text:
Reactions to the presidential pardon of Sri Lankan rightwing religious leader · Global Voices
GroundViews

Venerable Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thero. Screenshot from YouTube via Hiru TV Salakuna
This post originally appeared on Groundviews, an award-winning citizen journalism website in Sri Lanka. An edited version is published below as part of a content sharing agreement with Global Voices.
The photos, depicting a saffron-robed Gnanasara Thero, received thousands of reactions on Facebook. “He has been freed” they read. Others were messages with Buddhist religious greetings like “Budu saranai” (May you be protected by the noble power of Lord Buddha) and “Theruwan saranai” (May you be protected by triple gem)  which were posted on the Facebook Pages of mainstream media outlets like Neth FM and Hiru News.
On May 23, the General Secretary of the right-wing nationalist organisation Bodu Bala Sena Galagod Aththe Gnanasara Thero received a Presidential pardon and was released from Welikada prison after serving 9 months of a 6-year sentence.  In August 2018, the monk was charged with contempt of court for shouting at a judge presiding over the case of missing journalist Prageeth Eknaligoda and then threatening the journalist's wife.
Gnanasara is well known for his provocative rhetoric which can be seen in a video from a BBS rally in Aluthgama in 2014. Some feel that there are correlations between the speech he gave and the violence that ensued shortly after in which at least four people were killed in riots targeting the Muslim community.
Groundviews spoke to lawyers and members of civil society on the implications of the Presidential pardon.
Human rights activist and wife of missing journalist Sandhya Eknaligoda commented on Gnanasara release:
Gnanasara was imprisoned for contempt of court, for threatening me at the Homagama town Magistrate. It is the Executive’s responsibility to protect the independence of the judiciary. This is a disrespect to the judiciary and to the rule of law. The President is setting an example that any individual can do anything they want in court, and get away with it through a pardon. This sets a bad example for future cases.
Speaking on the legal implications of the pardon, lecturer in Public Law at the University of Edinburgh Dr. Asanga Welikala noted that Gnanasara Thero was convicted and given a custodial sentence for contempt of court after displaying behaviour “so egregious within the court premises, and well beyond the respectful behaviour expected of ordinary citizens before the courts, that it would have been a threat to the Rule of Law itself to let him go unpunished.” In this context, he said, the presidential pardon raised a number of very serious questions.
Dr. Welikala also noted that the appeal against the conviction is still in the courts and have yet to be decided on:
In this context, would a pardon serve to interfere in the due process of law? It is not only the President but also the relevant Minister who has endorsed the requests by third parties to pardon the Thero. The government as a whole, therefore, will need to justify, with stated reasons, why the grant of a pardon, in this case, will not be inconsistent with the Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the administration of justice. Anything less will directly undermine the legitimacy of Sri Lanka’s constitutional democracy.
Attorney J C Weliamuna added that under the Witness Protection Act, a pardon usually isn’t given without consultation with the witness or affected party. Speaking with Groundviews shortly after the monk’s release, Weliamuna said:
I am not sure if the Magistrate was given notice. I know Mrs. Eknaligoda has written to the President objecting to Gnanasara’s release 2 months ago. We still don’t know if the views of the Attorney General’s Department, the Ministry of Justice and the judges who convicted him were obtained. Strictly speaking, there is no constitutional requirement to do so, but this is the pardoning of a suspect who has a history of conviction.
Weliamuna also noted the wider implications of the Presidential pardon, given the Thero’s influential position.
Human rights law researcher at the University of Oxford Gehan Gunatilleke said that the pardon was reflective of a new and disturbing nexus between mainstream politics and “militant nationalism”.
Human rights activist and founder member of the Mannar Women’s Development Federation (MWDF) Shreen Saroor termed the pardon an insult to Sandhya’s long fight for justice.
Legal and Advocacy Coordinator of the National Christian Evangelical Alliance of Sri Lanka (NCEASL) Yamini Ravindran added that given Gnanasara’s past record of hateful speech, the Presidential pardon amounted to disrespect to all those who had suffered religious freedom violations in Sri Lanka.
Doctoral student at the University of Oxford Shamara Wettimuny had similar sentiments, noting that it appeared that the Government was not serious about addressing ethnoreligious violence.
Despite criticism from the legal fraternity and civil society, there was undeniable support for Gnanasara Thero’s release, as evidenced by the positive reactions on Facebook. Although the President met with Gnanasara and his mother on the day of his release, the UNP has maintained a stoic silence on the issue, which has been met with criticism from TNA MP M A Sumanthiran. This points to continued fractures within the coalition government – fractures which have had devastating and fatal consequences.
The official Presidential pardon document has not yet been made public.

author: GroundViews


text:
Xi Jinping has muzzled Chinese social sciences, says French sinologist Chloé Froissart · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Political slogans on Beijing walls mentioning ‘People's participation’. Photo by Filip Noubel, used with permission
Understanding social issues in China is essential to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 30 years ago, its survival was challenged as the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement picked up, and since then, the CCP has been very wary of any large-scale social movements. Global Voices spoke with Chloé Froissart, a lecturer in political science at the Chinese studies department of the University of Rennes 2 in France, about the status of social science in today's China and to what extent it is used as a tool for the Party's survival.
The following is the abridged transcript of an interview between Global Voices and Froissart from May 2019.
Global Voices (GV): What is the role played by the social sciences in China?
Chloé Froissart (CF): Il n’a jamais existé de sciences sociales totalement indépendantes du pouvoir en Chine. Les chercheurs en sciences sociales ont toujours été sommés de servir le Parti et de l’aider à gouverner afin qu’il se maintienne au pouvoir. Mais il y a différentes manières de le faire et l’espace de liberté des chercheurs face au Parti a fluctué dans le temps. Une première manière de servir le pouvoir est d’identifier, d’analyser les problèmes sociaux, économiques et d’y trouver des solutions afin d’aider le Parti à y faire face. C’est pourquoi les sciences sociales en Chine ont toujours été plus quantitatives, sous-tendues par de grandes enquêtes, que qualitatives; plus techniques que critiques. Une deuxième manière, et c’est d’ailleurs la raison pour laquelle les intellectuels ont été réhabilités par Deng Xiaoping après avoir été persécutés pendant toute l’ère maoïste, c’est de légitimer les réformes et d’apporter des idées pour les promouvoir. Les chercheurs chinois ont bien souvent été des passeurs entre l’Occident et leur pays, puisant des idées dans les théories occidentales -qu’elles soient sociales, politiques, économiques- et les adaptant à la situation chinoise, s’inspirant de ce qui se fait en Occident pour impulser de nouvelles expérimentations en Chine.
Chloé Froissart (CF): Social sciences have never existed independently from the center of political power in China. In fact, researchers in social sciences have always been ordered to serve the Party, and to help it govern so that it can remain in power. But there are indeed several ways that this task is achieved, thus the space for freedom from the Party for researchers in social sciences has evolved in time. One way to serve those in power is to identify and to analyse socio-economic issues, and to find solutions in order to help the Party face them. This is why social sciences in China have always been more quantitative and supported by large surveys, rather than qualitative. Thus it is more technical than critical of the system. Another way, which is the reason why intellectuals were rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping after years of persecutions during Mao’s period, is to legitimize reforms and to provide ideas in order to promote them. Chinese researchers have often been operating as go-betweens linking the West and China, appropriating ideas in western theories, whether social, political or economic, and adapting them to the Chinese context, thus finding inspiration in the West in order to launch new experimentation in China.
Studying Xi's app. Image via The Stand News.
GV: What has changed since Xi Jinping gained power in March 2013?
CF: L’ère Xi Jinping a mis un coup d’arrêt violent à la politique de réformes et d’ouverture qui avait été impulsée par Deng Xiaoping. Tout ce qui vient d’Occident est désormais considéré avec méfiance, voire fait l’objet d’une véritable paranoïa. Cela a commencé dès avril 2013 -soit un mois après l’élection de Xi à la présidence de la RPC- avec l’ordre intimé aux chercheurs, journalistes, éditeurs etc. de ne plus utiliser des expressions jugées occidentales et nocives telles que « valeurs universelles », « liberté d’expression », « société civile », « indépendance du système judiciaire ». Les enseignants-chercheurs -comme les éditeurs et les journalistes- sont contraints d’assister à des réunions de lavage de cerveau et d’inculcation de la pensée Xi Jinping au cours de séjours d’étude sur campus ou hors du lieu de travail qui se déroulent généralement sur des week-end entiers, voire des semaines entières. Ironiquement, en chinois, le verbe « étudier » se prononce de la même manière qu’ « étudier la pensée de Xi » (« xuexi »/ « xue Xi » 学习 ), de sorte qu’il semble impossible d’étudier autre chose que la pensée du nouveau timonier. Une nouvelle application intitulée « xuexi qiangguo » : « étudier pour renforcer le pays » (学习强国）, mais qui peut donc aussi se comprendre comme « étudier la pensée de Xi Jinping pour renforcer le pays » a fait son apparition depuis un an : les enseignants et les chercheurs sont censés y passer au minimum deux heures par jour pour lire les articles sur la pensée Xi Jinping et visionner les vidéos de propagande. Xi Jinping a assigné une nouvelle mission aux chercheurs : celle de contribuer à l’élaboration de l’idéologie du régime ainsi qu’à l’élaboration d’un modèle de modernité sociale, économique, politique, environnementale exportable à l’étranger. Il s’agit là selon Xi Jinping, de l’ultime revanche que la Chine doit prendre sur les Guerres de l’Opium. Il appartient donc aux chercheurs de parachever le rêve chinois, qui est avant tout un rêve de puissance et de domination sur le reste du monde.
CF: The Xi Jinping era has put a brutal end to the policies of reforms and opening initiated by Deng Xiaoping. Everything that comes from the West is now regarded with utmost suspicion if not paranoia. It started in April 2013 – one month after Xi Jinping was elected President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with orders given to researchers, journalists, publishers to no longer use expressions regarded as ‘too Western’ such as “universal values”, “freedom of expression”, “civil society”, “independence of the judiciary”. Professors, researchers, as well as editors and journalists are forced to attend brainwashing sessions during which a Xi Jinping way of thinking is instilled via study programs taking place on campus or outside of work on weekends, but sometimes also for entire weeks. The irony is that in Chinese, to study is pronounced the exact same way as ‘studying Xi's thought’ (« xuexi »/ « xue Xi » 学习 ) thus it seems that the only thing to really study is indeed the thought of the new helmsman. A new App, called  « xuexi qiangguo » which can be understood as “studying to strengthen the nation” （学习强国） but also as “studying Xi's thought to strengthen the country” appeared in 2018. Professors and researchers are supposed to spend at least two hours per day on it in order to read articles about Xi's thought and to watch propaganda videos. Xi has assigned a new mission to researchers: contributing to the development of the regime's ideology and of a model of social, economic, political and environmental modernity that can be exported abroad. According to Xi Jinping, this represents the ultimate revenge that China must take on after the Opium Wars. Researchers are thus expected to finalize the Chinese Dream, which is ultimately a dream of world domination.
Chloé Froissart. Photo used with permission
GV: Is there then any space left today for independent research in social sciences?
CF: L’espace d’autonomie s’est beaucoup rétréci, la contrainte est partout. Les chercheurs chinois ne bénéficient pas de financements autres que ceux du Parti Communiste Chinois. Même étudier à l’étranger ne peut désormais se faire qu’avec une bourse du gouvernement chinois, tout financement étranger étant considéré comme extrêmement sensible. Bien sûr, certains chercheurs mettent toujours en œuvre des tactiques de contournement. Il est toujours possible de maquiller votre projet de recherche pour le faire entrer dans les priorités du régime ou de demander à votre assistant de recherche de surfer sur l’application « Xuexi » à votre place. Une collègue me disait récemment qu’elle travaille en faisant défiler les articles machinalement sur son portable sans y jeter un œil. Mais la marge de manœuvre est de plus en plus restreinte et même maquillé, un colloque sur la conscience de classe chez les ouvriers, les mouvements de protestation ou l’Etat de droit ne passera pas.
CF: The space has shrunk considerably, there are constraints everywhere. Chinese researchers can only rely on funding from the CCP. Even studying abroad is now possible only thanks to a grant from the Chinese government, as any foreign funding is considered extremely sensitive. Of course, some researchers develop avoidance strategies. One can always mask a research project as seemingly fitting the official political line, or ask her or his assistant to surf on the Xuexi APP. One colleague was telling me recently that she scrolls down articles on the APP without even looking at it while working. Yet the margin is very thin, and even when masked, a seminar on workers’ class conscience, protest movements or the rule of law will not be permitted.
Jasic worker solidarity group formed by university students in support of Jasic labour right campaign. Image from the group's Twitter page.
GV: What is happening with the labor movement in China today?
CF: Le mouvement ouvrier est désormais complètement étouffé en Chine. Il s’était beaucoup radicalisé à l’arrivée de Xi au pouvoir. Les ouvriers chinois sont passés à une vitesse impressionnante de mobilisations pour faire respecter le droit du travail, à des revendications plus politiques pour faire respecter la loi grâce à la reconnaissance de droits collectifs (droit de grève, d’élire les syndicats et en particulier des représentants ouvriers pour négocier avec l’employeur). ONG et avocats ont été sévèrement réprimés en décembre 2015, et plus aucune ONG de défense des droits des ouvriers ne subsiste. Dans le même temps, la réforme des syndicats officiels a été complètement gelée. Avec le ralentissement de la croissance économique, le chômage qu’elle va nécessairement engendrer, la situation risque d’être dramatique s’il n’y a plus de possibilité de dialogue social. L’éventualité d’une explosion du mécontentement et de révoltes sauvages n’est pas à écarter.
GV: The labor movement is now completely censored in China. It had become quite radicalized when Xi Jinping took power. Chinese workers quickly went from mobilizing efforts aimed at applying the labor code, to more political requirements aimed at the implementation of the law thanks to the recognition of collective rights, such as the right to go on strike, to elect their own trade-unions and representatives in charge of negotiations with employers. There was a major crackdown on NGOs and lawyers in December 2015, and not a single NGO advocating workers’ rights remains. At the same time, the reform of the official trade-unions remains frozen. As China's GDP slows down, and unemployment grows, the situation will get worse with the absence of any mechanism for social dialogue. One cannot rule out an explosion of frustration and violent riots.
GV: No one can predict the future of China, but if there were significant socio-political changes to happen, where do you see them potentially coming from?
CF: Ils viendront nécessairement d’une alliance entre des hauts cadres dirigeants et des secteurs clés de la population : les étudiants et intellectuels, les ouvriers, les minorités sexuelles et les ONG qui défendent leurs droits, les personnes qui ne peuvent plus pratiquer leur religion etc., bref tous ceux qui souffrent du régime actuellement et ils sont nombreux. C’est d’ailleurs la leçon qu’a tirée le Parti du mouvement démocratique de 1989, à la suite duquel la préservation du consensus au sein du PCC est devenue un principe intangible pour éviter toute union verticale entre la population et une partie des dirigeants. Ce consensus a été largement remis en cause par Xi, qui a dû par conséquent accroître la répression tant au sein de la société que dans les rangs du Parti, notamment à travers sa campagne de lutte contre la corruption qui est en partie une purge politique déguisée. Mais le jeu est très risqué car si peu de gens le montrent, la frustration et le mécontentement sont bien réels. Xi a en réalité créé une situation de crise permanente très dangereuse : que l’équilibre précaire soit rompu et il n’y aura d’autre alternative qu’un changement violent.
CF: They will come as a result of an alliance between high-ranking state officials and key sectors of society: students, intellectuals, workers, sexual minorities and affiliated NGOs, people who can no longer practice their faith, in other words all who suffer from the current regime, which represents a lot of people. The Party learnt that lesson well during the pro-democracy movement in 1989. After that date, preserving a consensus within the CCP became an intangible principle in order to prevent a vertical alliance between the people and some of the political leaders, yet Xi Jinping has shattered this consensus, which has led to increased repression within society but also within the Party. Xi's fight against corruption is mostly a political purge in disguise. This game is extremely risky because even if people do not show it, they are very frustrated. In fact Xi has created a situation of permanent crisis, that is very dangerous: if the fragile balance is broken, the only alternative will be a violent change.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Filip Noubel


text:
Could the PetroCaribe scandal be the end of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse? · Global Voices
Joseph W. Alliance

PetroChallengers stage a protest against corruption allegations linked to PetroCaribe scandals in Haiti. Photo by Medyalokal via Wikimedia Commons: CC BY-SA 4.0.
On May 31, 2019, Haiti's High Court of Auditors released a 600 plus-page report as a deeper audit regarding the mismanagement of the PetroCaribe funds. The corruption scandal surrounding PetroCaribe, a regional energy programme orchestrated by Venezuela and intended to provide petroleum products to Haiti under preferential terms, was at the heart of violent protests that threatened to cause President Jovenel Moïse's downfall this past February.
The Haitian president is linked to the $3.4 billion PetroCaribe scheme via his own company, Agritrans, and now another — Betexs — which have benefited from the opaque contracts that characterise the scandal.
In releasing the report, Haiti's Court of Audit has opened a Pandora's box that is bringing to light the high level of corruption and dilapidation that President Moïse and his Tèt Kale party have been accused of:
The final @ComptesCour report on #Petrocaribe does not give @moisejovenel a free pass. The president's firm Agritrans is mentioned 69 times in the report's 612 pages. And the findings don't look good for the Banana Man. Full report: https://t.co/Fkf9wgTfAC
— Jake Johnston (@JakobJohnston) May 31, 2019
The Moïse administration may be taking the heat, but in fact, prior successive governments have been involved in managing the PetroCaribe funds.
A screenshot of the title page of the final audit by Haiti's High Court of Auditors regarding mismanagement of the country's revenue from PetroCaribe.
The PetroCaribe programme started in 2006 under President René Préval, who first signed the agreement. Control reverted to the Tèt Kale party when President Joseph Michel Martelly took over in 2010, then the baton was passed to Jocelerme Privert, who acted as interim president between February 2016 and February 2017. Privert, a seasoned bureaucrat, has emerged in politics, just like Preval, through the channels of Fanmi Lavalas, a once-dominant political party and movement. Although allegations of embezzlement of PetroCaribe dollars have also been directed toward them, the public perception is that the Tèt Kale regime has taken the siphoning of PetroCaribe money to astronomical heights.
The inflated cost for painting the Rex Theatre, for example, a famous old movie theatre in Port-au-Prince, is telling in that regard:
Timoun franchman mpanse se Youri Chevry kite pentire devan Rex la telman li wel led wi, ? poutan se phtk ki vole 5 milyon dola ameriken an, ? se bagay la yo diw ki 5 milyon an wi pou we ?men mesye bagay sa ineksplikab epi @GarryGPPC ap defann malfekte yo? pic.twitter.com/P2nIfAJA8s
— RicardeauToussaint (@ricardeaut) June 2, 2019
I naively thought that Youri Chevry [the mayor of Port-au-Prince] was the one who painted the front of the Rex to mask its ugliness, ? but it's  the Tèt Kale Party that stole 5 million US dollars, ? that poor thing they do for 5 million ? how can one explain such a scam and @GarryGPPC is defending their misbehaviour ?
One Twitter user asked this intriguing question:
Mwen gon kesyon: Se Picasso ki pentire Rex pou 5 million an? ???
— جاهل (@pedouardlouis) June 2, 2019
My question that hangs in the balance: was it Picasso who painted the Rex for 5 million?
Social programmes such as Ede Pep, branded under Martelly's presidency as government initiatives to alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable, have instead served private purposes. The report has revealed huge discrepancies between the funds that were supposedly allocated to these programmes and what was disbursed in reality. The number of fictive beneficiaries is staggering, amounting to 20,850 between 2012-2014 for the Ti Manman Cheri programme alone.
Etzer Emile, a local economist, echoed that the country's current poor governance, insecurity and socio-economic troubles relate to the mismanagement of PetroCaribe funds:
Fòk nou byen konprann jodia si n pa gen wout, kouran, lopital, dlo, manje, ayewopò, kwasans ekonomik ak djòb pou jèn yo, men nou gen mizè, an pati se paske gen yon gwoup moun ki dechèpiye kòb Petrocaribe a. Koudèkont fin travay, nap mete presyon pou lajistis fè djòb pal #kotkòdla
— Etzer Emile (@etzeremile) June 2, 2019
We must understand that today if there aren't enough roads, electricity, hospitals, water, food, airport, economic growth and jobs for young people, but we are going through misery, partly it's because there is a group of people who have embezzled Petrocaribe's money. The Cour des Comptes has done their work, now we'll put pressure for justice to be done #kotkodla [#Polishhaitians]
Meanwhile, the ratification of Jean Michel Lapin as Moïse's third prime minister has hit a standstill in the Senate.
Having exceeded his time as interim prime minister, Lapin has been unable to secure the post permanently thanks to a group of four senators (known as G4) from different opposition factions that have blocked him from presenting his statement of general policy. The G4 scolded the government over the presence of several ministers who had been part of the previous administration in Lapin's nominated cabinet.
Chief among these is Jean Roudy Aly, the Minister of Justice whom the group blames for negotiating the departure of Haiti's foreign mercenaries in February 2019. The G4 obstructed both attempts, on May 14 and 30, 2019, to ratify Prime Minister Lapin.
As a response to the G4, 72 deputies affiliated with the president from the majority bloc in parliament were planning to resign in order to invalidate the parliament. They presented this initiative as a way to resolve the crisis, but it was received very negatively in the court of public opinion. Some of the deputies later tried to dismiss the fact that they ever had such plans.
Haïti-Crise: 72 députés menacent de démissionner, Gary Bodeau attend la lettre… https://t.co/8EQLU5Zrro #Haiti #Politique pic.twitter.com/MKpHfG5Jeo
— La Chambre des Députés (@deputeshaitiens) June 1, 2019
Haiti-Crisis: 72 MPs threaten to resign, Gary Bodeau [President of the Chamber of Deputes] is waiting for the letter
PetroCaribe activism, known as the #PetroChallengers, has dipped recently due to other protests taking centre stage: the November 2018 La Saline massacre and the collective rape of young female students. As more information suggests that elected officials close to the president have connections with armed gangs, some citizens wonder if the government is staging such insecurities to intimidate and instill fear so that people will stop asking for accountability:
Eske nap rete gade yo kap masakre ayisyen ak ayisyèn parèy nou???
https://t.co/K8tjOGs0oO
— Pascale Solages (@PascaleSolages) May 15, 2019
Will we just stand by and watch them massacre our fellow Haitians???
The report has fueled a greater discontent rooted in the country's socio-economic crisis. The government's poor handling of the situation, all while insecurity and gang activity increase, is also re-igniting social mobilisation around the PetroCaribe issue, intensifying calls for those who embezzled money to be brought to justice:
“Nou pa dwe janm demobilize jiskaske tout koupab nan vòlè lajan popilasyon an ale nan prizon pou krim kont peyi a, epi pou lajistis sezi byen yo remèt enstans konsène yo pou pwojè devlopman k ap itil popilasyon an.”#noupapdòmi #PwosèPetroCaribeA pic.twitter.com/F7h7HIlbdP pic.twitter.com/XG1o9fnDET
— Pascale Solages (@PascaleSolages) June 3, 2019
We must never demobilise until all the culprits of stealing money from the population go to prison for crimes against the country, and for the sake of prosecution, assets handed over to the relevant institutions for the useful development of citizens.
#wearen'tsleeping #PetroCaribetrial
A PetroChallengers anti-corruption protest is scheduled for Sunday, June 9.
The report focuses on the Tèt Kale party as the one that stole the most from PetroCaribe. It even revealed that rose bracelets which partisans and government officials used to wear to show allegiance to the party were produced with PetroCaribe money. The cost of one bracelet? $90:
Ahhhh les temps changent! ?✊?? pic.twitter.com/Ogx0Rd9dUX
— Gaëlle Bien-Aimé (@Gaelleactrice) June 2, 2019
In the beginning were the bracelets… Now come the handcuffs
Ahhhh, how times change!
Tèt Kale supporters are already making efforts to discredit the report as being biased and untruthful, but intense social mobilisation around PetroCaribe and other related instances of poor governance may well force Moïse's government to deal with the issue.
If the government refuses, many Haitians wonder whether this movement has the potential to cause its downfall.

author: Joseph W. Alliance


text:
Hundreds of thousands protest in Hong Kong against the extradition bill · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Huge protesting crowd against the extradition bill paralyzed a large part of Hong Kong Island on June 9 2019. Photo from inmediahk.net
Hundreds of thousands of people in Hong Kong took to the streets on Sunday, 9 June 2019, to stop the government from passing amendments to the existing extradition laws – the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance.
The rally started at 2:30 p.m. and it quickly paralyzed a large part of Hong Kong island. Anna Pearce recorded the crowd near Victoria Park, the starting place of the rally:
No to China extradition.. incredible mass protest turnout in Hong Kong #occupyhk #umbrellarevolution #hongkong #timelapse pic.twitter.com/DmE643iKVx
— Anna Pearce (@stilltalkin) June 9, 2019
Streets flooded with protesters
The organizer of the rally, Civil Human Rights Front, estimated that there were more than a million protesters in the rally as the scale of the protest was larger than the anti-national security law mobilization on 1 July 2003. But the police said there were about 240,000 in the streets during the peak of the rally. As South China Morning Post reporter Jeffie Lam put it, Hongkongers made history today:
#hongkongers are making history today. All lanes of the Hennessy Road – including those which police refused to open before – are flooded by protesters against the #extraditionbill @SCMPNews pic.twitter.com/UTr2ui7Fix
— Jeffie Lam (@jeffielam) June 9, 2019
Protesters said the proposed amendments would make it easier for mainland China to cause the arrest of critics, dissidents, and even journalists in Hong Kong. They were chanting “no evil law” and calling for the city's chief executive Carrie Lam to step down.
Protester placard: No China extradition; Liar Carrie Lam, step down. Image via inmediahk.net CC: AT-NC
A social worker told reporter from inmediahk.net that she rallied to defend the people working in the social work sector because under China's judicial system, those who tried to bring positive change in society would be arrested. Another student protester believes that once the amendment is passed, the city will cease to exist as the constitutional principle of “One Country Two Systems” would come to an end.
Today, Hongkonger are telling the world we oppose the Extradition Bill! #noevillaw #NoChinaExtradition pic.twitter.com/fNvaBjRhRm
— Denise Ho (HOCC) (@hoccgoomusic) June 9, 2019
There have been several mass protests against the extradition bill. On 30 March, about 12,000 rallied from Wanchai to Admiralty right before the government presented the amendment bill to the legislature. One month later on 28 April, about 130,000 took to the streets demanding the scrapping of the bill.
The series protests has caught the world's attention. Many are now monitoring if the city's Chief Executive Carrie Lam would withdraw the controversial bill which is scheduled for second reading in the legislative chamber this week.
The amendments were first proposed by the Hong Kong government in February to provide further legal grounds for the Chief Executive and local courts to handle case-by-case extradition requests from jurisdictions with no prior agreements, specifically Taiwan and China. By citing the murder case of a pregnant woman in Taiwan, the government claimed that amending the extradition laws was meant to address ‘legal loophole’ that allow fugitives to escape punishment.
However, legal experts pointed out that the so-called ‘loophole’ was in reality a firewall to prevent crime suspects from being handed over to mainland China where there is no fair trial.
Human rights defenders, journalists, NGO workers and social workers at risk
Various sectors have warned that if extradition requests are processed without legislative oversight, the amendments would provide a legal basis for mainland Chinese authorities to arrest political dissents. This concern was stated in an open letter jointly signed by over 70 non-government organizations:
Given the Chinese judiciary’s lack of independence, and other procedural shortcomings that often result in unfair trials, we are worried that the proposed changes will put at risk anyone in the territory of Hong Kong who has carried out work related to the Mainland, including human rights defenders, journalists, NGO workers and social workers, even if the person was outside the Mainland when the ostensible crime was committed. We are calling on the Hong Kong government to immediately withdraw the bill…
Instead of addressing the concerns raised by the petitioners, the Beijing Liaison Office met representatives of the local business sector and demanded them to back the bill. At the same time, the Hong Kong government gave some concessions to the business sector by exempting nine white-collar crimes in the bill and raising the threshold for extradition from crimes punishable by three years in jail to crimes with a seven-year prison penalty.
But on the other hand, it decided to by-pass the legislative committee-level deliberations and tabled the bill for full legislative council discussion.
The direct intervention of the Beijing Liaison Office and the Hong Kong government’s violation of legislative procedure have given a strong and clear signal to the public that the amendment bill is a controversial political decision which is far from protecting Hong Kong people’s interest.
Under the current bill, foreigners who traveled to Hong Kong could also be handed over to mainland Chinese authorities upon extradition requests. Diplomats from the U.S, Canada and European Union have expressed a concern about this. Against the background of the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China, some are worried that the amendments would turn Hong Kong into a battlefield of international politics:
The intended effects of the amendments can be regarded as a mirrored counterpart of the legal rights utilised by the US government in Meng’s case [Note: the arrest of Meng Wanzhou in Canada upon the extradition request filed by the United State on 1 of December 2018]. If the amendments are passed, then any person who happens to come to Hong Kong can be arrested and surrendered to mainland China with the consent of a court or the Chief Executive, and without deliberation in the Legislative Council of Hong Kong.
More than 2500 lawyers demonstrated against the amendment of extradition law on June 6. Photo: Kris Cheng/HKFP.
The Hong Kong government responded by accusing the opposition of misleading the public.
Lawyers stage “Black March”
But among those who have spoken out against the bill were not just opposition politicians but also members of the professional legal sector. On 6 June, the legal sector staged a “black march”  against the controversial bill. Dressed in black, about 2,500 lawyers gathered outside the Court of Final Appeal and marched to government headquarters in silence. Prior to the “black march”, both the BAR society and the Law society have submitted opinions to the government demanding an extensive consultation with the legal sector and other stakeholders.
While debate in the legislature has been muted by the Hong Kong government, grassroots opposition voices have taken over. In the past few weeks, social media platforms have been flooded with joint signature campaigns against the amendments initiated by hundreds of university and secondary schools alumni groups, Christian groups, and neighborhood associations.
Hongkongers abroad have also spoken out. Diaspora Hong Kong communities from at least 25 cities, including London, New York, Berlin, Toronto, Melbourne, and Tokyo among others also held a coordinated protest against the amendment bill.
Chants of We Love Hong Kong and We Love Freedom are shouted from central #Sydney CBD (#Australia). Protesters oppose the #HongKong law that would allow for extradition to mainland China. Police estimate 2000 attending. #反送中 #NoChinaExtradition pic.twitter.com/AycfpKVNjO
— Roydon Ng (@RoydonNg) June 9, 2019
The whole world is now watching if Carrie Lam would redraw or continue to push through the extradition bill in Legislature this week.

author: Oiwan Lam


text:
Argentina resumes the fight for legal abortion with new draft bill · Global Voices
Romina Navarro

Photo by Majo Malvares (@malvaresz) taken during the May 28th march. Used with permission.
A bill that would legalize pregnancy terminations in Argentina was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies on May 28 followed by nationwide demonstrations of support of abortion legalizaton.
Abortion is a crime in Argentina except in cases of rape or to save a woman's life, according to the country's 1921 Penal Code. Many states refuse to uphold those legal exceptions. It isn't uncommon for a Argentine young girls to be forced by a court order to carry a pregnancy to term.
The Voluntary Termination of Pregnancy Draft Bill (IVE) establishes the right to termination on request within the firt 14 weeks of pregnancy. Beyond the 14th week, a woman may terminate a pregnancy in the case of rape or when her health is at risk. The bill exempts the patient to seek legal authorisation from a judge to terminate the pregancy in such cases — doctors will be obligated to accept a sworn statement by the patient.
In 2018, the Chamber of Deputies narrowly approved a similar bill that was eventually defeated in the Senate.
This bill, as well as last year's, were drafted by Argentina's National Campaign for the Right to Legal, Safe and Free Abortion, a national alliance of human rights groups, institutions, politicians, and doctors who support legalization of abortion that has existed for 14 years.
This is the eighth time the National Campaign, or “la Campaña” as they're known locally, presents a bill in the Argentine Congress. This year's bill has initial support of more than 70 legislators.
The Campaña chose May 28 to introduce the draft legislation as that is the International Day of Action for Women's Health.
Argentinian social movements staged demonstrations in many cities in support of the bill on May 28. Women waved green handkerchiefs in a “pañuelazo,” the color long being a symbol of the pro-choice movement in Argentina.
With the help of social media, supportive demonstrations also took place abroad, such as in the cities of Leeds, in England, and Berlin, in Germany:
5.28.2019
Berlin stands in solidarity with the campaign for abortion rights in Argentina?
Photo: Julieta Palombi #NiUnaMenosBerlin #28M #GritoGlobal #Pañuelazo #ive2019 #SeraLey #AbortoLegalYa #TodxsAlaCalle #MareaVerde #CongresoVerde #QueSeaLey #prochoice @NiunaMenos_De pic.twitter.com/KOhABsNOON
— Berlin Ireland Pro Choice Solidarity (@ProChoiceBerlin) May 28, 2019
Yesterday we joined Leeds Women's Strike Assembly sending solidarity to our Argentinian compañeras, in favor of the decriminalization of abortion #pañuelazo #QueSeaLey #SeVaACaer #AbortoLegal #NiñasNoMadres #legaliseabortion ✊ pic.twitter.com/CimT7Z77Ic
— Leeds Sisters Uncut (@UncutLeeds) May 29, 2019
Around 97 percent of Latin American and Caribbean women live in countries with restrictive abortion laws, according to a study by Guttmacher Institute. The only countries in Spanish-speaking Latin America where abortion is legal on request are Cuba and Uruguay. In the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, abortion is illegal with no exceptions.
The defeat of last year's abortion bill in the Argentinian Senate had the ironic collateral effect of establishing the abortion debate in the national public agenda. A statement by “Alerta Feminista” collective explains this:
Aunque el proyecto de ley para legalizar el aborto en Argentina, que ha dejado en suspenso a toda América Latina, fue rechazado por el Senado el 9 de agosto [de 2018], la lucha por el derecho a decidir ha adquirido una fuerza internacional e intergeneracional incomparable, llamando no sólo al aborto legal, sino a la separación de la Iglesia y el Estado.
Although the bill to legalize abortion in Argentina, which had left all of Latin America in suspense, was rejected by the Senate on August 9 [2018], the fight for the right to choose has gained an incomparable international and intergenerational force, calling for not only legal abortion, but also the separation between Church and State.
They've added:
El año 2018 resultó ser un año clave a nivel mundial en la movilización de las mujeres hacia la conquista de este derecho: la lucha de las mujeres polacas contra las restricciones al acceso al aborto y el triunfo del “sí” en Irlanda fueron seguidos por una lucha ejemplar de las mujeres argentinas.
The year 2018 proved to be a key year worldwide in women's mobilization for obtaining this right: Polish women's fight against restrictions on access to abortion and the victory of the “yes” in Ireland were followed by the exemplary fight of Argentinian women.
Many see the balance as positive when it comes to the fight for reproductive rights. The following tweet was shared from the march in the city of Córdoba:
Somos miles en Córdoba en esta 5ta marcha #NiUnaMenos, en este nuevo #3J ✊??#BastaDeMachismo #BastaDeViolencias #AbortoLegalYa #NiñasNoMadres pic.twitter.com/EkndaXdtjW
— Ni Una Menos Córdoba (@niunamenosCBA) June 3, 2019
There are thousands of us at this 5th march. #Not One Less, in this new June 3rd #NoMoreMachismo #NoMoreViolence #LegalAbortionAlready #GirlsNotMothers
The “green wave” of 2018 has drawn attention to many women's help networks as well as to the consequences of clandestine abortions in Latin America. The past year has also seen a wave of reports of institutions, health professionals and public officials obstructing abortions in cases permitted by the law, or hindering access to contraception (available over-the-counter in Argentina).
The campaign “Girls, not mothers”, a regional call for Latin American states to ensure safe abortion for young girls who become pregnant as a result of sexual assault, also emerged in the wake of 2018's movements. They've tweeted this on May 27:
#AméricaLatina: Cada año miles de niñas menores de 14 años sufren violencia sexual y son forzadas por sus Estados a continuar los embarazos.
NO ES FAKE NEWS
Necesitamos que millones de voces se sumen al grito:#NiñasNoMadres!!!
(Gracias @crisyepez4 por esta ilustración!) pic.twitter.com/p4i7kbe6Gl
— NiñasNoMadres (@NinasNoMadresLA) May 27, 2019
#LatinAmerica: Every year thousands of girls under the age of 14 suffer sexual violence and are forced by their states to continue their pregnancies.
THIS IS NOT FAKE NEWS. We need millions of voices to join us in shouting “GirlsNotMothers!!!”
An image of the #NiUnaMenos (“not one less” in Spanish) march on June 3 in Buenos Aires. Photo by Xime Talento for the Emergentes collective, used with permission.
Other movements that go hand-in-hand with the fight for free abortion gained strength recently too, such as #MeToo, #YoTeCreo (I believe you) and #NiUnaMenos (not one less), all denouncing different forms of aggression against women.
In Argentina, there has been increased support for the Comprehensive Sex Education Program, which aims to introduce in school curricula prevention methods for unwanted pregnancies, and is regulated by a 2006 law.
However, it should be noted that 2019 presents a very complex scenario for Argentina: The composition of the chambers is the same as last year, which means that there are few expectations of obtaining more votes at this time, and the country is in the midst of political and economic uncertainty, with rising inflation and a nearing presidential election.
Despite this, the Campaña considers it essential “that the legalization of abortion becomes part of the public debate and that [presidential] candidates take a stand when it comes to sexual and reproductive rights and the implementation of the Comprehensive Sexual Health Law.”

author: Romina Navarro


text:
In Nigeria, tensions rise in Kano Kingdom as king faces finance corruption charges · Global Voices
Bala Muhammmad Makosa

King Sanusi II of Kano Kingdom sits on his throne in the palace, Kano state, Nigeria, September 2016. The king now faces serious allegations of financial corruption and misuse. Photo by DonCamillo via Wikimedia Commons: CC BY-SA 4.0.
An atmosphere of gloom settled over the ancient city of Kano in northern Nigeria, as the Kano State Public Complaints and Anti-Corruption Commission investigated King Muhammad Sanusi II, the Emir of Kano Kingdom, for financial scandals that date back to 2017:
More trouble for Emir Sanusi as Kano anti-corruption agency unveils 5 heavy allegations against Emirate Council https://t.co/Yt2CrP1wGK
— Awal Idris Evuti (@Awevooty) June 6, 2019
King Sanusi II of Kano Kingdom in northern Nigeria. Photo by Baaballiyo via Wikimedia Commons, March 2017, CC BY SA 4.0.
“As a government instituted agency, we [started] investigating these accusations since 2017 to date. We are still in the process. Code 9 promulgated by the Kano House of Assembly grants us the mandate to investigate all institutions under Kano State government. And Kano Palace is among others,” Muhuyi Magaji Rimin Gado, chairman of the commission, told Global Voices in an interview on May 30, 2019.
The Kingdom dates back to the year 999 as one of Nigeria’s largest kingdoms and exists within modern Kano State under the jurisdiction of state Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje.
Ganduje has been at odds with King Sanusi II and made the controversial decision to break up the historic kingdom into five sub-domains, undermining the king's power.
The commission investigated King Sanusi II and three others — his palace chief of staff, Mannir Sanusi, finance officer, Mujtaba Abba and bookkeeper Sani Kwaru — for blowing nearly 3.4 billion Nigerian Naira (approximately $9,456,920 United States Dollars) since King Sanusi II's coronation in 2014.
The commission released a report dated May 31 with five specific allegations lodged against the palace over misuse of funds between 2014-2017: They awarded illegal contracts to 21 shell companies; spent 117 million Naira to fuel generators ($325,481 USD); 54 million Naira expended on airtime and data ($150,210 USD); 105 million to an individual account ($292,075 USD); and 144 million Naira on hotel accommodation and flight tickets ($400,542 USD).
Kano govt queries Emir Sanusi for allegedly misappropriating N3.4 billion https://t.co/FtF6sFVUQS pic.twitter.com/voQ1l9J6o6
— SK (@introvert_king) June 7, 2019
“…It is regrettable, and we further [see] that seven among these companies are not certified with the government,”  Muhuyi Magaji said.
Based on these findings, the commission recommended the suspension of King Sanusi II and “all other suspects connected to this case … pending the final outcome of the investigation.”
When Global Voices asked if the commission’s investigation into the king’s financial misdealing was a form of political prejudice, Muhuyi said this was a “false and mischievous accusation.” According to him, a few concerned individuals discovered the financial wrong-doing in Kano Palace and reported the king in 2017 — during that time, no hostility existed yet between the government and King Sanusi II.
Twitter user Abubakar A. Ibrahim disagrees:
If there is any take away from the Gov Ganduje vs Emir Sanusi drama and Buhari generously withdrawing corruption allegations against Goje is that this corruption ‘fight’ is only a pressure weapon against political opponents. The more things change, the more they stay the same.
— Abubakar A. Ibrahim (@Moonchild509) June 8, 2019
Ironically, Governor Ganduje himself is the subject of financial scandals, but Section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution restrains the commission from investigating the governor.
Yet, video footage circulating online shows Ganduje allegedly collecting a bribe from state contractors in 2018. Ganduje adamantly denied it.
In the year of our Lord 2019, Ganduje wants to probe Sanusi for allegations of corruption ???. Wonders shall never end!pic.twitter.com/3UNe4FdV1E
— To Plan Is To Plot, To Plot Is To Conspire (@TweetAtAustin) June 4, 2019
A beautiful Friday morning to remind you that Ganduje, a shameless old thief caught on camera several times stealing, is querying the Emir of Kano on charges of corruption ?
— Ibrahim M (@ibrah_shuwa) June 7, 2019
Muhuyi Magaji says these were unsubstantiated rumors that only circulated online and were never brought to the commission, and even it was brought forward, they do not have the legal authority to review the governor’s actions:
Governor Ganduje is masked by the immunity of section 308 of the Nigerian constitution, which rules out the prosecute of top political office holders in a court of law until their term expires.
Former Governor Ibrahim Shekarau created Kano State Public Complaints and Anti-Corruption Commission in 2005. The Kano State House of Assembly endorsed the law that established it.
On Friday, May 31, 2019, Global Voices headed to Kano Kingdom palace mid-morning, seeking comment on allegations leveled at the king as well as the other three suspected of wrongdoing.
The palace was crowded with followers who come to offer their allegiance to the king every Friday.
Global Voices secured a meeting with Chief of Staff Mannir Sanusi and passed through guards and other auxiliary forces to speak with the palace official inside the palace grounds, who said:
On behalf of the Emir, and the entire Kano palace, we will not recount. We are going back to court on June 13. And thus, we hold that we will keep silent.
On June 7, the palace issued a brief statement on behalf of the king, claiming he only inherited 1.8 billion Naira ($5,006,406) when anointed in 2014.
In another recent development, Aliko Dongote, an international businessman from Kano, along with Governor Kayode Fayemi of Ekiti State, has initiated a peace talk between Governor Ganduje and King Sanusi II. Details of the meeting have not been revealed.
A welcome lifeline. Kings should avoid politics, a real lesson. https://t.co/OeZoWLusFM
— Olawale Rasheed (@iwogoke) June 8, 2019
Now, Kano citizens and the international community anxiously await the June 13 trial, when the courts will decide the fate of the historical Kingdom of Kano.

author: Bala Muhammmad Makosa


text:
A decree by President Bolsonaro could threaten civil society group investigating deaths under Brazil’s military dictatorship · Global Voices
Agência Mural

The play “Common”, performed by the Group Pandora, addresses the topic. Photo: Luh Silva, used with permission.
This story was authored by Jéssica Moreira and originally appeared in the website of Agência Mural, a non-profit newsroom covering São Paulo's suburbs. An edited version is published below under a content partnership with Global Voices.
When Antônio Eustáquio, now 73, became the administrator of the Dom Bosco cemetery in Perus, a district of the Brazilian city of São Paulo, in the late 1970s, he helped discover a clandestine mass grave at the site.
Years later, in 1990, the Brazilian government made the existence of the mass grave public: It was built in 1976 and contained exactly 1,049 skeletons of both indigents and political prisoners of Brazil's US-backed military dictatorship (1964-1985).
In May 2019, the grave became a point of discussion in the national news with the publication of a federal decree by President Jair Bolsonaro that determined the end of civil society councils and committees. The measure could threaten the Working Group of Perus, known by the Portuguese acronym GTP, that since 2014 has investigated the human remains found at the Dom Bosco mass grave.
The federal government denied the GTP would be ended. Sought for comment by Agência Mural, the Ministry for Women, Family and Human Rights said that it supported the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappeared [People], with which the GTP is affiliated: “The Ministry reaffirms the importance of the work undertaken by the Working Group, attending to humanitarian and legal obligations so that the families can exercise their right to burial and mourning,” the Ministry said in a statement.
However, the GTP depends on a cooperation agreement signed with the Union and renewal is pending. The current agreement, which also involves the Federal University of São Paulo and the São Paulo city council, expired in March 2019 and a new agreement is now in the approval process.
Visit of people from Perus to the Forensic Institute. Photo: Carla Borges, used with permission.
So far, the GTP has identified the remains 14 people, some of them killed by agents of Brazil's military dictatorship.
The GTP also arranges visits to the São Paulo's Forensics Institute, where it's based, and has organized a collaboration with 100 local artists to make the largest graffiti display in the neighbourhood: a mural on the walls of the cemetery depicting the various human rights abuses committed in the military period.
Carla Borges, a former officer at the Office of Human Rights and Citizenship in the city of São Paulo who collaborated with the GTP, says the presidential decree has caused apprehension. “For me, these are direct attacks on the few and already fragile spaces for social participation that we had before, and on research facilities, which have been working to confirm the facts and the violations of human rights committed by the Brazilian State during the military dictatorship”, she told Agência Mural.
According to GTP-member Marina Di Giusto, the Brazilian president does not have the power to dismantle the working group, as it is in an agreement of cooperation. She highlighted, though, that it depends on the government to renew the agreement and the rehiring of the experts to continue the work. “Although not having the power to end the GTP, the government can make the work difficult”, she said.
When the mass grave was publicized in the 1990s, Rogério Tretin, 40, was a young student living three kilometres away from the cemetery. He still remembers the bustle at the cemetery upon finding the remains. “I saw the press coming. I saw fathers and mothers who went to the site, thinking about their disappeared [children] during the dictatorship”.
Now a history teacher, Rogério says he believes “[they] are trying to hide yet another [set of] remains” with the possible end of the GTP. At work, the educator says he is committed to presenting narratives that go beyond the official one, with the aim of connecting the students to the reality of the neighbourhood's history. “Addressing these facts in class allows the student to broaden their knowledge, break one-sided paradigms and have a participatory view on the neighbourhood,” he said.
The effort to address the mass grave’s history also takes place in the streets and the neighbourhood’s cultural spaces, with the work of  local groups such as Pandora Theatre Group, the Quilombaque Cultural Community, and the Alberto Pazzini Centre for Human Rights.
Since 2018, the Pandora Theatre Group has performed the show “Comum” (“common,” in English), which tells the story of the grave from different perspectives – the gravediggers, activists, and families of the disappeared.
“A memory that stayed hidden for so many years cannot go back to being buried”, says the actor Caroline Alves, 19, who grew up hearing about the memories of the grave. “The GTP must continue so as to attain the right of the families to bury their relatives with dignity and prevent other graves from opening”.
Quilombaque people take the “Dictatorship Never Again” trail, on a route that passes by the Dom Bosco cemetery. Photo: Karen Siqueira, used with permission.
The crimes she referred to are also mentioned by Cleiton Ferreira, 35, founder of the Quilombaque Cultural Community. “As well as the political prisoners, it is important to highlight the genocidal system that they supported in that period and which persists to today. The majority of the skeletons are from youths executed by a shot from above, in the era of the extermination squad”.
The youths of the Quilombaque regularly walk the memory trail “Dictatorship Never Again”, organized by the Agência Queixadas initiative, which begins with a visit to the cemetery, followed by the Museum of Resistance, in the centre of São Paulo, and also to the Forensics Institute.
“It is a trail for the residents to gain an understanding of what is happening and what the grave was. For us, [the possible end of the GTP] is sad, because we have been following the work of the experts, learning about the context in which the people died or the illnesses that affected them”, explained Cleiton.
It is estimated that 49 skeletons are of disappeared political victims and the rest are probably of youths executed or victims of meningitis, commented the law student Amanda Vitorino, a member of the Alberto Pazzini Centre for Defense of Human Rights.
The concealment of the deaths by disease is highlighted by some as also being part of the military regime’s crimes. “Even today, black youths are executed on a daily basis, victims of structural racism and institutional violence. What are the threads that link the deaths of yesterday and those of today?” Amanda questioned. “We need to understand the deeds of the period of dictatorship and the roots that they planted in our present.”

author: Agência Mural


text:
Arrest of investigative journalist Ivan Golunov marks turning point in Russian society · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

I and we are (all) Ivan Golunov. Banner provided by Meduza, used with permission
Точка кипения: this Russian expression meaning boiling point—the point when enough has become enough—is perhaps the best way to convey how an increasing number of Russians feel about the arrest of Ivan Golunov. Golunov, a leading investigative journalist, was detained on June 6 in Moscow on what appear to be trumped-up charges of drug dealing and possession.
Golunov was arrested and initially denied access to a lawyer, in violation of Russian law. His lawyer confirmed he sustained serious injuries while in custody. After being taken to hospital, he was discharged and placed under house arrest on June 8.
The Russian police initially produced photos of a drug lab allegedly found when they searched in Golunov’s flat, but the images were later retracted. The pro-Kremlin media outlet Russia Today also confirmed that the pictures were not taken in Golunov’s flat. The charges being leveled against Golunov could lead to a 10 to 20-year prison sentence.
Thirty-six-year-old Golunov works for Meduza, one of the few remaining independent Russian-language online media platforms. Meduza is registered in neighboring Latvia, but maintains an office and several journalists in Moscow. Golunov has led and published several investigations pointing at cases of corruption involving high-ranking officials.
Since Golunov’s arrest, Meduza has released Golunov’s articles under a Creative Commons license and has encouraged media outlets and individuals to republish the stories, an initiative fully supported by Global Voices. Among his most important reports are ones detailing how Moscow’s deputy mayor Pyotr Biryukov channeled state contracts to his family, and how Moscow's urban beautification program involved inflated budgets. The story he was working on just before his detention focused on the monopoly of funeral services in Moscow.
Golunov's arrest has sparked a rare expression of solidarity among not only journalists, activists and lawyers, but also actors, popular singers, and figures from outside the liberal circles of Moscow and Saint Petersburg. On June 10, three leading newspapers agreed to publish editions with identical front pages in support of Golunov. The newspapers were sold out in record time. In a rather ironic u-turn, pro-Kremlin media, including Channel One, Russia’s most-viewed TV channel, are also calling for a fair investigation.
June 12 marks Russia Day, when public marches and demonstrations approved by local authorities will take place. Under Russian law, public demonstrations require a permit. Golunov’s supporters have announced they will hold their own march without obtaining official permission.
Kremlin observers say the Russian government is seeking to lift the charges against the journalist before June 20. On that day, President Vladimir Putin, whose ratings have fallen to a historical low in the country, will host the Direct Line, his annual talk show where he takes questions from citizens by telephone and online media.


text:
Beyond Beijing: What China’s 1989 Democracy Movement was like in Changsha · Global Voices
Sinopsis

Changsha, May 19, 1989: Students on hunger strike at the provincial government headquarters. Photograph by Andréa Worden.
This interview by Filip Jirouš originally appeared on Sinopsis.cz as part of a series on the 30th anniversary of the Tian'anmen massacre. An edited version is published below as part of a content-sharing agreement.
The democracy movement in 1989 was a nationwide student movement that spread across more than 60 major cities (and more than 300 including town and county-level cities) all over China. The protests and crackdown in Beijing Tian'anmen were widely reported, but the situation outside of the capital rarely received media attention.
While the original student demonstrations, which began in 1986, were fueled by concerns over an increased cost of living and perceptions about government corruption, they gained nationwide traction after the death of former communist party leader Hu Yaobang, whose reforms aimed to make the Chinese government more accountable. The protests in Changsha (in Hunan province near Hu's hometown Liu Yang) were rather radical. Not only was there a hunger strike, but according to Lu Siqing, founder of the Hong Kong-based Information Centre of Human Rights & Democratic Movement in China, on April 22 1989 a few hundred protesters broke into the Hunan provincial government building in Changsha.
Andréa Worden's profile picture. Used with permission.
Quickly spotted by the central authorities, this protest action in the revolutionary city was mentioned in the April 26 editorial of the People's Daily, which defined the student movement as “a destabilizing anti-party revolt that should be resolutely opposed at all levels of society”. In Beijing, students protested against the editorial and demanded that it be retracted.
Andréa Worden is a researcher, translator and consultant whose work focuses on human rights and rule of law in China, and China’s interactions with the UN human rights mechanisms. Currently a scholar at the East Asian Studies Program of Johns Hopkins University, she was teaching at the time at Hunan Medical University and bore witness to the student protests. In this interview, Worden remembers 1989 as she experienced it in Changsha.
Sinopsis (S): You were in China during the spring of 1989; why and where were you exactly?
Andréa Worden (AW): I went to China with the Yale-China Association after graduating from Yale with a double major in East Asian Studies and history. I was in Changsha, the capital of Hunan, on a two-year English teaching fellowship at the Hunan Medical University (HMU). The student protests began just a few months before the end of my fellowship.
S: Was it hard for you to adjust to China back then? Did you make a lot of friends?
AW: Yes and no. I had taken some time off during college in 1984 and spent several months in Taiwan studying Chinese and then traveled for about two months on my own in the mainland. I found it endlessly fascinating, and was encouraged that I could actually communicate effectively in Chinese.
So when I got to China in 1987 I had a pretty clear idea of what to expect, but being part of a work unit provided a new set of bureaucratic challenges and nonsensical things I had to adjust to. I tried my best to go with the flow, accept uncertainty, and maintain a good sense of humor.
I did make quite a few friends in China.  Some of my students became good friends over time, as well as my Chinese English teacher colleagues, and other teachers at the school. I also became friends with some of the young tennis crowd in Changsha.
Demonstration in Changsha, May 18, 1989. Photograph by Andréa Worden.
S: What was the local reaction when martial law was imposed on May 20? Did it scare the locals or incite them to participate in larger numbers?
AW: Martial law was declared only in Beijing, but things took a more serious and solemn turn in Changsha after the martial law declaration. People were angry and dismayed, and protested against martial law the next day. One student from another university who was marching in the demonstration […] saw me on the sidewalk observing, and called out in English: ‘How can our government be so cruel?’
S: What was the atmosphere like before June 4?
AW: Many students had returned to class by May 30. There was a sense that the movement was over; the Changsha students had heard that students in Beijing were going to leave Tian'anmen Square –- this was before the Goddess of Democracy appeared. I recall that my students expressed concern about the ‘settling of accounts’ [秋后算账] during this time; in other words, they were worried about how they might be punished.
S: Could you tell us what happened immediately after the massacre in Beijing? What were the first reactions? What was the atmosphere like?
AW: Early in the morning of June 4, a Sunday, some students came rushing over to the house where the Yale-China Association teachers lived. They had learned the news from VOA, and banged on the door to wake us up (the American teachers were still asleep at 6:00 or 6:30 am on Sunday). They were distraught and angry. Some were crying. I was in shock.
S: Do you believe another similar protest is possible today? Is there any hope for change?
AW: Because China today is now a high-tech police state with near total surveillance, a nationwide popular movement on the scale of 1989 is impossible. It could only happen with a collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But smaller protests happen frequently in China. They are usually quite specific in terms of the issue and demand, such as the recent protests by parents whose children were given expired polio vaccines.
Change is always possible.
S: What do you think the West should do, if anything, about the current human rights situation in China?
AW: Rights-respecting governments and people should do whatever they can to support human rights defenders and victims of human rights abuses in China and elsewhere, including in our own countries. Specifically with respect to China, we need to be taking much stronger measures; one obvious example where a more robust intervention is needed urgently is the mass internment by the CCP of over 1 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

author: Sinopsis


text:
In Tanzania, advocates pressure police to investigate ‘teleza’ rapes and robberies · Global Voices
Susie Berya

Left: Getrude Dyabere, the Women and Children's Desk officer with the Legal Human Rights Center, speaks on the legal issues regarding “teleza,” armed men who allegedly rape and terrorize women in Kigoma, Tanzania. Right: Ramla Issa, a resident of Kigoma, calls on the government and police for intervention, May 8, 2019, screenshot via StarTV Youtube.
On May 27, 2019, Tanzanian police announced the launch of an operation to investigate and prosecute “teleza” — armed men who have allegedly raped and terrorized women in the Mwanga Kusini Ward of Kigoma in western Tanzania since 2016.
The men reportedly grease their faces and bodies with oil before breaking into female-majority households to rape and rob women throughout the Mwanga Kusini area. Teleza means “slippery” in Swahili and the term has been used to describe these types of attacks.
The District Commissioner of Kigoma, Samson Anga, made the announcement to investigate the allegations following multiple media reports and a May 7 press release by a coalition of civil society organizations including the Legal and Human Rights Center, Tamasha, Twaweza, Jamii Forums, the Centre for Strategic Litigation and Change Tanzania, urging the police to investigate the women's testimonies of rape and torture.
Kigoma District Commissioner, Samson Anga, has launched an operation against rapists known as “Teleza” in Kigoma. He has said that once the culprits are caught they will be whipped and rot in jail.#TokomezaTelezaKigoma #teleza pic.twitter.com/pNG1KgPjUS
— WateteziTv_International (@WateteziTv_Int) May 28, 2019
I have spoken via WhatsApp with Annagrace Rwehumbiza, program coordinator with the youth-focused civil society organization (CSO) Tamasha, about teleza occurrences in Kigoma.
In early March 2019, Tamasha staff members were in Kigoma to conduct fieldwork on participatory community engagement focused on women, youth and girls. During her interactions with Kigoma community members, Rwehumbiza says, several women mentioned their concerns about teleza.
Rwehumbiza says she went to the Kigoma-Ujiji municipal office to inquire. She says one official acknowledged that they were aware of at least 20 women who had experienced violent break-ins, but no formal charges had been made.
Rwehumbiza says the official asked her to bring the women forward to discuss the allegations, but only two were willing to show up, who said that teleza started to terrorize the community in 2016. That's when she decided to go house-to-house to inquire about teleza.
I just wanted to hear from [the women], what kind of counseling were they receiving? The way the stories were being told, the way we were seeing the pictures, it's like those women were being tormented, and we wanted to know what kind of services did they get in terms of … security, counseling, and things like this.
Over a three-day period in March, Rwehumbiza and her colleagues interviewed at least 43 girls and women who shared similar testimonies about teleza. Rwehumbiza recorded video testimonies and photographed survivors’ wounds allegedly suffered during teleza attacks. She shared the stories with her colleagues and strategized with other CSOs throughout April to call attention to the issue, eventually releasing the press statement as a coalition on May 7.
It snowballed. The more you go to one house, they'll show you another one, another person, another house. … So we went from house to house to hear these women's stories and we got close to 45. These are their stories. … Each described what happened to them. … One says she was broken into more than five times. … Some were raped in front of their children…
Rwehumbiza says it's unclear how many men are involved in these attacks and to what extent they operate as an organized crime network. On Twitter, she insisted an urgent investigation is necessary to find out more.
#Teleza Tunachoomba kwa Serikali yeti, Uchunguzi wa kina ufanyike ili kubaini undani wa suala hili ili hatua za makusudi na haraka ziweze kuchukuliwa na kunusuru wanawake hawa pic.twitter.com/WzNytFDO4u
— Annagrace Rwehumbiza (@annagracer23) May 9, 2019
#Teleza What we are asking from the government is a comprehensive investigation to identify the extent of this issue so that deliberate and quick action can be taken and to help these women.
Jamii Forums, a popular online discussion forum in Tanzania, agreed to post and circulate the women's testimonies in the forum as well as a series of tweets to raise awareness. All of the witnesses and survivors shared their testimonies anonymously, fearing reprisal.
One witness describes how a man referred to as teleza entered her home while she and her siblings were sleeping:
SIMULIZI YA BINTI WA KIDATO CHA TATU: Nikiwa kidato cha pili, #TELEZA alikuja nyumbani kwetu usiku na kukuta mdogo wetu wa kiume amelala sebuleni
- Alimvua nguo ili kumbaka lakini alipongundua ni wakiume alimwacha na kuingia kumbani tulipokuwa tumelala wasichana#JFLeo pic.twitter.com/GVM9tMfESW
— Jamii Forums (@JamiiForums) May 22, 2019
TESTIMONY OF A YOUNG WOMAN IN FORM 3: When I was in Form 2, #Teleza came to our home in the night and [saw] my young male sibling sleeping in the living room. He took off his clothes to rape him but when he discovered he was male, he left him and entered the rooms where us girls were sleeping.
“These women need us,” Rwehumbiza said. “Their stories have not gotten the communal outcry they deserve.”
Tunaendelea kupaza sauti juu ya suala hili la #Teleza, Serikali isikie sauti hizi na kuona kwamba ni suala linalohitaji hatua za makusudi na haraka sana. pic.twitter.com/5Ekxq0ISz1
— Annagrace Rwehumbiza (@annagracer23) May 10, 2019
We continue to amplify voices concerning this question of #Teleza for the government to hear these voices and to see that this question needs swift and intentional steps taken.
Rwehumbiza says that the legal process is a major challenge in effectively reporting teleza cases. According to a witness, one survivor recognized her perpetrator in the community but police failed to hold him in jail after his initial arrest:
Ushahidi 1: Kuna Msichana aliingiliwa na #Teleza siku 3 mfululizo. Alimjua huyo kijana, akashtaki Polisi lakini huyo kijana hajawahi kukamatwa mpaka leo
- Mtu huyo huyo, alitambuliwa sehemu nyingine na akashtakiwa, Polisi walimkamata lakini baada ya siku akaachiwa#JFLeo pic.twitter.com/ZNt7LRd4tD
— Jamii Forums (@JamiiForums) May 22, 2019
Witness 1: There's a young woman who was broken into by #teleza three days in a row. She knew the young man and pressed charges with the police but this young man has not been arrested up to now.
This exact person was recognized in another area and charged and the police arrested him but after one day, he was released.
Rwehumbiza says women who did go to the police to report these cases were belittled and disbelieved.
The CSO coalition's press release reiterates that survivors were the targets of disapproval and humiliation by male law enforcement officers and the community-at-large stigmatized and ridiculed them — when survivors sought help, they were met with victim-blaming. One survivor said that when she sought care, the doctor blamed her and said it was her fault for playing “hard to get,” according to a tweet from Jamii Forums.
On May 20, Member of Parliament Zitto Kabwe, who represents the Kigoma-Ujiji municipality, tweeted his concern about teleza:
Extremely sad that women continue to suffer from rape and physical violence called #Teleza in my constituency @KigomaUjijiMC. Police @tanpol have been informed but they do nothing to end this madness regardless of public outcry from CSOs. Tonight another woman badly injured
— Zitto Kabwe Ruyagwa (@zittokabwe) May 20, 2019
The next day, he brought the issue before parliament, referring to the public outcry and need for police accountability. In response, the Minister of Home Affairs, Kangi Lugola, said that Kigoma police records do not reflect any reports related to teleza incidents and that the issue is not as severe as MP Kabwe claims:
#Teleza Majibu ya Waziri Kangi Lugola pic.twitter.com/0R2R07qFyX
— Zitto Kabwe Ruyagwa (@zittokabwe) May 21, 2019
#Teleza Response by Minister Kangi Kugola
The #Teleza and #TokomezaTelezaKigoma (#ObliterateTelezaKigoma) hashtags have made the rounds on Twitter. Netizens from East Africa are calling for action against the violence inflicted upon the women in Mwanga Kusini.
Tanzanian lawyer and activist Anna Henga wrote that Kigoma's image has been tarnished by teleza and the lack of urgency in response:
Kigoma is beautiful, the only thing tarnishing her good image is trending incidents of violence against women known as #Teleza.
I call upon people of Kigoma and all Tanzanias to respect and protect rights of women. #Teleza #Kigoma #Tanzania pic.twitter.com/O4Z6gC74Iy
— Anna Henga (Advocate) (@HengaAnna) May 17, 2019
Rebecca Gyumi called on netizens to “re-politicize” violence against girls and women:
We need to re-politicize violence happening to women and girls. While the current approaches have made progress, it still within an ever-shifting context of impunity #Teleza #VAWG
— RebecaGyumi (@RebecaGyumi) May 30, 2019

author: Susie Berya


text:
Vietnamese victims of 2016 marine disaster have filed a landmark lawsuit against Formosa Plastics Group in Taiwan · Global Voices
Guest Contributor

The press conference for the first transnational litigation in Taiwan. Photo credit: Nikole Nguyen.
By the Global Voices Chinese Lingua team
In a landmark move, victims of the 2016 marine disaster that affected the coastal communities in central Vietnam filed a transnational lawsuit against the Taiwanese corporation responsible for the environmental damage, Formosa Plastics Group (FPG), on Jun 11, 2019. If successful, this case could pave the way for new norms related to Taiwanese corporate responsibility for environmental protection in third-party countries.
With the assistance of environmental and human rights organizations in Taiwan, Vietnam, US, France and Canada, the legal representatives of the Vietnamese plaintiffs, a group composed of 7,875 victims of the marine disaster, presented the lawsuit against FPG at the Taipei district court on June 11.
The marine disaster, which took place on 6 April 2016, is seen as the most serious environmental disaster in Vietnamese history. The incident, caused by the discharge of toxic waste into the sea by FPG subsidiary Ha Tinh Steel Corporation, led to the death of massive amounts of fish and marine life in central Vietnam.
FPG accepted responsibility for the disaster on 30 June 2016 and agreed to give 500 million USD in compensation to the Vietnamese government for disaster relief work. However, the Vietnamese authorities have not released any information about the number of victims who have received any compensation. And for those who were compensated, they only received around US$ 2,430 dollars per household — an amount that can only support a person's expenses for one year, based on GDP per capital in Vietnam. Many affected community members have been forced to work in other cities or other countries. Other community members claim to have never received any compensation at all.
The victims tried to bring the case to local courts in Vietnam but were rejected, and many activists who reported on the pollution were arrested and jailed. In a recent case, 39-year-old shrimp farmer Nguyen Ngoc Anh was given a 6-year jail sentence for “making, storing, releasing, and circulating information and documents against the state.” Nguyen is one of the activists protesting against FPG over the 2016 marine disaster.
For the past three years, Taiwanese lawyers (with the help of Christian churches in Vietnam) have identified 7,875 plaintiffs and gathered evidence to prepare for this transnational litigation. Even though the number of victims is thought to be far more than 7,875, a civil liability case must be filed within three years after the liable party (in this case FPG) admits its negligence. The Taiwanese lawyers have to present the case in court before June 30, 2019, if they want it to be admissible. The lawyers are asking the judges to apply Vietnamese civil and environmental laws in the transnational lawsuit, and are asking for 4 million USD in compensation on behalf of their plaintiffs.
Vietnamese victims of the marine disaster filed the civil complaint against Formosa Plastics Group in Taiwan. Photo credit: Nikole Nguyen
This is the first transnational litigation case regarding environmental harm in Taiwan. If successful, it has major implications for setting up new norms regarding environmental protections in global investments. Taiwan is a home-state to multinational corporations which invest in industries that cause environmental harm in other third-party countries. This current case reinstates the liability of corporations, such as FPG, for the environmental damage caused in those third-party countries.
FPG's subsidiary, Ha Tinh Steel Corporation, is the largest foreign investor in Vietnam. Even after the marine disaster, FPG has continued to expand its steel mill investment in Vietnam. In May 2017, the first furnace of the steel mill in Ha Tinh started to operate and one year later the second furnace started to operate. Very soon the third furnace will start operating, according to an FPG press release.
Although the Vietnam Environment Administration claimed that the pollution from the steel mill in Ha Tinh has been carefully monitored after the disaster, there hasn't been any monitoring data released to the public yet. On the other hand, there were reports about how the fishery industry in the affected areas has declined dramatically after the marine disaster. In 2018, a report published by the BBC stated that fish were found dead in Ha Tinh again.
Apart from fisheries, local industries related to seafood like fish sauce factories or restaurants have also been seriously affected.
After the marine disaster in 2016, Mr. Chou Chun Fan from FPG said Vietnamese should choose between catching fish and shrimp or hosting a modern steel industry. Nevertheless, when the people chose “fish and shrimp” and protested against this steel mill, they were arrested and jailed.
For the Vietnamese plaintiffs, this lawsuit is not only about monetary compensation, but about justice, truth, democracy, and freedom of speech. It is about the relationship between humans and their environment.
After the marine disaster, the poem written by a non-professional poet Trần Thị Lam was widely downloaded in Vietnam because it touches many Vietnamese:
Đất nước mình buồn quá phải không anh
Biển bạc, rừng xanh, cánh đồng lúa biếc
Rừng đã hết và biển thì đang chết
Những con thuyền nằm nhớ sóng khơi xa…
My country is so sad, isn't it?
Silver sea, green forest, blue rice fields
The forest is gone and the sea is dead
The boats remember the distant waves…

author: Guest Contributor


text:
Racing down socialist memory lane: a classic Yugoslav cars video goes viral · Global Voices
Filip Stojanovski

Wikipedia photos of cars featured in the video: Zastava 101, Renault 4, Volkswagen Beetle, Yugo 55, Zastava 750, and Polski Fiat 126
A Slovenia-produced video of a race featuring classic cars from the former Yugoslavia has gone viral in the Balkans. The video, in which iconic car models from the 1970s and 80s vie for supremacy, has attracted the interest of older and younger alike, bringing a touch of nostalgia to those who lived through the period, and inspiring a new generation of aficionados of Yugoslav-made cars.
Produced by the team at car-aficionado site Atmosferci, the short video “Charge! – Race with cars of our youth” (Na juriš! – Dirka z avtomobili naše mladosti) features a race between six economy cars that used to be status symbols for the middle-classes during the golden age of Yugoslav socialism. The video had over 400,000 views on YouTube in just one week after it was published.
The cars include three brands produced by Yugoslav factory Zastava from Kragujevac, Serbia, that were based off models by Italian manufacturer Fiat.
The six cars featured in Atmosferci's video and how the hosts described them.
Although designed to be family cars, modified versions of all those vehicles have figures in rally racing — a sport that was the subject of the Yugoslav cult film “National Class Category Up to 785 ccm” (1979).
The title of the Atmosferci video (“Na juriš!”) was the battle cry of Yugoslav partisans. It invokes patriotic pride based on the successful anti-fascist struggle during World War II and Yugoslavia's post-war independence from the Cold War blocs.
In the video, the three hosts and three Slovenian celebrities race each other while sharing remarks such as “my dad used to drive one of these.” The video is spoken in Slovenian and has Croatian subtitles. However, much of the video is self-explanatory, and the results of the race are shown on screen in text form.
Between 1986 and 1992, Yugoslavia had exported over 140,000 Yugos to the US. In line with the widespread perception in that country that the car was poorly made, several Hollywood movies featured a Yugo for tragicomic effect during car chases. For instance, Bruce Willis’ and Samuel L. Jackson's characters replace it by hijacking a Mercedes in a scene from the 1995 action thriller “Die Hard with a Vengeance.”
But for many Generation X ex-Yugoslavs who had experienced some benefits of that life before the breakup of the federation, these cars carry a lot of nostalgia.
Bosnian rock band Zabranjeno Pušenje has dedicated one of its post-war songs to the Yugo 45. The lyrics (here they are in Bosnian and English) tell the story of how a family managed to purchase the car. Told from the perspective of the youngest son, it says that low-interest loans were widely available during socialism.
The tragicomic video closely follows the allegoric narrative: once the whole multi-ethnic neighborhood used the Yugo 45 model for chores and fun; that all came to an end with the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian War. The car's final purpose is to enable the family to escape from their home, carrying only “two nylon bags” of possessions, and resettle in another city as refugees.

author: Filip Stojanovski


text:
Sudan’s democratic spring is turning into a long and ugly summer · Global Voices
Ethan Zuckerman

Protestors near the Sudanese army headquarters in Khartoum in April 2019. Photo by M. Saleh (CC BY-SA 4.0)
When protesters forced Omar al-Bashir out of power in Sudan this April after 30 years of dictatorial role, it was an unalloyed good for the world. Bashir has been wanted by The Hague since 2008 for genocide and war crimes in Darfur, and his ouster was a key step towards a free and democratic Sudan, as well as justice for Darfuris.
But what’s followed in Sudan has been far less encouraging. Sudan’s military has promised elections, but not for as much as two years. The Transitional Military Council (TMC), the military leaders now in charge of the country, have included Bashir confidantes like Lt. General Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, who was suspected of leading Janjawid militia massacres in Darfur. Many Sudan observers believe that Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, is the person really pulling the strings on the TMC, where he serves as vice president. Hemedti not only recruited and led many of the Janjawid fighters who brutally suppressed dissent in Darfur—he has also been accused of having recruited child soldiers from Darfur to fight in Yemen’s bloody civil war on behalf of the Saudis.
Despite the obvious dangers, Sudanese pro-democracy protesters are back out in the streets, demanding immediate transition to a civilian government. Their demands have been met with brutal violence. On June 3, security forces including the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—whose members are veterans of the Janjawid militias responsible for Darfur’s worst massacres—killed over 100 protesters, dumping bodies into the Nile River, raping and robbing civilians stopped at military checkpoints.
Despite these horrific incidents, Sudanese citizens have continued to fight, launching a mass general strike on Sunday June 9.
As with most conflicts today, there’s an important information component to the struggle between activists and the Sudanese military. The protests that ousted Bashir and have confronted the military have been organized by groups of middle-class Sudanese like the Sudanese Professionals Association and the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors using social media, especially Facebook. Since the June 3 massacre, Sudan’s mobile internet has been largely shut down, making online organizing and reporting on conditions on the ground vastly more difficult. Sudan’s government previously shut down the internet for 68 days to combat the protests that ultimately led to Bashir’s ouster.
Facebook was an especially significant force in bringing women into the streets to protest against Bashir. Tamerra Griffin reported on a set of women-only Facebook groups that were initially used to share gossip, but which were mobilized to identify abusive state security officials, who were then hounded and sometimes chased out of their own neighborhoods. The presence of women in the protest movements and the Zagrounda chant—a women’s ululation—has become a signature of the uprising. Bashir memorably declared that the government could not be changed through WhatsApp or Facebook. His ouster suggests that the power of social networks as tools for mobilization is routinely underestimated by governments.
But now social media seems to be leveraged at least as much by the military as by the opposition. The internet has not been completely shut down—the government has been able to maintain its presence on Facebook, which features at least four pages controlled by the RSF, which are advertising the militia veterans’ version of events. Sudanese activist Mohamed Suliman is organizing a petition campaign, demanding Facebook remove these pages in recognition that they promote violence against peaceful protesters in Sudan.
In addition to combatting Sudanese propaganda on Facebook, Sudanese activists inside the country and in the diaspora are looking for ways to return internet access to the general population, so they can continue organizing protests and document government violence. Activists are organizing information-sharing networks on top of SMS and voice phone calls, but I’m also getting calls from Sudanese friends who wonder whether technologies like Google’s Loon could be used to put a cloud of connectivity over Khartoum. (The answer: maybe. Loon acts as an antenna for existing telecoms networks, and those networks in Sudan have been forced to cut off connectivity. In addition, a balloon floating 20km over a city is a very attractive missile target.)
Until very recently, the few Sudanese who had access via ADSL had been opening their wifi networks or sharing passwords with friends and inviting them to post messages from their houses. A couple of days ago I was seeing reports—unconfirmed—that even ADSL has been turned off. This may signal the start of a new phase of the crackdown.
???
Last available internet route “Sudani ADSL” is now reported to be down.
This completes a dark ring over sudan as internet are now Almost completely disabled, this gives the TMC milita “janjaweed” enough lack of media attention to continue abusing and killing the Sudan. https://t.co/4WDs0YhvAP
— Space Cadet (@nourality) June 10, 2019
On the morning of June 10 Yassir Arman, a major figure in the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement, which fought a war against Khartoum leading to the independence of South Sudan, was deported from Khartoum to Juba by military helicopter.
I have been deported against my will by a military helicopter from Khartoum to Juba. I was not aware of where they were taking me. I asked them many times. They tied me up in the helicopter together with Comrade Ismail Khamis Jalab and Mubarak Ardol.
— Yassir Arman (@Yassir_Arman) June 10, 2019
One major channel for information from Sudan in the future may be from Sudanese who are in touch with organizers on the ground who have been forced to flee the country and report from neighboring countries.
Countries are known by the company they keep, and the military government’s supporters are well resourced: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have provided $3 billion in aid to the military leaders. Given the Trump administration’s tight ties to the Saudi and UAE governments — which have extended to overruling Congress in selling arms to those regimes — it seems unlikely that a petition to the White House to recognize the RSF as a terrorist organization will meet with approval any time soon. (By contrast the African Union — which has a regrettable history of ignoring misbehavior by African military rulers — has suspended Sudan after this weekend’s crackdown.
It’s hard to know what to do as a private citizen when faced with a situation like the one in Sudan. Some thoughts on what might actually be helpful:
–  Pay attention and ask others to do so as well. All governments, including military governments, are limited in what actions they can take by public perception. If Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates understand that people are actually watching what the Sudanese military is doing, it may limit their willingness to support a government run in part by experienced génocidaires. Reporter Yousra Elbagir is reporting from the ground in Khartoum and her Twitter feed is deeply helpful. Declan Walsh, the New York Times bureau chief, is doing excellent reporting from the ground. Reem Abbas, a Sudanese journalist and blogger, is sharing excellent content, much of it in Arabic. Al Jazeera’s synthesis of the conflict has been excellent, but I worry that their reliance on Skype interviews to cover events may limit their coverage going forward:
– In the spirit of getting people interested in what’s going on in Sudan, I recommend Hasan Minhaj’s occasionally silly but good-hearted Patriot Act episode on Sudan’s pro-democracy movement and the military government’s violent reaction.
– Pressure organizations that are helping legitimate the military government. That includes Facebook, which should not be hosting pages for the Rapid Support Forces, or for any entities associated with the transitional military government.
Sudan’s two telecom operators — MTN and Zain — are international companies which could (in theory) be pressured to violate the military’s demands that they shut down. Zain is a Kuwaiti company, which means they are heavily influenced by Saudi Arabia, but MTN as a South African company might be susceptible to shareholder pressure, lawsuits, etc. The Internet Society has released a statement calling for Sudan to turn the internet back on. It’s unclear whether they would be an organizing point for protests to pressure MTN.
– It can be difficult to get money to the ground in Sudan. While the Trump administration removed some financial sanctions on Sudan in 2017, other sanctions stemming from the Darfur conflict remain in place. My friends in Sudan have pointed me to Bakri Ali and the University of Khartoum Alumni Association USA, a US 501c3 which is using their tax-exempt status to deliver aid to democracy protesters.
It can be hard, in retrospect, to remember the excitement and enthusiasm that accompanied the Egyptian revolution and the broader Arab Spring. But after only a year of a democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government, a military dictatorship took over. The fear right now is that Sudan could go directly from one dictatorship to another — from one Arab winter to another without an intervening Spring. Some Sudanese protesters have been using the slogan “Victory or Egypt”, looking at the return to dictatorship as the worst possible outcome. The worse outcome is even worse — it’s the prospect of systemic military violence like in Darfur, without intervention by the international community. The same folks are in charge, and we are already looking away.

author: Ethan Zuckerman


text:
Thousands of anti-extradition protesters block roads surrounding Hong Kong government headquarters · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Protesters block roads surrounding government headquarters to stop the passing of extradition bill. Image from inmediahk.net. Used with permission.
On June 12, thousands of protesters blocked major roads surrounding Hong Kong's government headquarters and legislature in the Admiralty district to prevent government officials from presenting amendments to a controversial extradition bill. The secretary of the Legislative Council announced that the scheduled session at 11:00 am would be deferred until further notice after lawmakers were unable to reach the Legislative Council Complex.
This is not the 2014 #UmbrellaMovement. This is #HongKong now.
Just after Sunday's million-strong protest, the HK gov announced it would continue to push the #extraditionbill. The parliament is to debate it today & this is the people's way of stopping it.
Pic: Tanya Chan's FB pic.twitter.com/UUzeK0tSRp
— Venus Wu (@wu_venus) June 12, 2019
The roadblock protests followed a June 9 rally where over a million people took to the streets against proposed amendments to the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment)  Bill. The proposed bill would provide legal grounds for the Chief Executive and local courts to handle case-by-case extradition requests from authorities in mainland China, Taiwan and Macau. Protesters believe that the amendments would make it easier for mainland China to arrest critics, dissidents, and even journalists in Hong Kong.
Soon after the rally, the government issued a statement stressing that the administration will continue to proceed with the second reading of the bill on June 12. The government's hard-line stance triggered a round of violent clashes between the police and hundreds of young protesters who gathered outside the Legislative Council on June 10.
Confrontation after midnight on June 10. Image from Stand News. Used with permission.
The police arrested 31 protesters and took records of the identity of 358 protesters who stayed overnight after the rally. About 80 percent of them are between 16 to 25-years-old.
On June 10, Chief Executive Carrie Lam continued defending the bill and stressed Hong Kong is “duty-bound to address that deficiency”. The president of the Legislature, Andrew Leung, decided that Hong Kong lawmakers would have to vote on the controversial bill by June 20.
The organizer of the Sunday rally, Civil Human Rights Front, called for another round of protests outside the government headquarters to paralyze the government starting on June 12. Student unions from seven Hong Kong tertiary institutions, including Chinese University and Baptist University, have called for students to boycott classes and join the rally. Over a hundred Hong Kong employers from across industry sectors have pledged to either suspend business or support employees who choose to strike.
About 2,000 protesters gathered overnight outside the Legislative Council on June 11 and more protesters joined them the next morning. At around 8:00 am, thousands of protesters occupied major roads (namely Lung Wo Road and Harcourt Road) surrounding the Legislative Council Building. Jerome Taylor, Hong Kong/Taiwan/Macau bureau chief for AFP, reported on Twitter:
Pepper spray deployed again pic.twitter.com/1wNCzqrYre
— Jerome Taylor (@JeromeTaylor) June 12, 2019
Although the protester's blockade was able to push back the scheduled session on the morning of June 12, house rules allow the Legislative Council president to resume the meeting with only one hour's notice.