MV Liemba

MV "Liemba, formerly Graf Goetzen or Graf von Goetzen", is a passenger and cargo ferry that runs along the eastern shore of Lake Tanganyika. The Marine Services Company Limited of Tanzania sails her, with numerous stops to pick up and set down passengers, between the ports of Kigoma, Tanzania and Mpulungu, Zambia.
"Graf von Goetzen" was built in 1913 in Germany, and was one of three vessels the German Empire used to control Lake Tanganyika during the early part of the First World War. Her captain had her scuttled on 26 July 1916 in Katabe Bay during the German retreat from Kigoma. In 1924, a British Royal Navy salvage team raised her and in 1927 she returned to service as "Liemba". "Liemba" is the last vessel of the German Imperial Navy still actively sailing anywhere in the world.
"Liemba" is believed to be the inspiration for the German gunboat "Luisa" in C. S. Forester's 1935 novel "The African Queen", and John Huston's subsequent film version. The ship featured in the 1992 BBC Television travel series "Pole to Pole." Indican Pictures and Breadbox Productions released a documentary on the ship in 2010, "Liemba."
History.
Early history.
The Meyer-Werft Shipyard in Papenburg, Germany, built "Goetzen" in 1913 and named her after Count Gustav Adolf Graf von Götzen, the former governor of German East Africa. "Goetzen" was designed to serve as a passenger and cargo ferry in conjunction with the "Ostafrikanische Eisenbahngesellschaft" (East African Railway Company).
After preliminary assembly "Goetzen" was taken apart and shipped in 5000 boxes loaded on three cargo vessels to Dar es Salaam in German East Africa (modern day Burundi, Rwanda and Tanganyika (the mainland part of present Tanzania)). From there the trains of the Mittellandbahn ("Central Line") carried the boxes to Kigoma. She was rebuilt there in 1914 and launched on 5 February 1915.
Originally the ship had seven first class cabins (single bed & sofa bed) and five second class cabins (double bed), as well as first and second class dining and smoking rooms.
The machinery consisted at first of two round boilers for steam for the two triple expansion engines with a power rating of per engine. She also had a carbonic ice and cooling unit in an insulated cold storage with a capacity of of ice per hour, and a lighting and a ventilation system. The ship was designed for a crew of 64 men (60 men and four officers).
First World War.
During World War I the Germans converted "Goetzen" to an auxiliary warship under the name SMS "Goetzen". They gave her a gun from the light cruiser , a ship no longer operational and which her crew later scuttled in the mouth of the Rufiji River. She also received an gun, one of two that "Königsberg" had brought out from Germany to arm auxiliary cruisers should the opportunity arise. Lastly, the survey ship contributed two 37 mm Hotchkiss revolver guns to "Goetzen"s armament.
The Germans appointed Oberleutnant zur See Siebel captain of "Goetzen". Under his command "Goetzen" initially gave the Germans complete supremacy on Lake Tanganyika. She ferried cargo and personnel across the lake between Kigoma and Bismarckburg (now Kasanga, Tanzania), saving troops from a two-week overland march, and provided a base from which to launch surprise attacks on Allied troops. It therefore became essential for the Allied forces to gain control of the lake themselves.
Geoffrey Spicer-Simson and the Royal Navy succeeded in the monumental task of bringing two armed motor boats, and , from England and via the Belgian Congo to the lake by rail, road and river. The British then launched their two boats at Albertville (Kalemie) on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika. The two boats waited until December 1915, then mounted a surprise attack on the Germans, capturing the gunboat "Kingani" – renamed HMS "Fifi". They sank a second German vessel, , in February 1916; this left "Götzen" as the only German vessel remaining on the lake.
As a result of their strengthened position on the lake, the Allies advanced towards Kigoma by land, and the Belgians established an airbase on the western shore at Albertville. From there on 10 June 1916 they used "Short Admiralty Type 827" planes for a bombing raid on "Goetzen" as she sat in the harbour of Kigoma. These bombing raids didn't severely damage the "Goetzen", but she remained in the harbour. The Germans had already removed most of her guns in the beginning of May as they needed them elsewhere. At the time of the air raid "Goetzen" had only one 37 mm Hotchkiss left, which she used as an anti-aircraft gun.
The war on the lake had reached a stalemate by this stage, with both sides declining to mount attacks. However, the war on land was progressing, largely to the advantage of the Allies, who cut off the railway link in July 1916 and threatened to isolate Kigoma completely. This led the German naval commander on the lake, Gustav Zimmer, to abandon the town and head south. In order to avoid the ship falling into Allied hands, General Lettow-Vorbeck ordered that "Goetzen" be scuttled. The task was given to the three engineers from Meyer Werft who had travelled with the disassembled ship to Lake Tanganyika in order to supervise its re-assembly. The engineers decided on their own that they would try to facilitate a later salvage; they loaded the ship with sand and covered all engines with a thick layer of grease before sinking her carefully on 26 July, in a depth of near the banks of the Katabe Bay (Belgian designation: Baie de l’éléphant; British designation: Bangwe Bay) at the position .
Salvage and recommissioning.
Johann Ludwig Wall, a Swede working for the Belgians, salvaged the ship in 1918. He initially had divers remove large quantities of material. Then he filled the holds with empty barrels and passed cables under the ship to two 375 t barges that the "Compagnie des Chemins de fer du Congo Supérieur aux Grands Lacs Africains" had purpose-built for the task and positioned on each side of the wreck. By the end of June 1919, the Belgians had succeeded in lifting the ship up to her gunwales by winding in the cables. Then in mid-September the Belgians floated the semi-submerged vessel to Kigoma. There she settled in water deep. The water was shallow enough that her superstructure extended above the surface of the lake. Early in 1920, a storm moved the vessel, sinking her at Point Lusana in . The photos of Kigoma Bay that Homer L. Shantz made in mid-February 1920 show no sign of the ship.
In 1921 the British took control of Kigoma. They then took until 16 March 1924 to raise the ship again. The British found that the engines and boilers were still usable and so they decided to rehabilitate the ship.
On 16 May 1927 the ship went back into service under the name "Liemba". Mary Katherine Scott, the wife of the chief secretary and acting governor Sir John Scott, launched "Liemba" for the "Tanganyika Railways and Port Service".
The pure conversion costs amounted to about £30,000 sterling. Salvage had cost £20,000, and infrastructure £28,000. The Germans had spent the equivalent of just £36,000 to construct her.
1927 to 1948.
In 1941, following the death of Lord Baden-Powell on 7 January 1941, his widow, Olave, Lady Baden-Powell sailed in "Liemba" from Northern Rhodesia northwards.
1948 to 1952.
"Liemba" returned to service in 1952 after a two-year break.
Since 1952.
"Liemba" was operating almost non-stop from 1927. In 1948 the East African Railways and Harbours Corporation (EAR&H) took over running the ferry, allowing it to link services with the Central Line from Kigoma to Dar es Salaam. From 1976 till 1979 the ship was overhauled. At this time twin diesel engines replaced the original steam engines. The driving force behind this renovation was Patrick "Paddy" Dougherty. He was born on 18 March 1918 in Downpatrick and did an apprenticeship at Harland & Wolff in Belfast. Subsequently, he served during the Second World War in the Royal Navy and became a ship's engineer. In the 1960s and 1970s, he worked for the EAR&H in Kisumu, Kenya as first engineer, and later as chief engineer on the ferries of Lake Victoria. After the renovation of "Liemba" he left Tanzania.
In 1977 the EAR&H was dissolved and the new Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) took over operation of "Liemba". In 1993 the TRC gave "Liemba" an overhaul managed by the Danish shipyard OSK ShipTech A/S, sponsored by the Danish International Development Agency. The rebuild included the deck house, the electronic system, and the pipes, renovation of the cabins of the passengers and crew, new MAN engines of each, installation of a hydraulic crane on the foredeck, and conversion of the rear cargo hull into a passenger room (capacity increase to 600 passengers).). To improve safety "Liemba" received a double bottom in the area of the forward cargo compartment. The ship was re-measured and the Danish engineers found that "Liemba" was long and had a beam of . With the new machinery, the ship can achieve a speed of . "Liemba" now has ten first-class passenger cabins (double bed) and two VIP cabins. Eighteen second-class cabins (six double and twelve quad-beds) are also available.
In 1997 TRC's inland shipping division became a separate company, the Marine Services Company Ltd.
In 1997 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees used "Liemba" and to repatriate more than 75,000 refugees who had fled Zaire during the First Congo War, following the overthrow of longtime dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. "Liemba" made a total of 22 trips between Kigoma and Uvira during this five month operation. In May 2015 she was hired by the United Nations to evacuate 50,000 refugees fleeing from the troubles in Burundi.
In 2014, the BBC showed a film about the ship, as part of their series on "World War 1 - Beyond the Trenches".
Renovation or replacement?
In 2011, TRC wrote to the Federal Government of Germany, requesting assistance in either renovating or replacing the vessel. The German authorities undertook a study that it is thought concluded that it would be cheaper to build a new ship than renovate "Liemba". The final request for financial help fell between the governments of Lower Saxony, where the ship was built, and the federal government in Berlin, with the then President of Germany Christian Wulff stating that the vessel had a "singular history" and performed an "indispensable service" to the people of East Africa.
The "Liemba" was in 2017 in Kigoma for a major maintenance. It is sailing again since 9 August 2018.
"The African Queen".
The original version of "The African Queen", written by C. S. Forester and serialised in the "News Chronicle" in 1934, was very different from the one associated with the film. In this Rose and Allnut are planning to attack a German cruiser named "Dortmund" (loosely based on SMS "Königsberg"), with the launch sailing down the river to attack it in the river delta.
In the book the German gunboat "Königin Luise" (referred to by hero Charlie Allnutt as "Louisa") is based on "Kingani", a German gunboat sunk on Lake Tanganyika and to a certain extent the events portrayed in the film are based on the dramatic naval operation carried out by the Royal Navy, but the events described in the book bear little resemblance to the true historical events.
The book was subsequently made into the 1951 classic film "The African Queen", starring Humphrey Bogart and Katharine Hepburn. The steam-tug "Buganda" on Lake Victoria, which was used for the long shots, played the gunboat used in the filming. The film brought a certain notoriety to "Goetzen" or "Liemba".
Ferry operation.
"Liemba" is running once a week in each direction again since August 2018, from Kigoma to Mpulungu Wednesday to Friday, and back again from Friday to Sunday. Accommodation ranges from 1st class (luxury cabin) to 3rd class (seating only).
There are docks at Kigoma, Mpulungu and Kasanga but at all other stops passengers must travel between ship and shore by way of a smaller boat. Notable stops along the route include: Lagosa (for Mahale Mountains National Park), Karema (for Mpanda) and Kipili or Kasanga (for Sumbawanga).


Seabees Memorial

The Seabees Memorial is a sculpture and memorial to Seabees by Felix de Weldon, installed along Memorial Drive near the entrance of Arlington National Cemetery. It is administered by the National Park Service as part of George Washington Memorial Parkway in Arlington, Virginia.
Congress authorized the placement of a memorial on public land by the Seabee Memorial Association in September 1972. It was dedicated on Memorial Day 1974.
Description.
The memorial features panels depicting Seabee missions since 1942. According to the CEC/Seabee Historical Foundation, the bronze figure at the center of the memorial depicts a "bare-chested, muscular SEABEE, rifle slung over one shoulder, offering a helping hand to a small child."
Gold-colored inscriptions above and below the panels read "SEABEES CAN DO" and "With willing hearts and skillful hands, the difficult we do at once. The impossible takes a bit longer!", respectively. The base which supports the figure sculpture is the inscribed text: "With compassion for others / we build – we fight / for peace with freedom".


Blue Spring Heritage Center

Blue Spring Heritage Center (formerly known as Eureka Springs Gardens) is a privately owned tourist attraction in the Arkansas Heritage Trails System containing native plants and hardwood trees in a setting of woodlands, meadows, and hillsides. It is located at Highway 62 West, five miles (8 km) west of Eureka Springs, Arkansas, and open daily to the public during warmer months for a fee.
The spring pours 38 million US gallons (140,000 m³) of water daily into the trout-filled lagoon. Blue Spring has been a tourist attraction since 1948, and is now on the National Register of Historic Places for its archaeological significance as a site occupied between the Early Archaic and the Mississippian periods.
Historians from several Indian nations, including the Tsalagi (Cherokee), Osage and Quapaw, say their people have been making journeys to, and living intermittently at Blue Spring for tens of thousands of years. Artifacts excavated at the Blue Spring Shelter support this, as they date back to between 8000 B.C. and A.D. 1500.
Blue Spring Shelter.
The American Indian people who lived here in ancient times (10,000 years ago and beyond to 500 B.C.) are known as the ‘Bluff Dwellers’. These indigenous people populated not only the Blue Spring area, but much of the Ozark Mountains. They lived beneath giant bluff shelters such as this one. As most human beings of their time, they hunted, gathered, and planted. Tools, clothes and many other necessary items were made from many native plants and animals available to them. They also traded goods with other Indian nations.
Indigenous people who lived here between 500 B.C. and A.D. 900 continued to hunt, gather, plant and trade, though planting gardens had become a more prominent activity. With over 62% of the world's food having been developed by American Indians, it is no surprise that the Indians of the Ozarks domesticated maygrass, lamb's quarter, knotweek, sumpweek, sunflower, squash, and strains of little barley. The bottomlands and terraces of the White River provided fertile garden spots for the indigenous occupants of the Blue Spring Shelter.
From A.D. 900 to A.D. 1541, agriculture had become an integral part of many Indian communities in the Ozarks and Arkansas area. They depended mostly on maize, squash and beans. As always, hunting, gathering and trading remained an important part of society. The Blue Spring Shelter continued to be used by Indian people for short and long term camps, and for ceremony.
In recent history (1541 to present), Tsalagi (Cherokee) people made a stop at Blue Spring on the “Trail of Tears” during the late 1830s. Indian people continue to spend time at Blue Spring and Blue Spring Shelter. Today, visits and ceremonies by Indian people such as Lenape, Musogee, Cherokee, and Lakota take place at the Blue Spring Shelter regularly. It remains a place of peace, healing, and connection.


Siege of Weinsberg

The Siege of Weinsberg took place in Weinsberg, in the modern state of Baden-Württemberg, Germany, which was then part of the Holy Roman Empire. The siege was a decisive battle between two dynasties, the Welfs and the Hohenstaufen. The Welfs for the first time changed their war cry from "Kyrie Eleison" to their party cries. The Hohenstaufen used the 'Strike for Gibbelins' war cry.
On the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Lothair II in 1137, Henry the Proud was the Welf heir of the patrimony of his deceased father-in-law, and possessor of the crown jewels. He stood as a candidate for emperor, but the local princes opposed him and elected Conrad III, a Hohenstaufen, in Frankfurt on February 2, 1138. When Conrad gave the Duchy of Saxony to Count Albert the Bear, the Saxons rose in defence of their young prince, and Count Welf of Altorf, the brother of Henry the Proud, began the war.
Exasperated at the heroic defence of Welfs, Conrad III had resolved to destroy Weinsberg and imprison its defenders. However he suspended the final assault after a surrender was negotiated. According to the Latin chronicle "Chronica regis Coloniensis," first compiled in the 1170s, these terms granted the women of the city the right to leave with whatever they could carry:The year of our Lord 1140. The king [Conrad] besieged the city of the duke Welf of Bavaria, which was called Weinsberg, and accepted its surrender, having granted with royal magnanimity permission to the wives and other women found there that they might take with them whatever they could carry on their shoulders. Taking thought both for their loyalty for their husbands and the safety of the others, they disregarded their household goods and came down carrying the men on their shoulders. When Duke Friedrich said that such things should not happen, the king, showing favour to the women's cunning, said that it would not be fitting to change his royal word.
This story of wifely loyalty and cunning saving their husbands became known as the "Loyal Wives of Weinsberg" ("Treue Weiber von Weinsberg"). The castle ruins are today known as "Weibertreu" ("wifely loyalty") in commemoration of the event.
The women's unique interpretation of the king's orders was used as a plot device in the modern film adaption of the Cinderella story "Ever After" (1998).


Military service by British royalty

Many members of the British Royal Family have seen service in British or other Commonwealth armed forces, others hold honorary ranks or positions. This is a list detailing formal military service by members of the British royal family.
The honorary ranks and titles are included in a separate column. The "rank whilst active" column dictates the rank worn and held whilst the Royal was serving with the armed forces and the "current rank worn" column denotes any rank worn currently (notably honorary rank, promotions). Members of the royal family receive regular promotions even after their active service has ended.
Key.
A number of abbreviations, acronyms and initialisms are used, to save space:
List.
Notes
N.B. Upon leaving active service, royal members are generally promoted to the rank they would have received, if they had stayed in the Armed Services.
Military service of English monarchs.
A few English monarchs came to the throne from other countries and served in the armies of their home country. A few served in other armies during their exile.


Operation Desert Spring

Operation Desert Spring was part of an ongoing operation in Kuwait by the United States that was established on December 31, 1998, following Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Shield. The mission objective is to maintain a forward presence and provide control and force protection over the military of Kuwait.
Operation Desert Spring ended with the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom on 18 March 2003.
Participants in Operation Desert Spring are entitled to receive the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.


Military Working Dog Teams National Monument

The Military Working Dog Teams National Monument is a monument to military working dogs located at Joint Base San Antonio (JBSA)-Lackland in San Antonio, Texas. The monument represents handlers, dogs, and veterinary support, from all military service branches (Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard) that have made up the Military Working Dog program since World War II. The monument grounds include a 3,000 square feet granite plaza, granite pedestals, granite history wall, granite benches and water fountain. The granite pedestals have large bronze statues of dogs and handlers. The monument was dedicated on October 28, 2013.
Monument.
The Military Working Dog Teams National Monument consists of five bronze sculptures (four dogs and dog handler) seated on a large granite pedestal inscribed, "Guardians of America's Freedom." The center sculpture is a highly detailed 9 foot modern day Military Working Dog Handler wearing combat gear and holding a dog leash in his left hand and a M4 rifle in his right hand.
The remaining sculptures are four of the more common breeds of Military Working Dogs utilized by the United States Department of Defense since World War II. They include a Doberman Pinscher, German Shepherd, Labrador Retriever, and Belgian Malinois.
Behind the main granite pedestal is a large granite wall containing inscriptions about the history of the Military Working Dog program on one side. The other side of the wall contains laser etched images of Military Working Dog Teams in action during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Behind the granite wall are five flag poles, one for the five U.S. Armed Services which existed when the monument was built.
The "Not Forgotten Fountain" is a bronze sculpture depicting a Vietnam War dog handler pouring water from his canteen into a helmet. The sculpture represents a Vietnam era dog handler and his working dog. A significant feature is the dog’s paw resting on the thigh of his hander accentuating their bonding relationship. The water fountain idea was conceived by Burnam and sculpted by artist Paula Slater. The water fountain is fully functional so that a visiting dog may have a drink. The granite pedestal of the "Not Forgotten Fountain" reads "In everlasting memory of all the war dogs who served, died, and were left behind in the Vietnam War".
History.
The monument was conceived by John C. Burnam, author and Vietnam veteran infantryman and German shepherd scout dog handler from 1966-1968). In February 2004, Burnam founded the John Burnam Monument Foundation to design, fund, build, and maintain a Military Working Dog Teams National Monument. Joining John Burnam were U.S. Air Force Vietnam veteran security/patrol dog handlers, Richard Deggans and Larry Chilcoat.
In 2007, U.S. Representative Walter B. Jones sponsored congressional legislation within H.R. 4986 National Defense Authorizations Act for FY 2008, Section 2877 of authorizing the JBMF the exclusive rights to design, fund, build, and maintain the Military Working Dog Teams National Monument. The bill was signed into public law by the President George W. Bush on January 28, 2008.
Over a span of nine years, the JBMF raised $2.1 million from corporate sponsors and public donations to fund the construction and maintenance of the national monument. Arrangements were made with the Department of Defense to accept the monument and have it installed in the southeast corner of the 37th Training Wing Basic Military Training Parade Field at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland. This site was selected by the JBMF due to its historical significance as the training center and headquarters of the Department of Defense Military Working Dog Program since 1958.
Design.
Graphic artist and designer Brian Rich, was tasked to digitally illustrate renderings that would bring their visions to life while telling the story of military working dog teams. The final design creates a visual structure that incorporates the simplicity of the subjects but also details the complexity of military working dogs and their handler's lives on the battlefield. The monument is meant to embody the history of the war dog program from World War II to present-day War on Terror theaters with meaningful purpose and accurate historical representation. It included all four U.S. Armed Services (Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force) and the US Coast Guard. The materials selected to build the national monument were granite and silicone bronze, which could stand the test of weather and time with minimum maintenance for its outdoor location. The concept and design was presented and approved by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).
The Keith Monument Company procured the entire horde of granite from the Rock of Ages Granite Quarry, Graniteville, Vermont. The granite components were cut to specifications, shipped to JBSA-Lackland and installed on-site. Pieces of the granite were cut-out to allow for lighting. Those pieces were gifted by the JBMF to key contributors and members of the Dedication and Unveiling Ceremony.
Artist Jim Smith, Laser Imaging and Design, Inc., created the artistic impression of authentic photos of war dog teams in action scenes since World War II. Authentic photos from World War II to the War on Terror was acquired from public records at the National Archives in Washington DC. The black granite panels were seamlessly mounted on the large gray granite wall.
The four large bronze dog sculptures and the 9 foot bronze military dog handler were crafted by artist and bronze sculptor Paula Slater, M.A.. which were based on the initial creative design.
The bronze and granite fully functional "Not Forgotten Fountain" was conceived by John C. Burnam and sketched and sculpted by Artist, Paula B. Slater, M.A.
Dedication and unveiling ceremony.
The Military Working Dog Teams National Monument was unveiled during a formal dedication ceremony with full military fanfare on October 28, 2013. The event was covered by many local and national news organizations and was open to the American public. The ceremony was organized by the JBMF along with the assistance and under the direction of Lt Col Harris, 341st Training Squadron (TRS) Commander and TSgt Christopher Dion, 341st TRS Military Working Dog Handler Course Team Chief and representative to the JBMF. Speakers included its founder and author, John C. Burnam, retired USMC Handler Ron Aeillo, President US War Dogs Association, USAF Wounded Warrior and K9 Handler cast member of the movie "Glory Hounds", TSgt Leonard Anderson, and , USMC Handler and author of Sergeant Rex, SGT Mike Dowling.
Public access.
The Military Working Dog Teams National Monument is located on a secure United States Air Force Installation. However, Public Law 110-181 requires the Department of Defense to provide reasonable access to the monument by visitors and their dogs. Therefore, members of the public (and their dogs) who wish to visit the Military Working Dog Teams National Monument can access the installation to see the monument by requesting a base pass at the Lackland Air Force Base visitor control centers. The pass is limited to four hours of base access and can only be used to visit the monument. All those requesting access should know that they will be vetted for security purposes.
Current.
In 2014 responsibility for the care, upkeep, and promotion of the national monument was officially transferred by the John Burnam Monument Foundation to the Airmen Heritage Foundation.


Operation Shed Light

Operation Shed Light was a crash development project in aerial warfare, initiated in 1966 by the United States Air Force to increase the ability to accurately strike at night or in adverse weather. During the 1960s the United States military worked hard to interdict the movement of men and materiel along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The North Vietnamese were experts in the use of weather and darkness to conceal their movement, and understanding the superiority of American air power put their skills immediately to good use. US forces seeking to impede the steady flow of supplies attempted to locate largely static targets during the day with poor results.
The United States Air Force, focused toward nuclear weapons and delivery of such munitions against static strategic targets had spent little effort in expanding its tactical capabilities since the end of World War II. Operation Shed Light sought to rectify this by bringing together improved tactics and technology. The programs were subsequently centered on improved communication and navigation aids for all-weather and night flying, sensor equipment for seeing through clouds, foliage, and darkness, improved equipment and methods for target marking and battlefield illumination, and aircraft and tactics to utilize these developments. In the end, few of the programs would yield applicable results and most of the aircraft developed under its umbrella would largely fall into obscurity. The most applicable developments were those that could be mainstreamed such as the work done on navigation and communication and sensor equipment.
Origins.
The United States Air Force had largely redirected its efforts to the matter of strategic deterrence in the period between the Korean War and deployment to southeast Asia. As a result, it had few serious capabilities for the plethora of conventional missions that became readily apparent with the expanding US commitment to southeast Asia. Dedicated attack aircraft were virtually nonexistent, with the exception of the Korean War era A-1 Skyraider. The US Navy was still using the type at the time, and the US Air Force had itself been long interested in the type, with this further reinforced as a result of its advisory role in South Vietnam. The US supported Republic of Vietnam Air Force was in fact using it as their primary aircraft by 1965. These aircraft had directly replaced aging F8F Bearcats in 1962 and the decision was made in 1964 to transition to the type from the then standard T-28 Trojans.
As a result of the orientation toward nuclear war, tactical air strikes were flown almost exclusively by the US Air Force between 1964 and 1966 using a variety of fighter bombers intended initially for the delivery of small strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. These types included the F-100 Super Sabre, F-4 Phantom II, and even the F-105 Thunderchief. The F-100 had two fighter bomber variants in service at the time, the F-100C and F-100D, both of which were capable of carrying a nuclear store, and only the latter of which was primarily for use as a strike aircraft and not a fighter. The F-100C had largely been passed to the United States Air National Guard and by 1965 less than two hundred of the aircraft were capable of using cluster bombs or even the largely standard AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. The F-104C, a fighter bomber version of another fighter, though capable of utilizing conventional air-to-ground stores, was intended as a nuclear weapon delivery platform. Only the F-4C and F-4D were available as a true multirole aircraft, and the F-4C had still been used firstly as a fighter when deployed to the theater. The only other major non-fighter type in use early on in the conflict was the B-57 Canberra. Strikes in Laos were even conducted for a time using the F-102 Delta Dagger, modified with infrared sensors, and using its internal rocket armament. These strikes proved largely fruitless and were quickly discontinued.
Realizing the need for more dedicated attack aircraft the Air Force combed its inventory and looked to invest in new types. It found itself with an odd selection of obsolete, new, and experimental aircraft, and grasped for immediate solutions. To try and coordinate this effort, a task force was established by Lt. General James Ferguson, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. Dubbed Operation Shed Light, it began on 7 February 1966 as a means of coordinating a wide variety of technological and other projects and programs that were being pursued in order to improve the United States Air Force's night fighting capabilities. Outlined in the Task Force's charter as of April were the following:
In all, the Shed Light Task Force identified nine new weapon systems and seventy-seven research and development "tasks" in the first five months of operation. Over the next 5–10 years it hoped to have a fully functional "self-contained night attack aircraft," a single type that would meet the operational need and would be functionally useful in other similar situations.
Initial programs.
Shed Light's initial programs were broken down into a number of categories, the most important being communication and navigation systems, sensors, and illumination and target marking equipment. Also detailed were proposed aircraft modifications and tactics.
Communication and navigation.
Issues of communication and navigation were identified under Shed Light. That air strikes could not be called in effectively and/or guided to the target reduced the effectiveness of air power overall. A variety of communication system improvements and navigational aids, including improvements to the Long-Range Navigation (LORAN) system (specifically LORAN-D) were incorporated into the Shed Light mission.
Sensors.
The sensors to be developed under Shed Light were broken into three categories, Low Light Level TV (LLLTV), Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), and Forward Looking Radar (FLR).
Two LLLTV systems were in development initially. Both were podded, designed to be added to aircraft already in USAF inventory. The first, produced by Dalmo-Victor under "Project 1533", was LLLTV only, but had provision for a laser range finder. It was intended for the A-1E Skyraider. The second, produced by Westinghouse under "Project 698DF", contained both the LLLTV and a laser ranger finder. It was intended for either the A-1E or B-57 Canberra series. The second unit would eventually be fitted to the B-57B. The two programs were named projects "Tropic Moon I" and "Tropic Moon II" respectively. The Tropic Moon I system was essentially obsolete before it was deployed, and tests quickly confirmed this. Only 4 A-1Es were so equipped. The results from the Tropic Moon II B-57Bs were almost as discouraging, with 456 trucks detected on 182 sorties, for only 39 confirmed kills. Both systems were removed from the theatre by the end of 1968.
A prototype FLIR unit had been tested under "Project Red Sea" in a DC-3 at Eglin AFB, and later in an AC-47 in South Vietnam in September 1965. Using technology developed from those tests, "Project Lonesome Tiger" was initiated, testing a FLIR unit on two B-26 Invader aircraft. Climate was found to have serious effects on the units, especially humidity, and this fit was not to be put into widespread use. Improvised mounting of "starlight scope[s]" in the bomb bay of the B-26 is also mentioned in oral history reports, and this fit was found to be largely impractical.
Illumination equipment and target marking.
Battlefield illumination was of key importance within the original Shed Light programs. The dominant aerial flare at the time was the Mk 24 Mod 0, developed by the US Navy. Reliability of the units, however, were in question, as was availability. Perhaps of greater concern was existing test data in 1966 that suggested pilot disorientation and flare placement were serious issues. "Project Night Owl", conducted in 1954, testing flares dropped from F-86 Sabre aircraft, led to twenty-five percent of pilots reporting experiencing some level of vertigo. Ironically, initial studies showed that in correcting this problem, issues of insufficient illumination were experienced.
A new flare, designated MLU-32/B99, also referred to as Briteye, was put into development. The new flare burned at 5 million candle power for over five minutes and produced a signal that could be heard by pilots indicating when it was about to burn out. Additionally, the Navy's Mk 33 Mod 0 flare warhead for the 5" Mk 16 "Zuni" rocket motor was tested under Shed Light. Projected delays in the procurement of the MLU-32/B99 led to a proposal to test the Swedish Lepus flare as an interim measure. The Lepus flare was tested, but found to be inferior to the MLU-32/B99.
The issues surrounding flares led to exploration of other methods of battlefield illumination. The "Battlefield Illumination Airborne System" or "BIAS", employed two banks of Xenon ARC lamps (28 total) fitted to a modified C-123B aircraft. A cooling system was installed on the left side of the aircraft to help dissipate the heat generated. The system was deployed to Vietnam, but it was found that the lamps provided a perfect target for enemy gunners and the system was discontinued. Initially it had been proposed that a similar system be installed on the more capable C-130, but the experience during the operational trials brought the whole program to a halt.
More unorthodox methods were also explored. Astrosystems International developed a so-called "Quartz Chamber" which burned pure oxygen and aircraft fuel, converting the chemical energy into light. The system was planned to be evaluated within a year, and installed in a similar arrangement to the more conventional BIAS. A plan, codenamed "Moonshine", was also put forward. Moonshine was to be a joint effort with NASA to determine the feasibility of a geosynchronous satellite that could project light directly down on any desired location.
Ground target marking, which was a key tactic for day time strikes, was investigated. "Project 2531" was to investigate target marking munitions, and looked into warheads for the Mk 40 2.75" rocket motor, using a variety of chemiluminescent materials. These were to be loaded with compounds developed under the US Navy's "Target Illumination and Recovery Aid" ("TIARA") program. Initially they used modified M151 high-explosive warheads, but found the amount of compound that could be contained provided poor results. The Shed Light Task Force noted that a lighter case for these compounds was in development. A combination of red phosphorus and a flare was investigated in an attempt to provide a system that could be used at night or during the day.
Aircraft and tactics.
The key aircraft intended to be developed under Shed Light was to be a "Self Contained Night Attack" aircraft or SCNA. The SCNA would have "the necessary night sensors and weapon delivery capability to find and strike targets at night on the first pass without the use of visible artificial illumination."
However, to provide an interim capability, the idea of using a "Hunter-Killer" concept using aircraft capable of spotting targets at night and more or less unmodified conventional strike aircraft was proposed. This method had many identified disadvantages, including the need for specialized aircraft and capability differences between the hunter and the killer that might affect their combined operation. The need for specialized aircraft was further exposed by the fact that only three aircraft at all suitable for the hunter role were available to the US military in southeast Asia as of 1966. These included the Army's OV-1B Mohawk, and the USAF's RF-4C Phantom II and RB-57E Canberra aircraft. There were only two RB-57E aircraft in country at the time, under a special reconnaissance project codenamed "Patricia Lynn", and the aircraft were essentially experimental. They also featured Reconofax VI FLIR units, which was an older technology than those being developed under Shed Light. The RF-4C had the benefit of being of a similar capability to strike aircraft at the time, and a modified hunter version, given a designation RF-4C(H) was to be developed, replacing the camera equipment with LLLTV, FLIR, and Side-Looking Radar (SLAR) units.
A three-phase program had been outlined as early as 1966 for development of the SCNA. The first would be a slower bomber or cargo aircraft, followed, by a jet aircraft of some type. The F-111 was originally slated to become the key SCNA aircraft. It was ultimately hoped it would incorporate the final versions of all three types of sensors (LLLTV, FLIR, and FLR) developed under the program. In the initial study, an "RF-111" was also supposed to be available in the 3–7-year time frame for use in the hunter-killer pairing. This time frame led the initial study report to propose using the OV-10 Bronco aircraft in the interim measure, but decided against it because of the inability of the OV-10 to carry all the desired sensor equipment. As it turned out that while the RF-111A did enter testing in December 1967, it was not easily convertible to and from the existing F-111A configuration. The Air Force looked for alternatives, but the revised RF-111D program was terminated because of a funding shortage in September 1969 and the RF-111A program was cut for good by March 1970.
With the decision not to use the OV-10 and the desire for an immediate capability, the USAF decided to investigate using the S-2 Tracker aircraft. The proposed aircraft would incorporate the three main sensors under development in a revised aircraft that provided operators for all major systems. The S-2's built-in search light was to be slaved to the LLLTV, crew protection would be provided, and the armament system would be primarily 10 SUU-24/A munitions dispensers in a revised bomb bay. Six wing hard points would be available for additional conventional munitions including bombs, rockets, cluster munitions and dispensers, and gun pods. The program package documentation suggests that the "XM-9" would be the primary under-wing store. The XM9 designation is the US Army designation for the SUU-7/A low-drag dispenser pod modified for use on the UH-1B/C Iroquois helicopter. The two planned pre-production aircraft were to be designated YAS-2D, while the production aircraft would have been AS-2D. Difficulties in funding, getting the aircraft from the US Navy, and delays in completing the modifications led the USAF to scrap the S-2 based SCNA in January 1968.
The F-111 would initially have a mixed record in Southeast Asia, when a detachment of six aircraft from the 474th Tactical Fighter Wing were deployed to Takhli RTAFB in Thailand, in early 1968, as part of "Operation Combat Lancer". The remaining aircraft were returned to the United States in November after logging 55 missions, but at the cost of three F-111A's lost in combat. Eventually the aircraft redeemed itself when two squadrons (48 F-111As) from the 474th deployed to Takhli in September 1972, in order to participate in the aerial offensive against North Vietnam under "Operation Linebacker II". During this deployment the F-111s operated day and night, in all weather conditions and without electronic countermeasures escort, and relied on less aerial refueling support than other tactical aircraft. Eventually over 4000 missions were logged by the two F-111-equipped units at the cost of six aircraft lost in combat and two lost to operational causes. However, by this point in time, the aircraft was no longer earmarked for conversion into the SCNA role.
Black Spot.
Perhaps the most radical of Shed Light's projects were two C-123K Provider aircraft modified in September 1965 under "Project Black Spot". Black Spot had been in development prior to the establishment of the Shed Light Task Force, but were subsequently incorporated in under the wide reaching charter. With the scrapping of the AS-2D aircraft program in 1968, the Black Spot aircraft became the prime contenders for Shed Light's first phase.
The Black Spot aircraft were to fit under the "self-contained night attack capability" description and E-Systems of Greenville, Texas was contracted to complete the modifications. These aircraft featured the following sensors:
The LLLTV system was described as having the highest resolution, and was to be the primary means of target location and engagement. The aircraft itself looked radically different visibly from its transport brethren, as the new equipment required lengthening the nose by over .
Also included was an armament system that could carry BLU-3/B (using the ADU-253/B adapter) or BLU-26/B (using the ADU-272/B adapter) bomblets, or CBU-68/Bs cluster bombs. Both the ADU-253A/B and ADU-272A/B are listed as being used in combat, with no mention of combat drops of CBU-68/Bs. In addition to the offensive armament, two hand-operated flare launchers were initially provided, until LAU-74/A automatic launchers could be supplied. Besides the automated nature of the LAU-74/A, the unit only required one loadmaster to operate it.
The two aircraft, serial numbers 54-691 and 54-698, were first designated NC-123K in 1968 and then redesignated AC-123K in 1969. These NC/AC-123Ks were first deployed operationally at Osan in South Korea between August and October 1968, and flying in support of operations against North Korean infiltrators approaching by boat. The operations in Korea met with a certain level of success and as a result the NC/AC-123Ks were transferred to South Vietnam in November 1968.
Once in South Vietnam the aircraft were engaged in missions against the transport of materiel along Ho Chi Minh Trail and in the Mekong Delta Region. The aircraft operated there until January 1969, when they were redeployed to Ubon RTAB, Thailand. Two missions a night were flown from Ubon with two A-1 escorts from Nakhon Phanom RTAB (often referred to simply as NKP) flying cover and providing additional firepower. Initial escort had been provided by F-4s, but the difference in speed and capabilities had made protecting the lower and slower flying NC/AC-123Ks difficult. The area of responsibility for the first six months was approximately east-southeast from NKP. After that, the area of coverage was a river in southern Laos.
The two aircraft were returned to the United States, to Hurlburt Field, Florida in May 1969, where a second round of training occurred. Four crews attended a ground school in Greenville, Texas and returned to Hurlburt where they flew the aircraft for the first time. In October 1969, two crews flew the aircraft to a second deployment at Ubon. The other two crews arrived in early November. After attending jungle survival training at Clark AB in the Philippines missions over Laos commenced.
The final phases of the program are slightly unclear. Some sources have missions terminating in early July, 1970 and the aircraft flying to the "Bone Yard" at Davis-Monthan AFB where they were returned to C-123K standard, then returned to South Vietnam still wearing their camouflage and black undersides for transport duty. The description of the designation in the official documentation supports this, by saying that the NC-123K is "Similar to C-123K but partially demodified from AC-123K (modified to an attack configuration) to permit general cargo handling and troop movement."
However, the official history states that combat operations ceased 11 May 1969, with no mention of the second deployment. The second deployment is mentioned in associated documentation, but only as to when the aircraft were scheduled to arrive in Thailand, not when they departed. Also, the official aircraft records show both aircraft as transferred to Napier Field, Alabama, where they were still listed as an NC-123K as of December 1972. The purpose of this transfer is unclear. That the official history notes an "munitions accident" on 19 March 1969 in the chronology, but without any details as to the fate of aircraft or which aircraft was affected, adds additional confusion.
It is also suggested that the Black Spot aircraft were never intended to be used in combat. However, as of 1966, twenty production aircraft were planned, for a total cost of $64.7 million (equivalent to $ million in ). There was even a recommendation that the C-130 Hercules be added to the program and used instead. These projected aircraft were referred to as a "Black Spot II". After the Operation Trial and Evaluation, it was found that the aircraft were not suitably protected and survivable for protracted use in combat zones. No C-130 aircraft are known to have been converted to a Black Spot II standard.
Tropic Moon III.
Shed Light's Second phase eventually turned out to be based on the B-57. B-57 aircraft had already been deployed to southeast Asia and had been the subject of initial sensor evaluations under Tropic Moon II. "Tropic Moon III" was envisioned as an SCNA that made up for the gross shortcomings of Tropic Moon I and II.
Tropic Moon III involved a completely new set of systems, up to date, and infinitely more capable than those previously installed. An entire new aircraft sub-variant, the B-57G, was developed for the purpose with a redefined nose to house the new sensor package. Development of the aircraft experienced major delays during which it was equipped with a laser target designated to be used with the then new first-generation Pave Way laser-guided bombs.
In the end the Tropic Moon III proved to be a capable system, both with conventional ordnance and laser guided weapons, day and night. However, the advent of the side-firing gunship threatened the system. The B-57G conducted its first combat missions in October 1970 during Operation Commando Hunt V. The kill rates per sortie between the AC-130A/E and the B-57G made it clear which system was dominant in the role of "truck hunter," in reference to the primary targets of the campaign. During the course of the operation the B-57G's claimed over 2,000 trucks destroyed, mostly as a result of using precision guided weaponry. In the same period AC-130s were credited with destroying six times this number of trucks. While B-57G operations continued, this led to an attempt to modify the system to incorporate gunship elements. One B-57G was modified to house a special bomb bay installation of one Emerson TAT-161 turret with a single M61 20mm cannon as a gunship under "Project Pave Gat". This system proved to still be inferior to the capabilities of the AC-130.In addition to their laser guided ordnance, Tropic Moon III B-57Gs also used a variety of conventional ordnance, including M36 incendiaries, cluster dispensers, and iron bombs. These other systems were used in light of a shortage of precision guided munitions available.
The B-57G was removed from the theatre in May 1972 coinciding with the withdrawal of the bulk of US Air Elements. Plans remained for the continuation of the B-57G program and there were proposals for multiple wings of aircraft to operate in concert with AC-130s and similar aircraft. Post-conflict spending cuts ended this.
Other associated programs.
Other programs were also associated with Shed Light, either coming under its wide-reaching charter, or otherwise being observed. Similar mission requirements meant other services were working on developing their own equipment, and the Shed Light Task Force was under orders from the start to survey all other development (see the original 1966 charter).
The US Army had been managing a piece of equipment referred to as S-202, which combined four IR cameras, a display, and operator chains, an artificial illumination component (described as "covert – UV," using Ultraviolet light to provide illumination), and a freeze display function. Under "Project Night Life", the S-202 it was to be tested on a S-61 helicopter by early 1967. The project itself was being funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).The Army was also working on "Project Dancing Dolls", which was attempting to develop a "foliage penetration radar." Triple canopy jungle in Laos meant that being able to see at night might not be enough to acquire a target. The system was being tested on OV-1 aircraft then in use by the Army, but the USAF envisioned the radar as a component on the planned SCNA F-111s. This program and continued investigations into hunter-killer combinations led to the OV-1B (using SLAR) and OV-1C (using FLIR) aircraft being deployed themselves as hunters, teaming up with gunship aircraft during Operation Commando Hunt.
Summary.
No report on the effectiveness of Operation Shed Light as a whole exists. It is known that there was some discontent among some of its major participants. General John D. Ryan, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Air Forces, complained following the poor showings from the Tropic Moon II program that he was "tired of buying everything they send us". He then requested that his staff draft a message that would allow him to send "this thing [the Tropic Moon II B-57B] to CONUS [Continental United States]." Even in regards to the development of the Tropic Moon III aircraft, the Aeronautical Systems Division was forced to admit that the myriad of delays in that program had been caused by "reduced quality control" springing from the "crash" nature of the program.
Shed Light was a crash development project, and was largely unguided. It was tasked with research and development of almost any piece of equipment that might help with the mission outlined in its charter. As a result, few of the programs came to fruition and fewer still left a definitive mark on the conflict. The developments under Shed Light were quickly eclipsed by new aircraft produced under "Project Gunship" (notably under Gunship II and Gunship III). They were fitted with many of the sensors developed under Shed Light, but took on a life all their own. Shed Light's most visible programs, Black Spot and Tropic Moon, have largely fallen into obscurity.


Battle of Kasserine Pass

The Battle of Kasserine Pass was a series of battles of the Tunisia Campaign of World War II that took place in February 1943 at Kasserine Pass, a gap in the Grand Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains in west central Tunisia.
The Axis forces, led by "Generalfeldmarschall" Erwin Rommel, were primarily from the "Afrika Korps" Assault Group, the Italian "Centauro" Armored Division and two Panzer divisions detached from the 5th Panzer Army, while the Allied forces consisted of the U.S. II Corps (Major General Lloyd Fredendall), the British 6th Armoured Division (Major-General Charles Keightley) and other parts of the First Army (Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson).
The battle was the first major engagement between U.S. and Axis forces in Africa. Inexperienced and poorly led American troops suffered many casualties and were quickly pushed back over from their positions west of Faïd Pass. This result confirmed a prediction of Winston Churchill, who had strongly advocated that the invasion of France as laid out in the proposed 1942 plan Operation Roundup be delayed until the Allies could support such an ambitious undertaking, which would give the U.S. troops time to get up to speed with the realities of war against the experienced and well-equipped Germans.
After the early defeat, elements of the U.S. II Corps, with British reinforcements, rallied and held the exits through mountain passes in western Tunisia, defeating the Axis offensive. As a result of the battle, the U.S. Army instituted sweeping changes of unit organization and replaced commanders and some types of equipment.
Background.
U.S. and British forces landed at several points along the coast of French Morocco and Algeria on November 8, 1942, during Operation Torch. This came only days after the breakthrough of the British Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery) following the Second Battle of El Alamein. In response, German and Italian troops were ferried in from Sicily to occupy Tunisia, one of the few easily defended areas of North Africa and only one night's sail from bases in Sicily. This short passage made it very difficult for Allied naval vessels to intercept Axis transports, and air interdiction proved equally difficult, because the nearest Allied airbase to Tunisia, at Malta, was over distant.
The Run for Tunis in November and December 1942 is the term for an attempt to reach Tunis before German and Italian reinforcements could arrive. Because of the poor road and rail communications, only a small, division-sized Allied force could be supplied, and, due to the excellent defensive terrain, small numbers of German and Italian troops were sufficient to defeat the attempt. The Allied build-up continued, more aircraft became available and new airfields in eastern Algeria and Tunisia were built. The Allies reduced the flow of Axis troops and equipment into Tunis and Bizerta, but a sizable Axis force was already ashore.
On January 23, 1943, the Allied Eighth Army took Tripoli, Erwin Rommel's main supply base. Rommel had anticipated this, switching his line of supply to Tunis with the goal of blocking the southern approach to Tunisia from Tripoli at Gabès. The Mareth Line, which the French had built to protect against an Italian attack from Libya, was
Allied troops had already crossed the Atlas Mountains and set up a forward base at Faïd, in the foothills on the eastern arm of the mountains, an excellent position to thrust east to the coast, split the Axis forces in southern Tunisia from the forces further north, and cut the line of supply to Tunis.
Prelude.
Faïd Pass.
Elements of the 5th Panzer Army, headed by General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, reached the Allied positions on the eastern foot of the Atlas Mountains on January 30. The 21st Panzer Division met French troops at Faïd, and, despite excellent use of the French guns, which caused heavy casualties among the German infantry, the defenders were easily forced back.
U.S. artillery and tanks of the 1st Armored Division then entered the battle, destroying some enemy tanks and forcing the remainder into what appeared to be a headlong retreat. This was, however, a trap, and when the 1st Armored Division gave chase it was engaged by a screen of German anti-tank guns, and sustained heavy casualties. A U.S. forward artillery observer whose radio and landlines had been cut by shellfire recalled,
The 21st Panzer Division resumed its advance towards Faïd. American infantry casualties were exacerbated by the practice of digging shallow shell scrapes instead of foxholes, as German tank drivers could easily crush a man inside a scrape by driving into it and simultaneously making a half-turn. Several attempts were made by the 1st Armored Division to stop the German advance, but all three combat commands found that each defensive position they tried to occupy had already been overrun, and they were attacked by German troops with heavy losses. On 2 February, the 1st Armored Division was ordered to end its attacks and concentrate to form a reserve. The Germans captured most of Tunisia, and the entrances into the coastal lowlands were blocked. The Allies held the interior of the roughly triangular Atlas range, but with the exits blocked this was of little advantage to the Allies. For the next two weeks, Rommel and the Axis commanders further north debated what to do next.
Sidi Bou Zid.
Rommel did not consider the Eighth Army a serious threat because, until Tripoli was open, Montgomery could maintain only a small force in south Tunisia. Ships commenced unloading on February 9 but the port was not fully operational until the end of the month. Rommel made a proposal in early February to "Comando Supremo" (Italian High Command in Rome) to attack with two battlegroups, including detachments from the 5th Panzer Army, toward two U.S. supply bases just to the west of the western arm of the mountains in Algeria. A quick thrust could capture the supplies and disrupt a U.S. attempt to concentrate forces near Tebessa. Arnim objected and the attack was delayed for a week until agreement was reached to mount Operation "Frühlingswind", a thrust by the 5th Panzer Army through the U.S. communications and supply center of Sidi Bou Zid. Rommel's forces, to the south-west, would conduct Operation "Morgenluft" to capture Gafsa and advance on Tozeur.
On February 14 the 10th and 21st Panzer divisions began the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid, about west of Faïd, in the interior plain of the Atlas Mountains. The U.S. tanks were defeated and the infantry, poorly sited on three hills and unable to give mutual support, was isolated. A counterattack the next day was easily repulsed and on February 16 the Germans advanced towards Sbeitla. After the success at Sidi Bou Zid, Rommel ordered the "Afrika Korps" Assault Group to attack Gafsa on February 15, but, on the night before, Anderson ordered the defenders to evacuate Gafsa and make the main defence line the hills around Feriana, as he believed Gafsa should not be defended against a large attack. The next day, because of the threat to the southern flank, Anderson obtained Eisenhower's agreement and ordered a withdrawal from the Eastern Dorsale, to the line of the Western Dorsale from Feriana northwards. Early on February 17, Fredendall ordered a withdrawal from Sbeitla and Feriana. The U.S. II Corps was able to concentrate at the Kasserine and Sbiba Passes, on the western arm of the mountains. U.S. casualties were 2,546 men, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 field guns, three anti-tank guns and an anti-aircraft battery.
Axis plan of attack.
At this point, there was some argument in the Axis camp about what to do next; all of Tunisia was under Axis control, and there was little to do until the Eighth Army arrived at Mareth. Rommel decided to attack through the Kasserine Pass into the main force of the U.S. II Corps at Tébessa to capture U.S. supplies on the Algerian side of the western arm of the mountains, eliminate the Allied ability to attack the coastal corridor linking Mareth and Tunis and threaten the southern flank of the First Army. On February 18, Rommel submitted his proposals to Albert Kesselring, who forwarded them with his blessing to the "Comando Supremo" in Rome.
At 13:30 on the 19 February Rommel received the "Comando Supremo"s agreement to a revised plan. He was to have 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions transferred from Arnim's 5th Panzer Army to his command and attack through the Kasserine and Sbiba passes toward Thala and Le Kef to the north, clearing the Western Dorsale and threatening the 1st Army's flank. Rommel was appalled; the plan dispersed Axis forces and, through the passes, would expose their flanks. A concentrated attack on Tébessa, while entailing some risk, could yield badly needed supplies, destroy Allied potential for operations into central Tunisia and capture the airfield at Youks-les-Bains, west of Tébessa.
Battle.
In the early hours of the 19 February Rommel ordered the "Afrika Korps" Assault Group from Feriana to attack the Kasserine Pass. The 21st Panzer Division at Sbeitla was ordered to attack northward through the pass east of Kasserine which led to Sbiba and Ksour. The "Kampfgruppe von Broich", the battlegroup released by Arnim from 10th Panzer Division, was ordered to concentrate at Sbeitla, where it would be ready to exploit success in either pass.
Sbiba.
The Sbiba area was attacked by Battle Groups Stenkhoff and Schuette, remnants of the 21st Panzer Division. Facing the German armored advance was the British 6th Armoured Division (less the 26th Armoured Brigade which except for the tanks of the 16/5th Lancers had been sent to Thala). Also in the line was the 18th Regimental Combat Team from the U.S. 1st Infantry Division; and three battalions of infantry from U.S. 34th Infantry Division. There were also three U.S. Field Artillery battalions, elements of two British anti-tank regiments and some French detachments. The Germans made little progress against the combined firepower of the defending force which had also laid minefields. The 21st Panzer Division was checked and then driven back by February 20.
Kasserine.
Defending the pass was a force consisting of the U.S. 1st Battalion, 26th Regimental Combat Team, the U.S. 19th Combat Engineer Regiment, the 6th Field Artillery Battalion, a tank destroyer battalion and a battery of French artillery. On the hills to their west was French General Welvert's Task Force Welvert comprising a U.S. Ranger and infantry battalion, three French infantry battalions, two U.S. field artillery battalions, four French artillery batteries and engineer and anti-aircraft detachments. Furthest west was Task Force Bowen (consisting of the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regimental Combat Team), blocking the track from Feriana towards Tebessa. Between Task Force Bowen and Tebessa to the north was the regrouping 1st Armored Division although only Combat Command B was fit for combat. The positions in the pass had been placed under Colonel Alexander Stark, commander of the 26th RCT, on the night of February 18 and the command named Stark Force.
An attempt to surprise the Kasserine defenses by the 33rd Reconnaissance Unit into the pass failed and a battalion of Panzer grenadiers was ordered into the floor of the pass and another onto Djebel Semmama, the hill on its eastern flank and slow progress was made against artillery fire. The tanks of 1/8th Panzer Regiment were committed at noon but little further progress resulted against stubborn defense. Rommel decided to commit his units from the 10th Panzer to the Kasserine Pass the next morning in a coordinated attack with the "Afrika Korps" Assault Group, which was to be joined by elements of the Italian 131st Armored Division "Centauro". British reinforcements from the 26th Armoured Brigade (6th Armoured Division) had been assembling at Thala and Brigadier Dunphie, making forward reconnaissance, decided to intervene. The First Army headquarters restricted him to sending Gore Force, a small combined-arms group of a company of infantry, a squadron of 11 tanks, an artillery battery and an anti-tank troop. Brigadier Cameron Nicholson (6th Armoured Division) was given command of Nickforce, all units north-west of the pass.
During the night, the American positions on the two shoulders overlooking the pass were overrun and at 8:30 am German panzer grenadiers and Italian Bersaglieri resumed the attack. At 10:00am Dunphie judged that Stark Force was about to give way and ordered Gore Force to the Thala side of the pass as elements of the "Centauro" Division launched their attack towards Tebessa and continued it during the afternoon. At 1:00 pm Rommel committed two battalions from 10th Panzer which overcame the defense. Tanks and Bersaglieri from the "Centauro" Division advanced along Highway 13 and overran the 19th Combat Engineer Regiment. The U.S. survivors made a disorganized retreat up the western exit from the pass to Djebel el Hamra, where Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division was arriving. On the exit to Thala, Gore Force slowly leapfrogged back, losing all its tanks in the process, to rejoin the 26th Armoured Brigade some further back.
Djebel el Hamra.
The "Afrika Korps" Assault Group began moving along the Hatab River valley towards Haidra and Tebessa in the early afternoon of February 21 and advanced until they met defenders consisting of the U.S. 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division and Combat Command B of the U.S. 1st Armored Division at Djebel el Hamra. The German–Italian force was halted and, despite heavy pressure including air attacks, failed to dislodge the American defenders. Having brought the Axis drive towards Tebessa to a halt, General Paul Robinett and General Terry Allen now turned their attention to planning a counterattack that was to take place the next day, February 22. Plans made by both sides were upset by the battle, and the Axis forces (5th "Bersaglieri," a "Semovente" group from "Centauro" and 15 Panzer) launched another assault on the U.S. position on the morning of the 22 February toward Bou Chebka Pass. Although the American defenders were pressed hard the line held and, by mid-afternoon, the U.S. infantry and tanks launched a counterattack that broke the combined German and Italian force. More than 400 Axis prisoners were taken as the counterattack was pressed into the "Afrika Korps" position.
Thala.
Rommel had stayed with the main group of the 10th Panzer Division on the route toward Thala, where the 26th Armoured Brigade and remnants of the U.S. 26th Infantry Regiment had dug in on ridges. If the town fell and the southern of two roads from Thala to Tebessa was cut, the U.S. 9th Infantry Division to the north would be cut off and Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division would be trapped between the 10th Panzer Division and its supporting units moving north along the second road to Tebessa. The combined force fought a costly delaying action in front of Thala, retreating ridge by ridge to the north until by dark, the force held the German attacks just south of the town. The divisional artillery (48 guns) of the 9th Infantry Division and anti-tank platoons, that had moved from Morocco on the 17 February west, dug in that night. Next day, the front was held mostly by British infantry, with exceptionally strong backing by unified U.S. and British artillery, under Brigadier General Stafford LeRoy Irwin, the U.S. artillery commander. The British had 36 guns, supported by armoured cars of the Derbyshire Yeomanry and Valentine and Crusader tanks of the 17th/21st Lancers.
Anderson ordered the 9th Infantry Division and its artillery support to Le Kef to meet an expected German attack but U.S. Major General Ernest N. Harmon, who had been sent by Eisenhower to report on the battle and the Allied command, instructed the 9th divisional artillery to stay behind. On the morning of the 22 February an intense artillery barrage from the massed Allied guns forestalled the resumption of the 10th Panzer Division attack, destroying armor and vehicles and disrupting communications. Broich, the battle group commander, decided to pause and regroup but Allied reinforcements continued to arrive. Under constant fire, 10th Panzer waited until dark to retire from the battlefield.
Withdrawal.
Overextended and with supplies dwindling, pinned down by the Allied artillery in the pass in front of Thala and now facing U.S. counterattacks along the Hatab River, Rommel realized his attack had been stopped. At Sbiba, along the Hatab River and now at Thala, the efforts of the German and Italian forces had failed to make a decisive break in the Allied line. With little prospect of further success, Rommel judged that it would be wiser to break off to concentrate in South Tunisia and strike a blow at the Eighth Army, catching them off balance while still assembling its forces. He at least had the consolations that he had inflicted heavy losses on his enemy and that the Allied concentrations in the Gafsa – Sbeitla area had been destroyed. At a meeting at Rommel's Kasserine HQ on the 23 February Kesselring and his Chief of Staff Siegfried Westphal tried to change Rommel's mind, arguing that there were still possibilities for success. Rommel was adamant; Kesselring finally agreed and formal orders from the "Comando Supremo" in Rome were issued that evening calling off the offensive and directing all Axis units to return to their start positions. On the 23 February a massive American air attack on the pass hastened the German retreat and by late on the 24 February the pass had been reoccupied, Feriana was in Allied hands; Sidi Bou Zid and Sbeitla followed soon after.
Aftermath.
Casualties and losses.
German losses at Kasserine were 201 killed, 536 wounded and 252 missing, totalling 989 casualties. In material Germans lost 20 tanks, 67 vehicles and 14 guns. Allied forces captured 73 German and 535 Italian soldiers.
American losses totalled 300 killed, 3,000 wounded, and 3,000 missing. Losses were so high that an additional 7,000 replacements were needed to recover units to their original strength. The French losses on the 34th Division totalled 50 killed, 200 wounded and 250 missing. Regarding Allied personnel captured, Rommel and Ziegler claimed 3,721 prisoners captured but in a consolidated report of 24 February they reported 4,026 Allied prisoners of war.
Material losses of the US II Corps were staggering, in total 183 tanks, 104 half tracks, 208 guns and 512 trucks and motor vehicles were lost, some of them captured by the Germans. The allies also lost supplies and fuel, over 215 cubic meters of gasoline and lubricants were seized along with 45 tons of ammunition.
Rommel.
Rommel had hoped to take advantage of the inexperience of the new Allied commanders but was opposed by Arnim who, wanting to conserve strength in his sector, ignored Kesselring's orders and withheld the attached heavy tank unit of 10th Panzer. Rommel felt that most U.S. units and commanders had showed their inexperience, losing sight of the broader picture. Rommel was unable to exploit Allied failings due to a lack of forces and freedom of maneuver and the opportunity was missed, but he praised the 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment of the 1st Armored Division in its defense of Sbeitla for being "clever and well fought". Rommel was later impressed with how quickly U.S. commanders came to understand and implement mobile warfare and also praised U.S. equipment: "British experience has been put to good use in American equipment". Of particular interest to the Germans was the sturdy M3 armored half track, and for some time after the battle, German units deployed large numbers of captured U.S. vehicles.
The Allies studied the results equally seriously. Positioned by senior commanders who had not personally reconnoitered the ground, U.S. forces were often located too far from each other for mutual support. It was also noted that U.S. soldiers tended to become careless about digging in, exposing their positions, bunching in groups when in open view of enemy artillery observers, and positioning units on topographic crests, where their silhouettes made them perfect targets. Too many soldiers, exasperated by the rocky soil of Tunisia, were still digging shallow slit trenches instead of deep foxholes.
The 1st Armored Division was on the receiving end of German anti-tank and screening tactics and had not learned about those tactics from experienced British armored forces. Others in the U.S. Army were well aware of the German deception tactics. The Allies were also unable to prevent the Germans from attaining air superiority over the battlefield, limiting effective Allied air reconnaissance and allowing relentless German bombing and strafing attacks that disrupted Allied attempts at deployment and organization. Attacks by the "Luftwaffe" in close support of German ground offensives often neutralized U.S. attempts to organize effective defensive artillery fire.
Eisenhower.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower began restructuring the Allied command, creating the 18th Army Group, commanded by General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, to tighten the operational control of the three Allied nations involved and improve their coordination. Major General Lloyd Fredendall was relieved by Eisenhower and sent home. Training programs at home had contributed to U.S. Army units in North Africa being saddled with disgraced commanders who had failed in battle and were reluctant to advocate radical changes. Eisenhower found through Major General Omar Bradley and others, that Fredendall's subordinates had lost confidence in him and Alexander told U.S. commanders, "I'm sure you must have better men than that".
Fredendall took the blame but Anderson, the First Army commander, was judged to be at fault for the failure to concentrate Allied armored units and keep forces concentrated, that later disintegrated into individual units. When Fredendall disclaimed all responsibility for the poorly equipped French XIX Corps and denied French requests for support, notably when under pressure at Faïd, Anderson allowed the request to go unfulfilled. Anderson was also blamed for dispersing the three combat commands of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, despite the objections of Major General Orlando Ward, the divisional commander. U.S. Brigadier General Irwin later became commander of the 5th Infantry Division in Europe and went on to higher command, as did British Brigadier Nicholson. Allied commanders were given greater scope for initiative and to keep forces concentrated. They were also urged to lead their units from the front and to keep command posts well forward, unlike Fredendall who had rarely visited the front line. (Ward was sent home, where he trained troops and then commanded the 20th Armored Division in Europe.)
On the 6 March, Major General George Patton was temporarily removed from planning for the Allied invasion of Sicily to command the II Corps. Bradley was appointed assistant corps commander and moved up to command of II Corps when Patton returned to planning for Sicily. Fredendall was reassigned to the United States and several other commanders were removed or promoted out of the way. Patton was not known for hesitancy and did not bother to request permission when taking action to support his command or other units requesting assistance. During the advance from Gafsa, Alexander, the 18th Army Group commander, had given detailed orders to Patton, afterwards changing II Corps' mission several times. Once beyond Maknassy, Alexander again gave orders Patton considered excessively detailed. From then on, Patton simply ignored those parts of mission orders he considered ill-advised on grounds of military expediency and/or a rapidly evolving tactical situation.
Efforts were made to improve the integration of immediate artillery and air support, which had been poorly coordinated. While U.S. artillery response times improved dramatically, coordinating close air support was not achieved until Operation Overlord over a year later. American anti-aircraft artillery began reforms, having learned that, while Stuka dive bombers were vulnerable to .50 BMG rounds fired from vehicles, field units needed dedicated autocannon to protect them from aerial attack: in one division, 95 percent of air attacks were concentrated on its artillery.


Battle of Santander

The Battle of Santander was a battle fought in the War in the North campaign of the Spanish Civil War during the summer of 1937. Santander's fall on 26 August assured the Nationalist conquest of the province of Santander, now Cantabria. The battle devastated the Republic's "Army of the North"; 60,000 soldiers were captured by the Nationalists.
Background.
After the fall of Bilbao on 19 June and the end of the failed Republican offensive at Brunete on 25 July, the Nationalists decided to continue their offensive in the North and occupied the Cantabria Province.
Opposing forces.
The Nationalists' Army of the North had 90,000 men (of which, 25,000 Italian), led by general Davila. The Italian force, led by General Bastico, comprised Bergonzoli's "Littorio" Division, Frusci's Black Flames Division and Francischi's 23 March Division. The Nationalists had also six Navarrese brigades led by Colonel Solchaga, two Castilian brigades led by General Ferrer, and one mixed Hispano-Italian division, the Black Arrows, led by Colonel Piazzioni. The Nationalists had also 220 modern aircraft on this front (70 of the "Condor Legion", 80 of the "Aviazione Legionaria" and 70 Spanish), including many Bf 109 fighters.
Opposing them, the Republicans had Prada's 14th Army Corps and José García Vayas's 15th Army Corps, under the overall command of General Mariano Gámir Ulíbarri; a total of about 80,000 men. The Republicans had also 44 aircraft (mostly slow and old, except 18 Soviet-built fighters). Furthermore, the morale of the Republican troops was low, and Basque soldiers thought that they might surrender to the Italians, in return for their lives.
Consequences.
Santander's fall, coupled with the capture of heavily fortified Bilbao, tore an irreparable gap in the Republic's northern front. The destruction of the Army of the North marked another crippling blow to the Republic's sagging strength and turned the war to Franco's favour. Factors accounting for the Republican defeat include:
The disaster proved total and the losses beyond repair. Of the twelve Basque brigades there remained at the end only eight battered battalions. The Republican Army of Santander of twelve brigades was reduced to six battalions. The Asturians committed 27 battalions and escaped with only fourteen. In no other theatre of the civil war did Franco's troops achieve results as decisive as those of the Santander campaign: sixty thousand Republican soldiers were wiped off the map, with corresponding losses in materiel. The War in the North was all but won.


Save Uganda Movement

The Save Uganda Movement (abbreviated SUM) was a militant Ugandan opposition group which fought against the government of President Idi Amin from 1973 to 1979. Described as "specialists in sabotage" by journalist John Darnton, SUM attempted to overthrow Amin by waging a guerrilla campaign of bombings, raids, and assassinations. The movement mainly operated from Kenya and Tanzania. Unlike much of the Ugandan opposition at the time, SUM had no firm ideology and was decentralized, consisting of different groups with similar aims. SUM cooperated with the forces loyal to ex-President Milton Obote during the Uganda–Tanzania War (1978–1979) and eventually joined the Uganda National Liberation Front which formed the country's post-Amin governments.
History.
Early guerrilla operations.
The Save Uganda Movement (SUM) was founded in Nairobi in 1973. Its initial members were Ugandan exiles based in Kenya and Tanzania and its overall aim was to overthrow Amin through guerrilla warfare. Unlike other militant Ugandan factions, like Kikosi Maalum or the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), SUM was not loyal to one specific leader and was instead split into groups led by Akena p'Ojok, William Omaria, and Ateker Ejalu. Ejalu acted as SUM's "contact person". Other prominent figures in the movement included Yonasani Kanyomozi, Ephraim Kamuntu, Tarsis Kabwegyere, and Richard Kaijuka. At times, Robert Serumaga was also part of SUM, although he later joined the Uganda Nationalist Organization. SUM member Zeddy Maruru was simultaneously a member of SUM and Kikosi Maalum.
SUM members claimed that the group began training guerrillas from mid-1973, teaching them how to use guns and explosives in three-month long courses before they infiltrated Uganda disguised as regular civilians. The group initially launched its raids from Kenya. In 1974, SUM contacted members of the Uganda Army to organize an anti-Amin coup, but the operation was betrayed and two SUM operatives were executed. On 10 June 1976, an unidentified individual attempted to assassinate Amin by throwing a grenade into his car. "Some authors" have claimed that SUM was responsible for the attack, while the Ugandan President blamed the United States' CIA. The overall extent of SUM's early operations is difficult to gauge due to the group's exaggerated claims and the presence of few reliable sources in Amin-ruled Uganda.
After the killing of archbishop Janani Luwum by Ugandan security forces in 1977, Tanzania agreed to train and arm SUM fighters near Arusha. This operation involved 50 militants and was headed by Ateker Ejalu. The small group entered Uganda in early 1978, and attempted to kill ranking Ugandan officials to cause tensions within Amin's government. Although the SUM guerrillas killed a few low-ranking officials in March 1978, most assassination attempts failed.
Uganda–Tanzania War.
By October 1978, there were at least two major SUM factions. One was led by Omaria, an ethnic Teso, and included about 100 fighters. The other was loyal to Akena p'Ojok, an Acholi, and about 300 strong. In course of the Uganda–Tanzania War (1978–1979), SUM mostly conducted bombings, raids, and acts of sabotage to destabilise Amin's regime from within. It also claimed to have contacted Uganda Army officers in an attempt to overthrow the President. Journalist Martha Honey described SUM as the "largest and best organized group" of militant Ugandan exiles at the time. At an early point of the war, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere invited Ugandan opposition groups to a conference at Dar es Salaam to discuss their strategy to overthrow Amin. SUM attended, alongside FRONASA and the Uganda Nationalist Organization. The Tanzanian government also set up a training camp at Tarime for Ugandan rebels during the conflict's early stages. Nyerere asked several Ugandan exiles, including Ejalu, to send volunteers to the camp to raise an anti-Amin army. The SUM leader complied, although only a few hundred militants ever showed up at the Tarime camp. In December SUM assassinated three agents of the State Research Bureau. Over the next few months its operatives, moving across Lake Victoria from Kenya, destroyed a Kampala fuel depot, severed electricity lines, and attacked military outposts.
In early 1979, Ejalu made a unity pact with another opposition faction headed by ex-President Milton Obote. At this point, SUM had a neutral stance in regard to Obote's possible restoration to presidency, working with him but preferring another successor to Amin. SUM eventually became affiliated with the "National Revolt", a loose coalition of Ugandan militant groups connected to Obote. SUM and Obote eventually agreed to launch a united raid into Uganda, targeting the barracks at Tororo. However, Obote's faction launched the attack earlier than planned without informing SUM, resulting in the Battle of Tororo in early March 1979 and a defeat for the rebels. SUM blamed Obote's faction for the failure, causing severe tensions. Obote's followers countered that SUM had not been able to organize the agreed number of fighters for the operation. Later that month during the Moshi Conference, SUM and other Ugandan opposition groups united to form the Uganda National Liberation Front and its armed wing, the Uganda National Liberation Army. SUM member Zeddy Maruru was appointed secretary of the UNLA's Military Commission. At this time, SUM claimed to have grown to 1,500 fighters, of which 1,100 were already operating in Uganda. These numbers were probably exaggerated. Regardless, these claims helped SUM to raise funds from wealthy donors.
At one point, three hundred UNLA fighters belonging to SUM attempted to cross Lake Victoria to launch a raid into Uganda using two boats. However, one boat sank and 140 rebel fighters drowned. It was suspected that Kikosi Maalum (which was loyal to Obote) had sabotaged the boat. The remaining SUM militants who reached Uganda were quickly captured by Amin's security forces or forced to join Kikosi Maalum.
After Amin's fall.
In course of the Uganda–Tanzania War's later stages, the different Ugandan opposition groups greatly expanded their militias through mass recruitment in territories occupied by the Tanzanians. Following the conflict, these groups developed into private armies and were used by strongmen as well as politicians to enforce their will in post-Amin Uganda. SUM leaders Omaria and Akena p'Ojok were among those who raised large militias. By September 1979, Omaria's group had grown to 5,000 militants, while Akena p'Ojok led about 12,000 militiamen; combined around 17,000. At this time, some leading SUM members like p'Ojok, Kanyomozi, and Kabwegyere belonged to the political "third force" in Uganda who attempted to set up new parties such as the Uganda Labour Congress and the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM). The former was not even launched, and the latter experienced great tensions during the founding phase. Negotiations on the UPM's leadership positions between SUM and FRONASA broke down following disagreements over the party office of treasurer. UPM did poorly during the 1980 Ugandan general election.
Ateker Ejalu, Akena p'Ojok, and William Omaria became cabinet ministers in Uganda's post-Amin governments. Ex-SUM member Matayo Kyaligonza later became a high-ranking officer in the National Resistance Army (NRA). After NRA leader Yoweri Museveni seized power in 1986, Ejalu fled to Kenya and reportedly attempted to revive SUM. Ejalu later became a minister in Museveni's government.
Ideology.
SUM had no strong ideological position. Its members were described as Ugandan nationalists by Honey and researcher A.B.K. Kasozi. Catherine Thomas described it "as much anti-Obote as it was anti-Amin." In late February 1979 it released a manifesto which stated its aims were "to organise, unite, and mobilise all Ugandans for the overthrow of the fascist regime of Idi Amin with a view to restoring a democratic system of government, law and order, and the rule of law." It stated that once Amin was overthrown, the movement would support the establishment of a transitional government until a permanent one could be elected. The document further declared that SUM was not ethnically or denominationally based, and that the movement was not a political party.


Balaguer Offensive

The Balaguer Offensive was an offensive carried out by the Spanish Republican Army around Balaguer during the Spanish Civil War. The offensive consisted in a series of counterattacks in the spring and summer of 1938 after the disastrous Aragon Offensive. The offensive was a failure for the Spanish Republic and many lives and military material were wasted.
History.
The offensive was planned by General Vicente Rojo Lluch as a morale-lifting counterattack by Republican military units after the defeats suffered at the Aragon fronts. Historically this battle was part of the longer Battle of the Segre.
The town of Balaguer had fallen in the hands of the rebel faction in a series of vehement surprise attacks between 5 and 6 April 1938, following which the Francoist armies captured the strategic bridge over the Segre River on 10 April when the Republican Army withdrew to the other side of the river.
In order to retake at least the bridgehead of the left bank the 27th, 60th and 72nd divisions of the XVIII Army Corps of the Spanish Republic counterattacked between the 12 and the 15 April. The Republican soldiers however, were mostly very young men – some only 17 years old, hastily recruited and ill-trained – who, despite their enthusiasm, were not successful. Again, another series of efforts to reconquer the Balaguer bridgehead took place between 22 and 29 May, but these were again fruitless and the Republican units had to withdraw in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the enemy, leaving many casualties behind.
Last effort.
After almost three months, together with the wider Republican offensive of the Battle of the Ebro, there was again a series of combats to retake the bridgehead at Balaguer. The attacks were made between 9 and 11 August but the Republican forces were defeated again, being smashed against the superior firepower of the rebel lines.