2009.clean.txt

Volume 11, 2009
Baltic Security & Defence Review
Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks
By William C. Ashmore *
During a two week period in April and May of 2007 Estonia was the
victim of a sustained massive cyber attack on its information infrastructure.
While the cyber attack was not the first nor was it the largest, it was the
first cyber attack that was directed at the national security of a country.
(Davis, 2009)
The significance of a cyber attack on a small country can be difficult to
measure for a casual observer. Estonia is a small country that can be seen
as a model for the future. Estonians have developed and used internet
technology for voting, education, security and banking (ninety-five percent
of banking operations are done electronically) (Collier, 2007). It is not
uncommon to see a sign for free Wi-Fi internet access at a pub, restaurant
or on public transportation. 1
Imagine going to an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), while on a
business trip, to get money for meals and lodging and the system is down.
Restaurants and hotels are unable to process your credit card. You try to
send a message to your bank, your work, and your family but the computer
servers are all down. The government is unable to communicate with the
public and its different departments. News agencies are having difficulties
publishing information. The aftermath of a cyber attack can impact anyone
that uses the internet, whether it is an individual, business, or government
that has been affected. By investigating the attack, how it happened, and
Estonia
s reaction, states can decide whether their internet defences and
strategies are adequate. 2
The cyber attacks on Estonia have implications for both its allies and
adversaries. This article is not meant to establish a complete strategy for
cyber defence but to create a better understanding of how a cyber attack
can have far reaching consequences beyond the immediate aftermath of a
targeted infrastructure. What are the implications for Estonia? Is the
framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
appropriate for cyber defence? Is an attack against one really an attack
* William C. Ashmore is a Major in U.S. Army.
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against all? Does the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) have the ability to react to cyber attacks? Lastly, does the
Russian Federation have a coherent cyber strategy that it is willing to use
and what have been the consequences for Russia?
Any country that uses the internet as part of its infrastructure needs to be
aware of the vulnerabilities and consequences of a cyber attack on their
system. A coherent strategy must include internet defences that are set-up
in conjunction with technical defences. Currently, legal definitions for
cyber crimes do not exist in all countries. The international community
must examine treaties and update them to better define assistance and
common defence in the event of a cyber attack. Russians have shown the
ability and the desire to use cyber warfare. Cyber strategy by, in defence of,
or against Russia affects more than computer networks. Although, attacks
that originate in China, Japan or the United States may have similar
implications they are outside of the scope of this article.
Internet attacks occur on a daily basis throughout the world. How nations
prepare themselves for an internet attack will determine the impact of a
cyber attack on their infrastructure. The aim of this article is to achieve a
greater understanding of the possible Russian cyber strategy and to
understand the counter measures that can be used to prevent or mitigate
cyber attacks. This awareness could possibly prevent a tactical defeat
during conflict when a cyber attack targeting command and control and
communications infrastructure is blocked.
1. The media accounts
Internet trade magazines and mass media reports were used to gather
evidence on the events surrounding the cyber attack on Estonia. Internet
sources were a major source of information on the subject of cyber
security because of the amount of information that is new and has not yet
been published in books. Several Estonian government officials have
spoken on the issue of cyber attacks at great lengths. Estonian government
documents were also used to analyze the Estonian response to the cyber
attack. Media accounts along with documents from the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were used to analyze the aftermath of the
Estonian cyber attack on organizations and other states. Analysis of
Russian involvement was conducted using western documents.
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In order to understand the reasons behind the Estonian cyber attack this
article will explore the social tensions and the cyber attack itself. The
impact that the attack had on the different actors will also be noted. The
reality of the attacks indicates some important implications for Estonia and
other former Soviet satellites to work with NATO to develop a coherent
cyber strategy. Russia
s cyber strategy also has considerable significance for
the United States. This article will conclude with a summary of possible
countermeasures to a cyber attack.
2. Cyber attack on Estonia
The social tensions between Estonians and Estonia
s Russian minority are
key to understanding why there was a cyber attack. Estonia is made up of
1.3 million people where 25.6 percent of the population is Russian (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2008). In 1918, the Estonians gained their
independence from Russia, and in 1940 they were forced into the Soviet
Union. From 1940 until they regained their independence in 1991 Estonia
viewed Russia
s presence as an illegal occupation. Mass deportations were
made, people were summarily executed, and the population was resettled
by ethnic Russians. Russians on the other hand view the Estonians as
ungrateful because they were saved by Russians from the Nazi German
fascists. Today there exists significant animosity between the Russians and
the Estonians that permeate personal relationships and political
interactions within the country and between the two nations. (Vesilind,
2008) 3
The actual events that occurred in Estonia centred on the Soviet Bronze
Soldier monument. The Bronze Soldier monument is a World War II
Soviet War memorial which memorialized the graves of Soviet Soldiers
who died during World War II. However, over time ethnic Russians had
used the memorial as a rallying site for demonstrations and other forms of
protest against the Estonian government. This led to a decision by the
Estonian government to move the monument to an area that was less
public. (Davis, 2009)
The decision to move the statue led to actual riots in the capital city of
Tallinn on April 27th, 2007. The demonstrations degraded into criminal
activities involving looting and the destruction of private and public
property. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, most of whom were
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ethnic Russians. The civil unrest was contained, order was restored to the
streets by the Estonian government, and most of the physical damage was
repaired by the next morning. (Davis, 2009)
During this period of civil unrest computers in the Estonian government
and the Estonian national media were hacked into with significant affect.
Some of the attacks on the system were vandalism of sites and some were
distributed denial of service attacks (a cyber attack that disrupts internet
service so that a user cannot access a given computer service). The attacks
started small with a major attack culminating on the Estonian internet
system on May 9th, 2007. This date coincidentally corresponded to the day
the Russians celebrate their victory over the Germans in World War II.
During this time a Russian youth-group conducted protests against the
Estonian ambassador to Russia and against the Estonian Embassy in
Moscow. The protests against the ambassador and the embassy did not
end until the ambassador left the country as part of a deal that was
negotiated by Germany. The Russian government even suspended
passenger rail services between Tallinn and St. Petersburg. The riots, the
protests, the stopping of rail service, and the cyber attacks led to an
increasingly tense relationship between Estonia and Russia. (Davis, 2009;
Kampmark, 2003: 288-293)
The Estonians were able to respond to the cyber attacks in a very
proficient manner, as they were able to coordinate responses that only
caused relatively short term outages instead of any permanent damage to
their IT infrastructure. The Estonian government was able to employ its
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which coordinated IT
responses among government and civilian specialists. However, due to the
ambiguous nature of the internet and the use of fake internet protocol (IP)
addresses the Estonian
s were unable to conclusively prove who initiated
the cyber attacks. (Collier, 2007)
The cyber attacks themselves were not very sophisticated as the attackers
used techniques that had been in existence for several years. The focus of
the cyber attack was to completely shut down the IT structure of Estonia.
The cyber attackers used botnet attacks to perform a distributed denial of
service rendering systems that use the internet useless. Botnets are hijacked
computers that send out mass amounts of information which overwhelm
an internet server. The increase in internet traffic will cause a server to
exceed its bandwidth capabilities and cause it to shut down. The botnets
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can be installed well in advance of a planned cyber attack, and they can be
placed in any computer anywhere in the world. If the computer user has
not installed appropriate protective software on their computer they will
not even know that they have been hijacked and that they are participating
in a cyber attack. The botnet attacks on the Estonian IT structure ended as
abruptly as they began leading Estonian officials to conclude that the
attack was a planned and coordinated. (Davis, 2009)
The cyber attacks on Estonia illustrates the vulnerability of IT structures
that rely on the internet. The use of technology can improve personal,
business, and government interactions but it is still vulnerable to attacks
and interruptions. The next section of this article will concentrate on the
implications for Estonia in the aftermath of the cyber attacks.
3. Implications for Estonia
After the cyber attacks in 2007, there were several implications for Estonia
as the country recovered from the cyber wake-up call. Some implications
had an immediate impact on the people and the government of Estonia,
while others were more long term and required a deliberate strategy. The
immediate implication for Estonia was the loss of services for government,
communication, and banking. What emerged from the attack was Estonia
ability to counter and minimize the effects of the attack. There was no
permanent damage to the information technology (IT) structure and
financial losses were minimal, but the significance was frightening. (Collier,
2007)
One of the long term implications is the continued strain on Estonia
relationship with Russia. Members of the Estonian government and
outside observers believe that the attacks originated in Russia, but that fact
remains unproven. The finger pointing between Estonia and Russia began
immediately after the attacks and continues today. Dmitry Peskov, Deputy
Press Secretary for the Russian President said, 
Russia can no way be
involved in cyber terrorism and all claims to the contrary are an absolute
 (The Baltic Times, 2007a). Andrus Ansip, the Estonian Prime Minister,
and others have accused the Russian government because of the
identification of Russian internet protocol (IP) addresses used in the attack.
To date, Russian involvement has never been proven, but the implications
and belief that they were involved continues to influence and affect the
relationship between Russia and Estonia. (The Baltic Times, 2007b)
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After the attacks and recovery, Estonia has been heralded as a leader in
technological security. According to Alexander Ntok, head of Corporate
Strategy at the International Telecommunication Union, 
it was
imaginative responses that allowed Estonia to emerge from the spring
cyber attack relatively unscathed
 (Collier, 2007). As a result Estonia has
capitalized on the internet security market. They are called upon to assist
during attacks and to speak to different business and IT groups on internet
security issues. Estonian government leaders have spoken to allies, regional
organizations and international organizations to improve IT security and
cooperation. (Ibid.)
When Georgia
s IT infrastructure was attacked in August 2008 specialists
from Estonia
s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) travelled to
Georgia and assisted response efforts to counter the attacks (DPA, 2008).
This example demonstrates how Estonia has established itself as a major
player in an emerging field, as they are too small to make a large impact on
the international scene through the use of economic or military power.
Estonia has been able to establish itself as a major player in Europe and
among NATO members as an expert in cyber security and cyber war.
Their expertise has allowed them to lobby for increased IT awareness and
for increased cooperation to defeat or deter future cyber attacks.
(Nikiforov, 2008)
In 2003 Estonia proposed a cyber excellence centre in Tallinn even before
it became a member of NATO. In light of Estonia
s expertise in IT the
NATO Cyber Defence Centre was approved. In May 2008 the centre
opened in Tallinn with Estonia providing the leadership and personnel to
man the centre. Estonia emerged as a leader within NATO and leads the
effort to protect the IT structure of NATO. (Socor, 2008)
The continuous threat of cyber attacks against its IT structure, and the
dedication of public officials to improve IT security resulted in a
comprehensive national cyber security strategy. This strategy, developed by
the Ministry of Defence, was adopted by the Estonian government in May
of 2008, just over a year after the attack on its IT systems. The main
measures of its strategy included IT security measures that strengthened
their defensive posture, as well as developed their expertise and awareness
in the IT field. Estonia now looks to strengthen the international legal
framework to ensure that the IT system is protected by laws, and that
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violators of the law will be prosecuted. Estonia has also taken the charge
of increasing international co-operation not just to protect their systems
but to protect the global cyber system. (Estonian Ministry of Defence,
2008)
4. Cyber concerns for former Soviet satellites
What do the countries of Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan have
in common? They are all former Soviet satellites and have all been allegedly
cyber attacked by Russia.
4.1. Georgian cyber attack
On July 20th, 2008 the website of the Georgian president came under a
denial of service cyber attack. The attack shut the website down for 24
hours and was a precursor to a larger cyber attack that would come less
than a month later (Melikishvili, 2008/2009). On August 8th, 2008 a
coordinated distributed denial of service attack was made against the
Georgian government websites at the same time that Russian forces were
engaged in combat with Georgian forces. As the ground attacks increased
so did the cyber attacks. This was the first time that a cyber attack was
done in conjunction with armed conflict. (Ibid)
The cyber war between Georgia and Russia focused on shaping public
opinion on the internet. Georgian and Russian supporters used a variety of
cyber techniques including distributed denial of service attacks and the
creation of fake web sites to control how their version of the 
truth
 was
delivered to the public. (Thomas, 2009:55-59)
Georgia
s IT infrastructure was not very advanced so the disruption of
service was not as complicated as it was in Estonia. Banking, media and
government websites were blocked disrupting the flow of information
throughout Georgia and to the outside world. The websites of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the National Bank were vandalized by adding
pictures of the Georgian President and Adolf Hitler (Melikishvili,
2008/2009). The cyber attacks against Georgia were different from the
cyber attacks on Estonia, as these attacks included distributed denial of
services using botnets, but they also included SQL injection attacks that are
harder to identify than a botnet attack because they require less computers
than a botnet attack. The SQL injection attack shows a greater expertise in
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the ability to conduct a cyber attack than the cyber attacks on Estonia
s IT
infrastructure. (Secure Works Press Release, 2008)
Georgia received considerable assistance in countering the cyber attacks
and in communicating internally and internationally. Google provided
domain space to protect the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Civil.ge, a Georgian Daily online news service. A private American
internet service provider (the head of the company is an ethnic Georgian)
assisted the Georgian government by hosting the Georgian President
website. The President of Poland also assisted the Georgian government
by placing official press releases on his website. Estonia even sent two
information security specialists from its Computer Emergency Response
Team to assist Georgia in countering the cyber attacks. According to
outside investigators there is no direct proof of any Russian government
involvement in the cyber attacks. But what is undeniable is that even
without proven Russian government involvement it remains clear that the
Russian government benefited from the cyber attacks. (Melikishvili,
2008/2009)
4.2. Lithuanian cyber attack
Lithuania faced its own attacks in June 2008 three days after it passed a law
outlawing the use of Soviet and communist symbols; over 300 websites
were attacked. Some were denial of service attacks while other sites were
vandalized with the Soviet hammer and sickle. Prior to the attacks and the
passage of the law, Russian and Lithuanian ties had deteriorated because of
Russia
s refusal to compensate Lithuanian victims of Soviet labour camps,
and Russia
s leveraging of energy resources for political gain. Lithuania also
blocked talks on an EU-Russia partnership. The animosities between the
two countries have provided observers with a clear motive that the attacks
were by the Russians. The reason for the cyber attacks against Lithuania
was similar to the cyber attacks against Estonia, both attacks were in
response to a government action that was unpopular to the Russian
people. (McLaughlin, 2008)
4.3. Kyrgyzstan cyber attack
The latest country that has come under a cyber attack from computers in
Russia is Kyrgyzstan. On January 18th, 2009 Kyrgyzstan
s two main
internet servers came under a denial of service attacks shutting down
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websites and email within the country. The originators of the attacks were
traced back to Russia (Rhoads, 2009). The attacks occurred on the same
day that the Russian government was pressuring Kyrgyzstan to stop U.S.
access to the airbase at Bishkek at Manas. The airbase is a key logistics
centre that supports the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan. According to Don
Jackson, a senior security researcher at SecureWorks 4, the distributed denial
of service attacks are believed to be directed towards any opposition that is
not in favour of the closure of the airbase. While it is unproven whether
the government was behind the attacks the implication is that cyber attacks
will be used against any opposition to the Russian government (Bradbury,
2009).
The cyber attacks on Georgia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan have two
characteristics in common. The first characteristic is that the cyber attacks
were initiated because of opposition to the Russian government and
secondly that there is no proof that the Russian government was involved
in the cyber attacks. Regardless of who is initiating the attack it is clear that
opposition to the Russian government could result in a cyber attack which
could disrupt critical government infrastructure.
5. Compelling realities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Cyber defence is a critical issue for NATO. U.S. General James Mattis,
NATO
s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, articulates the
importance of cyber defence for NATO by stating, 
We cannot say that
we are not going to defend the Web that everybody needs
 (Tanner &
Peach, 2008). Nations that are party to the North Atlantic Treaty agree on
Article 5 
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all
 (The
North Atlantic Treaty, 1949). Does a cyber attack fit the requirement of an
armed attack? A senior NATO official asked, 
If a member state
communications centre is attacked with a missile, you call it an act of war.
So what do you call it if the same installation is disabled with a cyberattack?
 (The Economist, 2007). However, the current political reality is
that they are not the same. Prior to the cyber attacks on Estonia, NATO
cyber strategy was focused on NATO
s ability to protect its own IT
infrastructure. Now, the current reality is, is that the NATO
s strategy
must focus on assisting allies as they protect their own IT infrastructure
during an attack (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated a).
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Members of NATO have taken several steps in defining a cyber strategy
and implementing a cyber defence. As early as 2002, at the Prague Summit,
cyber defence appeared on NATO
s agenda. At the Prague Summit
NATO leaders agreed to the implementation of a NATO Cyber Defence
Program. The program consisted of a NATO Computer Incident
Response Capability and for NATO to use the latest cyber defence
measures (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated a). In the spring of
2006 cyber defence was made a priority for NATO during the Riga
Summit. The issue of cyber security gained even more attention when
Estonia, a NATO member, was cyber attacked in 2007 (EU News, Policy
Positions & EU Actors online, 2008).
NATO conducted a thorough assessment of its IT structure and how it
would defend itself against a cyber attack. This assessment led to an
October 2007 report on cyber defence that was issued to the Allied
Defence Ministers. The report recommended measures to improve
protection against cyber attacks (North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
undated a). What followed was a cyber defence policy in early 2008 and the
creation of a NATO Centre of Excellence for cyber defence in May 2008
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2008a). In April 2008, during the
Bucharest Summit, cyber defence was part of the summit declaration. The
declaration emphasizes the need to protect key information systems, the
sharing of best practices, and for Allied nations to provide assistance to
counter a cyber attack (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2008b).
Even though not all NATO nations are part of the Cyber Defence Centre
the centre works to enhance the cyber defence capabilities of all NATO
members. The centre itself is not even funded by NATO but by the
nations that participate in the running of the centre of excellence. The
centre has been charged with doctrine and concept development,
awareness and training, research, development, analysis, and lessons
learned. The experts at the centre also serve as cyber defence consultants
for NATO members North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated b).
The compelling reality for NATO is that cyber warfare has affected
member nations and continuous to be a realistic threat for the organization
and for its members. NATO members are continuing to develop ways to
counter future threats by sharing best practice information, information on
technical cyber defences, and by agreeing to assist member nations in
countering a cyber attack.
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6. Multilateral initiatives
Only a few international treaties on cyber security exist making
international cooperation to prevent cyber attacks extremely difficult. Even
finding and then holding accountable a person that commits a cyber crime
is almost impossible without some international cooperation (Organization
for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 2008). In the aftermath of the
cyber attacks on Estonia the European Union commissioned a study to
examine the issues concerning cyber security facing members of the
European Union. This section will examine the European Union study and
other multinational initiatives that have an impact on the cyber security of
former Soviet satellites and Russia. (Cornish, 2009)
6.1. Convention on Cybercrime
The Council of Europe has established a treaty on cyber crime that entered
into force 5 in 2004. Twenty-two Council of Europe member nations, along
with the United States, have ratified the treaty agreeing to international
cooperation concerning cybercrime issues. The Russian Federation has not
agreed to the treaty making it difficult for states to resolve issues with
Russia concerning cyber crimes in an international forum (Council of
Europe, undated a). This treaty is still significant because it is the first
international treaty on crimes committed on the internet (Council of
Europe, undated b).
The main goal of the convention, as stated in the preamble, is to protect
nations against cybercrime, by adopting laws and regulations, and fostering
co-operation internationally. The states that become a party to the
Convention on Cybercrime agree to adopt laws that create criminal
penalties for committing crimes on the internet. The convention outlines
several areas that states have agreed to make criminal statutes on issues
such as illegal access of computer systems, system and data interference,
and other computer related fraud. Nations that are party to the convention
also agree to cooperate with investigations, to provide mutual assistance
concerning cyber crimes, and to pursue the collection of evidence. The
extradition of alleged cybercriminals is also agreed to by parties to the
treaty. Disagreements between states that have ratified the treaty include
direct negotiations, settlement in front of the European Committee on
Crime Problems (CDPC), a tribunal for arbitration or adjudication in front
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of the International Court of Justice. The Convention on Cybercrime gave
a framework for cooperation among member states for the prosecution of
cyber criminals by removing safe havens for the cyber criminals. (Council
of Europe, 2001)
However, Russia does agree to the convention and it protects citizens who
engage in cyber misconduct by preventing their extradition out of Russia.
Failing to sign the convention agreement also prevents Russia from having
any legal standing to prosecute trans-national cyber criminals who attack
Russia
s IT infrastructure.
6.2. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has a
tradition of promoting the security and stability of Europe. This tradition
of promoting security and stability since 2004 has included cyber security.
The OSCE
s initial focus on cyber security concerned the use of the
internet for recruiting, fundraising, and communication by terrorist
organizations. In 2006 the OSCE
s efforts began to focus on protecting
vital information infrastructures against cyber attacks. Debate in the OSCE
has not led to great change but has been a forum for further cooperation
in cyber security in Europe. In June 2008, the Estonian Defence Minister,
Jaak Aaviksoo, in an address to members of the OSCE, said there is 
immense amount of work to be done [concerning cyber security].
Minister Aaviksoo used the forum of the OSCE to use his nation
experience in defending against cyber crime to increase international
cooperation in Europe. This statement by the Estonian Defence Minister
sums up OSCE
s efforts concerning cyber defence, they are still in the
talking phase and have at least recognized the importance of cyber defence
(Cornish, 2009:20-21). The OSCE will continue to be a forum to publicize
grievances for European nations that have had their IT infrastructures
attacked by Russian hackers. European nations will judge Russia on its
cooperation with the OSCE in finding and prosecuting individuals who
engage in cyber attacks.
6.3. The European Union
Estonia continues to lobby for improved international cooperation in
cyber security as it calls on the European Union (EU) to pass legislation
concerning crimes committed on the internet. While addressing the
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European Parliament, Toomas Hendrik, the Estonian President, called
upon the EU to pass legislation that make cyber attacks against public and
private web sites a criminal act (Jones, 2008). The EU has several initiatives
involving different agencies but lacks an overall cyber security strategy. The
European Commission has the Information Society and Media Directorate
General, the European Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA), and the Contact Network of Spam Authorities that deal with
different aspects of cyber security. The Information Society and Media
Directorate has a program to improve the content of the internet by
protecting people from child pornography, racism, and other harmful
online content. The ENISA is an agency that was created in 2004 to raise
awareness of cyber security issues and to promote best practices by
member nations with the EU. The Contact Network of SPAM authorities
is an initiative to counter SPAM and share information on best practices
between EU member nations. (Cornish, 2009:24-27)
The European Parliament has established several standing committees
concerned with cyber security issues. The Committee on Industry,
Research, and Technology (ITRE) is concerned with establishing
information technology networks within the EU. The Committee on Civil
Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) is responsible of the
protection of personal information on the internet for members of the
EU. The Committee on Foreign Affairs is responsible for the Security and
Security policies of the EU which includes internet security policies.
(Cornish, 2009:26)
The European Police Office (EUROPOL) is an agency of the Police and
Judicial Co-operation (PJC) that has more of a direct role in EU cyber
security in the context of combating terrorism, organized crime, and
financial crime (Cornish, 2009:25). Although cyber security is addressed by
the EU there is no organization within the EU to ensure that there are no
contradictions in cyber security policy among all of the various EU
agencies, commissions, and co-operations. The European Parliament
commissioned a study on cyber security published February 2009 that
examined security challenges concerning the internet for the EU. The
study recommended that clear roles should be defined for cyber security
responses with the many EU organizations, including the establishment of
the post of cyber security coordinator and the establishment of a common
operating vision for cyber security in order to achieve operational
consistency across the EU (Cornish, 2009:31). The EU and Russia work
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together on different challenges including drug and human trafficking,
organized crime, and counter-terrorism. Russia is also the EU
s third
largest trading partner (European Commission, 2009). The EU
s cyber
security organizations can offer a framework for increased cooperation to
defeat cyber attacks that originate from or are directed at Russia.
6.4. The United Nations
The main purpose of the United Nations (UN) is to maintain international
peace and security among the different nations of the world (United
Nations, 1945). The focus for cyber security for the UN, through the UN
Security Council, has been on countering terrorism. Debates among the
UN General Assembly started in 2002 highlighted the growing dependence
on IT use. Out of discussions came a warning that law enforcement
activities would not be sufficient but that more efforts in cyber security
need to be made on prevention. (Cornish, 2009:17)
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the main
organization that is responsible for cyber security within the UN
framework. The ITU
s goal is to enhance cyber security in order for
individuals, businesses and nations to have confidence in the use of
cyberspace. The ITU uses its Global Cyber Security Agenda, which began
in 2007, to promote its goals of increased cyber security. The ITU has not
been an agency for the enforcement of legislation and international
agreements concerning cyber security but has focused on assisting in
building nation
s capabilities for cyber security (Cornish, 2009:17-18).
Former Soviet satellites can cooperate with the ITU to improve their cyber
defences against cyber criminals from Russia or any other nation. The UN
will continue to be a forum for Russia to voice grievances or defend
themselves against world opinion in matters involving international peace
and security including cyber security.
6.5. Relevance of multilateral initiatives
Although the Russian government cooperates with Europe and other
nations on a variety of economic and security issues, individuals,
organizations, and governments are able to exploit the weaknesses of the
international system in order to use the internet for criminal activities
without fear of any major reprisals. Significant effort has been made
towards cyber security since the cyber attack on Estonia in 2007, but much
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more needs to be done among national and international organizations to
ensure genuine cyber security. The framework for increasing cyber security
exists, but it will take the cooperation of many nations, including Russia, to
make a difference in cyber security.
7. Implications for the United States
The cyber attack on Estonia should be considered a significant wake-up
call for the United States. Even though the attacks had no direct impact on
the U.S., Estonia is a NATO ally and the attack clearly showed aggressive
intent seeking advantage. When the attacks occurred the U.S. sent experts
to assist and help Estonia with its cyber defences. Jaak Aaviksoo, the
Estonian Defence Minister, was told by U.S. officials that Estonia coped
better than the U.S. is likely could in responding to a cyber attack. The
Estonian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was able to
concentrate on protecting vital sites by coordinating government and
public efforts. They were also able to create diversions which caused
hackers to attack sites which were already disabled or not very important.
(Collier, 2007)
The cyber attack on Estonia demonstrated the importance of legal
obligations for the U.S. in rendering support to its allies during a cyber
attack (Gee, 2008). The cyber attack also showed the vulnerability of an IT
system, raising the question, if it could happen to Estonia could another
trans-national cyber attack of this magnitude happen in the U.S. (Griggs,
2008)? The convention on cybercrime, which the U.S. is a party to,
outlines principles for providing mutual assistance regarding cybercrime
(Council of Europe, 2001). The convention does not mention cyber
attacks or cyber war but treats such activities as crimes (Korns &
Kastenberg, 2008/2009). Because only 23 countries have agreed to this
treaty, its force in the international community is limited (Gee, 2008).
Several members of NATO are participating in the Cyber Defence Centre
of Excellence that was established in Estonia, but the U.S. only agreed to
the creation of the cyber defence centre as an observer. The cyber defence
centre is working on issues of cyber security that affect NATO along with
the U.S (The Associated Press, 2008). What will the U.S.
s response be if a
cyber attack destroys infrastructure and kills citizens in an allied country,
and then that ally declares war because of the attack? The plausibility of
such an attack was demonstrated in 2007 when scientists from the Idaho
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National Laboratory demonstrated how a cyber attack could cause a power
plant to overload its system, begin to smoke, and then break down which
caused physical damage to equipment. Currently, both international law
and NATO
s framework lack coherent responses that are legal in the event
of such an attack. The cyber attackers could limit options for the U.S.
under such a scenario by routing their cyber attack through countries
which do not have laws or agreements to cooperate with the U.S. The
cyber attacker could remain completely anonymous if the country where
the attack was routed through refused to hand over information identifying
the cyber attackers. (Gee, 2008)
Cyber attacks on the U.S. government IT infrastructure are not new. In
March 1998 a cyber attack was launched against computer systems of the
U.S. government, private universities and research labs computer systems
that lasted for over three years. Government investigators named the
attacks 
Moonlight Maze.
 The cyber attacks targeted gaining access to
sensitive but unclassified information (Abreu, 2001). John Adams, a
National Security Agency (NSA) consultant says that government
investigators have identified seven internet addresses involved in the cyber
attacks that originated in Russia. Dion Stempfley, a former Pentagon
computer analyst, believes that the U.S. prove that the Russian Federation
government is sponsoring the attacks but there is evidence that they are
allowing or otherwise permitting the cyber attacks. The cyber attacks
which resulted in the theft of technical defence information were serious
enough that the U.S. State Department issued a formal complaint to the
Russian Federation. (Loeb, 2001)
In Global Trends 2025, a study conducted by the National Intelligence
Council, states over the next two decades non-military aspects of warfare,
including cyber, will be prominent (National Intelligence Council, 2008).
According to Secure Works, a cyber security company, in 2008 over 20
million attacks originated from computers within the United States (Secure
Works Press Release, 2008). In 2008 the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security created the National Cybersecurity Centre to counter these threats
(Griggs, 2008). The threats to the U.S. infrastructure and technology are
moving at a much faster pace than the creation of government structures
to counter the threat.
Even a casual observer can see that there is a cyber threat to the U.S., but
how is that connected to any Russian involvement in cyber attacks? There
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are three recent examples of how cyber attacks, that may have allegedly
originated in Russia, that demonstrate danger for U.S. and Russian
relations. These examples show how attacks against an IT structure were
used as cyber pressure to influence nations or organizations.
The first example is when Radio Free Europe
s internet sites in April 2008
in Eastern Europe were shut down because of a denial of service attack.
The attack lasted two days and coincided with the planned coverage of the
anniversary of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. The attacks effectively shut
down the websites which stopped the flow of information from Radio
Free Europe, a U.S. sponsored program (America.gov, 2008).
Another example is the malware (malware is a term used to identify illegal
computer access including computer viruses) attack on U.S. Department of
Defence computer systems in November 2008. According to WMD
Insights 6 the computer attacks are thought to have originated from Russia.
The attacks seemed to target military computer systems and affected the
U.S. central command along with computers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
attacks led to a ban on the use of external computer flash drives on
military computers throughout the world. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
The latest example of an attack that may have originated in Russia is the
January 2009 denial of service attack that was directed at the government
websites of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. One theory on why the attack was
started was because of Kyrgyzstan
s support of the U.S. in its war on terror
in Afghanistan. This shows the significance of a cyber attack not directed
against the U.S. but against one of its allies. (Rhoads, 2009)
One senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, D.C. believes there is no adversary that can defeat the U.S. in
cyber space. A spokesman for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
commented that the U.S. government is able to protect itself from cyber
attacks, but the U.S. IT system is not completely impenetrable. The
director of a non-profit research institute, the United States Cyber
Consequences Unit, stated that because the U.S. controls so much internet
bandwidth that most of the people that want to harm the U.S. lack the
capabilities to shut down U.S. servers. (Griggs, 2008)
The U.S. faces a wide variety of challenges in protecting its own IT
structure along with facing the reality of the challenges of its allies
 cyber
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defences. In the future the U.S. may face cyber attacks that could cause the
deaths of its or its allies
 citizens due to the effects of a cyber attack on an
electrical system. The U.S.
s bilateral agreements with countries that hold a
strategic U.S. interest could be affected by the use of a cyber attack to
influence leaders. The cyber threats to the U.S. are real and continued
attention by the leaders must focus on this threat.
8. The weakest link 
 the computer user
As you read this article you could be an accomplice to a cyber criminal
without even knowing that your computer is conducting a worldwide
distributed denial of service attack. The actions or lack of action of
computer users have contributed to the ability of hackers in Russia and
elsewhere to conduct their attacks in relative anonymity. 7 The internet has
vulnerabilities and the individual computer user contributes to the
vulnerabilities of private and government IT systems.
In 1997 the National Security Agency (NSA) conducted an exercise to find
out how vulnerable government IT systems were to external cyber attacks.
They named the exercise 
Eligible Receiver.
 Thirty-five IT specialists
were given the mission to hack into government systems. They could use
any software programs that were available on the internet and they were
only given a few limitations. The IT specialists couldn
t use any classified
hacking software that belonged to the NSA and they could not violate U.S.
law. The IT specialists were also confined to U.S. government computer
systems. (Verton, 2003:32-33)
What they discovered was how easy it was to hack into government
systems, into both classified and unclassified networks. With the free
software that they downloaded from the internet, the NSA specialists were
able to conduct distributed denial of service attacks, delete or modify
sensitive information and shut down or reformat systems. Along with the
software they used, personal contact methods were also used to gain access
into the systems. The NSA computer specialists would use telephone calls
or emails to gain passwords or entry into a system by posing as a
supervisor or technician. The IT specialists were surprised at how easily
government and military members delivered their passwords without
question. Even though the exercise was conducted in 1997, and may seem
dated, it gives us a great example of how a dedicated effort can disrupt any
IT system. (Verton, 2003:32-33)
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As noted earlier, external flash drives were banned from use with military
computer systems. Authorized users unknowingly passed intrusive
malware files from computer to computer infecting IT systems throughout
the U.S. Central Command. The ban on flash drives complicated the
sharing of information throughout the theatre. The malware file was even
found on a classified network. This is one more example of how an
individual can spread malicious software infecting multiple computer
systems because of a lack of computer security protocols. (Melikishvili,
2008/2009)
One vulnerability that is associated with computer users is that some
people who become hackers are former employees with a grievance against
their former employer. Such people may be motivated by a personal
grudge against the U.S. government because they were fired or lost their
job due to a reorganization or downsizing. Their actions as hackers are
usually malicious in nature as such people steal or corrupt data, deface
websites, or shut down systems. (Conway, 2007:82)
Even more dangerous than an angry former employee is a case of cyber
espionage. This is where an individual who is motivated by money or
ideology sells highly sensitive IT security information. One such case
involves Herman Simm and his wife, Heete Simm, from Estonia
(Melikishvili, 2008/2009). Mr. Simm was arrested in September 2008 for
allegedly passing highly classified information on cyber security and missile
defence to members of the Russian foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Mr.
Simm was the head of the State Secret Protection Office where he was
responsible for protecting Estonia
s classified information. Mrs. Simm was
a lawyer who was previously employed at the Estonian national police
headquarters. Mr. Simm had access to classified information concerning
NATO and allies of Estonia including the operational information of the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre based in Tallinn. If the
Estonian government had access to a secret so did Mr. Simm. The amount
of classified information that was compromised is unknown, but may be
quite large. Mr. Simms allegedly became a Russian spy in the mid-1990
and was paid millions of dollars from the Russian Government. Regardless
of how secure a country
s IT structure is, it is still vulnerable because some
people will compromise sensitive cyber security information for personal
gain. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
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Along with the vulnerabilities already mentioned there are always problems
with software products. Some software is easy for hackers to take
advantage of because of security deficiencies. Computers may be infected
before the user or software company has identified the problem. Then it
will take time for the software company to produce a security patch. It will
take even more time to get the patch to the computer program user and
for the security patch to be installed. During this time the infected
computer program may have already infected other computers in a system
or throughout the internet. (Wilson, 2006:15-16)
A major vulnerability for any IT system is the computer user. Whether the
computer user is a military member, a government employee, or just a
computer user sitting in front of his computer at home, their practices can
cause serious damage to a computer system. Normal computer users
receive little or no training in the best security practices. (Wilson, 2006:14)
The cost of poor security practices can be high. Along with the loss of data
or the disruption of service there is also the physical cost associated with
malware and viruses. For example, in 2007 the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) uncovered a botnet campaign that caused losses of
over 20 million dollars (Cornish, 2009:9). One of the botnet hackers that
was caught by the FBI and sentenced to prison used botnets to steal
peoples
 identities and bank account information. After gaining access to
personal information and passwords he made on-line purchases and
transferred money from the bank accounts. Another cyber attacker used a
phishing scheme where he collected information through infected emails
(Wired Staff, 2009). This section highlighted how the computer user has
made IT structures even more vulnerable and the Simm affair
demonstrates how cyber espionage adds to that vulnerability. If countries
like the U.S. and Estonia that have highly developed IT infrastructure can
be attacked, it is not hard to imagine the vulnerabilities less developed
former Soviet satellites have in their IT development phase.
9. The Russian Federation
In this article study several cyber attacks have been attributed to Russia.
Regardless of whether the government of Russia is responsible for the
attacks, or merely sanctioned them, for many the perception remains that
Russia was behind the cyber attacks. I will examine Russia
s use of cyber
warfare against former Soviet satellite states. (Davis, 2009)
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The Russian government views itself as the victim in the case of the cyber
attacks on Estonia in 2007. According to sources in the Kremlin the
website of the President of Russia came under a cyber attack. This was
supposedly the largest attack the Russians have faced and it appeared that
the servers used to originate the attack were located in the Baltic States.
The Deputy Press Secretary of the Russian President, Dmitry Peskov,
countered accusations from Estonia with the fact that Russian government
websites are under attack every day from all over the world. (The Baltic
Times, 2007a)
Even as cyber attacks occurred against Georgia, Russians said that they
were also the victims of cyber attacks. Russia Today 8, a major media source
in Russia, was shut down because of a denial of service attacks directed
towards its websites. IT security specialists that work for Russia Today
believe that the denial of service attacks originated from Tbilisi, the capital
of Georgia. (Watson, 2008)
In the aftermath of the cyber attacks on Estonia, Georgia, and other
attacks mentioned in this article, the Russian response was to deny any
involvement in any cyber attack. When confronted with evidence that
some of the attacks originated from Russian government computers
members of the Russian government countered with the fact that
computers from all over the world were hijacked and used to attack
different computer systems. (The Baltic Times, 2007a)
Another fact that Russian officials are quick to point out is that the only
person arrested for the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia was an Estonian.
Dmitri Galushkevich, a 20 year old ethnic Russian, who was convicted for
the cyber attacks. Some members of the Estonian government have issued
statements doubting the involvement of the Russian government in the
cyber attacks. (Greenberg, 2008)
With the finger pointing that ensues after a cyber attack it is still unclear
who was behind the attacks. The actions of cyber activist groups, or
hactivists, will be examined in the case of the cyber attacks on Estonia and
Georgia. Hactivists are individuals that use cyber attacks to take a patriotic
or political stand on a political or international issue. (Melikishvili,
2008/2009)
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During the protests in Estonia, increased chatter and postings on how to
conduct and participate in denial of service attacks were found on Russian
internet chat sites (Melikishvili, 2008/2009). Along with the denial of
service attacks, some of the Estonian government websites were hacked in
order to deface the site. The sayings on the websites were very pro Russian
and very anti Estonian. Joshua Davis in Wired Magazine supports the view
that the reason behind the attacks was nothing more than Russian pride.
(Davis, 2009)
In March of 2009 a member of a Russian pro-Kremlin youth group,
Konstantin Goloskokov, publicly took responsibility for creating the 2007
cyber attacks on Estonia. Goloskokov is a leader of the youth movement
Nashi that has routinely conducted cyber attacks and intimidation
campaigns on behalf of the Russian government. The government of the
Russian Federation is able to maintain separation from the youth group
because it does not directly fund their activities. The youth groups are
funded by pro-government business owners who are trying to gain favour
from the Russian government (Shachtman, 2009). Goloskokov believes
that his actions were not illegal but were, 
an act of civil disobedience
organized within the confines of virtual space
 (Buranov, Vodo &
Yegikyan, 2009). The cultural aspects or belief that actions in the cyber
world are beyond the law is a consequence for the Russian government
and how cyber attacks affect their international relationships.
An assistant to Sergei Markov, a member of Russia
s State Duma lower
house, has also admitted to using his own initiative to conduct cyber
attacks against Estonia (Baltic News Service, 2009). Rein Lang, the
Estonian Justice Minister, is contemplating issuing a European arrest
warrant for individuals who have admitted to taking part in the attack. The
idea for the warrant is not to send law enforcement officials into Russia,
but to have the alleged perpetrators arrested whenever they leave the
country (Baltic News Service, 2009). Aleksandr Gostev, director of the
Kaspersky Lab
s Global Research and Analysis Team, explains that hackers
who participate in a distributed denial of service attack violate the Russian
Criminal Code (Article 274, Violation of the Rules Governing the Use of
Computers, Computer Systems, or Networks Thereof) and can be imprisoned for
four years for violating the code. But he also states that the article is rarely
used (Buranov, Vodo & Yegikyan, 2009). The examples of Russian citizens
admitting to participating in the Estonian cyber attacks are grounds for
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Russian citizens to be arrested in other parts of Europe if Russia fails to
uphold its own laws.
Similar actions occurred in the Georgian cyber attacks. Messages were
posted on Russian hacker forums on how to participate in shutting down
Georgian websites. The website StopGeorgia.ru was also established as a
private forum to coordinate the denial of service attacks. Jeff Carr, a
network security expert and cyber analyst, established an all volunteer
group to investigate the cyber attacks. Throughout the course of the
investigation, which they named Project Grey Goose, no evidence was found
to implicate the Russian government. This was just another example of a
hactivist movement which had the collective power to conduct a cyber
attack against a government. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
The Project Grey Goose investigation has looked at hactivists and how they
can independently conduct cyber attacks. It also focused on a criminal
gang known as the Russian Business Network (R.B.N.). The R.B.N. is based
in St. Petersburg and engages in criminal cyber activities. According to
Don Jackson, the director of threat intelligence at Secure Works, some of
the cyber attacks used against Georgian websites originated from
computers under the control of the R.B.N. As is the case with any cyber
attacks it is very difficult to establish who is completely responsible or if
there is any Russian government sanctioned involvement. (Markoff, 2008a)
This article has already noted that there are other groups involved with
cyber attacks against former Soviet satellites. The evidence of Russian
government involvement will now be investigated (Davis, 2009). Indeed,
some statements made by Russian government officials suggest Russian
government involvement in cyber attacks. Prior to the cyber attacks in
Estonia the Russian government protested the movement of the Russian
memorial, the Bronze Soldier, to the Estonian government. The Russian
government warned how disastrous the move would be to Estonia. What
followed were the protests and the cyber attacks. (Davis, 2009)
The head of the Russian Army Centre for Military Forecast, Colonel
Anatoly Tsyganok, made comments to the Russian news outlet, Gazeta,
about the cyber attacks on Estonia. He believes that there was nothing
wrong with the attacks because there are no international agreements
established. Colonel Tsyganok also believes that NATO couldn
t do
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anything to stop the attacks, and that they were highly successful.
(prygi.blogspot.com 9, 2008)
The most telling example of Russian government involvement in cyber
warfare was with Herman Simm selling IT secrets to the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service that was discussed earlier in this article. This examples
shows that the government of the Russian Federation is actively seeking
information on cyber defences and is willing to pay large sums of money
(Mr. Simm is accused of selling cyber security secrets for millions of
dollars) to receive information on cyber security. (Melikishvili, 2008/2009)
There are also cases where cyber attacks were used against people who are
in opposition to the Russian government. One such example is with Gary
Kasparov, Russian opposition party leader, had his website shut down for
two weeks due to denial of service attacks during the Russian presidential
campaign. John Palfrey, a researcher at Harvard Law School, believes that
several organizations in Russia who plan to protest, or act in opposition to
the Russian government, are subjected to cyber attacks in an attempt to
control the information that is getting to the public. (Greenberg, 2008)
Another example of Russian government complicity is the lack of
assistance or interest in tracking down those responsible for the cyber
attacks against governments of former Soviet satellites (Davis, 2009). The
evidence of government involvement remains circumstantial, but certain
facts are clear concerning cyber security and former Soviet satellites. If
there is opposition to Russian Federation policy than that country that is in
opposition is likely to be subject to a cyber attack and it has been shown
that the Russian Federation actively collects information on other
countries cyber defences.
10. The future of Russian cyber warfare
The perception exists among different nations (some of those nations have
been discussed earlier in this study) that the government of the Russian
Federation has been involved in cyber attacks. This section will examine
future trends concerning the use of cyber attacks by, or sanctioned by, the
Russian Federation government. The cyber attacks against Estonia and
Georgia have forced Russia to evaluate its future cyber strategy. In
examining the Russian focus on improving its cyber strategy some
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conclusions can be drawn about the future of Russian cyber warfare.
(Panarin, 2008)
As with many countries that have an advanced IT system, a sub-culture of
hacking has developed. Even though the state sponsored university in St.
Petersburg produces computer programmers that are highly regarded it is
believed that most of the hackers are young and not educated at the
university level. The reason behind the growth of Russian computer
hackers is the prestige and monetary reward that hacking garners in a
growing IT infrastructure. (Varoli, 2000)
The criminal organization, R.B.N., has been able to conduct its cyber
activities with little interference from the Russian Federation government.
The R.B.N. is very difficult to track on the internet as they are able to
locate their activities from several different locations. The group has been
involved in several different types of criminal cyber activities such as the
use of malware, identity theft, and child pornography. Without any
concerted effort to stop the R.B.N., and their ability to operate anywhere,
R.B.N. is an organization that is positioned in Russian cyber activities now
and in the future. (Markoff, 2008a)
One example of latitude and scope created by Russian indifference, a
group identified by a computer security firm as a Russian gang conducted a
botnet based computer operation operating in Wisconsin. The Russian
gang was controlling as many as 100000 computers in an effort to steal
passwords and information. As soon as the system was shut down the
Russian gang moved its host computer system to a site in the Ukraine. This
shows how resilient these gangs are when they can relocate their operating
systems to countries that are out of reach of law enforcement of the
country that they are targeting. (Markoff, 2008b)
The Russian responses to the recent cyber attacks are a guide to how they
will react in the future. Valery Yashenko, vice director of the Institute of
Information Security Issues at Lomonosov Moscow State University,
advises the Russian government on the issues of cyber terrorism.
Yashenko believes that there should be greater international cooperation
concerning cyber security but does not think that the cyber attack on
Estonia was of any real consequence. Yashenko indicates that the Russian
Federation government is only concerned with cyber security matters that
affect his own government. (Davis, 2009)
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Not surprisingly, the Russian Federal Security Service (F.S.B.) is believed
to employ its own hackers (Varoli, 2000). The manner of recruiting is a
little different than normal ways of looking for employees. When an IT
specialist or hacker is caught committing a cyber crime they may receive an
offer to work for the F.S.B., or face criminal charges. According to a
Russian computer security specialist hackers that were working for the
F.S.B. attacked pro-Chechen web sites. According to the same computer
security specialist the F.S.B. hackers have hacked into opposition
newspapers in order to control information about the Russian Federation
government and its leaders. The recruitment of hackers for offensive cyber
attacks vice cyber defences is an indication of the future Russian
Federation government cyber strategy. (Varoli, 2000)
The Russian Federation government has shown the capability for law
enforcement in cyber space. Laws exist in Russia that make crimes
committed on the internet punishable under the law. Russia has even
established a computer crime unit, which it called Department 
 which
operates under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation
(MVD). Department 
 is responsible for the detection, prevention,
suppression, and solving crimes involving information technology. In
2008, Department 
 was able to identify 158 computer crimes and shut
down seven illegal internet operations. The MVD is currently conducting
Project 
Clean Network
 aimed a combating illegal uses of the internet
(Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, undated). It
remains to be seen whether the efforts of Department 
 will have any
negative impact on the R.B.N. or the cyber gangs that support the Russian
government.
The Russian Federation Public Chamber 10 organized a discussion on
Russian information warfare in September 2008 and Just Russia 11 political
party hosted an international conference on information warfare in
October 2008. The conclusions of the meeting were that Russia has grossly
underestimated the role of information warfare and failed to 
champion
their goals and interests in the world media. (Panarin, 2008)
Dr. Igor Panarin, the Dean of the Faculty of International Relations of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, used the
information warfare discussions to make several recommendations to the
Russian government concerning information and cyber warfare. Dr.
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Panarin proposes that Russia develop specialized management and
analytical structures to counter information threats. Dr. Panarin proposes a
system that has eight key components. (Panarin, 2008)
The first component is the creation of a Council for Public Diplomacy that
will develop a single point of view for both the Russian government and
Russian businesses. Government and business leaders are to be included
on the council in order to ensure that all activities concerning foreign
political media are coordinated. The second component is to create an
advisor to the President of Russia for Information and Propaganda
Activities in order to coordinate the foreign political information activities
of the administration of the President, the government, different
ministries, and the Russian Security Council. (Panarin, 2008)
The third and fourth components are to create state holding companies,
one for foreign media affairs and one for the internet. The holding
companies would be combined between business and government to see
that Russian political positions were broadcast to the world. The
information would not just be focused towards ethnic Russians but would
be focused globally towards economic partners, future partners,
adversaries, and overall world opinion. (Panarin, 2008)
The fifth component would be the creation of an information crisis action
centre in order to ensure that Russia maintains the initiative when
delivering the state message to the world. The information crisis action
centre would be responsible for developing talking points and themes that
would support the government in any crisis. (Panarin, 2008)
The sixth component would create an information countermeasures
system that would counter enemy information operations. The information
countermeasures system would include assets from business and the
government. The seventh component focuses on a system on
nongovernmental organizations that would operate throughout the world.
(Panarin, 2008)
The final component would consist of a system for training information
warfare specialists. This system would use existing educational institutions
and academies to train specialists that would be able to operate at the
diplomatic, management, or individual level. The training system would
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also include the creation of an Information Special Forces that are highly
trained to for conducting information operations in a crisis. (Panarin, 2008)
Along with the creation of the information warfare system Dr. Panarin
believes that financing for information warfare needs to be increased by
both the Russian government and by Russian businesses. The increased
attention on information warfare is designed to increase Russia
s image
throughout the world and ensure that Russia is prepared for future conflict
in the cyber and information arenas. (Panarin, 2008)
Statements by Russian government officials have been very similar to Dr.
Panarin
s position which makes the future of cyber warfare in Russia
offensively poised. Colonel Aleksandr Drobyshevskiy, head of the Russian
Federation Ministry of Defence Directorate for Press Service and
Information, stated that Georgia won the information war during the
conflict in South Ossetia and there is a need for the development of
information and telecommunications technologies within the Ministry of
Defence. Colonel Drobyshevskiy further advocates the creation of an
information warfare system. (Svobodnaya Pressa, 2009)
Another clue to the future of Russian cyber warfare is the development of
a new information warfare defensive strategy by the Russian Armed Forces
General Staff. Colonel-General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, Deputy Chief of the
General Staff, stated that leading world powers will be able to conduct fullscale information warfare and that Russia must be prepared (Usov, 2009).
General Nogovitsyn believes that Russia will be involved in a large-scale
information war within two to three years that will be fought in the cyber
world (Litovkin, 2009).
The existence of hackers that support the Russian government and
information specialists within the Russian government have created an
asset that will be used during future cyber conflicts. The Russian
government
s emphasis on developing cyber strategies will enable Russia to
be prepared for future cyber conflict.
11. Countermeasures
We need to examine what can be done to counter cyber crimes and protect
a nation
s IT structure. Cyber countermeasures can be taken at the
international level, followed by cyber defences at the national level, and
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ending with actions that an individual computer user can make to improve
cyber defence.
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the organization
within the UN that is responsible for the international oversight of the
world
s telephone system, is developing a system for oversight of the
internet. The ITU is working towards a convention against cybercrime that
will provide international cooperation on issues concerning internet
communications (Schrank, 2007). Members of the international
community will need to work together in order to track and prosecute
cyber criminals that operate outside of the country that is being attacked.
Nations will also have to work together to share technical data to maintain
cyber defences to keep up with the newest and ever changing cyber
attacks. Hackers routinely share information on new techniques that can
penetrate IT defence structures. Nations need to do the same to protect
their own IT infrastructure, the same IT structure that affects the entire
globe (Lipson, 2002:47-48).
Individual countries can improve their cyber defences within their own
boundaries which would also improve the cyber security of the
international IT system. Countries can make laws making cyber crimes
illegal with punishments and programs that will deter potential cyber
criminals. Governments can create a system that increases co-operation
between the government, businesses, and academic institutions in order to
improve their cyber defences. This co-operation could lead to an IT
infrastructure that is resilient and able to withstand and recover from a
cyber attack with little or no permanent damage to a country
s IT structure.
(Schrank, 2007)
In 8th section the computer user was identified as the weakest link in an IT
system. Some individual countermeasures are easy to accomplish for any
computer user. Actions like keeping antivirus and anti-spyware software up
to date along with updating your web browser and operating system can
greatly enhance your own computer security. Even following safe
computer practices of not opening unknown attachments on emails that
may carry viruses or malware are very instrumental in making the cyber
environment more secure (Secure Works Press Release, 2008). The U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has tips for computer users
posted on their website to increase internet security. The main points of
the DHS website are to promote personal responsibility for increasing
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cyber security and to promote best practices for safe computer usage. The
best practices that DHS advertises are to make cyber security a habit by
following three core practices. The three core practices are to 
install antivirus and anti-spyware programs and keep them up to date, install a
firewall and keep it properly configured, and to regularly install updates on
your computer
s operating system
 (Homeland Security, 2008). Computer
users are the first line of defence in cyber security and their actions can
help protect the cyber infrastructure that is used by all.
Conclusion
The international system is lacking in its ability to effectively manage issues
of cyber security. The Russian Federation is perceived by the international
community as a country that engages in or supports groups that are
involved in cyber crime. International and regional organizations along
with countries that interact with the Russian Federation have to deal with a
reality that they may be the target of a cyber attack if they are in opposition
to the government of the Russian Federation.
The issue of cyber security is ongoing. As more of the former Soviet
satellites become more developed with an advanced IT structure they will
have to face the realities of cyber attacks. Regardless of whether the
government of the Russia Federation has been involved in any cyber
attacks, or will be in the future, the reality remains that nations, groups, or
individuals that are in opposition to Russia may face a cyber attack. The
cyber attacks will be used to influence public opinion or to influence
government leaders through the use of cyber pressure. Future conflicts
that involve the use of force will also see cyber attacks in conjunction with
combat operations. Currently international agreements and laws are
inadequate which allows cyber attackers to take advantage of the lack of
such laws and can conduct acts of civil disobedience on the internet.
The conflict in Georgia has been a motivator for military reform which
includes reform in the cyber arena. The Russian government and the
Russian military will continue to develop systems to improve both their
offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Russia will continue to capitalize
on their diaspora present throughout the world to support their political
positions but will have to realize that some of that diaspora will be in
opposition to them and provide private support to organizations and
nations that have received cyber attacks. Russia
s active collection of cyber
Volume 11, 2009
Baltic Security & Defence Review
defence secrets will also be a combat multiplier for them in future conflicts
either alone in the cyber world or as part of a ground conflict.
Organizations and nations will be best served by creating a resilient
defence in depth while educating users and managers of IT systems in best
practices to counter the threat of a cyber attack. This defence in depth
includes technical responses to counter the threats while ensuring that their
IT systems are resilient and become effective after an attack. President
Bush remarked in 2001 that, 
s time to work together to address the new
security threats that we all face. And those threats are not simply missiles
or weapons of mass destruction in the hands of untrustworthy countries.
Cyber-terrorism is a threat, and we need to work on that together
(Verton, 2003:248).
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1 Personal recollection of the author who lived in Estonia from July 2007 to June
2008.
2 Multiple sources were used along with the author
s personal recollections of
living in Estonia. Three of the main sources that describe the attack are: Davis,
Joshua, 2009. Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe. Wired
Magazine. Issue 15; Kampmark, Binoy, Autumn 2003. Cyber Warfare Between
Estonia And Russia. Contemporary Review. pp. 288-293; Aaviksoo, Jaak, 2007 (Nov.
28th) Address by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Estonia at The Centre
for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D.C.
Volume 11, 2009
Baltic Security & Defence Review
3 This reference offers an Estonian view of its history and underlines the reasons
behind the friction between Russia and Estonia.
4 SecureWorks is an internet security firm based out of Atlanta. The company
tracks suspicious activities throughout the internet.
5 Entered into force refers to the date that the treaty becomes enforceable
according to the provisions of the treaty by the members that have agreed to the
treaty.
6 WMD Insights is a journal sponsored by the U.S. Defence Threat Reduction
Agency.
7 Idea based on comments used by Jaak Aaviksoo in 2007. Minister Aaviksoo used
this technique to show that some members of the audience may unknowingly be
helping cyber-terrorists. Jaak Aaviksoo, Address by the Minister of Defence of the
Republic of Estonia delivered to the Centre for Strategic & International Studies,
Washington, D.C., November 28, 2007.
8 Russia Today is a globally broadcast news channel broadcast in the English
language and owned by the Russian government news agency RIA-Novosti.
Similar in programming to CNN and BBC but with a Russian perspective on
events in the world news.
9 Information from a Russian and English language blog that discusses issues
concerning Russia.
10 The Russian Federation Public Chamber is an organization created in 2005 to
oversee all aspects of government and to act as a consultant to the heads of the
Russian government. The Russian Federation Public Chamber Website, About the
House:
Public
Chamber
Russian
Federation,
http://translate.google.ru/translate?hl=en&langpair=ru|en&u=http://www.oprf.
ru/. (accessed April 10th, 2009).
11 A Just Russia is a Russian political party created as an opposition party but still
supports the power of the Russian executive branch (Abdullaev, 2006).
JR02-2009
Tracking GhostNet:
Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network
Information Warfare Monitor
March 29, 2009
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/ghostnet
http://www.tracking-ghost.net t
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD
March 29, 2009
Foreword
Cyber espionage is an issue whose time has come. In this second report from the Information Warfare
Monitor, we lay out the findings of a 10-month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against
Tibetan institutions.
The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more.
The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries.
Up to 30% of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located
at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The
Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began,
were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to
potentially sensitive information.
But the study clearly raises more questions than it answers.
From the evidence at hand, it is not clear whether the attacker(s) really knew what they had
penetrated, or if the information was ever exploited for commercial or intelligence value.
Some may conclude that what we lay out here points definitively to China as the culprit. Certainly
Chinese cyber-espionage is a major global concern. Chinese authorities have made it clear that they
consider cyberspace a strategic domain, one which helps redress the military imbalance between
China and the rest of the world (particularly the United States). They have correctly identified
cyberspace as the strategic fulcrum upon which U.S. military and economic dominance depends.
But attributing all Chinese malware to deliberate or targeted intelligence gathering operations by
the Chinese state is wrong and misleading. Numbers can tell a different story. China is presently
the world
s largest Internet population. The sheer number of young digital natives online can more
than account for the increase in Chinese malware. With more creative people using computers, it
expected that China (and Chinese individuals) will account for a larger proportion of cybercrime.
Likewise, the threshold for engaging in cyber espionage is falling. Cybercrime kits are now available
online, and their use is clearly on the rise, in some cases by organized crime and other private actors.
Socially engineered malware is the most common and potent; it introduces Trojans onto a system,
and then exploits social contacts and files to propagate infections further.
Furthermore, the Internet was never built with security in mind. As institutions ranging from
governments through to businesses and individuals depend on 24-hour Internet connectivity, the
opportunities for exploiting these systems increases.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - FOREWORD
This report serves as a wake-up call. At the very least, a large percentage of high-value targets
compromised by this network demonstrate the relative ease with which a technically unsophisticated
approach can quickly be harnessed to create a very effective spynet
These are major disruptive
capabilities that the professional information security community, as well as policymakers, need to
come to terms with rapidly.
These are major disruptive capabilities that the professional information security community, as well
as policymakers, need to come to terms with rapidly.
Ron Deibert, Director, the Citizen Lab,
Munk Centre for International Studies,
University of Toronto.
Rafal Rohozinski, Principal and CEO,
The SecDev Group,
Ottawa, Canada.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Acknowledgements
This investigation was prepared by a dedicated team of professionals.
Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research in India, Tibetan Missions
abroad, and Europe. Greg is a SecDev Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor
website. He is currently a SecDev Fellow at the Citizen Lab. The Indian portion of the field work
benefited from the expertise of Dr. Shishir Nagaraja, Security Laboratory, Cambridge University.
Dr. Nagaraga visited Dharamsala for a period of five days in September to assist on aspects of the
technical data collection.1
The technical scouting and computer network interrogation was carried out by Nart Villenueve. Nart
is the CTO of Psiphon Inc, and the Psiphon Fellow at the Citizen Lab. His investigations included the
discovery and exploration of the GhostNet control servers. He led the data analysis research, which
included log files gathered in the field, as well as data obtained through technical scouting of the
GhostNet control servers.
This report represents a collective effort. The drafting team consisted of the following individuals
(listed in alphabetical order). Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab), Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group),
Rafal Rohozinski (SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc.), Nart Villeneuve (Psiphon Fellow, Citizen Lab)
and Greg Walton (SecDev Fellow, Citizen Lab). Layout and design was led by Jane Gowan (Psiphon
Inc. and Citizen Lab). Belinda Bruce (Blurb Media) and James Tay (Citizen Lab), provided additional
support to the team.
Countless others also contributed to the research effort. This includes individuals in India and Tibet,
who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Private Office of his Holiness
the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the missions of Tibet in London, Brussels, and New
York, and Drewla (a Tibetan NGO).
Aspects of the research carried out by Dr. Nagaraga focusing on socially engineered malware are published in a separate study.
See, The snooping dragon: social-malware surveillance of the Tibetan movement, Shishir Nagaraja, Ross Anderson, Cambridge
University Computer Laboratory Technical Report, Mar 29 2009
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary 
p. 5
Introduction 
p. 7
Rise of the cyber spies 
A focus on China 
Outline of Report 
Part One: Context and background 
Alleged Chinese operations in cyberspace 
Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks: the challenge of attribution 
Targeting Tibet 
Conduct of the investigation 
Phase 1: Field investigation 
Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers 
Part Two: Tracking Ghostnet 
p. 7
p. 9
p. 9
p. 10
p. 11
p. 12
p. 13
p. 14
p. 14
p. 14
p. 16
Phase I: Field investigation 
Targeted malware 
 previous research 
Information Warfare Monitor field research 
Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile 
Offices of Tibet 
Drewla 
Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers 
List of infected computers 
Sending commands 
Command results 
Methods and capabilities 
Analysis of list of infected computers 
Methodology 
Selected infections 
Infection timeline 
p. 17
p. 17
p. 22
p. 22
p. 27
p. 27
p. 27
p. 30
p. 32
p. 34
p. 37
p. 39
p. 40
p. 40
p. 42
p. 44
Part Three: Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions 
p. 46
Alternative explanations 
Attribution 
The significance of GhostNet 
Part Four: About the Information Warfare Monitor 
p. 47
p. 48
p. 49
p. 51
Boxes
Box 1: Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice 
p. 28
Tables
Table 1: Domain name registration information 
Table 2: List of selected infections 
p. 32
p. 42
Figures
Fig. 1: A 
Social Engineering
 attack connects to GhostNet 
Fig. 2: A 
Socially Engineered
 email sent to the International Tibet Support Network 
Fig. 3: A Virus Total Screen Capture of a malware infected email attachment 
Fig. 4: Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations 
Fig. 5: Malware retrieving a sensitive document 
Fig. 6: The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware 
Fig. 7: The GhostNet control servers 
Fig. 8: The GhostNet 
Server List
 interface 
Fig. 9: The GhostNet 
Send Command
 interface 
Fig. 10: The gh0st RAT interface 
Fig. 11: The GhostNet 
List Command
 interface 
Fig. 12: The geographic location of infected hosts 
Fig. 13. GhostNet infection timeline 
p. 19
p. 20
p. 21
p. 23
p. 26
p. 29
p. 31
p. 33
p. 35
p. 36
p. 38
p. 41
p. 45
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY
Summary
Trojan horse programmes and other associated malware are often cited as vectors for conducting
sophisticated computer-based espionage. Allegations of cyber espionage (computer network
exploitation) are increasingly common, but there are few case studies in the unclassified realm that
expose the inner workings of such networks.
This study reveals the existence and operational reach of a malware-based cyber espionage network
that we call GhostNet.
Between June 2008 and March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an extensive and
exhaustive two-phase investigation focused on allegations of Chinese cyber espionage against the
Tibetan community.
We conducted field-based investigations in India, Europe and North America. In India we worked
directly with affected Tibetan organizations, including the Private Office of the Dalai Lama, the
Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and several Tibetan NGOs. In Europe and North America we worked with
Tibetan missions in London, Brussels, and New York. The fieldwork generated extensive data that
allowed us to examine Tibetan information security practices, as well as capture real-time evidence
of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems.
During the second phase of our investigation, the data was analyzed, and led to the discovery of
insecure, web-based interfaces to four control servers. These interfaces allow attacker(s) to send
instructions to, and receive data from, compromised computers. Our research team successfully
scouted these servers, revealing a wide-ranging network of compromised computers. This extensive
network consists of at least 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries.
Significantly, close to 30% of the infected computers can be considered high-value and include the
ministries of foreign affairs of Iran, Bangladesh, Latvia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Barbados
and Bhutan; embassies of India, South Korea, Indonesia, Romania, Cyprus, Malta, Thailand, Taiwan,
Portugal, Germany and Pakistan; the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat,
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and the Asian Development Bank; news
organizations; and an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters.
The GhostNet system directs infected computers to download a Trojan known as gh0st RAT that allows
attackers to gain complete, real-time control. These instances of gh0st RAT are consistently controlled
from commercial Internet access accounts located on the island of Hainan, People
s Republic of China.
Our investigation reveals that GhostNet is capable of taking full control of infected computers,
including searching and downloading specific files, and covertly operating attached devices, including
microphones and web cameras.
The vector for spreading the GhostNet infection leverages social means. Contextually relevant emails
are sent to specific targets with attached documents that are packed with exploit code and Trojan
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - SUMMARY
horse programmes designed to take advantage of vulnerabilities in software installed on the target
computer.
Once compromised, files located on infected computers may be mined for contact information,
and used to spread malware through e-mail and document attachments that appear to come from
legitimate sources, and contain legitimate documents and messages. It is therefore possible that the
large percentage of high value targets identified in our analysis of the GhostNet are coincidental,
spread by contact between individuals who previously communicated through e-mail.
Nonetheless the existence of the GhostNet network is a significant fact in and of itself. At the very
least, it demonstrates the ease by which computer-based malware can be used to build a robust, lowcost intelligence capability and infect a network of potentially high-value targets.
Key findings:
Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network
GhostNet
infecting at least 1,295
computers in 103 countries, of which close to 30% can be considered as high-value
diplomatic, political, economic, and military targets.
Documented evidence of GhostNet penetration of computer systems containing sensitive
and secret information at the private offices of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan
targets.
Documentation and reverse engineering of the modus operandi of the GhostNet
system
including vectors, targeting, delivery mechanisms, data retrieval and control
systems
reveals a covert, difficult-to-detect and elaborate cyber-espionage system
capable of taking full control of affected systems.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Computer network exploitation represents the leading edge of signals intelligence in the information
age. The proliferation of computer systems throughout governments, businesses, and civic
organizations represents a boon for would-be cyber spies.
Awareness of cyber vulnerabilities, and even basic information security practices, is in its infancy, and
largely absent in most organizations outside of the classified realm. Commercial computer systems, which
represent most of the world
s installed base, are insecure. This lack of security consciousness is reflective
of the infancy of the information age. The Internet was never designed for security and, for the most part,
there has been little incentive for software manufacturers to make security a first priority in the design
and development of products, many of which are destined for consumer and/or small business use.
These challenges are present in advanced industrial societies, but are amplified many times over
in developing countries. Ownership of computers is a relative rarity among many government
departments. Where they exist, they often use grey market or pirated software. Resources are lacking
to employ properly trained computer professionals, and many staff are barely computer literate. In
this context, information security is often a distant priority.
And yet, computers in the hands of individuals or at government offices, ministries, embassies, and
civic and non-governmental organizations contain information that can be valuable. Files and e-mails
with contact information, lists of meetings and attendees, draft position papers, internal PowerPoint
presentations, organizational budgets, and lists of visitors can represent items of strategic value
to rivals and enemies. Organizations, like individuals, can be subject to identity theft, leading to
potentially serious breaches of security.
Rise of the cyber spies
Little is known of the sophistication of state-based cyber espionage capabilities, such as those of the
United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, all considered leaders in this field. They are assumed
to be considerable as the security doctrines of these countries treat cyberspace as a strategic domain
equivalent to that of land, air, sea, and space.2
Other powers including China have made cyberspace a key pillar of their national security strategies.
China is actively developing an operational capacity in cyberspace, correctly identifying it as the
domain in which it can achieve strategic parity, if not superiority, over the military establishments
of the United States and its allies. Chinese cyber warfare doctrine is well developed, and significant
resources have been invested by the People
s Liberation Army and security services in developing
defensive and offensive capabilities.3
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/ojcs/07-F-2105doc1.pdf ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&
name=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
But the most significant actors in cyberspace are not states. The online engagements that
accompanied the recent Russia-Georgia conflict in August 20084 and Israel
s January 2009 offensive
in Gaza5 were carried out by independent attackers. The May 2007 denial of service attacks against
Estonia6 resulted in a single conviction of a Russian living in Estonia. Likewise, previous high-profile
investigations of hacking against strategic U.S. targets were never positively attributed to foreign
intelligence services7, and in many cases were the work of individuals.8
The contest in the shadows currently underway in cyberspace appears to rely largely on third parties.
In numerous instances, including case studies conducted by the Information Warfare Monitor
s sister
project, the OpenNet Initiative, third party attackers were responsible for triggering national-level
cyber events. In Kyrgyzstan (2005)9, Belarus (2006)10, during the Russia Georgia war (2008), and
Kyrgyzstan (2009), individuals and/or loose coalitions were responsible for publishing target lists
and attack tools on semi-private websites. The ensuing 
cyclones in cyberspace
 were sufficient to
precipitate events outside of cyberspace.11
International cooperation has for the most part focused on establishing capabilities for counteracting
the criminal use of cyberspace, and with good reason. In 2009, the FBI estimated that cybercrime is
responsible for over $10 billion worth of losses each year.12 Cybercrime is a relatively low cost, low
threshold activity. Techniques such as phishing and targeted malware are easy to construct, and the
chances of prosecution are minimal given a general lack of international coordination.
This is slowly changing as national and international authorities become more aware of the threat.
The attacks on Estonia, for example, led to the establishment of NATO
s Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.13 The International Telecommunication Union has also
established its own specialized agency, IMPACT, designed to aid intelligence sharing and tracking of
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ; http://www.slate.com/id/2197514
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0123/p04s03-wome.html
http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2008/01/24/man-convicted-in-estonia-cyber-attack
For example, a US government investigation of systematic hacking of Department of Defense networks and defence laboratories
dubbed 
Titan Rain
 never provided conclusive evidence to substantiate allegations that the hacking was conducted at the behest of
the Chinese government. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html
A good example is the 1998 
Solar Sunrise
 investigation. The evidence gathered by US authorities eventually led to the conviction
of an Israeli citizen, Ehud Tenebaum, although the involvement of Israeli security services was never proven. http://www.sans.org/
resources/idfaq/solar_sunrise.php
http://opennet.net/special/kg/
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Belarus_Country_Study.pdf
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2146
http://kn.theiet.org/magazine/issues/0903/hacking-goes-pro-0903.cfm
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - INTRODUCTION
malicious criminal activity in cyberspace.14 Countries such as the United States, Russia and China
have also entered into bilateral agreements with allied countries and partners.
A focus on China
Recent allegations of Chinese cyber espionage largely rely on anecdotal evidence. The most common
proof provided by victims of these attacks consists of log files or malware that shows connections
being made by infected computers to IP addresses assigned to the People
s Republic of China.
This kind of evidence is circumstantial at best. Internet usage statistics suggest that focusing on
Chinese instances of information warfare is misleading.15 With 41% of the world
s Internet users
located in Asia, China alone accounts for the largest national population of Internet users
some 300
million, nearly one-fifth of the global number of users. Coupled with the rapid growth in Chinese use
of the Internet
a 1,200% increase in the period 2000-2008
this would more than account for the
rise in instances of Chinese-oriented malware.16
At the same time, however, allegations of Chinese hacking and exploitation of private and
government computer systems are persistent enough to warrant an evidence-based investigation.
This report provides such an investigation.
Outline of report
This report is divided into three parts:
Part one provides a brief introduction to the context and background to this report. We examine past
allegations of cyber espionage by China-based actors and the challenge of evidence-based research
in this field. Part one concludes with a brief description of the methods used in our two-phase
investigation.
Part two provides a detailed account of the conduct of our investigation. The findings of each phase
are presented sequentially.
Part three analyses the overall findings of the investigation, suggests alternative explanations and
assesses the implications.
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/impact/index.html
For global Internet usage statistics please see http://www.internetworldstats.com
http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/03/03/wheres-the-badware
PART ONE:
Context and background
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
Context and background: Alleged Chinese operations
in cyberspace
China has been developing its cyberspace doctrine and capabilities since the late 1990s as part of its military
modernization programme. The Chinese doctrine of 
active defence,
 which is the belief that China must be ready
to respond to aggression immediately, places an emphasis on the development of cyber warfare capabilities.
The Chinese focus on cyber capabilities as part of its strategy of national asymmetric warfare involves
deliberately developing capabilities that circumvent U.S. superiority in command-and-control warfare.
The strategy recognizes the critical importance of the cyber domain to American military and economic
power and the importance of offensive cyber operations to victory in a modern conflict with the United
States. Chinese doctrine also emphasizes the contiguity between military and non-military realms.17
In recent years, there has been an increase in allegations that China-based hackers are responsible for
high-level penetrations of computer systems in Europe, North America and Asia. Attackers originating
in China have been accused of infiltrating government computers in the United States, Britain, France,
Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. China-based hackers have been accused of data theft from foreign
government computers and commercial and financial institutions. The U.S. Department of Defense
reports it is continuously targeted by Chinese attackers, most notably in the series of attacks since 2003
known as 
Titan Rain,
 which targeted the Department of Defense and numerous defence companies.18
There are also allegations of attacks originating from China directed against non-governmental
organizations active in regions where China has a national interest. This includes organizations
advocating on the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan,19 Tibetan groups active in India, and the
Falun Gong. The majority of attacks involve website defacements, denial of service attacks, or virus
writing campaigns. Nationalistic and patriotic cyber-activity by Chinese nationals intensifies during
crises, such as during Sino-American or Sino-Taiwanese tensions (see below). To date none of these
attacks have been traced back to Chinese state authorities or specific individuals, although many
have benefited official Chinese policy and interests.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&na
me=Archive&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=2&page=1 ; http://www.heritage.org/Research/asiaandthepacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961,00.html ; http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/
ai_n31140190 ; http://www.afa.org/media/reports/victorycyberspace.pdf
http://www.insidetech.com/news/articles/1630-mysterious-forces-hack-pro-tibet-save-darfur-sites ; http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/20/AR2008032003193.html
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
Applying the evidence-based approach to cyber attacks:
the challenge of attribution
Determining those responsible for cyber attacks, commonly known as the attribution problem, is
a major challenge. The Internet was never built with security as a priority. The current version of
the Internet
s address assignment system, IP V4, provides a wealth of loopholes and methods by
which a perpetrator can mask his or her real identity and location. Online identities and servers
can be cleverly hidden. Packet flows and connections can be masked and redirected through
multiple servers. A clever attacker can often hijack a machine belonging to an otherwise innocent
organization and use it as a base for launching attacks.
Hand-in-hand with the problem of attribution is the difficulty of identifying motivating factors
behind a cyber attack. Many perpetrators of Internet-based attacks and exploits are individuals whose
motivation can vary from a simple profit motive through to fear of prosecution or strong emotional
feelings, including religious belief and nationalism. Many cyber attacks and exploits which seem to
benefit states may be the work of third-party actors operating under a variety of motivations. This
makes it difficult to separate the motivation of the individual from the potential motives of the
party on whose behalf the attacks have occurred, or a prospective client to which the perpetrator
is trying to market his or her wares. In either case, the challenge of identifying perpetrators and
understanding their motives gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to
officially distance themselves from attacks.
Cyber campaigns can also take on a life of their own. Even though a state might 
seed
 a particular
campaign through tacit encouragement or the absence of sanctions or prosecutions, these campaigns
are inherently chaotic and unpredictable in scope and outcome.20 Phenomena such as spontaneous
cyber rioting
 can surpass the initial purposes of the cyber campaign. Low barriers to entry to this
sort of activity enable anyone with a computer and Internet connection to take part in a cyberattack.21 For the most part, governments appear to passively benefit from online manifestations of
nationalistic and patriotic fervour, although outcomes are inherently unpredictable.22
In China, the authorities most likely perceive individual attackers and their online activities as
convenient instruments of national power.23 A favourite target of Chinese hackers is Taiwanese
computer systems, especially during times of Sino-Taiwanese tensions, such as elections and
http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/canada-watch/obama/pdfs/Deibert.pdf
http://worldanalysis.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=343
For instance, during the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008, tools were made available online for those who wished to
participate in the ongoing 
cyber-war
 against Georgian websites. http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/10/government-and.html ;
http://www.slate.com/id/2197514
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_88/ai_n31140190 ; http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijingsrising-hackers.pdf
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
referendums.24 In April 2001, following the death of a Chinese fighter pilot after a collision with an
American spy plane near the Chinese island of Hainan, Chinese hackers began a sustained campaign
to target American computer networks. No link was made with elements of the Chinese government.25
However, governments cannot always preserve direct control over such activities; groups can maintain
their freelance and autonomous status and undertake their own cyber initiatives that may not always
attain official sanction or serve state interests.26
Targeting Tibet
Accusations of Chinese cyber war being waged against the Tibetan community have been
commonplace for the past several years. The Chinese government has been accused of orchestrating
and encouraging such activity as part of a wider strategy to crack down on dissident groups and
subversive activity.27 Earlier research has traced these attacks against Tibetan groups to IP addresses
registered in the People
s Republic of China. The attacks used malware hidden in legitimate-looking
email messages, infecting unsuspecting users
 computers and exploiting the data on it by sending it
to control servers.28
The identity of the attackers has never been attributed in a conclusive manner to any specific group
or individual.29 The motivation of those behind the attacks, despite conjecture, is also unproven.
In earlier studies, researchers focused on attacks specifically targeting the Tibetan community.
But a wide variety of other victims of computer penetrations have reported infections similar to
those used against Tibetan organizations, following a similar modus operandi and also reporting
to control servers usually located in China. These additional targets include the Falun Gong30, the
U.S. Government, and multinational corporations.31 While reports of these targeted attacks have
circulated, the extent to which attackers successfully exploited the affected computers is unknown.
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1305755.stm
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Beijings-rising-hackers.pdf
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032102605.html
See, http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177 ; http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4176 and http://archive.cert.uni-stuttgart.
de/isn/2002/09/msg00086.html for background information on these attacks.
Attribution for previous penetrations of Tibetan groups has never been publicly attributed and is not available from open sources.
Classified studies may reveal a finer grained detail, as many of the attacks are relatively unsophisticated, and given proper assets,
could be traced back to specific locations and presumably individuals.
Research by Maarten Van Horenbeeck shows that similar attacks have targeted the Falun Gong. http://www.daemon.be/
maarten/Crouching_Powerpoint_Hidden_Trojan_24C3.pdf and http://isc.sans.org/presentations/SANSFIRE2008-Is_Troy_Burning_
Vanhorenbeeck.pdf
See http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
Conduct of the investigation
From June 2008 to March 2009 the Information Warfare Monitor conducted an in-depth investigation
of alleged cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. We chose this case study because of the
unprecedented access that we were granted to Tibetan institutions through one of our researchers, and
persistent allegations that confidential information on secure computers was somehow being compromised.
Our lead field investigator had a long history of working with the Tibetan community, and was able
to work with the private office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and a number of
Tibetan non-governmental organizations.
The investigation consisted of two distinct phases.
Phase 1: Field-based investigations in India, Europe, and North America (June-November 2008)
Field research was carried out in Dharamsala, India, the location of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
Follow-up research was conducted at Tibetan missions abroad in London, Brussels and New York. During
this phase we had unprecedented access to the Tibetan government and other Tibetan organizations.
This allowed us to establish a baseline understanding of information security practices at these
locations and to design an evidence-based approach to the investigation.
We also conducted extensive on-site interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the
private office of the Dalai Lama, and Tibetan non-governmental organizations. The interviews focused on
the allegations of cyber espionage. We also sought alternative explanations for leakage of confidential
documents and information and examined basic information security practices at these locations.
Network monitoring software was installed on various computers so as to collect forensic technical
data from affected computer systems, and initial results were analysed in situ.32 This initial analysis
confirmed the existence of malware and the transfer of information between infected computers and
a number of control servers.33
Phase 2: Computer-based scouting, target selection, and data analysis (December 2008-March 2009)
During the second phase of the investigation, researchers based at the Citizen Lab analysed the data
collected by the field team.
The data collected in Dharamsala and at Tibetan missions abroad led to the discovery of four control
servers and six command servers. These control servers were identified and geo-located from the captured
A portion of the fieldwork was carried out in conjunction with Dr. Shishir Nagaraja who spent five days in Dharamsala at the request
of IWM researchers and assisted in conducting technical tests.
A packet capturing program, Wireshark, was installed at each test location. All traffic from each of the affected systems was
captured in real-time, and recorded for further analysis. Compromised systems try to connect to control servers in order check-in and
report an infection. Once a connection is made, infected computers may receive instructions or additional locations from where they
are to download instructions. The Wireshark data is sufficient to analyse these connections, determine the behaviour of the attack
vector, and identify the location of control servers.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART ONE
traffic using a simple IP lookup.34 The control servers were then probed and web-based control interfaces
were identified on four control servers, which allowed us to view and control the network. The system was
actively monitored for two weeks, which allowed us to derive an extensive list of infected systems, and to
also monitor the systems operator(s) as the operator(s) specifically instructed target computers.
The data collected during both phases was integrated in Palantir, a data visualization and analysis
tool. The Palantir platform provides a data fusion and visualization environment that enhances
analytical capabilities.
We looked up the associated Internet Protocol (IP) address in all five Regional Internet Registries in order to identify the country
and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name System (DNS) look-up on each IP
address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses; reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address
into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP
address. If we discovered a domain name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain
name registrations and provides information about who registered the domain name.
PART TWO:
Tracking GhostNet
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Phase 1: Field investigation
We conducted our investigation in Dharamsala between July and September 2008. The initial purpose
was to gather targeted malware samples from Tibetan NGOs based in the area and to brief the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (TGIE) on the basics of information security. This included raising end-user
awareness about social engineering and its policy implications for the secure use of information systems.
The investigator met with the Dalai Lama
s representative in Geneva, Tseten Samdup. During the
meeting, Samdup inquired about the potential threat to computer security at the Office of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) in light of the targeted malware threat. Samdup requested that
the investigator perform a preliminary security review of OHHDL systems, including Dalailama.com
and the office computer network. A five day mission was scheduled in early September. Malware
was discovered on computers located in the OHHDL.
Following the discovery of malware in the OHHDL, our investigator shifted focus to the campus
network of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. We approached Thubten Samphel, a senior civil
servant in the Department for Information and International Relations, and sought permission
to run Wireshark on several key computer systems, and to access the firewall logs at the Tibetan
Computing Resource Centre. This access was readily granted.
Additional testing was carried out at a Tibetan NGO. This was done at the suggestion of Phuntsok
Dorjee, the director of a local NGO, TibTec. Dorjee suggested that we conduct testing and monitoring at
the offices of Drewla.35 As was the case at other sitesthe investigator conducted a series of interviews
with the NGO staff.
Targeted malware 
 previous research
In September 2002, Tibetan groups reported that they were targeted with malware originating
from servers in mainland China. They claimed that this was a coordinated attempt to disrupt their
operations and spy on their computer networks. Similar attacks have occurred since then against a
range of Tibetan non-state actors, including exile groups, human rights organizations, trade unions
and labour organizers, writers, scholars and intellectuals.
In 2005, a member of our investigating team convened a working group that coordinated the
collection and archiving of the malware, including the payloads and associated examples of social
engineering employed. Since early 2008, we have analysed every sample available to us, and
identified control servers for at least fifty incidents.
During an analysis of attacks which occurred during the 2008 Beijing Olympics we discovered
the location of a control server that was later identified as part of the network which infected a
computer in the private office of the Dalai Lama.
The Drewla Initiative Project is an outreach model that seeks new ways to communicate directly with citizens of the People
Republic of China. It relies heavily on the Internet.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
We were able to gain access to the command interface of this control server and identify the
infected computers which reported back to this server. While were are unable to prove exactly how
the computer in the Dalai Lama
s office became infected, this case demonstrates one of the attack
vectors used by the attacker(s) behind the network of infected computers we later uncovered.36
The following steps illustrate the attack vector using the malicious document we collected, which was
configured to connect to a control server to which we later acquired access. (See Fig. 1 - p.19)
An email message arrives in the target
s inbox carrying the malware in an attachment or web link.
The attackers(s)
 objective is to get the target to open the attachment or malicious link so that the
malicious code can execute. In this case, the attacker(s) sent a carefully crafted email message which
was configured to appear as if it was sent from [email protected] with an attached infected
Word document named 
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
 to entice
the recipient to open the file.37 (See Fig. 2 - p. 20)
Over time, it has been observed that the carrier emails have become more sophisticated in their
targeting and content in order to trick their recipients into believing that they are receiving
legitimate messages. This is also known as 
social engineering.
 It is common to see legitimate
documents recycled for such attacks or the attacker injecting their message into an ongoing group
conversation. There are also cases where it appears that content stolen from previously-infected
machines was recycled to enhance the appearance of legitimacy.
The targeted user proceeds to opens the attachment or malicious link. Once opened, the infected
file or link exploits a vulnerability on the user
s machine and installs the malware on the user
computer, along with a seemingly benign file. From the user
s perspective, the infected document
will often open normally, leaving the user unaware of the infection that just took place.
Only 11 of the 34 anti-virus programs provided by Virus Total38 recognized the malware embedded in
the document. Attackers often use executable packers to obfuscate their malicious code in order to
avoid detection by anti-virus software. (See Fig. 3 - p. 21)
Researchers monitoring the use of socially engineered malware attacks against the Tibetan
community have identified over eight different Trojan families in use.39 Control over some targeted
machines is maintained using the Chinese gh0st RAT (Remote Access Tool). These Trojans generally
allow for near-unrestricted access to the infected systems.
A detailed technical investigation of a similar case of a targeted attack which connected to the same control server is available
here: http://xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; another investigation of targeted attacks connecting to the same control
server is available here: http://www.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
For a detailed list of malicious files and control servers see xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
VirusTotal.com is a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with 34 leading anti-virus products.
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4177
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 1
Social Engineering
 attack connects to GhostNet.
This Palantir screen capture summarizes the relationships between an 
unknown sender
 pretending to be 
[email protected]
, the email
sent to the International Tibet Support Network , and the attachment (
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
that contained malware that connected to a GhostNet control server.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 2
Socially Engineered
 email sent to the International Tibet Support
Network.
This email was sent on July 25, 2008 by an unknown attacker pretending to be 
[email protected]
 to the International Tibet Support
Network. Attached to the message was a Microsoft Word document named 
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book for Tibetans in Exile.doc
that exploits a vulnerability in Word to install malware on the target
s computer system.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 3
A Virus Total screen capture of a malware infected email attachment.
This is a screen capture from VirusTotal.com, a free, web-based service that allows users to upload malicious files that are scanned with
anti-virus products. It shows that only 11 of 34 anti-virus products detected the malicious file (
Translation of Freedom Movement ID Book
for Tibetans in Exile.doc
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
After infecting the target, the Trojan packed in the Word document performed a DNS look-up to
find its control server and then connected to that server. This Trojan attempted to connect to
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. This is one of the control servers that we later scouted and was in the same
Trojan family that infected computers in the Dalai Lama
s private office.
About 70% of the control servers behind the attacks on Tibetan organizations are located on IP
addresses assigned to China. However, servers have also been identified in the United States,
Sweden, South Korea and Taiwan. The host names pointing to these servers are quite often
configured on dynamic DNS services, such as 3322.org. While these services in and of themselves
are not malicious, they are heavily used in these specific attacks.40
Information Warfare Monitor field research
In September and October 2008 the Information Warfare Monitor investigated information security
practices and alleged cyber espionage activities on the computer systems in various offices related
to the work of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan groups. The offices that we investigated were:
the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL), based in Dharamsala, India; the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile (TGIE); various Offices of Tibet (OOT) in New York City, London, Paris, Brussels,
and Geneva; and the Tibetan activist NGO, Drewla. (See Fig. 4 - p. 23)
Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
The OHHDL is the personal office of the Dalai Lama. The OHHDL provides secretarial assistance and
is responsible for all matters related to the Dalai Lama and acts on his behalf. It is worth noting
that the OHHDL
s primary responsibilities include organization of the Dalai Lama
s international
schedule, handling all diplomatic, governmental and personal correspondence, and acting as
the liaison between the Dalai Lama and officials of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and
the Offices of Tibet (OOT) worldwide. Therefore the OHHDL
s computer network is continuously
transmitting and receiving extremely sensitive data.
While the Office does not have any secrets, it is essentially the hub of the Tibetan movement and
thus handles strategic, time-sensitive communications. Examples of these communications include
scheduling meetings with world leaders, and, since 2002, coordinating the negotiations between
the People
s Republic of China and Dharamsala.
On September 10, 2008, we used Wireshark to capture packets from an OHHDL computer named
xxxxxx. We chose xxxxxxx from among 23 computers on the OHHDL internal network due to
time constraints and consultations with office staff to identify the computers most likely to be
infected, such as those operated by relatively inexperienced users vulnerable to social engineering
techniques, or those handling particularly sensitive data.
An analysis of the data collected reveals that this computer was compromised by malware that was
in interactive communication with identified control servers. The infected computer connected to
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/08_16/b4080032218430.htm
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 4
Field researchers discovered malware at five Tibetan locations.
A Palantir screen capture showing the Tibetan organizations at which we conducted field research and the connections from infected
computers at these locations and various control servers located in China. The locations at which we found evidence of infection are:
the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Offices of Tibet in New York City and London and the Tibetan
activist NGO, Drewla.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
four different IP addresses, each with a somewhat different method. While there are four groupings
of communications between the infected computer and the control servers, they are related such
that there appear to be two distinct families of malware. In both cases, the malware uses the
protocol for standard web traffic, HTTP, in order make the network activity appear as if it were
normal Internet browsing.
The first family of malware used HTTP connections to connect to PHP files.41 Despite connecting
to different IP addresses and requesting different files, both used the same unique key when
communicating, indicating that they are part of the same family of malware.
1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxxx
using two host names, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The IP address
xxxxxxxxx is in a range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) in China. The malware used HTTP to connect to various PHP files
on the control server in order to update its status and receive instructions about where
to download commands. The commands are embedded in what appear to be image files
(e.g. JPEG).
2) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address xxxxxxxxxxx, port
8000. This IP address reverse resolved to xxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.
com.cn and is in an IP range assigned to Hainan-TELECOM (HAIFU node adsl dialup
ports) in China. The malware used HTTP POST to upload content to the control server.42
The investigation carried out in Phase 2 identified the network of control servers used in this
particular attack. The control servers we discovered include the control server used in the welldocumented instances of social malware used frequently against Tibetan targets during the 2008
Olympics in Beijing.
The second family of malware used HTTP POST to connect to a CGI43 script to communicate between
the infected computer and the control server. While their functions appear to be different, with one
malware focusing on reporting and commands and the other on document retrieval, they are likely part
of the same family of malware. In addition, the domain names used, www.lookbytheway.net and www.
macfeeresponse.org, are registered to the same person, 
zhou zhaojun
 ([email protected]).
1) The malware made connections to a control server on IP address 221.5.250.98 using
the host name www.lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to
CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169 Chongqing Province Network) in China. The
malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect to a file in an attempt to
inform the control server of the infected computer
s status and to download commands.
PHP is a popular scripting language often used in web applications.
HTTP POST is a method often used to upload content to a web server.
CGI scripts are often written in the Perl programming language.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
In one case, the file the infected computer was requesting was not present and the
infected computer received a 404 error. However, successful connections were made
via HTTP to CGI scripts. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI
scripts hosted on the control server.
2) The malware made connections to a control server on 218.241.153.61 using the host name
www.macfeeresponse.org. The IP address 218.241.153.61 is assigned to BITNET (Beijing
Bitone United Networks) in Beijing, China. The malware on the infected computer used
HTTP to connect to a file to inform the control server of the infected computer
s status
and download commands. In addition, connections were made via HTTP to CGI scripts. The
infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the control
server. Connections to one CGI script appear to inform the control server of the presence of
particular documents, while connections to a second CGI script appear to cause the infected
computer to upload documents to the control server using HTTP POST.
Instances of malware that connect to control server locations www.lookbytheway.net and www.
macfeeresponse.org have been analysed by security companies.44 This network extends to a variety
of domain names including:
www.lookbytheway.com 
 210.51.7.155
www.macfeeresponse.com - 210.51.7.155
www.msnppt.net - 221.5.250.98
www.msnxy.net - 210.51.7.155
www.msnyf.com - 221.5.250.98
www.networkcia.com - 210.51.7.155
www.indexnews.org - 61.188.87.58
www.indexindian.com - 210.51.7.155
During the in situ investigation at the Dalai Lama
s private office we observed several documents
being exfiltrated from the computer network and uploaded to www.macfeeresponse.org, including
a document containing thousands of email addresses and one detailing and discussing the Dalai
Lama
s envoy
s negotiating position. (see Fig. 5 - p. 26)
Our investigators did not have access to the stolen documents for reasons of confidentiality.
However, we can assume their significance to Sino-Tibetan negotiations. One example is the fact
that GhostNet penetrated computers of organizations involved in China-TGIE negotiations.45
See, http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=79f7f4695b8878cf1760e8626129ca88 and http://www.threatexpert.com/report.
aspx?md5=ea03a7359505e19146994ad77b2a1e46
Lodi Gyari is the lead person designated by the Dalai Lama to coordinate negotiations with the Chinese government. Our invesigator
interviewed him in December 2008 in Delhi. We briefed him on our ongoing investigation and offered advice on information security
while engaged in negotiations in Beijing. Lodi Gyari is also the Executive Chairman of the Board of the International Campaign for
Tibet (ICT), an independent Washington-based human rights advocacy group. (Note that our investigation uncovered that seven of
s computers were compromised by GhostNet).
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 5
Malware retrieving a sensitive document.
This screen capture of the Wireshark network analysis tool shows an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama uploading a
sensitive document to one of the CGI network
s control servers.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE)
On September 11, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a TGIE computer xxxxxxx. An
analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
received communication from, control servers.
The malware made connections to a control server on 221.10.254.248 using the host name 927.
bigwww.com. The IP address 221.10.254.248 is assigned to CNCGROUP-SC (CNC Group CHINA169
Sichuan Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect
to a JPEG file, which was not an image file but instead contains an IP address and port number
(124.135.97.21:8005). This IP address, 124.135.97.21, is assigned to CNCGROUP-SD (CNC Group
CHINA169 Shandong Province Network) in China.
Offices of Tibet
London
On October 1, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the London OOT. An
analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
received communication from, control servers.
The malware made connections to a control server on 58.141.132.66 using the hostname oyd.3322.
org on port 4501. The IP address 58.141.132.66 is assigned to NamBu TV in Seoul, South Korea. 3322.
org is a Chinese dynamic domain service.
New York
On March 3, 2008, Wireshark was used to capture packets from a computer in the New York OOT.
An analysis revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which attempted to send
communication to a control server.
The malware attempted to make a connection to what appears to be a control server at
125.108.172.81 but there was not an active server at that location. The IP address 125.108.172.81 is
assigned to CHINANET-ZJ-WZ (CHINANET-ZJ Wenzhou node network) in China.
Drewla
Following the discovery of targeted malware on the OHHDL, TGIE and OOT networks, we performed
similar analysis on Tibetan NGOs to see if we could identify more infected machines communicating
with control servers in China. While we carried out such analysis on a number of NGOs, in this report
we focus on Drewla
s network.
The Drewla (
connection
 in Tibetan) is an online outreach project was set up in 2005 that employs
Tibetan youth with Chinese language skills to chat with people in mainland China and in the
diaspora, raising awareness about the Tibetan situation, sharing the Dalai Lama
s teachings, and
supplying information on how to circumvent Chinese government censorship on the Internet.
On September 12, 2008 Wireshark was used to capture packets from a Drewla computer. An analysis
revealed that this computer was compromised by malware which sent communication to, and
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
received communication from, control servers.
The malware made connections to a control server on 221.5.250.98 using the host name www.
lookbytheway.net. The IP address 221.5.250.98 is assigned to CNCGROUP-CQ (CNC Group CHINA169
Chongqing Province Network) in China. The malware on the infected computer used HTTP to connect
to a file in an attempt to inform the control server of the infected computer
s status and download
commands. The infected computer used HTTP POST to submit data to CGI scripts hosted on the
control server. (see Fig. 6 - p. 29)
Box 1.
Chinese Internet SIGINT in practice
During the course of our research, we were informed of the following incident. A member of
Drewla, a young woman, decided to return to her family village in Tibet after working for two
years for Drewla. She was arrested at the Nepalese-Tibetan border and taken to a detention
facility, where she was held incommunicado for two months. She was interrogated by Chinese
intelligence personnel about her employment in Dharamsala. She denied having been politically
active and insisted that she had gone to Dharamsala for studies. In response to this, the
intelligence officers pulled out a dossier on her activities and presented her with full transcripts
of her Internet chats over the years. They indicated that they were fully aware of, and were
monitoring, the Drewla outreach initiative and that her colleagues were not welcome to return
to Tibet. They then released her and she returned to her village.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 6
The OHHDL and Drewla were infected by the same malware.
This Palantir screen capture shows the relationship between an infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) and the
Tibetan NGO Drewla. Both attempted to connect to the same control server in the CGI network.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Phase 2: Identifying command and control servers
This phase of the investigation focused on the discovery of the command and control servers. We
were able to identify and connect to the control servers used by the GhostNet by analysing the data
from the OHHDL obtained during the field investigations carried out in Phase 1. During this process
we were able to find and access web-based administration interfaces on the control server identified
from the OHHDL data. These servers contain links to other control servers as well as command
servers, and so therefore we were able to enumerate additional command and control servers.
After discovering several instances of malware on these servers, we set up a honey pot computer and
were able to identify additional malicious servers by monitoring the traffic generated by our infected
honey pot. Using the attacker(s)
 web-based administration interface, we were able to command our
honey pot computer to download gh0st RAT, one of the Trojans used by GhostNet. Eventually, our
honey pot computer established a connection to the attacker(s)
 gh0st RAT client. The attacker(s)
proceeded to execute commands on our honey pot. We were able to discover several IP addresses
within a DSL range in Hainan Island (PRC) that the attacker(s) used to communicate with computers
infected with gh0st RAT.
Finally, we were able to map out the methods and capabilities of the GhostNet by a triangulated
analysis of three sources: 1) data obtained from our collection of socially engineered emails with
backdoor attachments, 2) the captured network traffic from Tibetan targets; and, 3) data obtained by
gaining access to the command and control interface. (see Fig. 7 - p. 31)
While analysing the data collected from the infected OHHDL computer (xxxxxxx), we discovered
web-based administration interfaces to four control servers. Through some strategic guessing
concerning file paths and file names, we were able to access web interfaces to multiple control
servers. In total, we found 26 instances of the administration interface across the four servers. It
remains unclear why the attacker(s) did not secure access to the control interface. Perhaps the
attacker(s) concluded that the file paths and file names could not be easily guessed.
The control servers
 web interface contains three main components: 1) a listing of all the infected computers
that have reported to the control server; 2) an interface to issue commands to the infected computers; and
3) an interface to monitor pending commands to infected computers and their results when completed.
The commands issued to the infected computers direct the infected computer to download files
from additional command servers under the attacker(s)
 control. In some cases, these servers act as
control servers themselves; however, some appear to be used exclusively to host malicious files that
infected computers are meant to download. The attacker(s) set commands on the control servers
that instruct infected computers to download additional remote administration Trojans, such as
gh0st RAT, in order to take complete real-time control of the infected computers.
Three of the four control servers are located in three different locations in China: Hainan,
Guangdong and Sichuan. One of the control servers is located at a web-hosting company in the
United States. Five of the six command servers are located in mainland China (Hainan, Guangdong,
Sichuan and Jiangsu) and one in Hong Kong.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 7
The GhostNet control servers.
This Palantir screen capture shows the GhostNet servers we uncovered and their relationship with the malicious email sent to, 1) the
International Tibet Support Network, 2) the infected computer at the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama; and, 3) the honey pot network set
up at the Citizen Lab.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
The four control servers are:
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Hainan-TELECOM, CN
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, US
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx CHINANET-SC, CN
The six control/command servers are:
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-HI, CN
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CUHKNET, HK
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-GD, CN
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-JS, CN
 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, CHINANET-SC, CN
The data obtained from WHOIS records concerning domain name registration reveals that most
of the domains are traceable to the same individual. However, the attacker(s) could have simply
stolen the domains from someone else, or compromised the servers hosting these domains.
Table 1: Domain name registration information
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
25/04/06
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
26/11/07
xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
20/06/08
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
03/09/08
List of infected computers (see Fig. 8 - p. 33)
The Server List interface provides information on each computer infected by the attacker(s)
malware, indicating the name given to the computer (by its owner/operator), its IP address, when
it was first infected, when it last called home (i.e. the control server), and how many times it
has called home. Each infected computer is assigned a unique identification number so that the
infected computer can be tracked even when its IP address changes. The page also features a link
to the Send Command interface, through which the attacker(s) sends instructions to the infected
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 8
The GhostNet 
Server List
 interface.
This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows all infected computers that have 
checked in
 with the control server. It has been obscured
to protect the identity of the victims.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
computers. There is also a button at the top of the page that links to a Command Result page that
shows the status of the commands sent to the host and their results.
To corroborate our findings, there was an entry in the Server List page of the infected OHHDL
computer that we analysed during our field investigations outlined in Part One. It contained the
unique ID, the IP address, computer name, and a link to issue commands to the infected computer.
Sending commands
The Send Command link provided for each entry yields an interface that allows an attacker(s) to
send specific commands to the selected infected computer. In addition to a custom command, the
attacker(s) may choose from a menu of commands, which includes options to download binaries that
provide additional functionality (such as keystroke logging or remote administration), acquire system
information (list computer information, software and documents on the computer), or cause the
malware to become dormant. (See Fig. 9 - p. 35)
Using the Send Command interface, the attacker(s) issues instructions to the infected computers to
download malicious files that are disguised as standard image files. As mentioned above, the files
are most often hosted on additional command servers that appear to be dedicated to hosting these
infected files.46 These command servers contain a variety of files. While the exact function of each
file is not known, the file names given to them by the attacker(s) provide some indication of their
functionality. There are file names associated with the retrieval of files as well as keystroke logging.
One of the commands available to the attacker(s) instructs infected computers to download the
gh0st RAT remote administration tool, which gives the attacker(s) full, real-time control of the infected
computer. Gh0st RAT is an open source Trojan that is widely available online. It was developed by
Chinese programmers but has now been translated into English. The program allows an attacker to
create an executable file that can be repacked and disguised and used to infect and compromise a target
computer. This file can be configured to directly connect to the gh0st RAT owner or to a third location, a
control server, when it retrieves the current IP address of the gh0st RAT owner. (See Fig. 10 - p. 36)
Once the infected computer connects to the gh0st RAT owner, an entry appears in the Connection
window with some information about the infected computer. The gh0st RAT owner may then
issue commands to the infected computer. These commands include file manager, screen capture,
keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture, as well as the ability to force the
infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as a gh0st RAT update.
During the course of the investigation, we infected a honey pot computer with the attacker(s)
malware. We instructed our infected computer to download the attacker(s)
 version of gh0st RAT
using the malicious network
s web-based administration interface. The gh0st RAT attempted to
connect to several *.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn IP addresses before finally successfully
connecting to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn).
In some cases the malicious image files are hosted on the control servers themselves.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 9
The GhostNet 
Send Command
 interface.
This screen capture of the GhostNet interface shows how the attacker(s) can send specific commands to infected computers. It has been
obscured to protect the identity of the victims.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 10
The gh0st RAT interface.
This screen capture of the English language version of the gh0st RAT software shows the commands that an attacker is able to execute on the
compromised computer.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
The gh0st RAT tool attempts to connect to IP addresses of a DSL provider in Hainan, China:
 xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
 xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
 xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
 xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
 xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
 xxxxxxxxxxxx.broad.hk.hi.dynamic.163data.com.cn
After a successful connection, the attacker(s) proceed to issue commands on our infected
computer in real-time.
We found similar but unsuccessful connections to the same IP address range from some of the
infected computers we analysed and discovered that a rudimentary version of the web-based
administration interface contained only one infection from the same IP address range in Hainan.
In addition, one of the servers used to host the attacker(s)
 malicious files is a Government of
Hainan web server located in Hainan, and one of the control server interfaces we gained access
to is also located in Hainan. However, one should not rush to judgement concerning the identity
of the attacker(s) based on this location. The gh0st RAT software can be configured with a proxy
server; therefore it is possible that the attacker(s) were using a compromised system as a proxy to
hide their true location.
Command results
The Command Result page lists the commands issued through the Send Command page and the
status of those commands. Each entry in this interface shows what command was sent to the
infected computer, including the URL to the command server and the command file (the malicious
file disguised as an image). Upon the successful completion of a command, the relevant date, time,
and result are recorded. (See Fig. 11 - p. 38)
The Command Result page contains a column that displays the content sent back to the control
server from the infected computer. The command issued to retrieve this content in the Send
Command interface is labelled 
Acquire System Information.
 Even though we have been unable
to properly decode the content,47 the plain text values in the binary content indicate that these
entries contain information about the infected computer (CPU, memory, operating system,
programmes installed) as well as file names of documents on the computer, presumably for later
retrieval. This information is likely used to determine which targets the attacker(s) will further
exploit and control using remote administration tools such as gh0st RAT.
The content is base64 encoded and XORed with values we have yet to identify.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 11
The GhostNet 
List Command
 interface.
This screen capture of the GhostNet interface lists the commands issued to infected computers. It has been obscured to protect the identity of
the victims.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Methods and capabilities
The attacker(s) are able to exploit several infection vectors. First, they create web pages that
contain 
drive by
 exploit code that infects the computers of those who visit the page. Second, the
attacker(s) have also shown that they engage in spear phishing in which contextually relevant emails
are sent to targets with PDF and DOC attachments which, when executed, create back doors that
cause the infected computer to connect to a control server and await further instructions.
With each successful infection the attacker(s) may use any contextually relevant data to further
exploit the targeted community and may also impersonate the initial target in order to infect all the
targets
 contacts. Finally, the targets themselves may infect others by forwarding infected documents
to their contacts. In this way, the network of infected computers grows organically.
The first stage of infection focuses on getting targets to execute malicious code. Once infected, the target
computer routinely checks in with a control server in order to receive further instructions. At this stage,
the attacker(s) acquires some initial information regarding the identity of the infected computer.
Newer versions of the administration interface contain a direct link to a web service that looks up
the relevant WHOIS information about the IP address of the infected computer along with a simple
port scan. This version also does a geoIP lookup on the infected computer
s IP address and lists the
country in which the computer is located, indicating that the attacker(s) has an interest in the
geographical location of the infected computers.
The attack may also issue an acquire system information command that causes the infected computer to upload
its hardware statistics, list of programs installed, list of recent documents, and current network connections.
The attacker(s) may use this information to target the infected computer for further exploitation.
The attacker(s) directs the infected computers to download and install a remote administration
Trojan. The attacker(s) have demonstrated a preference for gh0st RAT but may choose from a variety
of Trojans. The attacker(s) simply browses to the 
send command
 interface and pastes in a link to
a version of gh0st RAT on a 
command
 server under his or her control. The next time the infected
computer checks in to the control server, it will be instructed to download and execute gh0st RAT.
Upon completion, the infected computer notifies the control server and the result appears in the
attacker(s)
 web interface.
Once gh0st RAT is installed on the target, the infected computer will periodically check a specific
location and retrieve the IP address to which it is supposed to connect. When the attacker(s)
is not available, he or she will often change this IP to 127.0.0.1 (localhost) so that the amount
of potentially suspicious external traffic is limited. When the attacker(s) is ready to receive
connections, the IP address is changed to a valid external IP address.
When the attacker(s) turns on gh0st RAT, he or she is able to see all the infected machines that have
established connections to him or her. The attacker(s) may then execute a wide variety of commands,
including file manager, screen capture, keylogger, remote shell, system, webcam view, audio capture,
as well as the ability to force the infected host to download and execute additional malware, such as
a gh0st RAT update. The attacker(s) may also secretly execute programs on the target computer.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Analysis of list of infected computers
A detailed analysis of the list of infected computers revealed an overwhelming number of unique
infections in many countries. The same malware that infected computers at the Dalai Lama
s office
and other Tibetan organizations had a much more extensive set of targets. The list of entities and
locations of those targeted was quite varied.
In total, we found 1,295 infected computers located in 103 countries. We found that we were able to
confidently
on a scale of low, medium, high
identify 397 of the 1,295 infected computers (26.7%),
and labelled each one as a high-value target. We did so because they were either significant to the
relationship between China and Tibet, Taiwan or India, or were identified as computers at foreign
embassies, diplomatic missions, government ministries, or international organizations.
Of the remaining infected computers, 536 appear to be computers on private broadband Internet
providers. The remaining IP addresses do not reverse resolve and available information on these
hosts does not allow us to make judgements regarding the identity or purpose of these computers.
Methodology
We compiled a unified and comprehensive list of infected computers from all the control servers,
as there was considerable duplication across them. There were several duplicate entries in the list
of infected computers
in some cases, the same infected computer was logged multiple times as it
was connecting from a different IP address. In other instances, multiple infected computers were
assigned different internal IP addresses and had different computer names but shared the same
external IP address. This signifies that there were multiple infected computers sharing Internet
access. Where possible, we filtered the results by unique computer name, and if no computer name
was present, we filtered by unique external IP address.48 (See Fig. 12 - p. 41)
On the surface, the names of the infected computers in the sample are provocative. There are references
to ministries of foreign affairs, foreign embassies, and other government entities. Some contains names of
officials or their positions/titles. However, we recognize that a computer name can be anything its owner
wishes, and may be completely unrelated to the location, function, or owner of that particular computer.
Therefore, in order to be more confident as to the true identity or purpose of the infected computer,
we relied on reverse DNS look-ups and each IP address
 record from the Regional Internet Registries.
Using these two pieces of information we were able to confirm the validity of the identity of several
infected computers with a high (H) degree of confidence.
In some cases the computer name associated with the infected computer is actually a domain
name or an acronym for a recognizable institution or organization. In these cases we classified our
identification of the target with either a medium (M) or low (L) level of confidence. Medium
confidence refers to instances where we have otherwise identified a related high confidence target,
In one case we removed 117 unique IP addresses from Mexico that appeared to belong to the same computer connecting in to the
control server from a DSL provider.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 12
The geographic location of infected hosts.
This graphic illustrates the global reach of the GhostNet. There were 1,295 infected computers that reported to the control server. The
infections were spread across 103 countries. Taiwan reported the most infections followed by the United States, Vietnam and India.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
but for which we rely on the computer name for identification. Low confidence refers to instances
in which we rely solely on the computer name for identification.
Table 2: Selected infections
Organization
Confidence
Location
Infections
ASEAN
ID, MY
Asian Development Bank
PH, IN
Associated Press, UK
GB, HK
Bureau of International Trade Relations
CanTV, Venezuela
Ceger, Portugal
Consulate General of Malaysia, Hong Kong
Deloitte & Touche, New York
Department of Commerce, Solomon Islands
Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia
Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines
Department of Science and Technology, Philippines
Embassy of China, US (see footnote 50)
Embassy of Cyprus, Germany
Embassy of Germany, Australia
Embassy of India, Belgium
Embassy of India, Serbia
Embassy of India, Germany
Embassy of India, Italy
Embassy Of India, Kuwait
Embassy of India, USA
Embassy of India, Zimbabwe
Embassy of Indonesia, China
Embassy of Malaysia, Cuba
Embassy of Malaysia, Italy
Embassy of Malta
Embassy of Malta, Australia
Embassy of Malta, Belgium
Embassy of Malta, Libya
Embassy of Pakistan, Bahrain
Embassy of Papua New Guinea, China
Embassy of Portugal, Finland
Embassy of Portugal, Germany
Embassy of The Republic Of China (Taiwan), Swaziland
Embassy of Romania, Finland
Embassy of Romania, France
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Table 2: Selected infections (cont
Organization
Confidence
Location
Infections
Embassy of Romania, Norway
Embassy of Romania, PRC
Embassy of Thailand, Philippines
Embassy of the Republic of Korea, China
Government Integrated Telecommunication Network, Malaysia
High Commission of India, Cyprus
High Commission Of India, United Kingdom
Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan
International Campaign for Tibet
International Chamber of Shipping, United Kingdom
Lanka Education and Research Network, Sri Lanka
Malta External Trade Corporation Ltd.
Maritime Police, Solomon Islands
Ministry of Communications, Brunei
Ministry of Education, Solomon Islands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangladesh
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Barbados
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brunei
Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Iran
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Vietnam
Ministry of Labour and Human Resources, Bhutan
National Informatics Centre, India
NATO, (SHAPE HQ)
Net Trade, Taiwan
New Tang Dynasty Television, United States
Office of the Dalai Lama, India
Pakistan Mission to The United Nations
US, JP
Permanent Delegation of Cyprus to the European Union
Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations
PetroVietnam
Prime Minister
s Office, Laos
Public Service Division, Solomon Islands
Russian Federal University Network, Russian Federation
Software Technology Parks of India, India
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
BD, US
Students for a Free Tibet, United States
TAITRA, Taiwan
TW, NG
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Table 2: Selected infections (cont
Organization
Confidence
Location
Infections
Taiwan Government Service Network, Taiwan
Tibetan Government in Exile, India
IN, US
Trade and Industry Department, Government of Hong Kong
Infection timeline
The earliest infected computer called home to the control server on May 22, 2007. The most recent
entry in our sample is March 12, 2009. On average, the amount of time that a host was actively
infected was 145 days.49 While 90 infected computers were only infected for one day, 145 were
infected for over 400 days. The longest infection span was 660 days. In total, 422 hosts checked in
March 1-12, 2009; 373 of these computers were infected in 2008. The data indicates that despite a
reduction in new infections, the network continues to be operational. (See Fig. 13 - p. 45)
There are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.
There were 320 infections in December 2007 spread across 56 countries. However, 113 were located
within Taiwan and the majority of these infections occurred within a single organization: the
Taiwan External Trade Development Council. During this same period, computers at the Embassies
of India in Belgium and Zimbabwe were infected as were the Embassies of Indonesia and the
Republic of Korea in the People
s Republic of China. In addition, computers at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Iran were infected as were several computers at the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
The spike in August 2008 totalled 258 infections spread across 46 countries. The OHHDL computer
was infected during one of these spikes in August 2008 (It last checked in to the control server
in September 2008). This spike included the Chinese Embassy in the United States,50 3 computers
at the Embassy of India in the Unites States, and the High Commission of India in the United
Kingdom and in Cyprus. It also included the Embassy of Cyprus in Germany, the Embassy of
Malaysia in Cuba, the Embassy of Thailand in the Philippines and the Ministry of Industry in
Vietnam. Several companies were also compromised, including Net Trade in Taiwan, the New York
Office of Deloitte & Touche, and PetroVietnam, the government-owned oil and gas Company.
The average number of days from the initial infection to the last time an infected computer 
checked in
 with a control server.
It is unclear whether the affected embassy is the Republic of China (Taiwan) or People
s Republic of China.
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART TWO
Fig. 13
GhostNet infection timeline.
This screen capture of a timeline generated with Palantir illustrates when and how many computers were infected by the GhostNet.
It shows that there are significant spikes in infection rates in December 2007 and August 2008.
PART THREE:
Investigating GhostNet: Conclusions
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
The evidence presented in this report
through a combination of field investigations,
interviews, technical scouting, data analysis, mining and visualization
paints a
disturbing picture.
GhostNet represents a network of compromised computers resident in high-value political,
economic, and media locations spread across numerous countries worldwide. At the time of writing,
these organizations are almost certainly oblivious to the compromised situation in which they find
themselves. The computers of diplomats, military attach
s, private assistants, secretaries to Prime
Ministers, journalists and others are under the concealed control of unknown assailant(s).
In Dharamsala and elsewhere, we have witnessed machines being profiled and sensitive documents
being removed. At our Laboratory, we have analysed our own infected 
honey pot
 computer
and discovered that the capabilities of GhostNet are potent and wide ranging. Almost certainly,
documents are being removed without the targets
 knowledge, keystrokes logged, web cameras are
being silently triggered, and audio inputs surreptitiously activated.
This raises the question, how many sensitive activities have been preemptively anticipated by
intelligence gathered through this network? How many illegal transactions have been facilitated by
information harvested through GhostNet? Worst of all, how many people may have been put at risk?
While these questions are compelling, it would be imprudent to read these findings as an indictment,
or to attribute to the owners of GhostNet motivations and intentions for which there is no evidence.
Alternative explanations
The list of computers controlled by the GhostNet is significant, and certainly atypical for a cybercrime
network. The size of the network is small, and the concentration of high-value systems is significant.
At the same time, penetrations of this type are not uncommon. Recently, several large-scale spy
nets have been discovered, including ones containing lists of affected computers of a magnitude
higher than that harvested by GhostNet.
This trend is predictable, converging with accumulating incidents of cyber-attacks facilitated by
lower entry-thresholds for computer exploitation methods and technologies. The tools we profile in
our investigation, though apparently amassed in a complex way to achieve a definite purpose, are
not restricted to an exclusive guild of experts with specialized and confidential knowledge.
Today, pirated cyber-crime kits circulate extensively on the Internet and can be downloaded by
anyone about as easily as the latest pirated DVD.51 Cyberspace has empowered individuals and small
groups of non-state actors to do many things, including executing sophisticated computer network
operations that were previously only the domain of state intelligence agencies. We have entered
the era of do-it-yourself (DIY) signals intelligence.
http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/11/zeus-crimeware-kit-gets-carding-layout.html
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
Attribution
Who is ultimately in control of the GhostNet system? While our analysis reveals that numerous
politically sensitive and high-value computer systems were compromised, we do not know the
motivation or the identity of the attacker(s) or how to accurately characterize this network of
infections as a whole. We have not been able to ascertain the type of data that has been obtained
by the attacker(s), apart from the basic system information and file listings of the documents
located on the target computers. Without this data we are unable to deduce with any certainty
what kind of data the attacker(s) were after. There are thus several possibilities for attribution.
The most obvious explanation, and certainly the one in which the circumstantial evidence tilts the
strongest, would be that this set of high profile targets has been exploited by the Chinese state for
military and strategic-intelligence purposes. Indeed, as described above, many of the high confidence,
high-value targets that we identified are clearly linked to Chinese foreign and defence policy,
particularly in South and South East Asia. Like radar sweeping around the southern border of China,
there is an arc of infected nodes from India, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, through Laos, Brunei,
Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Many of the high profile targets reflect some of China
s most
vexing foreign and security policy issues, including Tibet and Taiwan. Moreover, the attacker(s)
addresses examined here trace back in at least several instances to Hainan Island, home of the Lingshui
signals intelligence facility and the Third Technical Department of the People
s Liberation Army.52
However, we must be cautious to rush to judgement in spite of circumstantial and other evidence,
as alternative explanations are certainly possible and charges against a government of this nature
are gravely serious. On the other end of the spectrum is the explanation that this is a random set
of infected computers that just happens to include high profile targets of strategic significance
to China, collected by an individual or group with no political agenda per se. Similarly one can
postulate that the targets gathered together happened less by concerted effort than by sheer
coincidence. Given the groupings of various entities in the infected computer list (by country
and organization), internal email communications and sloppy security practices could have led to
cross-infection and subsequent listing on the control servers.
Another possible explanation is that there is a single individual or set of individuals (criminal networks,
for example) who are targeting these high-value targets for profit. This can be in the form of stealing
financial information or critical data that can be sold to clients, be they states or private entities. There
are countless examples of large-scale fraud and data theft worldwide and numerous apparent instances
of outsourcing to third parties of cyber-attacks and espionage, some of which the Information Warfare
Monitor and its related research project, the OpenNet Initiative, have documented. GhostNet could very
well be a for-profit, non-state venture. Even 
patriotic hackers
 could be acting on their own volition,
or with the tacit approval of their government, as operators of the GhostNet.
Finally, it is not inconceivable that this network of infected computers could have been targeted
by a state other than China, but operated physically within China (and at least one node in
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/lingshui.htm
JR02-2009 Tracking GhostNet - PART THREE
the United States) for strategic purposes. Compromised proxy computers on Hainan Island, for
example, could have been deployed as staging posts, perhaps in an effort to deliberately mislead
observers as to the true operator(s) and purpose of the GhostNet system.
The Significance of GhostNet
GhostNet is significant, as it does not appear to be a typical cybercrime network. The potential
political fallout is enormous. But ultimately, the question of who is behind the GhostNet may
matter less than the strategic significance of the collection of affected targets. What this study
discovered is serious evidence that information security is an item requiring urgent attention at
the highest levels. It demonstrates that the subterranean layers of cyberspace, about which most
users are unaware, are domains of active reconnaissance, surveillance, and exploitation.
Regardless of who or what is ultimately in control of GhostNet, its capabilities of exploitation and
the strategic intelligence that can be harvested from it matter most. Indeed, although the Achilles
heel of the GhostNet system allowed us to monitor and document its far-reaching network of
infiltration, we can safely hypothesize that it is neither the first nor the only one of its kind.
PART FOUR:
About Information Warfare Monitor
About the Information Warfare Monitor
http://infowar-monitor.net/
The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research activity tracking the emergence of cyberspace
as a strategic domain. We are an independent research effort. Our mission is to build and broaden the
evidence base available to scholars, policymakers, and others. We aim to educate and inform.
The Information Warfare Monitor is a public-private venture between two Canadian institutions: The
SecDev Group, an operational think tank based in Ottawa (Canada), and the Citizen Lab at the Munk
Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. The Principal Investigators and
co-founders of the Information Warfare Monitor are Rafal Rohozinski (The SecDev Group) and
Ronald Deibert (Citizen Lab).
The Information Warfare Monitor is supported by The SecDev Group which conducts field-based
investigations and data gathering. Our advanced research and analysis facilities are located at the
Citizen Lab. IWM is part of the Citizen Lab
s network of advanced research projects, which include the
OpenNet Initiative and ONI Asia.
The Information Warfare Monitor also benefits from donations from a variety of sponsors including
Psiphon Inc, and Palantir Technologies.
The Information Warfare Monitor engages in three primary activities:
1. Case Studies. We design and carry out active case study research. These are self-generated
activities consistent with our mission.
We employ a rigorous and multidisciplinary approach to all our case studies blending qualitative, technical,
and quantitative methods. As a general rule, our investigations consist of at least two components:
Field-based investigations. We engage in qualitative research among affected
target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ
interaction with our partners, and extensive technical data collection involving
system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation. Our field-based teams
are supported by senior analysts and regional specialists, including social scientists,
computer security professionals, policy experts, and linguists, who provide additional
contextual support and substantive back-up.
Technical scouting and laboratory analysis. Data collected in the field is rigorously
analysed using a variety of advanced data fusion and visualization methods. Leads
developed on the basis of infield activities are pursued through 
technical scouting,
including computer network investigations, and the resulting data and analysis
is shared with our infield teams and partners for verification and for generating
additional entry points for follow-on investigations.
2. Open Source Trend Analysis. We collect open-source information from the press and other
sources tracking global trends in cyberspace. These are published on our public website.
3. Analytical Workshops and Outreach. We work closely with academia, human rights
organizations, and the defense and intelligence community. We publish reports, and occasionally
conduct joint workshops. Our work is independent, and not subject to government classification. Our
goal is to encourage vigorous debate around critical policy issues. This includes engaging in ethical
and legal considerations of information operations, computer network attacks, and computer network
exploitation, including the targeted use of Trojans and malware, denial of service attacks, and
content filtering.
About The SecDev Group
http://www.secdev.ca
The SecDev Group is a Canadian-based operational consultancy focused on countries and regions at
risk from violence and insecurity. We deliver to our clients insights and access to a diverse range
of cultures, audiences, challenging environments and ungoverned spaces. Our approach combines
a field research capability with advanced techniques and methods for generating policy-relevant
analysis and solutions. As a think tank, we identify and communicate realistic options to enhance
effectiveness through evidence-based research on the causes, consequences and trajectories of
insecurity and violence. We are operational because we design and conduct activities in complex and
insecure environments.
About The Citizen Lab
http://www.citzenlab.org
The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at
the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection
of digital media and world politics. We are a hothouse that combines the disciplines of political
science, sociology, computer science, engineering, and graphic design. Our mission is to undertake
advanced research and engage in development that monitors, analyses, and impacts the exercise of
political power in cyberspace. The Citizen Lab
s ongoing research network includes the Information
Warfare Monitor and the OpenNet Initiative, ONI Asia, and benefits from collaborative partnerships
with academic institutions, NGOs, and other partners in all regions of the world.