social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan movement, Shishir Nagaraja, Ross Anderson, Cambridge
+University Computer Laboratory Technical Report, Mar 29 2009
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - TABLE OF CONTENTS
+Summary 
+p. 5
+Introduction 
+p. 7
+Rise of the cyber spies 
+A focus on China 
+Outline of Report 
+Part One: Context and background 
+Alleged Chinese operations in cyberspace 
+Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks: the challenge of attribution 
+Targeting Tibet 
+Conduct of the investigation 
+Phase 1: Field investigation 
+Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers 
+Part Two: Tracking Ghostnet 
+p. 7
+p. 9
+p. 9
+p. 10
+p. 11
+p. 12
+p. 13
+p. 14
+p. 14
+p. 14
+p. 16
+Phase I: Field investigation 
+Targeted malware 
+ previous research 
+Information Warfare Monitor field research 
+Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
+Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
+Offices of Tibet 
+Drewla 
+Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers 
+List of infected computers 
+Sending commands 
+Command results 
+Methods and capabilities 
+Analysis of list of infected computers 
+Methodology 
+Selected infections 
+Infection timeline 
+p. 17
+p. 17
+p. 22
+p. 22
+p. 27
+p. 27
+p. 27
+p. 30
+p. 32
+p. 34
+p. 37
+p. 39
+p. 40
+p. 40
+p. 42
+p. 44
+Part Three: Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions 
+p. 46
+Alternative explanations 
+Attribution 
+The significance of GhostNet 
+Part Four: About the Information Warfare Monitor 
+p. 47
+p. 48
+p. 49
+p. 51
+Boxes
+Box 1: Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice 
+p. 28
+Tables
+Table 1: Domain name registration information 
+Table 2: List of selected infections 
+p. 32
+p. 42
+Figures
+Fig. 1: A 
+Social Engineering
+ attack connects to GhostNet 
+Fig. 2: A 
+Socially Engineered
+ email sent to the International Tibet Support Network 
+Fig. 3: A Virus Total Screen Capture of a malware infected email attachment 
+Fig. 4: Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations 
+Fig. 5: Malware retrieving a sensitive document 
+Fig. 6: The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware 
+Fig. 7: The GhostNet control servers 
+Fig. 8: The GhostNet 
+Server List
+ interface 
+Fig. 9: The GhostNet 
+Send Command
+ interface 
+Fig. 10: The gh0st RAT interface 
+Fig. 11: The GhostNet 
+List Command
+ interface 
+Fig. 12: The geographic location of infected hosts 
+Fig. 13. GhostNet infection timeline 
+p. 19
+p. 20
+p. 21
+p. 23
+p. 26
+p. 29
+p. 31
+p. 33
+p. 35
+p. 36
+p. 38
+p. 41
+p. 45
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY
+Summary
+Trojan horse programmes and other associated malware are often cited as vectors for conducting
+sophisticated computer-based espionage. Allegations of cyber espionage (computer network
+exploitation) are increasingly common, but there are few case studies in the unclassified realm that
+expose the inner workings of such networks.
+This study reveals the existence and operational reach of a malware-based cyber espionage network
+that we call GhostNet.
+Between June 2008 and March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an extensive and
+exhaustive two-phase investigation focused on allegations of Chinese cyber espionage against the
+Tibetan community.
+We conducted field-based investigations in India, Europe and North America. In India we worked
+directly with affected Tibetan organizations, including the Private Office of the Dalai Lama, the
+Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and several Tibetan NGOs. In Europe and North America we worked with
+Tibetan missions in London, Brussels, and New York. The fieldwork generated extensive data that
+allowed us to examine Tibetan information security practices, as well as capture real-time evidence
+of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems.
+During the second phase of our investigation, the data was analyzed, and led to the discovery of
+insecure, web-based interfaces to four control servers. These interfaces allow attacker(s) to send
+instructions to, and receive data from, compromised computers. Our research team successfully
+scouted these servers, revealing a wide-ranging network of compromised computers. This extensive
+network consists of at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries.
+Significantly, close to 30% of the infected computers can be considered high-value and include the
+ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados
+and Bhutan; embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, Taiwan,
+Portugal, Germany and Pakistan; the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat,
+SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank; news
+organizations; and an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters.
+The GhostNet system directs infected computers to download a Trojan known as gh0st RAT that allows
+attackers to gain complete, real-time control. These instances of gh0st RAT are consistently controlled
+from commercial Internet access accounts located on the island of Hainan, People
+s Republic of China.
+Our investigation reveals that GhostNet is capable of taking full control of infected computers,
+including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices, including
+microphones and web cameras.
+The vector for spreading the GhostNet infection leverages social means. Contextually relevant emails
+are sent to specific targets with attached documents that are packed with exploit code and Trojan
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY
+horse programmes designed to take advantage of vulnerabilities in software installed on the target
+computer.
+Once compromised, files located on infected computers may be mined for contact information,
+and used to spread malware through e-mail and document attachments that appear to come from
+legitimate sources, and contain legitimate documents and messages. It is therefore possible that the
+large percentage of high value targets identified in our analysis of the GhostNet are coincidental,
+spread by contact between individuals who previously communicated through e-mail.
+Nonetheless the existence of the GhostNet network is a significant fact in and of itself. At the very
+least, it demonstrates the ease by which computer-based malware can be used to build a robust, lowcost intelligence capability and infect a network of potentially high-value targets.
+Key findings:
+Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network
+GhostNet
+infecting at least 1,295
+computers in 103 countries, of which close to 30% can be considered as high-value
+diplomatic, political, economic, and military targets.
+Documented evidence of GhostNet penetration of computer systems containing sensitive
+and secret information at the private offices of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan
+targets.
+Documentation and reverse engineering of the modus operandi of the GhostNet
+system
+including vectors, targeting, delivery mechanisms, data retrieval and control
+systems
+reveals a covert, difficult-to-detect and elaborate cyber-espionage system
+capable of taking full control of affected systems.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
+Introduction
+Computer network exploitation represents the leading edge of signals intelligence in the information
+age. The proliferation of computer systems throughout governments, businesses, and civic
+organizations represents a boon for would-be cyber spies.
+Awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, and even basic information security practices, is in its infancy, and
+largely absent in most organizations outside of the classified realm. Commercial computer systems, which
+represent most of the world
+s installed base, are insecure. This lack of security consciousness is reflective
+of the infancy of the information age. The Internet was never designed for security and, for the most part,
+there has been little incentive for software manufacturers to make security a first priority in the design
+and development of products, many of which are destined for consumer and/or small business use.
+These challenges are present in advanced industrial societies, but are amplified many times over
+in developing countries. Ownership of computers is a relative rarity among many government
+departments. Where they exist, they often use grey market or pirated software. Resources are lacking
+to employ properly trained computer professionals, and many staff are barely computer literate. In
+this context, information security is often a distant priority.
+And yet, computers in the hands of individuals or at government offices, ministries, embassies, and
+civic and non-governmental organizations contain information that can be valuable. Files and e-mails
+with contact information, lists of meetings and attendees, draft position papers, internal PowerPoint
+presentations, organizational budgets, and lists of visitors can represent items of strategic value
+to rivals and enemies. Organizations, like individuals, can be subject to identity theft, leading to
+potentially serious breaches of security.
+Rise of the cyber spies
+Little is known of the sophistication of state-based cyber espionage capabilities, such as those of the
+United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, all considered leaders in this field. They are assumed
+to be considerable as the security doctrines of these countries treat cyberspace as a strategic domain
+equivalent to that of land, air, sea, and space.2
+Other powers including China have made cyberspace a key pillar of their national security strategies.
+China is actively developing an operational capacity in cyberspace, correctly identifying it as the
+domain in which it can achieve strategic parity, if not superiority, over the military establishments
+of the United States and its allies. Chinese cyber warfare doctrine is well developed, and significant
+resources have been invested by the People
+s Liberation Army and security services in developing
+defensive and offensive capabilities.3
+http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf
+http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&
+name=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
+But the most significant actors in cyberspace are not states. The online engagements that
+accompanied the recent Russia-Georgia conflict in August 20084 and Israel
+s January 2009 offensive
+in Gaza5 were carried out by independent attackers. The May 2007 denial of service attacks against
+Estonia6 resulted in a single conviction of a Russian living in Estonia. Likewise, previous high-profile
+investigations of hacking against strategic U.S. targets were never positively attributed to foreign
+intelligence services7, and in many cases were the work of individuals.8
+The contest in the shadows currently underway in cyberspace appears to rely largely on third parties.
+In numerous instances, including case studies conducted by the Information Warfare Monitor
+s sister
+project, the OpenNet Initiative, third party attackers were responsible for triggering national-level
+cyber events. In Kyrgyzstan (2005)9, Belarus (2006)10, during the Russia Georgia war (2008), and
+Kyrgyzstan (2009), individuals and/or loose coalitions were responsible for publishing target lists
+and attack tools on semi-private websites. The ensuing 
+cyclones in cyberspace
+ were sufficient to
+precipitate events outside of cyberspace.11
+International cooperation has for the most part focused on establishing capabilities for counteracting
+the criminal use of cyberspace, and with good reason. In 2009, the FBI estimated that cybercrime is
+responsible for over $10 billion worth of losses each year.12 Cybercrime is a relatively low cost, low
+threshold activity. Techniques such as phishing and targeted malware are easy to construct, and the
+chances of prosecution are minimal given a general lack of international coordination.
+This is slowly changing as national and international authorities become more aware of the threat.
+The attacks on Estonia, for example, led to the establishment of NATO
+s Cooperative Cyber Defence
+Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.13 The International Telecommunication Union has also
+established its own specialized agency, IMPACT, designed to aid intelligence sharing and tracking of
+http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ; http://www.slate.com/id/2197514
+http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0123/p04s03-wome.html
+http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/01/24/man-convicted-in-estonia-cyber-attack
+For example, a US government investigation of systematic hacking of Department of Defense networks and defence laboratories
+dubbed 
+Titan Rain
+ never provided conclusive evidence to substantiate allegations that the hacking was conducted at the behest of
+the Chinese government. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html
+A good example is the 1998 
+Solar Sunrise
+ investigation. The evidence gathered by US authorities eventually led to the conviction
+of an Israeli citizen, Ehud Tenebaum, although the involvement of Israeli security services was never proven. http://www.sans.org/
+resources/idfaq/solar_sunrise.php
+http://opennet.net/special/kg/
+http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf
+http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2146
+http://kn.theiet.org/magazine/issues/0903/hacking-goes-pro-0903.cfm
+http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
+malicious criminal activity in cyberspace.14 Countries such as the United States, Russia and China
+have also entered into bilateral agreements with allied countries and partners.
+A focus on China
+Recent allegations of Chinese cyber espionage largely rely on anecdotal evidence. The most common
+proof provided by victims of these attacks consists of log files or malware that shows connections
+being made by infected computers to IP addresses assigned to the People
+s Republic of China.
+This kind of evidence is circumstantial at best. Internet usage statistics suggest that focusing on
+Chinese instances of information warfare is misleading.15 With 41% of the world
+s Internet users
+located in Asia, China alone accounts for the largest national population of Internet users
+some 300
+million, nearly one-fifth of the global number of users. Coupled with the rapid growth in Chinese use
+of the Internet
+a 1,200% increase in the period 2000-2008
+this would more than account for the
+rise in instances of Chinese-oriented malware.16
+At the same time, however, allegations of Chinese hacking and exploitation of private and
+government computer systems are persistent enough to warrant an evidence-based investigation.
+This report provides such an investigation.
+Outline of report
+This report is divided into three parts:
+Part one provides a brief introduction to the context and background to this report. We examine past
+allegations of cyber espionage by China-based actors and the challenge of evidence-based research
+in this field. Part one concludes with a brief description of the methods used in our two-phase
+investigation.
+Part two provides a detailed account of the conduct of our investigation. The findings of each phase
+are presented sequentially.
+Part three analyses the overall findings of the investigation, suggests alternative explanations and
+assesses the implications.
+http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/impact/index.html
+For global Internet usage statistics please see http://www.internetworldstats.com
+http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/03/03/wheres-the-badware
+PART ONE:
+Context and background
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
+Context and background: Alleged Chinese operations
+in cyberspace
+China has been developing its cyberspace doctrine and capabilities since the late 1990s as part of its military
+modernization programme. The Chinese doctrine of 
+active defence,
+ which is the belief that China must be ready
+to respond to aggression immediately, places an emphasis on the development of cyber warfare capabilities.
+The Chinese focus on cyber capabilities as part of its strategy of national asymmetric warfare involves
+deliberately developing capabilities that circumvent U.S. superiority in command-and-control warfare.
+The strategy recognizes the critical importance of the cyber domain to American military and economic
+power and the importance of offensive cyber operations to victory in a modern conflict with the United
+States. Chinese doctrine also emphasizes the contiguity between military and non-military realms.17
+In recent years, there has been an increase in allegations that China-based hackers are responsible for
+high-level penetrations of computer systems in Europe, North America and Asia. Attackers originating
+in China have been accused of infiltrating government computers in the United States, Britain, France,
+Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. China-based hackers have been accused of data theft from foreign
+government computers and commercial and financial institutions. The U.S. Department of Defense
+reports it is continuously targeted by Chinese attackers, most notably in the series of attacks since 2003
+known as 
+Titan Rain,
+ which targeted the Department of Defense and numerous defence companies.18
+There are also allegations of attacks originating from China directed against non-governmental
+organizations active in regions where China has a national interest. This includes organizations
+advocating on the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan,19 Tibetan groups active in India, and the
+Falun Gong. The majority of attacks involve website defacements, denial of service attacks, or virus
+writing campaigns. Nationalistic and patriotic cyber-activity by Chinese nationals intensifies during
+crises, such as during Sino-American or Sino-Taiwanese tensions (see below). To date none of these
+attacks have been traced back to Chinese state authorities or specific individuals, although many
+have benefited official Chinese policy and interests.
+http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&na
+me=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1 ; http://www.heritage.org/Research/asiaandthepacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf
+http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html ; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/
+ai_n31140190 ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf
+http://www.insidetech.com/news/articles/1630-mysterious-forces-hack-pro-tibet-save-darfur-sites ; http://www.washingtonpost.
+com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/20/AR2008032003193.html
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
+Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks:
+the challenge of attribution
+Determining those responsible for cyber attacks, commonly known as the attribution problem, is
+a major challenge. The Internet was never built with security as a priority. The current version of
+the Internet
+s address assignment system, IP V4, provides a wealth of loopholes and methods by
+which a perpetrator can mask his or her real identity and location. Online identities and servers
+can be cleverly hidden. Packet flows and connections can be masked and redirected through
+multiple servers. A clever attacker can often hijack a machine belonging to an otherwise innocent
+organization and use it as a base for launching attacks.
+Hand-in-hand with the problem of attribution is the difficulty of identifying motivating factors
+behind a cyber attack. Many perpetrators of Internet-based attacks and exploits are individuals whose
+motivation can vary from a simple profit motive through to fear of prosecution or strong emotional
+feelings, including religious belief and nationalism. Many cyber attacks and exploits which seem to
+benefit states may be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. This
+makes it difficult to separate the motivation of the individual from the potential motives of the
+party on whose behalf the attacks have occurred, or a prospective client to which the perpetrator
+is trying to market his or her wares. In either case, the challenge of identifying perpetrators and
+understanding their motives gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to
+officially distance themselves from attacks.
+Cyber campaigns can also take on a life of their own. Even though a state might 
+seed
+ a particular
+campaign through tacit encouragement or the absence of sanctions or prosecutions, these campaigns
+are inherently chaotic and unpredictable in scope and outcome.20 Phenomena such as spontaneous
+cyber rioting
+ can surpass the initial purposes of the cyber campaign. Low barriers to entry to this
+sort of activity enable anyone with a computer and Internet connection to take part in a cyberattack.21 For the most part, governments appear to passively benefit from online manifestations of
+nationalistic and patriotic fervour, although outcomes are inherently unpredictable.22
+In China, the authorities most likely perceive individual attackers and their online activities as
+convenient instruments of national power.23 A favourite target of Chinese hackers is Taiwanese
+computer systems, especially during times of Sino-Taiwanese tensions, such as elections and
+http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/canada-watch/obama/pdfs/Deibert.pdf
+http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=343
+For instance, during the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008, tools were made available online for those who wished to
+participate in the ongoing 
+cyber-war
+ against Georgian websites. http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ;
+http://www.slate.com/id/2197514
+http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijingsrising-hackers.pdf
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
+referendums.24 In April 2001, following the death of a Chinese fighter pilot after a collision with an
+American spy plane near the Chinese island of Hainan, Chinese hackers began a sustained campaign
+to target American computer networks. No link was made with elements of the Chinese government.25
+However, governments cannot always preserve direct control over such activities; groups can maintain
+their freelance and autonomous status and undertake their own cyber initiatives that may not always
+attain official sanction or serve state interests.26
+Targeting Tibet
+Accusations of Chinese cyber war being waged against the Tibetan community have been
+commonplace for the past several years. The Chinese government has been accused of orchestrating
+and encouraging such activity as part of a wider strategy to crack down on dissident groups and
+subversive activity.27 Earlier research has traced these attacks against Tibetan groups to IP addresses
+registered in the People
+s Republic of China. The attacks used malware hidden in legitimate-looking
+email messages, infecting unsuspecting users
+ computers and exploiting the data on it by sending it
+to control servers.28
+The identity of the attackers has never been attributed in a conclusive manner to any specific group
+or individual.29 The motivation of those behind the attacks, despite conjecture, is also unproven.
+In earlier studies, researchers focused on attacks specifically targeting the Tibetan community.
+But a wide variety of other victims of computer penetrations have reported infections similar to
+those used against Tibetan organizations, following a similar modus operandi and also reporting
+to control servers usually located in China. These additional targets include the Falun Gong30, the
+U.S. Government, and multinational corporations.31 While reports of these targeted attacks have
+circulated, the extent to which attackers successfully exploited the affected computers is unknown.
+http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf
+http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1305755.stm
+http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf
+http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032102605.html
+See, http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177 ; http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4176 and http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.
+de/isn/2002/09/msg00086.html for background information on these attacks.
+Attribution for previous penetrations of Tibetan groups has never been publicly attributed and is not available from open sources.
+Classified studies may reveal a finer grained detail, as many of the attacks are relatively unsophisticated, and given proper assets,
+could be traced back to specific locations and presumably individuals.
+Research by Maarten Van Horenbeeck shows that similar attacks have targeted the Falun Gong. http://www.daemon.be/
+maarten/Crouching_Powerpoint_Hidden_Trojan_24C3.pdf and http://isc.sans.org/presentations/SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_
+Vanhorenbeeck.pdf
+See http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
+Conduct of the investigation
+From June 2008 to March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an in-depth investigation
+of alleged cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. We chose this case study because of the
+unprecedented access that we were granted to Tibetan institutions through one of our researchers, and
+persistent allegations that confidential information on secure computers was somehow being compromised.
+Our lead field investigator had a long history of working with the Tibetan community, and was able
+to work with the private office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and a number of
+Tibetan non-governmental organizations.
+The investigation consisted of two distinct phases.
+Phase 1: Field-based investigations in India, Europe, and North America (June-November 2008)
+Field research was carried out in Dharamsala, India, the location of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
+Follow-up research was conducted at Tibetan missions abroad in London, Brussels and New York. During
+this phase we had unprecedented access to the Tibetan government and other Tibetan organizations.
+This allowed us to establish a baseline understanding of information security practices at these
+locations and to design an evidence-based approach to the investigation.
+We also conducted extensive on-site interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the
+private office of the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan non-governmental organizations. The interviews focused on
+the allegations of cyber espionage. We also sought alternative explanations for leakage of confidential
+documents and information and examined basic information security practices at these locations.
+Network monitoring software was installed on various computers so as to collect forensic technical
+data from affected computer systems, and initial results were analysed in situ.32 This initial analysis
+confirmed the existence of malware and the transfer of information between infected computers and
+a number of control servers.33
+Phase 2: Computer-based scouting, target selection, and data analysis (December 2008-March 2009)
+During the second phase of the investigation, researchers based at the Citizen Lab analysed the data
+collected by the field team.
+The data collected in Dharamsala and at Tibetan missions abroad led to the discovery of four control
+servers and six command servers. These control servers were identified and geo-located from the captured
+A portion of the fieldwork was carried out in conjunction with Dr. Shishir Nagaraja who spent five days in Dharamsala at the request
+of IWM researchers and assisted in conducting technical tests.
+A packet capturing program, Wireshark, was installed at each test location. All traffic from each of the affected systems was
+captured in real-time, and recorded for further analysis. Compromised systems try to connect to control servers in order check-in and
+report an infection. Once a connection is made, infected computers may receive instructions or additional locations from where they
+are to download instructions. The Wireshark data is sufficient to analyse these connections, determine the behaviour of the attack
+vector, and identify the location of control servers.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
+traffic using a simple IP lookup.34 The control servers were then probed and web-based control interfaces
+were identified on four control servers, which allowed us to view and control the network. The system was
+actively monitored for two weeks, which allowed us to derive an extensive list of infected systems, and to
+also monitor the systems operator(s) as the operator(s) specifically instructed target computers.
+The data collected during both phases was integrated in Palantir, a data visualization and analysis
+tool. The Palantir platform provides a data fusion and visualization environment that enhances
+analytical capabilities.
+We looked up the associated Internet Protocol (IP) address in all five Regional Internet Registries in order to identify the country
+and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name System (DNS) look-up on each IP
+address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses; reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address
+into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP
+address. If we discovered a domain name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain
+name registrations and provides information about who registered the domain name.
+PART TWO:
+Tracking GhostNet
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Phase 1: Field investigation
+We conducted our investigation in Dharamsala between July and September 2008. The initial purpose
+was to gather targeted malware samples from Tibetan NGOs based in the area and to brief the Tibetan
+Government-in-Exile (TGIE) on the basics of information security. This included raising end-user
+awareness about social engineering and its policy implications for the secure use of information systems.
+The investigator met with the Dalai Lama
+s representative in Geneva, Tseten Samdup. During the
+meeting, Samdup inquired about the potential threat to computer security at the Office of His
+Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) in light of the targeted malware threat. Samdup requested that
+the investigator perform a preliminary security review of OHHDL systems, including Dalailama.com
+and the office computer network. A five day mission was scheduled in early September. Malware
+was discovered on computers located in the OHHDL.
+Following the discovery of malware in the OHHDL, our investigator shifted focus to the campus
+network of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. We approached Thubten Samphel, a senior civil
+servant in the Department for Information and International Relations, and sought permission
+to run Wireshark on several key computer systems, and to access the firewall logs at the Tibetan
+Computing Resource Centre. This access was readily granted.
+Additional testing was carried out at a Tibetan NGO. This was done at the suggestion of Phuntsok
+Dorjee, the director of a local NGO, TibTec. Dorjee suggested that we conduct testing and monitoring at
+the offices of Drewla.35 As was the case at other sitesthe investigator conducted a series of interviews
+with the NGO staff.
+Targeted malware 
+ previous research
+In September 2002, Tibetan groups reported that they were targeted with malware originating
+from servers in mainland China. They claimed that this was a coordinated attempt to disrupt their
+operations and spy on their computer networks. Similar attacks have occurred since then against a
+range of Tibetan non-state actors, including exile groups, human rights organizations, trade unions
+and labour organizers, writers, scholars and intellectuals.
+In 2005, a member of our investigating team convened a working group that coordinated the
+collection and archiving of the malware, including the payloads and associated examples of social
+engineering employed. Since early 2008, we have analysed every sample available to us, and
+identified control servers for at least fifty incidents.
+During an analysis of attacks which occurred during the 2008 Beijing Olympics we discovered
+the location of a control server that was later identified as part of the network which infected a
+computer in the private office of the Dalai Lama.
+The Drewla Initiative Project is an outreach model that seeks new ways to communicate directly with citizens of the People
+Republic of China. It relies heavily on the Internet.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+We were able to gain access to the command interface of this control server and identify the
+infected computers which reported back to this server. While were are unable to prove exactly how
+the computer in the Dalai Lama
+s office became infected, this case demonstrates one of the attack
+vectors used by the attacker(s) behind the network of infected computers we later uncovered.36
+The following steps illustrate the attack vector using the malicious document we collected, which was
+configured to connect to a control server to which we later acquired access. (See Fig. 1 - p.19)
+An email message arrives in the target
+s inbox carrying the malware in an attachment or web link.
+The attackers(s)
+ objective is to get the target to open the attachment or malicious link so that the
+malicious code can execute. In this case, the attacker(s) sent a carefully crafted email message which
+was configured to appear as if it was sent from campaigns@freetibet.org with an attached infected
+Word document named 
+Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
+ to entice
+the recipient to open the file.37 (See Fig. 2 - p. 20)
+Over time, it has been observed that the carrier emails have become more sophisticated in their
+targeting and content in order to trick their recipients into believing that they are receiving
+legitimate messages. This is also known as 
+social engineering.
+ It is common to see legitimate
+documents recycled for such attacks or the attacker injecting their message into an ongoing group
+conversation. There are also cases where it appears that content stolen from previously-infected
+machines was recycled to enhance the appearance of legitimacy.
+The targeted user proceeds to opens the attachment or malicious link. Once opened, the infected
+file or link exploits a vulnerability on the user
+s machine and installs the malware on the user
+computer, along with a seemingly benign file. From the user
+s perspective, the infected document
+will often open normally, leaving the user unaware of the infection that just took place.
+Only 11 of the 34 anti-virus programs provided by Virus Total38 recognized the malware embedded in
+the document. Attackers often use executable packers to obfuscate their malicious code in order to
+avoid detection by anti-virus software. (See Fig. 3 - p. 21)
+Researchers monitoring the use of socially engineered malware attacks against the Tibetan
+community have identified over eight different Trojan families in use.39 Control over some targeted
+machines is maintained using the Chinese gh0st RAT (Remote Access Tool). These Trojans generally
+allow for near-unrestricted access to the infected systems.
+A detailed technical investigation of a similar case of a targeted attack which connected to the same control server is available
+here: http://xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; another investigation of targeted attacks connecting to the same control
+server is available here: http://www.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+For a detailed list of malicious files and control servers see xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+VirusTotal.com is a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with 34 leading anti-virus products.
+http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 1
+Social Engineering
+ attack connects to GhostNet.
+This Palantir screen capture summarizes the relationships between an 
+unknown sender
+ pretending to be 
+campaigns@freetibet.org
+, the email
+sent to the International Tibet Support Network , and the attachment (
+Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
+that contained malware that connected to a GhostNet control server.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 2
+Socially Engineered
+ email sent to the International Tibet Support
+Network.
+This email was sent on July 25, 2008 by an unknown attacker pretending to be 
+campaigns@freetibet.org
+ to the International Tibet Support
+Network. Attached to the message was a Microsoft Word document named 
+Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
+that exploits a vulnerability in Word to install malware on the target
+s computer system.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 3
+A Virus Total screen capture of a malware infected email attachment.
+This is a screen capture from VirusTotal.com, a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with
+anti-virus products. It shows that only 11 of 34 anti-virus products detected the malicious file (
+Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book
+for Tibetans in Exile.doc
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+After infecting the target, the Trojan packed in the Word document performed a DNS look-up to
+find its control server and then connected to that server. This Trojan attempted to connect to
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. This is one of the control servers that we later scouted and was in the same
+Trojan family that infected computers in the Dalai Lama
+s private office.
+About 70% of the control servers behind the attacks on Tibetan organizations are located on IP
+addresses assigned to China. However, servers have also been identified in the United States,
+Sweden, South Korea and Taiwan. The host names pointing to these servers are quite often
+configured on dynamic DNS services, such as 3322.org. While these services in and of themselves
+are not malicious, they are heavily used in these specific attacks.40
+Information Warfare Monitor field research
+In September and October 2008 the Information Warfare Monitor investigated information security
+practices and alleged cyber espionage activities on the computer systems in various offices related
+to the work of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan groups. The offices that we investigated were:
+the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), based in Dharamsala, India; the Tibetan
+Government-in-Exile (TGIE); various Offices of Tibet (OOT) in New York City, London, Paris, Brussels,
+and Geneva; and the Tibetan activist NGO, Drewla. (See Fig. 4 - p. 23)
+Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
+The OHHDL is the personal office of the Dalai Lama. The OHHDL provides secretarial assistance and
+is responsible for all matters related to the Dalai Lama and acts on his behalf. It is worth noting
+that the OHHDL
+s primary responsibilities include organization of the Dalai Lama
+s international
+schedule, handling all diplomatic, governmental and personal correspondence, and acting as
+the liaison between the Dalai Lama and officials of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and
+the Offices of Tibet (OOT) worldwide. Therefore the OHHDL
+s computer network is continuously
+transmitting and receiving extremely sensitive data.
+While the Office does not have any secrets, it is essentially the hub of the Tibetan movement and
+thus handles strategic, time-sensitive communications. Examples of these communications include
+scheduling meetings with world leaders, and, since 2002, coordinating the negotiations between
+the People
+s Republic of China and Dharamsala.
+On September 10, 2008, we used Wireshark to capture packets from an OHHDL computer named
+xxxxxx. We chose xxxxxxx from among 23 computers on the OHHDL internal network due to
+time constraints and consultations with office staff to identify the computers most likely to be
+infected, such as those operated by relatively inexperienced users vulnerable to social engineering
+techniques, or those handling particularly sensitive data.
+An analysis of the data collected reveals that this computer was compromised by malware that was
+in interactive communication with identified control servers. The infected computer connected to
+http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 4
+Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations.
+A Palantir screen capture showing the Tibetan organizations at which we conducted field research and the connections from infected
+computers at these locations and various control servers located in China. The locations at which we found evidence of infection are:
+the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Offices of Tibet in New York City and London and the Tibetan
+activist NGO, Drewla.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+four different IP addresses, each with a somewhat different method. While there are four groupings
+of communications between the infected computer and the control servers, they are related such
+that there appear to be two distinct families of malware. In both cases, the malware uses the
+protocol for standard web traffic, HTTP, in order make the network activity appear as if it were
+normal Internet browsing.
+The first family of malware used HTTP connections to connect to PHP files.41 Despite connecting
+to different IP addresses and requesting different files, both used the same unique key when
+communicating, indicating that they are part of the same family of malware.
+1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxxx
+using two host names, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The IP address
+xxxxxxxxx is in a range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) in China. The malware used HTTP to connect to various PHP files
+on the control server in order to update its status and receive instructions about where
+to download commands. The commands are embedded in what appear to be image files
+(e.g. JPEG).
+2) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxx, port
+8000. This IP address reverse resolved to xxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.
+com.cn and is in an IP range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (HAIFU node adsl dialup
+ports) in China. The malware used HTTP POST to upload content to the control server.42
+The investigation carried out in Phase 2 identified the network of control servers used in this
+particular attack. The control servers we discovered include the control server used in the welldocumented instances of social malware used frequently against Tibetan targets during the 2008
+Olympics in Beijing.
+The second family of malware used HTTP POST to connect to a CGI43 script to communicate between
+the infected computer and the control server. While their functions appear to be different, with one
+malware focusing on reporting and commands and the other on document retrieval, they are likely part
+of the same family of malware. In addition, the domain names used, www.lookbytheway.net and www.
+macfeeresponse.org, are registered to the same person, 
+zhou zhaojun
+ (losttemp33@hotmail.com).
+1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address 221.5.250.98 using
+the host name www.lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to
+CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169 Chongqing Province Network) in China. The
+malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a file in an attempt to
+inform the control server of the infected computer
+s status and to download commands.
+PHP is a popular scripting language often used in web applications.
+HTTP POST is a method often used to upload content to a web server.
+CGI scripts are often written in the Perl programming language.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+In one case, the file the infected computer was requesting was not present and the
+infected computer received a 404 error. However, successful connections were made
+via HTTP to CGI scripts. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI
+scripts hosted on the control server.
+2) The malware made connections to a control server on 218.241.153.61 using the host name
+www.macfeeresponse.org. The IP address 218.241.153.61 is assigned to BITNET (Beijing
+Bitone United Networks) in Beijing, China. The malware on the infected computer used
+HTTP to connect to a file to inform the control server of the infected computer
+s status
+and download commands. In addition, connections were made via HTTP to CGI scripts. The
+infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the control
+server. Connections to one CGI script appear to inform the control server of the presence of
+particular documents, while connections to a second CGI script appear to cause the infected
+computer to upload documents to the control server using HTTP POST.
+Instances of malware that connect to control server locations www.lookbytheway.net and www.
+macfeeresponse.org have been analysed by security companies.44 This network extends to a variety
+of domain names including:
+www.lookbytheway.com 
+ 210.51.7.155
+www.macfeeresponse.com - 210.51.7.155
+www.msnppt.net - 221.5.250.98
+www.msnxy.net - 210.51.7.155
+www.msnyf.com - 221.5.250.98
+www.networkcia.com - 210.51.7.155
+www.indexnews.org - 61.188.87.58
+www.indexindian.com - 210.51.7.155
+During the in situ investigation at the Dalai Lama
+s private office we observed several documents
+being exfiltrated from the computer network and uploaded to www.macfeeresponse.org, including
+a document containing thousands of email addresses and one detailing and discussing the Dalai
+Lama
+s envoy
+s negotiating position. (see Fig. 5 - p. 26)
+Our investigators did not have access to the stolen documents for reasons of confidentiality.
+However, we can assume their significance to Sino-Tibetan negotiations. One example is the fact
+that GhostNet penetrated computers of organizations involved in China-TGIE negotiations.45
+See, http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=79f7f4695b8878cf1760e8626129ca88 and http://www.threatexpert.com/report.
+aspx?md5=ea03a7359505e19146994ad77b2a1e46
+Lodi Gyari is the lead person designated by the Dalai Lama to coordinate negotiations with the Chinese government. Our invesigator
+interviewed him in December 2008 in Delhi. We briefed him on our ongoing investigation and offered advice on information security
+while engaged in negotiations in Beijing. Lodi Gyari is also the Executive Chairman of the Board of the International Campaign for
+Tibet (ICT), an independent Washington-based human rights advocacy group. (Note that our investigation uncovered that seven of
+s computers were compromised by GhostNet).
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 5
+Malware retrieving a sensitive document.
+This screen capture of the Wireshark network analysis tool shows an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama uploading a
+sensitive document to one of the CGI network
+s control servers.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE)
+On September 11, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a TGIE computer xxxxxxx. An
+analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
+received communication from, control servers.
+The malware made connections to a control server on 221.10.254.248 using the host name 927.
+bigwww.com. The IP address 221.10.254.248 is assigned to CNCGROUP-SC (CNC Group CHINA169
+Sichuan Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect
+to a JPEG file, which was not an image file but instead contains an IP address and port number
+(124.135.97.21:8005). This IP address, 124.135.97.21, is assigned to CNCGROUP-SD (CNC Group
+CHINA169 Shandong Province Network) in China.
+Offices of Tibet
+London
+On October 1, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the London OOT. An
+analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
+received communication from, control servers.
+The malware made connections to a control server on 58.141.132.66 using the hostname oyd.3322.
+org on port 4501. The IP address 58.141.132.66 is assigned to NamBu TV in Seoul, South Korea. 3322.
+org is a Chinese dynamic domain service.
+New York
+On March 3, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the New York OOT.
+An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which attempted to send
+communication to a control server.
+The malware attempted to make a connection to what appears to be a control server at
+125.108.172.81 but there was not an active server at that location. The IP address 125.108.172.81 is
+assigned to CHINANET-ZJ-WZ (CHINANET-ZJ Wenzhou node network) in China.
+Drewla
+Following the discovery of targeted malware on the OHHDL, TGIE and OOT networks, we performed
+similar analysis on Tibetan NGOs to see if we could identify more infected machines communicating
+with control servers in China. While we carried out such analysis on a number of NGOs, in this report
+we focus on Drewla
+s network.
+The Drewla (
+connection
+ in Tibetan) is an online outreach project was set up in 2005 that employs
+Tibetan youth with Chinese language skills to chat with people in mainland China and in the
+diaspora, raising awareness about the Tibetan situation, sharing the Dalai Lama
+s teachings, and
+supplying information on how to circumvent Chinese government censorship on the Internet.
+On September 12, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a Drewla computer. An analysis
+revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+received communication from, control servers.
+The malware made connections to a control server on 221.5.250.98 using the host name www.
+lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169
+Chongqing Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect
+to a file in an attempt to inform the control server of the infected computer
+s status and download
+commands. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the
+control server. (see Fig. 6 - p. 29)
+Box 1.
+Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice
+During the course of our research, we were informed of the following incident. A member of
+Drewla, a young woman, decided to return to her family village in Tibet after working for two
+years for Drewla. She was arrested at the Nepalese-Tibetan border and taken to a detention
+facility, where she was held incommunicado for two months. She was interrogated by Chinese
+intelligence personnel about her employment in Dharamsala. She denied having been politically
+active and insisted that she had gone to Dharamsala for studies. In response to this, the
+intelligence officers pulled out a dossier on her activities and presented her with full transcripts
+of her Internet chats over the years. They indicated that they were fully aware of, and were
+monitoring, the Drewla outreach initiative and that her colleagues were not welcome to return
+to Tibet. They then released her and she returned to her village.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 6
+The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware.
+This Palantir screen capture shows the relationship between an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) and the
+Tibetan NGO Drewla. Both attempted to connect to the same control server in the CGI network.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers
+This phase of the investigation focused on the discovery of the command and control servers. We
+were able to identify and connect to the control servers used by the GhostNet by analysing the data
+from the OHHDL obtained during the field investigations carried out in Phase 1. During this process
+we were able to find and access web-based administration interfaces on the control server identified
+from the OHHDL data. These servers contain links to other control servers as well as command
+servers, and so therefore we were able to enumerate additional command and control servers.
+After discovering several instances of malware on these servers, we set up a honey pot computer and
+were able to identify additional malicious servers by monitoring the traffic generated by our infected
+honey pot. Using the attacker(s)
+ web-based administration interface, we were able to command our
+honey pot computer to download gh0st RAT, one of the Trojans used by GhostNet. Eventually, our
+honey pot computer established a connection to the attacker(s)
+ gh0st RAT client. The attacker(s)
+proceeded to execute commands on our honey pot. We were able to discover several IP addresses
+within a DSL range in Hainan Island (PRC) that the attacker(s) used to communicate with computers
+infected with gh0st RAT.
+Finally, we were able to map out the methods and capabilities of the GhostNet by a triangulated
+analysis of three sources: 1) data obtained from our collection of socially engineered emails with
+backdoor attachments, 2) the captured network traffic from Tibetan targets; and, 3) data obtained by
+gaining access to the command and control interface. (see Fig. 7 - p. 31)
+While analysing the data collected from the infected OHHDL computer (xxxxxxx), we discovered
+web-based administration interfaces to four control servers. Through some strategic guessing
+concerning file paths and file names, we were able to access web interfaces to multiple control
+servers. In total, we found 26 instances of the administration interface across the four servers. It
+remains unclear why the attacker(s) did not secure access to the control interface. Perhaps the
+attacker(s) concluded that the file paths and file names could not be easily guessed.
+The control servers
+ web interface contains three main components: 1) a listing of all the infected computers
+that have reported to the control server; 2) an interface to issue commands to the infected computers; and
+3) an interface to monitor pending commands to infected computers and their results when completed.
+The commands issued to the infected computers direct the infected computer to download files
+from additional command servers under the attacker(s)
+ control. In some cases, these servers act as
+control servers themselves; however, some appear to be used exclusively to host malicious files that
+infected computers are meant to download. The attacker(s) set commands on the control servers
+that instruct infected computers to download additional remote administration Trojans, such as
+gh0st RAT, in order to take complete real-time control of the infected computers.
+Three of the four control servers are located in three different locations in China: Hainan,
+Guangdong and Sichuan. One of the control servers is located at a web-hosting company in the
+United States. Five of the six command servers are located in mainland China (Hainan, Guangdong,
+Sichuan and Jiangsu) and one in Hong Kong.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 7
+The GhostNet control servers.
+This Palantir screen capture shows the GhostNet servers we uncovered and their relationship with the malicious email sent to, 1) the
+International Tibet Support Network, 2) the infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama; and, 3) the honey pot network set
+up at the Citizen Lab.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+The four control servers are:
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Hainan-TELECOM, CN
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, US
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx CHINANET-SC, CN
+The six control/command servers are:
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-HI, CN
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CUHKNET, HK
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-JS, CN
+ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN
+The data obtained from WHOIS records concerning domain name registration reveals that most
+of the domains are traceable to the same individual. However, the attacker(s) could have simply
+stolen the domains from someone else, or compromised the servers hosting these domains.
+Table 1: Domain name registration information
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+25/04/06
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+26/11/07
+xxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+20/06/08
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxx
+xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+03/09/08
+List of infected computers (see Fig. 8 - p. 33)
+The Server List interface provides information on each computer infected by the attacker(s)
+malware, indicating the name given to the computer (by its owner/operator), its IP address, when
+it was first infected, when it last called home (i.e. the control server), and how many times it
+has called home. Each infected computer is assigned a unique identification number so that the
+infected computer can be tracked even when its IP address changes. The page also features a link
+to the Send Command interface, through which the attacker(s) sends instructions to the infected
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 8
+The GhostNet 
+Server List
+ interface.
+This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows all infected computers that have 
+checked in
+ with the control server. It has been obscured
+to protect the identity of the victims.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+computers. There is also a button at the top of the page that links to a Command Result page that
+shows the status of the commands sent to the host and their results.
+To corroborate our findings, there was an entry in the Server List page of the infected OHHDL
+computer that we analysed during our field investigations outlined in Part One. It contained the
+unique ID, the IP address, computer name, and a link to issue commands to the infected computer.
+Sending commands
+The Send Command link provided for each entry yields an interface that allows an attacker(s) to
+send specific commands to the selected infected computer. In addition to a custom command, the
+attacker(s) may choose from a menu of commands, which includes options to download binaries that
+provide additional functionality (such as keystroke logging or remote administration), acquire system
+information (list computer information, software and documents on the computer), or cause the
+malware to become dormant. (See Fig. 9 - p. 35)
+Using the Send Command interface, the attacker(s) issues instructions to the infected computers to
+download malicious files that are disguised as standard image files. As mentioned above, the files
+are most often hosted on additional command servers that appear to be dedicated to hosting these
+infected files.46 These command servers contain a variety of files. While the exact function of each
+file is not known, the file names given to them by the attacker(s) provide some indication of their
+functionality. There are file names associated with the retrieval of files as well as keystroke logging.
+One of the commands available to the attacker(s) instructs infected computers to download the
+gh0st RAT remote administration tool, which gives the attacker(s) full, real-time control of the infected
+computer. Gh0st RAT is an open source Trojan that is widely available online. It was developed by
+Chinese programmers but has now been translated into English. The program allows an attacker to
+create an executable file that can be repacked and disguised and used to infect and compromise a target
+computer. This file can be configured to directly connect to the gh0st RAT owner or to a third location, a
+control server, when it retrieves the current IP address of the gh0st RAT owner. (See Fig. 10 - p. 36)
+Once the infected computer connects to the gh0st RAT owner, an entry appears in the Connection
+window with some information about the infected computer. The gh0st RAT owner may then
+issue commands to the infected computer. These commands include file manager, screen capture,
+keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture, as well as the ability to force the
+infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as a gh0st RAT update.
+During the course of the investigation, we infected a honey pot computer with the attacker(s)
+malware. We instructed our infected computer to download the attacker(s)
+ version of gh0st RAT
+using the malicious network
+s web-based administration interface. The gh0st RAT attempted to
+connect to several *.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn IP addresses before finally successfully
+connecting to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn).
+In some cases the malicious image files are hosted on the control servers themselves.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 9
+The GhostNet 
+Send Command
+ interface.
+This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows how the attacker(s) can send specific commands to infected computers. It has been
+obscured to protect the identity of the victims.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 10
+The gh0st RAT interface.
+This screen capture of the English language version of the gh0st RAT software shows the commands that an attacker is able to execute on the
+compromised computer.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+The gh0st RAT tool attempts to connect to IP addresses of a DSL provider in Hainan, China:
+ xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
+ xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
+ xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
+ xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
+ xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
+ xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
+After a successful connection, the attacker(s) proceed to issue commands on our infected
+computer in real-time.
+We found similar but unsuccessful connections to the same IP address range from some of the
+infected computers we analysed and discovered that a rudimentary version of the web-based
+administration interface contained only one infection from the same IP address range in Hainan.
+In addition, one of the servers used to host the attacker(s)
+ malicious files is a Government of
+Hainan web server located in Hainan, and one of the control server interfaces we gained access
+to is also located in Hainan. However, one should not rush to judgement concerning the identity
+of the attacker(s) based on this location. The gh0st RAT software can be configured with a proxy
+server; therefore it is possible that the attacker(s) were using a compromised system as a proxy to
+hide their true location.
+Command results
+The Command Result page lists the commands issued through the Send Command page and the
+status of those commands. Each entry in this interface shows what command was sent to the
+infected computer, including the URL to the command server and the command file (the malicious
+file disguised as an image). Upon the successful completion of a command, the relevant date, time,
+and result are recorded. (See Fig. 11 - p. 38)
+The Command Result page contains a column that displays the content sent back to the control
+server from the infected computer. The command issued to retrieve this content in the Send
+Command interface is labelled 
+Acquire System Information.
+ Even though we have been unable
+to properly decode the content,47 the plain text values in the binary content indicate that these
+entries contain information about the infected computer (CPU, memory, operating system,
+programmes installed) as well as file names of documents on the computer, presumably for later
+retrieval. This information is likely used to determine which targets the attacker(s) will further
+exploit and control using remote administration tools such as gh0st RAT.
+The content is base64 encoded and XORed with values we have yet to identify.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 11
+The GhostNet 
+List Command
+ interface.
+This screen capture of the GhostNet interface lists the commands issued to infected computers. It has been obscured to protect the identity of
+the victims.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Methods and capabilities
+The attacker(s) are able to exploit several infection vectors. First, they create web pages that
+contain 
+drive by
+ exploit code that infects the computers of those who visit the page. Second, the
+attacker(s) have also shown that they engage in spear phishing in which contextually relevant emails
+are sent to targets with PDF and DOC attachments which, when executed, create back doors that
+cause the infected computer to connect to a control server and await further instructions.
+With each successful infection the attacker(s) may use any contextually relevant data to further
+exploit the targeted community and may also impersonate the initial target in order to infect all the
+targets
+ contacts. Finally, the targets themselves may infect others by forwarding infected documents
+to their contacts. In this way, the network of infected computers grows organically.
+The first stage of infection focuses on getting targets to execute malicious code. Once infected, the target
+computer routinely checks in with a control server in order to receive further instructions. At this stage,
+the attacker(s) acquires some initial information regarding the identity of the infected computer.
+Newer versions of the administration interface contain a direct link to a web service that looks up
+the relevant WHOIS information about the IP address of the infected computer along with a simple
+port scan. This version also does a geoIP lookup on the infected computer
+s IP address and lists the
+country in which the computer is located, indicating that the attacker(s) has an interest in the
+geographical location of the infected computers.
+The attack may also issue an acquire system information command that causes the infected computer to upload
+its hardware statistics, list of programs installed, list of recent documents, and current network connections.
+The attacker(s) may use this information to target the infected computer for further exploitation.
+The attacker(s) directs the infected computers to download and install a remote administration
+Trojan. The attacker(s) have demonstrated a preference for gh0st RAT but may choose from a variety
+of Trojans. The attacker(s) simply browses to the 
+send command
+ interface and pastes in a link to
+a version of gh0st RAT on a 
+command
+ server under his or her control. The next time the infected
+computer checks in to the control server, it will be instructed to download and execute gh0st RAT.
+Upon completion, the infected computer notifies the control server and the result appears in the
+attacker(s)
+ web interface.
+Once gh0st RAT is installed on the target, the infected computer will periodically check a specific
+location and retrieve the IP address to which it is supposed to connect. When the attacker(s)
+is not available, he or she will often change this IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost) so that the amount
+of potentially suspicious external traffic is limited. When the attacker(s) is ready to receive
+connections, the IP address is changed to a valid external IP address.
+When the attacker(s) turns on gh0st RAT, he or she is able to see all the infected machines that have
+established connections to him or her. The attacker(s) may then execute a wide variety of commands,
+including file manager, screen capture, keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture,
+as well as the ability to force the infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as
+a gh0st RAT update. The attacker(s) may also secretly execute programs on the target computer.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Analysis of list of infected computers
+A detailed analysis of the list of infected computers revealed an overwhelming number of unique
+infections in many countries. The same malware that infected computers at the Dalai Lama
+s office
+and other Tibetan organizations had a much more extensive set of targets. The list of entities and
+locations of those targeted was quite varied.
+In total, we found 1,295 infected computers located in 103 countries. We found that we were able to
+confidently
+on a scale of low, medium, high
+identify 397 of the 1,295 infected computers (26.7%),
+and labelled each one as a high-value target. We did so because they were either significant to the
+relationship between China and Tibet, Taiwan or India, or were identified as computers at foreign
+embassies, diplomatic missions, government ministries, or international organizations.
+Of the remaining infected computers, 536 appear to be computers on private broadband Internet
+providers. The remaining IP addresses do not reverse resolve and available information on these
+hosts does not allow us to make judgements regarding the identity or purpose of these computers.
+Methodology
+We compiled a unified and comprehensive list of infected computers from all the control servers,
+as there was considerable duplication across them. There were several duplicate entries in the list
+of infected computers
+in some cases, the same infected computer was logged multiple times as it
+was connecting from a different IP address. In other instances, multiple infected computers were
+assigned different internal IP addresses and had different computer names but shared the same
+external IP address. This signifies that there were multiple infected computers sharing Internet
+access. Where possible, we filtered the results by unique computer name, and if no computer name
+was present, we filtered by unique external IP address.48 (See Fig. 12 - p. 41)
+On the surface, the names of the infected computers in the sample are provocative. There are references
+to ministries of foreign affairs, foreign embassies, and other government entities. Some contains names of
+officials or their positions/titles. However, we recognize that a computer name can be anything its owner
+wishes, and may be completely unrelated to the location, function, or owner of that particular computer.
+Therefore, in order to be more confident as to the true identity or purpose of the infected computer,
+we relied on reverse DNS look-ups and each IP address
+ record from the Regional Internet Registries.
+Using these two pieces of information we were able to confirm the validity of the identity of several
+infected computers with a high (H) degree of confidence.
+In some cases the computer name associated with the infected computer is actually a domain
+name or an acronym for a recognizable institution or organization. In these cases we classified our
+identification of the target with either a medium (M) or low (L) level of confidence. Medium
+confidence refers to instances where we have otherwise identified a related high confidence target,
+In one case we removed 117 unique IP addresses from Mexico that appeared to belong to the same computer connecting in to the
+control server from a DSL provider.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 12
+The geographic location of infected hosts.
+This graphic illustrates the global reach of the GhostNet. There were 1,295 infected computers that reported to the control server. The
+infections were spread across 103 countries. Taiwan reported the most infections followed by the United States, Vietnam and India.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+but for which we rely on the computer name for identification. Low confidence refers to instances
+in which we rely solely on the computer name for identification.
+Table 2: Selected infections
+Organization
+Confidence
+Location
+Infections
+ASEAN
+ID, MY
+Asian Development Bank
+PH, IN
+Associated Press, UK
+GB, HK
+Bureau of International Trade Relations
+CanTV, Venezuela
+Ceger, Portugal
+Consulate General of Malaysia, Hong Kong
+Deloitte & Touche, New York
+Department of Commerce, Solomon Islands
+Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia
+Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines
+Department of Science and Technology, Philippines
+Embassy of China, US (see footnote 50)
+Embassy of Cyprus, Germany
+Embassy of Germany, Australia
+Embassy of India, Belgium
+Embassy of India, Serbia
+Embassy of India, Germany
+Embassy of India, Italy
+Embassy Of India, Kuwait
+Embassy of India, USA
+Embassy of India, Zimbabwe
+Embassy of Indonesia, China
+Embassy of Malaysia, Cuba
+Embassy of Malaysia, Italy
+Embassy of Malta
+Embassy of Malta, Australia
+Embassy of Malta, Belgium
+Embassy of Malta, Libya
+Embassy of Pakistan, Bahrain
+Embassy of Papua New Guinea, China
+Embassy of Portugal, Finland
+Embassy of Portugal, Germany
+Embassy of The Republic Of China (Taiwan), Swaziland
+Embassy of Romania, Finland
+Embassy of Romania, France
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Table 2: Selected infections (cont
+Organization
+Confidence
+Location
+Infections
+Embassy of Romania, Norway
+Embassy of Romania, PRC
+Embassy of Thailand, Philippines
+Embassy of the Republic of Korea, China
+Government Integrated Telecommunication Network, Malaysia
+High Commission of India, Cyprus
+High Commission Of India, United Kingdom
+Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan
+International Campaign for Tibet
+International Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom
+Lanka Education and Research Network, Sri Lanka
+Malta External Trade Corporation Ltd.
+Maritime Police, Solomon Islands
+Ministry of Communications, Brunei
+Ministry of Education, Solomon Islands
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Barbados
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brunei
+Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Iran
+Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia
+Ministry of Industry and Trade, Vietnam
+Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, Bhutan
+National Informatics Centre, India
+NATO, (SHAPE HQ)
+Net Trade, Taiwan
+New Tang Dynasty Television, United States
+Office of the Dalai Lama, India
+Pakistan Mission to The United Nations
+US, JP
+Permanent Delegation of Cyprus to the European Union
+Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations
+PetroVietnam
+Prime Minister
+s Office, Laos
+Public Service Division, Solomon Islands
+Russian Federal University Network, Russian Federation
+Software Technology Parks of India, India
+South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
+BD, US
+Students for a Free Tibet, United States
+TAITRA, Taiwan
+TW, NG
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Table 2: Selected infections (cont
+Organization
+Confidence
+Location
+Infections
+Taiwan Government Service Network, Taiwan
+Tibetan Government in Exile, India
+IN, US
+Trade and Industry Department, Government of Hong Kong
+Infection timeline
+The earliest infected computer called home to the control server on May 22, 2007. The most recent
+entry in our sample is March 12, 2009. On average, the amount of time that a host was actively
+infected was 145 days.49 While 90 infected computers were only infected for one day, 145 were
+infected for over 400 days. The longest infection span was 660 days. In total, 422 hosts checked in
+March 1-12, 2009; 373 of these computers were infected in 2008. The data indicates that despite a
+reduction in new infections, the network continues to be operational. (See Fig. 13 - p. 45)
+There are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.
+There were 320 infections in December 2007 spread across 56 countries. However, 113 were located
+within Taiwan and the majority of these infections occurred within a single organization: the
+Taiwan External Trade Development Council. During this same period, computers at the Embassies
+of India in Belgium and Zimbabwe were infected as were the Embassies of Indonesia and the
+Republic of Korea in the People
+s Republic of China. In addition, computers at the Ministry of
+Foreign Affairs in Iran were infected as were several computers at the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
+The spike in August 2008 totalled 258 infections spread across 46 countries. The OHHDL computer
+was infected during one of these spikes in August 2008 (It last checked in to the control server
+in September 2008). This spike included the Chinese Embassy in the United States,50 3 computers
+at the Embassy of India in the Unites States, and the High Commission of India in the United
+Kingdom and in Cyprus. It also included the Embassy of Cyprus in Germany, the Embassy of
+Malaysia in Cuba, the Embassy of Thailand in the Philippines and the Ministry of Industry in
+Vietnam. Several companies were also compromised, including Net Trade in Taiwan, the New York
+Office of Deloitte & Touche, and PetroVietnam, the government-owned oil and gas Company.
+The average number of days from the initial infection to the last time an infected computer 
+checked in
+ with a control server.
+It is unclear whether the affected embassy is the Republic of China (Taiwan) or People
+s Republic of China.
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
+Fig. 13
+GhostNet infection timeline.
+This screen capture of a timeline generated with Palantir illustrates when and how many computers were infected by the GhostNet.
+It shows that there are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.
+PART THREE:
+Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
+The evidence presented in this report
+through a combination of field investigations,
+interviews, technical scouting, data analysis, mining and visualization
+paints a
+disturbing picture.
+GhostNet represents a network of compromised computers resident in high-value political,
+economic, and media locations spread across numerous countries worldwide. At the time of writing,
+these organizations are almost certainly oblivious to the compromised situation in which they find
+themselves. The computers of diplomats, military attach
+s, private assistants, secretaries to Prime
+Ministers, journalists and others are under the concealed control of unknown assailant(s).
+In Dharamsala and elsewhere, we have witnessed machines being profiled and sensitive documents
+being removed. At our Laboratory, we have analysed our own infected 
+honey pot
+ computer
+and discovered that the capabilities of GhostNet are potent and wide ranging. Almost certainly,
+documents are being removed without the targets
+ knowledge, keystrokes logged, web cameras are
+being silently triggered, and audio inputs surreptitiously activated.
+This raises the question, how many sensitive activities have been preemptively anticipated by
+intelligence gathered through this network? How many illegal transactions have been facilitated by
+information harvested through GhostNet? Worst of all, how many people may have been put at risk?
+While these questions are compelling, it would be imprudent to read these findings as an indictment,
+or to attribute to the owners of GhostNet motivations and intentions for which there is no evidence.
+Alternative explanations
+The list of computers controlled by the GhostNet is significant, and certainly atypical for a cybercrime
+network. The size of the network is small, and the concentration of high-value systems is significant.
+At the same time, penetrations of this type are not uncommon. Recently, several large-scale spy
+nets have been discovered, including ones containing lists of affected computers of a magnitude
+higher than that harvested by GhostNet.
+This trend is predictable, converging with accumulating incidents of cyber-attacks facilitated by
+lower entry-thresholds for computer exploitation methods and technologies. The tools we profile in
+our investigation, though apparently amassed in a complex way to achieve a definite purpose, are
+not restricted to an exclusive guild of experts with specialized and confidential knowledge.
+Today, pirated cyber-crime kits circulate extensively on the Internet and can be downloaded by
+anyone about as easily as the latest pirated DVD.51 Cyberspace has empowered individuals and small
+groups of non-state actors to do many things, including executing sophisticated computer network
+operations that were previously only the domain of state intelligence agencies. We have entered
+the era of do-it-yourself (DIY) signals intelligence.
+http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/zeus-crimeware-kit-gets-carding-layout.html
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
+Attribution
+Who is ultimately in control of the GhostNet system? While our analysis reveals that numerous
+politically sensitive and high-value computer systems were compromised, we do not know the
+motivation or the identity of the attacker(s) or how to accurately characterize this network of
+infections as a whole. We have not been able to ascertain the type of data that has been obtained
+by the attacker(s), apart from the basic system information and file listings of the documents
+located on the target computers. Without this data we are unable to deduce with any certainty
+what kind of data the attacker(s) were after. There are thus several possibilities for attribution.
+The most obvious explanation, and certainly the one in which the circumstantial evidence tilts the
+strongest, would be that this set of high profile targets has been exploited by the Chinese state for
+military and strategic-intelligence purposes. Indeed, as described above, many of the high confidence,
+high-value targets that we identified are clearly linked to Chinese foreign and defence policy,
+particularly in South and South East Asia. Like radar sweeping around the southern border of China,
+there is an arc of infected nodes from India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, through Laos, Brunei,
+Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Many of the high profile targets reflect some of China
+s most
+vexing foreign and security policy issues, including Tibet and Taiwan. Moreover, the attacker(s)
+addresses examined here trace back in at least several instances to Hainan Island, home of the Lingshui
+signals intelligence facility and the Third Technical Department of the People
+s Liberation Army.52
+However, we must be cautious to rush to judgement in spite of circumstantial and other evidence,
+as alternative explanations are certainly possible and charges against a government of this nature
+are gravely serious. On the other end of the spectrum is the explanation that this is a random set
+of infected computers that just happens to include high profile targets of strategic significance
+to China, collected by an individual or group with no political agenda per se. Similarly one can
+postulate that the targets gathered together happened less by concerted effort than by sheer
+coincidence. Given the groupings of various entities in the infected computer list (by country
+and organization), internal email communications and sloppy security practices could have led to
+cross-infection and subsequent listing on the control servers.
+Another possible explanation is that there is a single individual or set of individuals (criminal networks,
+for example) who are targeting these high-value targets for profit. This can be in the form of stealing
+financial information or critical data that can be sold to clients, be they states or private entities. There
+are countless examples of large-scale fraud and data theft worldwide and numerous apparent instances
+of outsourcing to third parties of cyber-attacks and espionage, some of which the Information Warfare
+Monitor and its related research project, the OpenNet Initiative, have documented. GhostNet could very
+well be a for-profit, non-state venture. Even 
+patriotic hackers
+ could be acting on their own volition,
+or with the tacit approval of their government, as operators of the GhostNet.
+Finally, it is not inconceivable that this network of infected computers could have been targeted
+by a state other than China, but operated physically within China (and at least one node in
+http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/lingshui.htm
+JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
+the United States) for strategic purposes. Compromised proxy computers on Hainan Island, for
+example, could have been deployed as staging posts, perhaps in an effort to deliberately mislead
+observers as to the true operator(s) and purpose of the GhostNet system.
+The Significance of GhostNet
+GhostNet is significant, as it does not appear to be a typical cybercrime network. The potential
+political fallout is enormous. But ultimately, the question of who is behind the GhostNet may
+matter less than the strategic significance of the collection of affected targets. What this study
+discovered is serious evidence that information security is an item requiring urgent attention at
+the highest levels. It demonstrates that the subterranean layers of cyberspace, about which most
+users are unaware, are domains of active reconnaissance, surveillance, and exploitation.
+Regardless of who or what is ultimately in control of GhostNet, its capabilities of exploitation and
+the strategic intelligence that can be harvested from it matter most. Indeed, although the Achilles
+heel of the GhostNet system allowed us to monitor and document its far-reaching network of
+infiltration, we can safely hypothesize that it is neither the first nor the only one of its kind.
+PART FOUR:
+About Information Warfare Monitor
+About the Information Warfare Monitor
+http://infowar-monitor.net/
+The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research activity tracking the emergence of cyberspace
+as a strategic domain. We are an independent research effort. Our mission is to build and broaden the
+evidence base available to scholars, policymakers, and others. We aim to educate and inform.
+The Information Warfare Monitor is a public-private venture between two Canadian institutions: The
+SecDev Group, an operational think tank based in Ottawa (Canada), and the Citizen Lab at the Munk
+Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. The Principal Investigators and
+co-founders of the Information Warfare Monitor are Rafal Rohozinski (The SecDev Group) and
+Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab).
+The Information Warfare Monitor is supported by The SecDev Group which conducts field-based
+investigations and data gathering. Our advanced research and analysis facilities are located at the
+Citizen Lab. IWM is part of the Citizen Lab
+s network of advanced research projects, which include the
+OpenNet Initiative and ONI Asia.
+The Information Warfare Monitor also benefits from donations from a variety of sponsors including
+Psiphon Inc, and Palantir Technologies.
+The Information Warfare Monitor engages in three primary activities:
+1. Case Studies. We design and carry out active case study research. These are self-generated
+activities consistent with our mission.
+We employ a rigorous and multidisciplinary approach to all our case studies blending qualitative, technical,
+and quantitative methods. As a general rule, our investigations consist of at least two components:
+Field-based investigations. We engage in qualitative research among affected
+target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ
+interaction with our partners, and extensive technical data collection involving
+system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation. Our field-based teams
+are supported by senior analysts and regional specialists, including social scientists,
+computer security professionals, policy experts, and linguists, who provide additional
+contextual support and substantive back-up.
+Technical scouting and laboratory analysis. Data collected in the field is rigorously
+analysed using a variety of advanced data fusion and visualization methods. Leads
+developed on the basis of infield activities are pursued through 
+technical scouting,
+including computer network investigations, and the resulting data and analysis
+is shared with our infield teams and partners for verification and for generating
+additional entry points for follow-on investigations.
+2. Open Source Trend Analysis. We collect open-source information from the press and other
+sources tracking global trends in cyberspace. These are published on our public website.
+3. Analytical Workshops and Outreach. We work closely with academia, human rights
+organizations, and the defense and intelligence community. We publish reports, and occasionally
+conduct joint workshops. Our work is independent, and not subject to government classification. Our
+goal is to encourage vigorous debate around critical policy issues. This includes engaging in ethical
+and legal considerations of information operations, computer network attacks, and computer network
+exploitation, including the targeted use of Trojans and malware, denial of service attacks, and
+content filtering.
+About The SecDev Group
+http://www.secdev.ca
+The SecDev Group is a Canadian-based operational consultancy focused on countries and regions at
+risk from violence and insecurity. We deliver to our clients insights and access to a diverse range
+of cultures, audiences, challenging environments and ungoverned spaces. Our approach combines
+a field research capability with advanced techniques and methods for generating policy-relevant
+analysis and solutions. As a think tank, we identify and communicate realistic options to enhance
+effectiveness through evidence-based research on the causes, consequences and trajectories of
+insecurity and violence. We are operational because we design and conduct activities in complex and
+insecure environments.
+About The Citizen Lab
+http://www.citzenlab.org
+The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at
+the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection
+of digital media and world politics. We are a hothouse that combines the disciplines of political
+science, sociology, computer science, engineering, and graphic design. Our mission is to undertake
+advanced research and engage in development that monitors, analyses, and impacts the exercise of
+political power in cyberspace. The Citizen Lab
+s ongoing research network includes the Information
+Warfare Monitor and the OpenNet Initiative, ONI Asia, and benefits from collaborative partnerships
+with academic institutions, NGOs, and other partners in all regions of the world.