aṇu ākāśa diś ādīnām asaṅkīrṇam yadā sthitam / svarūpam ca tadā etasmāt vailakṣaṇya upalakṣaṇam // miśrībhūta apara ātmānaḥ bhaveyuḥ yadi te punar / na anya bhāve api avibhrāntam vailakṣaṇya upalakṣaṇam // katham teṣu viśeṣeṣu vailakṣaṇya upalakṣaṇam / svatas eva iti ced na evam aṇu ādau api kim matam // 
Among atoms, ākāśa, space and such things (in which the ultimate individualities are held to subsist),—if their forms are distinct from each other,—then the apprehension of distinction among them need not be due to anything else in the shape of this ultimate individuality.—If, on the other hand, they have their forms mixed up with each other, then, even though there may be difference, the apprehension of absolute distinction could not but be wrong.—How too is the distinction among ‘ultimate individualities’ apprehended? If by themselves,—then why is not the same held to be the case with atoms and other things also? 