Congress has created a wide array of advisory bodies, separate from each chamber's committees and officers, in order to better exercise its legislative, oversight, and investigative mandates, and to attend to both temporary and ongoing administrative tasks and responsibilities. During the past two decades, Congress has established or renewed the existence of hundreds of statutory entities to study, advise on, coordinate, or monitor matters of particular interest to Congress. These entities vary in several dimensions, including their official designation, purpose, lifespan, membership, and mechanism by which members are appointed. Many of these bodies are expressly identified as commissions, but others are designated as boards, advisory committees, or other terms. In this report, they are referred to generically as "congressional advisory bodies." These groups are sometimes created to address a single purpose—to study a discrete policy issue or to attend to one-time or recurring administrative functions. Often, they have a well-defined mandate, which typically includes the submission of a final report to Congress with detailed findings and recommendations. Although some have a specific lifespan, others have been created to provide ongoing support and advice (e.g., the boards of visitors for the U.S. military service academies, or the Commission to Recommend Individuals to the President for Appointment to the Office of Architect of the Capitol). The statutory provisions creating a substantial proportion of congressional advisory bodies provide for a membership that, either entirely or in part, (1) includes, (2) is chosen by, or (3) is recommended by Members of Congress. This report addresses only those statutory groups whose membership involves congressional participation in one or more of these forms. It provides selected background information on these groups and specific information relating to the role of Members of Congress in the appointment process. This report is intended to inform Members of Congress of their specific appointment responsibilities and to make them aware of their opportunities to serve as members of congressional advisory bodies. Additionally, observations regarding the rationale and effects for the many variations in the appointment schemes for existing bodies are intended to provide some alternatives to legislators to facilitate the drafting of membership language in potential future statutes. Following an examination of the appointment schemes to various congressional advisory bodies, this compilation attempts to identify all congressional advisory bodies currently in existence on which Members of Congress serve directly, or for which they make appointments or recommend potential members to another appointing authority (e.g., the President). It includes any statutorily created advisory entity (e.g., boards, advisory panels, task forces) whose membership scheme mandates the participation of Members of Congress, either as potential members or as participants in the process of appointing the membership. Entities created by Congress that have neither congressional membership nor congressional involvement in the appointment process have been omitted. Boards and commissions for which the Senate has "advise and consent" authority are also omitted, unless Members of Congress otherwise participate in the appointment process. Also excluded are ad-hoc commissions and advisory groups empaneled by individual congressional committees under their general authority to procure the "temporary services" of consultants to "make studies and advise the committee with respect to any matter within its jurisdiction," pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §72a or under chamber rules or resolutions. The membership of these entities, such as the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index, might be selected by the chairman and ranking minority member of the committee concerned, and these bodies are generally empaneled for short durations. This report also does not include caucuses, observer groups, or working groups created by means other than statute. Tracking the provisions of law that create congressional advisory bodies is an inherently inexact exercise. Although many such bodies are created in easily identifiable freestanding statutes, others are contained within the statutory language of lengthy omnibus legislation. It is also sometimes difficult to determine when such bodies have ceased to operate, as termination dates are not always included in the organic statute, or may be tied to ambiguous conditions. When making appointments to congressional advisory bodies, Members of Congress may be empowered to act independently or in concert with other Members. Structurally, variations in the authority of appointment officials fall within several common patterns. The statutory scheme may mandate that membership of a congressional advisory body be made up in whole or in part by specifically designated Members of Congress, typically members of the leadership or of specified committees. In most such cases, leadership service is limited to bodies concerned with the internal administrative functions of the House and Senate. For example, membership of the Commission to Recommend Individuals to the President for Appointment to the Office of Architect of the Capitol includes the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the majority and minority leaders of the House and the Senate, and the chairmen and the ranking minority members of the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. Selected leaders, often with balance between the parties, may appoint congressional advisory body members, who may or may not be Members of Congress. For appointments made by congressional leaders, the statutory scheme generally mandates that appointments be made by leaders of both parties. The members of some congressional advisory bodies are selected by majority and minority party leaders in equal numbers. In other instances, the majority party appoints a greater number. In a few cases, the majority/minority ratio of appointments to a commission varies, depending upon whether the President is of the same party as the majority in the House or the Senate. One common component of statutory appointment schemes for certain congressional advisory bodies is the requirement that Members of Congress serve on these panels. Certain bodies, such as the British American Parliamentary Group, are composed entirely of Members of Congress. In other instances, a statute may require that a certain specified number of Senators or Representatives be selected, or may prohibit Members of Congress from serving. For appointments made by the President pro tempore of the Senate, 2 U.S.C. §199 specifies involvement of the majority and minority leaders of the Senate. Selected leaders, again often with balance between the parties, may be authorized to recommend members, who may or may not be Members of Congress, for appointment to a congressional advisory body. They may do so either in parallel or jointly, and the recommendations may be made to other congressional leaders, such as the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, to the President, or to a cabinet official. Some statutory provisos may have the effect of limiting the degree of autonomy a Member has in appointing or making recommendations of individuals for congressional advisory body membership. For example, the appointing official may be required by law to select members who are specifically qualified by virtue of their education, knowledge, training, experience, expertise, distinguished service, or recognized eminence in a particular field or fields. In other instances, appointments are expressly limited to individuals occupying specific federal, state, or local government positions, representing a particular occupation, or serving as head of a particular public or private sector institution or organization. In many instances, the authority to appoint members to the entities covered in this report is shared by the executive and legislative branches. When the appointment authority set out in a statute creating a congressional advisory body is shared by the President (or other executive branch officials) and Members of Congress, questions about implementation of the appointment scheme have sometimes prompted the President to comment on separation-of-powers issues raised under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Some statutes instruct the President to appoint congressional advisory body members from a list provided by congressional leadership. For example, the appointment scheme for the Commission on Interoperable Data Sharing provides for nine members, one member appointed by the President to serve as chairman, and eight members appointed by the President "from a list of nominees jointly provided by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, and the minority leader of the Senate." In the signing statement accompanying the law, President George W. Bush noted that methods of selection included in the Appointment Clause of the Constitution include "appointment by the President with Senate consent, or by the President alone," but not by the President "from a pool of persons selected by congressional leadership." Similarly, in a statement accompanying the signing of legislation creating the Brown v. Board of Education 50 th Anniversary Commission, President Bush made it clear that he would not be bound by the membership recommendations of House and Senate leadership required by the statute, but would rather "welcome, as a matter of comity, the suggestions of the congressional leadership for those positions." As the foregoing discussion suggests, several alternative approaches are available to legislators in drafting membership selection language. Inclusion of legislators on such panels insures that Congress will be able to exercise a certain degree of control over the operations of the entity concerned. At the same time, service by Members on congressional advisory bodies is arguably antithetical to at least one of the rationales for creating the entity in the first place, namely, to reduce the workload of Congress by delegating certain functions to temporary bodies. Even in the absence of direct membership on a congressional advisory body, in drafting the particulars of an appointment scheme, legislators can dictate, to some degree, the measure of autonomy an entity enjoys. For example, although the legislation creating the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9-11 Commission) did not stipulate that Members of Congress be included in the commission's membership, it did call for 9 of the 10 members of the commission to be selected by congressional leaders. Attention to the proper balance between the number of members appointed by congressional leaders and by other individuals, or to the number of Members of Congress required to be among the appointees, or to the qualifications of appointees, can be significant factors in enabling an advisory body to fulfill its congressional mandate. Each currently functioning congressional advisory body that was identified, regardless of when it was initially established, is profiled following the narrative portion of this report. For each entity, a brief summary of its purpose or role is provided, as well as the following information: Statutory D uration of the A dvisory B ody . The termination date is provided for each advisory body, where appropriate. Occasionally, termination dates are ambiguous, due to their contingency upon an associated time line within the statute, such as the date of submission of a final report. FACA A pplicability . Advisory bodies established in the executive branch that report to the President are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which governs their creation, administration, and management. Advisory bodies that are appointed by Congress and report only to Congress are not specifically bound by the requirements set forth in FACA. Because many commissions involve both congressional and presidential participation, some of the entities in this report may be governed by FACA. Occasionally, statutes creating congressional advisory bodies will incorporate explicit statutory language exempting a commission from FACA requirements, in whole or in part. Membership Appointment Structure . Each entry includes the advisory body's membership appointment scheme. The particulars of congressional involvement in the appointment process are varied. The statutory language of membership appointment schemes detail a wide range of membership patterns that may be of interest to lawmakers who might be contemplating creation of advisory bodies. In the legislative branch, the individuals most commonly empowered to make appointments to commissions and similar bodies are the Speaker of the House, the President or President pro tempore of the Senate, and the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate. The majority leader of the House is less often included in these mechanisms, since the appointment role of the minority leader may be paired with the Speaker's appointment role. For each board, the appointment structure is outlined, with the participation of Members of Congress highlighted. For Member appointments, the appointer's role is provided in (parentheses) in the left-hand column. Additionally, the role of noncongressional officials is also provided. Term of Appointment . Most ongoing congressional advisory bodies have fixed terms of appointment set by statute. Statutes creating temporary commissions often provide that appointments are for the "life of the commission." Additionally, commissions are divided into two groups: temporary advisory commissions (e.g., those with a statutory end date) and permanent entities. The more than 90 entries on the following pages highlight the broad diversity of matters Congress has felt deserved examination beyond the established organizational structure of Congress. Entries are arranged alphabetically. Citations to the U.S. Code and the Statutes at Large are provided where particulars relating to the scope, purpose, and composition of these bodies may be located. The internet address of the entity's website is also provided, if available. Information on the involvement of Members of Congress in the appointment process for congressional commissions is also presented in a series of tables. Table 1 through Table 6 list the appointment responsibilities of each of these major congressional leaders. Table 7 lists other congressional leaders, namely the chair or ranking minority members of specified committees in the House and Senate who may also be granted authority to make or recommend appointments, or be designated as members of a commission.
Over the past several decades, Congress, by statute, has established a wide array of commissions, boards, and advisory bodies to provide it with assistance in meeting various legislative, investigative, and administrative responsibilities. Some of these entities are temporary and created to serve specific functions, such as studying a discrete policy area or performing one-time tasks. Others are permanent, serving an ongoing purpose, such as overseeing an institution or performing a regular administrative function. The majority of these congressional bodies provide that Members of Congress, particularly the leadership, be intimately involved in the appointment process, either through direct service on a commission, or by appointing or recommending candidates for membership. The choice of a particular mechanism for membership appointment may have implications for the ability of these entities to fulfill their congressional mandates. Examination of the statutory language creating these bodies reveals several common approaches to membership selection. Each alternative schema has its advantages. For example, a commission or board composed entirely of Members permits a high degree of congressional control over the entity's operations. Bodies composed mainly of qualified private citizens or executive branch appointees may provide a broader expertise than Member-only bodies. Assemblages of mixed membership provide some of the advantages of both Member and citizen-only appointment schemes. This report contains a compilation of existing commissions and boards that demonstrates the range of alternative membership-appointment structures. It includes any statutorily created advisory entity (e.g., boards, advisory panels, task forces) whose membership scheme mandates the participation of Members of Congress either as potential members or as participants in the process of appointing the membership. For each entity, information on the purpose, duration, appointment structure, and term of appointment is provided. Finally, information on the involvement of Members of Congress in the appointment process is presented in a series of tables.