The Coast Guard has 11 statutory missions, which are divided into homeland security and non-homeland security missions (see appendix II). The Coast Guard’s units that conduct operations to achieve its statutory missions are organized into shore-based forces such as boat stations, maritime patrol forces such as cutters and icebreakers, and Specialized Forces—the latter of which can serve as a force multiplier for the other units, such as by deploying for added capacity during homeland security missions, including port security, drug interdiction, and defense readiness. Table 1 details Specialized Forces teams, types of operations they conduct, and an example of an operation. Specialized Forces units deploy from their home locations, such as major U.S. port areas, to conduct operations in U.S. coastal waters and internationally. For example, some units such as MSRTs, MSSTs and PSUs deploy with specialized boats on trailers that can be towed or air lifted to the site of an antiterrorism patrol or defense readiness operation. Other Specialized Forces units do not maintain the vessels, such as cutters, or air assets, such as helicopters, from which they carry out operations. TACLETs, for example, do not maintain any boats and rely on and deploy via U.S. Navy or Allied vessels, as well as Coast Guard cutters, to conduct drug interdiction operations. Figure 1 shows Coast Guard personnel conducting a drug interdiction operation that included a TACLET member boarding a foreign, semi-submersible vessel, which resulted in seizing 17,000 pounds of cocaine. The Coast Guard is the lead federal maritime law enforcement agency on waters beyond 12 nautical miles offshore of the U.S. coast. The Coast Guard shares responsibility for patrolling the U.S. maritime borders and territorial sea (i.e., maritime approaches 12 nautical miles seaward of the U.S. coast) to interdict drugs and foreign nationals illegally entering the United States with U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine Operations and Border Patrol. Outside of DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD) is the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, and it operates systems, such as radar, that can be used in support of DHS and other federal, state, and local law enforcement activities. Figure 2 depicts the geographic areas in which Specialized Forces operate and resources, such as vessels or aircraft, used to support their operations. In July 2007, the Coast Guard reorganized the command structure of its Specialized Forces and aligned them as an independent Coast Guard command—the Deployable Operations Group. The Deployable Operations Group was intended to enhance operational effectiveness and interagency coordination in responding to a range of national emergencies and events, such as terrorist threats or natural disasters. Prior to the Deployable Operations Group, Specialized Forces aligned geographically under Atlantic Area and Pacific Area commands. In 2010, we found that the unified command structure achieved its intended benefits of standardized training and centrally managing assets. We also reported in 2010 that the Deployable Operations Group faced human resource challenges such as selecting qualified candidates and achieving and maintaining qualifications to perform certain high-skill techniques, such as vertical insertion from a helicopter onto the deck of a ship during maritime interdiction missions. Because of the ongoing program changes at that time, we did not make recommendations. In 2010, a DHS Inspector General report recommended a systematic review and analysis of the MSST program to determine, in part, the optimal staffing levels, training, and competency mix needed. The Coast Guard agreed and cited planned MSST program changes in its response to the Inspector General report. The Coast Guard’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget included a proposal to close five MSSTs and consolidate those forces to achieve cost savings, among other things. A 2011 Coast Guard report recommended that the Coast Guard integrate Specialized Forces units across the Coast Guard, balance the capacity of the Specialized Forces with proficiency and safety levels, and manage risk. In April 2013, the Coast Guard disbanded the Deployable Operations Group, and Specialized Forces units returned to regional commands. Figure 3 shows the evolution of Coast Guard Specialized Forces units since 1970. The April 2013 reorganization of the Coast Guard’s Specialized Forces units under regional commands more closely aligns with its original command structure that existed prior to the 2007 creation of the Deployable Operations Group. Figure 4 details the three command structures—pre-Deployable Operations Group, Deployable Operations Group, and Post-Deployable Operations Group. The Coast Guard generally applied three of five key practices for agency reform and partially applied two of five when developing its report that recommended the 2013 reorganization of its Specialized Forces units. Table 2 identifies the extent to which the Coast Guard’s reorganization applied key practices and considerations. Coast Guard generally applied three of five key practices for Specialized Forces reorganization, including establishing goals and outcomes, involving employees and key stakeholders, and addressing high risk areas and longstanding management challenges. Establishing goals and outcomes of reforms can help decision makers determine what problems genuinely need to be fixed, how to balance differing objectives, and what steps need to be taken to create long-term gains. The Coast Guard generally applied this key practice in its analysis of Specialized Forces units. For example, the Coast Guard’s 2011 report cites personnel safety as a main reason to reform Specialized Forces operations. According to Coast Guard officials, part of the rationale for this focus was because of a training mishap and a problem with equipment requirements. Specifically, officials stated that in 2010, a Coast Guard member drowned while training when he entered the water without self-inflating flotation equipment. Coast Guard officials told us that at the time of the incident, members of Specialized Forces units would carry in excess of 100 pounds of specialized gear and equipment. Officials also noted that at that time there were concerns that members’ self-inflating flotation devices could inflate onboard aircraft, which in the event of a crash in the water could result in personnel being unable to exit the aircraft. The Coast Guard subsequently established a goal for its reorganization to mitigate this safety risk by decreasing gear weight and personal flotation devices. Further, the report recommended reducing or eliminating inconsistencies between the Specialized Forces units and the rest of the Coast Guard. For example, a Coast Guard official told us that integration between the Deployable Operations Group and the rest of the Coast Guard was inconsistent, training programs were not standardized, and training took place at 15 different locations. This resulted in difficulties sharing assets, such as aircraft and boats, for use during training sessions. As a result of the report findings and its recommendation, the 2013 reorganization realigned Specialized Forces units under regional operational commands to integrate its logistics with the rest of the Coast Guard (fig 2.). Involving employees and key stakeholders in the process of developing reforms is part of an integrated approach that helps facilitate the development of reform goals and objectives, as well as incorporate insights from a frontline perspective and increase customer acceptance of any changes. The Coast Guard generally applied this key practice because it involved senior officials representing the agency to develop the goals of the reorganization, how to address them, and to make reform recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Specialized Forces operations. The Coast Guard’s 2011 report included and incorporated input from a broad range of subject matter experts including high level officers representing a comprehensive mix of Coast Guard units, with a diverse mix of experience, and it reflected different programs throughout the Coast Guard to ensure a comprehensive review. During site visits, Coast Guard officials told us the reorganization from the Deployable Operations Group to Specialized Forces had a positive effect by helping to ensure tactics, training, and techniques became standardized and ensuring better cooperation within the Coast Guard as well as with other agencies. For example, Coast Guard officials told us that because their area of responsibility is large and busy, they use MSSTs to augment their local capabilities and to apply the MSST’s specialized capabilities that the local unit does not have. Coast Guard officials also emphasized an increase in safety, particularly with a decrease in a risk of drowning while in tactical gear. Addressing long standing weaknesses in how some federal programs and agencies operate is a key practice, which can improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of the federal government. The Coast Guard generally applied this key practice because it considered high risk areas when considering Specialized Forces reorganization. Specifically, the Coast Guard addressed retention and training, which it identified in its 2011 report to be high risk areas and longstanding management challenges. For example, the Coast Guard’s 2011 report identified the need for additional subject matter expertise and made recommendations to implement training standardization across the Specialized Forces. Our work has also identified retention and training as challenges. We found in 2010 that the Coast Guard was unable to retain qualified Specialized Forces personnel, in part because of additional training requirements. For example, while personnel working on a cutter may need a boat driver certification, an MSST or MSRT member would need an additional tactical boat driver course. The Coast Guard subsequently developed detailed guidance for Specialized Forces units that includes standardized training, requirements, and qualifications to be followed regardless of the unit location and to be applied consistently across organizational commands. During site visits to units in the Pacific and Atlantic Areas, we observed that equipment was standardized across Specialized Forces, and officials we spoke with described the benefits of the standardized training and equipment. Figure 5 shows Coast Guard MSST personnel conducting standardized training, which officials said has the added benefit of providing potential deterrence of illegal activities, such as drug smuggling, in the geographic area of the training. Coast Guard officials also told us that, prior to the 2007 reorganization to the Deployable Operations Group, Coast Guard personnel working in Specialized Forces units could not remain in those units and be competitive for promotions. Coast Guard officials told us that this was because the Coast Guard has certain requirements for career progression, including personnel working in various assignments within a given career path. In 2010, we reported that the Coast Guard had developed a career path for maritime law enforcement personnel—who are part of operations that generally address the Coast Guard’s homeland security missions. Coast Guard officials told us that this change was a response to challenges the agency faced retaining law enforcement personnel. Officials said this change created a maritime law enforcement career path within the Specialized Forces community. Coast Guard officials we spoke with also told that us the career path has helped them retain qualified Specialized Forces personnel. Coast Guard partially applied two of five key practices for agency reorganization, including using data and evidence, and considering to some extent the possibility of fragmentation, duplication, and overlap. However, it has not used data and evidence to fully assess Specialized Forces workforce needs and has not comprehensively evaluated the potential for overlaps or gaps in the capabilities among them. We have reported that agencies are better equipped to address management and performance challenges when managers use reliable data and evidence, such as evidence from program evaluations and performance data that provide information on how well a program or agency is achieving its goals. We have previously reported that when reforming a given program, the use of data and evidence is critical for setting program priorities and allocating resources. The Coast Guard used some data and evidence related to a specific management challenge—training mishaps—but did not use data and evidence to fully assess Specialized Forces workforce needs. As previously mentioned, the Coast Guard analyzed equipment weight data and scenarios and made recommendations based on the results of these analyses to reduce the risk of drowning. The 2011 report affirmed the locations of the Specialized Forces units to ensure that unit capabilities were geographically distributed, but it recommended additional analyses of some unit locations, such as TACLETs. The Coast Guard found that the geographic distribution of the Specialized Forces, at the time of the analysis, provided coverage for their tactical law enforcement and waterside operations and did not recommend changes to the geographic locations of these units. The Coast Guard partially applied this key practice because, when it reorganized its Specialized Forces command structure in 2013, it did not assess Specialized Forces workforce needs with regard to the number of personnel required to conduct its operations. The Coast Guard’s 2011 report identified some capability and capacity shortfalls, including inadequate capacity to conduct certain security operations, and recommended an analysis of staffing levels for all Specialized Forces units. Similarly, a 2012 Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute peer review of the Coast Guard’s 2011 report on its Specialized Forces noted the need for a more comprehensive analysis of all of the units to ensure the effective use of their specialized capabilities. In the eight years since the Coast Guard study recommended workforce needs analyses, the Coast Guard has not assessed the overall Specialized Forces workforce needs or established such an analysis as a priority. The Coast Guard conducted a unit level analysis of its PSUs in January 2014, but it did not use the results because the analysis focused on non-deployed personnel. Officials stated the analysis identified gaps in personnel and recommended that the Coast Guard expand the size of the units to be able to fulfill mission requirements. However, Coast Guard officials said they did not act on the recommendations of the study to request different resource levels. Officials told us that leadership changes among Specialized Forces can result in units, such as PSUs, getting study results based on scope decisions with which the new leader disagrees. We found that the Coast Guard might not have the right mix and number of personnel relative to the mix and number of operations Specialized Forces conduct to meet mission demands. Our analysis of Specialized Forces data for fiscal years 2016 through 2018 and planned for 2019 found variation in the number of operations requested of some units during this period, even though the number of personnel remained relatively constant. For example, our analysis of Coast Guard data found that PSU requests—and the number of operations carried out—changed from three operations in 2016 to six in 2018, with two operations planned in 2019, spread among a constant of approximately 1,000 personnel. In another example, our analysis of Coast Guard data found that the of number operations requested for MSSTs varied from 85 in 2016 to 67 in 2018, and 39 planned for 2019. Our analysis of Coast Guard data found that the number of MSST operations carried out was 152 in 2016, 141 in 2018, and 379 planned operations in 2019, while the number of personnel assigned to MSSTs decreased from 562 in 2016 to 547 planned for 2019. Such variations may affect the extent to which Specialized Forces units are used efficiently. Officials from some units we interviewed indicated that they experienced periods of underutilization, while other similar units turned down operations for lack of available personnel. For example, an official at one unit described efforts to increase the number of operations carried out by the unit, with officials describing outreach efforts to other Coast Guard units to encourage those units to call on them for specialized assistance. Officials at another unit conducted similar outreach, including passing out flyers describing Specialized Forces capabilities and contact information should the other Coast Guard units need assistance. In contrast, officials from a different Specialized Forces unit described instances where they had to decline operations because they did not have enough personnel to meet the demand. Further, an official from one Area Command responsible for assigning some of the Specialized Forces operations stated approximately 5 percent of requests for Specialized Forces assistance went unfulfilled. Without an analysis of the Specialized Forces units as a whole, the Coast Guard does not have the assurance that it has the requisite number of personnel in the right units to conduct the required missions. Such an analysis would better position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps between mission requirements and mission performance caused by deficiencies in the numbers of personnel available, as required by the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015. Coast Guard officials from Specialized Forces units we interviewed in 2019 acknowledged that an analysis of each unit would be useful and in August 2019, officials from headquarters affirmed this and stated the Coast Guard aims to conduct analyses of the individual units. We found that these analyses consider each unit individually and do not comprehensively consider similar units, such as Specialized Forces. Therefore, without analyzing the Specialized Forces program as a whole, the Coast Guard may miss opportunities to optimize the allocation of personnel among Specialized Forces units, as well as the number of units. Using data and evidence to comprehensively assess workforce needs across Specialized Forces units would better position the Coast Guard to prioritize its Specialized Forces efforts to more effectively achieve desired outcomes. As we have reported since 2011, agencies may be able to achieve greater efficiency or effectiveness by reducing or better managing programmatic fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. We have also reported that these issues should be considered during agency reform efforts. We found that the Coast Guard partially considered how to reduce potential duplication and overlap when reorganizing the Specialized Forces units. The 2011 Coast Guard report identified some duplication of one specialized unit and challenges associated with uncoordinated training and fragmented guidance. The Coast Guard recommended the elimination of one Specialized Forces unit with that specialized capability, and to change training requirements to reduce the duplication of roles within one specific Specialized Forces unit. Further, the report recommended training standardization and associated guidance, which the Coast Guard subsequently addressed by updating its guidance and standardizing training requirements. In addition, the Coast Guard report recommended changes to the capabilities maintained by some units, such as MSSTs. Specifically, the report recommended that the Coast Guard focus MSSTs on waterside security capabilities and eliminate law enforcement roles, among others, to reduce duplicative training costs. Further, according to officials, in response to the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, the Coast Guard eliminated the MSST in San Diego, California and replaced it with MSRT West, a second MSRT. The Coast Guard also placed all regional dive lockers under MSRT West. According to Coast Guard officials, structuring regional dive lockers under a single command in a single geographic location is safer and more efficient, because dive operations require a high level of subject matter expertise in the command as well as personnel actually participating in the dives. However, the Coast Guard partially applied this practice because it has not conducted the analyses necessary to fully identify potential overlap and the extent to which it could be unnecessarily duplicative. The Coast Guard categorizes Specialized Forces missions, such as drug interdiction or defense readiness, as primary, secondary or collateral, and assigns different levels of capabilities according to these categories. Specifically, multiple Specialized Forces are used to support the same Coast Guard missions, which often require similar capabilities from the units, such as the ability to perform enhanced law enforcement boardings. Figure 6 provides a visual representation of the Specialized Forces missions, the capabilities to carry out operations in support of those missions, and the units that address the mission areas. As shown in figure 6, MSSTs and PSUs primary and secondary missions overlap, as do the capabilities necessary to conduct three of the same missions—Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Defense Readiness; and Search and Rescue. MSSTs and PSUs have operational differences, but there may be benefits to assessing when to use PSUs in place of MSSTs or vice versa, such as when one Specialized Force can be deployed more rapidly, or because Specialized Forces are located in close proximity. For example, MSSTs maintain the ability to deploy almost immediately to carry out an operation, while PSUs generally require around 24 months to deploy. PSUs generally have a deployment preparation cycle of at least 24 months and up to 48 months. Moreover, the variance in Specialized Forces utilization and the overlapping capabilities units maintain underscores a challenge and an opportunity, particularly given the close proximity of Specialized Forces units. For example, given that there are certain instances where Specialized Forces units appear to be substitutable, assessing the extent to which co-located units could be better leveraged could help the Coast Guard more efficiently manage its resources. Figure 7 shows the locations of Coast Guard Specialized Forces units and the close proximity of some units, such as co-located MSSTs and PSUs, which have overlapping primary and secondary defense readiness and ports waterways and coastal security missions (fig. 6) and related capabilities. In March 2019, as previously noted, Coast Guard leadership again called for a review of PSUs, citing overlap, personnel shortages, and excessive distance to training areas (such as waterways and weapon ranges). The challenge this new PSU study seeks to address underscores the importance of a contemporary and comprehensive assessment of these units’ workforce needs. It also presents the Coast Guard with an opportunity to consider whether it could more effectively use its co- located Specialized Forces. For example, instead of deploying a PSU within commuting distance of an operation occurring in San Francisco, CA that required surge capacity, the Coast Guard deployed an MSST from Seattle, WA for 7 days, even though both Specialized Forces are to maintain the same capabilities needed for the operation. Coast Guard officials stated that they decided to send the MSST to meet a surge capacity instead of the local PSU because Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security is a secondary mission for PSUs and PSUs do not bring law enforcement capability of boarding officers, among other things. According to Coast Guard officials, each PSU costs around $1 million a year to operate when not deployed to Guantanamo Bay, and two of eight PSUs are deployed annually. Assessing Specialized Forces workforce needs to determine the optimal mix of units and analyzing trade-offs, such as eliminating underutilized units, could identify opportunities for the Coast Guard to save millions of dollars over time. Elimination of even one PSU could save around a million dollars annually. Because the exact amount of savings would depend on the outcomes of those analyses and currently available cost data is not available for making estimates, we cannot precisely estimate the value of potential savings. However, given that the Coast Guard has begun an assessment of PSUs, it is reasonable to expect that a comprehensive analysis of Specialized Forces could find unnecessary duplication and could recommend PSU closures. Coast Guard officials did not state that they are considering this review as part of a comprehensive review of Specialized Forces that would include assessing the overlapping capabilities of other Specialized Forces units. In August 2019, Coast Guard officials told us that overlap or gaps in Specialized Forces’ capabilities could exist. Coast Guard officials also stated that some overlapping capability could be beneficial. While overlap may be beneficial, overlapping capabilities, if unnecessary, could indicate inefficiencies, such as excess capacity in some areas, including geographic areas, to the detriment of others where there may be capability gaps. The Coast Guard is not currently positioned to take action to reduce the risk of some potentially unnecessary overlap or duplication among the Specialized Forces units because it has yet to comprehensively assess the Specialized Forces program. Specifically, as reported above, Coast Guard officials stated that the Coast Guard has conducted some staffing analyses of standalone Specialized Forces units, but has not evaluated the Specialized Forces’ workforce or operations as a whole. Until the Coast Guard comprehensively assesses Specialized Forces’ needs, the Coast Guard will lack a complete picture of the extent to which overlapping capabilities are necessary or appropriate, or where there are capability gaps or areas where certain Specialized Forces units could be better leveraged to meet mission requirements. Assessing the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists among Specialized Forces’ capabilities, would better position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps and reallocate resources, as needed, to use them more efficiently. The Coast Guard’s Specialized Forces units include a range of specialized capabilities that are vital to the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission, and they constitute a significant force multiplier to maintain readiness throughout major U.S. ports and cities. The Coast Guard faces the difficult decision of determining how best to invest its limited resources. Without having assessed its operational needs and mix of personnel for Specialized Forces units, the Coast Guard does not have the information it needs to ensure that it is investing its resources efficiently. GAO’s key practices and considerations provide a framework for agency reorganization and a decision-making approach that can help ensure that resources are allocated efficiently and do not result in unnecessary overlap or duplication. The Coast Guard did not fully apply these practices when reorganizing the Specialized Forces. By comprehensively assessing Specialized Forces’ workforce needs and determining the extent to which overlapping capabilities are necessary, or whether capability gaps may exist, the Coast Guard may be able to more efficiently allocate resources for its Specialized Forces. The Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Deployable Specialized Forces’ workforce needs. (Recommendation 1) The Coast Guard should assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists among Deployable Specialized Forces’ capabilities. (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. On November 5, 2019, DHS also provided comments, reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS concurred with one of our two recommendations, and described actions planned to address it, but did not concur with the other. DHS concurred with our first recommendation that the Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Specialized Forces’ workforce needs. DHS stated in its comments that the Coast Guard will conduct individual unit analyses, prioritizing for units that were not previously examined. Initial requests, according to the comments, will be submitted to staff responsible for the analyses by January 31, 2020, and estimated completion dates for the analyses are expected to be determined after assessing the availability of funding to support the analyses. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. DHS did not concur with our second recommendation that the Coast Guard assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists among Specialized Forces’ capabilities. In its comments, DHS stated that when the priority of the missions, capabilities, and subsequent geographic operating areas are appropriately considered for each DSF unit type, unnecessary overlap or duplication does not exist among DSF capabilities. DHS further stated that our conclusions illustrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the corresponding missions of DSF units. We note in our report that the way in which the Coast Guard deploys certain Specialized Forces units may not result in overlap, but overlapping capabilities amongst units could indicate inefficiencies in how they are used, such as excess capacity in some areas, including geographic areas, and missed opportunities for use in others. As noted in our report, the Coast Guard has not conducted the analyses necessary to fully identify potential overlap amongst units’ capabilities and the extent to which opportunities may exist to use the units more efficiently. The Coast Guard categorizes Specialized Forces missions, such as drug interdiction or defense readiness, as primary, secondary, or collateral, and assigns different levels of capabilities according to these categories. We found that multiple Specialized Forces are used to support the same Coast Guard missions, which often require similar capabilities from the units, such as the ability to perform enhanced law enforcement boardings. Further, as stated in our report, in August 2019, Coast Guard officials told us that overlap or gaps in Specialized Forces’ capabilities could exist and that some overlapping capability could be beneficial. While overlap may be beneficial, overlapping capabilities, if unnecessary, could indicate inefficiencies, such as excess capacity in some areas, including geographic areas. Also in its comments, DHS stated that we have not identified any substantive examples of unnecessary overlap or duplication nor provided any other compelling reasons for how implementing this recommendation could enhance Coast Guard mission effectiveness. DHS cited our use of MSST and PSU potential overlap as an example of misunderstanding DSF unit missions and active versus reserve personnel. However, MSST and PSU potential overlap is a prime example of why potential unnecessary overlap should be examined by the Coast Guard. Specifically, as noted in our report, MSST and PSU primary and secondary missions overlap, as do the capabilities necessary to conduct three of the same missions—Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Defense Readiness; and Search and Rescue. MSSTs and PSUs have operational differences due to active versus reserve personnel status, but there may be benefits to assessing when to use PSUs in place of MSSTs or vice versa, such as when one Specialized Force can be deployed more rapidly, or when Specialized Forces are located in close proximity. Beyond the MSST and PSU potential overlap, active duty units such as MSSTs and MSRTs provide an additional example. As shown in Figure 6 of our report, MSRTs and MSSTs share the primary missions of Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security, as well as common secondary missions, including Drug and Migrant Interdiction. Additionally, MSRT- San Diego and MSST-Long Beach are within close proximity to one another, offering an opportunity to examine potential overlap. Also, as noted in our report, officials from some units we interviewed indicated that they experienced periods of underutilization, while other similar units turned down operations for lack of available personnel. For example, an official at one unit described efforts to increase the number of operations carried out by the unit, with officials describing outreach efforts to other Coast Guard units to encourage those units to call on them for specialized assistance. Officials at another unit conducted similar outreach, including passing out flyers describing Specialized Forces capabilities and contact information should the other Coast Guard units need assistance. In contrast, officials from a different Specialized Forces unit described instances where they had to decline operations because they did not have enough personnel to meet the demand. Given that there are certain instances where Specialized Forces units appear to be substitutable, assessing the extent to which units could be better leveraged could help the Coast Guard more efficiently manage its resources. In addition, in March 2019, Coast Guard leadership called for a review of PSUs, citing overlap, personnel shortages, and excessive distance to training areas (such as waterways and weapon ranges). As noted in our report, the challenge this new PSU study seeks to address underscores the importance of a contemporary and comprehensive assessment of these units’ workforce needs and presents the Coast Guard with an opportunity to consider whether it could more effectively use its co- located Specialized Forces. According to Coast Guard officials, each PSU costs around $1 million a year to operate when not deployed to Guantanamo Bay, and two of eight PSUs deploy annually. Assessing Specialized Forces workforce needs to determine the optimal mix of units and analyzing trade-offs, such as eliminating or moving underutilized units, could identify opportunities for the Coast Guard to save millions of dollars over time. As noted in our report, because the exact amount of savings would depend on the outcomes of those analyses and cost data that is not currently available for making estimates, we cannot precisely estimate the value of potential savings. However, given that the Coast Guard has begun an assessment of PSUs, it is reasonable to expect that a comprehensive analysis of Specialized Forces could provide either a defensible basis for the existing structure or find unnecessary duplication and could recommend changes to the number and location of Specialized Forces. In summary, as we state in our report, a comprehensive assessment of Specialized Forces’ needs would, among other things, help the Coast Guard have a more complete picture of the extent to which certain Specialized Forces units could be better leveraged to meet mission requirements. Assessing the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists among Specialized Forces’ capabilities would better position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps and reallocate resources, as needed, to use them more efficiently. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or AndersonN@gao.gov. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. This appendix provides Coast Guard data on Deployable Specialized Force (Specialized Forces) personnel, operations, costs, and resource hours showing a mix of operational tempos, including variation in the number of operations requested of some units such as Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLETs) and Port Security Units (PSUs), but relatively constant numbers of personnel assigned to them. Table 3 provides operational and cost details for Coast Guard Specialized Forces units for fiscal years 2016 through 2018 and planned for 2019. This appendix details the Coast Guard’s 11 missions, which are characterized as non-homeland security and homeland-security missions (see Table 4). Nathan J. Anderson, (202) 512-3841 or AndersonN@gao.gov. In addition to the contact above, Ben Atwater (Assistant Director), Andrew Curry (Analyst-in-Charge), Chuck Bausell, David Dornisch, Michele Fejfar, Tracey King, and Calaera Powroznik made key contributions to this report. Also contributing were: Jason Berman, Dominick Dale, Eric Hauswirth, and Jan Montgomery.
The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the principal federal agency charged with ensuring the security and safety of the waters under U.S. jurisdiction. To help carry out its missions, the Coast Guard maintains Specialized Forces units with the capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, and other threats to the U.S. maritime environment. The Coast Guard reorganized the command structure of these units in 2007 and again in 2013. The Maritime Security Improvement Act of 2018 included a provision for GAO to evaluate Specialized Forces units and provide a report to Congress. This report examines the extent to which the Coast Guard addressed key practices and considerations for assessing reorganization of its Specialized Forces units. GAO assessed the Coast Guard report and associated workforce planning documentation and data used for its 2013 reorganization and analyzed the extent to which the agency applied key practices. GAO also analyzed guidance and data on Specialized Forces capabilities and operations to identify potential overlap or gaps and interviewed agency officials. In reorganizing its Deployable Specialized Forces (Specialized Forces) in 2013, the Coast Guard generally applied three of five key practices for agency reorganization, including establishing goals and outcomes, engaging stakeholders, and addressing longstanding management challenges, such as training shortfalls. However, the Coast Guard did not fully apply the other two key practices—using data and evidence and addressing potential overlap and duplication within the Specialized Forces workforce. For example: The Coast Guard has not assessed the overall Specialized Forces workforce needs, as this practice recommends. Officials from some units stated that they experienced periods of underutilization, while other units with the same or similar capabilities turned down operations for lack of available personnel. GAO identified some overlap among the capabilities of the different Specialized Forces units and the Coast Guard missions they support—in some cases Specialized Forces units were co-located with other Specialized Forces units with many of the same capabilities and similar missions. In August 2019, Coast Guard officials acknowledged that the 2013 reorganization did not conduct an analysis of potential overlap or duplication of capabilities and agreed that overlap or gaps in Specialized Forces capabilities could exist. Assessing workforce needs and the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication may exist among Specialized Forces would help ensure that the agency effectively allocates resources and uses them efficiently. GAO makes two recommendations to DHS. First, GAO recommends that the Coast Guard conduct an analysis of its Specialized Forces' workforce needs, with which DHS concurred. Second, GAO recommends that the Coast Guard assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists. Although DHS did not concur, GAO continues to believe the findings documented in the report support the recommendation.