The Hiker (Newman)

The Hiker is a statue created by Allen George Newman. Like Theo Alice Ruggles Kitson's statue of the same name, it was created to honor the American soldiers who took "long hikes in steaming jungles" during the Boxer Rebellion, the Spanish–American War and the Philippine–American War. Originally displayed in the New York building at the 1907 Jamestown Exposition, the statue was chosen by several camps of the United Spanish War Veterans to be erected as war memorials.
The statue, described as ”The best bronze soldier in America” by sculptor and critic Lorado Taft, proved to be very popular, copies of it being located in numerous cities. The Jno. Williams, Inc. foundry in New York City was “given exclusive rights for casting the statue ‘in real bronze’ “ adding that the sculptor Newman would “with great pleasure give his advice gratis as to the proper form for the pedestal according to its environment.”
The head is strongly poised on a sinewy column. The shoulders are broad, the chest full and deep. The flanks are thin, the hips narrow. The muscular legs show great marching capacity... There is a suggestion at the bow of the knee that he could ride a horse. His trusty Krag is not the first gun he has handled. You will not find that position in the manual, though the muzzle is elevated. It is equally handy to be aimed, clubbed or lunged. His head turns naturally a little to the right to balance the hat brim falling to the left. But the face is smooth shaven as was the mode—every part is strong, every feature clean cut, and all smoothly balanced. The lined cheeks show that in his 28 years he has lived. He is no saint. He is no molly-coddle. He is an American soldier. He is a disciplined man at arms, the wonder of the world today wherever such foregather. — Gen. Charles Wheaton Abbot, Jr., in his dedication of the statue at the North Burial Ground, Providence, Rhode Island, May 31, 1912.
Locations.
Reliefs.
A number of Spanish–American War memorials include a bronze relief showing Newman's "Hiker" in front of the battleship . Just under the statue's feet is engraved, "Hiker of '98." Included on the relief is President McKinley's quote, "You triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined."
Some of these relief memorials also carry the statement, "Every Man a Volunteer," and may also include the number 458,151. The total number of U.S. service personnel engaged in the war with Spain (proper), the Philippine–American War and the Boxer Rebellion numbered 458,151.
These bronze plaques were made by the Lamb Seal and Stencil Company, which was founded in 1900 by Richard L. Lamb (1871-1960). Lamb was a British immigrant who had fought in the Siege of Santiago in Cuba during the Spanish–American War.


Battle of Brunete

The Battle of Brunete (6–25 July 1937), fought west of Madrid, was a Republican attempt to alleviate the pressure exerted by the Nationalists on the capitol and on the north during the Spanish Civil War. Although initially successful, the Republicans were forced to retreat from Brunete and suffered devastating casualties from the battle.
Prelude.
After the capture of Bilbao on June 19, the Republicans devised the attack on Brunete to divert Nationalist forces from the north and allow the fleeing Republicans time to reorganize. In addition, Brunete was also chosen because it was situated on the Extremadura road and its capture would make it harder for the Nationalists to resupply their forces besieging Madrid, perhaps even forcing them to withdraw. Once Brunete had been taken, and after some reorganization, the plan was that the offensive would then in a second phase continue in the direction of Talavera de la Reina, a move that would eventually cut off the Nationalist forces outside Madrid. At the same times as the offensive on Brunete started an enveloping attack would be launched from the Carabanchel area just south of Madrid.
From a political standpoint, the offensive was chosen for Brunete to satisfy communist demands and to prove to the Russians that the Spanish possessed military initiative. In fact, Russian advisors had been pressing for an attack on Brunete since the spring of 1937. Furthermore, assistance from the Soviet Union had decreased due to the successful blockade of Republican ports by the Nationalists. Prime Minister Juan Negrín needed to convince the French Premier Camille Chautemps that the Spanish Republic was still capable of military action after the disastrous losses of Málaga and Bilbao. It was expected by the Republicans that a show of force at Brunete would persuade France to open its border for arms shipments.
The offensive was well prepared, and had been preceded both by major reorganizations of the government forces and a big influx of modern war material, mainly from the Soviet Union. Nine new brigades had been set up, and the number of heavy machine guns in the units had been increased. The commanders on the battalion level and up were often well qualified for their tasks, while the company and platoon commanders often lacked experience. The offensive was meant as a surprise attack, and the Nationalists were indeed caught unaware - despite the fact that "it had been discussed in the cafés of the Republic for three months".
The terrain where the battle was to be fought is pretty hilly, with many ridges and small creeks, but for the most part open, and thus accessible to the Republicans new Soviet tanks, which they now intended to put to their first full use.
The Combatants.
Republicans.
General Miaja initially commanded two Spanish Republican Army corps.
In reserve were Cipriano Mera's 14th Division, General Kléber's 45th Division, and Gustavo Duran's 69th Division. The reserve forces consisted of some 25,000 men and 40 tanks.
Nationalists.
The site of the offensive was well chosen. Initially facing the Republican attack was not a continuous Nationalist line of defense but (as in many parts of Spain in the initial phase of the war) a series of outposts in the villages, all defended by small detachments able to take the terrain between the outposts under flanking fire. This part of the front was part of the Nationalist Army of the Center under the command of General Andrés Saliquet Zumeta. However, pretty soon after the battle had started the overall command was shifted to General José Enrique Varela Iglesias. The units that fought during the battle were:
Transferred to the front were the 150th Division led by General Sáenz de Buruaga, the 4th Brigade of Navarre led by Colonel Juan Bautista Sánchez and the 5th Brigade of Navarre led by Colonel Alonso Vega.
Republican offensive.
July 6.
The first attacks started already during the night of July 5/6, with Republican forces in the cover of darkness penetrating deep into the thinly held Nationalist lines. At daybreak on July 6, the Republicans bombarded the Nationalist positions using artillery and air power, plus targets in the rear, including the local Nationalist HQ at Navalcarnero. Immediately after the bombardment, the Republican 11th Division commanded by Líster advanced and encircled Brunete. The Nationalist forces there were completely taken by surprise, and it wasn't until the morning attacks started that they realised the full extent of the Republican operation. Brunete fell to the Republicans by noon.
The Nationalists placed overall command of the battle in General Varela. During the morning all available manpower was rushed into the faltering front line, these included personnel from local staffs, field hospitals and supply units, and by noon the 12th, 13th and 150th Divisions along with parts of the Condor Legion were on their way to help bolster the defense.
Later that day the Republican attacks by the 34th and the 46th Divisions on the flanks of Líster's 11th Division stalled upon meeting fierce resistance by the Nationalists and forced Líster to halt his advance south of Brunete. Attempts by the Republican forces to widen the gap by attacking towards the west was also stopped, in front of Quijorna. The assault on Quijorna was then reinforced by tanks and given the support of both artillery and air assets, but the attackers were again repulsed.
Thus far the offensive had almost exclusively been carried out by the V Army Corps. The Republican command seems to have been surprised by their initial success, and there was obviously some confusion which meant that the deployment of XVIII Army Corps was delayed. (This confusion was probably compounded by the fact that many non-communists and regular army officers were reported to be sceptical towards the whole enterprise, which probably made them over-cautious.)
The planned east-wing of the enveloping attack, from Carabanchel south of Madrid, never broke the enemy line, despite heavy artillery bombardment.
July 7.
The Republican Colonel Jurado diverted the 15th Division to end the stalemate at Villanueva de la Cañada and the British Battalion of the XVth Brigade managed to clear the village of Nationalists by 7 am on July 7. The Nationalists in the nearby villages of Villanueva del Pardillo and Villafranca del Castillo continued to hold out.
To allow Gal's 15th Division to continue towards Boadilla on the Republican left flank, the 10th Division under Enciso attacked Asensio's 12th Division defending the Mocha Ridge. The Nationalist troops there were driven back and they fell back to the hills near Boadilla.
Outside Brunete the day was spent in inconclusive and incoherent fights. The bombardments in the dry landscape, that was parched by the heat, resulted in many wildfires.
The Republican insistence on reducing pockets of resistance, rather than bypassing them, gave the Nationalists time to bring up fresh reserves. On the afternoon Nationalist aircraft shifted from the Northern Front started to arrive, and they immediately went into action. Varela was also told that all attacks up north had been suspended, to allow ground units to be rushed to the Brunete sector.
July 8–9.
During the night of the 7/8 July general Miaja committed his reserve, the XVIII Army Corps, in an attack towards the east, in the direction of the Guadarrama River. It was performed in the morning hours. After crossing the river the 15th Division assaulted the newly fortified positions held by the 12th Division for two days. All of the attacks were repulsed and when an attack did succeed in evicting the Nationalist defenders, a counterattack quickly eliminated the gains made by the Republicans. Meanwhile, the nationalist position at the village of Quijorna on the Republican right flank continued to hold out. The attack south of Madrid was renewed, but failed once again. Nothing more came of this part of the plan.
With the Republican attack on the right flank of Líster remaining held up at Quijorna, Modesto ordered the 35th Division to assist "El Campesino's" 46th Division. The original intent of the 35th Division was for it to be used in support of Líster's attack through the center. Without the 35th Division, Líster's 11th Division would be unable to advance any further. On the morning of July 9, two Republican brigades attacked at Quijorna, and, after taking heavy casualties, they were able to finally clear the village of Nationalist defenders. On the Republican left flank attacks towards Boadilla del Monte initially made progress, but even though the assaulting units were well supported by tanks, armoured cars and aircraft their losses were so high that the attacks stranded. The fighting continued though, especially on and around the so-called Mosquito ridge in front of the village.
In the first attack the Spanish Republican Air Force was very active, attacking both ground targets and rebel-held airfields. But the Republican planes were slow and obsolete, which would assure the German "Legion Condor" almost total control of the air as the battle would unfold.
July 10–11.
On July 10 Villanueva del Pardillo was taken by the XIIth International Brigade of Durán's 69th Division, supported by tanks. Some 500 defenders with weapons, ammunition and materiel were captured. Villafranca del Castillo was slowly being surrounded by Enciso's 10th Division and Kléber's 45th Division. Colonel Jurado made plans for an assault on the village on July 11, but he became ill and was replaced with Colonel Casado. Citing poor morale and fatigue, Casado requested to cancel the attack, but General Miaja ordered for the attack to proceed as planned. (On this day the African American communist Oliver Law, acting commander of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, was killed whilst leading an attack on the Mosquito Ridge on the Boadilla del Monte sector.)
The Republicans were able to trap the Nationalist garrison in Villafranca del Castillo, forcing General Varela to send the 5th Brigade of Navarre to relieve the pressure. The arrival of the Navarrese tipped the balance in favor of the Nationalists as the Republicans were forced from their positions and fled back across the Guadarrama River. A Nationalist attempt to recapture Villanueva del Pardillo on July 11 failed.
The activity in the air was very high, as more and more Nationalist air units were committed to the fight. It was not uncommon to see aircraft in groups of thirty or more appear over the battlefield, and clash with equally big squadrons of opponents.
July 12–17.
As large Nationalist ground and air reinforcements had arrived to the threatened front, and as the planned pincer movement from the Carabanchel area south of Madrid had failed to make any impression, the Republican offensive was clearly grinding to a halt. Some minor diversionary attacks were still performed, but on July 15 general Miaja finally ordered an end to the offensive. (Major George Nathan, a battalion commander in the XV International Brigade, was killed by bomb fragments the day after.) At this moment, the Republicans held Brunete and had cut the Extremadura road. And the offensive had indeed relieved the Nationalist pressure on the Basque country, and it had proved to friend and foe that the Republican forces were rapidly increasing in both strength and capacity. At the same time the Nationalists had prevented their forces besieging Madrid from being cut off and with reinforcements having arrived were able to prepare to counterattack.
The Republican forces had suffered big losses, not only from the actual fighting, but also due to the extreme heat, which, combined with lack of water, had incapacitated many soldiers. Many brigades had lost between 40-60% of their numbers - killed, wounded, sick and missing - and one brigade (the XIVth) is said to have lost 80% of their manpower during this week.
The exhausted Republicans dug in and waited for the Nationalist counterattack that they knew probably would come.
Nationalist counterattack.
The nationalist commander general Varela planned to retake the terrain lost to the Republicans with a three-pronged attack. The main force consisted of some 20.000 men, that would attack from the west of the salient towards Quijorna. At the same time another force of some 10.000 men would strike from the east from Boadilla del Monte towards and over the Guadarrama river. Finally some 8.000 men would also attack from the south, towards Brunete itself.
July 18.
The counteroffensive started early that morning with a lengthy artillery barrage over the Republican front lines, together with heavy aerial attacks by Nationalist air units. However the Nationalists made only small gains this day: the western group managed to capture some hills northwest of Quijorna, while the eastern force took some ground east of the Guadarrama. The Republican troops defended their position stubbornly. The fighting west of Quijorna was particularly fierce. There Republican units made several countercharges, trying to recapture the hills which they had lost. The fighting in the air was also unusually heavy, as both sides threw large number of aircraft into the struggle: at one time around 80 Nationalist aircraft were involved in a massive dogfight with some 60 opponents. (On this day the British poet Julian Bell was killed by bomb fragments, whilst driving an ambulance for a volunteer British Medical Unit.)
July 19–20.
The three pronged attack by the Nationalists failed to achieve any substantial gains on July 19, but the next day the eastern forces, heavily supported by aerial units, managed to make some gains on the east side of the salient, close to the Guadarrama.
July 21–23.
In order to stabilize the situation on the eastern side of the pocket Miaja ordered a counterattack along the Guadarrama, which led to several days of bitter fighting in the stifling heat. The terrain initially taken by the Nationalists on July 20 switched hands several times. At the same time three Republican Brigades supported by 20 tanks made a small push from Las Rozas towards the south-east. While the see-saw battle raged on the eastern flank of the salient, the Republican forces on the west side held their ground, despite heavy attacks concentrated mainly on the terrain around Quijorna. However, on July 23 the eastern forces finally made a major breakthrough, and managed to fight their way across the Guadarrama, close to the place where the small Aulencia flows into the larger river.
July 24–25.
On July 24 the Nationalists started attacking from the south towards Brunete in earnest. They had managed to concentrate some 65 artillery batteries at this part of the front, against a mere 22 Republican. With this support plus bombing from the air the Nationalist breached the Republican lines south of the city. A counterattack supported by tanks had no success. On the afternoon the attackers entered Brunete, while the remnants of Líster's 11th Division retreated to positions just north of the city, clustering around the cemetery. At the same time the Nationalist east group managed to widen their breach on the Guadarrama. Miaja rushed reinforcements from Madrid, and the Republican 14th Division commanded by Cipriano Mera made yet another counterattack, but it failed, and on July 25 the defenders from the 11th Division around and on the cemetery - which included the division commander Líster himself - withdrew from their positions. After this there were no more large-scale attacks in the battle - save for some ineffectual Republican attempts to counterattacks - and the fighting petered out. Varela wanted to continue his attacks but Franco ordered them to halt so that troops could be moved north for the start of the offensive against the strategically important port of Santander. (On July 25 the German war photographer Gerda Taro was fatally wounded when the car she was riding in was hit by a Republican tank more or less out of control due to a Nationalist air attack.)
During the final days of the battle there were clear signs of the morale cracking on the Republican side, due to both exhaustion and the often terrible losses. Even among the volunteer International Brigades there were grumbling, insubordination and outright desertion.
Aftermath.
At the close of the battle, the Republicans failed to cut the Extremadura road, but they still held Villanueva de la Cañada, Quijorna and Villanueva del Pardillo from the Nationalists. From this point of view, both sides were able to claim victory.
The losses of men and equipment in the battle were much heavier for the Republicans than the Nationalists. Indeed, the Republican army lost much of its indispensable equipment and so many of their best soldiers in the International Brigades that the battle can be seen as a strategic Nationalist victory.
Politically, the communists suffered a loss of prestige because the offensive failed to stop the Nationalist troops from completing the conquest of the north.
The frenetic conditions at Brunete for the Nationalists enabled the Germans to acquire favorable trade concessions because of the effectiveness of the Condor Legion. The Nationalists granted most favored nation status to Germany and acquiesced in sending raw materials to Germany as repayment for the debt incurred.
Later the battle was commemorated in the name given to Armoured Division No. 1 "Brunete", formed in the mid-1940s.


Battle of Mokra

The Battle of Mokra took place on September 1, 1939 near the village of Mokra, 5 km north from Kłobuck, 23 km north-west from Częstochowa, Poland. It was one of the first battles of the Invasion of Poland, of the Second World War and one of the few Polish victories of that campaign, as well as the first German defeat of the conflict.
Eve of the Battle.
According to the Polish mobilization scheme, the main task of the Łódź Army was to secure the connection between the Kraków Army operating in Silesia and Lesser Poland and the Poznań Army defending Greater Poland. It was also to cover the mobilization of a reserve Prusy Army behind the Polish lines. Because of that, the main purpose of the army was to gain time and offer delaying actions and harsh resistance in order for the mobilization to be accomplished.
The Wołyńska Cavalry Brigade was located north of the town of Kłobuck, along the railway to Katowice. Two regiments (19th Volhynian Uhlan Regiment and 21st Vistula Uhlan Regiment, as well as 4th battalion of the 84th Infantry Regiment) were entrenched on both ends of a forest surrounding the village of Mokra, to the west of the north-south rail road line. To the east, Colonel Julian Filipowicz placed the reserves of the brigade: 12th Podolian Uhlan Regiment, 2nd Mounted Rifles Regiment and 21st Armoured Battalion.
The main task of the Polish brigade was to keep the connection between the 7th Infantry Division (Poland) operating to the south and the 30th Infantry Division (Poland) to the north. The terrain chosen by the Polish commander was ideal for defence: a railroad earthwork and a forest formed the main defensive line while the foreground was hilly, with a large number of ditches, streams and other obstacles.
Battle.
On September 1, at 0500, the German Tenth Army of Army Group South crossed the Polish border and initiated the invasion of Poland. The German 31st Infantry Division, as well as 1st and 4th Panzer Divisions crossed the border in the operational sector of the Polish Volhynian cavalry brigade. After breaking through small Border Guard and National Defence detachments, the German units seized the towns of Krzepice and Starokrzepice, directly in front of the main Polish positions. After capturing them, the Germans razed both towns and expelled all the local inhabitants towards the Polish lines.
The German units were divided into three separate assault groups. The 1st Panzer Division headed directly towards the town of Kłobuck, held by the Polish 7th Infantry Division, while the 4th Panzer Division was split into northern and southern columns, each trying to outflank the Polish positions around Mokra. At the same time, the Luftwaffe began a heavy bombardment of the Polish positions. By the end of the day, German aircraft made 15 attacks, with 9 to 26 bombers in each. The planes were mostly Junkers Ju 87 dive bombers.
At 0630 in the morning the motorcycle reconnaissance squads of the 4th Panzer Division made contact with the 12th company of the 84th Infantry Regiment under Stanisław Radajewicz. Soon afterwards the AFVs arrived, supported by infantry and purportedly using Polish civilians as human shields. However, after several hits from Polish AT weapons on their flanks, the German tanks lost orientation, which allowed the civilians to cross the Polish lines with negligible losses. The German assault was renewed shortly afterwards, but was repelled by heavy machine gun fire. Two AFVs retreated, while the majority of the motorcyclists were taken prisoner.
The 4th Panzer Division then mounted an assault on the Polish 21st Uhlans Regiment, further northwards. After a short artillery barrage and aerial bombardment, the German tanks took the village of Wilkowieck and headed directly for the village of Mokra. However, although the regiment lost many horses and approximately five ammunition cars, the bombs mostly missed the Polish defensive positions and the advancing tanks were welcomed at 150 metres by well-positioned Polish-made 37mm Bofors antitank guns. After two Panzers were destroyed, the German tanks withdrew to 400 metres and started shelling the Poles with artillery, but after losing two additional AFVs (one destroyed and one immobilized), the German tanks retreated. The German infantry were left on a flat open field, right in front of the Polish positions, without any cover. They were forced to retreat by a Polish infantry attack that caused heavy losses and resulted in a number of prisoners being taken by the Poles.
The positions of the 19th Uhlans Regiment were attacked at 0800 by an assault group composed of tanks, AFVs, motorcyclists and infantry. The German group, divided into three columns, was advancing towards the village of Rębielice Szlacheckie in order to outflank the 21st Regiment from the north. However, the Germans were apparently unaware of the 19th Regiment's positions. The westernmost group easily captured the village, but the central group was caught in an ambush by the Poles near the forest and had to flee. The third group was advancing alongside the Polish positions in the forest, completely unaware of the Polish forces several hundred metres away. When the Polish machine guns and anti-tank guns opened fire, the group was almost annihilated before it could respond.
Nevertheless, the Polish northern flank was endangered and the Germans had uncovered its positions. To counter the threat, Col. Filipowicz ordered the 12th Uhlans Regiment under Andrzej Kuczek, until then held in reserve, to strengthen the positions of the 19th Regiment. The newly arrived units were fresh, yet already battle-hardened in the first skirmishes in the early morning, which helped Polish morale.
The German Assault.
At 1000 hours, the Germans started an assault on the northern flank, but were repelled from most positions with significant losses on both sides. Fifteen minutes later the German 4th Panzer Division repeated the attack, this time with artillery support and air cover. The assault was planned in three directions:
The northern assault was carried out quickly. Under heavy covering fire, the German tanks, a mixture of Panzer Is and Panzer IIs, managed to break into the forest and secured a road leading across the railway line to the village of Izbiska Duże, to the north of the Polish headquarters. At 1030, the Polish 4th Squadron of the dismounted 19th Cavalry Regiment was attacked from behind and pushed out of the forest. This threatened the separation of their 19th and 21st Regiments. Colonel Filipowicz ordered the 19th Regiment to withdraw to the other side of the railway, but the way was already occupied by German tanks and the unit was effectively surrounded. However, the Polish defence was reinforced by the arrival of the "Armoured train No. 53", known as "Śmiały" ("Bold"), which arrived on the battlefield just as the German tanks were crossing the railway line. It stopped in the middle of the German column and opened fire on the German tanks at close range with its two 75mm guns and heavy machine guns. The German column was dispersed and retreated with heavy losses, losing a number of Panzer I and II tanks, while the 19th Regiment crossed the railroad under cover of the armoured train. Although the 19th Regiment suffered heavy losses, it managed to regroup on the other side.
Simultaneously, a German attack on the main positions of the 21st Regiment near the village of Mokra began. German tanks managed to outflank the 4th Squadron of the Regiment from the north, at the same time attacking it frontally. The Polish defenders were pushed out of the forest and heavy fighting for the village itself started. The Germans lost four tanks to the Polish 2nd Artillery Battalion firing from across the railway, but the 4th Squadron was in retreat, fighting for almost every house in the village and suffering heavy losses. Again the day was saved by "Śmiały". It arrived in the area at the height of the battle and opened fire from a distance of almost 2.5 km, which was beyond the effective range of all German tank guns of the time, in the end destroying or knocking out several more Panzer I and IIs. Also, more Polish cavalry, made up of the 12th "Uhlans" Regiment, was moved to the area; the men dismounted and reinforced the 21st Regiment.
Polish counter-attack and the "Charge".
The 21st Armoured Battalion under Maj. Stanisław Gliński, equipped mostly with Polish TKS tankettes was ordered to counter-attack the village, along with the cavalry squadron of Captain Jerzy Hollak. In the clouds of smoke of the burning village, the Polish units accidentally drove right into the middle of a German tank column. Although the Polish tankettes were no match for the heavier Panzer II German tanks and the cavalry was very vulnerable to tank fire, the confusion in German ranks prevented their commander from responding quickly enough. The Polish units managed to break through the German column with negligible losses and seized the forest to the northwest of Mokra. This manoeuvre is sometimes referred to as a Polish cavalry charge against German tanks, although no charge was planned nor executed. Nevertheless, the German tanks again lost orientation and the column withdrew from the village, again leaving it in Polish hands. The tanks withdrew to their initial positions in Wilkowiecko, leaving behind the infantry supporting the failed assault. German losses were high and a large number of German troops were taken prisoner.
At the same time, also at 1000, the positions of the 4th Battalion of the 84th Infantry Regiment were attacked by a detachment of German mechanized infantry. After initial clashes the Polish 11th and 12th Companies withdrew deeper into the forest. Colonel Filipowicz ordered the 2nd Mounted Rifles to counter-attack and strengthen the positions between the 21st and 84th regiments. Also the 10th Company managed to charge the enemy and retake the positions lost only a couple of minutes earlier. By noon, the fighting in the centre and in the south of the Polish positions was over. The fighting in the forest on the northern flank was ended after the 19th Regiment successfully withdrew.
Final struggles.
At 1215 approximately 100 German tanks returned to the village of Mokra. The main assault broke the lines of the 4th squadron of the 21st Regiment and the tanks managed to charge the AT artillery nests, destroying two of the guns and breaking through to the central part of the village. The houses there were set on fire and the 21st Regiment managed to withdraw to the rail line, under cover of the smoke. Only isolated pockets of resistance were left in the village itself, which caused much confusion to the Germans.
The withdrawal of the 21st Regiment allowed the Germans to attack the 12th Regiment and the 2nd Artillery Battalion directly. The losses of the latter unit were high since most of the 75 mm field guns were not the best weapon for antitank fire. The 2nd battery lost all three guns and the HMG, while the 5th battery lost two guns. However, the rest of the artillery positions were covered with smoke from the burning houses the Germans had set afire, and were successfully hidden. When a group of tanks unknowingly approached the 1st battery, the Polish guns used direct fire on the German tanks, destroying thirteen of them in a matter of minutes. This allowed the Poles to hold their positions. The 12th Regiment under Andrzej Kuczek attacked the German tanks from the rear, from the previously-retaken forest to the Northwest of the village. Although both sides suffered heavy losses, the Germans withdrew. After the assault ended, the 2nd Artillery Battalion was withdrawn from the battle due to heavy losses and lack of ammunition.
At 1500, the Germans repeated the frontal assault with heavy artillery fire, tactical air attacks and almost 180 tanks from Wilkowiecko. Simultaneously, side attacks were commenced on the Polish flanks. The frontal assault was directed on the 2nd Squadron of the 12th Regiment (commanded by Stanisław Raczkowski), in the centre of the village. Although the Polish artillery destroyed many of them, the German tanks managed to break through again to the village. The 4th squadron under Feliks Pruszyński counter-attacked, but both squadrons were being constantly pressed towards the rail line. Colonel Filipowicz had no further reserves and the German tanks were nearing the railway crossing, while the Polish cavalry was being pushed back with heavy losses. Soon the regiments lost contact with each other. Because of the smoke, the battle broke down to a series of different skirmishes in the forests, the village and along the rails. All batteries but one of the 2nd Battalion were withdrawn from the battle. This made the situation of the 12th Regiment critical.
The 2nd Mounted Rifle Regiment, the only unit that was still intact and in contact with the commander of the brigade, was ordered to assault at all costs and reinforce the 12th Regiment and the gap between the cavalry and the 84th Regiment in the south. This helped the Polish defence, but only for the moment. Colonel Filipowicz ordered the Polish tankettes to charge the German tanks in the village. Although the tankettes were not supplied with antitank ammunition, in the chaos of the battle they managed to halt the German advance temporarily. After losing one tankette the Poles withdrew, but managed to gain enough time for the armoured trains to return to the area. To the north, at the positions of the 19th Regiment the tanks also managed to break through and started crossing the railroad near Izbiska. When the German tanks crossed the line, both of the armoured trains arrived and attacked them from behind. While the losses in tanks were limited, the panic that started in German units resulted in many tanks being abandoned by their crews, who could not drive the tanks directly through the railway tracks (elevated some two metres above the ground); the crossing was blocked by burning AFVs. Although both trains suffered some losses and were finally forced to retreat, the panic in German ranks was not stopped. In the smoke some of the German tanks started firing at German positions, while others simply retreated towards their initial position, directly through the German infantry.
In the south the Polish infantry was yet again pushed deeper into the forest, but its lines were not broken. By 1700 the battle was over.
Aftermath.
The German 4th Panzer Division was forced back to its initial positions in Opatów and Wilkowiecko, and only the 12th Schützen Regiment managed to reach the rail road crossing at Izbiska. However, upon learning that the German 1st Panzer Division had managed to take Kłobuck, the Polish forces were withdrawn overnight south-eastwards, to the village of Łobodno located north-east of Kłobuck, and then to the second line of defence, some 12 km to the east.
Casualties.
The losses on both sides were quite high. The Germans lost approximately 800 men (killed, captured, wounded or missing), and between 100 and 160 AFVs (at least 50 of them tanks). The Polish brigade lost 200 killed and 300 wounded, as well as 300 horses and several guns. The 2nd Mounted Artillery Battalion lost almost 30% of its men, the 21st Regiment almost 25%; the 12th Uhlans Regiment that was used as a reserve lost 5 officers and 216 men killed and wounded.


Battle of Sapotillal

The Battle of Sapotillal, or the Battle of Zapotillal or Zapotillo Ridge, took place on the 9 October 1927 during the American occupation of Nicaragua of 1926–1933 and the Sandino Rebellion. The battle was an unsuccessful attempt by American and Nicaraguan government forces to rescue two downed American airmen.
Background.
On the 8 October 1927, Second Lieutenant Earl Thomas and his observer-gunner Sergeant Frank Dowdell, flying a Vought O2U Corsair, had to crash-land on a Nicaraguan ridge known as Sapotillal for unknown reasons. After destroying the plane and its machine guns, the two American Marine airmen started to head for Quilalí on foot, using a map dropped by their wingman, Mike "the Polish Warhorse" Wodarczyk. On their journey, the two aviators managed to fight off a group of fifteen Sandinistas with their pistols, killing five. After being surrounded by forty guerrillas and running out of ammunition, Thomas and Dowdell were finally captured. The two Americans were put on trial by the Sandinistas, "probably tortured," and executed.
Battle.
"Twelve miles north at Jícaro," Lieutenant George J. O'Shea, not knowing the fates of the two airmen, organized an expedition of eight other American Marines, ten Nicaraguan National Guardsmen, and one member of the United States Navy (Dr. John B. O'Neill) to rescue them. The patrol headed out at 12:45 p.m. on the 8 October 1927.
Early the following day, the group neared the crash site, only to be only ambushed by "about 200" Sandinista rebels. Rather than seize the guerrilla-occupied hill in front them, O'Shea's men turned back the way they had come and proceeded to attack the rebels blocking their way. Notably employing rifle grenades and hand grenades, the American and Nicaraguan government troops began shooting and blasting their way back to El Jícaro. Initially, O'Shea led the way, hurling grenades as he advanced. One member of the Nicaraguan National Guard continued firing "his rifle after half of the barrel had been blown off." At one point during the intense running battle, a Sandinista machine gun pinned down its enemies, who eventually killed the machine gunner with a very well-placed rifle grenade. O'Shea's troops could hear guerrillas closing in "[f]rom all sides in the dense jungle." A Thompson submachine gun and rifle grenades were used quite effectively by the Americans and their Nicaraguan allies, "demonstrating the high value of these two weapons in close-range bush warfare." The firefight lasted about two and a half hours.
Aftermath.
Although their native guides had abandoned them during the fight and O'Shea had lost his compass, the exhausted patrol arrived back in El Jícaro "just before midnight" on the 10 October.
O'Shea guessed that the total number of Sandinistas engaged in the battle was about 400, although he said this was a "very conservative estimate." Of these, at least 40 were killed or mortally wounded, but this number could actually be as high as 55 or 60. One rebel was captured during the fighting, and his captors were prepared to shoot him, but decided not to, as it might give away their position. Of O'Shea's men, four Nicaraguan National Guardsmen were killed.


Operation Mosaic

Operation Mosaic was a series of two British nuclear tests conducted in the Monte Bello Islands in Western Australia on 16 May and 19 June 1956. These tests followed the Operation Totem series and preceded the Operation Buffalo series. The second test in the series was the largest ever conducted in Australia.
The purpose of the tests was to explore increasing the yield of British nuclear weapons through boosting with lithium-6 and deuterium, and the use of a natural uranium tamper. Although a boosted fission weapon is not a hydrogen bomb, which the British Government had agreed would not be tested in Australia, the tests were connected with the British hydrogen bomb programme.
The Operation Totem tests of 1953 had been carried out at Emu Field in South Australia, but it was considered unsuitable. A new, permanent test site was being prepared at Maralinga in South Australia, but would not be ready until September 1956. It was decided that the best option was to return to the Monte Bello Islands, where Operation Hurricane had been conducted in 1952. To allow the task force flagship, the tank landing ship , to return to the UK and refit in time for Operation Grapple, the planned first test of a British hydrogen bomb, 15 July was set as the terminal date for Operation Mosaic. The British Government was anxious that Grapple should take place before a proposed moratorium on nuclear testing came into effect. The second test was therefore conducted under time pressure.
At the time of the Royal Commission into British nuclear tests in Australia it was claimed that the second test was of a significantly higher yield than suggested by the official figures: as compared to , but this remains unsubstantiated.
Background.
During the early part of the Second World War, Britain had a nuclear weapons project, code-named Tube Alloys, which the 1943 Quebec Agreement merged with the American Manhattan Project to create a combined American, British, and Canadian project. The British Government expected that the United States would continue to share nuclear technology after the war, which it regarded as a joint discovery, but the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act) ended technical cooperation. Fearing a resurgence of United States isolationism, and Britain losing its great power status, the British Government restarted its own development effort, which was given the cover name "High Explosive Research". The first British atomic bomb was tested in Operation Hurricane at the Monte Bello Islands in Western Australia on 3 October 1952.
Britain thereby became the third nuclear power after the United States and the Soviet Union, but just four weeks after Operation Hurricane, the United States successfully demonstrated a hydrogen bomb. The technology mastered in Operation Hurricane was six years old, and with the hydrogen bomb in hand, the US Congress saw no benefit in renewing cooperation with the UK. All the while Britain strove for independence, at the same time it sought interdependence in the form of a renewal of the Special Relationship with the United States. The British Government therefore resolved on 27 July 1954 to initiate the British hydrogen bomb programme. At the time, momentum was gathering both domestically and internationally for a moratorium on nuclear testing. The British Government was most anxious that this should not occur before Britain had developed hydrogen bombs, which it was hoped would be achieved in 1957.
Purpose and site selection.
In thinking about thermonuclear designs, the British scientists at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston considered boosted fission weapons. These are a type of nuclear device in which isotopes of light elements such as lithium-6 and deuterium are added. The resulting nuclear fusion reactions produce neutrons, and thus increase the rate of fission, and therefore the yield. The British had no practical experience with boosting, so a test of the concept was required. The scientists had also heard a rumour from American sources that the yield could be improved by up to 50 per cent through the use of a natural uranium tamper. Two tests were therefore scheduled: one with a lead tamper to investigate the effect of lithium deuteride, and one with a natural uranium one to investigate effect of the tamper. It was hoped that the two tests would advance progress towards building a British hydrogen bomb.
The need for speed dictated the location. The Operation Totem tests of 1953 had been carried out at Emu Field in South Australia, but it was considered unsuitable. The area was too isolated, with the nearest road over away, and only tracked vehicles or those with special tyres could traverse the intervening sand dunes. Emu Field therefore relied on air transport, but dust storms were a problem. Moreover, a shortage of water severely limited the number of personnel at the site. A new, permanent test site was therefore being prepared at Maralinga in South Australia, but it would not be ready until September 1956, and the Operation Buffalo tests were already scheduled to be held there. It was therefore decided that the best option was to return to the Monte Bello Islands, where the operation could be supported by the Royal Navy. There were also doubts as to whether the Australian Government would allow a test at Maralinga.
This was a sensitive matter; there was an agreement with Australia that no thermonuclear testing would be carried out there. The Australian Minister for Supply, Howard Beale, responding to rumours reported in the newspapers, asserted that "the Federal Government has no intention of allowing any hydrogen bomb tests to take place in Australia. Nor has it any intention of allowing any experiments connected with hydrogen bomb tests to take place here." While a boosted fusion weapon is not a hydrogen bomb, the tests "were" indeed connected with hydrogen bomb development.
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Anthony Eden, cabled the Prime Minister of Australia, Robert Menzies, on 16 May 1955. Eden detailed the nature and purpose of the tests. He explained that the experiments would include the addition of light elements as a boost, but promised that the yield of neither test would exceed two and a half times that of the Operation Hurricane test. Neither the anticipated nor the actual yield of the Hurricane test had been officially disclosed to Australian officials, but the yield was , so this implied an upper limit was about . Later an limit was agreed to. Eden informed Menzies that the two shots would be from towers, which would produce a fifth of the fallout of that of Operation Hurricane, and there would be no danger to people or animals on the mainland. He explained that the use of the Monte Bello Islands would save as much as six months' of development time. Menzies cabled his approval of the tests on 20 June.
Preparations.
Like Operation Hurricane before it, the test was a Royal Navy responsibility. Planning commenced in February 1955 under the codename Operation Giraffe. In June 1955, the Admiralty adopted the codename Operation Mosaic. The Atomic Trials Executive in London, chaired by Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, had already begun planning Operation Buffalo. It assumed responsibility for Operation Mosaic as well, sitting as the Mosaic Executive (Mosex) or Buffalo Executive (Buffalex) as appropriate. Captain Hugh Martell would be in charge as commander Task Force 308, with the temporary rank of commodore. Charles Adams from Aldermaston, who had been the deputy technical director to Leonard Tyte for Operation Hurricane and to William Penney on Operation Totem, was appointed the scientific director for Operation Mosaic, with Ieuan Maddock as the scientific superintendent. Group Captain S. W. B. (Paddy) Menaul would command the Air Task Group. Menaul was also a nuclear test veteran, having been an observer on board Vickers Valiant WZ366 when it had made the first operational drop of a British atomic bomb during Operation Totem. Planning was conducted at Aldermaston.
On 18 July 1955 a five-man mission headed by Martell that included Adams, Menaul and Lieutenant Commanders A. K. Dodds and R. R. Fotheringham departed the UK for Australia. They arrived on 22 July, and began a series of discussions. The Australian Government created a Monte Bello Working Party as a subcommittee of the Maralinga Committee as a counterpart to the British Mosex. Adams met with W. A. S. Butement of the recently formed Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee (AWTSC), an organisation created by the Australian Government to oversee the safety of nuclear tests. Mosex agreed that at least two members of the AWTSC would be present on board the Task Force 308 flagship, the Landing Ship, Tank, , when the decision to fire was taken. He also had discussions with Leonard Dwyer, the Director of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology about the weather conditions that could be expected for the test. It was agreed that a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) frigate would act as a weather ship for the test series, and that a second weather ship might be required to give warnings of willy willys and cyclones.
A small fleet of ships was assembled for Operation Mosaic. HMS "Narvik" began a refit at HM Dockyard, Chatham, in July 1955, which was completed by November. She departed the UK on 29 December 1955, and travelled via the Suez Canal, reaching Fremantle on 23 February 1956. The frigate , normally the yacht of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Fleet, was loaned to act as an accommodation ship for scientists and VIPs. Along with the tanker , they formed Task Group 308.1. The Far East Fleet also supplied the cruiser , and destroyers , , and . These formed Task Group 308.3, which was mainly responsible for weather reporting. The destroyer was detailed to carry out scientific tests, and formed Task Group 308.4.
They were augmented by RAN vessels, designated Task Group 308.2. The sloop and boom defence vessel carried out a hydrographic survey of the Monte Bello Islands, laying marker buoys for moorings. Care had to be taken with this, as Operation Hurricane had left some parts of the islands dangerously radioactive. The corvettes and provided logistical support, ferried personnel between the islands and the mainland, and accommodated 14 Australian and British media representatives during the first test. They were replaced by "Karangi" for the second test. A pair of RAN motor lighters, MWL251 and MRL252, provided water and refrigeration respectively. The two barges were visited by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Mountbatten, and Lady Mountbatten, who flew out to the islands on a Whirlwind helicopter on 15 April.
Only a small party of Royal Engineers and two Aldermaston scientists travelled on "Narvik". The main scientific party left London by air on 1 April. The Air Task Group consisted of 107 officers and 407 other ranks. Most were based at Pearce near Perth and Onslow in the Pilbara region, although four Royal Air Force (RAF) Shackletons and about 70 RAF personnel were based at RAAF Base Darwin, from whence the Shackletons daily flew weather reconnaissance flights, commencing on 2 March. There was a cyclone three days later. Three Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Neptunes flew safety patrols, five RAF Varsity aircraft tracked clouds and flew on low-level radiological survey missions, five RAF Canberra bombers were tasked with collecting radioactive samples, four RAF Hastings aircraft flew between the UK and Australia, and two Whirlwind helicopters provided a taxi service. The United States Air Force (USAF) provided a pair of C-118 Liftmasters to collect radioactive samples. Lieutenant-Colonel R. N. B. Holmes was in charge of the Royal Engineers, whose task including erecting the aluminium towers for the shots.
G1.
Adams arrived at Monte Bello on 22 April, and was sufficiently impressed with the progress of works to schedule a scientific rehearsal for 27 April. A second scientific rehearsal was held on 2 May, followed by a full dress rehearsal on 5 May. The fissile material was delivered by an RAF Hastings to Onslow, from whence it was collected by HMS "Alert" on 11 May, and delivered to the Monte Bello Islands the following day. Five members of the AWTSC—Leslie H. Martin, Ernest Titterton, Cecil Eddy, Butement and Dwyer—arrived at Onslow and were flown to "Narvik" by helicopter on 14 May. The following day, Martell set 16 May as the date for the test. There had been protests in Perth at the test series, and the Deputy Premier of Western Australia, John Tonkin, promised to discuss demands for an end to the tests. Martin and Titterton confronted Martell and Adams, and Martin told them that without sufficient information about the nature of the tests, the AWTSC could not approve the test. That it had a veto came as a surprise; it was not what their orders from London said. Penney sent a message to Adams 10 May:
Rather than stonewall, Adams and Martell disclosed the same information that had been given to Menzies, on condition that they kept it to themselves. This mollified them, and the G1 test went ahead. The device was detonated on Trimouille Island at 03:50 UTC (11:50 local time) on 16 May. Soon afterwards, "Narvik" and "Alert" entered the Parting Pool in the Monte Bello Islands. The Radiological Group, wearing full protective clothing, entered the lagoon in a cutter. They retrieved measuring instruments and conducted a ground survey. A tent with a decontamination area was established ashore, and a water pump allowed the Radiological Group to wash themselves before they returned to "Narvik". The main danger to the ships' crews was considered to be from radioactive seaweed, so they were prohibited from catching or eating fish, and the ships' evaporators were not run. Spot checks were made to verify that there was no contamination on board. Most of the sample collection was completed by 20 May. An extra run was made to collect film badges from Hermite Island, and Maddock paid the crater a visit on 25 May to collect further samples. Two RAF Canberra bombers flew through the cloud to collect samples, one of which was flown by Menaul.
The results of the test were mixed. The yield was between , as had been anticipated, although the mushroom cloud rose to instead of as predicted. Valuable data was obtained. The implosion system had performed flawlessly, but the boosting effect of the lithium deuteride had been negligible; the process had not been fully understood. HMS "Diana", about from ground zero, was quickly decontaminated, and sailed for Singapore on 18 May. The fallout cloud initially moved out to sea as predicted, but then reversed direction and drifted across northern Australia. Tests on the aircraft at Onslow had detected signs of radioactive contamination from G1, indicating that some fallout had been blown over the mainland.
G2.
The results of G1 meant that a natural uranium tamper could be used in G2 without exceeding the planned limit agreed to with the AWTSC. (One of was used for safety purposes.) Scientific rehearsals for G2 were held on 28 and 31 May, followed by a full rehearsal on 4 June. The fissile core for the device was delivered to Onslow by RAF Hastings on 6 June, and once again was couriered to the Monte Bello Islands by HMS "Alert". Then followed a period of waiting for suitable weather conditions. The idea was to avoid, as far as possible, fallout being blown over the mainland. At this time of year winds at low altitudes were mainly subject to coastal influences, but above the prevailing winds were from the west. What was required was an interval during which the prevailing wind pattern was interrupted.
These were not common at this time of the year; at the start of Operation Mosaic, it had been estimated that conditions favourable for G2 would occur only three days per month. In fact, since "Narvik" had arrived in March, not a single day had been suitable. And good weather conditions alone were insufficient; the meteorologists had to accurately forecast them. To allow "Narvik" to return to the UK and refit for Operation Grapple, the first test of a British hydrogen bomb, 15 July was set as the terminal date for Mosaic. As the deadline approached, William Cook, the scientist in charge of the hydrogen bomb project at Aldermaston, determined that in view of the results of G1, G2 was now more important than ever. He agreed that, if necessary, Grapple, could be delayed in order to conduct G2. With time running short, the test procedures were altered to allow for a break in the weather to be exploited, with an earlier firing time and a shorter countdown.
Another complication was safety. While the test of a larger device would normally mandate a larger safety area, Beale announced that G2 was going to be smaller than G1. To avoid embarrassing him, the safety area was not enlarged, and no official announcement was made to the contrary. The weather improved on 8 June, and Martell ordered the countdown to begin the following day, but Beale objected to a test being carried out on a Sunday. During Operation Totem there was an agreement that no tests would be conducted on Sundays. Mosex considered that matter in London, and directed Martell not to test on 10 June. The following 48 hours were unsuitable. On 17 June the meteorologists predicted a break in the weather and Martell ordered the countdown to recommence. Weather balloons indicated that conditions were stable between , with an anomaly between that was not considered significant.
G2 was detonated from a tower on Alpha Island at 02:14 UTC (10:14 local time) on 19 June. It produced a yield of , making it the largest nuclear device ever detonated in Australia. At the time of the Royal Commission into British nuclear tests in Australia in 1985, Joan Smith, a British investigative journalist, published a book, "Clouds of Deceit: Deadly Legacy of Britain's Bomb Tests", in which she alleged that the G2 test had a significantly higher yield than suggested by available figures— as compared to the official figure of . She based this claim on "secret documents released to the Public Record Office in 1985", but the text was uncited, and the documents have never been found. British official historian Lorna Arnold reported that she had never seen any such documents.
The cloud rose to , considerably higher than the predicted . The procedure for collecting samples was far more limited than that of G1. A Land Rover was landed from a Landing Craft Assault (LCA) and driven by a party wearing protective clothing to within of ground zero to collect samples and recover the blast measurement equipment. Another sortie was made to collect film badges from Hermite Island, and Maddock collected a sample from the G2 crater. The Canberra sent to fly through the cloud had trouble finding it, and only after some searching located it about from where it was supposed to be. The following day, the Canberra sent to track the cloud and collect more samples could not locate it at all. The bulk of the fallout drifted over the Arafura Sea, but owing to different winds at different altitudes, part of it again drifted over the mainland.
As fallout was detected over northern Australia by monitoring stations, in combination with Beale's announcement that G2 would be smaller than G1, an impression was generated that something had gone horribly wrong. The acting Prime Minister, Sir Arthur Fadden, ordered an inquiry. Seamen in Fremantle demanded that the SS "Koolinda", a cattle transport on which 75 cattle had died on board, be inspected, as it was feared that they had died from radioactive poisoning. The seamen refused to unload the remaining 479 cattle. A physicist from the Commonwealth X-Ray and Radium Laboratory (CXRL) with a Geiger counter found no evidence of radioactive contamination, and the deaths were determined to have resulted from red water disease caused by a malaria-like parasite. It was estimated that someone living in Port Hedland, where the contamination was highest, would receive a dose of over a period of 50 years, assuming that they wore no clothes; an annual exposure of is normally considered acceptable for occupational purposes.
Aftermath.
By the 1980s the radioactivity had decayed to the point where it was no longer hazardous to the casual visitor, but there were still radioactive metal fragments. The island remained a prohibited area until 1992. A 2006 zoological survey found that the wildlife had recovered. As part of the Gorgon gas project, rats and feral cats were eradicated from the Monte Bello Islands in 2009, and birds and marsupials were transplanted from nearby Barrow Island to Hermite Island. Today, the Monte Bello Islands are a park. Visitors are advised not to spend more than an hour per day at the test sites, or to take relics of the tests as souvenirs. A pyramid-shaped obelisk marks the site of the G2 explosion on Alpha Island.


Despina Storch

Despina Storch or Despina Davidovitch Storch (1894 or 1895 – March 30, 1918) was a Turkish woman who was alleged to be a spy for Germany and the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Storch was later immortalized as "Turkish Delight", "Turkish beauty", and a "modern Cleopatra" in spy literature.
Early life and travels.
Born in Istanbul to a Phanariote Greek family, Despina married Frenchman Paul Storch when she was 17 years old. Though they later divorced, their former marriage created a peculiar situation due to Paul's service in the French army while his ex-wife was suspected of spying for France's enemies.
Several factors led American authorities to suspect that Madame Storch was a spy. She traveled the capitals of the world frequently changing her name: "In Paris, for instance, she was known as Madame Nezie; in Madrid and London as Madame Hesketh; in Rome as Madame Davidovitch; at the New York Biltmore, in New York, as Madame Despina, and at the Shoreham, in Washington, as the Baroness de Bellville." That last name, "Baroness de Bellville", was used because she was accompanied almost everywhere by a mysterious Baron Henri de Beville (or de Bellville) in the last months before her arrest.
Despina Storch was a frequent guest at parties due to her remarkable beauty, a fluency in French and her dancing skill. At many parties she had no difficulty getting in contact with military officers who served for Allied forces and ambassadors of countries engaged in the war.
While in Madrid Despina Storch and the baron were noticed contacting German agents. After the couple became aware of the suspicions they quickly left Spain for Havana.
In the United States.
Later they made their way to the United States. They were accompanied by a German woman, Mrs. Elizabeth Charlotte Nix, and a man who purportedly was a French count named Robert de Clarmont.
As soon as the "a curious quartette" arrived in the U.S. they were "placed under suspicion by the Department of Justice".
One factor that aroused the suspicions of the Department of Justice was that she lived a life of a very rich lady, paying $1,000 per month for her stay in a New York hotel. Mrs. Nix also received an unexplained loan of $3,000 from Count Bernstorff.
Authorities later seized a safe deposit box held for a Madame Storch in a New York bank. It was said to contain important correspondence, with notable people from around the world, some of which was coded.
At first the co-conspirators were not aware about the scrutiny that they were under, and the Turkish Beauty led a "butterfly existence". She frequented "social affairs", adding new and important admirers to the long list of her suitors.
When the scrutiny became known to Storch she attempted to send her trunks to Panama, but those were intercepted. Realizing the danger that they were in, the Baron and Storch obtained French passports and made plans to flee to Cuba. After their plans became known to the Justice Department, all four were arrested on March 18, 1918 and sent to Ellis Island. The authorities tried to follow a suspicious money trail left by the four co-conspirators, but were not able to prove nor disprove that espionage had taken place. Eventually the Baron, Storch, and two others were deported from the U.S. as "undesirable".
Death.
While on Ellis Island they all became ill; while three of them recovered, Despina Storch died on March 30 of what was described as pneumonia at age 23. At the time of her death the authorities believed that she died of natural causes, but some publications later indicated that she could have bitten on a poisoned capsule.
Her funeral took place on April 1, 1918. The "New York Sun" wrote:

Her funeral was attended by her faithful admirer Baron Henri de Beville, his parents, and a secret service agent. The "New York Sun" wrote, "The Baron, whose infatuation for the Turkish spy suspect entangled him in the web of her intrigues, wept silently and cast a last look upon the vault as he was led back to the car." The service was held in a Greek Orthodox Church although no one could present any evidences of which religion Despina Storch practiced.
The United States Government accepted the explanation of the Baron's parents, whose loyalty to France was beyond any doubt, that their son was an innocent victim and that "any suspicion which might have been aroused came from his devotion to Madame Storch."
With the death of their main suspect, the U.S. government realized that the case would never be solved, although "The New York Times" reported her alleged confession just before her death.


Battle of Wittstock

The Battle of Wittstock took place during the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). It was fought on 24 September (Julian calendar) or 4 October (Gregorian calendar) 1636. A Swedish-allied army commanded jointly by Johan Banér and Alexander Leslie, later 1st Earl of Leven decisively defeated a combined Imperial-Saxon army, led by Count Melchior von Hatzfeld and the Saxon Elector John George I.
Leslie and Banér commanded two distinct armies: Banér commanded the Swedish main army (huvudarmén), and Leslie commanded the Army of the Weser. Their subordinate officers included the Swedish Count and major General Lennart Torstenson, Lieutenant General James King (later first Lord Eythin), and Major General John Ruthven who is usually erroneously conflated with his uncle Patrick Ruthven who was also a Lieutenant General in the Swedish army, but not present at Wittstock.
Context.
The Holy Roman Emperor, with his Saxon and Roman Catholic allies, was fighting for the control of northern Germany against the Swedes and an alliance of Protestant princes opposed to Habsburg hegemony. The Swedes were also allied to the French, but the latter played no part in the battle. The Imperial main army was screening the Swedish army behind the Elbe while a smaller army under General Klitzing was overrunning Brandenburg. Field Marshal Johan Banér commanding the main Swedish army was joined by Field Marshal Alexander Leslie commanding the Army of the Weser which comprised German, Scottish and (at least one) English regiments. Together they crossed the Elbe with a surprise march and met their opponents in the forested hilly landscape slightly south of Wittstock.
The Imperial army was larger in strength than the Swedish army, but at least one-third of it was composed of Saxon units of questionable quality. The Swedish artillery was considerably stronger, leading the Imperial commanders to maintain a largely defensive position on the hill tops.
The battle.
The Imperial forces decided to wait for the Swedes on a range of sandy hills, the Scharfenberg. A part of the Imperial front was further defended with six ditches and a wall of linked wagons. Their commanders waited for some time for the Swedish troops to appear on the open fields to their front. Instead, the Swedish army was turning the Imperial left flank, moving behind the cover of a series of linked hills. The Imperial troops were forced to redeploy their lines to set up a new front.
The battle was begun by small forces detached in detail to secure the hills. The Swedes, under Banér had problems moving up reinforcements through marshy ground, but battle was eventually joined along a wide front.
Banér and Leslie had detached one-fourth of the army under Lieutenant-General James King and Major-General Torsten Stålhandske to take a long detour around the Imperial right flank. They found the traverse difficult and slow, leading Banér's troops to take heavy casualties and begin to retreat. Alexander Leslie moved five of his regiments to his relief taking heavy casualties in the process with the Scottish and English regiments being particularly badly mauled. Nonetheless they were able to relieve Banér in time for King's cavalry to finally outflank the Imperial troops causing a rout. With Major General Vitzthum in the reserve refusing to engage the Imperialists, his role was taken by Major-General John Ruthven (Leslie's son-in-law) who had been so deployed for just such an emergency. Now attacked on two fronts and with the reserve brigades engaged, the Imperial forces, having lost all their artillery, retreated under the cover of dusk in full rout.
Conclusion.
In the accounts of the battle preserved in National Archives of Sweden, Johan Banér accredits the victory to Field Marshal Leslie. Leslie, in his personal correspondence to the Swedish Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, was clearly horrified at the losses sustained by his army and implies that there had been disagreement about the wisdom of Banér's tactics before the battle. A third report, by James King conforms with Leslie's, but also contains additional information. All three have been transcribed, translated and published in English. Nevertheless, Wittstock was a resounding victory for the Swedish forces and corrected any delusions harboured by the Imperialists that they were a spent force after the earlier battle of Nördlingen.


Fortifications of Sweden

Early Fortifications of Sweden were built to defend self-governing provinces, with rapid expansion of forts in the 14th Century and again in later in the 16th Century when Sweden became independent, needing to protect its borders.
Changes in the position of borders led to fortifications changing owner, to and from Sweden, some became redundant and a few forts were given major upgrades for improved technology over the centuries.
List of Fortifications.
12C
13C
14C
Hundred Years' War and Black Death
15C
Unification under one king and expansion of territory with first Union with Norway and Denmark
16C
Sweden gains independence and Protestant Reformation, Livonian War, creation of Sweden's first professional army.
17C
Ingrian War, Kalmar War, Thirty Years' War and Second Northern War saw Swedish territory expand.
18C
After Swedish defeats in the Great Northern War as well as in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743, there was a need to construct fortifications to guard both the border as well as the coast of Finland.
19C
Union with Norway after Norway ceded to Sweden by Denmark
20C
Dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden, neutral in First and Second World Wars. Cold War era.
[‡] Currently in use by the Swedish Military


Vaberget Fortress

Vaberget Fortress () is a fortress located five kilometers west of Karlsborg Fortress, by lake Vättern, in Västergötland, Sweden. The southern fort at Vaberget Fortress was the first fort in the world that fully used the protection provided by the bedrock itself by having all of its functions embedded in the mountain.
History.
Construction of nearby Karlsborg Fortress began in 1819 but was not in a defensible state until around 1870 and was not completely finished until 1907. During this time, artillery technology was rapidly evolving, and by 1861 it was realised that the nearby mountain Vaberget could now be used by long range artillery to fire straight into Karlsborg Fortress. It was thus necessary to build a satellite fortress at Vaberget to protect the main fortress. It took nearly 20 years before the first plans were drawn in 1879 and 1883, and funding for the project was granted by the Swedish Riksdag of 1888.
Work started in 1889 at the main fort located on the southern part of the mountain and in 1899 at the smaller fort on the northern part. The whole fortress was blasted into the bedrock, having all functions embedded in the mountain, which was a completely new technique not only in Sweden but in all of Europe. Other European fortresses preceding Vaberget Fortress had been built into mountains, but those were concrete structures placed in excavated mountain shafts, and were not using the bedrock itself as the main structure. The start of construction for Vaberget Fortress preceded the two Swiss forts Fort Bühl and Fort Bäzberg (part of the National Redoubt), also completely embedded in the mountain, by a few months. Another new technique was the use of artillery in turrets on top of the forts that could be rotated 360 degrees, an idea conceived by Belgian fortifications engineer Henri Alexis Brialmont.
The main armament at the southern fort consisted of four 12 cm pieces and eight 6 cm pieces, all in armoured turrets, accompanied by 14 caponier cannon that protected the ditch that surrounded the fort. The northern fort had a main armament six 6 cm pieces in armoured turrets, with eight caponier cannon for close defence. In addition to these two forts, six permanent batteries of four pieces each—either 12 cm cannon or 16 cm howitzers—were constructed on top of the mountain. By 1910, three (of the originally planned six) infantry bunkers ("skansar", redoubts) with two 7.5 cm cannon each had been constructed at the foot of the mountain.
The construction of the fortress was completed by 1902, but suffered various problems such as a lack of ventilation, heat sources and power supply. Damp damage due to water leaking in through the mountain—a consequence of blasting with dynamite as well as the bedrock type—led to the condemnation of the southern fort as unhealthy to reside in, in 1912. The problem was not solved until 1944 by the addition of a metal roof, 17 years after the fort had been decommissioned in December 1927, though it was still in use as a storage facility.
Even though Vaberget Fortress came to little use as a fortress, the experiences from the construction were of great use when the much larger Boden Fortress as well as the coastal defence fort Fort Oscar II in Gothenburg were constructed in the early years of the 20th century.


Governor of Inverness

The Governor of Inverness or Governor of Fort George and Fort Augustus was a British Army officer who commanded the garrisons at Fort George and Fort Augustus in Inverness-shire. The office became a sinecure and was abolished in 1833.


Cyril Stanley Smith

Cyril Stanley Smith (4 October 1903 – 25 August 1992) was a British metallurgist and historian of science. He is most famous for his work on the Manhattan Project where he was responsible for the production of fissionable metals. A graduate of the University of Birmingham and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Smith worked for many years as a research metallurgist at the American Brass Company. During World War II he worked in the Chemical-Metallurgical Division of the Los Alamos Laboratory, where he purified, cast and shaped uranium-235 and plutonium, a metal hitherto available only in microgram amounts, and whose properties were largely unknown. After the war he served on the Atomic Energy Commission's influential General Advisory Committee, and the President's Science Advisory Committee.
Smith founded the Institute for the Study of Metals at the University of Chicago, the first interdisciplinary academic organization devoted to the study of metals in the United States. He studied the details of faults and grain boundaries in metals, and developed theoretical models of them. In 1961, he moved to MIT as an Institute Professor with appointments in both the Departments of Humanities and Metallurgy. He applied the techniques of metallurgy to the study of the production methods used to create artefacts such as samurai swords.
Early life.
Smith was born in Birmingham, England, on 4 October 1903, the third of four children of Joseph Seymour Smith, a commercial traveller for Camp Coffee, and his wife, Frances, née Norton. He was educated at Bishop Vesey's Grammar School in Sutton Coldfield. He read metallurgy at the University of Birmingham, having not met the requirements in mathematics to study his first choice, which was physics, and was awarded a second-class BSc in 1924.
That year Smith entered the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he earned a ScD in 1926. He was a research associate at MIT from 1926 to 1927, then left to take up a position as a research metallurgist at the American Brass Company. His research there was mainly involved with the electrical, thermal, and mechanical and magnetic properties of copper alloys. He published numerous papers, and was awarded 20 patents.
He married Alice Marchant Kimball, a student of English social history at Yale University, from which she earned a PhD in 1936, on 16 March 1931. Of the marriage, Alice's sister remarked that: "If he didn't go to Oxford or Cambridge, isn't Church of England, and doesn't like sports, you might as well marry an American". He became a naturalized American citizen in 1939. His wife sparked an interest in history, a subject that he had disliked at school. He acquired old texts, and in 1945 he produced a translation of a classic metallurgical text, Vannocio Biringuccio's Pirotechnia (1540).
World War II.
In 1942, during World War II, he was called into service at the War Metallurgy Committee in Washington, D.C. In April 1943 he went to work on the Manhattan Project, joining the Chemical-Metallurgical Division at the Los Alamos Laboratory as the head of its Metallurgy Group. When the laboratory was reorganized in April 1944, he became the Associate Division Leader in charge of metallurgy. His first task was recruiting metallurgists, who were in great demand by the war effort. He also had to arrange for the transport of their metallurgical equipment to Los Alamos under wartime conditions.
Smith's metallurgists found ways of fabricating boron, producing beryllium bricks, and heat-treating steel. They also had to work with uranium. Frank Spedding had developed a large-scale process for producing pure uranium metal at the Ames Laboratory which was fine for producing tons of feed for the nuclear reactors, but enriched uranium could not be handled in this way, as it would form a critical mass. Smith was initially asked to produce cubes of uranium hydride, which he did, but the 1950s uranium hydride bomb tests were found to be inefficient, and the idea was set aside for the duration, although further work was carried out after the war. By July 1944, they were producing pure uranium metal in 200g amounts with a newly devised process.
But by far the biggest challenge for Smith and his group was plutonium, a metal hitherto available only in microgram amounts, and whose properties were largely unknown. It was initially assumed that plutonium would have properties similar to that of uranium, but this assumption turned out to be invalid. Plutonium proved to be "the most complicated metal known to man". There were found to be six allotropes of plutonium, more than any other metal, and its melting point turned out to be hundred of degrees lower than uranium. The metallurgists found that at around 125 °C, plutonium expanded in volume by 20 percent, which is unusual.
Plutonium was delivered to Los Alamos in the form of what was found to be a mixture of plutonium trifluoride (PuF3) and plutonium tetrafluoride (PuF4). Work with plutonium was carried out in gloveboxes for safety reasons. The metallurgists figured out how to purify the plutonium, and found that heating it to 250° allowed them to work it in the malleable γ phase. It was also found that alloying it with 3 percent gallium would stabilize it in the δ phase. When plutonium at last began to arrive in quantity from the Hanford Site in February 1945, they were ready for production. In a race against the clock, the metallurgists produced plutonium spheres for the Trinity nuclear test by 23 July 1945.
Smith was awarded the Medal for Merit by President Harry S. Truman for these activities in 1946.
University of Chicago.
After the war Smith founded the Institute for the Study of Metals at the University of Chicago, the first interdisciplinary academic organization devoted to the study of metals in the United States. He considered it "a natural outgrowth of the close association of metallurgists with chemists and physicists on the Manhattan Project." He developed methods for deriving the three-dimensional shapes of the crystalline structures of metals from the two-dimensional microscope images of the grains of the metals. He also studied the propagation of induced phase changes in metals. He was fascinated by the details of faults and grain boundaries in metals, and developed theoretical models of them. Perhaps his most influential paper was on "Grain Shapes and Other Metallurgical Applications of Topology" (1952), an explanation of metallic microstructure. He was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1955 to study the History of Science and Technology.
From 12 December 1946 to 10 January 1952, Smith served on the influential General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Chaired by Robert Oppenheimer, the wartime director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, the General Advisory Committee provided policy as well as technical advice to the commissioners. One of Smith's first papers for the commission recommended that it concentrate on the development of fast breeder reactors and high flux reactors. A 1948 visit to England to discuss plutonium metallurgy with British scientists nearly escalated into an international incident, as Senator Bourke Hickenlooper and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal feared that he would give atomic secrets away to the British. Smith did no such thing; but AEC Commissioner Sumner Pike faced severe criticism for authorizing Smith's visit. In common with other members of the General Advisory Committee, Smith opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb on technical and moral grounds. He also served on the National Academy of Sciences' Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy and the President's Science Advisory Committee.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
In 1961, Smith moved to MIT as an Institute Professor with appointments in both the Departments of Humanities and Metallurgy. His focus was to transplant the techniques of metallurgy into the study of the production methods used to create artefacts discovered by archaeologists such as samurai swords. In his role of teaching the history of science, he argued that important advances were often the result of curiosity rather than the pursuit of defined goals. He was interested in the scientific aspects of fine arts, and published several works linking the arts with the sciences. He lectured about this at the Smithsonian Institution's Freer Gallery of Art and the Arthur M. Sackler Gallery in Washington, DC.
Smith received numerous awards, including the Franklin Institute's Francis J. Clamer Medal in 1952, and the History of Science Society's Pfizer Medal and American Society for Metals' Gold Medal in 1961. He was awarded the Society for the History of Technology's Leonardo da Vinci Medal in 1966, and the Institute of Metals' Platinum Medal in 1970.
In 1981, Cyril Stanley Smith received the Dexter Award for Outstanding Achievement in the History of Chemistry from the American Chemical Society.
In 1991 he received the American Institute of Physics' Andrew Gemant Award for "pioneering the use of solid state physics in the study of ancient art and artefacts to reconstruct their cultural, historical and technological significance." He was also a member of the editorial board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
On retirement from MIT in 1969, Smith became a professor emeritus of the History of Science and Technology, professor emeritus of Metallurgy and Humanities and Institute Professor Emeritus, an unusual title "reserved for only a few whose work transcends the boundaries of traditional departments and disciplines". He died of colonic cancer in his Cambridge, Massachusetts home on 25 August 1992. He was survived by his wife of sixty years, Alice Kimball Smith, his two children, Anne Smith Denman, chair of the Department of Anthropology at Central Washington University, and Stuart Marchant Smith, a marine geologist at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, and a sister, Mary Smith. His papers are in the Niels Bohr Library in College Park, Maryland. His collection of antiquarian metallurgical texts was left to the Burndy Library at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology.


Battle of Borovo Selo

The Battle of Borovo Selo of 2 May 1991, known in Croatia as the Borovo Selo massacre () and in Serbia as the Borovo Selo incident (), was one of the first armed clashes in the conflict which became known as the Croatian War of Independence. The clash was precipitated by months of rising ethnic tensions, violence, and armed combat in Pakrac and at the Plitvice Lakes in March. The immediate cause for the confrontation in the heavily ethnic Serb village of Borovo Selo, just north of Vukovar, was a failed attempt to replace the Yugoslav flag in the village with the flag of Croatia. The unauthorised effort by four Croatian policemen resulted in the capture of two by a Croatian Serb militia in the village. To retrieve the captives, the Croatian authorities deployed additional police, who drove into an ambush. Twelve Croatian policemen and one Serb paramilitary were killed before the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) intervened and put an end to the clashes.
The confrontation resulted in a further deterioration of the overall situation in Croatia, leading Croats and Serbs to accuse each other of overt aggression and of being enemies of their nation. For Croatia, the event was provocative because the bodies of some of the dead Croat policemen killed in the incident were reportedly mutilated. The clash in Borovo Selo eliminated any hopes that the escalating conflict could be defused politically and made the war almost inevitable. The Presidency of Yugoslavia convened several days after the battle and authorised the JNA to deploy to the area to prevent further conflict. Despite this deployment, skirmishes persisted in the region. After the war, a former paramilitary was convicted of war crimes for his role in abusing the two captured policemen, and ultimately sentenced to three years in prison. Four others were indicted, but remain at large outside Croatia.
Background.
In 1990, following the electoral defeat of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia by the Croatian Democratic Union ("Hrvatska demokratska zajednica" – HDZ), ethnic tensions between Serbs and Croats worsened. The Yugoslav People's Army ("Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija" – JNA) confiscated the weapons of Croatia's Territorial Defence ("Teritorijalna obrana" – TO) in order to minimise the possibility of violence following the elections. On 17 August, inter-ethnic tensions escalated into an open revolt of the Croatian Serbs, centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin, and parts of Lika, Kordun, Banovina and eastern Croatia.
In July 1990, local Serbs established a Serbian National Council to coordinate opposition to Croatian President Franjo Tuđman's policy of pursuing Croatian independence from Yugoslavia. Milan Babić, a dentist from Knin, was elected president of the council, while Knin's police chief, Milan Martić, established a number of paramilitary militias. The two men eventually became the political and military leaders of the Serb Autonomous "Oblast" of Krajina (SAO Krajina), a self-declared state incorporating the Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia. In March 1991, SAO Krajina authorities, backed by the government of Serbia, began consolidating control over the Serb-populated areas of Croatia, resulting in a bloodless skirmish in Pakrac and the first fatalities in the Plitvice Lakes incident.
At the beginning of 1991, Croatia had no regular army. In an effort to bolster its defence, it doubled the number of police personnel to about 20,000. The most effective part of the police force was the 3,000-strong special police, which was deployed in twelve military-style battalions. In addition, Croatia had 9,000–10,000 regionally organised reserve police officers organised in 16 battalions and 10 companies, but they lacked weapons.
Prelude.
In 1991, the village of Borovo Selo, situated on the right bank of the Danube opposite Serbia, was a part of the Vukovar municipality. While the city of Vukovar itself had an ethnically mixed population of 47.2 percent Croats and 32.2 percent Serbs, smaller settlements in the area were more homogeneous. Fourteen were predominantly populated by Croats, ten (including Borovo Selo) by Serbs, two by Ruthenians and the remaining two were ethnically mixed.
Amid the worsening ethnic tensions, Borovo Selo was barricaded on 1 April, one day after the Plitvice Lakes clash. Two days later, the JNA garrison in Vukovar increased its combat readiness to the maximum level. In early spring, the Croats and Serbs reached an agreement whereby Croatian police would not enter Borovo Selo without explicit consent from local Serb authorities. A political rally was held in Borovo Selo on 14 April, and by the end of the month the situation had become more volatile. Speakers at the rally—Serbian Radical Party ("Srpska radikalna stranka" – SRS) leader Vojislav Šešelj, Serbian National Assembly member Milan Paroški and Serbian Minister of Diaspora Stanko Cvijan—promoted the creation of Greater Serbia, a state which would unite all Serbs within a single country. They all repeated their speeches, together with an open call for dissenting Croats to be killed, a week later in Jagodnjak, north of Osijek.
In addition, White Eagles paramilitaries arrived in Borovo Selo in mid-April at the request of local militia commander Vukašin Šoškoćanin. The paramilitaries were either armed directly by Serbia's Ministry of the Interior directly or by a militia linked to the SAO Krajina, with the approval of the Serbian authorities. By the end of April 1991, the White Eagles in Borovo Selo were joined by fighters from the Dušan the Mighty paramilitary unit, which was linked to the Serbian National Renewal party.
In mid-April, Armbrust rockets were fired from Croatian positions outside Borovo Selo into the village. According to one version of the event, several rounds were fired at agricultural machinery that served as barricades in the outskirts of Borovo Selo. According to a second version, three rockets were fired at the village with the specific aim of inflaming ethnic tensions. One of the rockets struck a house and another landed in a field without detonating. There were no casualties. Radio-Television Belgrade subsequently broadcast images of the rockets and presented them as evidence of Croatian aggression, further exacerbating inter-ethnic tensions. The rockets were fired by a group of men who were led to the site by Osijek police chief Josip Reihl-Kir, who was later killed by Croatian irregulars. Croatia's Interior Minister Josip Boljkovac later indicated that the group included Deputy Defence Minister Gojko Šušak, Branimir Glavaš and Vice Vukojević. Šušak claimed that he had nothing to do with the incident, but admitted to having been in the area at the time. Nikola Jaman, then a reserve unit commander in the Ministry of the Interior, later stated that he had led the action, and denied that Šušak, Glavaš and Vukojević had been involved. He claimed that the action was planned together with Reihl-Kir.
Timeline.
During the evening of 1 May 1991, four Croatian policemen entered Borovo Selo in an unauthorised attempt to replace a flag of Yugoslavia in the village with a flag of Croatia. The attempt resulted in an armed clash. Two of the policemen were wounded and taken prisoner, and the other two fled after sustaining minor injuries (one a wounded foot and the other a grazing wound to the head). According to Croatia's Ministry of the Interior, the police had been patrolling the Dalj–Borovo Selo road at the time of the incident. Even though the officers were assigned to the Osijek police administration, the Vinkovci police administrationwhich was assigned authority over the Vukovar municipalityasked the Vukovar police station to contact Šoškoćanin about the incident. Vukovar police contacted him at 4:30 a.m., but Šoškoćanin reportedly said he knew nothing. At 9:00 a.m., Vinkovci police chief Josip Džaja telephoned Šoškoćanin and received the same answer. When Reihl-Kir contacted Šoškoćanin half an hour later, the latter confirmed the incident and said the police had shot at members of the local population, wounding one. Reihl-Kir failed to secure the release of the two captured officers.
Reihl-Kir and Džaja concluded that a party should be sent to Borovo Selo. Šoškoćanin agreed to grant the police safe passage under a white flag. A force of twenty to thirty policemen subsequently entered Borovo Selo. Although they bore a white flag, they were ambushed by paramilitaries and members of a local militia. Around 150 policemen arrived from Osijek and Vinkovci on buses and were deployed as reinforcements. The force dispatched from Vinkovci entered Borovo Selo and was ambushed, while the reinforcements sent from Osijek via Dalj were stopped at a roadblock north of Borovo Selo and failed to enter the village. A firefight ensued and lasted until 2:30 p.m., when seven JNA armoured personnel carriers (APCs) moved into the village from Dalj. Another convoy of APCs deployed by the JNA through Borovo Naselje, just south of Borovo Selo, was stopped by a crowd of Croat women who refused to let them through.
Aftermath.
Casualties.
Twelve Croatian policemen were killed and 21 injured in the ambush. The two captured policemen were ferried across the Danube and transported to Novi Sad, but were released and returned to Osijek by the evening of 2 May. Vojislav Milić, a paramilitary from Valjevo, was the only fatality among the Serb militia. Four other paramilitaries were wounded. Some of the police killed at Borovo Selo were found to have been mutilated, their ears cut, their eyes gouged out and their throats slit. These acts were meant to inflame ethnic hatred.
Escalation to war.
The clash led Tuđman's advisers to advocate an immediate declaration of independence from Yugoslavia and retaliation against the JNA, which Croats viewed as being pro-Serb. On 3 May, Tuđman opined that Croatia and Serbia were virtually at war, but said he hoped the international community would stop the violence. According to the Croatian historian Davor Marijan, Tuđman's decision not to retaliate against the JNA was often interpreted at the time as cowardice bordering treason, leading to public criticism and the resignation of General Martin Špegelj from the post of Defence Minister. Nonetheless, the decision afforded Croatia much-needed time to prepare for war, as Yugoslav Navy Fleet Admiral Branko Mamula later acknowledged. The incident shocked the Croatian public, causing a massive shift in public opinion towards demonisation of Serbs, supported by the Croatian media. Serbs were collectively labelled "Chetniks", "terrorists" and "enemies of Croatia". Similarly, Serbs referred to Croats as "Ustaše" and "enemies of the Serb people". Thus, a political settlement to avoid all-out war became increasingly unlikely. After the clash, war appeared unavoidable.
On 8–9 May, the Presidency of Yugoslavia convened to discuss the events in Borovo Selo and deliberate over a JNA request for military intervention. The presidents of all of Yugoslavia's constituent republics were present at the meeting. The Croatian leadership permitted the JNA to be deployed to areas where inter-ethnic tensions were running high. On 9 May, representatives of the federal and Croatian governments visited Vukovar. Federal representatives visited Borovo Selo, unlike the Croatian government officials who stated they "refused to talk to terrorists". In response to the Borovo Selo clash, the JNA redeployed a part of the 12th Proletarian Mechanised Brigade from Osijek and the 1st Mechanised Battalion of the 453rd Mechanised Brigade based in Sremska Mitrovica to the Vukovar area. At the same time, the 2nd Mechanised Battalion of the 36th Mechanised Brigade was moved from Subotica to Vinkovci. Despite the deployment of the JNA in the area, ethnically motivated skirmishes persisted until the start of the Battle of Vukovar in late August.
Memorial controversy and prosecution.
During the 1996–98 United Nations administration established pursuant to the Erdut Agreement to restore the area to Croatian control, three Croatian non-governmental organisations erected a memorial on public property at the entrance to Borovo Selo, but the site was quickly vandalised. A new monument was erected in the centre of the village in 2002, but this was also vandalised soon after completion. A new plaque bearing the names of the 12 Croatian policemen killed in the incident was added to the monument in 2012, but was also subject to vandalism. Although the vandalism was condemned by local Serb politicians, they complained that the memorial was offensive to the Serb minority and imposed guilt on the entire community because it branded Serb forces at Borovo Selo in 1991 as "Serb terrorists".
In February 2012, an Osijek court convicted Milan Marinković of war crimes and sentenced him to three-and-a-half years in prison for mistreating two captured Croatian police officers. In 2014, Marinković's sentence was reduced to three years on appeal. Four other men were indicted in relation to the officers' mistreatment. Since they live outside Croatia, they are not subject to prosecution by the Croatian judiciary.


List of Castilian battles

The following is an incomplete list of Castilian Battles fought by the Kingdom of Castile, organized by date. The list is not exhaustive.


Battle of Sandomierz

The Battle of Sandomierz was a series of battles during Deluge.
Prelude.
On March 20, 1656, Charles X Gustav with his army of 8.000 men was trapped between the rivers San and Vistula, chased by a Polish-Lithuanian army of about 10.000 men. On the western side of Vistula was the town and castle of Sandomierz, which had a Swedish crew. The Swedes thought to cross the river at this point and then continue their march along the Polish coast.
Battle.
On March 24 the bridgehead, the city and the castle were attacked by Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski, with a Polish corps of 6.000 men. In the castle there were large stores of ammunition that Swedes the needed. The castle was held by Colonel Cronlood, with barely 280 men. However, Swedish garrison managed to flee down the river San in boats, saving most of the provisions, while the main army's artillery shelled the Poles. However, 4000 grenades were left with matches lit, so the castle was blown in the air, together with several hundred Poles.
In the evening 300 Swedish soldiers departed from the Swedish camp, and in three boats crossed the San River. The troops immediately removed the Polish guards and more Swedish troops crossed the river, including cavalry who swam over with their horses. Lithuanians who held this river bank believed the entire Swedish army was on them, and fled in panic.
On March 26, Swedish army built a bridge over the River San, and the entire army crossed over. They took the abandoned camp left by the Lithuanians, and got a rest of a night. On April 5, they were in security inside Warsaw's walls.