Court for Crown Cases Reserved

The Court for Crown Cases Reserved was an English appellate court for criminal cases established in 1848 to hear references from the trial judge. It did not allow a retrial, only judgment on a point of law. Neither did it create a "right" of appeal and only a few selected cases were heard every year.
History.
The Court for Crown Cases Reserved was created by the Crown Cases Act 1848, introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Campbell. Under the Act, after a conviction, the trial judge in a criminal case could refer the case by way of case stated to the Court. A case that was reserved would then be heard by at least five judges, including at least one Chief Justice or Chief Baron.
The Court could only hear appeals on a point of law; it could quash a conviction, but not order a retrial or alter a sentence.
It was superseded by the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907.
Bibliography.
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Rufus Franklin

Rufus William Franklin was an American criminal who served a life sentence in Alcatraz. He is best known for taking part in the third documented attempted escape from Alcatraz Prison with Thomas R. Limerick and James C. Lucas on the night of May 23, 1938.
Biography.
He was born in Alabama, in either Calhoun, Jefferson or Montgomery Counties. Franklin was originally sentenced to imprisonment for bank robbery, car theft, and assault. He was then transferred to Alcatraz, where he became inmate number 335-AZ.
Alcatraz escape attempt.
In the spring of 1938, Franklin, Thomas R. Limerick and James C. Lucas planned an escape from Alcatraz. Their escape plan began by incapacitating an unarmed guard supervising a work detail on the top floor. Once the supervisor was rendered unconscious, the convicts would escape through a window to the rooftop, where they would incapacitate an armed guard and leave the island via a seized police boat. They enacted their escape plan on May 23, 1938 in the prison's mat shop, where they assaulted Custodial Officer Royal Cline with hammer blows to his head. They proceeded to the roof, where an armed guard shot both Franklin and Limerick, although Lucas wasn't shot. Other guards arrived at the scene. Franklin, Limerick, and Lucas were cornered and surrendered to the guards.
Cline died of his injuries the next day, as did Limerick.
Franklin and Lucas, the other surviving convict, were tried for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Franklin spent many years of solitary confinement in Alcatraz's D Block. He was eventually transferred to the Atlanta federal prison where he was paroled in 1974. Franklin died a year later.


Criminal law in the Waite Court

During the tenure of Morrison Waite as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (March 4, 1874 through March 23, 1888), the Supreme Court heard an unprecedented volume and frequency of criminal cases. In just fourteen years, the Court heard 106 criminal cases, almost as many cases as the Supreme Court had heard in the period from its creation to the appointment of Waite as Chief Justice. Notable cases include "United States v. Cruikshank" (1875), "United States v. Reese" (1875), "Reynolds v. United States" (1878), "Wilkerson v. Utah" (1879), the "Trade-Mark Cases" (1879), "Strauder v. West Virginia" (1880), "Pace v. Alabama" (1883), "United States v. Harris" (1883), "Ex parte Crow Dog" (1883), "Hurtado v. California" (1884), "Clawson v. United States" (1885), "Yick Wo v. Hopkins" (1886), "United States v. Kagama" (1886), "Ker v. Illinois" (1886), and "Mugler v. Kansas" (1887).
The Waite Court decided many issues of first impression, both new crimes and new doctrines of criminal procedure and criminal investigations. For example, the Waite Court was the first to hear cases regarding the federal anti-polygamy statutes, the Reconstruction-era civil rights crimes, extortion under color of office, fraud on the United States, and mail fraud. Further, the Waite Court was the first to interpret the Confrontation Clause and the Grand Jury Clause, the criminal procedure implications of the Equal Protection Clause, and the application of the Fourth Amendment to criminal proceedings.
The Waite Court decided several issues involving the interaction between the federal courts and the courts of the various states, such as civil rights and federal officer removal, criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, and federal habeas review of state criminal convictions.
Background.
Despite the massive increase in the criminal case load before the Supreme Court, the statutory structure of the federal criminal system was not substantially changed during the Waite Court. In 1874 and 1878, the criminal statutes were codified in Title LXX of the Revised Statutes of the United States. Title LXX occupied only 41 pages.
Sources of jurisdiction.
Writs of error.
State courts.
The Waite Court heard twenty-five criminal writs of error from the state courts (as authorized by § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its progeny). Several of these cases involved the compatibility of state criminal laws with the Dormant Commerce Clause (and its counterweight, the police power). In "Welton v. Missouri" (1875), the Court reversed a conviction for selling goods without a license. In "Turner v. Maryland" (1883), the Court upheld a statute that required inspection of exported tobacco packed at a different place from where it is grown. "Barbier v. Connolly" (1884) upheld a ban on laundries. "Presser v. Illinois" (1886) upheld a ban on militias. "Walling v. Michigan" (1886) invalidated a tax on out-of-state liquor wholesalers (which did not apply to in-state liquor wholesalers). "Smith v. Alabama" (1888) upheld a locomotive licensing scheme.
Others involved the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Strauder v. West Virginia" (1880) and "Bush v. Kentucky" (1883) reversed convictions because of racial exclusion in the jury system. In "Pace v. Alabama" (1883), the Court upheld an adultery prohibition that punished inter-racial fornication more than same-race fornication. "Pace" was overruled by "McLaughlin v. Florida" (1964). "Yick Wo v. Hopkins" (1886) struck down a discretionary laundry permitting system that disadvantaged Asians. "Hayes v. Missouri" (1887) rejected an equal protection challenge to a statute authorizing the prosecution more peremptory challenges in large cities.
"Mugler v. Kansas" (1887) upheld a state liquor prohibition under substantive due process.
The Waite Court was several times called upon to decide issues related to the interaction of the state and federal criminal systems. In "Coleman v. Tennessee" (1878), the Court held that a state court had no jurisdiction to try a Civil War-era murder by a soldier, which at the time was subject to courts martial jurisdiction (and where in fact the defendant had previously been tried and convicted). But, in "Robb v. Connolly" (1884), the Court permitted a state court to issue a writ of habeas corpus against the state officer who administers extradition to the state from other states. And, in "Kurtz v. Moffitt" (1885), the Court held that—as habeas is a civil proceeding and the federal diversity jurisdiction removal statute required an amount in controversy—state habeas proceedings could not be removed to federal court under this provision. "Natal v. Louisiana" (1887) declined to issue a writ of supersedes, finding that the state's initiation of a civil suit while a writ of error was pending before the Supreme Court was not contemptuous.
"Royall v. Virginia" (1886) struck down a misdemeanor conviction for unauthorized practice under the Contract Clause. Royall's case repeatedly reached the Waite Court through various jurisdictional means, and ultimately Royall was denied relief.
Territorial courts.
The Waite Court heard nine criminal appeals from the territorial courts, the majority of them arising from prosecutions of Mormon polygamists in the courts of the Utah Territory. "Reynolds v. United States" (1878) rejected six challenges to a polygamy conviction: that the territorial grand jury statute provided for fewer members that grand juries in the circuit courts; that it violated the Impartial Jury Clause to seat a juror opposed to polygamy; that for cause challenges were improperly granted to the prosecution; that testimony violated the Confrontation Clause; that polygamy was protected by the Free Exercise Clause; and that it was improper for the judge to comment on the social ills of polygamy.
"Miles v. United States" (1880) also rejected several challenges to a polygamy conviction. The Court held that bigamy could be proved by testimony (as opposed to, for example, a wedding certificate); that the question of whether the evidence established guilty beyond a reasonable doubt could not be raised de novo in the Supreme Court; that the judge could exclude jurors for-cause who believed polygamy was compelled by God; that it was too late post-conviction to complain for the first time that the wives were not named in the indictment; that there was no invalid variance from the indictment between the names "Caroline Owens" and "Caroline Owen Maile"; that wearing a wedding dress and attending a church known for polygamous weddings were competent evidence of marriage; that incompetent testimony (proof of the first marriage given by the second wife) could be given at the voir dire.
In another such case, "Clawson v. United States" (1885), the Court held that there was no right to bail on appeal where a defendant had been sentenced to imprisonment (there was such a right where the only punishment was a fine). Reaching the merits that same year, the Court held that the Congressional statute permitting for-cause challenges of jurors who believed that polygamy was divinely compelled applied to grand juries as well as petit juries, and that the marshall could call a second venire if the 200-person venire was exhausted before a full jury was seated.
In "Cannon v. United States" (1885), the Court rejected two further challenges. First, the Court held that an indictment for the polygamy offense (which only applied to male defendants) need not allege the gender of the defendant. Second, the Court held that it was no defense that the defendant had ceased having sexual relations with his additional wives.
An 1885 statute governing appeals from the territorial court reduced the possibility of such appeals. In "Snow v. United States" (1886), the Court rejected a polygamy appeal on the grounds that the statute granted jurisdiction in criminal appeals only if the validity, existence, or jurisdiction of the territorial courts was called into question. The statute did not preclude jurisdiction to hear appeals from denials of habeas corpus by the territorial courts. In "Ex parte Snow" (1887), the Court for the first time granted relief to a polygamy defendant, holding that the crime was a continuing offense, and thus the prosecutor could not increase the number of counts in the indictment by charging the same conduct over different time periods.
The Court also heard a few non-polygamy territorial appeals. In "Smith v. United States" (1876), the Court for the first time dismissed an appeal pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. In "Wilkerson v. Utah" (1879), the Court held that execution by firing squad was not cruel and unusual punishment. In "Ex parte Reggel" (1885), the Court held that the territorial extradition statute—referring to "treason, felony, or other crime"—included misdemeanors.
Original habeas.
The Waite Court heard twenty-four original habeas petitions in criminal matters. Many of these rulings held that the original habeas jurisdiction did not extend to the type of case presented. The general rule, articulated in several cases, was that there could be no post-conviction original habeas jurisdiction unless the court below was totally without jurisdiction (for example, if the criminal statute were unconstitutional).
Thus, in several cases, the Court found the alleged error too insubstantial to consider via original habeas. In "Ex parte Parks" (1876), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to free a defendant convicted in a United States district court, even though no appeal was possible from the district court to the circuit court, and even though the petitioner alleged that the district court had been entirely without jurisdiction to try the offense charged. Similarly, in "Ex parte Rowland" (1881), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to examine a contempt of court conviction arising from the disregard of a writ of mandamus. And, in "Ex parte Bigelow" (1885), the Court held that there could be no review of a double jeopardy determination of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. In "Ex parte Harding" (1887), the Court held that the composition of a grand jury (i.e. whether an alien sat) could not be so reviewed.
But, in several cases, the Court did find original habeas jurisdiction and reached the merits. In "Ex parte Karstendick" (1876), the Court held that a federal court had no statutory authority to sentence a defendant to hard labor at a state prison outside of its territorial jurisdiction. In "Ex parte Jackson" (1877), the Court considered several constitutional issues, including the Postal Power, the application of the First Amendment to mail-order gambling, and the application of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement to the mail. In "Ex parte Lothrop" (1886), the Court found that the Arizona territorial courts were properly constituted. In "In re Sawyer" (1888), the Court granted the writ to state judges imprisoned by a federal judge for violating an injunction.
In "Ex parte Clarke" (1879), the Court held that a habeas petition filed with a single justice would be referred to the entire Court.
In "Ex parte Royall" (1886), for the first time, the Court was petitioned to grant an original writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner in state custody. The Court held that, assuming it had such a power, it should not be exercised except in special circumstances:
It is sufficient to say that if this court has power, under existing legislation, and upon habeas corpus, to discharge the petitioner, who is in custody under the process of a state court of original jurisdiction, for trial on an indictment charging him with an offense against the laws of that state,-upon which it is not necessary to express an opinion,-such power ought not, for the reasons given in the other cases just decided, to be exercised in advance of his trial.
In "Ex parte Fonda" (1886), the Court denied leave to file an original habeas petition, citing "Royall". In "Ex parte Ayers" (1887), the Court denied a state-prisoner petition on the merits, finding that the state tax law did not violate the Contracts Clause.
Habeas appeals.
During the Chase Court-era, Congress had stripped the Court of the authority to hear appeals from habeas petitions in the circuit courts. In "Ex parte Royall" (1884), the Waite Court dismissed such an appeal, holding that the jurisdiction had never been restored. But, the Court did retain jurisdiction over habeas appeals in a limited subset of cases. For example, in "Wales v. Whitney" (1885), the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia's denial of a habeas petition on the meits, holding that it had no power to review a navy courts martial. Similarly, in "Roberts v. Reilly" (1885), the Court affirmed a denial of habeas corpus on the merits, but held that it had jurisdiction to consider such appeals under the Extradition Act.
In 1885, Congress restored the authority of the Supreme Court to hear appeals from habeas petitions in the circuit courts. In "Ex parte Royall" (1886), the first case heard under the new statute, the court affirmed a habeas denial, holding that the lower federal courts had discretion to grant or deny habeas relief while the petitioner had not exhausted potential state court remedies. In "Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail of Hudson County" (1887), the Court denied another such appeal, holding that the consular treaty with Belgium had not deprived New Jersey of its power to punish a murder committed on a docked foreign vessel. But, in "Baldwin v. Franks" (1887), the Court granted the writ on appeal, holding that the Reconstruction-era civil rights crime statute applied only to those who deprived U.S. citizens (and not foreign nationals) of their rights.
Certificates of division.
In "Ex parte Tom Tong" (1883), the Court held that—under 1872 amendments to the certification procedure, which went into effect during the Chase Court-era—because habeas corpus was a civil proceeding, questions arising in habeas cases could not be certified to the Supreme Court until a final judgment had been entered. In "United States v. Hamilton" (1883), the Court reaffirmed its earlier holdings that certificates could not issue from motions to quash an indictment.
Prerogative writs.
The Waite Court heard two criminal cases under the prerogative writ of mandamus (habeas corpus is also a prerogative writ). In "Virginia v. Rives" (1879), the Court used mandamus to order a criminal cases removed to federal court under the civil rights removal statute to be remanded back to state court, finding that the statute did not authorize federal jurisdiction because the bar on African-Americans serving on juries was not codified by statute or state constitution. In "Ex parte Wall" (1883), the Court denied a writ of mandamus, finding that it was proper to remove an attorney who participated in a lynch mob from a case.
Defining federal crimes.
Bankruptcy fraud.
In "United States v. Fox" (1877), the Court held that the criminal bankruptcy fraud statute exceeded Congress's powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Civil rights.
In "United States v. Cruikshank" (1875), the Court overturned a conviction under the civil rights crime statute, holding that the First and Second Amendment were not incorporated against the states and the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to state action. In "United States v. Reese" (1875), the Court overturned another civil rights conviction for depriving African-Americans of the right to vote, holding that the statute was void for vagueness as applied to voter suppression. In "United States v. Harris" (1883), known as the "Ku Klux Case", the Court invalidated as unconstitutional the civil rights crime statute that applied to conspiracies to deprive state-law rights and privileges.
But, in "United States v. Gale" (1883), the Court upheld a statute that punished state officers for misconduct in federal Congressional elections. And, in "United States v. Waddell" (1884), the Court upheld a criminal civil rights law as applied to the rights of Homesteaders. In "Ex parte Virginia" (1880) and "Ex parte Siebold" (1879), the Court held that the civil rights crime statute was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. In "The Ku Klux Cases" (1884), the Court upheld a conviction for a conspiracy to prevent voters from voting for federal officials, finding a relevant constitutional right.
Counterfeiting.
In "United States v. Carll" (1881), the Court defined the mens rea required under the counterfeiting statute. In "Ex parte Carll" (1883), the Court held that the offense of counterfeiting was stated where the name of the original payee had been erased and replaced.
In "United States v. Arjona" (1887), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a prohibition on counterfeiting the notes of foreign banks and corporations under the Foreign Commerce Clause and the law of nations power.
Embezzlement.
In "United States v. Britton" (1883), the Court issued four opinions on the subject of the misapplication of public funds. In "United States v. Smith" (1888), the Court held that the clerk of the Collector of Customs was not a public officer and thus was not indictable for embezzlement.
Extortion under color of office.
Section 12 of the Crimes Act of 1825 punished extortion under color of office:
Every officer of the United States who is guilty of extortion under color of his office shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment not more than one year, according to the aggravation of his offence.
In "United States v. Germaine" (1878), the Court held that § 12 applied only to defendants who were officers within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of Article Two of the United States Constitution. Because Germaine (a surgeon appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions) was not appointed by the President, a court of law, or a head of a department, the Court held that he was not covered by the statute. The key dispute was whether the Commissioner of Pensions was a head of a department. "Germaine" held that the phrase "Heads of Departments" in the Appointments Clause had the same referent as the phrase "principal Officer" in the Opinions Clause of Article Two. Further, the Court held the definition of "inferior Officer[]" turned on "tenure, duration, emolument, and duties [that] were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary."
Fraud on the United States.
An 1873 statute punished fraud in connection with claims against the United States. In "United States v. Hall" (1878), the Court upheld the conviction of a ward who had withheld from a guardian the proceeds of such a claim. In "United States v. Benecke" (1878), the Court held that the statute did not apply to money withheld before its passage.
In "United States v. Irvine" (1878), a prosecution concerning a lawyer who withheld money from a client, the Court held that the crime was not a continuing offense was thus was susceptible to the statute of limitations. In "United States v. Hirsch" (1879), the Court held that the crime was subject to a 5-year statute of limitations, rather than the 3-year statute of limitations under the revenue laws.
Mail fraud.
In "Ex parte Henry" (1887), the Court held that each mailing can form the basis for a separate count of mail fraud.
Perjury.
In "United States v. Curtis" (1883), the Court held that a false oath taken before a notary public could not be the basis for a perjury conviction because a notary has no power to issue such an oath. But, in "United States v. Ambrose" (1883), the Court held that an accounting of services given to a clerk of court is a "certification" covered by the statute.
Private money.
In "United States v. Van Auken" (1877), the Court held that the offense of circulating private legal tender did not apply to the circulation of a bill which stated that it was payable in goods only.
Revenue laws.
In "United States v. Norton" (1875), the Court held that the embezzlement of postal money orders was not an offense under the revenue laws. In "United States v. Spiegel" (1886), the Court held that possession of an uncancelled stamp for imported liquors was not a crime unless it had been intentionally removed.
Trademark.
In the "Trade-Mark Cases" (1879), a criminal prosecution under the new trademark law, the Court found the act unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.
Federal jurisdiction.
In "United States v. McBratney" (1881), the Court held that the federal government had failed to reserve criminal jurisdiction over Indian country in Colorado upon its admission as a U.S. state. Thus, it had no jurisdiction to try the murder of a non-Indian by a non-Indian on the Ute reservation.
In "Ex parte Crow Dog" (1883), the Court held that the Nonintercourse Act of 1834's exception for Indian-on-Indian crimes had not been repealed by the "bad men" clause of a treaty, and that therefore there was no federal jurisdiction to try such a crime. Congress responded by passing the Major Crimes Act. In "United States v. Kagama" (1886), the Court upheld the Major Crimes Act.
In "Tennessee v. Davis" (1879), the Court upheld the federal officer removal component of the Reconstruction-era removal statute (the civil rights removal component of which had come before the Chase Court).
"Davis v. South Carolina" (1883) concerned an attempt by a state court to continue criminal proceedings in spite of an effected federal officer removal. On the merits, the Court held that an assistant U.S. Marshall was entitled to official immunity. Further, the Court held that bail could not be forfeited for failing to appear in state court after the removal.
In "Ex parte Reed" (1879), the Court held that the clerk of the navy postmaster could permissible be tried by courts martial. In "Ex parte Mason" (1881), the Court held that courts martial jurisdiction extended to a military prison shooting and that the courts martial had the power to add a dishonorable discharge onto the maximum sentence authorized by Congress.
Criminal procedure.
Constitutional issues.
"Reynolds v. United States" (1878) was the first Supreme Court case where the defendant raised a Confrontation Clause issue. The Court held that the defendant's right to confront the witnesses (the alleged multiple wives) was forfeited by the wrongdoing of the defendant in procuring their absence.
In "Wilkerson v. Utah" (1879), the Court held that execution by firing squad was not cruel and unusual punishment.
In "Kring v. Missouri" (1883), the Court held that it violated double jeopardy for a statute to attempt to abrogate the rule that a guilty plea to second degree murder is an implied acquittal for first-degree murder. In "Bohanan v. Nebraska" (1886), without reaching the merits (but only deciding a motion to dismiss), the Court held that it had the authority to consider whether a second murder conviction in state court constituted double jeopardy.
In "Brooks v. Missouri" (1888), the Court held that a state rule requiring a new trial motion within four days of the verdict did not violate the Due Process Clause.
"Strauder v. West Virginia" (1880) and "Bush v. Kentucky" (1883) reversed convictions because of racial exclusion in the jury system.
"Hayes v. Missouri" (1887) rejected an equal protection challenge to a statute that provided the prosecution 8 peremptory challenges in small towns and 15 in large cities.
In "Kring v. Missouri" (1883), the Court also found that the statute violated the Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws (the plea was entered before the state constitutional amendment was passed). This alternative holding was overruled by "Collins v. Youngblood" (1990).
In "Ex parte Wilson" (1885) and "United States v. Petit" (1885), the Court held that hard labor is an infamous punishment and therefore that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment attached. In "Mackin v. United States" (1886), the Court held that an authorized sentence of two years imprisonment (even without hard labor) was sufficiently infamous to require a grand jury. In "Ex parte Bain" (1887) and "Parkinson v. United States" (1887), the Court held that an authorized sentence of one year in the penitentiary was sufficiently infamous.
In "Hurtado v. California" (1884), the Court held that the Grand Jury Clause was not incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. "Hurtado" remains good law, and—along with the Vicinage Clause of the Sixth Amendment and (maybe) the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment—the Grand Jury Clause remains the only criminal procedure provision of the Bill of Rights not to be incorporated.
Other.
In "United States v. Simmons" (1877), the Court assessed the sufficiency of an indictment charging the production of untaxed alcohol. The Court held that an indictment must either name the defendant or state that the defendant's name is unknown.
In "United States v. Hess" (1888), the Court held that a mail fraud indictment was insufficient where it merely parroted the words of the statute. Rather, the Court required a more specific description of the scheme and the fraud.
In "Smith v. United States" (1876) and "Bonahan v. Nebraska" (1887), the Court dismissed appeals pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
In "United States v. Gale" (1883), the Court held that a challenge to the composition of a grand jury (specifically, the disqualification of Confederate veterans) was waived after the defendant entered a plea.
In "United States v. Northway" (1887), the Court upheld the conviction of a bank president for a crime committed by his organization.
In "United States ex rel. Phillips v. Gaines" (1880), the Court held that it had no power to award costs in criminal cases.
In "Ex parte Hitz" (1884), the Court found that a Swiss consul indicted for embezzlement had no diplomatic immunity because he had resigned before the indictment.
Criminal investigations.
"Ex parte Jackson" (1877) was perhaps the first criminal Fourth Amendment case to reach the Supreme Court. The Court held that a warrant was required to open mail. In "Ex parte Spies" (1887), the Court held that a Fourth Amendment claim was waived because the facts establishing the legality of the search did not appear in the record.
In "United States v. Rauscher" (1886), the Court vacated the conviction of a defendant who had been extradited from Great Britain to the United States, but not in conformity with the extradition treaty between the two countries. Justice Gray concurred, and Chief Justice Waite dissented. But, in "Ker v. Illinois" (1886), involving a defendant apprehended in Peru—a country which also had such a treaty but which had recently experienced a coup that interfered with the extradition process—the Court held that a defendant could raise no objection to the legality of his capture.


Caesar von Hofacker

Caesar von Hofacker (sometimes Cäsar) (2 March 1896 – 20 December 1944) was a German Luftwaffe Lieutenant Colonel and member of the 20 July plot against Adolf Hitler.
Career.
Hofacker was born in Ludwigsburg; his father Eberhard von Hofacker was a general in World War I.
Hofacker's main activity in relation to the events culminating in the attempted assassination of Hitler at the Wolf's Lair on 20 July 1944 consisted of acting as a secret liaison between his cousin, Claus Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg, and another plotter in occupied Paris, General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, France's military governor, to whom he was personal adviser. Hofacker assessed the chances of the coup attempt as "only ten percent". He had a point of introduction to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel as Rommel served under the Hofacker's father in World War I; Rommel considered the elder Hofacker something of a hero. Hofacker tried to draw Rommel into the plot to rid Germany of Hitler, but although Rommel gave his backing to the conspiracy Rommel did not agree that Hitler should be killed.
On 26 July 1944, Hofacker was arrested in Paris, taken to Berlin Gestapo headquarters where, according to William Shirer in "The Rise and Fall of the 3rd Reich", he was horrifically tortured and gave up the name of Erwin Rommel stating that Rommel said to "Tell the people in Berlin they can count on me". This was support for the conspiracy to overthrow Hitler, not to kill him - but this made no difference to Hitler who ordered the forced suicide of Erwin Rommel and false hero's funeral. The torture confession was taken down and Hofacker was put on trial before the "Volksgerichtshof". He was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. He was hanged at Plötzensee Prison in Berlin.


Frederik Motzfeldt

Frederik Motzfeldt (2 November 1779 – 2 January 1848) was a Norwegian politician. He was a member of the Norwegian Constituent Assembly at Eidsvoll in 1814.
Motzfeldt was born at Skaun in Sør-Trøndelag, Norway. He was raised in Trondhjem. He was the son of Major Jacob Motzfeldt (1744–1816) and Sophia Cathrine Mühlenphort (1751–1789). He was a cousin of Peter Motzfeldt and Carl Frederik Motzfeldt. He graduated as cand.jur. in 1801.
He worked as both stipendiary magistrate ("byfoged") and district stipendiary magistrate ("sorenskriver") at Molde in Romsdal, Norway. He was a member of the Norwegian Constituent Assembly in 1814, representing Molde. He generally supported the position of the Independence Party
("Selvstendighetspartiet").
He left Molde later in 1814 to work as a Supreme Court assessor. In 1821 he was appointed Auditor General of Norway, a post he held until 1827. He continued to work at the Office of the Auditor General of Norway to 1845. He was elected to the Norwegian Parliament in 1830, representing the constituency of Christiania. He had been a deputy representative in 1827.


Tripartitum

The Tripartitum or Opus Tripartitum (in full, , "Customary Law of the Renowned Kingdom of Hungary in Three Parts") is a manual of Hungarian customary law completed in 1514 by István Werbőczy and first published at Vienna in 1517. Although it never received official approval, it was highly influential and went through fifty editions in three hundred years. The "Tripartitum" did not include the so-called written law (parliamentary laws, royal decrees and statutes of the assemblies of the counties and the statutes of the free royal cities), which were always recorded in the law books after the decisions.
Werbőczy was a petty nobleman and the "Tripatitum" "enshrines the ideals of a typical contemporary member of his class". It asserts the privileges of the nobility against the crown, the equality of all nobles as against the claims of superiority of the upper nobility (magnates) and the onerous duties of serfs. A peasant revolt led by György Dózsa had been suppressed earlier in 1514, which influenced Werbőczy harsh treatment of serfs. The "Tripartitum" played a large role in perpetuating Hungary's feudal system.


Trial of Joseph Spell

The trial of Joseph Spell, State of Connecticut v. Joseph Spell, was a 1940 legal case in which an African-American chauffeur was accused of raping Eleanor Strubing, a wealthy white woman who was his boss. The accusations and trial made sensational headlines. Spell was represented by Samuel Friedman and Thurgood Marshall. The case featured in the 2017 film "Marshall".
Spell, who was African-American, worked as a chauffeur for a wealthy white woman. After 17 hours of questioning, Spell confessed to being intimate with her, but (contrary to police accounts) said that he had never confessed to raping her. The jury in 1940 ruled him not guilty of rape.
Background.
Spell was born in Lafayette, Louisiana in 1909. He served for six years in the U.S. Army before being dishonorably discharged after getting drunk, stealing an officer's car, and crashing it. He married at 17, split with his wife after three months, but never got a divorce, and was living in the attic of his employer's home with his common law spouse Virgis Clark, who was employed by the Strubings as a cook.
After his accuser was cross-examined and contradictions in her story exposed, Spell was acquitted. Immediately after the trial Marshall travelled to Oklahoma to assist with the defense of W.D. Lyons.
In media.
Some elements of the trial and surrounding events were depicted in the 2017 movie "Marshall". Spell was portrayed by Sterling K. Brown and Thurgood Marshall by Chadwick Boseman.


Haarmann Hemmelrath

Haarmann Hemmelrath was a German professional services firm which provided legal services, audit counsel and tax advice. Haarmann Hemmelrath was founded in Munich in 1987 and at its peak employed 650 professionals, including 350 attorneys in 22 offices worldwide. It was broken up in 2006.
History.
Haarmann Hemmelrath was founded in Munich in 1987. Haarmann Hemmelrath grew quickly, becoming one of a small number of German law firms to build a successful international network in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Asia.
During 2000, Haarmann Hemmelrath opened offices in London, Belgium and Moscow.
In February 2004, Haarmann Hemmelrath completed a major internal restructuring, including the overhaul of its partnership structure and profits distribution system.
In July 2005 one of Haarmann Hemmelrath's founding partners, Wilhelm Haarmann, announced their intention to leave the firm following disagreements over the firm's strategy.
In 2006 Haarmann Hemmelrath disintegrated as a result of continuing internal feuds over the distribution of profits in the partnership. Its Berlin and Shanghai offices joined Anglo-French firm Salans while most of its London and Frankfurt offices joined Squire, Sanders & Dempsey. White & Case absorbed the firm's Munich office to launch in that city. The Moscow office split up, with two partners joining LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, and the rest of the 28-strong team joining CMS Hasche Sigle. In January 2006, Wilhem Haarmann launched a boutique law firm in Frankfurt am Main, Haarmann, with several former Haarmann Hemmelrath attorneys and tax advisors.
Commentators viewed Haarmann Hemmelrath's collapse as another indicator that independent German law firms were unable to compete with international British and American heavyweights that had been making inroads into the German legal market. Many medium to large sized German firms had merged with international firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example Pünder, Volhard, Weber & Axster which joined with Clifford Chance and Boesebeck Droste with Lovells, both in 1999. The following year Bruckhaus Westrick Heller Löber and Deringer Tessin Herrmann & Sedemund merged with UK-based Freshfields to form Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer.
Offices.
Haarmann Hemmelrath had offices in the following locations:


R v DeSousa

R v DeSousa [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, is the Supreme Court of Canada case where the Court determined the Constitutionally required level for "mens rea" for the charge of "unlawfully causing bodily harm". The case is one of a series of cases including "R. v. Hundal" and "R. v. Creighton" where the Court reduced the requirement for culpability for a number of crimes.
Background.
Shortly before midnight, during a New Year party in Toronto on December 31, 1987, a fight broke out. Several people started throwing bottles including Joao DeSousa who threw a bottle that ricocheted off the wall and hit Teresa Santos in the forearm causing serious harm.
DeSousa was charged with unlawfully causing bodily harm contrary to s.269 of the Criminal Code.
The issue before the Court was whether s.269 of the Criminal Code violated the s.7 of the Charter as it potentially allowed for prison sentences for "Absolute Liability" offences (which was deemed unconstitutional in "Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act").
Ruling.
Justice Sopinka, writing for the Court, held that s.269 did not violate s.7.
The charge itself is broken down into two separate requirements. First, there must be an underlying offence (the "unlawful act") with a valid "mens rea" requirement. This includes provincial and federal offences, criminal or otherwise, but precludes any absolute liability offences. Secondly, the "unlawful act" must be at least "objectively dangerous" so that a reasonable person would realize that the act created a risk of bodily harm. Due to the lack of "stigma" or any sort of significant prison sentence attached to the offence it did not warrant a higher "subjective fault" requirement ("R. v. Martineau").
The Court dismissed the argument that the offence would punish the morally innocent by not requiring proof of intention to bring about the consequences. Instead the offence aims to prevent "objectively dangerous" acts (this justification was elaborated on in "R. v. Creighton").


Pramoedya Ananta Toer

Pramoedya Ananta Toer (EYD: Pramudya Ananta Tur) (6 February 1925 – 30 April 2006) was an Indonesian author of novels, short stories, essays, polemics and histories of his homeland and its people. His works span the colonial period under Dutch rule, Indonesia's struggle for independence, its occupation by Japan during the Second World War, as well as the post-colonial authoritarian regimes of Sukarno and Suharto, and are infused with personal and national history.
Pramoedya's writings sometimes fell out of favour with the colonial and later the authoritarian native governments in power. He faced censorship in Indonesia during the pre-"Refomasi" era even though he was well-known outside Indonesia. The Dutch imprisoned him from 1947 to 1949 during the War of Independence (1945-1949). During the transition to the Suharto regime, he was caught up in the shifting tides of political change and power struggles. Suharto had him imprisoned from 1969 to 1979 on the Maluku island of Buru and branded him a Communist. He was seen as a holdover from the previous regime, despite having struggled with it. It was on the Island of Buru that he composed his most famous work, the Buru Quartet. Not permitted access to writing materials, he recited the story orally to other prisoners before it was written down and smuggled out.
Pramoedya opposed some policies of founding President Sukarno as well as the New Order regime of Suharto, Sukarno's successor. Political criticisms were often subtle in his writing, although he was outspoken against colonialism, racism and corruption of the Indonesian new government. During the many years in which he suffered imprisonment and house arrest (in Jakarta after his imprisonment on Buru), he became a "cause célèbre" for advocates of human rights and freedom of expression.
Early years.
Pramoedya was born on 6 February 1925, in the town of Blora in the heartland of Java, then a part of the Dutch East Indies. He was the firstborn son in his family; his father was a teacher, who was also active in Boedi Oetomo (the first recognized indigenous national organization in Indonesia) and his mother was a rice trader. His maternal grandfather had taken the pilgrimage to Mecca. As it is written in his semi-autobiographical collection of short stories "Cerita Dari Blora", his name was originally Pramoedya Ananta Mastoer. However, he felt that the family name Mastoer (his father's name) seemed too aristocratic. The Javanese prefix "Mas" refers to a man of the higher rank in a noble family. Consequently, he omitted "Mas" and kept Toer as his family name. He went on to the Radio Vocational School in Surabaya but had barely graduated from the school when Japan invaded Surabaya (1942).
During World War II, Pramoedya (like many Indonesian Nationalists, Sukarno and Suharto among them) at first supported the occupying forces of Imperial Japan. He believed the Japanese to be the lesser of two evils, compared to the Dutch. He worked as a typist for a Japanese newspaper in Jakarta. As the war went on, however, Indonesians were dismayed by the austerity of wartime rationing and by increasingly harsh measures taken by the Japanese military. The Nationalist forces loyal to Sukarno switched their support to the incoming Allies against Japan; all indications are that Pramoedya did as well.
On 17 August 1945, after the news of Allied victory over Japan reached Indonesia, Sukarno proclaimed Indonesian independence. This touched off the Indonesian National Revolution against the forces of the British and Dutch. In this war, Pramoedya joined a paramilitary group in Karawang, Kranji (West Java) and eventually was stationed in Jakarta. During this time he wrote short stories and books, as well as propaganda for the Nationalist cause. He was eventually imprisoned by the Dutch in Jakarta in 1947 and remained there until 1949, the year the Netherlands recognised Indonesian independence. While imprisoned in Bukit Duri from 1947 to 1949 for his role in the Indonesian Revolution, he wrote his first major novels "The Fugitive" and "Guerilla Family" with financial support from the Opbouw-Pembangoenan foundation, which also published the books.
Post-Independence prominence.
In the first years after the struggle for independence, Pramoedya wrote several works of fiction dealing with the problems of the newly founded nation, as well as semi-autobiographical works based on his wartime memoirs. He was soon able to live in the Netherlands as part of a cultural exchange program. In the years that followed, he took an interest in several other cultural exchanges, including trips to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, as well as translations of Russian writers Maxim Gorky and Leo Tolstoy.
In Indonesia, Pramoedya built up a reputation as a literary and social critic, joining the left-wing writers' group Lekra and writing in various newspapers and literary journals. His writing style became more politically charged, as evidenced in his story "Korupsi" ("Corruption"), a critical fiction of a civil servant who falls into the trap of corruption. This created friction between him and the government of Sukarno.
From the late 1950s, Pramoedya began teaching literary history at the left-wing "Universitas Res Publica". As he prepared material, he began to realise that the study of Indonesian language and literature had been distorted by the Dutch colonial authorities. He sought out materials that had been ignored by colonial educational institutions, and which had continued to be ignored after independence.
Having spent time in China, he became greatly sympathetic to the Indonesian Chinese over the persecutions they faced in post-colonial Indonesia. Most notably, he published a series of letters addressed to an imaginary Chinese correspondent discussing the history of the Indonesian Chinese, called "Hoakiau di Indonesia" (History of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia). He criticised the government for being too centred on Java and insensitive to the needs and desires of the other regions and peoples of Indonesia. As a result, he was arrested by the Indonesian military and jailed at Cipinang prison for nine months.
Imprisonment under Suharto.
In an October 1965 coup, the army took power after alleging that the assassination of several senior generals was masterminded by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). The transition to Suharto's New Order followed, and Pramoedya's position as the head of People's Cultural Organisation, a literary group with connections to the PKI, caused him to be considered a communist and enemy of the "New Order" regime. During the violent anti-Communist purge, he was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned by Suharto's government and named a "tapol" ("political prisoner"). His books were banned from circulation, and he was imprisoned without trial, first in Nusa Kambangan off the southern coast of Java, and then in the penal colony of Buru in the eastern islands of the Indonesian archipelago.
He was banned from writing during his imprisonment on the island of Buru but still managed to compose - orally - his best-known series of work to date, the Buru Quartet, a series of four historical fiction novels chronicling the development of Indonesian nationalism and based in part on his own experiences growing up. The English titles of the books in the tetralogy are "This Earth of Mankind", "Child of All Nations", "Footsteps", and "House of Glass". The main character of the series, Minke, a Javanese minor royal, was based in part on an Indonesian journalist active in the nationalist movement, Tirto Adhi Surjo.
The quartet includes strong female characters of Indonesian and Chinese ethnicity and addresses the discrimination and indignities of living under colonial rule, and the struggle for personal and national political independence. Like much of Pramoedya's work, it tells personal stories and focuses on individuals caught up in the tide of a nation's history.
Pramoedya had researched for the books before his imprisonment in the Buru prison camp. When he was arrested, his library was burned, and much of his collection and early writings were lost. In Buru, he was not permitted even to have a pencil. Doubting that he would ever be able to write the novels down himself, he narrated them to his fellow prisoners. With the support of other prisoners who took on extra labour to reduce his workload, Pramoedya was eventually able to write the novels down, and the published works derived their name "Buru Quartet" after the prison. They have been collected and published in English (translated by Max Lane) and Indonesian, as well as many other languages. Though the work is considered a classic by many outside of Indonesia, the publication was banned in Indonesia, causing one of the most famous of Indonesia's literary works to be mostly unavailable to the country's people whose history it addressed. Copies were scanned by Indonesians abroad and distributed via the Internet to people inside the country.
Pramoedya's works on colonial Indonesia recognised the importance of Islam as a vehicle for widespread opposition to the Dutch, but his works are not overtly religious. He rejected those who used religion to deny critical thinking, and on occasion wrote with considerable negativity to the religiously pious.
Release and subsequent works.
Pramoedya was released from imprisonment in 1979 but remained under house arrest in Jakarta until 1992. During this time he released "The Girl From the Coast", another semi-fictional novel based on his grandmother's own experience (volumes 2 and 3 of this work were destroyed along with his library in 1965). He also wrote "Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu" (1995); "A Mute's Soliloquy", an autobiography based on the letters that he wrote for his daughter from imprisonment in Buru but were not allowed to be sent, and "Arus Balik" (1995).
He wrote many columns and short articles criticising the Indonesian government. He wrote a book "Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkeraman Militer" ("Young Virgins in the Military's Grip"), a documentary written showcasing the plight of Javanese women who were forced to become comfort women during the Japanese occupation and were subsequently subject to oppression by their own Indonesian society. The women were brought to Buru where they were sexually abused by the Japanese and ended up staying there instead of returning to Java. Pramoedya's fellow political prisoners were able to meet some of these women (generally only once) and relate this information to Pramoedya, who wrote it down in narrative form in the 1970s, providing the basis for the book published in 2001.
Pramoedya was hospitalised on 27 April 2006, for complications brought on by diabetes and heart disease. He was also a heavy smoker of Kretek (clove) cigarettes and had endured years of abuse while in detention. After his release, his health deteriorated and on April 30 he passed away in his daughter's home. Pramoedya earned several accolades and was frequently discussed as Indonesia's and Southeast Asia's best candidate for a Nobel Prize in Literature.
Pramoedya's writings on Indonesia address the international and regional currents caused by political events in history and how these events flowed through his homeland and buffeted its people. Pramoedya also shares a personal history of hardship and detention for his efforts of self-expression and the political aspects of his writings and struggled against the censorship of his work by the leaders of his own people.
Further reading.
Books on Pramoedya Ananta Toer


United States Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction

The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, also known as the Joint Committee of Fifteen, was a joint committee of the 39th United States Congress that played a major role in Reconstruction in the wake of the American Civil War. It was created to "inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called Confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled to be represented in either house of Congress.”
This committee also drafted the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, though some changes were later made by the full Congress. The committee successfully recommended that Congress refuse to readmit southern states to representation in Congress until they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.
Establishment and composition.
The committee was established on December 13, 1865, after both houses reached agreement on an amended version of a House concurrent resolution introduced by Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania to establish a joint committee of 15 members. Stevens and Senator William P. Fessenden of Maine served as co-chairmen. The joint committee divided into four subcommittees to hear testimony and gather evidence, the first subcommittee handled Tennessee; the second handled Virginia and the Carolinas; the third handled Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas; and, the fourth subcommittee handled Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. In all, 144 witnesses were called to testify.
The joint committee included nine members from the House, and six from the Senate. The House members were Congressman Stevens (R-PA), Elihu Washburne (R-IL), Justin Morrill (R-VT), John A. Bingham (R-OH), Roscoe Conkling (R-NY), George Boutwell (R-MA), Henry Blow (R-MO), Henry Grider (D-KY), and Andrew Jackson Rogers (D-NJ). The Senate members were Chairman Fessenden (R-ME), James W. Grimes (R-IA), Jacob Howard (R-MI), George Henry Williams (R-OR), Ira Harris (R-NY), and Reverdy Johnson (D-MD).
Journal and report.
The decisions of the committee were recorded in its journal, but the journal did not reveal the committee's debates or discussions which were deliberately kept secret. However, once the committee had completed work on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, several of its members spoke out, including Senator Howard who gave a long speech to the full Senate in which he presented "in a very succinct way, the views and the motives which influenced that committee, so far as I understand those views and motives."
The joint committee also produced a report after Congress had already given final approval to send the draft Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification, and the report was widely disseminated. The report was signed by twelve of the committee's fifteen members, and a minority report was signed by the other three members: Johnson, Rogers, and Grider. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was not revived at the next Congress.


Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation

The Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation (TCCDR) was a legal code introduced by the British in Iraq in 1916. The TCCDR was incorporated into the Iraqi Constitution in 1925. The regulation gave significant tax-levying and judicial powers to the Hashemite monarchy.


Cay von Brockdorff

Cay von Brockdorff (9 February 1915 - 17 January 1999) was a German sculptor and art historian who after 1933 became an anti-Nazi resistance activist.
Life.
Cay-Hugo Graf von Brockdorff ("Cay-Hugo, the Count of Brockdorff") was born in the Berlin quarter of Schmargendorf. He was the son of Count Ludwig von Brockdorff (1881-1938), a district judge and his wife Erika Hildegard Therese Martha von Spalding (1892-1940). His grandfather, , had been a cavalry officer and a theosophist-anthroposophist.
He studied at the in Berlin-Charlottenburg where he was taught by the sculptor . After that he launched himself as a freelance visual artist. Through his studies he made contacts with people who would later become opposition activists in the Charlottenburg district, and members of the group around Kurt Schumacher who would be arrested by the Gestapo in 1942.
In or before 1931 von Brockdorff became a member of the Communist Party and of the Socialist Workers' Party ("Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands" / SAP). In January 1933 the Nazis took power and lost no time in transforming Germany into a one-party dictatorship. Political activism (except in support of the Nazi party) became illegal. Sources nevertheless indicate that from 1936 he was involved in "illegal work" in various groups of "intellectuals" and "workers".
In 1937 he married Erika Schönfeldt (1911-1943). Their daughter Saskia was born towards the end of October 1937. In 1939 he linked up with Hans Coppi who around this time became a member of the so-called Rote Kapelle ("inaccurately but conventionally translated into English as "Red Orchestra"") resistance group. Erika von Brockdorff would later put her Berlin apartment at the disposal of Coppi for use as a radio communication centre, connecting with Moscow, as a result of which she was arrested and, on 13 May 1943, executed. Meanwhile, war having broken out in September 1939, Cay von Brockdorff found himself serving in the army between July and October 1940, and again between April 1941 and October 1942.
In 1942, while serving on the Russian Front, von Brockdorff was arrested because of his involvement in the Red Orchestra group. He was found guilty of "preparing to commit high treason" and sentenced to a four year prison term before being transferred to serve in a punishment battalion. The time-lines are not entirely clear, but it does appear he never had the chance to communicate with his wife before she died, although a short moving letter of valediction that she wrote to him shortly before her execution does survive. Between 1943 and November 1946 Cay von Brockdorff was held by the British military authorities as a prisoner of war in Italy.
After May 1945 the central portion of Germany surrounding Berlin was administered as the Soviet occupation zone, and it was to the Soviet zone that Brockdorff returned. April 1946 saw the contentious political merger that created the Socialist Unity Party ("Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands" / SED) which after October 1949 became the ruling party in the Soviet sponsored German Democratic Republic, a new kind of German one-party dictatorship. By the end of 1946 Brockdorff had become an SED party member. His daughter later recalled that following her mother's death, in the Soviet zone (later East Germany), she and her father "enjoyed many advantages, because [surviving] members of [what the Nazis had disparagingly termed] the "Rote Kapelle" ("Red Orchestra") were celebrated as antifascist heroes."
Between 1947 and 1949 Brockdorff was employed as a senior official in the "German Administration for People's Education" ("Deutschen Verwaltung für Volksbildung"). During this period, in 1948, he married the author and former resistance activist . They set up home together at near Zossen, a short distance to the south of Berlin. In 1950 Cay von Brockdorff received a doctorate.
In 1953 Brockdorff became the first editor in chief of the magazine , a publication produced jointly by the and by the state approved , an organisation to which those wishing to pursue a career in the visual arts were in effect obliged to belong. However, during 1954 he resigned the editorship and resumed his life as a "freelance artist". His successor, who took over with effect from Issue 3 of the newly launched publication, was another surviving anti-Nazi resistance activist, the cartoonist and caricaturist Herbert Sandberg who, despite a discretely satirical approach, managed to stay in the post till 1957. Between 1955 and 1956 he was deputy general director of the State Art Collection in Dresden. After that, From Autumn 1957 till his retirement, he was director at the newly rebuilt Marcher Museum in Berlin.
Towards the end of the 1950s he was excluded from the party.
Output.
Cay von Brockdorff wrote a number of books on art history, notably "Soviet Artists, building peace" (1952), "Soviet and pre-revolutionary Russian art" (1953 ), "German Painting" (1954) and "Finnish graphic art" (1954).


Political Parties Order, 2002

The Political Parties Order, 2002 was an executive order in Pakistan stating that any person can become a member of a political party as long as they are not in the service of Pakistan and that a person cannot become a political party office-bearer if they are disqualified from being a parliamentarian by Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The order was repealed by the Election Act, 2017.


Nazi Anti-Flag Desecration Law

The Nazi Anti-Flag Desecration Law was not a Nazi law, but an amendment to the Second Reich Strafgesetzbuch signed into law as a "Notverordnung" in the Weimarer Republik on 19 December 1932 by Reichspräsident Paul von Hindenburg and the cabinet of Reichskanzler Kurt von Schleicher, making it illegal to desecrate the flag by "insulting or maliciously and with intent belittling" the Reich, the Länder, their constitution, colors, or flags, or the Wehrmacht.
 Initially, §134a StGB protected only the flag of the democratic Germany.
Later legislation, on 12 March 1933, and the "" of 15 September 1935, extended the protection to the "Hakenkreuzfahne".
Paragraph introduced by Reichspräsident von Hindenburg on 19 December 1932.
§134a StGB
 § 134a. Wer öffentlich das Reich oder eines der Länder, ihre Verfassung,
 ihre Farben oder Flaggen oder die deutsche Wehrmacht beschimpft
 oder böswillig und mit Überlegung verächtlich macht,
 wird mit Gefängnis bestraft.
Case studies of §134a application.
21 December 1934: Defendant acquitted of desecrating SS flag.
On 21 December 1934, a defendant accused of desecrating the SS flag was acquitted, because the insignia of a sub-organisation of the NSDAP were not considered protected under §134a StGB.
26 July 1935: New York demonstrators acquitted of tearing down NSDAP flag.
On 26 July 1935 in New York a group of demonstrators boarded the "SS Bremen", tore the Nazi party flag from the jackstaff and threw it into the Hudson River. The German ambassador sharply protested, but the protest was rejected, with the judgement that only a party symbol was harmed and the national flag was not affected. On 15 September 1935, in response to this incident, the "Reichsflaggengesetz" (Reichs flag law) (RGBl. I S. 1145) came into effect, declaring the Nazi flag to be the exclusive national flag of Germany and removing the status of the black-white-red tricolor flag of the German Empire as co-national flag.
Laws specifying which flag is the German national flag.
Black-red-white flag reintroduced and Nazi flag introduced on 12 March 1933.
After the Nazi Party seized power on 30 January 1933, the black-red-gold flag was swiftly scrapped; a ruling on 12 March established two legal national flags: the reintroduced black-white-red imperial tricolour and the flag of the Nazi Party.
Reichsflaggengesetz, 15 September 1935.
The "" that declared the "Hakenkreuzfahne" as the only national flag was announced at the annual party rally in Nuremberg on 15 September 1935.
Current (as of 1 January 1975) version of the Anti-Flag Desecration Law.
§90a StGB
 § 90a. Verunglimpfung des Staates und seiner Symbole.
 (1) Wer öffentlich, in einer Versammlung oder durch Verbreiten von Schriften
 1. die Bundesrepublik Deutschland oder eines ihrer Länder oder ihre verfassungsmäßige Ordnung
 beschimpft oder böswillig verächtlich macht
 oder
 2. die Farben, die Flagge, das Wappen oder die Hymne der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 oder eines ihrer Länder verunglimpft,
 wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.
 (2) [1] Ebenso wird bestraft, wer eine öffentlich gezeigte Flagge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland oder eines ihrer Länder
 oder ein von einer Behörde öffentlich angebrachtes Hoheitszeichen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland oder eines ihrer Länder
 entfernt, zerstört, beschädigt, unbrauchbar oder unkenntlich macht oder beschimpfenden Unfug daran verübt.
 [2] Der Versuch ist strafbar.
 (3) Die Strafe ist Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahren oder Geldstrafe,
 wenn der Täter sich durch die Tat absichtlich für Bestrebungen
 gegen den Bestand der Bundesrepublik Deutschland oder gegen Verfassungsgrundsätze einsetzt.


Winny v. Whitesides

Winny v. Whitesides alias Prewitt (1 Mo. 472, 1824 WL 1839 [1824]) was the first freedom suit heard by the Supreme Court of Missouri. The case established the state's judicial criteria for an enslaved person's right to freedom. The court determined that if a slave owner took a slave into free territory and established residence there, the slave would be free. The slave remained free even if returned to slave territory, engendering the phrase "once free, always free."
For two decades, the "once free, always free" precedent was upheld in a number of freedom suits.
Territorial Law.
Winny filed suit in 1818, basing her claim on the laws of two U.S. territories, the Northwest Territory and the Louisiana Territory (renamed the Missouri Territory when the State of Louisiana joined the Union in 1812).
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established laws prohibiting slavery in the Northwest Territory, the region north of the Ohio River comprising the present-day states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. Article 6 of the ordinance declares, "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted: Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid."
The "Laws of the Territory of Louisiana" included "an act to enable persons held in slavery, to sue for their freedom" and a process for achieving that end.(Chapter 35, "Freedom," June 27, 1807)
"1. It shall be lawful for any person held in slavery to petition the general court or any court of common pleas, praying that such person may be permitted to sue as a poor person, and stating the grounds on which the claim to freedom is founded..."
"2. The court to whom application is thus made, may direct an action of assault and battery, and false imprisonment, to be instituted in the name of the person claiming freedom against the person who claims the petitioner as a slave..."
"3. If the court, or any judge thereof in vacation shall have reason to believe that the above order has been or is about to be violated, in such case the said court, or any judge thereof in vacation, may require that the person of the petitioner be brought before him or them, by writ of "habeas corpus", and shall cause the defendant or defendants, his, her, or their agent to enter into recognizance with sufficient security, conditioned as recited in the above order, or in case of refusal to direct the sheriff of the district to take possession of the petitioner, and hire hi or her to the best advantage, which hire shall be appropriated either to the petitioner, or to the defendant or defendants, as the event of the suit may justify...
"4. The court before whom such a suit may be tried, may instruct the jury that the weight of proof lies on the petitioner, but to have regard not only to the written evidences to claim of freedom, but to such other proofs either at law or in equity as the very right and justice as the case may require. And the court on a verdict in favor of the petitioner, may pronounce a judgement of liberation from the defendant or defendants, and all persons claiming by, from, or under, him, her, or them."
"5. Suits instituted in any court of common pleas under this law, may be removed into the general court before judgement, or if judgement is given in any such cause in the court of common pleas, appeal, or writ of error shall lie to the general court as in other cases."
Winny's Suit.
In 1794 or 1795, Phebe Whitesides and her husband lived in the Carolinas with a slave about 12 years of age called Winny. When the Whitesides moved to Illinois, then part of the Northwest Territory, they took Winny with them. The couple resided in Illinois for three or four years, retaining the girl in slavery. The Whitesides then moved to St. Louis, Missouri, once more bringing Winny with them and still holding her as a slave.
Winny filed suit to obtain her freedom from Mrs. Whitesides (Mr. Whitesides had died) in the Superior Court of Missouri Territory in 1818. When Missouri entered statehood, the case was transferred to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. The court assumed the Whitesides had held Winny as a slave in Missouri for about 20 years, at which time she petitioned for her liberty. The records do not explain why she waited to sue or what caused her to sue when she did.
Winny's claim against Phebe Whitesides was “assault and battery.” The term did not necessarily connote that Whitesides had been physically abusive, but meant that Whitesides was restraining Winny in an unlawful way, "i.e." “unlawful imprisonment.”
Whitesides refused liability on the grounds that Winny was her slave. She admitted to "imprisoning" Winny, but claimed the imprisonment was not unlawful, but justified since Winny was not free. Winny challenged this defense.
A jury trial began in February 1822. Winny's case centered on her assertion that residence in the Northwest Territory had conferred her freedom. Whitesides’ attorney asked that the jury be instructed Winny's residence in Illinois “did not render the said Winny free, under and by virtue of the ordinance of Congress of 1787.” The trial judge refused to give this instruction. Instead, he told the jury that if they believed the Whitesides resided in Illinois, with the intention of making the place their home, they should find for Winny and award damages to her as they would to any plaintiff in an action of false imprisonment.
The jury returned a verdict in Winny's favor and awarded her damages of $167.50.
Whitesides' Appeal.
Phebe Whitesides appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which heard the case in late 1824. Her argument consisted of three parts:
First, through the Articles of Confederation, "the [Continental] Congress had no power, either to purchase the said Territory, or to forbid, by law, that slaves should be held in that Territory.”
Second, even if Winny had been free in the Northwest Territory, she had not sued for her freedom or been declared free there. For 20 years, Winny had been a resident of Missouri a slave territory and state. According to Whitesides’ counsel, her right of ownership "revived so soon as the slave was found in Missouri, unless the slave had, while residing there [in the Northwest Territory], asserted and obtained his freedom by the process of law.” Counsel also argued concerning the willingness of the court of one jurisdiction to recognize and apply the law of another. A Missouri court, adjudicating the rights of Missouri residents, need not and should not apply the law of the Northwest Territory or Illinois.
Third, the Northwest Ordinance simply provided that there would not be slavery in the Northwest Territory. It did not state "that the slaves of persons settling in that country . . . thereby become free.
The Court's Decision.
The three-member court, Justice Mathias McGirk, Judge George Tompkins and Judge Rufus Pettibone unanimously found in Winny's favor. Tompkins wrote the decision.
As to the first argument, Tompkins conceded the Continental Congress might not have had the power, under the Articles of Confederation, to create the Northwest Territory, but declared that issue moot. As to the laws governing the region, the Constitution of 1789, "expressly placed this power of regulating the Territory where alone it could be exercised, in the Congress.” He noted that rules regulating the Territory included laws concerning slavery, “To acquire property is incident to sovereignty; so it is to make rules for the disposition and regulation thereof. To us it appears most manifest that Congress had both power to acquire the Territory, and to forbid the introduction of slaves.”
Addressing Whitesides' second point, Tompkins rejected the assumption that the Northwest Territory was akin to a separate nation, asserting it was the property of the states and subject to the laws enacted by those states. Even in situations involving different countries, he opined, “personal rights and disabilities, obtained or communicated by the laws of any particular place, are of a nature which accompany the person wherever he goes.” Assuming Winny had gained her freedom in the Northwest Territory, she retained that right, regardless of whether or not she sought or obtained a court decree confirming her status. "If, by a residence in Illinois, [Mrs. Whitesides] lost her right to the property in the defendant, that right was not revived by a removal of the parties to Missouri.”
An astonished Tompkins continued, "We did not suppose that any person could mistake the policy of Congress in making this provision. When the States assumed the right of self-government they found their citizens claiming a right of property in a miserable portion of the human race. Sound national policy required that the evil should be restricted as much as possible. What they could, they did. They said, by their representatives, it shall not vest within these limits, and by their acts for nearly half a century they have approved and sanctioned this declaration."
The justice did, however, dinstnguish between residence and transit. Freedom attached if the master brought the slave into free territory with the intent of residing there, but did not if master and slave simply passed through the territory. "The sovereign power of the United States has declared that 'neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist' there; and this court thinks that the person who takes his slave into said territory, and by the length of his residence there indicates an intention of making that place his residence and that of his slave, and thereby induces a jury to believe that fact, does, by such residence, declare his slave to have become a free man. But it has been urged that by such a construction of the ordinance every person traveling through the territory, and taking along with him his slave, might thereby lose his property in his slave. We do not think the instructions of the Circuit Court can be, by any fair construction, strained so far; nor do we believe that any advocate for this portion of the species ever seriously calculated on the possibility of such a decision."
Significance.
At the end of 1824, the Missouri General Assembly passed a law providing a process for enslaved persons to sue for freedom and have some protections in the process. The years between 1824 and 1844 are considered the "golden age" of freedom suits since many slaves won their freedom during these years. "Winny v. Whitesides" set the standard for determining freedom cases up until the 1850s.
Under its guidance, the courts of Missouri and Kentucky ruled in favor of slaves in most cases. Many of the successful petitions originated in St. Louis County. Between 1806 and 1865, in the City of St. Louis alone, nearly 300 enslaved individuals took legal action against their masters in a fight for freedom.
Notable cases include Merry v. Tiffin & Menard, LaGrange v. Chouteau, Theoteste alias Catiche v. Chouteau, Julia v. McKinney, Wilson v. Melvin and Rachel v. Walker.
The "once free, always free" precedent was overturned by the Missouri Supreme Court in "Dred Scott v. Irene Emerson" (1852) and the resulting U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857). Very few slaves pressed successful suits after 1852.


Edward G. Loring

Edward Greely Loring (January 28, 1802 – June 18, 1890) was a Judge of Probate in Massachusetts, a United States Commissioner of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and a Judge of the Court of Claims. He was reviled in Massachusetts and much of the North for his ordering the return of fugitive slaves Thomas Sims and Anthony Burns to slavery in compliance with the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. His action would result in his being removed as Judge of Probate.
Education and career.
Born on January 28, 1802, in Boston, Massachusetts, Loring received an Artium Baccalaureus degree in 1821 from Harvard University and read law with Charles Greely Loring in Boston in 1824. He entered private practice and concurrently served as a master in chancery in Suffolk County, Massachusetts starting in 1824. He was a United States Commissioner for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts from 1840 to 1855. He was a Judge of Probate for Suffolk County from 1847 to 1858. He was a lecturer for Dane Law School (now Harvard Law School) at Harvard University from 1852 to 1855.
Fugitive slave ruling and aftermath.
As United States Commissioner of the United States District Court, Loring was responsible for issuing warrants for arrest and ruling in cases under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which was widely opposed in Boston and the North. In 1851, an escaped slave named Thomas Sims was captured in Boston; Loring ordered his return to slavery in the South, as required by the new law. Boston abolitionists were outraged. In 1854, Loring ordered another escaped slave, Anthony Burns, returned to slavery in Virginia. During the prosecution of this case there was an attack on the courthouse in which James Batchelder, a 24-year-old police officer temporarily employed by the United States Marshal, was stabbed to death. Widespread protests marked the trial and its aftermath. President Franklin Pierce felt obliged to send United States troops to ensure that the ruling be carried out.
Following the Burns decision, abolitionists led by William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips agitated for Loring to be removed from his office as probate judge. Forming a Vigilance Committee to monitor judges' activities under the law, they circulated petitions and lobbied against Loring with the Massachusetts legislature. Though he had assisted Burns in his court case, attorney Richard Henry Dana Jr. defended Loring before the legislature. Under pressure from an increasingly antislavery public, the legislature made two unsuccessful attempts to remove Loring from office by passing a Bill of Address in 1855 and 1856. Governor Henry J. Gardner, elected as a candidate of the Know-Nothing Party, declined to remove him.
In 1857, after the Republican Nathaniel Prentice Banks was elected Governor of Massachusetts, the legislature passed another Bill of Address against Loring. The new governor complied and removed Loring from office.
Federal judicial service.
Loring was nominated by President James Buchanan on May 3, 1858, to a seat on the Court of Claims (later the United States Court of Claims) vacated by Judge John Gilchrist. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on May 6, 1858, by a vote of 27 to 13, and received his commission the same day. He served as Presiding Judge from 1859 to 1863. His service terminated on December 14, 1877, due to his resignation.
Death.
Loring died on June 19, 1890, in Winthrop, Massachusetts.
Family.
Loring was a fourth great grandson of New England pioneer Thomas Loring. His double cousin, also a lawyer, Charles Greely Loring, defended Thomas Sims in the 1851 action.


Saddler v. Republic

Saddler v. the Republic, Dallam 610 (1844), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas which held that although more than one person must take part in an affray, at trial, one may still be convicted even if the others charged are acquitted.
Background.
In the fall of 1843, the grand jury of Lamar County, Texas indicted Hiram Saddler, Thomas Doss, Joshua Dillingham and C. W. Saddler for an affray. Before trial, the prosecutor dropped charges against Dillingham, and the case went to trial against the other defendants. The jury found Hiram Saddler guilty, but acquitted the other two. Hiram Saddler appealed.
Decision.
Judge William B. Ochiltree issued the opinion of the Court. He noted that Hiram Saddler claimed that he could not be convicted if the others indicted with him were acquitted, and that it took more than one individual to create an affray, that they had to fight by consent. Ochiltree dismissed this contention, noting that fighting by consent was not part of the offense, but fight in public was, although not all parties need consent to the fight to be involved. Even if the others were acquitted, the conviction against Hiram Saddler was affirmed.


Jonas Rein

Jonas Rein (30 January 1760 – 21 November 1821) was a Norwegian priest, poet and member of the Norwegian Constituent Assembly at Eidsvoll in 1814.
Background.
He was born at Øksendal in Møre og Romsdal, Norway. He was the son of parish priest Ole Rein (1729–1792) and his wife Margretha Hansdatter Ross. She died two weeks after Jonas' birth. In 1763 the family moved to Jevnaker, where his father was hired as vicar. Rein took his examen artium in 1777, and studied at the University of Copenhagen. He started studying theology, but soon switched to literature and philosophy. He graduated in 1780. While a student in Copenhagen, he was a member of the Norwegian Society ("Det Norske Selskab"), a literary society for Norwegian students in the city.
Career.
In 1780 Rein returned to Norway, working mostly as a private tutor. He debuted as a playwright, but the play did not reach the stage. In 1787 he returned to Denmark to seek a post as a civil servant. After one rejection, he took the cand.philol. degree in 1789. He was appointed as vicar of northern Kautokeino in 1791, but never assumed office; instead he chose to become curate in Skjeberg in 1792. He left in 1799, and in 1800 he became vicar in Eidanger and Brevik. From 1808 he was the vicar of Nykirkenin Bergen. In the meantime Rein had developed into a recognized poet. He published the poetry collections "Samlede Digte" (two volumes, 1802) and "Nyeste Digte" (1810).
In 1814 he was elected to the Norwegian Constituent Assembly at Eidsvoll as a representative with the Bergen deputation, which was led by Wilhelm Frimann Koren Christie. He favored the Independence Party ("Selvstendighetspartiet"), and held animosity towards the proposed Union between Sweden and Norway. The Constituent Assembly elected Crown Prince Christian Frederick of Denmark as King of Norway. However, after the Swedish campaign against Norway during the summer, Norway came into a loose personal union with Charles III John as King . Rein's anti-Swedish sentiments might have cost him the position of Bishop of Bergen, which became vacant in 1816. In 1817 he co-founded the patriotic magazine "Den norske Tilskuer" together with Christian Magnus Falsen and Herman Foss.
Personal life.
Rein was married twice. In December 1791 he married Anna Cathrine Arbo (1756–1794), a grand-aunt of painter Peter Nicolai Arbo. In February 1796 in Berg he married Fredrikke Bergersen (1779–1856). He had six daughters. He died in November 1821 in Bergen, and was buried at Nykirkegården.
Legacy.
At Nykirken in Bergen ("Nykirken i Bergen") there is a memorial that is decorated every May 17 by the command of the Nordnæs Bataillon in commemoration of Rein's service to Norway. In 1882, a street at Nygård in Bergen ("Jonas Reins gate") was named after him.


Real Audiencia of Cusco


Murray v United Kingdom

Murray v United Kingdom was a legal case heard by the European Court of Human Rights in 1994 to determine if part of the United Kingdom's anti-terrorism laws were in violation of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The case was referred to the Court on 7 April 1993 from an application lodged on 28 September 1988 relating to events occurring in 1982. The case was heard in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 January 1994 and the Chamber delivered their judgement on 28 October 1994.
The applicants were six Irish citizens, all members of the same family: Margaret Murray, Thomas Murray, Mark Murray, Allana Murray, Michaela Murray and Rosena Murray.
In June 1982 two brothers of Margaret Murray were convicted in the United States in connection with the supplying of weapons to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Mrs Murray, her husband Thomas, and their four children were then residing in Belfast.
On the morning of 26 July, Margaret Murray was taken into custody by the Army on suspicion of fund-raising for the Provisional IRA in connection with her brothers' activities and taken to the Springfield Road screening centre. The style and procedure of her arrest was under section 14 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, her suspected offences were contained with section 21 of the act and also section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976.
At Springfield Road, Mrs Murray gave her name but refused to answer any other questions and she also declined to be photographed or to submit to an examination by a medical orderly. She sat through two short interviews and was also photographed without her knowledge or consent. She was released after two hours without being charged; the "screening proforma" record form did not list any offence.
On 9 February 1984 Mrs Murray brought an action before the High Court against the Ministry of Defence for false imprisonment and other torts, arguing that her arrest and detention were illegal on a number of grounds - notably that they had been without genuine suspicion that she had committed an offence or any genuine intention to question her, it had been a "fishing expedition" for improper purposes. In his judgment of 25 October 1985 the judge dismissed all the plaintiff's arguments. Mrs Murray took her case to the Court of Appeal, which unanimously rejected her claims on 20 February 1987. The case was appealed to the House of Lords – on the manner of the arrest, the use of the screening proforma, and the length of detention – and was unanimously rejected on 25 May 1988.
The Murrays applied to the ECHR, as previously noted, in 1988. Mrs Murray stating that her arrest and detention were a violation of Article 5 (paragraphs 1, 2 and 5) and that the photograph and record taking was in breach of Article 8. Her family also applied under the same parts of Article 5 because they had been required to assemble in a single room of their house while Mrs Murray prepared to leave with the Army. They also applied under Article 8 in regard to the recording and retention of personal details. The entire family also applied that under Article 8 regarding the entry and visual search of their home and under Article 13 that no effective remedies existed under domestic law.
In February 1993 the Commission supported the Murrays' application in part. There had been a violation of Article 5, but no violation of Article 8, or of Article 13 in regard to the entry and search, or the taking and keeping of a photograph and personal details, or concerning the lack of remedies in domestic law. The case went to a public hearing on 24 January 1994.
At the hearing the Court gave significant weight to the need for a democratic society to protect itself against the threat of organised terrorism and to the problems involved in the arrest and detention of persons suspected of terrorist-linked offences.
The Court dismissed Mrs Murray's claims against her arrest and detention under 5(1)(c); dismissed her contention that she had not been informed promptly of the reasons for the arrest and of any charge (5(2)). Since there had been no violation of 5(1) or 5(2) in the Court's opinion there could be no consideration of 5(5). The Court decided that there had been no violation of Article 8 as the Army's action had been in accordance with the law, as contained in paragraph two of the Article, and had not been disproportionate to the aim pursued. The Court dismissed the Murrays' claims of a violation of Article 13.
The Court's decisions were by majority – 14–4 in regard of Article 5(1), 13–5 in regard of Article 5(2), 13–5 in regard of Article 5(5), 15–3 in regard of Article 8, and unanimous in regard of Article 13.


List of British police officers killed in the line of duty

This article lists British police officers killed in the line of duty since 1900.
Thousands of police officers in Britain are believed to have died during the course of their duties, but this article includes only those who were killed as a direct result of a crime or while attempting to prevent, stop or solve a specific criminal act. The list omits those who died in more regular circumstances such as traffic collisions, and the many killed by air raids during the Second World War. The list also omits the more than 300 officers of the former Royal Ulster Constabulary and current Police Service of Northern Ireland who were killed during the Troubles in Northern Ireland.
List.
Key to rank abbreviations: A/x = Acting • ACC = Assistant Chief Constable • CEO = Civilian Explosives Officer • Cmdr = Commander • DC = Detective Constable • DI = Detective Inspector • DS = Detective Sergeant • Insp = Inspector • PC = Police Constable • Sgt = Sergeant • SPC = Special Police Constable • Stn Sgt = Station Sergeant • Supt = Superintendent • WPC = Woman Police Constable • WRC = War Reserve Constable.


Act Respecting the Future of Quebec

The Act Respecting the Future of Quebec (also known as "Bill 1" or the "Sovereignty Bill") was a bill proposed to the Quebec National Assembly by Premier Jacques Parizeau and his Parti Québécois government in 1995. It proposed to give the National Assembly the power to declare Quebec "sovereign", with the "exclusive power to pass all its laws, levy all its taxes and conclude all its treaties". It received a first reading in the National Assembly but the final version of the bill was never voted on following the defeat of the sovereignty option in the 1995 Quebec referendum. Had it become law, it would have served as the legal basis for the Quebec government to declare Quebec a sovereign country.
Preamble.
The bill contained a 1,586-word preamble, evoking the history of Quebec and the right of the Quebec people to choose its destiny. It also contained considerable poetic phrases, such as "We know the winter in our souls. We know its blustery days, its solitude, its false eternity and its apparent deaths." It concluded with the phrase, "We, the people of Québec, through our National Assembly, proclaim: Québec is a sovereign country."
The original version of the bill had a blank page as its preamble. Jacques Parizeau explained it this way: "[T]he preamble... has intentionally been left unwritten. This preamble will eventually become the Declaration of Sovereignty of Quebec. It must describe who we are as a people and who we wish to become. As such, it must be a vivid reflection of our values and our hopes, our traditions and our ambitions. This blank page calls out to all of us. We must devise it together, participate and contribute the best of ourselves."
In the end, the preamble was written by several prominent pro-sovereignty Quebec writers and poets, including famous Quebec singer Gilles Vigneault, author-playwright Marie Laberge, sociologist Fernand Dumont and constitutional experts Andrée Lajoie and Henri Brun.
Main text.
In addition to declaring Quebec a sovereign country, the bill lays out several key steps in the independence process. It required the Government of Quebec to propose to the rest of Canada a partnership treaty based on a "Tripartite Agreement" signed on 12 June 1995 between Parizeau, Bloc Québécois leader Lucien Bouchard and Action democratique du Quebec leader, Mario Dumont. This agreement outlined a series of proposals that the leaders agreed a sovereign Quebec would make to Canada to share power between the two countries, including in the areas of:
The Bill provided that negotiations on a partnership treaty could not extend past 30 October 1996 (one year after the 1995 referendum).
The Bill also foresaw the drafting of a new Quebec constitution, the continuity of Quebec's current boundaries, the creation of a Quebec citizenship, use of the Canadian dollar and continuity of current laws and social benefits.
Political significance.
The bill was part of the Quebec government's strategy to increase support for sovereignty prior to the 1995 referendum. The Parti Québécois promised during the 1994 Quebec election to hold a referendum during 1995. However, the Parti Québécois received only 0.35% more votes than the federalist Quebec Liberal Party in that election, and polls at the time showed that Quebec independence (at least, without significant economic and political links with Canada) was not supported by the majority of Quebecers. Along with the February 1995 hearings on the future of Quebec and 12 June 1995 Tripartite agreement between Parizeau, Bouchard and Dumont, the sovereignty bill was designed to both get people interested in discussing Quebec sovereignty and reassure Quebecers about the likelihood that a sovereign Quebec would retain links with Canada. As part of this strategy, the draft bill was sent to every Quebec household by the Quebec government in advance of the referendum campaign, along with a copy of the Parizeau-Bouchard-Dumont agreement of 12 June 1995. Despite these efforts, polls did not show a significant increase in support for Quebec sovereignty until the final weeks of the October 1995 referendum campaign.
The bill was explicitly referred to in the question appearing on the ballot in the 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum:
"Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on 12 June 1995?."


Burnett Act

The Burnett Act of 1913 was sponsored by United States Representative John L. Burnett (Democrat) of Alabama. It authorized $40 million in spending on new government buildings in the District of Columbia and in smaller towns across the nation.


William le Petit

William le Petit, or Lepetit (died after 1360) was an Irish judge who was very briefly Lord Chief Justice of Ireland. He is notable for having been pardoned for homicide.
He is referred to as the Irish King's Serjeant in 1338 and as Attorney General for Ireland in 1343, although the two offices are easily confused in this era, due to the lack of precision about their respective roles. He was a justice of the Court of King's Bench (Ireland) by 1347, and in 1359 briefly replaced John de Rednesse as Lord Chief Justice.
He had two powerful patrons in James Butler, 2nd Earl of Ormond, and his wife Elizabeth Darcy, who employed le Petit as her attorney. It was at their request that le Petit in 1351 received a royal pardon for killing Robert de Lynham; little is known of the circumstances of the crime.


Heinrich Fehrentz

Heinrich Hermann Fehrentz (26 June 1908 in Spiesen – 22 December 1943 in Stuttgart) was a German truck driver and sportsman, who was critical of the Nazi regime and listened to foreign radio stations, so called Feindsender. He was arrested, sentenced and executed at age 35.
Life.
Fehrentz came from a miner's family in Saarland, near the French border, and had nine siblings. Already at age 14 he had to work in a coal mine. He left the locksmith's training in Saarbrücken for economic reasons. Afterwards, he became a wandering labourer in Alsace and Luxembourg, working as a land-grabber and locksmith. At the end of the 1920s he moved to Heidelberg to live with his brother Hans. First he worked there as a shoemaker and roller shutter fitter. He was a member of the "Red Sports", where he mostly did wrestling. After a motorcycle accident, he found a job as a truck driver and locksmith at the company Seppich. He married Gertrud née. Blum in 1938. The couple moved to an apartment in Dreikönigstraße and had two children.
After the defeat of Stalingrad the Nazi regime exacerbated their policies against any kind of resistance inside the Reich. Fehrentz was an outspoken anti-fascist and was introduced to some members of the illegal Communist Party by his brother. He did not join the Party but he regularly met some friends at the local pub "Zum Neckarstaden" for bowling and exchanging news they heard from acquaintances or from the radio programs of the Allied forces. The group was opposed to the Nazi regime. The circle was betrayed by an informer to the Gestapo. On 10 February 1943, seven persons were arrested, including Heinrich Fehrentz, and on 26 October 1943 they were sentenced by the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart. The accusation was "preparation for high treason, undermining of military morale and listening to enemy radio stations". Six of his friends were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, while Heinrich Fehrentz was sentenced to death. Prosecutor Krebs has characterized him as a dangerous enemy of the Reich and as the leader of the group. Emilie Fehrentz remembers: "And then I was present there [at the trial]. They had already fixed everything in advance and then, they read the verdict directly from the print-outs. You can say, it was like a show trial."
On 22 December 1943 he was executed in Stuttgart.
Remembrance.
In 1950, an honorary grave site was established in Heidelberg's Bergfriedhof, the main cemetery of the town. It reminds the resistance fighters of Heidelberg murdered by the Nazi regime. There his name is engraved in a memorial stone.
In 1974 the Mühlstraße in Heidelberg-Bergheim was renamed to Fehrentzstrasse. In March 2014 an addition plaque was mounted on the street sign remembering Heinrich Fehrentz.
On 12 October 2010 Gunter Demnig posed a Stolperstein in front of his last residence in Dreikönigstraße 15. The inscription says: