Hellenistic armies

The Hellenistic armies is the term applied to the armies of the successor kingdoms of the Hellenistic period, which emerged after the death of Alexander the Great. After his death, Alexander's huge empire was torn between his successors, the Diadochi (). During the Wars of the Diadochi, the Macedonian army, as developed by Alexander and Philip II, gradually adopted new units and tactics, further developing Macedonian warfare and improving on the tactics used in the Classical era. The armies of the Diadochi bear few differences from that of Alexander, but during the era of the Epigonoi (Ἐπίγονοι, "Successors"), the differences were obvious, favoring numbers over quality and weight over maneuverability. The limited availability of Greek conscripts in the east led to an increasing dependence on mercenary forces, whereas in the west, Hellenistic armies were continuously involved in wars, which soon exhausted local manpower, paving the way for Roman supremacy. The major Hellenistic states were the Seleucid Empire, Ptolemaic Egypt and the Antigonid kingdom (Macedonia). Smaller states included: Attalid Pergamum, Pontus, Epirus, the Achaean League, the Aetolian League, Syracuse, and other states (like Athens, Sparta etc.).
Numerical strength.
The Diadochi were capable of deploying some of the largest armies of their day, and could easily outmatch the numerical strength of either Phillip II or Alexander's Macedonian full strength contingents. However, the size of the armies participating in different campaigns could vary extremely, from a few thousand to over 70,000. Of these armies, outside Greece, only a fraction would have been of Greek origin, the rest being allied contingents and conscripts from the local population.
Manpower and the state.
The lack of manpower was a serious concern for many Hellenistic rulers. In fact, the disparity between the manpower reserves available to Rome and to any Hellenistic monarch had a profound influence on the way in which the opponents made war. Roman generals could more easily risk defeat in battle, while for Hellenistic generals, a defeat might cripple their manpower base for nearly a generation. Many states had to rely on mercenaries to bulk up their citizen forces: For example, the army of the Achaean League under Aratus of Sicyon was re-organized to contain a permanent corps of mercenaries that numbered 8,000 foot and 500 horse, compared with the corps of picked Achaean troops, which numbered only 3,000 foot and 500 horse.
To take another example, by the mid-third century BC, the Spartiate citizen population had decreased to a tiny fraction of what it had been at the time of the Persian Wars (Cleomenes' army could only field about 5,000 men). The inchoate reforms of Agis IV in the 240s BC had failed after a reaction by those opposed to the reforms. The problem of the lack of man-at-arms was then taken up by Cleomenes III of Sparta, who attempted to address it by his radical reforms. Cleomenes launched a coup against his rivals at home and used their demise to push forward a reform to increase Spartan manpower. In 227 BC, Cleomenes cancelled all debts, pooled and divided the large estates and increased the citizen body by enfranchising 5,000 Perioikoi and 'metics' (resident foreigners). Before long, he increased the citizen body further by allowing Helots to buy their freedom for five minae and therefore he 'acquired 500 talents, some of which he used to arm 2,000 men in the Macedonian fashion as phalangites'. However, the defeat at Sellasia in 222 BC and the attendant great loss in manpower led to reliance on mercenaries, who were the basis of power for Machanidas and Nabis, his successors.
The great losses affected Philip V of Macedon greatly, especially after his defeat at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC. With such a small population, and such drastic losses in battle, the Antigonid king had to think radically as to how to improve his state's performance in the next war. In between the Second and Third Macedonian Wars, Philip V embarked on a major reform and re-organization of the kingdom. Expansion could secure 'the great reservoir of available man-power' that lay north in Thrace. Philip then transported segments of the populations of the coastal cities to the northern frontiers and moved those Thracians south. This, combined with economic and political moves, re-built Macedonia and allowed for Perseus, Philip's successor, to be in a stronger position. Perseus had enough grain to last the army ten years (without drawing on harvests), enough money to hire 10,000 mercenaries for ten years, and field an army of 43,000 men, a significant improvement compared to the situation of Philip V at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC, who fielded an army of 25,500 men.
The eastern kingdoms, for example the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, Graeco-Bactrian and Indo Greek kingdoms, had an even more problematic situation. The basis of their militaries relied on Greeks, which were obviously not common to the areas that they ruled over. In order to overcome this, these kingdoms set up military colonies, known as Klerouchoi, to settle mercenaries and others from Greece. The system would allow for the colonists to be given a plot of land and in return they would provide military service when needed. In Ptolemaic Egypt, for example, soldiers and officers were given lots 'in exchange for military service, whenever needed'. W.W. Tarn even suggests that the Greek (known to the Indians as 'Yavanas') population in India may not have been as small as one would suppose, stating 'there may well have been many more Yavanas...than we should suppose; we may have to reckon with a considerable number of men, adventurers or mercenaries from the west'.
Typical units and formations.
Hellenistic infantry.
The phalanx.
The Hellenistic armies based their strength on the pike-bearing phalanx, the legacy of Philip II and Alexander the Great. Throughout the age of the Diadochi and the Epigonoi, the phalanx, as the line of the pikemen was commonly referred to by ancient authors, remained the backbone of armies as diverse as those of Antiochos III and Philip V. The phalanx was an infantry formation, characterized by dense ranks and pikes (sarissas). Their soldiers (known as phalangites) ranged from professional warriors, drilled in tactics, weapon use and formation, typically of Greek origin, to basically trained, non-Greek villagers, as was the case in the army of Ptolemy Philopator, the victor of Raphia. Certain reforms in the weight of the phalangite equipment and the conscription methods used, turned the phalanx from a maneuverable formation into a bulky, slow moving steam roller, whose charge no enemy was able to withstand. Maneuvers like the fake retreat of Phillip II at Chaeronea or the oblique advance of Alexander at Arbela were never again attempted, but still, as long as the phalanx remained on relatively level terrain and its flanks were kept secure, it was not conquered by any other formation. Although it has been argued that the role of the phalanx on the battlefield was to act as an anchor for the entire army, holding the enemy in place, pushing him back, exerting a heavy toll on enemy morale, while the cavalry struck the enemy flanks and delivered the fatal blow to cripple their opponents, in most battles it was used as the main weapon to achieve victory.
Equipment varied over the years, and was also dependent on the geographical region, the preference/wealth of the ruler, and the assets of the individual soldier.
Helmets ranged from simple, open-faced affairs to stylized Thracian models (complete with mask-like cheek protectors that often imitated a human face). Historians argue about how common body armour would have been among phalangites (especially those in the middle ranks), but when it was worn it ranged from a cuirass of hardened linen (the "linothorax"), that may or may not have been reinforced/decorated with metal scales to metallic (typically bronze) breastplates.
The phalangite's shield - long misconstrued thanks to its description as a "buckler" by several writers - was a -diameter affair and less concave than the hoplite's "aspis". It was secured by both a shoulder harness and a fore-arm brace, allowing the off-hand to release the hand-grip and make wielding the enormous "sarissa" pike possible. Metallic greaves were also worn (especially by the front and rear-most ranks) to cover the shins of the soldier as he stood his ground.
The primary weapon of the phalangite was the "sarissa", a massive spear that ranged from 16 feet (mid-late 4th century BC) to as much as 22 feet (near the nadir of the phalanx's development). First made famous by Philip of Macedon, it allowed Macedonian infantry to "outrange" the opposition's existing spear formations by several feet. The "sarissa" would have been largely useless in single combat, but a compact, forward-facing infantry formation employing it would have been almost impossible to challenge. The first five ranks of the phalanx would have their "sarissai" projecting horizontally to face the enemy, with the remaining ranks angling theirs in a serried fashion, often leaning against their fellows' backs. If front-rankers were killed, those behind would lower their spears and step forward to maintain a solid front.
In the event of close combat, or in circumstances where the "sarissa" was impractical, a variety of swords were employed - the classic "xiphos", the "kopis" and the "makhaira", for example. It goes without saying that any sword-fighting in the vicinity of the phalanx's front was complicated by the "sarissai" projecting from the 2nd-5th ranks around the 1st rank combatants.
The primary drawback of the phalanx was its vulnerability to attacks from the rear and flanks. This is the reason why it depended on the units on its flanks to at least hold off the enemy until he would naturally break from the phalanx's irresistible pressure. It also had a tendency to fracture, when led across broken terrain for extended periods of time in close ordered battle formation. The Romans would later be able to use this weakness against the phalanx as their more mobile maniples could withstand the pressure of the phalanx longer than more traditional formations, thus earning valuable time for their wings to outflank it, as at Cynoscephalae and Magnesia, or for the phalanx to lose its cohesion due to prolonged movement forward or advancement through unfavorable terrain, as at Pydna. Yet, regardless of the many Roman victories against the Hellenistic Kingdoms, the legion never won against a phalanx by frontal assault. Even at Pydna, it took the strange withdrawal of the Macedonian cavalry for the Romans to finally outflank the phalanx and claim a bloody victory.
As the reign of the Diadochi persisted from the late 4th century to the mid-1st century BC, they grew to rely more and more on an increasingly heavier and longer-speared phalanx to ensure victory. Complementary arms of the later Hellenistic armies were neglected, fell into disuse, or became the province of unreliable mercenaries and subject peoples. Sound and creative tactics became increasingly rare, and were replaced by the belief that unbreakable phalanx walls could carry the day.
Historians and students of the field alike have often compared the Hellenistic-era phalanx with the Roman legion, in an attempt to ascertain which of the formations was truly better. Detractors of the former point out that in many engagements between the two (such as at Pydna and Cynosephalae), the legion was the clear victor, and hence represented a superior system. Opposing schools of thought, however, point to the Pyrrhic, Hannibalic and Mithridatic victories as evidence to the contrary. Finally, one might note that these were not conflicts that solely featured Republican Roman Legionaries engaged against Hellenistic phalangites. The Roman victories of Magnesia, Cynoscephalae and Pydna were won by armies that included thousands of non-Roman (often Hellenic) cavalry, elephants, as well as assorted heavy and light infantry. Such a comparison was also attempted in the ancient days, as is attested by Polybius' own effort to explain why the Macedonian sarissa was eventually conquered by the Roman gladius, but in the end, we should acknowledge that such a juxtaposition can be misleading, since both infantry formations had clear advantages and disadvantages that were historically oftentimes exploited.
Onomatology and development of the Hellenistic phalanx.
Numerous individual units of the phalanx infantry are attested in use during the Hellenistic period. Some of the old Alexandrian unit names were kept and units were named after Alexander's. An example of this are the "Argyraspides" ('silver shields'), who were originally a unit of Alexander's most fearsome and disciplined veterans. However, they were disbanded not long after having surrendered their commander Eumenes to Antigonus the One-Eyed. The name, however, was kept alive and formed into a corps of the Seleucid army. Livy describes them as a Royal Cohort in the army of Antiochus III the Great. Fighting in phalanx formation, the Argyraspides were present at Raphia (217 BC) and Magnesia (190 BC). Chosen from across the kingdom, they constituted a corps of roughly 10,000 men. By the time of Antiochus IV Epiphanes' parade at Daphne in 166 BC, the Argyraspides are counted as being only 5,000 strong. However, Bar-Kochva is of the opinion that the 5,000 men dressed and armed in the 'Roman' style counts for the other half of the corps. This is because the men of the 'Roman Contingent' are described as being in their prime of life.
In the Ptolemaic army the Graeco-Macedonian troops formed the phalanx. But Ptolemy IV Philopator and his ministers reformed the army in order to keep up manpower by allowing the native Egyptian warrior class, the Machimoi, into the phalanx. Up until that point the Machimoi had only performed auxiliary duties such as archery, skirmishing and so on. The Machmioi Epilektoi, or 'Picked Machimoi', first saw service at the battle of Raphia and from then on were featured in more important positions within the Ptolemaic army.
It was customary for the Hellenistic warlords to name individual units of phalangites according to the color of their shields. Thus, the phalanx of the Hellenistic armies used terms such as "Chrysaspides" (Greeks: Χρυσάσπιδες 'gold-shields'), "Chalkaspides" ('bronze-shields') and "Leukaspides" ('white-shields') to denote formations within their phalanxes, the two latter being important in the composition of the Antigonid phalanx. Antigonus Doson armed the citizens of Megalopolis as Bronze Shields for the Sellasia campaign in 222 BC. These units are mentioned by classical writers when describing the Antigonid army in battle. Although these units most probably ceased to exist after the battle of Pydna in 168, as the Antigonid kingdom had been crushed by Rome. These names were not only limited to the Antigonid (or Achaean) phalanx though. Plutarch tells us of Mithridates VI of Pontus, "The Great", having a corps of 'Chalkaspides' against Sulla at Chaeroneia. The majority of the Seleucid phalanx was probably formed by the two corps that are mentioned in the Daphne Parade of 166 BC, namely the 10,000 "Chrysaspides" and the 5,000 "Chalkaspides". Little else is known specifically about them, although they may have been present at the battle of Beth-Zachariah in 162. "Leukaspides" are mentioned in the army of Pyrrhus of Epirus on his campaigns in Italy. Under Cleomenes III, the Spartan army was reformed in 228 BC. Until then, the Spartans had merely kept the traditional hoplite spear. Cleomenes created a 4,000 strong phalanx and then formed another phalanx with 2,000 freed helots in order to counter the Antigonid Leukaspides. Philopoemen reformed the army of the Achaean League into the Macedonian phalanx in 208–207 BC and we are told that, by the end of the 3rd century, the Boeotians did the same, thereby creating the 'Peltophoroi'.
Antigonid 'peltasts'.
In his description of the Battle of Cynoscephalae, Polybius informs us of a unit he calls Peltasts, which he clearly places among the phalanx. Although the Macedonian shield could be characterized as a pelta (targe), the term peltast was usually used to describe a type of shielded, skirmishing, light infantry. It has been suggested that these peltasts were indeed a picked corps, much like Alexander's hypaspists, 'an infantry force...which fought beside the phalanx in battle, but at other times employed for ambushes, forced marches and special expeditions'. The Peltasts were sent on special missions, such as an ambush in Lycestis or being used as shock troops in the storming of Cephallenia. The elite of the Peltast corps was known as the 'Agema'.
The term peltast has also been coined by Diodorus Siculus to describe the Iphicratean hoplite, a type of hoplite introduced by the Athenian general Iphicrates, that was equipped with a lighter armor, a longer spear and a smaller shield. It could be that the peltasts of Polybius were similarly equipped.
Thureophoroi and Thorakitai.
New troop types, such as the "Thureophoroi" and the "Thorakitai", were developed. They used the Celtic "Thureos" shield, of an oval shape that was similar to the shields of the Romans, but flatter. The "Thureophoroi" were armed with a long thrusting spear, a short sword, and, if needed, javelins. While the "Thorakitai" were similar to the "Thureophoroi", they were more heavily armoured, as their name implies, usually wearing a mail shirt. These troops were used as a link between the light infantry and the phalanx, a form of medium infantry to bridge the gaps. Numerous armies used this form of troop, for example the Achaean League's armies before Philopoemen. By the end of the 3rd century BC, the 'Macedonian' phalanx had become the dominant fighting style even for states such as Sparta .
Both the "Thureophoroi" and the "Thorakitai" were able to fight both in a phalanx formation, armed with long spears, or in more loose, irregular formations to be used against enemy light infantry or to occupy difficult terrain.
Roman influence on Hellenistic warfare.
Reforms in the late Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies re-organised them and tried to add some Roman aspects to formations. This, however, would not be out of place as some Roman style tactics were used by Pyrrhus of Epirus in his campaigns against the Romans and by Antigonus II Gonatas at Sellasia in 222 BC. Pyrrhus and Antigonus both placed units of lighter troops in between the units of their phalanx. This was after Pyrrhus had 'observed the formation of the Roman legions and noticed how mobile they were and how unwieldy were his own forces... He therefore adapted his own formation to the Roman model, deploying light mobile detachments alongside the phalanx'. Philopoemen too used this tactic at Mantinea in 207 BC, making his phalanx more flexible.
Much is made of Polybius' description of 5,000 Seleucid infantryman in 166 BC armed in the 'Roman' fashion at a parade at Daphne. 'Romanized' troops are also mentioned in battle against the Maccabees. These reforms were probably undertaken by Antiochus IV because of several factors. Firstly, Antiochus IV 'had spent part of his early life in Rome and had acquired rather an excessive admiration for Rome's power and methods'. Secondly, to re-train the army in this manner would allow it to perform better in the Seleucid empire's eastern satrapies beyond the river Tigris, which were of high importance to Seleucid rulers from Antiochus III through to Demetrius II. Thirdly, changing their equipment and training would add to their fighting capability and efficiency, hence making the army more maneuverable. It has been suggested that the fact that these 5,000 men were marching at the head of the army was meant to show Antiochus IV's intention of reforming the entire Seleucid army along Roman lines, though whether or not this complete reform actually took place is unknown. The true extent of the adoption of Roman techniques is unknown; some have suggested that the infantry are in fact more likely to be Thureophoroi or Thorakitai, troops armed with an oval shield of the Celtic type, a thrusting spear and javelins. The Thureophoroi and Thorakitai pre-date any major Roman military influence and while similarly equipped and fought in a similar manner, had actually evolved independently from the Roman legions.
Stelae from Hermopolis show a Ptolemaic unit having a standard-bearer and other staff attached. This unit was like a Roman Maniple, being composed of two smaller units led by a Hekatontarch (i.e. a Centurion). The title of Hekatontarch appeared around the 150s BC. As well as this, Asclepiodotus describes in his 'Tactica' a new institution, the Syntagma, which had a standard-bearer, other staff and was composed of two smaller units led by Hekatontarchs. The Phalangarkhia, also described by Asclepiodotus, was about the size of a Roman Legion in strength. The potential Roman influence would have been great. In Ptolemaic Egypt, Roman adventurers and veterans are found commonly serving under the Ptolemies. Romans are found in Ptolemaic service as early as 252/1 BC. The Ptolemaic army was odd in that, out of all the Hellenistic armies, it was the only army where you could find Romans in Greek service. As Sekunda suggests 'such individuals would have spread knowledge of Roman military systems within the Ptolemaic military and political establishment'.
However, there are numerous aspects of the Roman army that were not carried into the Ptolemaic and Seleucid ones. For example, the differentiation of the Hastati, Principes and Triarii, or the integration of light-armed troops into the infantry structure. Hence, because of this, there was no Hellenistic equivalent to the Cohort. Instead, there was a system of larger units that had no relation to Roman organization. In terms of equipment, most of these so-called 'Romanized' troops did not abandon their traditional spear for a sword, which the Hastati and Principles abandoned between the 3rd and 2nd Century BC. Also the Romans used the pila, while Greek troops tended to use local variations of Javelins. Also similarity of equipment in regards to helmets and chain-mail can be explained by Celtic influence experienced by both the Greeks and Romans at a similar time. In this sense, we can only assume that the Hellenistic kingdoms did reform and re-organize their troops in some regards along Roman lines, but these appear to be superficial at best and quite possibly the result of convergent evolution, with both cultures influencing each other.
By the time of Mithridates VI, we are told that the Pontic army had troops armed in the Roman fashion and by 86 BC Mithridates had created an army of 120,000 such troops. This was after an alliance between Mithridates and Sertorius, an enemy of Sulla, in which Sertorius sent a military mission to reorganize Mithridates' army along Roman lines. These 'Roman' troops fought alongside the Pontic phalanx. 'Legions' of this sort are described by Julius Caesar in his campaigns against Juba in Numidia and alongside Deiotarus of Galatia whilst in the Middle East. If anything, these forces, as described by N. Sekunda, are nothing more than ersatz-legions.
Hellenistic cavalry.
Cavalry organisation.
The cavalry organization differed in the various Hellenistic states. Different variants of tactical formations were used to organise the state's cavalry, although there are cross-overs and similarities between different kingdoms. The Boeotian League's cavalry was commanded by a "Hipparchos" and each cavalry squadron ("ile", pl. "ilai") was led by an "ilarchos". They also had a "tarantinarchos" who commanded the League's Tarantine skirmishing cavalry.
The Aetolian League became well known for its cavalry and, by the end of the 3rd century, they were considered the best in Greece. Despite this fact, cavalry remained only a small proportion of its total military force. We can deduce this from the 400 cavalry accompanying 3,000 foot on campaign in 218 BC. All we know of specific organisation is a reference to "oulamoi", small squadrons of uncertain strength.
The cavalry of the Achaean League was supposedly inefficient. Philopoemen, in the late 3rd century, having already reformed the foot soldiers into a Macedonian-style phalanx, also reformed the cavalry. The Achaean cavalry was organised into "lochoi", files of eight men, who were then grouped into "dilochiai", double files of 16, then grouped into "oulamoi" of 32, "ilai" of 64, "hipparchiai" of 128 and "syntagmata" of 256.
The Antigonid kingdom of Macedon's cavalry only constituted a small fraction of the army. Duncan Head estimates this fraction as between 5 and 10% of the total strength of the Antigonid armies. This may well be due to over-campaigning, high casualties or even because many of the Macedonian noblemen who formed much of the heavy cavalry of Philip II and Alexander went east and never came back. But, by the time of Philip V and Perseus, cavalry strength had slowly increased. Philip V had a cavalry force of 400 'Household' cavalry, called the Royal or Sacred Ile in a campaign in 219 BC. This small number of native horse was then supplemented by mercenary cavalry.
In Ptolemaic Egypt, the cavalry forces were led by a "hipparchos", who commanded a "hipparchia". The "hipparchiai" were divided into "ilai", then into "lochoi" and then into "dekades" (sing. "dekas", a file of 10 men). "Hipparchiai" fall into two categories. There were five known "hipparchiai" in the 3rd century, of which the 4th and 5th are known to have been in existence in the 2nd century BC. Other than these, there were four "hipparchiai" of lower status known by 'ethnic' names; the Thessalians, Thracians, Mysians and Persians. These probably were not actual cavalry troops from those ethnic groups, but more like the Tarantine cavalry mercenaries who did not need to be from Taras to be called thus.
The Seleucid empire's cavalry were placed in units of "oulamoi" and then into divisions of "ilai". Other than the usual auxiliary, citizen and militia cavalry units, the main elite cavalry units of the Seleucids were the "Agema" and the "Hetairoi" ("Companions"). The "Hetairoi" were the standing elite cavalry unit of the Seleucid army, serving both in peace and war. The "Agema" was recruited from the Medes and their neighbours, although after the Parthian conquest of Media they were probably recruited from Macedonian settlers. The "Hetairoi" would escort the king into battle or both the "Hetairoi" and "Agema" would escort the king under direct command. Amongst these units were the various grades of 'Kings Friends' or "Basilikoi Philoi", who made up other elite cavalry units similar to the Companions.
Cavalry tactics.
Hellenistic cavalry is much more diverse than the Greek cavalry of earlier eras. Greek tactical manuals categorize them as cataphracts (fully armored, a type of cavalry not to be confused with the Seleucid, Parthian or Byzantine cataphracts) and aphracts (unarmored). Cataphracts was a term commonly employed to describe fully armored cavalry of various weights, with or without shield (usually a thureos), usually armed with a lance. Unarmored cavalry was classified as lancers, javelineers and bowmen. Lancers ("xystophoroi" or "doratophoroi") charged the enemy in dense formations. Javelineers were also called Tarentines and attacked the enemy from afar. Afterwards, they would charge the enemy with lances or keep their distance, in which case they were called light cavalry and/or Tarentines proper. A further category of light cavalry was that of the mounted bowmen, which were collectively called Scythians. These are broad categories, as attested by both Aelian and Asclepiodotus. Arrian's categorization is also very similar.
Most cavalry units of the Hellenistic era were moderately armored and would be armed with javelins or/and lances. Cataphracts were introduced to the Hellenistic world by the Seleucids in the late 3rd century BC and are attested to have been used, probably in a lighter version and for a very limited time, also by the kingdom of Pergamon. Antiochus III was able to field an extraordinary 6,000 men at Magnesia, the first testimony of cavalry gaining victory over the closed ordered ranks of a competent infantry, yet to no avail. The Seleucids also had moderate access to horse archers from their eastern borders, although they never fielded them in large numbers. The Ptolemies also deployed heavy armored lancers, never cataphracts, probably because of the high temperatures prevalent in their empire. In Macedonia, armored lancers were also deployed, after the tradition of Alexander's Hetairoi, yet their capability could not compare to that of their predecessors. In the rest of the Greek world, cavalry maintained its traditional equipment of javelin and short lance. Apart from the cavalry types used by the Greeks, the Hellenistic kingdoms also used cavalry from subordinate and allied barbarian states, which varied in quality, armor and equipment. Mercenary cavalry troops were also employed, including Thracians, Armenians, and even Berbers.
No cavalry formation is unfortunately mentioned in the existent descriptions of cavalry battles, but all ancient Greek tactical manuals, including Asclepiodotus' Techne Taktike written in the 1st century BC, clearly and in detail describe the wedge and the rhombus formations, stating that they were in use at least at the time of their compilation as well as the more common square and rectangular formations. Thus, we have to accept the probability that they were used throughout the Hellenistic era. Other formations attested and probably used were the Tarantenic circle, employed by the Tarentines proper and the Scythian formation, attested in use by the Scythian horse archers. Both were skirmishing formations and facilitated continuous harassment while at the same time providing the required mobility to avoid enemy charges.
Although, throughout the Hellenistic era, more importance was usually given to the role of the infantry than to cavalry, most major battles of the era were gained because of good or bad cavalry performance. Antigonus was defeated at Ipsus, because his victorious cavalry failed to return from the pursuit before the 400 enemy elephants effectively blocked its way back. Antiochus was defeated at Raphia, when, engaging in pursue of the defeated enemy cavalry, he failed to return and charge the enemy phalanx. At the Battle of Cynoscephalae, the Aetolian cavalry played a key role in the battle and at Pydna, the Macedonian lancers suddenly left the battlefield allowing the Romans to surround and massacre Perseus' phalanx. At Magnesia, the cataphracts routed the Roman legions but it was Eumenes' cavalry that turned the tide and effectively ensured victory for the Romans. In Sellasia, it was Philopoemen's cavalry that conquered Oida, earning the admiration of Antigonus Doson.
Heavy cavalry.
A modern conception, there is no mentioning of a "heavy cavalry" in the Greek military manuals. Unfortunately, even today, we don't have a concrete notion of what "heavy cavalry" should be. According to one school of thought, it is any cavalry capable of shock action against the enemy line, according to another, it should just be heavily armored. According to the Greeks, we have to define it as any cavalry that was not considered "light", that is, which was not purely skirmishing. Another aspect of the cavalry of the ancient era we have to keep in mind is the unwillingness to use even the best trained and heaviest of cavalries against any dense mass of able infantry. This is evident in many ancient descriptions of battles. According to Arrian, when Alexander faced the Indian tribe of the Malli, he did not dare assault them with his, by now, veteran Heteroi or Thessalians, but he followed the customary cavalry tactics of attacks and retreats (perispasmoi).
Thus, most cavalry types of the Hellenistic armies can be considered heavy, regardless of their armor, as long as they are equipped with lances and act in dense formations. Traditional Greek cavalry was usually employed to cover a retreat or pursue a retreating enemy. A cavalry engagement usually involved a lengthy exchange of javelins; close combat was avoided. The Macedonian Hetairoi (Companions; Companion Cavalry) may have been the first true, able shock cavalry, armed with long lances and heavy armor. Their tradition was carried on in the Hellenistic times and troops similarly armed were called doratophoroi or xystophoroi (both terms translated as lance bearers or plainly lancers). The term Hetairoi was reserved for units comprising men of aristocratic blood. These doratophoroi were primarily used against enemy cavalry; their use against densely deployed infantry was very limited. Their extreme version were the cataphracts of the Seleucid cavalry. The various Agemata (pl. of Agema), usually the elite bodyguards of the Hellenistic Kings, were similarly armed.
Cataphracts.
Cataphracts were heavily armed and armoured cavalrymen. The Cataphract (Kataphraktoi) were first introduced into the Hellenistic military tradition with the Seleucid Antiochus III the Great's anabasis in the east from 212-205 BC. With his campaigns in Parthia and Bactria, he came into contact with Cataphracts and copied them. Most of the Seleucid heavy cavalry after this period were armed in this manner, despite keeping their original unit names. The Cataphract generally only served in the eastern Hellenistic armies.
Both man and horse were entirely encased in armour—in the form of scale or banded segments sewn onto a fabric. Riders' faces were covered in seamless metal helmets. The weight carried by the horse was excessive, and prolonged charges were out of the question. Instead, cataphracts trotted to within a reasonable distance before charging, exerting energy only during the decisive engagement. Once in combat, the cataphract and his steed enjoyed superb protection from attacks thanks to their armour. However, stamina, endurance and heat were always concerns in extended combat.
The standard cataphract weapon was a "xyston"-like spear. For close-quarter combat, a mace or sword was made available as a secondary weapon. The mace and cataphract ideas were combined into the Sassanid-introduced and Roman-named "Clibanarii", who were armoured, both man and beast, in chainmail, and armed with a mace.
Light horse archers.
The writings of historians, from Arrian to Appian, detail numerous tribes, nations, and ethnic groups—Dahae, Mysians, Scythians, etc.—from whom Hellenistic rulers recruited such warriors.
Tarantine cavalry.
Originally the cavalry of the army of the Greek city of Tarantas (Tarentum) in Magna Graecia, it was renowned for its peculiar battle tactics. It was the only cavalry of the Graeco-Roman world to employ pure, advanced skirmishing tactics. It was unarmored and normally equipped with a shield and javelins, which it hurled at the enemy, evading any attempt to engage in close combat. In the Hellenistic era, we have numerous references to Tarantine units, even in the armies of the eastern Macedonian empires, but unfortunately no definite account of their equipment or their tactical use. From the Greek tactical manuals we learn that Tarantines is the collective name of the lightly armored cavalry, which was equipped with javelins and lance, that first skirmishes with the enemy and then charges. Cavalry that avoided using the charge, preferring to remain at a distance and skirmish, was called Tarantines proper. From these texts, we can safely deduce that, during Hellenistic times, the term "Tarantines" no longer bore a geographical significance and was used purely as a tactical term.
Special units.
Chariots.
War chariots were rarely used during the Hellenistic era. Their value against any opponent or commander of notable skill was very low as was already proven by the Ten Thousand (the Greek mercenaries with whom Xenophon served) at Cunaxa and Alexander in Arbela. Their use is considered more harmful than beneficial in the Greek tactical manuals, yet they could have a frightening effect on badly trained, inexperienced opponents, such as Asiatic tribal armies. The idea that the Romans had no previous experience in fighting chariots might be the reason why Antiochus III used them against the Roman army, with disastrous results for his own army. Appian suggests that wounding the horses drawing a war chariot can cast the formation in disorder, because an out-of-control chariot forces other chariots to engage in evading maneuvers to avoid being hit by its scythes. Archelaus also used them against Sulla in the battle of Chaeronea, again to no avail.
Elephants.
War elephants were considered untrustworthy by Greek military writers, but played an important role in many battles of the Hellenistic era, especially in the east. As was proven many times before, as well as in the wars of Pyrrhus of Epirus and Hannibal, elephants could throw a competent enemy battle line into confusion and win the day, as long as the enemy was not accustomed to battle against them. Yet, if used for a frontal assault, the danger of them being routed and falling in panic into the lines of their own army was great. As Livy attested, elephants were more dangerous when scared than when controlled. The Hellenistic generals were well aware of this fact and thus did not deploy them before or among their battle line, as was the case in Hydaspes or in Zama, both examples of how routing elephants could cost the battle. Instead, they were deployed on the wings, where they could keep the enemy cavalry at bay, protecting the infantry from a cavalry outflank. Against them, the enemy would use his own elephants, a necessity, since cavalry would never be able to conquer them. There, should they be defeated, they would have space to retreat without getting in the way of the infantry. Elephants would sometimes be accompanied by irregular infantry battalions, which would assist in the elephantomachia (elephant battle), while at the same time protecting their side from enemy infantry.
A peculiar use of the elephants is attested during the battle of Ipsus, where Seleucus Nicator posted his elephants in a long line between the battlefield and the victorious cavalry of Demetrius, effectively keeping him away and gaining victory. This incident might be the best attestation to the unwillingness of horses to approach an elephant.
War elephants were typically fitted with a tower on their back that housed several soldiers armed with sarissae and projectiles (arrows or javelins) to unload on the enemy. The rider (mahout) sat across the neck and guided the elephant into battle. Armour too, was sometimes wrapped around the elephants to protect them and increase the natural defense offered by the thickness of their hides. The size of the tower would be proportionate to the size of the elephants, the Asiatic being considerably larger than the North African elephants used by the Ptolemies. Polybius gives a valuable account of an elephant battle between these two species in his description of the battle of Raphia, where the beasts of Antiochus easily routed their African counterparts, yet the King failed to claim victory, since Ptolemy's phalanx forced his center to retreat in disorder.
Artillery.
Artillery was also used in the Hellenistic era, albeit rarely and without much effect. Catapults and other heavy artillery had a short range, which meant they would have to be up close to the enemy to make an impact. However, this made them vulnerable, indeed 'the difficulty of getting catapults quickly into, and out of, action might make them more of a liability than an asset in fluid warfare'. Machanidas of Sparta learnt this the hard way when his artillery at the battle of Mantinea in 207 BC was quickly taken by Philopoemen's Achaean infantry. Philip V of Macedon used artillery, in conjunction with defensive field works, in his defence of the Aous Valley in the Second Macedonian War, causing high Roman casualties. Antiochus the Great is attested to have used it at Thermopylae, resting it in imposing positions over the prospected battlefield. Perseus of Macedon used artillery in the Third Macedonian War to defend the Elpeus river from Aemilius Paulus, who did indeed move away to seek another route around this defensive line. It was also used in fortified towns to harass enemy assailants. Its use in the battlefield does not seem to have been important, as mass use is not attested until much later, as Arrian clearly suggests in his "Array against the Alans".
Dromedaries.
Camels are attested in use in the Seleucid army at the battle of Magnesia, but their small number (500) suggests they were not a regular addition. According to Xenophon, their scent scared off horses, but this effect must not have been especially notable or more writers would have commented on this.
Battle arrays.
The phalanx would be formed in the center, charging the enemy in pursuit of a swift victory. Its flanks would be protected by units of infantry, which ideally would be more trustworthy in case of disorder. Cavalry and elephants would be arrayed on the wings to counter those of the enemy. Light infantry would be deployed in front of the phalanx in an effort to throw the enemy line into confusion. Then they would run to the wings to assist in the cavalry and elephant battles.
Deviations from the norm existed when the circumstances called for a different plan. Pyrrhus countered the Roman legions by using a mixed phalanx formation of pikemen, spearmen and elephants, an array that proved successful in all battles against them, regardless of his "more than average" losses. A most competent tactician indeed, his decisions were influenced by the composition of his army, which included many untrustworthy troops from Magna Graecia. The battle of Sellasia was also peculiar, in reality being more of an assault against a static enemy, a fact that enabled Antigonus to effectively launch a series of separate attacks.
Siege warfare.
In the Hellenistic period, development in science was incredibly noteworthy and that could not but reflect on siegecraft: Archimedes developed machines that terrified the Roman assailants of Syracuse; while Demetrius Poliorcetes was notorious for the incredible size of the siege machines employed in his exploits, especially against the city of Rhodes. Yet, most sieges employed more traditional methods, relying on speed, surprise and traitors rather than lengthy preparations and a comprehensive barrage. Livius is very descriptive regarding the harassing manner of military campaigns, a complicated game of continuous attacks, movement of forces and constant patrols.


Air Corps Tactical School

The Air Corps Tactical School, also known as ACTS and "the Tactical School", was a military professional development school for officers of the United States Army Air Service and United States Army Air Corps, the first such school in the world. Created in 1920 at Langley Field, Virginia, it relocated to Maxwell Field, Alabama, in July 1931. Instruction at the school was suspended in 1940, anticipating the entry of the United States into World War II, and the school was dissolved shortly after. ACTS was replaced in November 1942 by the Army Air Force School of Applied Tactics.
In addition to the training of officers in more than 20 areas of military education, the school became the doctrine development center of the Air Corps, and a preparatory school for Air Corps officers aspiring to attendance at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College. The motto of the Air Corps Tactical School was "Proficimus More Irretenti"—"We Make Progress Unhindered by Custom".
The Air Corps Tactical School was notable as the birthplace of the Army Air Forces doctrine of daylight precision bombing. This doctrine held that a campaign of daylight air attacks against critical targets of a potential enemy's industrial infrastructure, using long-range bombers heavily armed for self-defense, could defeat an enemy nation even though its army and navy remained intact. The Tactical School, in formulating the doctrine, rejected the idea of attacking civilians.
Four former instructors of the school, the core of a group known as the "Bomber Mafia", were grouped together in the Air War Plans Division to produce the two war-winning plans—AWPD-1 and AWPD-42—based on the doctrine of precision daylight bombing that guided the wartime expansion and deployment of the Army Air Forces.
In a broader sense, the strategic bombing doctrine, adapted by factors encountered during combat, was also the foundation for the final separation of the Air Force from the Army as a military service independent of and equal to the other services. In 1946 the AAF created the Air University to carry on the work and traditions of the ACTS.
Background.
At the end of World War I, observation remained the main role of the Air Service. However, air combat and limited bombardment operations indicated to veterans of the Air Service, including Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell, that while ideally the service should be separate from the Army, it at the least should be centralized under an Air Service commander with some missions independent of direct support of troops. In reorganizing the post-war Army, the Armed Forces Reorganization Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 759) rebuked these ideas but did establish the Air Service as a statutory entity (previously it had existed by executive order only) and assigned it status as a "combatant arm of the line."
The Air Service followed the precedent of the other combat arms and began planning for its own service schools. An "Air Service School of Application" for technical training in aeronautical engineering, similar to the Ordnance School of Application at Sandy Hook, New Jersey, was set up at McCook Field, and began its first class 10 November 1919. Maj. Gen. Charles Menoher, Director of Air Service, wrote the War Department in October 1919 for permission to establish a tactical school at Langley Field, Virginia, to train field grade officers in the operation and tactics of the Air Service as a requirement for higher command or staff work.
On 25 February 1920, the War Department authorized the Air Service to establish its service schools. In addition to six pilot and advanced pilot training schools, and two technical training schools, an Air Service School was planned. It proposed to host courses for enlisted personnel as balloon observers, balloon mechanics, and aerial photography, but its main course was to be the Field Officers Course.
Langley Field, 1920–1931.
Air Service Field Officers School.
Major Thomas DeWitt Milling was assigned as officer-in-charge of the Field Officers Course at the new school and sent to Langley in July 1920 to set it up. War Department General Order No. 18 authorized the school on 14 August 1920. The balloon courses were split off into a separate school in a different area of Langley and the Air Service School was renamed the Air Service Field Officers School on 10 February 1921, after its primary function. The Air Service ordered 17 officers to Langley, eight as students and nine as instructors, although several officers swapped roles and some instructors were students as well. The 1920–1921 class opened on 1 November 1920, and although scheduled to last nine months, was concluded in May when both students and instructors were assigned to the 1st Provisional Air Brigade, as part of by the Air Service and the United States Navy. 11 officers, including four instructors, graduated the first course. The second class, beginning in October 1921, was devoted to the further training of instructors, the creation of a sound administrative system, and development of a well-rounded course curriculum.
In the first two classes, despite the school's title and function, only six of the first 23 graduates were field grade officers. A board reviewing all service schools of the United States Army observed that the Field Officers School had a course load that in other branches of the Army was distributed among several schools. Because all other Air Service schools were technical training in nature, the board recommended that the school be opened to all air service officers regardless of rank. Accordingly, Army regulations changed the name of the school to that of Air Service Tactical School on 8 November 1922. With the passage of the Air Corps Act of 1926, the school again changed its name, becoming the Air Corps Tactical School on 2 July 1926.
While at Langley, the ACTS was hampered by a chronic shortage of instructors, caused by a lack of policy within the Army for filling vacancies despite a rapid turnover in staff in the first three years. School administrators were forced to double as instructors. The situation was somewhat ameliorated in August 1924 when the Chief of the Air Service authorized extended duty for instructors, most of whom afterwards served four-year tours on the faculty, with an overlap between incoming and outgoing staff. Between 1925 and 1929 the number of instructors gradually doubled to 16 but even that number proved insufficient to research the vast collection of aviation literature the school's library was collecting to establish doctrine.
Despite school recommendations to the contrary, class size gradually increased, reaching 40 students by 1931. The first student from a branch other than the Air Service (an infantry officer) attended ASTS in 1923–1924. This became standard when the 1926–1927 class had five officers representing the other combat branches of the United States Army and three from the United States Marine Corps assigned as students.
The functioning of the school was also handicapped by a lack of permanent facilities, especially in quarters, and the school did not have a permanent academic building. When the five-year expansion program outlined in the Air Corps Act of 1926 failed to address these problems, and the creation of new units at Langley interrupted the functioning of the practical flying course, the Air Service began seeking a new location for the Tactical School.
The 1930–1931 class was the last at Langley. In its eleven years at Langley, the Tactical School graduated 221 students.
Tactical School curriculum.
The academic curriculum was standardized in 1922 by the Army's board tasked with preparing "programs of instruction" for all Army schools. 1,345 hours of instruction in 20 subjects, taught over a nine-month period beginning on or about 1 September of each school year, included approximately 900 hours of tactics, including those of other services and combined arms tactics, although more than half (480 hours) were devoted to air tactics in observation, bombardment, pursuit, and attack aviation. Approximately 290 hours involved technical subjects, including aeronautical engineering, armament and gunnery, navigation, meteorology, and photography, and 150 to administrative studies, covering staff duties, combat orders, organization of the Army, military and international law, supply and courses in equitation and stable management.
The curriculum was altered in July 1923 by the newly created Director of Instruction, Capt. Earl Naiden, cutting the academic course by 500 hours to 845 total hours. 450 hours of the cuts came from the various tactics subjects, although the equitation courses were also eliminated, and all academic courses were scheduled in mornings. Naiden added courses in the history of the Air Service and map reading to the academics, and a 126-hour afternoon course in practical flying, instituted to provide refresher training to pilots but required of all students, including those of non-aviation branches. The course structure remained the same until 1939, with changes only in individual course subjects, averaging 25 hours per week of classroom study and 3.7 hours weekly of flying.
The first printed texts covering air tactics replaced mimeographed texts in 1924. This development of the tactics portion of the school led to increased emphasis, and in 1925 aeronautical engineering was eliminated from the curriculum. Theoretical use of airpower was first advanced in 1928, and beginning in 1929 a new course was taught at the end of each class, "The Air Force", coordinating all air topics covered during the year.
Army regulations also made the commander of the 2nd Wing, as the base commander at Langley, the commandant of the Tactical School. However, during its first four years this caused little disruption as Milling, first as officer in charge and then as assistant commandant, remained in actual charge of the school. In 1924 Maj. Oscar Westover became the first commandant to exercise control over school activities. The assistant commandant then became responsible for academics, assisted by the director of instruction, directors of the individual academic departments, and the school secretary (formerly the school adjutant).
Course instruction assumed a pattern combining both theory and practical instruction. Subjects were generally scheduled in blocks, particularly tactics, beginning with those of other branches and services, along with logistics and staff functions, from the beginning of each class until December. The courses in air tactics followed, described by one student as coming with "bewildering rapidity."
Practical instruction came in the form of "field problems," initiated in the classroom, then demonstrated and practiced in the practical flying course. Annual inspection trips were also undertaken until 1930 to the Engineering Division at McCook and Wright Fields in Dayton, Ohio, when trips began to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. Beginning in 1924, ACTS students also participated in the annual Army War College maneuvers at Ft. DuPont, Delaware. However, by 1931 doctrinal disagreements between the schools and the exclusion of ACTS staff from the planning process created a perceived misuse of airpower on the part of AWC planners that ACTS assistant commandant Maj. John F. Curry criticized as not being of value to students of either school. Although Air Corps input resulted in some improvements, a lack of funds eliminated ACTS participation after 1933.
Maxwell Field, 1931–1940.
Relocation.
Difficulties with dilapidated facilities at Langley were not resolved, and a proposed relocation to Staten Island was rejected by the staff for lack of year-round flying weather, urban restrictions on flying, and a lack of support facilities. Locations at Bolling Field, Washington, D.C.; Richmond, Virginia; San Antonio, Texas; Fort Riley, Kansas; and another area of Langley Field were studied before the choice was made of Maxwell Field, a depot in Montgomery, Alabama, as the site for the school.
Plans were developed for a campus to accommodate a tactical school of 75 students, a squadron officers school of 50 junior officer students, and a school demonstration flying group of four squadrons. Congress appropriated almost $700,000 by July 1929 for new buildings, including Building 800-Austin Hall to house the Tactical School, and $200,000 to purchase acreage on which to build new officer quarters. Delays in construction caused two postponements of the relocation until June 1931, when Austin Hall was completed. On 15 July 1931, the school completed its move, although officer quarters were not begun until 1932. Architects commissioned by the Quartermaster Corps designed 99 residences for officers in an elegant style they deemed "French Provencial," and placed them in a neighborhood setting that became "the showplace of the Air Corps." The construction program at Maxwell continued until 1938, funded primarily by the WPA and PWA. A bombing and gunnery range was also set up near Valparaiso, Florida, for Tactical School use.
Course restructured.
In 1934 Curry, now ACTS Commandant, reorganized the academic structure of the school along functional lines into three principal departments: Air Tactics, Ground Tactics, and Basic and Special Instruction. Flying was a fourth department. The "Air Force", "Attack", "Bombardment", "Pursuit", and "Observation" sections were placed within the Department of Air Tactics. The next year these departments became the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy, Department of Ground Tactics, and Department of Command, Staff and Logistics.
Four faculty committees were also established to administrate scheduling, the school library, and publication of doctrine. The Air Corps Board, which had been inactive since the move from Langley, was permanently relocated to Maxwell in 1933. Restructured by the Tactical School faculty, who doubled as its members, the Board was directed by the War Department to formulate Air Corps doctrine. The Board became indistinguishable from the Tactical School and undertook 77 projects between 1935 and 1942, a third of which dealt with tactical doctrine, and the remainder with equipment, armaments, field manuals, and training texts.
After the move to Maxwell, the practice of requiring students to fly actual missions as part of the instruction process was discontinued for safety reasons. Plans for a composite school group were suspended by the Chief of the Air Corps because of a service-wide shortage of personnel and aircraft, and attempts to have demonstrations by existing combat units were mostly unsatisfactory. The demonstration group was not authorized until August 1939 and was utilized for less than a year before classes were suspended.
In 1938 the Department of Flying Instruction was dissolved and its functions parceled out to the remaining departments. The Department of Air Tactics and Strategy became the dominant division at the school, and its Air Force Section the most important course, in which airpower theories were presented and explored, doctrine emerging as much from the students as from the faculty.
Association with the Infantry School increased, but inspection trips formerly used at Langley first became voluntary and then were discontinued. Only a handful of graduates had gone on to attend the Command and General Staff School, and as a result the Tactical School ended its role as a preparatory school. Instead the ACTS became the equivalent for Air Corps officers of C&GSS, and increased the emphasis on air subjects to more than half of the total course hours by 1934–1935, with an accompanying decrease in hours for ground and administrative subjects. Classroom studies were similarly altered. Lectures occupied only half of a classroom hour, with the remainder given over to discussion and debate of concepts presented and of alternative ideas.
Short course.
The limited class size at the Tactical School led the Air Corps in 1938 to study the feasibility of using a series of shorter courses to allow a greater number of officers to attend. The study concluded that a significant number of potential staff and command officers had not attended the school and was growing annually. It recommended that the nine-month course be discontinued for a year and four 12-week courses scheduled, each having 100 students, all drawn from the group of prospective senior staff.
The plan had the drawbacks of limiting the amount of detail to which students could be exposed, and would require a rebuilding of the staff and curriculum when the long course was reinstated. Nevertheless, the curriculum was changed from 712 academic hours to 298. The short courses began on 1 June 1939, and continued for the next year.
Theory and doctrine.
Ascendance of bomber theory.
In its first years, the Tactical School taught that pursuit aviation was the most important of air operations, epitomized by the 1925–1926 class text "Employment of Combined Air Force" that compared the importance of pursuit to the Air Service to that of infantry to the Army. However, in 1926 the Tactical School modified this principle by asserting for the first time that airpower could strike at vital points deep inside enemy territory rather than merely targeting an enemy's military forces in a war of attrition. By 1931 the Tactical School was teaching that "a determined air attack, once launched, is most difficult, if not impossible to stop." This shift in emphasis from pursuit to bombardment was the result of two factors: the air war theories of the time and the state of aviation technology.
Devotees of Billy Mitchell, many of whom had served with the 1st Provisional Air Brigade, dominated the faculty of the Tactical School at Maxwell. With their students, they developed a theory of warfare that invoked the superiority of the long-range bomber over all other types of aircraft. Going beyond Mitchell's ideas, they de-emphasized balanced forces and support of ground troops in favor of a doctrine that heavily armed bombers could fight their way to industrial targets in daylight, unescorted by fighters, and with precision bombing (made possible by the introduction of the Norden bombsight in 1931), defeat an enemy by destroying key war production targets, rather than engaging in costly and prolonged ground campaigns aimed at destroying enemy armies. While the theory was based on tenets of strategic airpower developed by Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard, and Giulio Douhet, it rejected the concept of terror-bombing of civil populations as a means of destroying the morale and coercing the will of an enemy state.
The formulators of this doctrine were relatively young junior officers, nearly all of them former reservists commissioned during or immediately after World War I. They viewed war in the abstract, admitted (and even apologized for) being unable to offer conclusive proof of their theories, but firmly believed that the dominance of airpower lay ahead in the future, when existing limitations of technology had been overcome. Nine key advocates, all of whom instructed at the Tactical School, became known as the "Bomber Mafia." The unofficial leader of the group was the bombardment section chief and later director of the Department of Air Tactics and Strategy, Major Harold L. George.
The doctrine brought them in conflict with the Army General Staff, which did not view airpower as a major striking arm but as an auxiliary to the ground forces. Despite the poor performance of what few bombers the Air Corps possessed, the air theorists persisted in their beliefs, testifying in favor of a separate air force before commissions set up in the wake of the Air Mail scandal.
Although flawed and tested only under optimal conditions, the doctrine (originally known as the "industrial web theory") became the primary airpower strategy of the United States in the planning for World War II. Four former instructors of the school, the core of the "Bomber Mafia", produced the two airpower war plans (AWPD-1 and AWPD-42) that guided the wartime expansion and deployment of the Army Air Forces.
Failure of pursuit theory.
The doctrine was not universally held among air officers, however. Claire L. Chennault, chief of the pursuit section between 1931 and 1936, reasoned that the same technology that would increase the performance of the bomber would also eventually enable the single-engine fighter to challenge the bomber at high altitude, which it could not do in the years when the daylight bombing doctrine was formulated. Combined with a centralized early warning and control system (which came with the development of radar), defending interceptors would inflict serious losses on unescorted forces. The doctrine also ran counter to the theories of Billy Mitchell, who believed that pursuit support was essential for daylight bombing operations.
Chennault, however, also had a blind spot in his zealous advocacy of fighters as the offensive weapon of the Air Corps. He consciously avoided acknowledging the role of accompanying escort fighters as part of an offensive air strike. When his tour at ACTS ended, the fighter-versus-bomber controversy became a moot point among the staff, to the detriment of developing a role for escort fighters.
Although the proponents of daylight precision bombing at the Tactical School had a "failure of imagination" in not expanding the doctrine to include establishing air superiority as a prerequisite for success, and thus contributed to the delay in the development of a long-range escort fighter until two years into the war, the doctrine nonetheless became the foundation for the separation of the Air Force from the Army, and the basis for modern airpower theory. ACTS graduate, instructor, and "Bomber Mafia" member Haywood S. Hansell, concurred that both the theorists and the authors of the AWPD-1 war plan (he was both) made a serious mistake in neglecting long-range fighter escort in their ideas. Hansell wrote:
It was recognized that fighter escort was inherently desirable, but no one could quite conceive how a small fighter could have the range of the bomber yet retain its combat maneuverability. Failure to see this issue through proved one of the Air Corps Tactical School's major shortcomings.
However he also stated that ignorance of radar was fortuitous in the long run. He surmised that had radar been a factor in doctrine, many theorists would have reasoned that massed defenses would make all strategic air attacks too costly, inhibiting if not entirely suppressing the concepts that proved decisive in World War II and essential to the creation of the United States Air Force. Development of fighters was not ignored; by October 1940, over a year before Pearl Harbor, every type of piston-driven single-engine fighter used by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) in World War II had made its first flight except the P-47 Thunderbolt. However, the press of the enormous tasks confronting the Air Corps and the primacy of strategic bombing doctrine meant that development of a long-range capability for these new fighters was not undertaken until combat losses to bombers forced the issue.
School closure and legacy.
Before the short courses began, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called for an expansion of the Air Corps in January 1939. The need for experienced officers to supervise the expansion led to plans to reduce the size of the faculty and long course classes as a compromise to keep the school functioning. Six of the 24 Air Corps instructors would be returned to regular duty and class sizes would be reduced from 60 to 20 students. However World War II in Europe began on 1 September 1939, before the staff and class reductions could be implemented. The Air Corps permitted the short courses to be finished, but suspended all instruction on 30 June 1940. The Tactical School was reduced to a caretaker staff of seven officers, including two librarians.
One year later the Tactical School came under the control of the Southeast Air Corps Training Center, headquartered at Maxwell, with the objective of re-opening the school immediately. After completion of a study, the center recommended in July 1941 that the Tactical School curriculum be modified into a ten-week basic course in tactics for squadron and group level junior grade officers, to instruct 2,000 officers its first year and 5,000 officers thereafter, ending its twin missions of senior officer service school and doctrine development center. Instead the Air Corps Board was moved to Eglin Field, Florida and absorbed by the Air Corps Proving Ground, while all remaining staff of the Tactical School were transferred to Washington, D.C., where they continued work (mainly the production of training literature) until 30 June 1942, after which the school went unstaffed until its formal dissolution in 1946.
The ACTS at Maxwell graduated 870 officers, 400 of them in the short courses. During its entire history, the Tactical School trained 1,091 officers, 916 of them in the Air Service or Air Corps. 158 graduates from other arms included 118 Army officers, 35 Marines, and five Naval officers. The Tactical School also trained 17 officers from foreign countries. Of the 320 general officers in the Army Air Forces at the end of World War II, 261 were Tactical School graduates, including 14 of the 18 highest-ranking AAF generals. 134 officers (including 21 from the Army and Navy) served on the faculty of the Tactical School during its 20 years of existence, 58 of whom became general officers.
The senior service school function was abandoned for the duration of World War II in favor of development of an actual tactical center, responsible for the mass teaching of all aspects of air warfare to inexperienced officers who would become commanders of newly created units. Although commandants at ACTS had lobbied throughout its existence for the Tactical School to serve as the nucleus of such a center, it instead became the function of a new school, the Army Air Force School of Applied Tactics, activated 27 October 1942, in Orlando, Florida, both for the training of unit cadres and the continuing development of tactical doctrine.
The experiences of World War II created a new impetus for professional education of air commanders, as it had after World War I, but on a much vaster scale. The expectation of becoming a separate service from the Army resulted in planning for a service-wide educational system, the nucleus of which would be the Air University. Established in 1946, AU coordinated all professional education for Air Force officers, and "fell heir to the purpose and tradition of the old Tactical School".
School commandants.
"Without students":


Naval Air Transport Service

The Naval Air Transport Service or NATS, was a branch of the United States Navy from 1941 to 1948. At its height during World War II, NATS's totaled four wings of 18 squadrons that operated 540 aircraft with 26,000 personnel assigned.
Formation, 1941–42.
Prior to WW II, The Navy's air transport needs were provided by utility squadrons and aircraft assigned to commands. Five days after Pearl Harbor, Capt. C. H. Schildhauer presented a detailed plan for a naval air transport program to the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. Knox immediate approved the plan and the Naval Air Transport Service was created. This was a tall order since the largest transport operated by the Navy at this time were four R2Ds (DC-2). The first military transport version of the DC-3, the C-47, was first flown on 23 December 1941. Throughout the war, the Navy obtained its R4Ds (C-47) and later the C-54 (R5D) from U.S. Army contracts. Initially, additional DC-3s were appropriated from the commercial airlines. On 9 March 1942, the first NATS squadron, VR-1, was commissioned at NAS Norfolk with four R4D (C-47) aircraft, 27 officers, and 150 men. Initially, most of VR-1 flights were south in support of the Atlantic antisubmarine effort. "VR" is the Navy acronym for transport squadron – "V” is for heavier than air and "R” is for transport.
The next month, the Navy contracted American Airlines to operate an R4D school at Meacham Field, Fort Worth, Texas. The 30-day-long school included 30 hours of flight instruction and 30 hours of inflight observation. Student capacity was 30 per month. The Navy relied heavily on the expertise of former Naval aviators who were working for the commercial airlines and had been recalled to the Navy because of the war.
On 1 April 1942, VR-2 was commissioned at NAS Alameda, California. VR-2 initiated NATS transoceanic service on 15 May, from Alameda to Honolulu with a Sikorsky flying boat. VR-3, NATS's transcontinental squadron was commissioned on 15 July at the Fairfax Airport, Kansas City, Kansas with four DC-3s appropriated from Trans World Airlines. NATS also established its headquarters at Fairfax. In October, NATS moved its operation to the newly completed NAS Olathe, 25 miles to the southwest. The same month, the Pacific Wing Command was established in Honolulu.
Expansion, 1943.
The next year was spent building up the NATS operation. In March 1943, NATS Wing West Coast and NATS Wing Atlantic were formed. NATS received its first R5D(C-54) in the spring of 1943. Seaplane operations were conducted with the transport versions of the Consolidated PB2Y Coronado and the Martin PBM Mariner. NATS utilized the airlines as much as was feasible. Pan American conducted a navigation school at Coral Gables, Florida and American Export Airlines operated a similar navigation school at LaGuardia Airport, NY. By the end of 1943, the American Airlines R4D school expanded to train 50 pilots a month. The Pennsylvania Central Airlines school at Roanoke, Virginia which had been training Army C-47 pilots was taken over by the Navy when the Army cancelled its contract. United Airlines also began training Navy mechanics at the Oakland Airport by the end of the year. All transport pilots were required to be good instrument pilots so all NATS-bound pilots were sent through the Instrument Instructor School at NAS Atlanta. R4D and R5D aircraft commander school was located at Olathe.
NATS also contracted Pan American to operate seaplane transport service from San Francisco to Hawaii. Pan America utilized Martin M-130 China Clippers, Boeing 314s, and Navy supplied Consolidated PB2Y Coronados. Pan Am initially operated out of its prewar terminal at Treasure Island. By 1944, conflict with Navy surface ship traffic around Treasure Island caused Pan Am to move its operation south to Mills Field, now San Francisco International Airport. At the end of September 1944, Pan Am was operating four Boeing 314s and 15 PB2Y plus a few miscellaneous types.
Meanwhile, in March 1943, VR-4 was commissioned at Oakland as a maintenance squadron. The next month VR-6 was established at Dinner Key, Miami and took over transport seaplane training from VR-1. The same month, VR-7, an R4D squadron was formed at NAS Miami to service the Caribbean and South America. VR-7 was based at Miami Municipal, aka Amelia Earhart Airport, which was a part of the three airfield NAS Miami complex. VR-10 was also commissioned at Honolulu and was primarily a maintenance squadron.
In June, VR-5 was commission at Seattle to provide service to Alaska with R4D and R5Ds. The next month, VR-1 at Norfolk, moved to the recently opened NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. Several months later, VR-8 was established, and took over VR-1s transport seaplane operations. That September, VR-11 formed at Naval Air Station Oakland. VR-11 provided R5D service throughout the South Pacific and was eventually to become the largest VR squadron with over 700 pilots. In November 1943, the Navy took delivery of the first of six Martin PB2M Mars. On 30 November, the PB2M completed a 4,375-mile nonstop flight of 28 hours and 25 minutes, delivering 16,000 pounds of cargo from Patuxent River to Natal, Brazil. With the completion of facilities at NAS Honolulu, VR-11 moved its headquarters there in December.
In December 1943, the Naval Air Ferry Command was established under NATS to take over the mission previously provided by the Aircraft Delivery Units. The mission of the Ferry Command was to ferry aircraft from the factories to the fleet. The Command's headquarters were placed at NAS New York (Floyd Bennett Field) as well as the first squadron, VRF-1. Once a manufacturer, such as Grumman, Vought, or General Motors, deemed an aircraft was ready for delivery to the Navy, the aircraft was flown to NAS New York by the company's pilots. At New York, Navy personnel would check the aircraft and accept it. The Ferry Command would then fly the aircraft to where it was needed. NAS New York accepted over 20,000 aircraft during the course of the war – 25% of the Navy's total. The Air Ferry Command had a pilot training detachment at NAS Willow Grove, Pennsylvania. VRF-2 was established at Columbus, Ohio to accept aircraft from the Curtiss-Wright plant at Columbus and the Goodyear plant at Akron as well as others. Finally VRF-3 was established at NAS San Pedro to accept aircraft from the West Coast manufacturers. VRS-1 was also formed to provide servicing and refueling on the ferry route from New York to the West Coast. Ferrying stops were located at various times at Lynchburg and Petersburg, Virginia; Spartanburg, South Carolina: Knoxville and Nashville, Tennessee; Meridian and Jackson, Mississippi; Little Rock, Arkansas; Shreveport, Louisiana; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Fort Worth, Abilene, Midland, and El Paso, Texas; Tucson, Yuma, and Coolidge, Arizona; and El Centro, California plus others. In December 1944, VFR-4 was established at New York to specialize in the ferrying of seaplanes.
Full strength, 1944–45.
During 1944, NATS was operating at full steam. In June, two additional maintenance squadrons were formed, VR-12 at Honolulu and VR-9 at Patuxent River. VR-13, an additional R4D squadron was established and was eventually moved to Los Negros in the Admiralty Islands.
In March 1945, VRE-1, a wounded evacuation squadron, was formed out of VR-11 and moved to Guam. VR-11 became the largest squadron in the Navy with 700 pilots, 89 R5Ds and 10 R4Ds. NATS relied heavily on personnel with airline experience. At one time, VR-11 had 47 officers and 10 enlisted men that previously worked for 15 different airlines. One of VR-11's special missions was the delivery of whole blood to Pacific battle areas. Using special refrigerating units, the squadron was delivering 1000 pints a day by the invasion of Iwo Jima.
Post-war, 1945–48.
Following the war, the size of NATS diminished. The major operations at Miami and Olathe were eventually shutdown and the operations at San Francisco and Hawaii greatly reduced. The Naval Air Ferry Command was disbanded. By 1947, the NATS inventory had been reduced to only 116 aircraft. NATS meanwhile had planned for the future and introduced a new aircraft in 1947, the Lockheed R6O (later R6V) Constitution. Design of the Constitution had begun in 1942 for the Navy and Pan American. The Constitution featured a double deck cabin with a passenger capacity of 168 and was powered by four Pratt and Whitney R-4360s. Only two Constitutions were built for the Navy since Pan Am had previously dropped out of the project. The R6V remains to this day as the largest aircraft operated by the Navy.
Defense department.
In 1948, the newly created Defense Department, with economy and efficiency as its goal, combined the Air Force's Air Transport Command and NATS into the Military Air Transport Command or MATS. The Navy's contribution to MATS consisted of five squadrons and 58 aircraft. Although NATS was dissolved, the Navy was allowed to retain several transport squadrons for its specific needs. The Navy contribution to MATS and its subsequent command, Military Airlift Command or MAC, lasted until 1967. The demands of the Vietnam War and the resultant pilot shortage caused the Navy to withdraw its commitment.


Betty Shellenberger

Betty Shellenberger (August 8, 1921 – December 30, 2019), sometimes known as "Shelly Shellenberger", was an American field hockey and lacrosse player, coach, and official. She played on the U.S. women's national field hockey team from 1939 to 1941, 1946 to 1955, and in 1960. She was also a member of the USA national lacrosse team from 1940 to 1961. She was in the first class of inductees into the U.S. Field Hockey Association Hall of Fame.
Early years.
Shellenberger was born in 1921 and began playing field hockey at age nine. Constance Applebee was one of her coaches. Shellenberger attended The Agnes Irwin School.
Field hockey and military career.
She was a member of the U.S. national field hockey team from 1939 to 1941, 1946 to 1955, and in 1960. She was also a member of the USA national lacrosse team from 1940 to 1961. She served in the United States Marine Corps during World War II. She was stationed in California where she was an aviation mechanic.
Shellenberger was also a coach at Chestnut Hill College, serving as head coach of the field hockey program from 1964 to 1977, the lacrosse program from 1965 to 1977, and the badminton program from 1950 to 1956, 1960 to 1961, and 1964 to 1977.
After her playing career, she served as an umpire in both national and international games. The USA Field Hockey Association established the Shellenberger Umpiring Award in her honor. She was also an administrator with USA Field Hockey, serving as first executive secretary from 1955 to 1978.
Honors and later years.
In 1988, she was one of the charter inductees into the USA Field Hockey Hall of Fame. She was also inducted into the Pennsylvania Sports Hall of Fame in 1986, the National Lacrosse Hall of Fame in 1994, and the Philadelphia Sports Hall of Fame in 2009. In 1987, she was named a Distinguished Daughter of Pennsylvania.
She died in 2019 at age 98.


USCGC Half Moon (WAVP-378)


USCGC Isaac Mayo

USCGC "Isaac Mayo" is a homeported in Key West, Florida.
She is the twelfth Sentinel class to be delivered, and the sixth of six to be assigned to Key West.
Like her sister ships, she is equipped for coastal security patrols, interdiction of drug and people smugglers, and search and rescue. Like the smaller she is equipped with a stern launching ramp. The ramp allows the deployment and retrieval of her high speed water-jet powered pursuit boat without first coming to a stop. She is capable of more than and armed with a remote controlled M242 Bushmaster autocannon; and four crew-served Browning M2 machine guns.
Operational history.
On April 4, 2016, "Isaac Mayo" intercepted a small boat with twenty-two Cuban refugees on board. The refugees had gone off course, and had entered Bahamas territory.
Namesake.
She is named after Isaac Mayo, who served a surfman at a lifeboat station on Cape Cod.
Mayo was an employee of the United States Life-Saving Service, one of the precursor services that were amalgamated into the Coast Guard.


USCGC Evergreen (WLB-295)

The USCGC "Evergreen" (WAGL-295 / WLB-295 / WAGO-295 / WMEC-295) was a Cactus-class seagoing buoy tender operated by the United States Coast Guard. She served in the North Atlantic during World War II and participated in the International Ice Patrol in these waters after the war. She was the first dedicated oceanographic vessel in the Coast Guard's history. She was decommissioned in 1990 and sunk by the US Navy for target practice in 1992.
Construction and characteristics.
"Evergreen" was built at the Marine Ironworks and Shipbuilding Company yard in Duluth, Minnesota. Her keel was laid down on 15 April 1942. The ship was launched on 3 July 1942. Her original cost was $871,946.
Her hull was constructed of welded steel plates framed with steel I-beams. As originally built, "Evergreen" was long, with a beam of , and a draft of . Her displacement was 935 tons. While her overall dimensions remained the same over her career, the addition of new equipment raised her displacement to 1,025 tons by the end of her Coast Guard service.
She was designed to perform light ice-breaking. Her hull was reinforced with an "ice belt" of thicker steel around her waterline to protect it from punctures. Similarly, her bow was reinforced and shaped to ride over ice in order to crush it with the weight of the ship.
"Evergreen" had a single stainless-steel five-blade propeller driven by a diesel-electric propulsion system. Two Cooper-Bessemer GND-8 4-cycle 8-cylinder Diesel engines produced 700 horsepower each. They provided power to two Westinghouse generators. The electricity from the generators ran a 1200-horsepower Westinghouse electric motor which turned the propeller.
She had a single cargo boom which had the ability to lift 20 tons onto her buoy deck.
The ship's fuel tanks had a capacity of approximately ". Evergreen's" unrefueled range was at 13 knots, at 12 knots, and at 8.3 knots. Her potable water tanks had a capacity of . Considering dry storage capacity and other factors, her at-sea endurance was 21 days.
Her wartime complement was 6 officers and 74 enlisted men. By 1964 this was reduced to 5 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 42 enlisted personnel.
"Evergreen" was armed with a 3"/50 caliber gun mounted behind the pilot house. She also had two 20mm guns, one mounted on top of the wheelhouse and one on the aft deck. Two racks of depth charges were also mounted on the aft deck. She also was equipped with mousetrap anti-submarine rockets. All of this armament was removed in 1966 leaving "Evergreen" with only small arms for law enforcement actions.
At the time of construction, "Evergreen" was designated WAGL, an auxiliary vessel, lighthouse tender. Her namesake was the evergreen tree, in conformance with the Coast Guard tradition of naming buoy tenders after trees and shrubs.
World War II service (19421945).
"Evergreen" began her World War II service with brief postings in the Great Lakes and Charleston, South Carolina. She was then home-ported in Boston, where she spent the remainder of the war. Her primary mission was weather patrol in the North Atlantic. Between August 1943 and July 1944 she sailed from Boston, Portland, or Agentia out to designated points in the ocean to take weather readings which were radioed back to shore. These trips typically lasted about three weeks. This timely, mid-ocean weather data allowed military planners to route aircraft directly from the United States to England, saving the long delay in shipping aircraft by freighter. She rotated on these weather patrols With USCGC "Sorrel" and USCGC "Conifer".On 26 July 1944 she departed Argentia, escorting two merchant ships to Greenland. On 31 July she made a sonar contact and fired 16 anti-submarine projectiles at what was later concluded to be either whales or a cold water layer in the ocean. She arrived at Narsarssuaq on 1 August 1944. She patrolled up the east coast of Greenland to Cape Pansch, and supplied remote military bases including radio direction finding stations attempting to localize German U-boats and German weather stations in Greenland. On 19 November 1944 "Evergreen" landed a party of 27 soldiers on the east coast of Greenland to investigate possible enemy activity. She broke channels through the ice to allow other ships to reach port on several occasions.
"Evergreen" sailed to the United States for repairs at the Portsmouth Navy Yard in February 1945, but returned to Greenland in April 1945. She continued her work supplying remote bases, icebreaking, and building and maintaining aids to navigation. As World War II ended in Europe, her work went into reverse. She evacuated men from their remote bases. On 28 September 1945 she completed the evacuation of Cape Dan.
Post-war service (19451964).
After the war "Evergreen" remained based at Boston. She serviced remote LORAN stations in the North Atlantic and was involved in a number of search and rescue missions. In August 1947 she towed the disabled 90-foot fishing boat "Dartmouth" 450 miles back to Gloucester. In September 1947 she took in tow the disabled Army transport "Flemish Bend" off Newfoundland. A celebrity rescue took place in September 1953, when "Evergreen" rescued Malcolm Forbes, publisher of Forbes Magazine, when his yacht broke down in the path of an advancing hurricane.
On 25 July 1956 the Italian liner "Andrea Doria," with 1706 passengers and crew aboard, collided with the liner "Stockholm" off Nantucket and began to sink. Andrea Doria had 1,706 passengers and crew aboard. "Evergreen," returning to Boston from ice patrol, was diverted to the scene. She arrived at 8:06 am on 26 July 1956 and took command of the rescue effort. By that time there was little she could do. She radioed, "S.S. Andrea Doria sank in 225 feet of water at 10:09 A.M." After the sinking, "Evergreen" searched an 80-square mile area around the wreck for 40 people that had not been accounted for. She found none. She was joined by USCGC "Yakutat" and USCGC "Fredrick Lee" in recovering floating debris from the site. The Coast Guard ended this effort on 30 July.
In April 1948 Evergreen was the first buoy tender assigned to the International Ice Patrol. In this mission she would sail into the North Atlantic during the spring thaw. While off the coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland, she would assess conditions that could carry dangerous icebergs into shipping lanes. This was the first off a decades-long series of ice patrol cruises. While on these patrols crewmen and visiting scientists sampled water temperatures using Nansen bottles, and currents using a geomagnetic electrokinetograph. She deployed a deep-sea buoy to collect oceanographic data. Between 1948 and 1986 Evergreen was on ice patrol at least thirty-four times.
Oceanographic vessel (19641982).
In 1964, "Evergreen" was converted to an oceanographic vessel and re-designated WAGO-295. She was the first dedicated oceanographic vessel in the Coast Guard's history. During the conversion, a computer was installed, and "Evergreen" became the first government oceanographic ship to have one. As an oceanographic vessel, she was also converted from a black-hull paint scheme to a white-hull paint scheme, which she wore until decommissioned.
Her ice patrol duties continued under her new designation, and extended further into the Arctic. In 1964 she explored Kennedy Channel, north of Baffin Bay, with a team of scientists from the University of Washington, Dartmouth, and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. Her oceanographic studies took her across the Atlantic to Germany in 1965. In 1966 she sailed to the coast of Brazil to take water temperature, salinity, and oxygen content readings.
On 23 December 1968 "Evergreen" suffered a major fire in her engine room while tied to the pier at the Coast Guard's Boston base. Two of her crew were overcome by the smoke. The fire was put out in two hours, but damage was extensive. She was repaired at the Coast Guard Yard at Curtis Bay, Maryland and was back at sea by April 1970.
In 1972, "Evergreen" underwent a $2 million renovation at the Coast Guard Yard. New fresh water and sewage systems were installed. A bow thruster was added to increase her maneuverability. Crew quarters were renovated and modernized. The deckhouse was expanded and new laboratories were added. In March 1973 Evergreen sailed to her new homeport, New London, Connecticut. She left almost immediately for her regular ice patrol in the North Atlantic.
Medium endurance cutter (19821990).
By 1982 aircraft and satellites had grown in their capacity to monitor ice in the shipping lanes, leading to less reliance on ship-based data. Also, in 1970 the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration was established, and it too had grown in its capabilities. Amidst Reagan-administration budget cuts, the Coast Guard's oceanographic research program was ended. "Evergreen" was converted to a Medium-Endurance Cutter, and re-designated WMEC-295. For the rest of her career she would focus on law enforcement and fisheries management missions.
She got right to work in her new role, seizing an Italian vessel off the coast of New Jersey fishing illegally for squid in September 1982. On 1 May 1983 she boarded a vessel 35 miles off Montauk and discovered 26 tons of marijuana. When "Evergreen" brought the boat back to New London, it became the largest drug seizure in Connecticut history to that time. The sailboat she seized in 1984 had 4 tons of marijuana in her cargo. "Evergreen" caught another sailboat smuggling 700 pounds of cocaine in Florida waters in 1990.
The Coast Guard considered decommissioning "Evergreen" when the oceanography program she supported ended in 1982, but the ship was retained as a medium-endurance cutter. Her retirement was then linked to the construction of her replacement in the medium-endurance cutter fleet, USCGC "Tahoma". "Evergreen" was finally decommissioned on 26 June 1990, 48 years after her launch. During the course of her Coast Guard service she was awarded the Unit Commendation twice, the Meritorious Unit Commendation three times, the Arctic Service Medal, and the E-ribbon, among other honors.
She was used by the U.S. Navy as a target and sunk during a fleet exercise on 25 November 1992.


Eagle Harbor Coast Guard Station Boathouse

The Eagle Harbor Coast Guard Station Boathouse is a boathouse located at 9282 Marina Road in Eagle Harbor, Michigan. It was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 2012.
History.
The Life-Saving Station at Eagle Harbor was constructed in the period 1910-1912 by the United States Life-Saving Service. The original station complex included the station building with a hip-roof watch tower at the corner and a two-bay boathouse that probably was located where the present structure is. Other buildings and structures have been added to the complex over the years. In 1915, the Life-Saving Service was combined with the United States Revenue Cutter Service to create the United States Coast Guard, and the name of the Eagle Harbor Life-Saving Station was changed to the Eagle Harbor Coast Guard Station. In 1938 the original boathouse was replaced with the current structure. The station remained in service until 1950. In 1954, the station was turned over to the General Services Administration as surplus. Several structures were moved across Eagle Harbor to the grounds of the Eagle Harbor Light. The 1938 boathouse is the only original structure remaining on site.
The Eagle Harbor Coast Guard Station Boathouse is currently operated by the Keweenaw County Historical Society as the Eagle Harbor Life-Saving Station.
Description.
The Eagle Harbor Coast Guard Station Boathouse is a rectangular, one-story structure on a poured concrete foundation measuring 58 feet by 44 feet. The building has a hip roof clad in what may be original cedar shingles, and walls covered with wide exposure wood weatherboard siding. The building has three boat bays facing what was once a nearby former boat slip. There is a chimney on one side and small gabled dormers with round-head double-hung colonial windows in the roof on all the other elevations. There are five roll-up panel doors, two on the north elevation and three on the south elevation, and double-hung six-over-six windows with wooden shutters.
The interior of the building contains one large open space, with concrete flooring gently sloping toward one end. The Keweenaw County Historical Society has filled the interior with displays of Life-Saving Service and Coast Guard artifacts, including rescue boats and equipment of the types used at this station.