Fighter pilots staff both operational and non-operational positions, and fighter pilots alternate between these positions throughout their career. Operational positions include both flying (i.e., combat pilot or instructor pilot positions) and non-flying positions, such as a close air support duty officer in an Air Operations Center or an air controller in a ground infantry unit. In flying positions, fighter pilots operate aircraft that are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during combat operations and include Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft with air-to-air, air-to-ground, and electronic warfare missions. These aircraft operate during the first days of a conflict to penetrate enemy air space, defeat air defenses, and achieve air dominance, allowing follow-on ground, air, and naval forces freedom to operate within the battle space. Once air dominance is established, fighter aircraft continue to strike ground targets for the remainder of the conflict. Some fighter aircraft are also essential to protecting the homeland by responding to potential airborne and ground-based threats. Fighter pilots are assigned a variety of tasks when they are in an operational squadron. As well as studying for flights, flying, and debriefing, fighter pilots must also perform other squadron duties, such as coordinating squadron travel to external training locations, scheduling daily flights, or overseeing squadron maintenance departments. In addition to these duties, fighter pilots are required to complete common military training (i.e., training that is required for all military personnel and is not linked to a particular occupation). In May 2017, we reported that common military training comprises more than half of mandatory training requirements in the military services (not including additional training that the military services may require for specific groups of servicemembers, such as fighter pilots). Non-operational positions are generally non-flying positions and include assignments to headquarters or combatant command positions. Certain non-operational positions can only be filled by qualified pilots. For example, certain positions require fighter pilots due to the need for specialized technical knowledge, such as writing operational manuals for fighter aircraft. Other non-operational positions are more general in nature and are divided among officer communities in a military service. For example, Navy officials told us that certain shore assignments—positions that do not involve deployment—can be staffed by officers from aviation, submarine, or surface warfare communities. DOD’s current fighter aircraft fleet is comprised of both legacy and new aircraft (see fig. 1). The legacy aircraft include Air Force F-16, F-15, A-10, and F-22A and Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18A-D, EA-6B, and AV-8B. Most of these aircraft were purchased in the 1970s and 1980s and are more than 25 years old on average. DOD has been recapitalizing this aging legacy fleet by acquiring and fielding new aircraft, namely the Navy’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G and the joint service F-35. The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy are operating many of their fixed-wing aircraft well beyond their original designed service lives, and some of these legacy aircraft are confronted with sustainment challenges that affect their availability. In 2017, senior Air Force and Navy officials testified before the House Armed Services Committee regarding, among other things, the maintenance and sustainment issues relating to aging aircraft that are affecting the readiness of their forces. According to Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps guidance, the military services are to determine personnel requirements for military units. Service officials told us that this process includes squadron requirements—that is, the number of operational positions in a fighter pilot squadron that a military service has determined should be staffed by a qualified fighter pilot. Squadron requirements are primarily based on the missions the squadrons are expected to fulfill, and the military services use a variety of inputs to determine fighter pilot squadron requirements. These inputs include the projected operations of fighter squadrons, analyses of the amount of workload in the squadrons, the number of aircraft assigned to the squadrons, and the planned ratio of fighter pilots to aircraft. The military services are to determine the required number of fighter pilots to staff squadrons and meet operational mission needs and to document these in squadron staffing documents. The military services also determine the rank that pilots should have when staffing specific positions in a squadron—for example, Marine Corps F/A-18 squadron staffing documents specify the rank that should be held by pilots leading specific departments such as those for safety, operations, and maintenance. According to service officials, the military services then staff squadron requirements to the extent possible based on the number of those requirements funded by Congress and the number of trained and qualified personnel available to be staffed to those positions (see fig. 2). We refer to these funded positions as authorizations. Military service workforce planning documents acknowledge that, after this process, a squadron’s staffing level may be lower than the established squadron requirements—a readiness risk that the military services manage by assigning a higher priority to the staffing of certain positions, such as those in deployed squadrons. The military services vary in how they define when gaps between authorizations and staffing levels become a shortage. Specifically, fighter pilot staffing levels of 85 to 99 percent of authorizations could be considered a shortage, depending on the military service. For example, Air Force officials told us that their established practice is that pilot communities with less than 100 percent of authorizations are considered to be insufficiently staffed. Navy officials told us that they have a shortage when they are unable to fully staff deploying squadrons. Marine Corps personnel documents reflect that Marine Corps communities with less than 85 percent of authorizations are considered “unhealthy.” The process of staffing fighter pilots is managed in the Air Force by the Air Force Personnel Center, in the Navy by the Navy Personnel Command, and in the Marine Corps by the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. According to service guidance, the Secretaries are to review squadron requirements, and this review is required every 2 years for the Air Force and the Marine Corps and every 5 years for the Navy. Further, DOD guidance states that staffing requirements are driven by workload and shall be established at the minimum levels necessary to accomplish mission and performance objectives. According to Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps data, each military service had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations from fiscal years 2013 through 2017, and the Air Force and the Marine Corps project that these gaps will continue for several years. According to service officials, because of low numbers of fighter pilots, the military services are unable to staff all operational fighter pilot positions. According to the military services, deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots, due to staffing approaches that include extending deployments and augmenting deployed squadrons with fighter pilots from other squadrons. Service officials identified multiple factors that have led to low numbers of fighter pilots, including challenges in training and retaining fighter pilots. To increase fighter pilot numbers, the military services are taking a variety of actions. According to Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps data, each military service had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations (i.e., funded positions) from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. Specifically, the Air Force and the Marine Corps had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations for most years from fiscal years 2006 through 2017. The magnitude of these gaps has grown since fiscal year 2006 and is projected to continue through at least fiscal year 2023. The Navy had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations in fiscal years 2013 through 2017. According to service officials, these gaps between fighter pilot numbers and authorizations have prevented the military services from fully staffing operational positions, including in non- deployed squadrons and training units. According to Air Force pilot staffing level and authorizations data for fiscal years 2006 through 2017, the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations for 11 of 12 years from fiscal years 2006 through 2017. This gap grew from 192 fighter pilots (5 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 1,005 (27 percent) in fiscal year 2017. According to briefing documents prepared by the Air Force, this gap is concentrated among fighter pilots with fewer than 8 years of experience. The Air Force forecasts that the fighter pilot gap will persist over time, even as the Air Force takes steps to train more fighter pilots and improve retention. Figure 3 shows the Air Force fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. For information on trends for all Air Force fixed-wing aircraft pilot communities, see appendix II. According to Air Force data, the Air Force generally had sufficient fighter pilots to staff operational positions for fighter pilots for fiscal years 2006 through 2013. Air Force officials added that during that period, Air Force fighter pilot gaps were generally limited to non-operational positions, such as staff assignments at Air Force headquarters or combatant commands. However, our analysis found that the Air Force has been unable to fully staff operational positions since fiscal year 2014. The gap between staffing levels and operational positions increased from 39 fighter pilots (1 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2014 to 399 (13 percent) in fiscal year 2017. According to Navy fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations data for fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the Navy had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations for each of these fiscal years. Specifically, in fiscal year 2013 the Navy had a gap of 57 fighter pilots (12 percent) at the first tour milestone (i.e., a fighter pilot’s first operational tour at sea completed between 3 and 6 years of service), and this gap grew to 136 fighter pilots (26 percent) in fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 4). Navy officials told us that they believe current gaps in the fighter pilot community could increase through mid-2019. For information on trends for all Navy fixed-wing aircraft pilot communities, see appendix III. According to Marine Corps pilot staffing levels and authorizations data for fiscal years 2006 through 2017, the Marine Corps had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations during that time frame. This gap grew from 63 fighter pilots (6 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 262 (24 percent) in fiscal year 2017. Further, according to Marine Corps data, the gap is concentrated in the Marine Corps’ junior fighter pilot population (i.e., those fighter pilots below the rank of Officer-4—a major). The Marine Corps forecasts that the fighter pilot gap will decrease over time as the Marine Corps phases out legacy aircraft and takes steps to improve retention. Figure 5 shows the Marine Corps active component fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. For information on trends for all Marine Corps fixed-wing aircraft pilot communities, see appendix IV. In addition, Marine Corps data showed that the Marine Corps was unable to fully staff fighter pilot operational positions since fiscal year 2016. The gap between staffing levels and operational positions increased from 12 fighter pilots (1 percent of authorizations) to 57 (7 percent) in fiscal years 2016 through 2017. Although all of the military services had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations in fiscal years 2013 through 2017, service officials stated that deploying squadrons have been fully staffed with fighter pilots. Service officials reported using various approaches to continue to fully staff deploying fighter squadrons, including (1) prioritizing staffing fighter pilots to flying positions that require fighter pilot-specific technical skills; (2) using senior pilots to staff junior positions; and (3) having pilots deploy for longer and more frequently than planned, including on deployments with other squadrons. For example, Navy officials told us that approaches such as extending fighter pilots’ deployments allowed them to reduce the fiscal year 2017 first tour fighter pilot gap from 136 pilots (26 percent) to 75 pilots (15 percent). However, squadron leaders and fighter pilots told us that these approaches are having a negative impact on the fighter pilot workforce. Specifically, squadron leaders and fighter pilots told us that the high pace of operations for senior fighter pilots has limited their availability to train junior pilots, which has constrained the military services’ ability to increase the number of pilots with specific qualifications. In addition, fighter pilots told us that increased frequency of individual deployments cause instability for their families and lead to career dissatisfaction. Additionally, as we have previously reported, a high tempo of operations has increased the challenge of aviation squadrons to rebuild readiness. For example, according to Air Force officials, high deployment rates for Air Force squadrons have resulted in less time for squadrons to complete their full training requirements because high deployment rates mean that there are fewer aircraft available for training at home stations. Service officials report that they can also mitigate low numbers of fighter pilots by leveraging surpluses in other pilot communities. For example, as outlined in Air Force documents supporting pilot retention bonuses, the Air Force has staffed mobility pilots (i.e., cargo transport and aerial refueling pilots) to instructor pilot positions for certain basic flying training that would otherwise be staffed by fighter pilots. The Navy can also staff certain Department Head positions designated for fighter pilots with non- pilot aviators from that community. According to military service data, fighter pilot communities generally have the largest gaps among all military fixed-wing pilot communities. For example, in fiscal year 2017 the Air Force had 73 percent of the fighter pilots it needed, while the bomber community, which had the second largest gap among Air Force fixed- wing pilot communities, had 85 percent of the pilots it needed. According to service officials, squadron leaders, and fighter pilots, multiple inter-related factors have reduced each military service’s number of fighter pilots. Factors cited include reductions to active duty end strength, aircraft readiness challenges, and declining retention. Reductions to active duty military end strength have contributed to reductions in fighter pilot staffing levels. Service officials told us that reductions to military service end strength targets as part of the 2008 drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and funding reductions related to the Budget Control Act of 2011 led to reductions in the fighter pilot workforce. For example, the Air Force offered 54 fighter pilots early retirement incentives in fiscal years 2014 through 2015, while the Marine Corps offered 49 fighter pilots early retirement options between fiscal years 2013 through 2016. Further, as we have previously reported, the Air Force used fighter pilots to meet the initial demand for UAS operators. Air Force officials told us that they removed 206 of those pilots from the fighter pilot community in fiscal years 2011 through 2012. Reduced force structure has also decreased the opportunities for fighter pilots to gain experience in their aircraft. For example, the Air Force reported that the number of total Air Force fighter squadrons (including the reserve components) declined from 134 in fiscal year 1989 to 55 in fiscal year 2017 (a 59-percent decrease), and as such fewer squadrons are available to provide newly trained fighter pilots with flying experience. Reduced aircraft availability has affected fighter pilots’ ability to meet flight hour targets. Service leaders told us that this has resulted in delays in training new pilots with the necessary qualifications to participate in certain missions. Specifically, according to November 2017 testimony, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps leaders reported that fighter pilots do not meet military service flight hour targets—in part due to reduced aircraft availability. For example, Navy and Marine Corps leaders testified that Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18 pilots average 13.5 and 12.7 flight hours per month, respectively, compared with goals of 20.1 and 15.7 hours per month. A senior Air Force leader testified before Congress that Air Force fighter pilots average about 16 flight hours per month. In June 2017 we reported on readiness challenges in Air Force and Marine Corps aviation squadrons. The military services have trained fewer fighter pilots than targeted over the last decade. In fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the Air Force trained 12 percent fewer new fighter pilots than the targeted amount, while the Navy and the Marine Corps each trained 8 percent fewer new fighter pilots than the targeted amount. Fighter pilots told us that the need to prioritize the staffing of experienced pilots to deploying squadrons has limited the number of experienced personnel available to train newer pilots at home stations. Recent Safety Concerns Regarding Onboard Systems in Naval Aircraft In April 2017, the Navy paused all basic flight training on the T-45 aircraft due to safety concerns regarding the oxygen supply and atmospheric pressurization systems aboard the training aircraft. The Navy and the Marine Corps share basic flight training resources, including training for fixed-wing aircraft pilots on T-45 aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps officials told us that if these basic training squadrons are unable to produce newly trained fighter pilots on schedule, this can lead to a decreased number of new fighter pilots in both military services. The F/A-18 has also been affected by problems with onboard oxygen supply systems leading to hypoxia, which can occur when aircrews receive insufficient or contaminated oxygen on board the aircraft. In August 2017 the Navy established a team to lead its effort to research and prevent these problems in fixed- wing aircraft. numbers of trained pilots. In addition, aircraft readiness challenges led the Navy to pause flight training on the T-45 training aircraft in April 2017 due to safety concerns regarding the oxygen supply systems aboard the training aircraft. Navy officials reported that gaps in first tour operational positions designated for all fixed-wing aircraft pilot communities could grow from 86 pilots in fiscal year 2017 to about 100 in fiscal year 2019. Declining retention has also contributed to low fighter pilot numbers. Our analysis of Air Force and Navy bonus retention data shows that retention of experienced fighter pilots has declined in recent years. We found that the number of Air Force fighter pilots that have signed retention contracts decreased from 63 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 35 percent in fiscal year 2017 (see fig. 6). This decline has continued even as the Air Force increased its maximum aviation bonus contract from $125,000 in fiscal year 2012 to $225,000 beginning in fiscal year 2013, the highest amount offered by any of the military services. According to Navy retention data, the Navy pool of fighter pilots eligible for the Department Head milestone (i.e., a mid-career operational leadership tour for different aspects of squadron management for pilots with between about 11 and 13 years of service) has shrunk over time. Navy officials told us that, as a result, the percentage of fighter pilots selected for the Department Head milestone has increased. For example, the Department Head selection rate for Navy F/A-18 pilots increased from 49 percent in fiscal year 2012 to 100 percent in fiscal year 2017. Further, the Navy did not meet its goals for fighter pilots signing retention bonuses at the Department Head milestone in fiscal years 2013 through 2017. For example, the Navy fell short of its retention bonus target of 73 fighter pilots by 38 pilots (48 percent of the target) for fiscal year 2017. In comparison, the surveillance and transport pilot community met or exceeded its target of pilots who signed a bonus contract 2 out of 5 years during that same period, while the maritime patrol pilot community met or exceeded its target 4 out of 5 years. Figure 7 shows the Navy Department Head active component fixed-wing pilot retention bonus take rate for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. Squadron leaders and fighter pilots we met with attributed declining retention to the staffing approaches being used by the military services to mitigate fighter pilot gaps and fully staff deployed squadrons. For example, squadron leaders told us that assigning senior fighter pilots to junior positions hurts retention by reducing leadership opportunities believed to be necessary for promotion. Fighter pilots also told us that quality of life has decreased as a result of longer and more frequent deployments. Further, fighter pilots told us that understaffing fighter pilots in operational units has resulted in an increased workload per pilot and lower quality of service for non-deployed fighter pilots in those units. The Air Force has developed and implemented initiatives to help increase fighter pilot numbers, and the Navy and the Marine Corps are developing initiatives to address overall retention concerns. The Air Force established a dedicated team to identify and develop initiatives specifically to address its reported fighter pilot shortage, and this effort has resulted in over 35 implemented initiatives. The Navy and the Marine Corps have not formulated initiatives specifically for fighter pilots, but have identified actions to address retention concerns. Navy and Marine Corps officials stated that, because the military services can still staff authorizations for deployed squadrons, they do not believe their staffing levels of fighter pilots have reached a critical shortage. However, Navy and Marine Corps personnel management officials we met with told us that they are closely monitoring trends in fighter pilot retention, and they believe that decreased retention in the near future may exacerbate fighter pilot gaps in their military services. The military services’ initiatives are summarized below. The Air Force established a dedicated effort to address fighter pilot workforce challenges, and many initiatives from this effort have been implemented. Specifically, in March 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the initiation of an effort to address the Air Force fighter pilot shortage. The Air Force created a Fighter Enterprise Tiger Team in March 2016, and began formulating initiatives to address the fighter pilot shortage that the Air Force identified. For example, as the result of one initiative, 126 contractors have been placed in fighter squadrons to assist with administrative tasks and reduce workload for fighter pilots, and additional contractor support is in the process of being added. Also, in the fall of 2016 the Air Force reinstated its award program to recognize fighter pilots for superior performance. According to a member of the Air Force’s Fighter Enterprise Tiger Team, the awards are non-monetary, but because they are merit- based they can help fighter pilots to be more competitive when being assessed for promotion. In February 2017, the Air Force effort was expanded from a focus on fighter pilots to include all rated personnel and renamed the Aircrew Crisis Task Force. The 37 initiatives implemented by the Air Force as of November 2017 as a result of the Fighter Enterprise Tiger Team and Aircrew Crisis Task Force efforts are presented in appendix V. The Navy is formulating a service-wide strategy—referred to as Sailor 2025—which includes over 40 initiatives to address retention issues throughout the Navy. We identified 10 initiatives from Sailor 2025 that may address some of the retention issues raised in our discussion groups with fighter pilots—such as dissatisfaction with the assignments and promotion processes. For example, Navy officials told us they are developing staffing software to manage assignments and make the process more transparent and flexible. The Navy is also testing a new performance evaluation system to more accurately evaluate sailor performance. In addition, the Navy has adjusted the existing aviation bonus program by increasing the maximum bonus amount for fighter pilots from $25,000 to $30,000 per year for fiscal year 2018. To increase the number of available fighter aircraft, the Navy has also established a Rhino Readiness Recovery team— referring to the Navy’s term for the F/A-18 E-F Super Hornet aircraft— to identify and address readiness challenges in that community. Navy officials told us they believe their approaches are sufficient to address any potential future Navy fighter pilot gaps. In November 2017, the Marine Corps reinstated the aviation bonus program last offered by the Marine Corps in fiscal year 2011. The Marine Corps is offering 2-year contracts totaling $40,000 to fighter pilots who have completed their service obligation—except for those fighter pilots assigned to the EA-6B aircraft. However, the Marine Corps is not in the process of developing any non-monetary initiatives to address pilot retention. Rather, the Marine Corps is addressing aircraft readiness challenges—an issue consistently raised by fighter pilots in our discussion groups—by establishing four lines of effort to increase the number of available fighter aircraft for fighter squadrons. Marine Corps officials told us that they have begun implementing multiple initiatives for those lines of effort. For example, one initiative is focused on improving availability of aircraft spare parts by increasing their funding and modernizing the spare parts supply chain. Another initiative is focused on growing the maintenance workforce and retaining experienced aircraft maintainers. Specifically, the Marine Corps is offering retention bonuses to experienced aircraft maintainers. Fighter pilots and squadron leaders told us that the fighter pilot occupation has significantly changed in recent years, but the military services have not reevaluated fighter squadron requirements. Fighter pilots and squadron leaders from each of the military services consistently told us that the fighter pilot occupation has significantly changed in recent years due to changes in fighter aircraft tactics and technology, additional training requirements, and the removal of administrative support positions from squadrons. The fighter pilots added that these changes have led to an unsustainable increase in workload. As discussed earlier, squadron requirements—the number of fighter pilots needed to meet operational mission needs—are calculated by the military services using a variety of inputs, including workload. Once these requirements are funded by Congress, they are an “authorization.” Service guidance requires squadron requirements to be reevaluated on a 2-year schedule (5 years for the Navy) and to be updated as conditions change. For the Air Force, guidance defines staffing requirements as the staffing needed to accomplish a job, mission, or program, and notes that staffing should be sized to reflect the minimum essential level to accomplish the required workload. The Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (Resources), along with Major Command manpower staffs establish staffing standards and, at a minimum, by policy are to reevaluate these standards for applicability and updates every 2 years, or earlier if dictated by significant workload or mission changes. The Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency determines staffing resource requirements and provides staffing and management consultation services to Air Force functional communities for improved resource utilization and enhanced mission effectiveness and efficiency. The Air Force could not provide specifics on the most recent updates to squadron requirements, because such data were stored in a database that managed requirements on a position-by-position basis, rather than aggregated by squadron. Air Force pilots and squadron leaders consistently told us that changing conditions in fighter squadrons, such as a higher pace of changes to tactics and technology, increased training requirements, and reduced administrative support, have increased fighter pilot workload. However, Air Force officials told us that metrics that inform squadron requirements (i.e., crew ratios, the targeted ratio of pilots to aircraft) have not been increased because the Air Force is instead prioritizing the effort to recapitalize its fleet of fighter aircraft. Separately from reevaluating squadron requirements, Air Force officials told us that they have implemented changes to address workload concerns cited by fighter pilots—such as adding contractor staff in squadrons to provide administrative support, as part of initiatives to address fighter pilot shortages they have identified. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force is currently reassessing non-operational requirements for fighter pilots (i.e., non-flying positions at headquarters organizations). Air Force officials told us that this reassessment is focused on determining which non-operational requirements currently assigned to fighter pilots could be assigned to other types of officers or pilots, to reduce the overall number of fighter pilot requirements. For the Navy, squadron requirements are dependent on the current wartime requirements developed by the Navy, referred to as the Required Operational Capability and Projected Operational Environment of a particular squadron, aircraft configuration, specified operating profile, computed workload, and established doctrinal constraints. The June 2017 update to the relevant Navy guidance reduced the frequency of the reviews of these requirements from every 2 years to every 5 years, with updates as required by those officials responsible for specific units. Navy officials told us that reviews are to be completed every 2 years, but updates are only made to squadron staffing documents if specific events occur, such as additional aircraft being assigned to a squadron. Navy officials added that they believe squadron requirements are accurate and updated with sufficient frequency. However, Navy pilots and squadron leaders consistently told us that changing conditions in fighter squadrons, such as a higher pace of changes to tactics and technology, increased training requirements, and more frequent individual deployments, have increased fighter pilot workload. However, the Navy has not recently updated squadron requirements to reflect such changes. Specifically, Navy fighter pilot squadron requirements are outlined in 15 Navy squadron staffing documents, and as of November 2017, 9 out of 15 of those documents had not been updated within the last 2 years. For the Marine Corps, guidance states that reviews to optimize force structure will be conducted every 2 years, taking into consideration new and emerging requirements. Marine Corps pilots and squadron leaders consistently told us that changing conditions in fighter squadrons, such as a higher pace of changes to tactics and technology, reduced aircraft availability, and more frequent individual deployments, have increased fighter pilot workload. However, the Marine Corps has not updated squadron requirements to reflect such changes. Specifically, Marine Corps fighter pilot squadron requirements are outlined in four fighter squadron staffing documents, and, as of November 2017, none had been updated within the last 2 years. Marine Corps squadron leaders and fighter pilots told us that updates to squadron requirements are not being conducted for squadrons of legacy aircraft, but added that they believe updates are warranted due to the continued delays in fielding the F-35 and resulting extensions to the planned service of legacy platforms. Marine Corps officials told us that they have not updated squadron requirements because (1) Marine Corps fighter pilot authorizations and staffing levels are below squadron requirements, so any increase to squadron requirements would require a significant increase to fighter pilot authorizations, and (2) the Marine Corps has faced challenges obtaining technical assistance to conduct workload assessments in fighter squadrons. The Navy Manpower Analysis Center conducts workload reviews of squadrons, based on specific events such as changes to the amount of time needed for maintaining the specific type of aircraft. Navy and Marine Corps fighter pilots we met with told us that they have had difficulties maintaining fighter jets in their squadrons, and Navy and Marine Corps leaders have made similar statements in congressional testimony. Further, Marine Corps officials told us that they have had difficulty utilizing the Navy Manpower Analysis Center to update workload analyses for their fighter squadrons, as they believed the center prioritizes work for Navy organizations. Navy Manpower Analysis Center officials told us that there is no formal requirement for their organization to conduct analyses for the Marine Corps, but that they respond to such requests on an ad-hoc basis. They added that the Marine Corps Combat Development Command has formal responsibility for updating Marine Corps workload analyses. We have previously reported that the size and data collection capacity of the Navy Manpower Analysis Center has limited the Navy’s capacity to carry out periodic workload reassessments, which may be a contributing factor to chronic under-staffing of ship crews. According to a DOD planning document, funding for UAS platforms was expected to grow by 17 percent in fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Moreover, in 2015, the Secretary of the Navy directed the establishment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Unmanned Systems and announced that the F-35 will likely be the last cockpit-operated strike fighter aircraft the Department of the Navy will buy or fly. The Chief of Naval Operations announced in 2017 that the future of the Navy includes UAS systems as an integral part of the future fleet and must be purchased in large numbers to expand naval presence in key areas. For example, the Navy is developing a UAS platform—the MQ-25 Stingray— which is intended to replace that portion of the F/A-18 fighter aircraft’s mission set that involves re-fueling other F/A-18 aircraft. Also, in 2015 the Secretary of the Air Force stated that UAS pilots were flying on average about four times more hours than pilots in cockpit- operated aircraft. Further, a document outlining the Air Force’s vision for UAS for fiscal years 2009 through 2047 notes that systems will work in tandem with cockpit-operated aircraft, for example to attack air-defense systems, and that autonomous technologies will potentially allow one pilot to direct multiple aircraft, leading to personnel efficiencies. Although the impact of UAS on the fighter pilot workforce appears to be significant, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps have not accounted for the planned increased use of UAS to complete missions similar to those carried out by fighter aircraft, and the potential impact of these changes on fighter pilot requirements. Specifically, Air Force and Navy officials told us that their military services have not conducted an assessment of the impact of future UAS operations on fighter pilot requirements. While the UAS platforms that are expected to overlap with fighter aircraft missions will not be fielded until the mid-2020s, the length of time required to develop an experienced fighter pilot compels the military services to begin incorporating these planned changes to fighter pilot requirements promptly. For example, Navy fighter pilots who are entering initial training in 2018 will not have completed their active duty service obligation (currently 8 years after Navy pilots complete flight training) when the MQ-25 Stingray system is expected to be fielded in 2026. A key tenet of human capital planning is determining existing and future skills and competencies, and associated workforce gaps. Without steps by the military services, to include reevaluating workload and taking into account the impact that the planned use of UAS will have on the fighter pilot workforce, the military services will not fully know the extent and nature of gaps between fighter pilot numbers and authorizations and how to best target actions to address these gaps. Fighter pilots are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during combat operations. To achieve that mission, the military services must have appropriate numbers of qualified fighter pilots. Service officials report that no unit is deploying without 100 percent of its fighter pilots, and they believe that they will continue to be able to meet their operational missions. Nevertheless, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, are reporting fewer fighter pilots than authorizations, and they project that these gaps will continue through at least fiscal year 2023. Without re- evaluating fighter pilot requirements, it will be difficult for the military services to accurately determine the number of fighter pilots needed to complete missions and help ensure success in combat. Specifically, without updating squadron requirements to reflect the growing administrative burden on fighter pilots in non-deployed squadrons, the currently identified differences between fighter pilot numbers and authorizations may be understated. By contrast, without updating future fighter pilot requirements to take into account changing roles and missions—in particular the increasing role of UAS in combat operations— forecasted fighter pilot gaps may be overstated. In short, reevaluating fighter pilot requirements is a key first step to help the military services clearly determine the magnitude of the gaps and target strategies to meet their personnel needs. We are making the following three recommendations: The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Director of Operations and the Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements, to include updating current assumptions of fighter pilot workload, and assessing the impact of future incorporation of UAS platforms into combat aviation. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements, to include updating current assumptions of fighter pilot workload, and assessing the impact of future incorporation of UAS platforms into combat aviation. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements. (Recommendation 3) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. We had initially recommended that the Marine Corps also assess the impact of UAS platforms on fighter pilot squadron requirements, but removed that portion of the third recommendation because Marine Corps officials told us that Marine Corps UAS squadrons will continue to be resourced with operators through the accession process and Marine Corps UAS operator requirements do not affect either pilot inventories or fighter pilot workload. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, DOD concurred with our recommendations, citing its commitment to addressing manpower, personnel, and training challenges for the fighter pilot community and broader aviation and aviation support capabilities. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Secretary of the Navy; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. To assess the extent to which the military services had differences in the number of fighter pilots compared to authorizations, as well as contributing factors and service initiatives to address the differences, we obtained and analyzed data on authorizations designated for pilots and corresponding staffing levels of pilots for all fixed-wing, cockpit-operated (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing) aircraft communities in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. We did not include the Army in the scope of our review because the Army does not operate fighter aircraft. For the Air Force and the Marine Corps active component, we compared pilot staffing levels with authorizations for all fixed-wing aircraft communities for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. We obtained and analyzed projected authorizations and staffing levels for the same pilot communities for fiscal years 2018 through 2023. We further obtained and reviewed Marine Corps data on fighter pilot operational position staffing targets and staffing levels for fiscal year 2017 and similar Air Force data for fiscal year 2018. We also compared Air Force and Marine Corps reserve component fighter pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. For the Navy, we obtained and analyzed data on authorizations designated for active and reserve component pilots for fiscal years 2006 through 2017, and staffing levels for all Navy fixed-wing aircraft communities in the active component for fiscal years 2011 through 2017. However, the Navy’s authorization data did not specify how many fighter pilots were assigned to non-flying assignments because the Navy does not fully assign non-flying authorizations to specific communities, unlike the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Therefore, we were unable to conduct an analysis comparing total Navy fighter pilot staffing levels with authorizations, as we did for the Air Force and the Marine Corps. We instead obtained and analyzed Navy data on differences between authorizations and pilot staffing levels for first operational tour, Department Head, and Command positions for all fixed-wing aircraft pilot communities in the active component. We also obtained and analyzed Navy data on differences between staffing targets and pilot staffing levels for the Navy Reserve for fiscal year 2017, the only year of data available. We also obtained and analyzed Navy retention data for pilots eligible for Department Head assignments, a mid-career milestone in fixed-wing communities for fiscal years 2011 through 2017. Retention data for the Department Head milestone are made available in annual aviation continuation pay reports to Congress. Fiscal year 2018 retention data will be available in fiscal year 2019. We further obtained and analyzed the number of fighter pilots the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps trained in fiscal years 2007 through 2016. To assess the reliability of the data we obtained, we reviewed corroborating documentation, analyzed the data for inconsistencies, and interviewed service officials about the reliability of the data. We determined that the data we used were sufficiently reliable to describe the trends in personnel staffing levels and authorizations for the time period included in our scope. We met with DOD and service officials to discuss the results of our analysis and factors that may have contributed to low numbers of fighter pilots. We also collected and reviewed service documentation regarding the factors they identified. We interviewed service officials and reviewed documentation to identify any initiatives taken or planned to increase fighter pilot numbers. In addition, we selected a non-generalizable sample of locations where fighter pilots are stationed (see table 1). We selected these locations based on geographic diversity (one location for each military service in both the eastern and western portions of the contiguous United States), a diversity of types of fighter aircraft, and a mix of squadron types at the locations (i.e., operational squadrons, training squadrons, and reserve component squadrons). In selecting locations we also considered the availability of pilots due to conflicts with deployment or training events. At each location, we moderated one to two discussion groups with fighter pilots for a total of 13 discussion groups ranging from between 3 and 20 pilots per group. We held separate sessions with junior and senior pilots at all locations, except for at Naval Air Station Oceana, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, and Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, due to pilot availability. We also interviewed unit leadership at these locations (i.e., wing and squadron commanders and executive officers) to obtain their perspective on the status of the fighter pilot workforce. While these discussion groups and interviews allowed us to learn about many important aspects of the fighter pilot workforce from the perspective of fighter pilots and squadron leaders, they were designed to provide anecdotal information and not results that would be representative of all the department’s more than 5,000 fighter pilots as of fiscal year 2017. To assess the extent to which the military services have reevaluated squadron requirements for the number of fighter pilots needed, including the consideration of UAS pilot requirements, we reviewed service guidance to determine the frequency with which elements of fighter pilot squadron requirements are to be reevaluated, reviewed service documentation, and interviewed service officials to determine the extent to which these elements had been reevaluated on schedule, reviewed service documentation regarding the planned mix of cockpit-operated and remotely-operated aviation platforms for future operations, and discussed with service officials the extent to which these plans are incorporated into forecasts of fighter pilot squadron requirements. We conducted this performance audit from November 2016 to April 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The Air Force uses pilots from both the active and reserve components to staff fixed-wing, cockpit-operated (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing) aircraft pilot positions that Congress authorizes and funds through appropriations. These Air Force pilots staff a mix of operational and non- operational positions. Operational positions include both flying (e.g., combat pilot or instructor pilot positions) and non-flying positions (e.g., close air support duty officer positions in an Air Operations Center) that directly support combat operations. Non-operational positions are generally non-flying, and include assignments to headquarters or combatant command positions, some of which can be staffed by other types of Air Force officers. This appendix compares Air Force pilot staffing levels with authorizations for operational and non-operational positions for all fixed-wing aircraft communities for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. Air Force fixed-wing community pilots operate fighter, bomber, mobility, surveillance, and special operations aircraft. Fighter pilots operate tactical aircraft that engage in air-to-air and air-to-surface attacks and include the A-10, F-15, F-16, F-22A, and F-35 aircraft. Bomber pilots operate aircraft to deliver munitions and include the B-1, B-2, and B-52 aircraft. Mobility pilots operate aircraft used for aerial refueling and troop and cargo transport and include the C-17 and KC-135 aircraft. Surveillance pilots operate aircraft used for surveillance and reconnaissance to support ground troops and include the E-8 and U-2 aircraft. Special operations pilots operate aircraft that provide close-air support for ground troops, including the AC-130. Air Force officials report that they can staff certain operational positions designated for fighter pilots with pilots from other pilot communities that have surpluses. For example, Air Force officials told us they can staff mobility or surveillance pilots (communities which both had a surplus of pilots in fiscal year 2017) to certain basic flying training instructor pilot positions that would otherwise be staffed by fighter pilots. Figure 8 shows the Air Force active component fixed-wing aircraft community pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal year 2017. According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations in 11 of 12 years from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. This gap grew from 192 fighter pilots (5 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 1,005 (27 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 9 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s active component fighter pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Air Force data for the reserve components the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations every fiscal year from fiscal year 2006 through 2017. For example, the Air Force reported that the reserve components had a gap of 271 fighter pilots (17 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 10 illustrates the gap between staffing levels and authorizations for Air Force fighter pilots in the reserve components for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had fewer bomber pilots than authorizations in fiscal years 2014 through 2017. This gap grew from 11 bomber pilots (1 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2014 to 135 (15 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 11 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s active component bomber pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had more mobility pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. This surplus peaked at 1,637 mobility pilots (132 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2011, and declined to 264 (105 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 12 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s active component mobility pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Air Force data for the active component for fiscal years 2006 through 2017, the Air Force had fewer surveillance pilots than authorizations in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. In fiscal year 2017, the surplus was 220 surveillance pilots (128 percent of authorizations). Figure 13 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s active component surveillance pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Air Force data for the active component, the Air Force had fewer special operations pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. Special operations pilot staffing levels and authorizations have increased substantially from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2017. Further, the gap between the staffing levels and authorizations decreased from 342 special operations pilots (29 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2009 to 227 (14 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 14 shows the comparison of the Air Force’s active component special operations pilot staffing levels with authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. The Navy uses pilots from both the active and reserve component to staff fixed-wing, cockpit operated (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing) aircraft pilot positions that Congress authorizes and funds through appropriations. These Navy pilots staff a mix of operational and non-operational positions. Operational positions include both flying (i.e., combat pilot or instructor pilot) and non-flying positions that directly support combat operations. Non-operational positions are generally non-flying positions, and include assignments to positions at headquarters or in the combatant commands that can be staffed by other types of Navy officers. The Navy does not separate non-operational fighter pilot authorizations from authorizations for other pilots. As a result, this appendix only presents Navy pilot staffing levels for those communities for fiscal years 2011 through 2017, and compares Navy pilot staffing levels to specific operational positions. Specifically, we compared authorizations and pilot staffing levels for Navy first operational tour, Department Head, and Command positions for all fixed-wing, cockpit-operated aircraft communities in the active component for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. Navy fixed-wing community pilots operate fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol aircraft. Navy fighter pilots operate tactical aircraft for air defense and support. Fighter aircraft include both legacy and Super Hornet variants of the F/A-18, as well as newer tactical aircraft such as the EA-18G developed for electronic warfare and the F- 35. Surveillance and transport pilots operate turboprop aircraft, including the E-2D for surveillance and airborne early warning missions and the C- 2A for troop and cargo transport between aircraft carriers and shore bases. Maritime patrol pilots operate jet aircraft for missions including anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare, and include aircraft such as the P-8A. According to Navy personnel data, Navy fighter pilot staffing levels decreased from 1,707 fighter pilots in fiscal year 2015 to 1,548 (a 9- percent decrease) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 15 compares changes in the Navy fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol pilot staffing levels for fiscal years 2011 through 2017. According to Navy fixed-wing pilot staffing levels and authorizations data for the first tour milestone (i.e., pilots’ first operational tours at sea for pilots generally with between 3 and 6 years of service), the Navy was unable to fully staff fighter pilot, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol operational positions from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. The fighter pilot gap grew from 57 fighter pilots (12 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2013 to 136 fighter pilots (26 percent) in fiscal year 2017. The surveillance and transport pilot gap varied from 29 pilots (20 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2013 to 30 pilots (23 percent) in fiscal year 2017, while the maritime patrol community pilot gap decreased from 112 pilots (23 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2013 to 4 pilots (1 percent) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 16 compares the Navy active component fighter pilot, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol communities’ first tour staffing levels and authorizations for operational positions for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. According to Navy fixed-wing aviator staffing levels and authorizations data for the Department Head milestone (i.e., a mid-career operational leadership tour for different aspects of squadron management for pilots with between about 11 and 13 years of service), the military service had more fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol aviators than authorizations for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. However, the surplus of fighter aviators compared with authorizations decreased from 68 aviators (133 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2013 to 28 aviators (114 percent) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 17 compares the Navy active component fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol aviator communities’ Department Head staffing levels and authorizations for operational positions for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. According to Navy fixed-wing aviator staffing levels and authorizations data for the Command milestone (i.e., a leadership tour for Commanders, including squadron commander, for aviators with between about 17 and 19 years of service) the number of fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol aviators compared with authorizations increased from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. For example, while the fighter pilot community had fewer aviators than authorizations in fiscal year 2013 (a gap totaling 2 percent of authorizations), it had a surplus of aviators in fiscal year 2017 (2 percent above authorizations). Figure 18 compares the Navy active component fighter, surveillance and transport, and maritime patrol aviator communities’ Command milestone staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. The Marine Corps uses pilots from both the active and reserve components to staff fixed-wing, cockpit-operated (hereafter referred to as fixed-wing) aircraft pilot positions that Congress authorizes and funds through appropriations. These Marine Corps pilots staff a mix of operational and non-operational positions. Operational positions include both flying (e.g., combat pilot or instructor pilot positions) and non-flying positions (e.g., air controller in a ground infantry unit) that generally support combat operations. Non-operational positions are generally non- flying and include assignments to headquarters or combatant command positions, some of which can be staffed by other types of Marine Corps officers. This appendix compares Marine Corps pilot staffing levels with authorizations for operational and non-operational positions for all fixed- wing aircraft communities for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. Marine Corps fixed-wing community pilots operate fighter, tiltrotor, and tanker aircraft. Fighter pilots operate tactical aircraft for air defense and close air support and attack missions, and include the EA-6B, AV-8B, F/A-18, and F-35. Tiltrotor pilots operate the MV-22—an aircraft that operates as a helicopter for takeoffs and landings and, once airborne, converts to a turboprop aircraft—and is used to transport combat troops and equipment. Tanker pilots operate the KC-130, an aircraft used for in- flight refueling and transport of troops and equipment. According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine Corps had fewer pilots than authorizations in all of its fixed-wing communities in fiscal year 2017. The Marine Corps forecasts this gap will persist through at least fiscal year 2023. Figure 19 shows the Marine Corps active component fixed-wing pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal year 2017. According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine Corps had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. This gap grew from 63 fighter pilots (6 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 322 fighter pilots (24 percent) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 20 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps’ active component fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine Corps had fewer fighter pilots than operational positions in fiscal years 2016 and 2017. Figure 21 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps’ active component fighter pilot staffing levels with operational positions for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Marine Corps data for the reserve component, the Marine Corps Reserve, a community that the Marine Corps uses to augment its available staffing levels of active duty pilots, had more fighter pilots than authorizations for 8 of 12 years in fiscal years 2006 through 2017. The Marine Corps had a gap of seven reserve component fighter pilots (6 percent of authorizations) for fiscal year 2017. Figure 22 shows the Marine Corps Reserve fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine Corps had fewer junior fighter pilots—those pilots between grades Officer-1 and Officer-3—than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. Marine Corps officials told us that, as a result, the Marine Corps assigns pilots at the Officer-4 grade to staff positions designated for junior pilots. For example, in fiscal year 2017 the Marine Corps needed an additional 309 junior fighter pilots (48 percent of authorizations) to fill all authorizations. Figure 23 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps active component junior and senior fighter pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal year 2017. According to Marine Corps data for the active component, the Marine Corps had fewer tiltrotor pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. Tiltrotor pilot staffing levels and authorizations have increased substantially from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. Further, the gap between the staffing levels and authorizations has decreased from 137 tiltrotor pilots (70 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2006 to 322 tiltrotor pilots (34 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 24 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps active component tiltrotor pilot staffing levels and authorizations in fiscal years 2006 through 2017. According to Marine Corps active component data, the Marine Corps had fewer tanker pilots than authorizations from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2017. This gap decreased from 86 tanker pilots in fiscal year 2006 (22 percent of authorizations) to 18 tanker pilots (5 percent of authorizations) in fiscal year 2017. Figure 25 shows the comparison of the Marine Corps active component tanker pilot staffing levels and authorizations for fiscal years 2006 through 2017. In March 2016, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force created the Fighter Enterprise Tiger Team to address the fighter pilot shortage that the Air Force identified. In February 2017, the Air Force effort was expanded to include all rated personnel and renamed the Aircrew Crisis Task Force. According to Air Force officials, the task force has focused on the following areas to improve fighter pilot retention: work/life balance, quality of service, and monetary compensation. In August 2017 the Aircrew Crisis Task Force held a Dedicated Aircrew Retention Team Summit that included organizing discussion groups with pilots to obtain information on retention challenges. According to Air Force officials, in September 2017, the task force presented 25 of the 44 recommendations developed at the summit to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as of November 2017 the Chief of Staff had decided to implement 2 of them immediately and conduct additional analysis on the other 23. The recommendations being analyzed include reducing the length and number of deployments for fighter pilots and converting some non-flying fighter pilot positions to UAS pilot positions. As of November 2017, these efforts had resulted in 37 implemented initiatives (see table 2). In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report were Lori Atkinson, Assistant Director; Vincent Buquicchio, Timothy Carr, Mae Jones, Foster Kerrison, Amie Lesser, Michael Silver, and Nell Williams. Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better Position the Navy and the Marine Corps to Support Expanding Unmanned Systems Operations. GAO-18-162. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2018. Department of Defense: Actions Needed to Address Five Key Mission Challenges. GAO-17-369. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2017. DOD Training: DOD Has Taken Steps to Assess Common Military Training. GAO-17-468. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2017. Navy Force Structure: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Size and Composition of Ship Crews. GAO-17-413. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2017. High Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others. GAO-17-317. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2017. Military Compensation: Additional Actions Are Needed to Better Manage Special and Incentive Pay Programs. GAO-17-39. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2017. Unmanned Aerial Systems: Air Force and Army Should Improve Human Capital Planning for Pilot Workforces. GAO-17-53. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2017. Unmanned Aerial Systems: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Air Force and Army Pilot Workforce Challenges. GAO-16-527T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2016. Unmanned Aerial Systems: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Pilot Training. GAO-15-461. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2015. Air Force: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Unmanned Aerial System Pilots. GAO-14-316. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2014. Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions. GAO-10-789. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010. Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Comprehensive Planning and a Results- Oriented Training Strategy Are Needed to Support Growing Inventories. GAO-10-331. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 2010. Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning. GAO-04-39. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003. Military Personnel: Actions Needed to Better Define Pilot Requirements and Promote Retention. GAO/NSIAD-99-211. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 1999.
Fighter pilots operate aircraft that are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during combat operations. The military services invest significant time and funding to train, compensate, and retain fighter pilots. According to Air Force officials, it costs between $3-$11 million and takes approximately 5 years to develop an individual fighter pilot to lead combat missions. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of the fighter pilot workforce. GAO's report (1) assesses the extent to which the military services had differences in the number of fighter pilots compared to authorizations, and describes any contributing factors as well as initiatives to address the differences, and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services had reevaluated squadron requirements for the number of fighter pilots needed, including consideration of UAS pilot requirements. GAO analyzed military service personnel data, documentation on service initiatives to address factors contributing to fighter pilot shortages, and service documentation of requirements; met with a non-generalizable sample of fighter pilots at seven locations; and interviewed DOD and service officials. The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps had gaps between the actual numbers of fighter pilots and authorizations (i.e. funded positions) in fiscal years (FY) 2013 through 2017. In FY 2017 the Air Force's gap was the widest at 27 percent of authorizations (see fig. below) and is projected to continue through FY 2023. The Marine Corps' gap grew from 6 percent in FY 2006 to 24 percent in FY 2017; it is concentrated in fighter pilots below the rank of major. While the Navy did not have comparable data, it had a gap at fighter pilots' first operational tours that grew from 12 percent in FY 2013 to 26 percent in FY 2017, and Navy officials stated it could increase through mid-2019. Service officials attributed these gaps to aircraft readiness challenges, reduced training opportunities, and increased attrition of fighter pilots due to career dissatisfaction. To help increase fighter pilot numbers, the military services are taking actions, including increasing the amounts of financial incentives to retain pilots. The military services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect increased fighter pilot workload and the emergence of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). According to service guidance, squadron requirements are to be reviewed on a 2-year schedule and to be updated as conditions change (in June 2017 the Navy revised its guidance to extend its schedule from 2 years to 5 years). However, service officials acknowledged that they have not updated all squadron requirements within the last 2 years. These officials stated that the requirements have not been reevaluated because existing conditions do not warrant the change. However, fighter pilots and squadron leaders interviewed at locations GAO visited consistently stated that the typical workload has significantly increased in recent years due to, among other things, changes in fighter aircraft tactics and technology and reductions to administrative support in squadrons. Further, the military services have not assessed the effect of increased reliance on UAS on fighter pilot requirements. The Air Force's vision for UAS notes that systems will work in tandem with cockpit-operated aircraft and that autonomous technologies will potentially lead to personnel efficiencies. Without re-evaluating squadron requirements to reflect current and emerging conditions, the nature of the gap may be inaccurate and thus make it difficult for the military services to target strategies to meet their personnel needs. GAO recommends that the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements. DOD concurred with the recommendations.