In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah Saleh. During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces reverse their campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly. At the start of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United States would provide "logistical and intelligence support" to the coalition's operations without taking "direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort." Soon thereafter, a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the campaign. At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the current conflict. Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula. Members have considered legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition's operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the Bab al Mandab Strait; and/or support continued Saudi-led coalition and U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in Yemen. Beyond Yemen, many Members have appeared to view the conflict through the prism of a broader regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the U.S. effort to limit Iran's malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have viewed the Yemen conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel in October 2018. Congress has considered but has not enacted proposals to curtail or condition U.S. defense sales to Saudi Arabia. Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some Members' interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive branch. Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U.S. military involvement in support of coalition operations. Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen also has led to legislative changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense's authority to enter into and use acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries. Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not widespread at the outset of the coalition's March 2015 intervention in Yemen. In early to mid-2015, congressional interest in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes. In Congress, several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen. In late September 2015, Representative Ted W. Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties. In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama urging him to "work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the fullest extent possible." In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that "I fear that our failure to strongly advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this critical [U.S.-Saudi] partnership at risk." By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners, lawmakers began to express their concern over U.S. involvement in the coalition's intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification. After the formal notification in November 2015, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated shipments, marking the first use of this prior notification request authority. At that time, no related joint resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the delay and additional notification request demonstrated congressional concern. By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation of human rights abuses and errant coalition airstrikes. In April 2016, legislation was introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. Proposed amendments to FY2017 defense legislation would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia. The PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote. In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition had largely spared Yemen's capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified. During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.-Saudi planning cell. Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August 2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the proposal, citing concerns about Yemen. In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate ( S.J.Res. 39 ) and House ( H.J.Res. 98 ). On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145). During debate over the motion, many Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey Graham remarking "To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people in Iran will cheer you on." In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi airstrike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people, the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia. Based on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and refueling for coalition aircraft. In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with forces party to the conflict. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the first time U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration responded to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S. strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the conflict. In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but his efforts were rejected by the parties themselves. By the end of 114 th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, more lawmakers still viewed the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a localized affair. Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members viewed Iran's support for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran's malign regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. As the Houthis targeted Gulf state infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, their behavior was touted as evidence of Iran's growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security. Just as some Members considered the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others viewed it as a test of long-standing U.S. commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security. Supporters of the relationship, while acknowledging that Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border. Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving coalition behavior but damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to international law and human rights. Legislation seeking to limit U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia was not enacted in the 114 th Congress, but marked the beginning of the broader congressional debate that has continued. As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid groups were pressing Congress to become more attuned to the growing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia, nongovernmental groups deemed such action as insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, "Whatever conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of precision munitions near the tail end of Obama's term and suspending cluster munition transfers earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition attacks on civilians." From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump has signaled strong support for the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference. He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama's October 2016 restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition. On March 19, 2017, just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the Obama Administration, subject to congressional review. In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with proposed sales of precision guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia's air force on both targeting and the Law of Armed Conflict. Congress debated another resolution of disapproval ( S.J.Res. 42 ) of these proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completing the policy review in July 2017, President Trump directed his Administration "to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea." As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen's 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah. In early 2017, the coalition's gradual advance toward Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, sparked some Members of Congress to implore the Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to "use all U.S. diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international humanitarian aid organizations." A month later, another group of House Members wrote to President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U.S. support to the coalition amid its offensive against Hudaydah. On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution ( S.J.Res. 42 ) to disapprove of three direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 , Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that U.S. support to the coalition improved its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties. For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that "If we are worried about collateral damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt it." Senator Murphy retorted, saying "What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis." On June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion resolution was not taken up in the House ( H.J.Res. 102 ). Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution ( H.Con.Res. 81 ) pursuant to the War Powers Resolution ( P.L. 93-148 ) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition's military intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until after the November 2016 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative ( H.Res. 599 , 366-30, 1 Present, Roll no. 623). In his first year in office, while President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter Iran, and increase U.S. counterterrorism activity in Yemen, his Administration also at times took strong positions on the need for members of the coalition to improve humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian casualties. After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen's ports, including the main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis. The White House issued four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to "completely allow food, fuel, water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it. This must be done for humanitarian reasons immediately." On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods. The next day, the White House issued a statement welcoming "Saudi Arabia's announcement of these humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict." As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate also proposed use of the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition's military intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54 , a joint resolution to "direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces)." Efforts in the Senate followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 1 below), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution. Throughout 2018, between Congress and the Trump Administration and within Congress itself, there was disagreement as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been introduced into a "situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated" based on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution. The Trump Administration disagreed. In February 2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the extent of current U.S. support , and reported that "the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties." On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54 on the floor. During debate, arguments centered on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen's humanitarian crisis to reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After then-Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54 . Senator Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker's approach, a view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion. The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel testimony before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets. Then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that "It's correct that we do not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen." During the same hearing, U.S. officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following: Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations, restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is extremely important. After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained. The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 ( S. 2987 ). The provision was modified further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the FY2019 NDAA ( H.R. 5515 ). It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in mid-August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a statement accompanying the President's signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration's view that such provisions "encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent" with "[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs." As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of 2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched "Operation Golden Victory," aimed at retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense Mattis saying, "We are concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-term political resolution to the conflict." Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said, I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective leverage to push back on Iran's actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates humanitarian suffering…. Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world's worst humanitarian crisis. On August 9, the coalition conducted an airstrike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen, in the northern Sa'ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51 people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claims that its airstrike was a "legitimate military operation" and conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a day earlier that killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called on the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a "thorough and transparent investigation into the incident." Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information regarding U.S. operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan. Several Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act ( H.R. 6157 ) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to Congress that the coalition air campaign "does not violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians." The provision did not apply to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Yemen. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232 ). Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration's actions, asserting that the coalition has not met the act's specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian casualties in Yemen. On September 26, several House Members introduced H.Con.Res. 138 , which sought to direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within 30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been enacted into law. In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a detailed argument expressing its view that U.S. forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen. By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen coupled with international reprobation over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi pressured the Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks. On October 30, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-fire and resume negotiations. On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U.S. capabilities—to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen. Though fighting continued along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah (Yemen's largest port). As part of the U.N.-brokered deal (known as the Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port. The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. The international community praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace settlement. Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S.J.Res. 54 (56-41), which, among other things, directed the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U.S. forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces. In the House, lawmakers twice narrowly approved rules resolutions containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration ( H.Res. 1142 and H.Res. 1176 ). On December 13, the Senate also passed S.J.Res. 69 , which, among other things, expresses the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war. The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also enacted new legislation that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen. While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration, the Senate passage of S.J.Res. 54 at the conclusion of the 115 th Congress demonstrated growth in congressional opposition to U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years. Over time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight measures, and war powers measures. Nevertheless, after nearly four years of conflict, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen. Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U.S.-Saudi relations in broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Some lawmakers express opposition to the intervention and U.S. involvement on moral grounds, citing errant coalition airstrikes and the prospect of a looming famine. Others argue the conflict's continuation creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their influence and operations in Yemen. Still others may have come to oppose continued U.S. support for the intervention based on factors not directly related to Yemen itself, including the opaque mechanisms used by the executive branch to support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. It remains to be seen whether recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation is a harbinger of broader efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U.S. foreign policy writ large. Measures to enhance oversight over U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. strategy toward Yemen have received broad bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers measures have used mechanisms to ensure privileged consideration of their proposals. The 116 th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen. It is uncertain whether lawmakers may also broaden the scope of their oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen's chronic instability. Even if the United States is no longer an active supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen itself has been devastated by years of war and remains the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Experts expect Yemen to require sustained international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a political settlement. This suggests that Congress may grapple with questions about the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, the provision of U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance and defense funds for years to come.
This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement. The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016. The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies. This product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products. CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention. CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations. CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.