DOD is up to 21 months late in fully addressing five remaining requirements of section 911 related to DOD’s organizational strategy and cross-functional teams, as shown in figure 1 and discussed below. Specifically, DOD has not fully addressed the following statutory requirements: 1. Issue an organizational strategy: DOD has not issued its organizational strategy, which as of June 2019 is 21 months past the statutorily required issuance date of September 1, 2017. In January 2019, we reported that OCMO officials had revised the draft organizational strategy, incorporating, among other things, the criteria that distinguish cross-functional teams established under section 911 from other types of cross-functional working groups, committees, integrated product teams, and task forces, as required by section 918(b) of the John S. McCain NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019. The revised draft of the organizational strategy also includes steps DOD plans to take to advance a collaborative culture. As we reported in our June 2018 report, these steps, as outlined in the draft strategy, align with our leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations, which we recommended that DOD incorporate into its strategy. Based on our review of OCMO’s current draft of the organizational strategy, we found that it addresses all required elements laid out in section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. That January 2019 draft strategy, according to an official from OCMO’s Administration and Organizational Policy Directorate, was provided to OCMO leadership for review as early as August 2018, but has not been approved. A senior OCMO official stated that approval of the draft was delayed to ensure it aligned with the National Defense Strategy, issued in January 2018, and the National Defense Business Operations Plan, issued in May 2018, and to incorporate additional requirements of the John S. McCain NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019, which was enacted in August 2018. In addition, according to senior OCMO and Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense officials, the Acting CMO and the Deputy Secretary of Defense informally discussed the draft organizational strategy, but those conversations did not lead to the Acting CMO formally approving the draft for department-wide coordination. In May 2019, a senior OCMO official told us that the Acting CMO was fully committed to completing department-wide coordination of the draft strategy in June 2019 and advancing it for issuance by the Secretary of Defense in July 2019. After providing a draft of this report to the department for comment, we learned that the organizational strategy was circulated for department-wide coordination on July 12, 2019, with components expected to provide input by August 5, 2019. 2. Issue guidance for cross-functional teams: DOD has not issued guidance for cross-functional teams, which, as of June 2019, is 20 months past the required date of September 30, 2017. In June 2018, we reported that OCMO officials had revised the draft guidance to fully address all section 911 requirements and incorporate leading practices for effective cross-functional teams in the guidance, consistent with our February 2018 recommendation. Based on our review of this draft, we found that it addresses all required elements from section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, as well as all of the leading practices for effective cross-functional teams. That draft guidance, according to an official from OCMO’s Administration and Organizational Policy Directorate, was provided to OCMO leadership for review as early as August 2018, but has not been approved by the CMO. 3. Provide training to cross-functional team members and their supervisors: OCMO officials have provided some of the required training to members and leaders of a recently established cross- functional team described later in this report. The training included several required elements, including information on the characteristics of successful cross-functional teams, conflict resolution, and how to appropriately represent the views and expertise of functional components. However, OCMO officials have not provided training to supervisors in team members’ functional organizations as required. We reported in February 2018 that DOD had developed a draft curriculum for this training that addressed the section 911 requirements. An OCMO official told us it has not altered the curriculum since then, but that the department has still not provided the training to team members’ supervisors because the curriculum has not been approved by the Acting CMO or the Secretary of Defense. Such approval, though not required by statute, would demonstrate senior leadership support for cross-functional teams, a leading practice we have identified. Further, according to an OCMO official, department-wide coordination and approval would serve to strengthen the effectiveness of the training. However, the need for this training is evident. For example, when we observed one of the training sessions, a member of a cross-functional team stated that he did not believe his supervisors knew what cross-functional teams were. 4. Provide training to presidential appointees: OCMO has not provided the required training to individuals filling presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Section 911 requires these individuals to complete the training within 3 months of their appointment or DOD to request waivers. As of June 2019, 24 of 36 such officials had been appointed and in their positions for more than 3 months, and, according to an OCMO official, none had received their training or been granted a training waiver. An OCMO official told us in October 2018 he had revised the draft training curriculum following our February 2018 report to include all the required elements in section 911. However, as of May 2019, OCMO officials had not provided a copy of the revised curriculum for our review. After the curriculum is approved, the officials stated that they plan to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that all presidential appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense receive the training, rather than request waivers. 5. Report on successes and failures of cross-functional teams: OCMO has not completed an analysis of the successes and failures of DOD’s cross-functional teams, which, as of June 2019, is 3 months past its required completion date. Section 911 requires that an analysis of the success and failures of the teams and how to apply lessons learned from that analysis is completed 18 months after the establishment of the first cross-functional team. With the establishment of the first cross-functional team on personnel vetting in August 2017, the required completion date for the report was February 25, 2019. An OCMO official stated that OCMO planned to conduct an analysis on the personnel vetting team, but had not yet begun and had not set a time frame for doing so. DOD has not addressed most of these remaining requirements of section 911 because, according to an OCMO official, the Acting CMO has not approved the draft documents prepared by OCMO staff to satisfy the requirements. Moreover, the Acting CMO has not coordinated most of the documents department-wide and provided them to the Secretary of Defense for review and issuance. Specifically, according to an OCMO official, the Acting CMO has not reviewed or approved the guidance on cross-functional teams or curricula for cross-functional team members, their supervisors, and presidential appointees. These delays occurred in part because the department has not established and communicated internal deadlines for reviewing, coordinating, and approving these documents. According to OCMO officials, the primary reason they have not met these other outstanding requirements, including the guidance and training for cross-functional teams, is that they would like to have the organizational strategy approved and issued first, so that it can be reflected in the accompanying materials. However, while the OCMO has set an internal time frame for the organizational strategy, it has not set similar time frames for completing the remaining requirements. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government emphasize the need to establish time frames to implement actions effectively. In addition, as we reported in June 2018, establishing time frames with key milestones and deliverables to track implementation progress are important for agency reform efforts. By not setting and following clear internal deadlines for meeting the outstanding section 911 requirements, DOD has continued to fall short in meeting statutory requirements and missed opportunities to effectively implement its cross-functional teams and advance a collaborative culture that could bolster broader efforts within the department, such as reforming its business operations. Sections 918 and 1053(c) of the John S. McCain NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 required the Secretary of Defense to establish a cross-functional team pursuant to section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 on electronic warfare to identify gaps in electronic warfare and joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, capabilities, and capacities within the department across personnel, procedural, and equipment areas. In addition, section 1053(d) of the act required the electronic warfare cross- functional team to, among other things, (1) update the department’s Electronic Warfare Strategy in coordination with the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee by February 9, 2019, and (2) provide assessments of the electronic warfare capabilities of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China in consultation with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency by May 10, 2019. Section 918 of the John S. McCain NDAA for Fiscal Year 2019 required the team’s establishment by November 11, 2018; however, DOD did not establish an electromagnetic spectrum operations cross-functional team until February 2019, and the team did not begin its work until April 2019. An official from the team told us that the standup of the team was delayed due to the extensive department-wide review of the February 2019 memorandum that established the team. Because of the delayed establishment of the team, DOD officials estimated that the required update to DOD’s Electronic Warfare Strategy would be completed by the end of September 2019—7 months after the statutory deadline—and that the required assessments would be provided by fall 2019. According to the team’s establishment memorandum, the team will continue its work until at least fiscal year 2022. In addition to the requirements discussed above, section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 includes specific requirements for cross- functional teams established under that section, including that each team’s objectives be clearly established in writing and that the team should establish a strategy to achieve those objectives. We found that DOD and the electromagnetic spectrum operations cross-functional team have addressed 10 of 11 of those requirements for cross-functional teams. We also found that the team demonstrates several of the leading practices for cross-functional teams. For example, we found that the team has a well-defined team structure and well-defined team goals. However, as previously discussed, DOD has not fully addressed the section 911 requirement for training for cross-functional team members’ supervisors. We were also told by team officials that DOD was delayed in providing administrative support and funding to support the team’s operations. According to the memorandum establishing the electromagnetic spectrum operations team, the CMO is responsible for providing administrative support to the new team, to include providing the team with office space, information technology equipment, contracting, human resources, security, cross-functional team training, and other services, as appropriate. The memorandum also requires the team to work with the CMO to develop resource requirements for team operations for fiscal years 2019 and 2020 to ensure adequate resources are immediately available. However, according to a team official, funding was not provided to the team until late May 2019—over 3 months after the team was established and over 1 month after most of the team members were provided by their home units to work on the team full time. According to a team official, this funding was to be used for several team requirements, including dedicated office space, computer systems, travel funds, and contractor support. This funding was delayed in part because of disagreements over responsibility for funding the team under the terms of the memorandum establishing the team. Specifically, according to a team official, OCMO officials believed that funding should be provided by another organization, such as the Joint Staff. Team and Joint Staff officials told us that they believed the OCMO was responsible for this funding based on the memorandum establishing the team. A team official further stated that funding was provided only when the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that funding be provided to the team. OCMO officials told us that because the team was not a budgeted activity for fiscal year 2019, the team was added to DOD’s unfunded requirements list. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) identified funds for the team via the unfunded requirements process at the end of April 2019. However, a team official told us funding for the team for future fiscal years has not been identified and responsibility for providing that funding is still unclear. OCMO officials told us that the team will continue to rely on the unfunded requirements process for funding, since the team is not a budgeted activity for fiscal year 2020, and would need to compete for funding through DOD’s program budget review process for fiscal year 2021 and later fiscal years. Those officials also told us that the team has not yet signed a memorandum of agreement that is required to execute transfer of the funds to the team. A team official told us the team had not yet signed the memorandum because it believed the memorandum would transfer responsibility for funding the team from OCMO to the team. As noted previously, team officials believe the OCMO is responsible for this funding based on the memorandum establishing the team. According to a team official, this delay in funding hampered the team’s ability to achieve full operating capability. For example, until late May the team was working from the Pentagon Conference Center and OCMO conference rooms with only one secure laptop. A team official told us in June 2019 that though the team has moved into its own office space, that space does not have the level of security required for the team to work on a third of its initiatives. As a result, the team was also delayed in conducting mission analysis, work plan development, organizational design, and production of executive-level briefings. A team official told us the team expects to be at full operating capability in late July 2019. Leading practices for implementing effective cross-functional teams highlight the importance of senior management providing teams with access to resources. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies’ management should assign responsibility to achieve the entity’s objectives. If DOD does not clarify roles and responsibilities for providing funding for the new cross- functional team, the Acting CMO and the electromagnetic spectrum operations team may continue to have delays in funding and those delays may negatively affect the team’s ability to conduct its work and to meet its objectives. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 called for organizational and management reforms to assist DOD in addressing challenges that have hindered collaboration and integration across the department. The department has taken some steps to implement the section 911 requirements, but still has not met statutory time frames for implementing key requirements intended to support its cross-functional teams and to advance a more collaborative culture within the department. Setting specific internal deadlines would help ensure action on these outstanding statutory requirements. Moreover, DOD has established a new electromagnetic spectrum operations cross-functional team under section 911—one of the only requirements for which the department has made progress since our last report—but has not ensured that the team will have the funding it needs beyond fiscal year 2019 to maintain full operational capability and accomplish its assigned objectives. Senior leadership commitment to fully supporting this team and fulfilling all section 911 requirements could help the department make important advances in the type of collaboration necessary for the department to accomplish some of its most ambitious goals. We are making the following six recommendations to DOD: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD’s August 2019 deadline for final submission of the organizational strategy to the Secretary of Defense for review and issuance. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD’s September 2019 deadline for review and approval of DOD’s guidance on cross-functional teams and final submission to the Secretary for review and issuance. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD’s September 2019 deadline for review and approval of DOD’s training curriculum for cross-functional team members and their supervisors. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD’s September 2019 deadline for review and approval of DOD’s training curriculum for presidential appointees. (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD’s November 2019 deadline for drafting, review, and approval of DOD’s report on the success and failures of cross-functional teams and final submission to the Secretary for review and approval. (Recommendation 5) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO and the electromagnetic spectrum operations cross-functional team clarify roles and responsibilities for providing administrative support and funding for the team beyond fiscal year 2019 in accordance with the memorandum establishing the team. (Recommendation 6) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In written comments that are reproduced in appendix IV, DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD officials provided separate oral technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its response, DOD provided new information on a timeline for completing the outstanding section 911 requirements. Specifically, DOD updated its internal deadline for submission of the organizational strategy to the Secretary of Defense from July 2019 to August 2019. DOD also stated that it plans to issue the guidance on cross-functional teams and training for cross-functional team members, their supervisors, and presidential appointees by September 2019 and complete its report on the successes and failures of cross-functional teams by November 2019. We updated our first five recommendations to reflect this information. Establishing these timelines is an important step forward in meeting the statutory requirements under section 911 as well as addressing our recommendations. As part of our next and final audit of DOD’s implementation of section 911 requirements, we will assess the extent to which the department has met these new internal deadlines and fully addressed our recommendations in this report. Fully addressing these outstanding requirements will strengthen DOD’s ability to effectively implement its cross-functional teams and advance a collaborative culture within the department. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and DOD’s Deputy Chief Management Officer. In addition, the report is available at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2775 or fielde1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for us—every 6 months after the date of enactment on December 23, 2016, through December 31, 2019—to submit to the congressional defense committees a report. Each report is to set forth a comprehensive assessment of the actions that DOD has taken pursuant to section 911 during each 6-month period and cumulatively since the NDAA’s enactment. Table 1 identifies our four prior reports on DOD’s implementation of section 911 and the status of the five recommendations from those reports. Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 requires the Secretary of Defense to take several actions. Table 2 summarizes these requirements, the due date, and the date completed, if applicable, as of June 2019. In February 2018, we reported on eight leading practices for implementing effective cross-functional teams. Table 3 identifies these leading practices and their related key characteristics. In addition to the contact named above, Margaret Best (Assistant Director), Tracy Barnes, Arkelga Braxton, Sierra Hicks, Michael Holland, Matthew Kienzle, Amie Lesser, Ned Malone, Judy McCloskey, Sheila Miller, Richard Powelson, Daniel Ramsey, Ron Schwenn, and Sarah Veale made key contributions to this report.
DOD continues to confront organizational challenges that hinder collaboration. To address these challenges, section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to, among other things, issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives that span multiple functional boundaries; establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy; and provide related guidance and training. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 also included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's actions in response to section 911. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has made progress in implementing the requirements of section 911, including establishing a new cross-functional team on electromagnetic spectrum operations. GAO reviewed documentation, interviewed cross-functional team members and other DOD officials, and compared DOD's actions to section 911 requirements and leading practices for cross-functional teams. The Department of Defense (DOD) is up to 21 months late in fully addressing five of seven requirements of section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017. These remaining five requirements are designed to strengthen collaboration within the department to foster effective and efficient achievement of objectives and outputs (see figure). DOD has not addressed most of these remaining requirements of section 911 largely because the Chief Management Officer (CMO) has not approved the documents drafted to meet the requirements or coordinated department-wide review of the documents and provided them for Secretary of Defense issuance. According to Office of the CMO (OCMO) officials, some of the draft documents were provided to the CMO for review and approval as early as August 2018. After providing a draft of this report to the department for comment, GAO learned that the organizational strategy was circulated for department coordination in July 2019, with components expected to provide input by August 2019. However, while the OCMO has set an internal time frame for the organizational strategy, it has not set similar time frames for completing the other four remaining requirements, such as delivering guidance and training on cross-functional teams. GAO previously reported that establishing internal deadlines with key milestones and deliverables is important for tracking progress and implementing actions effectively. DOD established a cross-functional team pursuant to section 911 on electromagnetic-spectrum operations (EMSO), but according to a team official, funding for the team was delayed. EMSO refers to those activities consisting of electronic warfare and joint electromagnetic-spectrum management operations used to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic operational environment to achieve the commander's objectives. According to the memorandum establishing the team, the CMO is required to provide administrative support to and coordinate with the team to ensure adequate resources are immediately available. However, team officials stated that this funding was delayed in part because of disagreements over responsibility for funding the team under the terms of this memorandum. Moreover, according to a team official, plans for funding in future fiscal years have not been developed. If DOD does not clarify roles and responsibilities for funding the team, the CMO and the EMSO team may face additional delays securing funding, which could negatively affect the team's ability to conduct its work and meet its objectives. GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD set and ensure that it meets specific internal deadlines for review and approval of outstanding requirements of section 911, and that DOD clarify roles and responsibilities for providing funding for the EMSO cross-functional team. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and set deadlines for addressing the remaining requirements.