Battle of Zama

The Battle of Zama was fought in 202 BC near Zama, now in Tunisia, and marked the end of the Second Punic War. A Roman army led by Publius Cornelius Scipio, with crucial support from Numidian leader Masinissa, defeated the Carthaginian army led by Hannibal.
After defeating Carthaginian and Numidian armies at the battles of Utica and the Great Plains, Scipio imposed peace terms on the Carthaginians, who had no choice but to accept them. At the same time, the Carthaginians recalled Hannibal's army from Italy. Confident in Hannibal's forces, the Carthaginians broke the armistice with Rome. Scipio and Hannibal confronted each other near Zama Regia. Hannibal had 36,000 infantry to Scipio's 29,000. One third of Hannibal's army were citizen levies, and the Romans had 6,100 cavalry to Carthage's 4,000, as most of the Numidian cavalry that Hannibal had employed with great success in Italy had defected to the Romans.
Hannibal also employed 80 war elephants. The elephants opened the battle by charging the main Roman army. Scipio's soldiers avoided the elephants by opening their ranks and drove them off with missiles. The Roman and Numidian cavalry subsequently defeated the Carthaginian cavalry and chased them from the battlefield. Hannibal's first line of mercenaries attacked Scipio's infantry and were defeated. The second line of citizen levies and the mercenaries' remnants assaulted and inflicted heavy losses on the Roman first line. The Roman second line joined the struggle and pushed back the Carthaginian assault. Hannibal's third line of veterans, reinforced by the citizen levies and mercenaries, faced off against the Roman army, which had been redeployed into a single line. The combat was fierce and evenly matched. Finally, Scipio's cavalry returned to the battle and attacked Hannibal's army in the rear, routing and destroying it.
The Carthaginians lost 20,000–25,000 killed and 8,500–20,000 captured. Scipio lost 4,000–5,000 men, and 1,500–2,500 Romans and 2,500 Numidians were killed. Defeated on their home ground, the Carthaginian ruling elite sued for peace and accepted humiliating terms, ending the 17-year war.
Prelude.
Crossing the Alps, Hannibal reached the Italian peninsula in 218 BC and won several major victories against the Roman armies. The Romans failed to defeat him in the field and he remained in Italy, but following Scipio's decisive victory at the Battle of Ilipa in Spain in 206 BC, Iberia had been secured by the Romans. In 205 BC Scipio returned to Rome, where he was elected consul by unanimous vote. Scipio, now powerful enough, proposed to end the war by directly invading the Carthaginian homeland. The Senate initially opposed this ambitious design of Scipio, persuaded by Quintus Fabius Maximus that the enterprise was far too hazardous. Scipio and his supporters eventually convinced the Senate to ratify the plan, and Scipio was given the requisite authority to attempt the invasion.
Initially, Scipio received no levy troops, and he sailed to Sicily with a group of 7,000 heterogeneous volunteers. He was later authorized to employ the regular forces stationed in Sicily, which consisted mainly of the remnants of the 5th and 6th Legion, exiled to the island as a punishment for the humiliation they suffered at the Battle of Cannae.
Scipio continued to reinforce his troops with local defectors. He landed at Utica and defeated the Carthaginian army at the Battle of the Great Plains in 203 BC. The panicked Carthaginians felt that they had no alternative but to offer peace to Scipio, and having the authority to do so, Scipio granted peace on generous terms. Under the treaty, Carthage could keep its African territory but would lose its overseas empire, by that time a "fait-accompli". Masinissa was to be allowed to expand Numidia into parts of Africa. Also, Carthage was to reduce its fleet and pay a war indemnity. The Roman Senate ratified the treaty. The Carthaginian senate recalled Hannibal, who was still in Italy (although confined to the south of the peninsula) when Scipio landed in Africa, in 203 BC. Meanwhile, the Carthaginians breached the armistice agreement by capturing a stranded Roman fleet in the Gulf of Tunis and stripping it of supplies. The Carthaginians no longer believed a treaty advantageous, and rebuffed it under much Roman protest.
Troop deployment.
Hannibal led an army comprising Spanish mercenaries, Gallic allies, local citizens and veterans, and Numidian cavalry from his Italian campaigns. Scipio led a pre-Marian Roman army quincunx, along with a body of Numidian cavalry.
The battle took place at Zama Regia, near Siliana 130 km southwest of Tunis. Hannibal was first to march and reach the plains of Zama Regia, which were suitable for cavalry maneuvering. This also gave an edge in turn to Scipio, who relied greatly on his Roman heavy cavalry and Numidian light cavalry. Hannibal deployed his troops facing northwest, while Scipio deployed his troops in front of the Carthaginian army facing southeast.
Hannibal's army consisted of 36,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 80 war elephants, while Scipio had a total of 29,000 infantry and 6,100 cavalry. Putting his cavalry on the flanks, with the inexperienced Carthaginian cavalry on the right and the Numidians on the left, Hannibal aligned the rest of his troops in three straight lines behind his elephants. The first line consisted of mixed infantry of mercenaries from Gaul, Liguria and the Balearic Islands. In his second line he placed the Carthaginian and Libyan citizen levies, while his veterans from Italy, including mercenaries from Gaul and Hispania, were placed in the third line. Hannibal intentionally held back his third infantry line, in order to thwart Scipio's tendency to pin the Carthaginian center and envelop his opponent's lines, as he had done at the Battle of Ilipa. Livy states that Hannibal deployed 4,000 Macedonians in the second line. Their presence is widely discounted as Roman propaganda, although T. Dorey suggests that there may be a grain of truth here if the Carthaginians recruited a trivial and unofficial number of mercenaries from Macedonia.
Scipio deployed his army in three lines: the first was composed of the hastati, the second of principes and the third of the triarii. The stronger right wing was composed of the Numidian cavalry and commanded by Masinissa, while the left was composed of Italian cavalry under the command of Laelius. The greatest concern for Scipio was the elephants. He came up with an ingenious plan to deal with them.
Scipio knew that elephants could be ordered to charge forward, but they could only continue their charge in a straight line. He believed that if he opened gaps in his troops, the elephants would simply pass between them without harming any of his soldiers. He created lanes between the regiments across the depth of his forces and hid them with maniples of skirmishers. The plan was that when the elephants charged, these lanes would open, allowing them to pass through the legionaries' ranks and be dealt with at the rear of the army.
Hannibal and the Carthaginians had relied on cavalry superiority in previous battles such as Cannae, but Scipio, recognizing their importance, held the cavalry advantage at Zama. This was due in part to his raising of a new cavalry regiment in Sicily and careful courting of Masinissa as an ally.
Hannibal most likely believed that the combination of the war elephants and the depth of the first two lines would weaken and disorganize the Roman advance. This would have allowed him to complete a victory with his reserves in the third line and overlap Scipio's lines. Though this formation was well-conceived, it failed to produce a Carthaginian victory. The two men are said to have met face-to-face before the battle. Hannibal offered a treaty that would give up any claims to overseas territories to ensure the sovereignty of Carthage. Scipio refused, saying that it was either unconditional surrender or battle.
The battle.
At the outset of the battle, Hannibal unleashed his elephants and skirmishers against the Roman troops in order to break the cohesion of their lines and exploit the breaches that could be opened. The attack was met by Roman skirmishers. In addition, Scipio ordered the cavalry to blow loud horns to frighten the beasts, which partly succeeded, and several rampaging elephants turned towards the Carthaginian left wing and disordered it completely. Seizing this opportunity, Masinissa led his Numidian cavalry and charged at the Carthaginian left wing, which was also composed of Numidian cavalry, and was unknowingly lured off the field. Meanwhile, the rest of the elephants were carefully lured through the lanes and funneled to the rear of the Roman army, where they were dealt with. Scipio's plan to neutralize the threat of the elephants had worked; his troops then fell back into traditional Roman battle formation. Laelius, the commander of the Roman left wing, charged against the Carthaginian right. The Carthaginian cavalry, acting on the instructions of Hannibal, allowed the Roman cavalry to chase them in order to lure them away from the battlefield so that they wouldn't attack the Carthaginian armies in the rear.
Scipio now marched with his center towards the Carthaginian center, which was under the direct command of Hannibal. Hannibal moved forward with two lines; the third line of veterans was kept in reserve. After a close contest, his first line was pushed back by the Roman hastati. Hannibal ordered his second line not to allow the first line in their ranks. The bulk of them managed to escape and position themselves on the wings of the second line on Hannibal's instructions. Hannibal now charged with his second line. A furious struggle ensued and the Roman hastati were pushed back with heavy losses. Scipio reinforced the hastati with the second-line principes.
With this reinforcement the Roman front renewed their attack and defeated Hannibal's second line. Again, it was not allowed to merge with the third line and was forced to the wings, along with the first line. Carthaginian cavalry carried out Hannibal's instructions well and there was no sign of Roman cavalry on the battlefield. Once the Carthaginian cavalry was far enough away, they turned and attacked the Roman cavalry but were eventually routed. At this point there was a pause in the battle as both sides redeployed their troops. Scipio played for time as he redeployed his forces in a single line with the hastati in the middle, the principes in the inner wings and the triarii on the outer wings. Hannibal waited for Scipio to attack. The resulting clash was fierce and bloody, with neither side achieving superiority. Scipio was able to rally his men. The battle finally turned in the Romans' favor when the Roman cavalry returned to the battlefield and attacked the Carthaginian line from behind. The Carthaginian infantry was encircled and annihilated. Thousands of Carthaginians, including Hannibal, managed to escape the slaughter.
Hannibal experienced a major defeat that put an end to all resistance on the part of Carthage. In total, as many as 20,000 of Hannibal's troops were killed at Zama, while 20,000 more were taken prisoner. The Romans suffered 2,500 dead.
Aftermath.
Soon after Scipio's victory at Zama the war ended, with the Carthaginian senate suing for peace. Unlike the treaty that ended the First Punic War, the terms Carthage acceded to were so punishing that it was never able to challenge Rome for supremacy of the Mediterranean again. The treaty bankrupted Carthage and destroyed any chance of its being a military power in the future. Scipio returned to Rome a hero and was almost immediately granted a Triumph by the senate.
Hannibal initially returned to Carthage and went into civilian politics; under his leadership Carthage experienced a rapid post-war economic recovery. This startled the Romans, who considered the Carthaginian general a great potential threat as long as he lived. Hannibal still had many enemies both inside and outside of Carthage. Due to pressure from both Rome and domestic political rivals, Hannibal voluntarily stepped down from power and went into exile. For the rest of his life, he traveled across the Mediterranean, offering his service to any polity waging war against Rome. Though many were eager to accept his offer, Hannibal ultimately failed to check Roman expansion. In 184BC, facing imminent capture, Hannibal chose suicide instead.
One provision of the treaty ending the Second Punic War was that the Carthaginians were not allowed to make war without Roman consent. This allowed the Romans to establish a "casus belli" for the Third Punic War about 50 years later, after the Carthaginians defended themselves from Numidian encroachments, against which the Romans did not initially intervene. By then, Carthaginian power was a shadow of its former self. Though they fought with some success early on, the Carthaginians simply could not defeat the by-then very aged Masinissa once the armies of his Roman allies arrived in Africa. Unable to field a viable force in open combat and abandoned by all of their Punic allies, the Carthaginians commenced a spirited defense of their home city which, after an extended siege, was captured and completely destroyed in 146 BC. Only 55,000 of the city’s inhabitants survived, almost all of whom were sold into slavery by the Romans.


Beirut Air Bridge

Beirut Air Bridge 1984-1998 - Provided administrative and logistical support the US Embassy in Beirut. The Air Bridge provided the only safe mode of transportation for US diplomats between Larnaca International Airport, Larnaca, Cyprus, and several landing zones in the greater Beirut area.
UH-60 "Blackhawks" from C Co 7/158th Aviation Regiment, 12th Aviation Brigade, V Corps, from Wiesbaden Air Base and Giebelstadt Army Airfield, Germany, provided the "Air Bridge" to the US Embassy in the war-torn city of Beirut, Lebanon. Elements of this unit continued to perform this mission until July 1998.
Communication.
The Tactical Satellite Radios were provided and maintained by the 1st Combat Communication Group, Lindsey Air Station, Wiesbaden, Germany. and the Signal Detachment, Support Company of the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group(Airborne); initially out of Bad Tölz and then Bublingen Germany.


Battle of La Paz Centro

The Battle of La Paz Centro took place on May 16, 1927 during the American occupation of Nicaragua of 1926–1933. It took place after the end of Nicaraguan civil war of 1926–1927 and prior to the Sandino Rebellion of 1927–1933.
The Battle.
The incident began when American Marines heard gunshots coming from the town of La Paz Centro (located halfway between Managua and Chinandega) at nearly 1:00 in the morning and decided to investigate. The Marine platoon that entered the town was led by Captain Richard B. Buchanan. Three blocks into La Paz Centro, the Marines' left flank, led by Sergeant Glendell L. Fitzgerald came under fire from a crowd of about seventy-five armed Nicaraguans, forcing the former to take cover "under a protruding wooden sidewalk and behind a pile of railroad ties along the town’s main street." They were soon joined by Captain Buchanan's main force.
Buchanan was fatally wounded by fire coming from a local saloon while crossing Main Street. Sergeant Fitzgerald and two privates cleared out the enemy-occupied saloon, "killing seven of the enemy." The Americans' four casualties were brought into the recently cleared building, with Buchanan dying at 2:30. Private Marvin A. Jackson was also mortally wounded. "That was one boy that didn’t want to die. His brains were sticking out of that bullet hole, and he didn’t want to die" said Corporal Donald L. Truesdale. The hostile Nicaraguans began withdrawing at 3:00.
Aftermath.
Fourteen rebel corpses were found on the battlefield, some of which were wearing the red hatband of the rebel Liberal army. It is unknown for sure who commanded the Liberals that attacked the Marines at La Paz Centro, but Francisco Sequeira ("General Cabulla") seemed to be a likely suspect. After the firefight, two squads of Marines, led by Captain William P. Richards decided to visit Cabulla. On May 26, 1927, Captain Richards killed the Liberal general as the latter jumped out of his bed to go for a pistol. Cabulla's mistress, Concepción Alday, was also shot dead as she charged the Marines with a machete.
American casualties.
Fatally wounded:
Non-fatally wounded:


Battle of Fort Necessity

The Battle of Fort Necessity (also called the Battle of the Great Meadows) took place on July 3, 1754, in what is now Farmington in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The engagement, along with the May 28 skirmish known as the Battle of Jumonville Glen, was George Washington's first military experience and the only surrender of his military career. The Battle of Fort Necessity began the French and Indian War, which later spiraled into the global conflict known as the Seven Years' War.
Washington built Fort Necessity on an alpine meadow west of the summit of a pass through the Laurel Highlands of the Allegheny Mountains. Another pass nearby leads to Confluence, Pennsylvania; to the west, Nemacolin's Trail begins its descent to Uniontown, Pennsylvania, and other parts of Fayette County along the relatively low altitudes of the Allegheny Plateau.
Background.
The French Empire, despite the fact that they began colonizing North America in the 16th century, had between only 75,000 and 90,000 colonists living in New France in the mid-1700s. However, France was able to control the large colonies of New France (modern-day Canada), Acadia, and the Louisiana Territory with relatively few people by controlling waterways (especially the Saint Lawrence River, the Great Lakes, the Ohio River, and the Mississippi River) and cultivating strong political and economic relationships with powerful Native American nations. The Ohio Country, an area located roughly between Lake Erie and the Ohio River, became increasingly important to the French throughout the 18th century. As more settlers moved from Montreal, Quebec, and other established French settlements along the St. Lawrence to the newer Louisiana colony, the Ohio Country became an important connection between New France and Louisiana.
British settlers were also expanding into the Ohio Country at this time. The British colonies were far more populated than the French (there were about 1.5 million British subjects living in North America in 1754, meaning that the British outnumbered the French almost twenty to one), and settlers were eager to move over the Appalachian Mountains and into the Ohio Country and other western lands. Most British traders declared that, despite the facts that the French had been trading in the Ohio Country for years and that more and more displaced Native Americans were moving west from the Atlantic coast every year, the Ohio Country was unsettled, uncharted, and therefore unclaimed land that should be open to all traders. The French had no interest in trying to compete with the British for trade in the Ohio Country. Due to their high population and large colonial cities, British traders could offer Native Americans cheaper, higher quality goods than could their French counterparts. The French therefore set about keeping the British as far away from the Ohio Country as possible.
Authorities in New France became more aggressive in their efforts to expel British traders and colonists from this area, and in 1753 began construction of a series of fortifications in the area. In previous wars, the Québecois had more than held their own against the English colonials.
The French action drew the attention of not just the British, but also the Indian tribes of the area. Despite good Franco-Indian relations, British traders became successful in convincing the Indians to trade with them in preference to the Canadiens, and the planned large-scale advance was not well received by all. The reason for this was that they had to provide them with the goods that the Anglo-American traders had previously supplied, and at similar prices. This proved to be singularly difficult. With the exception of one or two Montreal merchant traders, the Canadians showed a great reluctance to venture into the Ohio country. In particular, Tanacharison, a Mingo chief also known as the "Half King", became anti-French as a consequence. In a meeting with Paul Marin de la Malgue, commander of the Canadian construction force, the latter reportedly lost his temper, and shouted at the Indian chief, "I tell you, down the river I will go. If the river is blocked up, I have the forces to burst it open and tread under my feet all that oppose me. I despise all the stupid things you have said." He then threw down some wampum that Tanacharison had offered as a good will gesture. Marin died not long after, and command of the operations was turned over to Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre.
Virginians felt that their colonial charter, the oldest in the British colonies, gave them claim to the Ohio Country despite competing claims from Native Americans, the French, and other British colonies. In 1748, wealthy Virginians formed the Ohio Company with the aim of solidifying Virginia's claim and profiting off the speculation of western lands. Governor Robert Dinwiddie, the royal governor of Virginia and founding investor in the Ohio Company, sent a twenty-one year old Virginia colonial Lieutenant Colonel George Washington to travel from Williamsburg to Fort LeBeouf in the Ohio Territory (a territory claimed by several of the British colonies, including Virginia) as an emissary in December 1753, to deliver a letter. George Washington's older brothers Lawrence and Augustine had been instrumental in organizing the Ohio Company, and George had become familiar with the Ohio Company by surveying for his brothers as a young man. After a long trek and several near-death experiences, Washington and his party (which included the Mingo sachem, Tanacharison, and the explorer Christopher Gist) arrived at Fort Le Boeuf and met with the regional commander, Jacques Legardeur de Saint-Pierre. Saint-Pierre politely informed Washington that he was there pursuant to orders, and Washington's letter should have been addressed to his commanding officer in Canada.
Washington returned to Williamsburg and informed Governor Dinwiddie that the French refused to leave. Dinwiddie ordered Washington to begin raising a militia regiment to hold the Forks of the Ohio, in present-day Pittsburgh, a site Washington had identified as a fine location for a fortress. However, unlike the French, Washington and his Virginia regiment could not easily reach the Forks via river. The governor therefore also issued a captain's commission to Ohio Company employee William Trent, with instructions to raise a small force capable of moving quickly through the wilderness and virgin forest that lie between Williamsburg and the Forks. Once there, they were to immediately begin construction of a fortification on the Ohio. Dinwiddie issued these instructions on his own authority, without even asking for funding from the Virginia House of Burgesses until after the fact. Trent's company arrived on site in February 1754, and began construction of a storehouse and stockade with the assistance of Tanacharison and the Mingos. In response, the Canadians sent a force of about 500 men, Canadian, French, and Indians under Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecœur (rumors reaching Trent's men put its size at 1,000). On April 16, they arrived at the forks; the next day, Trent's force of 36 men, led by Ensign Edward Ward in Trent's absence, agreed to leave the site. The Canadians tore down the British works, and began construction of the fort they called Fort Duquesne.
Prelude.
In March 1754, Governor Dinwiddie sent Washington back to the frontier with orders to "act on the [defensive], but in Case any Attempts are made to obstruct the Works or interrupt our [settlements] by any Persons whatsoever, You are to restrain all such Offenders, & in Case of resistance to make Prisoners of or kill & destroy them". Historian Fred Anderson describes Dinwiddie's instructions, which were issued without the knowledge or direction of the British government in London, as "an invitation to start a war". Washington was ordered to gather as many supplies and paid volunteers as he could along the way. By the time he left for the frontier on April 2, he had gathered 186 men.
Contrecœur operated under orders that forbade attacks by his force unless they were provoked. On May 23, he sent Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville with 35 men to see if Washington had entered French territory, and with a summons to order Washington's troops to leave; this summons was similar in nature to the one Washington had delivered to them four months previous. Sources disagree on the exact composition of Jumonville's force, which may have included French troupes de la marine, Canadian militia, and Indians.
During the march through the forests of the frontier, Washington received a few more men from another regiment that they met at Winchester. At this point Captain Trent arrived with news of the advance of the French force under Jumonville. Trent was accompanied by Tanacharison, who promised warriors to assist the British. To keep Tanacharison's support, Washington decided not to turn back, choosing instead to build a fortification south of the forks and await further instructions. The men of the Virginia Regiment built a road through the wilderness as they went, "broad enough to pass with all our Artillery and our Baggage." This road was essential, not just to allow Washington and his men to move quickly to Fort Duquesne, but to open up the Ohio country to Virginia troops and settlers in the future. The Washington and the Ohio Company had originally hoped to use the Potomac River to travel between the tidewater and the Ohio country; however, the Great Falls made such a journey impossible until the completion of the Patowmack Canal in 1803.
Jumonville Glen.
Washington sent out Captain Hog with 75 men to pursue French troops who had threatened to destroy his house and property. However, shortly after Hog left, Washington called together some young Indians and told them that the French had come to kill Tanacharison, and the Indians also left to pursue the French. That evening, Washington received a message from Tanacharison, who said he had found the French encampment. Washington decided to attack himself and brought 40 soldiers with him towards Tanacharison's camp. That morning, they met with Tanacharison's 12 Indian warriors, and Washington and Tanacharison agreed to attack the encampment. Washington ambushed the French, killing 10 to 12, wounding 2 and capturing 21. Among the dead was Jumonville; the exact manner of his death is uncertain, but by several accounts Tanacharison executed Jumonville in cold blood, crushing his head with a tomahawk and washing his hands in Jumonville's brains. One account, reported by an Indian to Contrecœur, claimed that Jumonville was killed by the Half King while the summons was being read.
Fort Necessity.
After retiring from Jumonville, Washington expected to be attacked. Tanacharison attempted to convince the Lenape, Shawnee and the Mingo Indians to join the Virginians at Great Meadows. With about 150 Virginians at Great Meadows, they began to construct a fort, which Washington named Fort Necessity. The fort was completed on June 3.
By June 9, the rest of the Virginia Regiment arrived at Great Meadows, excluding Colonel Joshua Fry, who had fallen from his horse, broken his neck and died. Washington took his place as colonel. A few days later, 100 British regulars under the command of James Mackay arrived, but, instead of making camp with the Virginians, they camped separately outside the fort.
Red Stone Creek.
Washington had heard that there were 500 poorly supplied French troops at Fort Duquesne, and thus he led the 300 Virginians out of Great Meadows on June 16 to widen the road, for he had been unable to convince the other chiefs to assist. They had said that they would also be unable to help the Virginians. Although he had lost Indian support, which made his troops more vulnerable to attack, Washington continued to widen the road towards Red Stone Creek.
On June 28, after a council of war, Washington ordered the withdrawal to Great Meadows. That same day 600 French and 100 Indians left Fort Duquesne led by the slain Jumonville's older brother, Louis Coulon de Villiers. In order to keep ahead of the French/Canadian force, the Virginians had to abandon most of their supplies. On July 1, they reached Fort Necessity.
British preparations.
At Fort Necessity, the provision hut was depleted, and there was little shelter from the heavy rain that started to fall on the 2nd. With the rain, the trenches that Washington had ordered to be dug had turned into streams. Washington realized that he would have to defend against a frontal assault and also realized that it would be difficult because the woods were less than 100 yards away, within musket range, making it possible for a besieging attacker to pick off the defenders. To improve the defense, Washington ordered his men to cut trees down and to make them into makeshift breastworks.
As the British worked, Coulon approached Fort Necessity using the road the Virginians had built. He arrived at Jumonville's Glen early on the morning of July 3. Horrified to find several scalped French bodies, he immediately ordered them to be buried.
Battle.
French attack.
By 11:00 am on the 3rd of July 1754, Louis Coulon de Villiers came within sight of Fort Necessity. At this time, the Virginians were digging a trench in the mud. The pickets fired their muskets and fell back to the fort, whereupon three columns of Canadian soldiers and Indians advanced downhill towards the fort. However, Coulon had miscalculated the location of the fort and had advanced with the fort at his right. As Coulon halted and then redeployed his troops, Washington began to prepare for an attack.
Coulon moved his troops into the woods, within easy musket range of the fort. Washington knew he had to dislodge the Canadians and Indians from that position, so he ordered an assault with his entire force across the open field. Seeing the assault coming, Coulon ordered his soldiers, led by Indians, to charge directly at Washington's line. Washington ordered the men to hold their ground and fire a volley. Mackay's regulars obeyed Washington's command, and supported by two swivel cannons, they inflicted several casualties on the oncoming Indians. The Virginians, however, fled back to the fort, leaving Washington and the British regulars greatly outnumbered. Washington ordered a retreat back to the fort.
Coulon reformed his troops in the woods. The Canadians spread out around the clearing and kept up heavy fire on Fort Necessity. Washington ordered his troops to return fire, but they aimed too high, inflicting few casualties, and the swivel cannon fared no better. To add to the garrison's troubles, heavy rain began to fall that afternoon, and Washington's troops were unable to continue the firefight because their gunpowder was wet.
Negotiations.
Louis Coulon de Villiers, who did not know when British reinforcements might arrive, sent an officer under a white flag to negotiate. Washington did not allow the Canadian officer into or near the fort, but sent two of his own men, including his translator Jacob Van Braam, to negotiate. As negotiations began, the Virginians, against Washington's orders, broke into the fort's liquor supply and got drunk. Coulon told Van Braam that all he wanted was the surrender of the garrison, and the Virginians could go back to Virginia. He warned, however, that if they did not surrender now, the Indians might storm the fort and scalp the entire garrison.
Surrender.
Van Braam brought this message to Washington, who agreed to these basic terms. One of Louis Coulon de Villiers' aides then wrote down Coulon's surrender terms and then gave them to Van Braam, who in turn gave them to Washington. Washington, who could not read French, had Van Braam translate it for him, and in the document it said that Jumonville had been "assassinated". Both Washington and Mackay signed the surrender document.
Aftermath.
On July 4, Washington and his troops abandoned Fort Necessity. The garrison marched away with drums beating and flags flying, but the Indians and the French began to loot the garrison's baggage on their way out. Washington, who feared a bloodbath, did not try to stop the looting. The Indians continued to plunder the soldiers until July 5. Washington and his troops arrived back in eastern Virginia in mid-July. On the 17th, Washington delivered his report of the battles to Governor Dinwiddie, expecting a rebuke, but Washington instead received a vote of thanks from the House of Burgesses and Dinwiddie blamed the defeat not on Washington but on poor supply and the refusal of aid by the other colonies.
The battlefield is preserved at Fort Necessity National Battlefield, and includes a reconstruction of Fort Necessity.
Political consequences.
When news of the two battles reached England in August, the government of the Duke of Newcastle, after several months of negotiations, decided to send an army expedition the following year to dislodge the French. Major General Edward Braddock was chosen to lead the expedition. His expedition ended in disaster, and the French remained in control of Fort Duquesne until 1758, when an expedition under General John Forbes finally succeeded in taking the fort.
Word of the British military plans leaked to France well before Braddock's departure for North America, and King Louis XV dispatched a much larger body of troops to Canada in 1755. Although they arrived too late to participate in Braddock's defeat, the French troop presence led to a string of French victories in the following years. In a second British act of aggression, Admiral Edward Boscawen fired on the French ship "Alcide" in a naval action on June 8, 1755, capturing her and two troop ships carrying some of those troops. Military matters escalated on both North American soil and sea until France and Britain declared war on each other in spring 1756, marking the formal start of the Seven Years' War.


Battle of Viadangos

The Battle of Viadangos or Fontedangos ("Fonte de Angos") was fought in the autumn of 1111 between the forces of Alfonso I of Aragon and the Galician allies of his estranged wife, Urraca of León and Castile, at Villadangos north of Luna, some twenty kilometres from León. Alfonso was victorious in a rout, but Urraca's son and co-ruler, Alfonso Raimúndez, escaped.
Background and preliminary manoeuvres.
Shortly after the Battle of Candespina, where Alfonso and his ally, Henry, Count of Portugal, had defeated the Castilian troops of Urraca on 26 October, the queen sought to pull Henry away from his alliance with Alfonso. An agreement was reached between her representatives, led by Fernando Garciaz de Hita, and Henry at Sepúlveda. The queen and her new ally then retreated to Palencia, away from Alfonso's army, to finalise a partition of the realm which would have given Henry a greater share than Alfonso had offered. The fortified southern city of Zamora and the royal castle at Ceia north of Sahagún, both in León, were offered to Henry on top of his Portuguese possessions, as were some territories in Castile.
Henry appears to have demanded more than his assistance to her cause could command, however, for Urraca soon entered into secret negotiations with her husband; before leaving she left orders with her men to surrender Palencia to him. The "Crónicas anónimas de Sahagún" attribute this to the ambitions of Theresa, Urraca's half-sister, Henry's wife, who coveted a queenship and had joined her husband at Palencia. From there the trio split: Henry turned to Zamora to possess it, while Urraca and Theresa went first to Sahagún before the queen moved on to her capital, León. Alfonso moved rapidly to seize Palencia (as agreed with his wife) and he almost captured Theresa while taking Sahagún, before he moved on to León. Probably fearful of her husband's dominance Urraca retreated into the hills of Galicia, probably cut off from contact with her supporters, who were thus left unaware of the new situation.
Battle and aftermath.
It was into this new situation that an army organised by Urraca's allies, the count Pedro Froilaz de Traba and apostolic archbishop Diego Gelmírez, ignorantly marched, with Urraca's young son from a previous marriage, Alfonso Raimúndez, in tow. It is possible that Diego and Pedro were intending to have Alfonso receive the homage of the magnates jointly with his mother at León. Eastern Galicia had been in Alfonso's hands since his campaign of 1110. Urraca's allies now recaptured Lugo and, perhaps diminishing their numbers with a garrison in that place, moved in the direction of León. At Viadangos they were ambushed by Alfonso and his Aragonese. According to the "Historia Compostelana" they possessed no more than 266 knights while Alfonso had 600 cavalrymen and 2,000 infantrymen with him. Pedro Froilaz was captured and the few who escaped captivity took refuge in Astorga. Among the dead was a certain Fernando, misidentified in the "Historia Compostelana" with the aforementioned count Fernando Garciaz.
Diego, when defeat was turning into a rout, took the young Alfonso and fled "in forti Castello Orzilione (quod Castrum est in Castella)" ("in the strong castle of Orzilio [which castle is in Castela]"), uniting the boy with his mother. The place where Urraca was staying and where Diego brought Alfonso was probably Orcellón in the diocese of Orense in a district known as Castela, not in Castile, as the text seems to be saying. After delivering Alfonso to Urraca, Diego returned to Astorga to retrieve the wounded and others and lead them back to Santiago de Compostela, from whence they had set out.


Andersonville Prison


All Ceylon Tamil Congress

All Ceylon Tamil Congress (), is the oldest Tamil political party in Sri Lanka.
History.
The ACTC was founded in 1944 by G.G. Ponnambalam. Ponnambalam asked for a 50-50 representation in parliament (50% for the Sinhalese, 50% for "all" other ethnic groups). This was immediately rejected by the British Governor General Lord Soulbury as a "mockery of democracy".
Due to the cooperation of the ACTC with the United National Party a group led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam broke away in 1949, forming the Federal Party (FP). The ACTC was largely discredited when their ally the UNP moved away from bilingual and bicommunal policies towards a pro-Sinhalese stance. Thus the FP emerged as the major Tamil party in 1956.
In 1972 the ACTC and the FP formed the Tamil United Front, which later evolved into the Tamil United Liberation Front in 1976.
Ahead of the 2001 elections, ACTC joined the LTTE-backed Tamil National Alliance (TNA). In the 2004 elections the TNA won 6.9% of the popular vote and 22 out of the 225 seats in parliament.
The ACTC left the TNA in 2010 and subsequently joined a new political alliance, the Tamil National People's Front.
Leaders.
Leaders of this party:
1947 Parliamentary General Election.
In the 1947 election, the first for the independent Ceylon, the ACTC won 4.37% of the popular vote and 7 out of 95 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament.
Votes and seats won by ACTC by electoral district
1952 Parliamentary General Election.
In the 1952 election the ACTC won 2.77% of the popular vote and 4 out of 95 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament.
Votes and seats won by ACTC by electoral district
1956 Parliamentary General Election.
In the 1956 election the ACTC fielded only one candidate, party leader G.G. Ponnambalam in Jaffna, who managed to win the seat with 8,914 votes.
1960 (March) Parliamentary General Election.
In the March 1960 election the ACTC won 1.32% of the popular vote and 1 out of 151 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament.
Votes and seats won by ACTC by electoral district
1960 (July) Parliamentary General Election.
In the July 1960 election the ACTC won 1.66% of the popular vote and 1 out of 151 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament.
1965 Parliamentary General Election.
In the 1965 election the ACTC won 2.44% of the popular vote and 3 out of 151 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament.
Votes and seats won by ACTC by electoral district
1970 Parliamentary General Election.
In the 1970 election the ACTC won 2.32% of the popular vote and 3 out of 151 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament.
Votes and seats won by ACTC by electoral district
2000 Parliamentary General Election.
In the 2000 election the ACTC won 0.32% of the popular vote and 1 out of 225 seats in the Sri Lankan parliament.
Votes and seats won by ACTC by electoral district


Celtiberian Wars

The First Celtiberian War (181–179 BC) and Second Celtiberian War (154–151 BC) were two of the three major rebellions by the Celtiberians (a loose alliance of Celtic tribes living in east central Hispania, among which we can name the Pellendones, the Arevaci, the Lusones, the Titti and the Belli) against the presence of the Romans in Hispania.
When the Second Punic War ended, the Carthaginians relinquished the control of its Hispanic territories to Rome. The Celtiberians shared a border with this new Roman province. They started to confront the Roman army acting in the areas around Celtiberia and this led to the First Celtiberian War. The Roman victory in this war and the peace treaties established by the Roman praetor Gracchus with several tribes led to 24 years of relative peace.
In 154 BC, the Roman senate objected to the Belli town of Segeda building a circuit of walls, and declared war. Thus, the Second Celtiberian War (154–152 BC) started. At least three tribes of Celtiberians were involved in the war: the Titti, the Belli (towns of Segeda and Nertobriga) and the Arevaci (towns of Numantia, Axinum and Ocilis). After some initial Celtiberian victories, the consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus inflicted some defeats and made peace with the Celtiberians. The next consul, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, attacked the Vaccaei, a tribe living in the central Duero valley which was not at war with Rome. He did so without the authorisation of the senate, with the excuse that the Vaccaei had mistreated the Carpetani. The Second Celtiberian War overlapped with the Lusitanian War of (154–150 BC).
The third major rebellion following the Celtiberian Wars was the Numantine War (143–133 BC), sometimes considered as the Third Celtiberian War.
Prelude.
The Romans took over the territories of the Carthaginians in southern Hispania when they defeated them at the Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC during the Second Punic War (218–201 BC). After the war, they established two Roman provinces: Hispania Citerior (Nearer Spain) along most of the east coast, an area roughly corresponding to the modern autonomous communities of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia, and Hispania Ulterior (Further Spain) in the south, roughly corresponding to modern Andalusia. There were numerous rebellions by many tribes of Hispania, including tribes both inside and outside Roman territory, in most years for 98 years, until the end of the First Celtiberian War in 179 BC.
The Celtiberians, or Hispanic coalitions formed in part by Celtiberians, soon clashed with the new imperial power. In 197 BC, 20,000 Celtiberians attacked a Roman army near Iliturgis, and in 195 BC, 10,000 Celtiberians joined the Turduli against Rome. A consular army by Cato the Elder was sent to the Celtiberia, and, despite not being able to take Saguntia, prompted the Celtiberians to stop hostilities in 195 BC. Soon after Cato returned to Rome, in 193 BC, a coalition of Celtiberians, Vaccei and Vettones was defeated by Marco Fulvio Nobilior near Toletum. In the same area, in the 185 BC, a new Hispanic coalition (probably of Celtiberians, Vettones and Carpetani), defeated two praetorian armies, but were defeated in another clash near the Tagus river.
In 182 BC, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus would step up the pressure by acting closer to Celtiberia. Flaccus conquered the city of Urbicua. In response, the Celtiberians raised an army of 35,000 men.
The First Celtiberian War (181–179 BC).
The siege of Aebura (Carpetania) (181 BC).
To confront the 35,000-strong Celtiberian army, Flaccus received reinforcements of 3,000 Roman and 6,000 allied infantry and 200 Roman and 300 allied cavalry, and raised as many auxiliary troops from the friendly tribes as he could. He went to Carpetania and defeated the Celtiberian army near Aebura 23,000 Celtiberians died and 4,700 were captured, against losses of 200 Romans, 800 allies and 2,400 native auxiliaries, and the Romans seized the city. The details given by Livy suggest that the Celtiberians formed an organised coalition, using an army composed both by cavalry and infantry, and fighting in closed battle formations by using banners.
Flaccus campaigns in the Celtiberia (180–179 BC).
Quintus Fulvius Flaccus then marched across Carpetania and went to Contrebia. A Celtiberian army was sent to protect the city, but due to the intense rains it arrived when the city had already surrendered. The Celtiberians were caught by surprise by the Roman army exiting the city. Most escaped, but 12,000 men died and 5,000 men, 400 horses and 62 banners were captured. The fugitives bumped into another body of Celtiberians on its way to Contrebia which, on being told about the defeat, dispersed. Quintus Fulvius marched through Celtiberian territory, ravaged the countryside and stormed many forts until the Celtiberians surrendered.
Since his successor, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, was late, Flaccus started a third campaign against the Celtiberians who had not surrendered, ravaging the more distant parts of Celtiberia, where the Lusones lived. On his way back to Tarraco to hand the command of the army to Gracchus, Flaccus was ambushed at the Manlian Pass. Flaccus defeated the Celtiberians (killing 17,000 and capturing 3,700 men and 600 horses), but suffered important losses (4400 men). Flaccus continued to Tarraco, and then to Rome with his some of veterans, while Gracchus went to Celtiberia.
Gracchus campaigns in the Celtiberia (179 BC).
Assisted by his colleague, Lucius Postumius Albinus, Gracchus marched to Celtiberia. Gracchus first took the city of Munda, and then attacked the powerful town of Certima. The town asked for help to a Celtiberian military camp in the nearby city of , who sent ten envoys to enquire the Romans about the reasons of the attack. After Gracchus ordered the entire army to march in review in front of them, the legates left and discouraged their people from sending aid to the besieged city. Munda surrendered, sent forty young nobles as hostages and an indemnity was imposed on them. After Certima, Tiberius Gracchus defeated the Celtiberians guarding the military camp in Alce (Livy mentions 9,000 men and 320 men and 112 horses captured; 109 Romans fell). Gracchus then captured the city, and negotiated the defection of some important nobles, including what Livy thought was by far the most powerful man in Hispania, a Celtiberian chief named "Thurru". Ergavica, another Celtiberian city, was alarmed about the defeats of its neighbours and opened its gates to the Romans. In addition, Gracchus defeated 20,000 Celtiberians who were besieging the city of Caravis (Magallon, in north-western Aragon), an ally of Rome, and conquered the city of Complega.
Livy thought that some of the surrenders were in bad faith because whenever Gracchus left hostilities resumed and there was also a major battle near Mons Chaunus (probably Moncayo Massif) with many casualties on both sides. Three days later there was a bigger battle which cost the defeated Celtiberians 22,000 casualties and the capture of 300 men and 300 horses. This last defeat was so decisive that prompted an end to hostilities.
Aftermath.
Gracchus signed a series of treaties with the Celtiberians that ‘were longed for in subsequent wars’. Unlike previous praetors he spent time to negotiate and cultivate personal relations with tribal leaders. After the surrender of Complega, he allocated land to the poor and made carefully defined treaties with the surrounding tribes and the surrounding country, binding them to be friends of Rome. Gracchus imposed the vicensima, the requisition 5% of the grain harvest, a form of tax which was more efficient and less vulnerable to abuse than the usual Roman practice of tendering tax collection to private ‘tax farmers.’ Silva notes this is the first reference to a regulatory collection of revenue. His treaties stipulated that the allies were to provide the Romans with auxiliary troops. They also established that the natives could fortify existing cities, but not found new ones. There is some evidence that he introduced civilian administrative measures, such the issuing of rights for mining to mint coins and the construction of roads. In addition, Gracchus founded the colony (settlement) of Gracchurris (Alfaro, in La Rioja, northern Hispania) in the Upper Ebro Valley; and Iliturgi, a mining town and a frontier outpost in Hispania Ulterior.
Gracchus' administrative arrangements and treaties ensured peace in the conquered territory for the next quarter of a century. Apart from a few minor episodes, Hispania remained quiet until the outbreak of the Lusitanian War (155–150 BC) and the Second Celtiberian War (154–151 BC).
Second Celtiberian War (154–152 BC).
Causes.
Appian wrote that this war broke out because Segeda (near Zaragoza), a powerful city of the Celtiberian tribe of the Belli, persuaded the people of some smaller towns to settle there and was building a circuit of walls seven kilometres long. It also forced the neighbouring Titti to join in. The Belli had agreed to the treaties Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus had made with tribes in Hispania at the end of the First Celtiberian War. Rome considered that Segeda was breaking the treaty. It forbade the building of the wall, demanded the tribute and the provision of a contingent for the Roman army in accordance with the stipulations of Gracchus' treaty. The Segedans replied that the treaty forbade the construction of new towns, but did not forbid the fortification existing ones. They also said that they had been subsequently released from the tribute and the military contingent by the Romans. This was true, but the senate argued that when it granted such exemptions it always specified that they were to continue only during its pleasure. The senate must have decided to withdraw the exemptions because it was worried about the development of Segeda into a powerful city in the land of the Celtiberians, who had a history of rebellions. Rome prepared for war.
Victories of the Celtiberian coalition.
In 153 BC the praetor Quintus Fabius Nobilitor arrived in Hispania with a force of nearly 30,000 men. The people of Segeda, whose wall had not been completed, fled and sought refuge among the Arevaci. The Arevaci welcomed them and chose a Segedan, Carus, as their commander. He prepared 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry for an ambush in a thick forest and attacked the Romans as they were passing through. It was a long battle, which he won; 6,000 Romans were killed. Carus was killed together with 6,000 of his men by the Roman cavalry which was guarding the Roman baggage while he was pursuing the fugitives from the battle in a disorderly manner. Nevertheless, the battle was a disaster for the Romans and, from then, on they would not engage in battle on the day of the festival of the god Vulcan because this defeat occurred on that day.
The Arevaci assembled at the town of Numantia (7 km north of Soria) which had strong natural defences, and chose Ambo and Leuco as their leaders. Three days later Nobilitor encamped four kilometres from the town. He was joined by 300 cavalry and ten elephants sent by Masinissa, the king of Numidia, a Roman ally in Africa. Before the ensuing battle, Nobilitor placed the elephants at the rear so that they would not be seen and then divided the army into two. During the battle he brought them into view. This frightened the enemy, who had never seen these animals. They fled inside the town. Nobilitor attacked the city walls and there was a fierce battle. Then an elephant was hit by a large falling stone and made a loud noise which frightened the other elephants. They went on the rampage, trampling over the Romans, who took to disorderly flight. The Numantines made a sortie and killed 4,000 Romans and three elephants. Nobilitor then attacked the town of Axinium which stored the enemy supplies, but did not achieve anything. He lost many men and returned to his camp at night. He sent his cavalry commander to pursue an alliance with a neighbouring tribe and ask for cavalry assistance. He was given some horsemen, but an ambush was prepared against him when he was on his way back. In the resultant ambush the allied horsemen fled and the Roman commander and many of his troops were killed. These Roman disasters encouraged the town of Ocilis (Medinaceli, in the modern province of Soria) to defect to the Celtiberians. The Roman provisions were kept in this town. Nobilitor withdrew to his winter camp and suffered food shortages. Because of this, heavy snowstorms and frost many of his men died.
In 152 BC Marcus Claudius Marcellus, consul for the third time, took over the command, bringing 8,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to Hispania. An ambush against him was prepared, but he avoided it by moving cautiously and he encamped in front of Ocilis. He seized the town, granted it pardon, took hostages and imposed a fine of thirty talents. His moderation encouraged the people of Nertobriga (a town of the Belli, in the modern province of Zaragoza) to ask for peace. Marcellus asked for 100 cavalry and they agreed. However, in the meantime the Roman rear guard was attacked and a lot of booty was taken. When the promised cavalry arrived its leaders said that this had been done by some people who did not know about the agreement with the Romans. Marcellus chained the horsemen, sold their horses, plundered the countryside and began to besiege the town, which sent a herald to ask for peace again. Marcellus stated that he would not grant peace unless the Arevaci, Belli, and Titti asked for it together. The Nertobriges sent ambassadors to these tribes and asked Marcellus for leniency and for the renewal of the treaty made with Gracchus. This was opposed by some rural people who had been incited to war. Marcellus sent envoys from each party to Rome to carry on their dispute there and sent private letters to the senate letters urging peace. He wanted to bring the war to an end himself and gain glory this way.
The Celtiberians send envoys to Rome and agree to stop hostilities.
Appian wrote that the envoys of the friendly faction were treated as guests in the city, whereas those of the hostile faction were lodged outside the city walls, as customary. Polybius specified that it was the Belli and Titti who had taken the side of Rome. Because of this their envoys were admitted into the city, while those of the Arevaci, as they were enemies, were ordered to encamp on the other side of the River Tiber. The Senate heard the friendly envoys first. They said that if the rebels were not punished properly they would soon take up arms again and make the whole of Hispania inclined to rebel. They asked either that the Roman army should remain in Hispania and that it should be commanded by a consul to check the malpractices of the Arevaci or, if the troops were to be withdrawn, that Rome should inflict an exemplary punishment on them. According to Polybius, when the envoys of the Arevaci were heard, they came across as not being willing to submit or to accept defeat and gave the impression that they thought that they had fought more brilliantly than the Romans. They said that they would pay a penalty, should it be imposed on them, but demanded that the Romans should revert to the terms of the treaty of Tiberius Gracchus. The officers of Marcus Claudius Marcellus were then heard. It seemed that they were inclined towards peace and the senate thought that the consul was more disposed towards the enemy than the allies. Appian wrote that the senate was not happy that these people had refused the terms put forward earlier by Nobilitor. However, when he described the campaign by Nobilitor he did not mention him making any terms with the Celtiberians. The senate replied that Marcellus would communicate its decision to them.
Polybius wrote that the private opinion of the senate was that what the allies said was true and to the advantage of Rome, that the Arevaci had a high opinion of themselves and that Marcellus was afraid of war. It secretly ordered the officers Marcellus had sent to continue to fight. It mistrusted Marcellus and it was minded to send one of the new consuls to replace him. It made preparations for the campaign as if the future of Hispania depended in this, assuming that if the enemy was defeated all the other tribes would submit to Rome and that if the Arevaci could avoid further war they and all others tribes would be encouraged to resist. Quintus Fulvius Nobilitor spread rumours of continuous battles and great Roman losses and about the valour of the Celtiberians, as well as claims that Marcellus was afraid of continuing the war. The young recruits panicked and found excuses to avoid recruitment which could not be verified. Competent officers were not willing to serve. Then, the young Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus spoke in the senate and asked to be allowed to be sent to Hispania as an officer or a junior commander and that he was ready to assume such role. He was willing to do so even though he had been given the safer task of going to Macedon where he had been invited to go to settle disputes there. All were surprised because of his youth and cautious disposition. He became popular and made those who had been avoiding military service feel ashamed. The young men enlisted and the officers volunteered. Appian wrote that the army to be sent to Hispania was chosen by lot instead of the customary levy. It was the first time this happened. This was because ‘many had complained that they had been treated unfairly by the consuls in the enrolment, while others had been chosen for easy service’.
In 151 BC the new consul, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, was assigned Hispania. While he was on his way, Marcellus told the Celtiberians about the impending war and returned the hostages. He had a long conversation with the chief of the embassy which had gone to Rome. He sought to persuade the Celtiberians to put matters in his hands because he wanted to bring the war to an end before the arrival of Lucullus. After this 5,000 Arevaci took possession of the city of Nertobriga and Marcellus encamped near Numantia. While he was driving the inhabitants inside the wall, their leader asked for a meeting with Marcellus. He said that the Arevaci, Belli and Titti would put themselves in his hands. He demanded and received hostages and money and let them go free. Thus, Marcellus managed to bring the war to an end before the arrival of Lucullus.
Lucullus' illegal war on the Vaccaei.
Appian wrote that Lucius Licinius Lucullus was greedy for fame and money and attacked the Vaccaei because he was ‘in straitened circumstances'. This was despite the fact that the senate had not declared war on them and this tribe had never attacked the Romans. He crossed the River Tagus and encamped near the town of Cauca (Coca) The inhabitants asked him what he had come for and what the reason for war was. He replied that they had mistreated the Carpetani and that he had come to their aid. The Caucaei attacked a party of Roman wood cutters and foragers, killed many of them and pursued the fugitives to their camp. In the ensuing battle, being more like a light infantry, they had the advantage at first. However, when they run out of darts they fled and 3,000 of them were killed while they were forcing their way through the gates. The town elders sought peace. Lucullus demanded hostages, 100 talents of silver and a contingent of cavalry for his army. When these were provided, he also demanded that the town be garrisoned by the Romans. This was agreed and Lucullus ordered 2,000 picked soldiers to seize the city. Then the rest of the Roman army, which had been ordered to kill all adult males, was let in. Only a few out of 20,000 managed to escape. Some of them went to other towns. They burnt what they could not take with them to deprive Lucullus of booty.
Lucullus marched on the town of Itercatia (location uncertain), where more than 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry had taken refuge. He called for peace talks. The inhabitants reproached him for the slaughter of the Caucaei and asked him if he intended to do the same to them. Appian wrote: "he, like all guilty souls, being angry with his accusers instead of reproaching himself, laid waste their fields". He then begun a siege and repeatedly lined up his men for battle to provoke a fight. The enemy did not respond. One man often rode into the gaps between the Roman armies and challenged for single fight. Nobody accepted and he went back making insulting gestures. Then the young Scipio Aemilianus accepted and luckily defeated this big man even though he was small. This lifted the spirit of the Romans. However, the next night an enemy cavalry contingent which had gone out foraging before Lucullus had arrived run about shouting and those inside the city also shouted. This caused terror in the Roman camp. The soldiers were sick due to lack of sleep and dysentery caused by the local food they were not used to. Many died of the latter. When some of the siege works were completed the Romans knocked down a section of the city walls, but they were quickly overpowered. They fled and not knowing the area many fell into a reservoir and died. The enemy repaired the wall. As both sides suffered famine, Scipio Aemilianus proposed peace and promised that it would not be violated. The Itercalati trusted him and gave Lucullus 10,000 cloaks, some cattle and fifty hostages as part of the terms.
Next Lucullus went to Pallantia (Pelencia). This town was hosting a large number of refugees and was renowned for its bravery. He was advised to avoid it, but he heard that it was a rich town. He encamped there and did not leave until constant harassment of the Roman foragers by the Pallantian cavalry prevented him from getting supplies. The Romans withdrew and were pursued by the enemy until they reached the River Durius (Douro). Then they went back home at night. Lucullus went to the territory of the Turdetani and went into winter camps This was the end of his illegal war against the Vaccaei. He was never called to account for it.
Appian commented: "As for the gold and silver that Lucullus was after (and for the sake of which he had waged this war, thinking that all of Hispania abounded with gold and silver), he got nothing. Not only did they have none, but these particular [tribes] did not set any value on those metals.
In his account of the Lusitanian War, Appian wrote that Lucullus and Servius Sulpicius Galba, a praetor who was in charge of the troops in Hispania Ulterior and was campaigning against a Lusitanian rebellion, conducted a joint pincer operation against Lusitania. According to Appian they gradually depopulated it. Appian described Galba as being even more Greedy than Lucullus. He killed many Lusitanians by treachery.
Aftermath.
In 147 BC, four years after the end of the Second Celtiberian War, the Lusitanians, who had rebelled between 155 BC and 150 BC, rebelled again in the Viriathic War (147–139 BC). In 144 BC, the fourth year of this war, Viriathus, the Lusitanian leader, incited the Celtiberians to rebel. This led to the Numantine War (143–133 BC), which was the longest war of resistance against the Romans.
Sources.
The First Celtiberian War is covered in Livy's detailed History of Rome. The books of Livy's work which cover the period of the Second Celtiberian War have been lost. Only a few fragments of Polybius' writings about Hispania are extant. We only have four fragments on the Second Celtiberian War and these only cover the story of Celtiberian envoys who went to Rome. For this war were rely on Appian's books on the wars in Hispania.


Steuben Monument

The Steuben Monument is a public art work by Swiss-American artist J. Otto Schweizer, located on the north side of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The bronze equestrian sculpture depicts Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben in his Revolutionary War uniform. It is located at the intersection of West Lisbon Avenue, Lloyd Street, and North Sherman Boulevard.


Ukrainian National Army

Ukrainian National Army (UNA) was a World War II Ukrainian military group, created on March 17, 1945 in Weimar, Germany, and subordinate to Ukrainian National Committee.
The army, formed on April 15, 1945, and commanded by General Pavlo Shandruk, consisted of the following units:
Plans were made regarding the inclusion of the Ukrainian Freedom Army (120,000 soldiers), Kuban Cossacks and Georgian military divisions.
The primary purpose of creation of the Ukrainian National Army was to integrate all the Ukrainian units fighting the Soviets under a single command. The intended size of the army, encompassing all the Ukrainian units subordinate to Oberkommando des Heeres was 220,000. However within the two months left till the end of the war, Shandruk was able to gather about 50,000 soldiers.
In reality, Shandruk was able to command only the 1. UNA Division and elements of the 2. UNA Division. On May 7, under his influence, the division - located in western Austria by this time, after slowly moving from Slovenia (February 1945) - withdrew further from Red Army forces. The Army now split into several groups, with one heading towards the Italian border and surrendering to the British Army's 15th Army Group, while others moved toward the German and Swiss borders and surrendered to the US Army's 6th Army Group. The UNA soldiers were interned in northern Italy, in the area controlled by Polish II Corps forces. After the capitulation, Shandruk asked for a meeting with Polish general Władysław Anders in London, and asked him to protect the army against the deportation to Soviet Union. Despite the Soviet pressure, Anders managed to protect Ukrainian soldiers as the former citizens of the Second Republic of Poland. Shandruk and the bulk of his forces managed to remain in the West, with many of the former UNA soldiers joining the French Foreign Legion.
Other groups, splintered, either surrendered to the Soviet or the Western Allies, facing repatriation, with several hundred interned in Switzerland.
The UNA had a bad relationship with general Andrei Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army (KONR) and was never subordinated to it.


Old Artillery Ground

The Old Artillery Ground is an area of land in Spitalfields, London formerly designated one of the Liberties of the Tower of London and Crown Land.
Originally the outer precinct of the Priory and Hospital of St Mary Spital, it was converted to an Artillery Ground in 1538, under Henry VIII, for the use of 'The Fraternity or Guild of Artillery of Longbows, Crossbows and Handguns', also known as 'The Fraternity of St George'. This group were later known as the Honourable Artillery Company and used the ground in conjunction with the Gunners of the Tower.
In 1658 the Honourable Artillery Company moved to a new Artillery Ground in Bunhill Fields, leaving the Gunners of the Tower in possession of the area until 1682, when it was sold off to speculative builders. These latter developed the area for housing, designating the streets with their present names of Fort Street, Gun Street, Artillery Passage and Artillery Lane which recall its former use.
In 1900 it and the neighbouring Liberty of Norton Folgate were merged into the new Metropolitan Borough of Stepney. Since 1965 the area has been administered by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.


Battle of Medenine

The Battle of Medenine ( [Operation Capri]) was an Axis spoiling attack at Medenine in Tunisia on 6 March 1943. The operation was intended to delay an attack by the British Eighth Army on the Mareth Line. The British had been forewarned by Ultra decrypts of German wireless communications and rushed reinforcements from Tripoli and Benghazi before the Axis attack, which was a costly failure. General Erwin Rommel, the commander of Army Group Africa , could not afford to lose forces needed for the defence of the Mareth Line and the effort was abandoned at dusk that day.
During the night, the Eighth Army remained alert for the possibility of another Axis attempt and sent forward patrols to carry out reconnaissance and to demolish knocked-out Axis tanks. During the day the and had made a maximum effort with little effect against the Allied anti-aircraft defence and the Desert Air Force (DAF). On 7 March the Axis forces began a withdrawal northwards towards the Mareth Line, the Eighth Army pursuit being slowed by rain. The Battle of Medenine was the last battle commanded by Rommel in the North African Campaign, who returned to Europe for good soon afterwards.
Background.
Axis retreat from El Alamein.
The retreat of took place from 1943 and on 8 November, Operation Torch began in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The evaded British outflanking moves but traffic jams, fuel shortage, poor weather and air attacks reduced the retreat to per day. in Rome and in Berlin took an optimistic view of the situation and chose the Mersa-el-Brega–El Agheila position as the terminus of the retreat, despite the position having a front long, strong points up to apart, too far for mutual support and being protected by only When the arrived, the had only and deliveries of only of the of supplies needed daily.
Rommel had wanted retreat to Wadi Akarit in the Gabès area, further west, where the non-motorised troops could defend the narrow gap between the Mediterranean and the Chott Djerid. The tanks and motorised infantry could join the 5th Panzer Army (Colonel-General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim) further north, drive back the First Army from Tunisia into Algeria, then swiftly return to force back the Eighth Army, preparatory to embarkation for Europe. At a meeting with Hitler on 28 November, Rommel discussed the proposal but only received a promise of more supplies. On the night of the British attacked and on the following evening the resumed its retreat and despite the chronic fuel shortage, evaded another outflanking move. The took up a defensive position at Buerat on 29 December but this was poorly fortified, wide open to an outflanking manoeuvre and vulnerable to being cut off by an attack on Gabès by the First Army from southern Tunisia. The supply situation was little better, with tons of the daily requirement being delivered and 95 percent of the fuel being used to distribute supplies or for withdrawals.
The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) attacked Axis supply lines and hundreds of lorries were stranded along roads for lack of fuel, while the Eighth Army massed petrol and ammunition for its next attack. On 13 January 1943, the infantry of the 21st Panzer Division were sent north to the 5th Panzer Army, to guard against the loss of Gabès and on 15 January, the Eighth Army attacked with against and tanks; in the evening Rommel ordered another withdrawal. Lack of fuel and apprehension about the threat to Gabès, led to the retreat passing beyond the Tarhuna–Homs line and Tripoli was occupied by the British on 23 January, the Axis retreat from El Alamein having covered . On 13 February, the last Axis soldiers left Libya and on 15 February, the rearguard reached the Mareth Line, inside Tunisia. intended the line to be held indefinitely but Rommel considered it too vulnerable to another flanking move, unlike the Wadi Akarit position, another back.
Operation Torch.
On 7 November 1942, Anglo-American troops landed in Morocco and Algeria, the British First Army (Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson) either side of Algiers and the US II Corps (Major-General Lloyd Fredendall) at Casablanca and Oran, against the resistance of Vichy French forces until an armistice on 10 November. On 14 November, the Allied forces tried to reach Tunis, to the east through mountainous country by a coup de main assisted by parachute landings but poor weather, a rapid German build-up of aircraft and the airlift of troops from Sicily to Tunisia under Case Anton ended the advance on 30 November. The Axis troops were able to form a bridgehead around the ports of Tunis and Bizerta and by December, about troops, fifty Panzer IV and forty Tiger tanks had arrived. The 5th Panzer Army had been formed on 8 December and winter weather began in mid-month, which was further to the advantage of the Axis defenders, as continued its retreat from El Alamein, towards southern Tunisia. Having stabilised the Axis position in Tunisia, the 5th Panzer Army undertook several local offensives in the new year, at the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid (14–17 February), the Battle of Kasserine Pass (19–24 February) and Operation Ochsenkopf (26 February – 4 March 1943).
Mareth Line.
Southern Tunisia is a region of broken terrain, with rocky ridge lines and desert, which obstruct manoeuvre; opposite a bight where the north–south coast opens to the east, a semi-arid, scrub covered coastal plain is met inland by the Matmata Hills which run south to north. North of Gabès, the road to Sfax passes between the sea and the Chotts, the only route north for the Eighth Army. Across the plain in a line roughly south-west to north-east, lay the Mareth Line, a fortification built by the French in the 1930s. In the north, the hills and line of forts terminated at the Tebaga Gap, a low pass between the Matmata Hills and the Djebel Tebaga, another line of high ground to the west of the gap running east–west. North and west of this feature is the Chott el Djerid; west of the Matmata Hills, lies dry Jebel Dahar country and then the impassable sand of the Grand Erg Oriental. Gabès is on the coast where the plain meets the route from the Tebaga Gap.
The Mareth Line followed the line of Wadi Zigzaou, a natural tank obstacle, with steep banks rising up to ; the north-west side had been fortified by the French and was reinforced by Axis engineers. The wadi crosses the coastal plain from Zarat to Toujane and into the Matmata Hills beyond. In 1938, the French judged Jebel Dahar to be impassable to motorised transport and had not extended the Mareth Line any further inland but 1943 motor vehicles had much better performance. The Italian 1st Army (General Giovanni Messe) occupied the Mareth Line with the 90th Light Division, 164th Light "Afrika" Division, and the 10th Panzer Division, 15th Panzer Division and the 21st Panzer Division of the with about and the 80th Infantry Division "La Spezia".
Prelude.
Axis offensive preparations.
On 28 February, Rommel, Messe and the senior armoured unit commanders met to discuss an attack on Medenine, the junction of several roads and tracks. An attack from three directions was suggested, from Toujane to Metameur on the left, an attack in the centre and an attack on the right from the Hallouf Pass to Medenine. Rommel suggested an attack nearer the coast to create the possibility of attacking from an unexpected direction but the subordinates disagreed because of information from reconnaissance by the that the coastal approaches were difficult, mined and covered by many guns. There was no room for manoeuvre and the tanks would be easy targets for British artillery and aircraft. Rommel gave way and the plan was drawn up by Messe and Lieutenant-General Heinz Ziegler, the temporary commander of the .
The attack was set for 6 March to give time for the units involved in (the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid) to replace casualties and re-organise. Messe planned to encircle the British troops between the Mareth Line and Medenine with the DAK Group ( Hans Cramer) formed from the three panzer divisions, Reconnaissance units 3 and 33, a battalion of the 164th Light Division, a parachute battalion, seven field artillery batteries and two anti-aircraft battalions and Column Bari ( Theodor von Sponeck) a battlegroup with two battalions of Panzergrenadier Regiment 200, two battalions of Panzergrenadier Regiment 361, the and the battle groups with two battalions each, a battery of German field guns and several , seven Italian field batteries and part of three anti-aircraft batteries; both columns had attached anti-tank and engineer units.
Axis plan of attack.
The DAK was to capture a line from Hir en Nraa to Ksar Rebounten and then circle north or north-east, the 10th Panzer Division advancing from the Hallouf valley to capture Metameur. The 21st Panzer Division was to emerge from the south end of Djebel Tebaga and attack towards Hir Ksar Koutine. The 15th Panzer Division was to move from Djebel er Remtsia towards Hir en Nraa followed by its infantry and the Reconnaissance units were to cut the Foum Tatahouine–Medenine road to prevent the movement of British reinforcements. Column Bari was to make a frontal attack at Zemlet el Lebene with Battle Group on the right flank, Panzer Grenadier Regiment 200 in the centre and Battle Group on the left. On 5 March, the and were to bomb Allied airfields and cover the assembly of the ground force and on 6 March were to attack British artillery positions east of Zemlet el Lebene, close the forward Allied airfields, provide fighter escorts for the ground attack and reconnoitre from Tatahouine to Ben Gardane.
British preparations.
Long before the Eighth Army reached the port of Tripoli, thought had been given to an attack on the Mareth Line and the LRDG had been sent to survey the land south of the Matmata Hills. Despite maps and reports indicating that the ground was impossible for tanks and lorries, the LRDG found a route inland southwards and around the hills to the Tebaga Gap, between the Chott el Fejaj salt marsh and the hills. The 7th Armoured Division (Major-General George Erskine) had probed forward from Tripoli, while the 51st (Highland) Division (Major-General Douglas Wimberley) and the 2nd New Zealand Division (Major-General Bernard Freyberg) rested at the port. Winter rains turned the ground into a swamp, until a short lull beginning on 15 February, when the 7th Armoured and 51st (Highland) divisions moved forward and captured airfields at Medenine on 17 February. The next day the Free French Flying Column and the 1st Infantry Battalion Marine and Pacific arrived with General Philippe Leclerc, after a march across the Sand Sea from Lake Chad, to join the Eighth Army. XXX Corps (Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese) brought the 2nd New Zealand Division forward from Tripoli, which had the 8th Armoured Brigade and the 201st Guards Brigade under command.
The Allied code breakers of the Government Code and Cipher School at Bletchley Park in England, read Axis Enigma codes and on 25 February, warned Montgomery that Rommel had ordered the termination of the Battle of Kasserine Pass (19–24 February). On 28 February, they decrypted orders from Rommel for a reconnaissance to be conducted by the 1st Italian Army, preparatory to an attack on the Eighth Army by 4 March and a fuel return on 1 March showed that the Axis forces had sufficient for a three-day operation. On 26 February, the Eighth Army had only about one division at Medenine, most of its tanks were with X Corps (Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks) at Benghazi, away and an attack on the Mareth Line could not be ready before 20 March. Montgomery thought that XXX Corps at Medenine would not be able to withstand an attack before 7 March but over three days and nights, reinforcements were rushed forward and by 4 March, guns and guns had been moved up. The DAF had also increased the number of aircraft in the area to double that of the Axis air forces. At on 6 March, Allied code breakers sent notice to Montgomery of the thrust line of the attack and that it was to begin at
Battle.
6 March.
It was foggy when the Axis bombardment of the British forward positions began at , and for ninety minutes tanks, guns and other vehicles emerged from the heights between Toujane and Kreddache. Tanks of the 15th Panzer Division moved along the Toujane–Medenine road and then turned north against the positions of the 7th Armoured Division and were engaged by the anti-tank guns of the 131st Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards. On the 2nd New Zealand Division front, the 164th Light Division was engaged by Bren carriers of the 21st NZ Battalion, which met seven vehicles carrying infantry and anti-tank guns at close range in the fog. The New Zealanders inflicted many casualties, for the loss of two casualties and a carrier. Small parties of Axis infantry probed the front and as the fog dispersed, artillery was seen moving up. The British artillery did not reply, being under orders to wait until the attackers were in range of the maximum number of guns; the anti-tank guns were only to commence firing at short range. The 5th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (RA) did not begin to fire until Axis tanks were engaged by the forward six-pounders and then bombarded infantry and lorries following the tanks, isolating them.
At about tanks were reported to be converging on Tadjera Kbir (Point 270) and the 28th NZ Battalion reported ten tanks and thirty trucks moving up the wadi to its right. The tanks reached a dummy minefield and then diverted towards rising ground, as had been intended. Two 6-pounder anti-tank guns from the 73rd Anti-Tank Regiment RA opened fire and knocked out four Panzer III Specials at and the mortars of the 28th NZ Battalion knocked out a fifth tank. When the crews alighted, mortars, machine-guns and artillery joined in. The attackers were taken by surprise and disorganised but then spotted the anti-tank guns and returned fire. A 6-pounder was damaged and two men wounded but the rest kept firing until the other weapons commenced fire and the surviving tanks retired. Fifteen prisoners from the 10th Panzer Division, including the tank company commander, were taken.
Just after 21st Battalion mortar fire dispersed a group of infantry dismounting from vehicles and by about the remaining infantry withdrew and dug in to the rear. The British artillery fired everywhere, especially on areas registered beforehand, as soon as Axis troops or vehicles moved into them. The leading tanks of the 21st Panzer Division crossed a skyline and were engaged, observers of the 201st Guards Brigade reporting that they "wandered rather vaguely". The 2nd New Zealand Division was not attacked again during the morning but much disorganised movement of tanks and transport was seen. It was realised that the main Axis effort was against Tadjera Kbir and further north. On the left flank, Reconnaissance units 3 and 33 and the Headquarters with nine tanks, worked round to the Foum Tatahouine–Medenine road against the Free French Flying Column, which repulsed attacks along the road from a point south of Medenine, losing during the day.
In the afternoon, Axis infantry joined in the attacks and from about were dispersed by the 2nd New Zealand Division artillery. At about with tank support advanced west of Point 270 and were devastated by the 2nd New Zealand Division artillery, the 5th Army Group Royal Artillery field and medium regiments and the heavy anti-aircraft guns on a landing ground nearby. A troop of captured guns with Royal Artillery crews operated as anti-aircraft guns. On the 51st Highland Division and 7th Armoured Division fronts, the Axis attacks were more determined but had little success and Tadjera Kbir was never threatened. At tanks and infantry were engaged by the New Zealand field artillery, after which there were no more attacks on the New Zealand front. At about Rommel accepted a suggestion from Messe to end the attack, since it could not be continued without risking losses which would compromise the defence of the Mareth Line.
Sorties by and fighter-bombers and fighters were made during the day but had little effect as the DAF controlled the air above the battlefield. Two New Zealanders were killed and two wounded in a raid over the 4th Field Ambulance and Bf 109 was shot down by the 26th Battalion with a captured Breda machine-gun. As dusk fell, the attackers withdrew, a detachment of the King's Royal Rifle Corps and other units at Haddada having remained undisturbed, despite being isolated when the FFF Column on the right was forced back, during an Axis outflanking move. During the night of XXX Corps patrols went out to find out if the attack would resume on 7 March, despite the Axis tank casualties, which as dark fell on 6 March, were already known to be another attack unlikely. On the New Zealand Division front, vigilance was maintained in case of an outflanking move south of the defensive line and after dark the five tanks knocked out on the 28th Battalion front were demolished, along with the others disabled along the XXX Corps front. Some tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry were moved forward slightly in the New Zealand area but the night was quiet except for British artillery harassing fire until
Aftermath.
Analysis.
In 1966, Ian Playfair, the British official historian, wrote that during the attack, the XXX Corps artillery fired about and that the had made a maximum effort, attacking DAF airfields and attempting close support of the 1st Italian Army, which failed against British anti-aircraft fire and the DAF, only tactical reconnaissance sorties having much success. In 1978, Matthew Cooper wrote that had the Axis attacked the previous week, it might have found the Eighth Army unprepared, having attacked at short notice to divert attention from the British First Army during . The rapid preparations made to receive the Axis attack, enabled the Eighth Army easily to defeat the offensive and Rommel wrote that the failure to delay the British attack on the Mareth Line, caused "a great gloom" and that for the Axis to remain in Africa was suicide.
Casualties.
In 1943, Montgomery made a diary note that the Eighth Army had lost and in 1957, G. F. Howe, the US official historian, recorded German losses of and and a minimum of tanks were lost. The Germans claimed tanks, cars, vehicles, and anti-aircraft guns and In 1966, Ian Playfair, the British official historian, called the Eighth Army losses "trifling" and recorded mostly German and tanks.
Subsequent operations.
At dawn on 7 March, some groups of Axis transport were seen moving to the north and quickly drew out of range as they were engaged by artillery. There were rearguard actions from as the Germans withdrew to the Mareth Line and Gabès but British attempts at pursuit were frustrated by the weather and the speed of the Axis withdrawal. On 10 March, some heights were still occupied and there was sporadic long-range artillery fire; Rommel left Africa the same day for the last time, leaving Arnim in command. The defeat had been so comprehensive that it caused the Germans to question their security and Montgomery was rebuked for not taking greater steps to hide the source of his information.
On 6 March, Montgomery wrote to General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (the professional head of the British Army):
Allied plans for the attack on the Mareth Line continued virtually undisturbed. On 17 March, the II US Corps began Operation Wop (sic), an attack towards Gafsa, the Eighth Army began the preliminary Operation Walk and Operation Canter and then began Operation Pugilist, the Battle of the Mareth Line on 19 March.