text:
Despite exile, Evo Morales’ influence in Bolivian politics endures · Global Voices
Melissa Vida

Evo Morales. Photo from Wikimedia Commons.
On January 18, 2020, the crowd at the inauguration of the Yacumo Technological Institute in northwest Bolivia was surprised by a familiar voice.
Through a microphone placed near a phone on speaker, former president Evo Morales, in exile since November 2019, said:
Lamento mucho todo lo que ha pasado, pero quiero decirles con mucho respeto que tenemos la obligación de unirnos y recuperar nuestro proceso de cambio.
I am very sorry for everything that has happened, but I want to tell you with great respect that we have the obligation to unite and reclaim our process of reform.
That wasn't the first time the former indigenous president showed up at an inauguration over the phone. In December 2019, Entre Ríos Deputy Governor Wálter Ferrufino called Morales on the phone during the opening ceremony of a market in the area. Weeks later, Ferrufino was detained for four hours at a Bolivian airport on his way to Argentina, where he was to attend a meeting with Morales and his Movement for Socialism (MAS) party.
El pueblo boliviano vuelve a llamar por teléfono a Evo Morales para que sea él quien inaugure una obra. Anteriormente inauguró una obra en la provincia Oconnor, razón por la que el Subgobernador se encuentra detenido. Esta ocasión la obra se inauguró en el departamento de Beni. pic.twitter.com/qBaKMfbTGu
— La Resistencia Bolivia (@ResistenciaBo) January 19, 2020
The Bolivian people call Evo Morales by phone once again so that he can inaugurate a project. He previously participated at the opening of a project in the Oconnor province, which is why the Deputy Governor is detained. This time the project is in the department of Beni.
Both phone calls attest to Morales's enduring influence in Bolivian politics despite his being in exile since he stepped down amid military pressure in November 2019.
Morales became the first-ever indigenous president of Bolivia — a country where more than 40 percent is of indigenous origin — in 2006. In November last year, he won his third reelection on a vote some international observers considered fraudulent. Protests against Morales erupted and, five weeks later, the army “advised” Morales to resign — an event that Morales and his supporters see as a coup d'etat. A wave of resignations within his party ensued.
In December, the Bolivian prosecution issued an arrest warrant for Morales on charges of “sedition and terrorism” after he allegedly threatened to “besiege cities” amid the protests against his reelection.
After the power vacuum left by MAS, the presidential line of succession pointed to Jeanine Añez, a right-wing opposition lawmaker and second vice-president of the Senate. Since her arrival to power as interim president, she has been accused of racism against indigenous peoples and of leading Bolivia into a “brutal right-wing regime” with fundamentalist Christian views.
New elections are scheduled for May 3. MAS’ presidential candidate is Luis Arce, Morales’ former Minister of Economy. Also running are MAS’ rivals Carlos Mesa and Jorge Quiroga, who ruled Bolivia between 2001 and 2005, as well as Añez. The elected candidate will be sworn in on August 6, when Bolivia celebrates Independence Day.
Morales, who first sought exile in Mexico before settling a month later in Argentina, has been accused by former Mexican President Felipe Calderon and Bolivia's interim president Jeanine Añez of contravening the Montevideo Treaty on asylum, which states that “asylum seekers will not be allowed to (…) participate in or influence political activities.”
Yet, neither Bolivia nor Mexico ratified the treaty, according to Mexico's Secretary of Interior, Olga Sánchez Cordero, and Mexico, under the government of leftist president Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador, has defended Morales’ right to “freedom of speech.” Since November, Bolivia's relations with Mexico and Argentina have soured.
Yerko Nuñez, Añez's right-hand man, considered Morales's phone calls at the inauguration “outrageous,” a “joke”  and a “usurpation of duties.”
Resulta jocoso, pero al mismo tiempo indignante, oír al expresidente inaugurar obras por teléfono. Usurpa funciones y agranda la lista de delitos por los que debe responder ante la justicia #boliviana.
— Yerko Núñez Negrette (@yerko_nunez) December 27, 2019
It is a joke, but at the same time an outrageous act, to hear the former president inaugurate projects by phone. You just usurp the functions and add to the list of crimes for which you must respond to the #bolivian justice.
- Yerko Núñez Negrette (@yerko_nunez) December 27, 2019
Morales sought to register as a candidate for the Senate in the upcoming elections on May 3, 2020, but the Bolivian Electoral Tribunal rejected his candidacy on the grounds that he did not meet the requirement of having permanent residency in Bolivia.
According to the analysis published in World Politics Review by columnist Frida Ghitis, Morales was the kingmaker behind the candidacy of Luis Arce, the former Minister of Economy who will represent MAS in the upcoming presidential elections.
Arce, who took political asylum in Mexico and Argentina along with Evo, and who is being investigated for corruption by the interim government, returned to Bolivia on January 28, 2020. A march in his support was held in La Paz on February 3 after his and David Choquehuanca's candidacies (the latter as vice-president) were accepted by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.
Some MAS leaders prefer Choquehuanca, who is indigenous, to run for president instead of Arce. Esperanza Calle, a journalist with the newspaper El Alteño, says that it seems that Morales does not want another indigenous leader to “overshadow him”:
La decisión de Evo, desató una serie de críticas por parte de los dirigentes que siempre apoyaron el partido azul y político del actual gobierno. Unos califican el hecho como “traición a las organizaciones sociales” y otros como una actitud de “soberbia” ya que supuestamente la exautoridad no quiere a nadie que la “haga sombra” en el campo indígena.
Evo's decision unleashed criticism from the leaders who have always supported the MAS party and the politics of the current government. Some describe his actions as a “betrayal of social organizations” and others as “arrogance” because the former authority supposedly does not want anyone to “overshadow” his indigenous status.
In January, Morales provoked outrage after he declared that “if I would return (…) we must organize, like the armed militias of the people in Venezuela.” He retracted his call three days later.
Following Morales's statement on his intentions to return to Bolivia, the Interior Minister of Bolivia's interim government, Arturo Murillo, said that Evo Morales “has a cell with his name” in the San Pedro de Chonchocoro jail in La Paz.
Columnist Ghitis says:
Con la fecha de las elecciones determinada y los partidos que están escogiendo sus candidatos, Morales esta luchando para guardar su influencia.
With the elections date already set and the parties choosing their candidates, Morales is struggling to keep his influence.


text:
Literature as a gateway for exploring Indian-Nepali hybridity: Interview with author Prajwal Parajuly · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Nepali-Indian author Prajwal Parajuly. Photo used with permission.
India and Nepal share a 1,750 km-long border that is open to people in both directions. This proximity has created a complex relationship of cultural and economic exchange as well as conflicts around issues of citizenship, border delimitation and the fine political balance with China and Pakistan.
To find out more about this relationship, I asked Indian-Nepali author Prajwal Parajuly, who writes about the different ways Nepali and Indian-Nepali identities are experienced around the world, his thoughts on the issue. The interview has been edited for brevity.
Filip Noubel: You are a Nepali-Indian English language author, grew up in Sikkim, and have been invited in March to the Paris Salon du Livre (Book Fair) to represent Indian literature. How do you relate to this mix of cultural and linguistic affiliations?
Cover of the French translation of Parajuly's novel “Land Where I Flee”. Image used with permission
Prajwal Parajuly (PP): I am of Indian of Nepalese heritage, with parents from two different countries. I also grew up in a former Himalayan kingdom—Sikkim, that was annexed by India in 1975. I think it’s perfectly okay to get goosebumps when one hears Jana Gana Mana, the Indian national anthem, but to feel more at home in Kathmandu, the Nepalese capital, than one does in any big Indian city. It’s okay to pledge allegiance to one country and have a lot in common with another.
I consider both English and Nepali my first languages. I think and dream in English but often pray in Nepali. Nepali is a beautiful language: I can speak endlessly about the onomatopoeic deliciousness you find in abundance in it. We laugh galala. We spit pyachcha. We sit thyaachakka. I have on more than one occasion called my novel “Land Where I Flee” a love letter to the Nepali language.
What a privilege it is to represent Indian literature at a book fair in Paris. I like this idea about a festival having a guest country of honour. It brings a spotlight on books one wouldn’t have ordinarily picked up, it brings up the importance of translations. Translations will keep the world sane.
FN: Your first published book, “The Gurkha’s Daughter”, is a collection of short stories describing the life of Nepali people, including in the diaspora, and spans from Bhutan to New York. Your second book, “Land Where I Flee”, takes place in Sikkim but is also a story about exile and homecoming, and touches upon issues of gender definition. Why are mixed or shifting identities such an important source of your inspiration?
PP: Let me tell you a story. In 2001, a group of us visited Bombay and Goa. It was an exciting time, but we often confronted confused looks from “heartland” Indians. Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim, may loosely rhyme with “Bangkok,” but that was still no reason for a fellow Indian not to know where it was. We were thought of as being from Thailand or Bhutan. Many Indians didn’t even know that Sikkim was a part of India. Anyone who grows up in the northeast of the country will have encountered questions of identity more than the average Indian. There’s no escaping it for the Nepali-Indian who has to stress her nationality every time she mentions her ethnicity. That’s the reason a map prefaces every story in “The Gurkha’s Daughter” and why all editions of “Land Where I Flee” also have maps. It was as much to inform my reader in Missouri as it was for the benefit of my average Indian reader. The northeast is almost always a footnote in the average Indian’s consciousness.
I've always been fascinated by gender identity, by fluidity in sexual identity. “Land Where I Flee” has a eunuch character. I can think of at least two other books that were published in the last several years with prominent eunuch characters. I think every South Asian wants to write about eunuchs.
Kathmandu's iconic Boudhanath, one of the largest stupas in Nepal. Photo by Filip Noubel, used with permission.
FN: Who are, according to you, the Nepali and Indian authors who deserve more global attention, possibly translation, according to you?
PP: Where do I begin? Narayan Wagle, who is likely the biggest-selling Nepali-language writer in the world, deserves to be translated widely. I would also mention Nepali-language writer Indra Bahadur Rai. Tashi Choppel, whose “How to Collect a Folktale“, was recently published by Rachna Publications, deserves global readers. He’s undoubtedly one of the best poets in the country. Others include Chetan Raj Shrestha, Sandip Roy and Sumana Roy. For us to understand Nepal through non-fiction, Sujeev Shakya’s Unleashing the Vajra is a must-read. I am also looking forward to Amish Raj Mulmi’s new book on Nepal and China. Sanu Lama and Bir Bikram Gurung—Nepali-language writers from Sikkim and Darjeeling—also deserve a worldwide readership.
Street scene in Kathmandu. Photo by Filip Noubel, used with permission.
FN: Your books have been and are being translated. How close do you work with your translators?
PP: I work very closely with the translators. I enjoy the process, a translator’s interpretation of my work. Benoîte Dauvergne, my French translator, and I had worked before for a wonderful French magazine called Jentayu. Collaborating with her on “Fuir et revenir” felt like being reunited with a close friend. My parents translated my book into Nepali. My characters often speak in Nepali, so for their conversation to be rendered in English by me entailed a process of translation. In many ways, my translators are translating conversations that are already translated. Translators are such amazing people. To translate is a selfless act.
Bookstore in Patan city near Kathmandu. Photo by Filip Noubel, used with permission.
FN: What’s the reading culture like in India and Nepal now? We hear about independent bookstores struggling in the West. Are things any different in South Asia?
PP: You’ve caught me at a strange time. I just discovered that pirated copies of my books have infiltrated the market. I guess I should be flattered because the bottom line is that people are reading. Of the hundreds of challenges I face as a writer, I never thought tackling counterfeit copies would be right up there. I have spent the last few days exchanging emails with my publishers and distributors about what actions they will take. It is a most exciting time to be a writer in India if the proliferation of literary festivals is any indication. I am amazed by what I see at Rachna Books, my hometown bookstore. The store has become a tourist destination. Imagine a bookstore being on every must-visit list! People are reading, and books sell. When in Kathmandu recently, I went to Nepalaya, my Nepali-language publishers, and saw that the Nepali translation of “The Gurkha’s Daughter” had sold over 10,000 copies. Isn’t that wonderful? The book being read by the very people it was about in the very language the characters speak in? Heart-warming. The book has reached the most remote corners of Nepal.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Filip Noubel


text:
Mitrovica Rock School unites young Albanians and Serbs in a segregated Kosovo city · Global Voices
Balkan Diskurs

Performance by the band The Moonage at the 2019 Skopje Summer School concert. (Source: Mitrovica Rock School Facebook page)
This story by Jose Carpintero Molina and Arolda Elbasani was originally published on Balkan Diskurs, a project of the Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC). An edited version is republished by Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
International interventions in the Balkans, which include ample funding for conflict prevention and reconciliation activities, have prompted a sprawling ‘industry’ of civil society initiatives. However, these are typically vulnerable to international funding or directed at donor priorities and focused on building capacities to thrive in the world of grants. Not surprisingly, donor sponsored organizations are often perceived as ‘foreign agents’ and/or representing a specific ethnic group, which hampers their potential role as actors working for and bridging divided communities.
Amidst the few civic initiatives that have succeeded in transforming themselves into popular centers that thrive and expand upon the demand of citizens from different ethnic groups is the Mitrovica Rock School. It started as a typical, internationally-sponsored project in 2008, and became an independent NGO in 2012 thanks to funding from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Moreover, working in a city marked by deep divisions – separate spaces, government services, phone lines, schools, and currencies, as well as occasional cases of violence –has not been easy. According to Dren Puka, the director of research at the Kosovar Civil Society Foundation, communal divisions pose clear limits to common civic action:
One of the main characteristics that defines Mitrovica is the absence of hope… Once you return home after participating in an activity, you are surrounded by the fear that is used to keep the city isolated.
Wendy Hassler-Forest, program manager and regional representative for the Dutch foundation Musicians without Borders, and  one of the foreign founders of the school, agrees:
Working in a place where people can’t even meet is tricky. I came to realize that people on the two sides of Mitrovica really don’t know anything about each other.
Some of the joint inter-ethnic activities of the Mitrovica Rock School at first took place in Skopje, the capital of neighboring North Macedonia, as a safe and in a way ‘neutral ground’ where kids who usually didn't venture on the other side of the river in their hometown felt safe to interact with their peers from the other community.
Despite such obstacles, the school has gradually succeeded in bringing together Albanians and Serbs, who rarely cross over to one another’s side of the city, to create music. Since its founding 12 years ago, the school can boast of hosting approximately 1,300 students, creating 49 multi-ethnic bands, organizing several well-attended concerts, and maintaining a sustainable program – all while enjoying the popularity of a multi-ethnic hub in Kosovo and beyond. In 2019 alone, 112 students participated in 1,782 skills acquisition lessons and 179 band coaching sessions. 10 mixed bands performed 96 rehearsals and 13 concerts in North and South Mitrovica, Prishtina, Leposavic, Brezovica, Novo Selo, Skopje, and Belgrade.
The school was founded under the motto “We restore Mitrovica’s proud music heritage, together”, connoting a rich, even if often forgotten, past when Mitrovica was a multicultural hub with a rich cultural scene. By promoting a specific focus – an interest in rock music – the organizers appeal to the individual tastes of adolescents from different communities and emphasize mutual respect and tolerance rather than communal links.
This focus translates into a range of appealing activities – daily lessons, training weeks, workshops, and concerts as well as the opportunity to create musical groups – all of which typically involve a variety of influences by members of different communities. Since 2015, the school has been helping its mixed bands record their songs and set up rehearsals in joint venues across both north and south Kosovo, a development that was unthinkable when the school was created in 2008. Hassler-Forest explains the power of music to transcend divisive politics:
When you place two people in a band together, then you suddenly have Jelena the singer with Dren the guitarist writing an amazing new song that has nothing to do with politics. They’ve transcended it.
Mitrovica Rock School band, Proximity Mine, at the rehearsal studio. (Photo: Andy Aitchison)
Indeed, the school has helped to forge an atmosphere of trust, and even friendship, between its participants and beyond. According to one of the school’s local directors, Milizza:
Over time, you see students who truly connected to form strong friendships…[But] it took us a long time to get to where we are now.
Given that security is of major concern to Mitrovica citizens, it is apparent that the school has struggled to create a safe and suitable space where members of various communities can come together to create music.
[Initially] we found a location, the basement of the Cultural Center, which is immediately next to the main bridge… we hoped that youth from the two sides would come there for music lessons. But this was naïve. People in Mitrovica don’t cross the bridge, especially not for something like music lessons.
The organizers then decided to invite young musicians to attend a summer school in Skopje, North Macedonia where young people from different communities were free to meet, form bands, rehearse, and, ultimately, perform a concert together. Upon their return to Mitrovica, students asked for a meeting place in their town. Hassler-Forest recalls:
When the kids came back to Mitrovica, they demanded a school in their own town. We then decided to restructure the project. One [school] on each side but where we brought the kids together for regular summer schools, training weeks, and tours.
And, thus, two branches were born – one in the North and one in the South.
Performance by the band Slow Molow at the 2019 Skopje Summer School concert. (Source: Mitrovica Rock School Facebook page)
The form of mixed local and international management has also enabled this project to advance, allowing for sensitivity to the subtleties of the local situation while also providing an adequate distance from it.
At rock school, we’ve always had a core management team consisting of one local from each side plus one international to support a mixed team of local teachers. So, we keep each other in balance.
Stimulating local demand, however, has taken a lot of time and patience. Organizers continue to manage safe transport for participants from one part of the city to the other, but, with the passing time, more and more students have started to organize their own transport or even prefer walking, which is a clear indication of the growing inter-connectivity and trust. Students have also become more confident in advertising their common activities, songs, and concerts on social media, a radical change from just a few short years ago when such promotion came with a fear of repercussion.
As local director Milizza notes,
When we ended up having a concert in Mitrovica last year, everyone participated. Honestly, I was myself a bit surprised, especially when I saw how supportive the parents were….The hardest work is to proceed slowly and stick around. Not to expect quick results.

author: Balkan Diskurs


text:
A renaissance is underway for Mongolia’s literature lovers · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

The landmark Gandan monastery in the centre of the Mongolian capital Ulaanbaatar. Photo (c): Filip Noubel,  used with permission
Sandwiched between Russia and China, Mongolia is a large but sparsely populated country whose long and bitterly cold winters provide ample time for reading. As Mongolia marks the 30th anniversary of its transition from state socialism to a free market economy, its publishing market has evolved to reflect the priorities of a more internationally connected society.
Bookshelves in Ulaanbaatar are heaving with international literature in translation, and new local authors writing in their native language. So, what are Mongolians reading?
In 1924, Mongolia became the world's second country after the Soviet Union to adopt state socialism as its ideology. Its ties to Moscow were so close, and its relations with its southern neighbour China so frosty, that Mongolia was often described in the 20th century as the “16th Soviet Republic” (the Soviet Union itself comprised 15). That all changed in 1990, when from January to March, Mongolia underwent its own glasnost-inspired revolution, embracing a democratic system based on political plurality and market economy.
One of the sectors deeply affected by the sudden changes was publishing. Under socialism, the content of books, newspapers, and magazines was tightly censored and shaped by ideological control from Moscow. With the revolution, that system collapsed. The resulting free-for-all meant greater freedom of expression, but it also spelled an end to state subsidies for book production and distribution. According to Bayasgalan Batsuuri, a writer and literary translator who co-founded the independent Tagtaa Publishing house:
After the democratic revolution of 1990, due to the closure of the state owned publishing factory, we experienced a whole decade of dark years. We had nothing to read but leftover books from the socialist period. But from early 2000, several private companies emerged and started to rebuild the industry. Now we have five big private publishing companies, and more than 40 independent publishing houses. I think that today, the publishing industry is one of the rising sectors of Mongolia.
Example of the traditional Mongolian alphabet. Photo (c): Filip Noubel, used with permission.
Therefore, the outlook appears positive. But there are obstacles. While there are over six million Mongolian speakers in the world, the Mongolian language book market is sharply divided because of differences in alphabets. Mongolia uses a Cyrillic alphabet, imposed by Moscow in 1940, which is used by the country's three million inhabitants.
Meanwhile, around six million Mongols live in China, roughly half of whom speak their ancestral language. China is also home to the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, where the traditional Mongolian alphabet is in official use. Also known as “Bichig,” it was inspired by the old Uyghur script, and is written in vertical lines from top to bottom.
According to a survey conducted by Batsuuri in 2019, over 600 books are published every year in Mongolia, for an average price of 7.5 US dollars for paperbacks, and 14 USD for hardbacks. This makes books rather expensive, given that the average monthly salary is below 400 USD.
The same survey mentions that nearly two thirds of these titles are domestic works and one third are translations. Most readers are aged between 21 and 38.
The majority of bookshops are concentrated in the capital Ulaanbaatar where over one-third of the country's population lives. Nevertheless, online reading and ebooks are also taking off.
Two major topics of interest seem to shape reading habits in Mongolia: national history and big names in global literature. The first is related to a legacy of heavy censorship under state socialist rule. After Stalinist purges in the late 1930s that led to the death of over 30,000 “enemies of the people” or ideological opponents, the Mongolian Communist Party imposed a rewriting of national identity that erased large parts of the country's history, Buddhist culture, literature, and art. Many Mongolians are still rediscovering forbidden parts of their heritage today, thus prompting a large demand for books about history and traditions, as Baatsuri explains:
Historical novels are more popular: after centuries of external pressure and lost identities, our people have an inevitable need to recover their national from their history.
Publisher and translator Bayasgalan Batsuuri holds a Mongolian translation of Chinese author Yu Hua. Photo used with permission.
Similarly, Batsuuri makes sense of the popularity of translated literature by way of Mongolia's historical traditions:
Mongolia has a very rich history of translation. The first recorded translations are from the third century BCE, when our ancestors translated mainly religious manuscripts from Sanskrit, Uyghur, Tibetan, Chinese, Persian, and Arabic classical literature. During the socialist period, Russian classics and Soviet literature were translated under strict censorship.
These days, Mongolians are free to travel, migrate, and publish leading figures from contemporary world literature. Japan's Murakami Haruki, Turkey's Orhan Pamuk, and China's Yu Hua are all popular choices, as are the world classics such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Ernest Hemingway, and Fyodor Dostoevsky.
Consequently, Mongolians have access to a greater choice of literature than ever before. Many of these names would have been unthinkable under socialism. But what has been gained in diversity is sometimes lost in the quality of these translations, warns Oyunzul Ariunbold, a 24-year-old translator and literary activist who ran a book club for several years in Ulaanbaatar.
Translator Oyunzul Ariunbold. Photo (c): Namuunsuren Tsendsuren, used with permission.
Before 1990, the state commissioned translations. That meant that the books had high standards: there was meticulous editing and proofreading. Today, some people say that the quality of books has gone down, and that translated works can be unreadable, blaming young translators. There is some truth in this criticism, but it’s getting better. And I'm just grateful that a reading culture is growing amongst young people, so that for example, my niece can read “To Kill a Mockingbird” in Mongolian.
Ariunbold agrees that Mongolia's independent publishers are aiming for true diversity:
A lot of emphasis is given to modern classics. Basically, we are just catching up with modern literature. One publishing house, for example, publishes only one author per country per year, to avoid ending up offering only white male authors from Europe.
Despite steep prices, and the variety of other forms of entertainment available now with the internet, cable television, Mongolians value paper books. Mongolia's reading culture seems strongly established, particularly as self-published books enjoy great popularity, as Batsuuri explains:
In our culture, books are very respected, and during the Soviet period, the reading culture developed intensively. For a population of three million, our national bestselling record was 95,000 copies: a book by a Mongolian author who self-published. In 2019, our company published Yu Hua's novel “To live” (活着) and we've already sold 12,000 copies.
Image designed by Oyunzul for her Book Club Facebook page. “I protest, Dostoyevsky is immortal,” reads this quote from Russian author Mikhail Bulgakov's famous novel, The Master and Margarita. Used with permission.
Oyunzul Ariunbold shares this impression:
Nobody expected “Madonna in a Fur Coat,” by Turkish author Sabahattin Ali, to become so popular, and yet it did. People are in need of emotional books, stories of vulnerability when society expects them to be tough and stoic. People are definitely using their phones and tablets to read, but we still have huge respect for paperbacks.
Perhaps the biggest change in Mongolia's reading culture in recent years has come from the phenomenon of self-publishing. As poet and journalist Yesunerdene Tumurbaatar explained to Global Voices:
If you have a bit of money, it's easy to print your own book yourself. Usually people print a thousand, then either sell them directly to bookstores or at their own events.
We organise events where we read poetry and perform music. That's how I sold two collections of my poems.
For now, at least, it seems that Mongolians have plenty to take their minds off those punishing winters.


text:
YouTuber in Mozambique kidnapped after denouncing a self-proclaimed prophet · Global Voices
Dércio Tsandzana

Screengrab of the YouTube page of “Beleza em pessoa.” made by the author
The Mozambican YouTuber Arsénio Amós was kidnapped on 5 February supposedly in retaliation for one of his videos. He was released the following day through the help of the police.
Known online as “Beleza em Pessoa”, Arsénio is recognized for humorously discussing various issues on his channel, with emphasis on social and political life in Mozambique. His channel “Arte & Vida” (Art and Life) has over 80 thousand subscribers, making it one of the country’s most popular YouTube channels.
In his recent videos, Arsénio commented on how Mozambican self-proclaimed “prophets” accumulate wealth by lying on their religious teachings. One of them focuses on the irregularities in the religious activity of Joe Williams, a Mozambican self-proclaimed prophet who today is suspected of being involved in the YouTuber’s kidnapping.
On 6 February, after the kidnapping of Arsenio, an audio attributed to Williams in which he threatened the young YouTuber was shared across social networks.
In another video published on 25 January, the YouTuber highlighted the fact that some of these ‘prophets’ did not like his channel’s approach and that he had received death threats.
Screengrab of the newspaper Notícias, 7 February
In the following days, photos began to circulate showing Arsénio Amós in handcuffs at a Maputo police station. In the photos, Joe Williams could be seen talking to a police officer.
On 7 February, the country's largest newspaper, Notícias, reported that the Williams had been arrested for attempted kidnapping. The police said they were already following his movements, and had been alerted by undisclosed sources that he was with the captive YouTuber in a car.
At the time of publication, Williams was in police custody. He is the prime suspect for being behind the kidnapping, and will also be investigated for “illegal accumulation of wealth” and corruption.
This phenomenon of prophets is not exclusive to Mozambique as it's also being reported in several African countries. They promise cures for diseases and resurrection after death and are usually linked to churches whose origins are unknown.
The photos that circulated soon after the incident showed the YouTuber with his mouth shut with tape, to which Zarito Mutana, a Facebook user, reacted:
Muito triste que fizeram com o Blogueiro “Beleza em pessoa” recebi muitas fotos que nao dignifican [sic] a nossa polícia, aquilo parece se, ser um rapto que uma detenção, espero estar errado porém, acho que trata-se de uma vingança do Joe William contra o jovem.
Alguém deve parar esse mostro, alguém deve parar de chamar este mostro nas TV`s, alguém deve dizer basta ao Joe William…
Very sad what they did to the blogger “Beleza em pessoa”… I hope I’m wrong, but I think it is Joe William’s revenge against the young man.
Someone should stop this monster, someone should stop calling this monster on television, someone should just tell Joe Williams “enough”…
The politician and television commentator, Domingos Gundana, criticized the way the YouTuber was detained.
NÃO ALGEMEM A LIBERDADE DE EXPRESSÃO!
Bom dia amigos meus e amigos de meus amigos, espero que esteja tudo bem com cada um de vocês, onde estiverem.
Estou postando as imagens abaixo desta escrita com profunda indignação, apesar de não ter todos os detalhes dos contornos que levaram ao tal Profeta a sair da essência do ser homem de Deus para o mundano.
Mas porque as imagens já rodam o mundo, torna dificil, ficar indiferente. Já se previa que o jovem tal Profeta, disso não é, mas pelo menos se sabe que ele conhece a palavra de Deus, e se isso for verdade, então se esqueceu do dito, ” PERDOAI A QUEM VOS TEM OFENDIDO, PARA QUE O VOSSO PAI DO CEU, POSSA PERDOAR AS VOSSAS OFENSAS” ou a outra ” AQUELE QUE NUNCA PECOU, ATIRE A PRIMEIRA PEDRA”.
Imagine se o Nyusi, Guebuza, Chisaano, Dhlakama ou Ossufo, saissem por ai a processar ou mandar prender todos os que lhes falam cada coisa, as cadeias ja nao tinham espaços .
Imagine se os Bispos da Universal fossem assim, saindo por ai a processar cada pessoa que os fala contra ou contra suas acções e de suas Igrejas.
Este tal de Profeta, vai calar a boca de todos nesta pátria? Mas ele é o primeiro que chama os irmaos de futxeka, de pobres, e faz videos estupendos.
Libertem o jovem Beleza em pessoa e deixem ele fazer o seu trabalho de informar.
Viva a liberdade e abaixo ignorância.
Lord bless
DON’T SHACKLE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Imagine if the Universal Bishops were like that, going around suing everybody who speaks against them or against their actions and those of their churches.
This so-called Prophet, is he going to shut everybody up in this country? But he's the first one who calls his brothers futxeka, poor people, and makes stupendous videos.
Release the young Beleza em Pessoa and let him do his job of informing [people].
Long live freedom and down with ignorance.
A similar comment was made by the journalist and historian Euclid Flavio:
ÁPICE DO ANADMISSIVEL
Penso que o Profeta joel williams, já esta a exagerar. Nestas imagens podemos ver o Blogueiro DA BELEZA EM PESSOA, submetido a situações de tortura antes de chegar nas autoridades de Justiça, supostamente porque o Blogueiro, terá manchado a HONRA E BOM NOME do nosso Profeta.
Isto não podemos admitir. Que se faça algo. É preciso compreender que Da Beleza não é assassino, é um profissional “Honesto”. Isto não. Repito: não.
APEX OF UNACCEPTABILITY
I think the Prophet Joel Williams is already exaggerating. In these images we can see the blogger BELEZA EM PESSOA, subjected to torture before reaching the authorities of Justice, supposedly because the blogger has stained the HONOUR AND GOOD NAME of our Prophet.
We can't allow this. Something must be done. You have to understand that Da Beleza is not a killer, he's an “honest” professional. Not this. I repeat, no.
Much has been speculated over the origin of Williams’ wealth, which is still unknown.
Others have suggested that the kidnapping happened in retaliation not for the criticisms made by the YouTuber, but for the non-fulfillment of a supposed contract between Williams and Arsenio for the YouTuber to speak well of him on his channel, although this is only speculation. This possibility was raised by journalist Virgílio Conjo:
Contractar serviços de acessória de imagem é normal. Mas, tal deve ser feito dentro de um contracto com as cláusulas bem definidas: objectivo comunicacional, Target, formatos e por aí.
Os blogueiros, apresentadores de Rádio e televisão estão a prestar um mau serviço de acessória as figuras públicas em benefício das soupinhas. O que eles não sabiam é que um dia o feitiço vira contra o feiticeiro.
Eles, durante muito tempo ajudaram JW a sair das merdinhas nem!… e, não tardou, não tendo mais espaço para tanta merda JW atacou os próprios blogueiros…
Contracting services for image enhancement is normal. But, this must be done within a contract with well defined clauses: communication purpose, Target, formats and so on.
Bloggers and radio and television presenters are providing a poor service to public figures for the benefit of donations. What they didn't know is that one day the spell turns against the wizard.
They, for a long time, helped JW to get out of the shit… and, without delay, not having room for so much shit, JW attacked the bloggers themselves…

author: Dércio Tsandzana


text:
An Italian national is the index case patient of COVID-19 disease in Nigeria · Global Voices
Nwachukwu Egbunike

Lagos skyline, February 28, 2015. Photo by Clara Sanchiz/RNW via Flickr CC BY 2.0.
On February 27, Nigeria’s Minister of Health, Dr. E. Osagie Ehanire confirmed the index case of COVID-19 coronavirus disease in Lagos, Nigeria.
In a press statement, Dr. Ehanire declared the first established patient as “an Italian citizen who works in Nigeria and returned from Milan, Italy, to Lagos, Nigeria,” on February 25, 2020. Based on a diagnostic report from the Virology Laboratory of the Lagos University Teaching Hospital, the minister further asserted that the “patient is clinically stable, with no serious symptoms, and is being managed at the Infectious Disease Hospital in Yaba, Lagos.”
Consequently, the Nigerian government has activated a multi-sectoral Coronavirus Preparedness Group under the leadership of the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) to “work closely with the Lagos State Health authorities to respond to this case and implement firm control measures,” according to Dr. Ehanire.
As of February 27, China has reported a total of 78,630 cases of COVID-19 with 2,747 deaths.
Director-General of the World Health Organisation (WHO), Dr. Tedros Adhanom, stated that the world is “at a decisive point” in this pandemic because the “number of new cases reported in the rest of the world, has exceeded the number of new cases in China”:
Outside China, there are now 3,474 cases in 44 countries, and 54 deaths. … And in the past 24 hours, seven countries have reported cases for the first time: Brazil, Georgia, Greece, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan and Romania.
The BBC stated that as of February 26, Italy has witnessed a total of 400 reported cases of COVID-19 so far. This is a dramatic spike from 80 cases the previous day.  Although the outbreak is focused on a small cluster of towns – Lombardy (near Milan) and Veneto (near Venice),— “the outbreak has killed 12 people,” the BBC reported.
Italy has also been the source of the spread to “a growing list of countries around the world,” Reuters further reported. Israel recently barred “entry to non-Israelis who had visited Italy in the past two weeks.”
Lagos, with an estimated population of 21 million people, the largest city in Africa and the seventh fastest-growing city in the world, is an epidemiological nightmare.
VIDEO: How travellers undergo screening for #coronavirus at #Lagos airport #COVID19 pic.twitter.com/LuQMNc5c7X
— TheCable (@thecableng) February 27, 2020
The swift response of Nigeria’s health ministry is commendable. However, the laboratory diagnosis report of the index case in Nigeria became available on February 27 — two days after the infected Italian traveler arrived in Lagos. The Port Health Services should have been more proactive in sharing this news, considering that COVID-19 had witnessed an exponential rise in Italy over the past few weeks.
Now the real work of fast and accurate contact tracing is imperative, considering that Lagos is a commercial hub in Nigeria. The likelihood of a rapid spread to other parts of the country is a looming possibility.
Netizens are already making efforts to quell any form of misinformation from generating undue panic following the entry of COVID-19 into Nigeria:
Everybody's now an epidemiologist & infectious diseases expert.
Please, just practice good hygiene. Spread facts, not panic. Let the experts do their job. Share only verified information.
COVID19 is a flu virus with very low mortality.
Stupid people are deadlier than the virus
— A Fokken Queen! ? (@cremechic11) February 28, 2020
It's better to share hygiene tips rather than inducing mass hysteria:
As Nigeria confirms first case of Coronavirus in Lagos, this is all you need to know about the virus and how to play safe. Don't panic!!! ⚠ #coronavirusnigeria pic.twitter.com/KVon7k6CxN
— Ondo First Born® (@OndoFirstBorn) February 28, 2020
Another netizen also cautioned against hysteria:
Coronavirus confirmed in Nigeria. ??
To be honest, Nigeria did a good job monitoring so far as I expected it sooner.
But now I am afraid of the panic, fake news and hysteria among our older citizens.
Times like this I wish I still did Reason Am.
Abi make I quick voice sontin??
— Ruona J. Meyer (@RGAMeyer) February 28, 2020
In July 2014, Nigerians were thrown into a similar panic when the country recorded its index Ebola case. Patrick Sawyer, an American Liberian who had nursed a sick Ebola relative in Liberia, collapsed in the Lagos airport upon arriving Nigeria. He was rushed to hospital where he was initially treated for malaria. He died some days later. Sawyer was diagnosed with Ebola days before his death.
On October 20, 2014, however, WHO declared Nigeria Ebola-free. Nigeria overcame the most explosive Ebola outbreak that started in Lagos through epidemiological ground-level work. It was so unprecedented that even the usually measured WHO declared the feat “a piece of world-class epidemiological detective work.”
Nigeria kicked Ebola, that gives so much hope we'll handle Corona virus too. Wishing all the health workers involved safe operations. Can't be easy knowing you can be infected with just one slip.
— Mngusuul Uji (@brendauji) February 28, 2020
The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) — the institution empowered to respond and track cases of infectious outbreaks in Nigeria — is prepared for this outbreak.
Nigeria has its first Coronavirus case. My prediction: their experience with Polio and Ebola are going to result in them handling this more competently than most Western democracies. https://t.co/PFmVGLKZw1
— Shelby Grossman (@shelbygrossman) February 28, 2020
Amy Maxmen writing for Nature, a research journal, stated that in the past two years, the NCDC head, Chikwe Ihekweazu, has “more than doubled the size of the NCDC staff, set up a network of molecular-biology labs across the country” in order “to diffuse the threat that an epidemic in Nigeria poses for the rest of the world.”
We are dealing with a new virus. There are 47 countries that have reported at least 1 case
A case is not a sign of failure. Our @NCDCgov was set up for situations like this. We are working 24/7 with the relevant state governments
Please avoid rumours & panic#FactsNotFear pic.twitter.com/k5kIXJDNL1
— Chikwe Ihekweazu (@Chikwe_I) February 28, 2020
Time will tell if Nigeria will surpass and curtail this COVID-19 pandemic as it did with the Ebola outbreak.
the global impact of COVID-19

author: Nwachukwu Egbunike


text:
Battered by criticism, Abe government scrambles to save Japan from COVID-19 · Global Voices
Nevin Thompson

“147 days until the start of the Tokyo Olympics.” Image from Akira, an animated movie set in 2019, in a Tokyo set to host the Olympics under the looming threat of an apocalypse has been widely shared on social media recently — as of February 28, the start of the 2020 Olympic games is 147 days away.
As Japan's eighth death from COVID-19 was confirmed, the Abe government has come under increasing pressure from domestic and international critics to contain the coronavirus that causes the disease. The gathering momentum of the outbreak in Japan and around the world has left the Japanese government with few effective tools against COVID-19, and has raised the spectre of cancelling the Tokyo Olympics, which are due to start in just five months.
After instructing citizens to avoid crowded places and large-scale events such as music concerts to be postponed, and even extending the deadline for spring tax returns, the Japanese recently government took its boldest step yet against COVID-19 by “requesting” all public elementary schools to close until April 8, 2020.
The directive, if followed, will keep 13 million students across Japan at home in what has been described as an unprecedented move by the Japanese government since the Second World War. In order to prevent the spread of COVID-19, Tokyo Disneyland also made the drastic decision to shut down, a situation not seen since the devastating earthquakes and tsunamis of March 11, 2011.
The Abe government's school closure plan was immediately criticized. Echoing the concerns of other public health experts, Yoshida Masaki, the chairman of the Japanese Society for Environmental Infection (JSEI) and a member of the government's own COVID-19 expert panel, said:
ただ、感染が起きている地域での休校は感染を広めないためにはよいと思うが、感染が起きていない地域で同じ対応をとることにどれほどの効果があるかはわからない。子どもたちが外に出歩き、友だちと遊んでしまっては効果は下がるだろうし、現時点で評価することは難しい。
In the sense of preventing human-to-human transmission in areas where there is already the presence of COVID-19, closing schools might help reduce transmission. However, closing schools where the virus is not present will not make any difference at all. Also, (even with schools closed) kids will go out play, so it's hard to determine if school closures will actually work.
Ogi Naoki, a media personality and a prominent commentator on education, also remarked that the elementary school closure would be very difficult on dual-income families, who would likely be unable to arrange childcare. Meanwhile, bureaucrats and policymakers, who had not been consulted by the directive, continued to express “confusion and anger.”
The potential chaos caused by the school closures was demonstrated by the decision of a large number of nurses at a Hokkaido hospital to remain at home to look after their children:
Good job everybody. We created a nursing shortage during a medical emergency. pic.twitter.com/aDBQyNRPJA
— Chris Pearce (@clpearce) February 27, 2020
Chyron translation: Obihiro Hospital: Approximately 170 nurses (20 percent of nursing staff) unable to appear for shifts because of childcare responsibilities.
The Abe government's haste to appear to be taking measures against COVID-19 may be in part from increasing criticism both at home and abroad about its initial efforts to contain the disease during the quarantine of cruise ship Diamond Princess in Yokohama which began on February 4.
The cruise ship quarantine resulted in a mushrooming number of COVID-19 infections aboard the ship, and anger over perceived lack of proper medical procedures by Japanese medical staff assigned to test and monitor passengers and crew.
It also came to light that staff assigned to the Diamond Princess were sent back to work in hospitals and in government offices without testing for infection by COVID-19.
TBS reports that most of the Japanese health ministry employees who had been on board the Diamond Princess ship — not clear how many — have skipped the coronavirus screening tests due to the fear of positive results. #COVID19 https://t.co/QuHWEIDdoX
— Thoton Akimoto (@Thoton) February 22, 2020
Testing on medical staff was abandoned after it became apparent that, with a potentially high number of medical and government workers incapacitated, positive results for COVID-19 would mean there would be no way to get any work done.
After paying a visit to the quarantined Diamond Princess, Iwata Kentaro, an infectious disease expert, made a video of what he saw, claiming medical staff were “violating all infection control principles.” After his viral video provoked a firestorm in Japan and around the world, Iwata deleted it.
“My intention […] was to change what was happening inside the cruise ship, and my intention was not to criticize anybody,” Iwata later explained in a press conference, when asked why he removed the video.
However, political damage to the Japanese government had already been done. Masuzoe Yoichi, a former Health Minister who was ousted as Governor of Tokyo over an expenses scandal in 2016, fired a broadside in English at his former friends in government:
As former Health Minister who coped with H1NI flu successfully in 2009 , I am much concerned about poor performance of the Japanese Gov't facing coronavirus. No commander capable of crisis management and no mobilization of human resources. Look at the cruise ship(Petri dishes).
— 舛添要一 (@MasuzoeYoichi) February 22, 2020
A few days later, the New York Times weighed in on Japan's response to COVID-19. In an English-language opinion piece published on February 26, Koichi Takano, a political scientist and the dean of Faculty of Liberal Arts at Sophia University in Tokyo, stated that “the leaders’ sense of entitlement breeds indifference and incompetence” when dealing with COVID-19. This “incompetence,” Takano says, combined with “institutional inertia” in the bureaucracy (“sound the alarm about an impending crisis and you might be blamed for causing it,” Takano writes) have caused a crisis in Japan.
Adding further pressure to the Abe government to successfully deal with COVID-19 were remarks widely reported around the world by Dick Pound, a senior official with the International Olympic Committee, that Japan has “three months to decide the fate of the Olympics,” to be held in Tokyo starting July 24.
Japanese Twitter noticed the similarities between a Tokyo 2020 Olympics plagued with the growing threat of a pandemic and the animated film Akira. In the 1988 film, a post-apocalyptic and chaotic Neo-Tokyo is preparing to host the Olympic games in 2019.
On February 28, “Just cancel it!” (#中止だ中止), a line from Akira about the cancellation of the fictional Olympics, accompanied by a screenshot of a billboard from the movie, trended on Twitter in Japan.
In Akira, with 147 days to go to the games, total annihilation is poised to descend on Tokyo. In real life, February 28, 2020 also marks 147 days until the start of the the Tokyo 2020 summer games.
#中止だ中止
今日かAKIRAと同じ日なんですねぇ
競技場蒸発しそう pic.twitter.com/YtZEpNdsDR
— こせき@黄身だけを愛してる (@egg68389419) February 28, 2020
#Just cancel it!
This scene from AKIRA also takes place on this date (February 28). I wonder if the new Tokyo stadium will also be vaporized?
the global impact of COVID-19

author: Nevin Thompson


text:
Twitter urged to take action against harassment of female reporter in Brazil · Global Voices
Fernanda Canofre

A collective of female journalists denounced the harassment of reporter Patrícia Campos Mello on Twitter. Image: Used under license CC0 Public Domain
Brazil has reached a new low when it comes to attacks faced by reporters covering the government of President Jair Bolsonaro. While testifying in an inquiry commission in the Brazilian Congress, on February 11, a former employee of a company suspected of running a mass-messaging scheme on WhatsApp on behalf of Jair Bolsonaro's (eventually victorious) electoral campaign in 2018 falsely accused the female reporter who broke that story of “trying to seduce him.”
Hans River, a former employee of digital content agency Yacows, was the main source of a December 2018 story published by newspaper Folha de S. Paulo revealing the agency had used social security numbers without their owners’ knowledge to mass-register SIM cards, which enabled the automated WhatsApp scheme.
That story's reporter, Patrícia Campos Mello, had first revealed the existence of such a scheme in October 2018, days before the vote that awarded the victory to Bolsonaro. Campos Mello has also revealed the scheme was funded by a group of businessmen, which would potentially violate Brazil's electoral law as it forbids corporate campaign donations. At that time, Campos Mello received multiple threats and had her WhatsApp account hacked.
River's allegations at the commission, which is investigating the spread of “fake news’’ during the 2018 elections, was swiftly refuted by screenshots of his exchange with Campos Mello disclosed by herself and Folha. The messages show River inviting the reporter to a concert where he would play, besides documents, audio and photos sent by him to her to corroborate the story on the scheme — he had claimed during the inquiry that he never gave any information to Campos Mello.
Publicamos aqui reportagem mostrando todas as mentiras da testemunha da CPMI, com áudio, foto, print screens e planilha. Agradeço à solidariedade de vcs, e peço para que compartilhem, para que o insulto e a narrativa mentirosa não prevaleçam. Obrigada, https://t.co/Ec3qFRTvnj
— Patricia Campos Mello (@camposmello) February 11, 2020
We’ve published a story showing all the lies that the witness told the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, with audio, photos, screenshots and spreadsheets. I appreciate your solidarity and ask you to share it, so the insults and this false narrative won’t prevail. Thanks,
River’s allegations were endorsed by President Bolsonaro on February 18 at a press conference when the president made a pun with the word “scoop’’ in Portuguese, which suggested that Campos Mello sought to have a sexual relation with her source.
Bolsonaro insulta repórter da @folha com insinuação sexual ? https://t.co/0ZchA9pqvZ pic.twitter.com/SxMmOiCJgx
— Jeff Nascimento (@jnascim) February 18, 2020
Bolsonaro insults Folha’s reporter with a sexual insinuation.
After River’s testimony, Campos Mello faced another smear campaign. Memes portraying a prostitute talking to a guy in a car with Folha’s logo pasted on her face have circulated widely. Later, a comedian enacted the meme (the video will be investigated by the Supreme Court). An old video in which Campos Mello says she identifies as a leftist and has voted for the Workers’ Party before has also resurfaced.
More than 770 women journalists signed a manifesto in support of Campos Mello.
The collective Journalists Against Harassment has called on Twitter, where most of the smears against Campos Mello were distributed, to take action to curb the abuse.
Speaking with Global Voices, collective member Janaína Garcia says Twitter invited them to an event in 2018 where they pledged to fight harassment against female journalists, but no concrete measures have been taken since then.
Last year, during a conference in Mexico City attended by Garcia, the social media company was called out again for its lack of action against harassment. Garcia says:
Prometeram transparência e atitude. O que temos visto, desde então, mas não só, é o oposto disso.
They’ve promised transparency and action. What we have seen since is the opposite of that.
In 2017, Twitter co-founder and CEO Jack Dorsey said they would take a more aggressive stance against hate symbols and violent groups:
6/ We decided to take a more aggressive stance in our rules and how we enforce them.
— jack ??? (@jack) October 14, 2017
Campos Mello is one of several reporters who have faced harassment recently in Brazil. Twitter's communications team addressed her case in a statement in Portuguese on February 15:
O Twitter condena comportamentos que tentem silenciar vozes, e o trabalho para evitar que isso ocorra está em constante aprimoramento. Avançamos em algumas frentes, como a tecnologia para identificar proativamente Tweets que violem as regras, mas sabemos que há muito a ser feito
— Twitter Comms (@TwitterComms) February 15, 2020
Twitter has rules that determine which content and behaviour is allowed on the platform. In the case involving journalist Patrícia Campos Mello, measures against some tweets and profiles that have violated such rules have been taken, while there are other contents still under review (1/2)
Twitter condemns behaviours that try to silence voices, and the work that seeks to curb this is constantly being improved. We have advanced in some fronts, such as the technology that proactively identify tweets that break the rules, but we are aware that there still is a lot to be done.
For Garcia, however, Twitter needs to adopt “more effective and transparent’’ measures:
[Não tomar medidas] é uma mensagem de que, para o Twitter, o tráfego, o engajamento e o buzz, ainda que a partir de práticas criminosas como o assédio, a calúnia e a difamação parecem prevalecer sobre a adoção de medidas por um ambiente seguro – sobretudo para mulheres jornalistas. Muito falamos de uma sociedade em que a impunidade é um traço histórico, como a nossa: afinal, o Twitter quer reforçar esse traço? Qual a preocupação deles com fortalecimento democrático? Ou adotam critérios mais transparentes e efetivos, ou, para nós, a resposta é uma só: o Twitter não se importa em criar uma esgotosfera.
[To not take action] is a message that says that, for Twitter, traffic, engagement and buzz, even if generated by criminal practices such as harassment, smear and defamation, seem to prevail over the adoption of measures for a safe environment — especially regarding women journalists. We often talk about our society in which impunity is a historical trace: after all, does Twitter want to reinforce this? What is their concern with democratic strengthetening? Either they adopt more transparent and effective criteria or, for us, the answer will be just one: Twitter doesn’t care that it is creating a sewersphere.
Two weeks after River's deposition, some tweets were considered by Twitter in violation with the platform's rules, as reporter Natália Portinari wrote on her profile:
o @TwitterBrasil concluiu que uma conta que denunciei por assédio direcionado à @camposmello violou as regras da plataforma. por comentários idênticos aos que fizeram aqui mtas autoridades c/ cargos públicos e muito mais influência. elas também foram notificadas, @TwitterBrasil?
— Natália Portinari (@ntlportinari) February 26, 2020
@TwitterBrasil concluded that one of the accounts that I've denounced for directed harassment towards @camposmello has violated the platform's rules. for comments identical to some made by public authorities and far more influence here. were they also notified, @TwitterBrasil?
Another reporter, Vera Magalhães, who writes at Estado de S. Paulo newspaper, became the latest target. A fake account was created under her name, while her private information was also publicised, including the the school attended by her children.
Magalhães reported on February 25 that president Bolsonaro himself has forwarded, via WhatsApp, a video calling supporters to a protest in March 15 against the Brazilian Congress and in favor of his government, which may consist on a “crime of responsibility”, according to Supreme Court Justice Celso de Mello.
The author of this story writes at Folha de S. Paulo and has signed the above manifesto.

author: Fernanda Canofre


text:
What kind of rumours were circulating during the 2020 Taiwan presidential election? · Global Voices
Huang HungYu

Summer Chen. Photo by Huang Hung Yu, used with permission.
During the campaign preceding Taiwan's January 2020 presidential elections, the widespread use of social media platforms, such as Facebook and LINE to share news from unreliable sources, significantly affected people's ability to make well-informed choices at the polls. As a result, a number of initiatives have emerged to counter the spread of disinformation in Taiwan.
The Taiwan Fact-Check Center is the first Taiwanese news organization certified by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN), a global network of fact-checking associations dedicated to promoting best practices in the field.
The Center already played a role in countering the spread of disinformation during the 2018 local elections that were paired with a multi-question referendum. As some of the referendum questions were about LGBT rights and energy policies, certain political groups made use of disinformation to mobilize people to vote in their favour.
For example, anti-LGBT groups had then spread the idea that the impact of LGBT rights on sexual education could affect their and others associated homosexuality with AIDS. Meanwhile, pro-nuclear energy groups launched a smear campaign against residents of Orchid Island who have suffered from nuclear waste pollution for years. Pro-Kuomintang (KMT) groups used unverified reports from mainland China to slam Taiwanese authorities for failing to provide assistance to Taiwan tourists at Kansai airport when Typhoon Jebi struck the region in 2018. A Taiwanese diplomat committed suicide as the fabricated story went viral online.
Ahead of the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, Wang Liqiang, a self-proclaimed Chinese spy revealed to Australian media outlets that Beijing had an army of information operators campaigning for the opposition KMT candidate, Han Kuo-yu. Rumors were also circulating that Beijing had infiltrated numerous media outlets in Taiwan. In view of this, Global Voices’ Chinese language editor Huang HungYu interviewed Summer Chen, the Chief Editor of Taiwan Fact Check Center to find out what exactly were the rumors circulating in Taiwan during the January 2020 presidential election.
GV: Can you share your observations about the spread of disinformation during the presidential election?
Summer Chen (SC): Before August 2019, the majority of rumors were related to health issues. Between September and November 2019, more policy-related disinformation emerged, including disinformation around LGBT rights. We also verified a number of stories about the Hong Kong anti-extradition protests. We observed that in online and in traditional media outlets, there was quite a lot of messaging using Hong Kong’s extradition protests to attack the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Between September and November, we published 66 verification reports, and 15 of them were about the Hong Kong anti-extradition protests and cross-strait relations between Taiwan and China. Between November 2019 and January 2020, there were 14 false reports about unfair election arrangements. After the election, rumors accusing officers at polling stations of tampering the ballots also emerged.
GV: Have the rumors affected the results of the elections?
SC: Just a few days before the election, we saw a rumor about Wuhan pneumonia [now called COVID-19] circulating on Facebook. It claimed that Taiwan had a confirmed case, and urged voters to wear a mask when going to the voting stations. It was confirmed to be a false piece of information at the time. The effect of it was very negative as it could spread fear. Many Taiwanese who live in mainland China travel back to Taiwan to vote [as distance voting is not possible], thus some might have been deterred from going to voting stations for fear of being infected. After we published our verification report, our center issued a joint statement with another fact-check group, MyGoPen against the manufacturing of social panic. Facebook also took measures to reduce the reach of posts about the outbreak of the new coronavirus in Taiwan before the election.
GV: Do you think Beijing’s information operators were behind the spread of election-related rumors and disinformation in Taiwan?
SC: Our center cannot track down the exact origin of rumors. There are some traces indicating that Beijing may have been involved. Sometimes we could see the use of simplified Chinese characters in the text and identify slogans. Some of the rumors about the anti-extradition protests were obviously originating from Hong Kong but spread to Taiwan, yet we don’t have hard evidence to prove this. Regardless of their origin, we don't want to allow rumors to affect voting behavior in Taiwan. In my own opinion, the majority of rumors were aimed at dividing Taiwanese society. By provoking people’s emotion and splitting the community into two political camps: either pro or anti-Han Kuo-yu. Some people would simply look at disinformation as a joke and laugh at people who spread the rumors. However, we have to ask this question: why would people still disseminate stories that they know we wouldn't not believe in? For example, whenever the verification reports about Han Kuo-yu were released, people would start mocking Han’s supporters in the comment section. This may as well be the very intention of disinformation — to divide society.
GV: Do you have another example about how disinformation divided Taiwanese society?
SC: After the election, there were rumors about election results tampering. For example, an edited video taken in a polling station showed that when the polling officer announced the result of the vote for Han Kuo-yu, another polling officer counted the vote under Tsai Ing-wen’s record [The reason for this was in fact that the officer counting the vote was in fact registering the previous, yet because of the way it was recorded, it looked indeed suspicious] In my opinion, this rumor was orchestrated by Beijing to divide society. In Taiwan, the pro-Beijing KMT is still the dominant party in local government bodies. The election result could not be tampered unless the KMT was involved. Moreover, as indicated in past elections, Taiwan’s election system is rather mature, and there has been no serious complaints about elections in the past. After the presidential election, the KMT did not demand a recount or question the fairness of the results. Hence, it is very likely that the rumor is manufactured and spread by Beijing’s information operators.

author: Huang HungYu


text:
World Health Organization officials criticized for ‘slow response’ and ‘pro-China’ bias as COVID-19 spreads across the world · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Screen capture from World Health Organization's February 29, 2020 report on COVID-19 outbreak.
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in China, World Health Organization (WHO) officials have been consistent in praising the country for its efforts in containing the spread of the disease. But as the virus has spread across 53 countries with more than 6,000 confirmed cases and 86 deaths outside China as of 29 February 2019, netizens pointed their fingers at WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus for his pro-China response at the initial stage of the outbreak.
As of this writing, almost half a million people have signed an online petition demanding his resignation.
As the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases jumped from 45 on 17 January to more than 500 cases on 23 January, China announced the shutdown of Wuhan. By this time, many health experts have raised an alarm of a possible global outbreak but members of the emergency committee of the WHO were split on the issue. During a press conference, Tedros stated that there was no need to declare a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).
On 28 January, Tedros visited China and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. After the trip, he praised China for its “commitment to transparency.” This is in contrast to the report of human rights observers who slammed China for its censorship measures that had prevented the flow of critical information concerning the outbreak. As of 21 February, 416 netizens have been punished for “spreading rumors” about the novel coronavirus.
Tedros deferred the declaration of PHEIC until 30 January, but he stressed that there was no need to “unnecessarily interfere with international travel and trade”.
Just a few days back on 26 January, the Wuhan mayor admitted that more than five million Wuhan residents had left the city before it was placed under lockdown. There was fear that those who left the city had brought the virus around the country. In less than a week, the number of confirmed cases in China had jumped to almost 10,000. As more and more cities announced drastic measures to contain the virus, those who can afford had left China for an extended vacation in other countries.
Though Xi made a promise to Tedros that China would welcome the investigation of an international expert team composed of 10-15 members to help study the origins of the virus, the process was delayed and China eventually only opened its doors to an “advanced expert team” composed of three WHO officials. State-affiliated media outlets and Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo and Tiktok widely shared the sound bites of WHO lead expert Bruce Aylward who praised China with statements like “to the people of Wuhan, it is recognized that the world is in your debt” and “if I had COVID-19, I would want to be treated in China.”
Aylward stressed that China’s quick response strategies have proven effective in curbing the outbreak. At the same time, he criticized other countries for not taking similar measures. Aylward later admitted in the press conference that he was not placed in quarantine after his trip to China because he did not visit any “dirty area” in Wuhan.
On 25 February, one day after the “advance expert team” concluded its mission in China, the total number of newly confirmed infected cases outside of China exceeded the number in China for the first time. As of 27 February, there were 4,351 confirmed cases and 67 deaths outside China across 48 countries. In South Korea, the number of confirmed cases surpassed 3,000 with 17 deaths. Italy reported more than 1,000 COVID-19 cases and 29 deaths. BBC’s source said COVID-19 had claimed 210 lives in Iran.
Some are asking why Tedros has been reluctant in declaring the outbreak as a pandemic.
Netizens are angry about WHO’s inaction and turned it into spoofs like this one:
Legends say if you whisper ‘Pandemic’ 3 times in front of a mirror Tedros Adhanom appears pic.twitter.com/4yPcEZuu7q
— Coronavirusmemes (@Coronavirusmem1) February 28, 2020
Some are accusing Tedros of having a pro-Beijing stand:
Death toll goes up when trusting #China_is_terrorist. Death toll goes up when trusting WHO Director Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. Do they collude? You say. pic.twitter.com/TseV3wq3Ae
— Bird Lennon (@bird_lennon) February 22, 2020
WHO, please stop fake news about CCP China, you make the world drain into virus, It is highly recommend to dismiss Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus from Director General of WHO @realDonaldTrump @JustinTrudeau @VP @BorisJohnson pic.twitter.com/PWC7bhblsd
— BNO & CC Equal Rights Rummage (@NewHope35384494) February 26, 2020
Others highlighted his self-contradictory language:
I think I now understand what Tedros was talking about regarding the “window of opportunity.” pic.twitter.com/Q3QOu1pP7M
— NotAPandemic (@LegendarySCV) February 21, 2020
Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong highlighted the slow and weak response of the WHO under the leadership of Tedros
[Public enemy No 1 is not only the virus, but also WHO chief Dr. Tedros’s weak and slow response] pic.twitter.com/o9GTdrhkOJ
— Joshua Wong 黃之鋒 ? (@joshuawongcf) February 29, 2020
Check out Global Voices’ special coverage of the global impact of COVID-19.

author: Oiwan Lam


text:
China censors report of how authorities hid COVID-19 genome sequence test result for 14 days · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Screen capture from China Central Television's report on the publication of “China combatting COVID-19 in 2020″ via Hong Kong Citizen News.
Chinese media outlets have been accused of echoing the Chinese Communist Party’s political propaganda in understating the severity of the COVID-19 outbreak. It was only on 20 January 2020 when Beijing finally admitted the existence of human-to-human transmission.
But the surge in the number of confirmed infected cases and the sudden shutdown of Wuhan on 23 January probably encouraged several mainland Chinese journalists to overcome their fear of reprisal by reporting the real situation on the ground.
Caixin is one of the most well-known economic and finance news sites which had resisted the pressure from China's propaganda department with its in-depth investigative reports.
A few days after prominent Chinese pulmonologist Dr. Zhong Nanshan’s confirmation about human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus was aired on China Central Television on 20 January, Caixin interviewed Hong Kong microbiologist Guan Yi who estimated that the scale of the COVID-19 outbreak could be 10 times bigger than the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003. But the warning was neglected as a majority of media outlets followed the propaganda authority's instruction to avoid creating social panic in China.
Caixin’s latest investigation published on 26 February found out that at least 9 samples collected from patients with unexplained viral pneumonia had been sent to multiple labs for testing as early as December 2019. Upon interviewing a number of medical doctors who were in charge of treating patients at the very initial stage of the outbreak, Caixin journalists obtained a list of labs which had helped the hospitals to run an analysis of the new virus. Upon testing, a lab in Guangzhou found out that the genome sequence of the new virus was 87 percent similar to Bat SARS-like coronavirus. The lab shared the results with the China Institute of Pathogen Biology and Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention on 27 of December. However, the National Health Commission issued a new regulation banning all the labs from sharing and releasing their test results in early January.
China only allowed the release of the genome sequence of COVID-19 to the World Health Authority (WHO) on 11 January, two weeks after they got hold of the result. Caixin’s report is explosive since it showed how Beijing had withheld a very significant public health information for 14 days. The genome sequence is essential not only in the production of a diagnostic test but also in tracking the origin of the virus and prevent an outbreak in the future.
The investigative report was quickly removed online but netizens have archived the report here.
This is not the first time Caixin’s investigation was erased by the propaganda authority. In early February, an investigation that questioned the data of the confirmed infection and death toll was also censored. A doctor from the fever branch of a Wuhan hospital told Caixin that out of 120 fever patients they received on a single day, about 80 of them had pneumonia but only 5 were admitted while the rest had to quarantine themselves at home. Caixin’s reporters also interviewed a dozen families who shared that many of their relatives had died of unexplained pneumonia before testing for COVID-19 became a standard procedure.
Another censored investigation was an interview with one of the experts from National Health Authority who visited Wuhan on 8 January and reported two days after that the outbreak was under control while refuting any trace of human to human transmission. The expert added that they had visited the fever branch of seven major hospitals but received no reports of medical workers getting infected with COVID-19. Even though the team suspected that there was already human to human transmission of the virus, they had not collected any evidence from their visit which they attribute to the unreliable testimonies given by local health authorities and hospital administrators.
On 10 February, two top leaders of Health Commission in Hubei were dismissed from their positions since they were held responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan.
In an interview with Li Wenliang, the whistleblower who died of COVID-19 on 6 February, Li said that local authorities were aware of human to human transmission as early as 8 January.
Apart from being subjected to censorship, Caixin’s investigations are often labeled by authorities as a rumor. On 20 February, Caixin reported on the COVID-19 outbreak in an elderly center in Wuhan which reportedly claimed 11 lives. Yet, the majority of the cases were not counted in the death toll since the fatalities were not tested for COVID-19. Wuhan authorities flagged the report as a rumor the following day on popular Chinese social media site Weibo and claimed that the Wuhan Civic Affair Bureau had tested all the elderly in the center which identified 12 confirmed cases and one COVID-19 death. In response, Caixin published a list of 19 deaths between 23 December to 15 February. The list showed that at least 7 of them had died of pneumonia, 3 from unknown viral infections, 2 sudden deaths, and 7 from heart failure.
As of 1 March, the total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases in China is 79,971 and the death toll is 2,873. While the figure is still big, the number of new confirmed cases has been declining for over a week and the Chinese propaganda agency has already published a book titled “China combatting COVID-19 in 2020″ (大國戰疫 2020）to glorify the state achievement in the handling of COVID-19. It is an indicator that control of the media sector might be tightened again to manipulate the flow of information about the COVID-19.
Check out Global Voices’ special coverage of the global impact of COVID-19.


text:
Could Russia’s ‘Sovereign Internet’ go international? · Global Voices
Maxim Edwards

Illustration (c) by Tom Venner for Global Voices. Used with permission.
Friends and foes of internet freedom are watching Russia closely.
Last November, Moscow's “Sovereign Internet” bill came into force. This series of amendments allow the Russian authorities to sever the RuNet — Russia's section of the internet — from the global network in hazily defined times of crisis, giving them control over in- and outward bound flows of data. It also mandates internet service providers to provide the state greater monitoring capacities over internet traffic, and calls for the creation of a national domain name system.
Since the law's implementation, analysts worldwide have been attempting to make sense of the Kremlin's long term strategy for digital policy. In January 2020, Alena Epifanova, a researcher at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), published a widely discussed paper considering how the move would “accelerate splinternets” globally. The term ”splinternet” is used by experts to describe the splintering of the internet along geographic and commercial boundaries (also sometimes referred to as the ”internet balkanisation”.)
Epifanova's paper provides the first insight into how Russia's “Sovereign Internet” drive fits into international trends — and wonders whether Moscow might set a precedent if the move proves successful.
I spoke with Epifanova after a panel discussion on digital rights in Russia in Berlin on February 20. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Maxim Edwards:  Your report was the first to stress the international dimension of Russia’s Sovereign Internet initiative. If, as you say, other authoritarian regimes might be watching closely, could there be a diffusion of digital authoritarianism if Moscow succeeds with this experiment? What countries could be the most at risk?
Алена Епифанова: Я думаю, что это одна из целей так называемого закона о суверенном интернете – сделать призыв Кремля к государственному управлению интернетом более конкретным и громогласным. Речь идет не только о государственном контроле над информационным потоком внутри страны, который, конечно, может быть привлекательным для других авторитарных стран. Если российская модель относительно недорогого наблюдения, по сравнению с китайской, сработает, то она может послужить прецедентом и быть адоптирована другими авторитарными режимами, и таким образом усилить их власть и ослабить демократические силы внутри этих стран.
Но речь идет также и о возможной альтернативной модели управления интернетом. Принимая закон и пытаясь реализовать суверенный интернет, Россия ставит под вопрос существующую модель и институты управления интернетом с участием многих заинтересованных сторон, такие как ICANN, и активно продвигает форму управления интернетом, основанную на ведущей роли государства. Россия стремится не изолироваться от остального мира, а создать прецедент, которому могли бы последовать другие государства, стремящиеся к суверенитету над своими сегментами интернета.
Я думаю, что республики Центральной Азии могут стать «цифровым союзниками» российской модели. Россия все еще имеет значительное влияние в бывших советских нелиберальных республиках и выстраивает сотрудничество между своим Евразийским экономическим союзом (ЕАЭС) и китайской инициативой «Один пояс, один путь» в этом регионе. Россия также передает знания и техническую помощь этим странам в рамках Шанхайской организации сотрудничества (ШОС).
Россия также заинтересована в создании параллельного сегмента и формировании ядра стран для альтернативной модели управления интернетом в рамках БРИКС. В ноябре 2017 года Совет Безопасности России предложил разработать идеи по созданию отдельной интернет-инфраструктуры и собственной системы корневых серверов DNS независимых от ICANN для стран БРИКС. Пока неясно, удастся ли России убедить другие страны использовать альтернативную модель. Но наверняка их может заинтересовать модель управления интернетом с сильным государственным влиянием. В долгосрочной перспективе такой «объединенный авторитаризм» может привести к фрагментации глобального интернета и смещению сил.
Alena Epifanova: I think this is one of the goals of the so-called sovereign internet law: to make the Kremlin’s call for state-centred internet governance more concrete and vocal. This is not just about state control of the flow of information within the country, which of course could be attractive to other authoritarian states. If Russia’s model of relatively low cost surveillance (in comparison to the Chinese one) works out, it could serve as a precedent and be adopted by other authoritarian regimes in order to strengthen their power and weaken democratic forces. It's also about a possible alternative model for internet governance. By passing this law and trying to implement the sovereign internet, Russia is putting into question the existing multi-stakeholder model and institutions such as ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), thereby actively promoting a state-centred form of internet governance. Russia is not seeking to isolate itself from the rest of the world, but rather to create a precedent which other states aspiring to sovereignty over their segments of the internet can follow.
I think the Central Asian republics could become “digital allies” for Moscow. Russia still has influence in the more illiberal republics of the post-Soviet space and is linking its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with Chinese’s Belt and Roads Initiative (BRI) in the region. Russia also provides expertise and technical assistance to these countries in the framework of the Shanghai Coordination Organization (SCO). Russia is also interested in establishing a parallel network and building the core of an alternative model of internet governance with BRICS countries. In November 2017, Russia’s Security Council proposed a separate internet infrastructure with its own DNS root server system for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), independent from ICANN. It is still unclear whether Russia will manage to convince other countries to use this alternative. But they certainly could be interested in having a greater stake in the state-centred model of internet governance. In the long term, such “networked authoritarianism” could lead to the fracturing of the global internet and a shift in power and in stakeholders.
ME: What risk would a successful “Sovereign Internet” pose to comparatively democratic societies, such as the EU and the U.S.? After all, it’s no secret that not only authoritarian regimes want to constrain digital freedoms.
AE: Несмотря на некоторые законы о контроле над интернетом в Великобритании или Германии (например, Акт о полномочиях следствия, The Investigatory Powers Act, Закон о контроле над сетями, The Network Enforcement Act), комплексный и целенаправленный подход России к контролю над интернетом невозможно отождествлять с этими законами. Но Россия предлагает альтернативное видение управления цифровым пространством в эпоху пост-Сноудена. Ее успех может привести к неправомерному убеждению в том, что растущий государственный контроль является необходимым элементом суверенитета. Это могло бы укрепить позицию сторонников усиления контроля над интернетом, что могло бы привести к ограничению цифровых прав.
AE: Despite some internet control laws in UK or Germany (e.g. the Investigatory Powers Act of 2016 and the Network Enforcement Act of 2017), they simply cannot be compared to the extent of Russia’s comprehensive and targeted approach towards internet freedom. Nevertheless, Russia is offering an alternative vision of managing digital space in the post-Snowden era. Its success could lead to the wrongful belief that growing state control is a necessary element of sovereignty per se. This could strengthen supporters of more control over the internet, leading to further restriction of digital rights.
ME: You suggest that Russia will collaborate more closely with China in the field of digital governance. I wonder whether we could already speak of a growing Russian dependency on Beijing — which is far more technologically advanced than Moscow. What risks could this partnership pose to Russian netizens?
AE: Я полагаю, что амбициозная интернет-политика России может потребовать более тесного сотрудничества с Китаем, поскольку Россия находится в конфликте с западными партнерами и критикует существующую модель управления интернетом. В то же время России нужны технологии и ресурсы для построения своего суверенного интернета, которых у нее недостаточно. Россия и Китай провели несколько встреч на высоком уровне по вопросам кибербезопасности и контроля над интернетом, между компаниями Huawei и МТС заключен контракт на развитие российской сети 5G, обе страны продвигают идею государственного суверенитета в киберпространстве на международном уровне. Новому российскому технократическому правительству, возможно, потребуется быстро показать результаты и успехи, и они могли бы извлечь выгоду из китайского опыта в области регулирования и цензуры интернета, а также перенять китайские технологии. Однако все еще неясно, будет ли пренебрегаться вопросом безопасности ради быстрой реализации, что может привести к конфликту между российскими службами безопасности и правительством.
Трудно сказать, растет ли зависимость России от Пекина и какие риски это партнерство представляет для российских пользователей, так как доступна лишь малая часть информации о практической стороне этого сотрудничества. Много написано о декларировании стратегического партнерства и встречах президентов на высшем уровне, а о конкретной реализации и результатах – очень мало. Я бы сказала, что пока еще нет уверенности, что Россия будет опираться на китайские технологии. В то же время я не уверена, что Россия сможет развить собственные технологии. В долгосрочной перспективе России необходимо будет решать, какую сторону выбрать между двумя гигантами ИТ-технологий – Китаем или США, которые определяют будущее киберпространства.
AE: Russia’s ambitious internet policy could require closer cooperation with China, as Russia is diverging from its western partners and criticising the existing model of internet governance. At the same time, Russia needs technology and resources to build its sovereign internet. Russia and China have had several high level meetings on cybersecurity and internet control; there is a contract between Huawei and (mobile network operator) MTS to develop Russia’s 5G network, and both countries promote the idea of state sovereignty in cyberspace on the international level. Russia's new technocratic government might need to show results quickly and could benefit from China’s experience in internet regulation and surveillance as well as technology by adopting them in Russia. However, it is still unclear if the security issue will be neglected for the sake of fast implementation, which could lead to a conflict between Russia’s security services and the government.
It is difficult to say whether there is a growing Russian dependency on Beijing, or what risks this partnership poses to Russian netizens. Very little information is available about the practical aspects of this cooperation. One can read a lot of proclamations about the strategic partnership and about meetings between the two countries’ presidents, but very little about its concrete implementation and results. I would say that for now it is still unclear that Russia will rely on Chinese technology. At the same time, I am not sure Russia will be able to develop its own technology. In the long term, Russia will need to decide which of the two IT technology giants it will choose: China or the USA.
ME: Much of the Sovereign Internet law is technically ambitious if not infeasible — for now. But it does create a legal framework for further shutdowns and surveillance. What is to stop this going the way of, say, the Yarovaya Laws of 2018 (allowing greater scrutiny of users’ communications in the name of counter-terrorism) — a bold statement of intent which is too expensive and tricky to realise?
AE: Интернет имеет стратегическое значение для нынешнего российского режима, поэтому я думаю, что Кремль постарается если не полностью реализовать закон о суверенном интернете, то хотя бы расширить государственный контроль над интернет-инфраструктурой и потоком данных в пределах российской границы. Я думаю, что Кремль будет использовать прагматичный и избирательный подход, который заставит интернет-акторов сотрудничать с российским государством по правилам Кремля и будет договариваться, извлекая для себя наибольшую выгоду (например, реализация закона о локализации данных).
AE: The internet has a strategic dimension for the current Russian regime, so I think the Kremlin will try if not to fully implement the sovereign internet law, then at least to gain greater state control over the internet's infrastructure and the flow of data within Russia’s borders. I think there will be a pragmatic and selective approach which will make digital actors cooperate with the Russian state on the state’s terms: negotiating and making the most of the situation (e.g. for example, the implementation of the data localisation law)
ME: Russia may not be able to take on the big Western digital giants immediately. But these mounting regulations could become so cumbersome that, in the long term, they hurt business opportunities. What are the long term consequences of the Sovereign Internet law for foreign digital companies operating in Russia?
AE: В рамках реализации закона DPI или аналогичные технологии должны быть установлены на сетях провайдеров интернет-серверов. DPI может использоваться, в частности, для установки приоритетов и дискриминации трафика, поэтому государственный орган, управляющий интернетом в России, может замедлить скорость трафика нежелательных соединений и увеличить для других. Это может поставить под угрозу сетевой нейтралитет и привести к дискриминации компаний, не защищенных российским государством.
Это может быть риском для иностранных компаний, так как будет только один регулятор, государственный орган Роскомнадзор, и существует большой простор для маневров и практически никакого контроля над внедрением технологии и ее использованием.
С помощью этого и других законов об интернете Россия пытается подчинить существующие правила национальным нормативным актам. Параллельно российское правительство отдает предпочтение российским крупным интернет-компаниям. Рынок в России становится более непредсказуемым и менее защищенным для иностранных компаний.
AE: In the framework of the law, deep packet inspection (DPI) or similar technologies should be installed on the networks of internet server providers. Among other functions, DPI can be used to prioritise and select certain traffic, so a state authority managing the internet in Russia could slow down the traffic speed of all undesired connections and prioritise others. This could compromise net neutrality and lead to discrimination against companies not protected by the Russian state. The risk I see is that there will be only one regulator, the state communications watchdog Roskomnadzor, which means more room for manoeuvre and less control of implementation. With this and other internet laws, Russia is trying to subordinate the existing rules to national regulations. In parallel, the Russian government gives preferential treatment to big Russian internet companies. That means that the market in Russia is becoming more unpredictable and less secure for foreign companies.
ME: You said at a recent panel discussion that the best response to the “Sovereign Internet” is for supporters of digital rights worldwide to “explain their own vision of a sovereign, and democratic, internet in contrast to the Russian model.” What might that look like?
AE: Необходимо широкая общественная дискуссия о будущем интернета, интернет-грамотности и правах человека в цифровую эпоху внутри стран, а также более тесное сотрудничество между заинтересованными сторонами, выступающими за экономические и политические преимущества свободного и глобального интернета. Необходимо снова усилить легитимность ICANN. Internet Governance Forum должен получить более широкую поддержку, признание и влияние. Стандарты транснационального правового регулирования в киберпространстве должны быть разработаны широкой коалицией стран, бизнеса, технологических компаний и гражданского общества.
AE: There should be a broad public discussion about the future of the internet, internet literacy, and human rights in the digital age — both within countries as between stakeholders who promote the economic and political advantages of a free and global internet. The legitimacy of ICANN should be reinforced, the United Nations’ Internet Governance Forum should receive more support, wider recognition and influence. Standards for transnational legal regulations in cyberspace should be developed by a broad coalition of countries, businesses, tech companies, and civil society.

author: Maxim Edwards