T he Constitution gives no direct role to Congress in conducting federal law enforcement. While Congress enjoys the legislative power under Article I of the Constitution, which includes substantial authority to investigate the executive branch pursuant to its oversight function, criminal investigations and prosecutions are generally considered core executive functions entrusted with the executive branch un der Article II. Because of the potential conflicts of interest that may arise when the executive branch investigates itself, however, there have often been calls for prosecutors with independence from the executive branch. In response, Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have used both statutory and regulatory mechanisms to establish a process for such inquiries. These responses have attempted, in different ways, to balance the competing goals of independence and accountability with respect to inquiries of executive branch officials. This report first analyzes the use of special prosecutors and independent counsels that were authorized under now-expired provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as well as the use of special counsels that are currently authorized by DOJ regulations. A glossary of terms at the beginning of the report briefly defines these italicized terms (see Table 1 ). The report continues with an examination of various legal questions relevant to these efforts. As a threshold matter, some have challenged the appointment of a special counsel under the current regulations as unconstitutional under the Appointments Clause. More broadly, designing a statutory framework for criminal investigations and prosecutions with independence from the executive branch raises questions about how this can be achieved consistent with the requirements of the Constitution. For instance, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the since-expired independent counsel statute in the 1988 case of Morrison v. Olson , but has not applied the reasoning of Morrison in subsequent cases raising related issues. The constitutional status of a statutory framework analogous to the independent counsel statute is thus subject to debate. Several bills introduced in the 116 th Congress (including S. 71 and H.R. 197 , which merge aspects of two preceding bills introduced in the 115 th Congress, S. 1735 and S. 1741 ) statutorily insulate a special counsel from removal, echoing aspects of the independent counsel statute's provisions. Whether such proposals would withstand constitutional challenge today might ultimately turn on the continued vitality of the analysis applied in Morrison . In part to counter perceptions that executive officials suspected of criminal wrongdoing may be subject to different standards than individuals outside the government, independent investigations have sometimes been used to determine whether officials have violated the law. The government has used a range of options to conduct these types of inquiries: special prosecutors, independent counsels, and special counsels. Executive branch officials have noted, however, that "there is no perfect solution" to achieving the goal of avoiding potential conflicts or the appearance thereof that may arise as a result of the executive branch investigating its own officials. While special prosecutors investigated executive officials prior to the 1970s, the events commonly known as Watergate led to perhaps the most famous use of an independent investigation in U.S. history. Specifically, the break-in and burglary of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel in 1972 led to widespread allegations of wrongdoing by senior officials in the executive branch and calls for the appointment of a prosecutor who could conduct an investigation independent of political interference. In the midst of the Watergate controversy, Elliot Richardson, whose nomination to be Attorney General was being considered by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, agreed to name an independent special prosecutor to pursue the Watergate allegations. Once confirmed by the Senate, the Attorney General, under his own authority, appointed Archibald Cox as special prosecutor for the Watergate investigation in 1973. The President subsequently ordered DOJ officials to fire the special prosecutor later that year, leading to public outcry, the appointment of another special prosecutor, and, ultimately, the initiation of impeachment proceedings by Congress. Following these events, Congress enacted a new mechanism—discussed in the following section—for the use of special prosecutors who would be appointed by a three-judge panel upon the request of the Attorney General. Congress enacted the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 out of a broad intent "to preserve and promote the integrity of public officials and institutions." The statute addressed a number of concerns about the ethical behavior of some public officials in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Title VI of the statute (hereinafter "the independent counsel statute") established a mechanism for the appointment of individuals to lead independent investigations and prosecutions in certain circumstances. The statute originally designated these individuals as "special prosecutors" and later renamed them as "independent counsels." Two of the most commonly known examples of appointments of independent counsels under the statute involved incidents known generally as Iran-Contra and Whitewater. In 1986, Lawrence E. Walsh was appointed as independent counsel to investigate potential criminal misconduct of government officials related to the sale of arms to Iran and alleged diversion of profits from the sale to support the "the military activities of the Nicaraguan contra rebels" in violation of federal law. That investigation resulted in criminal charges for 14 individuals, most of whom were convicted, though some convictions were overturned on various grounds. In 1994, Kenneth Starr was appointed as independent counsel to investigate potential violations of federal criminal or civil law related to President Clinton or First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton's relationship with Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association, Whitewater Development Corporation, or Capital Management Services, as well as any allegations arising out of that investigation. That investigation led to a myriad of charges for a number of individuals, but did not include indictments of the President or First Lady. Appointment of independent counsels under the statute occurred in two steps, requiring the involvement of both the Attorney General and a panel of federal judges. The independent counsel statute generally directed the Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receiving information about potential wrongdoing by certain officials in the executive branch or from presidential campaign committees. If, within 30 days of receiving such information, the Attorney General determined that the information was specific and from a credible source, the Attorney General was required to conduct a preliminary investigation for a period of up to 90 days. The statute did not require the Attorney General to acknowledge or notify any other parties that such information had come to his attention, but did require that the Attorney General inform the court that he had commenced a preliminary investigation. The conclusions reached in that initial investigation determined whether an independent counsel would be appointed to investigate the underlying allegations further. The statute required that the Attorney General request appointment of a special prosecutor by the special division of a federal court (discussed below) under three sets of circumstances. First, if the 90-day window for the preliminary investigation passed without a determination that further investigation or prosecution was not warranted, the Attorney General was required to request the appointment by the court. Second, if the Attorney General's initial investigation determined that further investigation or prosecution was warranted, the Attorney General was also required to request the appointment by the court. Finally, if the preliminary investigation indicated that further action was not warranted, but additional information was subsequently revealed which led the Attorney General to determine that further investigation or prosecution was indeed warranted, the Attorney General was mandated to conduct a preliminary investigation based on that information. Following that investigation, the statute required the Attorney General to seek appointment of an independent counsel under the same circumstances— i.e. , if no determination had been made within 90 days or if the Attorney General determined further investigation was warranted. The Attorney General's decision to request an appointment under the statute was not subject to judicial review. While the Attorney General was not authorized under the statute to appoint the independent counsel, he was required to provide the court with "sufficient information to assist" the court in the selection of the appointed individual and to define the jurisdiction of the inquiry. While the Attorney General conducted the initial investigation to determine whether an independent investigation was warranted, the independent counsel statute required that a special division of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (D.C. Circuit), composed of three federal judges or Justices, appoint the independent counsel. The Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court assigned three federal judges or Justices to that division for two-year assignments. The statute's provisions regarding assignment of the three-judge panel required that the panel include a judge from the D.C. Circuit and that not more than one judge or Justice be from any single court. Any judge or Justice serving in the special division of the court that appointed the independent counsel was barred from participating in any judicial proceeding involving the independent counsel while he or she was still serving in that position or any proceeding involving the exercise of the independent counsel's official duties. Based on recommendations from the Attorney General regarding the selection and jurisdiction of the independent counsel, the three-judge panel had the final authority to make the appointment and define the prosecutorial jurisdiction. The court was expressly barred from appointing "any person who holds or recently held any office of profit or trust under the United States." "[W]ith respect to all matters in [the] independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction," Congress granted the independent counsel "full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice . . . ." Examples of the independent counsel's enumerated authorities included conducting investigations and grand jury proceedings; engaging in judicial proceedings, including litigation and appeals of court decisions; reviewing documentary evidence; determining whether to challenge the use of testimonial privileges; receiving national security clearances, if appropriate; seeking immunity for witnesses, warrants, subpoenas, and other court orders; obtaining and reviewing any tax return; and carrying out prosecutions in court, including filing indictments. The independent counsel could request DOJ assistance in the course of his or her investigation, including access to materials relevant to the jurisdiction of the inquiry and the necessary resources and personnel to perform his or her assigned duties. Other than impeachment, the independent counsel could be subject to removal "only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for good cause, physical or mental disability . . ., or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties." In other words, the independent counsel was generally not subject to the control and oversight of any other official within the executive branch. If the Attorney General exercised his removal authority, he or she was required to notify the special division of the court responsible for the initial appointment and the Committees on the Judiciary of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, identifying the reasons for removal. The inquiry led by the independent counsel under the statute could be terminated under two methods. First, the statute directed that the office of the independent counsel would terminate upon notification by the independent counsel to the Attorney General that the investigation and any subsequent prosecutions had been completed. Second, the statute permitted the special division of the court—by its own choice or by the recommendation of the Attorney General—to terminate the office at any time if the investigation had been completed or sufficiently completed, allowing DOJ to formally complete the inquiry under its own processes. In either case, the independent counsel was required to submit a report to the special division of the court detailing the work completed. The report was required to include "a description of the work of the independent counsel, including the disposition of all cases brought." When the independent counsel statute was originally enacted in 1978, Congress provided that its authority would lapse five years after enactment. Investigations that had already started pursuant to the provisions were permitted to continue, but no new investigations could be initiated at that time. Rather than allow the statute to lapse, Congress reauthorized the law, with some amendments, several times. It was reauthorized in 1983 and 1987, and remained in effect until 1992, when Congress allowed the law to expire. The statute was again reauthorized in 1994, following concerns related to the investigation of the Whitewater controversy during the interim years. However, concerns over whether the independent counsel possessed too much power, which arose after the extensive independent counsel investigations of the Iran-Contra affair and the Whitewater controversy, resulted in the law's ultimate expiration and nonrenewal in 1999. Following the expiration of the independent counsel statute, DOJ promulgated regulations in 1999, which are currently still in effect, to establish procedures for the appointment of special counsels pursuant to the Attorney General's general administrative hiring authority. DOJ described these regulations as "strik[ing] a balance between independence and accountability in certain sensitive investigations." DOJ acknowledged at the time the regulations were promulgated, however, that "there is no perfect solution" to achieving that goal. Thus far, it appears the special counsel regulations have been invoked infrequently. In 1999, shortly after the regulations were promulgated, the Attorney General appointed former U.S. Senator John Danforth as special counsel to investigate events related to the government actions that occurred six years earlier at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. The special counsel's investigation found no wrongdoing on the part of federal law enforcement officials. In May 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein—acting in place of Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who had recused himself from the investigation—issued a publicly-available order (public order) appointing former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert S. Mueller III as special counsel. Rosenstein indicated in the public order that the appointment had been made pursuant to general statutory authority to manage DOJ investigations, but directed that the investigation would be subject to the agency's regulations governing the scope and administration of special counsel investigations. Specifically, the public order directed the special counsel to investigate efforts of the Russian government "to influence the 2016 election and related matters." DOJ later issued a non-public memorandum that set forth in more detail the scope of the investigation and definition of the special counsel's authority. That memorandum explained that the public order "was worded categorically in order to permit its public release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals." It should be noted that the Attorney General also possesses general statutory authority to appoint DOJ staff to conduct or coordinate particular investigations. DOJ has used this authority previously to appoint individuals who were referred to as "special counsels" to investigate particular matters. This authority differs from the special counsel regulations because it involves assignment of an internal agency official rather than an individual from outside the government. For example, in 2003, then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey (acting in place of then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, who had recused himself from the investigation) used this statutory authority to appoint Patrick Fitzgerald to lead an investigation of whether White House or other federal officials unlawfully leaked the identity of a Central Intelligence Agency officer to a reporter. While referred to as a special counsel, Fitzgerald was serving as a U.S. Attorney when named to lead the investigation, precluding an appointment under the special counsel regulations. While an individual referred to as a "special counsel" thus may be appointed under either the general statutory authority or under the specific special counsel regulations, those named under the regulations might be viewed as possessing more independence, as they are appointed from outside the agency and are insulated by the regulations from removal except for cause. DOJ may also task other arms of the Justice Department—such as the Office of the Inspector General—to investigate high-profile, sensitive, and resource-intensive matters regarding "the Department's compliance with certain legal requirements and [internal] policies and procedures." For example, recently, in response to concerns raised by some Members of Congress with respect to "certain prosecutorial and investigative determinations made by the [Department of Justice] in 2016 and 2017," Attorney General Sessions considered, but declined to pursue, a separate special counsel inquiry related to allegations of potential misconduct within the Department, noting that special counsel appointments are "by design, . . . reserved for use in only the most 'extraordinary circumstances.'" Such circumstances, according to Sessions, require the Attorney General to determine that "'the public interest would be served by removing a large degree of responsibility for the matter from the Department of Justice.'" Instead, the Attorney General indicated that DOJ's Inspector General has been tasked with reviewing the actions that the Members had suggested be the subject of the second special counsel inquiry, including allegations about DOJ's compliance with legal requirements and internal policies. Instead, the Attorney General announced that he had tasked John W. Huber, U.S. Attorney for the District of Utah, to lead the investigation into those allegations, emphasizing that Huber would be working "from outside the Washington, D.C. area and in cooperation with the Inspector General." Under the DOJ regulations that supplanted the independent counsel provisions, the authority to appoint and select a special counsel resides solely with the Attorney General (or his surrogate, if the Attorney General has recused himself from the matter), rather than with the judicial branch. The regulations generally state that the Attorney General "will appoint a Special Counsel" to conduct certain investigations or prosecutions. To make such an appointment, the Attorney General must determine that (1) a criminal investigation is warranted; (2) the normal processes of investigation or prosecution would present a conflict of interest for DOJ, or other extraordinary circumstances exist; and (3) public interest requires a special counsel to assume those responsibilities. When DOJ promulgated the special counsel regulations, it explained the type of conflicts that might lead to the appointment of a special counsel: "[t]here are occasions when the facts create a conflict so substantial or the exigencies of the situation are such that any initial investigation might taint the subsequent investigation, so that it is appropriate for the Attorney General to immediately appoint a Special Counsel." After receiving information that could warrant consideration of an independent investigation, the Attorney General generally has discretion under the regulations to determine whether and when the appointment of a special counsel would be appropriate. The Attorney General may appoint a special counsel immediately; may require an initial investigation to inform his decision about whether to appoint a special counsel; or "may direct that appropriate steps be taken to mitigate any conflicts of interest, such as recusal of particular officials," to permit the investigation to be concluded within "the normal processes." In the event that the Attorney General has recused himself from a particular matter upon which a special counsel appointment might be appropriate, the regulations contemplate that the Acting Attorney General will take responsibility for the appointment process. Federal law provides that the Deputy Attorney General would serve as the Acting Attorney General. Individuals appointed as special counsels under these regulations must be chosen from outside the federal government. Such individuals must be "a lawyer with a reputation for integrity and impartial decisionmaking, and with appropriate experience to ensure both that the investigation will be conducted ably, expeditiously and thoroughly, and that investigative and prosecutorial decisions will be supported by an informed understanding of the criminal law and Department of Justice policies." The special counsel may hold other professional roles during his or her service, but is required to agree that the duties of the appointment will take "first precedence." Like the appointment and selection process, the sole authority to determine the scope of the special counsel's inquiry rests with the Attorney General. The jurisdiction of the inquiry is determined by "a specific factual statement" about the matter to be investigated, which is provided by the Attorney General to the special counsel at the outset of the appointment. Beyond that general jurisdiction, the special counsel is also authorized "to investigate and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses." While these are the original parameters of a special counsel's jurisdiction, additional matters may be assigned to the special counsel as the inquiry proceeds. To expand the jurisdiction, the special counsel must find such an expansion is necessary to complete the original assignment or necessary "to investigate new matters that come to light in the course of his or her investigation." Upon such finding, the special counsel's jurisdiction may be expanded only after consultation with the Attorney General, who then has the authority to determine whether to assign the additional matters to the special counsel or "elsewhere." Within the jurisdiction identified by the Attorney General, the special counsel has relatively broad authority to carry out his or her inquiry. According to the regulations, "the Special Counsel shall exercise, within the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney." The scope of the special counsel's authority under DOJ regulations has been the subject of legal challenge in the course of Special Counsel Robert Mueller III's investigation that began in 2017. That inquiry resulted in several indictments, including against Paul Manafort, the former chairman of President Trump's 2016 campaign, for crimes such as conspiracy to launder money; tax fraud; obstruction of justice and witness tampering; failure to register as an agent of a foreign principal; false statements; and failure to file reports of foreign bank and financial accounts. Manafort filed a motion to dismiss the criminal indictment lodged against him, challenging the indictment as an unlawful exercise of the special counsel's authority. Specifically Manafort argued that the factual matter named as the special counsel's original jurisdiction in the May 2017 public appointment order (i.e., "any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump," as well as "any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation, and any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a)" ) would preclude the charges made against him. According to Manafort, because the charges made against him do not relate to links with the Russian government or actions taken during his time as a campaign manager in 2016 and because the public order's general authority does not grant authority on sufficiently specific matters as required by DOJ regulations, the special counsel cannot pursue the charges filed against him without seeking additional authority under the regulations. The government's response to these claims disclosed and explained additional documents outlining the scope of the investigation. DOJ acknowledged that the applicable regulations require the special counsel to be provided a "'specific factual statement of the matter to be investigated,'" but emphasized that "the regulations do not provide that the factual statement must be in an appointment order or otherwise made public." According to a subsequent memorandum from Acting Attorney General Rosenstein that was partially released with the government's filing, while the initial order "was worded categorically in order to permit its public release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals," a subsequent memorandum provided "a more specific description" of allegations deemed to be authorized as part of the special counsel investigation. Such development of the parameters of jurisdiction during the course of an investigation, according to DOJ, are necessary for "an effective investigation [which] must have some latitude to extend beyond the known facts at the time of [the appointment]." Ultimately, the courts that considered Manafort's motion to dismiss his indictments rejected his challenge to the special counsel's authority. For example, a federal district court in Virginia considering Manafort's motion concluded that while many of the charges pursued against Manafort "on their face, appear unrelated to the 2016 Presidential election," the investigation and issues charged in the particular case fell "squarely within the jurisdiction outlined" under the appointment order. The court emphasized that the appointment order's broad grant of authority to investigate "any links" between campaign officials and the Russian government permitted investigation into relationships with individuals supported by, even if not members of, the Russian government, such as members of a pro-Russia Ukrainian political party. Moreover, with respect to charges filed by the special counsel that did not pertain directly to the campaign and Russia, a D.C. federal court held such charges, such as tax evasion with regard to proceeds resulting from Manafort's relationship with pro-Russian entities, fell within the special counsel's jurisdiction as "'matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation.'" A federal district court in Virginia further relied upon the later DOJ memorandum that clarified the scope of the special counsel's original appointment as a source of the special counsel's authority, explaining that the original appointment order was worded categorically so that it could be publicly released and noting that the clarifying memorandum specifically authorized the special counsel to investigate crimes related to these other charges. Accordingly, the D.C. federal court rejected Manafort's argument that the special counsel's authority amounted to a "'blank check'" for limitless investigation, reading the appointment order's language as "tightly drafted" to give "the Special Counsel flexibility from the start to manage the investigation and pursue matters that arose 'directly' from the issues within his purview." The DOJ special counsel regulations limit the special counsel's relatively broad authority to conduct an inquiry by first subjecting his or her conduct to DOJ rules, regulations, procedures, practices, and policies. Special counsels are directed to consult with the appropriate offices within DOJ or the Attorney General directly if necessary. Additionally, special counsels are subject to discipline for misconduct and breach of ethical duties that are generally applicable to DOJ employees. Second, the DOJ regulations contemplate some oversight of the special counsel by the Attorney General. Specifically, they direct the special counsel to "determine whether and to what extent to inform or consult with the Attorney General or others within the Department about the conduct of his or her duties and responsibilities." The regulations expressly require the special counsel to "notify the Attorney General of events in the course of his or her investigation in conformity with the Departmental guidelines with respect to Urgent Reports." Under DOJ internal guidance, attorneys must inform DOJ leadership of certain events, including "major developments in significant investigations and litigation" such as the filing of criminal charges. DOJ has explained that conformance with this notification requirement "guarantees a 'resulting opportunity for consultation' between the Attorney General and the Special Counsel about the anticipated action, which 'is a critical part of the mechanism through which the Attorney General can discharge his or her responsibilities with respect to the investigation.'" While the regulations indicate that special counsels "shall not be subject to the day-to-day supervision of any official," the rules authorize the Attorney General to "request that the Special Counsel provide an explanation for any investigative or prosecutorial step." If, after giving the views of the special counsel "great weight," the Attorney General's review of such actions leads him to "conclude that the action is so inappropriate or unwarranted under established Departmental practices that it should not be pursued," the Attorney General must notify the Chairman and Ranking Members of the Judiciary Committees in Congress of that decision with an explanation. Aside from review of particular actions, the regulations also grant the Attorney General authority to discipline or remove the special counsel. This authority may be exercised "only by the personal action of the Attorney General." In other words, to comply with the regulations, the Attorney General himself must remove the special counsel, not the President or a surrogate (unless, as noted previously in this report, the Attorney General has recused himself in the matter under investigation). A decision to remove the special counsel must be made with "good cause," such as misconduct, a dereliction of duty, incapacity, the existence of conflicts of interest, or violation of departmental policies. The Attorney General must report his decision to remove the special counsel, with an explanation of that decision, to both the Chairman and Ranking Members of the Judiciary Committees of Congress. Although the special counsel regulations do not provide an explicit timeline for inquiries or a special counsel's tenure, they do require the special counsel to report to DOJ periodically about the budget of operations for the inquiry as well as with status updates in some circumstances. Specifically, the special counsel must provide a proposed budget within 60 days of the appointment. The special counsel must also provide annual reports regarding the status of the investigation and budget requests 90 days prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. The Attorney General is required to review the special counsel's annual report and determine whether the investigation should continue and with what budget. When the special counsel's inquiry concludes, the special counsel must provide a confidential report to the Attorney General with explanations of the decisions made in the course of the inquiry in favor of or declining to prosecute any charges. The regulations do not expressly provide for disclosure of this report to any other parties, nor do they further identify the parameters of the content of that report. The regulations do, however, require the Attorney General to make certain reports to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Judiciary Committees of each house of Congress, including upon the conclusion of the investigation. The regulations' only guidance regarding the Attorney General's concluding report's content is that the report must include "an explanation for [the] action," "including, to the extent consistent with applicable law, a description and explanation of instances (if any) in which the Attorney General concluded that a proposed action by a Special Counsel was so inappropriate or unwarranted under established Departmental practices that it should not be pursued." The regulation's use of the word "including," which generally denotes that the terms that follow are illustrative and not definitional, may suggest that the Attorney General's report to Congress is not necessarily limited to explanations of the Special Counsel's prosecutorial decisions. None of the reporting requirements mandate public release of any information shared either between DOJ officials or between DOJ and congressional committees. Instead, the regulations provide the Attorney General with the discretion to "determine that public release of [his reports to Congress] would be in the public interest." Moreover, the report's contents need to be "consistent with applicable law," which may suggest that legal doctrines such as executive privilege and the rules governing the release of grand jury information could restrict what can be included in the report. Designing a mechanism to provide for criminal inquiries of executive branch officials by officers independent from the executive branch has raised questions about whether this goal can be accomplished in harmony with the requirements of the Constitution. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution assigns each branch of government particular functions that generally may not be delegated to, nor usurped by, another branch. In this vein, Congress is entrusted with the legislative power, and may establish executive branch agencies and conduct oversight of those entities. Congress may not, however, engage in criminal prosecutions on behalf of the United States—a function generally reserved for the executive branch. A crucial bulwark in preserving this separation of powers is the Appointments Clause of Article II. That provision requires "Officers of the United States" to be appointed by the President "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," although Congress may vest the appointment of "inferior" officers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Crucially, Article II also empowers the President to hold executive branch officers accountable, through removal if necessary, which the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States explained was essential in order to "maintain administrative control of those executing the laws." The Court has, however, recognized that Congress may in certain situations restrict the President's power of removal over certain discrete offices. The powers of appointment and removal are key to understanding Congress's authority to create independent investigative offices and define their contours. While introduced legislation aimed to insulate a special counsel from executive control raises questions (addressed below) about the President's ability to oversee the executive branch, some have questioned whether the appointment of a special counsel under the current regulations violates the Constitution. Such challenges have been unsuccessful, however, as exemplified by the D.C. Circuit's recent ruling in In re: Grand Jury Investigation . In that case, the recipient of multiple grand jury subpoenas issued by Special Counsel Robert Mueller moved to quash those subpoenas on the grounds that the appointment of the special counsel was unlawful under the Appointments Clause. The D.C. Circuit's panel decision held that the Appointments Clause did not require Special Counsel to be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate because the special counsel is not a principal officer. Applying the Supreme Court's test in Edmond v. United States , the D.C. Circuit ruled that, because he is subject to the control of a superior who was nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate (i.e., a principal officer), the special counsel is an inferior officer who may be appointed by a department head. While acknowledging that the special counsel regulations bestowed a measure of independence on the special counsel, the court reasoned that because the Attorney General could rescind these regulations at any time, the special counsel is an inferior officer who "effectively serves at the pleasure" of a principal officer. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that Congress had not "by law" granted the Attorney General the authority to appoint a special counsel as required by the Appointments Clause. In so doing, the panel relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Nixon , in which the Court concluded that, because Congress had by statute vested general authority in the Attorney General to appoint subordinate officers, the Attorney General's delegation of power to a special prosecutor was valid. Finally, the D.C. Circuit panel concluded that a department head properly appointed Special Counsel Mueller in accordance with the Appointments Clause, notwithstanding his appointment by Rod Rosenstein, the Deputy and Acting Attorney General. The panel observed that the relevant statutory scheme provided that, in the case of a "disability" of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General "may exercise all the duties of that office." The D.C. Circuit reasoned that when Attorney General Sessions recused himself from matters concerning presidential campaigns, he had a "disability" under the statute on that issue. Accordingly, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein became the acting Attorney General—and was therefore the head of the Department of Justice—on such matters. Acting Attorney General Rosenstein's appointment of Special Counsel Mueller, therefore, was an appointment by the head of a department. While the legal questions surrounding the appointment of a special counsel under the regulations have largely been resolved, the circumstances in which a special counsel may be removed by a superior have not been settled by the courts. Consideration of the authority to remove a special counsel under current regulations poses several legal questions. As discussed above, Department of Justice regulations provide that a special counsel may be removed only (1) by the Attorney General; (2) "for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Departmental policies"; and (3) in writing provided to the special counsel specifying the reason(s) for removal. As a preliminary matter, the specific type of behavior that would constitute grounds for removal under the regulations is largely undetermined. For instance, terms such as "misconduct" and "good cause" are not defined in the regulations or by reference to an accompanying statute, and case law addressing the definition of similar statutory removal restrictions is sparse. More broadly, the manner in which a special counsel might be removed without new legislation itself poses difficult legal issues, including the ultimate efficacy of the regulations in constraining the discretion of the executive branch. The Attorney General (or his surrogate if recused) may, consistent with the governing regulations, remove a special counsel "for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Departmental policies." Conceivably, the Attorney General's decision could be the result of an order from the President, as the Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the President and, as the Court has recognized, the President's power to appoint executive branch officials is tied to the power of removal. A decision to remove a special counsel under current regulations could be difficult to challenge in court. Importantly, the current regulations explicitly disclaim the creation of any legal rights. Even without that disclaimer, internal agency rules and guidelines, including those of the Justice Department, have generally not been recognized as creating judicially enforceable rights. Instead, an individual seeking judicial relief against the United States in federal court must usually rely on a cause of action that asserts violation of a recognized legal right or requirement. Consequently, at least under current DOJ regulations, obtaining judicial review of a special counsel's removal by a federal court may be difficult. More broadly, it is uncertain to what extent the regulations ultimately constrain the executive branch. Because no statute appears to require the Department to promulgate regulations concerning a special counsel, the Department likely enjoys discretion to rescind them. The special counsel regulations also were not promulgated according to the notice and comment procedures that are typically required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when agencies issue legislative rules. Instead, the Department considered the regulations to be exempt from these requirements, as they concerned agency management or personnel. The Department could thus likely rescind the special counsel regulations without going through notice and comment procedures, meaning that the regulations could likely be repealed immediately. Once repealed, a special counsel would no longer be protected by a for-cause removal provision. While DOJ has noted its adherence to the current special counsel regulations, assuming for the sake of argument a situation where the regulations were left in place, a decision by the Attorney General or President to simply ignore the regulations raises unresolved legal questions. Generally, regulations in force typically bind the executive branch with the force of law. In fact, in Nixon v. United States , which concerned a claim of executive privilege by President Nixon against a subpoena issued by a special prosecutor, the Court opined on the regulation in force that insulated the special prosecutor from removal. The Court remarked in dicta that So long as this regulation is extant it has the force of law. . . . [I]t is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's authority. But he has not done so. So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce it. In other words, insofar as this reading continues to characterize the Court's approach to the matter, both the President and Attorney General must comply with the special counsel regulations until they are repealed. However, the concrete result of an order removing a special counsel in violation of applicable regulations is difficult to predict. For instance, there might not be a private right of action authorizing judicial review in this situation, leaving the legal remedy available for violation of the regulations in question. On the other hand, the matter raises open legal issues regarding the scope of the President's authority to supervise the executive branch. It is unclear to what extent agency regulations restricting the grounds for removal of a constitutional officer engaged in core executive functions can bind the President. One might argue that the special counsel regulations, while binding on the Department of Justice, do not ultimately restrict the President's powers. Article II vests the executive power of the United States in the President; and criminal investigations and prosecutions lie at the very core of this constitutional authority. An argument in favor of a more robust view of the President's authority might be that regulations issued by an executive branch agency nearly 20 years ago that restrict the President's power to remove a high-level officer of the United States who is charged with enforcing the law intrude on the President's authority under Article II. DOJ has in the past asserted authority to decline to follow statutes it deems unconstitutional intrusions on the executive branch's power, and this argument might be extended to the context of similarly viewed regulations, particularly those issued by a prior Administration. Given the questions regarding the scope and effect of the current DOJ special counsel regulations, a number of legislative proposals aim to impose statutory restrictions on the executive branch's ability to remove a special counsel. Consideration of these proposals requires examination of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding statutory restriction on the removal of certain officers. However, because Congress has not enacted any such bill, analysis of these efforts is necessarily preliminary. As discussed above, current Department of Justice regulations authorize the Attorney General to appoint a special counsel and determine the ultimate scope of his jurisdiction, but limit the Attorney General's discretion to remove a special counsel to certain specified reasons. A number of bills proposed during the 116 th and 115 th Congresses aim to codify aspects of these regulations. Notably, some would statutorily insulate a special counsel from removal and authorize a federal court to review the removal of a special counsel. For instance, S. 1735 , introduced in the 115 th Congress, would have provided that in order to remove a special counsel, the Attorney General must first file an action with a three-judge court; if that panel issues a finding of "misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or other good cause, including violation of policies of the Department of Justice," then a special counsel may be removed. Similarly, S. 1741 , the Special Counsel Integrity Act, would have provided that any special counsel appointed on or after May 17, 2017, may only be removed by the Attorney General, or the highest ranking Justice Department official if the Attorney General is recused, for good cause. S. 1741 further provided that a special counsel who has been removed may challenge this action before a three-judge panel, which is authorized to immediately reinstate the individual if the court finds that the removal violated the legislation's terms. Both bills were introduced in the 115 th Congress. Finally, S. 71 and H.R. 197 , introduced in the 116 th Congress, merge aspects of both of these proposals. They would similarly require good cause in order for the Attorney General to remove a special counsel, but provide a 10-day window in which the special counsel can challenge a removal decision in federal court. If the court determines that the removal violates that good cause standard, then the removal shall not take effect. Understanding these proposals requires an examination of the significant—and oft-debated—constitutional questions concerning Congress's power to establish executive functions outside the direct control of the President. Article II of the Constitution vests the executive power of the United States in the President. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has made clear that this power includes authority to hold executive branch officers accountable, through removal if necessary. However, the Court has upheld statutory restrictions on the President's removal power for certain offices. In one such case, Morrison v. Olson , the Court upheld restrictions on the removal of an independent counsel, although, as discussed below, the Court has not always followed aspects of that decision in subsequent years. The constitutionality of legislative efforts to statutorily insulate a special counsel from removal will thus likely turn on the continuing vitality of the Court's opinion in Morrison and, more generally, whether a court would apply a more formalist or functionalist methodology in considering such legislation. Definitive conclusions about such efforts are thus difficult absent further guidance from the Court. In the 1988 case of Morrison v. Olson , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a federal prosecutor can be insulated from executive control in the context of the now-expired Independent Counsel Act. Morrison upheld the independent counsel statute, which, as discussed above, vested the appointment of an independent counsel outside of the executive branch and limited the removal authority of the President. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the independent counsel was an inferior, rather than a principal, officer, whose appointment was not required to be made by the President subject to Senate confirmation. The appointment of such officers was permissible because they (1) were removable by the Attorney General for cause; (2) had a limited scope of duties; and (3) possessed limited jurisdiction. The Court also held that the Independent Counsel Act's provision limiting the authority of the Attorney General to remove the independent counsel for good cause did not impermissibly intrude on the President's power under Article II. The Court rejected a formalistic rule that would bar statutory for-cause removal protections for an individual tasked with "purely executive" functions; instead, it applied a functional test and asked whether Congress has "interfere[d] with the President's" executive power and his "duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'" The Court recognized that the independent counsel operated with a measure of independence from the President, but concluded that the statute gave "the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties." Morrison was decided 7-1, with Justice Scalia dissenting from the Court's opinion and Justice Kennedy not participating in the case. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the independent counsel statute violated the separation of powers because the Constitution vested authority for criminal investigations and prosecutions exclusively in the executive branch and the statute deprived the President of exclusive control of that power. Under this rationale, he warned that the Court must be very careful to guard against the "'gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department'" that can be likely to occur as one branch seeks to infringe upon another's distinct constitutional authorities. Justice Scalia emphasized the power and discretion typically vested in prosecutors and noted that the key check on prosecutorial abuse is political—prosecutors are accountable to, and can be removed by, the President, who is likewise accountable to the people. But operation of the independent counsel statute, for Justice Scalia, eliminated that constitutional feature by creating an unaccountable prosecutor outside of presidential control. In the years since Morrison , especially in the wake of the Whitewater investigation into President Clinton by an independent counsel that culminated in the President's impeachment on grounds that were tangential to the impetus for the investigation, a number of legal scholars criticized the independent counsel statute on both policy and constitutional grounds. Additionally, members of both political parties have since noted opposition to the law, resulting in relatively widespread agreement to let the Independent Counsel Act expire in 1999. The Supreme Court in the 1997 case of Edmond v. United States applied a different standard than that enunciated in Morrison in the context of a challenge to the appointment of certain "inferior" officers. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, adopted the reasoning he applied in dissent in Morrison for determining whether an individual is an inferior officer. In that case, the Court did not apply the functional test used in Morrison for determining whether an individual was an inferior officer. Instead, it adopted a formal rule—an inferior officer is one who is "directed and supervised" by a principal officer (officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate). Applying this rule, the Court concluded that the appointment of members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals by the Secretary of Transportation was consistent with Article II. Specifically, the Court reasoned that because Members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals are removable at will and lack power to render a final decision of the United States unless permitted to do so by a superior in the executive branch they are directed and supervised by principal officers. The appointment of the members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals by the Secretary of Transportation was thus constitutional because the members constituted inferior officers and the Secretary was a principal officer. More recently, in the 2010 case of Free Enterprise Fund v. P ublic Company Accounting Oversight Board , the Court invalidated statutory structural provisions providing that members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board could be removed only "for cause" by the Securities and Exchange Commission, whose members, in turn, appeared to also be protected from removal by for-cause removal protections. The Court again applied a rather formalist rule in analyzing Congress's attempt to shield executive branch officers from removal, rather than the functional approach followed in Morrison . The Court concluded that, while the early 20 th century case of Humphrey ' s Executor v. United States had approved such protections for the heads of independent agencies and Morrison did the same for certain inferior officers, the combination of dual "for cause" removal protections flatly contradicted the vestment of executive power in the President under Article II. Further, the Court then applied the test it used in Edmund , rather than the functional analysis of Morrison , in concluding that members of the regulatory board were now—after invalidation of statutory removal protections by the Court—inferior officers because the Securities and Exchange Commission, composed of principal officers, possessed oversight authority over the board and the power to remove its members at will. However, the Court has not gone so far as to overrule or even explicitly question Morrison . As a result, that opinion's holding regarding the constitutionality of for-cause restrictions for an independent counsel binds the lower courts. Moreover, while the Court's decisions in Edmund and Free Enterprise Fund have not applied the reasoning in Morrison concerning the test for who qualifies as an inferior officer, it is not necessarily clear what removal restrictions are appropriate for principal officers or how the determinations about the appointment power concern determinations about the scope of the removal power. Nonetheless, it appears that the Edmond test, rather than the Morrison analysis, for determining whether an individual is an inferior officer is what will guide the Court going forward. Furthermore, Free Enterprise Fund represents a movement toward a more formalist, and possibly more expansive, view of the Presidential power of removal than was expressed in Morrison . More fundamentally, no member of the Morrison Court sits on the Supreme Court today. Because of this apparent shift in the Court's general approach to separation-of-powers matters related to appointment and removal, and the current Court's relative silence on Morrison's import, whether today's Court would necessarily view a reauthorization of the independent counsel statute or a similar statute in the same manner as it did in Morrison is subject to debate . Assuming that the Supreme Court were to follow the functional approach reflected in its Morrison decision, efforts to statutorily require good cause to remove a special counsel would likely pass constitutional muster. As noted above, in Morrison , the Court examined whether Congress had impermissibly interfered with the President's constitutional duties; it approved of the independent counsel statute's provisions that, among other things, (1) required good cause to remove the independent counsel; (2) largely restricted the Attorney General's discretion in deciding to request the appointment of an independent counsel; and (3) placed the actual power of appointment with a panel of Article III judges. Legislation that would statutorily insulate a future special counsel from removal except for good cause appears roughly analogous to the for-cause removal provisions upheld in Morrison . In fact, some proposals appear to be less restrictive of the President's power relative to the independent counsel statute. For instance, S. 1741 (115 th Congress) and S. 71 (116 th Congress) appear to contemplate the appointment of a special counsel at the discretion of the AG, and they provide that only the Attorney General—or the most senior Justice official who has been confirmed by the Senate if the Attorney General is recused—may remove a special counsel. Under both bills, an executive branch official would retain discretion to appoint and remove a special counsel for cause. Under Morrison ' s functional balancing approach, which examines whether Congress has unduly interfered with the President's executive power and duty to take care that the law is executed faithfully, this framework is less intrusive of executive branch power than was the independent counsel statute because the executive branch would retain control over a special counsel's appointment. Likewise, insulating a special counsel from removal by the Attorney General except for those reasons outlined in current Justice regulations—"for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Departmental policies" —would likely permit removal of a special counsel for a broader range of reasons than did the now-expired independent counsel statute, which limited the basis for removal to "good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties." Specifically, several bills would add misconduct, dereliction of duty, and conflict of interest as grounds for removal, and specifically define good cause to include violation of departmental policies. At least considered in isolation, such a provision would be less intrusive into the executive branch's authority under Article II than the statute at issue in Morrison , as the proposal would grant the Attorney General—a principal officer directly accountable to the President—greater control of the special counsel than he had under the independent counsel statute. Accordingly, if the Court were to embrace a functionalist balancing approach in a challenge to such a provision, it would likely affirm its constitutionality as the executive branch could remove a special counsel for a broader range of reasons than was permitted in the independent counsel statute. Nevertheless, bills that aim to insulate a special counsel from removal might be constitutionally suspect if the Court chose to overrule Morrison or limit the reach of that case to its facts. In particular, were the Court to face a challenge to a special counsel entrusted with wide-ranging investigative authority who statutorily could not be removed except for cause, application of the approach in Edm o nd , rather than Morrison , might result in the Court concluding that a special counsel is a principal officer. As noted above, Edmond 's test for inferior officer status is that the individual be directed and supervised by a principal officer. And that test was satisfied because Coast Guard Court of Appeals judges were removable at will and lacked power to render final decisions of the executive branch. A special counsel with statutory removal protection would obviously not be removable at will. As to whether a special counsel renders final decisions, any analysis would likely depend on the scope of authority granted to a special counsel. Were the Court to conclude that a special counsel does constitute a principal officer, his or her appointment must be made by the President with Senate confirmation, rather than by the Attorney General. Further, any removal restrictions might be questioned as well, as the Court has never approved such restrictions for a principal officer charged with core executive functions. Nonetheless, the Court has not reconciled its holding on the appointments question in Morrison with its holding in Edmond, meaning that the limits on Congress's power to insulate executive branch officials from removal are subject to debate. More broadly, a departure from Morrison and an application of the Court's more recent formalist approach to separation of powers disputes, as evidenced in Free Enterprise Fund , might cast for-cause removal protections for a special counsel in an unfavorable light. The Court's emphasis in that case on the importance of presidential control over executive branch officers and the ability to hold them accountable in order to preserve the constitutional structure envisioned by the Framers could be read to conflict with statutory removal restrictions for government officers carrying out core executive functions. That said, a middle road is possible. Were Congress to pass legislation insulating a special counsel from removal except for cause, one option might be for the Court to narrowly construe the scope of for-cause removal protections, interpreting them to permit removal for a broad range of reasons. This would avoid overruling Morrison , but arguably preserve substantial executive branch authority over the special counsel. Nonetheless, such a reading might authorize more significant control of a special counsel's decisions, ultimately restricting the independence of the office, at least compared to that envisioned by the independent counsel statute. Certain bills authorizing a judicial role in the removal of a special counsel may raise distinct constitutional questions. As an initial matter, proposals to authorize judicial review of a decision by the Attorney General to remove a special counsel, such as S. 1741 (115 th Congress), as well as S. 71 and H.R. 197 (116 th Congress), appear somewhat similar to provisions considered by the Court in Morrison . And the Supreme Court has otherwise adjudicated suits from government officers who have been removed from their position. It bears mention, however, that the traditional remedy in such situations has been for back pay, rather than reinstatement. Bills that limit available remedies to reinstatement, or require this result, depart from the independent counsel statute's provisions, which provided a reviewing court with the option to order reinstatement or issue "other appropriate relief." One might distinguish between, on the one hand, a court's undisputed power to determine compliance with the law and award damages for violations, and, on the other, a potential judicial order directing an executive branch official to reappoint an individual to an office. In this vein, injunctive relief of this type could be viewed as inserting the judiciary into a role assigned by Article II to the executive branch. In addition, at least one proposal, S. 1735 , might authorize the judiciary to play a more substantial role in the removal of a special counsel. That bill would bar the removal of a special counsel unless the Attorney General first files a petition with a three-judge court, and that court itself finds "misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or other good cause, including violation of policies of the Department of Justice." Inserting the judiciary into a removal decision, by requiring a court to determine in the first instance the grounds for the dismissal of an executive branch official before he may be removed, appears to go beyond the restrictions on the President's removal power previously approved by the Supreme Court in Humphrey ' s Executor and Morrison . As the Free Enterprise Fund Court explained, even in the prior cases that "upheld limited restrictions on the President's removal power, it was the President—or a subordinate he could remove at will—who decided whether the officer's conduct merited removal under the good-cause standard." The body charged with determining whether good cause exists to remove a special counsel would not be one that is subordinate to or accountable to the President; indeed, that body is not located in the executive branch at all. Moreover, Free Enterprise Fund invalidated two layers of removal protection for executive branch officers as violating Article II. Here, a special counsel could not be removed unless permitted by Article III judges—judicial officers who may not be removed except through the impeachment process. As such, with regards to this proposal, not only would two layers of removal protection shield a special counsel from dismissal, but one layer would be significantly more stringent than the for-cause protection in Free Enterprise Fund . Further, while the Court in Morrison saw no issue with the independent counsel statute's provision authorizing ex post judicial review (i.e., after the fact) of a removal decision, that conclusion rested on the understanding that the executive branch retained discretion over the decision to remove an independent counsel. Judicial review in that situation was limited to ensuring compliance with the law. Indeed, the Morrison Court narrowly construed that statute to preclude any role for the judicial panel that was entrusted with appointing an independent counsel in removing him during an investigation or judicial proceeding. The Court explained that this move avoided an unconstitutional "intrusion into matters that are more properly within the Executive's authority." Proposals that require an initial judicial finding of good cause in order to authorize removal arguably insert the judiciary into an executive branch function in a manner the Morrison Court appeared to consider questionable. On the other hand, application of a functional approach akin to Morrison , which examined a variety of factors in adjudicating the separation of powers dispute, might nevertheless conclude that a requirement of an initial judicial finding of good cause in order to remove a special counsel does not impair the President's core Article II responsibilities. First, under S. 1735 , the Attorney General retains discretion to initiate a removal in the first place by petitioning the three-judge panel; that body would lack authority to remove a special counsel independently. Second, the previously upheld independent counsel statute authorized judicial review of a removal of the independent counsel and authorized reinstatement as a remedy. The bill's provision would shift the sequence of the judicial role from an ex post review to an ex ante (i.e., beforehand) authorization. Viewed in this light, it is unclear why that shift would necessarily make a substantive difference, because even if the executive branch ignored the provision allowing for ex ante review and removed a special counsel unilaterally, the special counsel could sue for reinstatement, which would leave the court in largely the same position. Finally, while requiring judicial authorization to remove a special counsel might intrude somewhat on the executive branch's Article II authority other aspects of the bill are less intrusive. For instance, the bill leaves discretion to appoint the special counsel with the Attorney General, and appears to permit removal for a wider range of conduct than did the independent counsel statute. Because the Morrison Court balanced a variety of factors and concluded that the independent counsel statute did not impermissibly interfere with the President's duty to execute the law, an application of Morrison might mean that these features ameliorate concerns about a judicial body first approving of a removal. Leaving aside issues arising under Article II of the Constitution, legislation requiring the Attorney General to first petition a federal court for a good cause finding before removing a special counsel might raise questions under Article III. The Constitution defines the proper scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction as limited to adjudicating "cases" and "controversies." The Supreme Court has articulated several legal doctrines emanating from Article III that limit the circumstances under which the federal courts will adjudicate disputes. The Court has interpreted Article III to require adversity between the parties, or a live dispute that is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." Further, the Court has made clear that duties of an administrative or executive nature generally may not be vested in Article III judges. Article III courts are permitted to exercise certain non-adjudicatory functions, but these exceptions are generally limited to duties incident to the judicial function, such as supervising grand juries and participating in the issuance of search warrants. With respect to a suit by the Attorney General seeking ex ante judicial authorization to remove a special counsel, these requirements might not necessarily be met. For instance, given this procedural posture, it is not obvious who the adverse party would be as the legislation does not explicitly authorize the special counsel to participate in the proceedings. Likewise, the supervision of executive branch officers, including discretion to remove them, is traditionally an executive or administrative function, rather than a judicial one. Finally, certain bills that aim to insulate a special counsel from removal might raise unresolved questions concerning their retroactivity. For instance, S. 1741 (115 th Congress) would have provided that a special counsel may not be removed except for cause and that this provision retroactively applies to any special counsel appointed on or after May 17, 2017. Likewise, S. 71 and H.R. 197 (116 th Congress) contain a similar provision, although it applies to any special counsel appointed on or after January 1, 2017. One might argue that statutorily insulating a currently serving special counsel from removal improperly inserts Congress into the appointments process. The Supreme Court has invalidated legislation that explicitly authorized Members of Congress to appoint executive branch officers and has done the same to legislation authorizing Congress to remove an executive branch officer through a joint resolution. Insulating a currently serving executive branch officer from removal via statute might be seen as an attempt by Congress to subvert the purposes of the Appointments Clause, effectively transforming a particular prosecutor's office from one that is subject to executive branch control into one that is statutorily independent without allowing for a new appointment consistent with the Constitution. In particular, if such a bill were passed immediately, it might be seen to apply exclusively to a single individual in the executive branch, effectively appointing a particular executive branch officer for an indefinite time period. To the extent that this provision is viewed as a legislative aggrandizement of the executive's appointment power, it might raise separation-of-powers concerns. That said, it does not appear that a Supreme Court case has directly addressed such a statutory provision. In Myers v. United States , the Court invalidated a statutory restriction on the removal of an executive branch officer. The pertinent statute in that case bestowed removal protection retroactively on executive branch officers, but the Court's opinion did not hinge on this feature of the statute. Further, such a provision would only codify requirements that already exist in regulations, which might be seen as a relatively minor adjustment to a special counsel's office that does not require a new appointment. Given the lack of preexisting case law relevant to such a provision, firm conclusions about its merit are likely premature. Both Congress and the executive branch have employed a variety of means to establish independence for certain criminal investigations and prosecutions. The use of special prosecutors, independent counsels, and special counsels all have allowed for the investigation of executive branch misconduct. Nonetheless, efforts to provide independence for prosecutors from executive branch control often raise constitutional questions. In turn, proposals to statutorily protect a special counsel from removal thus raise important, but unresolved, constitutional questions about the separation of powers. As a general matter, simply insulating a future special counsel from removal except for specified reasons appears consistent with the Court's opinion in Morrison . To the extent the current Court might depart from the functional reasoning of that case and apply a more formal approach to the question, however, such proposals might raise constitutional objections. Likewise, constitutional objections might arise against proposals aimed to insulate a special counsel in a manner beyond the framework approved in Morrison .
The Constitution vests Congress with the legislative power, which includes authority to establish federal agencies and conduct oversight of those entities. Criminal investigations and prosecutions, however, are generally regarded as core executive functions assigned to the executive branch. Because of the potential conflicts of interest that may arise when the executive branch investigates itself, there have often been calls for criminal investigations by prosecutors with independence from the executive branch. In response, Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have used both statutory and regulatory mechanisms to establish a process for such inquiries. These frameworks have aimed to balance the competing goals of independence and accountability with respect to inquiries of executive branch officials. Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, for example, Congress authorized the appointment of "special prosecutors," who later were known as "independent counsels." Under this statutory scheme, the Attorney General could request that a specially appointed three-judge panel appoint an outside individual to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of criminal law. These individuals were vested with "full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice" with respect to matters within their jurisdiction. Ultimately, debate over the scope, cost, and effect of the investigations (perhaps most notably the Iran-Contra and the Whitewater investigations) resulted in the law's expiration and nonrenewal in 1999. Following the lapse of these statutory provisions, DOJ promulgated regulations authorizing the Attorney General (or, if the Attorney General is recused from a matter, the Acting Attorney General) to appoint a "special counsel" from outside the federal government to conduct specific investigations or prosecutions that may be deemed to present a conflict of interest if pursued under the normal procedures of the agency. Special counsels are not subject to "day-to-day supervision" by any official and are vested "within the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney." The independent nature of these investigations has raised constitutional questions about the propriety of the appointment and removal mechanisms provided for the officials leading the inquiries. These concerns were addressed by the Supreme Court in the 1988 case of Morrison v. Olson, which upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute. The reasoning of that opinion has been challenged, however, and the Court's subsequent analysis of related issues in the 1997 case of Edmond v. United States and the 2010 case Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Board did not apply the standard enunciated in Morrison. The constitutional status of a statutory framework similar to the independent counsel statute is thus subject to debate. Several bills introduced in the 116th Congress (including S. 71 and H.R. 197, which merge aspects of two preceding bills introduced in the 115th Congress, S. 1735 and S. 1741) would statutorily insulate a special counsel from removal, echoing aspects of the independent counsel statute's provisions. Whether such proposals would withstand constitutional challenge today might ultimately turn on the continued vitality of the analysis applied in Morrison.