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Billionaire Patrice Motsepe, the favoured FIFA candidate, becomes Africa football boss · Global Voices
Richard Wanjohi

Patrice T. Motsepe at the World Economic Forum annual meeting Davos 2009 Photo: swiss-image.ch/Monika Flueckiger (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)
The Confederation of African Football (CAF), Africa's football governing body, was due to hold its elections on March 12. Instead, the show ended even before the first ballot was cast, after the other delegates stepped down to ensure the election of the first South African to this influential post.
The winning candidate, South Africa’s Patrice Tlhopan Motsepe, is a 58-year old billionaire mining tycoon and, since 2003, the president of  Mamelodi Sundowns football club. Motsepe is one of the richest men in Africa and also brother-in-law of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.
Four contenders were in the running to succeed the outgoing president, Madagascar's Ahmad Ahmad, but his expected re-election bid was halted by corruption allegations in France in the run-up to the elections. Augustin Senghor of Senegal, Ahmed Yahya from Mauritania, the Ivorian Jacques Anouma and Motsepe were the contenders in the “battle for the top job” at CAF.
CAF represents the national football associations or federations running the continental, national and club competitions. The federation is currently headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, and, at 56 members, has the largest membership pool among FIFA confederates.
Before the election, the South African Football Association, through its official Twitter account, was enthusiastic about its candidate's chances:
Patrice Motsepe will become the president of the Confederation of African Football (Caf) later this week after Ahmad's five-year ban was reduced to two years by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Cas) on Monday. pic.twitter.com/WvPaKn0qEa
— SAFA.net (@SAFA_net) March 8, 2021
Motsepe was the least known of the four candidates.  However, many observers saw him as the favorite FIFA candidate.
Soccerladuma, one of Africa's most influential soccer magazines, reported in early March on the purported support for Motsepe at the top level of FIFA:
Reports in Kenya suggest that Patrice Motsepe has taken a step closer in his efforts to become CAF President with some help of FIFA President Gianni Infantino. The Mamelodi Sundowns owner is in the running for the highest seat on the continent against the likes of Ivory Coast’s Jacques Anouma‚ Senegal’s Augustin Senghor and Mauritania’s Ahmed Yahya. Now, according to Kenyan journalist Francis Gaitho of Kenya Football, Motsepe’s bid was boosted after FIFA President Infantino brokered an agreement which will see Senghor and Yahya step down their respective bids in support of Patrice Motsepe, with both candidates being offered vice president roles.
Senegalese Football Association President Senghor was the first candidate to withdraw from the race on March 5, with Anouma and Yahya following a day later.
As reported by InsidetheGames.biz, FIFA suggested that the deal was to ensure more inclusivity and less division among the top African football chiefs. According to Motsepe:
African football needs collective wisdom, but also the exceptional talent and wisdom of every President of every country and every member association.
InsidetheGames.biz cited reports that FIFA allegedly brokered an agreement behind the scenes among the candidates to smoothen the way for their preferred candidate by ensuring that while the candidates stepped down from the race, they would serve as vice-president (two positions) and special advisor.  Senghor and Yahya agreed to take up the VP positions and Anouma, as advisor to Motsepe in the new line-up.
Reports have claimed Senegal’s Augustin Senghor and Mauritania’s Ahmed Yahya have agreed to end their campaigns to become CAF President. The duo will reportedly now back Motsepe, which will lead to the pair being named CAF vice-presidents.
The site continues:
The reported agreement comes days after FIFA President Gianni Infantino returned home following a tour of Africa.
Image by Sisi under Pixabay licence
In his election manifesto entitled, “Building African Football To Be The Best In The World,” Patrice Motsepe laid out his plans and said that high on his agenda will be:
good governance, global best practices, investment in African football infrastructure, increasing prize money and statutory reforms…
He also stressed the need to engage more with the private sector. Building partnerships and sponsorships with the private sector and other potential partners formed a continuous theme throughout the three-hour-long launch of his manifesto.
For a fairly new face on the continental front, Motsepe has confounded both friends and foes.
His presidency will see South Africa get its first-ever top official heading a body of immense influence and reach within the continent. He is also the first president of CAF from a country where English is one of its official languages, as the previous presidents were from French-speaking nations.
“I want to make my modest contribution in all circumstances to use sport to unite Africans,” Motsepe said at a press conference
His supporters included Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Botswana. The President of the South African federation, Danny Jordaan, praised Motsepe's “business acumen, knowledge of governance and global business.”
Motsepe assured:
“We will succeed and we will make African soccer competitive at the international level.”
The incoming CAF team will be faced with managing upcoming tournaments including qualifiers for the Africa Cup of Nations end of March as the teams prepare for the main tournament in January 2022.
The federation is also faced with the challenge of “professionalizing” refereeing on the continental front. This is after bribery scandals involving match officials were highlighted in the last couple of years. The incoming president also indicated he will implement the VAR system “at all CAF senior competitions.”

author: Richard Wanjohi


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Nearly five decades after Franco’s death, the far right might make a comeback in Madrid · Global Voices
Koldo Casla

Santiago Abascal, President of Vox, in 2019. Flickr (CC BY-SA 2.0)
By May 4, the far-right party Vox might have a seat at the table to govern the region of the capital of Spain. Vox, whose rhetoric is chauvinistic, Eurosceptic and xenophobic, has been gaining ground in Spain since 2018. Now, nearly five decades after Franco’s death, the far right could return to power in Spain.
Vox has become an unavoidable political force in Spain. Today, the party represents 15 per cent of the Parliament. Several regional governments depend on its support. They could join the conservatives in a coalition government in the region of Madrid, which would be hugely symbolic.
Since 2019, the region of Madrid has been governed by the conservative Partido Popular (PP) and the undefinable Ciudadanos (originally social-democrat, later turned centre-right, always unionist). Yet, Ciudadanos has been dissolving slowly like a sugar cube since late 2019 and Madrid’s regional premier Isabel Díaz-Ayuso (PP) called a snap election for May 4 and expelled Ciudadanos from her cabinet. She is confident her party, the PP, will swallow Ciudadanos’ votes. However, Vox is likely to retain its vote share, and the PP will eventually need Vox's support to form a government. Vox may then likely be part of the new coalition governing Madrid.
Vox's first success was the regional elections in Andalusia in December 2018, where they obtained 11 per cent of the votes. One year later, in Spain’s general elections of November 2019, Vox rocketed to third place with 3.6 million votes and 52 deputies in parliament.
Virtually inexistent two years earlier, extreme right populism was suddenly surfing the wave of widespread frustration with the political situation in Catalonia, where the separatist sentiment grew notably in the 2010s. In an unofficial plebiscite in October 2017, two million Catalans expressed their desire to create an independent state; the leaders of the secessionist campaign are either in prison for sedition or have fled the country.
Many Spaniards outside Catalonia thought that the Spanish central government had been ineffective and/or excessively lenient with the Catalan authorities, particularly before the plebiscite. The criticism was directed towards the two main parties and their leaders, Mariano Rajoy (PP) and Pedro Sánchez (PSOE), prime ministers before and after June 2018. Vox emerged out of frustration with the way these parties handled it and some people found refuge in Vox’s chauvinism.
While Catalonia sometimes appears connected to Spain by a cat’s whisker, recentralisation appears to be gaining momentum elsewhere in the country. According to the official Centre for Sociological Research, in December 2018, three in ten Spaniards wanted an entirely centralized system or one where regions had less power than they have now. Vox is capitalising on that position muscularly. In Catalonia, too, some anti-independence voters have sided with Vox, as well. In the Catalan elections of February 2021, Vox obtained 7.7 per cent of the vote and became the fourth largest party in the Catalan parliament.
While the situation in Catalonia might be the trigger for Vox's appearance, the party's platform is much wider. The party is a melting pot that combines nostalgia for Spain’s imaginary past glory, rejection of feminism and so-called “woke” culture, Euroscepticism, a negative attitude towards migration, and love for bullfighting. Vox’s socio-economic policy is purposefully vague, with a heavy dose of nativism (“Spaniards first”) and neoliberal support for small government.
To this day, influential voices on the right-hand side of Spanish politics speak about the roughly eight centuries (711-1492) of coexistence of Moorish and Christian kingdoms as a “reconquest” of the former’s lands by the latter. During the campaigns of 2019, Vox and PP competed in the use of that word “Reconquista” in their campaign events in Asturias, in the north, and Andalusia, in the south, the two territories where the reconquest supposedly began and ended, respectively.
Vox refrains from endorsing Francoism explicitly, but party leaders refer to Franco as “the General,” never “the Dictator,” and they oppose all attempts of memorialization, because, they say, historical memory goes against the spirit of reconciliation after Franco. With Hitler and Mussolini's support, Franco staged a coup against a democratic government in 1936, and led an authoritarian regime until 1975. Half a million people died in the Civil War between 1936 and 1939; 200,000 of them were executed in the rearguard.
While Vox spokespersons insist that Spaniards should not talk about the Civil War and Francoism anymore, they rant against leftist politicians of the 1930s. They enjoy slandering the “13 Roses,” a group of young communist and socialist women executed by firing squad in Madrid soon after the Civil War ended in 1939. In October 2020, Vox leader Santiago Abascal expressed in the Spanish parliament that the left-leaning coalition of PSOE and United Podemos was the worst government Spain had had in 80 years, which meant that in his mind this democratically elected government was worse than Franco’s dictatorship.
Up until relatively recently, alongside Portugal, Spain remained one of the few places in Europe where the far right had not managed to find its place in electoral politics. After Portugal’s presidential election last January, there is no Iberian exception anymore.
The far right is the new old piece on Spain’s political chessboard. And it doesn’t look like it’s going anywhere. Vox could be part of the government of the Region of Madrid in a matter of weeks. Even if it does not join the executive, Madrid’s political future is likely to depend on them.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Koldo Casla


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South African shack settlement activist wins the 2021 Per Anger Prize · Global Voices
Nwachukwu Egbunike

S'bu Zikode, co-founder of Abahlali baseMjondolo movement speaking at the Poverty Scholars Program: Poverty Initiative Strategic Dialogue, November 13, 2010. Image by Michael Premo,  (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
South African human rights activist Sibusiso (S’bu) Innocent Zikode is being awarded the 2021 Per Anger Prize. Zikode's work centres on the right to home, land and survival for the most impoverished inhabitants of the country’s shack settlements, and he will receive the humanitarian award from The Living History Forum on April 21.
Established by the Swedish government in 2004 and managed by The Living History Forum, the award promotes initiatives supporting human rights and democracy across the world. The prize was named after Per Anger, a Swedish diplomat in Budapest who saved many Jews from persecution and death during the Second World War in Nazi-occupied Hungary.
Zidoke was the co-founder, 16 years ago of Abahlali baseMjondolo (Zulu phrase that roughly translates as “the people of the shacks”), a South African movement that has been working to resist “illegal evictions and campaign for the right to housing for all,” especially for shack dwellers. The movement grew from a protest organised from the Kennedy Road informal settlement in the eastern city of Durban in early 2005 and expanded to Pietermaritzburg and Cape Town.
South Africa has an insidious housing problem, aggravated by the lack of basic amenities like electricity and water supply in shantytowns that house the “poor and needy” in that country.
Zikode has said that “a shack without water, electricity, and sanitation is not worth calling a home,” according to a press statement from the Living History Forum. “On the contrary, it means life-threatening circumstances that are particularly harsh towards women, children, and minority groups,” says Zikode.
The housing problem and the attendant lack of sanitation have exacerbated the COVID-19 pandemic among the disadvantaged and vulnerable communities in South Africa.
Zikode’s tireless work has gained him public acclaim but the movement is also considered a threat to South Africa’s ruling class.
Zikode now shares the same space with previous winners, including in recent years: Elena Urlaeva (2010), Narges Mohammadi (2011), Sapiyat Magamedova (2012), Justine Ijeomah (2013), Rita Mahato (2014), Islena Rey Rodríguez (2015), Abdullah al-Khateeb (2016), Gégé Katana Bukuru (2017), Teodora del Carmen Vásquez (2018), Najwa Alimi (2019) and Intisar Al-Amyal (2020).
Race-driven urban segregation was one of the defining features of apartheid South Africa. However, this regulation of spaces in urban centres continued after the fall of apartheid, albeit in a different form, in that country.
South Africans are still divided along the lines of those with homes and the homeless, the shack dwellers.
However, the 2004 “sequence of popular protest against local governments” across South Africa led to the emergence of Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM), “an autonomous shack dweller’s movement,” according to Richard Pithouse, scholar in political and international studies at the Rhodes University, South Africa. AbM “emerged from this grassroots ferment and has since issued a compelling demand for organisational autonomy, grassroots urban planning and the right to the city,” says Pithouse.
In May 2005, residents of six shack settlements and local municipal flats in Durban had organized a protest of over 5,000 people demanding access to land, adequate housing, toilet facilities, and the end of forced evictions.
Nigel C. Gibson, British activist and scholar states that the protesters “presented a memorandum of 10 demands that they had drawn up through a series of meetings and community discussions.” This led AbM, in early 2006, to “organize a boycott of the local government elections scheduled for March of that year,” says Gibson.
But AbM's fight for the vulnerable did not go down well with many.
In September 2009, the AbM movement's original home in the Kennedy Road settlement in Durban was attacked by armed men, in full view of the police. The attackers were searching for Zikode, whom they threatened to kill.
The attacks which were reportedly carried out by “people associated with the local branch of the ANC” (African National Congress, South Africa's ruling party), left two people dead, many injured and 30 shacks destroyed.
In the aftermath, S'bu Zikode went into hiding, and the police arrested 13 AbM members.
Human rights group, Amnesty International described the attack as “apparently politically motivated violence.”
Nonetheless, violence directed at AbM has neither deterred its leaders nor the movement. Rather, they have strengthened their resolve to continue fighting for the rights of vulnerable South African shack dwellers to live a dignified life.

author: Nwachukwu Egbunike


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Using tablets, activist gets 900 girls and women educated in rural Afghanistan · Global Voices
Samea Shanori

Photo courtesy of Pashtana Zalmai Khan Durrani.
Women’s literacy rate in Afghanistan is among the lowest in the world. A high number of girls remain out of school or drop out because of “rising insecurity, discrimination, corruption, and diminished funding.” The situation is worse in rural areas.
However, people like Pashtana Zalmai Khan Durrani are fighting to educate rural Afghan girls and women, who she says are “the future of Afghanistan.” Originally from the southern, rural province of Kandahar, she has developed an online platform that now helps 900 girls and women get an education in their language when they cannot go to school through a lack of resources or if the schools are attacked. She is a Malala Education Champion and a Youth Ambassador for Amnesty International.
I interviewed Pashtana Zalmai Khan Durrani to learn more about her work. The interview has been condensed for length and clarity.
Samea Shanori (SS): I would like to start by talking about your organization. Could you tell us more about LEARN?
Pashtana Zalmai Khan Durrani (PZKD): LEARN, a non-profit organization, focuses on three key areas: education, maternal healthcare, and women empowerment. We work with the government and community-based schools, community members and tribal elders. We also partnered with Rumie, a Canadian non-profit organization. Through their online and offline platforms, we provide educational materials and resources not only to schoolgirls, but also women in Kandahar. These materials cover various topics including financial literacy, business entrepreneurship and combating domestic and gender based violence.
Rumie’s offline application plays a crucial role with our students. Once the application is downloaded, LEARN’s entire library will be set up on the device in local languages, Dari and Pashto. We provide the tablets with good battery life. This is the perfect solution that works for us because people in Kandahar, like the majority of Afghanistan, don’t have access to proper electricity and internet.
The goal is that if we have 10 or 20 girls enrolled, five of them will go to high school, and then at least one of them will, for example, go to a midwifery school and become a midwife for that village. We have been having a great success with this model in Kandahar. We hope to expand to other major cities starting with Panjshir and Bamyan, then move to Herat and Mazar.
Photo courtesy of Pashtana Zalmai Khan Durrani.
SS: Why did you start LEARN?
PZKD: When I returned to Kandahar from Pakistan (where I was a refugee with my family during Afghanistan's civil war) to go to university, I learned about the rate of literacy among rural girls and women. A cousin told me they don't go to school; that was in 2016.  Many schools don't have the educational materials and the teachers. Some schools are attacked and burned. I knew I had to do something.
In our communities, it is a taboo for women to get out of their homes. There are women in my family who haven't been out of the house for years because it's not [seen as] normal. Changing an old man’s way of thinking is difficult and will take time. The better solution is to have an alternative for girls and women to get educated. As I did my research and met with my cousins and relatives, I noticed that my cousins had learned Hindi by watching television.
In 2018, I co-founded LEARN in our house with a table and a tablet. The only people who first believed in my dream of educating rural girls of Afghanistan were my parents. Today, we have more than 900 students enrolled in our programs. We have been able to reach those girls who could never get out of their homes, who didn’t have access to education materials and whose schools were burned down.
I cannot ask a father to send his daughters to a school which was burned right in front of his eyes. But I can provide the safer alternative—his daughter can stay at home and still get an education.
SS: Who has been your biggest supporter?
PZKD: There is always that one person in your life that makes you the person that you become. For me, that was my father. As an elder of our tribe, people always reminded him that his first born was a daughter and not a son. He kept telling them that I was that son. He believed in me from the moment I was born. He made sure I never saw my gender as a barrier to what I wanted to achieve in life. He always treated me better than the male members of the family. That is why I am confident in what I am doing.
When we were living in Quetta, in Pakistan, as refugees, my father started a school for Afghan girls so that his sister who was just divorced could learn to read and write. He also wanted to make sure that other women in his community were not left out. Both my parents started teaching subjects like English and math there. That was in the 1997 or 1998. That is why my father has always been my inspiration.
SS: What are some of the challenges you have been facing?
PZKD: I have been fortunate because my father was a tribal leader. People respect, support and listen to me because of the position my father held in our tribe. Despite that, sometimes, my male cousins think that my appearances on television and talking about taboo issues in Afghanistan bring shame to the family.
Pashtun women are among the most oppressed in our patriarchal society, which makes my work difficult, but also very important.
Outside of the family, there are many other challenges that a tribal Pashtun woman from rural Afghanistan like me faces. I have been told many times to shut up when I used to work with the Afghan government just because I am young and a woman. Additionally, in Kabul, people are not open to the idea of rural women advocating for their rights because we look, talk and dress different.
I am also concerned that the international community isn’t as supportive of the rural women of Afghanistan—the women outside of Kabul. Development of rural Afghanistan and Afghan women plays a critical role in advancement of Afghanistan.
Photo courtesy of Pashtana Zalmai Khan Durrani.
SS: If you could give one piece of advice to other women, what would that be?
PZKD: I would say read the history of Afghan women, especially women like Gawharshad Begum, Zarghuna Ana, Nazo Ana, Malalai Maiwand, the fifth-century female Afghan poet Rabia Balkhi and Queen Soraya. When I was growing up, my father didn’t read Snow White or Cinderella to me. He read the stories of these strong Afghan women who were pioneers and had changed the history of Afghanistan. I look up to them.
Also, my advice to the young girls is that when you have an idea, start discussing it with people you trust. Do your research and find those people who have done what you want to do, see how their models have affected their communities and then come up with a model of your own. Most importantly, make sure what you want to do is sustainable with a long-term impact on your community and people you want to serve.
When I started LEARN, I followed the steps of Fereshteh Forough, the founder of Code to Inspire, and Shabana Basij Rasikh, the co-founder of School of Leadership Afghanistan (SOLA) which is an all-girls boarding school. Both Fereshteh and Shabana have created organizations that are changing the lives of so many Afghans, especially Afghan women who are the future of this war-torn country.
In Afghanistan, many projects are not sustainable because the community members aren't part of the solution. Through LEARN, I want to change that. I tell the residents of the villages I work with that I will not be there forever to send a doctor to check on the women. You need one of your daughters to become a midwife so that she can take care of the entire village. That is why you need to send your daughter to school now.

author: Samea Shanori


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How Hong Kong lost its academic freedom in 2020 · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

The management of the Chinese University of Hong Kong invited national security police into the campus after students chanted pro-democracy slogans during a graduation ceremony on November 19, 2020. Image from the Stand News, used with permission.
Hong Kong dropped from grade “C” to “D” in the latest Academic Freedom Index, an annual global assessment by the Germany-based Global Public Policy Institute.
Ten years ago, Hong Kong was among the Index's top countries, with 0.82 points in a range between zero and one. Since 2014, academic freedom in the city has deteriorated, with the sharpest drop happening between 2019 and 2020 (from 0.442 to 0.348 points).
Hong Kong's 2020 score is lower than Russia's (0.374), Cambodia's (0.381), and Vietnam's (0.377), but still higher than China's (0.082), which scored among the lowest countries in the study.
Hong Kong academic index from 1910 to 2020. Screen capture from V-dem via the Stand News.
The Academic Freedom Index scores 175 countries and territories annually and was developed by the Global Public Policy Institute in collaboration with the Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, the Scholars at Risk Network, the V‑Dem Institute, and approximately 2,000 country experts worldwide.
Upon the release of this year's ranking, Risk Network issued a statement outlining the political pressure faced by Hong Kong's higher education community since the enactment of the national security law in June 2020.
Below is a brief summary of events of 2020 are behind the decline of academic freedom in Hong Kong, according to researchers and local media reports.
Scholars Benny Tai and Claudia Mo were arrested under the national security law for organizing primary elections for pro-democracy parties in July 2020. Both were charged with “taking part in conspiracies to subvert state power.”
Tai is a former law professor at Hong Kong University and Mo is a former lawmaker and part-time lecturer at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Mo was also a candidate at the primary elections.
In 2020, several pro-democracy scholars have had their employment terminated by universities in Hong Kong. Here is an incomplete list gathered by Lokman Tsui, assistant professor of the School of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Tsui's tenure application was also rejected in 2020.
While in all cases there was no concrete evidence that the decisions were political, many in the public share Benny Tai's view that there is “an authority beyond the University” making the calls. Tai said:
The decision to terminate my appointment was made not by the University of Hong Kong but by an authority beyond the University through its agents. It marks the end of academic freedom in Hong Kong. Academic staff in education institutions in Hong Kong are no longer free to make controversial statements to the general public about politically or socially controversial matters. Academic institutions in Hong Kong cannot protect their members from internal and external interference.
Hong Kong's Education Minister Kevin Yeung said that public universities will have to update their syllabi to include the national security curriculum by September 2021. He added that school administrators must help “prevent and suppress” acts that could violate national security law inside campi.
According to the guidelines issued by the Education Bureau on February 4, all education institutions, from primary schools to universities, must:
(…) ensure all school staff to uphold professional ethics, abide by the law and observe the code of conduct acceptable to the society; step up the prevention and suppression of teaching or other school activities that are in breach of laws, prevent and deal with political or other illegal activities from permeating schools; and help students gain a correct understanding of the national security law.
In October 2020, the director of Hong Kong University tore down the Lennon Wall, a space maintained by students for pro-democracy posters, artworks, slogans, and commentary. The Lennon Wall is located at a site managed by the university’s student union, but the management still decided to barricade it citing “safety and management concerns.”
In November 2020, the director of the Chinese University of Hong Kong invited national security police to the campus to investigate a protest during a graduation ceremony, in which slogans such as “Hong Kong independence, the only way out” and the banned “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times” were shouted. Police searched students’ dormitories and arrested nine individuals for taking part in the peaceful demonstration.
In February 2021, the administrator of the Chinese University cut ties with the newly-elected Student Union by withholding all support, including the collection of membership fees and providing venues. A statement by the school accused the student union of “exploiting the campus for political propaganda,” and added:
The University will not tolerate any behaviour on campus that may endanger national security (…) Disciplinary actions will be taken on any student who incites unlawful behaviour, which may lead to sanctions including suspension of studies or expulsion from the University.

author: Oiwan Lam


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In Kenya, abortion focus obscures legislation towards safe reproductive healthcare services · Global Voices
Laila Le Guen

Article 25's Global Day of Action for the Right to Health in Kenya. Photo by theteam25 (CC BY-SA 2.0)
Reproductive rights in Kenya is an intimate and emotive topic where hard lines have been drawn on both sides. Pro- and anti-abortion campaigners keep cycling through episodes of heightened attention when high-profile cases arise and passions continue to run high. Meanwhile, the country registers numbers of unsafe abortions that are among the highest in Africa. Maternal mortality is high at about 6,000 deaths per year, 17 per cent of them from complications of unsafe abortion.
Limited legal recourse to access termination of pregnancy is a potential compromise that remains contested, leaving the two camps with a status quo that seems hard to shake off. What's at stake on both ends of this fiercely debated issue?
On one side, some feminist and human rights advocates, such as those who rallied behind the #KeepWanjikuSafe campaign in 2020, are eager to see reproductive rights extended. This would help prevent more deaths through unsafe abortion practices, which claim the lives of seven women every day and cost public health facilities over 500 million Kenyan shillings every year in post-abortion care, according to research published in 2018 by the African Population and Health Research Centre (APHRC) and the Kenyan Ministry of Health.
On the other hand, “pro-life” groups argue that the Constitution already provides too many loopholes, which could allegedly lead to what they term “abortion on demand.”
The anti-abortion position comes mainly from religious groups and is led by CitizenGo, a foundation with links to Spain’s far right, that is active in several countries to curb legislation on a range of social issues, from same-sex marriage to sex education to abortion.
In Kenya, CitizenGo launched a petition against the local chapter of Marie Stopes, an international NGO offering free sexual and reproductive health services including abortion, leading to a ban on the NGO in 2018 that was lifted a month later. CitizenGo's most prominent representative in Kenya, Ann Kioko, also sits on the board of Kenya’s Conference of Catholic Bishops and has connections to US-based anti-abortion and anti-LGBT groups, such as the Center for Family and Human Rights (C-Fam).
The most recent iteration of this debate happened last year when the Reproductive Healthcare Bill 2019 sponsored by Senator Susan Kihika was proposed to consolidate the “right to the highest attainable standard of health, including the right to reproductive healthcare” enshrined in Article 43 of the Kenyan Constitution. Much more ambitious than the 2014 bill that preceded it, this piece of legislation proposed to make prenatal, delivery, and postnatal services free for every woman in Kenya, outlaw forced sterilization, regulate surrogacy and provide a more solid framework for sex education.
Both bills, however, have stirred controversy over similar questions, most poignantly the twin issues of access to abortion and the dissemination of accurate information about sexual health aimed at teenagers. Those opposed to the 2019 bill have called for it to be shelved, claiming that it amounted to a
“back door legalization of abortion.”
The bill has since been temporarily withdrawn to allow for further public consultation, possibly leading to redrafting. Quoted in Business Daily, Mercy Mwangangi, the Chief Administrative Secretary (CAS) of the Ministry of Health justified this decision on grounds that the bill is:
“defective” and “vague on the emotive technical issues of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and assisted reproductive technology (ART)”.
While it makes some bolder proposals, on the contentious issue of abortion, the Reproductive Healthcare Bill of 2019 does not challenge or modify the Kenyan Constitution adopted in 2010, which makes abortion legal only in specific cases, namely if a medical professional deems the health or life of the mother to be at risk, or if an emergency operation is needed. According to a 2019 Supreme Court ruling, these provisions include pregnancies that resulted from rape. Meanwhile, assistance in procuring an abortion outside of these circumstances is still severely punished by the Penal Code.
This matter threatened to tank the entire constitutional reform project in 2010 as anti-abortion campaigners—chiefly Catholic and evangelical Christian religious leaders—appealed to voters’ religious sentiments to reject the draft on grounds that it would “legalise abortion.”
Refugees receiving care at a hospital in the Ifo 2 Refugee Camp in Dadaab. Photo by World Bank Photo Collection (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
Meanwhile, doctors still lack clarity and training on how to perform safe abortions and are hesitant to proceed in the absence of a reassuring legal framework.
The laser focus on abortion also obscures other reproductive health matters that rarely have a chance of being discussed in the midst of this cacophony. Stephanie Musho, a Nairobi-based human rights lawyer with expertise in gender and reproductive justice, explains what public debates are missing:
The bill outlaws forced sterilization. In this country, women —particularly those living with HIV—have been forcefully sterilized because of the thinking of certain health care providers who feel this is the best way to stop the transmission of the virus from mother to child, even though we know that women living with HIV, for the longest time, have been able to get pregnant, carry the babies to term, and give birth without transmitting the virus. […]
The bill promotes the right to privacy and the right to consent. When you look at patients who have mental health disorders, a lot of times, decisions are made for them. […] We are not just going to make decisions for people about their bodies just because they have mental health conditions.
Tagged “the abortion bill” by its opponents, the Reproductive Healthcare bill of 2019 is, in fact, a comprehensive document that only mentions termination of pregnancy in five articles (art. 26-30) out of 39.
The bill had three major goals: to ensure access to reproductive healthcare countrywide through state and county efforts, including adequate budgetary allocations; to regulate assisted reproduction services, such as IVF and surrogacy; and to clarify the framework for access to reproductive health services by teenagers.
In an interview on Milele FM in July 2020, the bill’s sponsor, Senator Kihika, clarified her initial intent:
What drove me to come up with the bill was majorly to help couples that could not be able to conceive. I wanted to come up with a legislative framework that could bring in IVF and surrogacy. In my role as a representative of the people over time, I have come across couples who could not get the services. Even though it is available, there are no laws that govern it and it is extremely expensive that only the very wealthy in the society are able to access.
Although it falls short of authorizing same-sex couples to access surrogacy, the bill seeks to establish every person’s right to access reproductive health services (art 7.1) and assisted reproduction (art. 9.1) as well as standards for written informed consent in matters related to reproductive healthcare.
If the bill passes, the Births and Deaths Registration Act would also be amended to facilitate a child’s registration at birth by a parent or parents of a child born through surrogacy, to avoid the legal imbroglio of having the surrogate mother automatically registered on the birth certificate, as is currently the case.
Senator Kihika further reiterated that religious perspectives have been adequately taken into consideration in the drafting of the bill:
I am a Christian and the context of the bill also accounts for our religious background. The bill also encourages abstinence but also offers counselling on the consequences of things like abortions.
What ultimately gets lost in the pro- vs. anti-abortion debate is the hope to move forward with legislation that could pave the way for millions of Kenyan to access a range of safe reproductive health services.

author: Laila Le Guen


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Post-Magufuli, will Tanzania review its repressive online content regulations?  · Global Voices
GV Sub-Saharan Africa

A mobile money agent waits for clients in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Under 2020 content regulations, individual expression is restricted by exorbitant fees and the government's power to remove “prohibited content.” Picture credit by Fiona Graham/WorldRemit via Flickr, CC BY SA 2.0.
This article is part of UPROAR, a Small Media initiative that is urging governments to address digital rights challenges at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
In early March, as Tanzanians began to speculate about the health and location of President John Magufuli, many citizens took to social media with their queries and concerns.
In response, the government issued threats of mass arrests to anyone who used social media to share false information about the president. Authorities swiftly referred to Tanzania’s 2015 Cybercrimes Act, and the 2020 Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations (EPOCA) to arrest and detain those who violated its rules.
The government has often used cybercrime laws and online content regulations to undermine and clamp down on digital rights and freedom of expression in Tanzania, this time was no different.
On March 17, then-Vice President Samia Suluhu Hassan revealed on state TV that John Magufuli had died. Soon after, Hassan was sworn in as the sixth president of Tanzania.
By then, at least four people had been arrested in different parts of the country for “spreading false rumors” about Magufuli’s health and location.
Many now wonder if Tanzania will review its repressive online content regulations in a post-Magufuli world, or whether these laws will remain firmly in place until 2025- the remainder of Magufuli's term served by Hassan.
In early March, Innocent Bashungwa, Tanzania’s Minister of Information, Culture, Arts and Sports, issued a warning specifically to the media to desist from spreading “rumors” about Magufuli’s whereabouts, who had not been seen in the public eye since February 27.
Additionally, the Minister of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Mwigulu Nchemba, also threatened netizens with jail time via his Twitter account for sharing “nonsense” rumors, specifically citing Section 89 of the Penal Code and Section 16 of the Cybercrimes Act.
Police Chief Ramadhani Kingai expressed specific interest in the Twitter account of “Kigogo,” a Swahili name referring to a high-ranking official, who often exposes government wrongdoing.
Human rights activists have condemned these moves and the overall climate of fear created by these regulations and subsequent threats of enforcement.
Tanzania has experienced remarkable internet, communications and technological advancements over the last decade.
Nevertheless, the state often plays an influential role over Tanzanian media companies and platforms and independent media lacks diversity in terms of viewpoints and representation.
The internet created new spaces online for Tanzania’s young bloggers and social media activists to make their voices heard, but the government has not welcomed this new reality.
In 2010, Tanzania first published the Electronic and Postal Communications Act, the first of its kind in the country.
By 2018, specific regulations regarding online content were released through Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2018. The government argued that these regulations were intended to monitor and regulate citizens’ use of social media, in particular, and tackle issues like hate speech and disinformation.
However, the regulations applied not only to mainstream media but to individual bloggers and content providers, who were shocked by the new requirement to pay $900 United States dollars for a license. This includes anyone who produces live-streaming TV or radio.
The sudden imposition of fees turned Tanzanian social media dark as many bloggers and content providers gave up due to the exorbitant costs. Opposition politicians and social media practitioners critiqued the regulations for undermining online media freedoms as well as civil society.
In 2020, Tanzania released revised EPOCA regulations, issued under Section 103 of the Electronic and Postal Communication Act, 2010, adopted in July 2020, and announced through Government Gazette on Government Notice No. 538.
There are several main differences between the 2018 and 2020 versions of EPOCA.
Firstly, the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) recategorized fees with three additional sub-categories under online content: news & current affairs, entertainment and education or religious, furthering imposing restrictions on individual content providers.
EPOCA 2020, Part VI, Section 116:
Any person who provides network services without obtaining any relevant individual license, commits an offense and shall be liable upon conviction to a fine of not less than 6 million Tanzanian shillings [ $2,587 United States dollars] or imprisonment for a term not less than 12 months or to both.
Secondly, the TCRA expanded a more detailed list of “prohibited content” including, among other things, content that motivates or promotes phone tapping, espionage, data theft, tracking, recording or intercepting communications or conversation without right.
Thirdly, EPOCA 2020 also reduced the amount of time that a license-holder has to respond to prohibited content violations by suspending or terminating an account. Under 2018 guidelines, a license-holder had 12 hours. In 2020, under Part III, Section 11, the response time is reduced to two hours. Failure to comply within this time frame gives authorities permission to intervene, either by suspending or removing an account.
Global Voices spoke with several legal and human rights experts who have condemned EPOCA 2020 revisions, saying it undermines both digital rights and civil society protections. They argue that these regulations further repress digital rights and deter bloggers and writers from owning their online content.
The biggest problem here is that these powers contain no safeguards against abuse, and with the current situation, they certainly have the effect of stifling legitimate freedom of expression in Tanzania, said one human rights professional who asked to remain anonymous.
Under the Magufuli administration, civil, media and digital rights steadily declined with systematic restrictions on free speech online.
In the aftermath of Magufuli’s unexpected death, many now wonder about the future of digital rights in the country — after six years of increasingly authoritarian-style leadership.
Global Voices spoke to several government officials on the condition of anonymity about the current regulations and what’s at stake in terms of human rights in digital spaces. One human rights professional in Tanzania told Global Voices, on the condition of anonymity:
The regulations are not fair as anyone can be criminalized, because not many citizens understand the implications of these regulations.
Another suggested that the government finds social media to be an “annoyance.” He warned citizens to take precautions when speaking out on public platforms because the government can legally access all their details through the platform host.
EPOCA 2020 makes it “virtually impossible” to remain anonymous online, under Regulation 9(e), “coupled with the requirement imposed on the internet café providers to register users via recognized IDs, assign static IP addresses to their computers and put camera surveillance to record the activities in their premises,” according to this analysis by the Media Council of Tanzania.
These regulations reinforce criminal defamation, restrict anonymity, provide hefty punishments for violations and grant sweeping powers of content removal to the TCRA and intermediaries.
EPOCA is incompatible with internationally acceptable digital rights standards. Overall, these regulations stifle legitimate freedom of expression and press freedom in Tanzania.
Yet, the Tanzanian government is obligated to respect and uphold rights to freedom of expression and association of all persons — including members of the media, civil society, and the political opposition, according to Tanzania’s constitution as well as international and regional treaties. These rights are also essential to the exercise voting rights.
Tanzania is at a crossroads with digital rights.
Under newly sworn-in President Hassan, will the ruling Revolutionary Party continue to silence and repress digital rights in the country?
Editor's note: The author of this post wishes to remain anonymous due to security concerns.

author: GV Sub-Saharan Africa


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‘A day without internet is a day in the dark’: The Gambia’s growing digital divide · Global Voices
Jainaba Sonko

Citizens in Banjul, the Gambia's capital, stroll down the street, July 5, 2013. Photo via Maarten van der Bent, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY SA 2.0.
This article is part of UPROAR, a Small Media initiative that is urging governments to address digital rights challenges at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
The coronavirus pandemic ushered in new levels of reliance on the internet to conduct everyday business.
In the Gambia, however, frequent internet outages and overall instabilityhave made everyday life an increasingly frustrating challenge, impeding both national development and individual growth.
“Brief, nationwide connectivity disruptions were recorded in November 2019 and January 2020,” according to a 2020 Freedom House report.
In February, at least two additional internet blackouts occurred, one lasting six hours and another lasting 12 hours. Gambian President Adam Barrow was notably absent from an online Economic Community of West African States meeting due to an internet outage.
Ebrima Sillah, Minister of Information and Communication, insisted that the 2019 outage was not deliberate, confirming that the cable link connecting the African coast to Europe (ACE) was cut at sea level.
And the most recent shutdown had to do with a “power outage in the Senegal base Sonatel station that hosts the connectivity between the Gambia and Senegal, via the ACE cable,” according to The Chronicle.
But “the overlap of the disruptions with anti-government protests prompted suspicion of government involvement,” according to the 2020 Freedom House report.
Gambians have taken to social media — especially Facebook and Twitter — to express their frustration.
Demba Kandeh wrote that an “internet connection [is] no longer a luxury, it is a necessity.”
The Gambia experienced the second internet outage in 2021 and it is still January. Internet connection no longer a luxury, it is a necessity. Disruptions should be treated as national emergency. #KeepItOn everyone. #Gambia pic.twitter.com/d3c4YTbbCL
— Demba Kandeh (@D_Kandeh) January 28, 2021
Poor or non-existent internet connectivity can also be very challenging for businesses.
Global Voices spoke to Lamin Njie, editor-in-chief of FatuNetwork, an online news broadcasting company, about how internet outages and overall instability have affected their work:
As the biggest news media outlet in the country, the 12-hour outage for instance, not only caused us newsroom distress, it also cost us revenue we generated via our website through ads. Gambians who live abroad rely on The Fatu Network and other online outlets for news and information on Gambia. A day without the internet means wading in the dark for most of these people.
Like in many other countries, a lot of learning in the Gambia is now conducted online due to the pandemic.
Muhammed L. Darboe tweeted how, as a student, the outages are a major distraction:
The distracting thought that echoes in my mind every time I take an online exam is I could receive an SMS from my provider that “we are experiencing a nationwide internet outage, sorry for the inconveniences caused”. #Gambia
— Muhammed L. Darboe (@Nrs_MLDabo) February 27, 2021
Mamud Joof, a student at the University of the Gambia, told Global Voices that a lack of internet services affects him greatly:
“I cannot have access to my student portal to do my assignments or check new course updates.  … It further limits my research, which affects my output and understanding of the courses I do. As a student, internet outage in this pandemic basically halts all my activities.
The government launched the country’s first internet exchange point (IXP) in July 2014, to boost speed and security of internet services across the country, though the IXP runs slowly,” according to the 2020 Freedom House report.
Gambians face immense challenges with internet access due to expensive data. Today, data can go for up to 10,000 dalasis or $200 United States dollars per month to enjoy a high-speed internet connection, depending on the provider.
In fact, “high cost remains a primary hindrance to internet access in the Gambia, where 48.6 percent of individuals live in poverty,” according to 2015 World Bank data provided by Freedom House.
There's a wide range of internet service providers in the country, but state-owned Gamtel has a monopoly on the internet gateway, limiting the market's potential for competitive rates.
Journalist Momodou Gajaga told Global Voices that he spends about 15 percent of his salary — about $50 United States dollars per month — on internet fees and services:
As someone who lives from paycheck to  paycheck, spending this sum on the internet is a huge burden considering my commitments to provide other basic needs.
And Samba Jallow, a final year physics major at the University of the Gambia, told Global Voices:
“The digital divide in the country is seriously affecting us, as it’s near impossible for many students at the University of the Gambia to keep up with the high data cost maintenance needed to actively attend lectures online. One gigabyte of internet data costs $5 [United States] dollars whilst the average Gambia earns less than a dollar a day.
Most service providers in the Gambia have not prioritized investments in network coverage in rural areas, according to the 2020 Freedom House report.
Hatab Hydara, a manager of a community library in rural Gambia, told Global Voices:
Our children couldn’t get to school or access learning materials online due to the lack of and poor digital infrastructure in the country. Our children in the rural areas had to stay home for months missing out whilst only few private schools in the urban areas were able to afford the high cost of internet and materials for their children to continue having lessons online.
Gambian rapper ST-Brikama Boyo calls attention to the unfair digital divide in the Gambia with his hit song “My People,”  in collaboration with Grammy winner Baaba Maal. In the song, he sings, “[Internet] connection slow but internet is very expensive for my people.’’ The song garnered more than 100,000 views in 48 hours.
The government has identified “closing the digital divide” as part of its National Broadband Network project, yet progress since 2019 has been limited.
In November 2019, when the Gambia drafted a new constitution that later dead-ended in parliament, internet connectivity was not mentioned, even though many countries now consider it a necessity alongside water and electricity.
Give1Project Gambia, a nongovernmental organization, has been raising awareness about digital rights in the Gambia for the past several years.
During the constitutional review process, Give1Project was the only organization to submit a position paper on digital rights. The paper included a demand to provide equal access to technology and communications to all citizens, including marginalized groups, by removing barriers to access and improving affordability, as well as expanding infrastructure and preventing internet disruptions.
Alieu Sowe, Give1Project’s country director, told Global Voices that digital rights are not protected in the Gambia:
The Gambia still has a lot of ambiguous laws in the 1997 constitution which the authorities can use to infringe on the rights of Gambians, [and] due to these draconian laws, digital rights of Gambians are not protected.
He further called on the government to limit economic barriers to ensure access and introduce rights policies and laws to support these efforts.
Under former dictator Yahya Jammeh — accused of human rights abuses including rape and torture — many organizations and activist groups relied on the internet to communicate and connect with citizens. This led to an increase in the number of online media outlets leveraging technology to advocate for change.
When President Adama Barrow was elected in 2016, he applauded online media for supporting his agenda that led to his eventual victory.
Yet, to this day, the Gambia has not yet sufficiently solved its infrastructure challenges to solve these issues — stalling potential development and growth.
Ahead of an election year in the Gambia, internet instability also poses serious risks because it may disrupt online political campaign activities.
The internet is essential to the Gambia’s development. Digital rights activists must fight for the right to free and fair access to internet services.

author: Jainaba Sonko


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How a Salvadoran artist teaches Nawat to empower transgender people · Global Voices
Eddie Galdamez

Petrona Xemi Tapepechul. Photo published with permission.
The work of Petrona Xemi Tapepechul vows to unite two marginalized communities: the Nawat language speakers and transgender people. Throughout her creative work as an indigenous transgender woman, she honors her native heritage by using the nearly-extinct indigenous language Nawat in the artistic roles she acts, directs, or writes.
Nawat, a language belonging to the Nahuatl dialect group, which stretches from Mexico to Costa Rica, is critically endangered with fewer than 100 speakers. The language is now mainly spoken by a few indigenous elderly speakers who live in western El Salvador.
Image of Xemi's early artwork, obtained with permission.
The Nahuat or Nawat, lost a great part of their population due to an ethnocide at the hands of the military dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in 1932 — between 25,000 y 30,000 indigenous and peasant people were massacred that year.
Today, there is a movement of revitalization of Nawat among young people, which Xemi is a part of.
After leaving her native “Kuskatan” (El Salvador in Nawat), Xemi became an activist and leader in Washington D.C.'s transgender community. She was trained at the National Conservatory of Dramatic Arts, and has been featured on various D.C. theatre productions, including the plays of Angel Rose Artist Collective, a group she founded in 2015.
‘Siwayul (Heart of a Womxn) is a one-person play about reclaiming Two-Spirit identity through Indigenous Salvadoran culture and diaspora, and empowering the Ancestral Goddess within.’
The collective is a two-spirit theatre troupe that celebrates the members’ indigenous ancestors and honors themselves as transgender people through art.
“Two-spirit refers to a person who identifies as having both a masculine and a feminine spirit, and is used by some indigenous people to describe their sexual, gender, and/or spiritual identity,” according to the Canadian organization Re:searching for LGBTQ Health. It encompasses sacred and historical identities dating back centuries, and can comprise LGBTQ identities but is not limited to them.
Xemi told me through WhatsApp:
Creamos el colectivo para instar a la comunidad teatral de D.C. a dejar de borrar las historias, las tradiciones y los artistas indígenas. También para elevar a las comunidades indígenas y transgénero de dos espíritus de Washington DC.
We created the collective to urge the D.C. theatre community to stop erasing indigenous artists, traditions, and histories. Also, to uplift Washington DC's two-spirit indigenous and transgender communities.
Initially, the collective was called “Nelwat Ishkamewe,” which translates to “indigenous roots.” The collective changed its name to the Angel Rose artist collective to honor Angel Rose Garcia, a 21-year-old transgender woman who lost her life in December 2019.
‘The Cosmic Twins is a play for young audiences with music and dance, based on the Maya K'iche Pop Wuj, that tells the story of the creation of the world, and how the sun and the moon came to be.’
“Angel Rose was our Director of Bilingual Community Liaison. She was very proud to be a Trans Nahua Woman and to participate in a group with the root in the Nawat language,” Xemi told me.
The Angel Rose Collective creates artistic plays involving Nawat and transgender artists. Two of the collective's latest performances are Siwayul (Heart of a Womxn) and The Cosmic Twins. Over the years, the collective has created plays for the trans indigenous community, including a trilingual play called SIJSIWAYULU, which translates to “Trans Women.” Xemi says:
En los espacios, aseguramos que la comunidad Trans sea celebrada, y que puedan participar con su persona completa, mente, cuerpo, y espíritu.
In these spaces, we ensure that the Trans community is celebrated and that they can participate with their whole person, mind, body, and spirit.
In 2020, the Angel Rose Collective founded a virtual Nawat language school, aimed at keeping alive the almost-extinct indigenous language.
The collective's language classes are for transgender people and cisgender people who support the trans community. The name of the school is Tamachtiluyan Shuchikisa An Ne Nawat, which translates to “Nawat Flourishes Today School,” in English.
Xemi told me:
Abrimos nuestra escuela virtual con la meta de crear espacios alternativos para las comunidades Trans, Cuir, Inglesparlante, y migrante en la Diáspora y en El Salvador. Muchos espacios virtuales de aprendizaje del idioma Nawat son transmisogynistia, anti-Indigena, y solamente en Castellano.
We opened our virtual school intending to create alternative spaces for Trans, Queer, English-speaking, and migrant communities in the Diaspora and El Salvador. Many virtual spaces for learning the Nawat language are transmisogynistic, anti-indigenous, and only [taught] in Spanish.

author: Eddie Galdamez


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LIVE on April 7: The other health crisis—breaking the taboo on abortion · Global Voices
Melissa Vida

The COVID-19 pandemic is not the only health hazard affecting people—there's one that's way more persistent. This World Health Day, let's break the taboo topics of unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions.
It is no small feat—in places where it is illegal to terminate a pregnancy, unsafe abortions cause about 30,000 deaths each year, and numerous health complications.
About 73 million abortions are performed throughout the world each year, and at least one out of three are carried out under dangerous conditions. “Around 7 million women are admitted to hospitals every year in developing countries, as a result of unsafe abortion,” the World Health Organization reports. In some places, abortions can also lead to imprisonment.
Join us on World Health Day, April 7, for the latest in our Global Voices Insights live webinar series, where a panel of speakers from Brazil, Uganda, Poland, Pakistan, and Thailand will explore reproductive rights in their countries.
The session, which will be conducted in English and moderated by Melissa Vida, Global Voices’ regional editor for Latin America, starts at 1pm GMT (10am in São Paulo/3pm in Warsaw,/4pm in Kampala/6pm in Lahore/8pm in Bangkok). Click on this link to calculate the time in your time zone.
The session is free of charge and open to the public, and will be live-streamed on Facebook Live, YouTube y Twitch.
Here are the panelists:
Brazil: Debora Diniz is a Brazilian anthropologist who develops research projects on bioethics, feminism, human rights and health. She teaches at the University of Brasilia, is a researcher at Brown University, and is an activist for reproductive rights. Her documentaries on abortion, equal marriage, secular state and stem cell research have received numerous national and international awards and have been screened in numerous competitions.
is a leading African Sexual Reproductive Health, Human Rights, and Gender advocate and strategist with a global advocacy, campaigns, and movement building and coordination footprint. Joy was awarded Uganda Law Society’s best Female Human Rights Lawyer 2018/2019 and recognition as emerging mid-career woman leader in Global Health at the Women Leaders in Global Health Conference (2017) at Stanford University.
is the Founder and Director of Manushya Foundation, which she founded in 2017 (Manushya means ‘Human Being’ in Sanskrit), with the goal to reinforce the power of local communities, in particular women human rights defenders, so they can fight for their rights, equality, and social justice. She is an international human rights lawyer specialized in access to justice for marginalized communities.
is a freelance journalist. Earlier she was Associate Web Editor at The News on Sunday and The Nation Newspaper. She has over ten years’ experience in content, print and online media. She also contributes to online local and foreign media. She focuses on digital security, women issues, and animal rights. She is a contributor at Global Voices.
is a 19-year-old climate justice activist from Poland; She is part of the Fridays For Future movement and the Women's Strike.
We look forward to having you join us on April 7 at 1pm GMT (click this link to convert to your local time zone)!

author: Melissa Vida


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The Gambia’s missed opportunity for digital rights reform · Global Voices
Alieu Sowe

Mobile phone shop in the Gambia, December 7, 2005. Photo by NicholBrummer via Flickr CC BY 2.0.
This article is part of UPROAR, a Small Media initiative that is urging governments to address digital rights challenges at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
In the Gambia, social media has become a one-stop-shop for citizens to express themselves and receive alternative information. WhatsApp and Facebook are among the most popular platforms.
Current President Adama Barrow even praised the positive impact of social media on his presidential campaign in 2016. At the time, incumbent President Yahya Jammeh had denied politicians access to national media outlets during the contested elections. A total internet shutdown silenced the country on the eve of the 2016 presidential elections — but Barrow ultimately prevailed.
Many citizens had high hopes that Barrow could usher in new digital rights reforms in a country where these protections are nearly non-existent.
Yet, nearly five years later, the draft constitution dead-ended, falling short on its potential to adequately feature and protect digital rights. Now, activists continue to push to overturn many of the draconian laws instituted under the Jammeh regime that stifle dissent and censor citizens online.
Today, daily press reviews — unheard of or imaginable during the former Jammeh reign — became popular soon after Barrow’s government took office in 2016. On a daily basis, various radios read out news articles in all major local languages. Gambians are glued to their radios and soon after, many will convert the news broadcast into WhatsApp audio files.
During the Jammeh years, however, laws like the 2013 ICT Act prevented citizens from establishing independent, online media platforms. The government feared these platforms would be used as tools to expose wrongdoing in the government. Some Gambians ended up leaving the country to set up online news outlets abroad.
After the election ordeal, many activists expected the new government to tackle digital rights as one of its first reforms — to improve internet infrastructure and come up with sound policies to avoid another internet shutdown or disruption in order to ensure digital rights for everyone.
After all, Barrow’s government benefited from the power of social media to win the election in 2016.
In December 2017, the National Assembly of the Gambia set up a commission to draft a new statute book to replace the 1997 constitution, and activists saw this an opportunity to directly address and feature new guidelines on online freedom of speech and digital rights.
“Social media played an important role in the change of government but today it is being abused. I think the government should act now to look into the issue, like what China did to censor information disseminated via social media through technology,” said Foday Gassama, a formerly nominated national assembly member, during a March 2019 interview with The Standard newspaper.
Alieu Sowe, of Give1Project Gambia (center), engages with various stakeholders on digital rights during an UPR advocacy session, 2019. Photo by STS Pictures, courtesy of Give1Project Gambia.
The power of the internet goes beyond social media usage. Ordinary citizens use it to express themselves, but the internet made it possible for citizen journalists to quickly disseminate news via nontraditional media platforms.
The Give1Project Gambia, a nongovernmental organization, tried to advocate for digital rights reforms in the draft constitution and engaged with authorities and other vested groups, to push for digital-friendly, transparent laws.
In December 2019, the Give1Project team submitted a position paper, along with other stakeholders, to the constitutional review commission: They argued for the need to include clauses to protect citizens’ rights to privacy online, whistleblower protection, online freedom of speech, among others.
Give1Project also conducted radio campaigns and organized multiple community engagements to facilitate citizen dialogue, with the aim to incorporate the wishes of  ordinary people and inspire more participation in the digital rights conversation.
Some callers raised concerns about the need for whistleblower protection to curb corruption. Others appealed for the consideration of the internet as a human right in Gambia’s law books, hoping to avoid future shutdowns.
Data protection laws were discussed, citing a controversial contract between Semlex, a biometric company, and the government to produce biometric national identification cards. The process required the collection of citizens’ personal data, and the system lacked clear regulations to monitor how this information was processed, stored or used by the government, exposing citizens’ identity to potential theft.
The organization also made a submission during pre-sessions of the 34th session of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for the Gambia at the United Nations in Geneva.
Among the key submissions were calls to reform legislation on personal data protection and privacy in order to provide safeguards on the use of personal data, and protect the right to privacy online.
Give1Project submitted the following recommendations:
All these recommendations were made to the Gambian government for consideration during the 34th UPR session in November 2019. Until today, no major changes have occurred — especially due to the parliament’s failure to pass the draft constitution and to pass a referendum.
“The current constitution, usually called ‘Jammeh’s Constitution,’ was revised nearly 60 times of the course of Jammeh’s 20-year rule. A new constitution would have distanced the country from Jammeh’s tainted past,” wrote Laura Angela Bagnetto with RFi.
The COVID-19 pandemic further exposed the urgent need for better digital infrastructure and reforms across the country, from urban to rural spaces, to address a growing digital divide.
Until digital rights are considered human rights, many citizens in the Gambia will continue to miss out on opportunities that abound online.

author: Alieu Sowe


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The price of dissent: Women and political activism in Vietnam · Global Voices
The 88 Project

From left to right: Activist and journalist Pham Doan Trang, activist and environmentalist Dinh Thi Thu Thuy, and activist and musician Mai Khoi
This article was originally published on The 88 Project, an independent news site covering Vietnam, and an edited version is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
On January 20 Dinh Thi Thu Thuy became the latest female activist to be handed a prison sentence in Vietnam. Thuy, an aquaculture engineer and environmentalist from the Mekong Delta, had criticized a range of government policies on Facebook and was arrested in April last year. For just five posts that had received a mere 130 Likes and 80 Shares, Thuy was sentenced to seven years in prison. Before her trial, which lasted just four hours, Thuy had spent eight months in pre-trial detention unable to contact her family, including her 10-year-old son. Life in detention was tough. As a result of the harsh conditions of the detention facilities, Thuy developed problems with her heart and was hospitalized. Thuy is one of many brave Vietnamese women who have paid a heavy price for nothing more than expressing their opinion.
There are 241 Vietnamese activists currently imprisoned, both male and female. Thuy is one of 21 female activists serving a prison sentence, while six more are awaiting trial. Three women have been exiled from the country in exchange for early release. The 88 Project estimates that at least another 55 women remain at risk of persecution. While there are considerably more male activists than female ones, it is interesting to note that, of Vietnam’s most well-known dissidents, many are women. Blogger Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, also known in the West as “Mother Mushroom,” attracted international attention in 2017 after the US State Department awarded her with the International Woman of Courage award following her arrest one year earlier. Quynh was arrested for her online posts, which drew attention to police brutality, corruption, and the 2016 Formosa environmental disaster. Quynh received a 10-year sentence in 2017 but was released a year later and exiled to the United States.
The pop star Mai Khoi has used her platform as one of Vietnam’s most popular musicians to promote LGBT rights, feminism, and free speech. Khoi rose to fame in 2010 when she won Vietnam Television’s Song and Album of the Year but became increasingly disillusioned with the lack of artistic and political freedom in the country. In 2016, she tried, and failed, to run as an independent in the National Assembly. During Barack Obama's visit to the country in the same year, Mai Khoi met with him to discuss human rights in Vietnam. Her outspokenness attracted the attention of the authorities, and she was detained for eight hours at Hanoi airport on her return from a European tour in 2018. In 2019, Mai Khoi was the subject of an international documentary. She is now living in the US after continued harassment.
In Vietnam, politics is still dominated by men. Only one of the Politburo’s 18 members is female. Out of 200 members, there are just 19 women in the Central Committee (CC). Women fare better in the National Assembly, but real political power lies with the Politburo and the CC. The activist and journalist Pham Doan Trang told the 88 Project in 2019 that political activism is not just a struggle against dictatorship, but also a struggle against the limits of Vietnam’s patriarchal society.
Women are not only victims of the regime in terms of politics, but they are also victims of gender inequality, or self-constraint,” she explained. “Women restrain themselves in thinking that they are not suitable for a political career, that politics is for men … Thus, we should think that our fight is not only against dictatorship, or to free Vietnam from dictatorship. It is also a fight to free ourselves from our own ideological constraints, from the prejudice that we impose on ourselves.
Pham Doan Trang was arrested in October last year after years of harassment and is currently awaiting sentencing. She is charged with “conducting propaganda against the state” under Article 117 of the 2015 Penal Code. Article 117 is routinely used as a way to lock up activists who are critical of the regime.
The lack of female representation at the pinnacle of Vietnamese politics makes the contribution of female activists even more impressive. Of course, the majority of activists in Vietnam are male, but this just further emphasizes the impact that women have made. It is women like Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, Pham Doan Trang, and Mai Khoi who have brought international attention to human rights in Vietnam.
Of course, not all women have achieved the same level of international recognition for their contributions. The Communist Party (VCP) would like to keep it that way. Although freedom of expression is protected by the Constitution, criticism of the regime is not tolerated. Only five countries in the world have less press freedom than Vietnam according to Reporters without Borders. Even Iran and Saudi Arabia have a more independent press. Following last month’s 13th Party Congress that is unlikely to change any time soon.
The CC took the unusual step of re-electing the incumbent General Secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong. Trong is a conservative hardliner and has overseen an increase in repression, especially since his first re-election in 2016. Just weeks before the beginning of the Congress, three (male) members of the Independent Journalists of Vietnam received prison sentences ranging from 11 to 15 years in prison for their work. Like Pham Doan Trang, they were charged with “conducting propaganda against the state.”
In April 2020, Vietnam pressured Facebook into censoring and removing content of which the VCP disapproved. This may have been a response to the contribution of activists like Dinh Thi Thu Thuy, who had used the platform to criticise government policies. The VCP is certainly wary of the influence of social media.
Ongoing events in Myanmar are a testament to the power of social media in galvanizing and organizing political protests. The protests in Myanmar are unlikely to be replicated in Vietnam any time soon, however. In the short term at least, Vietnam’s future looks a little more predictable. The regime will continue to censor free speech and lock up dissenters. Vietnam’s female activists will continue to resist them.

author: The 88 Project


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North Macedonia forced to re-edit Eurovision music video following nationalist rage · Global Voices
Metamorphosis Foundation

Official Youtube thumbnail image of the Eurosong 2021 “Here I stand” by Vasil Garvanliev representing North Macedonia.
This story was originally published by Meta.mk. An edited version is republished here under a content-sharing agreement between Global Voices and Metamorphosis Foundation.
North Macedonia's public broadcaster MRTV was forced to re-edit the entry video of the country's contestant of this year's Eurovision Song Contest after two frames showing what appeared to be a Bulgarian flag drew public outrage.
Released on March 11, the music video of “Here I Stand,” by singer Vasil Garvanliev, was partially shot at the National Gallery Daut Pašin Amam in Skopje, and it shows many pieces of art by Macedonian artists. For a brief moment, a triptych with the colors of the Bulgarian flag can be seen.
That didn't sit well with North Macedonia's nationalists, who in the past two weeks have weighed a campaign against Garvanliev for “spreading Bulgarian propaganda.” A petition on Change.org demanding Garvanliev to withdraw from the competition gathered 20,000 signatures.
Adding to the controversy was the fact the Garvanliev holds both Macedonian and Bulgarian citizenship, as he has a grandmother who was born in Bulgaria.
According to the National Gallery, the piece in question is “Homage to Andrei Rublev,” a medieval painter from Russia, made by Macedonian artist Žaneta Vangeli in 1995, and has nothing to do with Bulgaria.
The gallery also claimed that the original order of the panels had been mixed up during cleaning. An older video uploaded on YouTube shows the intended order.
On March 13, MRTV re-released the music video without the two controversial frames. In relation to Garvaliev's heritage, the service said on a statement:
The public service has no right to discriminate against anyone based on religion, national or any other grounds, and that it has a complete freedom to select a singer to be a representative, regardless of his citizenship. In reality, there are many cases of performers who had dual citizenship or were citizens of different countries participating in the Eurosong contest.
Meanwhile, Garavaliev said he had “nothing to apologize for” when it comes to his heritage, and that he “was proud to be Macedonian.”
An internal investigation by MRTV also determined that the broadcaster had “respected all internal procedures and met all the requirements of the application process with the European Broadcasting Union.” The service also confirmed that Garvanliev will represent North Macedonia at the 65th edition of the Eurovision Song Contest, to take place from May 18 to 22 in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands.
Garanliev was originally selected to compete for North Macedonia on last year's Eurovision, which was canceled because of the COVID-19 pandemic. EBU allowed the same participants to run in 2021 as long as they released a new song. Garvanliev's 2020 song was called “You.”
The building of the Public Broadcasting Service Macedonian Radio and Television (PBS MRTV) in Skopje, North Macedonia. Photo by Meta.mk, used with permission.
On March 23, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Ekaterina Zaharieva summoned North Macedonia's ambassador Vladimir Krstevski to a meeting as “Bulgarian diplomats have expressed deep confusion and disappointment by the big negative campaign in North Macedonia against Vasil Garvanliev.”
The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “Bulgaria will continue to invest all the necessary efforts in accordance with the principles of the international law in order to protect the rights of the Bulgarian citizens and the citizens who have a Bulgarian identity wherever they are worldwide.”
Bulgarian nationalist politicians have been trying to appeal to their voters ahead of parliamentary elections by proposing the annexation of Macedonia. In that context, Bulgaria has been openly blocking the integration of their Western neighbor into the European Union since the fall of 2020.

author: Metamorphosis Foundation


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Beijing has rewritten Hong Kong’s electoral rules. What will change? · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Committee for Safeguarding National Security of Hong Kong. HK Gov photo via HKFP.
The Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress published the details of Hong Kong's new electoral rules on March 30. By all accounts, the new rules will ensure only Beijing's loyalists ever hold public office in the city.
The NPC announced first announced electoral rules for Hong Kong in early March, which would materialize through amends in the Annex I and II of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini-Constitution. Those annexes outline the process for selecting the Chief Executive, the city's top office, and the Legislative Council (LegCo).
One of the most significant changes introduced by the new set of rules is the requirement that all potential candidates to LegCo seats and Chief Executive are screened by Hong Kong's national security authorities.
In addition, a restructuring of the LegCo will reduce the number of directly elected seats from 57 percent to 22 percent.
The Chief Executive Election Committee, the electoral college that elects the Chief Executive, will also be restructured to ensure a significant number its seats are held by Beijing's loyalists. The political body will then be empowered to self-elect 40 seats in the LegCo and nominate candidates running for key public positions.
Below is an explainer of those three changes imposed by the new rules.
According to the updated Annexes I and II of the Hong Kong Basic Law, the national security unit of the Hong Kong police will conduct an initial screening of potential candidates who want to run in the city’s elections for top public offices — the Chief Executive, the Chief Executive Election Committee, and the LegCo.
The police review will be submitted to the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of Hong Kong, which will then issue an opinion to the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee (CERC) of the HKSAR, a screening body also established by the new electoral rules.
The CERC will ensure that all candidates competing for public office are “patriots;” the body's decision on the eligibility of the candidates cannot be appealed through the city's legal system.
The 11-member Committee for Safeguarding National Security of Hong Kong is headed by the city’s Chief Executive, with the China Liaison Office Director as its advisor. Five of the committee's members are the heads of the city’s security forces.
National security police will effectively be one of the highest organs to decide whom can be voted by the people. New normal in new #HongKong when every rule is reset in the name of national security. https://t.co/Wd6ixs23MS
— Phoebe Kong (@phoebe_kongwy) March 30, 2021
The LegCo is currently composed of 70 seats. Half of them are elected directly by the public via geographical constituencies; the other 35 seats are functional constituencies in which 30 are occupied by representatives of special interest groups and 5 are directly elected by the public from five big geographical areas.
The new legislature will instead comprise of 90 seats, with 30 seats coming from functional constituencies and 20  geographical constituencies. The remaining 40 seats will now be filled by self-elected representatives of the Chief Executive Election Committee. The five seats from the big geographical areas have been axed.
The ratio of directly elected seats in the LegCo will be reduced from 57 to 22 percent with the new rules.
Furthermore, as the voting rule has been rewritten in the geographical constituencies from a party-list proportional representation electoral system to a simple majorities of the top two candidates in 10 districts, the pro-democracy camp could at best win 10 seats in the direct election system.
The voting rule for functional constituencies has also been altered as individual vote is replaced by corporate vote in 9 sectors, which means without institutional support, candidates could not have a chance to win in these sectors.
The number of lawmakers ordinary #Hongkong voters will get to choose is being slashed and almost half of Legco will be handpicked by a committee, but Beijing's liaison office says the SAR's electoral system will now be more democratic and balanced. https://t.co/Er0iNudkCo
— RTHK English News (@rthk_enews) March 30, 2021
Previously, the power of Election Committee of the Chief Executive is confined to the election of the city top leader and the members of the Election Committee were elected or selected from four different sectors of Hong Kong society. Since 2017, the Election Committee has had 1,200 members.
With the new amendments, an extra sector comprised of 300 representatives elected by the members of China's national bodies — such as NPC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the All-China Women's Federation, among others — will be added to the committee. In other words, this sector will be directly under Beijing's control.
In addition, 18 sub-sectors which previously allowed individual votes will now permit only corporate bodies to vote. The 117 seats allocated to District Council members are axed and  replaced by government-appointed members of area committees on fire safety and crime prevention.
In 2017, the pro-democracy controlled more than 300 votes in the Election Committee thanks to the individual voting mechanism in professional groups. The camp could have controlled a majority after its landslide victory in the 2019 district council elections. With the new structure and voting method, Beijing and the pro-establishment will dominate the Election Committee.
The new rules also raise the threshold of candidates running for Chief Executive as the person will have to obtain a minimum of 188 nominations in total, with a minimum of 15 nominations from each of the committee's five sectors. Previously, candidates only need to obtain a minimum of 150 nominations.
The newly restructured election committee will be empowered to self-elect 40 representatives to the LegCo. Candidates running to legislture's publicly-contested seats will also have to obtain a minimum of 10 nominations from the election committee, with a minimum of 2 from each of the five sectors.
As independent journalist Mary Hui described earlier in March, the rewriting of the electoral system is to establish a “competitive clientelism” to make sure only loyalists can remain in power:
Authoritarian elections—what Beijing will soon impose on HK—help authoritarians consolidate power. One way is thru “competitive clientelism,” where candidates fight to show loyalty to the top. And it looks like HK's pro-govt elites may soon get swept out https://t.co/MHu4k15HEq
— Mary Hui (@maryhui) March 9, 2021


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Belarus banned from 2021 Eurovision contest for controversial song lyrics · Global Voices
Tanya Lokot

Galasy ZMesta, the Belarusian 2021 Eurovision contestants, have been excluded from the competition. Screenshot from ATN on YouTube.
Belarus has been excluded from participating in the 2021 Eurovision Song Contest, scheduled to take place in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on May 18-22, 2021, after both of the songs it submitted were found to be “in breach of the rules of the competition.”
The European Broadcasting Union, which is responsible for organizing the annual singing competition, disqualified the first song recorded by Belarus’ Galasy ZMesta band and titled “Я научу тебя” (“I will teach you”), in early March, asking the state broadcaster Belteleradiocompany (BTRC) to “take all steps necessary to amend their entry to this year’s event to ensure it is compliant with the rules of the competition.”
Per Eurovision rules, each country's state or public service broadcaster is responsible for managing the national selection process and working with the selected artists to vet their song entries. In late March, BTRC submitted a second song by the same band, but EBU also found it objectionable.
It was concluded that the new submission was also in breach of the rules of the competition that ensure the Contest is not instrumentalized or brought into disrepute.
As BTRC have failed to submit an eligible entry within the extended deadline, regrettably, Belarus will not be participating in the 65th Eurovision Song Contest in May.
Though the initial song submitted by GalasyZMesta isn't explicitly political, it contains veiled references to the power struggle currently ongoing in Belarus. For instance, the refrain, based on the song title, goes: “Я научу тебя плясать под дудочку / я научу тебя клевать на удочку” (“I'll teach you to dance to my fiddle/I'll teach you to swallow the bait”). The musicians themselves are open about their support for the embattled de facto President Aliaksandr Lukashenka: many of their songs contain ironic commentary aimed at ridiculing the Belarusian opposition and the participants of the recent anti-government protests.
Internet users had mixed reactions to the news of the ban. The official YouTube video for the second song (“Песенка” or “Little Song”) racked up 3,000 likes, 8,000 dislikes and over 3,000 comments in the first 48 hours. Commenting on the video, user Volny Stsyag said: “It's a good thing Eurovision doesn't give you a third try. I shudder to think what that would look like.”
Others, like user Sew Zavjalov, thought the game was rigged from the start: “Well done, lads, you've proven that the contest is politicized. There was an order to remove Belarus from the competition, so they did, and would have done it anyway, even if they simply played music without words.”
On their official website, the band explicitly notes their pro-government sympathies, proclaiming that “When they're trying to destroy the country that we love and where we live under the guise of ‘political struggle’, we cannot stay silent.” Commentators also note the choice of the contestants to submit the song in Russian rather than in English or Belarusian.
The band's frontman Dmitry Butakov told the Esquire Russia magazine that the ban did not come as a surprise and that the second song they submitted was “a fable kind of song… written on purpose,” hinting at its political undertones.
Reacting to EBU's decision, Ivan Eismont, head of the BTRC called it “politically motivated” and insisted that Galasy ZMesta had “made history” and that “Belarus had won this Eurovision.”
VAL, Belarus’ 2020 contestants, in the official video for their song “Da Vidna.” Screenshot from YouTube.
Belarus’ 2020 Eurovision choice, the R&B/pop duo VAL, who missed their 2020 chance to perform their Belarusian-language song, “Da Vidna” (“Before Dawn”) due to the pandemic, were denied the 2021 slot after a series of interviews in which they spoke out against government crackdown on the mass protests that followed a contested presidential election in August 2020.
The Eurovision Song Contest is no stranger to political controversies. In 2009, one year after the Russo-Georgian war, Stephane & 3G, the Georgian band selected for the annual competition, were asked to amend the lyrics to their entry, provocatively titled “We Don't Wanna Put In,” or to submit a new song. When they refused, Georgia was barred by EBU from participating in the 2009 contest, which was hosted by Moscow.

author: Tanya Lokot