A rticle II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the President "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." This executive power of clemency encompasses several distinct forms of relief from criminal punishment, of which a full presidential "pardon" is only one. The power has its roots in the king's prerogative to grant mercy under early English law, which later traveled across the Atlantic Ocean to the American colonies. The Supreme Court has recognized that the authority vested by the Constitution in the President is quite broad, extending to "every offence known to the law" and available "at any time after [a crime's] commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment." That said, there are some limits to the power conferred by the pardon provision of Article II: for instance, the President may grant pardons only for federal criminal offenses, and impeachment convictions are not pardonable. An administrative process has been established through the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of the Pardon Attorney for submission and evaluation of requests for pardons and other forms of clemency, though this process and the regulations governing are purely advisory in nature and do not affect the President's ultimate authority to grant relief. This report provides an overview of the President's pardon power. After briefly discussing the historical background to the power conferred by Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the report explores the different forms of clemency that are available, the relatively few limits on theÂ pardon power, and the process of seeking and receiving clemency. The report concludes by addressing selected legal issues related to the pardon power: (1) the legal effect of pardons andÂ other forms of clemency; (2) whether the President may grant clemency to himself; and (3)Â Congress's role in overseeing the use of the pardon power. The concept of governmental relief from the punishment that would otherwise apply to a criminal act has deep historical roots, with some scholars tracing it as far back as ancient Greece and Rome. An English form of pardon power vested in the king, the "prerogative of mercy," first appeared during the reign of King Ine of Wessex (688-725 A.D.). Over time, perceived abuses "such as royal sales of pardons or use of pardons as bribery to join the military" prompted Parliament to impose limitations on the pardon power. The king's power to pardon nevertheless endured through the American colonial period and applied in the colonies themselves through delegation to colonial authorities. Following the American Revolution, the English legal tradition of a pardon power held by the executive directly influenced the pardon provision included in the U.S. Constitution. At the Constitutional Convention, the two major plans offeredâthe Virginia and New Jersey plansâdid not address pardons. However, in a "sketch" of suggested amendments to the Virginia plan, Alexander Hamilton included a pardon power vested in an "Executive authority of the United States" that extended to "all offences except Treason," with a pardon for treason requiring Senate approval. It appears that the rationale for the treason limitation was, at least in part, that the head of the executive branch should not be able to absolve himself and possible conspirators of a crime threatening "the immediate being of the society." Hamilton's proposal was included in a subsequent draft of the Constitution, though the requirement of Senate approval for a pardon of treason was replaced with an exception for impeachment, apparently with the thought that exempting impeachment was sufficient to protect against abuse. Debate at the Convention over the pardon power was limited, primarily centering on questions of (1) how broad the power should be (i.e., what restrictions or exceptions to the power should exist), and (2) whether the legislature should have a role in the power's exercise. Ultimately, proposals to impose additional limits on pardons beyond an exception for impeachmentâsuch as by calling for Senate approval of pardons or requiring conviction prior to pardon âwere rejected, resulting in the expansive power in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton made the case for the breadth of this executive-held power in The Federalist , arguing that it "should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed" to ensure "easy access to exceptions in favour of unfortunate guilt." And on this view, "a single man of prudence and good sense," that is, the President, would be "better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever." In accordance with these principles, the text of the Constitution, as ratified, places few limits on the President's ability to grant pardons, as discussed in more detail below. In light of references in scholarship and the popular press to the President's "pardon power," a casual observer might think that Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution authorizes only one form of relief from criminal punishment. That is not the case, however: the text of the Constitution speaks of "Reprieves and Pardons," and the Supreme Court has explained that the "language of the [provision] is general, that is, common to the class of pardons, or extending the power to pardon to all kinds of pardons known in the law as such, whatever may be their denomination." As such, the President has "plenary" constitutional authority under the pardon provision "to 'forgive'" an accused or convicted person "in part or entirely, to reduce a penalty in terms of a specified number of years, or to alter it with conditions which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable." At least five forms of clemency fall under this authority: 1. pardon; 2. amnesty; 3. commutation; 4. remission of fines and forfeitures; 5. reprieve. A full pardon is the most expansive form of clemency; it "releases the wrongdoer from punishment and restores the offender's civil rights without qualification." A pardon may be granted at any time prior to charge, prior to conviction, or following conviction, but it appears that it must be accepted to be effective or at least may be refused. For instance, President Woodrow Wilson issued a pardon to George Burdick, an editor at the New York Tribune , for any federal offenses he "may have committed" in connection with the publication of an article regarding alleged customs fraud, despite the fact that Burdick had not been charged with any crime at the time of the pardon. The apparent motivation for the pardon was that Burdick had refused to testify before a grand jury investigating the involvement of Treasury Department officials in leaks concerning the wrongdoing, asserting his Fifth Amendment right not to provide testimony that would tend to incriminate him. Despite President Wilson's issuance of the pardon, Burdick "refused to accept" it and continued to refuse to answer certain questions put to him before the grand jury. In Burdick v. United States , the Supreme Court assumed that the pardon was within the President's power to issue and concluded that "it was Burdick's right to refuse it" and stand on his Fifth Amendment objection. Amnesty is essentially identical to a pardon in practical effect, with the principal distinction between the two being that amnesty typically "is extended to whole classes or communities, instead of individuals[.]" As an example, President Jimmy Carter granted amnesty to many who violated the Selective Service Act by evading the draft during the Vietnam War. In contrast to pardons and amnesty, which obviate criminal punishments in their entirety, commutation merely substitutes the punishment imposed by a federal court for a less severe punishment, such as by reducing a sentence of imprisonment. To take a well-known example, President Richard Nixon conditionally commuted to six and a half years the 13-year sentence of famed labor union leader Jimmy Hoffa, who had been convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice. Along the same lines, the President "may remit [criminal] fines, penalties, and forfeitures of every description arising under the laws of [C]ongress," and, apparently in contrast to a pardon, a commutation or remission is valid even in the absence of the consent of the offender whose punishment is reduced. Finally, a reprieve merely "produces delay in the execution of a sentence" for a period of time "when the President shall think the merits of the case, or some cause connected with the offender, may require it," such as "where a female after conviction is found to be [pregnant], or where a convict becomes insane, or is alleged to be so." President Bill Clinton, for instance, issued a reprieve delaying by six months the execution date of Juan Raul Garza, who had been convicted of multiple capital homicide offenses, so that DOJ could conduct a study of "racial and geographic disparities in the federal death penalty system." As noted above, forms of clemency such as pardons and commutations may be unconditional or may carry specific conditions that must be met for the relief to be effective. The federal courts have recognized that the power conferred by Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution is quite broad, establishing virtually "unfettered executive discretion" to grant clemency. The judiciary accordingly has been reticent to weigh in on clemency matters within the purview of the executive branch, particularly given separation-of-powers constraints inherent in the Constitution's structure. As a result, there is very little judicial guidance regarding the limits of the President's pardon authority. Two limits are nonetheless obvious from the constitutional text: first, pardons may be granted only for "offences against the United States," that is, federal crimes, and second, pardons may not be granted "in Cases of Impeachment." Beyond the limits established in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the power to grant conditional or unconditional clemency, though broad, may also be externally limited by other constitutional provisions and guarantees. The Supreme Court has, at times, alluded to such limits, noting, for example, that the President may attach to a grant of clemency conditions "which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable." Notably, in Hoffa v. Saxbe , the federal district court for the District of Columbia was called upon to squarely address the relationship between the President's pardon power and "the rights and liberties of the individual" as enshrined in other constitutional provisions. The case involved a commutation that was conditioned on the recipient forgoing participation in labor union management for a period of years. The recipient of the commutation challenged the condition as a violation of his First Amendment rights of free speech and association, among other things. Faced with the issue, the court took the view that "there are obvious limits beyond which the President may not go in imposing and subsequently enforcing" clemency conditions and "arrive[d] at a two-pronged test of reasonableness in determining the lawfulness of a condition: first, that the condition be directly related to the public interest," meaning that it "must relate to the reason for the initial judgment of conviction" in a way that reflects regard for protection of the public; "and second, that the condition not unreasonably infringe on the individual commutee's constitutional freedoms." Applying this two-pronged test, the district court ultimately concluded that the condition was valid because (1)Â the commutation recipient's crimes related to participation in union activities, which the public had a strong interest in the integrity of; and (2) the condition met applicable First Amendment standards. Because case law regarding the President's authority to grant clemency is limited, the two-pronged analysis laid out in Hoffa has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court, nor has there been extensive judicial development of alternative frameworks. Nevertheless, though the proposition remains largely theoretical given the dearth of case law, legal scholars have maintained that grants of clemency or clemency conditions at odds with certain constitutional guarantees like equal protection of the law, due process, and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment are subject to judicial review and potential invalidation. While not necessary, clemency is typically granted through an administrative process established in regulations that provide for consideration of applications by the Office of the Pardon Attorney within the Department of Justice (DOJ). The regulations require any person "seeking executive clemency by pardon, reprieve, commutation of sentence, or remission of fine" to execute a "formal petition" and submit it to the Pardon Attorney. To be eligible to file a pardon petition, at least five years must have elapsed since one's release from confinement or one's conviction (if no prison sentence was imposed). Petitions for commutation generally may be filed only after all other forms of judicial and administrative relief have been pursued, though allowance may be made "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Once a petition for clemency has been submitted, the Pardon Attorney is to investigate its merit by engaging "appropriate officials and agencies of the Government" like the Federal Bureau of Investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Pardon Attorney submits a recommendation through the Deputy Attorney General to the Attorney General as to whether the request for clemency should be granted or denied, and the Attorney General is to then review all pertinent information to "determine whether the request for clemency is of sufficient merit to warrant favorable action by the President." The Attorney General's final recommendation is made to the President in writing. The general standard for a pardon request "of sufficient merit" is that the petitioner has "demonstrated good conduct for a substantial period of time after conviction and service of sentence." DOJ lists five "principal factors" in determining whether a particular application warrants a favorable recommendation: 1. post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation , including, among other things, financial and employment stability, "responsibility toward family," and participation in community service; 2. the seriousness and relative recentness of the offense , with consideration of victim impact and whether sufficient time has passed "to avoid denigrating the seriousness of the offense or undermining the deterrent effect of the conviction"; 3. acceptanc e of responsibility, remorse, and atonement , including victim restitution and any attempts "to minimize or rationalize culpability"; 4. the need for relief , such as a legal disability like a bar to licensure, though "the absence of a specific need should not be held against an otherwise deserving applicant"; and 5. recommendations and reports from officials like the prosecuting attorneys and sentencing judge. Factors considered on a request for commutation include "disparity or undue severity of sentence, critical illness or old age," the "amount of time already served," the "availability of other remedies," "meritorious service rendered to the government" (such as cooperation with investigations and prosecutions), and/or "other equitable factors" like demonstrated rehabilitation or pressing unforeseen circumstances. Similarly, "satisfactory post-conviction conduct" is considered on application for remission of a fine or restitution, as well as "the ability to pay and any good faith efforts to discharge the obligation." During President Obama's second term, DOJ announced a "clemency initiative" to "encourage qualified federal inmates to petition to have their sentences commuted[.]" Under the initiative, DOJ prioritized applications of inmates who met special factors that included (1) being nonviolent, low-level offenders without significant ties to organized criminal enterprises; (2) lacking a significant criminal history; (3) demonstrating good conduct in prison; (4) lacking a history of violence; (5) having served at least 10 years of their sentence; and (6) serving a sentence for which they "likely would have received a substantially lower sentence" by operation of law if convicted at the time of consideration. DOJ made recommendations to President Obama on thousands of petitions received through the initiative, many of which were still pending at the end of his second term. The program ended when President Obama left office on January 20, 2017. More broadly, according to statistics kept by the Office of the Pardon Attorney, recent Presidents have granted a relatively small percentage of clemency petitionsâfor instance, President George W. Bush received over 11,000 petitions for pardon or commutation and granted a total of 200. Though DOJ's regulations and requirements guide its consideration of requests for clemency, they do not "restrict the authority granted to the President under Article II, section 2 of the Constitution." In other words, the President is free to grant clemency as he or she sees fit (subject to the constraints described elsewhere in this report), regardless of whether a prospective recipient meets DOJ standards or even participates in the formal petition process through the Office of the Pardon Attorney. For instance, as noted above, while DOJ regulations impose a five-year waiting period for submission of a pardon application through the Pardon Attorney, the President may issue a pardon at any time after the commission of a federal offense even if no charges have been filed, as was the case with President Gerald Ford's pardon of former President Nixon. When a pardon or commutation is granted, the recipient is notified, and a "warrant" is mailed to him or her (or sent to the officer in charge of the place of confinement in the case of a commutation of a sentence still being served). Though the requirements of notice and delivery are set out in DOJ regulations, it appears that they may be necessary for at least a full pardon to have legal effect. As noted above, an ostensible pardon recipient may be able to reject the pardon, at least when "personal rights" like assertion of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination are at issue. Moreover, Presidents have, in the past, revoked pardons prior to delivery and acceptance. For instance, in 1869, after outgoing President Andrew Johnson issued but did not deliver a pardon, incoming President Ulysses S. Grant revoked the pardon, and a federal court upheld the revocation. The President's use of the pardon power in particular circumstances can raise a number of legal questions, many of which may be unresolved given the limited authority addressing federal clemency matters. Three unresolved legal issues may be of particular interest to Congress given recent commentary: (1) the legal effect of clemency; (2) whether a President may issue a self-pardon; and (3) Congress's role in overseeing the exercise of the pardon power. The legal effect of limited forms of clemency like commutations is fairly clear: criminal punishment is reduced "either totally or partially," but the relief "does not change the fact of conviction, imply innocence, or remove civil disabilities that apply to the convicted person as a result of the criminal conviction." The legal significance of a full pardon, however, has been a subject of shifting judicial views over time. While early cases suggested that a pardon obviates all legal guilt of the offender, effectively wiping the crime from existence, more recent case law suggests that a pardon removes only the punishment for the offense without addressing the guilt of the recipient or other consequences stemming from the underlying conduct. In an 1866 decision, Ex parte Garland , the Supreme Court took a broad view of the nature and consequence of a pardon: A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. A few years after Garland , the Court appeared to affirm that a pardon "not merely releases the offender from the punishment prescribed for the offence, but . . . obliterates in legal contemplation the offence itself." However, in subsequent decisions, the Court backed away from the broad proposition that a pardon erases both the consequences of a conviction and the underlying guilty conduct. Most notably, in Carlesi v. New York , the Court determined that a pardoned offense could still be considered "as a circumstance of aggravation" under a state habitual-offender law, and then in Burdick v. United States , the Court noted that a pardon in fact "carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it." Based on this more recent Supreme Court case law, multiple federal Courts of Appeals have concluded that the "historical language" from early cases "was dicta and is inconsistent with current law." Modern cases instead recognize a distinction between the punishment for a conviction, which the pardon obviates, and "the fact of the commission of the crime," which may be considered in subsequent proceedings or preclude the pardon recipient from engaging in certain activities. A pardon will accordingly relieve the recipient of legal disabilities that "would not follow from the commission of the crime without conviction," such as possession of a firearm or the right to vote, but the conduct and circumstances of the offense may still be considered for purposes of, among other things, certain benefits or licensing determinations or as a basis for censure under rules of professional conduct. Relatedly, courts have held that a pardon does not automatically expunge the record of the conviction itself or require that the court's orders be vacated. Despite the judicial trend toward a narrower understanding of the legal effect of a pardon, however, the Supreme Court has not directly revisited its broad language from Garland , and thus its precise meaning in relation to later pronouncements from the Court remains somewhat unclear. Whether a President may pardon himself is an unresolved legal question that has been a subject of renewed interest following President Trump's statement in 2018 that he has "the absolute right" to do so. No past President has issued a self-pardon, and, as a result, no federal court has directly addressed the matter. That said, legal scholars and commentators have debated the question extensively and reached differing conclusions. Proponents of the view that the President may pardon himself tend to emphasize the lack of limitation in the constitutional language, as well as certain historical views and pronouncements of the Supreme Court as to the breadth of the President's pardoning power in general. By contrast, those asserting that the President lacks the power of self-pardon raise competing textual arguments and suggest that self-pardons would be inconsistent with other constitutional provisions, such as the Article I provision stating that officials convicted in an impeachment trial "shall . . . be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to law." An Office of Legal Counsel opinion issued shortly before President Nixon's resignation in 1974 concluded that the President cannot pardon himself "[u]nder the fundamental rule that no one may be a judge in his own case," and some scholars subsequently have supported this opinion. In any event, even were a President to pardon himself, at least one commentator has noted that it is questionable whether a court would issue a definitive ruling as to that pardon's lawfulness given practical considerations and separation-of-powers concerns. The Supreme Court has taken the view that Congress generally cannot circumscribe the President's pardon authority. In Ex parte Garland , the Court remarked that the "power of the President [to pardon] is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions." Consistent with this broad language, the Court later rejected post-Civil War attempts by Congress to limit the effect of pardons granted to those who aided the Confederate cause on their right to recover for seized property, stating that "the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change the law." More recently, in rejecting the proposition that a condition attached to clemency must be authorized by statute, the Court indicated that "the power [of clemency] flows from the Constitution alone, not from any legislative enactments, and . . . it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress." It thus appears that Congress lacks the authority to substantively constrain the President's power to grant clemency, though Congress may be able to take some actions that would facilitate exercise of the power, such as through appropriations. There is historical precedent for Congress funding positions in DOJ to assist in considering clemency petitions. That said, attempts to indirectly impair the pardon power through appropriations limitations could potentially be viewed as inappropriate. Given these limitations, Congress's practice for formally conveying its views on clemency matters has typically involved passing nonbinding resolutions expressing the sense of Congress as to whether clemency should or should not be granted. Legislation has also been introduced in the 116th Congress that would impose certain post hoc procedural requirements on the Attorney General in connection with pardonsâspecifically, (1)Â requiring submission of investigative materials to congressional committees upon the grant of a pardon or commutation arising from an investigation in which the President or a relative is a target, subject, or witness; and (2) requiring publication of pardon information within three days of any grant. Although such legislation may not be a direct substantive constraint on the President's authority to grant clemency, given the relative lack of case law interpreting the pardon power and the sometimes sweeping language the Court has used to describe the President's prerogative, it is unclear whether such legislation would be viewed by the courts as an impermissible imposition on an area of executive authority. Beyond legislation, Congress may have a role to play in pardon decisions through other constitutional processes. For instance, Congress has invoked its Article I authority to conduct oversight as a more indirect constraint on the use of the pardon power. And on that front, Congress has, in the past, been relatively successful in obtaining information from the executive branch on particular clemency decisions, up to and including congressional testimony from the President himself. Nevertheless, DOJ has taken the position that past examples of executive branch compliance with congressional requests for information regarding pardon decisions have been purely voluntary, and that in fact "Congress has no authority whatsoever to review a President's clemency decision." Whether a court, faced with an interbranch dispute regarding congressional demands for information on pardon decisions, would order the executive branch to comply with such demands would likely depend on the court's view of two possible constraints on Congress's oversight authority: (1) the existence of a valid legislative purpose, and (2)Â executive privilege. With respect to the first constraint, the Supreme Court has said that Congress's power to conduct oversight is inherent in the legislative process and is broad, encompassing "inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws[,] . . . proposed or possibly needed statutes," and "probes into departments of the federal government to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste." However, a congressional investigation cannot be used "to expose for the sake of exposure," meaning that a valid inquiry "must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress." The Court has also cautioned that Congress "cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government." It is on the basis of this language that DOJ has maintained that Congress's oversight authority does not extend to clemency decisions, averring that "[t]he granting of clemency pursuant to the pardon power is unquestionably an exclusive province of the Executive Branch." That said, the Supreme Court has at other times framed the issue of legislative purpose in the context of executive or judicial prerogatives as being whether it is "obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive," and a congressional committee seeking information on a clemency decision might accordingly argue that a subpoena or request for information on the decision is not a "usurpation" of the clemency function but is merely levied in aid of a "probe . . . to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste." Assuming a valid legislative purpose, the question would become whether materials related to a pardon decision are nevertheless protected from disclosure by executive privilege. Executive privilege "is a term that has been used to describe the President's power to 'resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which [is] crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government.'" The term encompasses at least two distinct forms of privilege that have been recognized by the federal courts: (1) a "presumptive privilege for Presidential communications" that extends to "direct communications of the President with his immediate White House advisers" made "'in performance of the President's responsibilities'" and "'in the process of shaping policies and making decisions,'" as well as "communications authored or solicited and received" by immediate White House advisers; and (2) a "deliberative process privilege" that may extend more broadly to "decisionmaking of executive officials generally," shielding "documents and other materials that would reveal advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated." Neither form of privilege is absolute, as either "can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need." However, "the presidential communications privilege is more difficult to surmount" than the deliberative process privilege; at least in the context of a congressional subpoena, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has indicated that the former can be overcome on a showing that "the subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions," while the latter is subject to a flexible, "ad hoc" determination of need and may "disappear[] altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct has occurred." It does not appear that courts have addressed the application of either form of privilege to information regarding presidential clemency decisions sought by Congress. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered whether the presidential communications privilege would apply to "internal pardon documents" of the Offices of the Pardon Attorney and Deputy Attorney General that were not solicited or received by the President or his immediate advisors in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice , concluding that such documents fell outside the scope of the presidential communications privilege but might still be covered by the deliberative process privilege. Based on Judicial Watch and the limited Supreme Court precedent addressing executive privilege, it seems that whether a court would order disclosure to a congressional committee of information concerning a presidential clemency decision in the face of an assertion of executive privilege could depend on whether the information sought is limited to internal agency documents (in which case the deliberative process privilege could apply) or includes communications among and between the President and/or senior White House officials (in which case the presidential communications privilege would appear to apply). Because the threshold of need is higher in the latter case than in the former, it seems more likely that Congress could obtain documents and information generated by the Pardon Attorney that are not requested by or submitted to the President or his advisors. Even in the case of presidential communications, however, a court could still conclude that a congressional committee is entitled to the information if the committee can demonstrate that it is critically needed. An additional way in which Congress might assert itself with respect to presidential pardon decisions is through impeachment. James Madison alluded to this "great security" against abuse of the pardon power when he noted during the Virginia ratification convention that "if the President be connected, in any suspicious manner, with any person, and there be grounds to believe he will shelter him, the House of Representatives can impeach him[.]" The Supreme Court also appeared to acknowledge the possibility of impeachment for misuse of clemency in the early 20th century case of Ex parte Grossman . In concluding that the pardon power extended to criminal punishment for contempt of court, the Supreme Court in that case indicated that if the President ever sought to "deprive a court of power to enforce its orders" by issuing "successive pardons of constantly recurring contempts in particular litigation," such an "improbable" situation "would suggest a resort to impeachment, rather than a narrow and strained construction of the general powers of the President." Consistent with these authorities, several commentators have alluded to the potential availability of impeachment as a check on the President's pardon authority. That said, some have also raised doubts as to the efficacy of impeachment as a constraint on the President, arguing that it is "useless against a President .Â .Â . who grants controversial pardons in the very last hours of his tenure" as some Presidents have. Were a President to be impeached in the House of Representatives for abusing the pardon power and subsequently convicted in the Senate, the remedy would be limited by the Constitution to his removal from office and "disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States[.]" Finally, Congress can seek to amend the Constitution to clarify or constrain the President's clemency authority. Resolutions have been introduced in the 116th Congress that would amend the Constitution to prohibit the President from granting a pardon to himself or to family members and current or former members of his campaign or administration. However, the requirements for successfully amending the Constitution are, by design, exceptionally stringentâamendments would need to be passed by a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the states. Passing a constitutional amendment as a means of addressing unpopular or controversial pardon decisions accordingly may be difficult.
Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the President "to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." The power has its roots in the king's prerogative to grant mercy under early English law, which later traveled across the Atlantic Ocean to the American colonies. The Supreme Court has recognized that the authority vested by the Constitution in the President is quite broad, describing it as "plenary," discretionary, and largely not subject to legislative modification. Nonetheless, there are two textual limitations on the pardon power's exercise: first, the President may grant pardons only for federal criminal offenses, and second, impeachment convictions are not pardonable. The Court has also recognized some other narrow restraints, including that a pardon cannot be issued to cover crimes prior to commission. The pardon power authorizes the President to grant several forms of relief from criminal punishment. The most common forms of relief are full pardon s (for individuals) and amnesties (for groups of people), which completely obviate the punishment for a committed or charged federal criminal offense, and commutations , which reduce the penalties associated with convictions. An administrative process has been established through the Department of Justice's Office of the Pardon Attorney for submitting and evaluating requests for these and other forms of clemency, though the process and regulations governing it are merely advisory and do not affect the President's ultimate authority to grant relief. Legal questions concerning the President's pardon power that have arisen have included (1) the legal effect of clemency; (2) whether a President may grant a self-pardon; and (3) what role Congress may play in overseeing the exercise of the pardon power. With respect to the first question, some 19th century Supreme Court cases suggest that a full pardon broadly erases both the punishment for an offense and the guilt of the offender. However, more recent precedent recognizes a distinction between the punishment for a conviction , which the pardon obviates, and the fact of the commission of the crime , which may be considered in later proceedings or preclude the pardon recipient from engaging in certain activities. Thus, although a full pardon restores civil rights such as the right to vote that may have been revoked as part of the original punishment, pardon recipients may, for example, still be subject to censure under professional rules of conduct or precluded from practicing their chosen profession as a result of the pardoned conduct. As for whether a President may grant a self-pardon, no past President has ever issued such a pardon. As a consequence, no federal court has addressed the matter. That said, several Presidents have considered the proposition of a self-pardon, and scholars have reached differing conclusions on whether such an action would be permissible based on the text, structure, and history of the Constitution. Ultimately, given the limited authority available, the constitutionality of a self-pardon is unclear. Finally, regarding Congress's role in overseeing the pardon process, the Supreme Court has indicated that the President's exercise of the pardon power is largely beyond the legislature's control. Nevertheless, Congress does have constitutional tools at its disposal to address the context in which the President's pardon power is exercised, including through oversight, constitutional amendment, or impeachment.