Battle of Stamford Bridge

The Battle of Stamford Bridge () took place at the village of Stamford Bridge, East Riding of Yorkshire, in England, on 25 September 1066, between an English army under King Harold Godwinson and an invading Norwegian force led by King Harald Hardrada and the English king's brother Tostig Godwinson. After a bloody battle, both Hardrada and Tostig, along with most of the Norwegians, were killed. Although Harold Godwinson repelled the Norwegian invaders, his army was defeated by the Normans at Hastings less than three weeks later. The battle has traditionally been presented as symbolising the end of the Viking Age, although major Scandinavian campaigns in Britain and Ireland occurred in the following decades, such as those of King Sweyn Estrithson of Denmark in 1069–1070 and King Magnus Barefoot of Norway in 1098 and 1102–1103.
Background.
The death of King Edward the Confessor of England in January 1066 had triggered a succession struggle in which a variety of contenders from across north-western Europe fought for the English throne. These claimants included the King of Norway, Harald Hardrada. According to the "Anglo-Saxon Chronicle" Manuscript D (p. 197), the Norwegians assembled a fleet of 300 ships to invade England. The authors, however, did not seem to differentiate between warships and supply ships. In "King Harald's Saga", Snorri Sturluson states, "it is said that King Harald had over two hundred ships, apart from supply ships and smaller craft". Combined with reinforcements picked up in Orkney, the Norwegian army most likely numbered between 7,000 and 9,000 men. Arriving off the English coast in September Hardrada was joined by further forces recruited in Flanders and Scotland by Tostig Godwinson. Tostig was at odds with his elder brother Harold (who had been elected king by the Witenagemot on the death of Edward). Having been ousted from his position as Earl of Northumbria and exiled in 1065, Tostig had mounted a series of abortive attacks on England in the spring of 1066.
In the late summer of 1066, the invaders sailed up the Ouse before advancing on York. On 20 September they defeated a northern English army led by Edwin, Earl of Mercia, and his brother Morcar, Earl of Northumbria, at the Battle of Fulford, outside York. Following this victory they received the surrender of York. Having briefly occupied the city and taken hostages and supplies from the city they returned towards their ships at Riccall. They offered peace to the Northumbrians in exchange for their support for Hardrada's bid for the throne, and demanded further hostages from the whole of Yorkshire.
At this time King Harold was in Southern England, anticipating an invasion from France by William, Duke of Normandy, another contender for the English throne. Learning of the Norwegian invasion he headed north at great speed with his huscarls and as many thegns as he could gather, travelling day and night. He made the journey from London to Yorkshire, a distance of about , in only four days, enabling him to take the Norwegians completely by surprise. Having learned that the Northumbrians had been ordered to send the additional hostages and supplies to the Norwegians at Stamford Bridge, Harold hurried on through York to attack them at this rendezvous on 25 September. Until the English army came into view the invaders remained unaware of the presence of a hostile army anywhere in the vicinity.
Location.
Manuscripts C, D and E of the "Anglo-Saxon Chronicle" all mention Stamford Bridge by name. Manuscript C contains a passage which states "... came upon them beyond the bridge ...". Henry of Huntington mentions Stamford Bridge and describes part of the battle being fought across the bridge.
The exact location of the battle site is not known for certain. We know that it took place along the Derwent River, where a wooden bridge crossed the water. There are indications of a meadow on the west side of the river and higher ground on the eastern side. The original bridge no longer exists, and no archaeological traces of it remain. The traditional locating of part of the battle at Battle Flats is based on no contemporary references. Statements that in the 18th-century skeletons and weapons were found there have not been corroborated by modern finds.
Battle.
According to Snorri Sturluson, before the battle a single man rode up alone to Harald Hardrada and Tostig. He gave no name, but spoke to Tostig, offering the return of his earldom if he would turn against Hardrada. Tostig asked what his brother Harold would be willing to give Hardrada for his trouble. The rider replied "Seven feet of English ground, as he is taller than other men." Then he rode back to the Saxon host. Hardrada was impressed by the rider's boldness, and asked Tostig who he was. Tostig replied that the rider was Harold Godwinson himself. According to Henry of Huntingdon, Harold said "Six feet of ground or as much more as he needs, as he is taller than most men."
The sudden appearance of the English army caught the Norwegians by surprise. The English advance was then delayed by the need to pass through the choke-point presented by the bridge itself. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle has it that a giant Norse axeman (possibly armed with a Dane Axe) blocked the narrow crossing and single-handedly held up the entire English army. The story is that this axeman cut down up to 40 Englishmen and was defeated only when an English soldier floated under the bridge in a half-barrel and thrust his spear through the planks in the bridge, mortally wounding the axeman.
This delay had allowed the bulk of the Norse army to form a shieldwall to face the English attack. Harold's army poured across the bridge, forming a line just short of the Norse army, locked shields and charged. The battle went far beyond the bridge itself, and although it raged for hours, the Norse army's decision to leave their armour behind left them at a distinct disadvantage. Eventually, the Norse army began to fragment and fracture, allowing the English troops to force their way in and break up the Scandinavians' shield wall. Completely outflanked, and with Hardrada killed with an arrow to his windpipe and Tostig slain, the Norwegian army disintegrated and was virtually annihilated.
In the later stages of the battle, the Norwegians were reinforced by troops who had been guarding the ships at Riccall, led by Eystein Orre, Hardrada's prospective son-in-law. Some of his men were said to have collapsed and died of exhaustion upon reaching the battlefield. The remainder were fully armed for battle. Their counter-attack, described in the Norwegian tradition as "Orre's Storm", briefly checked the English advance, but was soon overwhelmed and Orre was slain. The Norwegian army were routed. As given in the Chronicles, pursued by the English army, some of the fleeing Norsemen drowned whilst crossing rivers.
So many died in an area so small that the field was said to have been still whitened with bleached bones 50 years after the battle.
Aftermath.
King Harold accepted a truce with the surviving Norwegians, including Harald's son Olaf and Paul Thorfinnsson, Earl of Orkney. They were allowed to leave after giving pledges not to attack England again. The losses the Norwegians had suffered were so severe that only 24 ships from the fleet of over 300 were needed to carry the survivors away. They withdrew to Orkney, where they spent the winter, and in the spring Olaf returned to Norway. The kingdom was then divided and shared between him and his brother Magnus, whom Harald had left behind to govern in his absence.
Harold's victory was short-lived. Three days after the battle, on 28 September, a second invasion army led by William, Duke of Normandy, landed in Pevensey Bay, Sussex, on the south coast of England. Harold had to immediately turn his troops around and force-march them southwards to intercept the Norman army. Less than three weeks after Stamford Bridge, on 14 October 1066, the English army was decisively defeated and King Harold II fell in action at the Battle of Hastings, beginning the Norman conquest of England, a process facilitated by the heavy losses amongst the English military commanders.
Monuments.
Two monuments to the battle have been erected in and around the village of Stamford Bridge.
Village monument.
The first memorial is located in the village on Main Street (A116). The monument's inscription reads (in both English and Norwegian):
<poem>
THE BATTLE OF STAMFORD BRIDGE
WAS FOUGHT IN THIS NEIGHBOURHOOD
ON SEPTEMBER 25TH, 1066
</poem>
The inscription on the accompanying marble tablet reads:
<poem>
THE BATTLE OF STAMFORD BRIDGE
KING HAROLD OF ENGLAND DEFEATED
HIS BROTHER TOSTIG AND KING
 OF NORWAY HERE ON
25 SEPTEMBER 1066
</poem>
Battlefield monument.
A second monument is located at the battlefield site at the end of Whiterose Drive. This monument consists of a memorial stone and plaque detailing the events and outcome of the battle. The plaque points out that:
This viewpoint overlooks the site of the Battle of Stamford Bridge, fought by King Harold of England against the invading Norse army of Hardrada.


Dinara Division

The Dinara Division () was a Chetnik division that existed during World War II. Organized in 1942 with assistance from Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin and headed by Momčilo Đujić, the division incorporated commanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, northern Dalmatia, and the Lika region. The division was under the control of supreme Chetnik commander Draža Mihailović and received aid from Dimitrije Ljotić, leader of the Serbian Volunteer Corps, and Milan Nedić, head of the Serbian puppet Government of National Salvation.
In late 1944 the division began withdrawing towards Slovenia. Afterwards, it joined Dobroslav Jevđević's Chetniks, Ljotić's Serbian Volunteer Corps, and the remnants of Nedić's Serbian Shock Corps in forming a single unit that was under the command of Odilo Globocnik of the Higher SS and Police Leader in the Adriatic Littoral. In May 1945 Đujić surrendered the division to Allied forces, who took its members to southern Italy, from where they were taken to displaced persons camps in Germany and then dispersed. Đujić emigrated to the United States in 1949. Many members of the Dinara division are believed to have followed him there, while others emigrated to Canada. Đujić lived in the United States until his death in September 1999.
Background.
On 6 April 1941, Axis forces invaded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Poorly equipped and poorly trained, the Royal Yugoslav Army was quickly defeated. After the invasion, the country was dismembered. The extreme Croat nationalist and fascist Ante Pavelić, who had been in exile in Benito Mussolini's Italy, was then appointed "Poglavnik" (leader) of an Ustaše-led Croatian state – the Independent State of Croatia (often called the NDH, from the ). The NDH combined almost all of modern-day Croatia, all of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of modern-day Serbia into an "Italian-German quasi-protectorate." NDH authorities, led by the Ustaše militia, subsequently implemented genocidal policies against the Serb, Jewish and Romani population living within the borders of the new state. Serbs in particular were targeted for incarcerations, massacres, forced emigration, and murder. As a result, two resistance movements emerged – the royalist and Serb Chetniks, led by Colonel Draža Mihailović, and the multi-ethnic, Communist Yugoslav Partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito. Momčilo Đujić, a Serbian Orthodox priest, appointed himself "vojvoda" (commander) of Chetnik forces in northern Dalmatia. Chetnik movement in Croatia was developed among the Serbs of the Kninska Krajina, central Dalmatia and southern Lika region. These Chetnik groups were formed during separation of the Greater Serbian and pro-Chetnik elements which arose from insurgent Serb groups whose actions were against the military and civilian authorities of the NDH and Ustasha repressive measures against the Serb population. Some of the Greater Serbian and the pro-Chetnik groups were under protection of the Italian occupation army and they gradually became part of their service. After the Zagreb agreement between the NDH authorities and the Italian military authorities from the middle of 1942 these Chetnik groups became part of voluntary anti-communist militias (Milizia volontaria anticomunista) where they were properly supplied with weapons, food, and in time of combat activities against the Partisans paid with money and war loot. During March-April 1942 all these Chetnik groups from the Kninska Krajina, northern Dalmatia and southern Lika area will be united to the "Dinara Chetniks Division" and placed under the command of the West Bosnian, Lika-Dalmatian and Herzegovinian military Chetnik detachments where they were even better connected to the movement of Draža Mihailović.
Formation and objectives.
The division was formed in early January 1942 after Đujić was contacted by Mihailović via a courier. Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin played a central role in organizing the units of Chetnik leaders in western Bosnia, Lika, and northern Dalmatia into the Dinara Division and dispatched former Royal Yugoslav Army officers to help. Đujić was designated the commander of the division and its goal was for the "establishment of a Serb national state" in which "an exclusively Orthodox population is to live". According to Đujić: "We were under Draža's command, but we received news and supplies for our struggle from [Dimitrije] Ljotić and [Milan] Nedić. [...] Nedić's couriers reached me in Dinara and mine reached him in Belgrade. He sent me military uniforms for the guardists of the Dinara Chetnik Division; he sent me ten million dinars to obtain for the fighters whatever was needed and whatever could be obtained."
In March 1942 the division prepared a programmatic statement that concerned the "specific conditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, northern Dalmatia, and southwestern Croatia (Lika)." The statement was accepted by commanders of these areas during a conference at Strmica near Knin a month later. The statement echoed the tone of Mihailović's instructions issued in December 1941 to Chetnik commanders Major Đorđije Lašić and Captain Pavle Đurišić in pursuing a Greater Serbia that was to be inhabited solely by Serbs, the establishment of a corridor through the linkage of the territories Herzegovina, northern Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Lika to Slovenia; the mobilization of all Serb nationalists for the ethnic cleansing of other nationalities that existed in Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Lika. It also elaborated on the division's wartime strategy: "collaboration with the Italians on a live-and-let-live principle, determined struggle against Ustaša formations and the Domobrans, as well as against the Partisans; it is task of the Chetnik movement to prevent increasing number of Croats and Muslims who join the Partisan movement and the main focus must be towards "national Croats", though later they can be eliminated; and the formation of separate Croatian Chetnik units for pro-Yugoslav, anti-Partisan Croats." While towards Muslims "should be patient, not to kill them and plunder ie undertake such methods that Muslims really gain belief that military-Chetnik detachments are their friends", in this regard it is concluded "any premature action against the Muslim population would strengthen the Partisans because they have to sit at their houses so that we destroy them in their homes" In the area of the Sassari division according to a report of the Italian 18. Army Corps from 11 August 1942 exist nine Chetnik detachments with total of 12,440 persons under command of Momčilo Đujić, however according to same record only about 2600 persons were armed. While command of 18. Army Corps in mid-September 1942 talks about 4269 people armed with 4197 rifles, 35 light machine guns and 7 machine guns. In order to strengthen the Chetnik positions in the area of the Kninska Krajina and southern Lika at the end of 1942 were transferred about 3,200 Herzegovinian and east Bosnian Chetniks, among whom was and the Zlatibor Chetnik detachment from Serbia which remained there until March 1943. In the late summer of 1944 Dinara Division has about 6500 of Chetniks.
Decline and retreat to the Adriatic Littoral.
During early February 1943, as the Partisans began to prevail over the Chetniks as part of Case White, Đujić and Petar Baćović attempted to mount a counteroffensive around Bosansko Grahovo in western Bosnia preliminary to re-capturing Drvar. This was opposed by the Germans and made no headway. By early August, the Dinara Division was "poorly formed, badly armed and disciplined", lacked accurate rolls of its members, and consisted of no more than 3,000 effectives. Lieutenant Colonel Mladen Žujović, one of Mihailović's few remaining delegates in the area, concluded that the division was "a pure figment of the imagination."
On 21 December 1944, after Đujić requested a written guarantee from Ante Pavelić to afford him and his forces refuge in German-occupied Slovenia, Pavelić ordered the military forces of the Independent State of Croatia to give Đujić's division free passage. However, Đujić went through an alternate route towards the Istrian peninsula, as the routes offered by Pavelić were not secure from Partisan attacks, and killed the Croatian population along the way. When Đujić reached Slovenia, his forces joined Dobroslav Jevđević's Chetniks, Dimitrije Ljotić's Serbian Volunteer Corps, and the remnants of Milan Nedić's Serbian Shock Corps in forming a single unit that was under the command of Odilo Globocnik of the Higher SS and Police Leader in the Adriatic Littoral.
Aftermath.
In May 1945, Đujić surrendered the Dinara division to Allied forces. Its members were then taken to southern Italy. From there, they were taken to displaced persons camps in Germany and then dispersed. After staying in Paris from 1947 to 1949, Đujić emigrated to the United States, where many members of the Dinara division are believed to have followed him. Other members of the division emigrated to Canada and settled there. Đujić lived in the United States until his death in San Diego, California in September 1999.


Battle of Hollandia

The Battle of Hollandia (code-named Operation Reckless) was an engagement between Allies of World War II and Japanese forces during World War II. The majority of the Allied force was provided by the United States, with the bulk of two United States Army infantry divisions being committed on the ground. Air and naval support consisted largely of U.S. assets, although Australia also provided air support during preliminary operations and a naval bombardment force.
The battle took place between 22 April and 6 June 1944 and formed part of the New Guinea campaign. The operation consisted of two landings, one at Tanahmerah Bay and the other at Humboldt Bay, near Hollandia. The landings were undertaken simultaneously with the amphibious invasion of Aitape ("Operation Persecution") to the east. The battle was an unqualified success for the Allied forces, resulting in a withdrawal by the Japanese to a new strategic defense line in the west of New Guinea and the abandonment of all positions in the east of the island.
Background.
Geography and strategic situation.
Hollandia was a port on the north coast of New Guinea, part of the Dutch East Indies, and was the only anchorage between Wewak to the east, and Geelvink Bay to the west. It was occupied by the Japanese during their invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942, who planned to use it as a base for their expansion towards the Australian mandated territories of Papua and New Guinea. Japanese plans to occupy Port Moresby were negated by losses during the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Milne Bay. Consequently, Japanese efforts to develop the area were delayed throughout 1943 and 1944.
Hollandia was situated on the east side of a headland separating Humboldt Bay to the east and Tanahmerah Bay, to the west. The town itself was on the shore of Humboldt Bay, with a first-class anchorage. The headland was formed by the Cyclops Mountains, a mountain ridge rising steeply to and was backed by Lake Sentani, extending east to west. Between the mountain ridge and the lake was a narrow plain where the Japanese had built a number of airfields; three had been constructed by April 1944 and a fourth was under construction. Of these, only one was considered to be complete.
In early 1944, after the Huon Peninsula had been secured, the Allied South West Pacific Command determined that the area should be seized and developed into a staging post for their advance along the north coast of New Guinea into the Dutch East Indies and to the Philippines.
Plans.
Allied intelligence successes led to the decision to land at Hollandia. Intelligence gained from breaking the codes protecting Imperial Japanese Army radio messages led the Allies to learn that the Hollandia area was only lightly defended, with Japanese forces being concentrated in the Madang-Wewak region. In response, on 8 March General Douglas MacArthur sought approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bring forward the previously-planned landings at Hollandia to 15 April. Approval was granted four days later. MacArthur's plan was bold, as it involved making a large amphibious landing deep behind the front lines in New Guinea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed the United States Pacific Fleet to assign aircraft carriers to provide air support for the landings. The attack was designated Operation Reckless in recognition of the risks involved in carrying it out.
MacArthur met with the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, at Brisbane between 25 and 27 March to discuss the role of the Navy in the operation. While MacArthur sought eight days worth of support from the fleet's powerful fleet carriers, Nimitz would only agree to commit this force for two days after the landings. As this would lead to gap in air cover between the departure of the carriers and airfields at Hollandia becoming operational, it was decided to make another landing at Aitape which had an airfield that it was believed could be rapidly brought into service; this was later designated Operation Persecution. Nimitz offered to assign eight small escort carriers to support the landing at Aitape, with these vessels then proceeding to support operations at Hollandia until 11 May. The timing of the landings at Hollandia were moved back to 22 April at around this time due to logistical problems and the Pacific Fleet's other commitments, and it was decided to conduct the landing at Aitape simultaneously with the main assault.
The Japanese high command intended to hold Hollandia. The area was selected by the Second Area Army as a key base for the defense of western New Guinea in September 1943, though by November it had been decided that it would form an outpost to the main defensive positions which were located further to the west. Few combat units were stationed at Hollandia in early 1944. In March General Hatazo Adachi, the commander of the Japanese 18th Army, was ordered by the Second Area Army to withdraw his forces west from the Madang-Hansa Bay area to Hollandia, with one division to be dispatched there immediately. Adachi ignored this order, and instead decided to concentrate his troops at Hansa Bay and Wewak. Adachi's decision may have been motivated by a belief that Hansa Bay would be the target of the next Allied amphibious landing and that he could reinforce Hollandia at a later date. After the chief of staff of the Second Area Army travelled to Wewak to deliver Adachi orders in person, he directed that the 66th Infantry Regiment begin moving from Wewak to Hollandia on 18 April; it was expected that this unit would arrive there in mid-June. Adachi continued to plan to make a last stand at Hollandia if he was defeated at Hansa Bay.
As an attack on Hollandia was not expected, no plans were prepared to defend the area prior to the Allied landing. Because aircraft carriers had not been previously used to support Allied amphibious landings in the South-West Pacific, in early 1944 the Japanese leadership judged that Hollandia was safe from a direct attack as it was beyond the range of the available Allied fighter aircraft. The 18th Army did not plan for the defense of Hollandia, and the Army Air Force and Naval units stationed there had little opportunity to develop plans due to the rapid turnover of their leadership.
Opposing forces.
The port and airfields were the base for units of the Japanese 2nd Army (General Fusatarō Teshima) and the 6th Air Division of the 4th Air Army. These totaled 11,000 men under the command of General Masazumi Inada, Major General Toyozo Kitazono and Rear Admiral Yoshikazu Endo (Ninth Fleet). Only about 500 of the 11,000 personnel were ground combat troops, being drawn from several antiaircraft batteries. These troops were positioned along the Depapre – Lake Sentani trail. A large number of Japanese aircraft were stationed at airfields near Hollandia in March 1944.
Allied planners estimated Japanese forces around Hollandia at around 14,000 troops in total. It proved difficult to accurately estimate the size and composition of the Japanese defenses, as attempts to infiltrate reconnaissance parties in the area failed. As a result, code breaking was the main source of intelligence. During the early stages of the planning process MacArthur's headquarters believed that two Japanese infantry regiments may have been in the Hollandia area, but this was later discounted. It was later thought that 3000 troops from the 6th Sea Detachment were in the area, and reinforcements were being rapidly transferred there.
I Corps under Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger provided most of the ground forces for the combined Operations Reckless and Persecution. The attack force comprised 84,000 personnel, including 52,000 combat troops, 23,000 support personnel, and a naval task force of 200 vessels of 7th Fleet’s Task Force 77 under Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey. Of the total force, 22,500 combat troops were assigned to the landing at Aitape; while the rest (nearly 30,000) were allocated to the Hollandia landings.
The main landings at Hollandia would be made at two locations. The U.S. 24th Division's 19th and 21st Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) were to land at Tanahmerah Bay. The other landing would be made at Humboldt Bay by two RCTs (the 162nd and 186th) of the 41st Division. The operation was the 24th Infantry Division's first combat assignment after home defense duties in Hawaii and training in Australia, but the 41st Infantry Division had previously taken part in the fighting in New Guinea in 1942–1943.
The ground forces would be supported by two naval bombardment forces. Task Force 74, under British Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley, consisted of the cruisers HMAS "Australia" and "Shropshire" plus several destroyers, while Task Force 75 was made up of three U.S. cruisers, "Phoenix", "Nashville" and "Boise" under Rear Admiral Russell Berkey. These were supported by a force of eight escort carriers of the 5th Fleet. Secondary landings would take place Aitape, 125 miles to the east, at the same time as those around Hollandia. The decision to undertake these operations simultaneously stretched Allied shipping and logistics resources, and necessitated reallocating resources from other theaters and roles. The shortage of shipping meant that each ship had to be loaded as efficiently as possible, using a technique known as combat loading to ensure that the most important stores and equipment could be unloaded quickly.
Landings.
Preparations.
Initial operations commenced in the second week of March 1944 with air raids by aircraft of the U.S. 5th Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force attacked Japanese airfields along the New Guinea coast from Wewak to the Vogelkop and on Biak Island. In the final days of March, the Fast Carrier Force (Task Force 58) attacked Japanese airbases on Palau and islands in the Carolines. Meanwhile, on 30 March and continuing to 3 April these air forces attacked Hollandia itself and the airfields on the Sentani plain. Achieving complete surprise, they were able to destroy 340 aircraft on the ground and 60 more aircraft in the air, leaving the 6th Air Division unable to resist the planned invasion. This bombing operation was also the moment in the New Guinea campaign when Japanese air power no longer threatened the Allies. During the same period, American air and naval forces sank many of the Japanese ships which were attempting to transport reinforcements to the Hollandia and Wewak areas; these attacks were guided by intelligence gained from breaking the Japanese codes. The air and naval attacks succeeded in isolating the remaining Japanese forces in New Guinea.
The Allies conducted a deception operation to ensure that the Japanese continued to believe that they would land at Hansa Bay rather than Hollandia. This involved air attacks and naval bombardments on the Wewak area, and faked landings of reconnaissance patrols. This deception effort proved successful.
In response to a request from the head of the US Navy, Admiral Ernest King, the Eastern Fleet conducted a raid on Japanese positions on the island of Sabang in the Indian Ocean ahead of the landings at Hollandia and Aitape. This attack, which was designated Operation Cockpit, aimed to prevent the Japanese from transferring air units stationed near Singapore to New Guinea. The Eastern Fleet's British and American aircraft carriers raided Sabang on 19 April. This operation had no effect on the Japanese, as the air units were being held in reserve for a planned major attack on American naval forces in the Central Pacific.
Assault.
The 41st Division was to stage from Cape Cretin, while the 24th would depart from Goodenough Island. After rehearsals and loading, on 16 to 18 April the amphibious forces sailed from their bases at Finschafen and Goodenough Island; they joined up with other ships carrying troops bound for Aitape from Seeadler Harbour and then rendezvoused with the escort aircraft carriers providing air cover off Manus Island early on 20 April. After taking evasive routes to the west of the Admiralty Islands to avoid air attack, the convoy turned back towards their objective late in the afternoon. The convoy split around offshore, with the Eastern Attack Group, consisting of troops assigned to Operation Persecution turning away for Aitape. They arrived off Hollandia during the night of 21/22 April and about offshore, the convoy split again with the Central Attack Group preceding for Humboldt Bay while the Western Attack Group turned towards Tanahmerah Bay. The landings took place at dawn on 22 April after a supporting naval bombardment at each site. Meanwhile, carrier-borne aircraft attacked targets around Wakde, Sarmi and Hollandia from 21 April, destroying at least 33 Japanese planes in the air and more on the ground.
At Tanahmerah Bay, after a naval bombardment from the three Australian cruisers commencing around 06:00, the two RCTs from the 24th Division disembarked from the four U.S. and Australian transports – "Henry T. Allen", "Carter Hall", "Kanimbla" and "Manoora" – and moved ashore aboard 16 LCIs. Seven LSTs were also assigned. The plan called for the establishment of a two-battalion front, with troops landed in seven waves at two beaches: Red 1 around the Depapre Inlet and Red 2 on the eastern side of the bay. Allied planners believed that the two beaches were connected by a road, and that another road – suitable for vehicle traffic – ran inland towards Lake Sentani. Pre-landing reconnaissance efforts were hampered by the destruction of the Australian scouting party that was landed in the area by submarine in late March, and the reality of the terrain was only discovered through aerial intelligence that arrived too late.
On landing, the U.S. troops came under sporadic small arms and machine gun fire, but this was quickly suppressed. The terrain, however, proved more problematic. Red 2 beach was found to be highly unsuitable and the promised roads were non-existent. Backed by a swamp just 30 yards from the shoreline, and with just one exit trail unsuitable for vehicles, it quickly became congested. Red 1 was found to be better, allowing LVTs and LCMs to come ashore with their infantry charges, but the approaches had to be cleared by engineers to allow the passage of the larger LCMs and even after this had been completed. The beach was narrow, though, and only allowed two LCMs to land at a time, while the even bigger LSTs had to remain offshore where they were cross loaded on to LVTs.
As a result of the terrain difficulties, Tanahmerah Bay was quickly written off as a landing site; while the infantry already ashore pressed on to the Sentani plain the remainder of the 24th Division was diverted to Humboldt Bay, which had by this time been secured. After four days under these conditions the two units had reached the western airfield and on 26 April it was secured.
Meanwhile, at Humboldt Bay Rear Admiral William M. Fechteler's Central Attack Group carrying the U.S. 41st Division also achieved complete surprise, coming ashore at two beaches: White 1, about south of Hollandia, and White 2 on a narrow sandspit near Cape Tjeweri at the entrance to Jautefa Bay, and about from Lake Sentani. White 1 would be the main landing, as it provided the only spot where the larger LSTs could land, while White 2 would be secured with smaller LVTs and DUKWs, which would be used to cross the shallow entrance to Jautefa Bay. The three supporting U.S. cruisers and destroyers began their bombardment around 06:00, concentrating on targets around the entrance to Jautefa Bay and Hollandia. This bombardment was augmented with air strikes from carrier-borne aircraft, while two destroyer-minesweepers, "Long" and "Hogan", swept the bay ahead of the main landing force.
Three transports were assigned to the operation, "Westralia", "Gunston Hall" and "Ganymede". Eight waves landed at White 1 after two LCIs fired rockets at the high ground overlooking the beach where several Japanese antiaircraft guns were located. Over the course of an hour, this feature, dubbed Pancake Hill, was captured with only minimal opposition. The large majority of the defending Japanese troops there had uncharacteristically abandoned their positions and fled inland. One company landed on White 2 and secured Cape Tjeweri, after which a group of 18 LVTs crossed the sandspit to land two more companies near Pim inside Jautefa Bay.
Seven LSTs and the Australian transport "Westralia" were unloaded over the shore at White 1, landing 4,200 tonnes of combat supplies and over 300 vehicles on the first day. The beach quickly became congested, as it had also been the center of a Japanese supply dump prior to the assault, and engineers had to work to clear the area with bulldozers and construct a roadway to the beach's only exit. A fire caused by Allied bombing continued to burn in the Japanese supply dump for several days and later attracted the attention of a Japanese bomber, which attacked the beach area late on 23 April, resulting in more fires and killing 24 and wounding 100 more. This attack also destroyed 60 percent of all rations and ammunition that had been landed, and resulted in shortages amongst the infantry advancing towards the airfields. On 24 April, the beach became more congested with the arrival of scheduled reinforcements and further equipment, as well as two transports and seven LSTs carrying troops, including the corps commander and his headquarters, which had been diverted from Tanahmerah Bay. To ease the congestion on White 1, 11 LSTs were landed off White 2, while engineers from the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade worked to clear the beach, shifting stores and equipment into Jautefa Bay.
Meanwhile, the infantry continued their advance inland. By the end of the day on 23 April the 186th Infantry were about halfway to Lake Sentani, while those from the 162nd had secured Hollandia and were securing the high ground around their objective, winkling out isolated pockets of resistance with aerial support. There was little resistance initially, but further inland there was some opposition as elements of the 186th Infantry reached the lake by 24 April. Engineers operating amphtracs pushed forward from Jautefa Bay to the lake to carry the infantry around the Japanese positions at the lake, completing their flanking maneuver on 25 April. By 26 April, U.S. troops secured the two eastern airfields, and later that day linked up with forces advancing from the 24th Division advancing from Tanahmerah Bay. The fires around White 1 continued until 27 April when the engineers were released to return to the beach. The stores situation in the forward area grew more urgent as the supply line up the single road broke down. Aerial resupply brought some relief, and on 30 April a group of 12 LCTs, towed by several LSTs, arrived at Humboldt Bay. The situation was not fully resolved until 3 May when transport aircraft began landing on an airstrip that was hastily built by an engineer aviation battalion at Tami.
According to historian Stanley Kirby, the collapse of Japanese resistance was due to a lack of preparedness, changes in the command structure and a lack of combat troops; many of the 11,000 men based there were administrative and support units. None of the senior officers present had been in post more than a few weeks and the senior air officer had been relieved following the destruction of his air forces at the beginning of April. Neither Kitazono nor Endo had been able to prepare a comprehensive defensive plan, and in any event had neither the men nor the resources to carry it out. On the other hand, the Allied operation had been over-insured; concerns over the strength of the Japanese garrison had left the Allies with a four to one advantage in the event. Historian Edward J. Drea attributed the success of the operation largely to MacArthur's bold decision to exploit intelligence gained through code breaking, and judged it was "MacArthur's finest hour in World War II and ULTRA's single greatest contribution to the general's Pacific strategy". Stephen R. Taaffe reached a similar conclusion.
Aftermath.
Japanese casualties amounted to 3,300 killed and 600 wounded in combat; a further 1,146 were killed or died in the area up to 27 September 1944. A total of 7,200 Japanese troops assembled at Genjem and then attempted to withdraw overland to Sarmi; only around 1,000 reached their destination. Allied casualties amounted to 157 killed and 1,057 wounded. U.S. forces undertook mopping up operations in the area until 6 June.
Operation Reckless was an unqualified success, as were the landings around Aitape under the guise of Operation Persecution. The loss of Hollandia made the Japanese strategic defense line at Wakde, to the west, and all Japanese positions to the east untenable. Japanese forces to the west were reconfigured to form a defense line through Biak and Manokwari, while the Japanese 18th Army, still in defensive positions around Wewak, to the east, were faced with a long retreat west through the jungle having been ordered to bypass Hollandia and Aitape and reinforce the 2nd Army in western New Guinea. This plan was eventually reversed in favor of a counterattack on U.S. forces around Aitape.
Meanwhile, the Allies quickly made the Sentani airfields operational and were able to mount bombing raids on Japanese positions as far west as Biak, making them useless for air operations. The landings at Hollandia and Aitape were followed just four weeks later by landings at Wakde, Sarmi and Toem, to the west. In mid-July, the Japanese launched their counterattack with around 20,000 troops, resulting in heavy fighting further inland during the Battle of Driniumor River. Both Humboldt and Tanahmerah were developed with naval base, ammunition, repair and fuel facilities. The facilities in the area were designated Base G. Several higher headquarters were moved to the area, including those of the Sixth Army, Eighth Army, Fifth Air Force, and Seventh Fleet. Base G played an important role as a staging area for subsequent operations in New Guinea and the Philippines.


Stone Boat Yard

W. F. Stone & Son or Stone Boat Yard was a small wooden shipbuilding company in Alameda, California. To support the World War 2 demand for ships W. F. Stone & Son built tugboats, sub chasers and minesweepers. For World War 1 the shipyard, then called W. F. Stone & Son at Kennedy and Bocimer Streets, built tugboats for postwar work in 1921. The shipyard was opened in 1853 by William F. Stone (W. F. Stone), from Dartmouth, England, at the Hunter's Point in San Francisco Bay, near the current Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. In 1892 William Stone's son, Frank, ran the company and moved the shipyard to Tiburon. In 1899 he moved the shipyard again to Harbor View, San Francisco. In 1911, he again moved to Diesel Way, in Oakland, near Union Point Park on the Tidal Canal. When Lester Stone, Frank's son, became a partner, the company was changed to W. F. Stone & Son. In 1923, Frank Stone died, Lester Stone continued the company. In 1942 the company moved again, to 2517 Blanding Ave, Alameda on the south side of the Tidal Canal. In 1970 Lester Stone retired and sold the shipyard to John Whitset. Whitset, who did not rename the company, the company went into bankruptcy in 1986. It came out of bankruptcy and was sold to Bill and Grace Bodle. Bodle sold the company in 2000 to David Olson. The shipyard closed in 2004. For most of its history, the shipyard built a large variety of schooners, fishing boats, cargo ships, tugboats, sailboats, racing and recreational yachts.
Notable ships.
Notable ships include:
World War 2.
World War 2 ships built for the US Navy:


List of North African Campaign battles

This is a listing of World War II battles occurring during the North African Campaign and is sometimes known as the "Desert War". This includes the campaigns in Egypt and Libya (often referred to as the Western Desert campaign or the "Egypt-Libya Campaign") and those campaigns in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (usually referred to as the Tunisia campaign. This is not a comprehensive list of all engagements and generally does not cover isolated skirmishes of units smaller than a company in size.
This is part of the more comprehensive List of World War II Battles.


Shanghai Expeditionary Army

The was a corps-level ad hoc Japanese army in the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The Shanghai Expeditionary Army was first raised on February 25, 1932 as a reinforcement for Japanese forces involved during the First Battle of Shanghai. It was dissolved in June 1932, after the conclusion of that incident. Ethnic Chinese soldiers from the Taiwan Army were part of this army, and they were led by Iwane Matsui.
The Shanghai Expeditionary Army was raised a second time on August 15, 1937 on the eruption of full scale hostilities between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China. Its forces participated in the Second Battle of Shanghai, and the subsequent drive inland to the Battle of Nanking. Troops from this army were also involved in the subsequent Nanjing Massacre.
The Shanghai Expeditionary Army was disbanded on February 1, 1938, and its component units were incorporated into the Japanese Central China Area Army.
Organization 1932.
"See:" Order of Battle January 28 Incident
Organization 1937-1938.
"See:" Order of battle of the Battle of Shanghai


Operation Berlin (Atlantic)

Operation Berlin was a successful commerce raid performed by the German battleships and between January and March 1941. The commander-in-chief of the operation was Admiral Günther Lütjens, who subsequently commanded the famous cruise of and .
The two ships aborted the operation in December 1940, but finally sailed from Kiel on 22 January 1941. They were spotted "en route" through the Great Belt and the British Admiralty was informed. Admiral Sir John Tovey sailed with a strong force (three battleships, eight cruisers and 11 destroyers), hoping to intercept the German ships in the Iceland—Faroe Islands Passage. Instead, Lütjens took his flotilla through the Denmark Strait into the Atlantic, where they were positioned to intercept convoys between Canada and Britain.
Convoy HX 106 was intercepted, but the attack was aborted when the escorting battleship was spotted. Lütjens had orders to avoid action with enemy capital ships. The British failed to make an accurate identification of the German battleships.
After refuelling, the German ships missed convoy HX 111, but happened upon an empty convoy returning to the U.S. Over 12 hours, five ships were sunk but the attack was reported. The squadron moved south to the Azores to intercept the convoy route between West Africa and Britain.
A convoy was sighted but, once again, was not attacked due to the presence of the battleship . Instead, "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" shadowed it, acting to guide in U-boat attacks.
The two ships moved back to the western Atlantic, sinking a solitary freighter "en route". Two unescorted convoys were attacked and 16 ships were sunk or captured. One of these ships—"Chilean Reefer"—caused problems. It made smoke, radioed an accurate position and returned "Gneisenau"s fire with its small deck gun. Lütjens, uncertain of the freighter's capabilities, withdrew and destroyed it from a safe distance. During this action, appeared, possibly in response to the radio calls. The German ships bluffed their way to safety while "Rodney" picked up survivors.
The German ships were ordered back to Brest. They met air and sea escorts on 21 March and docked the next day.
In total, they had sailed nearly in 60 days and destroyed or captured 22 ships. They were supported by supply ships and the tankers , "Ermland", "Schlettstadt", "Friedrich Breme" and .


Central Defense Command

Central Defense Command (CDC) was a command formation of the United States Army during World War II. The CDC was established on 17 March 1941, responsible for coordinating the defense of the Midwest region of the United States. A second major responsibility of CDC was the training of soldiers prior to their deployment overseas. The first Commanding General (CG) of CDC was Lieutenant General Ben Lear, who continued on in command of the U.S. Second Army. CDC headquarters was co-located with the existing Second Army headquarters in Memphis. CDC's operational region covered the states of Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
One of the main responsibilities of CDC was guarding the Sault Ste. Marie locks and the St. Marys River waterway, which connect Lake Superior with Lake Huron. During the waterway's usable season from March through November, 90 percent of the United States' iron ore production for domestic use passed through it in 1939. A battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment, stationed at nearby Fort Brady, provided security beginning just after the outbreak of the European war in September 1939; this was reduced to a company in mid-1940 and replaced by a military police battalion in May 1941. After Pearl Harbor in December 1941, fear of possible air or paratroop attacks by German forces led to a major expansion of defense measures. Scenarios envisioned included U-boats in Hudson Bay launching attack aircraft, and one-way bombing or paratroop missions along a great circle route from German-occupied Norway. Units deployed included the 131st Infantry Regiment, the 100th Coast Artillery (Anti-aircraft) Regiment (Colored), and a barrage balloon battalion for a total in mid-1942 of 7,000 troops in the area. Canada provided an anti-aircraft battalion, elements of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and a warning system of 266 aircraft observation posts of the Aircraft Identity Corps extending northward to Hudson Bay. This was augmented by five US-manned radar stations in northern Ontario. Canada also hosted 2,000 of the US troops defending the area. Given the vast ground defenses, surprisingly no interceptor aircraft were provided. Three emergency landing fields were designated in the area for use by potential air reinforcements, however. By late 1943, with no threat emerging and spare components stockpiled in the event of lock damage, the US forces were cut to 2,500 troops, and the AA and air warning defenses were abandoned. In January 1944 the garrison was further reduced to a single military police battalion.
On 15 January 1944 Central Defense Command was merged into Eastern Defense Command.
Commanders.
The following men served as Commanding General, Central Defense Command: