Battle of Naseby

The Battle of Naseby was a decisive engagement of the First English Civil War, fought on 14 June 1645 between the main Royalist army of King Charles I and the Parliamentarian New Model Army, commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell. It was fought near the village of Naseby in Northamptonshire.
After the Royalists stormed the Parliamentarian town of Leicester on 31 May 1645, Fairfax was ordered to lift his siege of Oxford, the Royalist capital, and engage the King's main army. Eager to bring the Royalists to battle, Fairfax set off in pursuit of the Royalist army, which was heading to recover the north. The King, faced with retreating north with Fairfax close behind, or giving battle, decided to give battle, fearing a loss of morale if his army continued retreating. After hard fighting, the Parliamentarian army had effectively destroyed the Royalist force, which suffered 7,000 casualties out of 7,400 effectives.
King Charles lost the bulk of his veteran infantry and officers, all of his artillery and stores, his personal baggage, and many arms, ensuring the Royalists would never again field an army of comparable quality. Captured in the baggage train were the King's private papers, revealing to the fullest extent his attempts to draw Irish Catholics and foreign mercenaries into the war. Publication of these papers gave Parliament an added moral cause in fighting the war to a finish.
Background.
In July 1644, a Parliamentarian force under Sir Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell secured control of Northern England by victory at Marston Moor. However, this was offset first by defeat at Lostwithiel in September, then lack of decisiveness at the Second Battle of Newbury in October. The two commanders involved, Essex and Manchester, were accused by many in Parliament of lacking commitment, a group that included moderates like Sir William Waller as well as radicals like Cromwell.
In December, Sir Henry Vane introduced the Self-denying Ordinance, requiring any military officers to resign from Parliament. As members of the House of Lords, Manchester and Essex were automatically removed, since unlike MPs they could not resign their titles, although they could be re-appointed, 'if Parliament approved.' It also led to the creation of the New Model Army, a centralised, professional force. Moderates Fairfax and Philip Skippon were appointed Commander-in-Chief and head of the infantry respectively; Cromwell remained an MP but was given command of the cavalry on a 'temporary' three-month commission, constantly renewed.
At the outset of 1645, the Royalist high command was divided on strategy. Prince Rupert of the Rhine, recently appointed senior commander, wanted to link up with his brother Prince Maurice at Chester and retake the north, a key source of recruits and supplies. A faction headed by Lord Digby considered the New Model a threat to their capital at Oxford, while a third group preferred to consolidate control of the West Country. On 30 April, Fairfax marched west to relieve the Parliamentarian stronghold of Taunton; Lord Goring was despatched with 3,000 cavalry to support the Siege of Taunton, while the main Royalist field army of 8,600 men under Charles I and Prince Rupert moved north.
Concerned by this threat, Parliament's Committee of Both Kingdoms ordered Fairfax to change his plans and besiege Oxford. Although he made little progress, by the end of May the town was running short of provisions and to relieve the pressure, the Royalists stormed the Parliamentarian-held town of Leicester on 31 May, allegedly killing over 700 soldiers and civilians. Alarmed by this, Parliament instructed Fairfax to abandon the siege and on 5 June he marched north to engage the Royalist army. Unlike Prince Rupert who had been beaten by Fairfax and Cromwell the previous summer, Digby and Charles dismissed the fighting capabilities of the New Model. Despite being seriously outnumbered, they were eager for battle; messages were sent ordering Goring to rejoin them, but he refused to leave the West Country.
On 12 June, the Royalists were alerted to the presence of the New Model when Parliamentarian patrols clashed with their outposts near Daventry. The next day, Fairfax was reinforced by Cromwell's cavalry and troops from the Eastern Association under Edward Rossiter, bringing his numbers up to 14,000. Although Prince Rupert favoured withdrawing, Digby convinced Charles retreat would be bad for morale and they decided to stand and fight.
Battle.
The morning of 14 June was foggy, preventing the opposing armies from sighting the enemies at first. The Royalist army occupied a strong position on a ridge between the villages of Little Oxendon and East Farndon about south of Market Harborough. The Royalist scoutmaster, Sir Francis Ruce, was sent out to find the Parliamentarian army and rode south for but saw no sign of it, perhaps through negligence. Rupert himself moved forward and saw some Parliamentarian cavalry, apparently retiring. He was determined to secure the commanding Naseby ridge and ordered the Royalist army to advance.
Fairfax initially considered occupying the northern slopes of Naseby ridge. Cromwell believed that this position was too strong, and that the Royalists would refuse battle rather than attack it. He is said to have sent a message to Fairfax, saying, "I beseech you, withdraw to yonder hill, which may provoke the enemy to charge us". Fairfax agreed, and moved his army back slightly.
The Royalists did not see Fairfax's position until they reached the village of Clipston, just over a mile north of Naseby ridge. It was clearly impossible for the Royalists to withdraw to their original position without being attacked by the Parliamentarian cavalry while on the line of march and therefore at a disadvantage. Rupert deployed the army to its right, where the ground appeared to be more favourable for his own cavalry and prepared for battle.
Deployments.
Royalists.
The Royalist army occupied a front of about a mile and a half, between the Clipston-Naseby track on the left and the Sulby Hedges on the right. Their right wing consisted of between 2,000 and 3,000 cavalry under Rupert and his brother Prince Maurice. The centre was organised as three infantry tertias (brigades) commanded by Lord Astley, with a regiment of horse under Colonel Howard in support. On the left were 1,500 "northern horse" (cavalry recruited from the northern counties of England, who continued to fight even after their homes were overrun by Scottish Covenanters and Parliamentarians) commanded by Sir Marmaduke Langdale. The King commanded a small reserve, consisting of his own and Rupert's regiments of foot (800 in total) and his lifeguard of horse.
Parliamentarians.
Fairfax had drawn up his army on the ridge a mile north of Naseby, although some of it was behind the crest on the reverse slope. Ireton's wing of five and a half regiments of cavalry was on the left. The infantry under Sergeant-Major General Sir Philip Skippon was in the centre with five regiments in the front line and three in support. A forlorn hope of 300 musketeers was deployed to the front, and two companies of Colonel Edward Harley's regiment were in reserve. A Parliamentarian engraving of the battle shows 11 pieces of artillery, in the intervals between the infantry regiments. They played little part in the battle; their first salvoes went high, and the Royalist and Parliamentarian infantry were subsequently too closely engaged for the guns to be used. Cromwell's wing, with six and a half regiments of cavalry, was on the right.
The Parliamentarian army occupied a front about long. They outflanked the Royalist left, but their own left flank rested, like the Royalists' right flank, on the Sulby Hedges. At the last minute, as the Royalists began to advance, Cromwell sent a regiment of dragoons under Colonel John Okey into the Sulby Hedges, where they could fire into the flank of Rupert's cavalry.
Action.
The Royalist centre attacked first, with Rupert keeping his own wing of cavalry in hand so that the horse and foot could hit the enemy simultaneously. Skippon's infantry moved forward over the crest of the ridge to meet the Royalist foot. There was time for only one volley of musketry before both sides were fighting hand-to-hand, the veteran Royalist infantry using their swords and the butt ends of their muskets. Sir Edward Walker, Charles's secretary of war, stated "The Foot on either side hardly saw each other until they were within Carabine Shot, and so made only one Volley; our falling in with Sword and butt end of the Musquet did notable Execution, so much as I saw their Colours fall and their Foot in great Disorder." Skippon was wounded by a bullet which splintered his armour and struck him under the ribs, although he stayed on the field to prevent panic spreading. Even so, the Parliamentarians were hard-pressed and forced back.
On the Parliamentarian left, the opposing wings of horse paused briefly to dress ranks before charging into each other. Ireton's own regiment repulsed their Royalist opposite numbers, but Ireton then led at least part of them to the aid of the beleaguered Parliamentarian infantry. His troopers were driven off by Royalist pikemen, and Ireton himself was unhorsed, wounded in the leg and face and taken prisoner. At the same time, the second line of Royalist cavalry broke most of the Parliamentarian horsemen. Some of Ireton's regiments, on the far left, were saved from destruction by the fire from Okey's dragoons, but the others broke and fled, some of them not stopping until they reached Northampton, away. The entire Royalist right wing had been committed to defeat Ireton, and none were left in reserve. Rupert either neglected or was unable to rally the cavalier horsemen, who galloped off the battlefield in pursuit of the fleeing Parliamentarians.
Meanwhile, the Parliamentarian right wing of horse under Cromwell and the Royalist Northern Horse faced each other, neither willing to charge to the aid of their infantry while the other could threaten their flank. Eventually after half an hour, the Royalist cavalry began to charge and Cromwell's troops moved to meet them. Langdale's men were not only outflanked and outnumbered two to one, but forced to charge up a slope broken up by bushes and a rabbit warren. After a brief contest they were routed.
Unlike Rupert, Cromwell had roughly half of his wing uncommitted, as only the front line of Cromwell's wing had taken part in the defeat of Langdale. He sent only four divisions (roughly two regiments) after Langdale, and turned his reserves against the left flank and rear of the Royalist centre. At about the same time, Okey's dragoons mounted their horses and charged from the Sulby Hedges against the right wing of the Royalist infantry, as did some of Ireton's regiments which had partly rallied.
Some of the trapped Royalist infantry began to throw down their arms and call for quarter; others tried to conduct a fighting retreat. One regiment, apparently Rupert's bluecoats, stood their ground and repulsed all attacks. One eyewitness said "The Blue regiment of the Kings stood to it very stoutly, and stirred not, like a wall of brasse...". Eventually, Fairfax led his own regiment of foot and his regiment and lifeguard of horse against them from all sides. The bluecoats' resistance was broken and Fairfax is said to have taken their standard in person. Archaeological evidence (recovered musket balls etc.) suggests that this episode took place in the vicinity of Long Hold Spinney, about behind the Royalist position at the start of the battle.
At some stage, the King attempted to lead his lifeguard of horse to the rescue of his centre or in a counter-attack against Cromwell's troopers, but was prevented from doing so by a Scottish nobleman, the Earl of Carnwath, who seized his bridle, swore at him and said, "Would you go upon your death?" Seeing the King swerve away from the enemy, his lifeguard also retreated in disorder for several hundred yards.
Behind the Parliamentarian lines, Rupert's men had reached Naseby and the Parliamentarian baggage. The Parliamentarian camp guards refused to surrender, and Rupert eventually rallied his men and led them back to the battlefield. It was too late by this time to save the remnants of the Royalist infantry, and Rupert could not induce his men to make another charge. Fairfax halted and reorganised his lines, and when he resumed his advance, Rupert's cavalry rode off the field.
Fairfax's forces pursued Royalist survivors fleeing north towards Leicester. Archaeological evidence suggests that fugitives and Royalist baggage guards tried to rally on the slopes of Castle Yard (also known as Wadborough Hill), a wooded eminence which once had a motte and bailey castle, about behind the Royalist position at the start of the battle. Many Royalists were slaughtered when they mistakenly followed what they thought was the main road to Leicester into the churchyard in the village of Marston Trussell, and were unable to escape their pursuers. Parliamentarian troops also hacked to death at least 100 women camp-followers in the apparent belief they were Irish, though they were probably Welsh whose language was mistaken for Irish. This massacre was without precedent in a war where atrocities against civilians were rare and strongly discouraged, and the reason for it remains a mystery. Wedgwood suggests that the soldiers were intent on plunder rather than killing but were enraged when the women, possibly armed with cooking knives, resisted them.
Aftermath.
Fairfax recovered Leicester on 18 June. He immediately led his army southwest to relieve Taunton and capture the Royalist-held West Country. The Royalist forces surrendered at Truro in Cornwall, while leading Royalist commanders, including Lord Hopton, the Prince of Wales, Sir Edward Hyde, and Lord Capell, fled to Jersey from Falmouth.
The main Royalist military force had been shattered at Naseby. The King had lost his veteran infantry (including 500 officers), all his artillery, and many arms. He lacked the resources to create an army of such quality again, and after Naseby, it simply remained for the Parliamentarian armies to wipe out the last pockets of Royalist resistance.
The Parliamentarians had also captured the King's personal baggage, with correspondence which showed he intended to seek support from the Irish Catholic Confederation through the Cessation Treaty, and Catholic nations in Europe. By publishing this correspondence, entitled "The King's Cabinet Opened", Parliament gained much support in favour of fighting the war to a finish. Within a year, the first civil war ended in a Parliamentarian military victory.


9th Bombardment Group


7th Psychological Operations Group

The 7th Psychological Operations Group is a psychological operations (PSYOP) unit of the United States Army Reserve. Organized in 1965, it was a successor to United States Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific. It is currently based at Moffett Field, California.
Constituted 19 August 1965 in the Regular Army as the 7th Psychological Operations Group. Activated 20 October 1965 on Okinawa. Inactivated 30 June 1974 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Redesignated 30 October 1975 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 7th Psychological Operations Group; concurrently withdrawn from the Regular Army, allotted to the Army Reserve, and activated at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. Reorganized and redesignated 18 September 1990 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 7th Psychological Operations Group. Location changed 15 September 1994 to Moffett Field, California.
Within the psychological operations battalions, there are a number of tactical psychological operations companies. Such companies are organized in the same manner as other Tactical Psychological Operations Companies Army wide. It consists of a Headquarters Section, a Tactical PSYOP Development Detachment or TPDD and three Tactical PSYOP Detachments or TPD. The TPDD focuses on Product Development and Target Audience Analysis while the TPD usually focuses on product distribution, face to face engagement with a given target audience and loudspeaker operations.


502d Bombardment Group

The 502d Bombardment Group (502d BG) was a World War II United States Army Air Forces combat organization. The unit was inactivated on 15 April 1946.
The unit served primarily in the Pacific Ocean theater of World War II as part of Twentieth Air Force. The 502d Bomb Group's aircraft engaged in very heavy bombardment B-29 Superfortress operations against Japan. Its aircraft were identified by a "H" inside a diamond painted on the tail.
History.
The unit was established in early 1944 at Dalhart Army Air Field, Texas, being formed as a B-29 Superfortress Very Heavy bombardment Group. The unit was formed with three reassigned bomb squadrons (402d, 411th and 430th). The 402d was formed in 1940, becoming a II Bomber Command B-24 Liberator Replacement Training Unit (RTU); the 411th and 430th having their origins as World War I Air Service Aero Squadrons. The 411th became a II Bomber Command B-17 Flying Fortress RTU; the 430th serving in the Panama Canal Zone as part of the Sixth Air Force before being inactivated. From an original group of 11 officers and 82 enlisted men, the 502d grew to three flying squadrons, a photo lab and thousands of personnel.
In September 1944, the newly formed group was sent to its training station at Grand Island Army Airfield, Nebraska. Due to a shortage of B-29s, the group was equipped with former II Bomber Command B-17 Flying Fortresses previously used for training heavy bomber replacement personnel. The 502d eventually received Atlanta-built B-29B Superfortresses.
The B-29B was in fact unique, for it was equipped entirely with the only true variant of the B-29 ever manufactured. These aircraft were actually stripped-down versions of the normal B-29, bereft of the General Electric gun system and a variety of other components, in order to save weight and increase bomb-carrying capacity. The resultant unladen weight of 69,000 pounds was a vast improvement, lessening the strain on engines and airframe and enabling the payload to be increased from 12,000 to 18,000 pound ordnance. The only armament on these aircraft was in the tail, where two .50 caliber machine guns were installed. The elimination of the turrets and the associated General Electric computerized gun system increased the top speed of the Superfortress to 364 mph at 25,000 feet and made the B-29B suitable for fast, unescorted hit-and-run bombing raids and photographic missions.
In addition, the B-29Bs of the 502nd were equipped with the new AN/APQ-7 "Eagle" radar sets which gave a much clearer presentation of ground images through a wing-shaped radar vane slung beneath the fuselage. It also gave a biplane effect in appearance. The "Eagle" was the product of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Eagle radar development group. It had been designed especially for night missions. Missions had to be planned and prepared so that briefing material could be slanted from the radar point of view. During World War II this special antenna and equipment for precision night radar missions was so secret that no B-29s were ever shown with it, and there are no actual official photographs in existence.
The 502d was deployed to Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) in late 1944, being assigned to the XXI Bomber Command 315th Bombardment Wing in the Northern Mariana Islands; being stationed at Northwest Field, Guam. Upon arrival the group's personnel were engaged in Quonset hut construction. By mid-July most personnel were able to move into the huts from the initial tents which they were assigned on arrival. On 9 July, the group flew a shakedown mission to Truk, carrying about half a normal payload of bombs. The group entered combat on 30 June 1945 when the group bombed enemy installations on Rota.
It then began flying very long range strategic bombardment missions over the Japanese Home Islands, principally attacking targets relating to the enemy's petroleum industry. The 502d was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation (DUC) for attacks on the coal liquefaction plant at Ube, the tank farm at Amagasaki and the Nippon oil refinery at Tsuchizaki in August 1945. It also conducted night incendiary raids attacking major Japanese cities causing massive destruction of urbanized areas. The group continued strategic bombing raids and incendiary attacks until the Japanese Capitulation in August 1945.
After V-J Day, the 502d dropped supplies to Allied prisoners, participated in show-of-force missions, and flew over Japan to evaluate bombardment damage. In the fall of 1945, the group largely demobilized as part of the "Sunset Project", with some aircraft being sent reclamation on Tinian; others being returned to the United States for storage at aircraft depots in the southwest. By Christmas, the group fleet was reduced to 30 or fewer planes and the remaining elements of the group was effectively consolidated into the 501st Bombardment Group. Many of the remaining veterans signed for "any conditions of travel" to get home, arriving three weeks later in Oakland, California, where troop trains scattered them for points of discharge close to their homes.
The 502d was inactivated on Guam largely as a paper unit on 15 April 1946.


Operation Sea Horse

Operation Sea Horse was the naval part of Operation Lusty. Lusty's purpose was to locate and recover top secret German weaponry, e.g. aircraft and weapons.
Ship involvement.
The escort aircraft carrier HMS "Reaper" took part in the operation, being used to ferry captured airframes. On 23 July 1945, "Reaper" left Cherbourg for Newark, New Jersey. The news of the Japanese surrender came through during the voyage.
Aircraft captured.
On the ocean voyage to Allied bases, the planes were covered in protective "shrink wrap'" to protect them from sea spray. It was reported that the following aircraft were captured:
Aircraft uses.
In thanks for British help for providing the services of one of their aircraft carriers, the Americans gave them five Messerschmitt Me 262s for testing. The other five Messerschmitt Me 262s stayed with the AAF, and were flown to an airfield in Indiana known as Freeman Field where tests could be carried out relatively secretly. On 19 August, one of two Messerschmitt Me 262s travelling to Freeman Field via Pittsburgh crashed into a field during landing, with all that remained of the aircraft salvageable parts.
See also.
Operation Paperclip


Operation Sportpalast

Operation Sportpalast was the first German attempt to disrupt an Allied Arctic convoy in early March 1942, targeting PQ 12 and QP 8 led by German battleship "Tirpitz" and its escorting destroyers.
Convoy PQ-12 sailed from Reykjavík for Murmansk on 1 March, escorted by the battlecruiser , the battleship , the cruiser and six destroyers under command of Vice-Admiral Alban Curteis. Convoy
QP-8 left Murmansk on the return route at about the same time, expecting to pass PQ-12 near Bear Island. Additional naval forces, the battleship , the aircraft carrier , the cruiser and six destroyers, sailed from Scapa Flow on 6 March to join Vice-Admiral Curteis near Jan Mayen Island.
"Tirpitz" left Fættenfjord on 5 March, in response to a report from a spotter plane and was joined by Admiral Otto Ciliax and an escort of three destroyers on the following day. In turn, the German movements were reported by a British submarine. Despite using her destroyers to sweep for the convoys, "Tirpitz" missed QP-8. A slow freighter, "Izhora", was caught by the destroyers and sunk after reporting the attack.
The German and British forces and the two convoys managed to move around each other in the vicinity of Bear Island without meeting or being seen by spotter aircraft. Advice from German High Command and the British Admiralty added to the confusion of the commanders on the spot. Eventually, on 9 March, aircraft from "Victorious" spotted and shadowed the German flotilla, despite being attacked by "Tirpitz's" aircraft. The consequent air attacks were unsuccessful but encouraged the Germans to return to Norway. The two convoys reached port safely but the incident had demonstrated the threat that convoys faced. In March and April, 1942, RAF Bomber Command made three unsuccessful attacks on "Tirpitz".


Club Run

Club Run was an informal name for aircraft ferry operations from Gibraltar to Malta during the Siege of Malta in the Second World War. Malta was half-way between Gibraltar to Alexandria and had the only harbour controlled by the British in the area. Malta had docks, repair facilities, reserves and stores, which had been built up since the cession of the island to Britain in 1814. Malta had become an important staging post for aircraft and a base for air reconnaissance over the central Mediterranean. The Axis powers Italy and Germany made several attempts from 1941 to 1942 to either force the British military authorities on the island to surrender or to destroy its effectiveness as a military base. The island was a forward base from which Axis supplies to their North African armies could be attacked. It is a measure of Malta's importance that Britain reassigned fighter aircraft from home defence.
Ferry missions were covered by Force H, based at Gibraltar (called The Club), consisting of the battlecruiser , aircraft carrier , light cruiser and the E and F-class destroyers of the 8th Flotilla. Its Mediterranean operations were called Club Runs. It was deemed to be an exclusive club of the most efficient warships in the Royal Navy. A mythical "regimental tie" was designed for members of "The Club", consisting of a Mediterranean grey field, scattered with raspberries.
Malta's air defences were essential and aircraft reinforcements and replacements were a constant need. Fighters (Hawker Hurricanes and Supermarine Spitfires) and torpedo bombers (Fairey Swordfish and Fairey Albacores) were required but they lacked the range to fly direct from the British base at Gibraltar. The solution was for aircraft carriers to move within range for the fighters to fly off and land at a Maltese airfield.
At the outbreak of war, the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff was that Malta was indefensible and this view was supported by a later review, "there is nothing practicable that we can do to increase the powers of resistance of Malta". Winston Churchill disagreed. In July 1940, he insisted that Hurricanes be flown in "at the earliest moment". This led to the first Club Run, Operation Hurry, using the antiquated HMS Argus.
The Axis air forces developed measures to counter the Club Runs, attacking the aircraft while in transit and catching them on the ground before they could be armed and refuelled. Forty of the Spitfires delivered by the United States Navy carrier (Operation Calendar) were destroyed on the ground but in the following operation (Operation Bowery) the "Luftwaffe" were outwitted and British fighters were airborne and ready for their opponents.
In their turn, the carriers became prime targets and required more heavily protected and complex operations to ensure success. Despite this, the British carrier "Ark Royal" was sunk and the American carrier "Wasp" was loaned for Club Runs in April and May 1942. Aircraft losses over Malta were such that the replenishment Club Runs became a constant conveyor belt of aircraft ferried to Gibraltar, where they were transferred to carriers for flying off while more were ferried from Britain. Additional capacity was created by transporting aircraft in crates and assembling them at Gibraltar or on board carriers. In this way, one ferry run from Britain would deliver enough aircraft for two flying-off operations.
From early 1942, Spitfires were necessary to counter the more modern German fighters that outclassed the robust but outdated Hurricanes. On several occasions there were faults with the external fuel tanks that were needed to give the required range. As a result, two Club Runs were aborted and had to be repeated after modifications at Gibraltar, Calendar delivered inadequately prepared aircraft that fell prey to bombing on Malta and Bowery′s 64 Spitfires required adaptations to the external fuel tanks while on board USS "Wasp". The failure to rectify a fault over several deliveries for a critical purpose in hazardous circumstances is unexplained but was described as "embarrassing".
From October 1942, adapted Spitfire Mk VCs with additional internal and external fuel tanks and most armament removed were capable of flying the from Gibraltar to Malta, where the adaptations were reversed, which made Club Runs redundant.


Australia and the Empire Air Training Scheme

The Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) was a policy designed to train Royal Australian Air Force pilots for eventual transfer into the Royal Air Force during World War II. The policy, dubbed the Empire Air Training Scheme in Australia, was envisioned after the British Empire was unable to supply enough pilots and aircraft for the Royal Air force. In Australia the scheme would eventually branch out and provide the training of pilots for deployment in the Pacific War.
Background.
In the period of rearmament preceding World War II, the Royal Air Force estimated that they would need to acquire 50,000 new pilots annually in order to keep the RAF sufficiently supplied. While planners were confident that the industrial capacity of the British Empire would be capable of producing a sufficient number of planes, it became clear that there was a shortage of able fliers. As the War in Europe drew closer, it was estimated Britain could muster only 22,000 pilots annually.
In response to this shortage, the British government instituted a plan to levy pilots from the dominions referred to as the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The plan called for an establishment of a pool of recruits in the dominions from which the RAF could siphon replacement pilots. The government of Australia accepted the plan for three years and began making preparations to adopt it. Under the plan, dubbed the Empire Air Scheme in Australia, 50,000 aircrew would be trained in the dominions.
Australia planned to provide 28,000 aircrew under the scheme, accounting for 36% of the total number of proposed aircrew. Basic flying courses officially began 29 April 1940. The first Australian pilots departed for Canada on 14 November 1940, from where they would be transferred to Britain and funneled into the RAF.
Empire Air Training Scheme.
Following the signing of the plan, a massive construction and recruitment campaign was launched to increase the number of Australian pilots. The "Scheme" would ultimately cost Australia about £100,000,000 for her commitments. The RAAF built air and ground training schools, airfields, and specialized flying academies. While original designed only to train aircrew, the Australian government soon modified the scheme to compensate for the unique situation Australia found itself in. In addition to the Empire Air Training Scheme, wartime demands and restrictions led to shortages as funds and resources were needed for home defense. When German Strategic Bombing of British factories reduced the number of serviceable aircraft in Britain, the Australian government appropriated funds from EATS to establish the Department of Aircraft Production, the precursor to Government Aircraft Factories.
Following the opening of the Pacific War in 1941, the number of Australian aircrews being transferred to the European theatre greatly decreased as the RAAF prepared to counter the armed forces of the Empire of Japan. A series of Japanese air raids greatly increased the need for a large force of combat ready pilots and aircraft in Australia.
Schools established by EATS.
The following types of schools were established as part of EATS:
A memorial was dedicated to 5 Service Flying Training School RAAF, within the Empire Air Training Scheme at Uranquinty, 19 September 1999.


Operation Undertone

Operation Undertone, also known as the Saar-Palatinate Offensive, was a large assault by the U.S. Seventh, Third, and French First Armies of the U.S. Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups as part of the Allied invasion of Germany in March 1945 during World War II.
A force of three corps was to attack abreast from Saarbrücken, Germany, along a sector to a point southeast of Hagenau, France. A narrow strip along the Rhine leading to the extreme northeastern corner of Alsace at Lauterbourg was to be cleared by a division of the French First Army under operational control of the Seventh Army. The Seventh Army's main effort was to be made in the center up the Kaiserslautern corridor.
In approving the plan, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower asserted that the objective was not only to clear the Saar-Palatinate but to establish bridgeheads with forces of the Sixth Army Group over the Rhine between Mainz and Mannheim. The U.S. Third Army of the 12th Army Group was to be limited to diversionary attacks across the Moselle to protect the Sixth Army Group's left flank.
Opposing commanders were U.S. General Jacob L. Devers, commanding U.S. Sixth Army Group and German SS General Paul Hausser, commanding German Army Group G.
Significantly assisted by operations of the Third Army that overran German lines of communication, Operation Undertone cleared Wehrmacht defenses and pushed to the Rhine in the area of Karlsruhe within 10 days. General Devers′ victory—along with a rapid advance by the U.S. Third Army—completed the advance of Allied armies to the west bank of the Rhine along its entire length within Germany.
The bulk of the text in this article is taken directly from "The Last Offensive", a work of the U.S. Army that is in the public domain. The material was extracted from Chapter XII, "The Saar-Palatinate", pp. 236–265.
Plan.
Anticipating early completion of operations to clear the west bank of the Rhine north of the Moselle, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower on 13 February 1945 had told his two American army group commanders—Generals Omar Bradley and Jacob L. Devers—to begin planning for a joint drive to sweep the Saar-Palatinate. Assigned a target date of 15 March, the offensive was to begin only after the 21st Army Group had reached the Rhine. It was to be designed both to draw enemy units from the north and to provide an alternate line of attack across the Rhine should the principal Allied drive in the north fail. The main effort, SHAEF planners contemplated, was to be made by the Sixth Army Group's Seventh Army, which was to be augmented by transferring one armored and three infantry divisions from the U.S. Third Army.
During the first week of March, General Devers at Sixth Army Group approved a plan (Operation UNDERTONE) prepared by General Alexander Patch′s Seventh Army. A force of three corps was to attack abreast from Saarbrücken along a sector to a point southeast of Hagenau. A narrow strip along the Rhine leading to the extreme northeastern corner of Alsace at Lauterbourg was to be cleared by a division of the French First Army under operational control of the Seventh Army. The Seventh Army's main effort was to be made in the center up the Kaiserslautern corridor.
In approving the plan, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower asserted that the objective was not only to clear the Saar-Palatinate but to establish bridgeheads with forces of the Sixth Army Group over the Rhine between Mainz and Mannheim. The U.S. Third Army of the 12th Army Group was to be limited to diversionary attacks across the Moselle to protect the Sixth Army Group's left flank.
Eisenhower approved on 8 March, the same day that General George S. Patton obtained approval from General Bradley for the plan prepared by the Third Army staff for a major attack across the Moselle.
The 12th Army Group commander in turn promoted the plan with General Eisenhower. Noting that the Germans had given no indication of withdrawing from the Siegfried Line in front of the Seventh Army and that General Patch thus might be in for a long, costly campaign, Bradley suggested that the Third Army jump the Moselle near Koblenz, sweep south along the west bank of the Rhine to cut the enemy's supply lines, and at the same time press from its previously established Saar-Moselle bridgehead near Trier to come at the Siegfried Line fortifications from the rear. General Eisenhower approved the plan without qualification.
Although General Devers was briefly reluctant to endorse Third Army operations south of the Moselle lest the two forces become entangled with their converging thrusts, he too in the end approved the plan. He and Bradley agreed on a new boundary that afforded the Third Army a good road leading northeast from Saarlautern to headwaters of the Nahe River, some northeast of Saarlautern, thence along the valley of the Nahe to the Rhine at Bingen. This boundary gave the Third Army responsibility for clearing the northwestern third of the Saar-Palatinate. Bradley and Devers also authorized the commanders of the two armies—Third and Seventh—to deal directly with each other rather than through their respective army group headquarters.
Facing the undented fortifications of the Siegfried Line, the Seventh Army commander planned a set-piece attack, preceded by an extensive program of aerial bombardment. Before the attack could begin, supplies had to be accumulated, division and corps boundaries adjusted, some units shuffled, and new divisions joining the army fed into jump-off positions. This meant to General Patch that the Seventh Army could not attack before the target date, 15 March.
Assault.
All along the Mosel, from Koblenz to Trier, the German 7. "Armee" on 17 March was in peril, if not from direct attack, then from the flanking thrust against the right wing of the 1. "Armee" by General Walton Walker′s XX Corps. Collapse of the 7. "Armee" clearly was but a question of time. Soon the German 1. "Armee", too, would be in dire straits, for the U.S. Seventh Army two days earlier, on 15 March, had launched a power drive against "General" Hermann Foertsch′s army along a front from the vicinity of Saarlautern southeastward to the Rhine. Even if that offensive failed to penetrate the Siegfried Line, it might tie the 1. "Armee" troops to the fortifications while Patton's forces took them from the rear.
The U.S. Seventh Army traced its origin back to Sicily where General Patton had first led it into battle. An infantryman who had seen combat many months before on Guadalcanal, "Sandy" Patch, had assumed command for the invasion of southern France and a swift advance northward. Patch's chief of staff was an artilleryman, Maj. Gen. Arthur A. White, who had held a similar post under Patch on Guadalcanal.
The Seventh Army numbered among its ranks several relatively inexperienced units but retained a flavoring of long-term veterans. The VI Corps (Maj. Gen. Edward H. Brooks), for example, and three divisions—the 3rd, 36th, and 45th—had fought at length in the Mediterranean theater, including the Anzio beachhead. The XV Corps (Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip) had joined the Seventh Army after fighting across France with the Third Army. A third corps, the XXI (Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn), was relatively new, having joined the army in January.
As the Seventh Army offensive began, the basic question was how stubbornly the Germans would defend before falling back on the Siegfried Line. Only General Milburn's XXI Corps — on the Seventh Army's left wing, near Saarbrücken — was fairly close to the Siegfried Line, while other units were as much as away. Making the army's main effort in the center, General Haislip's XV Corps faced what looked like a particularly troublesome obstacle in the town of Bitche. Surrounded by fortresses of the French Maginot Line, Bitche had been taken from the Germans in December after a hard struggle, only to be relinquished in the withdrawal forced by the German counteroffensive. On the army's right wing, General Brooks's VI Corps—farthest of all from the Siegfried Line—first had to get across the Moder River, and one of Brooks's divisions faced the added difficulty of attacking astride the rugged Lower Vosges Mountains.
Two German corps and part of a third were in the path of the impending American drive. At Saarbrücken, the left wing of "General" Knieß′ LXXXV Korps would receive a glancing blow from Milburn's XXI Corps. Having recently given up the 559. "Volksgrenadierdivision" to the 7. "Armee", Knieß had only two divisions, one of which was tied down holding Siegfried Line positions northwest of Saarbrücken. Southeast of the town, with boundaries roughly coterminous with those of Haislip's XV Corps, stood the XIII SS "Korps" ("SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS" Max Simon) with three divisions. Extending the line to the Rhine was the XC Korps ("General der Infanterie" Erich Petersen) with two "volksgrenadier" divisions and remnants of an infantry training division.
Although the Germans worried most about a breakthrough in the sector of Petersen's XC "Korps" into the Wissembourg Gap rather than through Simon's XIII SS "Korps" into the Kaiserslautern corridor, the shifts and countershifts made in preceding weeks to salvage reinforcements for the 7. "Armee" actually had left the XIII SS "Korps" the stronger. In addition to two "Volksgrenadier" divisions, Simon's corps had the 17th SS "Panzergrenadierdivision", at this point not much more than a proud name, but a unit possessing considerably more tanks and other armored vehicles than were to be found in the entire adjacent corps. The American main effort thus aimed at the stronger German units, though at this stage of the war strength in regard to German divisions was but a relative term.
As General Patch's Seventh Army attacked before daylight on 15 March, the apparent answer on German intentions was quick to come. Only in two places could the resistance be called determined. One was on the left wing, where the 63rd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Louis E. Hibbs) sought to bypass Saarbrücken on the east and cut German escape routes from the city. The fact that the 63rd Division early hit the Siegfried Line provided ready explanation for the stanch opposition there. The other was on the extreme right wing where an attached 3rd Algerian Infantry Division (3e "Division d'Infanterie d'Algerie") was to clear the expanse of flatland between Hagenau and the Rhine. There an urban area closely backing the Moder River defensive line and flat ground affording superb fields of fire for dug-in automatic weapons accounted in large measure for the more difficult fighting.
Elsewhere, local engagements sometimes were vicious and costly but usually were short-lived. Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines abounded. German artillery fire seldom was more than moderate and in most cases could better be classified as light or sporadic. That was attributable in part to a campaign of interdiction for several days preceding the attack by planes of the XII Tactical Air Command (Brig. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus) and by D-day strikes by both the fighter-bombers and the mediums and heavies of the 8th Air Force. The latter hit Siegfried Line fortifications and industrial targets in cities such as Zweibrücken and Kaiserslautern. The weather was beautifully clear, enabling the aircraft to strike at a variety of targets, limited only by range and bomb-carrying capacity. Among the German casualties were the operations officers of two of the three XC "Korps" divisions.
Of the units of the outsized (six divisions) XV Corps, only a regiment of the 45th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Robert T. Frederick) faced a water obstacle at the start. That regiment had to cross the Blies River at a site upstream from where the Blies turns northeast to meander up the Kaiserslautern corridor. Yet even before dawn men of the regiment had penetrated the enemy's main line of defense beyond the river. Aided by searchlights, they bypassed strongpoints, leaving them for reserves to take out later. As night came, the 45th Division had driven almost beyond the Blies to match a rate of advance that was general everywhere except in the pillbox belt near Saarbrücken and on the flatlands near the Rhine.
On the right wing of the XV Corps, men of the 100th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Withers A. Burress) drove quickly to the outskirts of the fortress town of Bitche. Perhaps aided by the fact that they had done the same job before in December, they gained dominating positions on the fortified hills around the town, leaving no doubt that they would clear the entire objective in short order the next day, 16 March.
The only counterattack to cause appreciable concern hit a battalion of the 3rd Division′s 7th Infantry. Veterans of combat from the North African campaign onward, the regiments of the 3rd Division (Maj. Gen. John W. O'Daniel) were making the main effort in the center of the XV Corps in the direction of Zweibrücken and the Kaiserslautern corridor. Although a company of supporting tanks ran into a dense minefield, disabling four tanks and stopping the others, a battalion of the 7th Infantry fought its way into the village of Uttweiler, just across the German frontier. Then an infantry battalion from the 17. SS "Panzergrenadierdivision", supported by nine assault guns, struck back. The Germans quickly isolated the American infantrymen but could not force them from the village. Supported by a platoon of tank destroyers and the regimental antitank company organized as a bazooka brigade, another of the 7th Infantry's battalions counterattacked. The men knocked out four multiple-barrel "FlaKwagen"s and seven assault guns and freed the besieged battalion.
On the Seventh Army's right wing, pointed toward the Wissembourg Gap, divisions of General Brooks's VI Corps experienced, with the exception of the 3rd Algerian Division, much the same type of opposition. Although all four attacking divisions had to overcome the initial obstacle of a river, either the Moder or a tributary, they accomplished the job quickly with predawn assaults. The Germans were too thinly stretched to do more than man a series of strongpoints. On the corps left wing, the 42nd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Harry J. Collins) overcame the added obstacle of attacking along the spine of the Lower Vosges by avoiding the roads and villages in the valleys and following the crests of the high ground. Pack mules—already proved in earlier fighting in the High Vosges—provided the means of supply.
As with the 3rd Division, a battalion of the 103rd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe) ran into a counterattack, but the reaction it prompted was more precautionary than forced. Having entered Uttenhoffen, northwest of Hagenau, the battalion encountered such intense small arms fire and shelling from self-propelled guns that the regimental commander authorized withdrawal. When German infantry soon after nightfall counterattacked with support from four self-propelled pieces, the battalion pulled back another few hundred yards to better positions on the edge of a copse.
In the sector of the 36th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. John E. Dahlquist), the day's fighting produced a heroic performance by a rifleman of the 142d Infantry, Pfc. Silvestre S. Herrera. After making a one-man charge that carried a German strongpoint and took eight prisoners, Herrera and his platoon were pinned down by fire from a second position protected by a minefield. Disregarding the mines, Herrera also charged this position but stepped on a mine and lost both feet. Even that failed to check him. He brought the enemy under such accurate rifle fire that others of his platoon were able to bypass the minefield and take the Germans in flank.
The 3d Algerian Division meanwhile got across the Moder with little enough trouble but then encountered intense house-to-house fighting. Despite good artillery support made possible by the unlimited visibility of a clear day, grazing fire from automatic weapons prevented the Algerians from crossing a stretch of open ground facing the buildings of a former French Army frontier post. A welter of mines and two counterattacks, the latter repulsed in both cases by artillery fire, added to the problems. As night fell, no Algerian unit had advanced more than 1.6 kilometres.
On the second day, 16 March, indications that the Germans were fighting no more than a delaying action increased everywhere except, again, on the two flanks. It seemed particularly apparent in the zone of the XV Corps, where all three attacking divisions improved on their first day's gains. Mines, demolitions, and strongpoints usually protected by a tank or an assault gun were the main obstacles. By nightfall, both the 3rd and 45th Divisions were well across the German frontier, scarcely more than a stone's throw from the outposts of the Siegfried Line, and the 100th Division, relieved at Bitche by a follow-up infantry division, had begun to come abreast. Fighter-bombers of the XII Tactical Air Command again were out in force.
Even though the Germans appeared to be falling back by design, in reality they intended a deliberate defense. Although corps commanders had begged to be allowed to withdraw into the Siegfried Line even before the American offensive began, General Foertsch at 1. "Armee" and General Hausser at Army Group G had been impelled to deny the entreaties. The new Commander-in-Chief West—"Generalfeldmarschall" Albert Kesselring—remained as faithful as his predecessor to the Hitler-imposed maxim of no withdrawal anywhere unless forced.
As events developed, no formal order to pull back into the fortifications ever emerged above corps level. Beginning the night of 16 March, commanders facing the U.S. XV Corps simply did the obvious, ordering their units to seek refuge in the Siegfried Line whenever American pressure grew so great that withdrawal or annihilation became the only alternatives. The next day, commanders facing the U.S. VI Corps adopted the same procedure.
It became at that point as much a matter of logistics as of actual fighting before all divisions of the Seventh Army would be battling to break the concrete barrier into the Saar-Palatinate; but as more than one German commander noted with genuine concern, whether any real fight would develop for the Siegfried Line was not necessarily his to determine. That responsibility fell to those units, decimated and increasingly demoralized, which were opposing the onrush of U.S. Third Army troops from west and northwest into the German rear.
Breakthrough.
As the breakthrough of General Walker's XX Corps developed in the direction of Kaiserslautern, concern had mounted in the 1. "Armee" lest those units in the Siegfried Line around Saarbrücken and Zweibrücken be trapped. Once Kaiserslautern fell, the only routes of withdrawal left to those troops led through the Haardt Mountains south of Kaiserslautern. Covered by a dense wood, the Pfaelzer Forest, the region was crossed laterally by only one main highway, by a secondary highway close behind the Siegfried Line, and by a few minor roads and trails. The natural difficulties posed by these twisting, poorly surfaced routes already had been heightened by a mass of wrecked vehicles as American fighter pilots relentlessly preyed on hapless targets.
Using the authority granted by Kesselring on 17 March to pull back units threatened with encirclement, the 1. "Armee"′s "General" Foertsch authorized withdrawal by stages of his westernmost troops, those of "General" Knieß′ LXXXV "Korps". Over a period of three days, units of the corps were to peel back from west to east, redeploying to block the main highway leading northeast through the Kaiserslautern Gap.
Unfortunately for Foertsch's plan, the principal threat to the Kaiserslautern Gap came not from west or southwest but from northwest where Walker's XX Corps was pouring unchecked through General Walther Hahm's LXXXII Korps. The 10th Armored Division′s arrival at Kaiserslautern itself on 20 March meant not only that the gap was compromised by a force well in the rear of Knieß′' formations but also that the only way out for both Knieß′ troops and those of the adjacent XIII SS "Korps" was through the Pfaelzer Forest.
As Knieß′ withdrawal progressed, it had the effect of opening a path through the Siegfried Line for the left wing of the U.S. Seventh Army. Despite a stubborn rear guard, the 63rd Division of General Milburn's XXI Corps broke through the main belt of fortifications near St. Ingbert late on 19 March. Had events moved according to plan, Milburn then would have sent an armored column northward to link with Walker's XX Corps near St. Wendel; but so swift had been the advance of Walker's troops that all worthwhile objectives in Milburn's sector beyond the Siegfried Line already had fallen. Milburn and his XXI Corps had achieved a penetration but had no place to go.
The Seventh Army commander, General Patch, seized on the situation to provide a boost for his army's main effort, the attack of the XV Corps through Zweibrücken toward the Kaiserslautern Gap. In two days of hammering at "General" Simon's XIII SS "Korps", the divisions of the XV Corps still had opened no hole through the Siegfried Line for armored exploitation. Send a combat command, Patch directed the XV Corps commander, General Haislip, to move through the 63rd Division's gap and come in on the rear of the Siegfried Line defenders facing the XV Corps.
That the Americans would exploit the withdrawal was too obvious to escape the 1. "Armee" commander, General Foertsch. During the night of the 19th, he extended the authority to withdraw to the west wing of the XIII SS "Korps". Thus, hardly had the American combat command begun to move early on 20 March to exploit the 63rd Division's penetration when the 45th Division of the XV Corps also advanced past the last pillboxes of the Siegfried Line near Zweibrücken. During the night of the 20th, the rest of the SS "korps" also began to pull back, and the momentum of the 3rd Division's advance picked up accordingly.
The German problem was to get the survivors of both the LXXXV "Korps" and the XIII SS "Korps" through the Pfaelzer Forest despite three dire threats: one from the closely following troops of the U.S. Seventh Army; another from the 10th Armored Division of Walker's XX Corps, which at Kaiserslautern was in a position to swing south and southeast through the Pfaelzer Forest and cut the escape routes; and a third from the Argus-eyed fighter bombers of the XII Tactical Air Command.
It was the last that was most apparent to the rank and file of the retreating Germans. Since speed was imperative, the men had to move by day as well as by night, virtually inviting attack from the air. Since almost everybody, including the troops of the motorized 17. SS "Panzergrenadierdivision", had to use either the main east–west highway through the forest or the secondary road close behind the Siegfried Line, American fighter pilots had only to aim their bombs, their cannon, and their machine guns in the general direction of those roads to be assured of hitting some target. An acute gasoline shortage added to the German difficulties. Almost every foot of the two roads soon became clogged with abandoned, damaged, or wrecked vehicles, guns, and equipment.
The destruction in the Pfaelzer Forest was in keeping with the pattern almost everywhere. So long a target of both artillery and aircraft, the drab towns and cities in and close to the Siegfried Line were a shambles. "It is difficult to describe the destruction," wrote the 45th Division commander, General Frederick. "Scarcely a man-made thing exists in our wake; it is even difficult to find buildings suitable for CP′s: this is the scorched earth." In Zweibrücken, with the entire business district razed, only about 5,000 people of a normal population of 37,000 remained, and they were hiding in cellars and caves. Fires burned uncontrolled, neither water nor fire-fighting equipment available to quench them. No local government existed. Thousands of released slave laborers and German soldiers who had changed into civilian clothes complicated the issue for military government officials. In more than one city, particularly Homburg, looting and pillage were rampant.
Running the gantlet of American fighter aircraft through the Pfaelzer Forest, the amorphous mass of retreating Germans faced still a fourth American threat—General Brooks's VI Corps, which had followed closely the German withdrawal from northeastern Alsace and on 19 March had begun to assault the Siegfried Line on either side of Wissembourg. There, "General" Petersen's XC "Korps" was charged with holding the fortifications and denying access to the flatlands along the Rhine.
In the Seventh Army's original plan, the attached 3rd Algerian Division on the right wing of the VI Corps along the Rhine was to have been pinched out after it reached the Lauter River at the German frontier. The planners had not reckoned with the aspirations of the French and their First Army commander, General Jean de Lattre. Assured of support from the provisional head of the French state, General Charles de Gaulle, de Lattre was determined to acquire a zone along the Rhine north of the Lauter in order to assure a Rhine crossing site for the final drive into Germany.
As the Algerians matched and sometimes exceeded the strides of the American units of the VI Corps and reached the Lauter along a front, de Lattre had no difficulty pressing his ambition on the Sixth Army Group commander, General Devers. Using the 3rd Algerian Division and a combat group from the 5th French Armored Division, again to be attached to the VI Corps, the French (organized as Task Force ("Groupement") de Monsabert) were to continue northward some beyond the Lauter River, thereby gaining limited Rhine River frontage inside Germany. The subsequent French advance pushed through the Bienwald, a large forested expanse just north of the Lauter through which bunkers, trenches, and other obstacles of the Siegfried Line were emplaced. In the ensuing clash, elements of the German 257th "Volksgrenadier" and 905th Infantry Training Divisions were forced to retreat northward in fighting dominated by the forested terrain.
The adjustment meant that the Siegfried Line assault by the four American divisions of the VI Corps was to be concentrated in a zone less than wide. Since the German XC "Korps" had only the remnants of two "volksgrenadier" divisions and an infantry training division to defend against both Americans and French, a breakthrough of the fortifications was but a matter of time. Yet just as had been the case in the zones of the XXI Corps and the XV Corps, it was less the hard fighting of the VI Corps that would determine when the Siegfried Line would be pierced than it was the rampaging thrusts of the Third Army's XX Corps in the German rear.
The divisions of the VI Corps had been probing the pillbox belt less than 24 hours when General Walker, leaving the task of gaining the Rhine to the 12th Armored Division and of actually capturing Kaiserslautern to an infantry unit, turned the 10th Armored Division south and southeast into the Pfaelzer Forest. By nightfall of 20 March, two of the 10th Armored's columns stood only a few hundred yards from the main highway through the forest, one almost at the city of Pirmasens on the western edge, the other not far from the eastern edge. A third was nearing Neustadt, farther north beyond the fringe of the forest. The 12th Armored meanwhile was approaching the Rhine near Ludwigshafen. Not only were the withdrawal routes through the Pfaelzer Forest about to be compromised but a swift strike down the Rhine plain from Neustadt and Ludwigshafen against the last escape sites for crossing the Rhine appeared in the offing.
In desperation, on 20 March the Luftwaffe sent approximately 300 planes of various types—including jet-propelled Messerschmitt Me 262—to attack the Third Army's columns, but to little avail. Casualties on the American side were minor. Anti-aircraft units—getting a rare opportunity to do the job for which they were trained—shot down 25 German planes. Pilots of the XIX Tactical Air Command claimed another eight.
In the face of the 10th Armored Division's drive, the word to the westernmost units of the XC "Korps" to begin falling back went out late on the 20th, and when the 42nd Division—in the mountains on the left wing of the VI Corps—launched a full-scale assault against the Siegfried Line late the next day, the attack struck a vacuum. Soon after dawn the next morning, 22 March, a regiment of the 42nd cut the secondary highway through the Pfaelzer Forest. A column of the 10th Armored had moved astride the main highway through the woods and emerged on the Rhine flatlands at Landau. Any Germans who got out of the forest would have to do so by threading a way off the roads individually or in small groups.
By nightfall of 22 March, the Germans west of the Rhine could measure the time left to them in hours. In the Siegfried Line on either side of Wissembourg, Germans of Petersen's XC "Korps" continued to fight in the pillboxes in a manner that belied the futility of their mission. The 14th Armored Division (Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith) attacked into the Wissembourg Gap on 20 March and then fought Germans of the "XC Corps" over the possession of Steinfeld for the next two days. Both at Neustadt and at Landau, remnants of two divisions of the XIII SS "Korps", including the 17. SS "Panzergrenadierdivision", had held through the day, but early in the evening the defense collapsed. "General" Franz Beyer's LXXX Korps, transferred from the 7. "Armee" to plug the hole from the north alongside the Rhine, had hardly anything left to prevent the 12th Armored Division from driving southward from Ludwigshafen toward Speyer. By nightfall of the 22nd, a column of the 12th Armored stood only from Speyer, and on the 23rd, the 14th Armored broke through the Westwall at Steinfeld and began its advance on Germersheim.
To forestall a second Remagen, by 19 March the Germans had blown all Rhine bridges from Ludwigshafen northward. Of three that remained upstream, the southernmost, the Maxau Rhine Bridge at Maximiliansau, was destroyed on 21 March when a round of American artillery fire struck a detonator, setting off prepared demolitions. A second, at Speyer, was too immediately threatened and too far removed from the main body of German troops to be of much use to any but the defenders of Speyer itself. It would be blown late on the 23rd.
Over the remaining bridge, at Germersheim, roughly east of Landau, as many vehicles and field pieces as could be salvaged began to pass during the night of the 22nd. Still no orders for final withdrawal beyond the Rhine came from the Commander-in-Chief West. Headquarters of both the 1. "Armee" and Army Group G still were west of the river.
Some German officers were beginning to wonder if every last increment of the 1. "Armee" was to be sacrificed when at last, on 23 March, authorization came to cross the Rhine. While the bridge at Germersheim continued to serve artillery and vehicles, foot troops began to evacuate the west bank at three ferry sites south of the town. A smattering of infantrymen, an occasional tank or assault gun, and a regiment of antiaircraft guns operating against ground targets formed rear guard perimeters west of the ferry sites.
Conclusion.
Although all divisions of the U.S. VI Corps achieved clear breakthroughs during 23 March, they came in contact only with rear guards and failed to affect the German evacuation materially. Because a German force in Speyer fought doggedly, contact between the 12th and 14th Armored Divisions was delayed. Both armored divisions early on 24 March sent task forces in quest of the lone remaining Rhine bridge, the one at Germersheim, but neither had reached the fringes of the town when at 10:20 the Germans blew up the prize. Formal German evacuation of the west bank ended during the night of the 24th, while American units continued to mop up rear guards and stragglers through the 25th.
It is impossible to ascertain how many Germans escaped from the Saar-Palatinate to fight again on the Rhine's east bank, or how much equipment and matériel they managed to take with them. Yet German losses clearly were severe. "Tremendous losses in both men and matériel," noted the chief of staff of the 1. "Armee". The staff of the U.S. Seventh Army estimated that the two German armies had lost 75-80% of their infantry in the Saar-Palatinate fight. The Seventh Army and its attached French units captured 22,000 Germans during the campaign, and the Third Army imprisoned more than 68,000. The Third Army estimated that the German units opposing its advance lost approximately 113,000 men, including prisoners, while the Third Army's casualties totaled 5,220, including 681 killed. The Seventh Army, much of its fighting centered in the Siegfried Line, probably incurred about 12,000 casualties, including almost 1,000 killed.
In view of the success of the campaign, criticism of it would be difficult to sustain. Yet it was a fact nonetheless that the German 1. "Armee"—and to some extent the 7. "Armee"—for all the losses, conducted a skillful delaying action to the end in the face of overwhelming strength on the ground and in the air and never succumbed to wholesale encirclement, despite a higher command reluctant to sanction any withdrawal. In the process, the Germans had withstood the clear threat of a rapid drive by some unit of the Third Army or the Seventh Army along the west bank of the Rhine to trap the 1. "Armee". In preserving their forces, however, the Germans had to surrender the important industrial area around Saarbrücken as well as the readily defensible terrain of the Pfaelzer Forest.