Federal agencies carry out a variety of missions, including protecting and defending government buildings, public lands, and natural resources, as well as federal employees, elected officials, and visitors to federal sites. Agencies with FLEOs are also charged with investigating civil and criminal violations of federal laws. Inspectors General, which may also have FLEOs, are independent and objective units within agencies that are charged with combatting waste, fraud, and abuse within the programs and operations of their agencies. Table 2 lists the agencies within our review (20 agencies included in our review of spending data and 5 agency components included in our review of inventory controls) and describes their law enforcement missions. For more information about the data each agency provided, see appendix II. For the purposes of our review, a firearm is any weapon that is designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or that may be readily converted to do so. Some firearms are single-shot, while others may be semi-automatic (requires a separate pull of the trigger to fire each cartridge) or fully automatic (can shoot automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger). Ammunition includes its component parts, such as cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propellant powder designed to be used in a firearm. Ammunition can be used in multiple types of firearms, based on the size. For example, 9mm caliber ammunition used in pistols can also be used in certain types of fully automatic firearms. See figure 1 below for more information about the types of firearms FLEOs may use. In addition to firearms and ammunition, federal agencies may also have a variety of tactical equipment available to their officers to support their law enforcement roles. For example, officers engaged in counterdrug activities may use armored vehicles for drug raids in rural areas or night- vision equipment to maintain surveillance of drug activities. Officers that work in counterterrorism and border security may use helicopters or other aircraft, as well as armored or tactical vehicles, to patrol or surveil locations. See figure 2 for examples of selected tactical equipment in our review. Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) is a comprehensive web-based tool for agencies to publicly report contract transactions, including firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment purchases. The public can download FPDS-NG data on contract actions from the USASpending.gov website, and this data set enables users to examine spending in multiple categories across government agencies. The contracting officer, who awards a contract or order against an existing contract, has responsibility for accurately recording the individual contract action information in FPDS-NG. Agencies are responsible for developing a process for recording contract actions and monitoring results to ensure their timely and accurate reporting in FPDS-NG, and must submit certifications about the accuracy of contract reporting to the General Services Administration. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual require that each transaction record include the name of the funding agency—the agency that provided the obligated funds for the transaction. The FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual also requires a product or service code (PSC) that reflects the product or service procured. If more than one PSC applies, the PSC that represents the predominance of the dollars obligated should be selected. Generally, the FAR requires that agencies report contract actions with a total estimated value greater than $3,500 to FPDS-NG. Generally, contract actions that do not meet the $3,500 threshold may also be reported, but the FAR does not require agencies to do so. The 20 federal agencies in our review reported data from their internal record-keeping systems on the amount they spent on firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment. These agencies reported spending at least $38.8 million on firearms, $325.9 million on ammunition, and $1.14 billion on tactical equipment—at least $1.5 billion in total—from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. For detailed information about the data each agency provided, see appendix II. The 20 agencies in our review reported spending a total of at least $38.8 million on firearms for their FLEOs from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, based on available spending data they provided from their internal record- keeping systems. The amount each agency reported spending on firearms over the 8-year period ranged from $106,000, in the case of the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Inspector General (SSA OIG) to $4 million at U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Of the 20 agencies in our review, 18 agencies also reported the number of firearms they bought. These agencies reported buying a total of at least 44,551 firearms during this time. The quantity of firearms each of these 18 agencies reported buying over the 8-year period ranged from at least 311 at SSA OIG to at least 8,500 at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Agencies buy a variety of firearms in support of their law enforcement missions. From fiscal years 2010 through 2017, agencies reported buying pistols, rifles and shotguns, and three of the agencies—NPPD, ICE, and U.S. Secret Service—also reported buying revolvers. Seventeen agencies reported buying semi-automatic firearms, while eight agencies reported buying fully automatic firearms and ten agencies reported buying single-shot firearms. See figure 3 for more information about the types of firearms that agencies reported buying over the 8-year period. Agency officials told us there were several reasons why they buy firearms, such as to update their entire firearms inventory, to replace malfunctioning firearms, or to test new models of firearms. Agencies typically do not update their firearms inventory often because firearms can last many years when properly serviced and maintained. This is reflected in agencies’ spending data, which generally show periodic larger orders of firearms and more frequent smaller orders. For example, ATF reported buying several thousand pistols in both fiscal years 2012 and 2017, and fewer than 1,000 pistols and rifles in total in the intervening years. Similarly, BIA reported buying several hundred firearms in 2010, 2012, and 2014, and fewer than 200 in total in the remaining 5 years of our review. When firearms near the end of their useful life, agencies can choose to retire or replace them. Additionally, agencies frequently reported buying three or fewer firearms at a time, and officials from one agency we spoke with said that they may buy a single firearm at a time in order to test out new models for future consideration. The 20 agencies in our review reported spending a total of at least $325.9 million on ammunition for their FLEOs from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, based on available spending data from agencies’ internal record- keeping systems. The amount each agency reported spending on ammunition over the 8-year period ranged from $309,000 (SSA OIG) to $128 million (CBP). Of the 20 agencies in our review, 16 agencies also reported the number of rounds of ammunition they bought. The 16 agencies reported buying a total of at least 767 million rounds of ammunition during this time. The number of rounds of ammunition each of these agencies reported buying over the 8-year period ranged from at least 846,000 rounds (SSA OIG) to at least 429 million rounds (CBP). These agencies most frequently reported buying handgun ammunition, and .40 caliber was the most frequently reported caliber. See figure 4 for more information about the types of ammunition that agencies reported buying over the 8-year period. Agency officials we spoke with said the quantity of ammunition they buy annually varies within each agency based on factors such as ammunition usage in previous years, the number of officers qualifying to use a firearm each year, the skill level of officers, the type of training conducted, and their budget each fiscal year. Specifically, agencies require officers to pass certain firearms qualifications standards in order to maintain their proficiency—typically quarterly for pistols, and biannually for rifles and shotguns. Officers must qualify on each firearm they are authorized to carry, and some agencies may have additional training requirements throughout the year. For example, HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) officials said that, in addition to quarterly qualifications, officers also complete eight additional training modules each year that cover topics that include responding to multiple assailants, use of cover, and reactive shooting techniques. HHS OIG officials noted that they may add additional training if needed, and officials take this into account when determining the type and amount of ammunition they order each year. Of the 20 agencies in our review, 17 provided spending data for their tactical equipment. The 17 agencies reported spending a total of at least $1.14 billion on tactical equipment for their FLEOs from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, based on available spending data from agencies’ internal record-keeping systems. The amount each agency reported spending on tactical equipment over the 8-year period ranged from $10,000 (SSA OIG) to $609 million (CBP). We cannot report the total quantities of tactical equipment agencies bought because agencies reported quantity data using different units of measurement. For example, when we requested data on the number of camouflage uniforms agencies bought, agencies used “1” to refer to a variety of clothing, such as a single pair of pants or a full set of uniforms. A few agencies accounted for a significant portion of the total reported spending on tactical equipment. Specifically, four agencies—CBP, U.S. Marshals Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Drug Enforcement Administration—reported spending at least $755 million in the manned aircraft category, or 66 percent of all reported tactical equipment spending for all agencies. See figure 5 for the types of tactical equipment agencies reported in spending data. The 17 agencies that reported buying tactical equipment most frequently reported buying aiming devices, such as sights and scopes, and specialized image enhancement devices, such as thermal cameras or night-vision goggles. Few agencies reported buying tactical and weaponized vehicles, aircrafts, and vessels. See figure 6 for more information about the types of equipment reported in each agency’s spending data. For the three agencies we reviewed—BIA, Forest Service, and ICE— publicly-available purchase data from USASpending.gov on firearms and ammunition did not consistently match the internal agency data we reviewed. Table 3 shows the total dollar value of the firearms and ammunition obligations that each agency reported to us, alongside the dollar value of the obligations in the publicly-available data. Differences between the agency-reported values and the values shown in the publicly-available data ranged from less than 1 percent to approximately 700 percent of the values reported by the agencies. Of the three agencies that we reviewed, ICE had the largest discrepancies between the agency-reported and publicly-available values. ICE reported to us $2,539,585 in firearms obligations and $47,965,399 in ammunition obligations for fiscal years 2010 through 2017; however, the publicly- available data for ICE for the same time period shows $19,728,786 in firearms obligations—about eight times greater than what ICE reported to us—and $146,198,549 in ammunition obligations—about three times the amount that ICE reported to us. According to our analysis, some of the difference between the ICE- provided and publicly-available obligations in USASpending.gov results from other DHS agencies using ICE contracts to make firearms and ammunition purchases, and ICE not properly identifying the funding agency for those purchases in the Federal Procurement Data System- Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the database from which USASpending.gov draws contracting data. In these cases, agency officials told us that under a process known as “strategic sourcing,” ICE performs the procurement functions and is reimbursed by the purchasing agency. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires that the agency that “provided the predominant amount of funding for the contract action” be recorded in FPDS-NG. The FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual also specifies that users record the agency that “provided the obligated funds”—that is, the agency that purchased the item or service. However, when ICE records the transaction data in FPDS-NG, ICE lists itself as the funding agency for firearms and ammunition transactions. For example, in the publicly-available records, a fiscal year 2013 purchase of pistols from the manufacturer totaling $847,960 in obligations shows ICE as the funding agency, but the transaction description states: “to purchase pistols for FPS .” As a result, ICE appears to be the funding agency for more firearm and ammunition transactions in the publicly-available data than in the data ICE reported to us. ICE officials explained that their contracting officers manually enter ICE as the funding agency in FPDS-NG. They interpret the FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual guidance to allow designation of ICE as the funding agency, since payment for the purchase is made from an ICE account even when those funds are reimbursed by the agency that actually receives the purchased product. However, the FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual specifically requires the identification of the funding agency and distinguishes between the agency that makes the payment and the agency that ultimately provides the funds for the purchase. FPDS-NG guidance also clarifies that when one agency buys on behalf of another, the agency that is requiring the purchase should be recorded as the funding agency, not the payment office. Because ICE recorded other agencies’ purchases as its own in the publicly-available data, it significantly inflated the apparent dollar value of its firearms and ammunition purchases. As a result of ICE not accurately recording the correct funding agency information in FPDS-NG, the public does not have accurate information on the value of firearms and ammunition purchases made by ICE, and the agencies that make purchases using ICE contracting services. As we have previously reported, data need to be presented in a way that meets the needs of the end users—both policy makers and the public—if USASpending.gov is to fulfill its purpose of increasing accountability and transparency in federal spending. Improving the accuracy of the reported funding agency can better help the public understand and use federal data, and increase accountability and transparency of these sensitive purchases. Data on obligations for the publicly-available purchase records had smaller discrepancies when compared with purchases of firearms and ammunition reported to us by the BIA and Forest Service. The BIA’s ammunition obligations in the agency- and publicly-reported data sets closely matched, with a discrepancy of less than 1 percent overall from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. The Forest Service’s firearms obligation amounts in the agency- and publicly-reported data sets also closely matched, with a discrepancy of less than 1 percent overall from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. However, the dollar value of the Forest Service’s ammunition obligations recorded in the publicly-available data was approximately 25 percent greater than the value of the ammunition purchases in the data that they provided to us. Forest Service officials explained that the publicly-reported data includes ammunition purchased for non-law enforcement purposes—such as protecting Forest Service employees from wildlife attacks, controlling invasive species, or euthanizing injured animals—and those purchases were excluded from the data that they provided to us because the scope of this review focuses on purchases for FLEOs. The type and amount of information recorded in the publicly-available data also contribute to discrepancies between agency-provided and publicly-available purchase records. As a result, the publicly-available data may comply with the data reporting requirements enumerated in the FAR and in the FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual and still differ from the agency-provided data. Differences between publicly-available data and agency purchase records include: The product or service code (PSC) selected in the publicly-available data may not reflect all of the items in a purchase. According to the FPDS-NG Government User’s Manual, the PSC selected for a purchase should reflect the items that constitute “the predominance of the dollars obligated,” and only one PSC may be associated with a purchase. Therefore, when a purchase is assigned a firearms or ammunition PSC, but the purchase includes non-firearms or non- ammunition items as well, the total obligated amount of the purchase will be associated only with the selected PSC in the publicly-available data. This may result in over- or under-reporting the value of the obligations for firearms or ammunition purchases. For example, in fiscal year 2014, BIA purchased 103 shotguns, 220 tactical lights, and other equipment in a single transaction. The total value of the obligation was $145,970, of which the shotguns constituted 50.4 percent of the purchase ($73,549). Consistent with FPDS-NG guidance, the entire purchase was categorized as “Guns, through 30mm” in the publicly-available data, even though almost half of the purchase was for non-firearms items, thereby over-reporting the obligated value of the firearms purchased—in this case, effectively doubling the apparent obligated value of the firearms purchased while omitting the obligated value of the non-firearms items that were part of the purchase. Conversely, a purchase categorized as “Optical Sighting and Ranging Equipment” obligated for $2,971 included a line item for $500 of ammunition. BIA included the $500 ammunition purchase in the data provided to us, but that amount was included under the equipment PSC in the publicly-available data in keeping with FPDS-NG guidance. This excluded the purchase from the publicly-available data that we reviewed and under-reported the obligated value of ammunition purchases by BIA. The available PSCs in the publicly-available data do not distinguish between firearm parts and fully functional firearms. Several purchases associated with firearms PSCs included descriptive information indicating that the purchase was for firearms parts. ICE officials also confirmed that an order described as firearm “parts” could include fully functional firearms. The officials noted that whether a particular purchase included fully functional firearms, firearms parts, or both cannot be determined without the statement of work, and the statement of work is not part of the publicly-available data. By including purchases of both fully functional firearms and firearm parts in the same category, publicly-available data may inflate the obligated value of functional firearms purchases. Firearms and ammunition purchases may not be assigned a related PSC in the publicly-available data. In cases where agencies assigned a non-firearms or ammunition PSC to a firearms or ammunition purchase, those purchases were excluded from the publicly-reported data that we analyzed. For example, a Forest Service purchase of rifles and sights which obligated $50,799 was assigned a PSC for “Assemblies Interchangeable Between Weapons In Two or More Classes” in the public data, rather than a firearms- or ammunition- specific PSC. Another Forest Service purchase for rifles which obligated $23,457 was assigned a PSC for “R&D-Defense System: Weapons (Basic Research).” Agencies are not required to report purchases of $3,500 or less to FPDS-NG. Because purchases of $3,500 or less generally are not required to be reported to FPDS-NG, these purchases may be reported inconsistently or not at all in the publicly-available data. Ammunition is often purchased by the selected agencies in small quantities and may cost $3,500 or less. For example, Forest Service officials noted that such small ammunition purchases may be made using a purchase card, and their internal data included at least 130 such purchases. In addition, the publicly-available data do not include a field for agencies to report quantity information associated with purchases. Therefore, the number of firearms or rounds of ammunition that an agency purchased are not available in the publicly-available purchase data. HHS, EPA, and IRS law enforcement components, our case studies, in total reported inventories of five types of firearms—all with corresponding types of ammunition—and nine types of tactical equipment. According to officials in all components, their inventories of these items can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the missions and responsibilities of their FLEOs, the number of FLEOs, and the office’s schedule for disposing of and acquiring inventory. Table 4 summarizes the types and quantities of firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment reported at case study components as of November 2017. For additional information on case study components, see appendix II. Firearms. The numbers and types of firearms the components in our review reported having in their inventories varied. As of November 2017, all components reported inventories of pistols and shotguns, five components reported rifles, and three reported fully automatic firearms. Officials noted that they make decisions about what to have in their inventories based on factors such as their number of FLEOs and mission needs. All components issued pistols to FLEOs to carry, in accordance with their statutory authority. Officials stated that these firearms are to be carried on duty so FLEOs are prepared for potentially dangerous circumstances, such as serving warrants on armed individuals. Similarly, qualified FLEOs in all components can temporarily carry rifles or shotguns in anticipation of, or in response to, high-risk situations, such as active shooter threats or arrests of suspects who are believed to be dangerous. We found that components had more pistols per FLEO than shotguns or rifles per FLEO, which reflects components’ preferences to issue pistols to officers as their duty weapons. For example, six components reported having roughly a 2 to1 or 3 to 1 pistol-to-officer ratio, while EPA OIG agents had a 5 to1 ratio. Case study components generally reported having more pistols than FLEOs because every FLEO is assigned at least one pistol. On the other hand, six components reported having about 1 shotgun or fewer per every two FLEOs. However, EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA) had a 1.4 to 1 shotgun- to-FLEO ratio. According to EPA OECA officials, their shotgun-to-agent ratio is higher than other agencies because of two factors: 1) EPA OECA historically had more agents, which made their shotgun-to-agent ratios lower than when they acquired the shotguns in use today, and 2) EPA OECA sends additional unassigned shotguns to natural disaster response locations to pre-position them for EPA OECA agent use. Components in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and IRS reported keeping a relatively smaller number of shotguns, which they said they only deploy for high-risk investigations. Among the five components with rifles, rifle-to- FLEO ratios ranged widely—from less than 1 to 10 to 6 to 10 —due to differences in the number of FLEOs and mission needs. For example, officials with IRS Police, which had four rifles for nine officers, stated that they only use the rifles for continuity of operations drills and annual qualifications. Ammunition. As of November 2017, case study components reported inventories of ammunition ranging from 14,706, in the case of the IRS Police, to approximately 5 million rounds held by IRS CI. (See table 4 for all components’ inventories of ammunition.) Each law enforcement agency independently decides how much ammunition to allocate to its firearm-carrying personnel for training and qualification. Component officials noted that ammunition inventories constantly fluctuate throughout the year, based on factors such as the amount used for qualification and training purposes, and the timing of ammunition shipments. Officials from all components stated that their ammunition inventories can quickly change by thousands of rounds depending on training and qualification timing. For example, according to NIH officials, between November 2017 and February 2018, officers used 5,110 rounds of rifle ammunition during training, and subsequently NIH acquired 14,400 rounds of rifle ammunition. To help ensure they have sufficient ammunition on hand to support the training and operational needs of their FLEOs, components may maintain inventories of ammunition to last for several months. The length of time between ordering and receiving ammunition orders can be lengthy, sometimes up to 1 year, according to officials. Therefore, components order ammunition in large quantities to ensure there is enough available for training and qualification purposes. Tactical Equipment. Six case study components reported inventories of 9 of the 18 types of tactical equipment reviewed. Breaching equipment and aiming devices were the most frequently reported kinds of tactical equipment at these six components: four components reported breaching equipment and four reported aiming devices in inventories. Three components reported other equipment. EPA OIG reported inventories of silencers and tactical lighting; however, in February 2018 EPA OIG officials told us they began to transfer their silencers to another federal agency because officials decided that they were no longer necessary to meet their mission. Among the agencies in our review, NIH reported having pyrotechnics and large-caliber launchers. NIH officials said these items were necessary for assisting other law enforcement agencies in the event that extreme circumstances, such as a terrorist attack or riot, occurred in the area. HHS, IRS, and EPA case study components have inventory controls in place for firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment. Components generally followed their procedures at selected locations to track and secure FLEOs’ firearms. In addition, all 12 case study components’ offices that we visited were in compliance with their ammunition and tactical equipment inventory controls. All components had some controls governing ammunition and equipment, though the specific controls varied by component. HHS, IRS, and EPA case study components have controls in place for tracking, verifying, and securing FLEOs’ firearms. Through our observations, we found these components are generally following their inventory and security procedures at selected locations. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agencies should design control activities to respond to risks related to vulnerable assets. To ensure these controls operate effectively, management can take steps such as periodically counting and comparing such assets to control records, and establishing physical control to secure and safeguard vulnerable assets. Other examples of these controls include security for and limited access to assets, such as equipment that might be vulnerable to risk of loss or unauthorized use. In addition, we have identified areas that have been consistently recognized as important for effective inventory management that align with these controls. These areas include recording and tracking firearms inventory data and maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms inventories, among other things. Firearms Tracking. At each of these components, firearms are considered sensitive items and are tracked in electronic data systems or using paper records. At HHS OIG, there is a separate firearms tracking system, and other components track firearms in their overall property management system. A barcode or serial number is used to track the firearm through the life-cycle of the weapon—which includes initial assignment, changes in assignment (to a different agent or to storage), and weapon disposal. According to each component’s policy, every firearm has a bar code or serial number associated with it, and each firearm is assigned to an agent or placed in storage. When an agency receives a firearm, the serial number or bar code is entered into the agency’s firearms inventory system and upon assignment to an agent updated with the agent’s name. Typically, firearms in storage are assigned to the primary firearms instructor or the firearms coordinator in the inventory system to ensure accountability. At all case study components the primary firearms instructors and firearms coordinators are the persons responsible for managing the firearms inventory of an office and ensuring firearms are properly tracked—these are considered ancillary duties for these individuals, in addition to their regular responsibilities as FLEOs. We observed demonstrations or documentation of these tracking records at each office we visited and found them to be generally in accordance with office policies. Firearms Verification. Each component has a process whereby at least once a year officials conduct a firearms inventory to ensure that issued and stored firearms match with records in the office’s inventory tracking system. Figure 7 describes a general process that all components we reviewed follow to verify their firearms inventory. Five components we examined require this annual firearms inventory process to be conducted in person and entail the visual inspection of the serial number and condition of the firearm. However, FDA and EPA OECA FLEOs are permitted to send an email containing their firearm serial number, a photo of the firearm, or both to the official conducting the inventory to virtually verify they are in possession of their firearm. Officials stated that this saved them the expense of FLEOs in remote locations traveling for annual inventory checks. In addition to regularly verifying inventories of their firearms, five case study components conduct periodic checks to verify the accuracy of firearm inventory data. During these checks, headquarters or other inspection officials review data recorded about inventories, storage controls, and proper maintenance of weapons. For example, IRS CI and HHS OIG conduct regular internal reviews of firearms inventories and records that they use to identify data errors and make recommendations to improve data quality. We found that recent checks at the case study components have rarely identified issues related to recorded firearms data, and the majority of the identified issues were related to minor data errors, such as incorrectly recorded assignments of guns to FLEOs, locations of guns, and serial numbers. For example, in May 2017 EPA OECA’s check of one area office found two firearms listed as being in storage were actually in service. All components with these administrative errors corrected them as they became aware of them, according to the audit reports and agency officials. However, during our review of EPA OIG inventory control practices for firearms, we found that EPA OIG headquarters did not have a management review process in place for firearms inventory, which contributed to examples of inaccurate firearms inventory data. Specifically, we found 6 out of the 12 EPA OIG offices reported inventories with at least one firearm that did not match the location and individual to which it was assigned. For example, we found that the Special Agent in Charge at one EPA OIG’s field office verified that 10 firearms were physically in the office when actually they had been shipped to headquarters 11 months prior to the inventory date. According to EPA OIG officials, the errors we found were largely due to EPA OIG headquarters not updating records when agents transferred firearms from one office to another. As a result of our review, headquarters is implementing practices to improve future data quality. Specifically, EPA OIG officials said they reconciled their inventory data and had field offices with inaccurate inventories prepare memos to reflect their actual inventories. EPA OIG also updated firearms procedures to include headquarters increased oversight of firearms audits and inspections. In practice, EPA OIG officials stated that this will entail an annual reconciling of inventory memos sent by field offices with inventory data records maintained at EPA OIG headquarters. Thus, EPA OIG can more reliably track the location and agents responsible for firearms, ensuring proper weapons control procedures and accountability. Firearms Storage. All case study components had policies in place that required secure storage of firearms. All seven components’ policies specify that this must include a locked container, such as a file cabinet or desk safe for issued firearms or a firearm vault or safe for unissued firearms. In all 12 of the components’ offices we visited, we observed unissued firearms stored in a designated room that was kept locked with limited access. Specifically, we observed firearms storage rooms secured by keycard access, alarms, cameras, and other security devices. At all of the components’ offices we visited, only FLEOs with a need to enter the rooms had authorization to do so. For example, only FLEOs in management roles and firearms instructors had access to the firearms storage room at the IRS CI and HHS OIG offices we visited, according to officials at each. In the secure firearms storage rooms at all of the locations we visited, we observed firearms that were further protected by cabinets, cages, safes, vaults, or combinations of these devices. We also observed some instances of firearms being stored securely in safes outside of the designated firearms storage room. For example, two EPA OIG and OECA offices we visited had spare shotguns and related equipment in biometric safes in offices to be used in response to active shooter threats. Qualified FLEOs in these two offices can use their fingerprints to open the safes and respond to such threats. Based on our observations, the offices we visited for the six components were in compliance with their firearms storage policies. However, we found the IRS Police office in Martinsburg to be out of compliance with policy that limits access to stored firearms to the armorer and chief of security and its policy that restricts storage in locked cabinets to five firearms. Based on our finding, IRS Police officials said they will update their policy to reflect its current practice of allowing all IRS Police officers access to stored firearms to respond to active shooter threats and acquired an additional safe to store firearms in June 2018. For each of the components we examined in our review, there were no instances of firearms being lost or stolen from any office, according to component data and officials. All 12 offices for case study components that we visited were in compliance with their ammunition and tactical equipment inventory controls and procedures. All components had policies to treat ammunition and equipment as items with some level of control, though the specific controls varied by component. Ammunition. At the components’ offices we visited, we observed various methods for tracking ammunition inventories, such as electronic logs, physical logs, or visual inspection. In general, case study components’ policies require ammunition tracking through an ammunition log updated as ammunition is used, a regular inventory, or both. Components track ammunition to ensure they have enough on hand for training and qualifications, according to component officials. Some components, such as EPA OIG, maintain tight controls over their ammunition use by tracking ammunition use by lot number and the number of bullets used by each gun in physical logs. EPA OIG officials stated that they used this level of precision for three reasons: to track how many bullets are fired through each firearm for maintenance purposes, to quickly identify ammunition in inventory that may be affected by recalls, and to have a high degree of accountability. HHS OIG tracks ammunition using an electronic log, which they said they update whenever ammunition is removed for training and qualifications. IRS CI currently limits access to ammunition and entrusts use of force coordinators with independently managing their ammunition inventory to meet the training needs of their area of responsibility. One IRS CI use of force coordinator said that she relies on her experience and judgment to keep track of ammunition use at her field office without formally recording it. IRS CI is the only component in our review that does not have a documented policy to track ammunition or conduct a regular inventory; however, IRS CI officials indicated they are in the process of establishing a nationwide policy to track ammunition and conduct a regular ammunition inventory. Officials at two case study component offices said they provide their FLEOs extra boxes of ammunition to use for practice at a firing range outside of work hours. In general, four of the seven case study components did not track the real- time amount of ammunition they had on hand; rather, component officials said they had a general sense of the amount of ammunition in order to know if they had enough for training and qualifications, and when they would need to reorder ammunition. All case study components’ policies require secure storage of ammunition. In all 12 of the components’ offices we visited, we observed that ammunition was stored in their firearms storage rooms, and all offices took the additional step of securing the ammunition further in locked safes. For example, IRS CI requires ammunition storage in a security cabinet or a security room, preferably separately from firearms. Both of the IRS CI offices that we observed stored ammunition separately from firearms and with limited access. In the offices for two components, NIH and HHS OIG, we observed ammunition secured in a separate room from the firearms. Tactical equipment. Case study components do not control the tactical equipment in their inventory in the same ways that they control firearms and ammunition. Case study components that possessed aiming, breaching, and tactical lighting equipment did not have policies guiding their storage because they do not generally consider them to be as dangerous as a firearm or valuable enough to be tracked. However, components that possessed silencers, large-caliber launchers, pyrotechnics, or other items did have policies to control these items. Specifically, IRS CI policy requires the electronic tracking and inventory of night-vision equipment, optical equipment, and vehicles. NIH policy directs that large-caliber gas launchers be stored in the armory and pyrotechnics be stored in their bunker with ammunition. IRS CI, NIH, and EPA OIG all tracked this equipment during their annual inventory verification. Case study components did not report any instances of loss or theft of the tactical equipment in their inventories. Storage of tactical equipment varied and corresponded with case study components’ use of items. For example, we observed silencers and aiming devices stored on or near firearms at EPA OIG and NIH because they are accessories that attach to firearms. We observed breaching equipment to be stored either in the firearms storage room, vehicles, or elsewhere in the offices we visited. For example, at EPA OIG’s headquarters office, breaching equipment was stored in the firearms room because officials stated that they were only likely to use breaching equipment as part of a planned operation. However, officials at the FDA and NIH offices we visited said that their breaching equipment was stored in vehicles so it could be more readily accessible if they needed to use it. Accurate reporting of firearms and ammunition is critical for accountability and transparency of these sensitive purchases. While reporting such purchases with precision is difficult, the execution of this responsibility impacts the public’s access to information about which agencies purchase what types of firearms and ammunition, and the amount that they spent on those purchases. However, ICE did not properly identify the funding agency in FPDS-NG for purchases where other DHS agencies used ICE contracts to procure firearms and ammunition. This inflated its publicly-available data to show a significantly higher obligated dollar value of purchases than it actually purchased. Because ICE does not accurately report the agency that funded the purchase to FPDS-NG, the public does not have accurate information on how much ICE and the agencies that make purchases using ICE procurement services have obligated for firearms and ammunition. Data need to be presented in a way that meets the needs of the end users—both policymakers and the public—if USASpending.gov is to fulfill its purpose of increasing accountability and transparency in federal spending. Improving the accuracy of the reported funding agency can better help the public understand and use federal purchase data, and increase accountability and transparency for these sensitive purchases. To improve the accuracy of publicly-available purchase information, the Director of ICE should update ICE’s contracting process to include the name of the appropriate funding agency in data entered into FPDS-NG for firearms and ammunition purchases. (Recommendation 1) We provided a draft of the sensitive product to DHS, DOI, DOJ, EPA, HHS, SSA OIG, Treasury, USDA, and VA for review and comment. Agencies provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS also provided written comments on the sensitive report, which are reproduced in full in appendix III. In its written comments, DHS concurred with our recommendation and described the actions ICE plans to take in response. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretaries of the Department of the Interior, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Social Security Administration, the Department of the Treasury, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or goodwing@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. This report provides additional information on our objectives, scope, and methodology. Specifically, our objectives were to examine the following questions: 1. What do available data show about spending on firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment made by federal agencies with 250 or more federal law enforcement officers from fiscal years 2010 through 2017? 2. To what extent have selected agencies accurately reported purchases of firearms and ammunition in publicly-available data on USASpending.gov? 3. What types and quantities of firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment do the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have documented to be in their inventory systems, as of November 2017? 4. What inventory controls and procedures are in place at HHS, EPA, and IRS, and to what extent do these agencies follow these procedures at selected locations? This report is the public version of a sensitive report that we issued in October 2018. HHS, IRS and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deemed some of the information in our October report to be sensitive, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits sensitive information about the number of FLEOs at the TSA, an illustration of how HHS’s National Institutes of Health Police secures its firearms, and the number and types of some firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment in NIH’s and IRS’s inventory. Although the information provided in this report is more limited, the report addresses the same objectives as the sensitive report and uses the same methodology. To address our first question, we obtained available spending data on firearms, ammunition, and certain tactical equipment from 20 agencies from the departments named in the Chief Financial Officers Act that employed 250 or more federal law enforcement officers (FLEOs) at any point from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. Specifically, we identified applicable agencies by reviewing Office of Personnel Management employment data and contacting agency officials to verify the employment of 250 or more FLEOs during the timeframe we reviewed. We excluded military branches from our review, such as all Department of Defense (DOD) branches and the U.S. Coast Guard, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Table 5 shows the 20 agencies, within eight departments, included in our scope for this question. Because there was no definitive list of what is considered tactical equipment, we developed a list of equipment to include in our review. To do so, we reviewed the National Firearms Act List, the Law Enforcement Equipment Working Group Recommendations, the DOD’s list of Controlled Property, and the Special Weapons and Tactics Gear used by the New York, Los Angeles and Houston police departments. We then selected and categorized the tactical equipment that appeared in two or more of these lists to include in our review. The 18 categories of tactical equipment we created were: (1) silencers, (2) explosive devices, (3) large-caliber weapons (>.50 caliber, excluding shotguns), (4) armored vehicles, (5) weaponized aircraft, vessels, or vehicles, (6) camouflage uniforms, (7) manned aircraft, (8) unmanned aerial vehicles, (9) tactical vehicles, (10) command and control vehicles, (11) pyrotechnics and specialized munitions, (12) breaching apparatus, (13) riot batons, (14) riot helmets, (15) riot shields, (16) tactical lighting (excludes basic flashlights), (17) specialized image enhancement devices (such as thermal imaging devices and night vision gear), and (18) aiming devices (such as scopes and tripods). To more closely describe the types of equipment frequently reported in the large-caliber weapons and breaching apparatus categories, we refer to them in the report as large-caliber launchers and breaching equipment, respectively. To collect data from the 20 agencies within the scope of our review for this objective, we developed a data collection instrument that requested spending data of firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment from agencies’ internal record-keeping systems from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. For this objective, we requested the types of information that agencies reported using the data collection instrument: the date of each purchase; descriptive information on what was bought, including the caliber or gauge of firearms and ammunition; the quantity of items bought; the amount spent and whether those amounts were estimates; the type of record-keeping system used by the agency and any limitations associated with it or challenges compiling the information we requested; descriptions of changes or updates to the system that may have affected the data; and the contracting office(s) that were responsible for buying these items for the agency. We asked agencies not to include data on any items they received without spending funds, so agencies may have received more firearms, ammunition, or equipment in their inventories than what they reported in their spending data. For example, agencies may have received these items through interagency transfers, which may have no cost to receiving agencies. For the first objective, we analyzed the data agencies reported in the “amount spent” column, and we use the terms “spending” and “spent” to refer to these data. In cases where agencies only reported the amount they obligated for a purchase on the data collection instrument, we confirmed with agencies that those amounts reflected the amount they spent on the purchase and that we could use those amounts in our analysis. We pre-tested the instrument with Veterans Health Administration and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), whose officials provided feedback on the feasibility of providing the requested data. Based on the feedback we received from the pre-test, we revised and finalized the instrument and requested that the 20 agencies provide spending data on firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 from their internal record-keeping systems. To assess the reliability of the spending data, we conducted tests for missing data and obvious errors, reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed agency officials about their spending records and data reporting practices, and followed up with agency officials as needed. We re-categorized agency data that appeared to be miscoded. For example, we received data on specialized munitions and large-caliber launchers that agencies categorized as ammunition and firearms, respectively. Based on the descriptive data that agencies had provided, we re- categorized those items. We also adjusted the data to ensure consistency in their format, such as consistent entry of dates and use of categories of tactical equipment. Agencies in our review submitted a range of detail about their firearms when reporting their data, and we could not determine to what extent firearms were fully automatic. Some firearms have selector switches that allow the user to switch between semiautomatic and fully-automatic capabilities, while others are limited to shooting three-round bursts with each pull of the trigger. As such, we reported all firearms that are capable of firing multiple rounds with the single pull of the trigger as fully-automatic firearms. We also combined ammunition intended for use in machine guns with rifle ammunition because machine guns shoot rifle-caliber ammunition, and we did not have confidence that every agency accurately distinguished which rifle- caliber ammunition was intended for use in machine guns and what was reserved for rifles. We found the data sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting the minimum thresholds of total amounts agencies spent and the numbers of firearms and rounds of ammunition they purchased during fiscal years 2010 through 2017. However, we found the data were not reliable for reporting the number of tactical equipment items purchased or reporting further comparative analysis. Agency officials reported various challenges in compiling the data we requested and we identified some data limitations, as described in table 6. To address our second question, we selected three agencies—the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the U.S. Forest Service, and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—to assess the extent to which their purchases of firearms and ammunition were accurately reflected in publicly-available data. We requested that agencies report internal purchase data for firearms and ammunition that included, among other things, the amount obligated for these items, a unique transaction identifier (called the Procurement Instrument Identifier), and the product or service code for firearms and ammunition purchases from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. We compared the amounts these three agencies obligated for firearms and ammunition purchases, as reported to us in their data collection instruments, with the obligation data that are publicly- available data on USASpending.gov for those three agencies. We obtained publicly-available data from USASpending.gov, which includes purchase data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), using product or service codes (PSC) that identify contracts for firearms or ammunition purchases. We also reviewed our related work and Inspector General reports on the quality of USASpending.gov data. We obtained records for purchases made in fiscal years 2010 through 2017. We did not include equipment purchases because the publicly-available data lack product or service codes that would allow us to reliably identify those records. To select the three agencies for inclusion in this analysis, we started with the 20 agencies with at least 250 FLEOs in our scope. From those, we selected agencies that provided us with records of their firearms and ammunition purchases and that USASpending.gov listed as the funding agency for one or more firearms or ammunition purchase (12 agencies). From those, we selected three agencies based on the total dollar value of purchases reported in USASpending: one small (BIA), one medium (Forest Service), and one large (ICE), based on natural breaks in dollar values and not selecting multiple agencies from the same department. We then compared obligations data provided to us by each of the three agencies against obligations in the publicly-available purchase records using the Procurement Instrument Identifier to match records across agency-provided and publicly-available purchase data. We additionally corroborated these obligations by comparing fields related to the date of purchase, purchase value, and vendor. We reviewed a portion of purchase records to compare and interviewed agency officials about differences in the publicly-available and agency-provided data. For firearms, we included the following PSCs: 1005 - Guns, through 30mm 1010 - Guns, over 30mm up to 75mm 1015 - Guns, 75mm through 125mm 1020 - Guns, over 125mm through 150mm 1025 - Guns, over 150mm through 200mm 1030 - Guns, over 200mm through 300mm 1035 - Guns, over 300mm We excluded several weapons PSCs from our analysis that described weapons other than firearms, such as 1040 – Chemical Weapons and Equipment. Any excluded PSC, particularly 1095 – Miscellaneous Weapons, may have been used as the PSC to categorize a purchase that included firearms and those purchases would be excluded from the publicly-available records that we examined. Similarly, for ammunition, we included records associated with the following PSCs: 1305 – Ammunition, through 30mm 1310 – Ammunition, over 30mm up to 75mm 1315 – Ammunition, 75mm through 125mm 1320 – Ammunition, over 125mm Like firearms, we excluded records that were associated with non- firearms ammunition, such as 1336 – Guided Missile Warheads and Explosive Components. Any excluded PSC, particularly 1395 - Miscellaneous Ammunition, may have been used as the PSC to categorize a purchase that included firearms ammunition and those purchases would be excluded from the publicly-available records that we examined. To address our third and fourth questions, we reviewed inventory information and controls for case study federal law enforcement components within U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These components are as follows: EPA Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA); Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), HHS OIG, and IRS. Within IRS, two offices employ FLEOs: Criminal Investigation (CI) and Police Officer Section (Police). Accordingly, we can draw conclusions only about these components. We obtained and analyzed inventory data and other available documentation provided by these components regarding their current inventory as of November 2017 of firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment. This included firearms in storage as well as those in FLEO possession. To assess the reliability of the inventory data, we reviewed components’ documentation related to data management, especially policies to ensure that items are properly entered and removed from the system. In addition, we reviewed components’ recent purchases to verify that purchases were inventoried and reviewed their purchase data for any limitations that may affect their quality. We reviewed components’ acquisitions through DOD’s excess property program, known as the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) or 1033 program, to ensure these items were inventoried. We did not conduct physical inventories during site visits, and therefore did not actually count components’ physical inventories. To examine these components’ firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment inventory controls, we reviewed their policies describing storage protocols and inventory control procedures, and we interviewed components’ officials to better understand these policies and procedures in practice. We also compared these policies with applicable Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and key areas that we have identified as important for effective inventory management. We reviewed internal and external inspection and Inspector General reports related to the controls over firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment at these components to identify any reported deficiencies and actions taken or planned to address those deficiencies. We also conducted site visits to components’ offices selected based on a variety of factors, including the number of agencies with component offices in each city we visited, data discrepancies at field offices, and reports of loss or theft at these offices. The IRS Police facility we visited in Martinsburg, West Virginia is the only location for this component. In all, we visited 12 offices. During site visits, we observed officials demonstrating inventory inspection, inventory data entry, and access and other security controls. In addition, we interviewed officials responsible for maintaining and inventorying firearms, ammunition, and certain tactical equipment. The observations and information we obtained from the offices visited cannot be generalized to other locations for these components, but provide insights about the components’ controls for firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment. We conducted this performance audit from June 2017 to October 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We subsequently worked with the agencies addressed in this report from October 2018 to December 2018 to prepare this public version of the original sensitive report for release. This public version was also prepared in accordance with these standards. This appendix summarizes agency-provided spending data for the 20 agencies with 250 or more federal law enforcement officers and the 5 additional agency components that were included in our review. This appendix also identifies the challenges that agency officials identified in collecting the requested data and the limitations we identified while analyzing their data. To compile this information, we asked the agencies to provide data on their spending on firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. We reviewed the spending data provided by agencies to assess their accuracy and completeness, and followed up with agency officials as needed. Some agencies reported limited access to spending records because of their storage format or physical location, and we asked agencies to report the data that were accessible to them within the timeframe of this review. We found the data sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting the minimum thresholds of total amounts agencies spent and the numbers of firearms and rounds of ammunition they bought during the 8-year period in our scope. However, we found that data were not reliable for reporting the number of tactical equipment items purchased or for comparing the data across and within agencies. For more information on the methodology we used to collect these data and the challenges agencies faced compiling these data, see appendix I. Officials also provided information about the missions of their agencies or components, and the roles and responsibilities of their law enforcement officers. We included inventory data as of November 2017 for the agency components that were included in our review of inventory controls. Protects the public, employees, natural resources, and property under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service by enforcing the applicable laws and regulations that affect the National Forest System. Officers are responsible for conducting enforcement and investigations of criminal and civil offenses that affect the management of the National Forest System. Officers engage in public safety patrol operations, investigations of significant criminal offenses, community policing programs, natural disaster response, and law enforcement services at large group events, among other things. Agency stores purchase records for six years, which limited access to older data. Ammunition purchases and record-keeping are mostly decentralized among field offices, and officials could not provide the level of detail requested for all purchases. Upgrades to the record-keeping system may have compromised data from previous systems. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. Dollars (in thousands) FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations protects public health and furthers the FDA’s mission by investigating suspected criminal violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and other related laws. No known challenges. Officers conduct investigations related to criminal violations of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, which include conducting search and seizure warrants, transporting prisoners following arrest, conducting undercover operations, and other hazardous duties as necessary. Dollars (in thousands) Dollars (in thousands) Protects our country’s scientific research and the NIH research community, ensures that the mission of NIH is not impeded by personal attacks, loss of assets, criminal activity or acts of terrorism. Officers with the Division of Police are responsible for protecting property, employees and visitors; screening visitors entering NIH facilities; monitoring onsite equipment, cameras and alarms; operating the visitor badging system on and off campus; safeguarding selected buildings; patrolling areas of the NIH; providing traffic enforcement; conducting intelligence gathering and reporting; providing dignitary protection; and preparing warrants and arresting suspects. No known challenges. Dollars (in thousands) Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. NIH determined inventory information to be sensitive. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) No known challenges. Special agents conduct criminal investigations related to fraud, waste, and abuse within HHS’ hundreds of programs, which can involve surveillance, undercover operations, search warrants, and arrest warrants. Safeguards America’s borders, protects the public from dangerous people and materials, and enables legitimate trade and travel. Officers are responsible for preventing terrorists and weapons from entering the country, enforcing laws at ports of entry, and preventing the illegal trafficking of people, narcotics and contraband. Record-keeping system was implemented in 2016. Prior records required manual review. Records of purchases made at local field offices may be unavailable. Enforces federal laws governing border control, customs, trade and immigration to promote homeland security and public safety. responsible for conducting investigations to protect critical infrastructure industries that are vulnerable to sabotage, attack or exploitation. Some purchases are decentralized among field offices. Hard copy records required manual review and were difficult to access. Older records stored at field offices may not have been available. No known limitations. Dollars (in millions) NPPD’s Federal Protective Service prevents, protects, responds to and recovers from terrorism, criminal acts, and other hazards threatening the U.S. Government’s workforce, critical infrastructure, services, and the people who receive these services. No known challenges. Officers with the Federal Protective Service are responsible for enforcing all federal laws and regulations on and off federal property; investigating, mitigating, and defeating threats to federal facilities and the people who work within or visit those facilities; and providing integrated security, law enforcement, and protective intelligence capabilities to ensure the Federal Government functions securely. Dollars (in thousands) Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) detects, deters and defeats criminal and terrorist activities that target our nation’s transportation systems. TSA’s Office of Inspection (OOI) ensures the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of TSA’s workforce, operations, and programs through objective audits, covert testing, inspections, and criminal investigations. No known challenges. Officers with FAMS are deployed on U.S. aircraft worldwide to protect airline passengers and crew against the risk of criminal and terrorist violence, and perform investigative work to proactively fight terrorism. Officers with OOI investigate allegations of misconduct by TSA employees and contractors, conduct inspections of TSA operations, and evaluate effectiveness of security systems through covert testing and audits. No known limitations. Dollars (in millions) Ensures the safety and security of the President, the Vice President, their families, the White House, the Vice President’s Residence, national and visiting world leaders, former U.S. Presidents and events of national significance; and protects the integrity of our currency and investigates crimes against our national financial system committed by criminals around the world and in cyberspace. Officers are responsible for executing security operations that prevent, deter, and mitigate identified threats and vulnerabilities; and conducting investigations to identify, locate and apprehend individuals and criminal organizations targeting the nation’s critical financial infrastructure and payment systems. Record-keeping system changed in 2015 and older records may be incomplete. Officials were unable to provide records of equipment purchases because purchasing is decentralized among field offices and records required manual review; they provided current inventory records of the equipment instead. Dollars (in thousands) Officials reported that some cost data were estimated based on available information The percentages do not total 100 because of rounding. Dollars (in millions) BIA’s Office of Justice Services upholds tribal sovereignty and customs while supporting tribal justice systems, and corroboratively ensures the safety of Indian communities by protecting life and property, enforcing laws, and maintaining justice and order. Officers are responsible for patrolling designated Indian reservations, providing local law enforcement, responding to calls for emergency response, investigating crimes, transporting prisoners to and from tribal court appearances, gathering and analyzing criminal intelligence, and collaborating with state and federal task forces. The current financial management system was implemented in 2013, and records from the previous system may be incomplete. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. Dollars (in thousands) Because of incomplete data from the agency, we determined the data are not reliable for reporting in this category. Dollars (in thousands) Dollars (in thousands) Because of incomplete data from the agency, we determined the data are not reliable for reporting in this category. events within the NPS; and providing protection for dignitaries and visiting foreign heads of state. NPS’ Visitor and Resource Protection Directorate—under which fall the Law Enforcement, Security, and Emergency Services and U.S. Park Police—protects the safety and health of NPS visitors, partners, and staff, as well as our natural and cultural resources. Financial management system implemented in 2013, and older records did not retain the cost data fields. Some records kept as paper copies and were decentralized among field offices. Dollars (in thousands) Dollars (in thousands) Protects the public from crimes involving firearms, explosives, arson, and the diversion of alcohol and tobacco products; regulates lawful commerce in firearms and explosives; and provides worldwide support to law enforcement, public safety, and industry partners. Officers are responsible for reducing violent crime by targeting firearms traffickers, violent criminal organizations, armed violent offenders, and career criminals; investigating and arresting individuals and organizations that illegally supply firearms to prohibited individuals; and deterring the diversion of firearms from lawful commerce into the illegal market with enforcement strategies and technology. Retention policy is 6 fiscal years, so older records may have been unavailable. There may be errors associated with manual data entry. Dollars (in thousands) firearms in 2017. At the time of our review, the funds were obligated but not yet spent. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. No known limitations. No quantity or type data reported. Firearm of intended use for all years No quantity or firearm of intended use data reported. Protects society by confining offenders in prisons and community-based facilities and provides work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. Officers are responsible for ensuring the security of federal prisons, providing inmates with needed programs and services, and modeling mainstream values. Officers help protect public safety and provide security and safety to the staff and inmates in prison facilities. All non- custody staff are trained to assume the duties of Correctional Officers. Officials reported limited data—most records prior to 2016 were stored in file cabinets at prison facilities or in warehouses and would have required significant time and resources to review. Purchasing is decentralized across prison facilities, which limited the availability of data, and inconsistent data entry procedures among officials may limit the reliability of data. illicit drug trafficking; coordination with law enforcement officials on drug enforcement efforts and to reduce availability of illicit drugs. Firearms purchases were embedded in contracts and required manual review. Dollars (in thousands) Dollars (in millions) Officers provide for the security of federal courts and execute and enforce federal court orders, apprehend fugitives and non-compliant sex offenders. Officers also transport federal prisoners from arrest to incarceration, manage and disposes of assets subject to forfeiture, and provide protection for government witnesses and their families. The record-keeping system changed in 2012, and there may be gaps in the data from 2013 and 2014 while the agency transitioned to the new system. Dollars (in thousands) Firearm of intended use for all years No quantity data provided. IRS’ Criminal Investigation serves the American public by investigating potential criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code and related financial crimes in compliance with the law. Officers enforce tax laws and support tax administration to ensure compliance with the law and combat fraud. Investigations focus on tax fraud, abusive tax schemes, identity theft, public corruption, virtual currency, cyber-crimes, and narcotics-related financial crimes. Some requested data were not retained in the system. Agency could not provide equipment purchase data. Ammunition, equipment, and purchases $3,500 or less are decentralized among field offices. IRS’ Police Force at the Enterprise Computing Center in Martinsburg, West Virginia provides protection for the people, property and processes of this location, which houses 10 of IRS’ 19 critical tax processing functions. No known challenges. Officers patrol the facility and have authority to serve warrants and make arrests. No reported firearms purchases between fiscal years 2010 through 2017. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. Provides independent oversight of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) activities and addresses threats arising from lapses in IRS employee integrity, violence directed against the IRS, and external attempts to corruptly interfere with federal tax administration. Officers are responsible for conducting investigations that protect the integrity of the IRS; detecting and preventing fraud and other misconduct within IRS programs; investigating allegations of criminal violations and administrative misconduct by IRS employees; and protecting IRS against external attempts to corrupt or threaten its employees. After fiscal year 2016, record-keeping system no longer tracked purchases under $3,000. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. No known challenges. Officers with the Mint Police protect life and property, prevent, detect, and investigate criminal acts, collect and preserve evidence, make arrests, and enforce federal and local laws. EPA’s criminal enforcement program focuses on criminal conduct that threatens people’s health and the environment; enforces the nations’ laws by investigating cases, collecting evidence, conducting forensic analyses; and provides legal guidance to assist with prosecutions. No known challenges. Agents enforce the nation’s laws by investigating cases, collecting evidence, conducting forensic analyses and providing legal guidance to assist with prosecutions. No reported firearms purchases from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. Dollars (in thousands) Helps the agency protect the environment in a more efficient and cost effective manner by performing audits, evaluations, and investigations of EPA and its contractors; promoting economy and efficiency; and preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse. Law enforcement agents conduct criminal investigations of financial fraud involving EPA programs or funds; employee misconduct; intrusion into EPA computers; threats against EPA employees, contractors, facilities and assets; assaults on EPA employees or contractors and other acts of violence in EPA facilities; impersonating EPA officials; counterfeiting or misuse of insignia, logos or credentials; and theft of property or funds within EPA facilities. No known challenges. OIG’s Office of Investigations conducts and coordinates investigative activity related to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in SSA programs and operations. No known challenges. Officers with the Office of Investigations investigate wrongdoing by applicants, beneficiaries, contractors and third parties, and employees; conduct joint investigations with other law enforcement agencies; share responsibility for investigating threats or violence against SSA employees and facilities; and assist in the investigation of terrorism cases and other cases involving national security. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. Dollars (in thousands) No known limitations. No known limitations. Protects veterans by enforcing federal law at VA medical facilities (and some National Cemetery and Benefits locations) and by serving as initial response forces to active threat incidents. Officers protect veterans, visitors, and staff on department facilities and grounds; investigate serious incidents on VA controlled property; and provide personal protection to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the VA. Purchasing and record-keeping are decentralized among facilities, and there is no agency-wide system for recording purchases. Purchase card records were not easily accessible or identifiable. Dollars (in thousands) We identified missing data for some cost and date fields Officials reported some cost data were estimated based on available information The percentages do not total 100 because of rounding. Dollars (in thousands) In addition to the above contact, Adam Hoffman (Assistant Director) and Michelle Serfass (Analyst-in-Charge) managed this assignment. Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, Allison Gunn, and Kelsey Burdick made significant contributions to this report. David Alexander, David Blanding Jr., Willie Commons III, Eric D. Hauswirth, Julia Kennon, Susan Hsu, Diana Maurer, Wayne McElrath, and Kevin Reeves also contributed.
Federal law enforcement agencies purchase firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment, such as riot shields, to support their missions. GAO was asked to review these purchases for federal law enforcement agencies, and inventory controls at HHS, EPA, and IRS specifically. This report examines, among other objectives (1) firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment spending by federal agencies with 250 or more FLEOs from fiscal years 2010 through 2017; (2) the extent to which select agencies accurately reported purchases of firearms and ammunition in publicly-available data; and (3) inventory controls in place at HHS, EPA, and IRS. GAO obtained available data on purchases from 20 agencies and from USASpending.gov, and reviewed inventory information and controls within HHS, EPA, and IRS. GAO also conducted site visits to HHS, EPA, and IRS offices to observe inventory controls, selected based on data discrepancies or reports of loss or theft, among other factors. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2018. Information that HHS, IRS, and the Transportation Security Administration deemed sensitive has been omitted. The 20 federal law enforcement agencies in GAO's review reported spending at least $38.8 million on firearms, $325.9 million on ammunition, and $1.14 billion on tactical equipment—at least $1.5 billion in total—from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, based on data agencies provided to GAO. The internal agency data on firearms and ammunition purchases for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not always match data that were publicly available on USASpending.gov—a government source for federal contract data. In particular, the dollar value of firearms purchases by ICE in USASpending.gov was approximately 8 times greater than the value of the purchases reported by ICE to GAO. Some differences result from other agencies using ICE contracts to make firearms and ammunition purchases, and ICE not properly identifying the funding agency for those purchases in the system that supplies data to USASpending.gov. Because ICE does not accurately report the agency that funded these purchases, the public does not have accurate information on how much ICE—and the agencies that make purchases using ICE contracts—have spent on firearms and ammunition. This decreases accountability and transparency of federal purchases, which is in conflict with the intended purpose of this system. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have inventory controls for tracking, verifying, and securing federal law enforcement officers' (FLEOs) firearms. GAO observed these agencies' law enforcement components and found them to be generally following their inventory and security policies at selected locations. In instances where agencies were not in compliance with their policies, the agencies made corrections during the course of GAO's review. Each component has a process whereby at least once yearly officials review the firearms inventory to ensure that firearms match with records in the office's inventory system. The figure below illustrates a general process that all components GAO reviewed follow to verify their firearms inventory. Ammunition and tactical equipment inventory controls varied because agencies generally did not consider these items to be as sensitive as firearms. Examples of these controls include security for, and limited access to, equipment that might be vulnerable to risk of loss or unauthorized use, such as silencers or pyrotechnics. GAO recommends that the Director of ICE update ICE's contracting process to provide the name of the agency funding the purchase of firearms and ammunition to improve the accuracy of publicly available data. ICE concurred with the recommendation.