WASHINGTON — The United
States and the Soviet Union
Thursday signed an agreement
in principle to limit and possibl
reduce their stockpiles of of-
fensive nuclear weapons by the
end of 1974.

For the first time, the two
nations committed themselves
in principle to actual reductions
of their nuclear weaponry as
well as to permanent
limitations. Also significantly,
the United States evidently is
bowing to Soviet objections to
onsite inspections. Page 1.

WASHINGTON — In an at-
tack on “hard-core  por-
nography,” the Supreme Court
Thursday wrote stringent new
guidelines on the limits of
sexual candor in books and
movies. Page 1.
 
WASHINGTON (AP) — The
United States and the Soviet
Union Thursday signed an
agreement in principle to lim-
it and possibly reduce their
stockpiles of offensive nuclear
weapons by the end of 1974.

President Nixon and Soviet
Communist leader Leonid I.
Brezhnev raised their cham-
pagne glasses in toasts to suc-
cess at the ceremony in the
White House East Room.

The agreement, the out-
standing accomplishment of
their week-long summit was
forged by Nixon and Brézh-
nev earlier at Camp David,
the presidential retreat in the
mountains of Maryland. It is
designed to spur negotiators
for the two countries at the
recessed strategic arms limi-
tation talks (SALT) in Gen-
eva.

For the first time, the two
nations committed themselves
in principle to actual reduc-
 tions of their nuclear weapon-
ry as well as to permanent
limitations. Also significantly,
the United States evidently is
bowing to Soviet objections to
On-site inspections.

One of the seven stated
principles provides that ‘‘na-
tional technical means’ be
the system of verifying
whether Washington and Mos-
 cow were living up to a mis-
sile limitation.

Surveillance of multiple in-
dependently targeted  war-
heads MIRVS evidently would
be restricted mostly to obser-
vation by radar and spy sat-
ellite while in flight tests.

Henry A. Kissinger, the
President’s national security
adviser, briefing newsmen,
 said that “those MIRV agree-
ments that are not verifiable
by national technical means
would be difficult to recon-
cile”’ with the objective of re-
stricting complex nuclear of-
fensive weapons.

The two nations agreed in
another provision that efforts

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