DHS leads the federal government’s efforts to secure our nation’s public and private critical infrastructure information systems against cyber threats. As part of these efforts, cybersecurity professionals can help to prevent or mitigate the vulnerabilities that could allow malicious individuals and groups access to federal information technology (IT) systems. The ability to secure federal systems depends on the knowledge, skills, and abilities of the federal and contractor workforce that designs, develops, implements, secures, maintains, and uses these systems. The Office of Management and Budget has noted that the federal government and private industry face a persistent shortage of cybersecurity and IT talent to implement and oversee information security protections. This shortage may leave federal IT systems vulnerable to malicious attacks. Experienced and qualified cybersecurity professionals are essential in performing DHS’s work to mitigate vulnerabilities in its own and other agencies’ computer systems and to defend against cyber threats. Since 1997, we have identified the protection of federal information systems as a governmentwide high-risk area. In addition, in 2001, we introduced strategic governmentwide human capital management as another area of high risk. We have also identified a number of challenges federal agencies are facing to ensure that they have a sufficient cybersecurity workforce with the skills necessary to protect their information and networks from cyber threats. These challenges pertain to identifying and closing skill gaps as part of a comprehensive workforce planning process, recruiting and retaining qualified staff, and navigating the federal hiring process. In recent years, the federal government has taken various steps aimed at improving the cybersecurity workforce. These include establishing a national initiative to promote cybersecurity training and skills and developing guidance to address cybersecurity workforce challenges. Founded in 2010, the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) is a partnership among government, academia, and the private sector, and is coordinated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The NICE mission promotes cybersecurity education, training, and workforce development in coordination with its partners. The initiative’s goal is to increase the number of skilled cybersecurity professionals in order to boost national IT security. In 2013, NICE published the National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework to provide a consistent way to define and describe cybersecurity work at any public or private organization, including federal agencies. In 2014, OPM developed guidance for assigning 2-digit employment codes for each cybersecurity work category and specialty area identified in the 2013 NICE framework. Federal agencies can use the codes to identify cybersecurity positions in personnel and payroll systems, such the system of the National Finance Center. To further enhance efforts to strengthen the cybersecurity workforce, NICE subsequently revised the framework in 2017 to include 33 cybersecurity-related specialty areas organized into 7 categories— securely provision, operate and maintain, protect and defend, investigate, collect and operate, analyze, and oversee and govern. The revision defined work roles in specialty areas and cybersecurity tasks for each work role, as well as the knowledge, skills, and abilities that a person should have in order to perform each work role. Also, in 2017, OPM issued guidance creating a unique 3-digit employment code for each cybersecurity work role. In October 2017, NIST issued guidance that reflected the finalized 2017 NICE framework and included a crosswalk of OPM’s 2-digit employment codes to the 3-digit codes. DHS is the third largest department in the federal government, employing approximately 240,000 people, and operating with an annual budget of about $60 billion, of which about $6.4 billion was reportedly spent on IT in fiscal year 2017. In leading the federal government’s efforts to secure our nation’s public and private critical infrastructure information systems, the department, among other things, collects and shares information related to cyber threats and cybersecurity risks and incidents with other federal partners to enable real-time actions to address these risks and incidents. The department is made up of 15 operational and support components that perform its critical mission functions. Table 1 describes the 6 components that we included in our review. The Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 required DHS to perform workforce assessment-related activities to identify and assign employment codes to its cybersecurity positions. Specifically, the act called for DHS to: 1. Establish procedures for identifying and categorizing cybersecurity positions and assigning codes to positions (within 90 days of law’s enactment). 2. Identify all filled and vacant positions with cybersecurity functions and determine the work category and specialty area of each. 3. Assign OPM 2-digit employment codes to all filled and vacant cybersecurity positions based on the position’s primary cybersecurity work category and specialty areas, as set forth in OPM’s Guide to Data Standards. In addition, after completing the aforementioned activities, the act called for the department to take steps to identify and report its cybersecurity workforce areas of critical need. Specifically, DHS was to: 4. Identify the cybersecurity work categories and specialty areas of critical need in the department’s cybersecurity workforce and report to Congress. 5. Submit to OPM an annual report through 2021 that describes work categories and specialty areas of critical need and substantiates the critical need designations. The act required DHS to complete the majority of these activities by specific due dates between March 2015 and September 2016. Within DHS, OCHCO is responsible for carrying out these provisions, including the coordination of the department’s overall efforts to identify, categorize, code, and report its cybersecurity workforce assessment progress to OPM and Congress. The act required DHS to establish procedures to identify and assign the appropriate employment code, in accordance with OPM’s Guide to Data Standards, to all filled and vacant positions with cybersecurity functions by March 2015. In addition, DHS’s April 2016 Cybersecurity Workforce Coding guidance states that components should ensure procedures are in place to monitor and to update the employment codes as positions change over time. Further, the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government recommends that management assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles and that each component develop individual procedures to implement objectives. The standards also recommend that management periodically review such procedures to see that they are developed, relevant, and effective. DHS OCHCO developed departmental procedures in May 2014 and recommended implementation steps for coding positions with cybersecurity functions for the department’s components. However, OCHCO did not update its procedures to include information on identifying positions and assigning codes until April 2016—13 months after the due date specified by the act. In addition, the procedures were not complete because they did not include information related to identifying and coding vacant positions, as the act required. Moreover, the departmental procedures did not identify the individual within each DHS component who was responsible for leading and overseeing the identification and coding of the component’s cybersecurity positions. Further, although components were able to supplement the departmental procedures by developing their own component-specific procedures for identifying and coding their cybersecurity positions, OCHCO did not review those procedures for consistency with departmental guidance. The department could not provide documentation that OCHCO had verified or reviewed component-developed procedures. In addition, OCHCO officials acknowledged that they had not reviewed the components’ procedures and had not developed a process for conducting such reviews. OCHCO officials stated that several factors had limited their ability to develop the procedures and to review component-developed procedures in a timely and complete manner. These factors were (1) a delayed departmental decision until April 2016 as to whether certain positions should be considered cybersecurity positions; (2) a belief that each component had the best understanding of their human capital systems, so procedure development was best left up to each component; (3) a condition where each of the six selected DHS components recorded and tracked vacant positions differently; and (4) cybersecurity specialty areas for vacant positions were not known until a position description was developed or verified and a hiring action was imminent. Without assurance that procedures are timely, complete, and reviewed, DHS cannot be certain that its components have the procedures to identify and code all positions with cybersecurity functions, as required by the act. Accordingly, our February 2018 report included recommendations that DHS 1) develop procedures on how to identify and code vacant cybersecurity positions, 2) identify the individual in each component who is responsible for leading that component’s efforts in identifying and coding cybersecurity positions, and 3) establish and implement a process to periodically review each component’s procedures for identifying component cybersecurity positions and maintaining accurate coding. DHS concurred with the recommendations and stated that it would implement them by April 30, 2018. The act required DHS to identify all of its cybersecurity positions, including vacant positions, by September 2015. Further, the act called for the department to use OPM’s Guide to Data Standards to categorize the identified positions and determine the work category or specialty area of each position. As of December 2016, the department reported that it had identified 10,725 cybersecurity positions, including 6,734 federal civilian positions, 584 military positions, and 3,407 contractor positions. Nevertheless, as of November 2017, the department had not completed identifying all of its cybersecurity positions and it had not determined the work categories or specialty areas of the positions. In explaining why the department had not identified all its positions, OCHCO officials stated that components varied in reporting their identified vacant positions because the department did not have a system to track vacancies. Of the 7 work categories and 33 specialty areas in the NICE framework, DHS reported that its 3 most common work categories were “protect and defend”, “securely provision,” and “oversight and development;” and its 2 most common specialty areas were “security program management” and “vulnerability assessment and management.” However, DHS could not provide data to show the actual numbers of positions in each of these categories and specialty areas. According to OCHCO officials, the department was still in the process of identifying positions for the 2-digit codes and would continue this effort until the 3-digit codes were available in the National Finance Center personnel and payroll system in December 2017. At that time, OCHCO officials stated that the department intends to start developing procedures for identifying and coding positions using the 3-digit codes. The act also required DHS to assign 2-digit employment codes to all of its identified cybersecurity positions. This action was to be completed by September 2015. However, as of August 2017—23 months after the due date—the department had not completed the coding assignment process. Although, in August 2017, OPM provided a progress report to Congress containing DHS data which stated that 95 percent of DHS-identified cybersecurity positions had been coded, our analysis determined that the department had assigned cybersecurity position codes to approximately 79 percent of its identified federal civilian cybersecurity positions. The primary reason for this discrepancy was that DHS did not include the coding of vacant positions, as required by the act. Further, OCHCO officials stated they did not verify the accuracy of the components’ cybersecurity workforce data. Without coding cybersecurity positions in a complete and accurate manner, DHS will not be able to effectively examine its cybersecurity workforce; identify skill gaps; and improve workforce planning. Thus, in our recently issued report, we recommended that OCHCO collect complete and accurate data on all filled and vacant cybersecurity positions when it conducts its cybersecurity identification and coding efforts. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that, by June 29, 2018, it intends to issue memorandums to its components that provide instructions for the components to periodically review compliance and cybersecurity workforce data concerns to ensure data accuracy. According to the act, DHS was to identify its cybersecurity work categories and specialty areas of critical need in alignment with the NICE framework and to report this information to the appropriate congressional committees by June 2016. In addition, a DHS directive required the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer to provide guidance to the department’s components on human resources procedures, including identifying workforce needs. As of February 2018, the department had not fulfilled its requirements to identify and report its critical needs. Although DHS identified workforce skills gaps in a report that it submitted to congressional committees in March 2017, the department did not align the skills gaps to the NICE framework’s defined work categories and specialty areas of critical need. In September 2017, OCHCO developed a draft document that attempted to crosswalk identified department-wide cybersecurity skills gaps to one or more specialty areas in the NICE framework. However, the document did not adequately help components identify their critical needs by aligning their gaps with the NICE framework because it did not provide clear guidance to help components determine a critical need in cases in which a skills gap is mapped to multiple work categories. According to OCHCO officials, DHS had not identified department-wide cybersecurity critical needs that aligned with the framework partly because OPM did not provide DHS with guidance for identifying cybersecurity critical needs. In addition, OCHCO officials stated that the components did not generally view critical skills gaps in terms of the categories or specialty areas as defined in the NICE framework, but instead, described their skills gaps using position titles that are familiar to them. In the absence of relevant guidance to help components identify their critical needs, DHS and the components are hindered from effectively identifying and prioritizing workforce efforts to recruit, hire, train, develop, and retain cybersecurity personnel. DHS also did not report cybersecurity critical needs to OPM in September 2016 or September 2017, as required. Instead, the department first reported its cybersecurity coding progress and skills gaps in a March 2017 report that it sent to OPM and Congress to address several of the act’s requirements. However, the report did not describe or substantiate critical need designations because DHS has not yet identified them. Additionally, DHS had not developed plans or time frames to complete priority actions—developing a DHS cybersecurity workforce strategy and completing its initial cybersecurity workforce research— that OCHCO officials said must be completed before it can report its cybersecurity critical needs to OPM. According to OCHCO officials, the report that the department submitted to Congress in March 2017 had contained plans and schedules. However, we found that the March 2017 report did not capture and sequence all of the activities that DHS officials said must be completed in order to report critical needs. Until DHS develops plans and schedules with time frames for reporting its cybersecurity critical needs, DHS may not have insight into its needs for ensuring that it has the workforce necessary to carry out its critical role of helping to secure the nation’s cyberspace. In our report, we recommended that DHS 1) develop guidance to assist DHS components in identifying their cybersecurity work categories and specialty areas of critical need that align to the NICE framework and 2) develop plans with time frames to identify priority actions to report on specialty areas of critical need. DHS concurred with the recommendations and stated that it plans to implement them by June 2018. In summary, DHS needs to act now to completely and accurately identify, categorize, and assign codes to all of its cybersecurity positions, and to identify and report on its cybersecurity workforce areas of critical need. Implementing the six recommendations we made in our February 2018 report should better position the department to meet the requirements of the 2014 act. Further, doing so will help DHS understand its needs for recruiting, hiring, developing, and retaining a cybersecurity workforce with the skills necessary to accomplish the department’s varied and essential cybersecurity mission. Until DHS implements our recommendations, it will not be able to ensure that it has the necessary cybersecurity personnel to help protect the department’s and federal networks and the nation’s critical infrastructure from cyber threats. Chairmen Ratcliffe and Perry, Ranking Members Richmond and Correa, and Members of the Subcommittees, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to your questions. If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov, or Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony are Alexander Anderegg, Ben Atwater, David Blanding, Jr., Chris Businsky, Wayne Emilien, Jr., Nancy Glover, David Hong, Tammi Kalugdan, David Plocher, Luis E. Rodriguez, and Priscilla Smith. GAO, Cybersecurity: Federal Efforts Are Under Way That May Address Workforce Challenges, GAO-17-533T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2017). GAO, Information Security: DHS Needs to Continue to Advance Initiatives to Protect Federal Systems, GAO-17-518T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2017). GAO, High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others, GAO-17-317 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2017). GAO, Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Strengthen U.S. Capabilities, GAO-17-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2017). GAO IT Workforce: Key Practices Help Ensure Strong Integrated Program Teams; Selected Departments Need to Assess Skill Gaps, GAO-17-8 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2016). GAO, Federal Chief Information Security Officers: Opportunities Exist to Improve Roles and Address Challenges to Authority, GAO-16-686 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 26, 2016). GAO, Federal Hiring: OPM Needs to Improve Management and Oversight of Hiring Authorities, GAO-16-521 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2016). GAO, Information Security: DHS Needs to Enhance Capabilities, Improve Planning, and Support Greater Adoption of Its National Cybersecurity Protection System, GAO-16-294 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2016). GAO, Federal Workforce: OPM and Agencies Need to Strengthen Efforts to Identify and Close Mission-Critical Skills Gaps, GAO-15-223 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2015). GAO, Cybersecurity Human Capital: Initiatives Need Better Planning and Coordination, GAO-12-8 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 29, 2011). 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DHS is the lead agency tasked with protecting the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber threats. The Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 required DHS to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to all of the department's cybersecurity workforce positions. These codes define work roles and tasks for cybersecurity specialty areas such as program management and system administration. Further, the act required DHS to identify and report its cybersecurity workforce critical needs. GAO was asked to testify on the extent to which DHS has (1) identified, categorized, and assigned employment codes to its cybersecurity positions and (2) identified its cybersecurity workforce areas of critical need. To do so, GAO summarized the findings discussed in its February 2018 report on DHS's cybersecurity workforce ( GAO-18-175 ). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken actions to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to its cybersecurity positions, as required by the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 ; however, its actions have not been timely and complete. For example, DHS did not establish timely and complete procedures to identify, categorize, and code its cybersecurity position vacancies and responsibilities. Further, DHS did not complete efforts to identify all of the department's cybersecurity positions and accurately assign codes to all filled and vacant cybersecurity positions. In August 2017, DHS reported to Congress that it had coded 95 percent of the department's identified cybersecurity positions. However, the department had, at that time, coded approximately 79 percent of the positions. DHS's 95 percent estimate was overstated primarily because it excluded vacant positions, even though the act required DHS to report these positions. In addition, although DHS has taken steps to identify its workforce capability gaps, it has not identified or reported to Congress on its departmentwide cybersecurity critical needs that align with specialty areas. The department also has not reported annually its cybersecurity critical needs to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as required, and has not developed plans with clearly defined time frames for doing so. (See table). Without ensuring that its procedures are complete and that its progress in identifying and assigning codes to its cybersecurity positions is accurately reported, DHS will not be positioned to effectively examine its cybersecurity workforce, identify critical skill gaps, or improve its workforce planning. Further, until DHS establishes plans and time frames for reporting on its critical needs, the department may not be able to ensure that it has the necessary cybersecurity personnel to help protect the department's and the nation's federal networks and critical infrastructure from cyber threats. The commitment of DHS's leadership to addressing these matters is essential to helping the department fulfill the act's requirements. In its February 2018 report, GAO recommended that DHS take six actions, including ensuring that its cybersecurity workforce procedures identify position vacancies and responsibilities; reported workforce data are complete and accurate; and plans for reporting on critical needs are developed. DHS concurred with the six recommendations and described actions the department plans to take to address them.