The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," and "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." It also provides the Senate with the authority to provide "Advice and Consent" on presidential nominations of "all other Officers of the United States," which includes military officers. On the basis of its constitutional authority, Congress has passed a number of laws which govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. The most senior officers in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps are known as general officers. The most senior officers in the Navy are known as flag officers. The phrase "general and flag officers" or "GFO" refers to all officers in paygrades O-7 through O-10, thereby including one-star, two-star, three-star, and four-star officers. At the highest level, O-10, GFOs hold the most visible and important military positions in the Department of Defense, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the four military services, and the combatant commanders. At the lowest level, O-7, they hold positions that span an array of roles, including commanders, deputy commanders, and key staff roles in large organizations. This report provides an overview of active duty GFOs in the United States Armed Forces—including authorizations, duties, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active duty caps on GFOs. Given the authority granted to general and flag officers, Congress has developed a statutory framework applicable to this elite group, and considers changes to these laws as it deems appropriate. Congress also periodically reviews the number, duties, and compensation of GFOs. A frequent tension during these reviews has been DOD requests for additional GFOs versus congressional concerns that there are too many GFOs. As one senior DOD official noted during a 1997 congressional hearing: throughout our history there has been a dialogue, just as is going on now, that has ebbed and flowed between the Congress and the military on the number of general and flag officers we need.... I think it is fair to say that over the years, the Congress has consistently taken the view that we have needed fewer general and flag officers, and that we have taken the opposite view, that we needed more than the Congress would allow. These debates tended to intensify during periods of major downsizing and restructuring of our forces, such as after World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and now after the cold war. References in this report to specific grades (ranks) within the general and flag officer corps will use the appropriate capitalized title, insignia, or paygrade as indicated in Table 1 . As of November 1, 2018, there were 920 active duty GFOs, of which 891 were subject to the statutory caps and 29 were exempt from the statutory caps. Distribution by grade and service is summarized in Table 2 . The 891 GFOS subject to the statutory caps is lower than the maximum of 963 authorized in statute (see " Current Grade Limits " later in this report). This is in accord with an intentional decision made by DOD in 2011 as part of an efficiency initiative directed by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. By keeping GFO numbers substantially below the maximum authorized, this policy provides DOD flexibility to respond to new requirements for GFOs without the delays caused by the need to find an "offset" by downgrading or eliminating another GFO position. While Congress has specified functions or duties for some key positions—such as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the top two officers of each service, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau —the great majority of GFO positions are not defined in statute. In these instances DOD uses the following criteria for determining whether a position should be filled by a general or flag officer: Nature, characteristics, and function of the position; Grade and position of superior, principal subordinates, and lateral points of coordination; Degree of independence of operation; Official relations with other U.S. and foreign governmental positions; Magnitude of responsibilities; Mission and special requirements; Number, type, and value of resources managed and employed; Forces, personnel, value of equipment, total obligation authority; Geographic area of responsibility; Authority to make decisions and commit resources; Development of policy; National commitment to international agreements; Impact on national security and other national interests; and Effect on the prestige of the nation or the armed force A summary of the number of active duty GFOs and the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force over the past five decades is provided in Table 3 . A review of GFO levels indicates an 11% increase in the number of four-star officers (36 on September 30, 1965 vs. 40 on September 30, 2018) and a 24% increase in the number of three-star officers (119 vs. 147). At the same time, the number of one-star and two-star officers has decreased by about 35% (1,129 vs. 734). However, during this time period, the size of the total force was cut roughly in half, dropping from 2.66 million on September 30, 1965, to 1.32 million on September 30, 2018. Thus, a more salient measure may be the proportion of GFOs to the total force. Looking at the data from this perspective, it is clear that while GFOs have always made up a very small percentage of the total force, the general and flag officer corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.070%) of the total force in 2018, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs increased by 46%. This historical trend is more pronounced with respect to four-star officers (which grew from 0.0014% of the total force to 0.0030%, a 114% increase) and three-star officers (which grew from 0.0045% of the total force to 0.0112%, a 149% increase). One- and two-star officers as a percentage of the total force increased less rapidly (from 0.0425% of the total force to 0.0557%, a 31% increase). These increases occurred at the same time that the size of the officer corps in general was increasing as a percentage of the total force. As indicated in the last column of Table 3 , between 1965 and 2018, the officer corps increased from 12.76% of the total force in 1965 to 17.51% in 2018, indicating that the share of the total force made up of officers increased by 37%. There have been two principal criticisms raised against the increasing proportion of GFOs relative the total force. The first criticism revolves around the increased cost of employing a GFO in comparison to a lower ranking officer. The second relates to the belief that too many GFOs slow down decisionmaking processes. Each point is explained in more detail below. Cost . GFOs cost more to employ than officers of a lower rank. In part, this is due to the higher compensation they receive. For example, the average GFO in paygrade O-7 receives $204,405 in regular military compensation 14 in 2019, while the average officer in paygrade O-6 receives $180,709. Additionally, there can be other costs associated with GFOs, particularly at higher grades, such as the costs of larger staffs, official travel, security details, and aides. An example of this perspective was provided by a witness at a 2011 congressional hearing, who stated "The progression towards a more top-heavy force is not without its consequences.... The cost of officers increases markedly with their rank, so taxpayers are overpaying whenever a G/FO is in a position that could be filled by a lower ranking officer." Decision making . Another criticism is that an increasing proportion of GFOs slows down decisionmaking by adding additional layers of management between the highest echelons of command and the lowest. In a 2010 speech, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized the impact of an increase in GFOs and senior civilians in making the Department of Defense a top-heavy and overly bureaucratic organization: During the 1990s, the military saw deep cuts in overall force structure—the Army by nearly 40 percent. But the reduction in flag officers—generals and admirals—was about half that. The Department's management layers—civilian and military—and numbers of senior executives outside the services grew during that same period. Almost a decade ago, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17 levels of staff between him and a line officer. The Defense Business Board recently estimated that in some cases the gap between me and an action officer may be as high as 30 layers.... Consider that a request for a dog-handling team in Afghanistan—or for any other unit—has to go through no fewer than five four-star headquarters in order to be processed, validated, and eventually dealt with. This during an era when more and more responsibility—including decisions with strategic consequences—is being exercised by young captains and colonels on the battlefield. The increasing proportion of GFOs in comparison to the total force has been a topic of particular interest during past congressional hearings. During these hearings, and particularly during a 1997 congressional review of GFO authorizations, witnesses from the Department of Defense put forth a number of rationales for this growth, including the following: Joint requirements . One frequently cited cause of the increasing ratio of GFOs during past congressional hearings has been the increase in "joint" requirements that followed enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) in 1986. While removing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the chain of command, GNA enhanced the authority of the Chairman in other ways; significantly increased the roles and authorities of commanders of the joint Combatant Commands; and emphasized joint duty assignments for officers. These new institutional arrangements led to the creation of more joint GFO positions and powerful career incentives to serve in those positions. Testifying before Congress in 1997, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff emphasized how the growth of joint organizations affected the proportion of GFOs to the total force: "There is really no law of proportionality here when you talk about joint growth. If you think about it, sir, where we have been since 1980, we stood up CENTCOM, SOCOM, Space Command; we have reorganized to form ACOM, TRANSCOM, [and] STRATCOM." Since then, additional joint headquarters have been established, to include U.S. Northern Command (established in 2002), Joint Task Force Guantanamo (established 2002), Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (established 2002), U.S. Africa Command (2007), and U.S. Cyber Command (2009). Coalition Operations . Another rationale used to explain the increased proportion of GFOs has been an increased emphasis by the United States on forging coalitions with other nations to achieve common security objectives. This has, in turn, generated a demand for senior military leaders to conduct coordinated planning, training, and operations with their peers from foreign nations. The argument is also linked to the number of contingency operations the U.S. military has conducted since the end of the Cold War, which have often involved forces from dozens of countries, including the forces of the nation in which the operations take place. Examples of these coalition operations include Iraq and Afghanistan as well as smaller-scale contingencies such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo (ongoing). Contingency operations such as these are commanded by a GFO, who usually has additional GFOs as subordinate commanders and senior staff officers. Both their experience and the authority inherent in their grade can be considered important elements to the success of complex operations. Political and diplomatic considerations can also be a factor, as the officers leading these operations are normally expected to interact with the senior military and civilian leadership of the foreign nation where the operations are occurring. Organizational structure . As noted previously, the increase in the proportion of GFOs over the past 50 years has not been due to an increase in the number of GFOs, which has gone down in this time period, but to the much larger decrease in the size of the Armed Forces in general. In part, this slower reduction is due to the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, which includes certain GFO positions whether the Armed Forces are comparatively large or small. For example, there was a Chief of Staff of the Air Force at the peak of the Vietnam War, when the Air Force had about 900,000 airmen, and there is one today, when the Air Force has approximately 325,000 airmen. A similar case can be made for many of the GFOs who serve on the Joint Staff, the Service Staffs, the Combatant Commands, and certain defense agencies. Given the organizational structure of the Armed Forces—some of which is required by law—the amount of management "overhead" does not necessarily change in direct proportion to the size of the force. Another way of illustrating this is to consider what would happen if an Army division were disestablished: doing so would eliminate about 15,000 soldiers, but only three of them would be general officers. Technological changes . A fourth justification for increased GFO ratios is that technological advances have changed the way the United States fights its wars. Modern weapons systems, much more powerful and accurate than their predecessors, require fewer personnel to deliver greater firepower. Thus, while the number of personnel a GFO commands may decline as more sophisticated equipment is substituted for manpower, the lethality of those forces may increase. From this perspective, the lethality of the weapons systems, rather than the number of people, provides the justification for an organization to be led by a very senior military officer. Additionally, the advent and development of new domains of warfare—such as space and cyber—has led to the creation of new organizations to exploit advantages and defend against vulnerabilities in those environments. There are three main ways in which military personnel, including general and flag officers, are compensated: cash compensation (pay and allowances), non-cash compensation (benefits), and deferred compensation (retired pay and benefits). In this report, only the compensation elements which make up r egular m ilitary c ompensation will be discussed. Regular Military Compensation (RMC) is a statutorily defined measure of the major compensation elements which every servicemember receives. It is widely used as a basic measure of military cash compensation levels and for comparisons with civilian salary levels. RMC, as defined in law, is "the total of the following elements that a member of the uniformed services accrues or receives, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind every payday: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and Federal tax advantage accruing to the aforementioned allowances because they are not subject to Federal income tax." These elements are described in more detail in the Appendix . Certain GFOs receive a "personal money allowance" as well. This is not part of RMC, but is described in a footnote below. Congress included provisions in recent National Defense Authorization Acts to deny GFOs any increase in basic pay during calendar years 2015 and 2016. Table 4 provides the average RMC that general and flag officers received in 2019. It assumes that all GFOs receive BAH, rather than living in government provided housing. Congress has established a statutory framework for GFOs which limits their numbers by grade, requires presidential determination of many three-star and four-star positions, and specifies the grade and/or duties of certain key positions. This framework provides for greater congressional control over the most senior GFO positions, while providing substantial latitude to the executive branch in the management of the remaining GFOs. Sections 525 and 526 of Title 10 establish the number of general and flag officers that may be on active duty in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The two provisions establish separate caps for each service and for the joint community. There are certain circumstances under which a general or flag officer does not "count" against these caps. Additionally, the President has authority under 10 U.S.C. §527 to suspend the operation of the caps in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or the President. Table 5 summarizes the statutory limitations by grade for GFOs for service-specific positions. Table 6 summarizes the statutory limitations for GFOs service in Joint positions. Combining the maximum number of service and joint GFO authorizations, the maximum number of GFO positions authorized is currently 963. The current number of active duty GFOs subject to the statutory caps is 891. There are another 29 active duty GFOs who are not subject to the statutory caps. (See " Current Number of General and Flag Officers " earlier in the report.) The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision, codified at 10 U.S.C. §526a, to reduce the number of GFOs authorized to be on active duty. The conference report that accompanied the bill highlighted congressional concerns that the military departments had not demonstrated a willingness to implement GFO reductions directed by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2011 and, furthermore, noted the context of significant reductions in personnel strength that occurred in the 2011-2016 time frame. Starting in 2023, §526a will lower the number of GFOs that may be on active duty to a maximum of 620 for Service positions and 232 for Joint positions, a reduction of 111 from the current number of GFO positions authorized by 10 U.S.C. §526. Section 601 of Title 10 provides that "[t]he President may designate positions of importance and responsibility to carry the grade of general or admiral or lieutenant general or vice admiral.... An officer assigned to any such position has the grade specified for that position if he is appointed to that grade by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate." Thus, with the exception of those so designated in statute, all three-star and four-star positions must be designated as such by the President. Congress can review the rationale for this designation as part of its oversight function, and the Senate retains the power to confirm or reject the nomination of an individual to fill such a position. The authority of the President to designate such positions is also limited by the strength caps on general and flag officers found in 10 U.S.C. §§525 and 526. Congress has established a number of GFO positions in law which carry designated grades, designated duties, or both. Congress has specified the grade for a number of key positions. For example, 10 U.S.C. §152 specifies that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff holds the rank of General or Admiral. Similar language also exists for the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top two officers of each service, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Table 7 highlights some positions with statutorily required grades. Congress sometimes changes these statutory grades. For example, in 2008, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from Lieutenant General to General. Additionally, Section 502 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act amended various statutory provisions to eliminate the statutory grade for 54 positions. As explained in the report that accompanied the Senate version of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act, where the provision originated: The Committee determined that in order to effectively manage the reduction in the number of general and flag officers prescribed elsewhere in this Act, that the Secretary of Defense must be given the flexibility to assign appropriate officer grades to positions. The provision would not prohibit the position from being filled by an officer with the same, or a higher, or lower grade than the law currently requires. Positions with statutorily required grades typically have statutorily required duties as well. Table 7 provides excerpts of the statutorily required responsibilities, duties, or functions of certain GFO positions. Congress sometimes changes these duties. For example, in 2011, Congress changed the law to specify that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose duties included "the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions." Congress has a long-standing interest in the military officer corps in general, and has periodically focused additional attention on its most senior officers. Should Congress elect to address GFO authorizations, duties, compensation, or other related topics in more detail, it may wish to consider the following: What is the most appropriate way to determine how many GFOs the Department of Defense should have? How closely should this be linked to total force size? What other factors would be useful in determining what the right number of GFOs is? How do advances in information technology and decisionmaking tools impact the need for GFOs? Could use of these technologies result in flattened management structures and decrease the need for GFOs? Should Congress modify the current statutory framework that governs GFOs? Should it modify the caps set out in 10 U.S.C. §§525, 526, and 526a? To what extent do other statutory requirements, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), drive GFO requirements? Should GNA be revised to alter this effect? Could organizational restructuring of the Joint Staff and Service Staffs decrease the need for GFOs, or allow positions to be held by lower graded GFOs? Could certain organizations be merged to reduce the requirements for GFOs? Could military relations with international partners be restructured so as to lessen the need for GFO representation? How important is rank equivalence when senior U.S. military personnel work with their allied peers? Could National Guard and Reserve GFOs be used to reduce the need for active duty GFOs? Are there GFO positions that could be eliminated or "downgraded" to a lower rank? Are there GFO positions that could be replaced by civilian employees? What are the costs and benefits associated with these actions? How might this impact military effectiveness? Can the direct and indirect costs associated with GFOs be reduced? For example, could compensation or staff costs be reduced without significantly affecting the ability of GFOs to carry out their duties? Regular Military Compensation (RMC), as defined in law, is "the total of the following elements that a member of the uniformed services accrues or receives, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind every payday: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and Federal tax advantage accruing to the aforementioned allowances because they are not subject to Federal income tax." Each of these elements is described below. Basic Pay All members of the Armed Forces receive basic pay, although the amount varies by pay grade (rank) and years of service (also called longevity). For most servicemembers, basic pay is the largest element of the compensation they receive in their paycheck and typically accounts for about two-thirds of an individual's RMC. It is roughly analogous to civilian salary. Basic Allowance for Housing All servicemembers living in the United States are entitled to either government-provided housing or a housing allowance, known as basic allowance for housing (BAH). About 17% of GFOs living in the United States receive government-provided housing with the remainder receiving BAH to offset the costs of the housing they rent or purchase in the civilian economy. The amount of BAH a servicemember receives is based on three factors: paygrade (rank), geographic location, and whether or not the servicemember has dependents. However, there is no increase in BAH after paygrade O-7. Therefore, the amount of BAH for GFOs does not vary by rank, but only by locality and dependency status. Paygrade and dependency status are used to determine the type of accommodation—or "housing profile"—that would be appropriate for the servicemember (for example, one-bedroom apartment, two-bedroom townhouse, or three-bedroom single family home). Geographic location is used to determine the average costs associated with each of these housing profiles. The average costs of these housing profiles are the basis for BAH rates. As a result of this methodology, BAH rates are much higher in some areas than others, but servicemembers of similar paygrade and dependent status should be able to pay for roughly comparable housing regardless of their duty location. Basic Allowance for Subsistence Nearly all servicemembers receive a monthly payment to defray their personal food costs. This is known as basic allowance for subsistence (BAS). BAS is provided at a flat rate, with separate rates for officers and enlisted personnel. In 2019, all officers, including GFOs, received $254.39 a month. Federal Tax Advantage Military allowances are generally not considered part of gross income and are not subject to federal income tax, thus generating a tax benefit for servicemembers. RMC considers only the federal income tax advantage provided by the exemption of housing and subsistence allowances from gross income. The precise value of the federal tax advantage for an individual servicemember will vary depending on his or her unique tax situation.
In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the Armed Forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws which govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. Some of these laws are directed specifically at the most senior military officers, known as general and flag officers (GFOs). Congress periodically reviews these laws and considers changes as it deems appropriate. Areas of congressional interest have included the number of GFOs authorized, the proportion of GFOs to the total force, compensation levels of GFOs, and duties and grades of certain GFOs. As of November 1, 2018, there were 891 active duty GFOs subject to statutory caps, which is 72 less than the maximum of 963 authorized by law. There were also another 29 exempt from the statutory caps. The current number is about average for the post-Cold War era, though substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. However, while always very small in comparison to the total force, the general and flag officer corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.069%) of the total force in 2018, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs increased by 44%. Some argue that this increased proportion of GFOs is wasteful and contributes to more bureaucratic decisionmaking processes. Others counter that the increased proportion is linked to the military's greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations, core organizational requirements, and the increasing use of advanced technologies. Compensation for GFOs varies. One commonly used measure of compensation, known as regular military compensation (RMC), includes basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage associated with allowances, which are exempt from federal income tax. In 2019, the lowest-ranking GFOs make about $204,000 per year in RMC, while the highest-ranking GFOs make about $238,000 per year. Congress has also used its authority to specify the grade and duties of certain GFO positions. For example, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) from Lieutenant General to General in 2008. Three years later, Congress again changed the law to specify that the CNGB was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose duties included "the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions." In 2016, Congress removed the statutory grade requirement from 54 GFO positions. This report provides an overview of active duty GFOs in the United States Armed Forces—including authorizations, duties, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active duty caps on GFOs.