Battle of the River Plate

The Battle of the River Plate was fought in the South Atlantic on 13 December 1939 as the first naval battle of the Second World War. The Kriegsmarine heavy cruiser , commanded by Captain Hans Langsdorff, engaged a Royal Navy squadron, commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood, comprising the cruisers , (on loan to the New Zealand Division) and .
"Graf Spee" had sailed into the South Atlantic in August 1939, before the war began, and had begun commerce raiding after receiving appropriate authorisation on 26 September 1939. Harwood's squadron was one of several search groups sent in pursuit by the British Admiralty. They sighted "Graf Spee" off the estuary of the River Plate near the coasts of Argentina and Uruguay.
In the ensuing battle, "Exeter" was severely damaged and forced to retire; "Ajax" and "Achilles" suffered moderate damage. Damage to "Graf Spee", although not extensive, was critical because her fuel system was crippled. "Ajax" and "Achilles" shadowed the German ship until she entered the port of Montevideo, the capital city of neutral Uruguay, to effect urgent repairs. Langsdorff was told that his stay could not be extended beyond 72 hours. Apparently believing that the British had gathered a superior force to await his departure, he ordered the ship to be scuttled. Three days later, Langsdorff committed suicide.
Background.
"Admiral Graf Spee" had been at sea at the start of the Second World War in September 1939, and had sunk several merchantmen in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic Ocean without loss of life, due to her captain's policy of taking all crews on board before sinking the victim.
The Royal Navy assembled nine forces to search for the surface raider. Force G, the South American Cruiser Squadron, comprised the heavy cruiser of with eight guns in four turrets, the heavy cruiser HMS "Exeter" of with six guns in three turrets, and two light cruisers, HMS "Ajax" and "Achilles", both of with eight guns. Although technically a heavy cruiser because of the calibre of her guns, "Exeter" was a scaled-down version of the County-class. The force was commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood whose flagship was "Ajax", captained by Charles Woodhouse. "Achilles" was on loan to the New Zealand Division (precursor to the Royal New Zealand Navy) and captained by Edward Parry. "Exeter" was commanded by Captain Frederick Secker Bell. During the period before and at the immediate time of the battle, "Cumberland" (commanded by Captain Walter Herman Gordon Fallowfield) was refitting in the Falkland Islands but was available for sea at short notice. Force G was supported by the oilers , , and . "Olynthus" replenished HMS "Ajax" and "Achilles" on 22 November 1939, and "Exeter" on 26 November, at San Borombon Bay. "Olynthus" was also directed to keep observation between Medanos and Cape San Antonio, off Argentina south of the River Plate estuary (see chart below).
Following a raider-warning radio message from the merchantman "Doric Star", which was sunk by "Admiral Graf Spee" off South Africa, Harwood suspected that the raider would try to strike next at the merchant shipping off the River Plate estuary between Uruguay and Argentina. He ordered his squadron to steam toward the position 32° south, 47° west. Harwood chose this position, according to his despatch, because of its being the most congested part of the shipping routes in the South Atlantic, and therefore the point where a raider could do the most damage to enemy shipping. A Norwegian freighter saw "Admiral Graf Spee" practising the use of its searchlights and radioed that its course was toward South America.
The three available cruisers of Force G rendezvoused off the estuary on 12 December and conducted manoeuvres. The British combat instructions for engaging a pocket battleship with a cruiser squadron (which had been devised by Harwood during his period at the Royal Naval War College between 1934 and 1936) specified an attack at once, day or night. If during the day, the ships would attack as two units, in this case with "Exeter" separate from "Ajax" and "Achilles". If at night, the ships would remain in company, but in open order. By attacking from two sides, Harwood hoped to give his lighter warships a chance of overcoming the German advantage of greater range and heavier broadside by dividing the enemy's fire. By splitting his force, Harwood would force the Germans to either split their fire, reducing its effectiveness, or keep it focused on one opponent, allowing the other vessels to attack with less fear of return fire.
Although outgunned by "Admiral Graf Spee" and therefore at a tactical disadvantage, the British did have the upper hand strategically since any raider returning to Germany would have to run the blockade of the North Sea and might reasonably be expected to encounter the Home Fleet. For victory, the British only had to damage the raider enough so that she was either unable to make the journey or unable to fight a subsequent battle with the Home Fleet (by contrast the Germans would have to destroy the British force without being severely damaged). Because of overwhelming numerical superiority, the loss of even all three cruisers would not have severely altered Britain's naval capabilities, whereas "Admiral Graf Spee" was one of the Kriegsmarine's few capital ships. The British could therefore afford to risk a tactical defeat if it brought strategic victory.
Battle.
On 13 December at 05:20, the British squadron was proceeding on a course of 060° at 14 knots with "Ajax" at 34° 34' South 48° 17' West, east of Montevideo. At 06:10, smoke was sighted on a bearing of Red-100, or 320° (to the north-west). Harwood ordered the "Exeter" to investigate. She swung out of line and at 06:16 she signaled by lamp: "I think it is a pocket-battleship", and Captain Bell ordered Flag N hoisted to the yard arm – "Enemy in sight". "Graf Spee" had already sighted mastheads and identified "Exeter", but initially suspected that the two light cruisers were smaller destroyers and that the British ships were protecting a merchant convoy, the destruction of which would be a major prize. Since "Graf Spee"s reconnaissance aircraft was out of service, Langsdorff relied on his lookouts for this information. He decided to engage, despite having received a broadly accurate report from the German naval staff on 4 December, outlining British activity in the River Plate area. This report included information that "Ajax", "Achilles", "Cumberland" and "Exeter" were patrolling the South American coast.
Langsdorff realised too late that he was facing three cruisers. Calling on the immediate acceleration of his diesel engines, he closed with the enemy squadron at in the hope of engaging the steam-driven British ships before they could work up from cruising speed to full power. This strategy may seem an inexplicable blunder: Langsdorff could perhaps have manoeuvred to keep the British ships at a range where he could destroy them with his guns while remaining out of the effective range of their smaller 6in and 8in guns. On the other hand, he knew the British cruisers had a speed advantage over "Graf Spee" and could in principle stay out of range should they choose to do so, standard cruiser tactics in the presence of a superior force, while calling for reinforcements.
The British executed their battle plan: "Exeter" turned north-west, while "Ajax" and "Achilles", operating together, turned north-east to spread "Graf Spee"s fire. "Graf Spee" opened fire on "Exeter" at with her six guns at 06:18. "Exeter" opened fire at 06:20, "Achilles" at 06:21, "Exeter"s aft guns at 06:22 and "Ajax" at 06:23. Lieutenant-Commander Richard Jennings, "Exeter"s gunnery officer remembers:
As I was crossing the compass platform [to his Action Station in the Director Control Tower], the captain hailed me, not with the usual rigmarole of 'Enemy in sight, bearing, etc', but with 'There's the fucking "Scheer"! Open fire at her!' Throughout the battle the crew of the "Exeter" thought they were fighting the [sister ship] "Scheer". But the name of the enemy ship was of course the "Graf Spee".
From her opening salvo, "Graf Spee"'s gunfire proved fairly accurate, her third salvo straddling "Exeter". At 06:23, a shell burst just short of "Exeter", abreast the ship. Splinters from this shell killed the torpedo tubes' crews, damaged the ship's communications, riddled the ship's funnels and searchlights and wrecked the ship's Walrus aircraft, just as it was about to be launched for gunnery spotting. Three minutes later, "Exeter" suffered a direct hit on her "B" turret, putting it and its two guns out of action. Shrapnel swept the bridge, killing or wounding all bridge personnel except the captain and two others. Captain Bell's communications were wrecked. Communications from the aft conning position were also destroyed; the ship had to be steered via a chain of messengers for the rest of the battle.
Meanwhile, "Ajax" and "Achilles" closed to and started making in front of "Graf Spee", causing her to split her main armament at 06:30 and otherwise use her guns against them. Shortly after, "Exeter" fired two torpedoes from her starboard tubes but both missed. At 06:37, "Ajax" launched her Fairey Seafox spotter floatplane from its catapult. At 06:38, "Exeter" turned so that she could fire her port torpedoes and received two more direct hits from shells. One hit "A" turret and put it out of action, the other entered the hull and started fires. At this point, "Exeter" was severely damaged, having only "Y" turret still in action under 'local' control, with Jennings on the roof shouting instructions to those inside. She also had a 7° list, was being flooded and being steered with the use of her small boat's compass. However, "Exeter" dealt the decisive blow; one of her 8-inch shells had penetrated two decks before exploding in "Graf Spee"s funnel area, destroying her raw fuel processing system and leaving her with just 16 hours fuel, insufficient to allow her to return home.
At this point, nearly one hour after the battle started, "Graf Spee" was doomed; she could not make fuel system repairs of this complexity under fire. Two-thirds of her anti-aircraft guns were knocked out, as well as one of her secondary turrets. There were no friendly naval bases within reach, nor were any reinforcements available. She was not seaworthy and could make only the neutral port of Montevideo.
"Graf Spee" hauled round from an easterly course, now behind "Ajax" and "Achilles", towards the north-west and laid smoke. This course brought Langsdorff roughly parallel to "Exeter". By 06:50, "Exeter" listed heavily to starboard, taking water forward. Nevertheless, she still steamed at full speed and fired with her one remaining turret. Forty minutes later, water splashed in by a near-miss short-circuited her electrical system for that turret. Captain Bell was forced to break off the action. This would have been the opportunity to finish off "Exeter". Instead, the combined fire of "Ajax" and "Achilles" drew Langsdorff's attention as both ships closed the German ship.
Twenty minutes later, "Ajax" and "Achilles" turned to starboard to bring all their guns to bear, causing "Graf Spee" to turn away and lay a smoke screen. At 07:10, the two light cruisers turned to reduce the range from , even though this meant that only their forward guns could fire. At 07:16, "Graf Spee" turned to port and headed straight for the badly damaged "Exeter", but fire from "Ajax" and "Achilles" forced her at 07:20 to turn and fire her guns at them, while they turned to starboard to bring all their guns to bear. "Ajax" turned to starboard at 07:24 and fired her torpedoes at a range of , causing "Graf Spee" to turn away under a smoke screen. At 07:25, "Ajax" was hit by a shell that put "X" turret out of action and jammed "Y" turret, causing some casualties. By 07:40, "Ajax" and "Achilles" were running low on resources, and the British decided to change tactics, moving to the east under a smoke screen. Harwood decided to shadow "Graf Spee" and try to attack at night, when he could attack with torpedoes and better use his advantages of speed and manoeuvrability, while minimising his deficiencies in armour. "Ajax" was again hit by a shell that destroyed her mast and caused more casualties; "Graf Spee" continued to the south-west.
Pursuit.
The battle now turned into a pursuit. Captain Parry of "Achilles" wrote afterwards: "To this day I do not know why the "Admiral Graf Spee" did not dispose of us in the "Ajax" and the "Achilles" as soon as she had finished with the "Exeter"". The British and New Zealand cruisers split up, keeping about from "Admiral Graf Spee". "Ajax" kept to the German's port and "Achilles" to the starboard. At 09:15, "Ajax" recovered her aircraft. At 09:46, Harwood signalled to "Cumberland" for reinforcement and the Admiralty also ordered ships within to proceed to the River Plate. At 10:05, "Achilles" had overestimated "Admiral Graf Spee"s speed and she came into range of the German guns. "Admiral Graf Spee" turned and fired two three-gun salvoes with her fore guns. "Achilles" turned away under a smoke screen.
According to Pope, at 11:03 a merchant ship was sighted close to "Admiral Graf Spee". After a few minutes, "Admiral Graf Spee" called "Ajax" on W/T, probably on the international watchkeeping frequency of 500 kHz, using both ships' pre-war call-signs, with the signal: "please pick up lifeboats of English steamer". The German call-sign was DTGS, confirming to Harwood that the pocket-battleship he had engaged was indeed "Admiral Graf Spee". "Ajax" did not reply but a little later the British flagship closed with SS "Shakespeare" with its lifeboats still hoisted and men still on board. "Admiral Graf Spee" had fired a gun and ordered them to stop but when they did not obey orders to leave the ship, Langsdorff decided to continue on his way and "Shakespeare" had a lucky escape. The shadowing continued for the rest of the day until 19:15, when "Admiral Graf Spee" turned and opened fire on "Ajax", which turned away under a smoke screen.
It was now clear that "Admiral Graf Spee" was entering the River Plate estuary. Since the estuary had sandbanks, Harwood ordered "Achilles" to shadow "Admiral Graf Spee" while "Ajax" would cover any attempt to double back through a different channel. The sun set at 20:48, with "Admiral Graf Spee" silhouetted against the sun. "Achilles" had again closed the range and "Admiral Graf Spee" opened fire, forcing "Achilles" to turn away. During the battle, a total of 108 men had been killed on both sides, including 36 on "Admiral Graf Spee".
"Admiral Graf Spee" entered Montevideo in neutral Uruguay, dropping anchor at about 00:10 on 14 December. This was a political error, since Uruguay, while neutral, had benefited from significant British influence during its development and it favoured the Allies. The British Hospital, for example (where the wounded from the battle were taken), was the leading hospital in the city. The port of Mar del Plata on the Argentine coast and south of Montevideo would have been a better choice for "Admiral Graf Spee". Also, had "Admiral Graf Spee" left port at this time, the damaged "Ajax" and "Achilles" would have been the only British warships that it would encounter in the area.
Trap of Montevideo.
In Montevideo, the 13th Hague Convention came into play. Under Article 12, "belligerent war-ships are not permitted to remain in the ports, roadsteads or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four hours". Under Article 14, "[a] belligerent war-ship may not prolong its stay in a neutral port beyond the permissible time except on account of damage". British diplomats duly pressed for the speedy departure of the "Graf Spee". Also relevant was Article 16, of which part reads, "A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship flying the flag of its adversary".
The Germans released 61 captive British merchant seamen who had been on board in accordance with their obligations. Langsdorff then asked the Uruguayan government for two weeks to make repairs. Initially, the British diplomats in Uruguay — principally Eugen Millington-Drake — made several requests for "Admiral Graf Spee" to leave port immediately. After consultation with London, which was aware that there were no significant British naval forces in the area, Millington-Drake continued to demand that "Admiral Graf Spee" leave. At the same time, he arranged for British and French merchant ships to steam from Montevideo at intervals of 24 hours, whether they had originally intended to do so or not, thus invoking Article 16. This kept "Admiral Graf Spee" in port and allowed more time for British forces to reach the area.
At the same time, the British attempted to feed false intelligence to the Germans that an overwhelming British force was being assembled, including Force H (the aircraft carrier and the battlecruiser ) by broadcasting a series of signals, on frequencies known to be intercepted by German intelligence. In fact the two cruisers had been joined only by "Cumberland" which had arrived at 22:00 on 14 December, after steaming from the Falkland Islands in 34 hours, at an average of over 90% of her full trials speed attained over much shorter distances. The older and larger "Cumberland" was more powerful than "Exeter", with an additional aft turret containing two more 8-inch guns, but was no match on paper for "Admiral Graf Spee" whose guns had significantly longer range and fired much heavier shells (660 lb against 256 lb). Overwhelming British forces (HMS "Renown", "Ark Royal", , , and ) were "en route", but would not assemble until 19 December, although they could intercept earlier if "Admiral Graf Spee" headed north or north east from Montevideo shadowed by "Cumberland" and her smaller consorts. For the time being, the total force comprised the undamaged "Cumberland" with a full ammunition load, and the damaged "Ajax" and "Achilles" with depleted stocks of shells. To reinforce the propaganda effect, these ships — which were waiting just outside the three-mile limit — were ordered to make smoke, which could be clearly seen from the Montevideo waterfront.
On 15 December 1939, "Olynthus" refuelled "Ajax", which proved a difficult operation; the ship had to use hurricane hawsers to complete the replenishment. On 17 December "Achilles" was replenished from "Olynthus" off Rouen Bank.
The Germans were entirely deceived, and expected to face a far superior force on leaving the River Plate. "Admiral Graf Spee" had also used two-thirds of her ammunition and had only enough left for approximately a further 20 minutes of firing. Such a reduced ammunition stock was hardly sufficient for the ship to fight her way out of Montevideo, let alone get back to Germany, when contrasted with the previously unengaged "Cumberland"s ability to fight at full capacity for about 90 minutes and pursue at equal or higher speed for at least another before requiring replenishment at sea.
While the ship was prevented from leaving the harbour, Captain Langsdorff consulted with his command in Germany. He received orders that permitted some options, but not internment in Uruguay. The Germans feared that Uruguay could be persuaded to join the Allied cause. Ultimately, he chose to scuttle his ship in the River Plate estuary on 17 December, to avoid unnecessary loss of life for no particular military advantage, a decision that is said to have infuriated Adolf Hitler. The crew of "Admiral Graf Spee" were taken to Buenos Aires, Argentina, where Captain Langsdorff committed suicide by gunshot on 19 December. He was buried there with full military honours, and several British officers who were present attended. Many of the crew members were reported to have moved to Montevideo with the help of local people of German origin. The German dead were buried in the Cementerio del Norte, Montevideo.
Aftermath.
The German propaganda machine had reported that "Admiral Graf Spee" had sunk a heavy cruiser and heavily damaged two light cruisers while only being lightly damaged herself. "Admiral Graf Spee"s scuttling however was a severe embarrassment and difficult to explain on the basis of publicly available facts. The battle was a major victory for the British, as the damage to "Ajax" and "Achilles" was not sufficient to reduce their fighting efficiency, while "Exeter", as badly damaged as she was, was able to reach the Falkland Islands for emergency repairs, before returning to Devonport for a 13-month refit, thus enhancing the reputation of First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill.
Prisoners taken from merchant ships by "Admiral Graf Spee" who had been transferred to her supply ship "Altmark" were freed by a boarding party from the British destroyer , in the Altmark Incident (16 February 1940)—whilst in Jøssingfjord, at the time neutral Norwegian waters. Prisoners who had not been transferred to "Altmark" had remained aboard "Admiral Graf Spee" during the battle; they were released on arrival in Montevideo.
On 22 December 1939 over 1,000 sailors from "Admiral Graf Spee" were taken to Buenos Aires and interned there; at least 92 were transferred during 1940 to a camp in Rosario, some were transferred to Club Hotel de la Ventana in Buenos Aires Province and another group to Villa General Belgrano, a small town founded by German immigrants in 1932. Some of these sailors later settled there. After the war many German sailors settled permanently in various parts of Uruguay, some returning after being repatriated to Germany. Rows of simple crosses in the Cementerio del Norte, in the north of the city of Montevideo, mark the burial places of the German dead. Three sailors killed aboard "Achilles" were buried in the British Cemetery in Montevideo, while those who died on "Exeter" were buried at sea.
Intelligence gathering and salvage.
Immediately after her scuttling, the wreck of "Admiral Graf Spee" rested in shallow water, with much of the ship's superstructure remaining above water level, but over the years, the wreck has subsided into the muddy bottom and today only the tip of the mast remains above the surface.
A radar expert was sent to Montevideo shortly after the scuttling and reported a rotating aerial, probably for gunlaying, transmitting on either 57 or 114 centimetres. In February 1940, the wreck was boarded by US Navy sailors from the light cruiser .
In 1964 a memorial to the ship was erected in Montevideo's port. Part of it is "Admiral Graf Spee"s anchor.
In 1997, one of "Admiral Graf Spee"s secondary gun mounts was raised and restored; it can now be seen outside Montevideo's National Maritime Museum.
In February 2004, a salvage team began work raising the wreck. The operation is being funded in part by the government of Uruguay, in part by the private sector, as the wreck is now a hazard to navigation. The first major section, the heavy gunnery control station, was raised on 25 February 2004. It is expected to take several years to raise the entire wreck. James Cameron filmed the salvage operation. After it has been raised, it was planned that the ship may be restored and put on display at the National Marine Museum.
Many German veterans did not approve of this restoration attempt, as they considered the wreck to be a war grave and an underwater historical monument that should be respected. One of them, Hans Eupel, a former specialist torpedo mechanic, 87 years old in 2005, said that "this is madness, too expensive and senseless. It is also dangerous, as one of the three explosive charges we placed did not explode".
On 10 February 2006, the , 400 kg eagle and swastika crest of "Admiral Graf Spee" was recovered from the stern of the ship. This spread-wing statue of a Nazi eagle with a wreath in its talons containing a swastika was attached to the stern, not the bow like traditional figureheads. It was a common feature of prewar Nazi warships. In other cases, it was removed for a variety of practical reasons on the outbreak of the war, but because "Admiral Graf Spee" was already at sea when the war began, she went into action (and was scuttled) with it attached, thus permitting its recovery. To protect the feelings of those with painful memories of Nazi Germany, the swastika at the base of the figurehead was covered as it was pulled from the water. The figurehead was stored in a Uruguayan naval warehouse following German complaints about exhibiting "Nazi paraphernalia".
Legacy.
In 1956, the film "The Battle of the River Plate" (US title: "Pursuit of the Graf Spee") was made of the battle and "Admiral Graf Spee"s end, with Peter Finch as Langsdorff and Anthony Quayle as Harwood. Finch portrays Langsdorff sympathetically as a gentleman. The "Achilles", which had been recommissioned in 1948 as HMIS "Delhi", flagship of the Royal Indian Navy, played herself in the film. HMS "Ajax" (twin turrets) was "played" by HMS "Sheffield" (triple turrets), HMS "Exeter" (twin turrets) by HMS "Jamaica" (triple turrets) and HMS "Cumberland" by herself (although de-gunned as a trials platform). "Admiral Graf Spee" (two turrets) was portrayed by the U.S. heavy cruiser (three turrets).
The battle was for many years re-enacted with large-scale model boats throughout the summer season at Peasholm Park in the English seaside resort of Scarborough. The re-enactment now portrays an anonymous battle between a convoy of British ships and an unspecified enemy in possession of the nearby shore.
After the battle, the new town of Ajax, Ontario, in Canada, constructed as a Second World War munitions production centre, was named after HMS "Ajax". Many of its streets are named after Admiral Harwood's crewmen on "Ajax", "Exeter" and "Achilles". Its main street is named after Admiral Harwood, while a small street was named (after some controversy) for Captain Langsdorff. According to an article in the German language paper "Albertaner" on 6 October 2007, Steve Parish, the mayor of Ajax, defended the decision, declaring that Langsdorff had not been a typical Nazi officer. An accompanying photograph (above) from the funeral of crew members shows Langsdorff paying tribute with a traditional naval salute, while people beside and behind him—even some clergymen—are giving the Fascist salute.
Also in Canada, the names of the ships, and the commander of Force G, have been used for Cadet Corps. The Royal Canadian Sea Cadet Corps (RCSCC) Ajax No. 89 in Guelph, Ontario; the Navy League Cadet Corps (NLCC) Achilles No. 34 in Guelph, Ontario; the Navy League Wrenette Corps (NLWC) Lady Exeter (now disbanded) and the camp shared by all three corps, called Camp Cumberland (this camp no longer exists; it was decommissioned around 1999). RCSCC Harwood No. 244 and NLCC Exeter No. 173 are situated in Ajax, Ontario.
A number of streets in Nelson Bay, New South Wales, have been named after the battle including Montevideo Parade, Achilles Street, Ajax Avenue, Harwood Avenue, and Exeter Road (now called Shoal Bay Road). In Auckland, home port of the Royal New Zealand Navy, streets have been named for "Achilles", "Ajax" and "Exeter". Three streets in North Wollongong, New South Wales, are named Ajax Avenue, Exeter Avenue and Achilles Avenue.
The battle is also significant as it was the first time the current Flag of New Zealand was flown in battle, from HMS "Achilles". Also in New Zealand, four mountain peaks in the Two Thumb Range region of the South Island are named in commemoration of the battle. These are Achilles (2,544m), Exeter (2,327m), Ajax (2,319m) and Graf Spee (2,267m).


Japanese air attacks on the Mariana Islands

During World War II, a series of Japanese air attacks on the Mariana Islands took place between November 1944 and January 1945. These raids targeted United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) bases and sought to disrupt the bombing of Japan by B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers operating from the islands. The Japanese lost 37 aircraft during this operation, but destroyed 11 B-29s and damaged a further 43. Preparations were also made for commando raids on the bases in early and mid-1945 but these did not go ahead.
While the attacks on the Mariana Islands did not seriously disrupt the USAAF air campaign, they had an effect on other American operations. After determining that the Japanese raiders were staging through Iwo Jima, American forces stepped up their attacks on that island. While the decision to invade Iwo Jima had been made before the raids commenced, stopping the attacks formed part of the justification for the landing. In addition, further air defense units were deployed to the Mariana Islands to protect the B-29 bases.
Background.
United States forces recaptured Guam and captured Saipan and Tinian in the Mariana Islands between June and August 1944, as part of the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign. These islands were needed to provide bases for USAAF Twentieth Air Force B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers to attack the Japanese home islands. Construction of the large air bases needed to support B-29s began on Saipan in June 1944, before the end of the Battle of Saipan, and work on air fields on Tinian and Guam commenced in July and August respectively. The B-29s of the XXI Bomber Command began to arrive at Saipan starting on October 12, and the 73rd Bombardment Wing began flying warm-up missions against Japanese-held islands in the Pacific on October 27 in preparation for operations against Japan itself.
The USAAF bases in the Mariana Islands were within range of a number of Japanese air bases in the Pacific. These included Wake Island to the east, Truk and the Gilbert and Marshall Islands to the southeast, Woleai to the south and Yap to the southwest. To the north the Japanese had air bases in the Nampo Shoto chain of islands and Bonin Islands, which included three airstrips on Iwo Jima. Several of the minor islands in the Mariana chain also remained in Japanese hands, and there were airfields on Rota and Pagan. The Japanese were unable to use most of these bases, however, as they had been isolated and heavily damaged by United States air attacks, and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had relatively few aircraft and pilots available.
Despite the limited threat of attack, the United States military took steps to protect the B-29 bases in the Mariana Islands. The USAAF's Seventh Air Force played the most important role, and continuously attacked the Japanese-held islands until just before the end of the war. United States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) aircraft and XXI Bomber Command B-29s also occasionally participated in these attacks. The Seventh Air Force also provided air defence for the Mariana Islands; this task was assigned to the 318th Fighter Group, which was equipped with P-47 Thunderbolt fighters, and the 6th Night Fighter Squadron which flew Northrop P-61 Black Widows. The Thunderbolts were also responsible for suppressing the Japanese-held Mariana Islands, though it proved difficult to stop the 3,600-man garrison from repairing the airfield on Pagan. In addition, the US Army stationed elements of eight anti-aircraft gun battalions and two searchlight battalions on Saipan between July 1944 and February 1945. The head of the USAAF General "Hap" Arnold, who also directly commanded the Twentieth Air Force, was concerned about whether these defenses were sufficient, particularly given the high cost of the Superfortress bombers. Accordingly, he allocated a Microwave Early Warning (MEW) radar to protect the bases on Saipan. This advanced radar was not immediately installed, however, as the local commanders believed that the island's air defenses were adequate.
Japanese attacks.
The first Japanese air attacks on the B-29 bases occurred while they were under construction. Small numbers of Japanese aircraft flying from Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Truk made occasional raids on the American forces on Saipan during the fighting there, but caused little damage. Between June 24 and July 21 the 6th Night Fighter Squadron intercepted 37 raids on Saipan, and claimed three "kills". These raids typically comprised twelve IJN Mitsubishi G4M bombers (labeled "Betty" bombers by the Allies), or IJAAF Mitsubishi Ki-67 bombers operating from bases on mainland Japan and staging through Iwo Jima. The attacks disrupted airbase construction on several days and contributed to delays completing the B-29 base on Saipan, Isley Field. Small numbers of Japanese soldiers who had avoided capture at the end of the battles on the islands also raided the B-29 bases on occasion, mainly in search of food.
The main Japanese air offensive against the Mariana Islands began in early November 1944. On November 1, a B-29 flying from the Marianas overflew the Tokyo region for the first time. The next day, nine or ten IJN G4Ms belonging to the IJN Attack "Hikōtai" 703 struck Isley Field and the adjacent Kobler Field on Saipan. The raiders arrived over Saipan shortly after 1:30 am and dropped their bombs from low altitude. Only five bombs struck Isley Field, and these caused little damage. A Black Widow from the 6th Night Fighter Squadron shot down one of the G4Ms and another two were lost to other causes. On November 3 the Imperial General Headquarters issued a statement which falsely claimed that Japanese aircraft had bombed and destroyed fifteen locations in Saipan and Tinian. A further attack by either five or ten G4Ms with fighter escorts took place at 1:30 am on November 7, but also caused little damage. The USAAF official history states that three G4Ms were downed in this raid while another source states there were no Japanese losses. Imperial General Headquarters claimed that 20 B-29s out of 40 located were destroyed in the November 7 raid. These and all subsequent Japanese air attacks on the Marianas were overseen by the Air Training Army.
Further attacks were conducted against Saipan during late November in an attempt to disrupt the American offensive. On November 24, Marianas-based B-29s conducted their first raid against Japan, bombing targets in and around Tokyo. Three days later the Japanese mounted two raids against their bases. During the early hours of November 27, two G4Ms flying from Iwo Jima struck Isley Field from low altitude and escaped after destroying one B-29 and damaging eleven others. This attack came as a surprise to the Americans, and construction lights were still on at Isley at the start of the raid.
Later that day, twelve bomb-equipped Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighters from the IJN's 252 "Kōkūtai" (252 Air Group) accompanied by two Nakajima C6N "Myrt" reconnaissance aircraft for navigation purposes departed Iwo Jima for Saipan. The attackers flew just above sea level to avoid US radar, and one of the A6Ms was forced to divert to Pagan after its propeller struck a wave; this aircraft was shot down by a USAAF Thunderbolt while attempting to land. The remaining eleven A6Ms arrived over Saipan at noon, shortly after XXI Bomber Command's second raid on Tokyo had departed. These aircraft strafed Isley Field destroying three or four B-29s and damaging up to two others. One of the Japanese pilots landed his fighter on Isley Field and fired on airfield personnel with his pistol until he was killed by rifle fire; this incident was witnessed by Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, the commander of XXI Bomber Command. None of the ten other A6Ms survived; four were shot down by USAAF fighters and six by anti-aircraft guns. The U.S. gunners also downed a USAAF Thunderbolt in circumstances which an official assessment later described as "inexcusable". On the night of November 28/29 six or eight G4Ms from Attack "Hikōtai" 704 bombed Isley Field from high altitude but caused little damage.
The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the raids of November 27. Two USN destroyers were stationed northwest of the island to provide radar warning of further attacks. These ships detected some of the later Japanese raiders, but others managed to arrive undetected. An AN/TPS-3 radar was also flown to Saipan from Hawaii. Arnold became frustrated that the MEW still was not in use, and on December 3 Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas, ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat.
Further attacks were mounted in December. On December 7, Japanese aircraft, which included Attack "Hikōtai" 704 G4Ms and 110th "Sentai" (Wing) Ki-67s, conducted a simultaneous attack from high and low altitudes which destroyed three B-29s and damaged another 23. Japanese losses were heavy, however, with six out of eight Ki-67s of the 110th Sentai lost during this attack, the first carried out by this unit. The largest attack on Saipan occurred on the night of December 25/26 when 25 Japanese aircraft again attacked from high and low altitudes and destroyed one B-29, damaged three beyond repair and caused minor damage to a further eleven. Also on 26 December, the Air Training Army was redesignated the 6th Air Army but retained the mission of conducting attacks on the Marianas.
The raid on Christmas night was the last major Japanese attack on the Marianas. On January 2, a single Japanese aircraft destroyed one B-29 and damaged another three. A further two small raids were attempted in January and one on February 2, but none of five aircraft dispatched reached the islands and four were shot down. In early February the 6th Air Army's parent headquarters, the General Defense Command (GDC), reached the conclusion that the raiding forces being dispatched against the American bomber bases were too small to be effective. As it was not possible to allocate additional aircraft to bolster these missions, the GDC directed that the offensive cease and that the 6th Air Army be held in reserve to be used against any Allied forces which landed in the Japanese home islands.
Overall, more than 80 Japanese aircraft were dispatched against Saipan and Tinian between November 1944 and the end of the offensive in February 1945. The Japanese destroyed 11 B-29s, caused major damage to eight and minor damage to another 35. American casualties were 45 dead and over 200 wounded. USAAF fighters and anti-aircraft guns shot down about 37 Japanese aircraft during these raids.
US counterattacks.
After the Marianas began to come under attack, the United States military stepped up its raids on the Japanese-held islands which could be used to launch raids on the B-29 bases. Particular attention was given to Iwo Jima, as it was correctly assumed that the Japanese aircraft which attacked the Marianas were flying from Japan and staging through the island en route to their targets. Following the first raid against Saipan in November, XXI Bomber Command B-29s were dispatched against Iwo Jima's airfields on November 5 and 8. These attacks were primarily training missions and caused little damage. The first raid was unopposed by the Japanese, but the second was met by eight fighters which inflicted light damage on a B-29; this was the first combat damage suffered by any of XXI Bomber Command's aircraft. The Seventh Air Force also increased the number of B-24 Liberator attacks on Iwo Jima, and these attacked the island 30 times during November.
Nimitz ordered a major attack on Iwo Jima following the raids of November 27 and dispatched Lieutenant General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas, from Hawaii to Saipan to oversee this operation. Harmon arrived there on December 5 and met with Admiral John H. Hoover and Hansell to discuss his plans for a daylight attack using all available P-38 Lightning fighters and B-24 and B-29 bombers in conjunction with a naval bombardment by the heavy cruisers , and of Cruiser Division 5. This operation was scheduled for December 7, but was delayed by a day due to bad weather. The attack began at 9:45 am on December 8 when 24 P-38s attacked the island. The B-29 raid took place at 11:00 am and the B-24s attacked at noon. Due to cloud cover over Iwo Jima the heavy bombers were forced to use radar rather than visual bombing, which limited the effectiveness of these attacks. The operation concluded with a 70-minute bombardment by the three cruisers which began at 1:47 pm. Overall, the USAAF dropped 814 tons of bombs and the cruisers fired 1,500 rounds of 8-inch and 5,334 rounds of 5-inch shells. The damage caused by this attack contributed to the cessation of Japanese raids on the Marianas until December 25.
The bombardment of Iwo Jima continued until the Battle of Iwo Jima on February 19, 1945. The island was attacked at least once each day by the Seventh Air Force's B-24s between December 8, 1944, and February 15, 1945, and several of these aircraft were shot down. Cruiser Division 5 also conducted naval bombardments on December 24 and 27 as well as January 5 and 24. In the last of these attacks the heavy cruisers were joined by the battleship . US aircraft also mounted small-scale night attacks to disrupt Japanese repair efforts. In addition, the USAAF continued to attack the other Pacific islands within range of the Marianas until July 1945. While the attacks on Iwo Jima damaged the island's airfields, the Japanese managed to keep at least one of them operational at all times, and none were closed for more than a single day. The need to repair damage to the airfields forced the Japanese garrison on Iwo Jima to divert labor from building defensive positions, however. The combination of heavy losses over Saipan and damage to the airfields on Iwo Jima caused the Japanese to break off their attacks against the Marianas on 2 January. Few Japanese aircraft visited Iwo Jima starting in January, and due to their losses in the Philippines Campaign, the IJAAF and IJN lacked the long-ranged aircraft needed to resume attacks on the Marianas in early 1945.
Operation Tsurugi.
In December 1944, the Japanese Army's 1st Raiding Regiment, an elite commando formation, was ordered to attack the B-29 bases at Saipan. A 136-man force designated the Giretsu Airborne Unit was formed for this suicide mission, which called for the destruction with explosive charges of B-29s by troops carried by Mitsubishi Ki-21 "Sally" bombers. These aircraft lacked the range to reach Saipan directly from Japan, and it was planned that they would refuel at Iwo Jima. The commandos undertook intensive training at Saitama Kanto and the raid was scheduled to take place on January 17, 1945, but was canceled after damage to the airfields at Iwo Jima. The Giretsu Airborne Unit instead attacked a U.S. airbase at Okinawa on 24 May, destroying nine aircraft and damaging another 29.
Following the perceived success of the raid on Okinawa the IJN developed plans for a force of naval commandos to attack airfields in the Marianas. On June 24, it issued orders for a raid involving 30 Yokosuka P1Y "Frances" bombers and 20 G4Ms carrying naval commandos. The plan, Operation Tsurugi, called for the P1Ys to strafe the airfields before the G4Ms crash-landed on them. The commandos would then destroy as many B-29s as possible before fighting to the death. The commandos and G4Ms selected to land in the Marianas conducted intensive training at bases in northern Honshu and the operation was scheduled for late July. USN carrier raids on this area on July 14 and 15 destroyed many of the force's aircraft, however, and the operation was postponed until August.
Following its postponement the scale of Operation Tsurugi was expanded to include 60 G4Ms carrying 300 naval commandos from the 101st Kure Special Naval Landing Force and 300 Army commandos from the 1st Raiding Regiment. It was planned that 20 G4Ms would carry naval commandos to Guam, another 20 would carry army commandos to Saipan and the remaining 20 would transport a joint Army–Navy force to Tinian. The revised plan also called for a B-29 to be captured and flown back to Japan. This attack was scheduled to take place between August 19 and 23. Allied intelligence became aware of Operation Tsurugi, however, and another carrier attack on Honshu destroyed 29 G4Ms and 20 P1Ys on August 9. While the operation was not called off after this raid, it did not go ahead after the Japanese surrender on 15 August. The Japanese military also developed a plan to attack Saipan using Mitsubishi Ki-167 suicide aircraft during August, but nothing came of this.
Aftermath.
The Japanese attacks on the Mariana Islands during 1944 and 1945 did not seriously disrupt the USAAF's strategic air campaign against Japan. They did, however, force the United States to allocate forces to defend the islands in order to prevent further losses of expensive B-29s. Moreover, due to the high cost of the heavy bombers, the ratio of losses was in favor of the Japanese.
When the U.S. military was considering future operations in the Bonin Islands during August 1944 the planners assessed that an occupation of Iwo Jima might be necessary to protect the Marianas from attack, and after the war this was given as one of the justifications for the costly invasion of the island. However, this was not necessary due to the success of the Seventh Air Force and the USN's campaign against Iwo Jima's airfields as well as the Japanese military's shortage of long-ranged aircraft. In any event, the decision to invade Iwo Jima was made a month before the major attacks on the B-29 bases began, and there were no raids on the Marianas in the seven weeks before the landings began on February 19.
Notes.
 Cate and Olson (1953), p. 581 state that the attack on November 7 comprised two raids, each made by five bombers, and that three of these ten bombers were shot down. Sakaida and Takaki (2001), p. 28 write that seven bombers were dispatched of which five reached Saipan and escaped after bombing American facilities there. They do not state that the other two bombers were shot down.
 Cate and Olson (1953), p. 581 give USAAF losses from the second attack on November 24 as three B-29s destroyed and two damaged. Tillman (2010), p. 86 states that three B-29s were destroyed and Sakaida and Takaki (2001), p. 33 give a figure of four B-29s destroyed.


Operation Typical

Operation Typical was the name of the first World War II British mission fully assigned to Yugoslav Partisans HQ and Marshall Tito organised by the Special Operations Executive (SOE). The six soldiers flew from Derna airfield on 27 May 1943 and parachuted to Black Lake in Montenegro at the height of a large German offensive Operation Schwarz which aimed to destroy the Partisan forces. The group was led by Col William Deakin and Capt William F Stuart, together with the two radio operators - Sergeants Walter Wroughton and . Canadian-Yugoslav Ivan ('John') Starčević acted as a translator and Sgt John Campbell (RM) was a cipher clerk, and bodyguard.
Purpose.
The mission insisted on sabotage operations, offering explosives and, if necessary, British demolition experts, for this purpose. The selection of targets varied, from disrupting German supplies to North Africa by cutting off the railway line to Greece to shipments of Romanian oil and Yugoslav minerals (e.g. copper, chrome and bauxite) to Germany.
Route.
Deakin and the team followed Partisan HQ across the Durmitor range ending up in German, Italian and Bulgarian encirclement under heavy bombing. On 9 Jun 1943, Stuart was killed in an air-raid while Tito was wounded in the shoulder. The party broke through the encirclement at Tjentište in the middle of the night and informed Cairo HQ on 13 Jun 1943.
By the end of June they arranged timings and locations for the explosives and medical aid to be parachuted while they moved onto Olovo, Kladanj and Vlasenica. On 30 Jul 1943 they reached Bijela Voda near Žepče, where Deakin witnessed and reported on the destruction of fourteen kilometres of railway tracks. By 4 Aug the party reached plateau of Petrovo Polje, where they were able to welcome additional SOE officers being parachuted. Flight-Lieutenant Kenneth Syers (RAF), who came to replace William Stuart, and the surgeon Major Ian Mackenzie (RAMC) on 15 Aug, and the following day Major Basil Davidson who was to command his own Mission. For their own safety, the group had to move to Jajce on 25 Aug 1943.
Italian surrender.
The Italian army surrendered to the Anglo-American forces in Italy on 8 Sep 1943. Soon after, British G.H.Q. instructed the mission to negotiate an armistice and carry out the disarming of the Italian troops, which was rejected by Tito who demanded the Italians surrender to Partisan troops. The main race was towards Split, the Italian HQ, with the aim to disarm the Italians before the German troops reclaimed the region. On 11 Sep 1943, Deakin, together with an American Capt M Benson left for Bugojno, to join Gen Koča Popović and the 1st Proleterian Brigade on their way to Split. They arrived on 16 Sep 1943, and found Gen Becuzzi, the commander of the Bergamo Division with 14,000 already disarmed soldiers. Deakin and Benson, together with Lt John Burge, witnessed Becuzzi signing the terms of surrender.
After a brief speech to the citizens of Split in the main square, translated by Ivo Lola Ribar, Deakin and Wroughton returned to Jajce via Sajkovići, Grahovo and Drvar.
Mission expansion and failed evacuation attempt.
On 26 Sep 1943 Deakin reported to the recently arrived Brigadier-General Fitzroy Maclean in Mrkonjic-Grad. The new commander, heading his own Maclean Mission (Macmis) felt that Deakin, after three months at Tito's HQ "should give us a better idea than anyone of what the partisans were worth". The two officers continued to assess partisans' strength, willingness to fight and aid priorities.
As German troops started to reclaim Dalmatian coast and the islands, Maclean decided to go to Cairo and agree the further course of action. He agreed to take Ivo Lola Ribar and Miloje Milojević as emissaries of good will, subject to the Commander-in-chief and Foreign Office approvals. Maclean left Jajce for Cairo on 5 Oct 1943 where he presented Anthony Eden with a written report of his views and findings, before returning to Italy to organise the evacuation of Ribar and Milojević from an improvised airstrip at Glamoč. During Nov 1943, Maclean made three sorties trying to find and land there but each time the snowstorms, fog and heavy clouds forced him to return. By now, the partisans were getting impatient and had organised their own mission in a recently captured German airplane. On 27 Nov 1943 as they were trying to board, the airplane came under bombardment and Ribar, together with two British officers was killed and the mission abandoned.
Completion.
Knowing that the airstrip was likely to be lost to Germans soon, Maclean procured a troop-carrying Dakota, and landed there on 2 Dec 1943. Without switching the engines, they were able to take in Deakin, Anthony Hunter, Vladimir Velebit, and heavily wounded Milojević and Vladimir Dedijer. Finally, they on-boarded a German Abwehr officer Capt Meyer who was taken POW at Jajce earlier. The first landing operation in the enemy-occupied Yugoslavia had been successfully completed, bringing Operation Typical to an end.


Moore Equipment Company

Moore Equipment Company was founded in 1929 by Stanley S. Moore and his father in Stockton, California. Moore Equipment Company a repair and manufacture company of farm machines, road machines and tools. To support the World War 2 demand for ships Moore Equipment Company built a shipyard and switched over to military construction and built: US Navy YSD-11 Class Seaplane Wrecking Derricks, landing craft and barges. Moore Equipment Company also did work for the US Army repairing and rebuilding jeeps by way of the Ford Motor in Richmond. The shipyard also did Navy ship repair. Moore Equipment Company's main work before the war was on tractors, cranes, trucks, bulldozers, power winches, road scrapers and tools. The Moore Equipment Company office was at 1250 South Wilson Way, Stockton, now the Fairgrounds Industrial Park. Equipment Company sold the factory on February 15, 1944 to International Harvester Company. The shipyard closed after the war.</ref>
Moore Equipment Company.
Moore Equipment Company in Stockton, California built YSD-11 Class Seaplane Wrecking Derrick:
Landing craft.
Moore Equipment Company built Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) Mark 6.
Landing Craft Mechanized Mark 6 had :
Barges.
Built in 1945 four YC barges:


Battle of Horten Harbour

The Battle of Horten Harbour or the Action at Horten was an engagement that occurred on 9 April 1940 during Operation Weserübung when the Germans launched an amphibious assault on Karljohansvern, the Norwegian naval base at Horten. After being initially repulsed by Norwegian naval units, German troops headed overland to outflank the base, forcing it to capitulate.
Background.
Karljohansvern, up the Oslofjord, had been Norway's main naval base since 1819. On the morning of 9 April two operational ships were in the harbour: the minelayer (present for repairs) and the minesweeper . Approximately 40 percent of their crews were on shore leave at the time. Also present at the base were the dilapidated coastal defence ships and which, being unarmed, decommissioned training and depot vessels, took no part in the fighting. The commanding officer at the base was Admiral J. Smith-Johansen.
Shortly after midnight Admiral Smith-Johansen informed the captain of "Olav Tryggvason", T. Briseid, that there had been a battle at the mouth of the Oslofjord, and it was likely that the enemy ships had breached the outer fortifications. Briseid was given orders to open fire on any hostile ships. Smith-Johansen shared his intentions to send "Rauma" and out to sweep the fjord. Briseid dispatched one of his ship's motor boats to Langgrunn where it told the merchant ships at anchor to extinguish their lights.
The German forces allotted to attack Horten were from "Kampfgruppe" 5. This consisted of the torpedo boats and under the command of Siegfried Strelow and H. Wilcke respectively. They were accompanied by the motor minesweepers "R17" and "R21", heavily laden with troops from the light cruiser . Admiral Oskar Kummetz ordered the ships at 03:30 to detach from the main force and secure Horten.
Battle.
The detached force arrived at the mouth of the harbour at 05:35. The R boats proceeded to make their landings while the torpedo boats held back. "Olav Tryggvason", which had been guarding the entrance since 03:15, initially let the vessels pass. The crew soon realized its error and opened fire. The minesweeper "R17" was struck just as it pulled alongside the quay, sinking in the shallow water. The ship's depth charges detonated at 06:15, causing further casualties. "Rauma" returned and began dueling with "R21". "Rauma" was damaged and its gun crew was wounded, so the ship retreated to the naval base for medical assistance. Two sailors were killed. "R21", also damaged, disengaged.
At 07:30 "Albatros" tried to directly intervene by heading into the harbour. The boat's course was constricted by the narrow channel it was using, and soon began taking fire from "Olav Tryggvason". The "Albatros" responded with its forward battery, but it jammed after eight rounds and the damaged ship was forced to retreat.
At 08:00 "Emden" moved over to support the Germans at Horten, sending around 50 soldiers ashore to attack over the land. Captain Grundmann of "R17", seeking to establish communication with the Norwegian naval staff, managed to contact Admiral Smith-Johansen. Bluffing, he declared that a large German force had seized the town of Horten and that it would be bombarded if the admiral did not surrender within half an hour. Smith-Johansen surrendered Karljohansvern at 08:35.
Aftermath.
With Karljohansvern now subdued, the Germans could focus on taking the forts at the mouth of the Oslofjord. transferred its soldiers to "R21" so it could provide gunfire support for an assault on Bolærne. That afternoon the ship attacked, but was driven off by 10 rounds from the fort's guns. While maneuvering in the fog to avoid being hit the ship ran aground, becoming a total loss.
The Germans seized a number of ships at Karljohansvern and pressed them into service. "Olav Tryggvason" was renamed "Brummer"; "Rauma" became "Kamerun"; and "Tordenskjold" and "Harald Haarfagre" were transformed into AA batteries as "Nymphe" and "Thetis", respectively. Present at the nearby dockyards were the torpedo boats "Ørn" and "Lom", commissioned by the Germans as "Schlange" and "Eidechse", respectively. The incomplete torpedo boat "Balden" was finished by the Germans and commissioned as "Leopard". The crane vessel "Marinens Flytekran" was also seized.


Central Marianas naval order of battle

On 15 June 1944, United States Marine and Army forces landed on the southwest coast of the island of Saipan in the central Marianas chain. US forces declared Saipan secure on 9 July.
Marine Corps forces landed on the nearby island of Tinian on 24 July. Tinian was declared secure 1 August.
The naval forces involved can be summarized as follows:
Command structure.
The roles of Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), were both exercised by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz from his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Theater and Operational Command.
Since the Marianas lie in the Central Pacific, their capture was the responsibility of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, led by Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance from aboard his flagship, heavy cruiser "Indianapolis".
The ships and embarked troops of Operation Forager were under direct operational command of Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner aboard amphibious command ship "Rocky Mount".
The Marine and Army landing forces for Operation Forager were under the command of Maj. Gen. Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, USMC. Smith directed the ground troops from aboard Vice Adm. Turner's flagship "Rocky Mount" until the afternoon of 17 June when he set up his command post ashore.
Ground Troops.
V Amphibious Corps (Maj. Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC)

Forces afloat.
U.S. Fifth Fleet

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance in heavy cruiser "Indianapolis"
Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51)

Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner in amphibious command ship "Rocky Mount"
Combat Task Groups.
Carrier Support Group One (Task Group 52.14).
Rear Adm. Gerald F. Bogan

Carrier Support Group Two (Task Group 52.11).
Rear Adm. H.B. Sallada

Fire Support Group One (Task Group 52.17).
Rear Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf

Fire Support Group Two (Task Group 52.10).
Rear Adm. Walden L. Ainsworth

Amphibious Operations Task Groups.
Control Group (Task Group 52.6).
Commodore P.S. Theiss

Transport Group "Able" (Task Group 52.3).
Capt. H.B. Knowles

Embarking 2nd Marine Division

Transport Group "Baker" (Task Group 52.4).
Capt. D.W. Loomis

Embarking 4th Marine Division

Eastern Landing Group (Task Group 52.8).
Cmdr. C.J. McWhinnie

Embarking 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines

Transport Screen (Task Group 52.12).
Capt. R.E. Libby

Tractor Flotilla (Task Group 52.5).
Capt. A.J. Robertson

Minesweeeping and Hydrographic Survey Group (Task Group 52.13).
Cmdr. R.S. Moore, USNR

Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve (Task Group 51.1).
Rear Adm. William H.P. Blandy

Embarking 27th Infantry Division (Army)

Service and Support Units.
Service and Salvage Group (Task Group 52.7).
Capt. S.E. Peck

Fueling Group (Task Group 50.17).
Capt. Edward E. Paré


Battle of Sansapor

The Battle of Sansapor (Operation Globetrotter) was an amphibious landing and subsequent operations around Sansapor, Dutch New Guinea on the Vogelkop Peninsula during World War II.
Naval force.
Admiral William Fechteler's Attack Force (Task Force 77) was to have a D-Day groupment comprising 11 destroyers, 5 APDs, 16 LCIs, 3 rocket LCIs, 8 LSTs, 4 PCs, and 1 ATF. A Covering Force (Task Force 78), consisting of 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, and 9 destroyers under the command of Admiral Russell Berkey, was to be available for support fire if needed.
In preparation for Operation Typhoon (code name for the US Army landings on the Vogelkop Peninsula), on 17 June 1944, S-47, under Lieutenant Lloyd V. Young, sailed from the Admiralty Islands for Waigeo, with the mission to insert elements of the Alamo Scouts, Allied Intelligence Bureau agents, terrain experts of the Fifth Air Force, and hydrographic survey men of the VII Amphibious Force. The reconnaissance force landed near Sausapor-Mar on 23 June where the party spent the week surveying the region. As a result of both this reconnaissance and aerial reconnaissance the assault landing was diverted to land northeast of Sorong.
Landing force.
On 30 July 1944, Operation Typhoon landed at Sansapar (Green Beach), Mar (Red Beach), Middelburg Island and Amsterdam Island. In charge of the Operation Typhoon ground forces was Major General Franklin C. Sibert, commanding general of the 6th Infantry Division. General Sibert was to command an organization designated the TYPHOON Task Force, which comprised the 6th Division (Reinforced), less the 20th Regimental Combat Team. Combat units for the D-Day echelon of the TYPHOON Task Force were the 1st Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry Regiment, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, a company of the 6th Engineers, and four antiaircraft batteries.
All of the landings ultimately proved to be unopposed and it was not until 16 August that elements of the Japanese 35th Division were able to reach the area of the landings. By 31 August the 1-63rd Infantry had killed 155 Japanese and taken 42 prisoners. The American regiment lost only 3 men killed and 4 wounded. The 1st Infantry, on the west flank, killed 197 Japanese and captured 154, while losing only 4 men wounded itself. The 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, during its series of far flung patrols, killed 42 Japanese and captured 5 others. Total battle casualties for the TYPHOON Task Force from 30 July through 31 August were 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured. Japanese losses during the same period were estimated to be 385 killed and 215 captured.
Eventually, the runway for fighter aircraft was built on Middleburg Island and for bombers near Mar to the northeast (the landing strip is still visible to this day), although the control of Sausapor was vital for the security of the base to launch the campaign and remained an air warning radar station. Ships patrolled this area of the coastline throughout the month-long campaign, keeping the Japanese at bay. Operation Globetrotter ended on 31 August and General Douglas MacArthur's last point of landing on the way back to the Philippines was at Sansapor.
On 31 July, shore-to shore landings from Cape Opmarai were carried out at Sansapor. The Japanese garrison at Manokwari was cut off and attempted to retreat to Sorong.
Base development.
Airfields were built at Mar, Middleburg Island, Cape Opmarai and a flying boat base at Amsterdam Island. A radar station was also set up at Mar. Cape Opmarai Airfield is now a disused airfield.


Battle of Angaur

The Battle of Angaur was a battle of the Pacific campaign in World War II, fought on the island of Angaur in the Palau Islands from 17 September—22 October 1944. This battle was part of a larger offensive campaign known as Operation Forager which ran from June 1944 to November 1944 in the Pacific Theater of Operations, and Operation Stalemate II in particular.
Background.
Angaur is a tiny limestone island, just long, separated from Peleliu by a strait, from which phosphate was mined. In mid-1944, the Japanese had 1,400 troops on the island, under the overall command of Palau Sector Group commander Lieutenant General Sadae Inoue and under the direct command of Major Goto who was stationed on the island.
The weak defenses of the Palaus and the potential for airfield construction made them attractive targets for the Americans after the capture of the Marshall Islands, but a shortage of landing craft meant that operations against the Palaus could not begin until the Mariana Islands were secure.
Once the assault on Peleliu was "well in hand", the 322nd Regimental combat team (RCT) would land on the northern Beach Red, and the 321st RCT on the eastern Beach Blue, both of the 81st Infantry Division commanded by Major General Paul J. Mueller.
Battle.
Bombardment of Angaur by the battleship , four cruisers, and forty Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers from the aircraft carrier began on 11 September 1944. Six days later on 17 September, the two RCTs landed on the northeast and southeast coasts. Both RCTs were counterattacked during the night. Both RCTs linked up the next day. By the end of the third day, 19 September, the main area of Japanese resistance was to the northeast around Romauldo Hill, so the 323rd RCT was sent to Ulithi.
Resistance stiffened as the Americans advanced on "the Bowl", a hill near Lake Salome in the northwest of the island where the Japanese planned to make their last stand, after the rest of Angaur and Saipan town were taken. There was another small position where the Japanese had about 400 soldiers in a defense at the southeast corner of the island, around Beach Green, that was neutralized on 20 September after 2 days of harsh fighting and about 300 U.S. casualties.
From 20 September, the 322nd RCT repeatedly attacked the Bowl, but the 750 defenders repulsed them with artillery, mortars, grenades and machine guns. Gradually, hunger, thirst and American shellfire and bombing took their toll on the Japanese, and by 25 September the Americans had penetrated the Bowl. Rather than fight for possession of the caves, they used bulldozers to seal the entrances. By 30 September, the island was said to be secure although the Japanese still had about 300 more soldiers in the Bowl and surrounding areas that held out for almost four more weeks. Toward the end of the first week of October, the protracted conflict had degenerated into minor patrol action with sniping, ambushing, and extensive booby-trapping employed by both sides. The island's defense commander, Major Goto was killed on 19 October fighting to keep possession of a cave. The last day of fighting was 22 October with a total of 36 days of fighting and blasting the Japanese resistance from their caves with explosives, tanks, artillery and flamethrowers. The 81st Infantry Division had finally taken the whole of Angaur.
Aftermath.
Airfields were being constructed as the battle was still being fought, but the delay in the start of the Palaus operation meant that the airfields were not ready in time for the start of the Philippines operations in October 1944. Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. had argued before the invasion of the Palaus that the operation was unnecessary, and military historians have agreed with him, suggesting that the main benefit was the combat experience gained by the 81st Infantry Division.
During the fighting, Seabees created an airstrip that would house B-24 Liberator bombers of the 494th Bombardment Group, 7th Air Force which engaged in frequent bombings of the Philippines and other Palau Islands.
The 81st Division moved on directly to the battle on Peleliu to aid the 1st Marine Division, which had encountered extremely stiff resistance in the central highland of that island. They would remain on Peleliu for another month taking the island and mopping-up.


Alfred K. Newman

Alfred K. Newman (July 21, 1924 – January 13, 2019) was a United States Marine, best known for serving as a Navajo code talker during World War II.
Born in Rehoboth, New Mexico, on the Navajo Nation, Newman and his fellow native students were not allowed
to speak the Navajo language in school. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in mind, he joined the Marine Corps on March 26, 1943, and became one of over 400 code talkers.
In November 1943, Newman was part of the Guadalcanal Campaign, before he spent a month on Bougainville Island. He then went with the 3rd Division to Guam, before ultimately landing for the end of the Battle of Iwo Jima. Newman was honorably discharged with the rank of corporal in December 1945, and he worked as an ammunition inspector at Fort Wingate and later at an open-pit mine overseeing blasting at Kirtland Field.
Newman was married to Betsy Eleanor, his wife of 69 years. They had five children. He died at age 94 at the veterans hospital in Albuquerque. His death puts the number of code talkers still living at around 10.


Battle of Myton

The Battle of Myton, nicknamed the Chapter of Myton or The White Battle because of the number of clergy involved, was a major engagement in the First Scottish War of Independence, fought in Yorkshire on 20 September 1319.
Berwick Falls.
In April 1318, Berwick-upon-Tweed, the last Scottish stronghold which was in the hands of the English, was captured by Sir James Douglas and Thomas Randolph, Earl of Moray, two of King Robert Bruce's most able commanders. Ever since his defeat at Bannockburn in 1314, Edward II had been preoccupied by an ongoing political struggle with his senior barons, headed by Thomas, Earl of Lancaster. Repeated Scottish raids deep into the north of England had effectively been ignored: but the loss of Berwick was something different. Once the most important port in Scotland, it had been in English hands since 1296; during which time its defences had been greatly strengthened. News of its capture had a sobering effect on Edward and his magnates. Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke, managed to arrange a temporary reconciliation between the king and Lancaster. In a spirit of artificial harmony, they came north together with a sizeable army in the summer of 1319. Queen Isabella accompanied the king as far as York, where she took up residence.
Vigorous assaults were made on Berwick by land and sea, but Walter, the High Stewart of Scotland, ably assisted by John Crabb, a military engineer, conducted an effective defence, beating back all attacks. However, he could not be expected to hold out indefinitely. King Robert had no intention of risking a direct attack on the powerful English army which, in the words of John Barbour, 'might well turn to folly'. Instead, Douglas and Moray were ordered on yet another large-scale diversionary raid into Yorkshire, intended to draw off the besiegers. They came with a large force of mounted infantry, known as hobelars.
The Chapter of Myton.
The Scots seemingly had news of the queen's whereabouts, and the rumour soon spread that one of the aims of their raid was to take her captive. As King Robert advanced towards York, she was hurriedly taken out of the city by water, finally gaining refuge further south in Nottingham. Yorkshire itself was virtually undefended and the raiders had an uninterrupted passage from place to place. William Melton, the Archbishop of York, set about mustering an army, which included a large number of men in holy orders. While the force was led by some men of standing, including John Hotham, Chancellor of England, and Nicholas Fleming, Mayor of York, it had very few men-at-arms or professional fighting men. From the gates of York, Melton's host marched out to face the battle-hardened schiltrons, some east of Boroughbridge, where the rivers Swale and Ure meet at Myton. The outcome is described in the "Brut or the Chronicles of England", the fullest contemporary source for the battle;
Many men were pressed into service who were not trained soldiers, including those who were monks and choristers from the cathedral in York. As so many clerics were slain in the encounter, it also became known as the 'Chapter of Myton'. Barbour gives the English loss as 1,000 killed, including 300 priests, but the contemporary English Lanercost Chronicle says that 4,000 Englishmen were killed by the Scots, while another 1,000 were drowned in the River Swale. Nicholas Fleming was among those killed.
The King Departs.
The Chapter of Myton had the effect that Bruce was looking for. At Berwick it caused a serious split in the army between those like the king and the southerners, who wished to continue the siege, and those like Lancaster and the northerners, who were anxious about their homes and property. Edward's army effectively split apart: Lancaster refused to remain and the siege had to be abandoned.
The campaign had been another fiasco, leaving England more divided than ever. It was widely rumoured that Lancaster was guilty of treason, as the raiders appeared to exempt his lands from destruction. Hugh Despenser, the king's new favourite, even alleged that it was Lancaster who had told the Scots of the queen's presence in York. To make matters worse, no sooner had the royal army disbanded than Douglas came back over the border and carried out a destructive raid into Cumberland and Westmorland. Edward had little choice but to ask Robert for a truce, which was granted shortly before Christmas.


Project Danny

Project Danny was a World War II plan for United States Marine Corps F4U Corsair fighter aircraft to attack German V-1 flying bomb launch sites in northern France. Although the squadrons had been trained at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point and were loading onto their escort carriers for the trip to the North Atlantic, opposition from General Marshall meant that the operation was canceled before departing for the European Theater.
Chronology.
Extensive land-based Combined Bomber Offensive bombings of German targets had begun in June 1943, followed by "Crossbow" operations attacking German long range weapon facilities in August 1943 and V-1 launch sites in December 1943. In July 1944 after the V-1 "Robot Blitz" had begun on 13 June, Commander Thomas Hinman Moorer of the Naval Air Atlantic Staff (NavAirLant) provided a Pentagon briefing on a June 1944 plan for F4U squadrons of Marine Air Group 51 (MAG-51) (including VMF-511, VMF-512, VMF-513 and VMF-514) to attack V-1 launch sites from escort carriers in the North Sea with Tiny Tim rockets. The Tiny Tim was a rocket power adaption of a 500lb bomb - each aircraft carrying a single rocket. The plan was disapproved. Project Danny was a victim of the intense interservice rivalry that existed in the US armed forces during World War II; Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall stood up and walked out of the briefing: "That's the end of this briefing. As long as I'm in charge there'll never be a Marine in Europe."
Had the operation proceeded, MAG-51 would have been the second Marine Corsair squadrons to deploy from aircraft carriers, the first being at the Bombing of Rabaul in November 1943.
The only contribution the United States Navy did make to Crossbow operations were the Operation Anvil drone attacks on Crossbow sites in August 1944 using surplus bomber aircraft converted to radio-control bombs.


Peter Huchthausen

Peter A. Huchthausen (25 September 1939 – 11 July 2008 in Amfreville, Manche, France) was a Captain in the United States Navy and the author of several maritime books.
Naval career.
The son of the late Chaplain (Colonel) and Mrs. Walther A. Huchthausen, Peter graduated from Valley Forge Military Academy in 1957 and from the United States Naval Academy in 1962.
Huchthausen served as a line officer in the destroyer USS Blandy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, enforcing the naval blockade and verifying the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. He then served two combat tours of duty during Vietnam War, commanding a patrol boat and unit of ten river patrol boats in combat on the Mekong River with the United States Navy's Riverine Force in the Mekong Delta. He returned to Vietnam as Chief Engineer in the destroyer USS Orleck, which provided naval gunfire support to Army and Marine forces operations along the Vietnam coast. Transferring to Naval Intelligence, he became a Soviet naval submarine analyst and served in anti-submarine warfare positions on the staffs of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, the United States First Fleet, The United States Third Fleet, and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command. Later, he became the senior American naval attaché in Yugoslavia and Romania. Afterward, he became the chief of attaché and human intelligence collection operations in Western Europe for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Just before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Huchthausen served for three years in Moscow as the senior U.S. Naval Attaché to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Post-naval career.
After retiring from active service from the United States Navy in 1990, Huchthausen returned to Moscow and opened an office there for an American firm. At this point, he began his research and writing career. He wrote nine books. Two were made into movies: the HBO movie, "Hostile Waters" and "".
Shortly before his death, he moved to Normandy, where he opened a bed and breakfast in Amfreville.
He was survived by his daughter, Donna Davis (Colin); grandchildren Ewan and Blake of Perth, Western Australia; son Paul Huchthausen (Dana), grandchildren, Bailey Anne and Nicholas of Gum Spring, Virginia; as well as sisters Christa Mueller (Fritz) of Williamsburg, VA, Ann Ekman (Mike) of Waynesboro, VA; and former wife and friend, Kathleen Huchthausen of Kennebunk and Frye Island, Maine
He was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery on December 3, 2008, after a funeral at the Fort Myer Old Post Chapel.


British and French forces in Italy during World War I

During World War I, both Britain and France sent military forces to Italy in October 1917.
Following the Battle of Caporetto (24 October to 19 November 1917), the Italian Front collapsed. In order to ensure this did not lead to Italy withdrawing from the war the allies organised forces to reinforce the Italians. As the battle unfolded, General Luigi Cadorna invoked the agreement reached at the Chantilly Conference of December 1915. There the allies had agreed that should any of the allies come under threat, the other allies would support them. The first French troops arrived on 27 October 1917. The first British troops followed them after a few days. Fearing that his troops would be overrun and lost in case the Italian lines on the Piave river would be broken by the Austro-Hungarian and German forces, however, General Foch refused to commit them to the frontline until the Italian troops had halted the Central Powers' troops by themselves and firmly established a defensive line on the Piave river. The British was thus kept in reserve during the First Battle of the Piave (November 1917) and only saw action from December 1917 onwards.
The French expeditionary force consisted primarily of the French Tenth Army with the addition of the 12th Corps. They took up station around Verona. Four of the six French divisions (, , , ) were to return to the Western Front in spring 1918.
The British Expeditionary Force (Italy) came under the command of General Herbert Plumer. The principal units in the BEF(I) were the 23rd, 41st, 7th, 48th and 5th divisions. The 5th Division returned to France on 1 March 1918, followed by the 41st Division in April. Lieutenant General Cavan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of "British Forces in Italy" on 10 March 1918, comprising the three divisions of XIV Corps (United Kingdom).


D-Day (military term)

In the military, D-Day is the day on which a combat attack or operation is to be initiated. The best known D-Day is during World War II, on June 6, 1944—the day of the Normandy landings—initiating the Western Allied effort to liberate western Europe from Nazi Germany. However, many other invasions and operations had a designated D-Day, both before and after that operation.
The terms D-Day and H-Hour are used for the day and hour on which a combat attack or operation is to be initiated. They designate the day and hour of the operation when the day and hour have not yet been determined, or where secrecy is essential. For a given operation, the same D-Day and H-Hour apply for all units participating in it. When used in combination with numbers, and plus or minus signs, these terms indicate the point of time following or preceding a specific action, respectively. Thus, H−3 means 3 hours before H-Hour, and D+3 means 3 days after D-Day. (By extension, H+75 minutes is used for H-Hour plus 1 hour and 15 minutes.) Planning papers for large-scale operations are made up in detail long before specific dates are set. Thus, orders are issued for the various steps to be carried out on the D-Day or H-Hour minus or plus a certain number of days, hours, or minutes. At the appropriate time, a subsequent order is issued that states the actual day and times.
Other days such as A-Day (Battle of Leyte), L-Day (Battle of Okinawa) etc. have different meanings for the military.
Other languages have terms equivalent to D-Day such as "Hari H" (Indonesian),"Час Ч" (Russian), "Dagen D" (Swedish), ' (Slovenian), ' (Basque), ' (French), ' (Irish), "Tag X" (German), and "" (Romanian). The initial "D" in D-Day has been given various meanings in the past, while more recently it has obtained the connotation of "Day" itself, thereby creating the phrase "Day-Day", or "Day of Days".
History.
The earliest use of these terms by the United States Army that the U.S. Army Center of Military History has been able to find was during World War I. In Field Order Number 9, First Army, American Expeditionary Forces, dated 7 September 1918: "The First Army will attack at H hour on D day with the object of forcing the evacuation of the St. Mihiel Salient."
D-Day for the invasion of Normandy by the Allies was originally set for June 5, 1944, but bad weather and heavy seas caused U.S. Army General Dwight David Eisenhower to delay until June 6 and "that" date has been popularly referred to ever since by the short title "D-Day". Because of the connotation with the invasion of Normandy, planners of later military operations sometimes avoided the term to prevent confusion. For example, Douglas MacArthur's invasion of Leyte began on "A-Day", and the invasion of Okinawa began on "L-Day". The Allies' proposed invasions of Japan would have begun on "X-Day" (on Kyūshū, scheduled for November 1945) and "Y-Day" (on Honshū, scheduled for March 1946).