Binge v. Smith

Binge v. Smith, Dallam 616 (1844), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas which held that where one party to a joint contract dies, the survivor may be sued; that the drawer and indorser of a promissory note may and should be joined in the same action if both be sued simultaneously; and that where separate actions were brought at different terms in the same court, plaintiff might be required to consolidate unless manifest injustice would thereby be done.
Background.
Sometime before January 1, 1843, William H. Binge and a man named Titus entered into a contract. Binge made a promissory note, indorsed by James Blair, to pay Sampson Smith $300 on or before January 1, 1843. Payment was not made and Smith filed an action in Red River County, Texas. Binge and Blair did not appear, and they appealed from the default judgment.
Decision.
Judge William J. Jones delivered the opinion of the court. The contention that in a joint contract required both parties be sued was not supportable under either common law or statute. Second, Jones noted that the plaintiff could bring actions against both the maker and indorser, so long as he followed the proper procedure, which he did.
Jones noted that even had Smith sued Binge, Titus, and Blair separately, the judge may have joined the cases anyway to reduce costs.
Dissent.
Judges Richard Morris and Robert E. B. Baylor dissented, believing that the joinder was not permitted. They would have reversed on that ground.


Eddie Bentz

Edward Wilhelm Bentz (June 2, 1894 – October 31, 1979) was an American bank robber and Depression-era outlaw. He was associated with several high-profile public enemies during his criminal career, including Harvey Bailey, Albert Bates, George "Machine Gun" Kelly and Baby Face Nelson. He was eventually captured by the FBI and sentenced to Alcatraz.
Biography.
Little information is known of his early life; however, most accounts agree that Eddie Bentz was born in Pipestone, Minnesota (or South Dakota) on June 2, 1894. His father was supposedly killed by a runaway horse when he was a child and his family later moved to Tacoma, Washington. Bentz spent much of his youth in juvenile reformatories for burglary and later began safe-cracking and armed robbery by his early 20s. According to crime historian William Helmer, Bentz participated in over 150 robberies across the U.S. "without ever being named or indicted"; however, Helmer has never provided verifiable evidence for his claims. Bentz became extremely successful as a bank robber and lived an extravagant lifestyle collecting rare books and coins. He was also known as a meticulous planner and well known for charting escape routes.
He and Harvey Bailey were the prime suspects in the infamous bank robbery of $2,870,000 in Lincoln, Nebraska on September 17, 1930, although neither was ever charged for that robbery. During 1932, he began teaming with Albert Bates and George "Machine Gun" Kelly, robbing a bank in Ponder, Texas on July 31 and another in Colfax, Washington on September 21, taking $70,000 in cash and bonds. The robberies were wrongly attributed to Bonnie and Clyde and Pretty Boy Floyd, respectively.
Eight days after the Colfax robbery, Bentz and several unidentified accomplices raided another bank in Holland, Michigan. Bentz went into semi-retirement after that job and was living in Long Beach, Indiana, when he was approached in 1933 by George "Baby Face" Nelson to join him and his gang in planning the robbery of a bank in Grand Haven, Michigan. Bentz agreed, and the getaway driver fled on the day of the robbery, stranding Bentz, Nelson and the others. One of the robbers, Eddie Doyle, was arrested; however, the rest of the robbers managed to escape in a second waiting car with $30,000. John Dillinger was widely speculated to have been one of the participants; however, historical evidence indicates he was involved in bank heists on his own in Indiana and Ohio at the time of the robbery.
In spite of the federal government placing most bank robberies under federal jurisdiction, which consequently would involve the FBI's hunting down many Depression-era outlaws, Bentz remained a fugitive. On July 4, 1934, he and several unidentified accomplices robbed a bank in Danville, Vermont but escaped with only $8,500. It is unclear if that was the last robbery Bentz participated in, but he was not identified in any other hold-ups after the Danville robbery.
Bentz was eventually tracked down to an address in Brooklyn, New York and arrested by federal agents on March 13, 1936, finding him hiding in a dumbwaiter. Taken into custody, he refused to name his accomplices in the Danville robbery and was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. At the time of his sentencing, Bentz asked to be sent to Alcatraz, supposedly stating to the judge that "all my friends are there". He was eventually paroled from Alcatraz in 1948 and returned to his hometown in Tacoma where he died of a heart attack on October 31, 1979.


Richard Pepys

Sir Richard Pepys (2 July 1589 – 2 January 1659) was an English lawyer and politician who sat in the House of Commons in 1640 and was Lord Chief Justice of Ireland. He was a great-uncle of Samuel Pepys the diarist.
Pepys was born at Bunstead, Essex the son of John Pepys of Cottenham, Cambridgeshire and his wife Elizabeth Bendish, daughter of John Bendish of Bowes Hall, Essex. He entered Middle Temple in 1609 and was called to the bar in 1617. He was a bencher of his inn in 1636 and acted as reader in 1640.
In April 1640, Pepys was elected Member of Parliament for Sudbury in the Short Parliament . He was active in local government, attending meetings of the County Committee for Suffolk between 1642 and 1648. He acted as treasurer of the Middle Temple in 1648. He was appointed Baron of the Exchequer on 30 May 1654 and became Serjeant-at-Law at the same time. He was appointed Chief Justice of Ireland in 1654 between 22 August and 3 November. He sat in court with Miles Corbet on occasion and was also appointed chief justice of the Upper Bench and commissioner of the great seal in 1655. He was on the circuit in Ulster in early 1657. In 1658, he presented books to the Inner Temple. He died suddenly in 1659 and was buried in Christ Church Cathedral, Dublin.
Pepys married firstly Judith Cutte, daughter of Sir William Cutte of Arkesden, in 1620. He married secondly, Mary Gosnold daughter of Bartholomew Gosnold, who played a major part in the establishment of Virginia, and his wife Mary Goldinge. He had three sons and three daughters and was an ancestor of the Earl of Cottenham. From the Diary of Samuel Pepys, we know that the great diarist, Richard's first cousin once removed, was on friendly terms with at least one of his sons, also called Samuel, and two of his daughters, Elizabeth Strudwick and Judith Scott, who died in 1664. Pepys was grieved at the death of Judith, "a good woman", the more so since like so many of the Pepys family of their generation, she was childless: "it is a sad consideration how the Pepyses do decay."


Criminal law in the Marshall Court

The Marshall Court (1801–1835) heard forty-one criminal law cases, slightly more than one per year. Among such cases are "United States v. Simms" (1803), "United States v. More" (1805), "Ex parte Bollman" (1807), "United States v. Hudson" (1812), "Cohens v. Virginia" (1821), "United States v. Perez" (1824), "Worcester v. Georgia" (1832), and "United States v. Wilson" (1833).
During Marshall's tenure, the Supreme Court had no general appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. The Court could review criminal convictions from the state courts, but not the lower federal courts, via writs of error. It only did so twice. The Court could hear original habeas petitions, but disclaimed the authority to grant the writ post-conviction unless the sentence had already been completed. Thus, the majority of the Marshall Court's opinions on criminal law were issued in response to questions certified by divided panels of the circuit courts by a certificate of division.
Most of the Marshall Court's criminal opinions involved defining the elements of federal crimes. Criminal statutes considered by the Court during this period involved assimilative crimes, counterfeiting, embargoes, insurance fraud, piracy, and slave trading. But, the Court twice disclaimed the authority to define common law crimes not proscribed by Congressional statute.
The Marshall Court also issued important opinions regarding criminal procedure. Although the Court did not explicitly cite or quote constitutional provisions, its opinions remain influential in interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and venue provision of Article Three. The Court also laid down the common law rules of evidence in federal courts, including the hearsay exception for party admissions and the narrowing of the best evidence rule.
Background.
Under the Articles of Confederation, there were no general federal courts or crimes. Although the Articles authorized a federal court to punish "piracies and felonies committed on the high seas," and the Congress of the Confederation in 1775 created the Court of Appeals in Prize Cases, Congress soon devolved this power to the states. Rather than creating additional crimes, the Congress merely recommended to the states that they criminalize acts like piracy and counterfeiting.
Criminal law was considered in the framing of the Constitution. In addition to the criminal procedure provisions of Article Three, the Constitutional Convention discussed piracy, crimes against the law of nations, treason, and counterfeiting. As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 21, a "most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a to its laws. The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions . . . ."
One of the first statutes passed by the First Congress, the Judiciary Act of 1789, divided original jurisdiction for the trial of federal crimes between the district courts and the circuit courts. The district courts were given jurisdiction over all federal crimes "where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted." The circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction over these crimes, and exclusive jurisdiction over all other federal crimes. The circuit courts also exercised appellate jurisdiction over the district courts, but only in civil cases. In capital cases, the Act provided that "the trial shall be had in the county where the offence, was committed, or where that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence." "No other procedural provisions were included, probably because the legislators were simultaneously considering amendments which would provide such security."
The Act of 1789 also placed the responsibility for prosecuting federal crimes in the United States Attorney for each federal judicial district. The Act provided that "there shall be appointed in each district" a "person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States." The Act authorized judges, justices, justices of the peace, and magistrates to issue arrest warrants. The Act provided a right to bail in non-capital cases, and authorized bail in capital cases—by the district courts, circuit courts, and Supreme Court, or any individual judge of them—issued on an "exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law." The 1789 act did not create federal prisons, but it did provide for the imprisonment of federal prisoners (presumably in state prisons) "at the expense of the United States."
Many of the substantive federal crimes during this period were created by two omnibus pieces of legislation: the Crimes Act of 1790 (authored and introduced by Senator and future Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth) and the Crimes Act of 1825 (authored by Justice Joseph Story and introduced by Representative Daniel Webster). Congress also passed a variety of single-subject criminal statutes, which were not centrally codified in any official publication.
Between 1790 and 1797, only 143 or 147 criminal cases were brought in the circuit courts, and 56 of those cases were brought in the Pennsylvania circuit court concerning the Whiskey Rebellion. And, between 1790 and 1801, only 426 criminal cases were brought in all federal courts (the district courts and the circuit courts combined). Between 1801 and 1828, a total of 2,718 criminal indictments were returned in the circuit courts: 596 resulted in guilty verdicts by juries; 479, not guilty verdicts by juries; 902, nolle prosequi; and 741, other (either no disposition recorded, abated, quashed, discharged, discontinued, or prison break).
Prior to Chief Justice Marshall's tenure, the Supreme Court had heard only two criminal cases—both by prerogative writ. First, in "United States v. Hamilton" (1795), the Court granted bail to a capital defendant charged with treason—as it was authorized to do by § 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and § 4 of the Judiciary Act of 1793—on an original writ of habeas corpus. The greater portion of the decision was dedicated to the Court's refusal to order the case tried by a special circuit court, as was provided for by § 3 of the Judiciary Act of 1793. Second, in "United States v. Lawrence" (1795), the Court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a district judge to order the arrest of a deserter of the French navy, as the French government argued to be required by the consular convention between the United States and France.
Sources of jurisdiction.
Writs of error.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the Supreme Court to hear writs of error from the circuit courts and writs of error from the highest state courts in cases that involved the validity or construction of federal law. Either a judge of the lower court or a justice of the Supreme Court would have to sign the writ of error (which was drafted and signed by counsel) before the Supreme Court could hear the case. Signing the writ of error was not a mere formality, but rather a preliminary assessment of the merits of the arguments in the writ.
Circuit courts.
Section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized writs of error from the circuit courts only in civil cases. The District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801—which created the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia and granted it jurisdiction over crimes committed within the federal district—did not explicitly limit writs of error from the D.C. circuit court to civil cases, except insofar as it required an amount in controversy. Although the Court reached the merits of a criminal writ of error from the D.C. circuit court in "United States v. Simms" (1803), without any discussion of the jurisdictional issue, in "United States v. More" (1805), the Court held that it had no such jurisdiction. "More" held that Congress's piecemeal statutory grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Court operated as an exercise of Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause, eliminating all jurisdiction not explicitly granted.
"More" also rejected the argument that criminal writs of error were authorized by § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the "All Writs Act"). That section provided, in relevant part, that "all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue . . . all other writs, not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law." Following "More", the Court did not hear writs of error from federal criminal trials in the circuit courts for 84 years. In 1889, Congress created a right of appeal by writ of error in capital cases. The Judiciary Act of 1891 (the "Evarts Act") extended this right to serious crimes. And, the Judicial Code of 1911—which abolished the circuit courts and placed original jurisdiction for the trial of all federal crime in the district courts—granted general appellate jurisdiction.
State courts.
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the Supreme Court to hear writs of error from state courts in cases
where is drawn in question the vaildity of a treaty or statute of, or at, authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution. treaty, statute or commission . . . .
Only twice did the Marshall Court hear criminal cases under § 25. In "Cohens v. Virginia" (1821), the Court upheld a state lottery law conviction because the federal lottery was authorized only in the District of Columbia. In "Worcester v. Georgia" (1832), the Court reversed Worcester's conviction for being present in Cherokee country as inconsistent with federal law.
Section 25 was not a more significant source of criminal appeals in large part because—as "Barron v. Baltimore" (1833) held—the Bill of Rights (including its criminal procedure provisions) was viewed as inapplicable to the state governments. This continued until the incorporation of the Bill of Rights after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Original habeas.
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided, in relevant part, that
all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of . . . "habeas corpus" . . . . And that either of the justices of the supreme court . . . shall have the power to grant writs of "habeas corpus" for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.—"Provided", That writs of "habeas corpus" shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
The Marshall Court heard six original habeas cases of a criminal nature. All of the cases involved detention in the District of Columbia and prior proceedings in the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. Because the D.C. circuit court did not utilize the practice of riding circuit, certificates of division could not have been granted in these cases. In the first two cases, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ in pre-conviction situations. In the next two cases, the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ in post-conviction cases.
In "Ex parte Burford" (1806), the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus in a case of preventative detention. Eleven justices of the peace of Alexandria County, D.C. had issued a warrant for Burford's arrest on the grounds that he was ""not of good name and fame", nor of honest conversation, but an evil doer and disturber of the peace of the United States, so that murder, homicide, strifes, discords, and other grievances and damages, amongst the citizens of the United States, concerning their bodies and property, are "likely to arise thereby"." The D.C. circuit court initially granted Burford the writ of habeas corpus, but remanded him until he posted $1,000 bail.
The Court held that the "warrant of commitment was illegal, for want of stating "some good cause certain, supported by oath"." In his dissent in "Bollman", Johnson indicated that he also wished to have dissented in "Burford":
In the case of "Burford" I was one of the members who constituted the court. I owe it to my own consistency to declare that the court were then apprized of my objections to the issuing of the writ of habeas corpus. I did not then comment at large on the reasons which influenced my opinion, and the cause was this: The gentleman who argued that cause confined himself strictly to those considerations which ought alone to influence the decisions of this court. No popular observations on the necessity of protecting the citizen from executive oppression, no animated address calculated to enlist the passions or prejudices of an audience in defence of his motion, imposed on me the necessity of vindicating my opinion. I submitted in silent deference to the decision of my brethren.
In "Ex parte Bollman" (1807), the Court granted the writ to two members of the Burr conspiracy. Dr. Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, having been apprehended in New Orleans, were transported to Charleston and then Baltimore on a navy vessel—notwithstanding the writs of habeas corpus issued by a territorial judge in New Orleans and a district judge in Charlestown. The United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia issued an arrest warrant for Bollman and Swartwout (who were already in military custody), slated the case for trial in D.C., and denied the prisoners bail; Judge William Cranch (also the Supreme Court's reporter of decisions) dissented in part on the ground that there was no probable cause for the arrest warrant as required by the Fourth Amendment. The Senate passed, but the House rejected, legislation that would have suspended the writ for three months and legalized Bollman and Swartwout's arrests. Nearly every member of Congress attended the oral arguments in the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Marshall's two opinions for the Court in "Bollman" addressed several issues. On February 13, Marshall held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue the writ under Article Three and § 14. First, he held that the restrictive phrase "necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions" applied only to "all other writs, not specially provided for by statute," not habeas corpus. Next, he held that the proviso applies both to the power of courts and individual justices to issue the writ, and that the scope of the writ was to be determined by reference to common law. Then, he held that original habeas was not preempted by the decision of a lower court to deny bail. Finally, he reaffirmed the holding of "Burford" that original habeas was a constitutional exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
Justice Johnson dissented. Johnson stated that his dissent was "supported by the opinion of one of my brethren, who is prevented by indisposition from attending." Scholars are divided on whether Johnson referred to Justice Chase or Justice Cushing.
Prof. Freedman has argued that "Bollman" erred in applying § 14's proviso to both courts and individual judges (as opposed to only individual judges) and thus that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did confer federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners. The Reconstruction-era Congress granted federal courts this power in 1867.
In "Ex parte Kearney" (1822), the Court denied the writ to a prisoner who was imprisoned for criminal contempt. In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court's reasoning reached far further:
[T]his Court has no appellate jurisdiction confided to it in criminal cases, by the laws of the United States. It cannot entertain a writ of error, to revise the judgment of the Circuit Court, in any case where a party has been convicted of a public offence. And undoubtedly the denial of this authority proceeded upon great principles of public policy and convenience. If every party had a right to bring before this Court every case, in which judgment had passed against him, for a crime or misdemeanor or felony, the course of justice might be materially delayed and obstructed, and, in some cases, totally frustrated. If, then, this Court cannot directly revise a judgment of the Circuit Court in a criminal case, what reason is there to suppose, that it was intended to vest it with the authority to do it indirectly?
Story explained:
The only objection is, not that the Court acted beyond its jurisdiction, but that it erred in its judgment of the law applicable to the case. If, then, we are to give any relief in this case, it is by a revision of the opinion of the Court, given in the course of a criminal trial, and thus asserting a right to control its proceedings, and take from them the conclusive effect which the law intended to give them. If this were an application for a habeas corpus, after judgment on an indictment for an offence within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, it could hardly be maintained, that this court could revise such a judgment, or the proceedings which led to it, or set it aside, and discharge the prisoner.
In "Ex parte Watkins" (1830), the Court held that the writ did not lie after a federal criminal conviction even if the indictment failed to state an offense. Three years later, with the same petitioner, in "Ex parte Watkins" (1833), the Court did issue the writ because the petitioner was detained beyond his authorized sentence for non-payment of a fine; although the Court held that such detention would be permissible under the writ of capias pro fine (generally, a writ ordering the imprisonment of a defendant until a criminal fine is paid), it held that it was not under the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum (a civil law analog). After further proceedings in the D.C. circuit court, Tobias Watkins was discharged.
In "Ex parte Milburn" (1835), the Court denied an original habeas petition concerning pretrial detention holding that the forfeiture of bail for failure to appear did not satisfy a criminal indictment and that a prior granting of the writ of habeas corpus was no bar to a subsequent arrest warrant.
Certificates of division.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the United States circuit courts were composed of a stationary United States district court judge and any two Supreme Court justices riding circuit. If one judge or justice disagreed with the other two, the majority prevailed. If only one Supreme Court justice could attend (as was authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1793), and a division arose between the district judge and the Supreme Court justice, the practice was to hold the case over until the next term. If a one-to-one division persisted with a different circuit riding justice, the opinion of the previous circuit rider broke the tie. Following a brief intermezzo with the soon-repealed Midnight Judges Act of 1801 (which briefly abolished circuit riding), under the Judiciary Act of 1802, the circuit courts were composed of a stationary district judge and one Supreme Court justice assigned to the circuit. But, a single judge (either the district judge or the circuit rider) could preside alone. In cases where both judges sat, though, one-to-one divisions were less likely to be resolved by continuing the case until the next term because the circuit riding justice would be the same (barring a change in membership on the Court).
Accordingly, § 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1802 provided that the circuit courts could certify questions of law to the Supreme Court if the judges were divided on that question. Several scholars have argued that certificates of division were pro forma, and that the judge and justice would merely agree to disagree, often without writing opposing opinions. For example, with the circuit court decision leading up to "United States v. Marchant" (1827), the reporter records that "[t]he district judge concurred in this opinion; but as it was a matter of not infrequent occurrence, and important to the practice of the court, the judges afterwards divided in opinion for the purpose of obtaining a solemn decision of the superior court." Similarly, the "United States v. Ortega" (1826) circuit court opinion notes that the "point was taken to the supreme court upon a proforma certificate of a division of opinion in this court."
Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story in particular were known for making use of certificates of division while riding circuit. For example, Justice Marshall was one of the divided judges in "United States v. Klintock" (1820), "United States v. Smith" (1820), "United States v. Amedy" (1826), "United States v. Turner" (1833), and "United States v. Mills" (1833); and Justice Story played the role in "United States v. Coolidge" (1816), "United States v. Bevans" (1818), "United States v. Palmer" (1818), "United States v. Holmes" (1820), and "Marchant". But, Justice Story—in his opinions for the Court—cautioned against the too frequent use of certificates of division in criminal cases. In "United States v. Gooding" (1827), for the Court, Justice Story wrote:
We take this opportunity of expressing our anxiety, least, by too great indulgence to the wishes of counsel, questions of this sort should be frequently brought before this Court, and thus, in effect, an appeal in criminal cases become an ordinary proceeding to the manifest obstruction of public justice, and against the plain intendment of the acts of Congress.
The Judiciary Act of 1802 plainly did contemplate that certificates of division would issue in criminal cases. Section 6 provided that "imprisonment shall not be allowed, nor punishment in any case be inflicted, where judges of the said court are divided in opinion upon the question touching the said imprisonment or punishment." And, while the statute provided only for the certification of "the point upon which the disagreement shall happen," the justices sometimes took the liberty of enlarging the question. For example, in "United States v. Hudson" (1812), the question certified was "whether the Circuit Court of the United States had a common law jurisdiction in cases of libel?" but the question answered was "whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases?" And, in "United States v. Bevans" (1818), the Court noted that "[i]t may be deemed within the scope of the question certified to this court" to inquire whether the murder was cognizable under § 3 of the Crimes Act of 1790, even though the defendant had only been indicted under § 8.
But not every question or every case was eligible for a certificate of division. In "United States v. Daniel" (1821), the Court held that a motion for a new trial—as authorized by the § 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—could not be the subject of a certificate of division; rather, the division would operate a rejection of the motion. Similarly, in "United States v. Bailey" (1835), the Court held that the question of whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the offense charged could not be certified. And, certificates of division began to fall into disuse as it became increasingly common for the circuit courts to sit with a single judge. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, he did not have "the privilege of dividing the court when alone."
Defining federal crimes.
Assimilative crimes.
Section 3 of the Crimes Act of 1825 enacted the first federal assimilative crimes statute, criminalizing conduct in violation of state law within areas under federal jurisdiction. Section 3 provided that:
[I]f any offence shall be committed in any [fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory, magazine, lighthouse, or other needful building under the jurisdiction of the United States], the punishment of which offence is not specifically provided for by any law of the United States, such offense shall, upon conviction in any court of the United States having cognisance thereof, be liable to, and receive the same punishment as the laws of the state in which such [place aforesaid], is situated, provide for the like offence when committed within the body of any county of such state.
In "United States v. Paul" (1832)—involving a criminal burglary at West Point, prosecuted via an 1829 New York statute defining burglary in the third degree—the Court held that the assimilative crimes provision was limited to state crimes in force at the time of the federal statute's enactment. The 1866, 1874, 1898, 1909, 1933, 1935, and 1940 re-enactments of the assimilative crimes offense explicitly incorporated this interpretation of "Paul".
But, in 1948, Congress amended the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, to incorporate changes in state criminal law, as they occur, up until the commission of the charged conduct. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the revision in "United States v. Sharpnack" (1958). "Sharpnack" held that: "There is nothing in ["Paul"] to show that the issue was decided as anything more than one of statutory construction falling within the doctrine calling for the narrow construction of a penal statute. So interpreted, the decision did not reach the issue that is before us."
Common law crimes.
In "United States v. Hudson" (1812), without oral argument from either the defendants or Attorney General William Pinkney, the Court held that an indictment for a common law crime must be dismissed because all federal crimes (with the exception of contempt of court) must be established by statute. Justice Johnson, for the Court, wrote:
Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has this jurisdiction been asserted, and the general acquiescence of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition.
While riding circuit in Massachusetts, Justice Story—in addition to distinguishing "Hudson" under admiralty jurisdiction—argued for the overruling of "Hudson":
["Hudson"] having been made without argument, and by a majority only of the court, I hope that it is not an improper course to bring the subject again in review for a more solemn decision, as it is not a question of mere ordinary import, but vitally affects the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States; a jurisdiction which they cannot lawfully enlarge or diminish. I shall submit, with the utmost cheerfulness, to the judgment of my brethren, and if I have hazarded a rash opinion, I have the consolation to know, that their superior learning and ability will save the public from an injury by my error.
On the certificate of division, in "United States v. Coolidge" (1816), three justices—Washington and Livingston in addition to Story—indicated their willingness to depart from "Hudson", but since no counsel appeared for Coolidge, and since Attorney General Richard Rush refused to argue the point, "Hudson" was reaffirmed.
According to Prof. Rowe, "[f]ew major controversies have ended with as slight a whimper as the battle over federal common law crimes that raged in the first two decades of the American republic." Rowe argues that "without acknowledging it, the Hudson Court disapproved at least eight circuit court cases, brushed off the views of all but one Justice who sat on the Court prior to 1804, and departed from what was arguably the original understanding of those who framed the Constitution and penned the Judiciary Act of 1789." Rowe views "Hudson" as a codification of an issue decided by public opinion, including during the 1800 presidential election: ""Hudson" set onto tablets the principles that guided the Jeffersonians during their wanderings in the desert."
Counterfeiting.
When it created the First Bank of the United States, Congress criminalized counterfeiting the bills of the bank. "Read literally," the statute required both that the bill be counterfeit and that the bill be signed by the President of the Bank of the United States. In "United States v. Cantril" (1807), without oral argument, the Court arrested a judgment of conviction under the counterfeiting statute, finding the statute invalid "for the reasons assigned in the record" (without further elaboration). By the time "Cantril" was decided, Congress had already passed a new statute to correct the apparent drafting error.
According to Prof. Whittington, "Cantril" was the first challenge to a federal statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to be considered by the Court. In later cases, the Court has noted the several possible holdings that could have been intended in "Cantril".
Congress passed a new counterfeiting statute in 1816 when it created the Second Bank of the United States. In "United States v. Turner" (1833), interpreting the new act, the Court held that the offense of counterfeiting was committed even if the signatures forged were those of the wrong bank officers. But, in "United States v. Brewster" (1833), the Court held that the crime applied only to counterfeit bills, not counterfeit notes.
Embargos.
In June 1812, during the War of 1812, Congress passed a statute prohibiting the transportation "over land or otherwise, in any wagon, cart, sleigh, boat, or otherwise, naval or military stores, arms or the munitions of war, or any article of provision, from any place of the United States, to" Canada. In "United States v. Barber" (1815), the Court held "fat cattle" to be "provisions, or munitions of war, within the true intent and meaning of the act." In "United States v. Sheldon" (1817), decided after the war had ended, "Barber" was distinguished on the grounds that driving cattle on foot was not "transportation" within the meaning of the act.
The Neutrality Act of 1818 provided the arming of a vessel with the intention that it be employed against a people at peace with the United States. In "United States v. Quincy" (1832), the Court decided several questions concerning the interpretation of the Neutrality Act. First, the Court held that the elements of the offense did not require that the vessel be fitted out within the United States, but rather than an intention to fit the vessel out in an intermediary port was sufficient. Second, the Court held that a conditional intention (for example, an intention to so arm the vessel only if sufficient funds could be obtained) was insufficient to satisfy the elements of the offense. Third, the Court held that, if the defendant had a fixed intention to so arm the vessel upon leaving the United States, the frustration of that intention at the intermediate port was irrelevant. Fourth, the Court refused to distinguish between the statutory term of "people" and the concept of a "state."
False statements.
"United States v. Bailey" (1835) upheld an indictment for false swearing relating to a claim against the United States (as provided for by an 1823 statute) even though the officer administering the oath had been a state justice of the peace. Justice McLean dissented.
Maritime insurance fraud.
An 1804 criminal insurance fraud statute provided:
[I]f any person shall, on the high seas, wilfully and corruptly cast away, burn, or otherwise destroy, any ship or vessel of which he is owner in part or in whole, or in anywise direct or procure the same to be done, with intent or design to prejudice any person or persons that hath underwritten, or shall underwrite, any policy or policies of insurance thereon or of any merchant or merchants that shall load goods thereon, or of any other owner or owners of such ship or vessel, the person or persons offending therein, being thereof lawfully convicted, shall be deemed and adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death.
In "United States v. Amedy" (1826), the Court held that the federal criminal insurance fraud statute was no subjected to the same formalities as civil insurance fraud claims. First, the Court held that the state statute of incorporation of the insurance company required no more than the state's seal to be authenticated. Second, there was no need to prove the existence of the insurance company (i.e., that its stock had actually been subscribed) because it was not a party. Nor was it necessary to prove that the policy would have been binding against the insurance company. Nor did it matter whether the policy would have paid out under the circumstances of the fraud. Finally, it was held that an insurance corporation was a person within the meaning of the statute.
Piracy and the high seas.
The piracy cases considered by the Marshall Court arose under two Congressional statutes: the Crimes Act of 1790 and the Act of March 3, 1819.
Article One provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas." Five sections in the Crimes Act "were devoted to the subject," but "[t]he principal provisions with respect to piracy were incorporated in section 8." According to Prof. White, "from 1815 to 1823, piracy cases were among the most numerous and controversial of those decided by the Court."
Section 8 of the Crimes Act of 1790 provided:
[I]f any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a county, would by thelaws of the United States be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.
The first two decisions to interpret § 8 construed it not to apply to the crimes charged. In "United States v. Bevans" (1818), the Court held that the § 8 of the Act did not extend to a murder committed on a navy vessel within state waters. In "United States v. Palmer" (1818), the Court held that the § 8 of the Act did not extend to piracy by U.S. citizen defendants, in the employ of a South American government at war with Spain, committed against Spanish ships and citizens. President John Quincy Adams was a harsh critic of the decision in "Palmer". He wrote in his diary that the Court had "cast away the jurisdiction which a law of congress had given, that its "reasoning [was] a sample of judicial logic—disingenuous, false, and hollow," and that it gave him "an early disgust for the practice of law, and led me to the unalterable determination never to accept judicial office."
Following the Act of 1819, in 1820 the Court began to distinguish "Palmer". In "United States v. Klintock" (1820), the Court distinguished "Palmer"—in a case involving piracy by a U.S. citizen, claiming to act under the authority of the Mexican Republic, committed against a Danish ship and citizens, under the fraudulent claim that the Danes were Spanish (Spain being at war with the Mexican Republic)—on the grounds that the victims in "Palmer" were not subjects of a nation recognized by the United States. In "United States v. Furlong" (1820), sometimes referred to as "United States v. Pirates", authored by Justice Johnson (a dissenter in "Palmer"), the Court distinguished "Palmer" again, primarily on the ground that the pirate vessel had no nationality (it was an American ship prior to being hijacked). "United States v. Holmes" (1820) distinguished "Palmer" on the same ground, further holding that the burden was on the defendant to prove that his vessel flew a lawful flag.
Section 12 of the Act provided:
[I]f any seaman or other person shall commit manslaughter upon the high seas, or confederate, or attempt or endeavour to corrupt any commander, master, officer or mariner, to yield up or to run away with any ship or vessel, or with any goods, wares, or merchandise, or to turn pirate, or to go over to or confederate with pirates, or in any wise trade with any pirate knowing him to be such, or shall furnish such pirate with any ammunition, stores or provisions of any kind, or shall fit out any vessel knowingly and with a design to trade with or suppJy or correspond with any pirate or robber upon the seas; or if any person or persons shall any ways consult, combine, confederate or correspond with any pirate or robber on the seas, knowing him to be guilty of any such piracy or robbery; or if any seaman shall confine the master of any ship or other vessel, or endeavour to make a revolt in such ship . . . such person or persons so offending, and being thereof convicted, shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined not exceeding one thousand dollars.
In "United States v. Wiltberger" (1820), the Court held that § 12 of the Act did not extend to a manslaughter committed "in a river such as the river Tigris" because such was not on the "high seas." (Justice Washington had delivered an unrelated jury charge below.) In "United States v. Kelly" (1826), the Court interpreted the phrase "endeavour to make a revolt" to refer to "the endeavour of the crew of a vessel, or any one or more of them, to overthrow the legitimate authority of her commander, with intent to remove him from his command, or against his will to take possession of the vessel by assuming the government and navigation of her, or by transferring their obedience from the lawful commander to some other person." Justice Washington, the author of the opinion of the Court, had written a slightly longer opinion below.
In 1819, Congress enacted a new anti-piracy statute: "Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States and Punish the Crime of Piracy". Section 5 of that Act provided:
[I]f any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders shall afterwards be brought into, or found in, the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof, before the Circuit Court of the United States for the District into which he or they may be brought, or in which he or they shall be found, be punished with death.
In "United States v. Smith" (1820), in an opinion by Justice Story, the Court upheld a conviction under the 1819 statute, holding that Congress could leave the definition of piracy to the law of nations. After reviewing the history of foreign (primarily English) law, Justice Story declared: "We have, therefore, no hesitation in declaring, that piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea, and that it is sufficiently and constitutionally defined by the fifth section of the act of 1819." In a rare dissent, Justice Livingston argued that Article One, Section Eight, Clause Ten obliged Congress to define piracy with more specificity. The facts in "Smith" were almost identical to those which "Palmer" had held could not be reached under the Crimes Act of 1790: a U.S. citizen pirate, commissioned by a government in Buenos Aires, had led a mutiny, seized a new ship, and then robbed a Spanish ship.
Section 5 of the 1819 act was set to sunset at the end of the next session of Congress. Before that time, Congress made the provision permanent in an 1820 omnibus piracy bill that also defined additional offenses. Section 8 of the Crimes Act of 1790, § 5 of the 1819 act, and § 3 of the 1820 act were all separately codified in the Revised Statutes in 1874. Section 8 of the Crimes Act of 1790 was repealed by the Criminal Code of 1909.
Slave trading.
The Slave Trade Act of 1818 prohibited the importation of slaves into the United States. The "fitting out" offense provided that:
[N]o citizen or citizens of the United States, or any other person or persons, shall, after the passing of this act, as aforesaid, for himself, themselves, or any other person or persons whatsoever, either as master, factor, or owner, build, fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare, any ship or vessel, in any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, nor cause any such ship or vessel to sail from any port or place whatscever, within the jurisdiction of the same, for the purpose of procuring any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, to be transported to any port or place whatsoever, to be held, sold, or otherwise disposed of, as slaves, or to be held to service or labour; and if any ship or vessel shall be so built, fitted out, equipped, laden, or otherwise prepared, for the purpose aforesaid, every such ship or vessel, her tackle, apparel, furniture, and lading, shall be forfeited, one moiety to the use of the United Slates, and the other to the use of the person, or persons who shall sue for said forfeiture, and prosecute the same to effect; and such ship or vessel shall be liable to be seized, prosecuted, and condemned, in any court of the United States having competent jurisdiction.
and that:
[E]very person or persons so building, fitting out, equipping, loading, or otherwise preparing, or sending away, or causing any of the acts aforesaid to be done, with intent to employ such ship or vessel in such trade or business, after the passing of this act, contrary to the true intent and meaning thereof or who shall, in any wise, be aiding or abetting therein, shall, severally, on conviction thereof, by due course of law, forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, nor less than one thousand dollars, one moiety to the use of the United States, and the other to the use of the person or persons who shall sue for such forfeiture and prosecute the same to effect, and shall moreover be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years, nor less than three years.
In "United States v. Gooding" (1827), the Court construed the elements of the fitting out offense. First, the Court held that the offense of fitting out a vessel for slave trading could be committed even if the owner of the vessel did not personally fit it out. Second, the Court held that the statute could be violated by a partial fitting out (as opposed to a complete fitting out) of a vessel for that purpose. Third, the Court held that—since slave trading was a misdemeanor—there was no distinction between principal and accessory. Fourth, the Court held that, for the statute to be violated, the fitting out must have occurred within the United States. Finally, the Court held that the statute's mens rea required that the owner intend to cause the vessel to be used for slave trading, as opposed to intending that the vessel be used for slave trading (by some third party).
Treason.
Article Three, Section Three, Clause One of the Constitution provides that:
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
Section 1 of the Crimes Act of 1790 provided that
if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, and shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the United States, and shall suffer death.
In "Ex parte Bollman" (1807), the Court held that conspiracy to wage war on the United States was not treason. Further, "Bollman" held that the evidence against both Bollman and Swartwout was insufficient to justify pre-trial detention.
Criminal procedure.
Constitutional issues.
While "Ex parte Bollman" (1807) is more famous for its holding that the Burr conspirators had not committed treason, the Court could not have ordered the release of the prisoners without also addressing the Neutrality Act of 1794, under which the conspirators were also charged. With regard to these charges, the Court conceded, "those who admit the affidavit of General Wilkinson cannot doubt."
But, "Bollman" held that venue for the Neutrality Act charges was improper in the District of Columbia. First, the Court rejected locus delicti venue (without reaching the question of whether such could exist outside of a U.S. state). "[T]hat no part of this crime was committed in the district of Columbia is apparent. It is therefore the unanimous opinion of the court that they cannot be tried in this district." Second, the Court rejected statutory venue under section 8 the Crimes Act of 1790 (as permitted by Article Three for crimes not committed within a state). The Court held that the Territory of Orleans was not a place that triggered the alternative venue provisions of the Crimes Act. The Court held that the statutory term "any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state" applied only to "any river, haven, bason or bay, not within the jurisdiction of any particular state," and only in "those cases there is no court which has particular cognizance of the crime."
In three opinions, the Marshall Court considered questions of double jeopardy, without ever clearly referring to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. First, in "United States v. Perez" (1824), the Court held that there was no bar to a second prosecution after a mistrial was declared for "manifest necessity." (Justice Story authored the opinion of the Court, espousing the position taken by Justice Thompson below.) Next, in "United States v. Wilson" (1833), the Court held that the protection of prior jeopardy extended to lesser included offenses; "[a]fter the judgment [of conviction], no subsequent prosecution could be maintained for the same offence, nor for any part of it." But, "Wilson" held that, in order to receive the protection of a pardon, a defendant must accept the pardon and affirmatively plead its existence in court. And, finally, in "United States v. Randenbush" (1834)—where the defendant had first been acquitted of counterfeiting one note, and then convicted of counterfeiting a different note (which had been introduced as evidence at the first trial)—the Court held that double jeopardy did not run from the use of the same evidence for "entirely a distinct offence."
In "United States v. Ortega" (1826), the Court held that it was not unconstitutional to vest original jurisdiction for the criminal trial of assaults on ambassadors in the circuit courts. The Court did not reach the question of whether the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could be made concurrent with a lower court, instead holding that the criminal trial of an assault on an ambassador was not a "Case[] affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" within the meaning of Article Three. Justice Washington, the author of the Court's opinion, had also delivered the jury charge below.
Two Supreme Court justices had previously disagreed on this question while riding circuit. In "United States v. Ravara" (C.C.D. Pa. 1793), an indictment for sending anonymous and threatening letters to a foreign minister with a view to extort money, Justice James Wilson argued that the circuit court could be given concurrent jurisdiction; Justice James Iredell argued that it could not; Judge Richard Peters, of the District of Pennsylvania, sided with Wilson, and the case continued.
Evidence.
In "United States v. Gooding" (1827), the Court held that the government must bear the burden of proof in criminal cases "unless a different provision is made by some statute."
Also in "Gooding", the Court approved of a hearsay exception for the statement of an agent of the defendant, holding that the doctrine should be the same in civil and criminal cases.
In "United States v. Reyburn" (1832), the Court again held that civil rules of evidence should be applied in criminal cases, recognizing an exception to the best evidence rule where "non production of the written instrument is satisfactorily accounted for."
Other.
In "United States v. Tyler" (1812), without oral argument, the Court held that an error in a verdict sheet—referring to the goods in violation of the embargo as "pot-ashes" rather than "pearl-ashes"—was harmless because the jury need not find the value to be forfeited.
In "United States v. Gooding" (1827), the Court held that, in general, it is sufficient for a criminal indictment to merely repeat the text of the statute. Further, the Court held that—"under circumstances of an extraordinary nature," "on very urgent occasions"—a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment could be made post-conviction. In "United States v. Mills" (1833), the Court again embraced the general rule that a sufficient indictment need only follow the terms of the statute.
In "United States v. Marchant" (1827), the Court held that—even though a trial court has the discretion to sever the trials of co-defendants—a defendant has no right to insist upon being tried alone. The Court recounted the history of criminal severance in English law, and concluded that the practice merely arose to prevent co-defendants from each using their peremptory challenges to deplete the venire such that too few jurors remained for trial. Justice Story was the author of the opinion of the Court, as well as a substantially similar opinion in the Massachusetts circuit court below.
In "United States v. Phillips" (1832), the Court dismissed a criminal action, on the motion of the Attorney General, pursuant to the district prosecutor's filing of a nolle prosequi motion (a motion by the prosecutor to dismiss the case) in the trial court, even though the nolle prosequi motion was filed after the writ of error issued from the Supreme Court. "Phillips" has been cited as an early example of judicial recognition of the norm of prosecutorial enforcement discretion and as an example of mootness (although the "Phillips" Court did not use that term). The underlying case had involved the prosecution of Zalegman Phillips, a prominent Philadelphia attorney, for interfering with diplomatic immunity, as protected by the Crimes Act of 1790, by filing a lawsuit against a former diplomat. The question certified was whether the provision extended to former diplomats.


Duke v R

Duke v R [1972] S.C.R. 917 was a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on the Canadian Bill of Rights, concerning the right of an accused to make full answer and defence to a criminal charge.
Background.
The accused in the case was charged with drunk driving contrary to the Criminal Code after having been taken to a police station and given a breathalyzer. While the breathalyzer test results were given to the accused's lawyer, the breath sample itself was not. This raised the concern as to whether the accused would be able to have a full defence, as is expected under common law rules of natural justice. According to the Supreme Court, the legislative history of the Criminal Code indicated that it was intended that the accused need not be given breath samples.
The case thus involved section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights, which states that everyone has "the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations." In "Duke", the Court considered the meaning of the term "fundamental justice." This phrase had an ambiguous meaning, whereas the term natural justice was understood to provide certain procedural legal protections.
Decision.
The Court found that fundamental justice was, for the purposes of this case, merely equivalent to natural justice.
As the Court wrote,
However, the author of the majority opinion, Chief Justice Gérald Fauteux, did say that he was not trying "to formulate any final definition" of fundamental justice.
The relevant section of the Bill of Rights also references a hearing. As Fauteux noted, there was no hearing in this case. However, it was alleged that if the accused's lawyer had been given the breath sample, a trial would follow in which evidence regarding the breath sample would be debated. Fauteux replied that the denial of access to evidence does not breach the right to a fair trial unless the law mandates access to such evidence. According to the Criminal Code and its history, such access is not guaranteed.
The case also involved consideration of section 2(f) of the Bill of Rights, which states that no law shall "deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, or of the right to reasonable bail without just cause." However, the Court noted that section 2(f) does not contain more rights relevant to this case than section 2(e). Therefore, losing the case under section 2(e) implied also losing under section 2(f).
Concurrence.
A short concurrence was written by Justice Bora Laskin. He objected to the majority's finding that the right to a fair trial is not breached if it is in a manner consistent with statutes.
Aftermath.
In 1982, when the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was adopted, section 7 of the Charter included a right to fundamental justice with respect to laws limiting the right to life, liberty and security of person. In "Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act" (1985), the Supreme Court once again had to consider the meaning of the term "fundamental justice." According to Justice Lamer, those who argued fundamental justice meant natural justice placed "Considerable emphasis" on the precedent established by "Duke". Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court extended the meaning of fundamental justice beyond natural justice.


Slavery in the colonial history of the United States

Slavery in the colonial history of the United States, from 1526 to 1776, developed from complex factors, and researchers have proposed several theories to explain the development of the institution of slavery and of the slave trade. Slavery strongly correlated with the European colonies' demand for labor, especially for the labor-intensive plantation economies of the sugar colonies in the Caribbean and South America, operated by Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the Dutch Republic.
Slave-ships of the Atlantic slave trade transported captives for slavery from Africa to the Americas. Indigenous people were also enslaved in the North American colonies, but on a smaller scale, and Indian slavery largely ended in the late eighteenth century although the enslavement of Indigenous people did continue to occur in the Southern states until the Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863. In the colonies, slave status for Africans became hereditary with the adoption and application of civil law into colonial law, which defined all children of slave mothers, as enslaved. By the time of the American Revolution, the European colonial powers had embedded chattel slavery for Africans and their descendants throughout the Americas, including the future United States.
Native Americans.
Native Americans enslaved members of their own and other tribes before and after Europeans arrived, continuing into the 1800s; enslaved people might or might not be adopted eventually, especially if enslaved as children; and the enslavement might or might not be hereditary. Slaves included captives from wars and slave raids; captives bartered from other tribes, sometimes at great distances; children sold by their parents during famines; and men and women who staked themselves in gambling when they had nothing else, which put them into servitude in some cases for life.
In three expeditions between 1514 and 1525 Spanish explorers visited the Carolinas and enslaved Native Americans, who they took back to Santo Domingo. The Spanish crown's charter for its 1526 colony in the Carolinas and Georgia was more restrictive. It required that Native Americans be treated well, paid and converted to Christianity, but it also allowed already-enslaved Native Americans to be bought and exported to the Caribbean if they had been enslaved by other Native Americans. This colony did not survive, so it is not clear if it exported any slaves.
Native Americans were enslaved by the Spanish in Florida under the encomienda system. New England and the Carolinas captured Native Americans in wars and distributed them as slaves.
Native Americans captured and enslaved some early European explorers and colonists.
Larger societies structured as chiefdoms kept slaves as unpaid field laborers, while in band societies the ownership of enslaved captives attested to their captor's military prowess. Some war captives were also subjected to ritualized torture and execution. Alan Gallay and other historians emphasize differences between Native American enslavement of war captives and the European slave trading system, into which numerous native peoples were integrated. Richard White, in "The Middle Ground" elucidates the complex social relationships between Native American groups and the early empires, including 'slave' culture and scalping. Robbie Ethridge states, "Let there be no doubt…that the commercial trade in Indian slaves was not a continuation and adaptation of pre-existing captivity patterns. It was a new kind of slave, requiring a new kind of occupational specialty … organized militaristic slavers." One example of this militaristic slaving can be seen in Nathaniel Bacon's actions in Virginia during the late 1670s. In June 1676, the Virginia assembly granted Bacon and his men what equated to a slave-hunting license by providing that any enemy Native Americans caught were to be slaves for life. They also provided soldiers who had captured Native Americans with the right to "retain and keep all such Native American slaves or other Native American goods as they either have taken or hereafter shall take." By this order, the assembly had made a public decision to enslave Native Americans. In the years to follow, other laws resulted in Native Americans being grouped with other non-Christian servants who had imported to the colonies (Negro slaves) as slaves for life.
Puritan New England, Virginia, Spanish Florida, and the Carolina colonies engaged in large-scale enslavement of Native Americans, often through the use of Indian proxies to wage war and acquire the slaves. In New England, slave raiding accompanied the Pequot War and King Philip's War but declined after the latter war ended in 1676. Enslaved Native Americans were in Jamestown from the early years of the settlement, but large-scale cooperation between English slavers and the West and Occaneechi peoples, whom they armed with guns, did not begin until the 1640s. These groups conducted enslaving raids in what is now Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and possibly Alabama. The Carolina slave trade, which included both trading and direct raids by colonists, was the largest among the British colonies in North America, estimated at 24,000 to 51,000 Native Americans by Gallay.
Historian Ulrich Phillips argues that Africans were inculcated as slaves and the best answer to the labor shortage in the New World because Native American slaves were more familiar with the environment, and would often successfully escape into the wilderness that African slaves had much more difficulty surviving in. Also, early colonial America depended heavily on the sugar trade, which led to malaria, a disease the Africans were far less susceptible to than Native American slaves.
The first enslaved Africans.
Carolinas.
The first African slaves in what would become the present day United States of America arrived August 9, 1526 in Winyah Bay, when Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón brought 600 colonists to start a colony. Records say the colonists included enslaved Africans, without saying how many. After a month Ayllón moved the colony to what is now Georgia.
Until the early 18th century, enslaved Africans were difficult to acquire in the colonies that became the United States, as most were sold to the West Indies, where the large plantations and high mortality rates required continued importation of slaves. One of the first major centers of African slavery in the English North American colonies occurred with the founding of Charles Town and the Province of Carolina in 1670. The colony was founded mainly by planters from the overpopulated English sugar island of Barbados, who brought relatively large numbers of African slaves from that island to establish new plantations.
To meet agricultural labor needs, colonists also practiced Indian slavery for some time. The Carolinians transformed the Indian slave trade during the late 17th and early 18th centuries by treating such slaves as a trade commodity to be exported, mainly to the West Indies. Historian Alan Gallay estimates that between 1670 and 1715, between 24,000 and 51,000 captive Native Americans were exported from South Carolina—much more than the number of Africans imported to the colonies of the future United States during the same period.
Georgia.
The first African slaves in what is now Georgia arrived in mid-September 1526 with Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón's establishment of San Miguel de Gualdape on the current Georgia coast. They rebelled and lived with indigenous people, destroying the colony in less than 2 months.
Two centuries later, Georgia was the last of the Thirteen Colonies to be established and the furthest south (Florida was not one of the Thirteen Colonies). Founded in the 1730s, Georgia's powerful backers did not object to slavery as an institution, but their business model was to rely on labor from Britain (primarily England's poor) and they were also concerned with security, given the closeness of then Spanish Florida, and Spain's regular offers to enemy-slaves to revolt or escape. Despite agitation for slavery, it was not until a defeat of the Spanish by Georgia colonials in the 1740s that arguments for opening the colony to slavery intensified. To staff the rice plantations and settlements, Georgia's proprietors relented in 1751, and African slavery grew quickly. After becoming a royal colony, in the 1760s Georgia began importing slaves directly from Africa.
Florida.
One African slave, Estevanico arrived with the Narváez expedition in Tampa Bay in April 1528 and marched north with the expedition until September, when they embarked on rafts from the Wakulla River, heading for Mexico.
African slaves arrived again in Florida in 1539 with Hernando de Soto, and in the 1565 founding of St. Augustine, Florida.
When St. Augustine, FL, was founded in 1565, the site already had enslaved Native Americans, whose ancestors had migrated from Cuba.
The Spanish settlement was sparse and they held comparatively few slaves.
The Spanish promised freedom to refugee slaves from the English colonies of South Carolina and Georgia in order to destabilize English settlement. If the slaves converted to Catholicism and agreed to serve in a militia for Spain, they could become Spanish citizens. By 1730 the black settlement known as Fort Mose developed near St. Augustine and was later fortified. There were two known Fort Mose sites in the eighteenth century, and the men helped defend St. Augustine against the British. It is "the only known free black town in the present-day southern United States that a European colonial government-sponsored. The Fort Mose Site, today a National Historic Landmark, is the location of the second Fort Mose." During the nineteenth century, this site became marsh and wetlands.
In 1763, Great Britain took over Florida in an exchange with Spain after defeating France in the Seven Years' War. Spain evacuated its citizens from St. Augustine, including the residents of Fort Mose, transporting them to Cuba. As Britain developed the colony for plantation agriculture, the percentage of slaves in the population in twenty years rose from 18% to almost 65% by 1783.
Texas and the southwest.
An African slave, Estevanico arrived by raft from Florida with the remnants of the Narváez expedition in Galveston in November 1528. The group headed south on the mainland in 1529, when they were captured and held by Native Americans until 1535.
They traveled northwest to the Pacific Coast, then south along the coast to San Miguel de Culiacán which had been founded in 1531, and then to Mexico City.
Spanish Texas had few African slaves, but enslaved many Native Americans.
Spain freed slaves who escaped from the Louisiana territory, beginning in 1803. More African slaves arrived with American settlers.
Virginia and Chesapeake Bay.
The first recorded Africans in Virginia arrived in late August 1619. The "White Lion", a privateer ship owned by Robert Rich, 2nd Earl of Warwick but flying a Dutch flag, docked at what is now Old Point Comfort (located in modern-day Hampton) with approximately 20 Africans. They were captives from the area of present-day Angola and had been seized by the British crew from a Portuguese slave ship, the "São João Bautista". To obtain the Africans, the Jamestown colony traded provisions with the ship. These individuals appear to have been treated as indentured servants, since slave laws were not passed until later, in 1641 in Massachusetts and in 1661 in Virginia.
Some number of the colony's early Africans earned freedom by fulfilling a work contract or for converting to Christianity. At least one of these, Anthony Johnson, in turn, acquired slaves or indentured servants for workers himself. Historians such as Edmund Morgan say this evidence suggests that racial attitudes were much more flexible in early 17th-century Virginia than they would later become. A 1625 census recorded 23 Africans in Virginia. In 1649 there were 300, and in 1690 there were 950. Over this period, legal distinctions between white indentured servants and "Negros" widened into lifelong and inheritable chattel-slavery for Africans.
New England.
The 1677 work "" documents English colonial prisoners of war (not, in fact, opposing combatants, but imprisoned members of English-allied forces) being enslaved and sent to Caribbean destinations in the aftermath of Metacom's War. Captive indigenous opponents, including women and children, were also sold into slavery at a substantial profit, to be transported to West Indies colonies.
Slaves, African and Native American, made up a smaller part of the New England economy, which was based on yeoman farming and trades, and a smaller fraction of the population, but they were present. Most were house servants, but some worked at farm labor. The Puritans codified slavery in 1641. The Massachusetts royal colony passed the "Body of Liberties", which prohibited slavery in some instances, but did allow three legal bases of slavery. Slaves could be held if they were captives of war if they sold themselves into slavery, were purchased from elsewhere, or if they were sentenced to slavery by the governing authority. The Body of Liberties used the word "strangers" to refer to people bought and sold as slaves, as they were generally not English subjects. Colonists came to equate this term with Native Americans and Africans.
The New Hampshire Assembly in 1714 passed "An Act To Prevent Disorders In The Night", prefiguring the development of sundown towns in the United States: Notices emphasizing and re-affirming the curfew were published in "The New Hampshire Gazette" in 1764 and 1771.
New York and New Jersey.
The Dutch West India Company introduced slavery in 1625 with the importation of eleven enslaved blacks who worked as farmers, fur traders, and builders to New Amsterdam (present day New York City), capital of the nascent province of New Netherland. The Dutch colony expanded across the North River (Hudson River) to Bergen (in today's New Jersey). Later, slaves were also held privately by settlers in the area. Although enslaved, the Africans had a few basic rights and families were usually kept intact. They were admitted to the Dutch Reformed Church and married by its ministers, and their children could be baptized. Slaves could testify in court, sign legal documents, and bring civil actions against whites. Some were permitted to work after hours earning wages equal to those paid to white workers. When the colony fell to the English in the 1660s, the company freed all its slaves, which created an early nucleus of free Negros in the area.
The English continued to import more slaves. Enslaved Africans performed a wide variety of skilled and unskilled jobs, mostly in the burgeoning port city and surrounding agricultural areas. In 1703 more than 42% of New York City's households held slaves, a percentage higher than in the cities of Boston and Philadelphia, and second only to Charleston in the South.
Midwest, Mississippi River, and Louisiana.
The French introduced legalized slavery into their colonies in New France both near the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River. (They also used slave labor on their island colonies in the Caribbean: Guadeloupe and especially Saint-Domingue.) After the port of New Orleans was founded in 1718 with access to the Gulf Coast, French colonists imported more African slaves to the Illinois Country for use as agricultural or mining laborers. By the mid-eighteenth century, slaves accounted for as many as a third of the limited population in that rural area.
Slavery was much more extensive in colonial Louisiana, where the French developed sugar cane plantations along the Mississippi River. Slavery was maintained during the French (1699–1763, and 1800–1803) and Spanish (1763–1800) periods of government. The first people enslaved by the French were Native Americans, but they could easily escape into the countryside which they knew well. Beginning in the early 18th century, the French imported Africans as laborers in their efforts to develop the colony. Mortality rates were high for both colonists and Africans, and new workers had to be imported.
Implemented in colonial Louisiana in 1724, Louis XIV of France's "Code Noir" regulated the slave trade and the institution of slavery in the French colonies. As a result, Louisiana and the Mobile area developed very different patterns of slavery compared to the British colonies. As written, the "Code Noir" gave some rights to slaves, including the right to marry. Although it authorized and codified cruel corporal punishment against slaves under certain conditions, it forbade slave owners to torture slaves, to separate married couples (and to separate young children from their mothers). It required owners to instruct slaves in the Catholic faith, implying that Africans were human beings endowed with a soul, an idea that had not been acknowledged until then.
The "Code Noir" forbade interracial marriages, but interracial relationships were formed in La Louisiane from the earliest years. In New Orleans society particularly, a formal system of concubinage, known as "plaçage", developed. Usually formed between young white men and African or African-American women, these relationships were formalized with contracts that sometimes provided for freedom for a woman and her children (if she was still enslaved), education for the mixed-race children of the union, and sometimes a property settlement. The free people of color became an intermediate social caste between the whites and the mass of enslaved blacks; many practiced artisan trades, and some acquired educations and property.
Gradually in the English colonies, slavery became known as a racial caste that generally encompassed all people of African descent, even if mixed race. From the 17th century, Virginia defined all children born to enslaved mothers as born into slavery, regardless of their father's ancestry. Similarly, Virginia denied that converting a slave to Christianity was grounds for freedom. Even free people of color or mixed-race (known as mulattoes) were restricted in their rights, especially as colonies passed harsher laws after early slave revolts. During the centuries of slavery in the British colonies, many slaves were of mixed-race ancestry.
Slave rebellions.
Colonial slave rebellions before 1776, or before 1801 for Louisiana, include:
16th century.
While the British knew about Spanish and Portuguese slave trading, they did not implement slave labor in the Americas until the 17th century. British travelers were fascinated by the dark-skinned people they found in West Africa; they developed mythologies that situated them in their view of the cosmos.
The first Africans to arrive in England came voluntarily in 1555 with John Lok (an ancestor of the famous philosopher John Locke). Lok intended to teach them English in order to facilitate the trading of material goods with West Africa. This model gave way to a slave trade initiated by John Hawkins, who captured 300 Africans and sold them to the Spanish. Blacks in England were subordinate but never had the legal status of chattel slaves.
In 1607, England established Jamestown as its first permanent colony on the North American continent. Tobacco became the chief commodity crop of the colony, due to the efforts of John Rolfe in 1611. Once it became clear that tobacco was going to drive the Jamestown economy, more workers were needed for the labor-intensive crop. The British aristocracy also needed to find a labor force to work on its sugar plantations in the Americas. The major sources were indentured servants from Britain, Native Americans, and West Africans. During this period, Barbados became an English Colony in 1624 and the Caribbean's Jamaica in 1655. These and other Caribbean colonies became the center of wealth generated from sugar cane and the focus of the slave trade for the growing English empire.
The English entertained two lines of thought simultaneously toward the indigenous Native Americans. Because these people were lighter-skinned, they were seen as more European and therefore as candidates for civilization. At the same time, because they were occupying the land desired by the colonial powers, they were from the beginning, targets of potential military attack.
At first, indentured servants were used for labor. These servants provided up to seven years of service in exchange for having their trip to Jamestown paid for by someone in Jamestown. Once the seven years were over, the indentured servant was free to live in Jamestown as a regular citizen. However, colonists began to see indentured servants as too costly, in part because the high mortality rate meant the force had to be resupplied.
17th century.
In 1619, English Privateers, the White Lion, brought African slaves to Point Comfort who were pillaged from a Portuguese slaver ship in the Caribbean headed to Veracruz.
Several colonial colleges held enslaved people as workers and relied on them to operate.
The development of slavery in 17th-century America.
The laws relating to slavery and their enforcement hardened in the second half of the 17th century, and the prospects for Africans and their descendants grew increasingly dim. By 1640, the Virginia courts had sentenced at least one black servant, John Punch, to slavery. In 1656 Elizabeth Key won a suit for freedom based on her father's status as a free Englishman, and his having baptized her as Christian in the Church of England. In 1662 the Virginia House of Burgesses passed a law with the doctrine of "partus", stating that any child born in the colony would follow the status of its mother, bond or free. This was an overturn of a longheld principle of English Common Law, whereby a child's status followed that of the father. It enabled slaveholders and other white men to hide the mixed-race children born of their rape of slave women and removed their responsibility to acknowledge, support, or emancipate the children.
During the second half of the 17th century, the British economy improved and the supply of British indentured servants declined, as poor Britons had better economic opportunities at home. At the same time, Bacon's Rebellion of 1676 led planters to worry about the prospective dangers of creating a large class of restless, landless, and relatively poor white men (most of them former indentured servants). Wealthy Virginia and Maryland planters began to buy slaves in preference to indentured servants during the 1660s and 1670s, and poorer planters followed suit by c.1700. (Slaves cost more than servants, so initially only the wealthy could invest in slaves.) The first British colonists in Carolina introduced African slavery into the colony in 1670, the year the colony was founded, and Charleston ultimately became the busiest slave port in North America. Slavery spread from the South Carolina Lowcountry first to Georgia, then across the Deep South as Virginia's influence had crossed the Appalachians to Kentucky and Tennessee. Northerners also purchased slaves, though on a much smaller scale. Enslaved people outnumbered free whites in South Carolina from the early 1700s to the Civil War. An authoritarian political culture evolved to prevent slave rebellion and justify white slaveholding. Northern slaves typically dwelled in towns, rather than on plantations as in the South, and worked as artisans and artisans' assistants, sailors and longshoremen, and domestic servants.
In 1672, King Charles II rechartered the Royal African Company (it had initially been set up in 1660), as an English monopoly for the African slave and commodities trade—thereafter in 1698, by statute, the English parliament opened the trade to all English subjects. The slave trade to the mid-Atlantic colonies increased substantially in the 1680s, and by 1710 the African population in Virginia had increased to 23,100 (42% of total); Maryland contained 8,000 Africans (23% of total). In the early 18th century, England passed Spain and Portugal to become the world's leading slave-trader.
The North American royal colonies not only imported Africans but also captured Native Americans, impressing them into slavery. Many Native Americans were shipped as slaves to the Caribbean. Many of these slaves from the British colonies were able to escape by heading south, to the Spanish colony of Florida. There they were given their freedom if they declared their allegiance to the King of Spain and accepted the Catholic Church. In 1739 Fort Mose was established by African American freedmen and became the northern defense post for St. Augustine. In 1740, English forces attacked and destroyed the fort, which was rebuilt in 1752. Because Fort Mose became a haven for escaped slaves from the English colonies to the north, it is considered a precursor site of the Underground Railroad.
Chattel slavery developed in British North America before the full legal apparatus that supported slavery did. During the late 17th century and early 18th century, harsh new slave codes limited the rights of African slaves and cut off their avenues to freedom. The first full-scale slave code in British North America was South Carolina's (1696), which was modeled on the colonial Barbados slave code of 1661 and was updated and expanded regularly throughout the 18th century.
A 1691 Virginia law prohibited slaveholders from emancipating slaves unless they paid for the freedmen's transportation out of Virginia. Virginia criminalized interracial marriage in 1691, and subsequent laws abolished blacks' rights to vote, hold office, and bear arms. Virginia's House of Burgesses established the basic legal framework for slavery in 1705.
The Atlantic slave trade to North America.
Of the enslaved Africans brought to the New World an estimated 5–7% ended up in British North America. The vast majority of slaves transported across the Atlantic Ocean were sent to the Caribbean sugar colonies, Brazil, or Spanish America. Throughout the Americas, but especially in the Caribbean, tropical disease took a large toll on their population and required large numbers of replacements. Many Africans had limited natural immunity to yellow fever and malaria; but malnutrition, poor housing, inadequate clothing allowances, and overwork contributed to a high mortality rate.
In British North America the slave population rapidly increased via the birth rate, whereas in the Caribbean colonies they did not. The lack of proper nourishment, being suppressed sexually, and poor health are possible reasons. Of the small numbers of babies born to slaves in the Caribbean, only about 1/4 survived the miserable conditions on sugar plantations.
It was not only the major colonial powers of Western Europe such as France, England, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands that were involved. Other countries, including Sweden and Denmark, participated in the trans-Atlantic slave trade though on a much more limited scale.
Sexual role differentiation and slavery.
"Depending upon their age and gender, slaves were assigned a particular task, or tasks, that had to be completed during the course of the day." In certain settings, men would participate in the hard labor, such as working on the farm, while women would generally work in the household. They would "be sent out on errands but in most cases their jobs required that they spend much of their time within their owner's household." These gender distinctions were mainly applied in the Northern colonies and on larger plantations. In Southern colonies and smaller farms, however, women and men typically engaged in the same roles, both working in the tobacco crop fields for example.
Although slave women and men in some areas performed the same type of day-to-day work, "[t]he female slave ... was faced with the prospect of being forced into sexual relationships for the purpose of reproduction." This reproduction would either be forced between one African slave and another, or between the slave woman and the owner. Slave owners saw slave women in terms of prospective fertility. That way, the number of slaves on a plantation could multiply without having to purchase another African. Unlike the patriarchal society of white Anglo-American colonists, "slave families" were more matriarchal in practice. "Masters believed that slave mothers, like white women, had a natural bond with their children that therefore it was their responsibility—more so than that of slave fathers—to care for their offspring." Therefore, women had the extra responsibility, on top of their other day-to-day work, to take care of children. Men, in turn, were often separated from their families. "At the same time that slaveholders promoted a strong bond between slave mothers and their children, they denied to slave fathers their paternal rights of ownership and authority..." Biological families were often separated by sale.
Indentured servitude.
Some historians such as Edmund Morgan and Lerone Bennett have suggested that indentured servitude provided a model for slavery in the 17th-century Crown Colonies. In practice, indentured servants were teenagers in England whose father sold their labor voluntarily for a period of time (typically four to seven years), in return for free passage to the colonies, room and board and clothes, and training in an occupation. After that, they received cash, clothing, tools, and/or land, and became ordinary settlers.
The Quaker Petition Against Slavery.
In 1688, four German Quakers in Germantown, a town outside Philadelphia, wrote a petition against the use of slaves by the English colonists in the nearby countryside. They presented the petition to their local Quaker Meeting, and the Meeting was sympathetic, but could not decide what the appropriate response should be. The Meeting passed the petition up the chain of authority to Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, where it continued to be ignored. It was archived and forgotten for 150 years.
The Quaker petition was the first public American document of its kind to protest slavery. It was also one of the first public declarations of universal human rights. While the petition was forgotten for a time, the idea that every human has equal rights were regularly discussed in Philadelphia Quaker society through the eighteenth century.
18th century.
During the Great Awakening of the late eighteenth century, Methodist and Baptist preachers toured in the South, trying to persuade planters to manumit their slaves on the basis of equality in God's eyes. They also accepted slaves as members and preachers of new chapels and churches. The first black churches (all Baptist) in what became the United States were founded by slaves and free blacks in Aiken County, South Carolina, in 1773, Petersburg, Virginia, in 1774, and Savannah, Georgia, in 1778, before the end of the Revolutionary War.
Slavery was officially recognized as a serious offense in 1776 by the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. The "Yearly Meeting" had been against slavery since the 1750's.
East Indian slaves.
In the early 21st century, new research has revealed that small numbers of East Indians were brought to the colonies as enslaved laborers, during the period when both India and the colonies were under British control. As an example, an ad in the "Virginia Gazette" of Aug. 4, 1768, describes one young "East Indian" as "a well made fellow, about 5 feet 4 inches high" who had "a thin visage, a very sly look, and a remarkable set of fine white teeth." Another slave is identified as "an East India negro man" who speaks French and English. Most of the Indian slaves were already converted to Christianity, were fluent in English, and took western names. Their original names and homes are not known. Their descendants have mostly merged with the African-American community, which also incorporated European ancestors. Today, descendants of such East Indian slaves may have a small percent of DNA from their Asiatic ancestors but it likely falls below the detectable levels for today's DNA tests.
Beginning of the anti-slavery movement.
African and African American slaves expressed their opposition to slavery through armed uprisings such as the Stono Rebellion (1739) in South Carolina. More typically, they resisted through work slowdowns, tool-breaking, and running away, either for short periods or permanently. Until the Revolutionary era, almost no white American colonists spoke out against slavery. Even the Quakers generally tolerated slaveholding (and slave-trading) until the mid-18th century, although they emerged as vocal opponents of slavery in the Revolutionary era.
Further events.
Late 18th and 19th century.
During and following the Revolution, the northern states all abolished slavery, with New Jersey acting last in 1804. Some of these state jurisdictions enacted the first abolition laws in the entire New World. In states that passed gradual abolition laws, such as New York and New Jersey, children born to slave mothers had to serve an extended period of indenture into young adulthood. In other cases, some slaves were reclassified as indentured servants, effectively preserving the institution of slavery through another name.
Often citing Revolutionary ideals, some slaveholders freed their slaves in the first two decades after independence, either outright or through their wills. The proportion of free blacks rose markedly in the Upper South in this period, before the invention of the cotton gin created a new demand for slaves in the developing "Cotton Kingdom" of the Deep South.
By 1808 (the first year allowed by the Constitution to federally ban the import slave trade), all states (except South Carolina) had banned the international buying or selling of slaves. Acting on the advice of President Thomas Jefferson, who denounced the international trade as "violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, in which the morality, the reputation, and the best interests of our country have long been eager to proscribe", in 1807 Congress also banned the international slave trade. However, the domestic slave trade continued in the South. It brought great wealth to the South, especially to New Orleans, which became the fourth largest city in the country, also based on the growth of its port. In the antebellum years, more than one million enslaved African Americans were transported from the Upper South to the developing Deep South, mostly in the slave trade. Cotton culture, dependent on slavery, formed the basis of new wealth in the Deep South.
In 1844 the Quaker petition was rediscovered and became a focus of the burgeoning abolitionist movement.
Emancipation Proclamation and end of slavery in the US.
On 1 January 1863, Abraham Lincoln signed Emancipation Proclamation freeing slaves in areas in rebellion during the American Civil War when Union troops advanced south. The Thirteenth Amendment (abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude) was ratified in December 1865.
References.
Footnotes
Citations


Diderik von Cappelen

Diderik von Cappelen (21 June 1761 – 3 April 1828) was a Norwegian wholesaler, merchant, shipowner, estate owner and politician in 1814. He is often referred to as Diderik von Cappelen but he spelt his name "Didrich von Cappelen" and is also referred to as Didrik von Cappelen.
Personal life and family.
Cappelen was born at Mæla Manor in Gjerpen ("Mæla gård i Gjerpen") in the municipality of Skien, in Telemark, Norway. He was one of the sons of the wholesaler, timber merchant and ship owner Diderich von Cappelen (1734–1794) and his first wife Petronelle Pedersdatter Juel (1737–1785). His father was one of the richest ship owners in Norway. Diderik von Cappelen was the elder brother of Peder von Cappelen, Ulrich Fredrich von Cappelen and Cathrine von Cappelen who was married to Carsten Tank. Cappelen was married twice, first to Maria Plesner from 1787, and from 1800 to Marie Severine Blom.
Diderik von Cappelen was a grandfather of painter August Cappelen and of Axel Nicolai Herlofson. Among other of his descendants are Didrik Cappelen, Hans Cappelen, Andreas Zeier Cappelen and with family names i. a. Cappelen, Anker, Arnesen, Blom, Borgfjord, Finne, Flood, Hofgaard, Lund, Løvenskiold, Nicolaisen, Norby, Prebensen, Skråmestø, Wildhagen and Aall, are several business people, estate owners, politicians, lawyers etc. living in Norway, Sweden, Austria and USA.
Career.
Cappelen was educated in his father's business, after being in 1779-80 at Kingswood School outside Bristol where he also met John Wesley. Diderik von Cappelen was a successful businessman continuing and expanding the family business. He was a religious man, he helped several poor people, paid for public schools and roads in Skien and paid a considerable amount of money to the establishing of the first Norwegian university.
He represented Skien at the Norwegian Constituent Assembly in 1814.