Space systems generally involve one of four types of interrelated segments that are needed to make a space capability fully functional. As illustrated in figure 1, they include (1) space components—namely the satellites, (2) ground components, including satellite control systems and data processing subsystems and facilities, (3) user equipment, such as radios/terminals, needed by the warfighter to use the capability, and (4) launch vehicles and facilities. DOD space systems are acquired under the same acquisition policies as other weapons systems. However, as we found in July 2016, space systems are different from other acquisitions in some ways. For example, space has more programs of joint interest than other areas, and includes varied stakeholders, such as civil agencies and multiple services. According to officials, in developing space systems once a satellite is launched, if there are problems it is essentially impossible to change the hardware, and software changes may not be an option. In addition, space programs typically use cutting-edge technologies that have to withstand the harsh space environment. Such technologies are rarely available as off-the-shelf systems from the commercial market and must be developed following a specific process overseen by specially- trained DOD acquisition personnel. Data from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment’s Office of Human Capital Initiatives show that, as of June 2018, DOD employed about 170,000 military and civilian personnel who are designated as acquisition personnel and are responsible for acquiring weapon systems, such as aircraft, ships, tanks, and space systems. DOD tracks the characteristics, education, training, and experience of these acquisition personnel in DOD’s acquisition workforce data system—Data Mart—where they are tracked as belonging to 1 of 15 acquisition career fields. Table 1 shows a list of these acquisition career fields. Contractor and FFRDC personnel often support DOD acquisition efforts. For the purpose of this report, “contractor” refers to support service contractors who provide technical and administrative support rather than prime contractors who develop and produce weapon systems or products. FFRDCs are not-for-profit entities sponsored and funded primarily by DOD to fulfill research and development, engineering, and analytic needs that cannot be met as effectively by existing government or contractor personnel. Nonprofit, university-affiliated, or private industry organizations operate the FFRDCs through contracts or other agreements with federal agencies. DOD procures FFRDC services by staff years of technical effort. The total amount of FFRDC services time that DOD is permitted to obtain is set annually by Congress. For fiscal year 2018, DOD was authorized to use available funds for FFRDCs for not more than 6,030 staff years of technical effort. Authorized staff years of technical effort are allocated among the military services’ organizations that act as the primary sponsors for each FFRDC, which then prioritize what work the FFRDC will perform according to the allocation level received. In general, managers in the contractor and FFRDC organizations direct the daily activities of their respective personnel, while DOD military and civilian personnel oversee their work. Over the years, GAO has highlighted the importance of workforce management. Since 2001, GAO has included strategic human capital management as a government-wide high-risk area. More recently, we found that having the right workforce mix with the right skill sets is critical to achieving DOD’s mission, and that it is important for DOD, as part of its strategic workforce planning, to conduct gap analyses of its critical skills and competencies. Strategic workforce planning—an integral part of human capital management—is an iterative, systematic process that helps organizations determine if they have staff with the necessary skills and competencies to accomplish their strategic goals. As shown in table 2, many DOD offices play key roles in strategic workforce planning activities. DOD does not have comprehensive information about its space acquisition workforce—including the size, mix, and location of this workforce. DOD does not have this information because, among other things, DOD has not clearly identified its space programs, and its workforce data systems are not configured to identify space acquisition personnel. In the absence of comprehensive DOD data, we sought to obtain an understanding of the extent of this workforce. We aggregated data from individual DOD organizations and estimate that at least 8,000 military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC personnel were working on space acquisitions in multiple locations across the United States at the end of 2017. While this information represents only a snapshot in time, it provides insight into the extent of the space acquisition workforce. Given DOD’s recent decision to stand up a United States Space Command and to establish a consolidated Space Development Agency in 2019, along with the President’s directive for DOD to submit a legislative proposal for a United States Space Force, having knowledge about which personnel are involved with military space acquisitions and where these personnel are located will be important to DOD’s planning efforts. DOD collects data on its acquisition workforce, but does not collect and maintain comprehensive and complete data on the size, mix, and location of the military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC personnel working on space acquisitions. According to the military services’ Directors of Acquisition Career Management, DOD manages its acquisition workforce by career field, such as program management and engineering, and not by the type of product being acquired, such as space systems. They told us that, in their view, the acquisition skills needed for an acquisition program—such as those for program management, engineering, and contracting—are largely the same regardless of the product type. However, officials acknowledged that it takes some time for personnel to learn the nuances of acquiring a specific type of product. We identified three factors that hinder DOD’s ability to collect comprehensive data on its space acquisition workforce. Together, they impede DOD from maintaining a complete and accurate understanding of the size, mix, and location of its space acquisition workforce. DOD does not maintain a complete list of its space acquisition programs. Officials from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and the service-level acquisition career managers told us that DOD does not maintain a list of the universe of space acquisition programs. In addition, the budget document that DOD submits to Congress specific to space programs, which could possibly serve as an alternative source of such information, identifies programs that have large amounts of funding by name, but aggregates information for smaller programs without identifying them individually. While DOD does not maintain a complete list of space acquisition programs, during the course of our review we found that the military services were generally able to identify space acquisition programs. DOD does have a definition of space systems. Specifically, according to a DOD Directive, space systems include all systems related to making a space capability operational—that is programs acquiring satellites, satellite ground systems (including satellite control and data processing), receivers/user segments (including terminals and radios), and launch systems—but specifies that terminals that are embedded as part of a platform (i.e. aircraft, ship, or tank) are excluded. However, DOD officials had difficulty identifying some programs, particularly those in the user segment. For example, the Air Force’s Space Fence program, which is developing ground radar as a part of the space surveillance network that detects and tracks space objects, is included as a space program in DOD’s budget documents. Officials from the Program Executive Office that staffs personnel to the program initially told us they did not consider it a space program since it is a series of ground-based radars. They subsequently determined that it is a space program since the radar will track space objects and provide data for space situational awareness. DOD data systems are not currently configured to identify space acquisition personnel. We examined three data sources that have information on the different personnel groups in the acquisition workforce, and found that none of them can identify space acquisition personnel. The Office of Human Capital Initiatives within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment uses the Data Mart system to track the education, experience, and training of military and civilian acquisition-coded personnel working in the 15 acquisition functional career fields shown in table 1. DOD has taken periodic steps to enhance the data captured in this system. For example, in 2009 DOD began tracking whether acquisition personnel in the business career field were working on financial management or cost estimating. In 2014, DOD started to track personnel with expertise in contracting with small businesses, and expanded its efforts to track personnel with expertise in international acquisitions. However, this system does not currently identify personnel staffed to or supporting space acquisitions or any other type of product acquisition. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness tracks contractor data using the Enterprise-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application system to provide DOD management information on contracted services obtained by each military service and defense agency. The system includes data on the number of hours of service each contractor provides to the government, which could be used to approximate the number of contractor personnel used to perform the work. However, the system does not track the type of acquisition programs being supported, such as space acquisition programs. In addition, the data are self-reported by service contractors and concerns exist regarding potential underreporting. For example, we reported in March 2018 that the military services estimated that the Enterprise-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application included fiscal year 2016 contractor data for 80 percent of Army contracts and 75 percent of Navy contracts; the percentage of Air Force contracts was unknown. The Director of Laboratories and Personnel within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering tracks information on FFRDCs, such as the staff years of technical effort provided each year, to ensure that DOD stays within its congressionally mandated limit. Each FFRDC sponsor organization provides an annual report of their staff years of technical effort and funding to DOD. However, DOD officials told us that sponsoring organizations do not identify what type of acquisition program their respective FFRDC personnel support, such as space acquisition programs. Personnel supporting space acquisitions are dispersed across a variety of organizations and may also support non-space programs. Each of the military services we reviewed has program executive offices, research labs, or other organizations that support both space and non- space acquisitions. DOD officials told us that functional career field leaders in each of the organizations, such as the engineering or the contracting directorates, assign personnel to space or non-space programs on an as-needed basis, which could make it difficult for DOD to determine which and how many personnel should be included in the space acquisition workforce. Five of the 10 space acquisition programs we reviewed—1 Air Force, 1 Navy, and 3 Army—were managed by organizations that were primarily responsible for developing and acquiring non-space programs. Air Force—The Space Fence program is staffed by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s Program Executive Office for Battle Management. The Center primarily supports non-space programs, such as fighters, bombers, tankers, and presidential aircraft. Navy—The Mobile User Objective System is managed by the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, which primarily manages non-space programs that provide enterprise information system and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities. Army—The Joint Tactical Ground Station program is managed by the Army’s Program Executive Office for Missiles and Space. The office primarily manages a variety of missile programs—such as close combat, cruise, and integrated air and missile defense programs—that are non-space programs. Similarly, the Secure, Mobile, Anti-Jam, Reliable, Tactical-Terminal and the Transportable Tactical Command Communications programs are managed by the Army’s Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications-Tactical. This office primarily manages a variety of information systems to provide tactical communication for the service, which may or may not be space programs. Officials told us that the three Army programs we reviewed were also supported by other, separate Army organizations, such as the Army Contracting Command for contracting support; the Army’s Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center for engineering support; and the Army Materiel Command for logistics support. These organizations provide support to space and non-space programs on an as-needed basis. The Administration, Congress, and DOD are discussing a variety of approaches for strengthening the government’s space operations, including the establishment of one or more new organizations. In June 2018 the President directed DOD to begin the process of establishing a new military branch focused on space that is separate from and equal to the other military departments, Army, Navy, and Air Force. In an August 2018 report to the Congress on the organizational and management structure needed for the national space components, DOD described the immediate steps that it plans to take to implement the President’s direction while waiting for Congressional authorization to create the new military branch. These steps include establishing a new United States Space Command to further its space warfighting capabilities, as well as developing plans to establish a consolidated Space Development Agency to rapidly develop and field next generation space capabilities. DOD has described the general areas of focus planned for these new organizations; however, many specifics are still to be determined. DOD has announced that a committee of senior DOD leaders is expected to identify which of the current space activities will be consolidated into these new space organizations. In addition, the President’s February 2019 Space Policy Directive now requires DOD to submit a legislative proposal to establish a United States Space Force as a new armed service within the Air Force. DOD announced it delivered a legislative proposal to Congress on March 1, 2019. The lack of comprehensive information about DOD’s space programs and the acquisition personnel supporting those programs affects DOD’s ability to assess gaps in the overall capabilities of its space acquisition workforce and determine whether it has sufficient internal capability and critical knowledge or skills for its space acquisitions. Moreover, it hampers DOD’s ability to make decisions related to establishing the United States Space Command, a new Space Development Agency, or potentially the United States Space Force. This includes determining the appropriate number and mix of acquisition personnel that are needed for the new organizations, as well as which military and civilian personnel should be assigned to them. According to federal internal control standards, an agency, such as DOD, should have relevant, reliable, and timely information in order to run and control operations, including managing the workforce. Air Force Director of Acquisition Career Management officials stated that having a process for identifying space acquisitions personnel would be beneficial. As we reported in July 2003, the success of merging personnel during organizational transformations is more likely when the best individuals are selected to meet the skills and competencies needed for the new organization’s goals. In the absence of readily available comprehensive data from DOD, we collected and aggregated data from multiple DOD space organizations and found that at least 8,000 personnel were in the space acquisition workforce at the end of 2017. However, our data set is not complete. For example, the National Reconnaissance Office, which DOD officials told us has a significant number of personnel working on space acquisitions, is not included in our analysis. In addition, our count only includes personnel that spent 50 percent or more of their time working on space acquisitions; therefore any personnel who spent less than 50 percent of their time on space acquisitions was not included. Furthermore, it is important to note that our data provide a snapshot of the workforce as of December 31, 2017. According to DOD officials, the size and mix of the workforce can change based on the number of programs and where programs are in the acquisition process. The military and civilian personnel data we collected are expressed as number of people. The contractor and FFRDC personnel data are expressed as full-time equivalents and staff-years of technical effort equivalents, respectively. Size of Workforce: Based on data we collected from multiple DOD space acquisition organizations, at least 8,000 military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC personnel supported DOD’s space acquisitions as of December 31, 2017 (see figure 2). Military and civilian personnel comprised about 64 percent of the total space acquisition workforce, the vast majority of which support Air Force acquisitions. The remaining 36 percent of the workforce is contractor and FFRDC personnel that support DOD’s space acquisition activities. The Air Force has the largest number of military and civilian personnel because the Air Force has primarily been responsible for DOD’s space acquisitions and develops programs for all four segments of space capability, including launch services for the most critical national security space satellites. The Navy is responsible for systems that provide satellite communications across DOD as well as its user segments, while the Army and other DOD components primarily focus their efforts on developing their user segment systems or other space-related projects. Workforce Mix: Based on data we collected from multiple DOD space acquisition organizations, the mix of military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC personnel that each military service and agency had supporting their respective space acquisition programs varied considerably (see figure 3). Military and civilian personnel comprised between 54 and 63 percent of the Air Force’s, Army’s, and Navy’s space acquisition workforce and 94 percent of the other DOD components’ workforces. Contractors and FFRDC personnel made up the remainder of the workforce. The Air Force relies more heavily on FFRDC personnel as a percentage of its workforce than the Army, Navy, and other DOD components. According to Air Force officials, the Space and Missile Systems Center—the Air Force’s major space acquisition organization—has relied heavily on FFRDC support for space engineering and technical expertise since its founding in the 1950s. The Army and Navy primarily rely on contractors for their remaining support. These contractors mainly provide technical expertise, such as engineering services, to support military and civilian personnel. Some contractors also support program management and business and administration activities, such as cost estimating. Figure 4 provides detailed examples of how personnel support two space acquisition programs included in our review. Locations of Workforce: Based on data we collected from multiple DOD space acquisition organizations, space acquisition personnel work at over 20 organizations located across the United States. Figure 5 shows the primary locations of DOD’s space acquisition organizations. About 45 percent of the overall space acquisition workforce is located at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center in Los Angeles, California. The Army space acquisition workforce is located primarily at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The Navy space acquisition workforce is located at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in San Diego, California, and a few other locations. DOD faces several challenges related to hiring, assigning, and retaining qualified personnel to work on space acquisition programs, similar to the challenges it faces more generally with the acquisition workforce. However, some of the challenges are magnified because almost half of the military and civilian space acquisition workforce is concentrated in Los Angeles, California, which has a higher cost of living than many other areas in the United States, and where competition with private industry for personnel with space acquisition experience is high. DOD is taking steps to address these challenges where possible. DOD officials told us that one of the primary workforce challenges DOD faces is its ability to hire qualified people to work on space acquisitions. They said that DOD is competing with private industry and other federal agencies for top talent in several acquisition career fields. Attracting Candidates with Technical Expertise. DOD officials stated that it is particularly difficult to attract people with certain technical expertise, such as cybersecurity and systems engineering, because they are in high demand in both government and private industry. Air Force officials said the government cannot match the salaries offered by industry. For example, the Launch and Test Range System program office told us that a shortage of trained and qualified cybersecurity personnel exists both within the government and industry. Our prior work has described how maintaining cybersecurity personnel is a challenge government-wide, and that, according to DOD officials, even when DOD cybersecurity positions are filled, it may not necessarily be with the right expertise since it is a specialized area. Hiring in Areas with Higher Costs of Living. Air Force officials at the Space and Missile Systems Center said that hiring challenges are further exacerbated for space acquisition organizations that are located in areas with higher costs of living. They said, for example, that prospective employees often visit the center in Los Angeles, California, and, after assessing the local cost of living, decide not to accept a job offer. DOD is taking steps to address its hiring challenges. To address difficulties in obtaining personnel with sufficient technical experience, some officials told us that they typically hire the best candidate available—who may lack some of the desired technical skills— and provide them with on-the-job and formal training to increase their technical knowledge and skills. To better compete with higher salaries offered by other potential employers, several officials told us they offer tuition reimbursement as a recruiting incentive. Air Force officials told us that in areas with higher costs of living they focus their recruiting efforts on the local area because local candidates already understand the higher costs of living challenges for the area and are more likely to have support systems in place to manage such costs. Beyond the concerns expressed about hiring personnel, Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center officials expressed concerns that some functional areas within the space acquisition workforce face challenges assigning experienced personnel—personnel with the appropriate knowledge and skill set to perform the work—that are already hired to space acquisition programs. For example, contracting career field officials at the center noted that the space acquisition workforce does not have enough mid-level personnel who understand the detailed steps and documentation required in the acquisition process. In particular, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center reported that at the end of January 2018, the number of mid-level civilian and military personnel working in the contracting functional career field was 50 less than the number authorized. According to contracting career field officials at the center, a large number of mid-level procurement contracting officer positions were vacant, and senior procurement managers were picking up the corresponding workloads rather than performing their staff development and strategic planning tasks. Furthermore, officials from the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center program management functional office also expressed concern that the bulk of the military personnel assigned to the program management positions were more junior in rank than the Center was authorized by the Air Force to obtain. Figure 6 shows the level of the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center personnel that filled its program management positions as of January 2018. Junior officers typically have less experience managing acquisition programs than more senior officers. The military services are taking steps to manage the effects of military and civilian personnel skills and experience gaps, to some degree, by having contractor personnel perform the work. For example, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center’s contracting functional office used four contractor personnel to support its pricing work. DOD has also experienced challenges with retaining some space acquisition personnel, especially those within their first few years of joining federal government service that had obtained certain acquisition- related experience or authorities. For example, contracting career field officials at the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center said that they have difficulty retaining contracting officers once they receive their contract warrant authority because they can obtain a higher compensation package from private industry companies. Receiving contract warrant authority is considered an indication that the individual gained sufficient skills and experience to be able to perform the work involved in writing, awarding, and managing contracts. Officials also stated that some personnel leave after obtaining security clearances required to perform their work because private companies working on government contracts pay more to qualified individuals with clearances. Officials from the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center and Army Space and Missile Defense Command also told us that they have difficulty retaining engineers. They said some engineers have left because they were not satisfied with being used as generalists to oversee the work of FFRDC or contractor personnel, rather than being used to perform hands-on engineering work. Officials also stated that this situation is not unique to space acquisitions—government engineers seldom get to design, develop, or build systems as the hands-on engineering work is primarily performed by prime contractors. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center officials said they are trying to help the government engineers understand how to influence decisions and be more effective in working as part of the space engineering acquisition team, which would include military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC personnel. Officials from various functional career fields at these Air Force and Army locations noted that limited promotion opportunities for civilian personnel in space acquisitions also cause retention challenges. For example, the Air Force Space and Missile System Center has 53 management (General Schedule 15) positions; however, Center officials told us that the turnover rate for these higher-level positions is low. Officials reported that some mid-level program management personnel seek and accept promotions at other non-space acquisition offices or in other geographical locations that have more promotion opportunities. Some Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center and Army officials noted that retention incentives are used to help retain staff. This includes student loan repayments, and recognition incentives, such as monetary or time-off awards tied to performance. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center officials also said that they are working to realign current civilian acquisition personnel at the center under the Civilian Acquisition Workforce Demonstration project, which they believe will help attract, retain, and motivate high-quality civilian personnel for the acquisition workforce. DOD space systems and the personnel who work to acquire them remain critical components of national security and key resources. As DOD takes steps toward establishing the United States Space Command, its Space Development Agency, and potentially the United States Space Force, it will be essential to understand the size, mix, and location of the space acquisition workforce. However, DOD does not collect and maintain this type of comprehensive data on its space acquisition workforce. Although we were able to pull together information on the space acquisition workforce, the data represent a snapshot of the workforce at one point in time, and are not complete since acquisition personnel working on National Reconnaissance Office space programs and those who spent less than 50 percent of their time working on space acquisitions were not included. Taking steps to identify and routinely track accurate information on space acquisition programs and the organizations and personnel that support those programs would provide several benefits to DOD. In particular, it would better position DOD to assess whether it has the appropriate number and mix of military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC personnel working on space acquisitions and to make adjustments if necessary. Further, it would better position DOD to make decisions on which acquisition personnel will support or transition into the United States Space Command or the new Space Development Agency, since DOD has not clearly defined what acquisition functions may or may not be handled by these new organizations. Finally, comprehensive data on the space acquisition workforce would also be beneficial to support DOD’s development of its legislative proposal regarding the establishment of the United States Space Force. We are making the following two recommendations to DOD: The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services and other DOD components to identify the universe of space acquisition programs, as well as the various organizations that support these programs, and report this information to Congress. In doing so, DOD should implement procedures to maintain and periodically update the list. (Recommendation 1) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in conjunction with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Research and Development and for Personnel and Readiness, should collect and maintain data on acquisition-coded military and civilian personnel that support space acquisition programs and related activities—including those that may do so less than full time—as well as track the contractor and FFRDC workforce general levels of effort supporting space acquisition programs and related activities and the total resources annually committed to perform that work. (Recommendation 2) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD provided written comments (reproduced in appendix II) on our draft report. In those comments, DOD concurred with our first recommendation to identify the universe of space acquisition programs, as well as the various organizations that support these programs, and report this information to Congress. DOD did not concur with our draft second recommendation to collect and maintain data on the space acquisition workforce. DOD stated that the manner in which personnel data are captured in its human resource and development systems makes it difficult to identify, collect, and maintain data on the military and civilian personnel working on space acquisition programs. Further, DOD raised concerns over contractual limitations on collecting and maintaining data on contractor and FFRDC personnel supporting space acquisitions. In light of these concerns, we made changes to the draft recommendation. We believe the language of our final recommendation will better facilitate implementation by DOD. With regard to our second recommendation, we continue to believe that taking steps to identify military and civilian personnel supporting space acquisition programs would support DOD’s strategic workforce planning, particularly considering DOD’s recent legislative proposal for establishing the United States Space Force. For example, we acknowledge that the current personnel data system used to track military and civilian acquisition personnel has limitations, but we believe taking steps to make minor modifications to the system to facilitate identifying and routinely tracking accurate information on these two segments of the space acquisition workforce would provide several benefits to DOD. Most importantly, it would help DOD make decisions on how many and which military and civilian acquisition personnel should be assigned to the new space organizations—namely the Space Development Agency, the United States Space Command, and the United States Space Force. With regard to DOD’s comment that our recommendations do not recognize that DOD personnel have been shifted into and out of space acquisition programs, we recognize that acquisition personnel have been moved across programs and support space and non-space acquisitions. However, we continue to believe that DOD should have better information on military and civilian acquisition personnel. In particular, knowing which personnel have space acquisition backgrounds could enhance the productivity and effectiveness of DOD’s space acquisition efforts. As a result, we did not make a change to our second recommendation as it relates to military and civilian space acquisition personnel. However, in consideration of the concerns raised by DOD about tracking data on contractor and FFRDC personnel who are supporting space acquisition activities, we modified our second recommendation. It was not our intention to have DOD undertake significant modifications to the relevant contracts to obtain data on these segments of the space acquisition workforce. However, understanding the extent to which space acquisition programs rely on contractor and FFRDC personnel for support could be useful in helping DOD determine the right number and mix of military and civilian personnel needed in the new space organizations. As a result, we modified the language of our second recommendation to focus on tracking the contractor and FFRDC workforce general levels of effort supporting space acquisition activities and the resources spent to obtain this assistance, rather than—as we stated in our draft recommendation—tracking the individuals who perform such work. However, we continue to believe that collecting and maintaining more robust data on that workforce will support DOD’s planning efforts and better inform Congress. DOD also expressed concern that our report may be equating statements of officials at the staff- and operational-level to military service- and DOD- level officials. We reviewed statements attributed to DOD officials throughout our report. Where necessary, we clarified attributions to better reflect the appropriate level of the officials with whom we discussed the corresponding information during our review. DOD also provided technical comments on our draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or ludwigsonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. A House Report related to the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2017 contained a provision for GAO to review the current state of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space systems acquisition workforce. This report examines (1) what DOD knows about the size, mix, and location of its space acquisition workforce, and (2) the challenges, if any, DOD faces in hiring, staffing, and retaining space acquisition workforce personnel. For the purpose of this report, we defined the space acquisition workforce broadly to include military, civilian, contractor, and Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) personnel working on space acquisition programs and related efforts. To determine what DOD knows about the size, mix, and location of the space acquisition workforce, we met with officials from DOD’s Office of Human Capital Initiatives, the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and 4th Estate’s Director of Acquisition Career Management to obtain information that is collected on the space acquisition workforce. We were told by each of these officials that DOD does not have a group of personnel officially designated as the space acquisition workforce. They stated that DOD has separate mechanisms for collecting military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC workforce data and that none of these systems contained the level of granularity we would need to identify all personnel working on space acquisitions. Specifically, the sources we discussed were DOD’s Data Mart system, a central repository for military and civilian acquisition workforce data, as well as workforce data systems maintained by DOD components that feed into the Data Mart system; the Enterprise-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application system for contractor services data; and FFRDC data maintained by military components. We collected data on the size, mix, and location of the space acquisition workforce from the space organizations performing space acquisition activities. The Directors of Acquisition Career Management for the military services and the 4th Estate defense agencies provided a list of organizations that could be working on space acquisitions based on DOD’s 2017 space system definition, which states that a space system includes all areas related to making a space capability operational—that is programs acquiring satellites, satellite ground systems (including satellite control and data processing), receivers/user segments (including terminals and radios), and launch systems. It also specifies that terminals are included unless they are embedded as part of a platform (i.e., aircraft, ship, or tank). We contacted each of the identified space organizations to verify that they had personnel working on space acquisitions based on this definition. Three of the organizations we originally contacted stated their organizations did not work on any space acquisition programs based on the definition. We did not include these organizations in our data gathering efforts. We also identified other organizations that worked on space acquisitions through discussions with acquisition management officials from the Army and included these organizations in our data gathering efforts. We asked each space organization to identify the number of military and civilian personnel working on space acquisition activities for 50 percent or more of their work time as of December 31, 2017. We used the threshold of 50 percent or more of the time to be consistent with the DOD definition of the acquisition workforce, which requires personnel to work 50 percent or more of their work time on acquisition activities to be counted as part of that workforce. DOD officials could not identify the number of contractor and FFRDC personnel working on space acquisitions. Therefore, for contractor and FFRDC personnel, we asked for the number of full-time equivalencies and staff-years of technical effort equivalencies, respectively, provided as support to space acquisitions. We requested that the personnel data be categorized by acquisition career field. We collected data from each DOD component as follows: The Air Force Director of Acquisition Career Management provided military and civilian workforce data from the Air Force’s Acquisition Career Management System that feeds into Data Mart for all Air Force organizations where the entire organization works on space acquisitions. These organizations were the Air Force Space Command and the Networks Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Sight Terminals Division within the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence and Networks. The Deputy Director identified other space programs that are managed by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, but could not identify which military and civilian personnel were supporting those programs because the workforce data system is not configured to identify personnel by product types. In addition, the Deputy Director could not provide data on the number of contractor or FFRDC personnel working on any space acquisition program. We contacted these organizations directly to collect additional military, civilian, contractor and FFRDC workforce data: Air Force Space Command; Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center; Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications, Program Executive Office Battle Management; and Air Force Research Laboratory. These organizations provided personnel data from their respective manpower sources, such as personnel data systems or manning documents. To assess the reliability of the data, we discussed the data and sources used to compile the data with Air Force officials; reviewed the data for logical inconsistencies; compared the data received from the Air Force workforce data system to data from Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center briefing documents; and compared relevant data received from individual space organizations with data from the Air Force Research Laboratory Space Vehicle Directorate. We collected military, civilian, contractor and FFRDC workforce data directly from the following Army organizations performing space acquisition activities: Army Space and Missile Defense Command; Program Executive Office Missiles and Space; Program Executive Office Command, Control and Program Executive Office Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors; Communications-Electronics Research, Development and U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and Army Contracting Command. These organizations provided personnel data from their respective manpower sources, such as personnel data systems or manning documents. To assess data reliability, we discussed the data and sources used to compile the data with Army officials, and reviewed the data for logical inconsistencies. We collected military, civilian, contractor and FFRDC workforce data directly from the following Navy organizations: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command; Program Executive Office Space Systems; Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific; and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic. These organizations provided personnel data from their respective manpower sources, such as personnel data systems or manning documents. The Naval Research Laboratory and the Navy’s Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence were originally identified as performing space acquisition activities; however, officials stated they did not have any personnel working on space acquisition activities for at least 50 percent of their time. To assess data reliability, we discussed the data and sources used to compile the data with Navy officials, and reviewed the data for logical inconsistencies. We collected military, civilian, contractor, and FFRDC workforce data directly from: Defense Contract Management Agency; and Missile Defense Agency. To assess data reliability, we obtained information on the data and sources used to compile the data with the agencies’ officials and reviewed the data for logical inconsistencies. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was originally identified as performing space acquisition activities; however, officials stated they did not have any personnel working on space acquisition activities for at least 50 percent of their time. We determined the workforce data were sufficiently reliable to provide estimates of the general size and mix of the space acquisition workforce. To assess any challenges DOD faces in hiring, staffing, and retaining its space acquisition workforce, we interviewed officials from multiple levels within DOD and the Air Force, Army and Navy. In addition to discussing the challenges with the majority of the military service space organizations listed above, we also met with the following DOD organizations: Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; and Defense Acquisition University. To gather additional insight into the challenges faced at the program office level, we also interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of 10 space acquisition programs from the Air Force, Army, and Navy. The selected programs included different types of space acquisitions— such as satellites and launch systems—with a range of dollar values and phases of acquisition. During our review, the Air Force and Army had other space acquisition programs in addition to the ones we selected, whereas the Navy had one space acquisition program according to service officials. The selected programs from each military service included: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (space segment) Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (launch segment) Launch and Test Range System (launch segment) Protected Tactical Enterprise Service (ground segment) Space Fence (ground segment) United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (ground segment) Joint Tactical Ground Station (ground system) Secure, Mobile, Anti-Jam, Reliable, Tactical–Terminal (user segment) Transportable Tactical Command Communications (user segment) Mobile User Objective System (space segment) We also reviewed prior DOD and other space acquisition studies, including reports from the Defense Science Board, Institute for Defense Analyses, Office of Management and Budget, and the RAND Corporation. We conducted this performance audit from November 2017 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Jon Ludwigson (202) 512-4841 or ludwigsonj@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Cheryl K. Andrew (Assistant Director), Peter W. Anderson, R. Eli DeVan, Lorraine R. Ettaro, Lisa L. Fisher, Miranda Riemer, Anne Louise Taylor, and Lauren M. Wright made key contributions to this report.
DOD plans to spend about $65 billion from fiscal year 2019 to 2023 on space acquisition programs—including satellites, launch vehicles, ground components, and user equipment. DOD's space acquisition personnel perform a variety of activities, such as preparing and reviewing acquisition documents, to manage or oversee programs that develop or procure space capabilities. DOD recently announced it plans to establish a new Space Development Agency and a United States Space Command. A House Report accompanying a bill for the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act contained a provision for GAO to review DOD's space acquisition workforce. This report examines, among other things, what is known about the size, mix, and location of that workforce. GAO collected data from DOD's acquisition workforce data systems and multiple space acquisition organizations. GAO interviewed officials from these organizations and from a non-generalizable sample of 10 space acquisition programs, representing a range of dollar values and stages in the acquisition process. The Department of Defense (DOD) does not routinely monitor the size, mix, and location of its space acquisition workforce. However, data GAO collected and aggregated from multiple DOD space acquisition organizations show that at least 8,000 personnel in multiple locations nationwide were working on space acquisition activities at the end of 2017 (see figure). Also as shown, military and civilian personnel comprise the majority of the overall workforce, while contractor and Federally Funded Research and Development Center personnel also provide support. Several factors hinder DOD's ability to collect data needed for a comprehensive view of its space acquisition workforce: DOD does not maintain a complete list of its space acquisition programs; DOD's workforce data systems are not configured to identify personnel working on space acquisition activities; and DOD space acquisition personnel are dispersed across organizations and some personnel support both space and non-space programs. Without complete and accurate data, DOD cannot assess gaps in the overall capabilities of the space acquisition workforce. Identifying space programs and collecting such data would also better position DOD to ensure that the appropriate space acquisition personnel are assigned to the new Space Development Agency and the United States Space Command. Finally, comprehensive data on the space acquisition workforce would also be beneficial to support DOD's efforts related to its recent legislative proposal regarding the establishment of the United States Space Force. GAO recommends that DOD (1) identifies the universe of its space acquisition programs and the organizations that support them and (2) collects and maintains data on the workforce that supports these programs. DOD agreed with the first recommendation, but not the second. GAO revised the second recommendation to address DOD's concerns.