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Remembering Mahasweta Devi, Indian Writer and Tribal Rights Activist · Global Voices
Sakshi Rai

Screenshot from an interview of Mahasweta Devi with Rajiv Mehrotra
Renowned Indian Bengali writer and social activist Mahasweta Devi passed away aged 90-years-old on Thursday, July 28, 2016 in Kolkata. She was the wife of one of Bengal’s most prolific playwrights and literary figures, Bijon Bhattacharya.
Born in the tumultuous years of the British reign in India, Mahasweta Devi grew up in a family of artists, poets and social activists leading Bengal's literary movement (Kallol) at the time.
Surrounded and influenced by communist ideas all her life, she began her working life as a journalist in post-independence India and later went on to become an advocate for civil rights of indigenous tribes.
She published her first novel Jhansir Rani in the year 1956. She was best recognised for her work in improving the lives of the Kheria Sabar community.
The woman who walked with the broken and refused to sit with the ‘great'! Writer Mahasweta Devi passes away in Kolkata. What a life !!!!
— Mahesh Bhatt (@MaheshNBhatt) July 28, 2016
She was one of the founders of Denotified and Notified Tribal Rights Action Group, whose work among tribal communities spread from Bengal, Gujarat to Maharastra.
Ganesh N. Devy, in a seminar in 2004 on ‘Celebrating Women: a symposium on women who made a difference’, spoke of his shared experiences with Mahasweta Devi:
I had by now observed that she spared no one, in particular snobs, ministers, insincere journalists and literary aspirants. […] She spoke of the civilizational graces of the adivasis, of how our society had mindlessly destroyed the culture of our great continent, and how the innocents had been brutalised. She described the context in which the infamous Criminal Tribes Act, 1871 was introduced, the process of denotification in 1952 and the plight of the nomadic communities in India ever since.
Draupadi, an important female character in the Hindu epic, Mahabharata, was the subject of a bet in a game by her husband Yudhisthir, who eventually lost her in a round of the game after losing everything else.
She was then forcibly dragged into court by his rivals who intend to strip her naked.
However, when Draupadi silently pleads to Krishna (a major Hindu deity), he aids her with an endless supply of sari cloth which the enemy is unable to strip away from her, and this act ultimately saves Draupadi from her public humiliation.
Mahasweta Devi's Draupadi – still chillingly relevant, when you remember the adivasi women raped and killed by… https://t.co/P21v1uwLXL
— Kavita Krishnan (@kavita_krishnan) July 31, 2016
Re-imagining this story, Mahasweta Devi changed the leading character of Draupadi to Dopdi Mejhen, a tribal woman.
In her story the men succeeded in stripping the heroine naked.
Devi's audacity in depicting the plight of a tribal woman not only highlighted the different treatment of women across the social caste system but also the treatment women receive in the world as a whole.
Although Dopdi is stripped naked, she still stands as a symbol of strength.
Draupadi who tears up the rags they throw at her and flings them away, flaunting her nakedness in Senanayak’s face:
Draupadi comes closer. Stands with her hand on her hip, laughs and says, The object of your search, Dopdi Mejhen. You asked them to make me up, don’t you want to see how they made me?
Thus, according to Gayatri C. Spivak's English translation of the story, Dopdi escapes humiliation by refusing to put her clothes back on after being stripped of them, turning the shame back on Senanayak.
Mahasweta Devi's career spanned more than two decades and produced a timeless collection of literature driven by compassion for her compatriots.
Her status as an inspiration for coming generations of Indian writers is indisputable.
Journalists and writers took to twitter to share their grievances, along with a number of prominent literary organisations.
“Draupadi”, “Hazaar churasir ma”–must read from the mighty #MahaswetaDevi . RIP https://t.co/tSmhObIzZd
— Sagarika Ghose (@sagarikaghose) July 28, 2016
Withher passes an era of public intellectuals who stood for marginalised n oppressed n gave them a voice. A living legend RIP #MahaSwetaDevi
— Medha Patkar (@medhanarmada) July 28, 2016
Writers will come and writers will go but there will never be another Mahasweta Devi . Great writer, great activist , great human being .
— Javed Akhtar (@Javedakhtarjadu) July 28, 2016
RIP Mahasweta Devi. A terrible loss for literature. A great writer and extraordinary activist; a woman with a warm, generous heart.
— Amitav Ghosh (@GhoshAmitav) July 28, 2016

author: Sakshi Rai


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The Week That Was at Global Voices: Pokémon Go Gets Political · Global Voices
L. Finch

This week we speak with Global Voices editors Oiwan Lam, Mahsa Alimardani and Nevin Thompson about how politics and censorship are affecting Pokémon Go in Iran, Japan and China. We also take a look at two stories related to free expression in Timor-Leste and Mexico.
This episode features stories by Dalia Kiakilir, Giovanna Salazar, Nevin Thompson, Mahsa Alimardani and Oiwan Lam. Many thanks to all our authors, translators and editors who helped make this possible.
In this episode of The Week That Was at Global Voices, we featured Creative Commons licensed music from the Free Music Archive, including Please Listen Carefully by Jahzzar (CC BY-SA 4.0); Parade Shoes by Blue Dot Sessions (CC BY-NC 4.0); Mobile by Blue Dot Sessions (CC BY-NC 4.0); Falcon Hood by Podington Bear (CC BY-NC 3.0); and Another Brick in the Wall (live) by Montana Skies (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 US).
Image used in the SoundCloud thumbnail is a screenshot from a YouTube video by SeaMTee Gaming.
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source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: L. Finch


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‘This Is a 99.99 Percent Democracy’ and Other Orwellian Newspeak by Thailand’s Junta · Global Voices
Prachatai

This edited article by Kornkritch Somjittranukit is from Prachatai, an independent news site in Thailand, and is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement. The Thai army grabbed power in 2014 and continues to control the government despite its pledge of restoring civilian rule once political and electoral reforms have been implemented. A constitutional referendum is scheduled on August 7 but critics believe the draft constitution will only reinforce military rule in the country.
Thailand’s junta has long puts its faith in the power of language, using carefully-chosen words and phrases to describe and promote its activities. Here are a few examples of how the junta has reframed and redefined political terminology of Thailand over the past two years.
The term “attitude adjustment” was the very first example of newspeak by the junta. After the coup was staged, the junta repeatedly summoned people to military camps, mostly politicians, media personnel and activists seen as a threat to it. The military has the power to detain them for up to seven days. Neither media nor lawyers are allowed into the camps. It is basically arbitrary detention without charge or court oversight. The detainees are lectured by military personnel about the necessity of having the junta in power.
In some cases, the junta authorities, mostly soldiers, have approached individuals, including journalists, academics and politicians, who have criticized the junta regime. This is an alternative form of intimidation since an official summons for attitude adjustment usually triggers public outrage.
Generally, such visits take place in a public cafe or restaurant and the military will treat its guests to coffee or tea. Therefore, the junta always says that what they do is not intimidation, but rather just a chilling ‘coffee talk’.
Pravit Rojanaphruk, a senior reporter who was invited to a so-called coffee talk with the military, shared his experience:
Although they (the junta personnel) treated me well and politely, it is anyway ‘polite’ intimidation. It makes me feel that the freedom of expression and criticism against the government which we used to have under elected governments has gone.
On 29 March 2016, the junta issued NCPO Order No. 13/2016 which grants the military police-like powers to crack down on local mafia and ‘influential figures’ across the countries. The order immediately raised international concerns since it is equal to extra-juridical power.
When it came into practice, the public increasingly condemned the order since the so-called ‘influential figures’ who were prosecuted under the order are mostly junta opponents including community rights advocates, human rights defenders, and social activists.
Any attempt at criticism of the junta, the draft constitution, or the referendum is prohibited. The junta’s silencing method is pretty interesting. It rarely bans or shuts down the media directly, but rather issues a variety of laws making the media too paranoid to do their work freely. For instance, whenever reports on the anti-draft charter campaign are published, the ‘Vote No’ message on a campaigner’s t-shirt is usually deleted out of concern that the message could breach the controversial Referendum Act.
The closer to the August referendum, the more intense intimidation gets. In the past month, the junta has set a new standard of intimidation by arresting a journalist, summoning a journalist’s wife, prosecuting an activist’s mother, and pressing charges against children under the legal age. However, all of these violations of human rights practices were justified for the sake of so-called “social reconciliation.”
Political cartoon in today's Bangkok Post about the upcoming referendum in #Thailand pic.twitter.com/0Dwjyp5fqP
— Richard Barrow (@RichardBarrow) July 28, 2016
The junta is obsessed with the laws and orders they have written themselves. They usually issue regulations with severe punishments to prohibit people from sharing opinions against them. This is to make sure the country will move forward peacefully and silently. In only two years, a variety of authoritarian regulations, including NCPO Order No. 3/2015, the Public Assembly Act and the Draft Referendum Act, were issued. The junta has just approved an amendment of the controversial Computer Crimes Act to increase punishment and surveillance measures. The junta even once used the Public Cleanliness Act to press charges against pro-democracy activists when it could not prosecute them under more authoritarian laws.
Is this a human rights violation? No, do not call it that. The junta justifies these authoritarian practices, saying that it does not have to care about the human rights of those who break the law.
“Transition period” is arguably the most common term in the junta’s newspeak. Whenever the junta faces public criticism, it usually repeats this term to remind the public that this is not a normal political climate where people can freely express their ideas. However, the junta never explicitly explains where exactly the ‘transition’ is going to end – in democracy, semi-democracy, a full military regime, or the era of the new throne.
On 23 March 2015, Prayut Chan-o-cha, the junta head, accepted that Thailand under the junta regime is not fully democratic. However, compared with the political situation in neighboring countries, he said, Thai politics was far better and could be called a 99.99 percent democracy. Prayut insisted that
Our country nowadays is 99.99 per cent democratic. I never prohibit anybody from criticizing me, just don’t oppose me. If you were in other countries, you would be probably in jail or executed by shooting.
On 10 November 2015, General Udomdej Sitabutr admitted to the media that there were kickbacks paid in the construction of Rajabhakti Park, a park with seven statues of the prominent past kings of Thailand. As a Chairman of the Rajabhakti Foundation, Udomdej accepted that officials had asked the foundries hired to make the seven statutes to give them kickbacks. However, Udomdej said that all the kickbacks had already been donated to the project, The Nation reported.
However, a self-investigation by the Royal Thai Army concluded that there were no kickbacks in the construction process. There were only huge ‘consultant’s fees.’
From 2005 to 2009, British businessman James McCormick sold the Royal Thai Army hand-held bomb detectors called GT200. He also sold similar devices called Alpha 6 which were claimed to sniff out narcotics. The devices, which were later discovered to do nothing, cost 900,000 baht to 1.2 million baht each. A total of 772 devices were purchased. When the deals were done, Thailand had spent more than 1 billion baht (28 million US Dollars), reported Khaosod English.
In June 2016, after the British court sentenced McCormick to 10 years in jail for selling the bogus devices, the Thai public demanded a serious investigation to find the officials responsible. The Thai media usually refers to the wasted billion baht as a ‘foolish cost’ (kha ngo).
On 22 June 2016, Wissanu Krea-ngam, Deputy Prime Minister, told the media that the government will sue the vendors for compensation. However, he asked the media to avoid using term ‘foolish cost,’ but rather a ‘fairly expensive cost for knowledge.’

author: Prachatai


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Critics See China’s Fingerprints All Over the Turmoil at Hong Kong’s Anti-Corruption Authority · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

ICAC's office. Image from Apple Daily. Non-commercial use.
The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), considered one of the most trustworthy institutes in the eyes of the Hong Kong's people, appears to be coming apart at the seams — and many are blaming China.
On July 7, the head of the ICAC's operations department and the deputy commissioner, Rebecca Li Bo-lan, was removed from her position with no explanation. Commissioner Simon Peh Yun-lu says he was the sole person to decide to fire her, but his claim has been met with skepticism. Commissioners are appointed by China's cabinet with input from Hong Kong's chief executive, and speculation is rampant that Peh received instruction either from Chief Executive CY Leung or Beijing to stop an investigation into Leung.
Leung is in the hot seat for accepting HK $50 million dollars from Australian engineering firm UGL without declaring the money to Hong Kong's cabinet, called the Executive Council, even though the payments took place in 2012 and 2013 — after he was appointed to the Hong Kong government's top spot.
Established in 1974 by the British colonial government to clean up the city's corrupt civil service, the ICAC has a reputation among the public for credibility, which has made the recent drama all the more surprising.
The sudden dismissal of Rebecca Li, who joined the commission in 1984 and was promoted to deputy commissioner in July 2015, shocked the rest of the ICAC's operations team. A few days later, principal investigator Dale Ko resigned.
More dramatically, on July 28 Chief Forensic Accountant Tang Shuk-nei also announced she would be leaving the commission in August. Sources reported she had confronted Peh regarding Li's abrupt removal.
On the same day, Li's successor, Ricky Yau Shu-chun, who had been in the position for just two weeks, suddenly resigned. But he withdrew his resignation three hours later. Sources from the commission said that his resignation came after a meeting with Peh, and his withdrawal of resignation came after a series of “emotional” crisis meetings among member of the operations department.
Meanwhile, political groups demanded that Peh offer an explanation for the turmoil and resign.
A political commentator writing under the name Big Lychee at The Nanfang news site believed that Beijing was directly responsible for the strife:
In the grand scheme of things, the real issue is the contradiction between the ICAC’s independence and the Chinese Communist Party’s need to have total control. Beijing officials can’t sleep at night knowing that a Hong Kong law enforcement agency with British-trained (and indeed some actual British) staff can undermine state power. It’s the principle: if Beijing appoints a high official in Hong Kong, it can’t have some other body come along and prosecute the guy. Who’s in charge here? This is China. This has to be rectified.
Of course, this is the road to unintended consequences. An ICAC subject to Beijing’s ultimate influence will cease to be impartial and lose credibility.
Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China and is supposed to have a high level of autonomy from the mainland under the “one country, two systems” principle. Despite this arrangement, however, Beijing has faced accusations in recent years of tightening its grip on Hong Kong.
Efforts to weed out corruption have been high on Beijing's agenda since 2012, but they're not always sincere. The anti-graft campaign can be a political weapon to wipe out opposition; if the Chinese government were to use the ICAC as such, it would spell trouble for Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement and other camps who don't fall in line with the Chinese Communist Party.
Netizens spelled out their frustrations with the current situation in the comments thread of a YouTube analysis:
A fragmented ICAC, an unwelcome police force, a crippled government, a cocksucker CEO, etc, shall make HK a third world country.
Worst is ICAC. [CY Leung] should be suspended from his job immediately pending investigation. If he were decent (even if he knew he was guilty as hell) he would release statement from his Office to say “I understand our esteem ICAC is investigating some aspects of my past activities. I will cooperate fully with the investigation”. Failing to do that mark him as a small time crock play in the big pond. It is imperative that those resigned top ICAC officials should be begged to return. They are senior officials and normally would not have many more years to serve. The value of their knowledge is immense. The damage due to their absence deprive ICAC of their leadership is incalculable. CY destroyed the ideal that young people would want to join ICAC.
Political commentator Big Lychee also pointed out that the appointment of key public positions resembles the logic of the election loyalty pledge — a newly introduced election rule which requires that candidates for the legislature, called the Legislative Council, sign a declaration that pledges loyalty to China. Thus far, three candidates have been barred from entering the legislative election. One of them, Leung Tin-kei, had participated in the legislative by-election in January 2016.
The ICAC would not be the first organization to be affected by Beijing's demands for loyalty. A similar upheaval was seen at the city's public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong.
In 2011, former Chief Executive Donald Tsang appointed Roy Tang Yun-kwong, an administrative officer with no experience in broadcasting or the media, as director of broadcasting. In the following four years, Tang was criticized for politically interfering with the broadcaster's editorial and personnel affairs. Last year, veteran journalist Leung Ka-wing, the former news chief of pro-Beijing Asia Television, replaced Tang as the director of broadcasting.
Amid the turmoil at the ICAC, more than 100 Radio Television Hong Kong employees rallied outside the broadcaster's building during the staff awards ceremony on July 18 to protest against the delayed promotion of acting assistant director Kirindi Chan Man-kuen. Radio Television Hong Kong employee union spokeswoman Amy Wong explained that Chan, who has worked for the station for nearly 30 years, had failed twice in 14 months to pass the selection board's assessments. She was worried that the delay was due to Chan's “uncooperative attitude on several sensitive political issues” ahead of the Legislative Council and chief executive elections.
In other words, similar to Rebecca Li, Chan has failed the “loyalty test.”
In mainland China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) demands all media pledge their loyalty and follow the party line. Since the party is legally non-existent in Hong Kong, loyalty is reflected in personnel appointments, which happen behind closed doors with no public accountability.
Twitter user @renrenping was worried about what all these developments mean for the future of the city. He wrote sarcastically:
政府姓黨、警隊姓黨、法院姓黨、廉署姓黨、就差立法會那幾個泛民了、香港人加油，爭取九月以後全都姓黨。
The government is surnamed CCP, the police force is surnamed CCP, the court is surnamed CCP, the ICAC is surnamed CCP. What's left is the few pan-democratic legislators. Hong Kong people keep it up and make sure that all the rest are surnamed CCP after the September [Legislative Council election].

author: Oiwan Lam


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Here’s Why Russian Facebook Users Love Donald Trump · Global Voices
Yulia Savitskaya

Image edited by Kevin Rothrock.
Over the weekend, RuNet Echo published comments by more than a dozen public intellectuals, addressing an apparent lack of interest in Russia's supposed role in hacking the Democratic National Committee ahead of the party's national convention last week. In this article, Yulia Savitskaya takes a different approach, focusing on the many Russian Internet users who are in fact interested in the US presidential race and, in particular, Donald Trump's candidacy.
If you have many politically engaged Russian friends on Facebook, you might have already noticed that they care about the US elections a lot. Probably much more than you care about the upcoming parliamentary elections in Russia. For some of them, it is a substitute for Russia’s non-existent high-level political race, while others use it as a way to express themselves and their opinions. Apparently (and, perhaps, unsurprisingly to some) many of these Russian users support Donald Trump, or at least profess sympathy for him.
The first, largest (and probably the least interesting) group of Russian Trump supporters are those who are not really involved in the US presidential campaign. They did not follow the primaries, the debates, and the conventions, but they have probably heard Vladimir Putin calling Trump “a talented and colorful person.” They have also seen and maybe even flipped through the pages of Donald Trump’s infamous books on being a millionaire and closing successful business deals. Finally, they have seen Trump hanging out with Miss Universe contestants—what’s not to like about this guy? Trump’s quotes on money, success, business, and women are published and republished by hundreds of motivational self-help communities on Vkontakte, Russia’s biggest social network. (Needless to say, half of these quotes are fake.)
The second group is more complicated and very diverse. These users do not necessarily like Trump that much, but they hate Hillary Clinton fiercely, so they wish Trump would win just to spite the Democrats. One example is Ivan Yakovina, a Russian-Ukrainian journalist who used to support Bernie Sanders at the earlier stage of the US presidential race. After Bernie endorsed Hillary, Yakovina accused him of betrayal—something that some of Sanders’ American supporters have done, as well. By July 26, the journalist was referring to Trump in Facebook posts as “a populist,” while Clinton, in his opinion, is “a dull, lying, utterly corrupted fool.” The Republican presidential candidate’s sense of humor appeals to Ivan: on July 27, Yakovina admitted that Trump is “a good troll.” Yakovina might not evolve to become a true Trump supporter, but he said he would be glad to watch the Democrats lose after the “unfair expulsion” of Bernie Sanders from the race.
Dmitry Olshansky. Photo: Facebook
Dmitry Olshansky, a columnist at the pro-Kremlin tabloid “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” has nothing in common with Ivan Yakovina, but they still belong to the same group in their views on Trump. Olshansky has recently described Hillary Clinton as “pure evil,” and compared Donald Trump, “by contrast,” to the “fresh breeze from an open window in a room that had not been aired since Nixon’s 1970s.” Trump seems happy to encourage self-proclaimed Russian patriots like Olshansky, judging by his most recent comment on Crimea.
The third group appears to be following the US race intently. Mostly media professionals, these Russian Facebook users are particularly interested in US media coverage of the elections, and they are not happy with what they see: there are some recent examples of Russian journalists harshly criticizing their American colleagues. Alexey Kovalev is a former InoSMI chief editor, whose most recent personal project “Lapshesnimalochnaya” (Noodle Remover) is devoted to revealing Russian state propaganda's lies and debunking media fakes. Kovalev does not like the “anti-Trump campaign” some US media seem to be waging, either.
Alexey Kovalev. Photo: Facebook
He recently accused Slate of “xenophobia and orientalism” after it published a piece about Melania Trump plagiarizing Michelle Obama’s speech. In that piece, Slate’s Rebecca Schuman assumed that Melania Trump did plagiarize the speech because she’s a first generation immigrant unaware of the “American way of succeeding.” On the same day, a more academic piece on the same matter, alluding to the Eastern European culture of academic cheating as the root of Melania's plagiarism, appeared in the Washington Post, and provoked sharp criticism from Eastern European scholars. After making himself familiar with dozens of such reports, Kovalev wrote that he wished Americans would elect Trump in order to drive insane the “douchebags who see their readers as idiots.”
Aleksandr Gorbachev, a former Afisha chief editor who now works for Meduza, was annoyed by a New York Times piece titled “Why Men Want to Marry Melanias and Raise Ivankas.” “Every time I read something like this, I hope Trump wins,” the journalist concluded in a Facebook post. Alexey Kovalev later added that America “deserves Trump” because the US Democratic media is so “unconvincing.”
As the rumors about Trump being backed by Putin spread, more Russian Facebook users joined the discussion. Ilya Yablokov, a historian and conspirology expert, wrote: “Some of the ideas that pop up in the op-eds linking Putin and Trump remind me of the allusions used by the McCarthyists in the 1940-50s. The irony, however, is that today it's the left-wing intellectuals who spread them.”
It's not hard to guess what will come over the next several months: Trump will continue “trolling” the media, and the politically engaged Russian Internet audience will inevitably keep watching him, taking short breaks to discuss the doping scandal, the nonfunctioning storm-water drain systems in Moscow, and other domestic stories and controversies. For some, the US election is an important event that's worth their attention. For other Russians, it's a welcome diversion from the unsettling news closer to home.

author: Yulia Savitskaya


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Kyrgyzstan and the President Who Didn’t Want to Be a Dragon · Global Voices
Akhal-Tech Collective

Puff the Magic Dragon as illustrated in a video on uploaded onto YouTube by ThatIsSoDeck.
Bygone dragons have a lot to answer for in Kyrgyzstan, a Central Asian country whose dramatic mountainous setting and outspoken politicians sometimes combine to lend it the air of a faintly-recalled fairy tale kingdom.
But how has the real-life republic — the ex-Soviet region's only approximation of a democracy — fared since they spread their scaly wings?
President Almazbek Atambayev, for one, is fond in stating his pride in not being a fire-breathing mythical creature.
Speaking at an August 1 press conference in the city of Cholpon-Ata, he said:
In order that a dragon with 120 heads not appear in the future, the constitution needs to be changed…If there will be a president different from me, then he can very easily change the constitution and become a dragon.
To avoid confusion, this is what a human president of Kyrgyzstan looks like:
Almazbek Atambayev, President of Kyrgyzstan (2011-present). Likely to leave office without a bloody revolution to force his hand. Russian government image, free to re-distribute.
And these Kyrgyz presidents were the “dragons” Atambayev regularly refers to:
Askar Akayev, President of Kyrgyzstan 1990-2005. Unseated in a largely non-violent revolution. Taken from Yiv.narod.ru. License to reuse.
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005-10). Unseated in a violent revolution that left over a hundred people dead. Wikipedia image.
Atambayev's remarks came almost five years after his inauguration in 2011, when conservative lawmaker Tursunbai Bakir uulu — also famous for strange-speak — called him out on one of his earliest known references to dragons:
You were talking a lot about knights who defeated dragons, but later they all became dragons. The knights couldn’t resist the gold in the dragons’ dungeons. I sincerely don’t want you to become a new dragon in the history of Kyrgyzstan.
If it is to be assumed Atambayev has passed that test and did not become the dragon that some people feared, should Kyrgyzstanis be grateful?
On the one hand, yes. Atambayev has repeatedly stated that he will leave office at the end of his single six-year term that ends in 2017, and whereas the offspring of his predecessors attempted to seize large chunks of the economy, his youngest daughter paints attractive pictures.
Atambayev himself is partial to an acoustic sing-song, and will be putting an album out in September.
On the other hand, besides colourful press conferences full of dragon-talk, his years in office have failed to achieve anything meaningful for an economically troubled country.
Corruption is still rampant and the press and speech freedoms that appeared immediately following the 2010 revolution under the supervision of his interim predecessor Roza Otunbayeva (another non-dragon president) have been rolled back under his reign.
His capacity to get into unseemly public tit-for-tats with even the most menial political opponents as well as important foreign powers meanwhile is, according to his critics, unbefitting the office of president.
Well known liberal commentator Daniar Aitman wrote August 2 on Facebook a poignant reply to the president, who at the press-conference likened reading one of his articles — about possible motivations lurking behind Atambayev's attempts to change the constitution — to “stepping on a stinky turd”:
Атамбаев любит повторять, что он не дракон. Пожалуй, в этом он прав. Для того чтобы быть драконом, необходимо обладать определенными способностями.
Не быть драконом – это недостаточная квалификация для современного главы государства, иначе президентом мог бы работать любой бомж. В 2011 году Кыргызстану был нужен Лидер, который бы объединил и вдохновил народ своим высоким нравственным примером и стратегическим видением. Нам нужен был кыргызский Ли Куан Ю (выпускник Кембриджа) или кыргызский Саакашвили (выпускник Колумбийского университета), а вместо этого мы получили зампреда райисполкома.
Нет, я не слишком строг к Атамбаеву. Цена его посредственности чрезвычайно высока. Каждый, кто хоть сколько-нибудь пожил в развитых странах мира, понимает: время работает против Кыргызстана.
Atambayev likes to say that he is not a dragon. Perhaps, in this he is right. In order to be a dragon, you need to have certain skills.
Not being a dragon, is not a sufficient qualification to be a modern head of state, however. Otherwise any bum could be a president. In 2011, Kyrgyzstan needed a leader who would unite and inspire people through their high moral example and strategic vision. We needed a Kyrgyz version of [Singapore's] Lee Kuan Yew, a Cambridge graduate, or a Kyrgyz version of [ex-Georgia President Misha] Saakashvili, a graduate of Columbia University. Instead we got the deputy chairman of some regional political committee.
No, I'm not being harsh on Atambayev. The price of his mediocrity has been extremely high. Anyone who has lived even for a short time in the developed world understands that time is working against Kyrgyzstan.

author: Akhal-Tech Collective


text:
Remembering the Yugoslav Anti-War Movement of the Early 1990s · Global Voices
Filip Stojanovski

Zetra Project commemorating a 1991 anti-war concert in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Image: YouTube
It's summertime in the former Yugoslavia, when nationalist passions run high, as people look back on the wars in the 1990s that tore the nation apart. This July, some Internet users decided to go a different route, remembering the proud, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to stop those wars.
Traditionally, political elites in the region have used the war anniversary to provoke ethnic and religious tensions by organizing state celebrations and making inflammatory public statements, including denials of genocide and war crimes established by international courts, sometimes resulting in media frenzies.
The two most politically charged anniversaries are the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia, and the August 1995 Operation Storm in Croatia. (The former is the internationally-recognized genocide of the ethnic Bosniak population by Bosnian Serb forces. The latter is a major military victory by the Croatian Army, resulting in ethnic cleansing of ethnic Serb population in the region of Krajina.)
Fed up with the tendency to exploit these anniversaries for divisive political purposes, some Internet users throughout the region have tried to refocus the public's attention on anti-war efforts from the early 1990s. This approach breaks with official histories and most mainstream media coverage, and creates opportunities for “true reconciliation,” activists argue. The effort combines both spontaneous individual acts and organized activities.
For example, the Serbian Twitter user Zoran Torbica posted a link to a video clip with the first public performance of the anti-war music super-group Rimtutituki, held on March 8, 1992, in Belgrade.
Ozbiljna hrabrost je bila '92 tražiti mir, da su poslušali nas klince, ne bi bilo rata… #rimtutituki https://t.co/SCnuWQ3TQT
— Zoran Torbica (@torbica) July 28, 2016
It took serious courage to ask for peace in '92. If they had listened to us, who were kids at the time, there wouldn't have been war…
After the authorities refused to allow them to organize a concert, the band performed on the back of a truck, driving through the streets of Belgrade. The video documents the performance and the participation of thousands of young people, who protested against the war and conscription.
July 29 also marked the 25th anniversary of a massive pro-peace rock concert held in Sarajevo. The Zetra Project has worked to document this event and inform people at home and abroad about its importance. As an article published on Balakanist.net explains:
Due to a bad weather forecast, the concert was relocated to Zetra at the last minute. A Sarajevo taxi company ferried thousands of people from the original outdoor venue for free. An unprecedented 30,000 people amassed inside Zetra, while another 50,000 gathered around the sports hall to hear the show from outside. The concert was organized and broadcast by the Yugoslavia-wide television station Yutel and carried the name Yutel za Mir (Yutel for Peace). Yutel for Peace was the culmination of earlier peace protests in Yugoslavia uniting anti-war activists from all over the country with Yugoslavia’s most popular rock bands in a collective effort to save Yugoslavia from war and dissolution.
The working languages of the Zetra Project are the local Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian, as well as German. The project's website hosts interviews with several people who attended the concert about what it was like to be there, and what its ramifications were at the time:
In late July, the media organization Deutsche Welle published an interview with Zetra Project author, Berlin-based journalist, and film director Danijel Visevic, who explained:
The “Zetra Project” is an online space where people that were at the Zetra Hall concert can meet once again. We are collecting stories from people that were actively engaged in promoting peace, who were at the concert, and have a connection to the peace movement. They can tell us their stories so that the memory of the movement remains alive. But also to remind others that back then people around the country wanted peace.
Jadranka Pejaković Hlede, who as 13-year-old girl in 1991 gathered 11,586 signatures for peace with her friends from Tuzla, also shares her memories:
Mojih 11.586 potpisa za mir bili su utopija i zaista je smiješno kad se sjetim s kojom vjerom sam ih skupljala, to je bio posao, danima od jutra do navečer, misija. Sjećam se točno kako je priča krenula, o čemu sam razmišljala, čak i gdje sam sjedila kad sam odlučila pokrenuti akciju. Priča je uskoro postala veća nego što sam očekivala. Ali ako ništa drugo, tih 11.586 ljudi mi je ostavilo vjeru u ljudski rod.
My 11,586 signatures for peace were a utopia[n dream], and it's really ridiculous when I remember the conviction I had while collecting them. It was an effort, for days from morning to evening—a mission. I recall how it all started, what I thought about, even where I set when I decided to start the action. The story soon grew beyond my expectations. If nothing else, those 11,586 people enabled me to retain the faith in humankind.
In the following years, Pejaković Hlede witnessed the horrors of war in Bosnia, including the “liberation” of her birthplace, Prijedor, including murders in the streets and her neighbors being forced into concentration camps. Her father, a man who before the war avoided weapons, ended up buying a hand grenade and hiding it on the balcony of the family's home. He planned to use it to “save” the family from torture, in case “liberators” operating a sniper's nest one floor above decided to try to break in and rape all the women. The family later fled their home, fearing for their lives.
Now 38 years old and a mother of two, Ms Pejaković Hlede lives in Zagreb, Croatia. In her testimony for the Zetra project, she connects her suffering with current events:
Ponekad sumnjam u preostalu ljudskost, pa čak i u svoju zdravu pamet. Što bi se reklo kod nas «Tko je tu lud?». Na primjer, aktualna je izbjeglička kriza. Gledam te jadne ljude i djecu koji su cijeli život strpali u vrećicu i prelaze mora, rijeke, države, granice, bodljikave žice i koridore u potrazi za boljim životom. Da, možda se među njima sakrio i kakav kriminalac, loš čovjek, kakvog nađeš u bilo kakvoj populaciji, ali generalno sirotinja koja ne zna gdje će i kako će, ali zna da mora spasiti živu glavu, djecu, po bilo koju cijenu. Uh, poznat mi je taj osjećaj, strašno je to iskustvo, svaka sličica ti se utisne kao da si žigosan njom i ostaje zauvijek. Vidim na tim licima strahotu proživljenog i oplačem javno ili u sebi, skoro svaki prilog u medijima. I čini mi se da svi to moraju na isti način vidjeti i suosjećati.
Bila sam uvjerena da svi moji bliski prijatelji, pa čak i poznanici misle isto. A onda čuješ anti-izbjegličke, anti-ljudske, nacionalističke i sadističke komentare naoko normalnih, kulturnih ljudi s kojim si možda još jučer čavrljao o svakodnevnim temama. E tu ja vidim najveći poraz ljudskosti. Pa kako si ti, neobilježen ratom, osobnim strahotama, neugrožen, potpuno neupućen u tekovine tog naroda, uspio postati toliko “nabrijan”, samoživ i ljudogrozan. Zgrozim se što su takvi oko mene, što ih je tako puno, što im ne mogu objasniti, što će njihova djeca s mojom sjediti na nekom igralištu i razmjenjivati mišljenja. Što ako ih bude previše, što ako im povjeruju? I gdje god na svijetu zaviriš, čiji god dnevnik odgledaš, vidiš iste ljudske mržnje, patnje i opasnosti. To je zbilja zabrinjavajuće čak i za nas optimiste.
I sometimes have doubts about my remaining humanity—even about my sanity. As people say “Who is the lunatic here?” Take, for instance, the current refugee crisis. I see those poor people and children who have put all their lives in a bag and crossed seas, rivers, countries, borders, barbed wires, and corridors in search for a better life. Yes, maybe among them there are hidden some criminals, some bad men, which can be found in all populations. But generally they are impoverished people who don't know where or how they are going to live. They just know they have to save their lives and their children at any cost. Uh, I know that feeling, it's a terrible experience, every little image becomes imprinted as if you are branded as cattle, remaining forever. On their faces I see the horrors they've endured and cry for them, loudly or silently, whenever I watch media coverage about them. And I think that every person should see them and sympathize with them in the same way.
I was convinced that all my close friends and acquaintances think the same. And then I hear anti-refugee, anti-human, nationalistic, and sadistic comments by seemingly normal, cultured people—the same people with whom you've chatted about everyday issues only yesterday. I see that as biggest defeat of humanity. How can you, not branded by war, personal horrors, under no danger, completely ignorant about the characteristics of those people—how can you become so “fired up,” selfish and misanthropic? I am appalled by such people around me, because they are so many, because I can't explain to them, because their children will sit with my children at some playground exchanging opinions. What if there are too many of them, what if my children believe them? And wherever on the world one peeks, no matter whose evening news you watch, there's the same human hatred, suffering, and danger. This is very worrisome for us, for the people who are optimists like me.

author: Filip Stojanovski


text:
The Russian Caucasus They Don’t Show You in the News · Global Voices
Ksenia Khudadyan

Wading across the Kizgych River, Teberda Nature Reserve. Photo by Anton Lange. Used with permission.
A region so rich in unique cultures that it could even be called “a country within a country,” home to Russia’s most conservative Islamic communities, and an area where the federal government practices domestic policies like nowhere else, the North Caucasus enjoys a special, albeit controversial, identity throughout Russia and the rest of the world. After being a seat of intense violence between federal armed forces and local separatist movements for more than 15 years (with the last official military operation occurring as recently as in 2009), Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Russia's other Caucasian republics are gradually developing into a new North Caucasus that projects itself outward as prosperous, integrated, and open for visitors.
The new regional policy is marked by a strong federal presence and heavy funding. Chechnya's ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, is regularly in the news for his ardent and sometimes bizarre expressions of support for Vladimir Putin. In St. Petersburg, critics of Kadyrov's father recently failed to stop the renaming of a bridge after the man, Akhmad Kadyrov.
With these political scandals usually dominating news headlines, RuNet Echo turns its attention a cultural story from the region revolving around a new art project.
Because of the region's bloody history and troubled present, it's sometimes hard to remember that the North Caucasus isn't a land of death and destruction. The area is also a treasure trove of unique cultures and untamed natural riches. The journey requires understanding and preparation, however, and that's where a new art project comes in.
“The Range. The Caucasus from Sea to Sea,” by Anton Lange (one of Russia’s top photographers), launched earlier this summer as a Web project, which was preceded by a major photo album and a number of exhibitions. With his latest work, Lange, who's known best today for “Russia Through a Train Window,” has made a bold new effort to do justice to the region’s breathtaking natural and cultural legacies. A partnership with the Northern Caucasus Resorts JSC enabled the project team to explore the entire length of the Greater Caucasus mountain range and its northern slopes, in a search for original angles and undiscovered landmarks.
Ksenia Khudadyan spoke to Anton Lange about his Caucasian journey, which he says every person should find a way to experience.
Photo by Tengiz Mokaev. Used with permission.
Ksenia Khudadyan (KK): The general media coverage forms a rather dubious image of the Caucasus as a region, from the social perspective, first of all, and contributes to the development of certain stereotypes. Evidently, they can't all be true. Probably the most obvious stereotype is that anyone visiting the area is in extraordinary danger. How true was this for the project's team?
Anton Lange (AL): It's true that the region's image is contradictory—and the Caucasus itself is indeed a land of contradictions. It goes without saying that the media automatically exaggerates the level of danger, and it offers scarce, if any, coverage of good news from the Caucasus. But journalists pick up immediately on any problems, of course, broadcasting the news on every channel.
Once a story is online, it's there to stay. So when you look up “the Caucasus” on the Internet, you're showered with a pile—a heap—of news about explosions, shootouts, special operations, and so on. As a result, the picture of the region is quite distorted, and outsiders come away with the impression that the Caucasus is an incredibly dangerous place, but this isn't so.
It would also be untrue to say that the Caucasus isn't dangerous at all. Obviously, the Western Caucasus, which is closer to Sochi and full of resorts (mainly ski resorts like Arkhyz), isn't fraught with any dangers or threats. At the same time, there are places (like certain areas in Dagestan) that are inundated with security forces, where you need special permission just to enter. You can find it all.
The Towers of Two Rivals on a branch of the Skalisty Mountain Range. Photo by Anton Lange. Used with permission.
KK: Until very recent times, the history of the Russian Caucasus has been a story of confrontation between the empire and native peoples, so to speak. Can you tell us about interesting moments in your work on the project when you intentionally toned something down, leaving something off screen? Did you ever feel like you had to “edit the reality”?
AL: I wouldn't say we had to edit the reality. There were stories, however—certain things that we could have emphasized more. I'm talking about both more recent episodes, like the Chechen Wars, and things from the more distant past, like the deportation of entire peoples in Stalin's time, and the tragic events in Kabardino-Balkaria, for instance.
Personally, though, this wasn't something I engaged in; I'm not too involved in politics or history. My interests lie in the region's nature, ethnography, landscapes, and portraits—the artistic, traditional, and classical genres, instruments, and methods of exploring the outside world.
That said, we did include—in both the album and in the exhibition—villages destroyed in 1942 by agents in the NKVD [the KGB predecessor]. It's hard to pass any unambiguous judgment on the situation there.
The first thing to consider is that the Caucasus—the North Caucasus—is unbelievably hospitable. The roots of this hospitality lie in the ancient highland law, the so-called adat. When certain peoples were converted to Islam, they adopted a whimsical combination of adat and Sharia law. Later on, this cultural combination was entangled with Soviet customs and Soviet law. But adat remained the basis of highland ethics and highland law. In fact, [the hospitality required by] adat is the highland law, and highland hospitality is not merely an act of individual goodwill.
Khychin pies. Photo by Anton Lange. Used with permission.
Thus, speaking of Dagestan, it's worth noting that there isn't a single hotel in highland Dagestan, and it is the largest republic in the North Caucasus. There are a few in the lowland part of the republic, near the Caspian Sea, but there is none in the mountains. If you are traveling in the mountains, you will definitely be staying at people's homes as a guest. Caucasian hospitality doesn't mean that someone is more hospitable than others, or that someone is willing to welcome a guest while the other is not. This kind of hospitality is a universal obligation to welcome every guest. It is not a matter of discussion; it goes without saying.
As soon as you arrive in an ancient highland village, such as Kubachi or Khunzakh, or any Dagestani settlement, everyone welcomes you with great enthusiasm as a representative of “the big Russia.” Everyone tells you, “A lot of Russians used to come to us, but no one comes now, because they are afraid, and it makes us so frustrated and sad….” And they invite you into their homes, offer a cup of tea or some local treats, and suggest that you stay at their place. No one charges you any money, as it is prohibited by the same highland rule. Anyone who dares take your money invites great shame in the eyes of their fellow villagers.
Paradoxically, there is no concept of tourism in this land; there are only guests. I don't mean touristic destinations such as Arkhyz or the vicinity of Mount Elbrus—I'm talking about places where ancient ways are maintained, such as highland Dagestan, highland Ingushetia, highland Chechnya, or highland Kabardino-Balkaria. It's very difficult to give a definite answer to the question about conflicts…
Chechnya has gone through two terrible wars, preceded by mass deportations during WWII, in 1944. The Chechen people have survived one tragedy after another. The Chechens could be holding a huge grudge against us [Russians], but I have experienced an amazing destruction of stereotypes. It hasn't been even a decade since the debates about Grozny's restoration (the city was in such ruins that city planners even discussed rebuilding the capital in a different spot), and today you can come to Grozny as a welcome, seemingly long-awaited guest.
Bezengi Glacier. Photo by Anton Lange. Used with permission.
When you come to the Chechen highlands, you are received in the same way. And the people are sincerely happy to see you, because, again, you are an ambassador of the great country, the big Russia. I am convinced that every single resident of the North Caucasus is bound to feel isolated from the rest of the world, even if it's on a subconscious level. Because of the bias and a variety of other reasons, people from the North Caucasus face a lot of barriers. This is why the Internet is so widespread there and the use of social networks and Instagram is so ubiquitous: they serve as a window to the great outer world. This is why they are so keen on surfing the Net and Instagramming: they are all visionaries. They have to see everything and show it to the world, passing it around to everyone. I'd say it looks even more obsessive than anywhere else around the world.
During my first visits to Chechnya, I kept trying to understand how that terrible war that claimed so many civilians’ lives ended such a short time ago. Historically, it ended only yesterday. I kept trying to understand how we, the Russians, are perceived, almost forcing myself to feel resentment of the locals, or something hidden under a mask. But I couldn't feel any of it. Maybe there was something, but I never felt it.
I asked the people how it is that so much blood was spilled so recently, but that it doesn't feel this way in the region. And most of them answered something like, “You know, the blame was partly ours, too, and our share was pretty big. We just accepted that the hostilities couldn't go on forever, and both consciously and subconsciously we accepted a certain mutual settlement and agreed to a clean slate.”
It seems to me that people in the Caucasus know the price of resentment, betrayal, and blood better than people anywhere else. They know that the price of resentment is immeasurably great, and you need to have enough strength, courage, and wisdom to get over an offense—to step over it—as the price you would have to pay otherwise is a thousand times more. Unsurprisingly, the nations that once had a tradition of blood feud know it a lot better than others. This might even facilitate processes like mutual understanding, mutual forgiveness, or mutual settlement—I can't think of an exact term. Generally, it's a very interesting experience, both psychological and personal, as well as humanistic. One thing for sure: you can't hope to gain a deep insight all at once—it's too complicated a story. It takes a lot of visits.
Photo by Magomed Shapiev. Used with permission.
KK: What's the Caucasus like for a photographer? What makes it special? Would you call it an exotic destination?
AL: The mountains present a huge difficulty for a photographer in general because their beauty is commonplace. It's incredibly difficult to take an interesting mountain photograph. The closer you are to perfection in terms of technical skills, the weather and the chosen routes, the more and more often you face a glossy postcard view. In such situations, my cameraman would pack his lens, saying, “Let's wait for the weather to get worse.” More than any other landscape on the Earth, the mountains offer a range of banalities: rocky cliffs, glaciers, snowy peaks…. Bang your head against them if you like, but it's impossible to figure out what to do with them.
And this is why the mountains challenge not only mountaineers, but photographers, as well: try and find an exciting, original angle, make your pictures different from millions of other mountain photographs taken all over the world. Make your Caucasus stand out, or at least make it differ from the American Rocky Mountains or any other highlands. This task is in fact very demanding, and probably crucial.
The village of Gunib. Photo by Anton Lange. Used with permission.
KK: Anton, what is “The Range Project” as of today? What is happening to the album and other creations? What is available today and what kind of work is underway?
AL: Presently, The Range Project is still in the production stage. Jointly with our partners, the Northern Caucasus Resorts JSC, we spent a year and a half—almost two years—filming and photographing over the course of fifteen or so expeditions, which actually covered the entire territory of the North Caucasus. Of course, it wasn't a linear journey, and it never is, in such large and logistically complex projects.
These expeditions formed a kind of a mosaic that would fill out along the way, forming an artistic, entirely original picture. A spectator can get an impression that the journey is linear because of how it's presented, but in fact it's not true. Tracing expedition routes is one of the most exciting parts of any major project. Now that the shooting period is over, we have entered the stage of post-production, more or less.
The first result is a large photo album. Regrettably, there are a very limited number of prints, and we're really hoping to make it available for the general public by issuing a larger number of copies over the next year.
The second part of the project, which I find very important, is the film I made as an independent producer, co-director, and partly anchor, like it was with all of my other original films about Russia. Currently, it exists as footage ready for post-production and editing. Ideally, I see it as a two- or three-episode film, semi-fiction and semi-documentary—an unprecedented creation about the North Caucasus.
Aktoprak Mountain Pass. Photo by Anton Lange. Used with permission.
The third part is the exhibition, as the project is worthy of a most extensive display. What I see is a major exhibition of 300–350 large-size works that can be exposed in a hall the size of Moscow's New Manege or the Engineering Building of Tretyakov Gallery. And, last but not least, exhibitions must be held in the region itself, in the North Caucasus. One of my principal goals is making such projects accessible to the public, both in Russia and abroad. Photographers have a limited number of traditional, conservative ways of presenting their works to the public: a book, an exhibition, print media coverage, and sometimes, although not often, films. All of them are complex and costly, and this during a recession [in Russia].
I'm generally averse to the Internet, but I've begun to realize that the Web offers exceptional opportunities. We are now launching a [long-read] dedicated to the project and pages on social networks, in order to present our work to the largest audience possible and receive feedback. In our case, we also have a very special audience: the peoples of the North Caucasus, a region with an ardent commitment to national self-identification and local customs, and an interest in attracting the outer world's attention. Without doubt, it imposes certain extra obligations on anyone who works in the Caucasus.

author: Ksenia Khudadyan


text:
The Successful Hunger Strike That Changed Colombia’s University of Tolima · Global Voices
Lully

Nine hunger strikers at the University of Tolima. Photo from Kalitos Gamboa's Facebook account, used with his permission.
Between July 6 and July 15, 2016, nine people at the University of Tolima, Colombia — students, professors and staff members — organized a hunger strike to protest the serious administrative, financial, democratic, and leadership crisis occurring at this higher education institution, for which they held the Dean José Herman Muñoz Ñungo directly responsible.
The group initiated the strike after having exhausted all proper channels of negotiation. Among other things, their demands included the dean’s response to a list of 21 questions and his resignation. Not only was the dean reluctant to leave his position and respond to the questions, but the University Governing Board also kept silent, prolonging the hunger strike up to nine days.
Thanks to the mediation of a committee of local people and the presence of the Ministry of Labor, an agreement was signed at the cessation of the strike on July 15, which included the dean's resignation by July 31 and a written acceptance of various petition points.
José Javier Cepera summed up the fight on alternative news site Rebelión:
En últimas, la sed de justicia en la Universidad es una necesidad, y se trata de intentar abrir nuevos espacios, realizar acciones colectivas en defensa de lo público pero exigiendo transformación estructurales – no solo consiste en buscar la captación de recursos económicos sino en repensar la Universidad, sus bases, directivas, acuerdos, normatividad, razones, sentimientos y proyectos que no sigan encaminadas al servicio del mercado, los grupos políticos y el servilismo politiquero sino para la soberanía de los pueblos excluidos de estos tiempos
Basically, the hunger for justice at the university is a necessity and it involves trying to open new spaces and carry out collective actions in defense of a public institution. But demanding structural transformation not only consists of raising funds, but also of re-thinking the university, its headquarters, board of directors, agreements, regulations, reasons, feelings and projects in a way so they aren't meant to serve the market, political groups and civil servants, but instead support the sovereignty of the people excluded from these times.
The group of hunger-strikers wrote on cultural magazine El Salmón that not only did they do this in support of the University of Tolima but also “to defend public universities, threatened today by privatization politics of the Ministry of National Education.” They also talked about their hope that the community would make the commitment to follow this process closely:
Debemos informar a la comunidad universitaria y a la comunidad en general, que este movimiento no se reduce únicamente a la renuncia de un rector, es un ejercicio de transformación radical de la Universidad del Tolima, en el marco de la AUTONOMÍA, la AUTORREGULACIÓN Y la CALIDAD ACADEMICA; por eso convocamos a toda la comunidad a construir un gran pacto social que permita, desde el debate, la configuración de una universidad moderna, al servicio de la región y no de los intereses politiqueros de turno. Rechazamos cualquier intento de violación de la AUTONOMÍA UNIVERSITARIA, como es el caso de la Ley 550, la Ley 1740 o las reestructuraciones amañadas y a dedo; tampoco aceptaremos la imposición de manera autoritaria de un rector por parte de ningún sector; es decir, el rector encargado y los demás asignados, deberán obedecer a un proceso de legitimación dentro de la comunidad académica.
We should inform the university community and the community in general that this movement cannot be solely reduced to the resignation of a dean. It is an exercise of radical transformation of the University of Tolima, within the framework of AUTONOMY, SELF-REGULATION and ACADEMIC QUALITY. For this reason, we call the entire community together to form a large social pact that, through discussion, allows the configuration of a modern university, in the service of the region, not in the service of the interests of the politicians on duty. In accordance with Laws 550 and 1740, we reject any infringement upon UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY or deceptive reorganization and hiring of friends. We will also reject the authoritarian imposition of a dean on behalf of any sector. In other words, the dean in charge, along with the rest of the staff, should abide by a process of legitimization within the academic community.
There were so many protests both online and within the community in general that the dean, José Herman Muñoz Ñungo, felt obligated to request – within the signed agreement – the “cessation of hostility and psychological violence.”
Labor unions and other organizations across the nation joined together to demonstrate in support of the strikers and their rights. At the University of Tolima alone there were three profound milestones of support: a petition that demanded the resignation of Dean Múñoz with more than 3,000 signatures; the university’s decision to support the strike by stopping all activities since July 12; and the call that university members made to the Colombian Attorney General's Office to investigate the dean and other officials for embezzlement.
On Twitter there were multiple expressions of solidarity and support for the strikers using the hashtag #HuelgaDeHambreUT (UTHungerStrike):
Llamdo a la resistencia y la solidaridad con la huelga de hambre por la Defensa de la UT https://t.co/dDMcDJAGdl
— Katiuska Fonseca ϟ (@kafonseca9) 10 de julio de 2016
Called to resistance and solidarity with the hunger strike defending the UT
#HuelgadehambreUT no se rindan vale la pena luchar por el futuro. Así al gobierno no le importemos
— Juan B Restrepo (@juanbrestrepo) 10 de julio de 2016
Don’t give up, the future is worth fighting for. If you do, we won’t matter to the government.
#HuelgadeHambreUT Vamos todos mañana a apoyar a nuestros compañeros y docentes huelguistas.
— Camila Muñoz (@CamilaMGiraldo) 14 de julio de 2016
Let’s all go tomorrow and support our friends and teachers at the strike.
In order to dive deeper into the reasoning behind the strike, Global Voices interviewed one of the strikers, Carlos Arturo Gamboa Bobadilla, a pioneer blogger in the Colombian blogsphere as well as a writer, activist, teacher and president of the University Professor Union Association (ASPU). Despite his physical fatigue, he reported thoroughly on the strike on his blog and Facebook page because, as he himself expressed in one of his posts, “I don’t think I could ever be a silent protester, I wasn’t born to be a high priest of silence.”
Carlos Arturo Gamboa Bobadilla during the hunger strike. Photo from his Facebook account, used with his permission.
Global Voices (GV): Let’s start with the most important: How do you physically and mentally feel right now?
Carlos Arturo Gamboa Bobadilla (CAGB): El cuerpo se resiente bastante en nueve días de huelga de hambre, pero afortunadamente, según la valoración médica, no tengo ninguna complicación. La cuestión ahora consiste en descansar unos días y ejercer los cuidados correspondientes. Mentalmente los huelguistas salimos muy fortalecidos, logramos algunos objetivos concretos, pero sobre todo visibilizamos el problema de la Universidad del Tolima nacionalmente. Para que los problemas se empiecen a solucionar hay que aceptarlos primero, y creo que ahora muy pocas personas podrán mantenerse al margen de la realidad que padecemos.
Carlos Arturo Gamboa Bobadilla (CAGB): My body is really weak after nine days of hunger strike, but fortunately, according to a medical evaluation, I haven’t suffered any complications. Now I have to rest a few days and follow the proper care. We strikers left very mentally strengthened. We achieved some concrete objectives, but above all, we made the University of Tolima's problem nationally visible. In order to resolve the problems they must be acknowledged first and I think that now very few people can remain on the sidelines about the reality we suffer.
GV: How would you define your experience during the hunger strike? Was it worth the sacrifice and threat to your own life?
CAGB: Aunque fue extrema, en el sentido de que arriesgas mucho de ti mismo en ello, como experiencia humana me permitió reflexionar sobre algunas cosas, entre ellas el tema de la solidaridad que siempre me ha inquietado. Nosotros nos indignamos por todo, pero no actuamos y cuando alguien actúa no nos solidarizamos. En la Universidad encontré solidaridad de muchas personas, incluso de algunos muy distantes de nuestra forma de pensar. Padecer hambre es sentirse más humano, es acercarse a la condición animal que nos antecede, es también reflexionar sobre el sentido de la existencia porque si no te alimentas te descompones y eso te hace pensar en la vida en el sentido de estar “aquí”.
No creo que hubiese atentado contra mi vida, lo que hicimos los huelguistas fue un acto de desprendimiento por una institución que se hundía, es un símbolo de resistencia en donde la acción es igual de contundente a la idea.
CAGB: Even though it was extreme, in the sense of putting yourself at risk, as a human experience it allowed me to reflect on some things such as human solidarity, which has always preoccupied me. We get upset about everything, but we don’t act and then when someone acts we don’t show support. I found solidarity at the university from many people, including some who have a very different way of thinking. To suffer from hunger is to feel more human, moving closer to the animal condition that precedes us, and also to reflect on the meaning of existence because if you don’t feed yourself, you decompose and that makes you think about life and the meaning of being “here.”
I don’t believe I threatened my life. What we strikers did was an act of detachment from a sinking institution. It’s a symbol of resistance where the action is as equally as convincing as the idea.
GV: How do you see the future of the University of Tolima and public university education in Colombia?
CAGB: Lo que sucede en la Universidad del Tolima es casi un laboratorio de la situación de la educación superior en Colombia, con un ingrediente más, el fracaso de un grupo de poder que estuvo durante los últimos cuatro años al frente de su dirección. Ahora nos toca recomponer muchas cosas, la UT apenas lleva 60 años funcionando, digamos que está en su etapa embrionaria como institución. Es el momento de modernizarla, de blindarla contra la politiquería regional, de reorientarla académicamente, de entroncarla con la región, de limitarle su misión porque no podemos seguir intentando parecernos a lo que no somos.
Para la educación pública nacional se debe venir un gran cambio, los tiempos de posconflicto lo requieren. Sin un sistema educativo nacional que le apueste a la reconstrucción del país, será más difícil enraizar el sentido de la paz. Creo que la educación, si se orienta bien, es fundamental para la redefinición de la democracia, la ciudadanía y la activación de un sujeto en derecho. Esto se debe presionar, el Estado no parece muy interesado en ello, entonces seremos nosotros, las comunidades educativas quienes empujen ese cambio.
CAGB: What’s happening at the University of Tolima is almost a laboratory of the situation of higher education in Colombia, with one more ingredient: the failure of a group that has been in power for the last four years. Now it’s our job to repair many things. The UT has been in operation for at least 60 years; let’s just say it’s in its embryonic stage as an institution. It’s time to modernize it, to armor it against the regional politicking, to define its mission because we can’t continue trying to look like something were not.
For national public education a big change needs to come, times of post-conflict require it. Without a national education system that positions itself for the reconstruction of the country, it will be more difficult to lay down the foundations of peace. I think education, if it is properly guided, is fundamental for redefining democracy, citizenship and politically active citizens. This must be pushed and the state doesn’t seem very interested in doing it so it will be us, the educational communities, who push for this change.
GV: What do you consider the role of education to be in the process of peace in Colombia these days?
CAGB: Esencial. La educación les permite a las personas adquirir otras dimensiones, otras lecturas del mundo, y sobre todo reconocer las posibilidades del saber. Para ello, los currículos deben ser transformados, deben estar en disposición de un proyecto de país, deben abandonar las falacias de la competitividad y el falso progreso como meta última y centrarse en esa primicia que Jacques Delors denomina «aprender a vivir juntos», es quizás lo que más nos falta como colombianos.
CAGB: Essential. Education allows people to acquire other dimensions and other readings from around the world, and above all, to recognize the possibilities of knowledge. The curriculum should be revamped accordingly; it should be a national project; it should abandon the fallacies of competitiveness and false progress as the ultimate goal and focus on Jacques Delors’ original idea about “learning to live together,” which is maybe what we lack the most as Colombians.
Carlos Gamboa while on strike. Photo from  Facebook, used with permission.
GV: Do you consider yourself an activist, writer, teacher, or something else?
CAGB: Creo que todo está imbricado en mí. No me imagino ser un docente sin capacidad de acción y pensamiento críticos, o un escritor encerrado frente a un ordenador intentando narrar o poetizar la vida sin vivirla de facto. Si observas con cuidado todas estas acciones están cruzadas por la palabra, creo que vengo siendo eso: un encantado por las palabras que generen acción transformadora. Si la palabra no busca transformar es mejor guardar silencio.
CAGB: I think it’s all interwoven in me. I don’t imagine myself being a teacher without the ability to act and think critically, or a writer locked up in front of a computer trying to narrate or poeticize life without actually living it. If you observe carefully, all of these actions are crossed by words, I think of myself as this: a lover of words that generate transformative action. If words do not seek to transform, it’s better to remain silent.
GV: Regarding your statement, “The day I wake up without the will to change the world, will be the day the world has changed me,” do you believe this day will come?
CAGB: La frase surgió tratando de elaborar un cuento en el cual el personaje central debía ser un idealista. El cuento fracasó y quedó la frase. La guardé para mí, en el fondo soy eso, un idealista y me agrada serlo. No me gusta el mundo en el que nací y el que habito, que es peor hoy que cuando nací; quisiera cambiarlo y cada día lo intento, desde las acciones más pequeñas, estamos en el tiempo de la revolución de las pequeñas cosas, por eso luchar por cambiar una institución formadora como la Universidad del Tolima, merece todo nuestro esfuerzo. Espero ser idealista hasta el final, porque me hastía ver tanto conformismo; también me desagrada ver antiguos luchadores refugiados en el confort que provee el egoísmo del bienestar individual.
CAGB: This statement came about while trying to elaborate a story in which the main character was supposed to be an idealist. The story failed and the statement remained. I saved it for me. In my heart that’s what I am — an idealist — and I am pleased to be it. I don’t like the world I was born into and live in, which is worse today than when I was born. I would like to change it and each day I try with the smallest actions. We’re in times of revolution of the small things, that’s why fighting to change an educational institution like the University of Tolima deserves all our effort. I hope to be an idealist until the end, because I am tired of seeing so much conformity. Nor do I like seeing old refugee fighters in the comfort that is provided by the selfishness of individual well-being.
GV: Is there anything else you would like to share with the world?
CAGB: El deseo de cambio. Estamos supeditados a ello o feneceremos. Debemos frenar. El mundo va al desfiladero de su existencia. Cada día contribuimos con nuestro consumismo desaforado a depredar el planeta, es fácil de ver, pero difícil de cambiar. A veces quisiera tener el poder de resetear las mentes, eso es imposible, por eso soy profesor, porque considero que desde las aulas es posible cambiar el chip de la autodestrucción que hace tiempo nos implantó el capitalismo.
CAGB: The desire for change. We are dependent on it or we will cease to exist. We must stop. The world is headed to the chasm of its existence. Everyday we contribute to the pillage of the Earth with our immeasurable consumerism, it’s easy to see, but difficult to change. Sometimes I would like to have the power to reset minds, but that’s impossible and that’s why I am a professor, because I believe that inside the classroom it’s possible to reprogram the self-destruction chip that capitalism implanted in us sometime ago.

author: Lully


text:
Bad Laws Are Contagious: Demystifying the UAE’s New Information Tech Law · Global Voices
Guest Contributor

Dubai construction workers, 2008. Photo by Paul Keller via Wikimedia (CC BY 2.0)
This post was guest authored by Amin Jobran, who works as the MENA region outreach manager with the Internet censorship research group ASL19.
The United Arab Emirates federal government will soon pass an amendment that could criminalize the use of VPNs and other censorship-dodging tools. Violators could face astronomical fines of up to 545,000 USD and possible jail time. What does this law mean? How might it affect online expression in the MENA region?
UAE law already bans the use of VPNs and other circumvention technologies in specific circumstances — the chief purpose of the new amendment is to extend the law to anyone who “uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by using a false address or a third party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery.” (Federal Law No. 12/2016, Article 1, United Arab Emirates.)
Stakeholders on various sides of the issue are struggling with the ambiguity of the language used in the amendment. In response to their complaints, the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority issued a follow-up statement vowing that the law will not affect economic interests, and promising that business can continue to use VPN technology on their internal networks, as long as they don’t misuse it for criminal activities.
But the TRA statement does not talk about unlicensed and unorganized services. Would using a VPN on a public network be considered illegal? Is using a VPN to access a service that is not licensed, like Viber for example, be considered a crime in itself? Answers to these questions will depend on how the government interprets and enforces the new amendment.
In its broadest interpretation, the law could affect everyone using a VPN or other circumvention tools, even those who aren’t accessing illegal content, banned services (such as certain VOIP providers), or engaging in truly malicious criminal activities.
This is no small matter in the UAE, where VPN use is widespread at universities, businesses, airports and private homes. Many Emiratis use VPNs to hide their IP addresses to protect against data theft through cyber attacks. And recent policy changes — such as the blocking of VOIP services — have made VPNs more vital than ever, especially for working class users.
A VPN (aka virtual private network) is a tool that lets you to create a secure connection to another network in a different physical location. So someone in the UAE, for example, might connect to a VPN located in Canada. This allows them to bypass Emirati censors and use the Internet as if they were in Canada. It's an important tool for people who live in countries whose governments restrict access to certain websites and services.
Preceded by a wave of VOIP blocking in various Arab countries, the new law comes as no surprise for those familiar with digital policy in the region. In the last six months alone, the UAE blocked snapchat for its video feature, Morocco blocked VOIP calls, and Saudi Arabia blocked Whatsapp calling, Facebook messenger calling features, and Facetime for iPhone.
These governments justify their decisions on security and economic grounds. Free VOIP services naturally make customers less likely to use paid international calling features through their local telecom service providers. This means loss of revenue for national, often state-affiliated telecom companies. With rising tensions surrounding violent extremism in the region, MENA governments are also wary of VOIP and certain messaging apps because of their security features — tools like WhatsApp, which now features end-to-end encrypted messaging, make it difficult for governments to monitor users’ communications.
There are also market and policy factors in play. Etisalat and DU are the UAE’s only two ISPs. Both are licensed to provide VPN services, but these are centralized and unencrypted VPN services that eliminate the user’s ability to protect their privacy. This is especially problematic, given that Emirate Investment Authority (EIA), a sovereign wealth fund for UAE federal government, owns 60% of Etisalat shares and 39.5% of DU shares, the only two telecom companies operating in the country. This overlap of interests and power between state and corporate entities all but ensures that state authorities will have relatively easy access to VPN user data.
And this power dynamic is not limited to the UAE. Etisalat is present in four Arab countries, while Zain (34.4% owned by the Kuwaiti government), the other major regional telecom giant, is present in eight Arab countries. This indicates that they have major influence over Internet policy in these countries as well. So the new laws passed in the UAE can be exported, one way or another, to other countries in the MENA region.
Beyond enabling VOIP usage, VPNs have important accessibility and privacy functions, such as accessing blocked content and adding a layer of security to Internet browsing.
These features are important for users but could also have critical implications for the new law’s implementation. In practice — as with an encrypted messaging app — it is often impossible to track a user’s activities when he or she is using a VPN. A developer with a major open source VPN explained to ASL19: “Many types of VPN traffic can be detected by a network operator. If the VPN is using appropriate encryption, ISPs should not be able to easily identify what the user is doing through the VPN.”
This means that while Emirati Internet service providers (ISPs) can see if a customer is using a VPN, they cannot easily determine what services or websites that customer is accessing. Simply put, it may be impossible for authorities to determine whether or not a person is using a VPN for “criminal activity.”
In light of the increasing threats to digital access, online free expression and privacy in the MENA region, civil society must organize and work to defend the rights of Internet users. While the impact of such advocacy might fall on deaf ears in some countries, it has proven effective in other instances. When VOIP services were blocked in Morocco in January 2016, users’ boycotted telecom companies, launched online initiatives and started using VPNs to circumvent the blocking. Telecom companies rescinded their decision a few weeks later.
But the blocking was restored some months later, after telecom regulator ANRT upheld the ban in a controversial decision, ruling that VOIP services do not have licenses to operate in Morocco. ANRT’s decision was based on an outdated law from 2004 criminalizing the use of VOIP services for commercial purposes, not personal ones. Following the decision, there were calls from the public asking the king to intervene, but the ban remained.
At ASL19, an organization providing information access solutions for users in countries where surveillance and censorship are prevalent, our staff monitored the situation and began working to distribute circumvention tools. We saw a strange drop in the usage of some tools following the second ban. After investigating and receiving many comments on social media, we learned that users had fears about the prison sentence in the 2004 decree that regulates VOIP use, even though the law only applies to the commercial use of VPNs.
The Morocco case is indicative of the need to raise public awareness of digital rights. Educating Internet users about their digital rights — and their rights to organize, speak out, and demand stronger services and accountability from local telcos — will be critical in shaping the future of the Internet in the MENA region.

author: Guest Contributor


text:
Calls to Investigate Retribution Against the Tharu Community in Nepal’s Far West Grow Louder · Global Voices
Saprina Panday

A Tharu man from Nepal is on his way to do farm work on April 26, 2011. Image from Flickr by © ILO/ Pradip Shakya. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
The southern plains of Nepal, known as the Terai, are home to one half of Nepal's population. It is here where the Tharus, a historically marginalized community, have become victims of harsh retribution at the hands of the country's police forces, following the killing of nine people — eight security personnel and a child — a year ago.
An alarming report published by Amnesty International says at least 19 people have been detained in jail since that protest on August 24, 2015 turned violent, with no investigations launched into their alleged involvement.
Many feel that this is a classic example of ethnic-based discrimination that is endemic to the country, where political leaders in the capital turn a blind eye towards the plight of those who are not part of the the country's social elite.
@Nepal_RR While Madhesis and Tharus (mostly Hindus) are dying for their rights, the pro-Hindu nation leaders of Kathmandu are keeping quiet.
— Gautam Sakya (@sakyagm123) September 29, 2015
First their land was taken,then freedom 2live n now Tharus've been targeted 4extinction by these racist hill elites  https://t.co/0TVTmA9cSj
— Rewati R. Ray (@RewatiRay) July 20, 2016
According to Amnesty International’s South Asia director, Champa Patel, this type of treatment is not something new facing the Tharu community:
The Tharu community has long suffered marginalization and the denial of their human rights in Nepal. These cases are, sadly, not an aberration but form part of a longstanding pattern of police abuse against the Tharu community.
For the past seven years, Nepal's political instability, reflected in its infamous delays in drafting a constitution, has meant that groups on the fringe of society such as the Tharus and Madhesis have been stuck in a state of poverty and economic and social inertia. The constitution, pending since 2008, promised to include a federalist structure, which for many marginalized groups, meant a possibility for long-denied representation.
In Nepal's Far West, although the Tharus outnumber groups of a higher social caste such as the Brahmins and the Chhetris, they have not been represented in either politics, bureaucracy or security forces. The Tharuhat movement was the first group to demand representation by explicitly calling for a province for the Tharus by fusing two districts — Kailali and Kanchanpur. The Brahmin and Chhetri landowners feared the possibility of being taxed for the property they owned or losing it altogether should such a fusion happen.
In the spring of 2012, a group called the Akhanda Sudur Paschim (Undivided Far West) made the opposite demand: to merge into one province known as the Far West all nine provinces of the region, including the two demanded by the Tharuhat.
Tensions between the two groups brewed, erupting into sporadic clashes. But none reached the proportions of what happened in Tikkapur, Kailali in August 2015.
That's because the stakes this time were much higher.
Leading up to the incident, Nepal's four leading political parties controversially decided to fast-track the promulgation of a new constitution on the basis of needing to help Nepal's reconstruction following the devastating earthquakes of the spring. They agreed to a six-province federalism model on August 8, providing all groups with only a week to express their grievances by coming to Kathmandu.
At the same time, when violent protests erupted in the western part of the country — in Surkhet, Thori (Parsa), Baglung and Jumla — the government paid heed, by adding on a seventh province. Leading journalist Om Astha Rai suggested that this would have led the leaders of the Tharuhat movement to reasonably believe that violence would beget their political aim.
The incident in Tikkapur could have arguably been just another one of those protests, for which the Tharus would have been rewarded in similar kind. Except that they were not. After police fired tear gas into the crowd, some protesters attacked them, and the violence left nine dead.
Afterward, a curfew was imposed and more than 41 homes and shops belonging to Tharus — many of whom were leaders and supporters of the Tharuhat movement — were looted, burned and destroyed overnight. Supporters of the Akhanda Sudur Paschim were known to have participated in the attacks, but so far none of them have been detained.
On September 20, 2015, the new constitution was passed despite much controversy over several discriminatory provisions it contained.
A constitution that makes women unequal citizens & tramples on the aspirations of Dalit, Indigenous & Madhesi Nepalis is #NotMyConstitution.
— Manjushree Thapa (@manjushreethapa) September 13, 2015
Against this backdrop, many wonder why nothing is being done to remedy the situation.
If the demands of agitating Madhesis and Tharus are legitimate, why has the govt. not shown its readiness to amend the constitution? #Nepal
— PRAVEEN (@PrvnTweets) November 15, 2015
While a Human Rights Watch's report clarifies that violence between different communities has not been reported beyond the case of Tikkapur, it along with Amnesty International and Crisis Group call for a political solution, structural changes and thorough investigations in this particular instance.
In the meantime, mainstream media continues to paint Tharu protesters as violent without reporting details of police violence. The Tharu perspective on this state of affairs is summarized in the following tweets:
Tikapur, where 8 security personnel+1 child were killed. '10 months later, Tikapur appears calm.’ But for Tharus, it’s a “death-like” peace.
— Amish Mulmi (@amish973) July 20, 2016
ILL-treatment of Tharu community by Police!!https://t.co/G5hY9PaI8F pic.twitter.com/EHk1M0IDPn
— anand gupta (@dawnlilacs) July 23, 2016
After #Tikapur killings,19Tharus were arrested,tortured.Not 1person has been arrested for counter-violence on Tharus https://t.co/uH7QyU3Rmc
— Anurag Acharya (@Anurag_Acharya) July 21, 2016

author: Saprina Panday


text:
How the Vietnamese People Reacted to the South China Sea Ruling · Global Voices
Loa

Vietnamese activists demand China to comply with the ruling of the international tribunal. Source: Facebook
This edited article by Giang Nguyễn is from Loa, an independent news website and podcast that broadcasts stories about Vietnam. It is republished by Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
On July 12, the United Nation’s Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea have no grounds.
This is the area China has delineated by a nine-dash line across much of the South China Sea. If you’ve seen it on a map, it looks like the letter “U” or a tongue sticking out from the southern border of mainland China and that’s what the Vietnamese call it: lưỡi bò, cow’s tongue.
China and the Philippines had been locked in a heated standoff over rich fishing grounds at the Scarborough Shoal, a chain of reefs and islands in the South China Sea. The Philippines finally got fed up and, in January of 2013, it filed suit to the Permanent Court of Arbitration to challenge China’s aggressive territorial claims.
The legal basis for this ruling is rooted in a set of laws known by its acronym: UNCLOS, short for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas. China, the Philippines (and Vietnam) are all signatories to this body of law, which is designed to settle disputes.
The first take-away is that China’s claims of historic rights over the U-shaped area have no merit. When China signed on to UNCLOS, it relinquished any historic rights.
The second takeaway is that man-made islands do not merit an exclusive economic zone. In several instances, Beijing has tried to stake their claim by turning rocks and reefs into islands. That is, literally piling sand onto reefs and building ports and military installations on top.
UNCLOS — and the tribunal — however do not rule over who has sovereignty.
Skeptics are playing devil’s advocate and point out that despite China’s violations, the international community has no mechanism to make China comply with the ruling, without escalating tensions.
Vietnamese everywhere cheered on the ruling.
In Hanoi, activists under the “No-U” campaign called on Vietnamese citizens to come out to the Lake of the Returned Sword to show their support for the PCA.
On Sunday, July 17, a lot of people wore the No-U shirt. We were overjoyed to wear it because for the past five years, the Hanoi communist regime has painted people like us as subversive elements. So now that we have this PCA ruling, we’re so happy, because this judgement is recognized by the international community.
But activist Nguyễn Chí Tuyến, a member of the No-U campaign, tells Loa their joy did not last long.
The government sent security police from the districts and wards to walk and circle the meeting point. Anyone who wore a No-U shirt, they called for security forces with cars to sweep them up. It didn’t matter if a person who wore the No-U shirt was doing something wrong or not. They put them all on the trucks.
Tuyến says 40 to 50 demonstrators were rounded up and bussed away. They were released later that day.
In Saigon, several demonstrators who were prevented from assembling used a different tactic – they dispersed their messages on motorcycle. Groups of riders zipped through the streets, each biker with a passenger holding up a sign that read “China get out of Vietnam” and “Vietnam is an embarrassment compared to the Philippines.”
Now that Manila has laid the groundwork, many Vietnamese civil society organizations are calling for the government to strengthen its position and bring its own case against China, and to vigorously protect Vietnamese fishermen who have faced harassment at sea. But experts say that is unlikely, given Hanoi’s past reluctance to antagonize its communist neighbor.
Hanoi is unlikely to match its people’s forceful assertions. Mindful of the economic and political support it derives from Beijing, Hanoi will probably resolve to just issuing measured statements.
Listen to the podcast about the issue:

author: Loa