Federal law houses hundreds of offenses punishable by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Although only a handful of these mandatory minimum offenses are prosecuted with any regularity, drug trafficking offenses accounted for over two-thirds of the total. Congress has created three procedures that make punishment for these offenses a little less mandatory. One, the so-called safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)), permits a sentencing court to disregard a statutory minimum sentence for the benefit of a low-level, nonviolent, cooperative defendant with a minimal prior criminal record, convicted under several mandatory minimum controlled substance offenses. The other two, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, afford a sentencing court comparable latitude but only on the motion of the prosecutor, based on the defendant's substantial assistance to the government, and without regard to the offense charged. In October 2009, Congress instructed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to prepare a report on the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions under federal law. In early 2010, the commission conducted a survey of federal district court judges regarding their views on mandatory minimum sentencing. A majority of those responding endorsed amendments to the safety valve and substantial assistance exceptions. The commission also held a public hearing at which several witnesses urged adjustments in the safety valve and substantial assistance provisions. The commission subsequently recommended that Congress consider expanding the safety valve to cover other offenses and to reach offenders with a slightly more extensive prior criminal record. The First Step Act authorized safety-valve relief for convictions under the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act and for defendants with slightly more extensive prior criminal records. Low-level drug offenders can escape some of the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentences if they qualify for the safety valve. Congress created the safety valve after it became concerned that the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions could have resulted in equally severe penalties for both the more and the less culpable offenders. It is available to qualified offenders convicted of violations of the drug trafficking, simple possession, attempt, or conspiracy provisions of the Controlled Substances or Controlled Substances Import and Export acts. It is not available to avoid the mandatory minimum sentences that attend some of the other controlled substance offenses, even those closely related to the covered offenses. For instance, not covered are convictions under the statute that proscribes drug trafficking near schools, playgrounds, or public housing facilities and that sets the penalties for violation at twice those set for simple drug trafficking. In addition, until the First Step Act, safety valve relief was not available to those convicted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), even though the MDLEA proscribes conduct closely related to the smuggling and trafficking activities outlawed in the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. The prosecution need not prove that a defendant is ineligible for safety valve relief. The Supreme Court did hold in Alleyne v. United States "that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an 'element' [of the offense] that must be submitted to the jury" and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsequent lower appellate courts, however, have held that Alleyne does not require a jury verdict or application of the reasonable doubt standard. Thus, for the convictions to which the safety valve applies, the defendant must convince the sentencing court by a preponderance of the evidence that he satisfies each of the safety valve's five requirements. He may not have a disqualifying criminal history point total. He may not have used violence or a dangerous weapon in connection with the offense. He may not have been an organizer or leader of the drug enterprise. He must have provided the government with all the information and evidence at his disposal. Finally, the offense may not have resulted in serious injury or death. [T]he defendant does not have – (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). The criminal history point disqualification refers to the defendant's prior criminal record. The Sentencing Guidelines assign criminal history points based on a defendant's past criminal record. Prior sentences of imprisonment or juvenile detention of less than 60 days are assigned a single criminal history point . Prior sentences of imprisonment or juvenile detention of from 60 days up to a year and a month are assigned two criminal history points ; as are sentences imposed for offenses committed while the defendant was in prison, was an escaped prisoner, or was on probation, parole, or supervised release. Prior sentences of imprisonment for a year and a month or more are assigned three criminal history points . A number of convictions do not count, including the following: Stale convictions 15-year-old, three-point convictions, 10-year-old, one- or two-point convictions, or 5-year-old, one- or two-point juvenile adjudications; Summary court-martial convictions; Foreign convictions; Tribal convictions; Expunged, reversed, vacated, or invalidated convictions; and Certain petty offenses or minor misdemeanors: Hunting and fishing violations, juvenile truancy, and the like, regardless of the sentence imposed. Gambling, prostitution, and the like if the offender was sentenced no more severely than to imprisonment for 30 days or less or to probation for less than a year. Similar offenses to those listed "by whatever name they are known." [T]he defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense, 18 U.SC. 3553(f)(2). [T]he offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(3). The safety valve has two disqualifications designed to reserve its benefits to the nonviolent. The weapon or threat-of-violence disqualification turns upon the defendant's conduct or the conduct of those he "aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused." It is not triggered by the conduct of a co-conspirator, unless the defendant aided, abetted, or counselled the co-conspirator's violence or possession. Disqualifying firearm possession may be either actual or constructive. Constructive possession is the dominion or control over a firearm or the place where one is located. Disqualification requires the threat of violence or possession of a firearm "in connection with the offense," sometimes characterized as "active possession." In many instances, possession of a firearm in a location where drugs are stored or transported, or where transactions occur, will be enough to support an inference of possession in connection with the drug offense of conviction. "[E]ven a single intimidating confrontation [is] enough to constitute a credible threat" and is consequently safety valve disqualifying. Conversely, a sentencing enhancement for a co-conspirator's possession does not automatically preclude qualification. The Sentencing Guidelines define "serious bodily injury" for purposes of Section 3553(f)(3) as an "injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation." On its face, the definition would include serious bodily injuries, such as hospitalization, suffered by the defendant as a result of the offense. Moreover, a defendant is more likely to be disqualified under Section 3553(f)(3) if a fellow conspirator seriously injures a victim than would be the case under Section 3553(f)(2) if the conspirator merely carries a firearm. [T]he defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in Section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4)(emphasis added). The defendant must also establish that he or she was not "an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense." The term supervisor is construed broadly and encompasses anyone who exercises control or authority of another during the commission of the offense. The Sentencing Guidelines disqualify anyone who receives a guideline level increase for their aggravated role in the offense. Thus, by implication, it does not require a defendant to have received a guideline increase based on his minimal or minor participation in a group offense, nor does it disqualify a defendant who acted alone. [N]ot later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). At one time the most heavily contested safety valve prerequisite, Section 3553(f)(5) requires full disclosure on the part of the defendant. As in the case of the other prerequisites, the defendant here bears the burden of establishing his qualification for safety valve relief. The requirement extends not only to information concerning the crime of conviction, but also to information concerning other crimes that "were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan," including uncharged related conduct. Neither Section 3553(f) nor the Sentencing Guidelines explain what form the defendants' full disclosure must take. At least one court has held that under rare circumstances disclosure through the defendant's testimony at trial may suffice. Most often the defendant provides the information during an interview with prosecutors or by a proffer. The defendant must disclose the information to the prosecutor, however. Disclosure to the probation officer during preparation of the presentence report is not sufficient. Moreover, a defendant does not necessarily qualify for relief merely because he has proffered a statement and invited the prosecution to identify any additional information it seeks; for "the government is under no obligation to solicit information from a defendant." The defendant must provide the government with all the relevant information in his possession. And, he must do so "no later than the time of the sentencing hearing." Information offered after the sentencing hearing does not qualify, although information offered following appellate remand for resentencing and prior to the resentencing hearing may qualify. On the other hand, past lies do not render a defendant ineligible for relief under the truthful disclosure criterion of the safety valve, although they may undermine his credibility. Three provisions authorize federal courts to reduce a defendant's sentence on the motion of the government for substantial assistance: Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Only Section 3553(e) and Rule 35(b) authorize sentences below otherwise applicable mandatory minimums. Unlike the safety valve, neither Section 3553(e) nor Rule 35(b) is limited to mandatory minimums established for controlled substance offenses. The substantial assistance provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), passed with little fanfare in the twilight of the 99 th Congress as part of the massive Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, legislation that established or increased a number of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. The section continues in its original form virtually unchanged: (e) Limited Authority To Impose a Sentence Below a Statutory Minimum. - Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code. The section passed between the date authorizing creation of the Sentencing Guidelines and the date they became effective. Rather than replicate the language of Section 3553(e), the guidelines contain an overlapping section that authorizes a sentencing court to depart from the minimum sentence called for by the guidelines. As a general rule, a defendant is entitled to a sentence below an otherwise applicable statutory minimum under the provisions of Section 3553(e) only if the government and the court agree. The courts have acknowledged that due process or equal protection or other constitutional guarantees may provide a narrow exception. "Thus, a defendant would be entitled to relief if a prosecutor refused to file a substantial-assistance motion, say, because of the defendant's race or religion." A defendant is entitled to relief if the government's refusal constitutes a breach of its plea agreement. A defendant is also "entitled to relief if the prosecutor's refusal to move was not rationally related to any legitimate Government end." Some courts have suggested that a defendant is entitled to relief if the prosecution refuses to move under circumstances that "shock the conscience of the court," or that demonstrate bad faith, or for reasons unrelated to substantial assistance. A majority of the judges who answered the Sentencing Commission's survey agreed that relief under Section 3553(e) should be available even in the absence of motion from the prosecutor. Despite their similarities, Section 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. Section 5K1.1 are not the same. A motion under Section 3553(e) authorizes a sentence beneath the mandatory minimum, and a motion under U.S.S.G. Section 5K1.1 authorizes a sentence beneath the applicable Sentencing Guideline range. Thus, a motion under Section 5K1.1 will ordinarily not be construed as a motion under Section 3553(e), in order to permit a court sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentencing requirement. Any sentence imposed below the statutory minimum by virtue of Section 3553(e) must be based on the extent of the defendant's assistance; it may not reflect considerations unrelated to such assistance. It has been suggested, however, that a court may use the Section 5K1.1 factors for that determination, that is, "(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; [and] (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance." The substantial assistance exception makes possible convictions that might otherwise be unattainable. Yet, it may also lead to "inverted sentencing," that is, a situation in which "the more serious the defendant's crimes, the lower the sentence—because the greater his wrongs, the more information and assistance he had to offer to a prosecutor"; while in contrast the exception is of no avail to the peripheral offender who can provide no substantial assistance. Perhaps for this reason, most of the judges who responded to the Sentencing Commission survey agreed that a sentencing court should not be limited to assistance-related factors and should be allowed to use the generally permissible sentencing factors when calculating a sentence under Section 3553(e). In the before-and-after sentencing tale of avoiding a statutory mandatory minimum for substantial assistance, Rule 35(b) is the after. It is available only after sentencing. If the defendant's sentence is vacated on appeal, a Section 3553(e) motion rather than a Rule 35(b) motion is the appropriate vehicle for relief during resentencing. The rule features a two-pronged postsentence authorization for sentence reduction at the behest of the government. First, the government may always file a motion for sentence reduction including reduction below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum if it does so within a year of sentencing. Second, the government may file a comparable motion a year after sentencing, but only under narrow circumstances that excuse the failure to make a more timely motion. Here, too, a motion by the government is a prerequisite to relief, and the government's decision to refuse to move can be overcome only where the government's silence is unconstitutionally grounded or based on some rationale not reasonably related to a legitimate government end. A district court, faced with a Rule 35(b) motion, must determine whether the defendant in fact rendered substantial assistance and if so what level of reduction, if any, is warranted. As part of its assessment, the court may, but is not required to, consider the general sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). There is some authority for the proposition that the defendant has no right to notice and hearing following the submission of a Rule 35(b) motion. Moreover, Rule 35(b) does not authorize a court to reduce the amount of restitution previously ordered.
Federal law requires a sentencing judge to impose a minimum sentence of imprisonment following conviction for any of a number of federal offenses. Congress has created three exceptions. Two are available in any case where the prosecutor asserts that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the criminal investigation or prosecution of another. The other, commonly referred to as the safety valve, is available, without the government's approval, for a handful of the more commonly prosecuted drug trafficking and unlawful possession offenses that carry minimum sentences. Qualification for the substantial assistance exceptions is ordinarily only possible upon the motion of the government. In rare cases, the court may compel the government to file such a motion when the defendant can establish that the refusal to do so was based on constitutionally invalid considerations, or was in derogation of a plea bargain obligation or was the product of bad faith. Qualification for the safety valve exception requires a defendant to satisfy five criteria. His past criminal record must be minimal; he must not have been a leader, organizer, or supervisor in the commission of the offense; he must not have used violence in the commission of the offense, and the offense must not have resulted in serious injury; and prior to sentencing, he must tell the government all that he knows of the offense and any related misconduct. In response to a congressional request, the U.S. Sentencing Commission recommended expansion of the safety valve. The First Step Act, P.L. 115-391, broadened the safety valve for the benefit of (1) defendants with slightly more serious criminal records and (2) defendants convicted under the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act.