Judicial functions of the House of Lords

Whilst the House of Lords of the United Kingdom is the upper chamber of Parliament and has government ministers, it for many centuries had a judicial function. It functioned as a court of first instance for the trials of peers, for impeachments, and as a court of last resort in the United Kingdom and prior, the Kingdom of England.
Appeals were technically not to the House of Lords, but rather to the Queen-in-Parliament. In 1876, the Appellate Jurisdiction Act devolved the appellate functions of the House to an Appellate Committee, composed of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (informally referred to as Law Lords). They were then appointed by the Lord Chancellor in the same manner as other judges.
During the 20th and early 21st century, the judicial functions were gradually removed. Its final trial of a peer was in 1935, and in 1948, the use of special courts for such trials was abolished. The procedure of impeachment became seen as obsolete. In 2009 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom became the new court of final appeal in the UK, with the Law Lords becoming Supreme Court Justices.
Jurisdiction.
Appeals.
Historical development.
Parliament's role in deciding litigation originated from the similar role of the Royal Court, where the King dispensed justice. Parliament grew out of the Court and took on many of its roles. As lower courts were established, the House of Lords came to be the court of last resort in criminal and civil cases, except that in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary remained the highest court in criminal matters (except for 1713-1781).
Parliament originally did not hear appeals as a court might; rather, it heard petitions for the judgments of lower courts to be reversed. The House of Commons ceased considering such petitions in 1399, leaving the House of Lords, effectively, as the nation's court of last resort. The Lords' jurisdiction later began to decline; only five cases were heard between 1514 and 1589, and no cases between 1589 and 1621. In 1621, the House of Lords resumed its judicial role when King James I sent the petition of Edward Ewer, a persistent litigant, to be considered by the House of Lords. Petitions for the House of Lords to review the decisions of lower courts began to increase once again. After Ewer, 13 further cases would be heard in 1621. The House of Lords appointed a Committee for Petitions. At first, the Clerk of the Parliaments would bring petitions to the House, and the whole House could decide if they should or should not be referred to the Committee. As the number of petitions increased, the Committee gained the power to reject petitions itself.
Petitions to the House of Lords did not have to seek reversal of lower court judgments; often, petitions were brought directly to the Lords without prior consideration in the inferior judiciary. The practice of bringing cases directly to the Lords, however, ended with the case of "Thomas Skinner v. East India Company". Skinner had established his business's trading base in Asia while few British restrictions on trade existed; later the base was seized by East India Company which had been granted a monopoly. In 1667, the King, Charles II, referred the case to the Lords after failed attempts at arbitration.
Replying to Skinner's petition, the East India Company objected that the case was one of first instance, and that the Lords therefore should not have accepted it. Notwithstanding the Company's protests, the House of Lords proceeded with the matter. Though lawyers argued that the House could intervene only after the lower courts had failed to remedy the case, the Lords decided in Skinner's favour in 1668. The East India Company then petitioned the House of Commons, arguing that the acceptance of a case in the first instance by the Lords was "unusual" and "extraordinary."
A famous dispute then broke out between the two Houses; the Commons ordered the imprisonment of Thomas Skinner and the Lords retaliated by ordering the imprisonment of the Company Chairman. In 1670, Charles II requested both Houses to abandon the case. When they refused, he ordered that all references to the case be expunged from the Journals of both Houses and that neither body continue with the dispute. The House of Lords then ceased to hear petitions in the first instance, considering them only after the lower courts had failed to remedy them.
Even afterwards the Houses clashed over jurisdiction in 1675. The Commons felt that the upper House (as it was often accurately termed until 1911) had breached its privileges by considering cases with members of the Commons as defendant(s). After the Lords considered one of these "Shirley v. Fagg" (see Sir John Fagg) the Commons warned them to "have regard for their Privileges." Soon the dispute became worse when two more such cases emerged. These included Thomas Dalmahoy and Arthur Onslow (grandfather of Arthur Onslow the noted Speaker (1728–1761)). One case was from the Court of Chancery, and the other from the equity branch of the Court of the Exchequer. The Commons unsuccessfully contended the Lords could hear petitions challenging decisions of common law courts but not those from courts of equity.
The dispute rested during prorogation commencing 1675. After the Parliament reassembled in 1677, the cases involving members of the House of Commons were quietly dropped and neither House revisited the dispute.
In 1707, England united with Scotland to form the Kingdom of Great Britain. The question then arose as to whether or not appeals could be taken from Scottish Courts. The Articles provided that "no causes in Scotland be cognoscible by the courts of Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas or any other court in Westminster Hall; and that the said courts "or any other of the like nature" after the union shall have no power to cognosce, review or alter the acts or sentences of judicatures in Scotland, or stop the execution of the same." The Articles were silent on appeals to the House of Lords unless the latter be deemed of 'like nature' to Westminster Hall in which case it would be banned. In 1708, the first Scottish appeal to the Lords arrived, and it was accepted by the House. In 1709, the House ordered that no decree of the lower Scottish courts could be executed while an appeal was pending; that rule was reversed only by the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1808 empowering the lower Court to determine if an appeal justified the stay of its decree. In 1713, the House of Lords began to consider appeals from Scotland's highest criminal court, the High Court of Justiciary. In 1781, when deciding "Bywater v. Lord Advocate", the House recognised that before the Union, no further appeal lay. The House agreed not to hear further Scottish criminal appeals.
The Kingdom of Ireland was politically separate from Great Britain and subordinate to it. The Irish House of Lords regarded itself as the final court of appeal for Ireland, but the British Declaratory Act of 1719 asserted the right of further appeal from the Irish Lords to the British Lords. This was odious to the Irish Patriot Party and was eventually repealed as part of the Constitution of 1782. Appellate jurisdiction for Ireland returned to Westminster when the Acts of Union 1800 abolished the Parliament of Ireland.
A 1627 lunacy inquisition judgment was appealed from Chancery to the Privy Council of England rather than the House of Lords. Bypassing the Lords was repeated at the next such appeal, in 1826 from the Irish Chancery.
Appellate jurisdiction.
The judicial business of the House of Lords was regulated by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. Generally, only important or particularly complex appeals came before the House of Lords. The only further appeal from the House of Lords was to the European courts (the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights), and only then in matters concerning either European Community law or the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Law Lords did not have the power to exercise judicial review over Acts of Parliament. However, in 1972 the UK signed up to be a member of the European Union, and with this accepted European law to be supreme in certain areas so long as Parliament does not explicitly override it (see the "ex parte" Factortame case). The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty still applies – under UK constitutional law, Parliament could have at any time unilaterally decided to dismiss the supremacy of European law. In common with other courts in the European Union, however, the Law Lords referred points involving European Union law to the European Court of Justice. The Lords could also declare a law inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights pursuant to section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Whilst this power was shared with the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the High Court of Justiciary, the Court of Session, and the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, such declarations were considered so important that the question would almost inevitably be determined in the House of Lords on appeal. However, the challenged law in question was not automatically struck down; it remained up to Parliament to amend the law.
In civil cases, the House of Lords could hear appeals from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland and the Scottish Court of Session. Alternatively, cases raising important legal points could "leapfrog" from the High Court of England and Wales or High Court in Northern Ireland. In England, Wales or Northern Ireland Leave (or permission) to appeal could be granted either by the court whose decision is appealed or the House of Lords itself. Leave to appeal is not a feature of the Scottish legal system and appeals proceeded when two Advocates certified the appeal as suitable.
In criminal cases, the House of Lords could hear appeals from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, the High Court of England and Wales, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland and the Courts-Martial Appeal Court but did not hear appeals from the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland. In addition to obtaining leave to appeal, an appellant also had to obtain a certificate from the lower court stating that a point of general public importance was involved. The effect of this was that, in criminal matters, the House of Lords could not control its own docket.
Permission to appeal could be granted by an Appeal Committee. The Committee consisted of three Lords of Appeal or Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. Appeal Committees could not meet while Parliament was prorogued or dissolved. Formerly, leave to appeal was unnecessary if two solicitors certified the reasonableness of the case. This procedure was abolished in English cases in 1934 and in Northern Irish cases in 1962; Scottish cases continued to come before the House of Lords in a similar manner.
An Appellate Committee, normally consisting of five Lords of Appeal in Ordinary or Lords of Appeal, heard the actual appeals. It was not a standing committee, and hence there was no one Appellate Committee; a separate Appellate Committee was formed to hear each appeal. The minimum number of Law Lords that could form a Committee was four. Seven Lords could sit in particularly important cases. On 4 October 2004 a Committee of nine Lords, including both the Senior Law Lord Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Second Senior Law Lord Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, was convened to hear challenges to the indefinite detention of suspects under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, and on 16 December it announced an 8-1 ruling against the Government. Only five Appellate Committees ever comprised nine members. Three of these occurred after 2001.
The determination of each Appellate Committee was normally final, but the House of Lords (in common with the Court of Appeal and High Court of England and Wales) retained an inherent jurisdiction to reconsider any of its previous decisions, this includes the ability to "vacate" that decision and make a new one. It was exceptional for the House of Lords to exercise this power, but a number of important cases such as "Dimes v Grand Junction Canal" (a seminal case on bias in England and Wales) proceeded in this way.
A recent example of the House of Lords reconsidering an earlier decision occurred in 1999, when the judgment in the case on the extradition of the former President of Chile Augusto Pinochet was overturned on the grounds that one of the Lords on the committee, Lord Hoffmann, was a Director of a charity closely allied with Amnesty International, which was a party to the appeal and had an interest to achieve a particular result. The matter was reheard by a panel of seven Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.
Formerly, appeals were heard in the House of Lords Chamber. The Lords would sit for regular sessions after four in the evening, and the judicial sessions were held prior to that time. During the Second World War, the Commons Chamber was bombed, so the Commons began to conduct their debates in the Lords Chamber. The judicial sessions of the House were temporarily moved to a Committee room, which escaped the noise of building repairs. The temporary move later became permanent, and appeals continued to be heard in Committee rooms. No judicial robes were worn by the judges during hearings; they wore regular business suits. Appellate Committees could meet while Parliament was prorogued. Additionally, if the Sovereign authorised the same, the Committee could meet while Parliament was dissolved.
Although each Appellate Committee was essentially acting as an appellate court, it could not issue judgments in its own name, but could only recommend to the House of Lords how to dispose of an appeal. This is why all the Law Lords framed their opinions in the form of recommendations (for example, "I would dismiss the appeal" or "I would allow the appeal"). In British constitutional theory, the Law Lords' opinions were originally intended to be individually delivered as speeches in debate before the full House of Lords, upon a motion to consider the Committee's "report" on a particular appeal. The actual reading of full speeches before the House was abandoned in 1963, after which it became possible for a deceased Law Lord to give a speech.
Judgment was given in the main House of Lords Chamber during a full sitting. Sittings for the purposes of giving judgment were normally held at two o'clock on Thursday afternoons; non-judicial matters were not dealt with during these sittings. The House of Lords' staff would notify counsel that judgment was imminent about five or six days before the relevant sitting, and provide advance copies of the Committee's written report (the Lords' written speeches) and the House minutes (in plain English, a script of the "pro forma" questions to be raised and voted upon) to counsel when they arrived for the sitting.
Only the Law Lords on the relevant Appellate Committee spoke, but other Lords were free to attend, although they rarely did so. After the abandonment of reading speeches in full, each Law Lord who had heard the appeal would rise only to acknowledge they "have had the advantage of reading the speech" (or speeches) prepared by the other Law Lords on the Appellate Committee, and to state they would allow the appeal or would dismiss the appeal for the reasons given in their own speech or in another Law Lord's speech. After all five members of the Committee had spoken, the question was put to the House: "That the report from the Appellate Committee be agreed to." The House then voted on that question and on other questions related thereto; the decisions on these questions constituted the House's formal judgment. In theory, the full House was voting on the recommendations of the Appellate Committee, but by custom only the Law Lords on the Appellate Committee actually voted, while all other Lords (including all other Law Lords) always abstained.
If the House of Lords was in recess, the Lord Chancellor or Senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary could recall the House to give judgment. Judicial sittings could occur while Parliament was prorogued, and, with the authorisation of the Sovereign, dissolved. In the latter case, the meeting was not of the full House, but was rather of the Law Lords acting in the name of the full House. Judgment could not be given between the summoning of a Parliament and the State Opening. No Parliamentary business is conducted during that time, except the taking of oaths of allegiance and the election of a Speaker by the House of Commons.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which includes the twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary as well as other senior judges in the Privy Council, has little domestic jurisdiction. The Committee hears appeals from the appellate courts of many independent Commonwealth nations and crown dependencies. The Judicial Committee's domestic jurisdiction was very limited, hearing only cases on the competency of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales. Precedents set in devolution cases, but not in other matters, are binding on all other courts, which included the House of Lords. The 'devolution issues' were transferred from the Privy Council to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom; however, it continues to hear Commonwealth appeals.
Trials.
Trials no longer occur; those of peers of the realm in the House were abolished in 1948, and those of impeachment have not occurred since 1806; all sane adults are liable to criminal trial, though the law is moot as to a triable offence of the monarch, however the Edward VIII abdication crisis saw an abdication on far less than criminality and again could take place for reputational reasons, with the ex-monarch then standing trial.
Peers of the Realm were entitled to a trial in the House of Lords, just as commoners were entitled to trial by jury. Peers of Ireland were, after Union with Great Britain in 1801, entitled to be elected to the Commons, but during such service their privileges, including the privilege of trial in the House of Lords, abated. Peeresses in their own right and wives or widows of peers were also entitled to trial in such a court, though never members of the House of Lords. Widows of peers who later married commoners lost the privilege.
After a Grand Jury indicted a peer, the case was brought before the Court of King's/Queen's Bench. The judges of that court could not accept any plea of guilty or not guilty, except a plea that the crime in question was previously pardoned. If pardon was not pled, the court issued a writ of certiorari moving the indictment to the House of Lords. The Lord High Steward presided, but the entire House could decide all legal, factual or procedural disputes. At the end, the Lords then voted, starting with the most junior baron, and proceeding in order of precedence, ending with the Lord High Steward. Jurors vote on (after making) oath or affirmation; a lord voted (up)on his honour. Bishops could not be tried in the House, because they were not peers, but they could participate as judges in a trial, except in the verdict. If Parliament was not sitting the case would be referred to the Lord High Steward's Court. He as president was sole judge of questions of law or procedure, but a jury of Lords Triers determined the verdict. (He selected, at his discretion, any 23 or more peers to be Lords Triers.) A simple majority of votes was enough to convict, but this could not be less than 12. Since the Crown appointed the Lord High Steward, peers lamented that in what may well be a political persecution this procedure put the accused at great disadvantage (since the Crown could appoint a hostile Lord High Steward who could select hostile peers as Lords Triers), and in the late 17th century made repeated efforts to ameliorate this.
The last trial of a peer in the House of Lords was in 1935, when Lord de Clifford was tried for motor manslaughter. Under the First Attlee ministry, the Criminal Justice Act 1948 abolished trials of peers by their equals; now, peers are tried by juries of commoners.
The UK constitutional institutions since early Victorian Britain have been careful to uphold a Diceyan emphasis on separation of powers (finalised with the Lord Chancellor's ending of his judicial office thwarted by a change of government in the 1870s, which that took place in the 2000s). The Lords legally has power to try impeachments after the House of Commons agrees and words "Articles of Impeachment," which it forwards.
Originally, the Lords held that it applied only to peers and only for certain crimes. In 1681 the Commons passed a resolution that it may forward articles against anyone for any crime. The Lords tries/tried impeachment by simple majority. When the Commons demand judgment, the Lords may proceed to pronounce the sentence against the accused. The Commons may refuse to press for judgment whereupon the accused, convicted, faces no punishment.
The accused could not, under the Act of Settlement 1701, obtain and plead a pardon to avoid trial in the House of Lords; but could if liable to trial before the lesser courts. Any convict could be pardoned (absolutely) by the Sovereign. In Britain the House of Lords trials were in direct substitution of regular trial; they could impose the same sentences, and the Sovereign could pardon the convict like any other. This combined jurisdiction differs from many other nations. For instance, in the United States, the President may not issue pardons in cases of impeachment. The Senate can at most remove the accused from office and bar them from future offices of public trust or honour, the accused remaining liable to trial and punishment in the lesser courts after such trial.
Impeachment was originally used to try those who were too powerful to come before the ordinary courts. During the reign of the Lancastrians, impeachments were very frequent, but they reduced under the Tudors, when bills of attainder became the preferred method. During the reign of the Stuarts, impeachment was revived; Parliament used it as a tool against the King's ministers during a time when it felt it needed to resist the tyranny of the Crown. The last impeachment trials were the Impeachment of Warren Hastings from 1788 to 1795 and the Impeachment of Viscount Melville in 1806.
The novel "Clouds of Witness" (1926) by Dorothy L. Sayers depicts in the House of Lords the fictional trial of a duke who is accused of murder. Sayers researched and used the then current trial procedures. "Kind Hearts and Coronets" (1949) comedy from Ealing Studios features an almost identical scene.
Peerage claims.
Such claims and disputes were in early centuries a matter for the monarch alone; "Erskine and May" states (2019) the House is regarded as guardian of its own privileges and membership. Theoretically, the Crown, as "fount of honour", is entitled to decide all questions relating to such disputes. In practice such decisions are made where disputed only after full reference to the House of Lords.
Since the taking effect of the House of Lords Act 1999, the House of Lords may declare the law on matters of peerage
where the Lord Chancellor has recommended it is proper to be considered by the Committee for Privileges and Conduct. Once the latter reports to the House, the House usually issues a concurring resolution which is reported to the Crown which by custom confirms the decision by directing entries on the Roll of Peerage. Each decision is deemed to turn on its own facts and is not of binding precedent value for other cases.
Constitution of the Lords.
Appeals.
At first, all members of the House of Lords could hear appeals. The role of lay members of the House in judicial sittings faded in the early nineteenth century. Soon, only "Law Lords"—the Lord Chancellor and Lords who held judicial office—came to hear appeals. The last time that lay members voted on a case was in 1834. The Lords later came close to breaching this convention a decade later, when the House was considering the case of Daniel O'Connell, an Irish politician. A panel of Law Lords—the Lord Chancellor, three former Lord Chancellors, a former Lord Chancellor of Ireland and a former Lord Chief Justice—opined on the matter. Immediately thereafter, lay members began to make speeches about the controversial case. The Lord President of the Privy Council then advised that lay members should not intervene after the Law Lords had announced their opinions. The last time a lay peer attempted to intervene was in 1883; in that case, the Lord's vote was ignored.
No provision stood whereby the number of Law Lords could be regulated. In 1856, it was desired to increase their number by creating a life peerage. The House, however, ruled that the recipient, Sir James Parke, was not entitled thereby to sit as a Lord of Parliament.
Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, the Sovereign nominated a number of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary to sit in the House of Lords. In practice, they were appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister (they were not covered by the Judicial Appointments Commission established in 2006). Only lawyers who had held high judicial office for a minimum of two years or barristers who had been practising for fifteen years were to be appointed Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. By convention, at least two were Scottish and at least one from Northern Ireland.
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary held the rank of Baron and seats in the House for life. Under the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 they ceased to be such at 70, but could be permitted by ministerial discretion to hold office as old as 75. The Act provided for appointment of only two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, but as of 2009 twelve could be appointed; this number could have been further raised by a Statutory Instrument approved by both Houses of Parliament. They were, by custom, appointed to the Privy Council if not already members. They served on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, highest court of appeal in certain cases such as from some Commonwealth countries. They were often called upon to chair important public inquiries, such as the Hutton inquiry.
Two of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were designated the Senior and Second Senior of their type. Formerly, the most senior of the Law Lords took these posts. Since 1984, however, the Senior and Second Senior Lords were appointed independently.
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were joined by Lords of Appeal. These were lawyers who are already members of the House under other Acts (including the Life Peerages Act 1958 and the House of Lords Act 1999) who held or had held high judicial office. High judicial officers included judges of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, the Inner House of the Court of Session and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. Additionally, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary who had reached the age of seventy could become a Lord of Appeal. Between 1996 and 2001, Lord Cooke of Thorndon, a retired judge of an overseas appellate court (the Court of Appeal of New Zealand), served as a Lord of Appeal.
Judicial appeals were heard by Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and Lords of Appeal under the age of seventy-five. Lords of Appeal in Ordinary were entitled to emoluments. Thus, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary ceased to be paid at the time they ceased to hold office and became Lords of Appeal. The Senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary received £185,705 as of 2009 (the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales was the only judicial figure who received a higher salary). The other Lords of Appeal in Ordinary received £179,431.
By convention, only the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and Lords of Appeal participated in judicial matters. When the House gave judgment, the regular quorum of three applied, but these had to be Law Lords. Normally, only the Law Lords on the Appellate Committee who were deciding the case voted when the House gave judgment.
Trials.
The Lord High Steward presided over the House of Lords in trials of peers, and also in impeachment trials when a peer was tried for high treason; otherwise, the Lord High Chancellor presided. The post of Lord High Steward was originally hereditary, held by the Earls of Leicester. After the rebellion of one of the Lord High Stewards, the position was forfeited and re-granted to Edmund Crouchback, but it later merged in the Crown. The position was created again, but its holder died without heirs in 1421, and the post has since been left vacant. Whenever a Lord High Steward became necessary—at certain trials and at coronation—one was appointed for the occasion only. Once the trial or coronation concluded, the Lord High Steward would break his white staff of office, thereby symbolising the end of his service in that position. Often, when a Lord High Steward was necessary for trials of peers, the Lord Chancellor was appointed to the post.
The Lord High Steward merely presided at trials, and the whole House could vote. The position of the Lords Spiritual (the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England with seats in the House), however, was unclear. The Lords Spiritual, though members of the House, were not considered "ennobled in blood" like the temporal peers. Though they retained the right to vote in both trials of peers and impeachment trials, it was customary for them to withdraw from the chamber immediately before the House pronounced judgment. This convention was followed only before the final vote on guilt and not on procedural questions arising during the trial.
When the House was not officially in session, trials were heard by the Court of the Lord High Steward.
Peerage claims.
If the claim is a difficult one, or if the Lord Chancellor is not satisfied that the claimant has established a right to succession, the matter is referred to the Lords, which then refers it to its Committee. In hearing such claims it sits with three current holders of high judicial office, who are granted the same speaking and voting rights as members of the Committee.
Reform.
In 1873, the Government introduced a bill to abolish the judicial role of the House of Lords Judicial Committee in English cases (Scottish and Irish appeals were to be preserved). The bill passed, and was to come into force in November 1874. Before that date, however, the Liberal Government of William Ewart Gladstone fell. The new Conservative Government, led by Benjamin Disraeli, passed a bill to postpone the coming-into-force of the bill until 1875. By then, however, the sentiments of the Parliament had changed. The relevant provisions of the bill were repealed, and the jurisdiction of the House of Lords came to be regulated under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876.
Concerns were chiefly around the Lord Chancellor, able and prone to sit in judicial and legislative/executive bodies (judicial committee "and" house). The other Law Lords would not participate in the latter. In the final 42 years of such office holder's possible participation in judicial sittings this was for a minority of their sessions:
Lord Chancellors tended to recuse themselves (not sit) when the Government had a stake in the outcome; during a debate in the Lords, Lord Irvine said, "I am unwilling to lay down any detailed rules because it is ever a question of judgment combined with a need to ensure that no party to an appeal could reasonably believe or suspect that the Lord Chancellor might, because of his other roles, have an interest in a specific outcome. Examples might be where the lawfulness of a decision or action by any Minister or department might be at issue." Under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 the Lord Chancellor is no longer a judge.
Part 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which came into force on 1 October 2009, abolished the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and transferred it to a new body, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Among the initial Justices of the Supreme Court were ten of the twelve then existing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (Law Lords). One of the Law Lords (Lord Scott of Foscote) had retired on 30 September 2009 and the 12th, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, became the Master of the Rolls (one of two sub-head judges, that for civil justice, in England and Wales). The 11th place on the Supreme Court was filled by Lord Clarke (previously the Master of the Rolls), a member of the House of Lords who was the first Justice to be appointed directly to the Supreme Court. The 12th place was initially vacant. Formally addressed as (customarily styled) "My Lord" or "My Lady", later appointees are not elevated to the House of Lords.


Acte van Consulentschap

The Acte van Consulentschap (; in English historiography variously known as Act of Advisership, or less correctly, as Act of Consultation) was a secret, private contract between stadtholder William V, Prince of Orange of the Dutch Republic and his mentor and former guardian Duke Louis Ernest of Brunswick-Lüneburg, concluded on 3 May 1766 (shortly after William's majority), in which the latter was informally given continued powers of guardianship over the stadtholder in his private and public capacity. Not only gave this document the Duke a nefarious influence over affairs of state in the Republic, but when it became public in 1784 it caused such a scandal that the stadtholder's regime was almost fatally undermined in the political upheaval of the Patriottentijd.
Background.
When William V's father William IV, Prince of Orange died in 1751, the young prince was only three years of age. His mother Anne, Princess Royal and Princess of Orange became Regent for her son in as far as the hereditary office of stadtholder was concerned. Before his death, however, William IV had already made arrangements to give the Duke a role as her adviser. In any case, the ancillary office of Captain-General of the Dutch States Army could not be exercised by a woman, and the Duke was appointed its Captain-General. The Duke remained in this position during the subsequent regencies of Landgravine Marie Louise of Hesse-Kassel and Princess Carolina of Orange-Nassau. During this entire period he had great influence on the prince's education, and an almost father-son relationship developed between the two.
The Act and its influence.
In the eyes of contemporaries the young prince had not fully matured before he reached his majority on 8 March 1766, and became stadtholder in his own right. The class of ruling "Regenten" therefore felt anxious about his taking the reins of power unchecked, and the pensionary of Delft, Pieter van Bleiswijk, a leading member of the States of Holland and the States General of the Netherlands for Holland, together with other grandees, like the Grand Pensionary Pieter Steyn took the initiative of making an arrangement in which "for the time being" the influence of the Duke would be informally continued. This was formalized in a contract (which later became known as the "Acte van Consulentschap" or Act of Advisorship), drawn up by van Bleiswijk, and concluded between the Prince and the Duke on 3 May 1766. Both signed it, and the Duke swore to it, according to the witness, the Princes' secretary, F.J. de Larrey
The Act consisted of our articles.
All of this until further notice from either party.
The Act remained secret for a long time, but of course the inner circle around the Prince knew about it. If necessary, the Duke would brandish it, if challenged by other courtiers, like Willem Bentinck van Rhoon. The immediate effect of the Act was that an attempt to saddle the stadtholder with an "advisory council" was thwarted. As will be clear from the above account of the contents of the Act, it did not give the Duke formal powers over the stadtholder, but it helped him exploit the natural ascendancy he had enjoyed over William from an early age. The relationship helped to perpetuate the dependence of the younger on the older person to an "unhealthy" extent, as was recognized by many in their environment. The Duke was instrumental in obtaining the hand in marriage of Wilhelmina of Prussia, Princess of Orange, a niece of the Prussian king Frederick the Great, whom William married on 4 October 1767, but the Princess soon started to resent the Duke's influence, and she became one of his main opponents.
The Duke had many other enemies, who blamed him for many of the mistakes the Prince made. The conduct of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War was seen as one of his main failures, and in other military respects, like the encroachments of the new emperor of Austria, Joseph II, in the Austrian Netherlands. This caused the dismissal of the Duke as Captain-General on 24 May 1782, though he remained governor of the fortress of 's-Hertogenbosch until the crisis of the Kettle War in 1784. Because of this removal the Act was no longer operational, and in any case the Duke no longer was a convenient lightning rod for the political opposition from the Patriots, who from then on more and more attacked the stadtholder himself.
When in the issues of 19, 23, 26, and 30 June 1784 of the De Post van den Neder-Rhijn, a Patriot newspaper, its editor Pieter 't Hoen published the previously secret text of the Act, a tremendous scandal broke out in the Republic, which made the position of the Duke untenable, and severely harmed the political position of the stadtholder. The fact that it was a private contract that never gave due deference to the position of the true sovereign of the country, the States General, drew 't Hoen's stentorian criticism. It proved in his eyes that the Duke (and by extension the Prince) from the beginning of William's stadtholderate had denied the true constitutional relationships within the Republic, and arrogated a "monarchical" position for the Prince, which was contrary to what that position in the eyes of the Patriots ought to be.
The scandal gave his opponents the opportunity to engineer the Duke's definitive removal. Princess Wilhelmina demanded his dismissal. The States of Holland on 18 August 1784 declared the Act null and void. In the States General they proposed his dismissal as field marshal of the States Army, a rank he still held after his dismissal as Captain-General in 1782, and his deportation from the country. The States of Friesland already had demanded this on 11 June. The Duke resigned his commission on 14 October 1784, and left the Republic for Aachen.


Franz Jacob (Resistance fighter)

Franz Jacob (August 9, 1906 – September 18, 1944) was a German Resistance fighter against the National Socialists and a Communist politician.
Life.
Early years.
Jacob was born in Hamburg in a working-class family. His mother, Marie Pgetz, was a maid and his father, August Moser, was a house servant, who died young. His family lived with his grandfather, an active member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) until his mother remarried in 1917. Her new husband, Gustav Jacob, adopted Franz.
Jacob only attended one year of Oberrealschule. He then learned the trade of machine fitting on Hamburg wharfs and joined the metalworkers' union, where he was elected representative of the apprentices. The First World War and the economic situation in Germany prompted Jacob to join the youth branch of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1920, at the age of 15. A year later, he joined the SPD. In 1925, he left the SPD for the youth group of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), over the objections of family.
He also joined the Rote Hilfe and the Rote Frontkämpferbund (RFB). His activity in the Communist Youth group, led to him being elected the organization leader of the waterfront district. In 1928, he joined the KPD itself and was allowed to be a delegate to the 5th International Congress of Communist Youth and the 6th World Congress of the Communist International, both in Moscow. As a result, Jacob lost his job at the Hamburg Telegraph Office. His next job was at Reiherstieg-Werft, but he was fired without notice after calling for a short strike.
In 1929, Jacob began working as a correspondent for the KPD publications for Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, the "Hamburger Volkszeitung" (Hamburg Peoples' Press) and the "Norddeutsche Echo" (North German Echo). For a short time, he went to Kiel to help build a new anti-fascist organization to replace the RFB, which had been made illegal. In 1931, he became Secretary for agitation and propaganda for the KPD's Hamburg waterfront district, working then primarily for the KPD. His flyers made his name well known and in April 1932, he became a member of the Hamburg Parliament, at the age of 26.
The Nazi era.
The Hamburg years.
The March 1933 elections saw great gains by the National Socialists to seats of power, both on the state and national level. On February 27, 1933, six days before the election, the Reichstag was burned, an event that was blamed on the Communists. With Nazis in key positions in government, Adolf Hitler was able to push through the Reichstag Fire Decree, which was then signed into law by President Paul von Hindenburg. The decree withdrew civil liberties and enabled the Nazis to arrest anyone they deemed to be an enemy. This became first and foremost a confrontation with the KPD, but in effect, outlawed all political parties in Germany, other than the Nazi Party. The Enabling Act of March 27, 1933 consolidated their power and authority. By the end of April 1933, the Nazis had arrested 18,000 Communists, 12,000 SPD members and others, filling concentration camps. By June 1933, more than half of the KPD's district leaders were in detention and hundreds of Nazi opponents had been killed. Many people went underground, including Jacob.
A year later, in mid-August 1933, he was arrested in Berlin by the Nazis and sent to prison, where Jacob subjected to torture in the Gestapo prisons Columbia Haus in Berlin and KolaFu in Hamburg. In 1934, he was sentenced to three years at hard labor in a Zuchthaus for "preparation to commit high treason. After he had served his sentence, he was sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp for three years of preventive detention, where he stayed till 1940.
Upon his release, he immediately went to Hamburg, where he found work at a shipyard and got back in touch with friends Bernhard Bästlein and Robert Abshagen, with whom he formed the Bästlein-Jacob-Abshagen Group, a Communist resistance group. He again was responsible for agitation and propaganda, producing flyers and other publications. He also began creating an archive for the group, which he conspired with a friend, Otto Gröllmann, who was a set designer at the Thalia Theater (Hamburg) to conceal there. The archive has since been lost.
The Berlin years.
After a wave of arrests began in Hamburg in October 1942, which included Bästlein and Abshagen, Jacob fled and went to Berlin, where he was again underground. In 1943, he formed another resistance group, this time with Anton Saefkow. Bästlein was able to escape prison during a bombing raid in 1944 and ran into Jacob by chance, after which he joined them in forming the Saefkow-Jacob-Bästlein Organization, also called the "Operative Leadership of the Communist Party in Germany". It was one of the largest resistance groups in Germany. They focused on disseminating information that they were able to glean from foreign newspapers and from radio broadcasts from Moscow.
They also organized the Bewegung Freies Deutschland (Free Germany Movement) to work with people in factories, military units, opposition parties and others, growing to several hundred people. In his publication, "Am Beginn der letzten Phase des Krieges" ("At the beginning of the last phase of the war"), Jacob wrote that to end the war and overthrow the fascist dictator, Communists should concentrate all their strength "on developing a broad, national front composed of all groups that stand opposed to fascism.
Jacob lived underground in Berlin almost two years, moving frequently, some 30 times in 18 months, and having to remain very quiet during the daytime, so as not to be overheard. Being illegal, meant he also had to sit out bomb raids and dared not seek cover in a bomb shelter.
In April 1944, Social Democrats Adolf Reichwein and Julius Leber, who were members of the Kreisau Circle, got in touch with Saefkow and Jacob to talk about bringing their Communist organization into the conspiracy of the 20 July plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler. This was done with the knowledge and agreement of Claus von Stauffenberg. There was a meeting with Reichwein and Leber on June 22, 1944 in the apartment of Dr. Rudolf Schmid. Then Jacob and Leber, who had been together at Sachsenhausen and had formed a good trust with one another, met again, separately. According to historian Peter Steinbach, they knew this military resistance was an effort without a broad foundation of support and that the leaders of the SPD and KPD, as well as trade unions, had the contacts to turn it into an act of resistance with support.
An additional meeting was planned for July 4, 1944 to discuss concrete measures. They were denounced by an informer, however, and when Jacob, Saefkow and Reichwein arrived at the appointed place, the Gestapo snared them all. Leber was arrested a few days later. Jacob was sentenced to death by the "Volksgerichthof" on September 5, 1944 and was executed on September 18, 1944, at Brandenburg-Görden Prison, along with Saefkow and Bästlein.
Family.
Jacob married Katharina Hochmuth (née Emmermann), whom he had known from the Young Communist League. He moved in with her and her daughter, Ursel Hochmuth. Katharina was also politically active and had already been in concentration camps more than once and had served a year in prison. She helped Jacob gather information for his flyers, which were smuggled to Berlin by courier Charlotte Groß.
After Jacob was forced to flee to Berlin in October 1942, it was Charlotte Groß who brought him news of the birth of his daughter, Ilse, who was born on November 9, 1942. Jacob saw his daughter just once, when Katharina and her children were on a trip and on the way home, secretly spent one night in Berlin.
Jacob's wife survived the war and became involved in the Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime. Years later, she was asked if her fight against Adolf Hitler had been worth it.
Historian and author Ursel Hochmuth (b. 1931), daughter of Katharina and Franz Jacob's stepdaughter, has researched the German Resistance for decades and written several books on the subject.
Memorials.
The Lichtenberg suburb of Berlin named a street named after Franz Jacob in 1975. There is also a street in Rostock named for Jacob. There is a stolperstein for Franz Jacob at Jarrestraße 21, in Hamburg, where he lived with his wife and family.


Daniel Frederik Petersen

Daniel Frederik Petersen (21 December 1757 – 24 September 1816) was a Norwegian military officer.
Johan Daniel Frederik Petersen was born at Drammen in Buskerud, Norway.
He was a career Military Officer. He first enlisted in the military during 1783 in the service of the Prussian Army. He rose in the rank to Captain in the Norske Jegerkorps at Kongsvinger in Hedmark during 1788 and Major in the 2nd Akershus Infantry Regiment in 1801. In 1807, he became a Lieutenant colonel and in 1811 Colonel and Commanding officer of Sønnafjelske infantry Regiment in Halden at the fortress of Fredriksten. In 1814 he had the rank of Major General and was Second-in-command at Fredriksten fortress.
He represented Sønnafjelske infantry Regiment, together with Ole Svendsen Iglerød, at the Norwegian Constituent Assembly in 1814. He died in Christiania during 1816.


Joe Thompson vs Walter Clarke

Joe Thompson vs Walter Clarke was decided in December 1817.
Background and Facts.
Joe Thompson was born circa 1784 in St. Mary's County, Maryland where he was enslaved to a prosperous farmer and slaveholder John Thompson. Slaveholder John Thompson's died in 1804,in a subsequent 21 February 1805 estate inventory, of real and personal property, Joe Thompson is enumerated among the 24 listed slaves. In this document, Joe Thompson's age is given as 21 years. John Thompson's last will pronounced his strong desire that most of his slaves; including Joe and his wife Nell, be prospectively manumitted after a period of 10 years in servitude. The younger enslaved individuals were to be likewise freed after other specified periods. Most slaves in the District of Columbia were "slaves for life." However a slave granted a prospective manumission became "a term slave". For a slaveholder to free a slave by manumission, was to reduce the total value of his or her estate. Even manumission by last will and testament was not always secure for heirs often challenged such testamentary manumissions in court. While John Thompson's will had made provisions for his widow Elizabeth, she through her attorney challenged the will, especially the testamentary manumissions. Following her death, she left the residue of her estate to her brother in law Walter Clarke, 1777 - 1846 who had married Anne Thompson and subsequently became estate administrator. Walter Clarke moved into the District circa 1798 where he became a prominent businessman who served the District of Columbia as an Alderman and later on the Board of Appeals. Walter Clarke was a slaveholder in his own right purchasing and utilizing slaves both for his business and household. Clarke quickly moved to set aside the provisions of John Thompson's will. As administrator Clarke held Joe, Nell, and their daughter Sarah Ann as slaves after 1808. Clarke also appeared as a juror in an early and highly significant petition for freedom case, Ben v. Sabret Scott (1807).
About 1808 Clarke leased Joe Thompson to the Washington Navy Yard, where Thompson worked as a blacksmith striker for many years. For the first thirty years of the nineteenth century, the Navy Yard was the District's principal employer of enslaved African Americans. Their numbers rose rapidly and by 1808, the enslaved made up one-third of the workforce. During this era the navy yard was "a favorite place to rent out slaves," and to sell them; but quickly became a recognized center of resistance.
The number of enslaved workers gradually declined during the next thirty years, though free and some enslaved African Americans remained a vital presence. One such person was a former slave later freeman Michael Shiner 1805-1880 whose diary chronicled his life and work at the navy yard for over half a century The majority of District slaveholders appear to have negotiated their own rental contracts with the navy yard. Exactly when Joe Thompson was employed at the navy yard is unknown, the first surviving document enumerating Thompson dates from 12 May 1808. This document written to answer a query from the Secretary of the Navy provides the names of slaves and slaveholders. Typically to get their bondsmen on the navy payroll; some owners dealt directly with the master mechanics, especially those in the blacksmith shop, while others bargained with the Commandant or the Secretary of the Navy. Most slave rentals were private transactions and except for the notations of wages paid and the names of the slaveholder, we have few details. In some instances the enslaved conducted their own negotiations with an employer and arranged self-hire Note in the 1811 payroll (see thumbnail) Thompson and the other enslaved workers were paid 85 cents per day while the typical white blacksmith earned $1.80 per day. Joe Thompson and his wife Nelly age 22, must have kept careful track of the terms of John Thompson's will. On the navy yard the enslaved workforce was far from passive, on 1 August 1809 Commodore Thomas Tingey complained to Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton regarding black freeman and ship caulker Henry Adams, who had the courage to write Hamilton requesting the same wages as white men, "I am concerned that you should be thus pestered with, and will certainly endeavor to discover, who it is thus prone to disturb or destroy the regulations & discipline of this yard, by aiding such men as Adams with their pens and stimulating them to troublesome acts. Henry Adams, "Sir, is an ignorant impertinent Negro man, who however, it is allowed , is a good journeyman caulker..."
As early as 1815 the Board of Navy Commissioners complained of "maimed & unmanageable slaves." Somehow Joe Thompson found his way to Francis Scott Key, who had represented other petitioners for freedom, and put together this case as soon as the 10 years were up. Key a noted attorney in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, although a slaveholder himself,had a reputation for offering his services gratis to slaves and former slaves. In 1815 Joe Thompson filed a petition for freedom in which he was represented by Francis Scott Key 1779 -1843 and Augustus Taney -1787 - 1823 brother of Supreme Court Justice Roger B. Taney 1777 -1864, and author of Dred Scott v. Sandford. The Thompson freedom petition was decided in December 1817 with a verdict for the plaintiff.
Ruling and Scope.
The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia with Judge William Cranch presiding held "If a testator by his will manumits his slaves after a certain term of service, and the widow renounces the provision made for her by the will and adheres to her rights under the law of Maryland, and there is sufficient personal estate to satisfy her thirds without resorting to the slaves, they will be entitled to their freedom, although the executor should have assigned them to the widow in part satisfaction of her claim."
Following his manumission, Joe Thompson continued to work at the Washington Navy Yard blacksmith shop as a blacksmith striker. He is listed on the 1819 payroll of mechanics and laborers, as a blacksmith striker pay rate $1.12 per day, on the April 1829 list of persons employed at the Washington Navy Yard, Thompson's again appears with the shipyard blacksmith shop employees, pay-rate $1.12 per diem. The compilers specifically noted Joe Thompson as "free.". On the same 1829 list of black free and enslaved employees is celebrated diarist Michael Shiner. On the list, Shiner is enumerated as a slave of the clerk of the yard, Thomas Howard. In that year Shiner was working in the navy yard "ordinary" where his occupation is given as "O.S." or Ordinary Seaman. This was a common subterfuge of the era to avoid restrictions on the employment of enslaved labor. Shiner's wages are recorded as $10.00 per month, but were collected by Thomas Howard.
News of the favorable verdict for Thompson spread rapidly within the navy yard African American community. Michael Shiner, in similar circumstances, and scheduled to be prospectively manumitted after a period of 10 years in servitude. However, in 1836 faced with a reluctant estate administrator, Shiner who had worked with Joe Thompson for years, chose to adopt the same freedom petition strategy. On 25 March 1836 Shiner acting through his attorney, filed a successful petition for freedom.
"Joe Thompson vs Walter Clarke", while favorable, to the plaintiff, the unique facts of the case in that "the widow renounces the provision made for her" limited the scope of the decision. This meant as a matter of law, the Thompson case had limited application, as the verdict, hinged on a plainly written testamentary manumission. Such testamentary manumissions were often successfully challenged in court.see "Bell vs. Stephenson 1835".


Sally Maria Diggs

Sally Maria Diggs (1851 – ?) was an African-American slave girl, also known as "Pinky," whose freedom was famously bought by Henry Ward Beecher in 1860, during a sermon at Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, NYC. Beecher famously said, "No child should be in slavery, let alone a child like this’ and raised $900 to purchase her freedom. The episode was celebrated in a number of paintings and drawings at the time, including Eastman Johnson's "Freedom Ring."
In 1927, "Pinky" returned to Plymouth Church to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Henry Ward Beecher's first sermon at Plymouth Church.
In 2010, "Pinky" was celebrated by sculptor Meredith Bergmann.


Nicolai Wergeland

Nicolai Wergeland (9 November 1780 – 25 March 1848) was a Norwegian minister, writer and politician, and a member of the Norwegian Constituent Assembly at Eidsvoll that wrote the Constitution of Norway on 17 May 1814. He was elected as one of two delegates from Kristiansand to the Eidsvoll Assembly in 1814. He represented the unionist side, and came very well prepared to Eidsvoll, bringing his own constitution draft. Along with him from Kristiansand came wholesaler Ole Clausen Mørch.
Family.
Wergeland's family hailed from Brekke in Sogn. His father was Halvor Lassesen, a teacher and parish clerk in Hosanger.
Wergeland's daughter Camilla Collett, author of the novel "Amtmandens døttre" ("The Governor's Daughters", 1854, anonymously), is regarded as Norway's first feminist writer.
The son Henrik Wergeland is often characterized as Norway's national poet, and a symbol of the country's independence. Wergeland was also father of military officer Oscar Wergeland, and proprietor Harald Titus Alexis Wergeland. His nephew, mountaineer, lieutenant general and government minister Harald Nicolai Storm Wergeland grew up with the family, when the young mother, Wergeland's sister, became a widow.
Career.
Wergeland studied theology in Copenhagen. As he did not come from a wealthy family, his economic conditions were so difficult that he considered enlisting as a soldier. He became a cand.theol. in 1803, served as a curate in Kristiansand from 1812, a vicar to Eidsvold from 1816, and rural dean in Eidsvold from 1822.
He became well known for winning a contest arranged by the Norwegian Society for Development ("Selskabet for Norges Vel") in 1811, coming up with the best writing arguing for a separate Norwegian university in Christiania, with "Mnemosyne" (published in "Historisk-philosophiske Samlinger" in 1811).
In Kristiansand he was an active participant at Det Dramatiske Selskab, which had been founded by his father-in-law.
He was elected delegate to the Eidsvoll Assembly in 1814, where he was a member of the constitution committee. He participated actively also in the plenary sessions, with long and well-prepared speeches. His unionist and anti-Danish point of view made him less popular among delegates with a different opininon.
Throughout his life Wergeland participated actively in political and cultural debates, published several works, experimented with drawing and painting, and composed music.


Ferdinand v MGN Ltd

Ferdinand v Mirror Group Newspapers is a 2011 High Court case in which the English footballer Rio Ferdinand was unsuccessful in preventing the publication of a tabloid newspaper story revealing details of an alleged sexual relationship.
Background.
On 25 April 2010, the "Sunday Mirror" ran an article entitled "My Affair with England Captain Rio", in which interior designer Carly Storey gave an account of an alleged relationship with Rio Ferdinand. Ferdinand described the article as "gross invasion of my privacy" and brought legal action in which he sought damages and a worldwide injunction against further publication. Ferdinand said that he had not met Ms. Storey for six years at the time of publication of the "Sunday Mirror" article, and had exchanged text messages with her between that time and his appointment as captain of the England national football team in February 2010. He claimed that there had been a misuse of private information. Ms. Storey received a payment of £16,000 for her interview with the "Sunday Mirror", which had been sold to the newspaper after she had contacted the publicist Max Clifford. Lawyers acting for Mirror Group Newspapers argued that he had been appointed as captain of the England football team on the basis that he was a "reformed and responsible" character. The case centred on whether the "Sunday Mirror" had a public interest defence based on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to freedom of expression, or whether Ferdinand was entitled to privacy in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life
On 29 September 2011, Mr. Justice Nicol ruled in favour of the defendant, Mirror Group Newspapers, saying: "Overall, in my judgment, the balancing exercise favours the defendant's right of freedom of expression over the claimant's right of privacy."
Lawyers acting for Ferdinand issued a statement saying that he was "extremely disappointed" with the decision, and announced an intention to appeal. Costs in the case were estimated at around £500,000. Tina Weaver, the editor of the "Sunday Mirror", commented: "There has never been greater scrutiny of the media than now, and we applaud this ruling in recognising the important role a free press has to play in a democratic society."
Media commentators described the victory of the "Sunday Mirror" in the case as significant in the wake of the News International phone hacking scandal and the 2011 British privacy injunctions controversy.


Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others

The Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others was the trial of several members of the Nazi regime in Germany for the execution of British agents without a trial. None was sentenced to death, and a few received relatively short sentences, which, in some cases, were not served as they were released after the trial by the French authorities.
Background information and proceedings.
On 1 June 1946, nine members of the concentration camp staff at Natzweiler-Struthof were charged with the murders of four British women. Wolfgang Zeuss, Magnus Wochner, Emil Meier, Peter Straub, Fritz Hartjenstein, Franz Berg, Werner Rohde, Emil Bruttel, and Kurt Aus Dem Bruch were all tried and convicted of capital murder of British women sent to aid liaison officers in France. These women assisted in establishing communications between the resistance movement in France and London. The names of the victims were Andrée Borrel, Sonia Olschanezky, Vera Leigh and Diana Rowden. Two of these women were a part of the Women's Auxiliary Air Force and the other two were a part of the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry. All four were sent by the SOE for French resistance efforts.
Thought to be spies of the Allied Powers, the Nazi regime detained them and eventually imprisoned them in the Natzweiler Camp. There, these women were allegedly inhumanely killed by lethal injection and then cremated without a previous trial regarding the execution. Major Bill Barkworth of the SAS and Vera Atkins of the SOE were in charge of the prosecution. Under Article 29 of the Hague Convention of 1907 the women were not considered spies because of their purpose to obtain intelligence openly for communicating to their own army. Also, they were not wearing disguises when captured by the SS. Article 30 states that no spy can be punished until a trial has been completed.
Defendants' arguments and charges.
All of the accused were officials at the Natzweiler Camp except for Franz Berg who was imprisoned at the camp and worked the oven in the crematory. Horst Kopkow was the head of counterintelligence and was responsible for all SOE agents captured in France at the time. Kopkow was never tried because he had not yet been captured at the time of the investigation. By 1946 he was captured in British custody and was thought to be dead of bronchial pneumonia. In 1948 the Allies realised that he was sent to aid in Counterintelligence efforts against the Soviets for uses in the Cold War.
Fritz Hartjenstein was the Kommandant of the Natzweiler Camp and claimed that he was not present at the camp during the time of the executions and stated he had no idea that they were given the lethal injections. However, to his dismay evidence was found that he was at a party in the camp during the same day of the killings. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life and then tried again for the hanging of a pilot in Natzweiler. He was sentenced to death by firing squad and then extradited to France for another trial for the mass murder of prisoners. He was sentenced to death again but later given life in prison. Hartjenstein died of a heart attack in 1954.
Werner Rohde was a medical officer at the Natzweiler Camp and admitted that he was ordered by Officer Otto to inject one of the women. Officer Otto was found to not be an official at the camp and also evidence came out that Rohde was aware that the four British women never received a trial before the executions. Officer Otto could never be prosecuted because information came out that he committed suicide once the war ended. Along with Rohde, Dr. Heinrich Plaza assisted in the executions using lethal injections. Plaza was never captured. In 1954, he was sentenced to death "in absentia" in France, but continued to live and practise as a doctor in Altötting (Bavaria). He died in 1968. Rohde was sentenced to death and was hanged on 11 October 1946 at Hameln (Germany).
Peter Straub was the SS officer in command for the executions. According to testimony Straub was said to be drunk the night of the executions because of a party thrown for the departure of Plaza. Straub was known to have bragged about the injections to other prisoners in the camp. Straub was sentenced to 13 years in prison which was thought to be surprising considering all of the other war crimes he had been accused of committing in other concentration camps. However, he was later found guilty at the Natzweiler trial in Wuppertal and executed on 11 October 1946 ("Nazi War Crimes Trials: Natzweiler Trial". Jewish Virtual Library. Retrieved 18 September 2015).
Franz Berg was a prisoner in the camp who operated the crematorium oven. Berg was a recognised criminal with a record of up to 22 crimes. He stated that he never knew that anyone unusual was being cremated and that he was locked in his cell when the injections were being administered. He went on to state a fellow prisoner told him what was happening as the murders were taking place. His defence argument was that Straub told him to heat up the furnaces because he was in charge. Berg was sentenced to five years in prison.
Magnus Wochner was the political head of the Natzweiler Camp and was directly under orders of the Berlin Police. He stated that the four British women were sent to his office and was told by the police that they were going to be executed. He sent them away because he did not think it concerned him and denied having any knowledge of the killings until the trial was conducted. However, one witness told the Judge Advocate that Straub, head of the crematorium, could not conduct any execution without Wochner's permission. Wochner was sentenced to ten years in prison. He was later sent to France for prosecution but was released.
Emil Bruttel was a first aid officer at the Natzweiler Camp who was ordered to bring the lethal injections to the site of the killings. He was outside the room at the time of the murders and stated that he wanted to leave but could not because he did not have a lamp. Moreover, he admitted to hearing words such as "four women spies", "we cannot escape the orders", and "execution" but did not admit to have any knowledge of the executions when given the order to obtain the lethal drugs. Bruttel was sentenced to four years in prison. Once turned over to French custody he was released as well.
Results.
Aus dem Bruch and Emil Meier were found not guilty due to insufficient evidence. Wolfgang Zeuss was found not guilty because he was not at the camp during the time of the executions and the other accused witnesses supported his claim.


Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P.R.)

Puerto Rico v. Shell Co. (P. R.), Ltd., 302 U.S. 253 (1937), was a notable Supreme Court of the United States case. The issue was whether a local ("insular") law could be pre-empted by the Commerce clause of the United States Constitution. It was also notable as being one of the first cases that determined that Puerto Rico can be treated "as if" a state for some purposes under the law. It has become a precedent for similar cases.


Criminal law in the Taney Court

The Taney Court (the Supreme Court of the United States under Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, 1836–1864) heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include "Prigg v. Pennsylvania" (1842), "United States v. Rogers" (1846), "Ableman v. Booth" (1858), "Ex parte Vallandigham" (1861), and "United States v. Jackalow" (1862).
Like its predecessor, the Taney Court exercised only limited appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. Like its predecessor, it heard original habeas petitions, writs of error from the state courts, and certificates of division from the circuit courts. In addition, unlike its predecessor, the Court heard two writs of error from the territorial courts and three prerogative writs of mandamus and prohibition in criminal matters. The Court denied every petition for a prerogative writ that it received, habeas or otherwise.
Background.
The basic structure of the federal criminal system remained the same during Chief Justice Taney's tenure as it had been during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure. The Judiciary Act of 1789 divided original jurisdiction for the trial of federal crimes between the United States district courts and the United States circuit courts. The district courts were given jurisdiction over all federal crimes "where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted." The circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction over these crimes, and exclusive jurisdiction over all other federal crimes. The circuit courts also exercised appellate jurisdiction over the district courts, but only in civil cases.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 also placed the responsibility for prosecuting federal crimes in the United States Attorney for each United States federal judicial district. The Act provided that "there shall be appointed in each district" a "person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States."
Sources of jurisdiction.
In "Ex parte Gordon" (1861), the Court summarized its jurisdiction in federal criminal cases thus:
[I]n criminal cases, the proceedings and judgment of the Circuit Court cannot be revised or controlled here, in any form of proceeding, either by writ of error or prohibition, and, consequently, we have no authority to examine them by a certiorari. And the only case in which this court is authorized even to express an opinion on the proceedings in a Circuit Court in a criminal case is, where the judges of the Circuit Court are opposed in opinion upon a question arising at the trial, and certify it to this court for its decision.
Writs of error.
Although the Supreme Court could not issue writs of error to examine criminal convictions in the lower federal courts, it could issue such writs with regard to the state courts and territorial courts.
State courts.
Pursuant to its power—under § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—to review the judgments of state courts on federal questions by writs of error, the Marshall Court had twice reversed criminal convictions obtained pursuant to a criminal statute that violated the federal constitution.
The Taney Court continued this trend. In "Prigg v. Pennsylvania" (1842), the Court invalidating a state kidnapping conviction as in conflict with the Fugitive Slave Clause, which the Court found to authorize self-help. In "Thurlow v. Massachusetts" (1847), known as the "License Cases", the Court invalidated state liquor laws. But, in "Fox v. Ohio" (1847), the Court sustained state counterfeiting statutes, even though the power to punish counterfeiting had been explicitly granted to Congress. And, in "Moore v. Illinois" (1852), the Court upheld state laws that punished those who harbored escaped slaves, even though the same conduct was punishable by the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.
In "United States v. Booth" (1855) and "Ableman v. Booth" (1858), the Court held that state courts have no authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to free federal criminal defendants. Booth had been indicted under the federal Fugitive Slave Act.
Territorial courts.
Article Four, Section Three, Clause Two of the Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory". Pursuant to this authority, Congress had created territorial courts outside of the Article Three courts established by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its progeny. Although the Marshall Court had heard some civil appeals from the territorial courts, no criminal appealed had been attempted.
In "Forsyth v. United States" (1850) and "Simpson v. United States" (1850), the Court held that its authority to hear writs of error from the Florida territorial courts—which was defined by the organic statute of those courts—extended to criminal cases. "Forsyth" and "Simpson" found invalid criminal cases transferred of criminal cases which had begun with indictments by grand juries in the territorial courts and then been transferred to the newly created state courts within re-indictment.
Original habeas.
The Marshall Court had heard six original habeas petitions in criminal matters, all involving the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. Its precedents established that the Court could grant the writ in pre-conviction situations, but could not grant the writ in post-conviction situations, unless the sentence of conviction had run.
The Taney Court heard seven additional such petitions. In "Ex parte Wells" (1855), over the dissents of Judges Curtis and Campbell, the Court affirmed the holding of the Marshall Court that original habeas petitions were a constitutionally permissible exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
In "Ex parte Dorr" (1845), the Court held that it had no power to issue the writ to state prisoners serving sentences pursuant to a state conviction (except for the limited purpose of obtaining their in-court testimony). The holding of "Dorr" was abrogated by a Reconstruction-era statute granting federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.
In "In re Metzger" (1847), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to review the case of a prisoner held in custody pursuant to the order of a district judge, awaiting foreign extradition. In "In re Kaine" (1852), by a 5-3 decision, the Court extended this holding under the 1848 extradition act which authorized commissions to play part of the role previously exercised by a district judge.
In "Ex parte Gordon" (1861), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to review a post-conviction sentence of death.
In "Ex parte Vallandigham" (1863), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to review the judgements of military commissions; because the military courts were not one of the courts authorized to consider habeas petitions by § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, any such jurisdiction would be constitutionally original rather than appellate, and thus unconstitutional.
Certificates of division.
The Marshall Court heard thirty-one criminal cases under the certificate of division procedure authorized by § 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1802. However, the Court had held that the sufficiency of the evidence could not be certified—whether on a motion for a new trial or a motion for a directed verdict. In "United States v. Briggs" (Briggs I) (1847), the Court further limited its jurisdiction to hear criminal certificates of division by holding that the question of whether a demurrer to an indictment should be sustained was to general to be certified.
Other prerogative writs.
Prior to the Taney Court, no reported decision recorded an attempt by a party to obtain review in a criminal case by means of a prerogative writ other than habeas corpus. In "Ex parte Gordon" (1861), the court held that it had no power to issue a writ of prohibition to examine a death sentence issued by an admiralty court for piracy (the Court did possess the power to issue writs of prohibition in civil admiralty cases).
The Taney Court also heard and rejected to petitions for mandamus in criminal cases. In "Ex parte Taylor" (1852), denied a petition on the merits, holding that federal bail in D.C. depended on federal law, not Maryland law. In "Kentucky v. Dennison" (1860), the Court denied another mandamus petition, holding that—even though the Extradition Clause of the Constitution obliged states to extradite criminals to other states for trial—this provision was not enforceable in the federal courts. "Dennison" was overruled by "Puerto Rico v. Branstad" (1987).
Defining federal crimes.
Counterfeiting.
Section 20 of the Crimes Act of 1825 prohibiting counterfeiting. In "United States v. Marigold" (1850), the Court held that this was a Constitutional exercise of Congress's power to punish counterfeiting.
Indian country.
Section 25 of the Nonintercourse Act of 1834 provided federal crimes governing areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction would apply in Indian country, with an exception for Indian-on-Indian crimes. In "United States v. Rogers" (1846), the Court held that the exception did not apply to defendants who were white persons who were adopted by Indians.
Naval timber.
An 1831 statute prohibited the taking of trees reserved for the use of the United States—specifically, "any life oak or red cedar tree or trees, or other timber". In "United States v. Briggs" (Briggs II) (1850), the Court held that the "other timber" language was not limited to trees used for naval purposes, even though that was the purpose of the statute.
Shipwreck theft.
Section 9 of the Crimes Act of 1825 prohibited removing goods from a wrecked ship "within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States". In "United States v. Coombs" (1838), the Court held that the act did not extend to a defendant who had purloined several textile goods from a beached boat above the high tide line because there was no federal criminal admiralty jurisdiction beyond that point.
Slave trading.
The Slave Trade Act of 1800 prohibited U.S. citizens from participating in the international slave trade. In "United States v. Morris" (1840), the Court held that the offense could be charged even if the vessel—fitted out for slave trading—was apprehended before slaves were taken aboard.
Criminal procedure.
In "United States v. Reid" (1851), the Court held that § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—also known as the Rules of Decision Act (RDA)—applied only in civil, not criminal, cases. Whereas the RDA would have incorporated post-1789 changes in state law, the Court held instead that the Judiciary Act of 1789 adopted state rules of criminal procedure as they exited in 1789, unless inconsistent with a more specific federal statute.
Constitutional issues.
Double jeopardy.
In the Taney Court, for the first time, the Court was asked to apply the criminal provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. In "Fox v. Ohio" (1847) and "Moore v. Illinois" (1852), the Court reject the argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated by permitting the state and federal government to criminalize the same conduct (which could hypothetically lead to duplicative prosecutions). Justice McLean dissented in both cases on constitutional grounds. The Court was not called on to consider a case in which dual prosecution had actually occurred.
In "United States v. Nickerson" (1854), a federal case, the Court held that a second indictment after acquittal should be dismissed because of double jeopardy. The statute at issue punished false statements on an application for a subsidy for cod fishing vessels. The defendant had submitted multiple false statements. The issue was whether the first indictment—which referred only to statements required by the subsidy statute—reached all the statements named in the second indictment. The Court held that all the statements were required by the statute and thus prior jeopardy barred the second prosecution.
Vicinage.
"United States v. Dawson" (1854) concerned a murder committed in the Indian Territory by a non-Indian defendant, a crime which by statute was triable in Arkansas. Between the murder and the trial, the District of Arkansas had been subdivided into the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas. The Court held that the Vicinage Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which requires a jury drawn from the state and district wherein the crime was committed, had no application to crimes committed outside of a U.S. state.
Venue.
Article Three, Section Two, Clause Three of the Constitution provides: "The Trial of all Crimes ... shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed."
In "United States v. Jackalow" (1861), the Court held that Article Three venue must be established by facts found by a jury. The act of piratical murder by Jackalow was alleged to have occurred on the high seas, between the waters within the jurisdiction of the states of New York and Connecticut; New Jersey was the first state into which Jackalow was brought upon capture. An 1820 anti-piracy statute provided that, if the crime occurred on the high seas, venue was proper in the first state into which the defendant was brought after capture. The Court held that—although the boundary of New York and Connecticut state waters were a question of law for the judge—the location of the crime was a question of fact for the jury. Thus, Jackalow was granted a new trial.
Evidence.
Best evidence.
In "United States v. Wood" (1840), the Court held that the false statement (in connection with customs) could be proved up by the entries in the customs house logs, as opposed to testimony, without violating the best evidence rule.
Competence.
In "United States v. Murphy" (1842), the Court held that a victim of theft was competent to testify in a criminal theft prosecution because the victim is not formally an interested party; even if the victim might later file a civil suit, any fine or forfeiture would pass to the government.
In "United States v. Reid" (1851), the Court held that a jointly-indicted, separately-tried codefendant was not competent to be called as a witness.
Other.
Sufficiency of an indictment.
In "United States v. Hardyman" (1839), the Court held that an indictment for knowingly possessing treasury notes stolen from the mail was insufficient if it misdescribed the interest rate printed on the note. In "United States v. Staats" (1850), the Court held that an indictment for fraud need not charge "felonious intent" in addition to fraudulent intent.
External influence on jury.
In "United States v. Reid" (1851), the Court held harmless the fact that two jurors had read a newspaper article that summarized the evidence in the case, determining that the newspaper article did not influence the verdict.
Clemency.
In "Ex parte Wells" (1855), the Court held that the President has the power to grant a conditional pardon (i.e. the power to commute a sentence of death to life imprisonment); Judge McLean dissented on the merits.
Prosecutorial peremptory challenges.
The Crimes Act of 1790 gave 20 peremptory challenges to capital defendants and 35 to treason defendants. An 1840 statute provided that federal jury selection should follow state procedures in the absence of a more specific federal statute. In "United States v. Shackleford" (1855), the Court held that—with regard to peremptory challenges by prosecutors in capital and treason cases—the Crimes Act controlled, and thus prosecutors were to be given no peremptory challenges, even if they would have such challenges under the laws of the relevant state. Ten years later, Congress abrogated "Shackleford", granting prosecutors five peremptory challenges in treason and capital cases (and two in non-capital felony cases); the 1865 act left the defendant's number of peremptory challenges unchanged.


John K. Giles

John Knight Giles (February 16, 1895February 8, 1979) was an inmate at Alcatraz prison, most well known for an escape attempt in 1945. He was originally sentenced to the United States Penitentiary on May 11, 1935 for attempted robbery of the Denver and Rio Grande Western mail train; he had previously been serving a life sentence in Oregon for murder before escaping. Giles began serving his federal sentence for the attempted train robbery at McNeil Island on June 17, 1935, but due to his escape record and the length of his sentence, was transferred to Alcatraz Island on August 28, 1935.
Escape attempt.
On July 31, 1945, at 10:40 a.m., the Army ferry pulled into the Alcatraz Wharf. Giles, wearing an Army Technical Sergeant's uniform that he had been able to steal while working in the laundry that was contracted to clean army uniforms, jumped aboard the boat through a freight hatchway below deck. As the boat pulled away, a count of the soldiers on board indicated one extra, and at the same time, a count of the Alcatraz dock workers indicated one missing convict. Assistant Warden E.J. Miller was notified, and he followed the Army boat in a small speedboat until it reached Fort McDowell on Angel Island. Alcatraz officials called ahead to Fort McDowell, instructing them to keep everyone on the boat. The boat captain took this to mean nobody was to disembark without a pass. Giles showed his pass and was allowed to exit the boat. (According to Alcatraz Warden Johnston, it should have been called a successful escape, but the Bureau of Prisons and the Attorney General classified it as an attempted escape.)
While on board, Giles was unaware that he was being followed. He talked to fellow passengers and told them he was a "lineman working on the cable".
Capture, aftermath, and death.
After Giles left the boat, he was questioned by Lieutenant Gordon L. Kilgore, the Fort McDowell officer of the day. Kilgore had noticed that Giles' uniform appeared incorrect. After inspecting the pass and realizing it was a bad forgery, Giles was detained and eventually turned over to Assistant Warden Miller. By 11 a.m., he was headed back to Alcatraz.
The story of Giles' capture and his attempted escape were profiled on the radio program "Gang Busters" in 1945. He died in 1979 in California.


Third Force (South Africa)

The "Third Force" was a term used by leaders of the ANC during the late 1980s and early 1990s to refer to a clandestine force believed to be responsible for a surge in violence in KwaZulu-Natal, and townships around and south of the Witwatersrand (or "Rand").
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that:
while little evidence exists of a centrally directed, coherent or formally constituted "Third Force", a network of security and ex-security force operatives, frequently acting in conjunction with right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, was involved in actions that could be construed as fomenting violence and which resulted in gross human rights violations, including random and target killings.
Uses after 1994.
Today, the high rate of protest in South Africa is often attributed to a "third force", often assumed to be linked to foreign intelligence agencies, opposition political parties and white intellectuals. In this context the term 'third force' functions in South Africa in the same way that the term 'outside agitator' functions in the United States, a term often argued to have racist origins.
However, S'bu Zikode of the shackdweller's movement Abahlali baseMjondolo has deconstructed the term by claiming the third force is the anger of the poor. Abahlali baseMjondolo has also argued that "it is clear that the third force is just another name for the organised poor".
The ANC also often refers to protestors and other critics as "counter-revolutionaries". Cosatu President Sdumo Dlamini has claimed that popular organisations active in local politics are linked to the CIA.
The "Mail & Guardian" has reported that: "According to grassroots activists the accusations of 'criminality' and 'third forces' are familiar: used to delegitimise and dismiss dissent and grievances - and perpetuate the notion of a society homogenously content with an ANC-led government." The newspaper also quoted activist Ayanda Kota as saying that these allegations "take the agency away from us. It's the same argument used for the mineworkers fighting for a living wage: they are being used by some 'third force' . . .Poor people…apparently can't organize. It was the same with Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement - the CIA were behind them."
The xenophobic pogroms in May 2008 were also ascribed to 'the third force'. In 2015 Malusi Gigaba also ascribed xenophobic violence to a "third force". Protest at mining on communal lands, independent trade union action, student protest and the formation of new political parties has also been seen in conspiratorial terms by the ANC. Gwede Mantashe, secretary general of the ANC, has ascribed strikes on the mines to the agency of 'white foreigners'. The ANC controlled eThekwini Municipality in Durban has repeatedly claimed that 'the third force' is behind land occupations in the city. Charles van Onselen argues that the ANC uses the idea of 'the third force' as a conspiracy theory to deflect attention from its own failings.


Regina Mundi Catholic Church (Soweto)

Regina Mundi (Latin for "Queen of the World"), designed by architect Anthony Noel Errol Slaven, is the largest Roman Catholic church in South Africa. It is located in Rockville, Soweto, a populous black urban residential area within the city of Johannesburg. Due to the role it played as a place of gathering for the people of Soweto in the years before, during, and after the anti-apartheid struggle, it is often referred to as "the people's church" or "the people's cathedral".
The church is located in the middle of Soweto, in Rockville, in the neighbourhood of Moroka; it was built in 1964, replacing Moroka's former parish church. While the A-shaped exterior of the building is quite ordinary in design, its main feature is the vast interior, that can accommodate as many as 5000-7000 people. The stained-glass windows are decorated with scenes of Mary's life and were donated by Poland in 1998.
One of the most prominent artifacts in the church is the painting entitled "The Madonna and Child of Soweto", mostly referred to as "The Black Madonna", depicting a black Virgin Mary holding the Child Jesus (also black). The painting was created by artist Larry Scully in 1973, as a part of a campaign to raise funds for the education of black South Africans. The painting was then bought by a benefactor and donated to the church. A highly symbolic element of the painting is a large eye right under the Black Madonna. According to journalist Mpho Lukoto of newspaper "The Star", the pupil of the eye represents the township of Soweto; two forks directed towards the pupil from the sides represent the violence that was used against the people of Soweto during the apartheid era, and the cross in the center of the pupil represents the Church that illuminates the people with hope.
After the end of apartheid, a large park was built before the church, with a fountain and memorials, including a "peace pole" donated to the church by Japanese Christians. The church is still a popular place for the people of Soweto and it has also become a prominent tourist attraction in the area.
Regina Mundi and the anti-apartheid movement.
Regina Mundi played a pivotal role in the struggle against apartheid in the second half of the 20th century. Since political meetings in most public places were banned, the church became the main place where Soweto people could meet and discuss. Even funerals often ended up as political meetings. For this reason, Regina Mundi earned the reputation of being one of the main centres of anti-apartheid activism in the province of Gauteng.
During the Soweto uprising of June 16, 1976, when students were shot by the police in Orlando West (with Hector Pieterson and others being killed), many demonstrants fled to Regina Mundi. The police entered the church, firing live ammunition. No one was killed, although many were injured and the church itself, as well as its furniture, decorations, and symbols (for example the marble altar and the statue of Christ), were damaged. Both the interior and the external walls of the church still bear the signs of the shootings.
After the end of apartheid, from 1995 to 1998, several meetings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were held in the church, presided over by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. From 1995 on, funds were raised to restore the church. The campaign eventually collected 1.5 million rands, and restorations were made.
The events of 1976 are commemorated by a dedicated ceremony held in the church every year on June 16.
Regina Mundi Day.
In 1997, President Nelson Mandela established 30 November as "Regina Mundi Day" to honour the church.
Bill Clinton's visit and controversy.
In March 1998, Regina Mundi was visited by the President of the United States of America Bill Clinton with his wife Hillary. Their visit was controversial as they received Holy Communion in the church despite not being Catholics. Clinton's visit was also widely covered by the media because the sermon mostly revolved on the topic of adultery, seemingly to the discomfort of President Clinton who was at the time involved in the Lewinsky scandal.
Visit of Michelle Obama.
First Lady of the United States Michelle Obama visited the church on the South Africa leg of her tour of the continent. She addressed the Young African Women Leaders Forum at the church, and in attendance were the Archbishop of Johannesburg and other women leaders.


Karlrobert Kreiten

Karlrobert Kreiten (26 June 1916, Bonn, Rhine Province - 7 September 1943) was a German pianist, though holding Dutch citizenship his entire life due to his Dutch father.
Biography.
He was regarded by Wilhelm Furtwängler and others to be one of the most talented young pianists in Germany. Born in Bonn, his German mother was the classical singer Emmy Kreiten, née Liebergesell, who sang under the stage name Emmy Kreiten-Barido. His father Theo Kreiten, was a Dutch composer, concert pianist, and writer. The Kreiten family originated in the area of the Lower Rhineland, near the current Dutch-German border.
He made his debut at the age of eleven with Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's Piano Concerto in A major in a live broadcast. He was educated in Berlin by Claudio Arrau.
Kreiten was reported to the Gestapo by Nazi neighbor Ellen Ott-Monecke for allegedly making negative remarks about Adolf Hitler and the war effort. He was indicted at the Volksgerichtshof, with Roland Freisler presiding, and condemned to death. Friends and family frantically tried to save his life, but to no avail. The family only accidentally learned that Karlrobert had been executed by hanging, with 185 other inmates, at Plötzensee prison.
His execution triggered a wave of articles in the German press about this "treacherous" artist. Prominent journalist Werner Höfer had to retire in 1987 when his articles about Kreiten received publicity.
Today in Berlin, a memorial of the life and death of Kreiten exists along the "Topography of Terror" outdoor exhibit, which deals with the terror inflicted by the German SS and the Gestapo. The very prison cells that held him and others arrested by the Gestapo have been unearthed and remain laid bare for all to see. Streets in Düsseldorf, Bonn, Hilden and Cologne have been named in his honor. His only sister, Rosemarie von Studnitz, became a book publisher in the United States and died in 1975. In September 2003 the Dutch composer Rudi Martinus van Dijk had his work Kreitens Passion for baritone, full choir and symphony orchestra premiered in Düsseldorf by the Düsseldorf Symfoniker in memoriam of Karlrobert Kreiten.


Lands Tribunal (England, Wales and Northern Ireland)

The Lands Tribunal was a tribunal in the United Kingdom created by the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 that had jurisdiction in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, although in the Northern Ireland context the term Lands Tribunal normally refers to a different body, the Lands Tribunal for Northern Ireland. The Lands Tribunal was unusual in having both first instance and appellate jurisdiction. The functions of the Lands Tribunal were transferred to the Upper Tribunal in June 2009 by the Transfer of Tribunal Functions (Lands Tribunal and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2009.
Jurisdiction.
The Lands Tribunal was established to replace the panel of official arbitrators which had previously determined disputes as to compensation payable to the owners and occupiers of land affected by compulsory purchase. It additionally acted as the appellate tribunal hearing rating appeals from the valuation tribunals and had jurisdiction in relation to ordering the discharge or modification of restrictive covenants affecting land, under section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925.
A major further jurisdiction was conferred under the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 which conferred upon the long leaseholders of lower value houses in England the right to acquire their freeholds, on terms laid out by statute. Disputes as to quantum were originally decided by the Lands Tribunal. In 1980 the original jurisdiction was transferred to the newly created leasehold valuation tribunals with the Lands Tribunal becoming the appellate tribunal on such disputes.
The Lands Tribunal also had a general appellate jurisdiction in relation to decisions of the leasehold valuation tribunals and residential property tribunals.
Appeals from the Lands Tribunal were heard in the Court of Appeal.
Composition.
The President of the Lands Tribunal had to be a solicitor or barrister, and the Members either solicitors, barristers, or persons experienced in the valuation of land.