In 2012, DOD developed plans to establish 133 CMF teams focused on offensive operations, defensive operations, and DOD network protection. DOD provided budget resources for these teams beginning in fiscal year 2014. It subsequently set goals for reaching initial operational capability and full operational capability. Later in this report we describe how some of the methods used to facilitate these teams’ achievement of full operational capability subsequently affected readiness. Once each CMF team has achieved full operational capability, it is required to certify to its mission at least every 2 years. According to CYBERCOM’s 2017 readiness guidance, in order for each CMF team to achieve the best readiness rating it must certify to its mission every 12 months. According to the DOD Cyber Strategy published in 2015, the first wave of CMF teams will include nearly 6,200 military, civilian, and contractor support personnel from across the military departments and defense components, when they are fully staffed. In February 2017, the commander of CYBERCOM endorsed an Army proposal to present its 21 Reserve component Cyber Protection Teams (11 Army National Guard and 10 Army Reserve) for assignment to U.S. Strategic Command to help address increased mission requirements. These 21 teams represent a second wave of teams, which CYBERCOM has scheduled to achieve full operational capability by September 30, 2024. The second wave of 21 Army Reserve component teams are to include more than 800 personnel once they are fully staffed. The CMF teams are aligned with various DOD organizations, as shown in figure 1. The military service cyber components—Army Cyber Command, Fleet Cyber Command, Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace, and Air Forces Cyber—are CYBERCOM’s service elements and support CYBERCOM in achieving its missions. The personnel on each team represent a variety of specialties, such as intelligence analysts, linguists, and cyber operators and specialists. Figure 2 provides a hypothetical example of how each team might combine personnel from different specialties to carry out its missions. This figure does not show the actual composition of any type of team, but rather provides notional examples of how each team consists of personnel from different specialties who unite to perform cyber missions as part of the CMF. Training personnel for the CMF occurs in four phases and is administered by different entities, as shown in figure 3. Phase one basic training is the initial training performed by the military services that is delivered to any new recruit so that he or she may be assigned a military specialty. As shown in figure 2, CMF personnel draw from a number of different military specialties, including cyber, all-source intelligence, signals intelligence, information technology, and language specialists. Phase one basic training is not necessarily cyber-specific, as it is meant to provide military personnel with the basic skills needed to perform a particular occupation for the service. For example, CMF teams include intelligence professionals who may be assigned to analyze intelligence information that comes from a variety of sources. Training in phases two (foundational), three (collective), and four (sustainment) are focused more directly on the specific skills required to function as a member of the various CMF teams. To establish and train the CMF teams, DOD has assigned components and senior officials with CMF training roles and responsibilities. The key responsibilities for training the CMF are summarized in table 1 below; a more inclusive list is presented in appendix I. As part of the department’s efforts to develop and maintain trained CMF teams, CYBERCOM and the military services have implemented a number of initiatives. Specifically, CYBERCOM established consistent training standards, developed standard operating procedures for readiness reporting, and established and maintained a series of phase two foundational training courses. Further, CYBERCOM and the military services used existing training capabilities to build CMF teams. However, many of the teams that have been built are not yet fully trained and, according to agency officials, have “generally low” readiness levels. In 2012, CYBERCOM established consistent standards for CMF training phases within its responsibility, and the command has continuously updated those standards, as needed, to meet evolving requirements. Specifically, the command has established and updated the standards for phases two (foundational), three (collective), and four (sustainment) of CMF training. These standards apply to all military personnel regardless of service affiliation or active/reserve status. The standards are contained primarily in two documents. First, CYBERCOM issued and has regularly updated the Joint Cyberspace Training and Certification Standards (JCT&CS) to create standardized joint procedures, guidelines, and standards for individual staff and collective training, and to accurately assess CMF teams’ ability to perform their missions. This document was most recently revised in February 2018, to update, among other things, the tasks and abilities associated with CMF work roles based on feedback from experts within the military services and CYBERCOM. Second, CYBERCOM published the CMF Training and Readiness Manual to serve as the primary training and evaluation guidance for DOD cyber professionals. The CMF Training and Readiness Manual has been updated 13 times since it was originally issued in 2013, and it is CYBERCOM’s authoritative guide to building and maintaining cyber training and readiness for its personnel. It provides graduated levels of evaluated training that teams can use in preparing for certification and in being certified. Additionally, it identifies approved training events and the mission-essential tasks, associated standards, and key duties for members of CMF teams. The manual requires each team to recertify every 2 years, or upon recovery from a 50 percent or higher turnover of CMF team personnel. In December 2017, CYBERCOM published standard operating procedures for readiness reporting that CMF teams are to use to assess whether they have the resources and capability to perform their missions. The procedures define CMF readiness reporting guidelines related to personnel, equipment, and training. For example, the document identifies three training metrics that evaluate (1) whether personnel are trained to job qualification standards; (2) whether CMF teams have successfully completed supporting tasks during training exercises, events, or real world operations; and (3) the length of time between formal evaluations. Specifically, the standard operating procedures emphasize that in order to obtain the best training readiness rating, teams must perform an evaluated event or operation at least once every 12 months. CYBERCOM maintains and coordinates a series of CMF courses for phase two foundational training. It develops and administers these course requirements for all of the CMF work roles and requires personnel to complete courses specific to their job responsibilities. All CMF personnel filling a specific mission and role complete the same foundational courses, regardless of military service, employment status—active duty or reserve—or type of CMF team to which they are assigned. For example, all intelligence analysts on CMF teams are to complete the same 14 courses that are specific to their role on the team. CYBERCOM training directorate officials told us they had to make changes to the training progression over time to adapt to the changing threat environment. Accordingly, CYBERCOM has added, modified, or deleted phase two foundational training courses over the past 4 years. For example, in the past 4 years CYBERCOM consolidated four existing courses into a single introductory cyber course that is taken by all-source intelligence analysts who will be part of CMF teams. In November 2017, the command updated the phase two foundational training requirements by removing three courses that were required for a variety of Cyber Protection Team work roles. CYBERCOM also added a new networking course that is a pre-requisite to a course that comes later in the training progression for Cyber and National Mission Team mission commanders. The most recent update also emphasized that Cyber Protection Team personnel must complete the Intermediate Cyber Core Course, the Cyber Protection Team Core Course, and then their specific methodology courses, in that order. According to officials from the service cyber components, the changes CYBERCOM has made to its phase two foundational training progression have been transparent and have addressed evolving threats. However, the changes have also negatively affected training time frames, particularly for the CMF teams composed of National Guard and Reserve personnel. Because National Guard and Reserve teams are scheduled to achieve full operational capability after the active duty teams, they are more likely to be subject to the newer training progressions, which in some cases require a few additional days of courses. Officials from the National Guard told us that this additional training time is more difficult to schedule for National Guard and Reserve personnel because—unlike the active duty personnel who are available to train full time—National Guard and reservist personnel are available to train only one weekend per month and generally for 2 weeks of annual training. Additionally, most of these personnel must coordinate time off from their full-time jobs to take the required phase two foundational training courses. To help address these challenges, CYBERCOM officials told us they use mobile training teams. The Army Cyber School has also used mobile training teams to provide CMF training opportunities to Reserve personnel. The officials from CYBERCOM and the Army told us that the mobile training teams make training more accessible by avoiding the need for the National Guard and Reserve personnel to travel. DOD has used existing training capabilities—including courses, instructors, and facilities—throughout all phases of CMF training. For example: Joint Cyber Analysis Course. The Navy’s Center for Information Warfare Training is the host for the Joint Cyber Analysis Course—a phase one basic training course for personnel designated for cryptologic roles. CYBERCOM recommends this course for many CMF work roles. Cyber and Cryptologic training institutions. CYBERCOM has partnered with the Defense Cyber Investigation Training Academy, the Defense Information Systems Agency, the National Security Agency, and military service schoolhouses to deliver phase two foundational training for the CMF. The Defense Cyber Investigation Training Academy offers almost all of the training courses needed by Cyber Protection Teams, and Army officials said they used the expertise and course materials provided by the Defense Cyber Investigation Training Academy to develop Cyber Protection Team training courses that they offer at the Army Cyber School as well. National Security Agency’s National Cryptologic School provides a majority of the other phase two foundational CMF training courses. According to officials from CYBERCOM and the National Cryptologic School, reliance on existing training capabilities and expertise from the National Security Agency enabled the command to quickly establish CMF capabilities. Operational events. CYBERCOM used both simulated and real-world operational events on networks to support the certification of CMF teams. For example, CYBERCOM officials told us that CYBER KNIGHT is a training event offered periodically by CYBERCOM for CMF teams to exercise national and non-national mission sets. CYBER FLAG and CYBER GUARD, also conducted by CYBERCOM on a periodic basis, utilize a dynamic joint cyber training environment and, according to CYBERCOM officials train all types of CMF teams. In addition to using simulated events through exercises, CYBERCOM and military service officials said that teams were allowed to use real- world operations to meet phase three collective training requirements. The military services and CYBERCOM plan to continue to use existing resources, such as the service school houses, for new and continuous training into the future. For example, as part of their training transition plan, Marine Corps officials reported that they have a contract in place with Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command to provide additional training to Marine Corps CMF personnel after they complete the phase two foundational training progression. Additionally, the Army Cyber School, which provides CMF-specific training for the Army, currently trains Marine Corps personnel as well. The Army and Marine Corps have training agreements in place to continue this arrangement. Figure 4 below shows a member of the National Guard participating in a cyber training exercise. We found that many of the CMF teams for which DOD has reported achieving full operational capability actually require further training, for varying reasons. For example, officials from many key organizations across the DOD cyber enterprise told us that the services moved some personnel among teams, reducing the readiness for teams from which personnel were transferred. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Joint Staff, and the military services cited other challenges affecting CMF team readiness levels as well, including the long time frames needed to obtain the appropriate clearances for CMF personnel and the high pace of operations for the teams, leaving little time for training. The same officials from across DOD’s cyber enterprise affirmed that, taken together, these actions and circumstances have had a negative effect on CMF team resource readiness levels. In April 2018, the commander of CYBERCOM acknowledged in testimony that “much works remains to be done to make the personnel proficient at their duties and the whole team ready and able to perform whatever missions might be directed.” The CMF teams were not fully trained and had lower readiness levels because CYBERCOM and the military services focused primarily on the teams’ achieving full operational capability by October 1, 2018, rather than on building operational readiness. Building operational readiness requires the teams to simultaneously have the appropriate number of sufficiently trained personnel across the force. According to the CMF Training Transition Plan, CYBERCOM’s senior leadership directed the command to achieve full operational capability, and it designated that effort as a higher priority than operational readiness. CYBERCOM officials told us that they recognized the low readiness of the CMF teams and have identified two actions to address the training deficiencies—and associated effects on readiness—for the CMF teams. First, according to the officials, CYBERCOM has developed a system that assigns unique identifiers to each person in the CMF and allows CYBERCOM to easily track when personnel move from one team to another. Second, in December 2017, CYBERCOM issued its readiness reporting standard operating procedure that establishes new readiness reporting guidelines. CYBERCOM officials stated that these guidelines emphasize readiness over the achievement of interim milestones, such as full operational capability. Given that CYBERCOM recently implemented these efforts to improve the readiness of the CMF teams, and that the quarterly readiness reports indicate improved resource readiness for personnel and training metrics, we are not making recommendations related to this issue. Through our body of work on defense cyber issues, we will continue to monitor DOD’s and CYBERCOM’s efforts to maintain a ready CMF. DOD has taken steps to shift its focus from building a trained CMF to maintaining this force, but it has not taken key actions to ensure that the department is poised to maintain CMF training following this transition. Specifically, the military services have not developed plans that include time frames for validating all phase two foundational training courses, or that comprehensively assess their training requirements. Further, as of June 2018, CYBERCOM had not provided a plan for establishing independent assessors to evaluate and certify the completion of phase three collective training for CMF teams. DOD officials told us that the department is shifting its focus away from building and toward maintaining a trained CMF. For example, the Army is leading the development of a Persistent Cyber Training Environment. The goal of that training environment is to provide on-demand access to scenarios that Army officials told us will enhance the quality, quantity, and standardization of phase three (collective) and phase four (sustainment) training and exercise events. The Persistent Cyber Training Environment is scheduled to provide some operational capability by 2019, and it is expected to continue to evolve to meet training needs. In addition to building a Persistent Cyber Training Environment, the department has developed the CMF Training Transition Plan, which will transfer administration of phase two foundational training from CYBERCOM to the services. Specifically, beginning in October 2018, the military services will assume responsibility for phase two foundational training of CMF personnel, which CYBERCOM has centrally managed since CMF training began in 2013. Officials from the services and CYBERCOM have held quarterly meetings to help guide the implementation of this plan. According to the CMF Training Transition Plan, the transfer is being made in response to a direction in Senate Report 114-49 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. The report directed the DOD Principal Cyber Advisor, the Commander, CYBERCOM, and the service secretaries to develop a plan for the military services to complete all required training for the second wave of CMF teams and to maintain individual training capabilities for the existing teams. In January 2017 the Joint Staff and Principal Cyber Advisor published the CMF Training Transition Plan, to transition CMF training to a model that complied with congressional committee direction. The principal goal of this approach is to drive efficiencies and reduce training development and delivery costs. According to the plan, CYBERCOM maintains control of the standards for phase two foundational training, while the Army, Navy, and Air Force are to assume specific joint curriculum lead roles. These roles entail developing joint training plans for the courses under the work roles they are assigned. In addition, the joint curriculum leads (i.e., Army, Navy, and Air Force) are responsible for identifying training gaps and developing learning objectives and courseware based on the CYBERCOM training task list requirements for each of the work roles. For example, under its curriculum lead role, the Army has accepted responsibility for the cyber planner courses. In carrying out this role, the Army developed the Cyber Operations Planners Course and submitted it to CYBERCOM to establish as an approved course for all cyber planners—regardless of service affiliation and of active or reserve duty status—in the CMF. Figure 5 shows the work role categories and responsibilities for which each military service has agreed to be curriculum lead. In November 2017, CYBERCOM directed the military services to develop plans to implement their responsibilities in support of the CMF Training Transition Plan. In accordance with the training transition plan, the military services will assume responsibility for phase two foundational course validation as part of their joint curriculum lead duties. In February 2018, each of the four services provided a plan to CYBERCOM that, at a minimum, highlighted the efforts each service was taking to prepare for its new training transformation responsibilities, including phase two foundational course validation. The purpose of course validation is to determine whether a course adheres to CYBERCOM’s joint training standards as published in the Joint Cyberspace Training and Certification Standards (JCT&CS). CYBERCOM’s draft course validation guidance states that validation involves an examination of both the content of the courses, as well as the instructional methods. The manual states that the content should align with the knowledge, skills, and abilities for the appropriate CYBERCOM work roles and should meet the joint training standard. Further, the manual states that the validation of instructional methods examines how the course is taught and determines whether the methods are appropriate to support desired course outcomes. CYBERCOM’s draft course validation guidance lays out a series of requirements for the validation process, among which are the following: The military service that is submitting the course for validation is responsible for assembling course information, providing back-up data about the course, and securing subject matter experts to review the submission. The military service that is the joint curriculum lead for the course is responsible for reviewing the submissions and offering recommendations for modifications to courses to reflect joint standards. CYBERCOM is responsible for making final determinations of course validity. In this final review, CYBERCOM may hold discussions with key stakeholders, audit the course, review student feedback on the course, or review evaluation data from the course to inform its final validation determination. Our review of the services’ training transition plans found that the Army’s and Air Force’s plans address course validation to some degree, but they do not identify specific time frames for completing course validation. Specifically, the Army’s plan identifies the milestones, dates, and resources for the submission of two of its analyst and planner courses to CYBERCOM for validation, but it does not indicate when the service will submit its Cyber Protection Team Core Training Course for validation. The Air Force’s plan establishes a timeline for developing, finalizing, and distributing course validation guidance, but it does not have time frames or milestones indicating a time for beginning the process of submitting courses to CYBERCOM for validation. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government highlights the need to define objectives in specific terms, to include how objectives are to be achieved and time frames for their achievement. For example, the Navy’s plan indicates that the four courses for which it is responsible will be iteratively validated between fiscal years 2019 and 2021. While a 24- month time frame is broad and it may be challenging for CYBERCOM and the other services to know with precision when the Navy will complete its course validation efforts, the plan includes a time frame that CYBERCOM and the services can use for further discussion and planning purposes. The plans submitted by the Army and the Air Force indicate that the course validation time frames for phase two foundational courses are unknown because course validation is still dependent upon CYBERCOM’s review. The Army’s plan includes time frames for submitting to CYBERCOM two of the three courses it is responsible for developing, but one of the courses does not have any time frames. Further, the Air Force plan includes time frames for developing guidance on how to perform course validation that only carry it through September 2018; it does not have time frames for actually carrying out its course validation processes. As the military services assume phase two foundational training responsibilities from CYBERCOM, it is important that they coordinate with CYBERCOM to establish a timeline for course validation, as appropriate. With a clearer idea of which information can appropriately be removed from training courses, the services will be able to make informed decisions to balance the cost-effectiveness of the training with delivering trained cyber personnel to CMF teams more quickly. However, without an established time frame to assess and validate the efficiency and effectiveness of all phase two individual foundational training against established expectations, DOD will not be well positioned to reasonably assure that the phase two foundational training meets the needs of the CMF and its mission. Training plans should be detailed enough to provide insight into the number of people needed to fill specific positions to sustain an organization. As part of the training transition process, CYBERCOM required the military services to submit implementation plans that identify, among other things, training requirements and execution. Also, according to our prior work published in Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, training plans should be designed to determine the skills and competencies a workforce needs to prepare for current, emerging, and future agency needs in pursuit of its missions. These needs include the size of the workforce; its deployment across the organization; and the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for the agency to pursue its current and future missions. To ensure a strategic workforce planning approach, it is important that agencies consider how hiring, training, and other human capital strategies can be aligned to support mission success. The Army, Navy, and Air Force developed training transition implementation plans to address training requirements and execution to some degree, but the plans do not identify the number of personnel or teams and the specific training activities needed across all phases of training to maintain the CMF. For example, neither the Army nor the Air Force plan identifies the number (average or total) of personnel for each of the work roles described in figure 2 (for example, cyber operators, intelligence analysts, linguists) that the military services need to complete phase two foundational training courses to maintain the appropriate sizing and deployment of personnel across CMF teams. Additionally, the Army and Air Force plans do not identify the number of personnel or teams needed to conduct phase three (collective) and phase four (sustainment) training in future years. In contrast, the Navy’s plan identifies the average number of personnel who would need to take specific phase two foundational courses—including those being developed by other services and CYBERCOM—to maintain its CMF teams. However, the Navy’s plan does not include this same information for phases three and four of training. The Marine Corps did not address training requirements and execution within its implementation plan. According to officials from the Army and the Air Force, the February 2018 documents they provided in response to CYBERCOM’s requirement do not include plans that identify training requirements because submission of that information was not required by CYBERCOM. However, a November 2017 CYBERCOM memorandum clearly directed the military services with joint curriculum lead responsibilities to submit plans that support implementation of the department’s CMF Training Transition Plan, including training requirements execution data. Having a comprehensive plan that identifies the number of personnel or teams needed to accomplish specific training activities would help the services to better manage the number of personnel who need to be rotated into the CMF teams. It would also help the military services coordinate with each other on course offerings by providing situational awareness of the number of personnel from other services who could attend their courses in any given year. For example, the Air Force would know how many Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel would attend the courses being offered by the Air Force. Without a plan that comprehensively assesses and identifies the services’ training needs for each type of personnel, DOD cannot reasonably ensure that its training plan will support the transition to a joint training model or be aligned with its stated goal to maintain a trained and ready force. As of June 2018, CYBERCOM had not provided a plan for establishing independent assessors to evaluate and certify the completion of phase three collective training for CMF teams. CYBERCOM’s CMF Training and Readiness Manual explains that evaluations are necessary to assess readiness and provide commanders with a process to determine a team’s proficiency in the tasks it must perform during a mission. Assessors play an important role in this evaluation process by judging the performance of CMF teams using CYBERCOM’s evaluation forms, which establish common evaluation criteria to determine whether the team being evaluated has met the certification standards. CYBERCOM officials told us that to evaluate teams completing phase three certification through CYBERCOM events (approximately 50 percent, according to agency officials), the command provided a joint team of assessors. CYBERCOM and service officials told us that the services provided their own assessors for teams that completed phase three training through their respective service-hosted exercises. In discussions with Army and Air Force officials, they identified two challenges they have experienced with the services providing assessors to evaluate their own teams, which could lead to subjectivity in CMF team evaluations. First, in some instances the assessors have come from within the same chain of command as the CMF team and thus are not truly independent. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government discusses the importance of segregation of duties in designing control activities so that incompatible duties are segregated in order to mitigate the risk of management override of internal control. In this case, having an assessor from the same chain of command evaluate a CMF team’s performance in a certification event presents an increased risk of fraud through management override. Second, while the CMF Training and Readiness Manual includes checklists that assessors can use to evaluate team performance, according to service officials, the manual does not provide clear guidance on how to evaluate whether the tasks and performance standards have been sufficiently met by the team. The absence of such information could lead to subjective evaluations as to whether a team met the desired performance standard. According to one service official, these challenges could be addressed if CYBERCOM were to provide an expert who evaluates the training tasks and performance standards—an action that could lead to a more consistent application of evaluation criteria. When we asked officials from CYBERCOM’s training directorate about whether the command could provide more oversight for certification events, the officials acknowledged that, among other tasks, the command is responsible for ensuring that assigned joint cyber forces are trained, certified, and interoperable with other forces. The officials said that to do this, the command will use established training standards and develop a plan to train and certify CMF team evaluators to a set of standardized criteria. Command officials said they believe this will enable the services and CMF teams to have qualified assessors who are trained and certified by CYBERCOM to consistently evaluate the performance of the CMF teams based on joint standards. With this capability, for example, a Navy Cyber Protection Team assessor can be used by an Army Cyber Protection Team to evaluate that team in an operation, exercise, or training event. This training capacity should enhance the interoperability between the services and allow for consistent evaluation of a team’s performance. However, as of June 2018, CYBERCOM had not provided a plan to train and certify assessors from across the services; as such a plan had not yet been developed. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government explains that in defining objectives, management should clearly define what is to be achieved, how it will be achieved, and the time frames for achievement. Documenting these objectives in a plan also will help formalize the new process and ensure that the appropriate managerial emphasis is given to the effort. DOD has used similar mechanisms to implement changes to cyber training in the past, such as developing the CMF Training Transition Plan in response to moving phase two foundational training responsibility from CYBERCOM to the military services. Since phase three certification events act as a quality control mechanism for CMF teams, it is important that the events be independently evaluated to ensure that CMF teams are trained to a consistent standard. Without a documented plan to train and certify assessors to evaluate CMF phase three collective training certification events, the CMF teams will not be consistently evaluated as they are operationally certified. CYBERCOM assesses the prior experience of CMF personnel to meet training requirements through a process known as individual training equivalency. This process allows personnel to be exempted from specific training courses by showing that they have already met the learning objectives of the course through their prior experience. CYBERCOM established an Individual Training Equivalency Board consisting of subject matter experts and representatives from CYBERCOM, the National Security Agency, and service cyber components who review the applications and recommend whether equivalency should be granted. The Individual Training Equivalency Board reviewed approximately 700 applications for equivalency from September 2013 through April 2018, and more than three-quarters of those applicants had at least one course exemption approved. According to officials from CYBERCOM’s training directorate, which is responsible for administering the individual equivalency process, there are a number of reasons why requests for course exemptions are not approved. For example, some applicants are denied for administrative reasons, such as not filling out the paperwork correctly. Also, applicants are not eligible to receive exemptions for courses that are not part of their work role requirements, but some personnel try to do so. Officials also said that board members do not deem some applicants’ reported experiences as comparable to the knowledge and skills they would obtain from taking courses for which they seek exemptions. Based on our review CYBERCOM’s memorandums that document the approval or disapproval of approximately 700 individual requests for training exemptions, we observed that applicants typically requested exemptions for multiple courses, with some seeking exemptions for up to 16 courses. Altogether during this period, we found that CYBERCOM granted more than 1,400 equivalencies for approximately 90 different phase two foundational training courses. Certain courses were exempted more often than others. For example, the course for which CYBERCOM most frequently granted individual exemptions was the Joint Advanced Cyber Warfare Course. This 4-week course provides an orientation to CYBERCOM, the global cryptologic platform, the intelligence community, and allies and major partners in the conduct of cyber warfare operations, planning, and analysis of effects. Other courses that were commonly granted training exemptions included 1-week courses related to computer network exploitation, cyber offensive and defensive operations, and understanding network and operating system fundamentals. These courses teach the basic skills associated with performing CMF operations. Additionally, we found that CYBERCOM’s Individual Training Equivalency Board approved approximately 50 exemptions for Intermediate Cyber Core, which is an 8- week course that CYBERCOM training officials described as providing the background and proficiency needed to identify, understand, and navigate the digital environment. The officials said that the course also provides an understanding of network operational methods and offensive and defensive cyber operation principles. CYBERCOM has not established master training task lists for phase two foundational training, a key set of standards the services are to use in preparing course equivalency standards. The task lists correlate to the knowledge, skills, and abilities that the services will use to develop learning objectives and course materials for training. They are also important in informing the services’ ability to make equivalency application determinations because they form the learning objectives of the courses that may be bypassed. To determine whether an applicant’s experience is equivalent to what would be taught in a course; the entity making the decision must know the learning objectives of the course. However, as of May 2018, CYBERCOM officials were unable to provide evidence that the command had developed master training task lists for phase two foundational CMF training courses, as required. The January 2017 CMF Training Transition Plan required CYBERCOM to provide all mission and support team master training task lists for the phase two foundational training courses to the military services no later than March of 2018. Service and CYBERCOM officials said that they are holding monthly meetings to provide updates related to the training standards and other training transition-related information, but as of May 2018, CYBERCOM officials had not confirmed that they had provided the master training task lists to the services. Officials from the services told us that they need these master training task lists to develop clear decision rules as they assume responsibility for making equivalency decisions for phase two foundational training courses. When we interviewed CYBERCOM in February of 2018, officials told us that they were not aware of the requirement established in the CMF Training Transition Plan, but said they would start developing the master training task lists. Establishing clear standards is particularly important at this time, because the services are scheduled to assume responsibility for administration of the individual training equivalency process for Cyber Protection Team phase two foundational training courses in October 2018. Until CYBERCOM establishes and disseminates the master training task lists for phase two foundational CMF courses, the military services are at risk of developing inconsistent decision rules for their training equivalency processes, and the development of such processes could be delayed, resulting in the funding of training that is unnecessary. Developing and maintaining a trained cyber mission force is imperative to DOD’s ability to achieve its missions in the connected world within which it operates. DOD has made progress toward its goals of building and maintaining a trained cyber mission force. As DOD starts to focus on maintaining a ready CMF, addressing gaps in its training plans and structure will help it reach those goals. The Army’s and Air Force’s lack of time frames, like those established by the Navy in its implementation plan, for validating phase two foundational training could contribute to training inefficiency and unnecessarily long time frames for training personnel. Further, the military services, by not clearly identifying the number of personnel they need to train, hinder planning and coordination efforts to ensure that the training infrastructure is sufficient and is used efficiently. In addition, the absence of a plan for CYBERCOM to establish independent assessors for phase three collective training certification events may lead to teams being certified to different standards. Also, not having the master training task lists necessary to establish clear decision rules for granting individual training exemptions for phase two foundational training courses may contribute to inconsistent personnel skill levels and inefficient use of training resources. Focusing on maintaining sustainable readiness, as DOD has already begun to do, and addressing these weaknesses can lead to long-term improvements in the capability and capacity of its CMF. We are making eight recommendations to DOD. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Army, in coordination with CYBERCOM and the National Cryptologic School, where appropriate, establish a time frame to validate all of the phase two foundational training courses for which it is responsible. (Recommendation 1) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Air Force, in coordination with CYBERCOM and the National Cryptologic School, where appropriate, establish a time frame to validate all of the phase two foundational training courses for which it is responsible. (Recommendation 2) The Secretary of the Army should ensure that Army Cyber Command coordinate with CYBERCOM to develop a plan that comprehensively assesses and identifies specific CMF training requirements for phases two (foundational), three (collective), and four (sustainment), in order to maintain the appropriate sizing and deployment of personnel across the Army’s CMF teams. (Recommendation 3) The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Fleet Cyber Command coordinate with CYBERCOM to develop a plan that comprehensively assesses and identifies specific CMF training requirements for phases three (collective) and four (sustainment) in order to maintain the appropriate sizing and deployment of personnel across the Navy’s CMF teams. (Recommendation 4) The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that Air Forces Cyber coordinate with CYBERCOM to develop a plan that comprehensively assesses and identifies specific CMF training requirements for phases two (foundational), three (collective), and four (sustainment), in order to maintain the appropriate sizing and deployment of personnel across the Air Force’s CMF teams. (Recommendation 5) The Commandant of the Marine Corps should ensure that Marine Corps Forces Cyberspace coordinate with CYBERCOM to develop a plan that comprehensively assesses and identifies specific CMF training requirements for phases two (foundational), three (collective), and four (sustainment), in order to maintain the appropriate sizing and deployment of personnel across the Marine Corps’ CMF teams. (Recommendation 6) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the commander of CYBERCOM develops and documents a plan for establishing independent assessors to evaluate CMF phase three collective training certification events. (Recommendation 7) The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the commander of CYBERCOM establishes and disseminates the master training task lists covered by each phase two foundational training course and convey them to the military services, in accordance with the CMF Training Transition Plan. (Recommendation 8) We provided a draft of the FOUO version of this product to DOD for review and comment and worked with the department to develop this unclassified product. In its comments on the FOUO version of this, reproduced in appendix II, DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense, the office of the Principal Cyber Advisor, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy, the Commander of CYBERCOM, the leadership of each of the service cyber components, and the director of the National Security Agency’s National Cryptologic School. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. Based on our review of related statutes, Department of Defense (DOD) instructions and directives, and other guidance, we found that various DOD officials have been assigned a variety of CMF training roles and responsibilities, summarized in table 1 below. In addition to the individual named above, Tommy Baril, Assistant Director; Tracy Barnes; Patricia Farrell Donahue; Ashley Houston; Amie Lesser; Randy Neice; Geo Venegas; and Cheryl Weissman made key contributions to this report.
Developing a skilled cyber workforce is imperative to DOD achieving its offensive and defensive missions, and in 2013 it began developing CMF teams to fulfill these missions. CYBERCOM announced that the first wave of 133 such teams achieved full operational capability in May 2018. House Report 115-200 includes a provision for GAO to assess DOD's current and planned state of cyber training. GAO's report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a trained CMF, (2) made plans to maintain a trained CMF, and (3) leveraged other cyber experience to meet training requirements for CMF personnel. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed DOD's cyber training standards, planning documents, and reports on CMF training; and interviewed DOD officials. This is an unclassified version of a For Official Use Only report that GAO previously issued. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has taken a number of steps—such as establishing consistent training standards—to develop its Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams (see figure). To train CMF teams rapidly, CYBERCOM used existing resources where possible, such as the Navy's Joint Cyber Analysis Course and the National Security Agency's National Cryptologic School. As of November 2018, many of the 133 CMF teams that initially reported achieving full operational capability no longer had the full complement of trained personnel, and therefore did not meet CYBERCOM's readiness standards. This was caused by a number of factors, but CYBERCOM has since implemented new readiness procedures that emphasize readiness rather than achieving interim milestones, such as full operational capability. DOD has begun to shift focus from building to maintaining a trained CMF. The department developed a transition plan for the CMF that transfers foundational (phase two) training responsibility to the services. However, the Army and Air Force do not have time frames for required validation of foundational courses to CYBERCOM standards. Further, services' plans do not include all CMF training requirements, such as the numbers of personnel that need to be trained. Also, CYBERCOM does not have a plan to establish required independent assessors to ensure the consistency of collective (phase three) CMF training. Between 2013 and 2018, CMF personnel made approximately 700 requests for exemptions from training based on their experience, and about 85 percent of those applicants had at least one course exemption approved. However, GAO found that CYBERCOM has not established training task lists for foundational training courses. The services need these task lists to prepare appropriate course equivalency standards. GAO is making eight recommendations, including that the Army and Air Force identify time frames for validating foundational CMF courses; the military services develop CMF training plans with specific personnel requirements; CYBERCOM develop and document a plan establishing independent assessors to evaluate training; and CYBERCOM establish the training tasks covered by foundational training courses and convey them to the services. DOD concurred with the recommendations.