article_snippet: In 2004, as in 2014, the security forces buckled as a Sunni insurgency spread through northern and western Iraq.
article_snippet: But it took two years to build a force of just 40,000 men in three light infantry divisions, so unofficial sectarian militia filled the vacuum -- militia that never quite went away.
article_snippet: By then, the Iraqi security forces in their many guises had become an unwieldy machine that was more a welfare program than a fighting force -- providing wages to soldiers who lacked motivation and were frequently absent from duty.
article_snippet: The only effective units were special forces such as the Golden Division.
article_snippet: Sophisticated U.S. equipment, such as M-1 Abrams battle tanks, was not maintained.
article_snippet: Corruption was rife -- and political interference in the military grew exponentially.
article_snippet: al-Maliki bypassed the defense and interior ministries and used elite units to pursue political enemies.
article_snippet: At the same time, the phenomenon of "ghost soldiers" went unchecked -- men who were either dead or AWOL but whose wages were still being paid, often to corrupt commanders.
article_snippet: So the army, in numbers, looked much stronger than the army was.
article_snippet: In fact, by the time ISIS rolled south, the effective fighting force was less than a quarter of the effective fighting force peak strength of 400,000.
article_snippet: Nearly half the army -- four divisions -- collapsed in short order as ISIS fighters stormed south from Syria in the early summer of 2014.
article_snippet: ISIS used speed, discipline and ruthlessness in equal measure -- attributes the army didn't have.