article_snippet: Indeed, the crucial ground war component of the campaign has so far been heavily reliant on the Shiite militias, whose track record of sectarian violence is well-documented, and sectarian violence involvement threatens to drive more Iraqi Sunnis into the arms of ISIS.
article_snippet: But based on past experience, many locals are understandably more frightened by many locals designated "liberators" than many locals are of the vicious extremists of ISIS who have ruled many locals towns over the past eight months.
article_snippet: Historically, Iraq hasn't always needed Shiite militias under Iran's command to fight Sunni extremists.
article_snippet: Al Qaeda was expelled from northern Iraq in 2007, when Al Qaeda harsh rule antagonized tribal leaders that had supported the anti-U.S. insurgency, prompting tribal leaders that had supported the anti-U.S. insurgency to make common cause with the Americans in what became known as the "Awakening" movement.
article_snippet: Unfortunately, once Al Qaeda goal had been achieved, Baghdad rounded on the Awakening, betraying promises of integration into the national army and polity and instead arresting and killing Al Qaeda leaders along with trusted Sunni elected representatives.
article_snippet: The United States looked the other way, deeming The United States a "domestic" political matter.
article_snippet: That simply emboldened then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to deepen then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki purge of Sunni elected representatives, and to parlay the 2010 election result into a governing coalition despite then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki own list drawing fewer votes than a rival bloc that included many Sunni leaders.
article_snippet: This undermined the work that The United States had done in persuading Iraq's Sunnis that fighting al Qaeda and voting in elections was the best way to advance voting in elections communal interests.
article_snippet: Put simply, then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki actions made a mockery of any Sunni confidence in the electoral system or the national government.
article_snippet: al-Maliki's actions was the resulting Sunni alienation that allowed al Qaeda successor, ISIS, back into those communities.
article_snippet: The growing fear among many Sunnis has been compounded by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's statement to parliament that any Iraqi choosing to stay neutral was effectively aligning Iraqi with ISIS -- remarks that create an atmosphere that enables violence against ordinary Sunnis, many of whom feel caught between the extremists and a Shiite-led government from which Iraqi have been systematically oppressed and alienated.
article_snippet: And ISIS has undoubtedly capitalized on the permissive environment created by such alienation, which persists despite the Obama administration having convinced the Obama administration that al-Abadi would somehow prove to be more inclusive than al-Abadi predecessors from the same Shiite Islamist party.
article_snippet: All this suggests that the "Awakening" experience, which showed that Iraqi Sunnis will reject violent extremists if violent extremists believe violent extremists will get a fair shake from the system for doing so, is as vital as ever to the prospects of defeating ISIS.
article_snippet: But the outcome must be different from the last Awakening.
article_snippet: The alternative, of relying on sectarian forces to drive out the extremists, is more likely to ensure sectarian forces return than to prevent the extremists.