The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, located mainly in southwestern Oregon and extending into northern California, encompasses nearly 1.8 million acres. The west side of the forest lies within the Klamath-Siskiyou ecoregion, which is known for its ecological diversity, with 28 coniferous tree species and numerous rare and endemic plants. The forest also contains diverse topography, with steep terrain and rugged geological features across several mountain ranges, including the Klamath Mountains, Siskiyou Mountains, Cascade Range, and Coast Range. Access to the forest is limited, due to many roadless areas and over 340,000 acres of wilderness, including the 180,000-acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness, where the Chetco Bar Fire began. Cities and communities in Oregon near the fire include Brookings and Gold Beach—along the coast of the Pacific Ocean—as well as Agness, Cave Junction, and Selma in Curry and Josephine counties. Figure 1 shows the final perimeter of the fire in southwest Oregon. The part of southwestern Oregon where the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest is located is a fire-adapted ecosystem, meaning that most native species and plant communities have evolved with fire, and many are adapted to or dependent on periodic wildfires. The historic fire interval in the area where the Chetco Bar Fire occurred varied, as did the historic severity of fires, according to a Forest Service ecologist. The forest experienced a number of fires over the 30 years before the Chetco Bar Fire occurred. In 1987, the Silver Fire burned nearly 100,000 acres. Fifteen years later, in 2002, the Biscuit Fire burned nearly 500,000 acres, including areas previously burned by the Silver Fire. The Chetco Bar Fire started in the areas burned by both the Silver and Biscuit Fires. In 2018, the year after the Chetco Bar Fire, the forest experienced another large fire, the Klondike Fire, which burned about 175,000 acres, abutting the burn scar of the Chetco Bar Fire in some places. The occurrence of large fires in the western United States has been increasing, while, at the same time, fire seasons have been increasing in length, according to recent assessments. Some of these assessments have found that these increases are due in part to climate change, which has contributed to increasing temperatures and droughts in the West, as well as a later onset of fire-season-ending rains. We have previously found that the cost of disasters, including wildfires, is projected to increase as extreme weather events such as droughts become more frequent and intense due to climate change. Moreover, land use practices have increased the risk that severe and intense wildfires will affect people and communities. As we have previously described, land use practices over the past century have reduced forest and rangeland ecosystems’ resilience to fire. In particular, fire suppression—with 95 percent or more of fires suppressed for nearly a century—and timber harvesting and reforestation have contributed to abnormally dense accumulations of vegetation, and these accumulations can fuel uncharacteristically large or severe fires. In some parts of southwestern Oregon, significant vegetation has built up, according to Forest Service and other documents. As a result, southwestern Oregon, as well as other parts of the country, is under high to very high risk from fire, according to a risk assessment and Forest Service presentation. At the same time, development in and around wildland areas continues to increase, placing more people, businesses, and infrastructure at risk of being affected by fires. Because a single firefighting entity may not be able to handle all wildfires in its jurisdiction, agencies in the United States use an interagency incident management system that depends on the close cooperation and coordination of federal, state, tribal, and local fire protection agencies. The Forest Service is the predominant federal firefighting agency in terms of funding. Other federal firefighting agencies include the Bureau of Indian Affairs, BLM, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service. Federal and nonfederal firefighting entities generally share their firefighting personnel, equipment, and supplies and work together to fight fires, regardless of who has jurisdiction over the burning lands. Agreements between cooperating entities govern these firefighting efforts and contain general provisions for sharing firefighting assets and costs. On a large wildfire, firefighting efforts generally fall into two phases—initial attack and extended attack. The initial attack phase consists of the efforts to control a fire during the first “operational period” after the fire is reported, generally 24 hours. While the majority of fires on Forest Service land are controlled and suppressed during initial attack, some fires require further firefighting efforts. Such additional efforts are referred to as extended attack. The Forest Service and its interagency cooperators use an incident management system designed to provide appropriate leadership of firefighting efforts. There are five types of incidents, ranging in complexity from type 5 (least complex) to type 1 (most complex). The fire’s complexity determines the type of incident commander and management team assigned. For example, for a type-5 incident, the incident commander may be a local employee qualified to direct initial attack efforts on a small fire with two to six local firefighters. In contrast, for a type-1 incident, the incident commander is one member of a highly qualified incident management team, often with more than 500 firefighters and other personnel. There are sixteen interagency type-1 incident management teams that operate nationwide and are typically deployed to fires for 14-day assignments. In addition, the Forest Service has four type-1 incident management teams under its National Incident Management Organization (NIMO). The Forest Service calls these “short” teams; each team has seven full-time members, but they can add additional members as needed. NIMO teams generally handle complex fires, including long-duration fires, so as not to tie up critical firefighting personnel over a long time. A single incident management team, under the direction of the agency administrator (the line officer, such as the forest supervisor or district ranger, responsible for management of the incident), is typically in charge of a fire, but the incident management system may be expanded into a unified command structure when multiple jurisdictions are involved. This structure brings together incident commanders from the relevant jurisdictions to facilitate a coordinated and integrated interagency response. In such cases, members of the unified command work together to develop a common set of incident objectives and strategies, maximize the use of firefighting assets, and enhance the individual jurisdictions’ efficiency. Once assigned to a fire, an incident management team works with local line officers and fire management staff to determine the strategy and tactics to use in managing the fire. The strategy is the overall plan designed to control the fire; for example, to protect structures and contain the fire within a certain geographic area. Tactics are actions taken to accomplish the objectives set out in the strategy. For example, the fire may be attacked directly, with firefighters working at the fire’s edge to extinguish it. If direct attack is not possible, practical, or safe—because the fire is burning too intensely or on very steep slopes, for example— firefighters may choose to attack it indirectly. In such cases, firefighters typically select an area away from the fire and construct a “fireline,” where vegetation is cleared in an effort to stop the fire’s spread at that point or slow it sufficiently to allow firefighters to attack directly. Firefighters often incorporate geographic features such as roads, rocky areas, ridgelines, and rivers into firelines to increase their effectiveness. In some cases firefighters conduct burnout operations, in which they intentionally set fire to fuels between a fireline and the main fire perimeter to slow or contain a rapidly spreading fire by depriving it of fuel. In carrying out strategies and tactics, firefighters use a variety of firefighting assets, both on the ground and in the air. Ground-based assets include firefighting crews, wildland fire engines, and machinery such as bulldozers, which firefighters use to help construct firelines. When providing personnel to fight fires, the Forest Service and other federal agencies generally rely on a “militia” strategy whereby personnel within each agency are trained to serve in firefighting roles when needed, in addition to performing their day-to-day work responsibilities. Air-based assets include helicopters and fixed-wing air tankers. Helicopters generally drop water directly on a fire, whereas air tankers generally drop fire retardant ahead of the fire, often near a fireline that has been constructed, to slow a fire’s spread. Air tankers range in size from small single-engine air tankers, which are maneuverable but carry only small amounts of retardant, to large aircraft such as converted DC-10s or Boeing 747s—referred to as “very large air tankers”—which can carry substantial amounts of retardant but whose use can be limited in mountainous terrain because of their size. The level of risk that decision makers and firefighters are willing to accept in any given situation depends on the experience and training of those involved. Overall, agency firefighting doctrine emphasizes safety above all other concerns; Forest Service policy, for example, states, “In conducting wildland fire suppression, responsible officials shall give first priority to the safety of firefighters, other personnel, and the public.” Firefighters and other personnel who respond to wildland fire incidents are required to complete training to help them identify risks as well as develop appropriate strategies and tactics to respond to different situations. The Chetco Bar Fire grew slowly in the summer of 2017 before undergoing a period of rapid growth driven by strong, hot winds. In response, the Forest Service and other agencies undertook various firefighting strategies and tactics over different phases of the fire, described below. Figure 2 provides a timeline of the fire’s key events. In the initial phase (July 12-13, 2017), the Chetco Bar fire was relatively small and inaccessible. When the fire was first detected on July 12, it was estimated to be between one quarter and one half acre in size, burning in remote, steep terrain in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness in the Rogue River- Siskiyou National Forest. The fire’s initial location was several miles from the closest road access point. No properties or other “values at risk” (such as structures, other property, and natural and cultural resources that could be damaged by a wildfire) were in the immediate vicinity of the fire, according to Forest Service documents and officials. The Forest Service was notified of the Chetco Bar Fire at 2:43 p.m. on July 12 and, at 4:14 p.m., four Forest Service firefighters rappelled from a helicopter to assess the fire. The rappellers landed on a ridge above the fire to create a helispot (a temporary helicopter landing area) so that additional firefighters and equipment could more easily be brought to the fire. The rappellers requested and received permission from the district ranger for chainsaw use in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness to prepare the helispot, and they worked on cutting trees and clearing brush until late that evening, according to Forest Service documents and national forest officials. The rappellers estimated that the helispot was 60 percent cleared by the end of the first day, according to national forest officials. While the rappellers were working, the Forest Service helicopter returned to its base near Grants Pass, Oregon, to attach a bucket to drop water onto the fire. In the meantime, two helicopters from the Oregon Department of Forestry headed to the fire. The three helicopters dropped about 17,000 gallons of water the first day, according to Forest Service documents. Forest Service officials said these water drops were intended to slow the spread of the fire while the rappellers worked to clear the helispot. Anticipating that the helispot would be completed shortly, the Forest Service ordered two 20-person crews to assist in firefighting efforts the next day. As the rappellers set up camp for the night, incident command radioed them to say that the fire appeared to be holding at about three quarters of an acre. The next morning, July 13, the Forest Service brought in four additional rappellers to continue working on the helispot throughout the morning and into the afternoon (see fig. 3). One of the rappellers walked the perimeter of the fire and determined that the fire had grown to about 10 acres overnight. While the rappellers were working, two helicopters dropped about 18,000 gallons of water that day and a single engine air tanker dropped 1,200 gallons, according to a Forest Service document. The crew bosses for the two crews that had been ordered the previous day flew over the fire early afternoon of July 13, according to Forest Service documents. They estimated the fire had grown to about 15 acres and observed a number of spot fires (smaller fires separate from the main fire) caused by burning material rolling down the hill. They expressed safety concerns about bringing crews into that area and also determined the helispot needed more work before a helicopter could land safely. Since the crews would need to be shuttled in by helicopter, the crew bosses decided not to bring in the requested crews, according to officials. Later that day, the incident commander requested a helicopter to remove the eight rappellers from the fire because of safety concerns and a low probability of success at containing the fire, according to the incident commander and Forest Service documents. The rappellers said that it was taking much longer to complete the helispot than initially anticipated and they did not have a good safety zone or escape route. They also noted that there was unburned vegetation on the slope between the fire and the helispot they were constructing—a dangerous situation if the fire started to spread quickly. The rappellers were removed by 5:00 p.m., at which time the helicopters also stopped dropping water. Figure 4 shows the ignition point of the Chetco Bar Fire and the fire’s growth as of July 13, 2017. In the second phase of the fire, Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest officials assigned a type-3 incident management team to manage the response to the Chetco Bar Fire, following the unsuccessful initial attack. Forest Service documents indicated that fire behavior was moderate over the next several weeks, averaging around 150 acres of growth per day. The Chetco Bar Fire was a relatively low-priority fire during this phase, since it was far from values at risk and it remained within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, while other fires in the region were threatening communities and resources, according to Forest Service documents and incident management team officials. Because firefighters had been unable to suppress the fire during initial attack, national forest officials said they anticipated, based on knowledge of previous fires in the area, that the Chetco Bar Fire would become a long-term incident. The type-3 incident management team completed a long-term assessment and began working to contain the fire using long- term, indirect strategies. Under the type-3 team, crews scouted potential locations to fight the fire and started building firelines some distance away, approximately 6 miles from the fire and outside of the wilderness boundary, according to a Forest Service document and an incident management team official. Several additional fire crews were assigned to work on the fire during this time, with staffing fluctuating between approximately 40 and 140 people per day. As the type-3 team’s 2-week rotation was ending, national forest officials decided to bring in a NIMO team to assume command of the fire. Officials said they brought in a NIMO team because it consisted of type-1-qualified staff who could be staffed on the fire for longer than 2 weeks, and the team could expand or contract as needed. The NIMO team took command of the fire on July 29, with the fire estimated at 2,181 acres in size, and started updating the type-3 team’s long-term assessment and developing a long-term implementation plan. The plan identified 13 trigger points, referred to as “management action points,” to help guide decision-making on protecting high values at risk if certain conditions were met. For example, the plan laid out actions to prevent the fire from crossing the Chetco River—the first trigger point identified—and actions to be taken if the fire crossed the river. The NIMO team continued the type-3 team’s efforts to construct a series of firelines away from the main fire and, according to a team summary document, completed all of the firelines by August 17. Forest Service officials told us that for these firelines to be effective, firefighters would have needed to burn the vegetation between the lines and the fire itself (known as a burnout). National forest and NIMO team officials said that the teams had not yet taken this step because they considered it an unnecessary risk as long as the fire remained north of the Chetco River. These officials said that burnout operations pose risks if the fire set by firefighters burns in a different direction than intended, and such operations can unnecessarily burn a larger area of the forest if the fire does not reach the burnout. Therefore, one national forest official said firefighters will prepare firelines but not conduct burnout operations until the incident management team determines they are needed—particularly since safety risks can be associated with conducting burnout operations. Figure 5 shows the Chetco Bar Fire’s growth from July 14 through August 16, 2017. As the fire burned into August, hotter and drier weather created conditions for more active fire behavior in the third phase of the fire. Chetco Effect winds developed in mid-August 2017, causing the Chetco Bar Fire to rapidly expand and intensify (see sidebar). The Forest Service was aware of the potential for such winds, as fire behavior modeling and the July 2017 long-term assessment showed the potential for these winds to increase fire behavior dramatically by mid-August. The winds, combined with dry fuels and heavy vegetation, created conditions that led to extreme fire behavior. Chetco Effect Winds Chetco Effect winds, also known as Brookings Effect winds, are warm, dry, and strong winds flowing down the Chetco River Basin toward Brookings, Oregon (see figure below). Such winds are more broadly referred to as Foehn or downslope winds, other examples being the Santa Ana winds in southern California and the Diablo winds in northern California. Chetco Effect winds can happen any time and generally occur two to four times a year, according to the National Weather Service. The Chetco Effect winds first occurred the evening of August 15 and morning of August 16, but the fire remained north of the Chetco River. When the winds returned the evening of August 16 and morning of August 17, the fire crossed the river and began expanding rapidly, in part because heavy vegetation on the south side of the river fueled the fire under the winds. Many officials and stakeholders said nothing could be done to moderate the fire’s behavior when the Chetco Effect winds were in effect. The fire increased in size from 8,500 acres on August 17 to 91,551 acres on August 21 (see fig. 6). As a result, the Chetco Bar Fire became a much higher priority fire, according to Forest Service documents. The NIMO team ordered additional crews on August 17, in anticipation of conducting burnout operations along 10 miles of fireline in an attempt to slow the fire, according to Forest Service documents. However, the Chetco Effect winds caused the fire to move rapidly toward and past the fireline before the Forest Service could conduct the planned burnouts. Even though the fireline was completed prior to being overrun by the fire, national forest officials told us that the weather conditions were not favorable for burnout operations, as the winds would have blown the burnout fires back toward private timberlands and populated areas. The winds also caused embers to fly far ahead of the fire during this time, creating spot fires 1 to 2 miles or more ahead of the main flame front. On August 18, the Chetco Bar Fire began spreading from national forest onto private timberlands and unincorporated areas containing homes. As the fire began to threaten homes and other structures, the NIMO team directed firefighters to take appropriate action to try to protect those structures, if fire behavior allowed. For example, between August 18 and 21, Forest Service documents indicated that firefighters cleared brush around several structures and homes in a small community known as Wilderness Retreat and along two Forest Service roads. On August 19, the fire burned rapidly toward Wilderness Retreat and firefighters conducted an emergency burnout, which successfully protected the community, according to a NIMO team document and national forest officials. Around this time in another area, the Chetco Bar Fire burned six primary residences and more than 20 other structures, according to state and Forest Service documents. On August 20, the fire traveled 6 miles toward Brookings in a single day, and threatened more than 3,000 homes during this phase. As the Chetco Bar Fire burned toward Brookings, the NIMO team notified the Curry County Sheriff that residents would need to be evacuated. However, the rapid spread of the fire provided limited time to notify residents and conduct evacuations, according to a NIMO team document and national forest officials. The Curry County Sheriff’s Office issued the first evacuation notices on August 18, and additional evacuation notices were issued between August 19 and 21. As the fire expanded, the NIMO team ordered additional firefighting assets, increasing the ground assets assigned from 65 firefighters and 1 fire engine on August 17, 2017, to 788 firefighters and 90 fire engines by August 21. However, some assets ordered were not available because they were assigned to other fires in the region. In addition to ground assets, additional aircraft were ordered and assigned to assist the firefighting effort—such as two large and one very large air tankers, which dropped retardant on the fire on August 17 and August 18. The incident management team had requested two additional air tankers, but the requests were cancelled since aircraft were unavailable, according to a Forest Service document. Some ordered drops from air tankers also were cancelled because of poor visibility from smoke. Six helicopters were ordered during this phase, four of which were assigned to the fire, but the helicopters also were unable to fly due to smoke, according to flight communication logs and an incident management senior official. With the Chetco Bar Fire’s rapid growth, national forest officials decided to order a type-1 incident management team on August 21. Since mobilizing the team would take time, a type-2 team already in the vicinity was brought in to assist the NIMO team on August 19. The type-1 team arrived on August 23 and assumed command on August 26, according to a team document. In the fourth phase, the Chetco Bar Fire continued to burn actively through the end of August and into September 2017, but the rate of its spread generally slowed. However, high temperatures and low humidity contributed to the fire growing from 97,758 acres on August 22 to 191,067 acres on September 22 (see fig. 7). Evacuations continued in the early part of this phase, threatening more than 8,500 homes during parts of September, but evacuation orders began to be lifted as the risk to homes declined. During this phase, the Forest Service ordered more firefighting assets, resulting in over 1,700 firefighters in total assigned to the fire. Between September 6 and 19, the fire began expanding to the east and the fire was divided into an east and west zone, with separate incident management teams assigned to each zone. Firefighters constructed firelines to the south and west of the fire. Forest Service documents indicated the agency put in 128 miles of fireline cut by bulldozers and 52 miles of hand cut fireline, and used 141 miles of existing roads and 25 miles of natural features as firelines. Air tankers and helicopters continued supporting firefighters, dropping over 950,000 gallons of water, 55,000 gallons of retardant, and 10,000 gallons of gel during this phase, according to Forest Service documents. However, smoke from the fire hampered air operations, with one type-1 team reporting it was unable to conduct air operations for about half of the days it was in command (August 26 through September 9). Firefighters gained substantial control of the fire during this phase, going from 0 percent containment on August 22 to 97 percent containment by September 22. In mid- to late-September, the weather started to change, with cooler days and more moisture, which helped to moderate the fire’s behavior. By September 23, the area had received several inches of rain, which nearly contained the fire, according to an incident management team document. Firefighting assets were released as the fire was contained. The Chetco Bar Fire was declared fully contained on November 2—nearly 4 months after it was detected. The fire burned a total of approximately 191,197 acres, according to the Forest Service’s Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) report (see fig. 8). Forest Service officials and stakeholders we interviewed raised a number of concerns about the Forest Service’s response to the Chetco Bar Fire. Many of these concerns related directly to the Forest Service’s response to the fire; some related to broader agency programs that may have had an effect on fire behavior. We grouped these concerns into five categories: (1) aggressiveness of firefighting response, (2) availability of firefighting assets, (3) communication with cooperators, (4) communication with the public, and (5) timber harvest and other fuel reduction activities. The Forest Service has taken steps that may help address some of the concerns, such as those related to communication. Agency officials and stakeholders expressed differing views about some of the concerns and whether changes were necessary. Some national forest officials and many stakeholders we interviewed said that the Forest Service was not aggressive enough in fighting the Chetco Bar Fire before the Chetco Effect winds arrived in mid-August. Several of these stakeholders said if the Forest Service had used more aggressive firefighting strategies and tactics, the agency could have prevented the fire from getting as large as it did and threatening homes. Some of these officials and stakeholders raised concerns about whether incident management teams and line officers appropriately balanced the risks of different firefighting decisions during the fire. Some said the strategies and tactics taken early on may have put hundreds of firefighters and the public at risk later in the fire. National forest and incident management team officials said that in attempting to suppress the Chetco Bar Fire, they adopted firefighting strategies and tactics that considered firefighter safety, the values at risk, and the probability of success. National forest officials said that when deciding how to respond to the fire, they prioritized firefighter safety and also considered the likelihood that a particular response would be successful, in accordance with 2017 Forest Service guidance. As previously discussed, in the early stages of the Chetco Bar Fire, firefighters expressed concerns about their safety and the likelihood of success of certain tactics. In addition, national forest officials noted that after the rappellers asked to be pulled out of the fire and other firefighters expressed safety concerns, line officers were hesitant to send in additional firefighters. Other officials and stakeholders said the area where the Chetco Bar Fire started is very dangerous, with some noting that it is one of the most dangerous areas in the region and possibly the country to fight fire. Specific concerns about the aggressiveness of the Forest Service’s response included the following: Number of firefighters. Some officials and several stakeholders raised concerns about the Forest Service not sending in more firefighters at the beginning of the Chetco Bar Fire to try to contain it before it threatened homes. In response, national forest officials said that the four rappellers that were sent on the first day were part of an 18-person crew stationed near Grants Pass, Oregon. They were the only crew members available to respond on July 12, as the remaining crew members had just returned from another fire assignment, and firefighters are generally required to take 2 days off after completing a standard 14-day fire assignment. As previously noted, safety concerns also factored into decisions to remove the rappellers and not add crews on the second day of the fire. Absence of smokejumpers. Some stakeholders raised concerns that the Forest Service did not send smokejumpers into the Chetco Bar Fire in its early stages, saying that smokejumpers may have been more effective at suppressing the fire when it was small. In response, national forest officials said that the rappellers who were sent to the fire were located much closer to the ignition point than the closest smokejumpers and were able to respond more quickly. These officials also said that rappellers can be more effective in rough terrain with heavy timber, since they do not need an open space to land with parachutes and can be dropped closer to the fire. Use of helicopters. Several stakeholders raised concerns about the Forest Service stopping the use of helicopters to drop water on the fire after the rappellers were removed. According to interagency guidance and Forest Service officials, water drops are not as effective at containing a fire without crews on the ground (to build firelines, for example), and they did not want to expose helicopter crews to unnecessary risk for actions that were unlikely to be effective. In addition, officials said that the water drops were causing burning logs and other debris to roll down the hill and create spot fires. Interagency guidance discusses the importance of coordinating air and ground firefighting tactics, noting that the effectiveness of aircraft is dependent on the deployment of ground assets. Use of indirect strategies. Several stakeholders raised concerns about incident management teams not engaging the fire more directly in the first several weeks rather than constructing fireline miles away. Some of these stakeholders described this indirect approach as a “watch and wait” or “let it burn” approach. In response, officials said that they looked for locations and opportunities to fight the fire directly, but the fire’s remote location and rugged terrain made this difficult. One official estimated it would have taken firefighters 2 days to hike to the fire because of the distance and trail conditions. Number of burnout operations. Several officials raised concerns about the Forest Service not conducting burnout operations before the Chetco Effect winds arrived in mid-August. However, as previously noted, officials stated that there are risks in conducting such operations. Limited use of chainsaws. Some national forest officials raised concerns about limited use of chainsaws in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, saying this prevented them from making quicker progress in constructing fireline. For example, two national forest fire management officials said that in trying to clear a wilderness trail to use as a fireline, the crew used handsaws rather than chainsaws after the initial attack, which made the task more difficult and time consuming. Limited action to protect homes. Several stakeholders raised concerns about incident management teams not doing more to protect homes, stating that firefighters and equipment in the vicinity of homes that later burned were not used to help protect those homes. In response, national forest and headquarters officials said that although the agency tries to prevent fires from reaching homes, protecting homes and other private structures is the responsibility of state and local entities. Moreover, headquarters officials noted that Forest Service firefighters are not trained or equipped to defend structures. Forest Service officials said that since the Chetco Bar Fire, the agency has expanded tools that may help address some of these concerns for future fires. They noted that some of these tools were not widely available at the time of the Chetco Bar Fire but are becoming more common. In particular, the Forest Service has an evolving risk management assistance program aimed at improving decision-making on fires by developing a strategic evaluation process. This program includes risk- management assistance teams that can be deployed to fires to assist with key decisions and exercises to help incident management teams and line officers analyze different firefighting options, according to program documents. For example, the Forest Service developed a tradeoff analysis tool through which decision makers assess different firefighting options and rate them according to how well they address firefighter safety, public safety, and values at risk. During the 2018 Klondike Fire, national forest officials said they brought in a risk-management team to facilitate analysis of firefighting options and included cooperators in the discussions. Officials said these discussions helped everyone understand the risks and tradeoffs of various firefighting options, adding transparency to the process. Several officials and stakeholders raised concerns about the number of firefighting assets assigned to the Chetco Bar Fire. According to Forest Service documents and officials, firefighting assets were stretched thin fighting other fires in the region, and there were a number of times throughout the Chetco Bar Fire when assets, such as management teams, crews, and helicopters, were requested but were unavailable (see table 1). For example, an incident management team that was heading to the Chetco Bar Fire was diverted to the Eagle Creek Fire, which was threatening homes and other structures near Portland, Oregon. Further, some officials said limited availability of certain firefighting assets with specific capabilities, such as infrared drones that can “see” through smoke or cloud cover, hindered their ability to fight the fire when visibility was limited. Some officials also emphasized the importance of having more long-term fire analysts assigned to national forests and incident management teams to help develop and interpret fire behavior models and long-term assessments that, in turn, could help protect people and values at risk. However, other officials said that having additional assets likely would not have made a significant difference in the response to the Chetco Bar Fire because of the difficult terrain where the fire started and because of the Chetco Effect winds. Beyond their specific concerns with the Chetco Bar Fire, some stakeholders also observed the Forest Service would likely benefit from having additional firefighting assets in the future, as the frequency and intensity of fires are likely to increase. Forest Service officials acknowledged that there were not enough firefighting assets in 2017, given the number of large fires that year. As a result, they said they had to make difficult decisions regarding prioritizing assets, with fires threatening life and property receiving higher priority. Forest Service officials said that the agency is working to increase the number of some types of firefighting assets. For example, headquarters officials said that the agency was in the process of developing a drone program. In addition, officials said that the agency is working on increasing the availability of some assets, such as air tankers and helicopters, through the use of different contracting authorities. Several officials and stakeholders raised concerns about communication among the various cooperators before and during the Chetco Bar Fire. In particular, some said that differences in firefighting approaches—due in part to cooperators’ differing missions, responsibilities, and priorities—had not been fully clarified in advance, leading some cooperators to express frustration with the Forest Service’s response to the fire. For example, according to some officials and stakeholders, the Oregon Department of Forestry and Coos Forest Protective Association generally place more emphasis on protecting timberlands than the Forest Service, and this sometimes leads to differences in the agencies’ preferred approaches to responding to fires. For example, when determining where to construct a fireline, Forest Service officials may identify a location aimed to keep a fire from reaching homes, whereas cooperators from the Oregon Department of Forestry or Coos Forest Protective Association may prefer a location that also protects timberlands. In addition, some stakeholders said that the frequent rotation of incident management teams—generally about once every 2 weeks—made it difficult for local cooperators to coordinate with those teams. One official noted that rotation of teams can make it difficult to build trust and maintain good communication with cooperators and the public. However, Forest Service headquarters officials said that the agency has studied the structure and use of incident management teams in the past, and the agency has not identified a better approach. Several officials and some stakeholders noted lessons learned from the Chetco Bar Fire. For example, they cited the need to do more pre-season fire planning, such as meeting with cooperators before the fire season begins to discuss coordination among agencies and planning how they might respond to fires in certain situations. Some also noted the need to improve communication and transparency with cooperators during fires, such as through the use of risk-management assistance teams previously discussed. Officials and stakeholders said that communication among cooperators in the region has improved since the Chetco Bar Fire, helping to develop a shared understanding of the potential firefighting response in different locations and under different conditions. Many officials and several stakeholders said the Forest Service did not provide sufficient or timely information to the public about the danger from the Chetco Bar Fire and what the agency was doing to fight it. In particular, several officials raised concerns about the Forest Service waiting to hold its first public meeting until over a month after the fire was detected. Several officials and some stakeholders said that in the absence of sufficient information, misinformation and rumors—such as incorrect information on evacuations in certain areas—spread, leading to frustration, anger, and fear on the part of the public. Officials and stakeholders said another lesson learned was the importance of communicating accurate and timely information through various means, including public meetings and social media. Officials and stakeholders told us that the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest is taking steps to help ensure that it communicates more effectively during fires. For example, national forest officials said that since the Chetco Bar Fire, they have increased their level of communication with local communities. Officials also said they are now more proactive in monitoring social media and ensuring they post correct information on fires, among other things. As a result, officials and stakeholders said that public perception of the 2018 Klondike Fire was much more positive than of the Chetco Bar Fire, even though both fires burned more than 175,000 acres. fueled the Chetco Bar Fire and made firefighting efforts more dangerous by leaving snags (standing dead trees) that could injure or kill firefighters. Following wildfires, the Forest Service may consider whether to leave burned trees and allow the burned area to recover naturally or to harvest some of those trees—called salvage harvesting—with the intention of generating funds to help pay for the recovery of natural resources or infrastructure, such as trails or roads, among other purposes. Considerable scientific uncertainty exists about whether and how quickly harvested areas recover compared with unharvested areas. Disagreement also exists about the extent salvage harvesting generates funding, considering the cost of planning, preparing, and administering sales of salvaged trees. Following the Chetco Bar Fire, the Forest Service determined that 13,626 acres of the burned area were potentially available for salvage harvesting. These areas had 50 to 100 percent tree mortality and were in areas of the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest where timber harvesting aligned with existing management objectives, according to an official. The Forest Service narrowed the area that it proposed putting up for salvage harvesting to 4,090 acres, removing areas that lacked economically viable timber, were inaccessible to logging equipment, were in roadless areas, or had sensitive wildlife habitat, among other factors. The total number of acres the Forest Service offered for salvage harvesting was 2,194 acres across 13 sales, according to an official. Of the 13 salvage sales offered, eight were sold, totaling 1,957 acres, and five were not sold. Of these five offers, three did not receive bids, and two were dropped by the Forest Service due to market changes or other considerations. In contrast, several Forest Service officials and some stakeholders said that higher levels of timber harvest and fuel reduction would not have made a large difference in the Chetco Bar Fire because of the fire’s intensity and rate of spread under the Chetco Effect winds. Several said that if there had been more timber harvest, the forest might have been replanted in ways that could have made the fire worse. Specifically, when replanting is done following timber harvest, trees may be planted more densely and uniformly than would occur if vegetation were allowed to grow back naturally, according to a Forest Service ecologist and some stakeholders. In addition, slash (debris from logging operations) is sometimes left on the ground after timber harvest, which can fuel future fires. As a result, areas where timber has been harvested may burn more severely during future fires, according to some officials and stakeholders. Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest officials said the forest has been carrying out many fuel reduction activities and has exceeded its fuel reduction target every year from fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2019 (see appendix I for a map of past timber harvests and other fuel reduction activities). As part of its fuel reduction efforts, the forest is creating some larger breaks in vegetation by connecting areas where fuel reduction activities have taken place, according to officials. Further, national forest officials are maintaining some firelines that were built during previous fires, including the Chetco Bar Fire, to aid in their response to future fires. Agency officials said these efforts are part of a broader effort to move towards spatial fire planning, where areas at risk and effective places to contain wildfires are identified before fires start. Forest Service officials and stakeholders we interviewed and reports and other documents we reviewed identified a variety of effects the Chetco Bar Fire had on local communities and resources. We grouped these effects into four categories: (1) homes and infrastructure, (2) public health, (3) local businesses and workers, and (4) natural and cultural resources. Most of the identified effects were negative, although some positive short- and long-term effects were identified. For example, the Chetco Bar Fire damaged habitat for many wildlife species, but some species that prefer burned landscapes likely benefitted from the fire, according to officials. The Chetco Bar Fire destroyed six homes and damaged one home, according to Forest Service and state documents. The fire also threatened over 8,500 homes, causing more than 5,000 residents to be evacuated over the course of the fire, according to Forest Service documents. In addition, Forest Service and state documents stated that the fire destroyed more than 20 other structures and damaged at least eight more, such as garages and other outbuildings. After a severe wildfire, soil erosion can increase and cause adverse effects. As fires burn, they destroy plant material, such as roots and leaves, that help prevent erosion during severe rainstorms. Plant roots help stabilize the soil, and leaves slow runoff by allowing water to seep into the soil. In some severe fires, burning vegetation creates a gas that penetrates the soil. As the soil cools, this gas condenses and forms a waxy coating that causes the soil to repel water. Rainwater and melted snow can then flow across these surfaces and cause erosion. Erosion can reduce water quality and damage roads. In addition, because burned soil does not absorb as much water as unburned soil, seeds have a harder time germinating, and surviving plants find it more difficult to obtain moisture. the 63 miles of trails within the fire perimeter. Further, a campground within the national forest was partially damaged and closed to the public while being repaired. Erosion following the Chetco Bar Fire also washed approximately 40,000 cubic yards of sediment into the Port of Brookings Harbor. A port official said that dredging the harbor is estimated to cost $4 million. The official noted that the commission governing the port was pursuing grants, such as disaster grants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to help with dredging costs but was unsure whether total costs could be covered. Local officials said that post-fire erosion could also negatively affect drinking water infrastructure, since the Chetco Bar Fire burned about 80 percent of Brookings’ watershed. Brookings received a grant to evaluate the fire’s effect on the city’s water system, according to a local official. The city hired a consultant, who reported in June 2018 that the quality of the water was generally excellent and that no significant water quality effects from the fire had been observed. People with existing lung disease may not be able to breathe as deeply or vigorously as they normally would during exposure to high levels of particulate matter. Healthy people may also experience these effects. susceptibility to respiratory infections and aggravate existing respiratory diseases, such as asthma and chronic bronchitis. smoke (see sidebar). Most healthy individuals recover quickly from smoke exposure and will not experience long-term health effects, according to an Environmental Protection Agency document; however, the smoke exposure effects are more sudden and serious for sensitive groups, including children, older adults, and people with existing heart or lung disease. Local health officials and a national forest official also raised concerns about the potential long-term effects of exposure to wildfire smoke, but little data exist on such effects. The Forest Service reported that four towns in the vicinity of the Chetco Bar Fire experienced, on average, about 9 days of unhealthy or worse air quality, although the severity and duration of wildfire effects on air quality varied by town (see fig. 10). Of these towns, Brookings had the most days—three—measured as “hazardous,” the worst category. The four towns also experienced about 5 days, on average, that were measured as being unhealthy for sensitive groups. Many residents also experienced mental and emotional effects from the Chetco Bar Fire, according to local health officials and some stakeholders. A local health official said that some residents experienced post-traumatic stress disorder after the fire, with some residents becoming hypervigilant of smoke and sirens. Some stakeholders noted that the 2018 Klondike Fire, which burned nearby, led to additional mental and emotional stresses for those affected by the Chetco Bar Fire. The Chetco Bar Fire’s effects on local businesses and workers included damage to the tourism and logging industries. Local businesses lost revenue in the short term because of decreased summer tourism during the Chetco Bar Fire, according to some documents and many stakeholders. According to estimates from the Oregon Tourism Commission, businesses—including tourism-dependent ones such as hotels and restaurants—lost over $1 million in both Curry and Jackson counties, and businesses in Josephine County lost over $160,000 during the 2017 fire season. For example, the Oregon Shakespeare Festival canceled nine outdoor performances because of wildfire smoke, resulting in losses estimated at about $600,000, according to a company document. In addition, one vineyard in Cave Junction lost an estimated $10,000 to $20,000 in revenue because of reduced tasting room sales and vacation rentals, according to an Oregon vineyard association spokesperson. The decrease in tourism also had short-term negative effects on workers in the tourism industry. According to a report, workers in Curry County lost income, in part due to employee furloughs, because of wildfires in 2017. Another document cited that Josephine County lost an estimated 100 jobs in 2017 because of the Chetco Bar Fire. Following the fire, the governor of Oregon created the Chetco Bar Fire Recovery Council to help the region recover from the fire. The council assessed economic damage, identified recovery needs, and identified potential state funding for those needs. For example, in November 2017, the council identified a potential need for state economic development funds to assist local businesses. However, the council reported in March 2018 that three businesses affected by the fire had received federal loans from the U.S. Small Business Administration and that there was no longer a clear need for state economic development funds. In addition, some stakeholders we interviewed and documents we reviewed raised concerns that if summer wildfire smoke became common in southern Oregon, it could have a long-term negative effect on tourism. However, a 2019 report found that wildfire smoke had a minimal effect on people’s willingness to consider traveling to southern Oregon in the future. One local business has set up air quality monitors at a tourist attraction to inform tourists of the current air quality. The Chetco Bar Fire burned 14,130 acres of nonfederal timberlands, according to the Forest Service’s BAER report. One privately owned lumber company was particularly hard hit, with the fire burning about 10,000 acres of its timberlands, according to company representatives. This loss was about 10 percent of the company’s timberlands and represented about 5 years of its average harvest. Following the fire, the company salvage-harvested approximately 6,000 acres of the burned timber, which company representatives said provided some short-term economic benefits for the company and, according to one stakeholder, also temporarily increased employment for loggers and truck drivers in the area. However, the long-term effects of the fire on the company are unknown. One representative said, depending on future market conditions, the loss of timber from the Chetco Bar Fire could lead the company to lay off employees or could jeopardize its future. The severity of the Chetco Bar Fire varied across the forest, which led to varied effects on soil and vegetation. As shown in figure 11, within the perimeter of the Chetco Bar Fire, burn severity ranged as follows: unburned or very low (19 percent, or 36,027 acres); low (40 percent, or 76,613 acres); moderate (34 percent, or 64,545 acres); and high (7 percent, or 14,012 acres). The severity with which soil burns during a fire affects both the potential for erosion following the fire and the severity of damage to vegetation. Areas of the Chetco Bar Fire that burned at moderate and high severity had increased potential for erosion, according to the BAER report. As previously discussed, post-fire erosion damaged roads and other infrastructure. Further, the BAER report noted that severely burned areas may have lower soil productivity and vegetation growth. However, most of the native vegetation in the area is adapted to fire and is likely to recover over time, according to the BAER report. Moreover, a Forest Service ecologist said the Chetco Bar Fire helped create a more diverse forest structure (characterized as a mosaic of different species and age classes) that benefits many plant and animal species (see fig. 12). For example, nine sensitive plant species found in the area burned by the Chetco Bar Fire thrive in early post-fire ecosystems, according to a Forest Service document. Further, officials said rapid regrowth of vegetation, such as a moss that thrives after fires, helped reduce erosion and limit potential future damage to roads and trails. Forest Service officials and documents noted that they did not expect widespread, long-term negative effects on vegetation from the Chetco Bar Fire, but they identified two negative effects: Invasive plants. More than a thousand individual invasive plants (such as noxious weeds) were introduced to an approximately 13,000- acre area of the national forest during the Chetco Bar Fire, mainly via firefighters’ boots and equipment. Invasive plants can, in some cases, displace native plants, compromise the quality and quantity of habitat for wildlife and fish, and increase wildfire risk. A national forest official said that it is labor intensive and costly to eradicate invasive plants because they have to be pulled out by hand. The official said the agency does not have the resources to remove all of the invasive plants brought in during the fire and is prioritizing removal of those that are the fastest growing, most disruptive, and affect the most highly valued resources. In addition, the National Forest Foundation administered a $7,000 grant to remove invasive plants on 10 of the affected acres in June and July 2019. Redwood stands. The Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest contains the northernmost naturally occurring coast redwood tree stands, and the Chetco Bar Fire burned about 12 percent of the total area of redwood stands within the forest, or about 60 acres, according to a Forest Service ecologist. However, most of the area burned at low severity, though parts burned at moderate or high severity. The ecologist said redwoods are adapted to survive fire, noting that larger trees will usually resprout from dormant buds under the bark along the entire length of the trunk (see fig. 13). Smaller trees and larger trees burned at high severity can be killed at the top but are often able to resprout. In the short-term, the Chetco Bar Fire killed or damaged habitat for many wildlife species, although the exact effect of the fire on wildlife is unknown, according to a Forest Service official. Most wildlife species are expected to recover, but the effects on some threatened and sensitive species could be longer lasting, according to Forest Service documents and officials. For example, half of the 13 known northern spotted owls—a species that is federally listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act—living within the perimeter of the fire were estimated to have died from the fire, according to a Forest Service biologist. In addition, this biologist said the fire’s effect on the population of a seabird called the marbled murrelet, as well as on two mammals—Pacific marten and fisher—is unknown, although it negatively affected their habitats. National forest officials said the Chetco Bar Fire also likely benefitted some wildlife species because the mosaic landscape resulting from the fire is preferred by some wildlife, including deer, elk, migratory birds, butterflies, and woodpeckers. For example, black-backed woodpeckers thrive in partly burned areas because they eat wood-boring beetles that feed on recently burned trees. Erosion resulting from the Chetco Bar Fire likely had short-term negative effects on fish populations, including the threatened coho salmon, according to the BAER report. Sediment in the water makes it harder for fish to breathe and can smother their eggs. In addition, over time, increased sediment in streams and rivers can disrupt salmon migration because salmon use their sense of smell to navigate to their native stream to spawn, and sediment can mask that smell. Some stakeholders said they were concerned that the loss of shade from trees might lead to warmer river water, thereby harming salmon. However, a Forest Service biologist said that vegetation near the river has regrown since the fire and there is no indication that the temperature of the river water has increased. The fire may provide some long-term benefits for salmon and other fish species. Specifically, erosion following the fire is likely to increase the supply of downed trees and coarse gravel in streams and rivers, which provide places for fish to lay their eggs and hide, according to a study and a Forest Service biologist. Some cultural resources—including archaeological sites, historic structures, and areas significant to contemporary Native American tribes—were negatively affected by the Chetco Bar Fire. The Forest Service reported that 130 known and recorded Native American archaeological sites were located within the perimeter of the Chetco Bar Fire, 49 of which the agency characterized as isolated sites containing one to three stone artifacts. The effect of the Chetco Bar Fire on known and recorded sites—and on any cultural sites not previously identified—is not fully known. Following the fire, as part of its BAER report, the Forest Service assessed some of these sites, including a prehistoric Native American village site and an area culturally important to Native American tribes. This report noted a number of cultural artifacts, such as arrowheads and tools, that were discolored by the fire or were displaced or moved during or after the fire by, for example, soil disruption caused by trees falling or roots burning and collapsing. The report also stated additional damage could occur in the future; for example, increased erosion could further damage some cultural sites, and vegetation loss could make artifacts more visible, increasing the potential for looting and vandalism. To help mitigate some of the effects, the Forest Service planted some of the burned area with native grass seed to reestablish ground cover and reduce erosion. In addition to the fire damaging cultural resources, a Forest Service archaeologist said fire suppression activities caused some damage. For example, Native American arrowheads and tools were unearthed when a bulldozer constructed a fireline. The archeologist said that they took precautions to minimize suppression impacts on cultural resources, for instance by avoiding using heavy equipment in areas where cultural resources were known to be located. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior for review and comment. In an email dated April 17, 2020, the Forest Service, responding on behalf of the Department of Agriculture, said it generally agreed with the draft report. The Forest Service also provided a technical comment, which we incorporated. The Department of the Interior told us it had no comments on the report. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix II. Figure 14 shows the timber harvests and other fuel reduction activities— such as thinning vegetation or conducting prescribed burns—done in the area of the Chetco Bar Fire from 2008 through 2017. Anne-Marie Fennell, (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov In addition to the individual named above, Jonathan Dent (Assistant Director), Lesley Rinner (Analyst-in-Charge), Elizabeth Jimenez, and Jesse Lamarre-Vincent made key contributions to this report. Philip Farah, Ellen Fried, Richard P. Johnson, John Mingus, Edward J. Rice, Sara Sullivan, and Elizabeth Wood made additional contributions.
A wildfire known as the Chetco Bar Fire began in the summer of 2017 in southwest Oregon and burned more than 190,000 acres over nearly 4 months. Since the fire began in a national forest, the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service played a key role in managing the firefighting response. Because the fire also threatened other lands, state and private firefighting entities were also involved. GAO was asked to review the Forest Service's response to and the effects of the Chetco Bar Fire. This report describes (1) key events of the Chetco Bar Fire and the Forest Service's firefighting response, (2) key concerns raised by Forest Service officials and stakeholders about the Forest Service's response, and (3) effects of the fire on local communities and resources. GAO reviewed federal documents related to key events and the response, such as incident action plans and daily status summaries; analyzed reports on effects of the fire; and visited burned areas. GAO also interviewed Forest Service, state, and local officials involved in the response, as well as other stakeholders—such as representatives of nongovernmental organizations and community members—to discuss key concerns and effects of the fire. To identify the stakeholders, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed Forest Service officials and stakeholders, who suggested others to interview. The Chetco Bar Fire was first reported in July 2017, burning in the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest in Oregon. Because of the remote, steep terrain, initial Forest Service attempts to fight the fire at close range were unsuccessful. The fire grew slowly over the next month. Firefighters, directed by the Forest Service, responded in various ways, such as by constructing “firelines”—clearing vegetation—in an effort to stop the fire's spread. In mid-August, strong, hot winds caused the fire to expand rapidly, from 8,500 acres to more than 90,000 acres over several days, threatening thousands of homes. Firefighters continued constructing firelines and dropped water and retardant on the fire to try to contain it. In September, the weather changed and cooler days and rain moderated the fire. Firefighers fully contained the fire in November (see figure). Forest Service officials and stakeholders raised a number of key concerns about the Forest Service's response to the Chetco Bar Fire. For example, some said that if the Forest Service's response had been more aggressive, it might have kept the fire from growing and threatening homes. Forest Service officials said that in making firefighting decisions, they prioritized firefighter safety and considered the likelihood that a particular response would be successful. The agency has taken steps to improve decision-making for future wildfires, such as developing a tradeoff analysis tool to help decision makers assess firefighting options. Forest Service officials, stakeholders, and documents identifed various effects of the fire. Some of these sources cited negative effects including destruction of six homes, damage to roads and trails, and damage to habitat for the northern spotted owl. However, the fire likely improved habitat for some species, such as woodpeckers that eat beetles that feed on burned trees, according to officials.