New Georgia counterattack

The New Georgia counterattack was a counterattack on 17–18 July 1943 by mainly Imperial Japanese Army troops against United States Army forces during the New Georgia campaign in the Solomon Islands. The U.S. and its allies were attempting to capture an airfield constructed by the Japanese at Munda Point on New Georgia with which to support further advances towards the main Japanese base around Rabaul as part of Operation Cartwheel.
The Japanese attack saw one infantry regiment from the Southeast Detachment carry out a frontal assault against the center and left of the U.S. front line, while another carried out a flanking attack on their left aimed at enveloping the U.S. forces and cutting them off from their supply line. While the frontal assault was checked, the flanking attack succeeded in breaking into the rear of the U.S. beachhead. Many casualties were inflicted among the logistics, support and medical troops in the area, and the 43rd Infantry Division's command post came under attack before heavy defensive artillery fire and local defensive fighting forced the Japanese attackers back. Ultimately, the Japanese attack was unsuccessful, having been badly coordinated, and after a brief lull in the fighting, the U.S. forces launched a two-week long corps-level offensive that captured the airfield on 4–5 August 1943.
Background.
Strategic situation.
In the wake of the Guadalcanal campaign, concluded in early 1943, the Allies formulated plans to advance through the Central Solomons towards Bougainville, in conjunction with further operations in New Guinea. These plans formed part of the effort to reduce the main Japanese base around Rabaul, which was designated Operation Cartwheel. Capture of the airfield at Munda would facilitate further assaults on Vila, Kolombangara and Bougainville. For the Japanese, New Georgia formed a key part of the defenses protecting the southern approaches to Rabaul. Accordingly, they sought to defend the area strongly, and moved reinforcements by barge along the Shortlands–Vila–Munda supply line.
The Allied campaign plan for securing New Georgia, designated Operation Toenails by U.S. planners, involved several landings by elements of Major General Oscar Griswold's XIV Corps to secure staging areas and an airfield in the southern part of New Georgia at Wickham Anchorage, Viru Harbor and Rendova. Once captured, these would then be garrisoned to support the movement of troops and supplies from Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands to Rendova, which would be built up as base for further operations in New Georgia focused on securing the airfield at Munda.
The Americans landed reconnaissance elements around Zanana on New Georgia on 30 June; this marked the start of the New Georgia campaign. These were followed by main force elements from Major General John H. Hester's 43rd Infantry Division on 2 July 1943, crossing from Rendova where they had landed on 30 June. After establishing a beachhead, the American troops made limited gains in their drive toward Munda Point and advanced slowly against strong opposition. From the outset, the Japanese forces around Zanana, consisting largely of troops from the 229th Infantry Regiment and 8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force, fought to delay the U.S. advance while reinforcements were dispatched. Over the course of several weeks, they delayed the U.S. troops' westward advance on Munda, and defeated an attempt to outflank their defenses.
In order to renew the offensive, the U.S corps commander, Griswold, was sent to New Georgia to assess the situation. He reported back to Admiral William Halsey on Noumea that the situation was dire and requested reinforcements in the form of at least another division to break the stalemate. Griswold took over command of the troops in the field from Hester on 15 July and began preparations for a corps-level offensive. The build up would take about 10 days, and amidst this situation, the Japanese began preparations for a counterattack.
Japanese reinforcements.
Japanese reinforcements arrived at New Georgia during July. The initial reinforcements comprised approximately 3,000 troops from the 13th and 229th Infantry Regiments, as well as a number of support units. These soldiers were stationed in the Shortland Islands. The first attempt to transport soldiers to New Georgia began on 4 July, when four destroyers departed Buin in Bougainville. The Japanese ships broke off the attempt to land troops when they encountered a U.S. Navy bombardment force off Rice Anchorage in the early hours of 5 July, though they sank the destroyer .
The Japanese had more success in landing troops the next day. A larger force of destroyers was dispatched, and landed about 1,600 troops and 90 tons of supplies. The Japanese destroyers were intercepted by an American force of cruisers and destroyers, and in the Battle of Kula Gulf, which was fought during the early hours of 6 July, an American cruiser and two Japanese destroyers were sunk. Three Japanese cruisers and four destroyers landed 1,200 soldiers unopposed on Kolombangara on the night of 9/10 July. On the night of 12/13 July, a further 1,200 Japanese soldiers were landed at Vila, though the Imperial Japanese Navy lost a light cruiser and the U.S. Navy a destroyer in the Battle of Kolombangara.
The troops landed at Kolombangara were subsequently moved to New Georgia by barge. Other Japanese units were moved to New Georgia piecemeal on barges during July. Overall, the units that arrived in the Munda Point area between early and mid-July were the 3rd Battalion of the 229th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 230th Infantry Regiment, the 13th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 10th Independent Mountain Regiment and anti-aircraft, anti-tank, engineer and signals units. In addition, the 2nd Battalion of the 45th Infantry Regiment was transferred from Bougainville to Bairoko on the north coast of New Georgia. These reinforcements enabled the Japanese to maintain their strength on New Georgia and prepare a counterattack, despite the American advances.
Opposing forces.
Around 30,000 U.S. troops were committed to actions around Munda throughout July and August, while the Japanese allocated around 8,000 troops. The U.S. troops were under the command of Griswold, commander of XIV Corps, and the Japanese force was commanded by Major General Minoru Sasaki of the Southeast Detachment. For the counterattack, Sasaki's main fighting elements totaled around five infantry battalions. These were drawn from the 229th Infantry Regiment, under Colonel Genjiro Hirata, and the 13th Infantry Regiment, under Colonel Tomonari Satoshi. The U.S. troops allocated consisted mainly of three infantry regiments from Hester's 43rd Infantry Division; to reinvigorate the advance on Munda, Griswold had requested reinforcements from the 37th and 25th Infantry Divisions, commanded by Major Generals Robert S. Beightler and J. Lawton Collins respectively. Ultimately, though, these divisions would not complete their movement to the battle area until after the Japanese counterattack.
Battle.
Due to the decision by U.S. commanders to land at Zanana in early July, rather than further west along the coast, the American lines of communication became stretched and vulnerable as the advance towards Munda continued. Meanwhile, the inexperienced American troops were disorganized and suffering from poor morale and bad leadership, having become bogged down by harsh terrain and bad weather, which had quickly turned the jungle tracks into mud. Sasaki launched his counterattack at the moment that the U.S. advance halted to reorganize. The objective of the Japanese operation was to destroy the American forces on New Georgia by attacking their exposed flank and rear areas. It was intended that the attack would be coordinated with naval operations to cut off the American troops on New Georgia and air attacks on Allied logistical bases on the island elsewhere.
Sensing an advantage, Sasaki ordered the 13th Infantry Regiment to penetrate the U.S. right flank around the upper reaches of the Barike River and attack their rear elements, while elements of the 229th which were already occupying defensive positions along the front attacked the left flank. A total of six companies from two battalions of the 13th Infantry Regiment were committed to this effort, while the regiment's 2nd Battalion remained around Bairoko. These troops began moving from their assembly area in a plantation north of Munda on 14 July.
While Tomonari's troops began their march, those of Hirata's 229th in the center of the line undertook a series of patrols and minor attacks to keep the U.S. forces off balance. Hampered by the terrain just as the U.S. troops had been, it took three days for Tomonari's troops to complete their preliminary move. From the Barike, the Japanese began probing the Allied right flank, which was only lightly held by isolated outposts, before moving towards an assembly area for the main assault. Track improvement had not been completed in this area and, as a result, the U.S. outposts could not be reinforced quickly. Sasaki planned for Tomonari's forces to infiltrate this area and sever the supply lines from Zanana while Hirata's 229th Infantry Regiment advanced from Munda to assault the center and right of the U.S. line. In doing so, the Japanese hoped to complete an envelopment of the U.S. regiments holding the front. The element of surprise was lost, however, when U.S. patrols detected the infiltration. In the afternoon of 17 July, elements of the U.S. 43rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop unsuccessfully attempted an ambush but were overwhelmed in the attempt.
Despite the Japanese commander's intentions to coordinate the efforts of the forces assigned to the counterattack, ultimately this was not achieved as the Japanese force lacked communications equipment. Japanese preparations were also disrupted by U.S. artillery fire around 11:30 on 17 July, which landed on the forward positions of the 229th Infantry Regiment just prior them forming up for the assault in the center of the U.S. line and this ultimately delayed their attack. Artillery and air strikes also broke up an effort by naval troops from the Yokosuka 7th Special Naval Landing Force to launch an amphibious landing behind the Allied front. Throughout 17 July, the 229th was kept off balance around the Laiana beachhead by the U.S. 172nd Infantry Regiment with well coordinated close armored support from several Marine Corps tanks, while the U.S. 169th Infantry Regiment carried out a local attack between Reincke Ridge and Kelley Hill with two battalions which kept the Japanese in contact throughout the day.
Meanwhile, at around 16:00, the 13th Infantry Regiment reached a mangrove swamp on the bank of the Barike River, where they began to assemble for the attack on the beachhead. The rear area of the U.S. beachhead consisted of many spread out camps and facilities that were mainly occupied by logistics, support and technical troops. Throughout the night of 17–18 July, formed into small section or platoon-sized groups, the Japanese succeeded in infiltrating and attacking several isolated outposts in the American rear areas, which were hastily defended by small groups of support troops. Over several hours, they carried out minor raids against supply dumps and engineer depots, and ambushed medical parties, inflicting many casualties on the American forces. During the confused fighting, the Japanese raiders destroyed vital telephone switchboards in an effort to disrupt communications. Nevertheless, the US forces were able to maintain communications with their supporting artillery battalions through a single telephone and throughout the night the artillery liaison officer called down heavy barrages from offshore batteries in response, some within of the divisional command post.
Although the attack in the rear areas continued throughout the night, the artillery fire prevented the Japanese from being able to concentrate in strength. The beachhead area was also attacked, but a force of 52 Marines from the 9th Defense Battalion commandeered two U.S. Army .30 caliber machine guns and occupied a defensive position on a knoll about inland, supported by an anti-tank platoon and an ad hoc force of another fifty service troops and artillerymen. From this position, at around 21:00 they ambushed a force of Japanese attackers moving from the command post to set up a mortar, while others manned the unit's antiaircraft guns. The Japanese made four efforts to push through the ambush, but ultimately withdrew, leaving at least 18 of their number dead. Other raiders attacked kitchen areas and medical facilities, including casualty clearing stations. At one aid station, several patients fought back, killing four Japanese. In other stations, the medics and doctors attempted to fight off Japanese infantrymen who bayoneted patients in their beds.
In the center of the line, and further to the south, just after midnight on 17–18 July, two battalions (the 2nd and 3rd) from Hirata's 229th Infantry Regiment began a series of attacks against elements of the US 169th Infantry Regiment. After the initial attack against the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry Regiment around Kelley Hill failed, the second effort began well for the Japanese who were able to skillfully advance close to the line in places to hurl grenades into the US front line. Mortar fire attempted to flush these troops out, and eventually the Japanese effort in the center of the lines was fought to a standstill as the defending troops used the high ground to their advance, calling down accurate artillery barrages down on the attacking troops, of which at least 102 were killed. Two hundred men from the Japanese 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry Regiment, which had been withdrawing from the Segi area following earlier fighting around Viru Harbor, stumbled into the area and also joined in the attack against a company of the U.S. 169th Infantry Regiment. An assault against the 3rd Battalion, 103rd Infantry Regiment, which had been assigned to support the 172nd Infantry Regiment around the beach area, was also beaten back.
Griswold urgently requested reinforcements. A battery was dispatched to Zanana from Kokorana and the 148th Infantry Regiment began preparations to move from Rendova at first light. Ultimately, though, the attack on the beachhead petered out and the 13th Infantry Regiment melted into the jungle during the morning of 18 July. They would remain scattered in small numbers, and in the aftermath of the attack continued to harass U.S. troops. Sasaki hoped to be able to mount another effort to go on the offensive, but ultimately this opportunity did not eventuate.
Aftermath.
According to the historian Eric Hammel, "the action cost both sides many lives", although exact casualty numbers are not specified. The US Army official historian John Miller Jr. judged that the Japanese 13th Infantry Regiment's attacks "caused a few casualties but accomplished very little, certainly not enough to justify its trip from Kolombangara".
The arrival of U.S. reinforcements began early on 18 July, with elements of the 148th Infantry Regiment landing at Zanana. Having hurriedly embarked at Rendova, they had been told to expect to fight as soon as they landed, but the fighting around the beach had concluded by the time they arrived. They were quickly pushed inland by U.S. commanders to shore up their vulnerable right flank and open the Munda Trail; during this movement the regiment's advanced elements clashed several times with small groups of Japanese infantry. Efforts to relieve the 169th took several days, with minor actions continuing until 20 July, including an ambush around one of the bridges across the Barike. In the coming days both the 145th and 161st Infantry Regiments arrived, and deployed opposite three battalions from the Japanese 229th Infantry, and a company from the 230th.
After the Japanese counterattack was defeated, the U.S. commanders completed preparations for a corps-level offensive to capture Munda, bringing in further reinforcements and supplies. A secondary landing had been undertaken closer to Munda, around Laiana, to shorten supply lines. Medical and logistic support was also improved utilizing the secondary landing beach that had been established around Laiana on 14 July. During the lull that followed, U.S. forces undertook a series of patrols to gather information about Japanese dispositions; a number of minor firefights took place during this time, with only limited casualties. Meanwhile, the Japanese commander, Sasaki, also resolved to renew the offensive. He ordered Tomonari to launch another counterattack on 25 July, aiming an attack on the U.S. right flank around Horseshoe Hill and then rolling up the Allied line east along the Munda Trail. Griswold ordered a renewed offensive on 22 July; this began three days later and nullified the Japanese efforts.
Supported by a strong naval bombardment on Lambeti Plantation, between Munda and Laiana, augmented by shore-based artillery and airstrikes, on 25 July the U.S. attack commenced with two divisions being committed across the front. The 37th Division attacked towards Bibilo Hill while the 43rd Division drove towards Lambeti Plantation and the airfield. After a sustained offensive that lasted two weeks, the Allies eventually captured the airfield in the Battle of Munda Point on 4–5 August. As the Japanese began withdrawing from New Georgia towards Kolombangara, U.S. forces undertook mopping up operations throughout August, during which time they advanced north from Munda to link up with the U.S. Marines and U.S. Army troops that had landed around Bairoko in early July. Bangaa Islet was secured in late August, while Arundel Island was captured later the following month.


San Angelo Army Air Field

San Angelo Army Airfield is an inactive United States Air Force base, about 8 miles south-southwest of San Angelo, Texas. It was active during World War II as a training airfield. It was closed on 30 November 1945.
History.
Initially built as "Carr Field" Municipal Airport, the original airport was on a 670-acre site being developed by the Works Progress Administration (WPA). It had two 4,500-ft runways with a third main of about 6,200 ft. Construction was well underway by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, after which discussions were held to convert Carr Field to an Army Air corps base.
The primary mission of the field was to train bombardiers for B-25 Mitchell, B-26 Marauder medium, B-17 Flying Fortress, and B-24 Liberator heavy bombers, and later B-29 Superfortress very heavy bombers for combat missions during World War II. San Angelo AAF was one of the "West Texas Bombardier Quadrangle" schools of the Army Air Forces Training Command. The other bases in the quad were Midland Army Airfield, Childress Army Airfield, and Big Spring Army Airfield.
Army personnel arrived in San Angelo in May 1942 and the construction of the civil airport was taken over by military construction crews in May 1942. Additional land was acquired and the military airfield eventually totaled almost 1,700 acres in size.
The base was activated on 1 June 1942 and jurisdiction was transferred to the Army Air Forces Training Command. However, the base was far from ready to perform any type of military training. Runway construction consisted of expanding the former civil airport into a four-asphalt-runway configuration along with seven hangars. In addition, the building of a large support base was carried out with barracks, various administrative buildings, maintenance shops, and hangars. The station facility consisted of a large number of buildings based on standardized plans and architectural drawings, with the buildings designed to be the "cheapest, temporary character with structural stability only sufficient to meet the needs of the service which the structure is intended to fulfill during the period of its contemplated war use" was underway. To conserve critical materials, most facilities were constructed of wood, concrete, brick, gypsum board, and concrete asbestos. Metal was sparsely used. The station was designed to be nearly self-sufficient, with not only hangars, but also barracks, warehouses, hospitals, dental clinics, dining halls, and maintenance shops were needed. There were libraries, social clubs for officers and enlisted men, and stores to buy living necessities. Over 250 buildings, together with complete water, sewer, electric, and gas utilities, the airfield served over 4,000 military personnel.
It was not until 8 January 1943 that Training Command activated the 34th Flying Training Wing (Bombardier and Specialized Twin- and Four-Engine) at the base, its mission being the training of bombardiers and specialized pilot two- and four-engine flying training. The 34th was one of two dedicated bombardier training wings, the other being the 38th at Williams Field, Arizona (later moved to Kirtland Field, New Mexico). Schools were also established at seven other locations in Central and Western Flying Training Commands (Victorville AAF, California; Carlsbad AAF, Deming AAF, and Roswell AAF, New Mexico; and Childress AAF, Midland AAF, and Big Spring AAF, Texas).
Operations.
The first training class (42-17) began in September 1942 when the field was about 90% complete. Flying cadets came from phase one flight schools at Ellington Field, Texas, and Santa Anna Army Airbase, California. The primary twin-engine trainer was the Beechcraft AT-11 Kansan, which provided both twin-engine training for pilots and could have practice bombs loaded for bombardier training, as the aircraft had a large glass nose where the trainee could sit and become familiar with the Norden bombsight. Later, some obsolete B-18 Bolos were used as the classes grew larger and the need for additional aircraft increased. Classes were organized into four "Flights", designated "A", "B", "C", and "D".
Early training at San Angelo AAF reflected the need to get men into combat quickly. The ground school was opened by a dozen second lieutenants who were recent graduates of the Officer Training School at Miami Beach, Florida, but none of them had any experience on the Norden bombsight or had any bombardier training. Initially, trained bombardiers were pulled from combat squadrons to perform the academic instruction in bombing techniques and flew along with the cadets making practice bomb drops and teaching them from their practical experience, more than from a syllabus. As time passed, recent graduates of the school at San Angelo, as well as other bombardier schools, became the instructors.
The first course of instruction was 12 weeks long, which again reflected the urgent need for bombardiers in the heavy and medium bombers which were beginning to roll off the production lines at Boeing, Martin, Consolidated, Ford, and other plants. The course used was modeled after the one already in use at Midland Army Airfield, Texas, which consisted of about 35 hours of bombing training, actual flying missions, and about 225 hours of classroom work. This included a study of the theory of bombing, automatic flight control equipment, bombsight maintenance in the field, and equipment. Practice missions were flown with 100-pound inert bombs that were dropped from altitudes ranging from 300 to 12,000 feet. Each cadet dropped about 200 bombs during training. Most of the time, the initial graduates spent in the first 12-week course was devoted to the use of the Norden bombsight and bombing accuracy with it.
Later, as time permitted and the number of graduates increased, the course was extended to 18 weeks in July 1943, which added instruction in night and dead-reckoning navigation. To accommodate the navigation training, both types of training were included in the same flight for the multiple pilots and navigators assigned to each aircraft and the length of the flights were extended, making simulated bomb runs over several simulated targets and dropping practice bombs over several practice ranges set up.
The training program was again extended to 24 weeks in October 1944, but this led to problems with the availability of the M-38A2 practice bombs. At the time, trainees were required to drop 20 practice bombs each per month, and students normally dropped as many as 200. However, due to a shortage of practice bombs, this was reduced to a maximum of 125. Some of the major additional to the course was the extension of flying time from 120 to 150 hours. Academic hours were increased in the ground school to study bomb racks and their in-flight maintenance, fuses, bombs, bombing analysis, radio navigation aids, glide bombing, and other subjects. Also, a 10-hour course was added in the use of the Astro-Compass.
The Norden bombsight was one of America's most closely guarded secrets at the time. They were removed from the aircraft when not in use and stored in one of three vaults in the bombsight maintenance building. The building was surrounded by a double barbed wire fence and kept under armed guard 24/7. Each trainee had to sign an oath of secrecy before starting the training. Most of the students were cadets, and upon graduation, would be commissioned as second lieutenants. Some later classes, however, received new students who had received their commission in other areas and were retraining.
Closure.
By early 1945, the urgent need for bombardiers was over and the number of trainees was significantly reduced. Enough bombardiers were available to meet anticipated needs, so the cadets in the training program underwent more thorough training. The concrete bomb shortage was past, and in March 1945, the 1,000,000th concrete practice bomb was dropped. The end of the war in Europe in May further cut back the number of trainees, and in August, the victory over Japan the role for which San Angelo Army Airfield ended. Notice from Army Air Forces Training Command was received that all training would stop on 15 August. Students and officers were given a choice of separation or being allowed to remain in the postwar Air Force and continue training. Those who elected for separation, however, were not immediately separated, but given nonflying duties around the field, and many did not receive their discharges until October.
The last class of bombardiers from San Angelo AAF graduated on 12 September, and all classes in progress were halted on 24 September. The remaining students were reassigned to Midland Army Airfield to complete their training. Then in October, a limited amount of training was restarted, and as late as 1 November, still over 100 aircraft were on the parking ramp, primarily AT-11s, but also some B-24 Liberators and B-17 Flying Fortresses that had been transferred from heavy bomber training bases and were used as trainers. Finally, Training Command sent orders to San Angelo AAF that the base would be closed on 30 November. Some aircraft were reassigned to other open bases, but the vast majority were sent to reclamation facilities for scrapping. On 30 November 1945, the flag was lowered at San Angelo Army Airfield for the last time.
Current status.
Ultimately, a transfer agreement was arranged after the war which allowed the City of San Angelo to reclaim its original 673.66-acre airport and also retain a lease on 896.7 acres of Tom Green County school land. The War Assets Administration also transferred almost all government-built-and-owned airport improvements to the city.
Today, the airfield is a civil airport named Mathis Field, in honor of First Lieutenant Jack W. Mathis, a bombardier who received the Medal of Honor posthumously as a result of his heroic actions over Germany in 1943. His brother, Mark Mathis, was also a bombardier who had requested an assignment to the 303d Bombardment Group, at Molesworth, England, the same group as which his brother Jack was assigned. Mark was on the base when the plane carrying his brother's body landed after the mission. At his own request, Mark Mathis was transferred into Jack Mathis' crew to replace him as bombardier. When the crew completed its tour of duty, Mark Mathis stayed in combat and was killed in action over the North Sea in May 1943 when his B-17 crashed into the North Sea as a result of combat damage. Today, a portrait of both brothers hangs in the lobby of Mathis Field Airport.
Three of the former wartime runways at Mathis Field are still in use. A new extended-length jet runway replaced the parallel twin north–south runways. The large aircraft parking apron remains, and two of the wartime hangars remain in use. The buildings of the ground station were sold, removed, or torn down over the years, and only some foundations remain in bushy areas. The streets still visible in aerial photography, some still accessible to drive through the abandoned station.


63rd Infantry Division (United States)

The 63rd Infantry Division ("Blood and Fire") was an infantry division of the United States Army that fought in Europe during World War II. After the war it was inactivated, but later the division number and shoulder sleeve insignia were authorized for use by the 63d Army Reserve Command (ARCOM).
The 63rd Regional Support Command is responsible for the base and administrative support of all United States Army Reserve units throughout the seven-state region of southwestern United States including California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and Arkansas. Although the 63rd Regional Readiness Command located in Los Alamitos, CA, was not authorized to carry the lineage of the 63rd Infantry Division, the creation of the new 63rd Regional Support Command in Moffett Field, CA, authorizes it to inherit the lineage and the bi-color red and blue background 63rd Infantry Division flag as an exception to policy. The unit was inactivated on 6 December 2009 and replaced by the 79th Sustainment Support Command, and was reactivated as a regional support command.
World War II.
Gathering strength.
The 63rd Infantry Division was activated on 15 June 1943, at Camp Blanding, Florida, using a cadre from the 98th Infantry Division. Shortly thereafter, the division removed to Camp Van Dorn, Mississippi to prepare for deployment to Europe. On three occasions during the next seventeen months, the division trained up fresh recruits into effective combat teams, only to have them pulled from the division and sent overseas as replacements. The first elements of the division, anxious to get in the fight, finally arrived in Europe in December 1944 and were joined by the rest of the division in January 1945.
Order of Battle.
The division consisted of the following units:
Major attached units.
More attached and detached units are listed here:
In action.
Three regiments of the 63rd Division arrived in Marseille, France, 8 December 1944, trained at Haguenau and, under the designation Task Force Harris, protected the east flank of the Seventh Army along the Rhine River. The task force fought defensively from 22 to 30 December 1944. On 30 December 44, while the 253d Inf Regt was attached to the 44th Inf Div and the 255th Inf Regt was attached to the 100th Inf Div, the 254th Inf Regt was moved to the Colmar area of France where it was attached to the 3d Inf Div which was at the time a part of the First French Army. The infantry regiments remained with their attachments until early February 1945. The rest of the division arrived at Marseilles, 14 January 1945, and moved to Willerwald on 2 February, where it was joined by the advance elements on 6 February. On 7 February, the 63rd conducted local raids and patrols, then pushed forward, crossing the Saar River on 17 February, and mopping up the enemy in the Mühlenwald (Muehlen Woods). After bitter fighting at Güdingen early in March, the division smashed at the Siegfried Line on 15th at Saarbrücken, Germany, taking Ormesheim and finally breaching the line at Sankt Ingbert and Hassel on 20 March. Hard fighting still lay ahead, but the Siegfried Line was Germany's last attempt to defend its prewar boundaries along the western front. Before resting on 23 March, the 63d took Spiesen-Elversberg, Neunkirchen and Erbach. From then until the end of the war, the 63d Division carved a path of "blood and fire" from Sarreguemines through Germany. On 28 March, the division crossed the Rhine at Lampertheim, moved to Viernheim and captured Heidelberg on 30 March. Continuing the advance, the 63rd crossed the Neckar River near Mosbach and the Jagst River The 253rd Infantry Regiment, received the majority of the German resistance during this time at the Battle of Buchhof and Stein am Kocher. Heavy resistance slowed the attack on Adelsheim, Möckmühl, and Bad Wimpfen.
The division switched to the southeast, capturing Lampoldshausen and clearing the Harthäuser Woods on 7 April. A bridgehead was secured over the Kocher River near Weißbach on 8 April, and Schwäbisch Hall fell on 17 April. Advance elements crossed the Rems River and rushed to the Danube. The Danube was crossed on 25 April, and Leipheim fell before the division was withdrawn from the line on 28 April, and assigned security duty from the Rhine to Darmstadt and Würzburg on a line to Stuttgart and Speyer. The 63d began leaving for home on 21 August 1945, and was inactivated on 27 September 1945.
From mid-February 1945 until the end of the war, the 63rd Infantry Division made a path of Blood and Fire from Sarreguemines through the Siegfried Line to Worms, Mannheim, Heidelberg, Gunzburg and ending in Landsberg Germany at the end of April 1945 when the division was pulled from the line for a much needed rest.
Post-war History (1945–1962).
On 1 May 1959, the division was reorganized as a Pentomic Division. The division's three infantry regiments were inactivated and their elements reorganized into five infantry battle groups:
Under the ROAD program (1963–1965).
On 1 April 1963, the division was reorganized as a Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) unit. Three brigade headquarters were activated and the Infantry battle groups were reorganized into six battalions. Two Armor battalions and five Field Artillery battalions were assigned to the Division.
The division and subordinate elements were inactivated on 31 December 1965.
Army Reserve.
The 63rd Infantry Division was reactivated in February 1952 as a unit reflagged from the 13th Armored Division, and assigned to the Army Reserve, with headquarters in Los Angeles, California. The division was again inactivated in December 1965, and the colors were transferred to the 63rd Reinforcement Training Unit.
On 1 January 1968, the 63rd Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) was activated and, as an exception to policy, allowed to wear the shoulder sleeve insignia and distinctive unit insignia of the 63rd Infantry Division. The 63rd ARCOM did not, however, perpetuate the lineage and honors of the 63rd Infantry Division, as Department of the Army policy does not authorize TDA units, such as ARCOMs, to inherit the lineage and honors of TO&E units, such as divisions.
Based at Los Alamitos Armed Forces Reserve Center, the command encompassed Army Reserve units in Southern California, Arizona, and Nevada. From 1990 through 1991, over 2,500 Army Reserve soldiers from the 63rd ARCOM served on active duty in support of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. Twenty-two of the command's units were mobilized, with fourteen of them deploying to the Persian Gulf.
In April 1995, the 63rd ARCOM was redesignated as the 63rd Regional Support Command (later revised to Regional "Readiness" Command), and its geographic boundaries were realigned to coincide with those of Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IX. The 63rd maintained command and control of 14,000 soldiers and 140 units in the states of California, Arizona and Nevada, and assumed additional responsibility to support the major functional reserve commands within its area. The 63rd RRC supported both foreign and domestic active Army missions, including participation in NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since 2001, thousands of soldiers from the 63rd RRC have served in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In September 2008, the 63rd and 90th Regional Readiness Commands combined into the 63rd which was redesignated the 63rd Regional Support Command again, with its new headquarters at Moffett Field, California. As a key component of the Army Reserve's transition to an operational force, the newly formed 63rd RSC has foregone command and control of units in favor if a greatly expanded area of responsibility. The 63rd RSC provides base support and administrative support to over 40,000 Army Reserve soldiers in the southwest United States.


Leningrad strategic defensive

Leningrad strategic defensive operation is the term in Soviet historiography for the defensive operations in the area south of Leningrad by the Red Army and the Soviet Navy during World War II from 10 July to 30 September 1941. The following operations are considered as part of the strategic operation:
Positions of the German forces at the start of the operation.
After the start of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, the German Army Group North, consisting of the 18th, the 4th Panzer Group and 16th Armies, had made a spectacular advance through the Baltics states.
In two and a half weeks, Lithuania and Latvia had been overrun and on 9 July, the 4th Panzer Group had already reached Pskov in Russia and the southern shore of Lake Peipus, with a bulge to the north-east towards Slavkovich. On the left flank of the bulge was the XXXXI Motorized Corps and on the right the LVI Motorized Corps.
The German 18th Army had advanced along the coast and pursued the Soviet 8th Army from its position on the border. The Soviet 8th Army was able to break contact and establish new defensive lines farther to the rear of the pre-war borders. On 10 July the German 18th Army, helped by the local Forest Brothers, had entered Southern Estonia and was positioned with its left flank occupying positions north of the city of Pärnu, along the Pärnu River through the Võhma District and then south-east to Tartu and Lake Peipus.
The 16th Army was at that time on the southern flank of the Army Group around the Velikaya River and west of Novorzhev. The Infantry of the 16th Army was lacking behind the 4th Panzergroup because of the difference in speed, but also because it was asked to support Army Group Center on its right flank.
Area covered during the operation.
Territory.
The campaign was conducted in the area to the northwest of the Kalinin Region to the Baltic Sea. In the north the land line of operations was limited to the shores of the Gulf of Finland, north of the Gulf Soviet troops were engaged in the Arctic–Karelia strategic defensive and the defense of the Hanko Peninsula. In the east the German troops reached the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, south along the Kirisha River to Kirishi, then south along the Volkhov River to Veliky Novgorod, including the city, then along the western side of Lake Ilmen to Staraya Russa, from there to the north end of Lake Vella and from the western boundary of the lake to the north shore of Lake Seliger to the region west of Peno. South of the border demarcation operated the forces of German Army Group Center. The width of the fighting front was roughly 450 kilometers and advanced a total of 270–300 kilometers due to Soviet withdrawals.
Background and operational plans of the forces involved.
German plans.
On 10 July, it was decided that Panzer Group 4 was to launch a two-pronged attack, without waiting for the slower infantry to arrive.
The XXXXI Panzer Corps of Georg-Hans Reinhardt was to attack towards the city of Luga, while LVI Panzer Corps of Erich von Manstein was to advance toward Lake Ilmen in a flanking movement.
Soviet plans.
On 4 July, General Georgy Zhukov, chief of the General Staff, gave the Military Council of the Northern Front instructions to defend Leningrad. The guideline envisaged the construction of a defensive line between Narva, Luga and Staraja Russa and expanding it to a depth of 10 to 15 km. From the end of June, three divisions of national people's militia were recruited in Leningrad and used to occupy the Luga line. On 6 July, General Konstantin Piadyshev was appointed commander of the new line of defense along the Luga River, and the Northern Front Military Council decided to strengthen the Luga section by transferring the 237th Rifle Division from Petrozavodsk and the 21st and 24th Tank Division of the 10th Mechanized Corps from Karelia. Stawka Guideline No. 260 of 7 July ordered that the commander of the Northern front immediately transferred the 70th and 177th Rifle Division to the commander of the Northwestern Front.
When the German breakthrough began to emerge south of Lake Peipus, the troops of the new line of defense were combined on 6 July to form the "Luga Operational Group" under General Konstantin Piadyshev's command. The Leningrad Infantry School (2000 men), the Kingisepp Militia and the Leningrad Gun and MG Infantry School (1900 men) soon concentrated in the area east of the city of Narva. A separate mountain rifle brigade (5800 men), which was recruited in Leningrad, was designed to secure the Luga line. The defined line of defense extended almost 250 kilometers in length from the Gulf of Finland along the rivers Luga, Mshaga, Luga Shelon to Lake Ilmen.
The Luga Operational Group consisted of 4 rifle divisions: 70th, 111th, 177th and 191st rifle division as well as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd division of the national militia and the 41st Rifle Corps with the 90th, 235th and 118th rifle divisions.
Order of battle.
The German ground forces were supported by Luftflotte 1 which was reinforces by the 8th Fliegercorps as the operation progressed.
Course of the operation.
Offensive of the XXXXI Panzer Corps (10–14 July).
On 10 July 1941, the advanced units of German Army Group North, breaking the line of the Velikaya River, continued their attack on Leningrad. The XXXXI Panzer Corps, under command of Georg-Hans Reinhardt and consisting of two panzer, motorized and infantry divisions and supported by aviation, pushed the 118th Rifle Division back to Gdov, and the 90th and 111th Rifle Divisions to Luga. On July 12, German troops clashed with cover units of the Luga defensive line in the Plyussa River area and were stopped during stubborn fighting. Unable to bypass the defending troops from the flanks because of the swampy terrain, Reinhardt left the 269th Infantry Division at Luga, and diverted the main forces of the XXXXI Panzer Corps towards the north-west and by 14 July captured two bridgeheads on the right bank on the Luga River near the villages of Ivanovskoye and Bol'shoy Sabsk in the area of Kingisepp. The German troops were stopped at these positions by the forces of the Luga Operational Group and were only able to continue the offensive a month later. Meanwhile, a large gap was formed between the two Corps of the 4th Panzer Group, which was now divided into two parts heading in different directions. Furthermore, the swampy-wooded area of the Leningrad region seriously impeded the independent actions of the tank units.
Offensive of the LVI Panzer Corps (10–14 July).
On 10 July, the 3rd Motorized Division of the LVI Panzer Corps occupied the city of Porkhov and continued the offensive in the direction of Dno. The 182nd Soviet Rifle Division fought against the advance, successfully repulsed two attacks, and inflicted about 400 soldiers and officers killed on the German 3rd Motorized Division. In addition, Soviet gunners destroyed or damaged 20 enemy tanks. Despite this, by nightfall, the Germans were able to advance east of Porkhov for another three kilometers.
On 12 July, the SS Totenkopf Division was left behind in the Porkhov area, and the 3rd motorized division was directed along a side road to the north. The 8th Panzer Division launched an attack on Shimsk, moving along the highway along the left bank of the Shelon River in the direction of Novgorod. The remnants of the 3rd Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps were trying to hold back the German offensive, retreating from line to line.
On 14 July, German units occupied Soltsy and reached the line of the Mshaga River. Despite the fact that German air reconnaissance reported a great concentration of Soviet troops and fresh approaches from the north, the immediate task of the 8th Panzer Division was to capture the bridge over Mshaga in an intact state.
By 14 July, the right flank of the LVI Corps, which was not covered by anything, turned out to be 70 km long, and the uncovered left flank, some 40 km. The command of the Corps believed that its safety was ensured by its speed.
Soviet counter-attack : Battle of Soltsy (14–22 July).
The Soviet command decided to take advantage of the fact that the LVI Panzer Corps was left without cover. The commander of the Northwestern Front, Major General Pyotr Sobennikov, on 13 July 1941, issued Order No. 012 to the troops of the 11th Army under command of Lieutenant General Vasili Morozov, reinforced by formations of the Northern Front (21st Tank, 70th and 237th Rifle divisions), to carry out a counter-attack and restore the situation in the Soltsy area.
After approvals, on the evening of 13 July, the commander of the 11th and 27th Armies was sent directive No. 010 on the beginning of the counterstrike. The development of the counterstrike plan took place under the leadership of the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front Nikolai Vatutin. It was based on the information printed on a secret map that fell into the hands of the Soviet command. It marked the position of all six divisions of Hoepner's Panzer Group. After checking the intelligence data, the headquarters of the North-Western Front developed a counter-offensive plan.
By order of the headquarters of the North-Western Front, the commander of the Soviet 11th Army created two groups of forces for counterattack - the northern and southern. They were to cut off the German group that had broken through to the Mshaga River.
From the northern grouping, two divisions (the 21st Tank and 237th Rifle divisions) advanced from the Gorodishche and Utorgosh line in the southwestern direction, on Baranovo and Sitnya, and the 70th Rifle division advanced in the southern direction, towards Soltsy. The 1st Separate Mountain Rifle Brigade (1GSSR) attacked Soltsy from the east.
The divisions of the southern group (the 183rd rifle from the 27th army) were to advance in the northern direction, to Sitnya, and there to join up with the units of the northern group.
On 14 July 1941, with the support of 235 aircraft, the Soviet 11th Army went on the offensive.
The sudden counterattack of Soviet troops came as a complete surprise to the German command. The bulk of the German 8th Panzer Division was surrounded. At the same time, the German 3rd Motorized Infantry Division was in a difficult position.
On 16 July, the Soviet 70th Rifle Division under the command of Major General Andrey Fedyunin occupied Soltsy. On the same day, the commander of the Northwestern Front ordered the front armies to complete the defeat of the enemy in the Soltsy area and, firmly holding the line occupied by the center and left flank of the 27th Army, the rest of the forces went on the offensive.
However, Manstein ordered the correct counter-action: he withdrew his troops some 40 km and prepared for all-out defence. Most of the LVI Panzer Corps managed to break out of the encirclement and on 16 July, the SS Totenkopf Division was transferred to the LVI Panzer Corps, which restored the situation on the Shelon River.
The Soviets launched wave after wave of attacks on the German positions, but were thrown back with heavy losses.
The fierce Soviet counterattack had as effect that on 19 July the entire German Army Group "North" suspended the offensive towards Leningrad. The 8th Panzer Division, which had suffered serious losses, was withdrawn to the rear.
On 16 July, the 1st Army Corps had been transferred to the 4th Panzer Group and on 18 July it took Dno from the 22nd Rifle Corps. Soltsy was retaken on 22 July but an attack of the German 21st Infantry Division on Shimsk was repulsed.
Only on 27 July did the situation along the entire front between Narva and Lake Ilmen stabilize, and was Army Group North able to think again about continuing the offensive against Leningrad.
Renewed German offensive : Battle of Luga–Kingisepp (8 August – 23 August).
The German command had decided to wait for the arrival of the bulk of the 18th Army from Northern Estonia and the 16th Army from Eastern Latvia, to launch a new offensive.
On 8 August the LVI Panzer Corps attacked in the area of Luga but failed to advance against strong Soviet defensive positions.
At the same time, the XXXXI Panzer Corps attacked in the Kingisepp area and was more successful. The 8th Panzer Division was added to the Corps and after defeating the 1st Soviet Tank Division at Moloskovitchi, the divisions of the XXXXI Panzer corps reached the road from Kingisepp to Gatchina on 16 August. The next day, the German 1st Infantry Division conquered Kingisepp, while the 291st Infantry Division occupied Narva from the west and the 58th Infantry Division from the south. Meanwhile, German tanks began to bypass the city of Luga on country and forest roads and reached the river Luga in the area 20–25 km southeast of Kingisepp. Under the threat of being cut off from Leningrad, the German XXXVIII Corps forced the 8th Soviet Army to withdraw onto the Koporskoye plateau on 18 August.
Further to the east, the German 16th Army had launched its attack towards Novgorod on 10 August. Preceded by intense aerial attacks by the VIII Air Corps under General Von Richthofen, the German 1st Army Corps (General of the Infantry Kuno-Hans von Both) attacked Novgorod directly with the 11th and 21st Infantry Divisions. The defensive positions of the Soviet troops could be breached. On 14 August 14, the 21st Infantry Division advanced on the Novgorod-Luga highway, and the 11th Infantry Division approached the line from the same direction. This threatened the rear connecting lines of the Soviet troops on the Luga line. The German attack on 15 August initially failed but the Soviet resistance was broken by attacks by dive bombers, which set Novgorod on fire in many places. In the evening the 21st Infantry Division was able to penetrate the city, at the same time as the 424th Regiment of the 126th Infantry Division. On the morning of 16 August, Novgorod was in German hands and the remaining regiments of the 21st Infantry Division launched an attack on Chudovo.
The Soviets 48th Army launched a counterattack to retake Novgorod and the battle for the eastern part of Novgorod lasted until 19 August. Strong air support ultimately ensured the Germans' success in the battles for Novgorod.
During the Battle of Novgorod, the left wing of the German I Corps advanced to Chudovo. The 11th Infantry Division now secured the right flank of the corps on the Volkhov section and the 21st Infantry Division conquered Chudovo on 20 August and interrupted the railway line there. The next day, several Soviet counter-attacks on units of the 1st Army Corps were repelled. The targets of the 16th Army had been reached.
The attack by the German XXVIII Corps of the 16th Army finally unlocked the left flank of General Astanin's Luga group. The SS Police Division had also been moved 74 kilometers north to the east bank of Luga and stormed on the city of Luga from the southeast on August 24. On 22 August, General Astanin had received the order to pull back his units behind the railroad to Gatchina (Krasnogvardeysk), but it was too late. The Soviet 70th, 90th, 111th, 177th and 235th Rifle Division, the 1st and 3rd Militia Division, the 24th Armored Division were trapped in the "Luga Pocket". The encirclement was completed in the north by XXXXI Panzer, in the south by the L Army Corps and in the east by XXVIII Army Corps. The struggle in the Luga Pocket continued until mid-September 1941, and some units were able to break out eastwards.
The Soviet Staraya Russa counter-offensive (12–25 August).
Meanwhile on the southern wing the Soviets were planning their own offensive in what became known as the "Staraya Russa offensive operation". The plan was for the newly formed Soviet 48th Army to attack from the Novgorod region along the northwest side of Lake Ilmen, while the newly formed 34th Army, supported by 11th and 27th Armies, would attack south of Lake Ilmen. The Soviets engaged 8 rifle divisions, a cavalry corps and a tank division for the offensive, with the objective of recapturing Staraya Russa and Dno, and destroying the 16th Army’s X Infantry Corps. The offensive started on 12th August and immediately threatened to overwhelm and trap the X Infantry Corps against Lake Ilmen.
The commander-in-chief of the German Army Group North, von Leeb, was forced to transfer the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf to the area of the Soviet offensive, it was soon followed by the 3rd Motorized Division and Erich von Manstein's LVI Panzer Corps, which was already heavily engaged at Luga. The 8th Air Corps of von Richthofen was also involved in repelling the Soviet counterattack.
On 19th August, the LVI Panzer Corps’ attack caught the 34th Army by surprise in the flank. The 34th Army was badly damaged and attempted to withdraw. By 22nd August, the LVI Panzer Corps reached the Lovat River having captured 12,000 men from the retreating 34th Army.
As a result of the unsuccessful offensive, the commander of the North-Western Front, Major General Pyotr Sobennikov, was removed from office and sentenced to 5 years in prison, later replaced by a demotion. The commander of the 34th Army, Major General Kuzma Kachanov, was arrested on 12 September, trialed for cowardice and executed on 29 September.
On 28 August, Tallinn fell after a siege of 3 weeks and the Soviet Baltic Fleet evacuated the city. The Germans had conquered Estonia and a large strip of Western Russia up to southern shores of the Gulf of Finland, although some strong-points of Soviet defence held out.
Encirclement of Leningrad (25 August – 21 September).
For the final attack on the city, the German XXXIX Panzer Corps was relocated from Army Group Centre to Army Group North.
It was ordered to cut off the city from the rest of the Soviet Union, bypassing the city to the east.
The I Army Corps was to advance north along the left bank of the Volkhov river towards Kirishi, covering the right flank of the XXXIX Panzer Army.
With the deepening crisis the Stavka assigned the newly mobilised 4th, 52nd and 54th Armies along and east of the Volkhov River. The Stavka also approved the formation of two new Armies: the 42nd and 55th, which would defend Leningrad itself.
The main German thrust on Leningrad was to be executed by the XXXXI Panzer Corps, in cooperation with the XXXVIII Army Corps on its left flank. In the south, between Gatchina and Mga, the L and XXVIII Army corps were to attack the southern belt around Leningrad.
On 25 and 26 August the two Panzer corps attacked. The XXXIX Panzer Corps captured Lyuban the same day and advanced towards the Neva River. On 1 September, the XXXIX Panzer Corps captured Mga and cut the last rail link to Leningrad. On 8 September, the 20th Motorized Division captured Shlisselburg on the shores of Lake Ladoga, closing the last land route out of Leningrad.
In the meantime, the XXXXI Panzer Division, supported by von Chappuis’s infantry, cut through the Soviet lines and advanced almost 10 kilometers and put further pressure on the shrinking line around Leningrad and the Oranienbaum region.
Also in the South, Soviet defensive positions began to crumble: Krasnoye Selo was lost on 12 September and Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina) on 13 September.
The remains of General Baranov's armored division continued to withdraw, occupying new positions on the Pulkovo Heights, the last line of defense on the southwestern approach of Leningrad.
In mid September 1941, two events had a serious impact on the course of events around Leningrad. On 14 September, Georgi Zhukov arrived in Leningrad to replace Marshal Voroshilov and ordered immediate counter-measures to push back the German troops. Around the same time, Adolf Hitler had changed his mind on Leningrad. He decided that Army Group North should not occupy the city, but surround it and starve it into submission. He also ordered the furious von Leeb to hand over all his armoured units and Panzer Group 4 to Army Group Centre for the coming attack on Moscow, except the 39th Panzer Corps.
From 14 to 21 September, the 18th Army continued to push the Soviet perimeter inwards, finally isolating the Soviet 8th Army in the Oranienbaum Pocket against the Gulf of Finland. On 17 September, Tsarskoye Selo in the town of Pushkin, was occupied by the German troops. During this period, the 41st and 56th Panzer Corps and the HQ of 4th Panzer Group were pulled back form the frontline to participate in the Battle of Moscow, and the German advance came to a halt.
Results of the operations.
At great costs, the Soviets had held the Luga Line for 45 days : from 10 July until 24 August, when German troops took Luga. Until 10 July, the average daily advance of the Germans was about 26 kilometers per day; then it fell to 5 kilometers a day and in August to 2.2 kilometers a day. Stopping and delaying the German advance enabled the Soviet leadership to take important measures regarding the defense of Leningrad, including the formation and training of new military units. Furthermore, between 29 June and 27 August 1941, 488,703 civilians were evacuated from Leningrad.
The retreating Soviet forces (and civilians alike) were cut off the Soviet mainland in Leningrad, isolated from the bulk of Soviet-controlled territory by the Finns and Lake Ladoga. Despite many costly attempts, the Soviets did not lift the siege completely until January 1944.
Subsequent operations continued on the outskirts of Leningrad, including the 1st and Second Sinyavino Offensives from 10 September – 28 October 1941 and the Tikhvin defensive, 16 October – 18 November 1941.


United States Army Pacific

The United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) is an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) of the United States Army and is the army component unit of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. The main areas that this command has jurisdiction in include Hawaii, Alaska, the Pacific Ocean, South Korea and Japan. It also performs missions in Southeast Asia, in the countries stretching from the Philippines all the way to Bangladesh and India. United States Forces Korea (USFK) has operational command and control on US Forces in Korea since January 2012, and USARPAC headquarters oversees the manning, training, and equipping of US Army forces assigned to USFK.
However, subordinate units of this command sometimes perform humanitarian missions in places such as Haiti, Cuba, and the Middle East.
Current structure.
Former units include the U.S. Army Chemical Activity, Pacific, at Johnston Atoll, which traced some of its history to the 267th Chemical Company and the Project 112 biological warfare defense experiments. This became the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, which was finally deactivated in 2001.
Commanders.
Command Group 2021.
Source:


Operation Montclair

Operation Montclair was a military operation during the Second World War. The final version of the outline plan originally called Operation Princeton, it outlined plans to recapture the Visayas and Mindanao in the Philippines, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies.
The operation was planned by the South-West pacific Area command under General Douglas MacArthur, and was a joint US and Australian effort. The US 8th Army under Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger was allocated the Visayas part of the operation, and the I Australian Corps under Lieutenant General Sir Leslie Morshead was allocated the Borneo part.
US plans originally called for the elimination of the Japanese garrisons in the unliberated parts of the Philippines to be performed by Filipino guerillas and the reformed Filipino army. Nonetheless, on February 6, 1944, General MacArthur ordered General Eichelberger to mop up the Japanese forces in the Philippines with his 8th Army, supported by Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's 7th Fleet. This culminated in a series of operations called Operation Victor I through V:
At the same time, I Australian Corps was ordered to take Borneo to supply the US forces for the planned invasion of Japan with oil. Once Borneo had been liberated, I Australian Corps was to form part of the invasion of Java. For more details, see Borneo campaign (1945).


Sea Frontier

Sea Frontiers were several, now disestablished, commands of the United States Navy existing from 1 July 1941 during World War II as areas of defense against enemy vessels, especially submarines, along the American coasts. Sea Frontiers generally started at the shore of the United States and extended outwards into the sea for a nominal distance of two hundred miles.
As early as 1927 the Navy's plans for the coastal defense of the United States and its Territories and possessions provided for the establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers that would be larger operational commands than the individual Naval Districts. On 1 July 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations formally established several Naval Coastal Frontiers; on 6 February 1942, these were renamed Sea Frontiers. Each Frontier was a geographic area, usually comprising a number of Naval Districts but including in addition the outer shipping lanes in its sea area. The land areas of the Frontiers corresponded roughly to the Army's Defense Commands, but the boundaries were not identical. The Frontier Commander was usually also the commandant of a Naval District within the Frontier. The chief responsibilities of the Sea Frontiers during World War II were operational; Frontier forces engaged actively in scouting for enemy forces, particularly submarines, and in attack on any enemy units within their boundaries. Toward the end of the war the Frontiers were assigned administrative and logistic functions in addition to their operational responsibilities.
Navy General Order No. 143, issued on 3 February 1941, stated that Commandants of United States naval districts and Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for local and coastal forces; but Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have task responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
In addition to the Sea Frontiers under the cognizance of U.S. military authorities, the Canadian Coastal Zone was the responsibility of the Royal Canadian Navy. This formation was very active since the majority of trans-Atlantic convoys originated or terminated in Canadian waters.
List of Sea Frontiers.
Alaskan Sea Frontier.
First established on 15 April 1944 with Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher in command, who remained in that capacity for the duration of the War as Task Force 91. From 1 January 1947 with the establishment of United States Pacific Command, Task Force 95, Rear Admiral Freeland A. Daubin's Alaskan Sea Frontier, was to operate under the commander-in-chief of the Alaskan Command, Major General Craig. Finally inactivated in 1971 as part of post-Vietnam military reductions. (jber.af.mil/library/factsheets, ALCOM)
Caribbean Sea Frontier.
Caribbean Sea Frontier – The Caribbean Sea Frontier (CARIBSEAFRON) was under the command of Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier or COMCARIBSEAFRON, and the responsibility of the frontier was the protection of Allied shipping in the Caribbean and along the Atlantic Coast of South America during World War II. The German U-boat made a last bitter stand in the Trinidad area in the fall of 1942. Since then, coastal waters continued to be relatively safe of the U-boat menace. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Eastern Sea Frontier.
Eastern Sea Frontier – proved to be a "rich hunting ground" for German submarines during early years of the war. See Second Happy Time. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Gulf Sea Frontier.
Gulf Sea Frontier – Organized 6 February 1942 the Gulf Sea Frontier (GULFSEAFRON) was headquartered at Key West, Florida, and was later moved to Miami, Florida on 17 June 1942. It was responsible for protecting the waters of Florida and the Bahamas as well as the Gulf of Mexico, the Yucatán Channel and areas near Cuba. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
The Hawaiian Sea Frontier (HawSeaFron) was a formation of the United States Navy established during World War II. It was organized to defend the island of Oahu. Vice Admiral David W. Bagley served as COMHAWSEAFRON from 4 April 1942 until July 1943. The Hawaiian Sea Frontier did not actually come into a settled form until September 1942. The Assistant Chief of Staff (HawSeaFron) attempted to mold the organization to a degree similar to the Western Sea Frontier. The difficulty of selecting a site for the joint Operating Center delayed his plans. Originally, it was planned to have a district headquarters in Honolulu, with a part of the building devoted to the Frontier headquarters. When the plan did not prove feasible, it was decided to take two and a half tunnels at the Aliamanu Crater. Because of the limitations of space and the distance from the Commandant's headquarters, the location did not become more than an operational center. Since the Crater was on U.S. Army property, the construction of a Joint Operating Center with a major plot was never accomplished because of the fluctuations of the war and difficulties over appropriations. One service did not desire to build and pay more than its share of expenses from its limited appropriations for the benefit of another service. The Frontier suffered because of its unique location to the Pacific Fleet's sprawling auxiliary, ComServPac. These two echelons determined the number of vessels under its control as well as the complements of manpower. In cases of emergency, units of the Fleet took over convoy and antisubmarine patrols. Just as its surface units were controlled by higher echelons, so also were its air units by Air Forces, Pacific Fleet. The major functions of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier were the maintenance of picket ships outside Pearl Harbor and the Port of Honolulu, the escorting of inter-island shipping, and the establishment of air-sea rescue facilities.Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Moroccan Sea Frontier.
The Morocco Sea Frontier, sometimes called the North Africa Sea Frontier, was a U.S. naval unit on the east coast of French Morocco during World War II. It was established as a Sea Frontier under the command of Rear Admiral John L. Hall, Jr. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Northwest Sea Frontier.
Northwest Sea Frontier – established as the Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, became the Northwest Sea Frontier in 1942, with headquarters at Seattle. Its Commander was also Commandant of the Thirteenth Naval District, and its land area coincided with that of the District, which until April 1944. included Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming. For administrative and operational purposes the Frontier was divided into the Northwestern and the Alaskan Sectors. In conjunction with the Army the Frontier maintained the Joint Operations Center at Seattle. On 15 April 1944, the Seventeenth Naval District, which consisted of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, was established, and the Northwest Sea Frontier was abolished. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Panama Sea Frontier.
Panama Sea Frontier was responsible for the defense of the Pacific and Atlantic sea approaches to the Panama Canal and for naval shore facilities in the Central America region during World War II. The Sea Frontier headquarters were located in Balboa, Panama. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Philippine Sea Frontier.
Philippine Sea Frontier – organised after U.S. return to the Philippines in 1944. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:
Western Sea Frontier.
Western Sea Frontier – the Western Sea Frontier (WESTSEAFRON) headquartered in San Francisco, was responsible for the sea defense of the Pacific coast of the United States and Mexico during World War II. The frontier commander was designated Commander, Western Sea Frontier (COMWESTSEAFRON). The Western Sea Frontier was composed of many forces and commands, including the Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Naval Districts. The Western Sea Frontier consisted of the Pacific Coastal regions lying west of the Cascade Range and Sierra Nevada as well as of Alaska. Western Sea Frontier's commander also served as commander of the Pacific Reserve Fleet as of 1937–38. Following admirals held command of the frontier during the World War II:


Sixth Air Force


Operation Teardrop

Operation Teardrop was a United States Navy operation during World War II, conducted between April and May 1945, to sink German U-boats approaching the Eastern Seaboard believed to be armed with V-1 flying bombs. Germany had threatened to attack New York with V-1 flying bombs and rocket U-boats. After the war, it was determined the submarines had not been carrying either.
Operation Teardrop was planned during late 1944 in response to intelligence reports which indicated that Germany was preparing a force of missile-armed submarines. Two large U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare task forces were set up. The plan was executed in April 1945 after several Type IX submarines put to sea from Norway bound for North America. While severe weather conditions in the North Atlantic Ocean greatly reduced the effectiveness of the four U.S. Navy escort carriers involved, long patrol lines of destroyer escorts detected and engaged most of the German submarines. Aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force supported this effort.
Five of the seven submarines in the group stationed off the United States were sunk, four with their entire crews. Thirty-three crew members were captured, and specialists among them abusively interrogated. One destroyer escort was sunk, with the loss of most of her crew. The war ended shortly afterwards and all surviving U-boats surrendered; interrogation of their crews found that missile launching equipment was not fitted.
Background.
In late 1944, the Allies received intelligence reports which suggested that Germany's "Kriegsmarine" was planning to use launched from submarines to attack cities on the east coast of the United States. In September of that year, Oscar Mantel, a spy captured by the U.S. Navy when the submarine transporting him to Maine was sunk, told his FBI interrogators that several missile-equipped U-boats were being readied. United States Tenth Fleet analysts subsequently examined photos of unusual mountings on U-boats at bases in Norway, but concluded that they were wooden tracks used to load torpedoes. Further rumors of missile-armed submarines emerged later that year, including one from Sweden passed on by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The British Admiralty discounted these reports, and assessed that while V-1s could be potentially mounted on Type IX submarines, the Germans were unlikely to devote scarce resources to such a project.
Despite the Tenth Fleet and Admiralty assessments, the U.S. military and government remained concerned that Germany would conduct vengeance attacks against East Coast cities. In early November 1944, the Eastern Sea Frontier mounted an intensive search for submarines within of New York City. In late December 1944, the spies William Curtis Colepaugh and Erich Gimpel, who had been captured in New York City after being landed by in Maine, told their interrogators that Germany was preparing a group of rocket-equipped submarines. On 10 December, the Mayor of New York City, Fiorello La Guardia, publicly warned that Germany was considering an attack on New York with long-range rockets. La Guardia's warning and the claims made by the captured spies received considerable media coverage. Despite this, the Department of War, which was dominated by the United States Army, advised President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 11 December that the threat of missile attack was so low that it did not justify the diversion of resources from other tasks. This assessment was not supported by the U.S. Navy.
In response to the perceived threat, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet prepared a plan to defend the east coast from attacks by aerial raiders and missiles. This plan was originally code-named Operation Bumblebee, and later renamed Operation Teardrop. Completed on 6 January 1945, the plan involved U.S. Navy anti-submarine forces as well as United States Army Air Forces and Army units, which were responsible for shooting down attacking aircraft and missiles. The centerpiece of the plan was the formation of two large naval task forces to operate in the mid-Atlantic as a barrier against submarines approaching the east coast. These task forces were formed from several existing escort carrier groups, and used Naval Station Argentia, Newfoundland, as their forward operating base. As well as guarding against missile attacks, these large forces were tasked with countering the new and high-performance Type XXI submarines if they began operating in the central Atlantic. The Atlantic Fleet's commander, Vice Admiral Jonas H. Ingram, gave a press conference on 8 January in which he warned there was a threat of missile attack and announced that a large force had been assembled to counter seaborne missile launchers.
In January 1945, German Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer made a propaganda broadcast in which he claimed that V-1 and V-2s "would fall on New York by February 1, 1945", increasing the U.S. Government's concern over the threat of attack. However, the Germans had no ability to fire missiles from their submarines, as both attempts to develop submarine-launched rockets ended in failure. In June 1942, was used to trial small and short-ranged artillery rockets which could be fired while submerged. Development of this system ended in early 1943, as it was found to decrease the U-boats' seaworthiness. The German military also began the development of a U-boat-towed launch canister for the V-2 ballistic missile in November 1944. Once complete, these canisters were to be towed to a position off the United States east coast and be used to attack New York. Vulkan Docks in Stettin was contracted to build a prototype in March or April 1945, but little work took place before Germany's final collapse. It is unlikely that the system would have been successful if it had been completed.
Battle.
Initial deployments.
Nine Type IX U-boats were dispatched from Norway to patrol off Canada and the United States in March 1945 and attack shipping. The purpose of this deployment was to divert Allied anti-submarine forces away from the coastal waters of the United Kingdom. These waters were the main operational area for German submarines in early 1945, but heavy casualties had forced the German navy to break off operations in late March. On 12 April, , , , , , and were designated "Gruppe Seewolf" and ordered to attack shipping from New York southwards. The remaining two boats, and , were directed to Canadian waters.
The Allies were aware of this force's departure and destination through information gathered from Enigma decrypts. Vice Admiral Ingram and the U.S. Tenth Fleet concluded that the boats in "Gruppe Seewolf" were carrying V-1s and launched "Teardrop" in response. The ships of the First Barrier Force, which comprised escort carriers and and 20 destroyer escorts, sortied from Hampton Roads between 25 and 27 March, proceeded to Argentia to refuel and assembled east of Cape Race on 11 April. Twelve of the destroyer escorts deployed into a line long while the two carriers, each protected by four destroyer escorts, sailed to the west of the line. The carriers' air operations were, however, greatly hindered by heavy seas. The rough weather also forced the cancellation of planned memorial services for President Roosevelt after his death on 12 April.
As it sailed west, "Gruppe Seewolf" was ordered to attack shipping by U-boat Command. The boats found no targets, however, as the Allies had routed convoys to the south to avoid the submarines and severe weather. The German submarines began to reach their initial stations east of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland on 8 April. U-Boat Command assigned "Gruppe Seewolf" 12 different scouting lines between 2 and 19 April. The radio signals directing these deployments were decrypted by the Allies, providing them with accurate information on where the boats were operating.
First Barrier Force actions.
Just before midnight on 15 April, made radar contact with "U-1235" at a position about north of Flores Island. She immediately attacked the submarine with her hedgehog anti-submarine mortar, but the submarine submerged and escaped. Assisted by , "Stanton" quickly gained sonar contact with the submarine and made three more hedgehog attacks. The third attack, which was conducted at 00:33 on 16 April, sank the submarine with the loss of her entire crew. Shortly afterwards "Frost" detected "U-880" by radar as she attempted to flee the area on the surface. After illuminating the submarine with star shell and spotlights, the destroyer escort opened fire on her with Bofors 40 mm guns from a range of at 02:09. "U-880" quickly submerged but was tracked by "Stanton"s and "Frost"s sonar operators. The two American ships made several hedgehog attacks on the submarine, with "Stanton" sinking her with no survivors at 04:04. Both submarines suffered huge explosions after being struck by hedgehog projectiles. This further raised the fear that they were carrying rockets and motivated the First Barrier Force to intensify its efforts to destroy the remaining U-boats.
The First Barrier Force maneuvered south westward following the destruction of "U-1235" and "U-880". Leigh Light-equipped B-24 Liberators from VPB-114 spotted "U-805" on the surface during the nights of 18–19 April. The submarine was only from "Mission Bay" and her escorts, but was not attacked as the aircraft could not confirm whether she was hostile before she submerged. On the night of 20 April, "U-546" attempted to torpedo a U.S. destroyer escort, but missed. The following night, "U-805" was detected by , but escaped after being depth charged by "Mosley", and for two hours.
The First Barrier Force scored its final success on the night of 21–22 April. Just before midnight, detected "U-518" with sonar. joined her and made the initial hedgehog attack on the submarine. Following this, "Carter" made her own hedgehog run, which sank "U-518" with no survivors. By this time, the First Barrier Force was returning to Argentia, after the Second Barrier Force had relieved it.
Even though "Teardrop" was undertaken in the part of the North Atlantic for which Canada had primary responsibility, Ingram did not seek assistance from the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) at any stage of the engagement. Moreover, Ingram did not provide the Canadian military with a situation report until after the sinking of "U-518". However, aircraft of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) flew offensive patrols in support of the American effort, and the RCN and RCAF intensified their patrols of inshore waters around Halifax.
Second Barrier Force actions.
The Second Barrier Force comprised escort carriers and and 22 destroyer escorts. "Bogue" and 10 destroyer escorts had sailed from Quonset on 16 April, while "Core" and 12 destroyer escorts sailed from Bermuda and other locations. The force was initially stationed along the 45th meridian in a patrol line long, and sailed towards the east. This line was made up of 14 destroyer escorts sailing at intervals, with "Core" and her four escorts at its northern end and "Bogue" and her four escorts at the southern end.
On the night of 22–23 April, U-boat Command dissolved Gruppe Seewolf and directed the three surviving boats to take up stations between New York and Halifax. Shortly afterwards, , and , which had been operating separately, were also ordered to positions between New York and Cape Hatteras. Radio signals directing these deployments were decrypted by Allied code breakers and increased fears that the submarines were trying to attack American cities.
The Second Barrier Force encountered its first U-boat on 23 April when a Grumman TBF Avenger from VC-19 sighted "U-881" about north west of "Bogue" just after noon. The aircraft dropped depth charges, but did not seriously damage the submarine. This was the first attack made by an aircraft during "Teardrop".
The next day, sighted "Core" and maneuvered to attack the escort carrier. She attempted to pass through the barrier line but was detected by at 08:30, which immediately prepared to attack the submarine. After realizing that his boat had been detected "U-546"s commander, "Kapitänleutnant" Paul Just, fired a T-5 acoustic torpedo at the destroyer escort from a range of . "Frederick C. Davis" Foxer decoy was not effective, and the torpedo struck her forward engine room at 0835. She sank five minutes later with the loss of 126 of her 192 crewmen. Eight American destroyer escorts subsequently hunted "U-546" for almost 10 hours, before severely damaged her with a hedgehog salvo. The submarine immediately surfaced, but sank after "Flaherty" and three or four other destroyer escorts fired at it. "Kapitänleutnant" Just and 32 other crewmen survived the sinking and were taken prisoner.
Some of "U-546"s survivors were harshly treated in an attempt to force them to divulge whether the submarines bound for the U.S. east coast were carrying missiles. After brief interviews on board "Bogue", the survivors were transferred to the U.S. base at Argentia. Upon arrival on 27 April, the prisoners were screened for interrogation, with eight specialists being separated from the other 25 survivors, who were then sent to prisoner of war camps. The specialists were held in solitary confinement and subjected to "shock interrogation" techniques, exhausting physical exercise and beatings. On 30 April, "Kapitänleutnant" Just provided brief information on Gruppe Seewolf's composition and mission following a second interview in which he collapsed unconscious. The information provided by Just and the other specialists did not mention whether the submarines were equipped with missiles. The eight men were transferred to Fort Hunt, Virginia shortly after VE Day, where they continued to be harshly treated until Just agreed to write an account of "U-546"s history on 12 May. Historian Philip K. Lundeberg has written that the beating of "U-546"s survivors was a "singular atrocity" motivated by the interrogators' need to promptly extract information on potential missile attacks.
The Second Barrier Force slowly moved south west from 24 April, searching for the remaining U-boats. made radar contact with a submarine on the night of 24 April, but it escaped during the resulting search. After a week of searching south of the Newfoundland Banks, the barrier force was split on 2 May to provide greater depth. The "Mission Bay" group reinforced the Second Barrier Force during this period, bringing its strength to three escort carriers and thirty one destroyer escorts.
"U-881" became the fifth and final U-boat to be sunk during "Teardrop" on 5 May. The boat was detected while attempting to pass submerged through the barrier line by shortly before daybreak. The destroyer escort immediately turned to starboard and dropped depth charges, which sank the submarine with no survivors at 0616. "U-881" was the last German submarine to be sunk by the U.S. Navy during World War II.
The Second Barrier Force established its final barrier line along the 60th meridian on 7 May. Following the end of World War II in Europe that day, it accepted the surrender of , "U-805", "U-858" and at sea before returning to bases on the U.S. east coast.
Aftermath.
After the German surrender the U.S. Navy continued its efforts to determine whether the U-boats had carried missiles. The crews of "U-805" and "U-858" were interrogated and confirmed that their boats were not fitted with missile launching equipment. "Kapitänleutnant" Fritz Steinhoff, who had commanded "U-511" during her rocket trials and was captured at sea when he surrendered , was subjected to an abusive interrogation at Portsmouth by the interviewers of "U-546"s crew. An official Navy investigation was held into this interrogation after Steinhoff committed suicide at Charles Street Jail in Boston shortly afterwards. It is not known if the Allies were aware of Steinhoff's involvement in the rocket trials.
The tactics used in "Teardrop" were evaluated by U.S. Navy officers after the war. The escort carriers' air wings were disappointed with their experience, as their ability to detect submarines was hampered by severe weather throughout the operation. Despite this, the aircraft were successful in forcing the U-boats to remain submerged, thereby greatly slowing their speed. Other after action reports stressed the importance of teamwork between destroyer escorts when attacking submarines and argued that single barrier lines such as those used throughout most of "Teardrop" were inferior to grouping ships in assigned patrol areas. Nevertheless, Philip K. Lundeberg has assessed the operation as "a classic demonstration not only of coordinated hunter tactics, derived in part from British experience, but also of the profound impact of communications intelligence in the interdiction of U-boat transit and operating areas." Similarly, the British official history of the role intelligence played in World War II noted that information obtained from decrypted German radio transmissions contributed to "virtually all" of the sinkings during "Teardrop".
A variant of the V-1 was used by the U.S. Navy to test the feasibility of launching missiles from submarines in the years after World War II. Republic‐Ford JB‐2 "Loon" missiles were launched from and in a series of tests which began on February 12, 1947. These tests were successful, and led to the development of further submarine-launched cruise missiles. The U.S. Navy's success in adapting a variant of the V-1 to be launched from submarines also demonstrated that it would have been technically feasible for the German navy to have done the same.