na pācaka ādi buddhīnām asti kiñcid nibandhanam  / karma asti ced prativyakti nanu tat bhidyate tathā // bhinneṣu anvayinaḥ asatve na yuktā anvayinī matiḥ  / iti ekam iṣṭam sāmānyam sarva vyakti anuvṛttimat  // karma anvaya daridram ca yadi hetuḥ prakalpyate  / tadā vyaktayaḥ eva asyāḥ kim iti iṣṭāḥ na hetavaḥ  // pācaka ādi matiḥ na syāt tatra ca uparata kriye  / na sadā saṃnidhānam hi karma iṣṭam jāti vat paraiḥ  // atīta anāgatam karma nimittīk 
In fact, there is no single basis for the notions of ‘cook’ and the rest.—If it be said that “the act (of cooking) is the basis”,—then, the answer is that the act varies with each individual person; and you have postulated the ‘universal’ as embracing all individuals only, on the ground that unless there is an all-embracing entity, there can be no comprehensive notion of things which are different.—If, even without such all-embracing character, the act be regarded as the basis (of the comprehensive notion) then why should not the individuals themselves be regarded as causes of it?—Further (if the act were the basis, then) the notion of ‘cook’ could not appear in regard to the man after he has desisted from the act (of cooking); surely even the other party do not regard the act as present there at all times,—like the ‘universal’,—if it be held that “the notion and name of the cook, etc. is based on past and future action”,—then such an act cannot be the cause at all, for the simple reason that it is not present at the time 