diff --git "a/2008.clean.txt" "b/2008.clean.txt" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/2008.clean.txt" @@ -0,0 +1,4147 @@ +Russian Invasion of Georgia +Russian Cyberwar on Georgia +10 November, 2008 +Regular updates can be found on the Georgia Update website: +www.georgiaupdate.gov.ge +INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................2 +BACKGROUND ON CYBERWARFARE.......................................................2 +RUSSIA +S ONLINE WAR ON GEORGIA: FIRST STRIKE ..............................3 +CYBER BLOCKADE.........................................................................................5 +SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS .................................................5 +PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR .............................................................7 +RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK......................................................................8 +THE 27 AUGUST ATTACK...............................................................................9 +CONCLUSION......................................................................................................10 +APPENDIX: Articles About Cyberwar on Georgia .........................................11 +1. INTRODUCTION +The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by an intensive build up +of cyberattacks attempting to disrupt, deface and bring down critical +Georgian governmental and civilian online infrastructure. These attacks +became a massive assault on the eve of the invasion which resulted in +the blocking, re-routing of traffic and control being seized of various +sections of Georgian cyberspace. The attack marks a new phase in the +history of warfare, being the first case in which a land invasion was coordinated with an orchestrated online cyber-offensive. This offers +crucial lessons for strategists and planners whilst providing vital +information about how the Russian Federation is developing its +offensive capacities on the internet. +The campaign has been reported in the media, with wide coverage +suggesting the campaign was a spontaneous outburst of popular +feeling in Russia lead by independent hackers. However, as this report +suggests, the offensive was too large, coordinated, and sophisticated +to be the work of independent hackers; the evidence leads by-andlarge to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in St. Petersburg, Russia. +Whilst only a criminal investigation can directly prove the involvement +of the Kremlin, both experts and commentators have accused +Moscow of sponsoring the attacks as their magnitude requires the +involvement of the kind of resources only a state-sponsor can provide. +2. BACKGROUND ON CYBERWARFARE +Cyberattacks are becoming an increasingly established and virulent +form of warfare in the early Twenty-First Century. High technology and +online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers, +including private individuals and terrorist organizations, and can +potentially destabilize a country +s whole economy and crucial security +infrastructure. Cyberwarfare has found its primary state-sponsor in the +Russian Federation, which is widely suspected of having played a +leading role in the first large scale cyberattack on a NATO member +state last year. +In the spring of 2007 government computers in Estonia came under +sustained attack from cyberterrorists following the decision taken by +Estonian officials to move a statue placed commemorating a Red +Army soldier that died fighting the Nazis, to the military cemetery in the +capital Tallinn. The event roused emotions and led to large scale +protests by the Russian minority. It was then that the Estonian +Government +s online networks came under massive assault using +Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDoS) assaults on its infrastructure. The +attacks, which flooded computers and servers, blocking legitimate +users were described as +crippling + by experts, owing to Estonia +s high +dependence on information technology. Commentators have pointed +out that the assault had very serious consequences for Estonia`s banks +and airports. Consequences similar in effect to a full scale missile strike. +This provided vital lessons for Estonia and NATO and has led to the +development of a cutting edge cyberwarfare institute in Tallinn. +3. RUSSIA +S ONLINE WAR ON GEORGIA: FIRST STRIKE +In August 2008, cyberwar associated with the Russian Federation struck +once more, this time against Georgia. The DDoS attacks began in the +weeks running up to the outbreak of the Russian invasion and +continued after the Kremlin announced that it had ceased hostilities on +12 August. Georgian claims have been confirmed by Tom Burling, an +executive of Tulip Systems, a U.S. Internet firm, which took over hosting +of the web sites for Georgia's government agencies during the conflict. +In a recent interview Burling said its experts had worked frantically to +curtail the damage from the hackers, remarking that "They have been +attacking Georgia from a cyber standpoint since July." Some of the +Western sources confirm this claim. +On 20 July the Shadowserver Foundation published news about the +serious attack against the website of the President of Georgia: +over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia +(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a +multi-pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. +Computerworld, 21 July: +The Web site for the president of Georgia was +knocked offline by a distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attack over +the weekend, yet another in a series of cyberattacks against countries +experiencing political friction with Russia. +New York Times, 12 August: +Weeks before bombs started falling on +Georgia, a security researcher in suburban Massachusetts was watching an +attack against the country in cyberspace. +The Russian invasion of Georgia was preceded by a cyber attack on +Georgia +s Internet facilities. A large number of Georgia +s Internet +servers were seized and placed under external control from late +Thursday, 7 August, whereas Russia +s invasion of Georgia officially +commenced on Friday, 8 August. Also, much of Georgia +s traffic and +access was taken under unauthorized external control at the same +time that this first large scale attack occurred. +The defacement of President Mikheil Saakashvili web site +president.gov.ge with the screen-shot provided below which operated +as a moving slideshow was part of the initial phase of the attack. What +followed were large numbers of DDoS against the site designed to +prevent the Georgian government from getting its message across to +the general population and international media during this critical +time. +Dancho Danchev is an independent security consultant and cyber +threats analyst, with extensive experience in open source intelligence +gathering, malware and E-crime incident response. As an expert in the +field, he views the defacement attacks as clearly being Kremlin linked +and not undertaken by independent or un-coordinated attackers. +What am I trying to imply? It smells like a three letter intelligence +agency +s propaganda arm has managed to somehow supply +the creative for the defacement of Georgia President +s official +web site, thereby forgetting a simple rule of engagement in such +a conflict - risk forwarding the responsibility of the attack to each +and every Russian or Russian supporter that ever attacked +Georgian sites using publicly obtainable DDoS attack tools in a +coordinated fashion. +An example of Russian efforts to shut the mouse of Georgian media is +the story of the Georgian news agency GHN. The first attack against +the agency +s website occurred in August 2008. Another wave of cyber +attacks started on 8 September. As a result, the GHN news agency +website had been paralyzed for 2 weeks. Another Georgian media +website that came under consistent cyber attacks after the end of the +armed conflict is www.apsny.ge + website of the Georgia-Online news +agency. It is interesting to note that Russian efforts to prevent Georgian +Internet media resources from disseminating information continued +even after the war. +4. CYBER BLOCKADE +The Russian assault on Georgian cyberspace was intensely coordinated and directed out of St. Petersburg, inside the territory of the +Russian Federation. The primary orchestrator was the Russian Business +Network (RBN) which conducted the cyber-blockade so that all +Georgian Internet traffic was going through Russia, denying Georgia its +internet independence. Computers in Georgia showed that an assault +was clearly taking place, which is presented here as evidence of +Russian sponsored cyber-terrorism: +Two trace routes for the web site mfa.gov.ge, that of the Georgian +Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were showing: +(a) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey +(b) From Ukraine - Ge = available & slow; not accessible, cached +(forged page) now only via redirect through Bryansk.ru +Other Georgia government websites such as mod.gov.ge, the +website of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the web site +president.gov.ge, the web site of the Georgian Presidency showed +(c) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey +(d) From Ukraine - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey +By examining Internet routes before and after the beginning of the war, +it is clear that they were altered either legally or illegally, blocking +traffic in and out of Georgia. Some of those routers are known to be +under control of the Russian Business Network (RBN). This can be +demonstrated via a comparison of route configuration before and +after the war. +5. SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS +Here we can provide clear evidence of co-ordination and a full list of +targets the cyber-terrorists had selected taken from the Russian hosted +web site stopgeorgia.ru (which also appears as stopgeorgia.info a +redirected page). This site provided the necessary attack tools for the +cyber assault against Georgia for hackers. As we can see the screenshot shows that mostly .ge web sites are listed for priority attacks. +However - also targeted for assault is the US embassy in Tbilisi. This web +site, as seen before, is an open site to attract future FSB cyber warriors. +The following evidence below shows how these sites can be traced +back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in ST. Petersburg and other +cybercriminal locations. +The information site Stopgeorgia.ru which provided information and +tools for independent hackers to attack Georgian sites was hosted +by AS36351 Softlayer of Plano Texas. This is a well known location +that is associated with Atrivo and Intercage malware hosting +connectivity, which is highly disruptive to online service. +The information site Stopgeorgia.info was hosted by AS28753 +NETDIRECT in Frankfurt, Germany as well as in AS12578 APOLLO +LATTELEKOM APOLLO in Latvia. +The link back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) was provided by +the clues left in the registration, which reads as: +Sponsoring +Registrar: +EstDomains, +Inc. +Registrant: Domain Manager, Protect Details, Inc, Street1: 29 +Kompozitorov St., Saint Petersburg, RU, Phone:+7.8129342271 +In summary, 36 important web sites were identified as targets for +hackers, including the US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi, Georgian +Parliament, Georgian Supreme Court, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various +news agencies and other media resources, the Central Election +Commission, and many others. +Due to efforts of many IT specialists in Internet hosting routing +companies, normal traffic was mostly resumed after the initial strikes. +Most critical websites were hosted outside of Georgia. +6. PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR +To help to make a final judgment regarding the cyberwar against +Georgia these two declarations from Russian officials can help us to +evaluate how Moscow thinks in regard to online warfare. The Russian +State Duma deputy and member of the Security Committee Deputy +Nikolai Kuryanovich stated in 2006 within a formal Russian +parliamentary letter of appreciation to hackers who had taken down +several Israeli web sites: +"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the +open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with +the aid of information soldiers, that is hackers. This means that a +small force of hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of +the current armed forces." +Should we interpret this declaration as a statement of intent, or merely +a prediction? A few days ago, the Editor of the Russian Online journal +cybersecurity.ru, made a similar statement that provides insight into the +Russian war aims: +Cyber-attacks are part of the information war, making your enemy +shut up is a potent weapon of modern warfare. +Clear examples that such thinking is being applied as guiding principles +of Russian strategy as part of the intense information-war taking place +can be drawn from the second wave of attacks that showed up from +Russian Business Network (RBN) server range. This time the weapon was +a new campaign purporting to come from the BBC that mocked +Georgia's President and spread as a new virus. +The malware from various locations caused the virus to be delivered +from +single +site, +address: +79.135.167.49). +The name of the malware is "name.avi.exe", and as of September 2008, +only FOUR out of 36 anti-virus products could detect it. The Russian +Business Network (RBN) had created a highly virulent strain designed to +act as a propaganda weapon against Georgia. +7. RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK +The individual, with direct responsibility for carrying out the cyber "first +strike" on Georgia, is a RBN operative named Alexandr A. Boykov of +Saint Petersburg, Russia. Also involved in the attack was a programmer +and spammer from Saint Petersburg named Andrey Smirnov. These +men are leaders of RBN sections and are not "script-kiddies" or +"hacktivists," as some have maintained of the cyber attacks on Georgia + but senior operatives in positions of responsibility with vast +background knowledge. +Intelligence can suggest further information about these individual +cyber-terrorists. According to Spamhaus SBL64881, Mr. Boykov operates +a hosting service in Class C Network 79.135.167.0/24. It should be noted +that the pre-invasion attacks emanated from 79.135.167.22, clearly +showing professional planning and not merely +hacktivism. + Due to the +degree of professionalism and the required massive costs to run such +operations, a state-sponsor is suspected. Further information gathered +also links the RBN to known disruptive websites. +The IP addresses of the range, 79.135.160.0/19 are assigned to +Sistemnet Telecom to provide services to companies who are +classified as engaging in illicit activities such as credit card fraud, +malware and so on. +79.135.160.0/19 Sistemnet Telecom and AS9121 TTNet (Turkey) are +associated with AbdAllah_Internet which is linked with cybercrime +hosting such as thecanadianmeds.com. These are known Russian +Business Network routes. +8. THE 27 AUGUST ATTACK +The last large cyberattack took place on 27 August. After that, there +have been no serious attacks on Georgian cyberspace. By that is +meant that minor attacks are still continuing but these are +indistinguishable from regular traffic and can certainly be attributed to +regular civilians. +On 27 August, at approximately 16:18 (GMT +3) a DDoS attack against +the Georgian websites was launched. The main target was the +Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. +The attacks peaked at approx 0,5 million network packets per second, +and up to 200 +250 Mbits per second in bandwidth (see attached +graphs). The graphs represent a 5-minute average: actual peaks were +higher. +The attacks mainly consisted of HTTP queries to the http://mfa.gov.ge +website. These were requests for the main page script with randomly +generated parameters. These requests were generated to overload +the web server in a way where every single request would need +significant +time. +The initial wave of the attack disrupted services for some Georgian +websites. The services became slow and unresponsive. This was due to +load +servers +these +requests. +As you see from the graphs above the attacks started to wind down +after most of the attackers were successfully blocked. The latest attack +may have been initiated as a response to the media coverage on the +Russian cyber attacks. +CONCLUSION +The information presented in here catalogues and explains the historic +first major use of cyberattacks as a weapon of war during the Russian +aggression against Georgia. Considering that this is the second Russiansponsored cyber-attack in just over a year, as well as the alarming fact +that the US Embassy in Tbilisi was listed for assault by cyberterrorists, +NATO member states as well as NATO aspirant countries need to be on +full alert for future Russian aggression against critical online +infrastructure. +APPENDIX: Articles About Cyberwar on Georgia +Contents +SHADOWSERVER............................................................................................................. 11 +COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 13 +COMPUTERWORLD ........................................................................................................ 14 +SOFT SECURITY ................................................................................................................ 15 +THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 15 +NEW YORK TIMES ........................................................................................................... 17 +AFP....................................................................................................................................... 19 +INTERNATIONAL DATA GROUP................................................................................ 20 +THE TELEGRAPH ............................................................................................................. 22 +WASHINGTON POST ...................................................................................................... 23 +NEWSWEEK....................................................................................................................... 26 +AFP....................................................................................................................................... 28 +WASHINGTON POST (blog)............................................................................................29 +SHADOWSERVER +20 July 2008; Updated on 10 August 2008 +The Website for the President of Georgia Under Attack - Politically Motivated? +For over 24 hours the website of President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia +(www.president.gov.ge) has been rendered unavailable due to a multi- +pronged distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. The site began coming +under attack very early Saturday morning (Georgian time). Shadowserver has +observed at least one web-based command and control (C&C) server taking +aim at the website hitting it with a variety of simultaneous attacks. The C&C +server has instructed its bots to attack the website with TCP, ICMP, and HTTP +floods. +Commands seen so far are: +flood http www.president.gov.ge/ +flood tcp www.president.gov.ge +flood icmp www.president.gov.ge +The server [62.168.168.9] which houses the website has been largely offline +since the attack started. Passive DNS records show the system houses several +other websites which are mostly unrelated to the Georgian government. +However, the server does also host the Social Assistance and Employment +State Agency website (www.saesa.gov.ge). This website along with the others +on the host have been rendered inaccessible. +Is the attack political or perhaps nationalistic in nature? Your guess is as good +as ours but it doesn't take much to come to this possible conclusion. Recent +DDoS attacks against various other neighbors of Russia to include Estonia +have been quite popular in the last few years. We do not have any solid +proof that the people behind this C&C server are Russian. However, the HTTPbased botnet C&C server is a MachBot controller, which is a tool that is +frequently used by Russian bot herders. On top of that the domain involved +with this C&C server has seemingly bogus registration information but does tie +back to Russia. +Who else have these guys been attacking with this MachBot C&C server? The +answer is no one. This server recently came online in the past few weeks and +has not issued any other attacks that we have observed until recently. All +attacks we have observed have been directed right at +www.president.gov.ge. +The C&C server involved in these attacks is on the IP address 207.10.234.244, +which is subsequently located in the United States. Beaconing traffic from +your network to this host may indicate that you have infected machines on +your network and are most likely participating in this DDoS attack. We would +recommend blocking and/or monitoring for traffic to this address. +Update (7/20/2008: 1:36 PM EST): It appears the host site for 207.10.234.244 has +taken action against this system and appears to now be blocking access to it. +However, the server being targeted by the C&C is still unreachable. +Update (8/10/2008: 10:34 AM EDT): With the recent events in Georgia, we are +now seeing new attacks against .ge sites. www.parliament.ge & +president.gov.ge are currently being hit with http floods. In this case, the C&C +server involved is at IP address 79.135.167.22 which is located in Turkey. We +are also observing this C&C as directing attacks against www.skandaly.ru. +Traffic from your network to this IP or domain name of +googlecomaolcomyahoocomaboutcom.net may indicate compromise and +participation in these attacks. +COMPUTERWORLD +21 July 2008 +By Jeremy Kirk +Georgia president's Web site falls under DDOS attack +Botnet took down site for one day +The Web site for the president of Georgia was knocked offline by a distributed +denial-of-service (DDOS) attack over the weekend, yet another in a series of +cyberattacks against countries experiencing political friction with Russia. +Georgia's presidential Web site was down for about a day, starting early +Saturday until Sunday, according to the Shadowserver Foundation, which +tracks malicious Internet activity. +Network experts said the attack was executed by a botnet, or a network of +computers that can be commanded to overwhelm a Web site with too much +traffic. +The command-and-control server for the attack is based in the U.S., +Shadowserver said. The botnet appears to be based on the "MachBot" code, +which communicates to other compromised PCs over HTTP, the same +protocol used for transmitting Web pages. +The tool used to control this kind of botnet "is frequently used by Russian bot +herders," according to Shadowserver. "On top of that, the domain involved +with this [command-and-control] server has seemingly bogus registration +information but does tie back to Russia." +One of the commands contained in the traffic directed at the Web site +contained the phrase "win+love+in+Rusia," wrote Jose Nazario, a senior +security engineer at Arbor Networks, on a company blog. +On Sunday, it appeared that the host for the command-and-control server +had been taken offline, Shadowserver said. +The motivation for the attacks is not entirely clear. But Georgia is just one of +several former Soviet satellites, including Estonia and Lithuania, that are +seeking to downplay their historical legacy with Russia. +Georgia has angered Russia by pushing for entry to NATO, a pro-Western +security alliance. It has also tangled with Russia over the handling of South +Ossetia and Abkhazia, two rebellious regions pushing for independence. +In Lithuania, 300 Web sites were defaced around July 1 following a new law +prohibiting the public display of symbols dating from the Soviet era and the +playing of the Soviet national anthem. The hacking was blamed on an +unpatched vulnerability in a Web server at a hosting company. +Estonian Web sites were pounded by a massive DDOS attack in April and May +2007. The attacks are believed to have been connected to a decision to +move a monument honoring Soviet World War II soldiers to a less prominent +place, which ignited protests from ethnic Russians. +COMPUTERWORLD +11 August 2008 +By Gregg Keizer +Cyberattacks knock out Georgia's Internet presence +Large-scale attacks, traffic rerouting traced to Russian hacker hosting network +August 11, 2008 (Computerworld) Hackers, perhaps affiliated with a wellknown Russian criminal network, have attacked and hijacked Web sites +belonging to Georgia, the former Soviet republic now in the fourth day of war +with Russia, a security researcher claimed on Sunday. +Some Georgian government and commercial sites are unavailable, while +others may have been hijacked, said Jart Armin, a researcher who tracks the +notorious Russian Business Network (RBN), a malware and criminal hosting +network. +"Many of Georgia's Internet servers were under external control from late +Thursday," Armin said early Saturday in an entry on his Web site. According to +his research, the government's sites dedicated to the Ministry of Foreign +Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the country's president, Mikhail +Saakashvili, have been blocked completely, or traffic to and from those sites' +servers have been redirected to servers actually located in Russia and Turkey. +As of midnight Eastern time on Sunday, Georgia's presidential and defense +ministry sites were unavailable from the U.S. Although the foreign ministry's site +remained online, the most recent news item was dated Aug. 8, the day +Georgian and Russian forces first clashed. +Armin warned that Georgian sites that appeared online may actually be +bogus. "Use caution with any Web sites that appear of a Georgia official +source but are without any recent news [such as those dated Saturday, Aug. +9, or Sunday, Aug. 10], as these may be fraudulent," he said in another entry +posted midafternoon on Sunday. +Statements from Georgia's foreign ministry have appeared in a blog hosted +on Google, perhaps in an attempt to circumvent attacks. +Researchers at the Shadowserver Foundation, which tracks malicious Internet +activity, confirmed some of Armin's claims. "We are now seeing new attacks +against .ge sites [Editor's note: .ge is the top-level domain for Georgia.] ... +www.parliament.ge and president.gov.ge are currently being hit with HTTP +floods," the researchers said in a Sunday update to a July post. +On Saturday, Armin reported that key sections of Georgia's Internet traffic +had been rerouted through servers based in Russia and Turkey, where the +traffic was either blocked or diverted. The Russian and Turkish servers Armin +identified, he said, "are well known to be under the control of RBN and +influenced by the Russian government." +RBN, which pulled up stakes last year and shifted network operations to China +in an attempt to avoid scrutiny, has been fingered for a wide range of +criminal activities, including a massive subversion of Web sites last March. +Later on Saturday, Armin added that network administrators in Germany had +been able to temporarily reroute some Georgian Internet traffic directly to +servers run by Deutsche Telekom AG. Within hours, however, the traffic had +been again diverted to Russian servers, this time to ones based in Moscow. +The attacks are reminiscent of other coordinated campaigns against Estonian +government Web sites in April and May 2007 and against about 300 +Lithuanian sites on July 1. Like Georgia, both countries are former republics in +the Soviet Union. +Three weeks ago, a distributed denial-of-service attack knocked Georgia's +presidential site offline for about a day. +Late Sunday, Russian ground forces were reported advancing toward Gori, +an important transportation hub in central Georgia. +SOFT SECURITY +11 August 2008 +This day highlights +Coordinated Russia vs Georgia cyber attack in progress (extract) +In the wake of Russian-Georgian conflict, a week worth of speculations +around Russian Internet forums have finally materialized into a coordinated +cyber attack against Georgia +s Internet infrastructure, whose tactics have +already managed to compromise several government web sites and is +continuing to launch DDoS attacks against numerous other Georgian +government sites +THE TELEGRAPH +August 11 2008 +By Jon Swaine +Georgia: Russia 'conducting cyber war' +Several Georgian state computer servers have been under external control +since shortly before Russia's armed intervention into the state commenced on +Friday, leaving its online presence in disarray. +While the official website of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian President, has +become available again, the central government site, as well as the +homepages for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, +remained down. Some commercial websites have also been hijacked. +The Georgian Government said that the disruption was caused by attacks +carried out by Russia as part of the ongoing conflict between the two states +over the Georgian province of South Ossetia. +In a statement released via a replacement website built on Google's bloghosting service, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "A cyber warfare +campaign by Russia is seriously disrupting many Georgian websites, including +that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." +Barack Obama, the Democratic US Presidential candidate, has demanded +Moscow halt the internet attacks as well as observing a ceasefire on the +ground. +Last April the computer systems of the Estonian Government came under +attack in a coordinated three-week assault widely credited to statesponsored Russian hackers. The wave of attacks came after a row erupted +over the removal of the Bronze Soldier Soviet war memorial in Tallinn, the +Estonian capital. The websites of government departments, political parties, +banks and newspapers were all targeted. +Analysts have immediately accused the Russian Business Network (RBN), a +network of criminal hackers with close links to the Russian mafia and +government, of the Georgian attacks. +Jart Armin, a researcher who runs a website tracking the activity of the RBN, +has released data claiming to show that visits to Georgian sites had been rerouted through servers in Russia and Turkey, where the traffic was blocked. +Armin said the servers "are well known to be under the control of RBN and +influenced by the Russian Government." +Mr Armin said that administrators in Germany had intervened at the +weekend, temporarily making the Georgian sites available by re-routing their +traffic through German servers run by Deutsche Telekom. Within hours, +however, control over the traffic had been wrested back, this time to servers +based in Moscow. +As in the barrage against Estonian websites last year, the Georgian sites are +being bombarded by a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, in which +hackers direct their computers to simultaneously flood a site with thousands of +visits in order to overload it and bring it offline. +The Shadowserver Foundation, which tracks serious hacking, confirmed: "We +are now seeing new attacks against .ge sites - www.parliament.ge and +president.gov.ge are currently being hit with http floods." +Mr Armin warned that official Georgian sites that did appear online may have +been hijacked and be displaying bogus content. He said in a post on his site: +"Use caution with any web sites that appear of a Georgia official source but +are without any recent news ... as these may be fraudulent." +The Baltic Business News website reported that Estonia has offered to +send a specialist online security team to Georgia +However a spokesman from Estonia's Development Centre of State +Information Systems said Georgia had not made a formal request. "This +will be decided by the government," he said +NEW YORK TIMES +12 August 2008 +By John Markoff +Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks +Weeks before bombs started falling on Georgia, a security researcher in +suburban Massachusetts was watching an attack against the country in +cyberspace. +Jose Nazario of Arbor Networks in Lexington noticed a stream of data +directed at Georgian government sites containing the message: +win+love+in+Rusia. +Other Internet experts in the United States said the attacks against Georgia +Internet infrastructure began as early as July 20, with coordinated barrages of +millions of requests + known as distributed denial of service, or D.D.O.S., +attacks + that overloaded and effectively shut down Georgian servers. +Researchers at Shadowserver, a volunteer group that tracks malicious +network activity, reported that the Web site of the Georgian president, Mikheil +Saakashvili, had been rendered inoperable for 24 hours by multiple D.D.O.S. +attacks. They said the command and control server that directed the attack +was based in the United States and had come online several weeks before it +began the assault. +As it turns out, the July attack may have been a dress rehearsal for an all-out +cyberwar once the shooting started between Georgia and Russia. According +to Internet technical experts, it was the first time a known cyberattack had +coincided with a shooting war. +But it will likely not be the last, said Bill Woodcock, the research director of the +Packet Clearing House, a nonprofit organization that tracks Internet traffic. He +said cyberattacks are so inexpensive and easy to mount, with few fingerprints, +they will almost certainly remain a feature of modern warfare. +It costs about 4 cents per machine, + Mr. Woodcock said. +You could fund +an entire cyberwarfare campaign for the cost of replacing a tank tread, so +you would be foolish not to. +Exactly who was behind the cyberattack is not known. The Georgian +government blamed Russia for the attacks, but the Russian government said it +was not involved. In the end, Georgia, with a population of just 4.6 million and +a relative latecomer to the Internet, saw little effect beyond inaccessibility to +many of its government Web sites, which limited the government +s ability to +spread its message online and to connect with sympathizers around the world +during the fighting with Russia. +It ranks 74th out of 234 nations in terms of Internet addresses, behind Nigeria, +Bangladesh, Bolivia and El Salvador, according to Renesys, a Manchester, +N.H., firm that provides performance data on the state of Internet. +Cyberattacks have far less impact on such a country than they might on a +more Internet-dependent nation, like Israel, Estonia or the United States, +where vital services like transportation, power and banking are tied to the +Internet. +In Georgia, media, communications and transportation companies were also +attacked, according to security researchers. Shadowserver saw the attack +against Georgia spread to computers throughout the government after +Russian troops entered the Georgian province of South Ossetia. The National +Bank of Georgia +s Web site was defaced at one point. Images of 20thcentury dictators as well as an image of Georgia +s president, Mr. Saakashvili, +were placed on the site. +Could this somehow be indirect Russian action? +Yes, but considering Russia is past playing nice and uses real bombs, they +could have attacked more strategic targets or eliminated the infrastructure +kinetically, + said Gadi Evron, an Israeli network security expert. +The nature of +what +s going on isn +t clear, + he said. +The phrase +a wilderness of mirrors + usually describes the murky world +surrounding opposing intelligence agencies. It also neatly summarizes the +array of conflicting facts and accusations encompassing the cyberwar now +taking place in tandem with the Russian fighting in Georgia. +In addition to D.D.O.S. attacks that crippled Georgia +s limited Internet +infrastructure, researchers said there was evidence of redirection of Internet +traffic through Russian telecommunications firms beginning last weekend. The +attacks continued on Tuesday, controlled by software programs that were +located in hosting centers controlled by a Russian telecommunications firms. +A Russian-language Web site, stopgeorgia.ru, also continued to operate and +offer software for download used for D.D.O.S. attacks. +Over the weekend a number of American computer security researchers +tracking malicious programs known as botnets, which were blasting streams +of useless data at Georgian computers, said they saw clear evidence of a +shadowy St. Petersburg-based criminal gang known as the Russian Business +Network, or R.B.N. +The attackers are using the same tools and the same attack commands that +have been used by the R.B.N. and in some cases the attacks are being +launched from computers they are known to control, + said Don Jackson, +director of threat intelligence for SecureWorks, a computer security firm +based in Atlanta. +He noted that in the run-up to the start of the war over the weekend, +computer researchers had watched as botnets were +staged + in preparation +for the attack, and then activated shortly before Russian air strikes began on +Saturday. +The evidence on R.B.N. and whether it is controlled by, or coordinating with +the Russian government remains unclear. The group has been linked to online +criminal activities including child pornography, malware, identity theft, +phishing and spam. Other computer researchers said that R.B.N. +s role is +ambiguous at best. +We are simply seeing the attacks coming from known +hosting services, + said Paul Ferguson, an advanced threat researcher at +Trend Micro, an Internet security company based in Cupertino, Calif. A +Russian government spokesman said that it was possible that individuals in +Russia or elsewhere had taken it upon themselves to start the attacks. +I cannot exclude this possibility, + Yevgeniy Khorishko, a spokesman for the +Russian Embassy in Washington, said. +There are people who don +t agree with +something and they try to express themselves. You have people like this in +your country. +Jumping to conclusions is premature, + said Mr. Evron, who founded the +Israeli Computer Emergency Response Team. +13 August 2008 +By Glenn Chapman +Georgia targeted in cyber attack +Georgian government websites have been under intense cyber attack on +top of the Russian military strikes launched against the country late last week, +a US Internet firm said Tuesday. +Tulip Systems Inc said they took over hosting of the websites for Georgia's +presidency and a major television network on Saturday, a day after Russian +forces poured into Georgia in response to Tbilisi's attacks on a Moscowbacked rebel province. +Tulip executive Tom Burling said the distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) +attacks began in the weeks running up to the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia +conflict and continued Tuesday after the Kremlin announced it had ceased +hostilities in the former Soviet state. +"They have been attacking Georgia from a cyber standpoint since July," +Burling told AFP. "They are still doing it now." +"Our poor technician here has gotten three hours sleep in the past four days," +he said. +Burling suggested that Russia was behind the attacks, which are similar to a +cyber offensive waged against Estonia last year that coincided with a +diplomatic spat between the Baltic state and Moscow. +DDoS attacks consist of overloading websites with so many online requests +that systems crash. +Burling said Georgian government websites were being slammed with +hundreds of millions of simultaneous requests for documents when Tulip gave +them refuge, Burling said. +"The cyber attack was taking down every Georgian government website," he +said. +On Tuesday, the Georgian sites hosted on Tulip were still reportedly getting hit +with 68,000 requests at a time. +Russia has denied involvement in cyber assaults on Georgia and experts say it +is difficult to determine exactly who is behind such attacks. +"The Georgian government's websites have obviously been under attack," +said Gadi Evron, an Israeli computer security specialist that investigated the +cyber assault on Estonia. +"It is simply too early and we lack enough information to reach any +conclusion as to the motive and identity of the attackers," he said. +Evron said that such cyber warfare has become commonplace in the past +decade. +"These types of attack are only natural and happen immediately following +any conflict or political tension," Evron told AFP in an email. +DDoS attacks are simple, economical and hard to trace. +The assaults are typically done by using networks of computers that have +been turned into "zombies" or "bots" with malicious software planted by +hackers without the owners of machines being aware. +"Botnets" can grow to thousands or millions of machines and be commanded +to simultaneously make requests at targeted websites. +Andre DiMino, director of Shadowserver, a nonprofit Internet security +watchdog with team members around the world, warned against jumping to +the conclusion that Russia's government is the culprit in the Georgia cyber +attacks. +"This actually looks more like grass roots hacktivist types -- people that jumped +on the bandwagon," DiMino said, using Internet jargon referring to political +activists that resort to online evil-doing. +Tulip's Burling said the trend of such cyber maliciousness was a cause for +concern. +"It's like the Olympics. We are supposed to be above politics in the Internet +community." +Georgian forces attacked the Moscow-backed rebel province of South +Ossetia to regain control of the region which broke away from Tbilisi in the +early 1990s. +Russian troops and tanks poured into Georgia on Friday after the Georgian +offensive. +INTERNATIONAL DATA GROUP +13 August 2008 +By Jeremy Kirk +Estonia, Poland help Georgia fight cyber attacks +In an intriguing cyber alliance, two Estonian computer experts are scheduled +to arrive in Georgia by evening to keep the country's networks running amid +an intense military confrontation with Russia. +And Poland has lent space on its president's Web page for Georgia to post +updates on its ongoing conflict with Russia, which launched a military +campaign on Friday to eject Georgian troops from South Ossetia and +Abkhazia, two renegade areas with strong ties to Russia. +The cooperation between the former Iron Curtain allies is aimed at blunting +pro-Russian computer hackers, who have been blamed over the last few +years for cyber attacks against Estonia, Lithuania and Georgia in incidents +linked to political friction between those nations and Russia. +Two of the four experts that staff Estonia's Computer Emergency Response +Team (CERT) were waiting Tuesday morning in Yerevan, the capital of +Armenia, seeking permission to drive into Georgia, said Katrin P +communication manager for the Estonian Informatics Center. The two officials +are also bringing humanitarian aid, she said. +Estonia is also now hosting Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, which +has been under sustained attack over the last few days. +"Let's just say we moved it," P +e said. "I know that there are interested +parties who read media so it's not good to say exactly where the hosting is." +The Web site for Georgia's president, Mikheil Saakashvili, remained up on +Tuesday morning. That site was knocked offline around mid-July after a DDOS +attack from a botnet, network experts said. +The botnet was based on the "MachBot" code, which communicates to other +compromised PCs over the HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol), the same +protocol used for transmitting Web pages. MachBot code has been known to +be used by Russian bot herders, according to the Shadowserver Foundation, +which tracks malicious Internet activity. +Shadowserver said Monday that hackers had at one point defaced the Web +site for Georgia's parliament. "The attackers have inserted a large image +made up of several smaller side-by-side images of pictures of both the +Georgian President and Adolf Hitler," the group wrote. +Georgia is now also hosting some sites in the U.S., a logical move to better +defend the sites against attacks, P +e said. Shadowserver wrote that the +presidential site appeared to have been moved to an IP (Internet protocol) +address belonging to Tulip Systems, an ISP in Atlanta, Georgia. +The country is also looking to other ways to keep information flowing. A +Georgian news site was also up, but the site warned it was under "permanent +DDOS attack" That Web site has set up a group in Google's Groups service, +where subscribers can get the news stories it regularly posts. +Georgia's banking sites also suffered attacks that caused them to shut down +their online systems, said David Tabatadze, a security officer with the Georgia +Research and Educational Networking Association and Georgia's CERT. Some +of those systems are still down, he said. +Tabatadze said that the majority of Georgia's Internet traffic is routed through +Turkey, with some of it going through Russia. Although some news reports +indicated Georgia's Internet traffic may have been shifted through Russia, +Tabatadze said that's not the case. +"We have checked the traffic route on Ripe.net...and we did not see any +traffic re-routing via Russia," Tabatadze said. +It appears that large groups of hackers are working together to take down +the Web sites, but the attacks have been so intense that it will take a while to +analyze, Tabatadze said. +Other CERTs around the world have been helping to provide information on +the attacks, Tabatadze said. +The last few days have been a nerve-racking time for Georgians, said +Tabatadze, who said he heard explosions on Sunday when Russian planes +bombed air-traffic control stations near Tbilisi, Georgia's capital. +"You can't even imagine the situation," Tabatadze said. "This is a terrible end +for Georgia." +On Tuesday morning, Russia announced it would stop military operations in +South Ossetia and Abkhazia, saying the safety of its peacekeepers in the +region had been secured. +THE TELEGRAPH +13 August 2008 +By John Swaine +Russia continues cyber war on Georgia +Their assault, which began before the commencement of the five-day +Russian military offensive, has again crashed the official website of the central +government and has been widened to include a US company which +stepped in to rescue the website of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian +President. +Tom Burling, from Tulip Systems, which began hosting the President's site on its +servers in Atlanta after it was brought down by the hackers, said his company +had become the latest target of a flood of bogus traffic sent from Russia to +crash the sites. He said the malicious visits were outnumbering legitimate ones +5000 to 1. +Mr Burling, who has reported the attacks to the FBI, said his company was +working around the clock to combat the hackers. "Our people aren't getting +any sleep," he said. +The President's website is currently accessible, as are the sites of the Ministry of +Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, which were also brought down in the +initial wave of attacks. At one stage, photographs comparing Mr Saaskashvili +with Adolf Hitler were posted on the Foreign Ministry's site. The website of the +National Bank of Georgia has also been compromised. +The Russian hackers are launching waves of distributed denial-of-service +(DDoS) attacks on the websites. This means their computers, and the +computers of unsuspecting people whose home systems they have hacked +and enlisted for their "botnet", or swarm of zombie computers, are directed to +simultaneously flood a chosen site with thousands of visits in order to overload +it and bring it offline. +Last April the computer systems of the Estonian Government came under +attack in a co-ordinated three-week assault that was widely credited to +state-sponsored Russian hackers. +The Georgian Government said that the present disruption was being caused +by attacks carried out by Russia as part of the conflict between the two +states, which was triggered last week over Georgia's attempt to reassert +authority over its northern rebel province of South Ossetia. +In a statement, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: "A cyber warfare +campaign by Russia is seriously disrupting many Georgian websites, including +that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." +Analysts immediately laid the blame for the attacks on Georgian sites with the +Russian Business Network (RBN), a gang of criminal hackers which has close +links to the Russian mafia and government. +Jart Armin, a researcher who tracks RBN activity, said visitors to the Georgian +sites had been re-routed through servers in Russia and Turkey, which were +"well known to be under the control of RBN and influenced by the Russian +Government." +Greg Day, a security analyst at McAfee, said increasingly hacking will be a +matter of national security. +"We can expect to see cyber attacks being increasingly used as a weapon. +The benefits of using such methods are that no one is directly physically hurt +or killed and it is much harder to pinpoint the source and who is involved," he +told Sky News. +The hackers have also been targeting the website of Garry Kasparov, the +Russian opposition figure and former chess champion. +WASHINGTON POST +27 August 2008 +By Kim Hart +A New Breed Of Hackers Tracks Online Acts of War +'Hacktivists' Update Their Mission +TORONTO -- Here in the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, a new breed +of hackers is conducting digital espionage. +They are among a growing number of investigators who monitor how traffic is +routed through countries, where Web sites are blocked and why it's all +happening. Now they are turning their scrutiny to a new weapon of +international warfare: cyber attacks. +Tracking wars isn't what many of the researchers, who call themselves +"hacktivists," set out to do. Many began intending to help residents in +countries that censor online content. But as the Internet has evolved, so has +their mission. +Ronald J. Deibert, director of the Citizen Lab, calls the organization a "global +civil society counterintelligence agency" and refers to the lab as the "NSA of +operations." +Their efforts have ramped up in the past year as researchers gather evidence +that Internet assaults are playing a larger role in military strategy and political +struggles. Even before Georgia and Russia entered a ground war earlier this +month, Citizen Lab's researchers noticed sporadic attacks aimed at several +Georgian Web sites. Such attacks are especially threatening to countries that +increasingly link critical activities such as banking and transportation to the +Internet. +Once the fighting began, massive raids on Georgia's Internet infrastructure +were deployed using techniques similar to those used by Russian criminal +organizations. Then, attacks seemed to come from individuals who found +online instructions for launching their own assaults, shutting down much of +Georgia's communication system. +Two weeks later, researchers are still trying to trace the origins of the attacks. +"These attacks in effect had the same effect that a military attack would +have," said Rafal Rohozinski, who co-founded the Information Warfare +Monitor, which tracks cyber attacks, with Citizen Lab in 2003. "That suddenly +means that in cyberspace anyone can build an A-bomb." +The cyber attacks that disabled many Georgian and Russian Web sites earlier +this month marked the first time such an assault coincided with physical +fighting. And the digital battlefield will likely become a permanent front in +modern warfare, Deibert said. +Seven years ago, Deibert opened the Citizen Lab using grant money from the +Ford Foundation. Soon after, he and Rohozinski helped begin the OpenNet +Initiative, a collaboration with Harvard's Law School, Cambridge and Oxford +universities that tracks patterns of Internet censorship in countries that use +filters, such as China. The project received an additional $3 million from the +MacArthur Foundation. Deibert and Rohozinski also launched the Information +Warfare Monitor to investigate how the Internet is used by state military and +political operations. And Citizen Lab researchers have created a software +tool called Psiphon that helps users bypass Internet filters. +The combined projects have about 100 researchers in more than 70 countries +mapping Web traffic and testing access to thousands of sites. +A number of companies specialize in cyber security, and several nonprofit +organizations have formed cyber-surveillance projects to keep international +vigil over the Web. Shadowserver.org, for example, is a group of 10 volunteer +researchers who post their findings about cyber attacks online. +The small Toronto office of Citizen Lab, tucked in a basement of the +university's Munk Centre for International Studies, serves as the technological +backbone for the operations. World maps and newspaper clips cover the +walls. Researchers move between multiple computer screens, studying lists of +codes with results from field tests in Uzbekistan, Cambodia, Iran and +Venezuela, to name a few. +"We rely on local experts to help us find out why a particular site is being +blocked," Deibert said. It could be a problem with the Internet service +provider, a temporary connection glitch or a downed server. "But what's more +effective is blasting a site into oblivion when it is strategically important. It's +becoming a real arms race." +He's referring to "denial of service" attacks, in which hundreds of computers in +a network, or "botnets," simultaneously bombard a Web site with millions of +requests, overwhelming and crashing the server. In Georgia, such attacks +were strong enough to knock key sources of news and information offline for +days. +Georgian Internet service providers also limited access to Russian news media +outlets, cutting off the only remaining updates about the war. On the night of +Aug. 12 -- the height of the fighting -- "there was panic in Tbilisi brought about +by a vacuum of information," Rohozinski said. +Shadowserver saw the first denial of service attack against Georgia's +presidential Web site July 20. When the fighting began, Andre M. Di Mino, +Shadowserver's founder, counted at least six botnets launching attacks, but it +was "difficult to tell if it was a grass-roots effort or one commissioned by the +government." +The organization detects between 30 and 50 denial of service attacks every +day around the world, and Di Mino said they have become more +sophisticated over the past two years. +"It really went from almost a kiddie type of thing to where it's an organized +enterprise," he said. But he's hesitant to label this month's attacks as a form of +cyberwar, although he expects networks to play an expanded role in political +clashes. +Jose Nazario, a security researcher with Arbor Networks, said cyber attacks +used to target a computer's operating system. But he's seen a "tremendous +rise" in attacks on Web browsers, allowing attackers access to much more +personal information, such as which sites a person visits frequently. An +attacker then could learn which servers to target in order to disrupt +communication. +It's unclear who is behind the attacks, however. In some cases, the locations +of botnet controllers can be traced, but it's impossible to know whether an +attacker is working on the behalf of another organization or government. "It's +going to take a year to figure this out," Nazario said. +The data trail often goes cold when it crosses borders because there is little +legal framework for such investigations. And many countries, along with the +United Nations and other international bodies, are still weighing whether a +cyber attack is an act of war. +"If a state brings down the Internet intentionally, another state could very well +consider that a hostile act," said Jonathan Zittrain, co-founder of Harvard's +Berkman Center for Internet Society, and a principal investigator for the +OpenNet Initiative. +There are also strategic reasons not to disrupt networks in order to monitor the +enemy's conversations or to spread misinformation. +"That's an amazing intelligence opportunity," he said. +Using the Internet to control information can be more important than +disrupting the networks when it comes to military strategy, Rohozinski said. In +Georgia, for example, the lack of access to both Georgian and Russian +sources of information kept citizens in the dark while the fighting continued. +"Sometimes the objective is not to knock out the infrastructure but to +undermine the will of the people you're fighting against," he said. "It's about +the nuts and bolts, but it's also about how perceptions can be shaped +through what's available and what's not." +NEWSWEEK +1 September 2008 +By Trevis Wentworth +ve Got Malice +Russian nationalists waged a cyber war against Georgia. Fighting back is +virtually impossible. +On July 20, weeks before Russia stunned Georgia with a rapid invasion, the +cyber attack was already under way. While Moscow baited Georgia with +troop movements on the borders of the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia +and South Ossetia, the "zombie" computers were already on the attack. +Russian viruses had seized hundreds of thousands of computers around the +world, directing them to barrage Georgian Web sites, including the pages of +the president, the parliament, the foreign ministry, news agencies and banks, +which shut down their servers at the first sign of attack to pre-empt identity +theft. At one point the parliament's Web site was replaced by images +comparing Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to Adolf Hitler. This was not +the first Russian cyber assault +that came against Estonia, in April of 2007 +it was the first time an Internet attack paralleled one on land. +The labyrinthine ways of the Web and the complicated interfaces between +the Russian government's clandestine services and organized crime make it +impossible, at this point, to say with certainty who was responsible, or how far +up the chain of command it went. The Russian military certainly had the +means to attack Georgia's Internet infrastructure, says Jonathan Zittrain, +cofounder of Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society. Moreover, +the attacks were too successful to have materialized independent of one +another. Bill Woodcock, the research director at Packet Clearing House, a +California-based nonprofit group that tracks Internet security trends, says the +attacks bear the markings of a "trained and centrally coordinated cadre of +professionals." +But who? Jart Armin, who has tracked Russian cybercrime, points to the +possibility that a role was played by the notorious Russian Business Network, a +cybermafia that specializes in identity theft, child pornography, extortion and +other dark and lucrative Internet crimes. The RBN's political agenda is vague +or nonexistent, but it often contracts out its services, and Armin says there is +increasing evidence that it is connected to, or at least tolerated by, the +Kremlin. +Indeed the timing is such that it's hard to discount some sort of Kremlin +coordination, even if it's impossible to prove, and Woodcock argues that such +cyber assaults have become a tool of Russian political leadership. As the +attacks' political intentions became more specific, he notes, the operations +have grown more complex. In addition to targeting Georgian government +and media Web sites, Russian hackers brought down the Russian newspaper +Skandaly.ru, apparently for expressing some pro-Georgian sentiment. "This +was the first time that they ever attacked an internal and an external target +as part of the same attack," he says. +Fighting back is tough. When Russian hackers made a name for themselves +last year by bringing down the Web site of the Estonian parliament along with +the sites of banks, ministries and newspapers, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas +Paet immediately accused the Kremlin of backing the attacks. But he was +unable to produce evidence supporting his claims. Putin eventually named a +suspect, or scapegoat, within his government. As Russian hackers waged a +similar assault on Georgian sites over the past few weeks, Estonia +one of +Europe's most wired countries +offered its better-defended servers to host +many Georgian government Web sites. Lithuania and Poland have stepped +up as well, prompting some excited bloggers to suggest that this is a digital +Sarajevo, akin to the events of August 1914, the start of the first Internet world +war. Certainly that's exaggerated, but the mutual defense going on in +cyberspace shows that these nations take the Russian threat to their online +infrastructure seriously. +Still, the nature of the Internet is such that it is almost impossible to respond +quickly enough. The government doesn't maintain its own botnets +large +networks of zombified computers standing ready to attack +but can rent one +from a crime network, like the Russian Business Network. Then, through statecontrolled media, the government can inspire waves of nationalists to amplify +the destructive force. "Everybody with a laptop has the responsibility to attack +the enemy +and you find out who the enemy is by looking at what the +government is saying," Woodcock says. +While no one can say who wrote the malware that was used to cause +Georgian servers to crash, it certainly proliferated on Russian Web sites in a +user-friendly form. Gary Warner, a cybercrime expert at the University of +Alabama at Birmingham, says he found "copies of the attack script" posted in +the reader comments section at the bottom of virtually every story in the +Russian media that covered the Georgian conflict, complete with instructions +on how the script could be used to attack a specific list of Web sites. The +efficiency is enough to make Russia's tanks and planes and ships, however +deadly, appear downright anachronistic. +4 September 2008 +Experts call for united global action against cyber attacks +The world has to unite against the growing menace of cyber terrorism, IT +experts said Thursday, evoking a recent "cyber war" against Georgia as the +latest example of the threat. +"The world has finally woken up and understood that cyber security needs a +global approach and is a very serious matter," Estonian politician Mart Laar +told a cyber security forum in the Estonian capital Tallinn. +Estonia had to deal with attacks on government websites blamed on Russian +hackers in the spring of 2007. +Official Georgian websites suffered a similar cyber offensive last month in the +wake of Russia's military offensive on Georgian soil. Estonia was among +several states that stepped in to host hacked Georgian websites. +"The cyber war against Georgia in August demonstrated how it has become +part of the real war on the ground and we must act," Laar added. +According to Laar, cyber attacks against the Georgian websites came a day +ahead of Russia's August 8 military action in the country, a move roundly +condemned in the West. +Robert Kramer, vice-president of public policy for CompTIA, the Computing +Technology Industry Association uniting the world's top IT firms, underscored +that global cyber security starts at home with the average Internet user. +"The weakest link in cyber space is the human being behind the computer +with not enough awareness and skills on IT security matters," Kramer told the +forum. +Heli Tiirmaa-Klaar, an IT expert with Estonia's defence ministry, repeated the +warning. +"People everywhere need to understand that your unprotected computer at +home can be used as a tool in cyber-war," she said. +Tim Boerner, an IT security expert with the US Secret Service, said experts +noted increased attacks on Georgian web sites weeks before the first bombs +fell on Georgia. +"Over one million computers worldwide were used during the cyber attacks +against Estonia in spring 2007," he added. +An ex-Soviet republic that broke free from Moscow in 1991, the tiny Baltic Sea +state of Estonia joined the European Union and NATO in 2004. +It has become a leader in global IT development and has focused heavily on +cyber security since suffering the wave of cyber attacks in early 2007. +WASHINGTON POST (blog) +16 October 2008 +By Brian Krebs +Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber Attacks +An exhaustive inquiry into August's cyber attacks on the former Soviet bloc +nation of Georgia finds no smoking gun in the hands of the Russian +government. But experts say evidence suggests that Russian officials did little +to discourage the online assault, which was coordinated through a Russian +online forum that appeared to have been prepped with target lists and +details about Georgian Web site vulnerabilities well before the two countries +engaged in a brief but deadly ground, sea and air war. +The findings come from an open source investigation launched byProject +Grey Goose, a volunteer effort by more than 100 security experts from tech +giants like Microsoft and Oracle, as well as former members of the Defense +Intelligence Agency, Lexis-Nexis, theDepartment of Homeland Security and +defense contractor SAIC, among others. +The group began its inquiry shortly after the cyber war disabled a large +number of Georgia government Web sites. Starting with the Russian hacker +forum Xaker.ru (hacker.ru), investigators found a posting encouraging wouldbe cyber militia members to enlist at a private, password-protected online +forum called StopGeorgia.ru. Grey Goose principal investigator Jeff Carr said +the administrators of the hacker forum were keenly aware that American +cyber sleuths were poking around: Within hours after discovering the link to +the StopGeorgia site, Xaker.ru administrators deleted the link and banned all +access from U.S.-based Internet addresses. +At StopGeorgia.ru, project members unearthed a top-down hierarchy of +expert hackers who doled out target lists of Georgian government Web sites +to relative novices, complete with instructions on how to exploit vulnerabilities +in the sites in order to render them inaccessible. Following a July defacement +of the Georgian president's Web site that was blamed on Russian hackers, the +Georgian government blocked Russian Internet users from visiting +government Web sites. +But Carr said StopGeorgia administrators also equipped recruits with +directions on evading those digital roadblocks, by routing their attacks +through Internet addresses in other Eastern European nations. The level of +advance preparation and reconnaissance strongly suggests that Russian +hackers were primed for the assault by officials within the Russian government +and or military, Carr said. +"The fact that the StopGeorgia.ru site was up and running within hours of the +ground assault -- with full target lists already vetted and with a large member +population -- was evidence that this effort did not just spring up out of +nowhere," said Carr, speaking at a forum in Tysons Corner, Va., sponsored +by Palantir Technologies, an In-Q-Tel funded company in Palo Alto, Calif., +whose data analysis software helped Grey Goose investigators track the +origins and foot soldiers involved in the cyber attack. "If they were planning +ahead of the invasion, how did they know the invasion was going to occur? +The only way they could have known that is if they were told." +Initially, security experts assumed that the sites were felled via "distributed +denial of service" (DDoS) attacks, a well-known method of assault that uses +hundreds or thousands of compromised personal computers to flood a +targeted site with so much junk traffic that it can no longer accommodate +legitimate visitors. But investigators soon learned that attackers were +instructed in the ways of a far more simple but equally effective attack +strategy capable of throttling a targeted Web site using a single computer. +Security researcher and Grey Goose investigator Billy Rios said attackers +disabled the sites using a built-in feature of MySQL, a software suite widely +used by Web sites to manage back-end databases. The "benchmark" feature +in MySQL allows site administrators to test the efficiency of database queries, +but last year hackers posted online instructions for exploiting the benchmark +feature to inject millions of junk queries into a targeted database, such that +the Web servers behind the site become so tied up with bogus instructions +that they effectively cease to function. +"Not only can a small number of users bring down the back end databases, it +indicates that there was some form of planning, reconnaissance, and some +technical sophistication by some of the members," Rios said. "It also indicates +that all the information from the attacked systems was most likely already +compromised and pilfered before the injection point was posted." +While Grey Goose members could find no direct link between Russian +government officials and the StopGeorgia.ru forum administrators, they claim +it is unreasonable to conclude that no such connection exists. +"The historical record shows clear support by members of the Russian +government and implied consent in its refusal to intervene or stop the hacker +attacks," the report states, naming at least three Russian politicians and +military officials who have previously endorsed coordinated cyber attacks +against other nations as a show of nationalistic pride. +Oleg Gordievsky, a former colonel in the Russian KGB who defected to the +British intelligence wing MI6 in 1985, spoke in 1998 at an international +conference on crime and discussed how Russian hackers convicted of cyber +crime are sometimes offered an alternative to prison -- working for the FSB" +(the federal security service of the Russian Federation and a successor to the +KGB). +According to a cyber warfare analysis by researchers at Dartmouth College, +Moscow has a track record of offensive hacking into Chechen Web sites. The +researchers provide this account of incidents in 2002, when Russian hackers +used cyber warfare in to supplement the ongoing military conflict with +Chechnya. +"In 2002, Chechen rebels claimed that two of their Web sites, kavkaz.org and +chechenpress.com, crashed under hack attacks by the Russian FSB security +service. The website crashes were reportedly timed to occur concurrently or +shortly after Russian Special Forces troops stormed the Moscow Theater in +which the rebels had taken hostages. "On October 26 ... our Web Site +kavkaz.org was attacked by a group of hackers," said a spokesman for the +Chechen rebel site run by Movladi Udugov. Following the attack on the site, +which is based in the United States, Udugov said that he was "amazed Russia's +special services can operate so freely on U.S. territory." The attacks on one +site, chechenpress.com, fell under the category of brute-force denial of +service (DoS) attacks, while on the other site, kavkaz.org, the attacks +appeared much more sophisticated. +According to Chechen sources, the Web site was hijacked by hackers from +the FSB. The FSB hackers reportedly accomplished this by changing the +domain registration of the site and then eliminating the data for the site from +the hosting server. Upon learning of these attacks, the rebels moved the +information on the sites to kavkazcenter.com. However, that site was +attacked just a week later, also apparently the work of FSB hackers. +In July, Russian hackers were blamed for a similar assault on Lithuanian +government Web sites. In Security Fix's account of that attack, I posted a +copy of a congratulatory letter sent to nationalist Russian hackers by Nikolai +Kuryanovich, a former member of the Russian Duma. The missive is dated +March 2006, and addresses the hacker group Slavic Union after the group +had just completed a series of successful attacks against Israeli Web sites. +"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the open field of +battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with the aid of information +soldiers, that is hackers," Kuryanovich wrote. "This means that a small force of +hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of the current armed +forces." +The Grey Goose report concludes that the journeyman-apprentice +relationship observed in the StopGeorgia forum will continue to be the +training model used by nationalistic Russian hackers, and that those hackers +are actively engaged in finding more efficient ways to disable networks. +In the meantime, Carr said, the Russian government will continue to deny any +involvement in any nation-level cyber attacks. +"The Russian government has adopted this hands-off and satisfying position of +deniability while enjoying the rewards achieved by the Russian hacker +community," Carr said. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +HOW CHINA WILL USE CYBER WARFARE +TO LEAPFROG IN MILITARY COMPETITIVENESS +byJason Fritz BS (St. Cloud), MIR (Bond) +Introduction +The People +s Republic of China (PRC) may be a global power economically but its military lacks force projection +beyond the Asia Pacific region. Its traditional military hardware is one to three generations behind the US and +Russia. In light of these deficiencies it is probable that cyber warfare will provide China with an asymmetric +advantage to deter aggression from stronger military powers as they catch up in traditional military capabilities. +Cyber warfare would also allow China to leapfrog by means of technology transfer and exploiting adversary +weaknesses. This investigation will address three primaryquestions: What is China +s current militarycapability? +How would cyber warfare allow China to seriously advance its strategic abilities? And what is the evidence that +China is headed in a cyber warfare direction? +1. Traditional Military Power of the PLA +In order to see how the Chinese military will +leapfrog + in military competitiveness, it is +necessary to establish its current capabilities. The Chinese People +s Liberation Army (PLA) +is composed of five main service branches, the PLA Ground Force, PLA Navy, PLA Air +Force, Second Artillery Corps, and the PLA Reserved Force. China has one of the world +largest military forces, with 2.3 million active members, a reserve force of 800,000, and a +paramilitary force of 3.9 million, for a grand total of approximately 7 million members. The +PLA has tried to transform itself from a land based power, to a smaller, mobile, high tech +power that is capable of reaching beyond its borders (Annual Report to Congress 2007; +China's National Defense in 2006). +During the 1980 +s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping pushed for quality over quantity, and the +military was reduced by one million members. In 1993, President Jiang Zemin officially +announced a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) a part of the national military strategy for +modernization. RMA is a theory about the future of warfare, often connected to +technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military +and others. RMA is tied to modern information, communications, space technology, and +total systems integration. Careful observation of US involvement in the Kosovo, +Afghanistan, and Iraqi wars, furthered China +s interest in network-centric warfare and +asymmetric warfare, the former successfully used by the US, and the latter successfully used +against the US. At the turn of the century, the bulk of China +s traditional military force +remained 1950s to 1970s era technology imported and reverse engineered from Russia. +China is seeking to modernize this force. The size of China +s traditional force will shrink, as +fewer numbers are needed when new technology is introduced (Cordesman and Kleiber 2006; +Corpus 2006; Moore 2000). +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +China +s defence budget has increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The official +military budget of China was US$57 billion in 2008, making it the second largest military +budget in the world. By contrast, the largest is the US with $623 billion, and the third largest +is Russia with $50 billion. Japan, South Korea, and India are the next largest spenders in the +Asia Pacific region with $41 billion, $21 billion, and $19 billion, respectively (World Wide +Military Expenditures 2007). China +s annual defence budget increases at approximately the +same rate as its annual GDP, with an average increase of 9% per year since 1996 (Pike 2008; +China's National Defense in 2006). However, China +s total military spending may be far +greater than the official figures reported. Foreign acquisitions, research and development of +dual use science and technology, national security, construction, and emergency response and +disaster relief, are a few examples of expenditures which may fall under non-military +headings but directly relate to the advancement of the military. The US Department of +Defence estimates China +s total military-related spending for 2007 could be between $97 +billion and $139 billion. Think tanks and academic institutions report a wide range of +estimates for China +s defence budget, using varying methodologies and sources, however +most arrive at the same conclusion: China significantly under-reports its defence expenditures +(Annual Report to Congress 2008; International Assessment and Strategy Center 2005). +Ground Force +The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) is the world +s largest, with 1.25 million personnel, or about +70% of the PLA +s total manpower (Annual Report to Congress 2008). Approximately +400,000 of these troops are based in the three military regions (MRs) opposite Taiwan. +According to the 2008 Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies +(IISS), the PLAGF comprises 18 group armies which include 9 armoured divisions, 3 +mechanised infantry divisions, 24 motorised infantry divisions, 15 infantry divisions, two +amphibious assault divisions, one mechanised infantry brigade, 22 motorised infantry +brigades, 12 armoured brigades, 7 artillery divisions, 14 artillery brigades, and nine antiaircraft artillery missile brigades. China +s military doctrine places an emphasis on electronic +and information warfare, long-range precision strikes, surface-to-air missiles, special +operations forces, army aviation helicopters, and satellite communications. The PLAGF +continues to reduce its overall size, opting for a more high tech and mobile force (China's +National Defense in 2006). +While much of the equipment remains antiquated, China is continually upgrading. This +includes approximately 200 Type 98 and Type 99 main battle tanks now deployed to units in +the Beijing and Shenyang MRs. As many as 6,000 tanks were produced by China in the +1960 +s. From the early 1970 +s to 2000, China +s tank inventory remained around 10,000. +This was mostly composed of old Soviet tanks and Chinese versions of old Soviet designs. +China continually upgraded over the decades, but was always one step behind the current +Soviet models. The Chinese-produced versions of the Soviet T-54A (Type 59 and Type 69) +account for over two-thirds of the total PLA tank inventory. While retiring some of the older +Type 59/69 series and replacing them with the second generation Type 88 and Type 96, the +PLA is also upgrading the remaining Type 59/69 series tanks with new technologies +including improved communication and fire-control systems, night vision equipment, +explosive reactive armour, improved power plant, and gun-fired anti-tank missiles so that +they can remain in service as mobile fire-support platforms. China +s newest tank, the Type +99, entered PLA service in 2001. Maintenance of such a massive force becomes a problem, +and many of China +s tanks may have fallen into disrepair. This may also be a push for +modernizing to a smaller but more effective force (Armoured Fighting Vehicles 2008). +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +The PLAGF +s hand guns further illustrate China +s attempts to modernize and catch up by +means of foreign acquisition and reverse engineering. Most of China +s weapons are derived +from Soviet models acquired before the Sino-Soviet split in late 1950s and early 1960s. +Examples include Soviet or Russian small arms like the Mosin-Nagant series rifles and +carbines, the SKS carbine, the AK-47 assault rifle, the RPD light-machine gun, the Tokarev +TT33 pistol, and the DShK heavy machine gun. The PLA +s main infantry rifle, the QBZ-95 +is derived from the Russian AK-47, and the Chinese Type 56 Assault Rifle is a direct copy, +albeit locally produced and with a permanently attached bayonet with a more sword-like, +stiletto style. The Chinese Type 56 Assault Rifle, a locally produced version of the SKS, also +differs from its Russian counterpart by having a permanently attached bayonet. The Chinese +Type 56 was mass produced from the 1960 +s to 1980 +s and was exported to many states +around the world (Small Arms 2008). +Navy +The People +s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is composed of 250,000 personnel divided into +three major fleets, the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, each containing +surface ships, submarines, naval air force, coastal defence, and marine units. China +s naval +force includes 57 attack submarines, 55 medium and heavy amphibious ships, and 49 coastal +missile patrol craft. A priority has been placed on anti-air capabilities with improvements in +over-the-horizon targeting, range, and accuracy in surface-to-air missiles. +Taking +informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives +high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation +weaponry and equipment + (China's National Defense in 2006). As a part of PLAN +modernization program, PLAN has been developing blue water navy capabilities. +PLAN does not currently have an aircraft carrier. However, evidence suggests they are +pursing such technology and have the capability to construct one. Renovation to a former +Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier may be used for training purposes, and the Chinese +have expressed interest in acquiring Russian Su-33 carrier-borne fighters. The ex-Australian +carrier Melbourne also provided research for the PLAN as it was towed to China for scrap. +Russian assistance, coupled with an already capable ship building infrastructure, could allow +PLAN to rapidly develop an aircraft carrier. The PLAN's ambitions include operating out to +the first and second island chains, extending operations to the South Pacific near Australia, +north to the Aleutian Islands, and west to the Strait of Malacca towards the Indian Ocean +(Annual Report to Congress 2008). +China +s submarine fleet is derived from outdated Russian technology and is seeking to +become a more modern and smaller force. Early Chinese submarines were domestically +produced versions of the Soviet Romeo class submarine, which were only capable of coastal +patrols with deployment to sea limited to a few days per year. One Romeo was modified to +carry six YJ-1 (C-801) anti-ship missiles, but it had to surface to fire them. The Chinese +Ming class submarines produced in the 1970s were not much better, other than being of +newer construction. This was followed by the Song class submarine, which had a +streamlined hull and can be fitted with anti-ship missiles capable of being fired while +submerged. China returned to purchasing subs in the late 1990s with the Russian Kilo class +submarine. The Type 041 Yuan Class is the newest diesel-electric submarine in the PLAN. +Its design incorporates parts of the Song class and Russian Kilo class submarines. The Yuan +class has five torpedo tubes capable of launching indigenous torpedos as well as Russian +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +designed torpedos, and it is believed to have anti-ship missiles. This ship was designed to +replace the aging Romeo and Ming class submarines which currently form the backbone of +the PLAN +s submarine fleet (Chinese Submarines 2008; see also China +s Navy 2007). +Chinese produced Han class nuclear submarines were plagued with problems. A follow-on +Type 093 nuclear submarine was developed with experience from the Han class and further +assistance from Russian submarine builders, such as advanced wielding and construction +techniques. Despite being armed with new Chinese wire-guided torpedoes; the Type 093 +overall capability remains comparable to Russian technology of the late 1970s. Nevertheless, +China continues to make progress and the true level of Russian assistance lacks transparency +(Smith 2001). Further, the Type 093 may have benefited from German fuel cell technology +and French design, which could allow for two to three weeks of submerged operations +without having to surface to recharge batteries. Internet-source photos of Type 039s under +construction also show Chinese mastery of advanced multi-layer rubber/polymer hull +coatings that greatly reduce hull-radiated noise while limiting the effectiveness of activesonar detection (Chinese Submarines 2008). +China maintains a fleet of approximately 28 destroyers, 48 frigates, and 30 ocean-capable fast +attack craft. The frigates were designed for anti-surface warfare, and lacking significant selfdefence. Chinese-built destroyers include the Luhu class, the Luhai class, and the Luda +I/II/III, from oldest to newest, respectively. The Luhai and Luda class are armed with a +battery of guns, torpedos, mortars, optional helicopter pads, and domestically built Crotale +SAMs which were built from designs provided by France in the 1980s. Construction of the +Luhai class was delayed from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s due to construction of frigates +for the Thai Navy. The most powerful addition to the PLAN is the Russian-built +Sovremenny class destroyers. These include MOSKIT anti-ship missiles and KASHTAN +combined gun/missile ship defence systems. While these designs are non-stealth 1970s +Russian technology, outdated by current designs, they provided the PLAN with modern antiship, anti-air, and anti-submarine systems. The most recent Sovremenny acquisitions carry 8 +Sunburn supersonic sea-skimming ASM and the SA-N-7 Gadfly, which will give PLAN +limited naval air-defence capability. Up to this point, China only possessed short-range +SAMs of French or domestic design (Surface Combatants 2008; IISS 2008). +Improvements in stealth design of the PLAN +s ships further the notion that China seeks to +modernize by purchasing or clandestinely obtaining technology from other states, reverse +engineering that technology, and then attempting to make upgraded domestically produced +versions. According to Frank Moore of the Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies: +The PLA developed new stealthy warships benefiting from Russian or Ukrainian design +advice, weapons, electronics and other systems, plus new computer aided design methods +which speeded their development. By 2002 it was possible to observe the construction of +three new classes of warships via Chinese internet sources ... the No. 168 class, which +armed with Russian SHTIL SAMs, Russian radar, Kamov Ka-28 ASW helicopters and +Chinese C-802/803 anti-ship missiles, and powered by Ukrainian gas turbine engines. Soon +after two No. 170 class destroyers were launched. These featured large phased array radar +similar in appearance to the U.S. AEGIS system... Most likely the new "AEGIS" radar comes +from the Ukrainian KVANT bureau and is a newly-developed active phased array radar with a +broad search range of about 150km ... In 2003 [PLAN] launched two Type 054 stealthy +frigates. Some sources indicate production was halted at two ships pending the completion of +a new Russian SAM... In early 2004 internet-source pictures of a model of this new variant, +apparently from a Chinese shipbuilding exhibition, confirmed that it will feature a new verticallaunched SAM and be outfitted with Russian radar and missile guidance systems. The Type +054 is also powered by co-produced French-designed SEMT Pielstick marine diesel engines. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +A fourth stealthy warship emerged in April 2004: a new fast-attack craft (FAC). Now being +produced at two or three shipyards, this new FAC utilizes a wave-piercing catamaran (twin) +hull design, which improves stability at high speeds even in rough seas. It is based on a +design obtained from the Australian fast-ferry firm AMD... [with] radar-absorbing materials +applied to the hull. (Moore 2000). +Not only does this illustrate China +s use of foreign technology, it also demonstrates the +complexity of modern warfare. These are highly sophisticated weapons, weapons pieced +together from multiple sources, the existence of which was leaked onto the internet. +Air Force +The People +s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is the third largest air force in the world +behind the United States and Russia. The PLAAF employs 250,000 personnel and 1,762 +combat aircraft (IISS 2008). The Soviet Union helped found the PLAAF in 1949, providing +aircraft in 1951, and production technology and pilot training in 1953. China gained limited +air combat experience during the Korean War. In 1956 China began assembling its own +aircraft based on Soviet design, such as the J-2, J-5, and J-6, copies of the MiG-15, Mig-17, +and Mig-19 respectively. The Sino-Soviet split was a significant setback to the PLAAF as +was resource competition with the missile and nuclear divisions of the military. China +aircraft industry received a boost during the Vietnam War by providing aircraft for North +Vietnam. +During the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant restructuring, opting for a more +streamlined force and increased training. Due to the Sino-Soviet Split, the PLAAF turned to +Western states for military expertise. Western states saw China as a counterbalance to the +Soviet Union; however support dissolved following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. +Reverse engineering of Soviet weaponry continued with the Chinese aircraft F-7 being an +illegitimate copy of the MiG-21, and the F-8 incorporating various Soviet designs. +Gorbachev +s 1989 visit to China marked an end to the Sino-Soviet split. The newborn and +economically struggling state of Russia used the transfer of military technology and expertise +to China as a way to sustain its own aerospace industry (Moore 2000). +The collapse of The Soviet Union, and concerns over a Taiwan conflict that could draw in the +United States, reinvigorated the PLAAF +s modernization program. In the 1990s, China +began development of fourth generation fighters, including the J-10 and a collaboration with +Pakistan on the JF-17. China continued focusing on improved pilot training and retiring +obsolete aircraft, preferring quality over quantity. The PLAAF is currently developing its +own fifth generation stealth craft and increasing Command, Control, Communications, +Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems for all its +fighters. +In addition to jet fighter aircraft, +China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted +from the Russian Tu-16) with a new variant which, when operational, will be armed with a +new long-range cruise missile + (Annual Report to Congress 2008). China is also developing +Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft utilizing Russian and possibly Israeli +technology; and is making progress in tanker aircraft used for in-flight refuelling and airlift +planes. These are important steps in obtaining the capability to conduct operations beyond +China +s borders (China's National Defense in 2006; Allen 2005). +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Production of indigenous Chinese aircraft has been lacklustre. Most of the designs require +foreign expertise which is then reverse engineered. The technology obtained is often one +generation old at the time of acquisition, as states do not want to give up their advantage. +Further, to reverse engineer they not only need the aircraft itself, but also high-precision and +technologically advanced machine tools, electronics and components, skilled personnel, and +facilities. By the time the technology is fully understood, and indigenous versions produced, +the aircraft may be two or three generations behind the latest models of the world +s advanced +military forces. China is not alone in this difficulty. Except for the five largest industrial +arms producers (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US), other countries that have +attempted to produce indigenously designed combat aircraft, such as Israel, South Africa, +India, Taiwan, and South Korea, have abandoned their efforts and returned to importing +systems from one of the five main producers. One reason is the economy of scale involved +with financing research, development, and production of all of the systems and sub-systems +that compose modern combat aircraft (Moore 2000; see also Allen, Krumel and Pollack +1995). Despite these difficulties, China remains committed to producing indigenous aircraft. +Continued purchase of foreign technology demonstrates that the Chinese believe reverse +engineering and then upgrading is the best approach to establish themselves as a selfsufficient producer in the future. In other words, the PRC aspires to become one of the elite +weapons producers, but it does not want to wait for the infrastructure to evolve; it wants to +leapfrog these capabilities. +Space +The PLA is responsible for the Chinese space program. China was the fifth nation in the +world to place a satellite in orbit, the third nation to put a human into space, and the third +nation to successfully test an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) capable of destroying an enemy +satellite in low earth orbit. China +s manned space activities have received substantial support +from Russia. This can be seen in the design of the Shenzhou spacecraft, which closely +resembles the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. Although China +s commercial space program has +utility for non-military research, it also demonstrates space launch and control capabilities +that have direct military application. All taikonauts have been selected from members of the +PLAAF, and the PLA has deployed space-based systems for military purposes. These +include imagery intelligence satellite systems such as the ZiYan series and JianBing series, +synthetic aperture satellites (SAR) such as JianBing-5, the BeiDou satellite navigation +network, and secured communication satellites such as FengHuo-1. China launched its 100th +Long March series rocket in 2007, and continues to put more sophisticated and diverse +satellites into orbit. The PRC is developing the Long March 5, an improved heavy-lift rocket +that will be able to lift larger reconnaissance satellites into low-earth orbit or communications +satellites into geosynchronous orbits by 2012. It expects to replace all foreign-produced +satellites in its inventory with indigenously produced sun-synchronous and geo-stationary +models by 2010 (Annual Report to Congress 2008; Center for Strategic and International +Studies 2003). +Many of China +s space assets are dual use, having financial and prestige benefits in addition +to military applications. The Ziyuan-2 series, the Yaogan-1 and -2, the Haiyang-1B, the +CBERS-1 and -2 satellites, and the Huanjing satellites, offer ocean surveillance, disaster and +environmental monitoring, and high resolution imaging in the visible, infrared, and radar +spectrums. New electro-optical satellites are capable of penetrating night and weather with a +1/10 meter resolution, providing near continuous targeting data for the PLA forces. In the +arena of navigation and timing, China has five BeiDou satellites with 20 meter accuracy over +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +the region. The PRC also uses the Russian GLONASS navigation system and is a primary +investor in the European Union +s Galileo navigation system. China has developed small +satellite design and production facilities, and is developing microsatellites, satellites which +weigh less than 100 kilograms. These satellites offer remote sensing, imagery, and radar, and +could allow China to rapidly replace or expand its satellite force in the event of war or a +disruption to the network. The country is also improving its ability to track and identify +foreign satellites, which is an essential component in the event of counter-space operations. +China +s successful test of an ASAT weapon demonstrates an ability to strike enemy assets in +low earth orbit. This acts as a deterrent to conflict and demonstrates the PRC +s commitment +to relatively low-cost asymmetric warfare (International Assessment and Strategy Center +2005). +Second Artillery Corps +The Second Artillery Corps (SAC) controls the PLA +s nuclear and conventional missile +forces. Weapons from the SAC are subsequently filtered to other branches of the PLA. +Items such as the land attack cruise missile (LACM) may be used by the PLAAF on H-6 +bombers, or by the PLAN on Type 093 nuclear submarines. China's total nuclear arsenal is +estimated to be between 120 and 250. China maintains a +no first use + policy; however, the +ambiguous nature of declaratory policies leave open the option for first strike if China +leaders believe their national security or the CPC are under threat. +China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with the help of Soviet assistance. +After the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s, China continued its development on its own and +made significant progress. The People +s Republic detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964, +making it the fifth state to do so, following the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, +and France. With the addition of India and Pakistan, and possibly Israel and North Korea, +China remains only one of nine states with a nuclear capability. China launched its first +nuclear missile in 1966, and detonated its first hydrogen bomb in 1967. Short-range ballistic +missile (SRBM) capability was obtained with the development of the Dongfeng-1, mediumrange ballistic missile (MRBM) capability with the Dongfeng-2, intermediate-range ballistic +missile (IRBM) capability with the Dongfeng-3, and limited intercontinental ballistic missile +(ICBM) capability with the Dongfeng-5 (Missile and Space Programme 2008; Second +Artillery Corps 2000). +It is estimated that China has 24-36 liquid fuelled ICBMs capable of striking the US and +approximately 100-150 IRBMs capable of striking Russia and Eastern Europe. China also +possesses approximately 1,000 SRBMs with ranges between 300 and 600 km. Beijing is +continually upgrading the range, accuracy, and payload capability of its SRBMs at a rate of +100 new missiles per year. Its most current missile, the Dongfeng-31A is a solid fuel ICBM +with a range of 11,200km. It is road mobile, and has multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). As noted above, China possesses submarine-launched ballistic +missiles (SLBMs) on its SSBN submarines. The PLAAF also has bombers capable of +delivering nuclear bombs. However, they would be unlikely to break through the modern air +defence systems of advanced military powers. The SAC has sought to improve its retaliatory +strike capability by hardening missile silos, developing mobile launchers, and increasing +range, accuracy, and response time of its missile system (Annual Report to Congress 2008; +see also Wortzel 2007). +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +China +s non-nuclear missile arsenal continues to develop anti-access/area denial capabilities. +These include the land attack cruise missile (LACM) DH-10, the Russian SUNBURN antiship cruise missile (ASCM), the Russian SIZZLER supersonic ASCM, and indigenous +versions of anti-ship missiles based on their own MRBMs. The acquisition of Russian arms +demonstrates China +s continued commitment to technology transfer and reverse engineering. +Thus, +The DH-10 will be similar in size and capability to the U.S. TOMOHAWK, in part +because the PLA has been collecting parts of this U.S. cruise missile from Iraq and +Afghanistan. The PLA has obtained at least six Russian Kh-55 cruise missiles from the +Ukraine, and reportedly, has benefited from Israeli cruise missile technology associated with +the DELILAH anti-radar missile + (Moore 2000). Asymmetric warfare, another tendency of +the PLA, is shown by its research into manoeuvring re-entry vehicles (MaRV), decoys, chaff, +jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons that will strengthen deterrence and strike +capabilities. Many of these technologies can also be used to defeat, deter, or stymie US +attempts at a National Missile Defence shield. By examining the weapons and deployment of +the SAC, China +s perceived primary threats can be identified. The majority of the SAC +SRBMs are opposite Taiwan. DF-11 Mod 1s are capable of carrying thermobaric and cluster +munitions as well as high-explosives. In addition, they may carry radiofrequency/electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads which, if used in sufficient numbers, could +disable electronic communications and electric power networks (Annual Report to Congress +2008). +People +s Armed Police +The People +s Armed Police (PAP) is no longer the official fifth service branch of the PLA; +however it remains an integral part of Chinese defence. The line between military operations +against foreign elements and operations of internal security are often blurred. This can be +seen all the way down to the PAP uniforms which differ only slightly from PLAGF, often +leading foreigners to mistake them as soldiers. In contrast, public security officers wear dark +gray or blue uniforms more common among Western police forces. Much of the PAP force +was absorbed directly from the PLA. They use a similar rank structure, and they obey the +s general regulations. PAP guards are also recruited at the same time and through the +same procedures as PLA soldiers. The PAP has a dual command structure including the +Central Military Commission (CMC) and the State Council through the Ministry of Public +Security. By law the PAP is not part of the PLA; however, their interconnection is +unavoidable, and the PAP will play an important role as domestic or non-military issues +become intertwined with traditional military issues (People's Armed Police Force +Organisation 2007; Tkacik 2007). +The PAP is a paramilitary force primarily responsible for law enforcement. China +s National +Defence White Paper, published in 2006, lists the total strength of the PAP at 660,000. The +IISS Military Balance of 2008 lists an estimated 1.5 million (IISS 2008). The PAP has its +origins in the PLA, which was originally tasked with both defending China from foreign +threats and providing internal security. While the two share much in common, China +eventually decided the differences were greater than the similarities. The PAP's primary +mission is internal security. They are responsible for guarding government buildings at all +levels, including party and state organisations, foreign embassies, consulates, and airports. +The PAP provides personal protection to senior government officials, and performs security +functions for major corporations and public events + including its much-publicized role in the +2008 Beijing Olympics (see Paramilitary Olympics 2008). Additionally, the PAP maintains +multiple counter-terrorism units, sea and land border security forces, fire fighting units, and +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +has a role in the protection of forests, gold mines, hydroelectric facilities, and highway +infrastructure. The secondary mission of the PAP is external defence, and in times of war +PAP internal security units can act as light infantry supporting the PLA in local defence +missions. Similarly, the PLA can fill in for the PAP and has done so during the Cultural +Revolution, the Tiananmen Square incident, and flooding of the Yellow River (People's +Armed Police Force Organisation 2007; China's National Defense in 2006; People +s Armed +Police 2005). +Military Intelligence +The General Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and is +responsible for implementing military modernization plans. It serves as the headquarters for +the PLAGF and contains directorates for the PLAN, PLAAF, and SAC, as well as a +department for electronic warfare. The General Staff Department also includes subdepartments for artillery, armoured units, communications, engineering, mobilization, +operations, politics, training, and surveying. Direct control over the four military branches is +sub-divided among the General Staff Department and regional commanders; however the +General Staff Department can assume direct operation control at any time. The General Staff +Department is under the control of the Central Military Commission (General Staff +Department 1997). +The Second Department of the General Staff Headquarters is responsible for collecting +military intelligence. This includes military attach +s at Chinese embassies abroad, +clandestine agents to conduct espionage, and the analysis of publicly available data published +by foreign countries. The Second Department oversees military human intelligence +(HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and satellite and aerial imagery intelligence +(IMINT) which it disseminates to the Central Military Commission and various branches. +The Second Department has increased its focus on scientific and technological military +intelligence gathering. The Third Department of the General Staff Headquarters is +responsible for monitoring the telecommunications of foreign militaries and producing +reports based on the military information gathered. China operates the most extensive signals +intelligence (SIGINT) network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the +1950s, the Second and Third Departments have maintained a number of secondary and higher +learning institutions for producing recruits, particularly in foreign languages. The Third +Department not only intercepts communication of foreign militaries, but also those of the +PLA, thereby maintaining control and supervision over the different branches and +commanders within all of the military regions (Second Intelligence Department 2005, +General Staff Department 1997). +Other branches of the General Staff Department include the Fourth Department and the +General Political Department (GPD). The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) is +responsible for electronic intelligence (ELINT) including electronic countermeasures and +maintaining databases on electronic signals. The GPD is responsible for overseeing the +political education required for advancement within the PLA and controls the PLA +s internal +prison system. The International Liaison Department, a branch within the GPD, conducts +propaganda, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and counter-espionage against foreign +intelligence. As with the PAP, many of the departments within the General Staff Department +appear to have significant overlap. The structural details are beyond the scope of this study; +however, they are worth noting, as they pertain to the discussion below of cyber warfare. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Technology Transfer +China continues to pursue the acquisition of foreign military technology. Beijing is in +ongoing negotiations with Moscow to obtain multiple weapons systems, and in 2007 signed +arms agreements worth $150 million. Israel has previously supplied advanced military +technology to China. However, under pressure from the US, Israel began to implement strict +military export regulations. China is attempting to remove an embargo placed on lethal +military export from the EU. This embargo was a response to the Tiananmen Square +incident. Opinion on removing the embargo remains divided among EU member states. +According to the 2008 Annual Report to Congress on China +s Military: +China continues a systematic effort to obtain dual-use and military technologies from abroad +through legal and illegal commercial transactions. Many dual-use technologies, such as +software, integrated circuits, computers, electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications, +and information security systems, are vital for the PLA +s transformation into an informationbased, network-enabled force. +Between 1995 and 2008, several high profile cases of Chinese espionage against the US +surfaced. These attempts targeted aerospace programs, space shuttle design, F-16 design, +submarine propulsion, C4ISR data, high-performance computers, nuclear weapons design, +cruise missile data, semiconductors, integrated circuit design, and details of US arms sales to +Taiwan. +Targeted organisations include Northrop Grumman, NASA, Los Alamos +Laboratories, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Sun Microsystems, and various defence installations. +The Chinese do not limit themselves to high value targets or an elite group of agents. They +obtain any data which may be of value, including legally obtained documents or OSINT, +which may help them piece together the larger picture. China utilizes a decentralized +network of students, business people, scientists, diplomats, and engineers from within the +Chinese Diaspora. The majority of these individuals have legitimate purposes within the host +state; however they are recruited at a later date, or asked for small pieces of information or +favours which can seem harmless in scope to the individual. Attempts are also made to +purchase interests within high technology companies, as well as win political favour with +government officials. For example, there have been repeated allegations that President Bill +Clinton +s decision to sell sophisticated computer and satellite technology to China was +influenced by campaign contributions (Appel 2004; Cooper 2006; Grier 2005; Jordan 2008; +Warrick and Johnson 2008; Lynch 2007; Cox Report 1999; McLaughlin 1999; PRC +Acquisitions of US Technology 1998). +China +s use of espionage to obtain foreign military technology is not restricted to the US. In +2007, the head of a Russian rocket and space technology company was sentenced to 11 years +for passing sensitive information to China. An alleged agent who defected in Belgium +claimed hundreds of Chinese spies were working within Europe +s industries. These +allegations coincided with an arrest in France for illegal database intrusion of the automotive +components manufacturer Valeo, and a guest researcher in Sweden arrested for stealing +unpublished and unpatented research. Further, Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin defected to +Australia in 2005, claiming there were over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants +within Australia (Luard 2005; Isachenkov 2007). Espionage and technology transfer prosper +in cyber warfare, where being physically present is not required, and attribution becomes +increasingly difficult. It also falls in line with China +s strategy of leapfrogging. By acquiring +foreign military knowledge, China can quickly catch up and begin working at a comparable +level, rather than investing the large amounts of time and effort it would take to acquire this +knowledge independently. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Doctrine/Strategy +Chinese military doctrine and strategy remain focused on modernization. Beijing has not +explicitly laid out an official grand strategy. This may be due to disagreement within the +government, or done intentionally to hide true motives and avoid being bound by them. +Much of the writings published by the PRC are contradictory or ambiguous, using modern +and ancient foundations, while being disseminated by varied sources. However, several +points which are continually emphasized may point to a general consensus. These include +modernization of weapons, equipment and training; accelerating the RMA; improving +education and training of the PLA and the CPC; +informationized + (xinxihua) warfare; and +scientific development. China seeks to maintain domestic and regional stability while +developing its economic, military, technologic, scientific, and soft power. It also seeks a +balance between military and economic development, believing they are mutually dependant. +Beijing maintains its One China Policy in relation to Taiwan, and claims sovereignty over the +Parcel and Spratly islands and adjacent waterways (China's National Defense 2006). +Deng Xiaoping, representing second generation leadership after Mao, sought to avoid +international responsibilities and limitations, as they could slow down development of the +military and economy. The third generation leadership of Jiang Zemin did look outward, +promoting a multipolar world in the face of the post-Cold War unipolarity under the US, just +as fourth generation leader Hu Jintao promoted the ideology of a Harmonious World (hexie +shijie) which places more emphasis on international relations (Lam 2004; Zheng and Tok +2007). However the PRC continues to avoid concrete stances through concepts of noninterference, diversity, and equality. It compares itself to other states through Comprehensive +National Power (CNP - zonghe guoli), using qualitative and quantitative values, and not +accepting traditional Western categorizations (see Pillsbury 2000). For example, China +includes the economy, soft power, and domestic stability as factors of CNP. This is +important, because it shows a correlativity which holds relevance for cyber warfare. Under +CNP the economy, soft power, and domestic stability can be seen as military matters. +Further, maintaining the status quo in regards to Taiwan and the Spratly islands may not be +China +s long-term intention, but rather a way to stall efforts while it builds up military +strength, strength which can include economic and international influence. +Despite not wanting to become embroiled in concrete commitments to military strategy, +Chinese leaders cannot ignore the interconnectedness of the modern world, and they have +realized the necessity of international cooperation. For example, the need for resources has +fuelled China +s global presence. The PRC is the world +s second largest importer of +petroleum. As the country +s economy grows and the middle class expands, the demand for +fossil fuel resources will continue to grow. This creates a need for sound international +relations with exporting nations and the need for securing transportation routes, such as the +Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. These are intertwined with the politics and +military affairs of the states involved. Competition with the US for these resources has often +led to China making agreements with nations the US opposes on several points, such as +Angola, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, +Venezuela, and Yemen (Hanson 2008; Brookes 2006). +Beijing may be using these countries simply because there is less competition for resource +access in the case of these suppliers. However, the result is often international criticism of +China as these states may be violating human rights or supporting terrorism. Moreover, +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Beijing +s methods of befriending these exporters comes into question, especially in regards to +arms being traded or availability of finance which may be supporting controversial policies. +China currently lacks the power projection to protect critical sea lanes from disruption or to +deter international criticism. Crucial to extended power projection is the blue water navy +which would benefit from online technology transfer and the further development of C4ISR. +Online PSYOPS and media warfare would enhance China +s soft power. Beijing believes that +economic growth is critical to military development; economic growth creates a greater +energy demand, which in turns creates a greater military demand, thus the two form a +positive feedback loop (Ikenberry 2008; China's National Defense in 2006). +While Beijing recognizes the need for international cooperation, it remains cautious. The +country suffered greatly from foreign incursions within the last century. Colonialism by +Western powers, Japanese occupation in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, +and border conflicts with India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are all kept fresh through +China +s historical discourse. Despite China +s long history, these events are of special note as +they are within living memory, and these events were present during the founding and +duration of the CPC +s rule. +Ensuring the survival of the CPC shapes China +s strategic outlook. In order to bolster +domestic support for policies, nationalism has been emphasized over communist ideology. +This can be seen with government organised protests against Japan over visits by Japanese +leaders to WWII war shrines and protests against the publishing of Japanese school text +books which downplay Japan +s atrocities against the Chinese. These protests often coincide +with other strategic interests, such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea, which are +often unbeknownst to the casual observer or participant. The mobilization of nationalism can +also be seen during the holding of a US reconnaissance plane in 2001, and the mistaken +bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. The 2008 Olympics further +demonstrated how China could garner national support in the face of a widening wealth gap, +forced relocation, corruption, and environmental degradation. These events demonstrate a +strategic value in public manipulation through nationalism; one that is interconnected with +military affairs, and one which is increasingly turning to online assets (see Faiola 2005). +Several conclusions can be drawn from the status of the PLA. China is committed to +modernizing its military, primarily through the purchase or illicit acquisition of foreign +technology and subsequently reverse engineering that technology so it can be produced +domestically. The PLA has placed an importance on trimming down its size, favouring +quality over quantity. The PLA +s weaponry often lags one or two generations behind that of +Western military powers. However, the total force base still poses a significant deterrent, and +establishes China as a dominant power within the Asia-Pacific Region. China lacks force +projection beyond its region, primarily do to the lack of a blue water navy and aircraft carrier +fleet, but also due to limits in missile technology and air-defence penetration, and opposition +by foreign powers such as the United States. China seeks to become self-sufficient in many +of these key capabilities. Once they have leapfrogged and are no longer trying to catch up, +the Chinese will no longer need such widescale technology transfer, and they will possess the +might to shape the international system, rather than be bound by one that was created by +foreign powers. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +2. A New Era +History has demonstrated that the advantage often goes to those who develop a technology +first. The great naval voyages of Ming admiral Zhang He were unprecedented for their time +and helped establish China as a suzerain of the wider Asian region. However, the mid-15th +century saw China retreat to xenophobic and isolationist policies that paved the way towards +China +s decline and opened the door for colonialism (see Dick 2006). This lesson has not +been lost among Chinese officials, and it is often used to spur initiatives such as their stated +desire to be the first to mine the moon for helium-3 (China +s Space Program 2005). The +information revolution has given more power to individuals and increased globalization +through the interconnectedness of economies, rapid dissemination of news, and improved +access to communication and information of all types. Any attempt to compete on a global +level without the use of these technologies would place the PRC at a significant military and +financial disadvantage. For this reason, the benefits of electronic reliance outweigh the risks +involved. Further, it is impossible for a state to develop a defence against cyber warfare +without simultaneously learning how to execute attacks themselves. +The US is the sole superpower, making it a benchmark for military competitiveness. Beijing +also views the US as a potential adversary, in particular due to perceptions of the US military +attempting to encircle China with bases in nearby states and opposition to China +modernization goals, to concerns over any forceful application of the One China Policy, and +to concerns over a range of internal affairs issues. China seeks to learn from US mistakes and +successes, using American expertise and field-tested military experience to accelerate +China +s development. The People +s Republic also focuses on weaknesses in the US military +in order to improve upon the American example and to expose asymmetric advantages. For +these reasons it is important to examine where the US is headed in military thinking and +development, as China is likely to follow (Derene 2008; Lasker 2005; Liang Xiangsui 1999). +Network-Centric Warfare +The US has viewed the internet as a potential tool of warfare since its inception. Arpanet, a +precursor of modern internet, was heavily funded by the US military, with a particular +emphasis on its research collaboration benefits. Despite fears of cyber terrorism post 9/11, +the US continues to place increasing reliance on the internet as a security tool. This can be +seen in the restructuring of US intelligence agencies and the creation of new online exchange +such as Intellipedia and A-Space (Shaughnessy 2008; Magnuson 2006). Militarily, the +information revolution has given rise to an increasing reliance on situational awareness, +weather monitoring, surveillance, communication, and precision strikes. Chinese military +strategists have made special note of the US reliance on, and dominance with, electronic +means in the Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi conflicts (Tellis 2007; Center for Strategic and +International Studies 2003; Liang and Xiangsui 1999). +Since the 1990s the US has put emphasis on developing network-centric warfare (NCW). +NCW seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, +into a military advantage through the networking of well informed, geographically-dispersed +forces. Originally described as a system of systems, it includes intelligence sensors, +command and control systems, and precision weapons that enable enhanced situational +awareness, rapid target assessment, and distributed weapon assignment. In essence, NCW +translates to information superiority, which requires the reduction of hard categorization, +because compartmentalizing military branches can stem the flow of information. In 2001, the +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Pentagon began investing in peer-to-peer software as a means to spread information while +supplying redundancy and robustness. The US Department of Defense has sought the +creation of the Global Information Grid (GIG) as a backbone of NCW. All advanced +weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centres are eventually to be +linked via the GIG. Collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing classified +security information on demand will be made globally available to soldiers, policymakers, +and support personnel to achieve information superiority (Alberts 2002; Alberts, Garstka, and +Stein 2000). +Vice President Richard Cheney stated in 2004: +With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years +ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective . . . . In Desert Storm, it +usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its +coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time +imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in +flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on maps, +grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our +commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen +(Raduege 2004). +Information Operations +In 2003, under the direction of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the US +expanded on NCW in a document titled the Information Operations Roadmap. Now +declassified, it was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by George Washington +University +s National Security Archive. Information Operations (IO) calls for NCW to +become a core military branch along with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Intelligence, and +Space. To accomplish this it requires the development of a comprehensive education +program to enlist new recruits, and an overhaul of the organizational structure of current +military branches in an attempt to break down barriers that hinder information exchange and +progress. IO activities include PSYOPS troops who try to manipulate the adversary +thoughts and beliefs, military deception and disinformation, media warfare, electronic +warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). Thus Information Operations +Roadmap stands as an another example of the US commitment to transform military +capabilities to keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by +innovation and rapidly developing information technologies. +IO seeks to +dominate the electromagnetic spectrum +, in an attempt to +deny, degrade, +disrupt, or destroy a broad range of adversary threats, sensors, command and control and +critical support infrastructures + (Information Operations Roadmap 2003). The document +notes that PSYOPS and manipulating the thoughts of populations through media and internet +require constant observation during peacetime, otherwise in the event of conflict, a state +would not be sufficiently engrained into the information culture to utilize them fully. This +can be seen with the emergence of patriotic hackers, the advancement of social media, and +the rapid evolution of memetics, slang, and subcultures, all of which will be discussed further +below (List of Internet Phenomenon 2008; Pang 2008; Slashdot Subculture 2008; Slashdot +Trolling Phenomenon 2008). IO includes defence, attack, and reconnaissance as vital +components (Information Operations Roadmap 2003). +IO seeks to put out a political message in coordination with any traditional military assault. It +places an emphasis on finding, and clandestinely promoting, favourable media from third +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +parties, so as to appear more credible. IO also seeks to establish a legal framework to defend +against cyber attacks and cyber reconnaissance, as well as establish rules of engagement for +conducting cyber attack. For example, how much certainty is required in identifying the +source of an attack before responding? If an attack is being routed through multiple +computers, is it acceptable to attack the intermediary computer? This would halt the attack +but it would harm or destroy a computer which may have been infected without the owner +knowledge or consent. Additionally, an intangible computer attack can result in significant +tangible loss, but does this warrant the use of traditional military weapons as a response? +Future Combat Systems +Another US project that is gaining attention and closely resembles NCW and IO is Future +Combat Systems (FCS). FCS places a particular emphasis on advanced robotics, including +Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAVs), NonLine of Sight Launch Systems, and Unattended Systems. This system of systems seeks to +make warfare as networked as the internet, as mobile as a mobile phone, and as intuitive as a +video game. The highly interconnected nature of FCS can even be seen in its development, +utilizing 550 contractors in 41 US states. While the US has yet to determine a definitive +name for this new type of information based, highly networked, and highly technological +warfare, it is clear that the US government has spent a significant amount of time and money +seeking to make it a reality. US Army officials have already stated that they intent to change +s name, because they believe the name is inappropriate, stating +the future is now + (FCS +Watch 2008; Future Combat Systems 2008; Baard 2007; Klein 2007; Gannon 2001). +Some of the complex logistical problems inherent in such an undertaking include: finance +allocation, giving the approval for use to commanders, inter-agency cooperation, a common +vernacular, rules of engagement, and adhering to the program +s stated goals. The US is +continually modernizing its cyber force, creating new hacker units, conducting cyber war +exercises, and diversifying and limiting the number of access points that could be used for an +attack (Waterman 2008; Greenberg 2007). And the US is not alone, +more than 120 countries +already have or are developing such computer attack capabilities + (GOA 1996). Information +warfare is being adopted by all modern nations and competition is mounting. +Informationization +China +s 2006 white paper on national defence places an emphasis on the informationization +of the military. +Informationization + (xinxihua) means improving the PLA +s ability to use +the latest technologies in command, intelligence, training, and weapon systems. New +automatic command systems linked by fibre-optic internet, satellite and new high-frequency +digital radio systems, allow for more efficient joint-service planning and command, while +also enabling a reduction in layers of command. The PLA +s move towards information +technology can be seen with the use of new space-based surveillance and intelligence +gathering systems, ASATs, anti-radar, infrared decoys, and false target generators. PLA +soldiers are using decision simulators, a low-light automatic tracking system for helicopters, +and a battlefield artillery/mortar fuse jamming system derived from Russian technology. +OSINT on China +s military continually makes note of informationization and the related, if +not identical, fields of cyber warfare, information warfare, CNO, and EW. +Priority is given +to R&D of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment, and endeavours to achieve +breakthroughs in a number of key technologies and leapfrogging technological progress, thus +speeding up weaponry and equipment modernization + (China's National Defense 2006). +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Informationization includes increased education of soldiers in cyber warfare and NCW, a +reorganization of military branches and command system, and integrating joint operations. +The PLA is improving the information network for military training, and has built more +virtual laboratories, digital libraries and digital campuses to provide distance learning and +online teaching and training. University courses have emerged for cyber attack and defence, +a study of hacker methods, computer virus design and application, and network security +protocols (Annual Report to Congress 2008). Following the Russian example, China is +engaging in the debate of defining cyber warfare, in part through the Shanghai Cooperation +Organization, in order to have a hand in the shaping of a legal framework and rules of +engagement related to this new warfare. The PLA is pursuing a comprehensive +transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to +one capable of fighting and winning short duration, high intensity conflicts along its +periphery against high-tech adversaries (Annual Report to Congress 2008) + an approach that +China refers to as preparing for +local wars under conditions of informationization + (China's +National Defense 2006). +Exponential Growth and Unrestricted Warfare +One view on twentieth century patterns of unrestricted warfare has noted: +The names Watt and Edison are nearly synonymous with great technical inventions, and +using these great technological masters to name their age may be said to be reasonable. +However, from then on, the situation changed, and the countless and varied technological +discoveries of the past 100 years or so makes it difficult for the appearance of any new +technology to take on any self importance in the realm of human life. While it may be said that +the formulations of "the age of the steam engine" and "the age of electrification" can be said +to be names which reflect the realities of the time, today, with all kinds of new technology +continuously beating against the banks of the age so that people scarcely have the time to +accord them brief acclaim while being overwhelmed by an even higher and newer wave of +technology, the age in which an era could be named for a single new technology or a single +inventor has become a thing of the past. This is the reason why, if one calls the current era +the "nuclear age" or the "information age," it will still give people the impression that you are +using one aspect to typify the whole situation. (Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui 1999). +It is important to stop for a moment and ponder the rapid advancement in military weaponry. +New weaponry and concepts are easily dismissed as science fiction, yet the integration of +mobile phones and the internet in 2008 would resemble science fiction to someone in the +1980s. Reports of research and development may be noted momentarily before being +subsumed in a busy, informationally-competitive world. For the purpose of this study, it is +useful to acknowledge them in passing as they show the rapid advancement in science and +technology, where military weapons are headed, and the increasing complexity and +cooperation involved in their development and use. Current militarily-applicable science and +technology, under development or already in use, include: augmented reality (Bonsor 2008); +biotechnology; genetics; giving soldiers internal/biologic infrared, night vision, radar, and +sonar capability (Block 2006); GPS; force fields (Hershkovitch 1998); invisibility cloaks +(Mark 2008; Winkler 2003); microwave guns (Beam It Right There Scotty 2005); +nanotechnology; neuroscience; positron bombs (Davidson 2004); robotic exoskeletons +(Berkeley Bionics Human Exoskeleton 2007; Yeates 2007); space-based weapons such as +ANGELS (Lewis 2005) and Rods from God (Adams 2004); telepathy (Braukus 2004; Put +Your Mobile Where Your Mouth Is 2002); thought control of internet surfing and electronic +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +devices (New Technology Operated by Thought 2007); unmanned ground combat vehicles +(Bloom 2008); and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (Pike 2008). +Adding further to this complexity, Unrestricted Warfare, a book by two PLA senior colonels, +Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, claims that warfare is no longer strictly a military operation, +and that the battlefield no longer has boundaries. Unrestricted Warfare was published by the +PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House in Beijing in February 1999. According to the +FBIS translation editor, the book +was endorsed by at least some elements of the PLA +leadership + and an interview with one of the authors was published in the CPC Youth +League +s official daily newspaper on June 28, 1999. Thus while the book is not entirely +backed by the PLA, especially the older generation, like the +half empty, half full + glass +analogy, it does have some official backing and hence a degree of legitimacy as a document +assisting analysis as to where the PLA is headed and how asymmetric tactics against a +superior hi-tech military might be employed. +Environmental concerns, human rights in regard to weapons of mass destruction, and the +increasingly intertwined economies and political structures of globalization all have an +impact on modern warfare. Sheer might of weaponry can no longer guarantee victory under +these conditions. US extravagance in weaponry has been shown to stymie in the face of +guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and Iraq. Under limited warfare, asymmetric warfare has seen a +resurgence in use and value. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda employ guerrilla tactics and +make use of the internet and financial institutions to subvert traditional warfare (Levinson +2008; Yassin 2008). No single weapon can deliver a decisive victory, and weapons have +been replaced by weapons systems. For example, the patriot missile relies on multiple +technologies working in concert, from satellites to the missile itself, with data being relayed +around the world. Modern militaries have become reliant on electronic sophistication. The +authors of Unrestricted Warfare assert that war has not disappeared, but its appearance has +changed and its complexity has increased (Qiao and Wang 1999). +Non-Traditional Threats +Increasing interdependence among states has increased the danger of non-traditional security +threats, including the spread of disease, environmental damage, international terrorist groups, +international crime, acquisition and transportation of energy and resources, natural disasters, +and intertwined economies that can have an impact on social and political issues. For +example, modern transportation has made it possible for criminals to traverse the globe with +relative ease. The internet allows them to transfer or hide money across the globe and to +covertly communicate beyond the jurisdiction of their enemies. Natural disasters or +communicable diseases are no longer something which can be kept quiet as information +radiates out through global media, causing damage to soft power factors, tourism, business, +and international scrutiny (China's National Defense in 2006). +The line between military and non-military, soldier and civilian, is being blurred. Terrorism +is the most common example: the 2001 plane hijackings in the US, the Madrid train +bombings in 2004, and the London bombings in 2005 to name just a few key examples. +These lack an easily identifiable enemy to target, they cross territorial boundaries and use +asymmetric attacks. Further blurring the line are the Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway +by disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, the actions of currency speculators in relation to the East +Asian financial crisis, drug cartels, the mafia, media moguls who can influence the opinion of +a mass audience, or industrial polluters who affect the economy and health of their +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +neighbours. These events can cause damage and disruption equal to war, but there is no +foreign military or state against which to go to war. The individuals involved may be from +multiple states and acting without government sponsorship. +Another form of non-traditional threat comes from hackers. Hackers tend not to have +military training, they may or may not have a political agenda, and they are capable of +causing massive damage with nothing more than an off-the-shelf computer and an internet +connection. For example, two British teenagers were able to access files on ballistic weapons +research of the US. They then took control of US air force computers and proceeded to +intrude into other military and government installations, making it appear as though the US +military was hacking other states (Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas +2001). The rapid advancements in technology and globalization are opening new and +complex ways to subvert security. In 2008, a group of 11 people managed to steal 45 million +users + bank and credit card details, resulting in a loss of more than $256 million. The group +members were from diverse, yet cyber-advanced, geographical locations, including: Belarus, +Estonia, China, Ukraine, and the US. Their unprecedented feat was accomplished by sitting +outside of TJX retail stores and hacking into the store +s wireless network. This illustrates +asymmetry, emerging technology security risks, globalization, and the enhanced vulnerability +of commercial targets as opposed to direct military targets (Malone 2008; Almeida 2006). +Combination +To be militarily successful in this new era will require the ability to combine operations. +Combining weapons has been used throughout military history. Horses, armour, stirrups, and +swords are not as effective when used individually. Their combination can create synergy, +where the combined strength is greater than the individual parts. During the Gulf War, the +US combined the old A-10 ground attack aircraft with the new Apache helicopter to create a +lethal union + (Qiao and Wang 1999). By dropping leaflets and publicizing video of +precision strike weaponry, the US combined PSYOPS and media warfare as well. The US +has pursued additional combinations of traditional and non-traditional attack methods. +During the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis, the US initially tried traditional military force, but when +this attempt failed they froze Iran +s foreign assets, imposed an arms embargo, supported Iraq +with weaponry and training, and began diplomatic negotiations. When all these channels +were used together, the crisis finally came to an end. The Americans have also employed +non-traditional attacks against non-traditional enemies. For example, they used hacking +methods to search for and cut off the bank accounts of Osama Bin Laden in various states +(Musharbash 2008; Vallence 2008). +China has demonstrated its commitment to such combinations. It seeks to develop military +modernization and economic growth in tandem, with an emphasis on science and technology. +China +s 2006 defence white paper puts forth a goal to +work for close coordination between +military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and legal endeavours +, using +strategies and tactics in a comprehensive way. . . + Also noted is the importance of taking +part in international organizations, such as ASEAN+Three, the Shanghai Cooperation +Organization, WTO, IMF, and the International Olympic Committee. These open up +diplomacy, aid in soft power, and give China a voice in determining the legal framework of a +globalized world (Ikenberry 2008; China's National Defense in 2006). +To learn how to conduct cyber security, the Chinese must have a full understanding of how +attacks are conducted; therefore they will learn offence along with the defence - the two are +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +inseparable. China has repeatedly stated its goal of military modernization, and cyber +warfare is where modern militaries are headed. However, cyber warfare would unlikely be +used alone. It could be used simultaneously with a traditional attack, perhaps as a first blow +to take an opponent off guard, or in tandem with multiple non-traditional attacks, such as +PSYOPS and economic operations, or variants of each. Additional combined tactics that will +be discussed in the following sections include cyber attack, cyber reconnaissance, and market +dominance. +Internal Security +As seen with the lack of division between the PLA and PAP, the Chinese defence white +paper +s stated goal of developing the military and economy in tandem, and with the blurring +of lines in Unrestricted Warfare, China cannot ignore the full spectrum of impact that +Information Communication Technologies (ICT) will have, including that within its borders. +China +s internet population has risen to 210 million people (Anick 2008; Bridis 2008). And, +as of 2007, China possessed over 500 million mobile phones. China has become a world +leader in the communications industry, and 3G and 4G technology are increasing the ability +for mobile phones to supplant a personal computer for online activities. On the one hand ICT +supports economic, scientific, and technology development; on the other it creates a nontraditional security threat. +Social networking services can be used as a tool to further nationalistic goals. These goals +may include the spread of political ideology, propaganda, and disinformation. As seen with +the US Information Operations Roadmap, PSYOPS are an integral component of cyber +warfare. Operatives can sway audiences by presenting well thought out arguments or by +altering opposing views; they may also manipulate democratized news by artificially inflating +votes using scripts (Cuban 2008). Recent informationization military courses offered at +Wuhan University include +An introduction to US and Taiwanese social information +systems + suggesting that China has already recognized the benefits of utilizing social +networking externally (China +s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and +Space Warfare Capabilities 2008). +Additionally, online users are increasingly volunteering to enter large amounts of personal +data, which can, and has been, used for prosecutions (Use of Social Network Websites in +Investigations 2008; WFTV 2008; Layer 8 2007). Users do so to enjoy the social service it +provides, either not realizing, or unconcerned, that the government is simultaneously gaining +access to a self-imposed Big Brother. Not only can China use this information to its benefit, +but also it must secure it from being used by an adversary, such as its use for identifying +potential espionage and subversive assets. In terms of stemming anti-government agendas, +state agencies censor blogs, bulletin boards, email, and forums. Internet Service Providers +(ISPs) often take it upon themselves to censor users, because they are held legally responsible +for any customer who violates the law. Internet caf +s are required to keep detailed records of +their customers. In addition, +every Chinese person who signs up for internet service must +register with his or her local police department within 30 days + (China and Internet +Censorship 2006). +As China +s economy continues to grow, personal electronic devices are becoming more +accessible to Chinese citizens. Products such as personal computers, high speed internet +connections, mp3 players, large hard drives for storage, gaming systems, and advanced +mobile phones fuel a desire for more software and entertainment. This will enhance +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +international criticism of Chinese copyright infringements and it will make it difficult for +China to prevent the spread of Western culture (French 2006; People +s Daily Online 2006; +Pirates of the Orient 2006). Increased connectivity also increases the capability of people to +conduct subversive activities that endanger state security. This may include, +Signing online +petitions, calling for reform and an end to corruption, planning to set up a pro-democracy +party, publishing rumours about SARS, communicating with groups abroad, opposing the +persecution of the Falun Gong and calling for a review of the 1989 crackdown on the +democracy protests . . . + (Kumar 2006). Other emerging non-traditional threats include mob +mentality, consumer price manipulation, domestic hacker groups who can damage and +interfere with the Chinese government or drag it into conflict with other states, and the +security of the identity and financial details of a growing online consumer market (Delio +2001). +In addition to China +s economy being directly linked to military issues, so too are domestic +threats, soft power, and the control of information. Readily available free web sources, such +as blogs, photo uploading, video uploading, Podcasts, torrents, and RSS feeds, have given +powers to individuals that were once restricted to large media outlets. Social networking +sites allow for the spread of this information across the globe at speeds exceeding traditional +mass media, and they are capable of reaching larger markets. These social networking +services, often referred to as Web 2.0, are noted for their ability for people to collaborate and +share information online, particularly emphasizing real-time dynamic displays, +interconnectedness, and being a part of a larger community. China maintains strict +government control over television, newspapers, and radio; therefore these new forms of +distribution pose a threat to China +s control. Censorship of the internet by China, known as +the Great Firewall, can be seen in the banning of foreign sites, such as Blogger and Voice of +America, as well as a wide range of search terms and images the government deems a threat +to national security or counter-productive to the political party. During the 2007 uprising in +Tibet, China blocked access to the video website YouTube (Richards 2008), and on multiple +occasions it has been accused of using Photoshop to digitally alter photos in its favour +(Pasternack 2008; Yue 2008). With the increasing popularity and economic success of Web +2.0, coupled with China +s global presence (prestige and international scrutiny) it is unlikely +that the Chinese government will ban these new forms of news distribution on a permanent +basis. However, it will seek to understand and entrench itself within the emerging system. +China has struggled to cope with internal and external cyber dissidents. This includes prodemocracy movements and the dissemination of sensitive information such as the spread of +SARS and human rights abuses. Pro-democracy activists Li Yibing and Jiang Lijun of Hong +Kong used virtual dead drops to secretly pass messages, such as a plot to +disrupt the 16th +Communist Party Congress by phoning the police with a false bomb alert + (Reporters +Without Borders 2006). Each member knew the user name and password to a single email +account. They would save messages as drafts, allowing the other member to log in and read +it at a later point. This avoided detection, because no message was ever sent. This represents +an asymmetric advantage provided by new technology; however China demonstrated its +prowess in using the same technology to combat the cyber-dissidents by using international +cooperation, internet laws, and online eavesdropping. Activists can use the internet to build +coalitions, create e-petitions, and organize protests, using elements such as maps, lookouts, +and live broadcasts. Foreign bloggers using commercially available satellite imagery have +compromised Chinese military secrets on numerous occasions. These non-governmental +bloggers have uncovered a Chinese site used for developing submarine technology, a training +facility used to prepare for a potential conflict with India, and the construction of a fourth +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +satellite and missile launch facility in Hainan (Reporters Without Borders 2006; Yahoo +implicated in third cyberdissident trial 2006). +Determined Chinese internet users are finding ways around The Great Firewall. One popular +way is to use proxy relays. A proxy server acts as an intermediate; it allows them to access +banned sites through servers that are based abroad. Other techniques include using +specifically designed software, circumventors, tunnelling, encryption, and cached pages. +Several foreign organizations have voluntarily taken on the task of circumventing China +censorship and making this information public. Among the groups that may have breached +The Great Firewall are the University of Cambridge, the University of Toronto, M.I.T., +underground hackers (presumably doing it just for the challenge), and groups formed by +Chinese defectors. Software such as Dynapass, Ultrasurf, Freegate and Garden Networks are +used by approximately 100,000 people in China to gain access to news and information that +is blocked by the firewall. With the increasing interconnectivity of modern times, China +must actively defend against these internal threats or risk having collateral damage to the +military, soft power, economy, and political integrity (China Tightens Vice on Internet 2006). +Despite some drawbacks, it is in China +s best interest to promote the growth of the internet as +it will boost the economy, improve education, and keep the nation competitive in the 21st +century. New freedoms for expressing political opinion will be counterbalanced by new +means of censorship and means to reduce a widening digital and social divide. The Chinese +government must be moderate in its approach to censorship and the digital divide or it runs +the risk of widespread dissent resulting from increasing socio-economic/rural-urban +disparities. The impact of the internet on China +s near future will be one of expanded +growth, a complex interaction of balances, and a constant adaptation to evolving technologies +from within pre-established ideologies. The following sections will further demonstrate how +the average internet user is becoming intertwined with military activity. +3. Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack +NCW, IO, FCS, and Informationization are not identical to cyber attack and cyber +reconnaissance; however they significantly overlap. The first four, discussed above, tend to +deal with the hi-tech advancement of traditional military assets, PSYOPS, and media warfare + all of which rely on the internet in some form. The lexicon is continuing to develop, having +at times included the terms: total dimensional warfare, expeditionary forces, command and +control warfare, information warfare, full spectrum dominance, and electronic warfare. +Cyber attack may be thought of as hacking with the intent to destroy or disrupt. This could +include the physical destruction of a computer, deleting/re-writing of files, or knocking a +network or service offline. Cyber reconnaissance is the collection of data, also known as +cyber espionage or network intrusion. This may include technology transfer or intelligence, +such as troop locations or weaknesses that could be used in an attack. In many cases a hacker +goes from reconnaissance to attack at will. Here all six will be addressed + NCW, IO, FCS, +Informationization, Cyber Attack, and Cyber Reconnaissance - as components of cyber +warfare (China +s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space +Warfare Capabilities 2008). +This section will examine cyber reconnaissance with an emphasis on Chinese examples and +military applications. In addition to China +s stated goal of informationization and the quasiofficially endorsed book, Unrestricted Warfare, this section will show that foreign allegations +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +and widespread network intrusions suggest China is developing a cyber warfare capability. +Cyber warfare fits with China +s established patterns of asymmetry and technology transfer. +In order to grasp why Beijing would pursue cyber warfare as a means of leapfrogging, it is +essential to acknowledge the skills of hacking. Hackers utilize a wide range of tools with +highly sophisticated techniques, the scope of which is beyond this article; however some +basic understanding is necessary. Hacking is capable of causing massive damage with little +funding, it is difficult to detect and defend against, it provides a high level of deniability, and +it eliminates the problem of geographical distance. +Security Hacking +A common method used in cyber reconnaissance and attack is the security exploit. A +security exploit is a prepared application that takes advantage of a known weakness. It is a +piece of software, data, or commands that utilize a bug, glitch, or vulnerability to cause an +unintended or unanticipated behaviour to occur on computer software, hardware, or +electronic devices. This can allow the attacker to take control of the computer, permitting its +use for other tactics, such as DDoS discussed below. An exploit may be used to gain lowlevel entrance to a computer, after which a hacker can search for further exploits to attain +high-level access such as system administrator (root). This tactic is known as privilege +escalation. Once exploit vulnerability has been identified by security experts, a patch will be +issued. For this reason hackers try to keep known exploits secret. These are known as zero +day exploits, and hackers may catalogue large numbers of them for their own use or to be +sold on the black market (Hines 2008). In 2006, Taiwan was hit with +13 PLA zero-day +attacks +, for which it took Microsoft 178 days to develop patches (Tkacik 2007). +Vulnerability scanners may be used to identify exploits. One such scanner known as a port +scanner automates the process of finding weaknesses of computers on a network. These +check to see which ports on a specified computer are +open +, available to access, and +sometimes will detect what program or service is listening on that port. Turning from +reconnaissance to attack, once an open port is found, large quantities of data can be sent in an +attempt to cause a buffer overflow. This can cause exposure of data, memory loss, and/or a +crash within the compromised system. +The primary means to identify computers used in cyber warfare is the IP address. An IP +address is a numerical identification that network management assigns to devices +participating in a computer network utilizing the Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) for +communication between nodes. In essence, each computer has its own unique IP address. +The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is responsible for +global IP address allocation. ICANN, a non-profit organisation operating in the US, is under +contract with US Department of Commerce and previously with US Department of Defense. +Despite this identification tool, hackers can mask their identity by using proxy servers. +Information is routed through multiple computers, only showing each computer +s identity to +the next in line. For example, a Chinese hacker could route his or her activity through a +computer in Brazil, which routes its activity through Russia. The computer in Russia could +be used to attack a computer in the US, and the US would see it as an attack from Russia. +Perhaps through painstaking effort the American investigators can identify that the Russian +computer was a proxy, but then they are led to Brazil. If they manage to go from Brazil to +China, they are still unsure whether China was the originator or simply another link in the +chain. Proxy servers can be rented or obtained through compromised systems. Additionally, +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +free software such as Tor (The Onion Router), encryption, tunnelling protocol, and wireless +access points (hotspots) add additional anonymity. +A spoofing attack is when a person or program fools another into thinking it is someone or +something else. One example is the man-in-the-middle attack, in which person C gets person +A to believe they are person B, and they get person B to believe they are person A, thus +gaining access to information sent in both directions. This is accomplished by monitoring +packets sent from A to B (often involving a packet sniffer), guessing their sequence and +number, knocking them out with a SYN attack, and injecting packets from C. Firewalls may +defend against these attacks, if they have been configured to only accept IP addresses from +the intended correspondent. +Webpage spoofing, known as phishing, imitates a webpage such as a bank +s website. When +the user enters their data, such as passwords and usernames, the fake website catalogues their +information. Webpage spoofing is often used in conjunction with URL spoofing, using an +exploit to display a false URL, and DNS cache poisoning to direct the user away from their +intended site and then back again when the data has been collected. As a precaution some +websites require a user to arrive at their login page from a specified referrer page, but these +referrer pages may also be spoofed. During the 2008 Olympics net users in China received a +high volume of email spam offering video highlights of the games. Clicking on the links +brought users to spoofed CNN pages which asked them to download a codec to watch the +videos; once installed the computer was compromised and become a part of the Rustock +botnet, i.e. an automated +robot + running on the web to generate false headlines that entice +people to load harmful code (Miller 2008; Hi-tech Thieves Target Olympics 2008). +Spoofing may also be used defensively. For example, the Recording Industry Association of +America (RIAA) has practised spoofing on peer to peer networks. The RIAA floods these +communities with fake files of sought-after material. This deters down loaders by means of +fear and by wasting their time and bandwidth. This could be employed in the same manner +by militaries, or as a source of disinformation. A similar defensive tactic, known as a honey +pot, lures criminals in by offering sought-after data or what appears to be a compromised +network. The honey pot is designed to collect data on the intruder, while giving away +nothing, or giving away something that is perceived as an acceptable loss to gain something +greater in return. +Attackers may also compromise a computer or network by using a Trojan horse, often known +simply as a Trojan. A Trojan appears to perform a desirable function, while secretly +performing malicious functions. Trojans can be used to gain remote access, destroy data, +download data, serve as a proxy, falsify records, or shut down the target computer at will. +The Pentagon, defence-related think tanks, and defence-related contractors were the target of +a combined spoofing and Trojan attack in 2008. Trojans were hidden in email attachments +designed to look as if they were sent from a reliable source. The Trojan was designed to bury +itself into the system, covertly gather data, and send it to an internet address in China. Due to +the ability of hackers to route their activity through foreign computers, security experts were +unable to determine if China was the final destination, if it was an attempt at framing China, +or if it was a state-sponsored activity (Waterman 2008). +This was not the first time US research facilities received spoofed emails with Trojans +purportedly from China. In 2005 the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Los Alamos +National Laboratory became infected. No classified information was believed to have been +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +obtained; however personal information of visitors from the years 1990 to 2004 was +compromised. This included names, date of birth, and social security numbers. These two +research facilities were originally constructed for sensitive nuclear weapons research during +WWII. Today they are used +for research in numerous areas including national security, +nanotechnology, advanced materials, and energy + (Lasker 2005). In general, Cyber +reconnaissance may be an attempt to attain victory conditions before battle. These intrusions, +if undetected, allow intruders to identify vulnerabilities for future cyber attack. The cost of +probing computer networks is low, given the lack of attribution, requiring as few as one +hacker, and the ability to work from remote locations using off-the-shelf hardware. +A rootkit is a toolkit hidden on a compromised computer. The rootkit can be a diverse set of +programs, but invariably is designed to hide the fact that the computer has been compromised +and defending itself once detected. These rootkits often hide themselves as seemingly +innocuous drivers or kernel modules, depending on the details of the operating system and its +mechanisms. In addition to covering the tracks of an intruder, they can allow easier access in +the future by opening backdoors. They may also include an arsenal of sniffers, key loggers, +and tools that relay email chat conversations. Rootkits may also serve as a staging ground for +email spam distribution and DDoS attacks as a part of a larger botnet. In 2005, it was +revealed that Sony BMG included rootkit software on their CDs. This software altered the +Windows OS to allow access to the computer by anyone aware of the rootkits existence, +presumably to enforce copyright protection. This example shows that corporations, too, can +be a part of cyber attack or reconnaissance, furthering China +s desire to create its own +software and establish market dominance as opposed to being subjected to the US +Numerous source codes for ready-made rootkits can be found on the internet. In 2006, +alleged Chinese hackers infiltrated +the Department of Commerce +s Bureau of Industry and +Security, which manages export licensing of military-use products and information + using +rootkits to allow privilege escalation. The agency spent millions of dollars on new, clean, +hardware and software, because they could not restore the integrity of the compromised +network (Tkacik 2007). +A virus is a self-replicating program that spreads by inserting copies of itself into other +executable code or documents. The original virus may modify the copies, known as a +metamorphic virus, making its destruction more difficult (similar to genetic diversity). A +virus can spread from one computer to another through the internet, email, the network file +system, or removable medium such as a USB drive. Damage caused by viruses include +deleting files, damaging programs, reformatting the hard drive, and disrupting or debilitating +the system completely. Viruses may also be used as PSYOPs or demoralizers by presenting +text, video, or audio messages to the computer user. In order to replicate, a virus must be +allowed to execute code and write to memory. For this reason, many viruses attach +themselves to executable files, such as Word and pdf documents, or html links. Some viruses +try to avoid detection by killing the tasks associated with antivirus software before it can +detect them. The Panda Burning Incense Virus is an example of cyber warfare posing an +internal security threat to China, and it set a legal precedent for pursuing and prosecuting +hackers (Lemon 2007). +Like a virus, a worm is also a self-replicating program. A worm is a program or suite of +programs that attempts to scan a network for vulnerable systems and automatically exploit +those vulnerabilities. Some worms work passively, sniffing for usernames and passwords and +using those to compromise accounts, installing copies of themselves into each such account, +and typically relaying the compromised account information back to the intruder through a +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +covert channel. Many worms have been designed only to spread, and do not attempt to alter +the systems through which they pass. However, the Morris worm and Mydoom showed that +network traffic and other unintended effects can cause major disruption. A +payload + is code +designed to do more than spread the worm - it might delete files on a host system, encrypt +files for extortion, send documents via email, or destroy the target computer by rendering it +unusable. +The Code Red and Code Red II worms were the most successful worms in internet history, +causing nearly $2 billion in damages and infecting over 600,000 computers. The worms, +which may have originated from a university in Guangdong, China (United States General +Accounting Office 2001), attacked computers running Microsoft +s IIS web server and +exploited a buffer overflow. Home computers were largely unaffected; however any attempt +at infection caused them to crash. The worms created slow downs in internet speed, knocked +websites and networks offline, and defaced websites with the phrase +Hacked by Chinese! + although Chinese involvement was never confirmed. The attacks may have been statesponsored, they may have been underground hackers and script kiddies, or they may have +been a combination of the two. A script kiddie is not an expert in computer security. They +use pre-packaged automated tools written by others and found online, such as WinNuke +applications, Back Orifice, NetBus, Sub7, Metasploit, and ProRat. Even though script +kiddies lack sophistication, and they are looked down on by the hacker culture, they still pose +a significant security risk. When media attention is drawn to internet incidents, it is often +followed by individuals seeking to participate without any coordinated effort or instructions +to do so. Code Red II had a slightly different payload that could open a backdoor, leaving the +computers vulnerable to further exploitation (Schwartz 2007; Cost of 'Code Red' Rising +2001). +The Code Red worms coincided with the collision of a US reconnaissance plane and a +Chinese fighter jet, in which the Chinese pilot died, and known as the Hainan or EP-3 +Incident. Patriotic Chinese hackers defaced dozens of US military and computer industry +websites. Patriotic US hackers responded with inflammatory web page defacements, +comment spamming, posting of photoshopped derogatory pictures, and probably were the +source of the Code Blue Worm (Delio 2001). Code Blue sought out systems infected by +Code Red and reprogrammed them to launch attacks against targets based in mainland China. +In particular, it launched DDoS attacks against the Chinese security firm NS Focus. These +type of attacks could be used clandestinely against one +s own country to spur nationalism. Or +cyber attacks could be used by a third party state, or organization, to create conflict between +external states to further some masked goal. For example, Iran could benefit by creating +tension between the US and China through an attack prior to a US proposed UN resolution, in +which China has veto power (Onley and Wait 2006; Delio 2001). +In 2004, the Myfip worm probably originated from IP addresses in the Chinese municipality +of Tianjin (Brenner 2005). This worm stole pdf files, with later variants targeting Microsoft +Word documents, schematics, and circuit board layouts. Among the victims were Bank of +America, BJ +s Wholesale Club, and Lexis-Nexis. The worm not only stole intellectual +property, such as product designs, but also took customer lists and databases. Identifying the +number of companies affected poses difficulties as they do not wish to further damage their +business by coming forward. To do so can damage consumer confidence and require the +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +implementation of costly security measures. Businesses may also be oblivious to the number +of previous infections and potential data loss as they simply update their patches and move on +(Brenner 2005). +A denial-of-service (DoS) attack or distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt +to make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users. This is accomplished by +flooding the target with data requests, so that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or so that +it responds so slowly that it is rendered useless. DDoS attacks may be conducted by a +collective of individuals, often co-ordinating their efforts, or by a network of computers +under the control of a single attacker. Such networks are called botnets, with each computer +in the botnet being known as a bot, or a zombie. These computers have been taken control of +by malicious users without the knowledge of the owner, usually through a rootkit, Trojan, or +virus. Sobig and Mydoom are examples of worms which created zombies. A botnet's +originator, known as a bot herder, can control the group remotely, usually through a means +such as IRC, and usually for nefarious purposes. Infected zombie computers are used to send +email spam, to host contraband data such as child pornography, or to engage in distributed +denial-of-service attacks as a form of extortion. The services of a bot herder can be rented on +the black market. One estimate suggested that Chinese hackers have 750,000 zombie +computers in the US alone (Waterman 2007). A similar, but non-malicious, phenomenon +involving the banding together of excess computer power can be seen in the Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence (SETI@home), or Stanford University +s protein folding simulations +(Folding@home). +DoS and DDoS attacks can prevent an internet site or service from functioning temporarily or +indefinitely. DOS attacks can also lead to problems in the network branches around the +actual computer being attacked. For example, the bandwidth of a router between the internet +and a local area network may be consumed by an attack, compromising not only the intended +computer, but also the entire network. If the attack is conducted on a sufficiently large scale, +entire geographical regions of internet connectivity can be compromised without the +attacker's knowledge or intent by incorrectly configured or flimsy network infrastructure +equipment. Scripts can be set up to automate the process, and subtle variations of these +attacks, such as smurf attacks, fraggle attacks, teardrop attack, ping flood, SYN flood, IRC +floods, banana attack, Fork bomb, pulsing zombie, and nuke exemplify their sophistication. +Various DoS-causing exploits such as buffer overflow can confuse server-running software +and fill the disk space or consume all available memory or CPU time. A permanent denialof-service (PDoS), also known loosely as phlashing, is an attack that damages a system so +badly that it requires replacement or reinstallation of hardware. Unlike the DDoS, a PDoS +attack exploits security flaws in the remote management interfaces of the victim's hardware, +be it routers, printers, or other networking hardware. These flaws leave the door open for an +attacker to remotely +update + the hardware firmware to a modified, corrupt or defective +firmware image, therefore bricking the device and making it permanently unusable for its +original purpose. The PDoS is a hardware-targeted attack which can be much faster and +requires fewer resources than using a botnet in a DDoS attack. +It is important to note the difference between a DDoS and DoS attack. If an attacker mounts +a smurf attack from a single host it would be classified as a DoS attack. In fact, any attack +directed against computer availability would be classified as a DoS attack. On the other +hand, if an attacker uses a thousand zombie systems to simultaneously launch smurf attacks +against a remote host, this would be classified as a DDoS attack. Several botnets have been +found and removed from the internet. Dutch police located and disbanded a 1.5 million node +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +botnet, and the Norwegian ISP Telenor disbanded a 10,000 node botnet (Keizer 2005; +Leyden 2004). Large, coordinated international efforts to shut down botnets have also been +initiated, such as Operation Spam Zombies, which included agencies from 25 different states +(Operation Spam Zombies 2005). It has been estimated that up to one quarter of all personal +computers connected to the internet may become part of a botnet. And an estimated 50% of +all pirated Windows programs contain pre-installed Trojans. China is renowned for its use of +pirated Windows programs. This is a cause for concern for China as it bogs down internet +and computer efficiency. It also could make Chinese computers susceptible to international +condemnation, if their computers are used via proxy. Further, it demonstrates to China the +value of developing its own operating systems for domestic and world markets, either to +avoid such problems, or to create them for others (Weber 2007). +There are also hybrids. A worm can install a rootkit, and a rootkit might include copies of one +or more worms, packet sniffers, or port scanners. A rootkit or virus may be used to conduct a +DoS attack, and compromising the system may include some traditional social engineering +(HUMINT). So all of these terms have somewhat overlapping usage and they are often +misused by mainstream media. The depth of security hacking goes far beyond the examples +given here. These examples serve as an introduction to the level of sophistication with which +computers can be compromised, illustrating the difficulty in providing defence. They also +demonstrate the high level of damage that can be caused by a small group of individuals who +work with little funding. This adds to the lack of attribution as it does not require the funding +and support of a military, making state-sponsored hacking easy to deny. In combination with +anonymity tools and the ability to hide intrusions, security hacking provides a high level of +stealth and asymmetry. +Military Applications of Hacking +The USA +s paramount position and its heavy reliance on computers have made it a prime +target. For this reason it has some of the most extensive information on cyber attacks. The +United States has had millions of computers infected at a cost in the billions of dollars. +Hackers may be lone teenagers searching for fun or curiosity or state-sponsored intelligence +gathering and technology transfer, the determination of which is highly problematic. +Frequently hit targets include the US Department of Defense, the Pentagon, NASA, Los +Alamos Laboratories, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Harvard +University, California Institute of Technology, and a wide range of think tanks, defence +contractors, military installations, and high profile commercial corporations. The attacks +have come from across the globe and identifying and prosecting those responsible has proven +difficult (Greenberg 2007; Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas 2001). +These hackers have been able to steal classified data, such as naval codes, information on +missile guidance systems, personnel performance reports, weapons development, and +descriptions of the movement of equipment and personnel. Jonathan ( +c0mrade +) James +downloaded $1.7 million worth of software used to control the International Space Station +life support. Dutch teenagers stole information on the Patriot rocket launching system, and +the Navy +s Tomahawk cruise missile, and tried to sell it to Iraqi officials during the Gulf War + Iraq thought it was a hoax and declined (Miklaszewski 1999). Hackers have +commandeered US commercial, educational, and military computers and used them in attacks +against other nations, including Taiwan. Hackers can cause an immense amount of damage +to a state, stealing information, deleting and changing files, transferring capital, and +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +destroying programs or entire networks (Hacking U.S. Government Computers from +Overseas 2001; Christensen 1999; Qian and Wang 1999). +In 2001 and 2002 Gary ( +Solo +) McKinnon probed US Army, Navy, Air Force, Department +of Defence, and NASA computers causing $700,000 worth of damage, taking down a +network of 2,000 computers, accessing classified data, deleting and re-writing files. He +accomplished this on his own from his home in London using commercially available +software and a dial up connection. McKinnon claims he was searching for proof that the US +is hiding information about UFOs and an anti-gravity propulsion system. This illustrates the +relative ease with which intrusions can take place, the difficulty of determining whether or +not it is a state-sponsored action, and a lack of legal framework for timely response. With +such attacks occurring so frequently to vital industries, the US, with the largest military +budget in the world, has inevitably developed a means to defend against them, which by +association means they have also developed the means to conduct cyber reconnaissance and +cyber attacks itself. China, too, is the subject of frequent attacks, albeit less publicized, and it +will want to remain competitive with US military capabilities (Boyd 2008; Bruno 2008). +Titan Rain +A coordinated series of attacks against US installations are strong indicators that China is +developing a cyber warfare capability. The attacks which ran from 2003 to 2006 were +designated +Titan Rain +. They targeted US defence and aerospace installations, Sandia +National Laboratories, Lockheed Martin, Redstone Arsenal, the Department of Defense, and +NASA, gathering sensitive military data. The United Kingdom also reported being attacked +by the Titan Rain hackers. Much of the data stolen was not classified; however it was not +meant for public or foreign consumption, nor was it meant for unlicensed use. For example, +the US military +s classified data is typically not connected to the broader internet, but +sensitive information such as logistics support for the armed forces is. This can provide +valuable insight into field tested experience, as well as expose possible weaknesses to an +adversary (Brenner 2007; Espiner 2005). +In addition to the unauthorized gathering, the US is concerned that enough of this data could +be used to piece together a larger picture, one that would be considered classified. Among +the information gathered were +a stockpile of aerospace documents with hundreds of detailed +schematics about propulsion systems, solar panelling and fuel tanks for the Mars +Reconnaissance Orbiter . . . specs for the aviation-mission-planning system for Army +helicopters, as well as Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air +Force + (Thornburgh 2005). Although the majority of data appears to have been benign, its +massive quantity may one day prove to include items that the US deems classified at a later +date. These attacks could be a staging ground, testing US defences, for future operations of a +more serious nature. +Titan Rain demonstrated how China could use cyber warfare as an asymmetric tactic (Norton +Taylor 2007). Apparently, a team of hackers, estimated to number between 6 to 30, would +take control of US defence computers, copy everything on the hard drive within 30 minutes, +and send that data to zombie computers in South Korea, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, where it was +subsequently routed to computers in the Chinese province of Guangdong. The ability to +route the data makes it difficult to prove the attacker +s identity. While it is believed China +was responsible, there is no certainty that the data was not further routed to another location. +Additionally, those computers may have been under remote control by a separate +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +government, or the hackers may not have been state-sponsored. The attacks themselves were +not particularly sophisticated, requiring only minimal training with commercially available +products. The instructions on how to conduct such attacks are widely available on the +internet itself (Delio 2001). But attempts to identify the attackers would require the +burdensome task of sending covert agents to physically identify the source. +By using the virtual world, hackers are able to traverse great distances without leaving their +station. On the night of November 1, 2004, Titan Rain members scanned, broke into, and +retrieved data from defence installations in Arizona, Virginia, California, and Alabama (in +that order) all within a period of six hours. Once attackers gain control of US computers, +through methods such as Trojans, they can not only shut down the system, they can also +conduct attacks using those computers. This could be used to raise condemnation of the US, +as it would appear the US is attacking other states (Graham 2005; Thornburgh 2005). While +proof is non-existent, some US officials believe that the PLA was responsible (Norton-Taylor +2007). Chinese military doctrine repeatedly discusses +the importance of penetrating an +adversary's military logistics and personnel networks. Furthermore, the multiple intrusions +into what nuisance and criminal hackers would regard as boring, mundane networks-networks that do not offer the treasure trove of credit card numbers, bank accounts, and +identity data that criminal hackers typically seek-- suggest a military purpose + (Tkacik 2007). +Further Evidence of Build-up +Attacks under the code name Titan Rain have ceased. However, OSINT suggests that cyber +attacks from China persist. From 2005 to 2007, the US State Department, Bureau of Industry +and Security, DoD, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Homeland +Security, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and defence-related think +tanks had intrusions from Chinese ISPs (China +s Proliferation Practices and the Development +of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Leyden 2007, Tkacik 2007, Almeida +2006). Sensitive but non-classified data continues to be harvested; items such as emails and +the +names and other personal information on more than 1,500 employees + (Onley and Wait +2006). Attacks from Chinese ISPs have forced entire networks to be taken offline or +replaced. In 2005 alone, +the Pentagon logged more than 79,000 attempted intrusions + (Reid +2007). Cyber reconnaissance and attacks from Chinese IP addresses had become so frequent +and aggressive that US President George W. Bush raised the subject to Chinese President Hu +Jintao at the APEC summit in 2007. +The difficulty of attribution in cyber attacks, such as proxies, botnets, non-state-sponsored +hackers, and a lack of legal framework to pursue them, means these attacks may not have +come from China; however the accusations alone are evidence that China will want to +develop a cyber warfare capability. China now has the world +s largest internet population, so +in terms of volume, China has the most targets to defend. Chinese officials have stated that +they are the victim of +massive and shocking losses of state and military secrets via the +Internet + (Leyden 2007). Foreign states wishing to use cyber warfare against the US may +recognise the focus being placed on China and use Chinese computers to conduct their own +reconnaissance and attacks by using botnets or proxies based there. Further, denouncements +by the US may indicate that retaliatory responses are in the works and that the US will use +allegations of Chinese incursions to bolster support for increasing US cyber warfare +capability, thereby putting China further behind in military competitiveness. Damage to +China +s soft power, particular in relation to ICT, may affect China +s economy by making +investors cautious and export controls/legal bureaucracy more stringent. PSYOPS campaigns +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +and media warfare, of the type outlined by the US Information Operations Roadmap +(discussed above), may help China regain its lost credibility. These are elements of cyber +warfare, but viewed as less offensive than reconnaissance and direct cyber3 attack. +Non-US Foreign Allegations +The US is not alone in accusing China of using cyber warfare. In 2007 and 2008, China was +publicly accused of hacking into government facilities by officials in Australia, France, +Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the UK (Basu 2008; Goodin 2008; +Ha 2008; Leyden 2007; Marquand 2007). The number of countries under Chinese attack +could be far greater as some may not know that they are under attack, may not wish to reveal +their weakness due to a loss of soft power and consumer confidence, or they do not wish to +upset China as a valuable trading partner. Hans Elmar Remberg, Vice President of the +German Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Germany +s domestic intelligence +agency) stated that +across the world the PRC is intensively gathering political, military, +corporate-strategic and scientific information in order to bridge their technological gaps as +quickly as possible + (Tkacik 2007). +Unlike HUMINT, cyber warfare provides a lack of definitive attribution, makes distance +nearly irrelevant, allows for the mass accumulation of data in a short span of time, and at a +small cost in comparison to traditional espionage or military activities. Cyber attacks, such as +an incident that shut down the UK House of Commons, may only be small scale test runs, +probing, or reconnaissance blunders, meaning that the true scope of cyber attack has yet to be +seen (Norton-Taylor 2007). Cyber reconnaissance appears to be the most beneficial tool of +cyber warfare. Beyond finding exploitation points in the military for future attack, the +commercial sector allows China the opportunity to skip generations of research and +development efforts, levelling the playing field in science and technology, and by association +boosting economic and military might. Chinese hackers have even gone after British +parliamentiary files on human rights issues, showing a potential interest in relation to soft +power, globalization, international condemnation, and the legal apparatus. As Unrestricted +Warfare has shown, there are no boundaries in relation to such military operations. +4. Case Studies: Estonia, Georgia and Chanology +The 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, Georgia and Project Chanology are examples of +large-scale cyber attacks. The Estonian attacks were the first to show how cyber attack +against a state provides a debilitating effect at a low cost, a lack of attribution, a lack of legal +framework in defence, world-wide attention, and may point to a new arm of traditional +attack. The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was even more sophisticated and intense +than the Estonian case, showing the maturation of the process. Project Chanology reveals +how the collective masses can use online tools to emerge as a powerful force without a +central leadership. This can be harnessed by military power through the tactics described in +IO (Information Operations, see above). And as a matter of internal security, Chanologystyle movements must be carefully observed as they pose a non-traditional threat. Estonia +and Chanology are an emerging expression of warfare that is fuelled by new powers afforded +by the internet, but spills over into the real world, not only through financial loss and media +coverage (soft power), but also in the form of volatile protests, disruption, mob mentality, and +the capability of drawing governments and militaries into unwanted actions. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Estonia +In 2007, the Estonian government relocated a Soviet-era war memorial and bronze statue in +Tallinn, stating that the memorial symbolised Soviet occupation. The Russian government +condemned the relocation, claiming it was a tribute to those who fought in World War II. +The relocation sparked protests which resulted in 150 injuries, one death, and a month-long +cyber war campaign. Estonian websites including parliament, banks, ministries, schools, and +newspaper outlets were attacked with DDoS attacks and web page defacements. Some +websites also redirected users to images of Soviet soldiers and quotations from Martin Luther +King about resisting evil. Hackers who hit the ruling Reform Party's website left a fake +message that the Estonian prime minister and his government were asking for Russian +forgiveness and promising to return the statue to its original site (The Cyber Raiders Hitting +Estonia 2007). +These attacks garnered world-wide attention. The Russian government was directly accused +by media outlets and the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Russia had the motive and +the means for such an attack. However, there was no direct evidence to suggest that the +attacks were state-sponsored. There was evidence that some of the IP addresses used in the +attacks belonged to Russian government officials, and instructions on how to carry out cyber +warfare did circulate on Russian websites. However, the source of DDoS attacks could have +been masked by using proxies or botnets that are located across the globe. Neither NATO +nor European Commission experts were able to find any proof of official Russian +government participation. Further, the Russian government denounced Estonia +s claims and +refused to participate in any type of investigation (Bright 2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber +War' 2008; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007). +Debilitating Effect at a Low Cost +The effects of the cyber attacks were magnified as Estonia is one of the most internet-savvy +states in the European Union (The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007). The Estonian +government has pursued a paperless society, or e-government, and web-based banking. +Slowing down, or halting, banking services and newspaper outlets that rely on advertising +revenue strains the economy. This happens not only through a direct loss in revenue, but also +with a reduction in productivity, lost efficiency, diverting resources, escalating frustration, +and lost consumer and investor confidence. Estonia also uses the internet to elect +parliamentary officials, file their taxes and, via mobile phone, shop or pay for parking. In +some cases, website administrators simply blocked access from foreign states. While this +was effective in curbing the attacks, it completely cut off banking services to Estonians +outside of the country, vital to Estonian business people abroad. Spam emails inundated +government officials + inboxes, halting online communication from the Parliament +s email +server. Officials closed off large portions of their network to keep more vital areas online. A +government briefing site was given high priority while the president +s website was sacrificed. +The 10 largest swarms of data requests by the hackers absorbed 90 megabits per second for +up to 10 hours each, straining Estonia +s networks. It was +equivalent to downloading the +entire Windows XP operating system every six seconds for 10 hours + (Landler and Markoff +2007). The cyber attacks on Estonia came close to shutting down the country +s digital +infrastructure. While these may seem more of a disruption than a collapse, the effects radiate +out into society (Bright 2007; Estonia Hit by Moscow Cyber War 2007). +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +The month-long campaign caused companies to put resources into alternative infrastructure, +such as going back to traditional mail, relying on telephones, fax, and libraries, and reenforcing alternative methods of payment. As well as the cost of material infrastructure, +these type of cyber attacks cause a loss in productivity. This includes paying more people to +staff bank tellers, increased traffic on the streets, and long lines at retail outlets. Newspaper +outlets, telephone companies, and product distributors, have grown accustomed to using +online tools, and now rely heavily on them. While this might be a boon for some industries, +the whole restructuring process weakens the nation in the short term. The cyber attacks are +comparable to the damage caused to industry (beyond tangible infrastructure) by flooding or +blizzards. It places a nation in a state of flux, and leaves it more vulnerable to a traditional +attack. +DDoS attacks offer an enemy country an effective low cost assault with high deniability. The +majority of attacks on Estonia were DDoS, clogging its servers, switches, and routers. +Analysis from Arbor Networks revealed thousands of bots were used against Estonia from +locations as diverse as the US, Vietnam, Peru, and China. The cost to a state wanting to +establish botnets is minimal, requiring only one person, an internet connection, and a basic +computer. While the information for conducting such attacks can be found online, it is more +likely someone with expertise, such as non-government hacker groups, would be involved in +securing the rental of a botnet. This still keeps the number at a minimum, and hackers can +find alternative ways to fund the rental of servers with high bandwidth, such as credit card +theft (Waterman 2007; The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007). +Deniability +Determining the source of DDoS attacks is a difficult task, as they can be conducted with +proxies or botnets. Even if an IP address is obtained, there is no certainty that that was the +true source of the attack and not one link in a chain of computers or simply a compromised +computer being used unbeknownst to the owner. Message boards and chat rooms located on +Russian websites served as a meeting place for attackers, a place to coordinate their time of +attack, discuss targets, and recruit others. Because these individuals can be scattered across +the globe, it is difficult to assign a group identity to them. The web host may not be aware +that plans are being laid on their website, or they may not realise the scope of such plans. +These discussions can appear as a childish prank, overshadowing the serious repercussions of +the actions taking place, with no individual feeling responsible to put a stop to it. +The Estonia cyber attacks raised debate as to whether they were sponsored by the Russian +government. Some believed the attacks were too sophisticated to be the work of individuals +or even organised crime. Others believed the attacks were endorsed and guided by the +Russian government, but thought they were not directly involved + using online operatives +and media warfare as mentioned in IO. Russia has been accused in the past of sponsoring +web brigades + - cyber attack teams - that conduct PSYOPS, disinformation, spamming, and +cyber bullying, such as revealing an enemy +s personal details (Polyanskaya 2006). From the +perspective of officials from the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team and the +Pentagon +s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the attacks were not conducted by +sophisticated means, nor were they state-sponsored. The attackers used commercially +available off-the-shelf computers and scripts that are readily available on the internet +(Waterman 2007). Data from the Arbor Networks Active Threat Level Analysis System +(ATLAS) indicated that the attacks were conducted by multiple distributed botnets which +appeared to have been acting independently (Kerner 2007). Even if the attacks were traced to +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Russian government computers there was no certainty that those computers had not been +taken over by remote hackers. It would also seem foolish for the Russian government to use +its own computers for such an attack, especially when it has the expertise to mask its identity, +unless doing so was masking its identity (knowing that you know I know). Johannes Ullrich, +chief research officer of the Bethesda, stated: +Attributing a distributed denial-of-service +attack like this to a government is hard. It may as well be a group of bot herders showing +patriotism, kind of like what we had with Web defacements during the US-China spy-plane +crisis [in 2001] + (Brenner 2007). +As evidence of the Estonia case continued to be examined, the consensus was that the +Russian government was not directly involved. It appeared to have been +hacktavists +simply a mass number of individuals upset over the relocation of the statue. Plans for the +attacks were posted on internet forums, message boards, and chat groups prior to the attacks, +including detailed instructions on how to send disruptive messages and which Estonian +websites to use as targets. The discussion of proposed attacks had become so popular that it +was indexed by Google, causing a Google search for the topic to return these incendiary +websites at the top of its search results, bringing them to the attention of even more people. +Despite being aware of these discussions prior to the attacks, Estonia could do little to stop +them. Estonian officials could not identify the individuals discussing attacks, as online (not +real) names were used, and obtaining IP addresses would involve going after the website +administrator and foreign ISP + a task with which mega-corporations such as the MPAA and +RIAA have difficulty, despite their massive funding and even when going after domestic IP +addresses. Further, there is no certainty that an individual participating in the discussion will +act on his or her comments, there were mass numbers of people involved (each with a +different IP address, ISP, and host state to deal with), and there is no solid legal apparatus in +place to deal with such an undertaking. Nonetheless, there was a growing and visible threat. +Estonian officials may have been better off devoting their resources to plant online +operatives. These operatives could have placed well thought out comments to try and sway +the crowd. Rather than spending all resources on physical prevention, some resources could +be used to train operatives in PSYOPS, mob mentality, propaganda, and logical deterrents +such as subtly mentioning flaws in their arguments, or the consequences of participating in +such an attack. In order to be effective this would also require an in-depth understanding of +internet subcultures (List of Internet Phenomena 2008; Pang 2008; Slashdot Subculture 2008; +Slashdot Trolling Phenomenon 2008). Subtle techniques, such as self-deprecating humour, +can sway the crowd +s emotions and train of thought (Landler and Markoff 2007). Russian +government involvement may have been as an instigator, knowingly or not, as +there [were] +anti-Estonian sentiments, fuelled by Russian state propaganda, and the sentiments were +voiced in articles, blogs, forums and the press + (The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia 2007). +This could be a type of outsourcing of activity that provides a low cost attack with high +deniability. Once in the hands of an unwitting mob, the tools necessary are readily available +and the means are simple, thereby coordinating a massive data request simultaneously. On an +individual level it takes very little effort, yet as a combined whole it has devastating effect +with emergent sophistication. This small individual role, may also cause participants to feel +less responsible (Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008). +Legality +In addition to the difficulty of identifying the source of a cyber attack, a lack of legal +framework to deal with such an attack makes it exceedingly problematic. Only one person +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +has been charged and convicted in connection with the Estonian attacks. Dmitri +Galushkevich was fined 17,500 kroons for attacking the Reform Party website. Galushkevich +admitted to his assault on the site, and he is believed to have acted alone. Several leads in +identifying other potential participants in the Estonian attacks relied on Russian cooperation. +Estonia made a formal investigation assistance request under a Mutual Legal Assistance +Treaty (MLAT) between the states. Moscow appeared as though it would help, but after a +delay in action, it ultimately refused to cooperate, stating that the proposed investigation was +not covered by the MLAT. Further, the Head of the Russian Military Forecasting Centre +stated that the attacks against Estonia had not violated any international agreements because +no such agreements exist (Alo 2007; Sobrale 2007). A pro-Kremlin youth movement called +The Commissar of the Nashi, claimed responsibility for some of the attacks + however, the +group is located within Moldova and Transnistria which are beyond the jurisdiction of +Interpol and no MLAT applies. This severely hampers the investigation as pursuing all-EU +arrest warrants for these suspects would be largely a symbolic gesture (Commissar of Nashi +2007; Estonia Fines Man for 'Cyber War' 2008; Ministry of Internal Affairs 2007). +International Publicity +Regardless of whether the attacks were state-sponsored, the Estonian incident brought cyber +warfare to the attention of the global community. The case was studied intensively by many +countries and military planners, since it was believed to have been state-sponsored and a +modern example of a large-scale attack. Experts from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization +(NATO), the European Commission, and organisations from the US and Israel were +dispatched to offer assistance and collect first hand analysis of the event. The implications +are far reaching: +For NATO, the attack may lead to a discussion of whether it needs to +modify its commitment to collective defense, enshrined in Article V of the North Atlantic +Treaty + (Landler and Markoff 2007). There is no precedence for an attack of this type. If a +state +s communications centre is attacked by a missile, it is considered an act of war. But +what is the response to a cyber attack on that same installation, with the same debilitating +effect? The Estonian attacks have encouraged the development of a NATO Cybernetic +Defence Centre in Estonia. This is an extension of Estonia +s 1996 push for the expansion of +computer and network infrastructure in Estonia, nicknamed the Tiger +s Leap (Bright 2007; A +Cyber-Riot 2007; Estonia Has No Evidence of Kremlin Involvement 2007). +Georgia +The 2008 war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia appeared to mirror the +Estonian attacks, hinting that cyber warfare may become a standard addition to traditional +warfare, whether that be state-sponsored or not. Hours after fighting broke out, +Russian +hackers had established a site, StopGeorgia.ru, where visitors could view a list of Georgian +websites being targeted, showing which sites had been successfully brought down, and +download a simple program that enabled their own computer to join the attack + (Waterman +2008). The attacks included DDoS attacks from six different botnets against government and +news websites, webpage defacements, spamming, the distribution of Georgian officials +email addresses, and distribution of a list of Georgian websites with known security flaws. +The level of sophistication and intensity of the Georgian attacks surpassed that of the +Estonian attacks, showing that capability is increasing. Russian-based hackers tried to halt +the Georgian hacker community from responding, by taking down the two highest-profile +Georgian hacker sites, hacker.ge and warez.ge, in their initial assault (Waterman 2008). +However, Georgian hackers did respond, going after Russian news sites, and in some cases, +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +spoofing those sites to redirect traffic to pro-Georgian news sources (Coleman 2008; Griggs +2008). Georgian officials asserted that the Russian military was behind the attacks, but they +could not provide concrete evidence. Regardless, it represents a new aspect to warfare that +must be taken into account. Patriotic cyber attacks may now accompany all traditional wars. +If this is not shaped according to government objectives, it runs the risk of undermining +operations. For example, patriotic cyber attacks could damage soft power, they could incite +damaging retaliatory attacks, and they could drag state powers into conflict. +Chanology +China may wish to tap into the power of a broader range of internet users, those who are not +government sponsored, nor skilled hackers, yet have wide-ranging knowledge of the internet +through frequent use. In one view: +I've always argued that I do not believe the patriotic hackers are dedicated government +agents, but I do believe that they are treated as useful idiots by the Chinese regime, and that +the Chinese regime has figured out a rough method, using the propaganda apparatus, to +shape the behavior of these patriotic hacker groups, many of whom are getting older and +going from black hat to gray hat to white hat, and they want wives and jobs and houses, and +the only way to get certified as an information security professional in China is to be certified +by the ministries of public and state security. (China +s Proliferation Practices, and the +Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008) +A powerful array of tools is openly available to anyone with an internet connection, and they +require little effort to learn. Free web-space, image and video uploading sites, such as blogs, +Flickr and YouTube, give anyone with an internet connection multimedia sharing tools that +rival traditional media. Social networking sites, such as Facebook and Digg, provide +additional means to spread this information to a massive audience which, given enough +popularity, draws in the traditional media as well. China can use propaganda and PSYOPs to +influence this crowd, using it as a political tool. For example, it can be used to organise +protest and cyber attacks denouncing Japan +s lack of remorse for WWII atrocities, to criticize +Falun Gong followers, or to rally support for the One China Policy (Faiola 2005). Project +Chanology gives insight into how these non-hacker internet users can come together towards +a common goal of disruption using the rapid growth of available internet capabilities. It also +illustrates a growing need to understand these emergent communities as they pose a nontraditional security threat. +Project Chanology was a series of cyber attacks and real life protests organised over the +internet against the Church of Scientology (CoS). The CoS is the largest organization +devoted to the practice and promotion of the Scientology belief system. They are often +criticized as being a cult which tries to exploit people for financial gain. A loose group of +internet users named Anonymous orchestrated attacks against the CoS using multiple image +boards, such as 4chan, 7chan, 12chan, 420chan, and 711chan, as well as supplementary +wikis, IRC channels, YouTube, Facebook, Slashdot, Digg, and Encyclopaedia Dramatica. +Users of the channels are collectively known as Anonymous, or anon, due to the website +use of anonymous posting; however their internet networks extend beyond the image boards. +A large and diverse population of internet users identify with the name Anonymous, many +having differing viewpoints and objectives. This point is often lost on the media, who +mistakenly believe Anonymous represents a cohesive group. Anonymous is connected, but +the nodes which connect each member are not the same, and therefore they do not all rally to +the same cause. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Project Chanology was officially launched in the form of a video posted on YouTube on +January 21, 2008. The video stated that the attacks where in response to Scientology +internet censorship, dubious recruitment tactics, saturating of disaster areas to +help + victims, +and overall belief system. Of particular contention was Scientology +s forced removal of a +leaked Tom Cruise video interview, in which he expounded his love for Scientology. +Additional complaints against the CoS include the removal of leaked Scientology belief +documents (part of a 10-year legal battle against Karin Spaink and several ISPs), and the +attempted removal of the newsgroup alt.religion.scientology from Usenet, which led the +hacker group Cult of the Dead Cow to declare war on the Church of Scientology as early as +1995. Anonymous +s stated intent was to +expel the church from the internet + and to +save +people from Scientology by reversing the brainwashing +. This was followed by DDoS +attacks, black faxes, prank calls, false deliveries to CoS buildings, the dissemination of +Church leaders personal information (telephone numbers, social security numbers, and +addresses), and the publishing of the contended leaked material on a wide range of websites. +Project Chanology members grew to approximately 9,000 people. They successfully took +down the Scientology website on January 18, 2008 with a mid-range DDoS attack. By +comparison a botnet can launch a simultaneous attack from 50,000 computers. Nonetheless, +Anonymous managed to cripple the Scientology website for a period of two weeks. In +response to the attacks, the CoS moved its internet domain to a more secure provider. The +original declaration of war video, which utilized a synthesized voice, was viewed over two +million times within 18 days of its release. Project Chanology garnered mainstream media +coverage on an international scale. Mainstream media +s attention created an unintended +DDoS attack by drawing more attention to the CoS website. Anonymous further raised +questions about Scientology +s actions, including the death of Lisa McPherson, a scientologist +who died in 1995, for which the CoS was previously under federal investigation. +Anonymous used a Google bomb technique to make the Scientology.org website the first +result in a Google search for +dangerous cult + (McMillan 2008; O +Connell 2008; Vamosi +2008; Cook 2008; Single 2008; Ramadge 2008; The Passion of Anonymous 2008). +Utilizing a wide range of online communication tools, and a new YouTube video titled +Call +to Action +, Anonymous coordinated a series of protests. In the video anon states: +We have +no leaders, no single entity directing us. + On February 10, 2008, approximately 7,000 people +protested throughout 100 cities in 14 countries. Protesters wore Guy Fawkes masks from the +V for Vendetta film, and made Rick Astley's pop single "Never Gonna Give You Up", a +theme song for the protests against Scientology. The seemingly bizarre and childish +behaviour of Anonymous is a part of their cohesion, a subculture of memes, slang, and +humour. A second series of protests began on March 15, 2008, with approximately 7,000 to +8,000 protestors throughout 100 cities in 10 countries. CoS has not released an official +estimate of the financial damage caused by Project Chanology. However, they have publicly +stated that they were forced to increase online security, hired off-duty police officers to +provide physical security at their churches, and have suffered increasing negative press and +scrutiny from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. CoS has denounced Anonymous as +cyber terrorists and Anonymous has since switched its campaign to go after Scientology +tax-exempt status. +China could use online operatives to incite this type of internet based +. It could be used +constructively within China, such as undermining the Falun Gong, or destructively against an +enemy country, such as inciting protests against pro-democracy Taiwanese leadership. +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Additionally, these online communities pose a security threat, and should therefore be +examined if only as a means of deterrence. As mentioned in IO, this sort of emergent mob is +not one that can be quickly understood. To be used as a military tool, China would need a +deep understanding of the asset +s culture. In the case of Anonymous, this equates to a heavy +reliance on inside jokes, slang, internet and pop culture. Anonymous uses humour to unite +and to obfuscate logic and responsibility. Credence within the group may come from inside +jokes and creativity, rather than sound information + they even revel in their own failure. +Internet communities can lack a centre of command, and be composed of serious, moderate, +and casual participants, all of whom may change their level of participation on a whim. +Assassin +s Mace +Assassin +s Mace, or shashoujian, is used in Chinese military writings to describe a weapon or +tactic +which can deliver decisive blows in carefully calculated surprise moves and change +the balance of power + (Johnston 2002). Similar concepts can be seen throughout China +history, from Sun Zi +s (tr. 1963) The Art of War to Mao Zedong +s (tr. 2000) On Guerrilla +Warfare. An assassin +s mace gains strength by ignoring pre-established rules of conduct. It +has many similarities to asymmetric warfare, such as being a novel way to level the playing +field, but it differs in that it is a decisive weapon, aimed at incapacitating an enemy, +suddenly and totally + (Navrozov 2005). China possesses several asymmetric, highly +devastating weapons, such as a limited but modernising nuclear weapons capacity, China +ASAT capability, and its electromagnetic pulse (EMP) capability. However each of these has +considerable drawbacks. For example, human rights and environmental concerns have +relegated nuclear weapons to the role of deterrent and introduced limited warfare. By using +cyber warfare, China could achieve the same asymmetric destructive power while bypassing +the drawbacks. +It is unlikely that China would use kinetic kill weaponry, such as its direct ascent ASAT, in +an attempt to disrupt US space based assets. To disrupt US satellite dominance would require +a massive sky clearing operation, because the US has constellations of satellites with multiple +redundancy. The US GPS provides tactical communication and precision navigation, making +it a desirable target + however, the GPS uses at least five space satellite constellations. When +one is destroyed, others can be manoeuvred to fill holes in the net. Not all of these satellites +are within striking range at any given time. This means a sky clearing operation would take a +significant amount of time, thereby revealing Beijing +s intentions. This would cause +international dispute due to space debris, and allow the US to manoeuvre its other satellites +out of harm +s way. It would risk retaliation in which China would be at a disadvantage. +Additionally, there is no guarantee an attempt would be successful, as each launch requires +precise targeting, and China +s ASAT has only been tested once. It is more likely China +would attempt to knock out the corresponding relay stations on Earth by using a cyber attack. +Chinese tacticians have focused on neutralising the uplinks and downlinks of the space-based +systems through diverse forms of cyber attack including simple DoS attack. This gives the +advantages of deniability and low cost. It would remove distance from the equation, allowing +multiple targets to be taken out simultaneously regardless of location, and it would remove +international condemnation and/or involvement (Waterman 2008; Tellis 2007; International +Assessment and Strategy Center 2005). +China could destroy a vast majority of US electronics, including computers, cars, phones, and +the power grid, using EMP weaponry. This is something of which all nuclear armed states +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +are capable by means of high altitude nuclear explosions, taking as few as three to blanket the +continental US (Electromagnetic Pulse 2005). Open source materials have shown the US, +China, France, and Russia all using an EMP burst as a surprise first strike in war games +(China +s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare +Capabilities 2008; Winn 2008; Nock and Lizun 2007; Qian and Wang 1999). However, it is +unlikely China would use such brute-force tactics. Using a high altitude atomic burst would +cause international outrage as it violates an international treaty, it damages the environment, +and it indiscriminately disrupts everything in its blast radius. Alternatively, shutting down +the US power grid, production lines, water utilities, chemical plants, telecommunications, and +transportation routes is possible through cyber attack, and it would provide the benefit of +deniability. Details on how such an attack would be conducted are scarce in OSINT as +governments do not wish to publicize their weaknesses or give away their assets. It is +important however that they do acknowledge them, since any computer system which is +connected to the internet is vulnerable to attack. In 2008, the CIA reported that multiple +cities outside the US had their electrical power shut off by hackers. The reports were vague, +supposedly due to security concerns; however it was reported that the attacks came from +online, through the internet, not by physical means (Bridis 2008; McMillan 2008). +Weapons of Mass Disruption +OSINT continually points to cyber warfare being capable of crippling a state +s electric power +transmission, transportation systems, and communications systems (Phone Phreaking 2008; +Weber 2008; Trahan 2008; McMillan 2007; Tkacik 2007; Reid 2007; Robson 2004; +Miklaszewski 1999). If the Russian government was behind the cyber attacks on Estonia, it +did not use such a dramatic assault. The Russians may simply have been testing their cyber +warfare capabilities, saving their most devastating capability for when it is needed most, as it +may only work once. Such an attack would cripple the flow of goods, effectively starving the +population and shutting down business. Evidence that such a possibility exists can be seen +across the globe. In 1997, a teenager shut down air and ground communication at a US +airport in Massachusetts, and in 2000, the Russian government announced that hackers had +succeeded in taking control of the world +s largest natural gas pipeline network, Gazprom, by +using a type of Trojan. In 2000, Vitek Boden took control of a sewage pumping station in +Australia. He remotely triggered the release of a million litres of sewage into public +waterways (Barker 2002). Computers and manuals seized in Al Qaeda training camps +contained large amounts of SCADA information related to dams and critical infrastructure. +In 2003, the Slammer Worm took a US nuclear power plant +s safety monitoring system +offline, and the Blaster Worm was connected with a massive blackout in the Eastern US +(Maynor and Graham 2006). +The United States is particularly vulnerable as much of the communication, manufacturing, +water, transportation, and energy infrastructure is owned by the private sector, as opposed to +China and Russia where infrastructure is predominantly in the hands of the government +(Greenemeier 2007). The relative ease with which the Titan Rain attacks were conducted +make private sector computer networks look like an easy target (Almeida 2006). The +government and defence installations are heavily funded for security, whereas the private +sector is not. Initially the US power grid control systems were on closed networks (not +connected to the internet). However, over time companies began deciding it was too costly to +maintain separate networks. The internet became essential for operations, meaning they +would need two separate systems for operation, one connected and one not. Through the +decision-making process companies decided it was cheaper to have only the one that was +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +connected, but focus on keeping it secure. Over time security became lax, and no network +that is connected can be entirely secure. Many of these systems do not support +authentication, encryption, or basic validation protocols; of those that do support them, most +run with security features disabled (Maynor and Graham 2006). In addition to the internet, +SCADA systems may be compromised through outdated modems used for maintenance +purposes, wireless access points, or roaming notebooks. Further, power companies may buy +and trade power amongst themselves, so loopholes designed to check available capacity have +provided another entry point (Winkler 2007). The vulnerability of the private sector +computer network, due to a lack of understanding or a lack of incentive, provides China (or +other cyber-capable groups) with the opportunity to cripple US infrastructure. +Point of Sale +Using a modern fuel service station as a parallel for a cyber attack on commercial +infrastructure, one can see the debilitating effects of a cyber attack. Magnetic stripe cards +have replaced tangible notes as the primary method of payment. By overwhelming a bank +through something as simple as a DDoS attack, an adversary could knock the point of sale +banking system offline. Few service stations are equipped to handle this for duration longer +than one day, and the Estonian attacks demonstrated a month-long capability. Lines in the +store would grow as the speed of transactions dramatically slowed. Nearby ATMs would be +taxed as people begin withdrawing more notes. As the ATM runs out of its supply of money, +an internal alert is sent to notify the ATM provider to send an armoured car to restock the +machine. This would require additional workflow, disrupting a fine tuned system of +allocated staff hours and drivers. The long lines at the register would disrupt the productivity +and efficiency of working customers who are unaccustomed to the long wait, and it would +radiate frustration and anger throughout the community. +As the service line grows and employees struggle to keep up, the amount of store theft (fuel +and merchandise) increases. More hours would be allocated to review surveillance footage, +and the local police would be inundated with cases of theft. Panic may ensue, as seen with +small disruptions at service stations, comparable to the temporary collapse of Optus +telecommunications or the temporary collapse of Westpac banking (Streem 2008). A +sustained disruption could lead to mob mentality. The fragility of social order was +demonstrated in 2008 when fuel price increases led to widespread violent protests across the +globe, including Argentina, Belgium, France, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Portugal, South +Korea, Spain, Thailand, and the UK (Arrests Following Jakarta Fuel Price Increases 2008; +Banerjee and Zappei 2008; Cowell 2008; Fuel Demo Adds To Road Taxes Row 2008; +Indonesia: Growing Fuel Price Protests Meet Repression 2008; Thai Truckers Join Global +Fuel Price Protest 2008). +Alternatively, the registers themselves are operated by using the internet and could be +targeted. China could bypass banking systems, energy providers, transportation systems, or +communications systems and go after the less guarded, and less funded, point-of-sale +software. Few service stations remain in the western world that use unconnected registers, as +it would be difficult to remain competitive. Similarly, there are few competitors in the +service station industry due to strong competition. This means there are only a small group +of service station vendors within a large city, and all of the computers within those companies +are running off of the same network. The six largest non-state owned energy companies, +known as super majors, are: Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron Corporation, +ConocoPhillips, and Total SA. These six companies control the vast majority of service +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +stations (SBDCNET 2001). This is sometimes obscured by the use of alternative store +names, despite being contracted to a supermajor, or the continued use of an old company +name despite having been bought out by a supermajor. This illustrates a lack of diversity in +the retail industry. By attacking only a few targets, an entire city +s service stations could be +knocked offline. There are a limited number of independent operators within a typical city; +however their numbers are too few to facilitate the influx of customers from the larger +competitors. +Without the online register, PLUs (price look-up codes) cannot scan and prices would have to +be manually added. Any extended duration of this process could shutdown a store, and +depending on the system, fuel may not be able to be dispensed without the computer. Service +stations are not known for their sophistication in computer defence as they routinely tighten +budgets to their limits and they have not seen a need to harden this infrastructure. As +community hostility rises, employees may resign due to stress. It would be difficult training +new employees during this time with extended lines and the employees themselves suffering +an inability to access fuel. New staff would also cause lost time and money for training. All +delivery trucks create online invoices sent and received by the service station. Assuming +they are able to maintain the fuel for their trucks, they would be forced to adapt to old +methods of interaction and record keeping. A store +s stock might also suffer shortages from +hoarding of products due to panic in the community. +These systems could be attacked solely online, or operatives could be placed into the store to +learn the system +s weaknesses and install malware directly. Operations could be expanded +beyond a service station to attack grocery and a wide range of retail outlets. Rather than +going after the transport of goods, it may be easier to disrupt them online at their point of +sale. The effects would radiate outward, knocking down additional infrastructure unable to +handle the increased stress. A service station is only one example of weak commercial +infrastructure that relies on computers to operate. If China could gain market dominance in +the point of sale software industry, or in the registers used for sales, it would gain an even +greater access to disruption. This disruption could be used as a deterrent, as blackmail, or as +a force multiplier in traditional warfare. +Market Dominance +China may seek to establish market dominance in the production of ICT software and +hardware as a means of increasing its cyber warfare capability. On an infrastructure level, +China could seek to control ownership of submarine cable infrastructure allowing it further +access to cyber reconnaissance or the option of shutting down portions of internet +connectivity during times of war (Whitney 2008; Of Cables and Conspiracies 2008). Further, +if China could unseat Microsoft as the industry standard in software, it could install +backdoors, latent viruses, or remotely triggered ex-filtration devices. This type of tactic was +examined in section 3, above (Cyber Reconnaissance and Attack), with Sony BMG +s use of +rootkits. China used legal and financial prowess to convince Microsoft to teach its software +engineers how to insert their own software into Window +s applications. As a part of the +Chinese argument for doing so, was an insistence that Microsoft Windows was a secret tool +of the US government. By providing China with +skeleton keys + to the Windows Operating +System, inadvertently China was given advanced knowledge on how to infiltrate foreign +computers and craft advanced exploits (Marsal 2008; Tkacik 2007). +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +US concerns over Chinese market dominance have begun to surface. In 2006, the State +Department banned the purchase of computers from the Lenovo Group, the Chinese firm that +acquired the IBM personal computing division, following penetrations using a zero-day flaw +in Microsoft software. China is also growing in the field of microchips, something other +states need for defence related electronics. Not only could China embed exploits, but also +dominance in this field gives it access to critical individuals and information through +partnership, such as a chance to liaise with industry insiders, come close to sensitive +information and hardware, and conduct social engineering or HUMINT. In 2003, the Huawei +Shenzhen Technology Company was charged with stealing secrets and wholesale pirating of +Cisco software, a US company. In 2007, Huawei then attempted to buy 3Com, a US +company which supplies the US government with security software, routers, and servers. +India turned down a $60 million Huawei investment deal in 2005 after concerns over cyber +reconnaissance, noting that Huawei is the same company that conducts sweeping and +debugging of the Chinese embassy. India +s Defence Ministry stated +the choice was between +cheap Chinese equipment and national security + (Tkacik 2007). +China consistently reverse engineers ICT hardware and software in an attempt to maintain a +stronghold on its own markets. This can be seen with the reverse engineering of Skype +Protocol and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and +knock offs + of the iPhone (VoIP +WkiBlog 2006). The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project, which has the potential to +rapidly spread internet connectivity to China +s remaining population, uses an open source +operating system and software, helping to free China from US owned Microsoft. Yet China +has denounced the sale of OLPC, promoting instead various domestic versions that were +reversed engineered from the OLPC model. +Further, the Chinese have secured +manufacturing rights to produce OLPC within China even though they do not intend to +promote OLPC sales domestically (O +Brien 2008). China also has a history of reverse +engineering websites that become popular and profitable in the Western world; examples +include clones of YouTube, Google, MySpace, Facebook, Wikipedia, and eBay being +YoQoo, Baidu, Baidu Space, Xiaonei/Zhanzuo, Baidu Baike/Hoodong, and Taobao +respectively (Marshall 2008; Wei 2008; Burns 2006). +Peacetime Operations +During peacetime, China is likely to rely on cyber reconnaissance to gather information and +catalogue exploits/weaknesses in the US military and infrastructure. Automobile companies, +food services, oil companies, financial institutions, and telecommunications all play a vital +role in supporting military operations, as well as housing technological advances, expertise, +and inside information which could prove useful for leapfrogging (Winkler 2005). +Technology transfer allows China to skip years of costly research and development, and it +removes the competitive edge of foreign militaries and companies (Tkacik 2007). In +unrestricted fashion, China may also seek advantage during peacetime to battle military +export restrictions of the EU, purchase vital capital in the US financial system, and help +shape the international legal structure being developed for cyber warfare. Cyber +reconnaissance against US military logistics networks could reveal force deployment +information, such as the names of ships deployed, readiness status of various units, timing +and destination of deployments, and rendezvous schedules. It could also reveal the details of +weaponry sold to Taiwan. +China has repeatedly shown interest in the US Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol +Router Network (NIPRNet) (China +s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008). NIPRNet is used to exchange unclassified but +sensitive information between internal users. The network is connected to the broader +internet to improve collaboration between scientists and officers located in different +organizations and in remote locations. This means it can provide intruders with data such as +ballistic weapons research, aircraft and ship design, military payroll, personnel records, +procurement, modelling of battlefield environments, and computer security research + (Lewis +1994). The US places classified military information on the Secret Internet Protocol Router +Network (SIPRNet) and secret information on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence +Communications System (JWICS). While these networks are not connected to the internet, +examining NIPRNet may give insight into the contents through cross talk, or it may provide a +means of escalating privileges, providing information on how to access SIPRNet and JWICS +either directly or indirectly via an asset. +Taiwan +China can use the internet to manipulate the Taiwanese populace, either to set up for an +attack, or to undermine Taiwan independence peacefully and avoid conflict altogether. This +may include PSYOPS/propaganda, recruitment and identification of sympathizers, or +cataloguing of cyber and defence weaknesses. For example, an internet rumour in 1999 that +a Chinese Su-27 had shot down a Taiwan aircraft caused the Taipei stock market to drop +more than two percent in less than four hours. An earthquake in 1999 and a typhoon in 2001 +revealed weaknesses in Taiwan +s telecommunications, electric power, and transportation +infrastructure; weaknesses which could be targeted in physical sabotage. Further, a landslide +revealed that the loss of a single power grid tower is capable of knocking out 90 percent of +the power grid in the central mountainous region. Building information, including the +location of the President +s office, and daily activities, are openly available on the internet. +This is even more significant given the lack of security present during the 2004 assassination +attempt on President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu (China +s Proliferation +Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008; Taiwan +Assassin 2004). +In the event of a Taiwan conflict, China could use cyber attacks to delay US involvement +long enough for Taiwan to capitulate. For example, China could go after the US logistical +apparatus, using information gained via NIPRNet, in order to delay the force deployment +phase. This would include the organization of forces, food supplies, uniforms, and/or +communication which are often organised through networks that are connected to the +internet. Cyber attack could also delay re-supply to the region by misdirecting stores, fuel, +and munitions, corrupting or deleting inventory files, and thereby hindering mission +capability. If the Chinese lack the capability to find exploits in NIPRNet, they could simply +conduct DDoS attacks to bring it down long enough for a Taiwanese surrender. While +delaying the US, China could use traditional military forces in concert with cyber warfare +against Taiwan. The cyber warfare component could include online PSYOPS, media +warfare, special forces aided by cyber reconnaissance information, and cyber attacks against +Taiwan +s point of sale and banking infrastructure. +6. Conclusion +This research has shown that China seeks to leapfrog in military competitiveness by utilizing +cyber warfare. Chinese military doctrine places an emphasis on asymmetric attack. Cyber +Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80 +Copyright + 2008 Jason Fritz +warfare epitomizes this a low cost means of levelling the playing field. Cyber attack strikes +at a superior adversary +s weakness + in the case of the US, a heavy reliance on hi-tech +computerized weaponry and a civilian population reliant on an unsecured computer +infrastructure. Cyber reconnaissance follows China +s tradition of technology transfer and +reverse engineering for domestic production as a means of leapfrogging. +Cyber +reconnaissance gives the added benefit of providing deniability, low cost, a lack of legal +framework against it, and the removal of geographical distance. Foreign allegations, such as +the Titan Rain incursions, suggest China is making rapid progress in cyber reconnaissance +and attack capabilities. The PRC openly states in its National Defense White Paper that it is +seeking informationization and modernization of the PLA. This follows the US, China +perceived greatest threat, in its pursuit of NCW, IO, and FCS. Cataloguing adversary +weaknesses not only provides an asymmetric advantage in the event of a conflict, it also acts +as a deterrent while China catches up in traditional military might. By utilizing cyber +reconnaissance, China can accelerate its advancement in hi-tech weaponry. Unrestricted +warfare has shown a blurring of the lines between military and non-military spheres. China +can tap into the power of its online population for military purposes, such as seen in the +Estonian, Georgian and Chanology case studies. Following the US example of IO, China can +leverage the internet as a means of boosting soft power. 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