Convoy ONS 5

ONS 5 was the 5th of the numbered ONS series of Slow trade convoys Outbound from the British Isles to North America. The North Atlantic battle surrounding it in May 1943 is regarded as the turning point of the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II.
The battle ebbed and flowed over a period of a week, and involved more than 50 Allied ships and their escorts, and over 30 U-boats. It saw heavy losses on both sides.
However it was almost the last Allied convoy to do so, while losses inflicted on attacking U-boats and U-boat groups became a besetting feature of the campaign;
As such it is seen as the point when the tactical and strategic advantage passed to the Allies, and ushered in the period known to Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" as Black May.
Background.
ONS 5 consisted of 43 ships bound from Liverpool to Halifax. The ships were either in ballast or carrying trade and export goods.
The convoy departed Liverpool on 21 April 1943, and would arrive in Halifax three weeks later on 12 May.
It was under the command of JK Brook RNR as Convoy Commodore, traveling in the Norwegian freighter "Rena".
The escort was provided by Mid-Ocean Escort Force group B7, 7 warships under Captain Peter Gretton, in the destroyer "Duncan". Also in the group were the destroyer "Vidette", frigate "Tay", and corvettes "Sunflower", "Snowflake"," Loosestrife", and "Pink". The group also contained 2 trawlers, "Northern Gem" and "Northern Spray" as rescue ships, and the fleet oiler "British Lady" for mid-ocean re-fuelling. The convoy was joined by other escort vessels as the battle progressed.
ONS 5 was just one of the allied convoys at sea at the end of April; also in the Western Approaches were ON 180, just leaving, and HX 234, just arriving.
Approaching the Americas were ONS 4 and ON 179; departing was SC 128, while in mid-Atlantic, due to pass ONS 5 east of Greenland, was SC 127. Two other east-bound convoys, HX 235 and HX 236, were also in mid-Atlantic, following a southerly route.
This accounted for over 350 ships on the move in the north Atlantic at that time.
Ranged against them were 58 U-boats in 3 patrol lines; "Specht" (Woodpecker) with 17 boats south of Greenland on the western side of the Air Gap; "Meise" (Bluetit) with 30 boats east of Greenland covering the northern route, and" Amsel" (Blackbird) with 11 boats, south of" Meise" covering the southern route.
"Meise" had been deployed to catch SC 127, which had been identified by B-Dienst, but on 26 April SC 127 had slipped through a gap in the line and escaped undetected. Realizing what had happened on 27 April, and aware that a slow west-bound convoy was imminent,
"Meise" was re-configured; the easternmost boats (16 in all) formed the patrol line "Star" (Starling) to intercept it.
At 8am on 28 April "U-650" sighted ONS 5, and group "Star" quickly gathered for the attack.
Ships involved.
ONS 5 comprised 42 ships and 16 escorts, (though not all were present at the same time); 13 ships were lost in the course of the 7 day engagement.
Wolfpacks "Star" and "Finke" comprised 43 U-boats (though again, not all had been in contact throughout); 6 of these were lost.
Action.
Merchant ships departing Liverpool on 21 April 1943 were met by Escort Group B7 at 1400 on the 22nd; and the convoy formed up in high winds and a heavy sea. At 2200, the Polish freighter "Modlin" had to turn back with engine trouble. Station-keeping for the remaining ships became increasingly difficult as weather worsened on the 23rd.
24 April.
At 1655 on the 24th, in a moderate gale, Flying Fortress C of 206 Squadron RAF from Benbecula, dropped six depth charges on the swirl of a diving U-boat. Fortress D found on the surface less than an hour later and sank it with depth charges as the U-boat attempted to fight back rather than submerge. "U-710" was just ahead of the convoy, though probably unaware of its proximity.
25–27 April.
Freighters "Bornholm" and "Berkel" collided on the evening of the 25th as a moderate west-northwest gale reduced convoy speed to two or three knots. "Bornholm" began taking on water and left the convoy on the 26th attempting to reach Iceland. "Vidette" joined the convoy with three merchant ships from Iceland on the 26th while rescue trawler "Northern Spray" was standing by the straggling freighter "Penhale" until the straggler was ordered into Reykjavík so the trawler could rejoin the convoy. At noon on the 26th, BdU changed the Enigma machine cypher being used to transmit instructions to the U-boats. Allied intelligence services were unable to decrypt message traffic until the afternoon of 5 May. The weather moderated enough for "Duncan", "Vidette" and "Loosestrife" to refuel from the escort oiler "British Lady" on the 27th and a salvage tug from Iceland rescued "Bornholm" that evening.
Battle of 28–29 April.
On the 28th ONS 5 arrived at the "Star" patrol area, and was sighted at 0900 by "U-650". "U-650" held contact despite being forced to dive three times to avoid approaching aircraft at 1014, 1150 and 1518. By nightfall "U-650" had been joined by "U-375", "U-386", "U-528" and "U-537". The U-boats' contact reports alerted Commander Gretton to the presence of U-boats on the convoy's port bow, beam, and quarter and astern. "Duncan" and "Tay" made an unsuccessful depth charge attack after sighting a U-boat on the port bow at 1830.
Gretton mounted a vigorous defence as the U-boats attacked after dark. At 2000 "Sunflower" detected a radar contact at ; and upon closing lost the radar contact, gained a doubtful ASDIC contact, and dropped two depth charges. At 2245 "Duncan" detected a radar contact at ; and upon closing lost the radar contact, gained an ASDIC contact at , lost contact at , and dropped one depth charge. Upon returning to station "Duncan" detected a radar contact at ; and upon closing sighted a U-boat which dived at , and appeared on ASDIC at . "Duncan" dropped a pattern of ten depth charges; and, while turning for another attack, gained another radar contact. The radar contact disappeared at a range of . "Duncan" made no ASDIC contact, but dropped a single depth charge at the estimated diving position before making another radar contact at . As "Duncan" closed, the U-boat dived at a range of . "Duncan" gained a good ASDIC contact and dropped a pattern of ten depth charges over a visible wake. Two more depth charges were dropped when a weak ASDIC contact was regained at 0045. At 0132 "Snowflake" approached a hydrophone contact, and "U-532" was detected visually and on radar at a range of . "U-532" launched six torpedoes. The closest one missed "Snowflake" by about . After "U-532" dived, "Snowflake" dropped three depth charges on the initial ASDIC contact and ten depth charges when contact was regained at . "Snowflake" regained ASDIC contact at and dropped another pattern of ten depth charges. A short time later "Tay" dropped depth charges on a good ASDIC contact astern of the convoy. "U-532" returned to base to repair depth charge damage. "U-386" and "U-528", were also damaged by these attacks and forced to return to base. "U-386" arrived safely at St Nazaire on 11 May, but "U-528" was attacked in the Bay of Biscay and sunk by aircraft on the same day.
"U-258" and "U-650" maintained contact through the night, and "U-258" was submerged ahead on the convoy at dawn on the 29th. As the convoy passed overhead at 0530, "U-258" rose to periscope depth and launched two torpedoes at "McKeesport". After one torpedo hit "McKeesport" on the starboard bow, "Northern Gem" detected "U-258" and dropped three depth charges. "Snowflake" dropped a single depth charge on a doubtful SONAR contact at 0605 and two more depth charges at 0615 after contact was regained at a range of . "McKeesport" was abandoned and sunk by the escort to prevent discovery of classified documents by German boarders. "Northern Gem" rescued all but one of the crew. "U-258" had also been damaged, and was forced to return to base. The Admiralty arranged reinforcements for ONS 5 in response to this battle. HMS "Oribi" was detached from SC127, and destroyers "Penn", "Panther", "Impulsive", and "Offa", of the 3rd Support Group under Capt. J.M. McCoy, RN, sailed from Newfoundland. Weather rapidly deteriorated, and the convoy was sailing into a full gale by late afternoon of the 29th. About 1700 "Sunflower" was struck by a wave which filled the crow's nest with water. "Oribi" was slowed to 11 knots by the storm, but joined the convoy at 2300 as "Tay" was attacking a U-boat astern. At 2312 "Duncan" obtained an ASDIC contact at ; and both "Duncan" and "Snowflake" dropped depth charges to discourage the U-boats.
30 April.
ONS 5 found itself making less than 3 knots headway into a Force 10 gale. The convoy started to be scattered, some ships ending up 30 miles from the convoy, and the escorts were kept busy rounding up stragglers. "Oribi" was able to refuel from the convoy oiler when the storm abated briefly on the 30th before the weather again made re-fuelling impossible, and a number of the destroyers became so low on fuel as to throw doubt on whether they could continue. At 2305 "Snowflake" made a radar contact at and dropped a single depth charge after the U-boat dived when illuminated by star shell. The escorts dropped some random depth charges until dawn, and Admiral Dönitz cancelled the chase on the evening of 1 May.
Regrouping 1–3 May.
On 1 May Dönitz ordered boats from "Star" and "Specht", with some newcomers to form a new patrol line to the west. This was group" Finke" (Finch) which was in place on 3 May numbering 27 boats, and tasked with intercepting westbound convoy SC128. The 3rd Support Group destroyers joined the convoy at 0100 2 May, but the fuel situation aboard destroyers became increasingly desperate as weather and frequent course adjustments to avoid icebergs prevented refueling. At 1400 on the 3rd Gretton was forced to take "Duncan" to St John's at economical speed (8 knots); and he arrived there with only 4 percent fuel remaining. In Gretton's absence, command was assumed by Lt-Cdr RE Sherwood, of HMS "Tay". The SONAR set aboard "Tay" failed just as Sherwood assumed command of the escort group. "Impulsive" also detached to Iceland at 1900 3 May, with "Northern Gem" carrying the survivors from "McKeesport", while "Penn" and "Panther" detached for Newfoundland at 0600 4 May.
4 May.
By 4 May the weather had abated to Force 6, and ONS 5 was now making up to 6 knots, though reduced to 30 ships and 7 escorts.
The rest were scattered and proceeding independently, including a group of four with "Pink", trailing some 80 miles behind the main body. The 1st Support Group sailed from Newfoundland at midday with frigates "Wear", "Jed", "Spey" and sloops "Pelican" and "Sennen" to replace "Oribi" and "Offa" whose fuel state would become critical on the 5th. "U-628" of group "Finke", assembled to catch convoy SC 128, sighted convoy ONS 5 at 2018. Two of the gathering group "Finke" U-boats were attacked by RCAF Cansos in separate incidents. One thought to have been "U-630" was sunk; but is now believed to have been "U-209", which was damaged in an attack by Canso W, and foundered later while attempting to return to base. The other, "U-438", was only slightly damaged in attacks by Canso E.
At 2220 "Vidette" detected "U-514" on radar at and approached until "U-514" dived when the range dropped to . "Vidette" punished "U-514" with a pattern of 14 depth charges causing damage putting "U-514" out of the battle until 7 May. "North Britain" was straggling astern of the convoy, and sank within two minutes of being torpedoed by "U-707" at 2237. "Vidette" detected "U-662" on radar at and, upon closing, sighted "U-732" at . The conning tower was still visible at a range of ; and a pattern of 14 depth charges dropped by eye caused damage requiring "U-732" to return to base.
5 May.
"U-264" and "U-628" each launched five torpedoes shortly after midnight. "Harbury" was hit at 0046; "Harperly" was hit by two torpedoes at 0104; and "West Maximus" was hit by one torpedo at 0103, another at 0110, and a third at 0135. Both U-boats claimed three ships; but modern historians credit the first freighter to "U-628" and the other two to "U-264". One of the torpedoes passed within of "Snowflake". At 0122 "Snowflake" started closing a radar contact illuminated by star shells fired by "Oribi"; and both ships dropped depth charges. The gunfire encouraged "U-264" to dive, and the depth charges forced "U-270" to return to base. "U-358" torpedoed "Bristol City" at 0225, and "Wentworth" at 0230. At dawn, "Lorient" was missing from the convoy. No witnesses to her destruction survived the battle. Before "U-125" was sunk, she sent a radio report about sinking a steamship sailing independently; and modern historians assume "Lorient" straggled from the convoy and was torpedoed by "U-125".
"Northern Spray" picked up 143 survivors from "North Britain", "Harbury", "Harperly", and "West Maximus" by 0700 and was detached to take the rescued men to Newfoundland. "Loosestrife" assumed the role of rescue ship and picked up the survivors from "Bristol City" and "Wentworth". At 1057 "Oribi" sighted a surfaced U-boat at . "U-223", "U-231", "U-621", and "U-634" dived as "Oribi" approached. "Oribi" dropped 14 depth charges after the U-boats dived. "U-638" torpedoed "Dolius" at 1240. "Sunflower" gained an ASDIC contact at within minutes and destroyed "U-638" with a pattern of ten depth charges before rescuing survivors from "Dolius". "Tay", "Oribi", and "Offa" refueled from convoy oilers that afternoon. "Selvistan", "Gharinda", and "Bonde" were hit by a salvo of four torpedoes from "U-266" within the space of a few minutes about 1950. "Selvistan" and "Bonde" sank within two minutes. "Tay" rescued survivors from the three ships while "Offa" made depth charge attacks damaging "U-266", which was sunk by aircraft on 15 May while attempting to reach base for repairs.
At midday, "Pink" commanded by Lieutenant Atkinson made a firm ASDIC contact ahead of her small convoy proceeding separately. "Pink" spent 90 minutes making five depth charge and hedgehog attacks. "Pink" received post-war credit for destruction of "U-192"; but later analysis concluded the victim, "U-358", returned to base after being damaged. "U-584" torpedoed "West Makadet" while "Pink" was attacking "U-358". "Pink" rescued the survivors.
Night of 5–6 May.
As May 5 faded into darkness, "Tay" counted seven U-boats surfaced in the convoy's path; but ONS 5 was entering the fog formed where the warm Gulf Stream meets the cold Labrador Current off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. Visibility dropped to by 2202 and to by 0100. British centimetric radar enabled the escorts to see while the U-boats could not. Many of the U-boats involved never returned to base to file their reports; so historians still struggle to correlate individual reports of the dozens of ships interacting briefly in no fewer than 24 attempted attacks on the night of 5/6 May.
At 2309 "Vidette" made a radar contact at , and a second appeared while closing the first. "Vidette" dropped a pattern of ten depth charges on a submarine seen submerging ahead, and then moved on to drop a pattern of five depth charges on the second contact which became visible at . Historians suggest the first attack destroyed "U-531".
At 0030 "Loosestrife" made a radar contact at . The U-boat turned away when the range reached and fired two torpedoes at "Loosestrife" from its stern tubes while diving. "Loosestrife" dropped a pattern of ten depth charges as it overran the diving U-boat. A reported slick of oil and debris is believed to have been produced by destruction of "U-192".
At 0252 "Oribi" collided with "U-125" first seen at a range of while investigating an ASDIC contact, but lost contact after the collision. While pursuing an ASDIC contact, "Snowflake" detected "U-125" on radar at 0354, observed heavy conning tower damage by searchlight at a range of , and watched the crew detonate scuttling charges and abandon ship. The escorts chose to continue protective patrolling around the convoy rather than attempting rescue of the U-boat crew assumed to have sunk the "Lorient".
At 0406 "Vidette" made an ASDIC contact at , and made a hedgehog attack causing two explosions. Historians suggest this attack destroyed "U-630".
At 0443 "Sunflower" made an ASDIC contact at and subsequently sighted a surfacing U-boat. "Sunflower" rammed "U-533" and dropped two depth charges as "U-533" attempted to dive. Both "Loosestrife" and "U-533" were able to repair damage and remain at sea.
At 0552 "Pelican" was leading the 1st Support Group to reinforce the convoy escort when it detected a radar contact at . "Pelican" made visual contact at , dropped a pattern of ten depth charges where the U-boat dived, and dropped a second pattern of nine depth charges after regaining contact. Historians suggest these attacks destroyed "U-438".
"Finke" had already outlasted its usefulness, and faced mounting losses if the attack continued. Realizing his mistake, Dönitz called off the assault on 6 May and ordered "Finke" to retire.
Conclusion.
In the course of a week, ONS 5 had been the subject of attacks by a force of over 40 U-boats.
With the loss of 13 ships totalling 63,000 tons, the escorts had inflicted the loss of 6 U-boats, and serious damage on 7 more.
This battle demonstrated that the convoy escorts had mastered the art of convoy protection; the weapons and expertise at their disposal meant that henceforth they would be able not only to protect their charges and repel attack, but also to inflict significant losses on the attacker.
ONS 5 marked the turning point in the battle of the Atlantic. Following this action, the Allies inflicted a series of defeats and heavy losses on the U-boat Arm, a period known as Black May. This culminated in Dönitz withdrawing his forces from the North Atlantic arena.
The official historian, Stephen Roskill commented:
"This seven day battle, fought against thirty U-boats, is marked only by latitude and longitude, and has no name by which it will be remembered; but it was, in its own way, as decisive as Quiberon Bay or the Nile."


Mediterranean Theater of Operations

The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army (MTOUSA), originally called the North African Theater of Operations (NATOUSA), was the American term for the theater of operations covering North Africa and Italy during World War II. American operations in the theater began with the Allied Expeditionary Force, which landed on the beaches of northwest Africa on November 8, 1942, in Operation Torch. They ended in the Italian Alps some 31 months later with the German surrender in May 1945.
Command structure.
The operational command of the MTO USA was a combined U.S.–British operational command called Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ), which planned and directed ground, air, and naval operations and military government activities in the North African and Mediterranean theatres of operations. It was created on September 12, 1942 to launch a combined U.S.–British operation against the northern and northwestern coast of North Africa. In February 1943 the authority of AFHQ was extended to include the British Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Bernard L. Montgomery, which, having advanced westwards after the Second Battle of El Alamein, was approaching the border of Tunisia where the American, British and French forces serving in the British First Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Kenneth A. N. Anderson, had been fighting the campaign in Tunisia.
Initially AFHQ was located in London, England from September until November 1942. It relocated to Algiers in Algeria in November 1942 and remained there until July 1944. From Algiers it moved to Caserta in Italy until April 1945. Its last relocation was to Leghorn (Livorno), Italy between April 1945 until April 1947.
The initial Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Allied (Expeditionary) Force, was General Dwight D. Eisenhower. General Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander, had the ultimate responsibility. The British General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander was Deputy C-in-C, and was responsible for the detailed planning and preparation, and the actual conduct, of combat operations. In effect, Alexander was the ground commander.
Shortly after the establishment of the headquarters, expeditionary was deleted from its title for reasons of operational security. Having overseen the campaign in Tunisia, the invasion of Sicily and the invasion of Italy and the early stages of the Italian Campaign, Eisenhower left AFHQ and returned to England in late 1943 to assume command of the forces assembling for Operation Overlord, codename for the Allied landings in Northern France. He was succeeded at AFHQ by Field Marshal Sir Henry M. Wilson. Wilson's title became Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and the American Forces then came under Lt. Gen Jacob L. Devers, who had been Commanding General, ETO since May 1943. As such Wilson exercised strategic control over the campaign in Italy. He strongly advocated the invasion of Germany via the Danube plain (instead of Operation Dragoon, codename for the Allied invasion of Southern France), but this did not take place as the Allied Armies in Italy (AAI) were constantly weakened to support other theaters of war. Wilson was in command for just under a year, until he was sent to Washington in December 1944 as head of the British Joint Staff Mission. Wilson was succeeded by Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander who was Supreme Commander and commander of AFHQ until the end of the war.
For administrative purposes, U.S. components were responsible to Headquarters North African Theater of Operations, United States Army (NATOUSA), from February 14, 1943 (NATOUSA redesignated Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army, MTOUSA, October 26, 1944). The British components were responsible to General Headquarters Central Mediterranean Forces (CMF), from October 1, 1945.
Termination.
Headquarters MTOUSA and General Headquarters CMF formally separated from AFHQ on October 1, 1945, leaving AFHQ to consist of a small interallied staff responsible for combined command liquidation activities and commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir William D. Morgan as Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean. AFHQ was abolished, effective September 17, 1947, by General Order 24, AFHQ, September 16, 1947. The Deputy Theater Commander in 1946 and '47, and Commanding General, US Army, MTO, was Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee.


Operation Bullseye

Operation Bullseye was the code-name of the first Special Operations Executive (SOE) mission to Yugoslavia since its occupation by the Axis forces. It was led by Capt D.T. Bill Hudson with the objective to discover what was happening in Yugoslavia and co-ordinate all forces of resistance there. The mission also included three Royal Yugoslav Army (RYA) officers from Montenegro: Maj Mirko Lalatović, Maj Zaharije Ostojić and Sgt Veljko Dragićević the wireless transmitter (W/T) operator. The group boarded the submarine HMS Triumph in Malta and reached Petrovac on the Montenegrin coast on 20th Sep 1941.
Background, logistics and the first contacts.
The quick and intense Axis Blitzkrieg Operation Punishment in April 1941 had caught Yugoslav government and the army unprepared. Within a fortnight, the army had capitulated, King Peter II and the Royal Government left for exile in London together with the SOE agents posted in the country. Disjointed snippets of news of uprisings, resistance and civilian suffering were reaching both British and Yugoslav Government-in-Exile (YGE) who realised that they needed a more comprehensive picture and had arranged for a direct mission to the region. Col S.W. (Bill) Bailey, Head of the SOE Balkan section, instructed Hudson to contact all resistance, regardless of national, religious or political belief.
Given the pressures of the North African campaign, lack of available aircraft and distance from the Egyptian airfields, it was decided that the infiltration would be done by a submarine. Julian Amery, an SOE agent and the son of L.S. Amery, then Secretary of State for India, stated that it was his father's intercession that made a submarine available.
Capt Hudson was a 31 year-old consultant mining engineer who had lived in Serbia for several years before the war. He was fluent in the language and had valuable experience of conditions there. Maj Lalatović was a Royal Yugoslav Air Force (RYAF) officer who had flown with a squadron of planes from Nikšić (Montenegro) via Greece to Cairo in April 1941. Maj Ostojić was on the General Staff of the RYA who escorted Prince Paul to Greece in April 1941 and then travelled onto Cairo.
Once disembarked, the party were picked up by local partisans and taken to Radovče north of Podgorica. Using one of the two available radio sets, they reported to the SOE W/T station in Malta on 26 Sep 1941 that they were met by a local band, led by Arso Jovanović and 'professor' Milovan Djilas. On 9 Oct 1941 Hudson received a signal from Cairo (via Malta) to move to Suvobor in Western Serbia and deliver safe ciphers to Col Draža Mihailović and his Chetnik movement who had been sending un-encrypted radio messages. It was at this time that the two different approaches to resistance and its timelines between the communist partisans and nationalist chetniks became apparent. On 13 Oct 1941 Lalatović and Ostojić sent the message to Malta (in French):
Three days later, Hudson, on his way to Serbia, sent the following telegram:
Locating local resistance leaders and attempts at reconciliation.
The mission was accompanied by Jovanović and Mitar Bakić - another senior Montenegrin communist, and via partisan held territories in Sandžak and Western Morava valley reached Užice around 25 Oct 1941 where they met partisan leadership including Josip Broz Tito, their commander-in-chief. Shortly afterwards Hudson moved to Mihailović's HQ at the village of Brajići near Suvobor. His host was aware of his reports favourable of Montenegrin partisans and threatened to break off relations in case Hudson intended to go to Užice again.
In Brajići, Hudson was a bystander during the talks between Mihailović and Tito, and had realised that the two cannot reconcile easily. Mihailović, encouraged by the reports of Ostojić and Lalatović that he had the official backing of the YGE, and promise of British aid, demanded the partisans submit to his command. He also believed in biding his time until his movement was strong enough to destroy the communists, resist the Germans without the fear of reprisals or the Anglo-American allies had invaded the region. Tito, on the other hand, demanded an immediate fight against the occupiers, no subordination but common operational activities with chetniks or at the worst - their promise that they would leave partisans alone in their war against the Germans. The talks failed.
On 29 Oct 1941 Mihailović sent a telegram asking for help "while the weather is good" so he could form an army corps "in a short time" and gave the impression that an offensive against the Germans was imminent. At the same time, spurred by his advisers, especially the two new arrivals, he instigated chetnik attacks on partisans near Užice on 2 Nov 1941. One week later, on 9 Nov 1941, he received the first British aid sortie from Malta.
Fearing the escalation of conflict between the two groups, and worried that the military aid would be used to fight partisans rather than the Germans, on 13 Nov 1941 Hudson asked for it to be suspended unless Mihailović attempted to incorporate all anti-fascist elements under his command. He volunteered to go to Užice to assist and asked the British Government to influence partisan leadership to work under Mihailović's command via Radio Moscow message which was broadcast shortly afterwards.
On 20 Nov 1941 Hudson was present at chetnik-partisan negotiations in Čačak, reporting that "partisans are stronger" and have "no confidence in Yugoslav officers who were responsible for the collapse". He also stated that Mihailović would "first liquidate partisans with British arms, before turning seriously to the Germans". Shortly afterwards, he left Mihailović's HQ to visit Tito at Užice, just as the Germans had attacked the city in Operation Užice on 29 Nov 1941. He followed partisans' withdrawal via Zlatibor mountain range, all the way to Uvac and then decided to return to Mihailović at Ravna Gora on 8 Dec 1941. His host, who reported him missing to London on 1 Dec 1941 was about to withdraw towards Montenegro. He refused to see Hudson and denied him the use of radio communications, finally leaving him behind as a lone fugitive in peasant clothes.
Cut off from the outside world, Hudson made his way to southern Serbia and spent the following four winter months in Ivanjica surviving mainly on potatoes and fully dependent on local population. Worried about his fate, in Feb 1942, the SOE organised Operation Hydra, led by Maj Terence Atherton to discover what had become of him. Sadly, Atherton was killed two months later, and it was Hudson who ended up investigating his "rescuer's" murder instead.
Rapprochement with Mihailović.
Around the same time, in Apr 1942, Mihailović contacted Hudson and asked him to join his HQ in Sandžak. Hudson accepted and traveled mainly in Italian run lorries. London was informed of his survival, promoted him to the rank of Major and awarded him the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in Jun 1942. The following few months, Hudson spent inspecting local chetnik units and reported on their commanders' frequent collaboration with the Italian occupiers.
In Aug 1942, Lieut Lofts and two British W/T operators arrived in order to provide more regular and secure communications with Cairo and London. This enabled both Mihailović and Hudson to make their cases separately. The former ignored questions about partisans' strength and locations and refused to take sabotage action on the Belgrade-Niš railway while trying to conceal his collaboration with the Italians while the latter was preparing the 'tell all' report.
In early Sep 1942, Hudson reported:
Even after the direct appeal by General Harold Alexander (Commander-in-chief of the Middle East Command) to sabotage Axis communications, Mihailović refused to act. Finally, after living in the country for over a year, on 15 Nov 1942, Hudson sent a considered summary on the situation:
Mission expansion.
In addition to enhanced communication channels, towards the end of 1942, the SOE sent a high ranking official (Head of SOE Balkan section) Col S.W. (Bill) Bailey to co-ordinate all SOE activities in the region (including Albania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) and report on the military value of chetnik movement as a whole. He was also to persuade Mihailović to undertake active sabotage, study his political intentions and propose how British policy of creating a united resistance front could be implemented.
Similar to Hudson, Bailey was a mining engineer with pre-war experience in Yugoslavia. In early 1942, he was on a mission to the USA and Canada, together with Capt William Stuart from the SIS (who later became co-chief of Operation Typical and was killed during German bombardment of Tito's HQ in May 1943), trying to recruit Yugoslav ex-pats for potential engagement in the Balkans. Many of the recruits already had military experience in the Spanish Civil War, and were sent to Britain, and later to Cairo for further training.
Bailey parachuted to Mihailović's HQ at Gornje Lipovo (Montenegro) on 25 Dec 1942. One of his tasks was to improve the relations with Mihailović by informing him of events outside the country (esp. in North Africa) and how these had largely been responsible for the meagre flow of aid so far. He was also to convince Mihailović to fit into the overall Allied strategy of being regional communications centre should the Allies be forced to evacuate the Middle East. In his earliest communications, Bailey concurred with Hudson's opinion on the impossibility of reconciling Mihailović and the partisans or his collaboration with anti-Axis groups in Croatia, who were not under his command. He also reported that about 4,000 professed communists led by Tito had proclaimed an 'independent republic' at Bihać, supported by another 10,000 fighters who could potentially switch their support to Mihailović later. Given the irreconcilability of the two groups, Bailey proposed partisans move to Croatia, leaving all Serbian-majority areas to Mihailović's command. That way the two armies should have little to fight over and would focus on fighting the Axis instead. He warned that Mihailović would accept the loss of British support in pursuit of the liquidation of partisans in Serbian territory. The Foreign Office realised that the plan could lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia after the war, and it was never put in action.
Overall, early reports indicated that Bailey got off to a good start with Mihailović, who agreed to receive British sub-missions to his regional commands, such as Mission Greenwood-Rootham in Eastern Serbia, and pass agents onto other countries. It turned out that Hudson's standing with Mihailović was much better than he had anticipated. Unfortunately, Bailey's inability to pause BBC broadcasts praising the partisan resistance, or to increase the supply drops (affected by the lack of serviceable long-range aircraft and poor weather) meant that the relationship began to deteriorate quickly.
Finally, at a christening in Lipovo, on 28th Feb 1943, Mihailović made a speech highly critical of "perfidious Albion", requiring the Serbs to fight to the last, without adequate aid, his only source of supply being the Italian occupiers. He stated that his main enemies were the "partisans, Ustashas, Muslims and Croats - in that order" - and only when he had dealt with them, he would turn his attention to the Germans and the Italians. Bailey reacted on the spot and later reported the content of the speech to London which caused a major furore between the British Government, YGE and Mihailović whose list of priorities was in reverse order of what was expected. This led to a near-complete breakdown of the relationship between the British mission and Mihailović.
Switching the support.
In Mar 1943, as the Axis troops and their collaborators pushed partisan forces from Bihać in North-west Bosnia to Herzegovina in the south, Mihailović left his HQ to take direct command, and spent the next few weeks in Kalinovik, Konjic and Foča. On 6 Apr 1943, Bailey reported that chetniks were openly collaborating with the Italians in Foča area and that Mihailović had refused all access to the British mission.
Around the same time, the Axis defeat at Stalingrad and North Africa, made the collaboration with resistance groups in the Balkans more important. British PM Winston Churchill had obtained ten Halifax bombers to add to the four Liberators and ease the delivery of military aid and in Apr 1943 sub-missions with Mihailović's commanders throughout Serbia were established. On 27 May 1943, Operation Typical, the first dedicated mission to partisans' HQ was dropped at the height of a large German offensive Operation Schwarz which aimed to destroy them. Both missions by now had American (OSS) representatives, Bailey's had Capt Mansfield, and Deakin's had Lieut M.O. Benson.
Over the next few months, the situation remained complex. Mihailović continued to collaborate with the Italians and remained focused on fighting the partisans. His troops refrained from attacking the Axis for fear of reprisals and he was still unhappy about the lack of British aid. Partisans, on the other hand, continued to fight Germans, Italians, Ustashe, Chetniks and others, while professing their commitment to the Soviet cause. The British government then decided to back both sides with equal support, sending a senior officer to each HQ, Brigadier Charles Armstrong to Mihailović and Brig Fitzroy Maclean to Tito.
The two brigadiers arrived at the time of Italian surrender and saw the two armies' behaviour in its aftermath. At Berane, place of Venezia Division's HQ, its commander General Oxilia agreed with Mihailović's representative and Bailey to come over to Allies' cause together with his troops and arms. Tito's 2nd Proletarian Division, led by Peko Dapčević, arrived shortly afterwards and persuaded Oxilia to join the partisan side instead. This was seen as a great loss of reputation, arms and territory by Mihailović.
Armstrong was present on 5 Oct 1943 when Mihailović's troops overtook the German garrison in Višegrad allowing Maj Archie Jack to blow up a large railway bridge nearby. Together with blowing up of four railway bridges at Mokra Gora this was the first significant and overt anti-German action by Mihailović's troops since the beginning of the war, although in Bosnia rather than Serbia as originally planned. BBC broadcast attributed successes of Mokra Gora and Višegrad raids to partisans, further angering Mihailović, who returned to his previous priorities of fighting partisans and ignoring the occupiers and the British Liaison Officers (BLOs).
On 8 Nov 1943, the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met King Peter II and the new Yugoslav PM Purić and told them that the British intended to ask Mihailović to carry out certain specific military operations and that a failure to accede to this request would stop British aid. The task was to destroy railway bridges in the Ibar and Morava valleys. Mihailović had agreed, but the request was withdrawn at the last moment. At the same time Churchill had access to intercepted highly secretive German messages and thus knew that the partisans continually resisted and fought. On 10 Dec 1943, he declared that he wanted Mihailović removed by the end of the year. Two months later, on 25 Feb 1944, he sent a message to Tito informing him that the British missions were being withdrawn from Mihailović.
The withdrawal.
As ordered, both Bailey and Hudson left Mihailović's HQ for Cairo via Bari. Bailey travelled via Mihailović's sympathisers to the coast and was evacuated on 14/15 Feb 1944, Hudson who travelled via partisan's town of Berane left on 28 Mar 1944. Their withdrawal from the region meant the end of Operation Bullseye after two and a half years.
Sgt Veljko Dragićević, who had offered to stay with the Montenegrin partisans in Sep 1941, had been persuaded not to do so. His hosts were worried that his officers would think that they had brainwashed him. Instead, he joined them two months later and eventually became a Communications Chief at the Supreme Headquarters. Sadly, both he and his wife were killed during the Operation Rösselsprung, the German raid on the town of Drvar on 25 May 1944.


Battle of Vinjesvingen

The Battle of Vinjesvingen was a battle of the Norwegian Campaign and took place in May 1940 in the Telemark county, Norway. It became one of the two last strongholds of Norwegian resistance in southern Norway during World War II, the other being Hegra Fortress.
Background.
Under the command of Second Lieutenant Thor O. Hannevig, the Norwegians held their position against superior German forces until 5 May 1940. Hannevig managed to sneak great loads of arms, equipment and fuel from depots right in front of the German forces. The equipment was brought to Vinje and Vågsli in Telemark, where Hannevig established a unit which came to be known as Telemark Infantry Regiment. This included Krag-Jørgensen bolt action rifles, Madsen light machine guns, Colt M/29 heavy machine guns, mortars as well as mines and explosives to destroy bridges and roads. The plan was to prevent German advance westward through Telemark and Setesdal, and to support Allied reinforcements from the west.
Battle.
A full mobilization was carried out in the area, and at most the force totaled around 300 men, but the number changed constantly. Several small battles were fought, mostly involving Norwegian ambushes on advancing German formations, using small arms and IEDs. The Norwegian defenders often destroyed and/or damaged bridges and roads in the area to delay the German advance.
The main battle took place from 3–5 May. Large German forces were eventually deployed to the area, and the German losses were considerable. When it was realized that the entire south of Norway was lost, and that the Allied Åndalsnes task force would not break through from the west, Hannevig initiated negotiations for surrender. The battles of Vinjesvingen had a great symbolic effect during the occupation, and provided a moral boost to a rather depressing occupation. It was however not known to the rest of the country while the battles were fought.


Battle of Hopton Heath

The Battle of Hopton Heath was a battle of the First English Civil War, fought on Sunday 19 March 1643 between Parliamentarian forces led by Sir John Gell, 1st Baronet and Sir William Brereton and a Royalist force under Spencer Compton, 2nd Earl of Northampton.
Background.
On 6 March 1643, Sir John Gell successfully captured the town of Lichfield in Staffordshire. Gell then decided that he would attack the Royalist stronghold at Stafford which protected the Royalist's supply route between the ports of Yorkshire and their capital at Oxford. To capture such a garrison, however, Gell would need reinforcements and therefore he arranged to meet and combine forces with the cavalry of Cheshire commander Sir William Brereton. The two Parliamentary leaders decided to meet at Hopton Heath on the 19th of the month. Meanwhile King Charles had sent an expeditionary force under the command of the Earl of Northampton on a mission to take control of the West Midlands and Staffordshire. Northampton had joined forces with Royalist allies led by Henry Hastings at Tamworth and on 18 March they arrived at Stafford.
Battle.
On the morning of 19 March, Gell arrived at Hopton Heath. The Royalist forces became aware of the presence of the Parliamentarians mid-morning and shortly thereafter they began their preparations to advance to Hopton Heath. At 14:00 hours, Brereton arrived at the heath. The Parliamentarians took a position along a ridge on the northeast side of the field. In total, the Parliamentarian forces consisted of 1400 men including 700 infantry, 300 dragoons, and 400 cavalry.
At 15:00 hours, the Royalists arrived and deployed in battle formation to the south of the Parliamentarians. Their combined forces consisted of 1200 men including 300 dragoons and 800 cavalry. Hastings led the initial attack with his dragoons and was successful at pushing the Parliamentarians back at the edges. An exchange of artillery fire began with the Royalists doing the most harm with their large 29-pounder known as "Roaring Meg."
Northampton then led two cavalry charges aimed at the Parliamentarian's centre. Each time his attack was repulsed. On the second charge, Northampton was thrown from his horse into the Parliamentarian line where he was killed after refusing quarter. The Royalists regrouped and Sir Thomas Byron led a third charge against the Parliamentarians, but to no avail. Hastings tried to rally the Royalists for a fourth charge, but their energy was spent. At that time Brereton led a Parliamentarian infantry attack and pushed the Royalists back recapturing some of the field and artillery that had earlier been lost.
At dusk the fighting ended and the Parliamentarians left the field. The battle was over, not to be resumed. Brereton returned to his headquarters in Cheshire and Gell left for Derby abandoning the attempt to capture Stafford. Because of the nature of the cavalry charges against a Parliamentary force composed largely of infantry, the casualties were heavily one-sided; the Parliamentarians had 500 casualties as compared to 50 killed or wounded Royalists.
Aftermath.
After the battle, both sides claimed victory. The Parliamentarians believed they had won in that they held the field at the end of the day and had killed the Royalist's commander, the Earl of Northampton. The Royalists believed that they had won the battle in that they reoccupied the field the next morning and had captured eight artillery pieces.
With respect to the control of Staffordshire, Stafford was now free of Parliamentarian threat. Henry Hastings and the Royalists immediately tried to retake Lichfield and its strongly defended Close on 21 March, but failed. Two weeks later, Prince Rupert entered Lichfield and surrounded the Close. On 21 April Colonel Russell and the Parliamentarian garrison surrendered. Lichfield would then remain a Royalist stronghold for the duration of the Civil War.


United States Navy Argus Units

The United States Navy created the Argus Training program during the first stages of World War II in the Pacific. The Argus program was strategically designed to train and deploy elite amphibious combat teams able to land in potentially hostile territory and rapidly deploy radar and radio communications equipment, thus paving the way for the beginnings of effective land based fighter aircraft direction. This coordinated fighter direction allowed for interception and prevention of enemy air and surface attacks on allied Pacific bases. The name Argus, referring to a mythological Greek being with 100 eyes, was chosen to symbolize the 'all-seeing' radar of the Argus Units.
History.
In October 1942, five officers arrived at the Advance Base Depot, Port Hueneme, California with orders to assist in setting up the Argus Training program and to serve overseas in the first Argus Unit. By January 1943, the Argus training program was shaping up and included classes covering radar plots on polar coordinate charts, operation of radios, the study of 588, 270 and ASE radars as well as other functions all of which were either at Warehouse "I" or at outposts. The first commanding officer, Lt.Comdr. Ralph A. Jack A-V(RS) and other administrative officers were stationed at Port Hueneme.
On April 23, 1943, Argus Unit 1, consisting of 20 officers and 94 enlisted, shipped out of Port Hueneme for combat duty in the South Pacific. Lt.Comdr. Jack accompanied the unit as commanding officer. Lt.Comdr. Andrew Cowan took his place as commanding officer of the Argus Assembly and Training Detachment.
Training.
On December 12, 1943, Commander Arthur H. Cummings succeeded Lt.Comdr. Cowan as Commanding Officer as the Argus Training detachment moved to spacious new quarters near Point Mugu. The former schedule of producing four Argus Units per month (which inevitably resulted in inadequate training) was reduced to one unit per month, and a new training syllabus was worked out assuring units were far more competent the earlier ones. Improved radar, radio and other gear were obtained for the units by CNO (Op-30-E) under the sponsorship of Commander M.J. West and the future for Argus operations assumed a broader role than ever before.
Under the new syllabus, training of enlarged units (21 officers and 220 men) went through three stages:
Deployment.
At the completion of the training syllabus the units were ready for combat duty overseas, being a close-knit combat unit, skilled in all Argus functions, self-sufficient and with high morale. These three stages of training simulate the stages in the conquest of a Pacific island - assault, development and occupation.
Assault.
As assaults opened against occupied islands, a task force consisting of carriers, battleships or cruisers and destroyers would strike first, firing on enemy defenses and attacking with available carrier-borne aircraft. Ships bearing a United States Marines amphibious strike force would send strike force troops ashore by landing craft. Fighter Director Officers aboard destroyers close at sea were tasked with directing allied aircraft to intercept and repel any enemy air forces that may have been alerted to the invading strike force. Once a foothold had been established on the island, a selected section of the Argus Unit, known as the first echelon, would deploy ashore carrying radios, portable radars and the basics of necessary equipment. These first elements of the Argus Units would take over parts of the fighter direction role from the destroyers at sea and become the chief component in detecting and warning of approaching enemy air and surface attacks. As the invading force's position gained strength and became secure against counter-offensive attacks from any enemy forces still present, the assault stage transitioned to the development stage.
Development.
In the island development stage, a Navy ACORN unit, composed of a Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees) and other components, construct an airfield. Simultaneously, the remainder of the Argus Unit moved in in waves, setting up the long range 270 radars, the fighter direction 527 radar and surface search radars (such as SO-7M). These remaining Argus personnel are also responsible for erecting the Combat Information Center, the radio tent and telephone lines and for establishing a liaison with Air Command, anti-aircraft batteries, searchlight batteries, PT Boat squadrons, crash boats and other relevant commands. Fighter direction and air warning roles were supplied for the base by the Argus Unit while continuous contact was maintained with other Argus Units and surface forces in the immediate area.
Occupation.
As the island transitioned to an occupation stage, the Army Air Corps assumed control of the airfield and set up permanent airfield and air warning facilities. The Argus Unit returned to a staging point for rest and replacements.


South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command

The South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command is a former United States Army Air Forces unit. It was organized in 1942 to ferry aircraft and transport personnel and equipment from the Caribbean to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, European Theater of Operations, China-Burma-India Theater and for delivery of lend lease aircraft to the Soviet Union. It also transported critical material from South America. The wing commander also served as the United States Army theater commander for South America. After V-E Day, the wing became responsible for the return of aircraft and personnel to the United States. It was inactivated in 1946 as operations in the South Atlantic decreased.
History.
Origins.
The origins of the wing date to January 1942, when Air Corps Ferrying Command informally organized sectors under its Foreign Division to provide control officers at various points on its overseas routes for ferrying aircraft. It established a sector at West Palm Beach, Florida on 23 January. The West Palm Beach Sector was formally established on 14 February and renamed the South Atlantic Sector in April. However, the relationship between the sector headquarters and the control officers at the stations along the routes in its area of responsibility remained unclear.
In the spring of 1942, a reorganization of the Foreign Wing contemplated the addition of regularly scheduled airlift service to the ferrying mission of the sector, accompanied by a transition of scheduled service from airline to military personnel. The new, expanded organizations would also be responsible for the service and maintenance of aircraft, communications and flight supervision at stations under their control. This plan was implemented in June 1942, with the South Atlantic Sector split between the 27th Wing at West Palm Beach and the 24th Army Air Forces Ferrying Wing, which was activated at Georgetown, British Guiana on 26 June 1942. Within a few days, the Ferrying Command had become Air Transport Command (ATC) and the wing, the South Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command.
Prior to the entry of either the United States or Brazil into World War II, in January 1941, negotiations began for American use of airfields for military use in northern Brazil. These negotiations were carried out by Pan American Airways through its subsidiary Panair do Brasil, to give them the appearance of being for commercial airfields. Panair proposed improvements to a number of airports in northern Brazil, which would include construction of facilities to support commercial use of the fields, but which could be easily converted to military use. The Brazilian government agreed to these improvements in July 1941. Development of the fields by Panair continued through May 1942, when the United States and Brazil entered into an agreement permitting the United States to construct defense installations in Brazil and to use existing Brazilian military installations. All installations would be Brazilian military bases.
Operations.
Initial operations.
The wing's original area of responsibility extended from Trinidad in the Caribbean to Ascension Island in the middle of the Atlantic. However, the wing's boundary with the Caribbean Wing, Air Transport Command was adjusted to coincide with the boundary of the Antilles Air Command. Atkinson Field in British Guinea and Waller Field on Trinidad were transferred to Caribbean Wing and headquarters soon moved to Parnamirim Field, near Natal, Brazil. At the same time, the United States Army Forces in South America was established and the wing commander also assumed the duties of a theater commander. The wing's South Atlantic route was used for ferrying and transport to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, European Theater of Operations, China-Burma-India Theater and for delivery of lend lease aircraft to the Soviet Union.
Initial scheduled service on the wing's routes included Douglas DC-3 service by Pan American and Eastern Air Lines to Natal (originating in Miami) and Boeing 307 Stratoliner service by Transcontinental and Western Air between Washington, D.C. and Cairo. Pan American Air Ferries, also was using the route to deliver aircraft to the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the Middle East. RAF aircraft were also ferried by military crews, as were North American B-25 Mitchells and Douglas A-20 Havocs for the Soviet Union, although as the war progressed, the Alaskan route was preferred for Soviet aircraft. The first large scale movement of American aircraft along the wing's route was the flight of the 98th Bombardment Group in July. The 98th's heavy bombers were able to cross the Atlantic non stop, so the first use of the new Wideawake Field on Ascension Island was by the Mitchells of the 12th Bombardment Group. Much of the wing's efforts in 1942 were directed at the reinforcement of Ninth Air Force.
During 1942, however, the scheduled services were not functioning well. Large backups of materiel and mail were occurring along the wing's routes, especially at Natal. The main reason was a lack of transport aircraft. As the wing began operations, only four Consolidated B-24D Liberators, two Statocruisers and four Pan American Clippers were available to move supplies to Africa from Natal. The South Atlantic route was given the highest priority for heavy transport aircraft. American Airlines began to operate the first Douglas C-54 Skymasters from Miami to Natal, and Consolidated C-87 Liberator Express aircraft began to join the fleet, and 26 aircraft were in use on the transatlantic segment by the end of the year.
Operation Torch.
In the preparation for Operation Torch, the wing participated in the movement of five groups of light and medium bombers to provide immediate reinforcement after the amphibious landings in North Africa. Reinforcements for Twelfth Air Force also ferried their planes via the South Atlantic Wing's routes. As winter weather set in, light and medium bombers destined for England were encountering severe problems navigating the North Atlantic Ferry Route and were diverted to the South Atlantic. By December, the North Atlantic route was also closed to heavy bombers, so reinforcements for Eighth Air Force also ferried their planes via the South Atlantic Wing's routes. By February 1943, facilities were available at Dakar, Senegal so that heavy bombers could fly there directly from Natal, cutting two or three stops off their route. By the spring of 1943, the North Atlantic route was again opened for bombers.
Expanded operations.
The spring of 1943 saw the first movement of fighter aircraft through the wing's routes, as five groups of Lockheed P-38 Lightnings were ferried to fighter and photographic reconnaissance units. Although the North Atlantic Route remained open to a limited extent in winter of the war's following years, most aircraft were diverted to the South Atlantic during this period of adverse weather. Unit moves along the wing's routes continued into 1944, but ferrying operations shifted more toward the movement of individual replacement aircraft movements as the war progressed.
Not all traffic was eastbound. Ferry pilots returned after making their deliveries, and a few "war weary" planes were also returned. However, the largest segment of passenger traffic westbound was aeromedical evacuation of wounded soldiers. No planes were dedicated to this mission, and evacuation got off to a slow start in early 1943. The wing was also responsible for the air transport of certain strategic materials, whose scarcity and need justified rapid transportation. In particular beryl, a mineral used in the manufacture of delicate instruments, and tantalite, used in radio and radar sets, were both transported from Brazil. Special alloys from the Belgian Congo and rotenone from South America were transported through the wing's routes. In the early days of the wing, rubber was also carried on otherwise empty planes returning to the States.
The wing was originally established with its personnel assigned to two groups, whose squadrons were spread among the bases operated by the wing. However, the wing's manpower requirements varied from base to base, depending on the size and nature of its operations. In October 1943, the wing's remaining group was inactivated and the wing began manning by "exact manning tables." Under this system, manning requirements were measured on a functional basis and rather than being assigned to a group or squadron, personnel were assigned directly to a numbered station. Army Air Force Base Units replaced the numbered stations in 1944.
in July 1944, the expanded activity of the wing led to it becoming the South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command. However, when Air Transport Command was able to secure landing rights in the Azores later in 1944, a shorter route middle Atlantic became available between North America and Africa that permitted four engine and some twin engine planes to bypass of the wing's area of responsibility en route to Africa and eastbound activity on the division's routes began to lessen.
White and Green Projects.
The Air Staff outlined a general plan for redeployment of forces from the European and Mediterranean Theaters to the United States in September 1944. This plan was named the White Project. Planes being redeployed were flown by their combat crews with a few passengers on board, but under the control of ATC. While most planes would return via the North Atlantic route or the new Central Atlantic route, plans called for 25 bombers a day to come under the control of the South Atlantic Wing on their return flights. The flow of aircraft to the theaters ended in April 1945. A month later, on 20 May, the first bombers took off for the United States. Return of heavy bombers was essentially completed in July, while movement of twin-engine planes continued into August. Some 2,282 planes passed through the wing's control with a final contingent of B-17s finally returning in September. Although the White Project was directed at repositioning aircraft and their crews, over 33,000 passengers were able to hitch rides on returning aircraft.
The War Department directed ATC to prepare for the Green Project in April 1945. This project called for the transportation of 50,000 passengers a month from Europe to the United States. 40% of these passengers would return via the South Atlantic route. To assist the division, it was augmented by the 460th Bombardment Group, plus additional individuals who had formerly been assigned to combat units. The withdrawal of Fourth Fleet from the Atlantic made former Navy facilities at Belem and Natal available to the division for housing troops. C-47s from four troop carrier groups were made available for transporting troops from Natal. Their pilots were assigned individually, but the division found that they required additional training before assigning them to the project. Inbound traffic from Dakar to Natal was mostly C-54s, while flights from Natal to Atkinson Field were in C-47s or Curtiss C-46 Commandos flown by Eastern Airlines contract pilots. By August, shipping in the Atlantic had become available to transport most troops back to the United States, and Project Green, which was programmed to last until April 1946, was terminated on 10 September 1945.
Inactivation.
With the completion of the White and Green Projects, the South Atlantic Division once more became a wing in September 1945, and it was assigned to the Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command. Three of its stations in Brazil ended operations the following month, and by January 1946, the wing operated only a single station in Brazil, plus Ascension Island. The wing was inactivated at the end of June and its remaining units assigned directly to the Atlantic Division.


Battle of Pinkie

The Battle of Pinkie, also known as the Battle of Pinkie Cleugh, took place on 10 September 1547 on the banks of the River Esk near Musselburgh, Scotland. The last pitched battle between Scotland and England before the Union of the Crowns, it was part of the conflict known as the Rough Wooing and is considered to have been the first modern battle in the British Isles. It was a catastrophic defeat for Scotland, where it became known as "Black Saturday". A highly detailed and illustrated English account of the battle and campaign authored by an eyewitness William Patten was published in London as propaganda four months after the battle.
Background.
In the last years of his reign, King Henry VIII of England tried to secure an alliance with Scotland by the marriage of the infant Mary, Queen of Scots, to his young son, the future Edward VI. When diplomacy failed, and Scotland was on the point of an alliance with France, he launched a war against Scotland that has become known as the Rough Wooing. The war also had a religious aspect; some Scots opposed an alliance that would bring religious Reformation on English terms. During the battle, the Scots taunted the English soldiers as "loons" (persons of no consequence), "tykes" and "heretics". The Earl of Angus, who is said to have arrived with monks "the professors of the Gospel", the heavy pikemen of the Lowlands, eight thousand strong, was in the lead.
When Henry VIII died in 1547, Edward Seymour, maternal uncle of Edward VI, became Lord Protector and Duke of Somerset, with (initially) unchallenged power. He continued the policy of seeking forcible alliance with Scotland by demanding both the marriage of Mary to Edward, and the imposition of an Anglican Reformation on the Scottish Church. Early in September, he led a well-equipped army into Scotland, supported by a large fleet. The Earl of Arran, Scottish Regent at the time, was forewarned by letters from Adam Otterburn, his representative in London, who had observed English war preparations. Otterburn may have seen the leather horse armour designed and made by the workshop of the Italian artist Nicholas Bellin of Modena at Greenwich.
Campaign.
Somerset's army was partly composed of the traditional county levies, summoned by Commissions of Array and armed with longbow and bill as they had been at the Battle of Flodden, thirty years before. However, Somerset also had several hundred German mercenary arquebusiers, a large and well-appointed artillery train, and 6,000 cavalry, including a contingent of Spanish and Italian mounted arquebusiers under Don Pedro de Gamboa. The cavalry were commanded by Lord Grey of Wilton, as High Marshal of the Army, and the infantry by the Earl of Warwick, Lord Dacre of Gillesland, and Somerset himself. William Patten, an officer of the English army, recorded its numbers as 16,800 fighting men and 1,400 "pioneers" or labourers.
Somerset advanced along the east coast of Scotland to maintain contact with his fleet and thereby keep in supply. Scottish Border Reivers harassed his troops but could impose no major check to their advance. Far to the west, a diversionary English invasion of 5000 men was led by Thomas Wharton and the Scottish dissident Earl of Lennox. On 8 September they took Castlemilk in Annandale and burnt Annan after a bitter struggle to capture its fortified church.
To oppose the English south of Edinburgh, the Earl of Arran had raised a large army, consisting mainly of pikemen with contingents of Highland archers. Arran also had large numbers of guns, but these were apparently not as mobile or as well-served as Somerset's. Arran had his artillery refurbished in August, after the siege of St Andrews Castle, with new gunstocks made from woods of "Aberdagy" and Inverleith. The Lord Treasurer's account describes this work as preparation "against the feild of Pynkie Cleuch."
His cavalry consisted of only 2,000 lightly equipped riders under the Earl of Home, most of whom were potentially unreliable Borderers. His infantry and pikemen were commanded by the Earl of Angus, the Earl of Huntly and Arran himself. According to Huntly, the Scottish army numbered 22,000 or 23,000 men, while an English source claimed that it comprised 36,000.
Arran occupied the slopes on the west bank of the River Esk to bar Somerset's progress. The Firth of Forth was on his left flank, and a large bog protected his right. Some fortifications were constructed in which cannon and arquebuses were mounted. Some guns pointed out into the Forth to keep English warships at a distance.
Prelude.
On 9 September part of Somerset's army occupied Falside Hill (Falside Castle put up a slight resistance), east of Arran's main position. In an outdated chivalric gesture, the Earl of Home led 1,500 horsemen close to the English encampment and challenged an equal number of English cavalry to fight. With Somerset's reluctant approval, Lord Grey accepted the challenge and engaged the Scots with 1,000 heavily armoured men-at-arms and 500 lighter demi-lancers. The Scottish horsemen were badly cut up and were pursued west for . This action cost Arran most of his cavalry. The Scots lost around 800 men in the skirmish. Lord Home was badly wounded, and his sons were taken hostage.
Later during the day, Somerset sent a detachment with guns to occupy the Inveresk Slopes, which overlooked the Scottish position. During the night, Somerset received two more anachronistic challenges from Arran. One request was for Somerset and Arran to settle the dispute by single combat; another was for 20 champions from each side to decide the matter. Somerset rejected both proposals.
Battle.
On the morning of Saturday, 10 September, Somerset advanced his army, seeking to position his artillery at Inveresk. In response Arran moved his army across the Esk by the "Roman bridge", and advanced rapidly to meet him. Arran may have seen movement in the English lines and assumed that the English were trying to retreat to their ships. Arran knew himself to be outmatched in artillery and therefore tried to force close combat before the English artillery could be deployed.
Arran's left wing came under fire from English ships offshore. Their advance meant that the guns at their former position could no longer protect them. They were thrown into disorder and pushed into Arran's own division in the centre.
On the other flank, Somerset threw in his cavalry to delay the Scots' advance. The English cavalry was at a disadvantage, as they had left their horses' body armour at the camp. The Scottish pikemen drove them off, inflicting heavy casualties. Lord Grey himself was wounded by a pike thrust through his throat and into his mouth. At one point, Scottish pikemen surrounded Sir Andrew Flammack, the bearer of the King's Standard. He was rescued by Sir Ralph Coppinger, and managed to hold onto the standard, despite its staff breaking.
The Scottish army was by now stalled and under heavy fire on three sides, from the ships, land artillery, arquebusiers, and archers, to which they had no reply. When they broke, the English cavalry rejoined the battle following a vanguard of 300 experienced soldiers under the command of Sir John Luttrell. Many of the retreating Scots were slaughtered or drowned as they tried to swim the fast-flowing Esk or cross the bogs.
The English eye-witness William Patten described the slaughter inflicted on the Scots;
The Imperial ambassador's accounts of the battle.
The Imperial ambassador François van der Delft went to the court of Edward VI at Oatlands Palace to hear the news of the battle from William Paget. Van der Delft wrote to the Queen Dowager, Mary of Hungary, with his version of the news on 19 September. He described the cavalry skirmish on the day before the battle. He had heard that on the day of the battle, when the English army encountered the Scottish formation, the Scots advance horsemen dismounted and crossed their lances, which they used like pikes standing in close formation. Van der Delft was told that the Earl of Warwick then attempted to attack the Scots from behind using smoking fires as a diversion. When they engaged the Scottish rearguard the Scots took flight, apparently following some who already had an understanding with the Protector Somerset. The rest of the Scots army then attempted to flee the field.
Van der Delft wrote a shorter description for Prince Philip on 21 October. In this account he lays emphasis on the Scots attempting to change position. He said the Scots crossed the brook in order to occupy two hills which flanked both armies. The Scottish army, "without any need whatever were seized with panic and began to fly". Another letter with derivative news of the battle was sent by John Hooper in Switzerland to the Reformer Henry Bullinger. Hooper mentions that Scots had to abandon their artillery due to the archers commanded by the Earl of Warwick, and when the Scots changed position the sun was in their eyes. He was told there were 15,000 Scottish casualties and 2,000 prisoners. There were 17,000 English in the field and 30,000 Scots. Hooper's letter is undated but he includes the false early report that Mary of Guise surrendered in person to Somerset after the battle. These newsletters, though compiled and written by non-combatants days after the battle and far from the battlefield, are nevertheless important sources for the historian and for reconstruction of the events, to compare with Patten's narrative and archaeological evidence from the field.
Aftermath.
Although they had suffered a resounding defeat, the Scottish government refused to come to terms. The infant Queen Mary was smuggled out of the country to France to be betrothed to the young Dauphin of France, Francis. Somerset occupied several Scottish strongholds and large parts of the Lowlands and Borders but, without peace, these garrisons became a useless drain on the Treasury.
Analysis.
Although the Scots blamed traitors for the defeat, it may be fairer to say that a Renaissance army defeated a medieval army. Henry VIII had taken steps towards creating standing naval and land forces which formed the nucleus of the fleet and army that gave Somerset the victory. However, the military historian Gervase Phillips has defended Scottish tactics, pointing out that Arran moved from his position by the Esk as a rational response to English manoeuvres by sea and land. In his 1877 account of the battle, Major Sadleir Stoney commented that "every amateur knows that changing front in presence of an enemy is a perilous operation". Early commentators such as John Knox had focused on the move as the cause of the defeat and attributed the order to move to the influence of local landowners George Durie, Abbot of Dunfermline, and Hugh Rig of Carberry. Marcus Merriman sees the initial Scottish field encampment as the most sophisticated ever erected in Scotland, let down by their cavalry numbers.
Gervase Phillips maintains the defeat may be considered due to a crisis of morale after the English cavalry charge, and notes William Patten's praise of the Earl of Angus's pikemen. Merriman regards Somerset's failure to press on and capture Edinburgh and Leith as a loss of "a magnificent opportunity" and "a massive blunder" which cost him the war. In 1548, the Scottish Master of Artillery, Lord Methven, gave his opinion that the battle was lost due to growing support in Scotland for English policy, and the mis-order and great haste of the Scottish army on the day.
Scottish artillery.
Warned of the approach of the English army, the Scottish artillery was made ready at Edinburgh Castle. Extra gunners were recruited and 140 pioneers, i.e. workmen, were employed by Duncan Dundas to move the guns. On 2 September carts were hired to take the guns and the Scottish tents and pavilions towards Musselburgh. There were horses, and oxen were supplied by the Laird of Elphinstone. John Drummond of Milnab, master carpenter of the Scottish ordnance, led the wagon train. There was a newly painted banner, and ahead a boy played on the "swesche", a drum used to alert people.
William Patten described the English officers of the Ordnance after the battle retrieving 30 of the Scottish guns, which were left lying in sundry places, on Sunday 11 September. They found one brass culverin, 3 brass sakers, 9 smaller brass pieces, and 17 other iron guns mounted on carriages. Some of these guns appear in the English royal inventory of 1547–48, at the Tower of London where sixteen Scottish brass guns were recorded. They were a demi-cannon, 2 culverins, 3 sakers, 9 falconets, and a robinet.
The fitted account of the English Treasurer General of the Army.
Ralph Sadler was treasurer for Somerset's expedition in Scotland from 1 August to 20 November 1547. The expense of the journey northwards cost £7468-12s–10d, and the return was £6065-14s–4d. Soldiers' wages were £26,299-7s–1d. For his own expenses, Sadler had £211-14s–8d with £258-14s–9d for his equipment and auditor's expenses. A number of special rewards were given to spies, Scottish guides, and others who gave good service, and to the captain of the Spanish mercenaries. The Scottish herald at the battlefield was given 100 shillings. When Sadler's account was audited in December 1547, Sadler was found to owe Edward VI £546-13s–11d which he duly returned.
Today.
The battle site is now in East Lothian. The battle took place most probably in the cultivated ground southeast of Inveresk Church, just to the south of the main East Coast railway line. There are two vantage points for viewing the ground. Fa'side Castle above the village of Wallyford was just behind the English position, and with the aid of binoculars, a visitor can get a good view of the battle area though the Scottish position is now obscured by buildings. The best impression of their position is obtained from the golf course west of the river Esk and just off the B6415 road. The Scottish centre occupied ground a few yards west of the clubhouse. The Inveresk eminence, an important tactical feature at the time of the battle, is now built over, but from it, a visitor can get down to the Esk and walk for some way along the bank. The walk gives a further idea of a part of the Scottish position, but the town of Musselburgh now completely covers the left of the line. The battlefield was added to the Inventory of Historic Battlefields in Scotland in 2011.
A stone commemorating the battle has been erected southwest of Wallyford village near the junction of Salters Road and the A1 road. The stone is carved with St. Andrew's Cross, the English rose and Scottish thistle and the name and date of the battle. It is situated on the north side of the driveway to the home that is in the northwest corner of the intersection. Co-ordinates: 55.9302992°N 3.0210942°W.
In September 2017 the Scottish Battlefields Trust staged the first major re-enactment of the battle in the grounds of Newhailes House. Such re-enactments are intended to continue on a triennial cycle.
Casualties.
Some of the injured soldiers were treated by Lockhart, a barber surgeon from Dunbar. David H. Caldwell has written, "English estimates put the slaughter as high as 15,000 Scots killed and 2,000 taken but the Earl of Huntly's figure of 6,000 dead is probably nearer the truth." Of the Scottish prisoners, few were nobles or gentlemen. It was claimed that most were dressed much the same as common soldiers and therefore were not recognised as being worth ransoming. Caldwell says of the English casualties, "Officially it was given out that losses were only 200 though the rumour about the English court, fed by private letters from those in the army, indicated that 500 or 600 was more likely."
William Patten names a number of high-ranking casualties. The Englishmen he names were horsemen forced onto Scottish pikes in a ploughed field to the east of the English position, after they had crossed a slough towards the Scottish position on Falside Brae.
Scottish.
The names of a number of other Scottish casualties are known from legal records or Scottish chronicles, and include;


Battle of the North Cape

The Battle of the North Cape was a Second World War naval battle which occurred on 26 December 1943, as part of the Arctic campaign. , on an operation to attack Arctic Convoys of war materiel from the Western Allies to the Soviet Union, was brought to battle and sunk by the Royal Navy – the battleship with cruisers and destroyers including an onslaught from the of the exiled Royal Norwegian Navy – off Norway's North Cape.
The battle was the last between big-gun capital ships in the war between Britain and Germany. The British victory confirmed the massive strategic advantage held by the British, at least in surface units. It was also the second-to-last engagement between battleships, the last being the Battle of Surigao Strait in October 1944.
Background.
Since August 1941, the western Allies had run convoys of ships from the United Kingdom and Iceland to the northern ports of the Soviet Union to provide essential supplies for their war effort on the Eastern Front. These endured much hardship, frequently attacked by German naval and air forces stationed in occupied Norway. A key concern were German "Kriegsmarine" battleships such as the and "Scharnhorst". Even the threat of these ships' presence was enough to cause disastrous consequences for the convoys, such as Convoy PQ 17 that was scattered and mostly sunk by German forces after false reports of the "Tirpitz" sailing to intercept them. To ward off the threat of Germany's capital ships in the Arctic and with a high level of success escort convoys, the Royal Navy had to outlay great assets.
Operation Ostfront was an attempt by the German "Kriegsmarine" to intercept the expected Arctic convoys. In late December 1943, there was a Russia-bound convoy JW 55B consisting of 19 cargo vessels under the command of the Commodore, retired Rear-Admiral Maitland Boucher, accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers, and , among others, and an ocean escort of eight Home Fleet destroyers led by . Also in the area was convoy RA 55A, returning to the United Kingdom from Russia, consisting of 22 cargo ships, accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers and four other vessels, and an ocean escort of six Home Fleet destroyers led by . It had arrived safely at Murmansk with its normal escorts and the additional protection by Force 1, commanded by Vice Admiral Robert Burnett, consisting of the cruiser , the flagship, and the cruisers and .
Escorting the convoys to Russia was the responsibility of the Home Fleet and its commander-in-chief, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser. Fraser wished to neutralize "Scharnhorst", a major threat to the convoys, and planned a confrontation over Christmas 1943 in which convoy JW 55B would be used to draw the enemy out. Fraser expected and hoped that "Scharnhorst" would attempt to attack JW 55B. At a conference of the captains of the ships in his force Fraser described his plan to intercept "Scharnhorst" at a position between the convoy and the enemy's Norwegian base. He would then approach the enemy to within in the Arctic night, illuminate "Scharnhorst" with star shell, and open fire using .
Convoy JW 55B had left Loch Ewe on 20 December and was sighted two days later by a "Luftwaffe" aircraft which commenced shadowing. By 23 December it was clear to the British from intelligence reports that the convoy had been sighted and was being shadowed by enemy aircraft. Fraser then put to sea with Force 2 consisting of his flagship the battleship , the cruiser and S-class destroyers , , , and of the exiled Royal Norwegian Navy. Fraser was anxious not to discourage "Scharnhorst" from leaving its base, so did not approach before it was necessary to do so. As JW 55B and its escorts approached the area of greatest danger on the same day, the 23rd, travelling slowly eastward off the coast of north Norway, Burnett and Force 1 set out westward from Murmansk while Fraser with Force 2 approached at moderate speed from the west. On 25 December, "Scharnhorst" (under Captain Fritz Hintze) with the s , , , and left Norway's Altafjord under the overall command of "Konteradmiral" Erich Bey. "Scharnhorst" set course for the convoy's reported position as a south-westerly gale developed.
Battle.
Fraser received confirmation from the Admiralty in the early hours of 26 December that "Scharnhorst" was at sea and searching for convoy JW 55B. The stormy weather had resulted in the grounding of all "Luftwaffe" reconnaissance planes. With no ability to search for the British ships from the air and heavy seas hampering the movement of his ships, Rear Admiral Bey was unable to locate the convoy. Despite a German U-boat spotting the convoy and reporting its position, Bey was still not able to make contact with the British ships. Thinking he had overshot the enemy, he detached his destroyers and sent them southward to increase the search area, and the destroyers subsequently lost contact with their flagship. Admiral Fraser, preparing for the German attack, had diverted the returning empty convoy RA 55A northward, out of the area in which it was expected, and ordered JW 55B to reverse course to allow him to close. He later ordered four of the destroyers with RA 55A; , , and , to detach and join him.
The now unescorted "Scharnhorst" encountered Burnett's Force 1 shortly after 09:00. "Belfast" was the first ship to obtain radar contact on "Scharnhorst", and the British cruisers rapidly closed the range. At a distance of nearly , the British cruisers opened fire and "Scharnhorst" responded with her own salvoes. While no hits were scored on the British ships, the German battleship was struck twice, with one shell destroying the forward Seetakt radar controls and leaving "Scharnhorst" virtually blind in a mounting snowstorm. Without radar, gunners aboard the German battleship were forced to aim at the enemy's muzzle flashes. This was made more difficult because two of the British cruisers were using a new flashless propellant, leaving "Norfolk" the relatively easier target. Bey, believing he had engaged a battleship, turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers and perhaps draw them away from the convoy.
"Scharnhorst's" superior speed allowed Bey to shake off his pursuers, after which he turned northeast in an attempt to circle round them and attack the undefended convoy. Burnett, instead of giving chase in sea conditions that were limiting his cruisers' speed to , correctly guessed Bey's intentions and positioned Force 1 so as to protect the convoy. It was a decision that he had some personal doubts about as it would result in the cruisers losing contact with "Scharnhorst", and the decision was criticised by some of the British force's other officers but supported by Fraser. To Burnett's relief, shortly after noon, "Scharnhorst" was once again detected by the cruiser's radars as it attempted to approach the convoy. As fire was again exchanged, "Scharnhorst" scored two hits on "Norfolk" with 11-inch shells, disabling a turret and her radar. Burnett's destroyers were also unable to get close enough to "Scharnhorst" to launch a torpedo attack on the German ship. Following this exchange, Bey decided to return to port, while he ordered his destroyers to attack the convoy at a position reported by the U-boat earlier in the morning. The reported position was out-of-date, and the destroyers missed the convoy.
"Scharnhorst" ran south for several hours, once again taking advantage of its superior speed. Burnett pursued, but both "Sheffield" and "Norfolk" suffered engine problems and were forced to drop back, leaving the outgunned "Belfast" as the sole pursuer and dangerously exposed for a while. The lack of working radar aboard "Scharnhorst" prevented the Germans from taking advantage of the situation, allowing "Belfast" to reacquire the German ship on her radar set. Unbeknownst to Bey, his ship was now sailing into a trap, with Admiral Fraser's main force steaming towards "Scharnhorst's" position and perfectly placed to intercept the fleeing German ship. With "Belfast" sending a constant stream of radio signals on the "Scharnhorst's" position, the battleship "Duke of York" battled through the rough seas to reach the German ship. Fraser sent his four escorting destroyers to press ahead and try to get into torpedo-launching positions. The main British force soon picked up "Scharnhorst" on radar at 16:15 and were maneuvering to bring a full broadside to bear. At 16:17 "Scharnhorst" was detected by "Duke of York"s Type 273 radar at a range of 45,500 yards (41,500 m) and by 16:32 "Duke of York"s Type 284 radar indicated that the range had closed to 29,700 yards (27,700 m).
At 16:48, "Belfast" fired star shells to illuminate "Scharnhorst". "Scharnhorst", unprepared with her turrets trained fore and aft, was clearly visible from "Duke of York". "Duke of York" opened fire at a range of and scored a hit on the first salvo, disabling "Scharnhorst"s foremost turrets ("Anton" and "Bruno"), while another salvo destroyed the ship's aeroplane hangar. Bey turned north, but was engaged by the cruisers "Norfolk" and "Belfast", and turned east at a high speed of . "Scharnhorst" was now being engaged on one side by "Duke of York" and "Jamaica" while Burnett's cruisers engaged from the other side. The Germans took continuing heavy punishment from "Duke of York's" 14-inch shells, and at 17:24 a desperate Bey signalled to Germany "am surrounded by heavy units".
Bey was able to put some more distance between "Scharnhorst" and the British ships to increase his prospects of success. Two 11-inch shells from one of her salvoes passed through the masts of the "Duke of York", severing all the wireless aerials, and, more serious still, the wires leading from the radar scanner to the Type 284 gunnery control radar set. These hits could not have been known to Bey, and Lt H. R. K. Bates RNVR climbed the mast and managed to repair the broken wires. "Scharnhorst"'s fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse at 18:20 when a shell fired by "Duke of York" at extreme range pierced her belt armor and destroyed the No. 1 boiler room. "Scharnhorst"s speed dropped to only , and though immediate repair work allowed it to recover to , "Scharnhorst" was now vulnerable to torpedo attacks by the destroyers. Five minutes later, Bey sent his final radio message to the German naval command: "We will fight on until the last shell is fired." At 18:50 "Scharnhorst" turned to starboard to engage the destroyers "Savage" and "Saumarez", but this allowed "Scorpion" and the Norwegian destroyer "Stord" to attack with torpedoes, scoring one hit on the starboard side. As "Scharnhorst" continued to turn to avoid the torpedoes, "Savage" and "Saumarez" scored three hits on her port side. "Saumarez" was hit several times by "Scharnhorst"s secondary armament and suffered 11 killed and 11 wounded.
Due to the torpedo hits, "Scharnhorst"s speed again fell to , allowing "Duke of York" to rapidly close the range. With "Scharnhorst" illuminated by starshells "hanging over her like a chandelier", "Duke of York" and "Jamaica" resumed fire, at a range of only . At 19:15, "Belfast" joined in from the north. The British vessels subjected the German ship to a deluge of shells, and the cruisers "Jamaica" and "Belfast" fired their remaining torpedoes at the slowing target. "Scharnhorst"s end came when the British destroyers "Opportune", "Virago", "Musketeer" and "Matchless" fired a further 19 torpedoes at her. Wracked with hits and unable to flee, "Scharnhorst" finally capsized and sank at 19:45 on 26 December, her propellers still turning, at an estimated position of . She was later identified and filmed at . Of her total complement of 1,968, only 36 were pulled from the frigid waters, 30 by "Scorpion" and six by "Matchless". Neither Rear Admiral Bey nor Captain Hintze were among those rescued (although both were reported seen in the water after the ship sank), nor were any other officers. "Scorpion" tried to rescue Bey but he foundered. British casualties, in contrast, were relatively light with only 21 killed and 11 wounded. The majority of British casualties occurred on "Saumarez", with 11 of the destroyer's sailors being killed as the ship attempted to close with "Scharnhorst". HMS "Norfolk" suffered most of the remaining casualties with seven of her men being killed while the destroyer "Scorpion" also had one of its men missing in action. Fraser ordered the force to proceed to Murmansk, making a signal to the Admiralty: "Scharnhorst sunk", to which the reply came: "Grand, well done."
Aftermath.
Later in the evening of 26 December, Admiral Fraser briefed his officers on board "Duke of York": "Gentlemen, the battle against "Scharnhorst" has ended in victory for us. I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior, you will command your ship as gallantly as "Scharnhorst" was commanded today". After the battle Admiral Fraser sent the following message to the Admiralty: "... Please convey to the C-in-C Norwegian Navy. "Stord" played a very daring role in the fight and I am very proud of her...". In an interview in The "Evening News" on 5 February 1944 the commanding officer of HMS "Duke of York", Captain Guy Russell, said: "... the Norwegian destroyer "Stord" carried out the most daring attack of the whole action...".
The loss of "Scharnhorst" demonstrated the vital importance of radar in modern naval warfare. While the German battleship should have been able to outgun all of her opponents save the battleship "Duke of York", the early loss of radar-assisted fire control combined with the problem of inclement weather left her at a significant disadvantage. "Scharnhorst" was straddled by 31 of the 52 radar-fire-controlled salvoes fired by "Duke of York". In the aftermath of the battle, the "Kriegsmarine" commander, "Großadmiral" Karl Dönitz remarked, "Surface ships are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment."
The sinking of the "Scharnhorst" was a major victory for the Allied war effort in the Arctic theater and further altered the strategic balance at sea in their favour. The Battle of the North Cape took place only a few months after the successful Operation Source, which had severely damaged the German battleship "Tirpitz" as she lay at anchor in Norway. With "Scharnhorst" destroyed and Germany's other battleships out of service, the Allies were now for the first time in the war free from the threat of German battleships raiding their convoys in the Arctic and Atlantic. This would allow the Allies to reallocate their naval resources that had been previously tied up to counter the threat of the German 'fleet in being'. This would prove to be the final battle of battleships in European waters and was one of few major surface ship-on-ship battles in the Second World War without air support.


Battle of Auldearn

The Battle of Auldearn was an engagement of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms. It took place on 9 May 1645, in and around the village of Auldearn in Nairnshire. It resulted in a victory for the royalists, led by the Marquess of Montrose and Alasdair MacColla, over Sir John Urry and an army raised by the Covenanter-dominated Scottish government.
The pibroch Blár Allt Earrann commemorates the battle. The battlefield has been included in the Inventory of Historic Battlefields in Scotland and is protected by Historic Scotland under the Historic Environment (Amendment) Act 2011.
Background.
In mid-1644, after the Scottish Committee of Estates took the decision to intervene in the First English Civil War on the Parliamentarian side, Montrose had been given a commission by King Charles I to command his forces in Scotland. After initial setbacks, he was able to raise an army consisting partly of Highlanders and partly of professional troops sent by Confederate Ireland at the instigation of the Marquess of Antrim. Most of the Covenanter army had been sent into England, and Montrose began to threaten Covenanter control over the Highlands.
On 2 February 1645, Montrose won a complete victory over the pro-Covenanter Clan Campbell and its leader, the Earl of Argyll, at the Battle of Inverlochy. He then attempted to attack the Covenanter forces in the Lowlands, but found that many of his Highlanders were drifting home with plunder and the Covenanters were too strong. He fell back to the northeast, hoping to recruit more forces. In particular, he needed the support of Clan Gordon, who could provide at least some cavalry.
The Covenanters divided their forces. While Lieutenant General William Baillie remained based in Perth, he sent a detachment commanded by Sir John Urry to the north. Urry was an experienced soldier who had deserted the English Parliamentarians to join the Royalists in 1643, but had changed sides once again to join the Covenanters after their success at the Battle of Marston Moor in 1644.
Montrose, meanwhile, had made a couple of feints towards the Lowlands, but was unable to challenge Baillie's large army. On 18 April, he heard that Urry's army was threatening the Gordon lands. Montrose marched north to Skene, where he was rejoined on 30 April by Alasdair MacColla, who had been recruiting fresh forces in the western Highlands, and several contingents of Gordons. From Skene, Montrose advanced against Urry, who was near Elgin.
Battle.
As the area about Elgin was Covenanter in sympathy, Urry had plenty of information about Montrose's approach. He withdrew westwards, hoping to lure Montrose into a position where he could launch a surprise counter-attack. His army consisted of four regiments of foot commanded by Colonels Loudoun, Lothian, Buchanan and Sir Mungo Campbell of Lawers, the Mackenzies under the Earl of Seaforth, the levies of the Earl of Sutherland, 800 other local levies and 400 cavalry.
Hearing late on 8 May that Montrose had encamped at Auldearn, which was then a small hamlet, Urry advanced, hoping to catch the Royalists unawares at dawn. In his attempt to achieve surprise, he left his artillery some distance behind. Unfortunately for Urry, some of his men discharged their muskets to clear damp powder charges, thereby alerting the Royalists. Thus warned, Montrose hastily deployed his forces to counter-attack Urry.
On Montrose's right flank, Alastair MacColla commanded one Irish regiment and some Gordon infantry totalling about 500 men. They were deployed in some enclosures in front of Auldearn, and the Royal Standard was prominently displayed among them to convince Urry that the entire Royalist force was in this position. Montrose's main force was concealed in a hollow on MacColla's left flank. There were two Irish regiments and some Gordons fighting on foot (totalling about 800 musketeers and clansmen), and 200 Gordon horsemen led by Lord Aboyne and his younger brother, Lord Lewis Gordon.
Urry's four regular regiments of infantry advanced against the obvious position defended by Alasdair MacColla, while a small body of 50 cavalry attempted to outflank what they believed to be the Royalist left. The various levies and Urry's remaining cavalry remained in reserve. The impatient MacColla led an advance against the Covenanters but was forced back. Montrose rode up to the Gordon cavalry, who could hear the noise of battle but could not see what was going on, and claimed that the Macdonalds were driving all before them and were likely to claim all the glory. The Gordon horsemen charged out of the hollow. The small body of Covenanter cavalry trying to outflank MacColla was taken by surprise while trying to negotiate a bog and fled. Montrose's infantry followed his cavalry and advanced against the right flank of Urry's four infantry regiments, which broke under attack from all sides. Urry's three bodies of levies and his remaining cavalry fled the field.
The only part of Urry's army to make a stand was Clan MacLennan, styled the "Bannermen of Kintail", who, as standard bearers to Seaforth, chief of Clan Mackenzie, remained isolated during the Covenanters' flight. They refused to retreat and stood their ground in the face of the Royalist onslaught, refusing to give up the standard of the Mackenzies, the "Cabar Feidh." Offered no quarter by the Gordon cavalry, Ruairidh Mac Gille Fhinnein, chief of his name, and his clansmen, together with some MacRaes and Mathesons, were all cut down.
As with most of Montrose's victories, many of the casualties were inflicted after the Covenanter army broke and fled, in a merciless pursuit which was continued for .
Aftermath.
Montrose had destroyed half the Covenanter forces arrayed against him. Urry later turned his coat once again and joined Montrose.
A pub/restaurant, previously named "The Covenanter" and now the "1645" in commemoration of the battle, stands on part of the old battlefield at the end of Auldearn.
The battle and the Royalist campaign of 1644–1645 in general feature in the 1937 novel And No Quarter by Irish writer Maurice Walsh, told from the perspective of two members of O'Cahan's Regiment.