text:
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, volunteers defend stranded migrants against local rebuke · Global Voices
Balkan Diskurs

Tuzla, December 2019. Photo by Armin Durgut/Balkan Diskurs, used with permission.
This story by Belma Kasumović was originally published on Balkan Diskurs, a project of the Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC). An edited version is republished by Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is at a migration crossroads between Eastern and Western Europe. Around 60,000 people entered undocumented in the country from early 2018 to June 2020, according to the country's Service for Foreigner's Affairs. Many come from the Middle East and South Asia and are headed for Western Europe.
But with the route through Serbia and Hungary blocked by a border fence, and Croatia becoming increasingly dangerous for migrants to pass through, thousands have been stranded in Bosnia, dispersed through reception centers or living in improvised camps.
In Tuzla, Bosnia's third-largest city, migrants have been residing in and around the main bus station, where they have access to a small public fountain and are able to meet people of similar faiths. While their presence there has angered a few locals, a group of volunteers is going out of their way to provide some form of relief to them.
“I approach each and every man as a human being. At no point do I care if he is from Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria. I see a human being in need in front of me, and I act in accordance with that. This is how it all starts,” says Senad Pirić, a volunteer from Tuzla.
A person uses the public fountain near the bus station in Tuzla in December 2019. Migrants often rely on this fountain for refreshment and washing. Photo by Armin Durgut/Balkan Diskurs, used with permission.
In 2018, Pirić worked as a journalist and was assigned to do a story about the migrants in the station. After getting to know them, he began to help them by bringing supplies, food, or money.
“The first year was relatively easy for us, as Tuzla citizens did not notice these people. They would come here at night, they slept here, at the station, in the park” he said.
At the bus station, restaurant owner Azra Alibegović has been providing migrants with unrestricted access to the bathroom, showers, and power outlets. As a token of gratitude, they often help her clean the restaurant's garden, she says.
“In the evening, when we close, they put away chairs, tables, take down parasols, and say their greetings. In these three years of working with them, I have never had a single incident. They are good to me here, they respect me, and I respect them as well,” Alibegović added.
Train Station in Tuzla, December 2019. Photo by Armin Durgut/Balkan Diskurs, used with permission.
According to Wikipedia, Tuzla is one of the few Bosnian towns that “managed to keep the multiethnic character during and after the Bosnian War, with Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, and a small minority of Bosnian Jews still residing in the city.”
But intolerance still found its way to Alibegović's restaurant. She says locals avoid eating there now, and even recruiting a new waitress proved difficult. “They immediately would say ‘no, there are migrants, I wouldn’t work with them.'”
Recently, the police came and told Alibegović that migrants are no longer allowed to gather at the station. “The policeman said, ‘Azra, you have migrants in the restaurant again,’ and I said, ‘they are my only customers, I can’t chase them away.”
Volunteers, too, have faced condemnation from locals. “We are accused of human smuggling, equipping them with weapons and the like,” says Pirić. “In reality, [critics] can’t find imperfections with us or our work, because we do this with all our hearts and without any personal interest, and that’s somehow incomprehensible to people.”
Amila Rekić, who usually helps women migrants by providing accommodation at the Safe House, a shelter for women victims of domestic violence, says that lack of funds and the public pressure is driving other volunteers away. “Some citizens think that if there was no help from volunteers, migrants would no longer come to Tuzla,” she says.
For Rekić, the media's constant focus on negative stories has helped stoke distrust in the local community. “Yes, there are groups of people who cause trouble. And that happens as a consequence of losing everything, including being stripped of basic human rights. It happens either because all that stress, anxiety, and other things accumulate, or because they are simply that kind of individual – as some of us are,” she said.
Pirić says that many migrants come with the desire to find a job, and resents the fact society excludes them despite their talents. “One of them has, for example, a talent for painting. We've had one hafiz of the Qur’an, a carpenter, a cooker. And now they are all begging in the streets of our country while somewhere else their talents would be appreciated”
Data by IOM Bosnia and Herzegovina published in September 2020 show that there are 7,400 migrants were registered in seven reception centers, coming primarily from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, and Algeria.
Tuzla's station is a temporary home for two Morrocan friends who, in addition to sharing the same name – Hamza –, divide a sleeping spot under the open sky. They met while they were in Serbia and have reunited again in Tuzla.
One of them described how he thinks the local community perceives them: “They think we’re all the same. I know some [people] are causing problems, but we are not all the same,” he says.
Bosnia is not their final destination — the pair hopes to eventually move to Western Europe.
The two friends Hamza having lunch at Alibegović's restaurant. Photo by Belma Kasumović/Balkan Diskurs, used with permission.
Rekić says the migrants often show gratitude for the help they receive. “The fact they call us once they leave the country testifies that. We follow the course of their lives, we stay in touch. We meet their families,” she said. “The most emotional moments are those when mothers appear on the other side of the telephone screen and cry, thanking us for providing them with a meal or shoes that day, or for finding them accommodation.”
For Pirić, it isn't enough to feed them or find them a place to sleep. “I want to give them back their dignity, I want them to see that they do matter.”

author: Balkan Diskurs


text:
Masculinity in my genes/jeans · Global Voices
Amilcar Sanatan

Jeans photo by Jason Leung on Unsplash.
This article was originally published by Promundo, on “/masc: conversations on modern masculinity.” An edited version is published here with permission.
“Be a man!” said the police officer, when he felt my friend wasn’t answering his questions clearly and loudly enough. The officer was asking about a fight he’d heard was going to take place that Friday afternoon near my school. Meanwhile, higher up the road, boys in their school uniforms stood on the sidewalk in silent anticipation, prepared for combat with iron bars, planks of wood, dog chains, bottles from the village shop, and knives. Those were the boys who at 15 and 16 years old were busy “being men”.
Language is a funny thing. Formal education taught us to have a command of Standard English. In Literature and English classes, through correction and the recitation of prose, we were encouraged to be “middle-class, educated, post-colonial men.” But the boys who were versed in the national (“Creole”) language had no time for the ones who spoke Standard English only; they demanded that everyone be a man “of this culture and this soil!”
Switching registers depended on the social situation as much as the person you were speaking to. On one occasion, two police officers lined up a group of boys on the street to search them because they were “acting suspiciously.” They gave instructions for the boys to put their hands on their heads and kneel, as they pointed a gun to their adolescent faces. One of the boys communicated his every action in Standard English to show that he was following orders diligently and respectfully. The response he received was, “Why do you talk like that? You like boys or what?” Standard English—which was meant to distinguish him from the poor, the uneducated, those who were more likely targets of state violence—did not make this young man any safer.
I’ve never sat down and written exactly what it meant for me to be a man. I didn’t know there was the word—“masculinity”—that summed up the arbitrary definitions and meanings of manhood that could switch from person to person, depending on time, and context. The cry summoning us to “be men” assumed there was a DNA of maleness already living in us, sometimes waiting to be activated.
Being a man meant that we were tough, certain, in control and dominant. But masculinity was an idea of manhood that they tried to fit to our bodies like a pair of jeans. These jeans of masculinity were handed out to me over the years. The concept of time, especially the fear of “lost time”, is important to manhood. Culture in a patriarchy drives boys to be men as early as possible.
Boys seek out validation from peers and older men to continually affirm their “maleness.” This, in part, drives the animus in public discourse against single-parent female-headed households. Boys grow up learning to blame their mothers for not walking them along the measurements of manhood at what is perceived as an appropriate time. Some of the “mama’s boys” who long identified with the nurturing care and example of a woman may, later on, repudiate this tutelage. This is another form of “woman-blame” in our society.
Mothers may also have some investments in patriarchy that are harmful to themselves and their sons. However, women ultimately do not bring up patriarchal sons as effectively as the dominant male culture does—male-led violence and conflict, sexual violence against women and girls, and violent regulation of heterosexual male culture in social and institutional spaces is not carried out by women. At the core of this dilemma is that men may enjoy social spaces and experiences that run contrary to the dominant patriarchal culture, but hold the deep fear that they are more vulnerable for participating in these environments and ultimately, they feel less equipped to deal with patriarchal ones.
There were over 500 homicides in the last two years in Trinidad and Tobago. Of course, no government wishes to have a crime problem “on their hands” but the response of the state is always to throw responsibility to the public for their lack of morals and a culture of negligent parenting that supposedly engineered transnational trafficking of guns and drugs, entrepreneurial corruption in the procurement of contracts, gang formation in under-resourced urban communities and the increasing development of “gated communities” to draw lines of social distancing of classes, social outcomes, and opportunity. As a sign of the political dysfunction and the weak capacity of the state to create public safety, homicides, rapes, police brutality and societal “wickedness” generally go undetected and unpunished. The least we can do as a people is memorialize our dead to re-center the value of human life and expose the unfinished work of governance.
The miserable men who murdered their partners are too many to mention. In one case last January, after a woman attempted to free herself from a toxic union, her ex-partner went to her place of work, after months of online stalking, shot her twice and then killed himself. It was around 8:00 am, a time when some have just had their first cup of coffee, some have already made their way to work, and some school girls scan the faces of men on the taxi stand before deciding which taxi to take: “Who is the least threatening?” “I’ve seen him before” “Just because he is very old doesn’t mean he can’t be my rapist.” Around 8:00 am, I would drive to class. I would blow one horn if I saw a woman walking by who was attractive, two if she was so impressive and “bess” that I felt the need to bombard her eardrums and peace with the noise of harassment. If you cannot see how these everyday practices lead to dead women then you have chosen to ignore what “being a man” contains and conceals.
This is why when women march for their rights to be recognized and guaranteed by the state and ordinary members of the society, they ask “Where are the men?” The marchers, public displays of solidarity, and comrades are too few for us to really believe the compensatory cry: “Not all men are bad.” Some men point to their lives on the “right path”—extraordinary love for daughters, and “presence” in the home. And yes, all men are not bad, but too many are silent, and too few are reliable in the struggle for gender justice.
Maybe the men who need to speak up and act are too busy being careful, trying to zip up the wrong jeans and/or staying quiet, ignoring permanent flaws in this wardrobe ritual. Thinking that manhood was an inheritance that moved through the ages, as an unchanging and inevitable truth of the universe is a mortuary for humanity. We have choices to make, personal and political. Our jeans can be thrown away at any time, especially when they don’t fit, or refashioned, and that—just like our maleness—is our responsibility and our freedom.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Amilcar Sanatan


text:
North Macedonia scraps ministerial post responsible for the diaspora · Global Voices
Aleksej Demjanski

Prime Minister Zoran Zaev (right) and Minister Edmond Ademi at a meeting with representatives of the Macedonian diaspora, on August 14, 2019. Photo: Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, Public Domain.
North Macedonia’s “new-old” government, formed after the July parliamentary elections, recently announced the configuration of its ministerial portfolios. A new post—held by Ljupco Nikolovski—broadly covering corruption, sustainable development, and human resources, has garnered significant media attention. However, no one seems to have noticed the disappearance of the position of minister without portfolio responsible for the diaspora.
When Zoran Zaev’s Social Democratic Union came to power in 2017 following the Colorful Revolution there was much enthusiasm, both at home and abroad, about what the change in government would mean for Macedonia’s future. One of the areas of interest was relations with N. Macedonia’s large, multi-ethnic diaspora living abroad. These emigrants represent a potential source of foreign direct investment for the country, human capital to provide support to neglected sectors such as healthcare and education, and connections to Western governments on the path to NATO and EU membership.
However, relations between the diaspora and the homeland have for years been plagued by problems. In the early years of independence in the 1990s—many emigrants returned or directly invested in N. Macedonia, only to see their investments abused by corrupt officials. Over the past 20 years, other concerns such as inadequate staffing and poor services offered by its diplomatic and consular missions abroad, as well as the politicization of voting in the diaspora, have only exacerbated problems.
Many Macedonian citizens living abroad (both temporarily or permanently) have struggled to get documents such as passports and identity cards renewed or properly regulated via Macedonia’s diplomatic missions. Initial hopes of citizens abroad to have their own members of parliament—independent of political party affiliation—to represent their interests were also dashed when the process became politicized and political parties nominated their own candidates. Voting is further complicated by a declining interest in light of the complex process of having to pay to travel to the limited number of Macedonian diplomatic or consular missions, many Macedonian citizens living abroad being disengaged from what is going on in the country, and a broader feeling of betrayal on a variety of issues, from local corrupt politics to the sensitivities surrounding the name change. Furthermore, the cost of administering voting in the diaspora is high and raises many questions within Macedonia as to whether this is a priority. Today, even the initial three MPs afforded to the diaspora have been conditioned to a certain threshold of registered voters which, together with the difficulties of voting, is simply impossible to achieve. As such, in the last two parliamentary elections, the diaspora was unable to receive MPs in N. Macedonia’s Assembly.
In an effort to repair relations with this community, the government-appointed Edmond Ademi, a member of the Social Democrats, in 2017 to serve as minister without portfolio responsible for the diaspora. Aside from the Agency for Migration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their diplomatic and consular missions abroad, and the short-lived MP spots for the diaspora, this new position was the most visible and high-level attempt to engage N. Macedonia’s diaspora since independence. The Macedonian government’s 2017-2020 program briefly mentioned that “[t]he Government, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will attend to the well-being of the Macedonian national minority living in the neighboring countries” (this is no longer the case following the Prespa Agreement) and that “[w]e will improve ties with our diaspora.”
Minister Ademi, as well as other representatives of the government, quickly set out to establish contacts with various diaspora groups. One of the first major meetings was held in September 2017 on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. A month later, in October 2017, the government ambitiously announced the need to create a National Strategy for Cooperation with the diaspora and formed a working body comprising Minister Ademi’s cabinet, civil servants from within government institutions, a few experts, and individuals and organizations from the diaspora. There was a lot of initial buy-in from diaspora groups, but due to unresponsiveness, unpreparedness, and unprofessionalism, among other reasons, the process for engaging the diaspora via the working group began to unravel.
In the months after October 2017, the United Macedonian Diaspora organization cut ties with the government over their positions on the name-change negotiations with Greece and the Law on the Use of Languages. The Forum for Democratic Macedonia, a newer diaspora organization that emerged out of the pro-democracy #IProtest (#протестирам) and Colorful Revolution protests abroad, initially continued to work with the government on the National Strategy. However, they, too, eventually backed out of the working group because of unprofessionalism and unwillingness on the part of Edmond Ademi's cabinet to listen to input and recommendations from diaspora groups. Ultimately, in March 2019, the National Strategy for Cooperation with the Diaspora was formally passed by the government with little buy-in from many key stakeholders—most importantly individuals and organizations from the diaspora.
ИНФОРМАЦИЈА ЗА ЈАВНОСТА
Денес Форумот за демократска #Македонија го испрати ова писмо до координаторот на работната група за изготовка на Националната стратегија за соработка со дијаспората во кабинетот на министерот задолжен за дијасора – Едмонд Адеми.https://t.co/AXDTVeiVVX pic.twitter.com/9ceFFq5bSs
— Forum for Democratic Macedonia (@Forum_ZDM) January 28, 2019
Today, the Forum for Democratic #Macedonia sent this letter to the coordinator of the working group tasked with preparing the National Strategy for Cooperation with the Diaspora in the office of the Minister responsible for the Diaspora – Edmond Ademi.
Similarly, during this time, the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued with little to no changes in the ability to provide services for Macedonian citizens abroad. The Agency for Migration over the last three years traveled around Europe and engaged with diaspora groups on the cultural and education fronts: providing Macedonian language classes and highlighting the success of young professionals in the diaspora, but with little impact. While Minister Ademi continued the government’s funding of projects with diaspora groups via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and attempted to expand outreach to diaspora organizations from minority groups, such as ethnic Albanians from N. Macedonia, it is overall unclear what success his cabinet had in re-engaging the diaspora. Among the major impediments, the division of responsibilities with regard to diaspora issues between the cabinet of the Minister, the Agency for Migration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their diplomatic missions abroad was never defined and only further complicated things.
Now, following the 2020 elections and the return of the Social Democrat-led coalition to government, the post of minister without portfolio responsible for the diaspora has been scrapped. The government’s new 2020-2024 program is again brief in referring to the diaspora, only praising the creation of a National Strategy for Cooperation with the Diaspora, noting the government will continue to fund projects with diaspora organizations, and lauding 10 percent additional financial support (compared to domestic or foreign investments) for investors from the diaspora. It begs the question—what will happen to the National Strategy for Cooperation with the Diaspora and who will follow up on the work—however minor—done by Minister Ademi? According to the National Strategy’s Action Plan, by the third quarter of 2020 there should have been (1) an analysis of the need for a legal solution to regulating cooperation between the state and the diaspora, (2) the establishment of a parliamentary group for cooperation with the diaspora, (3) the conceptualization of a Law on the Diaspora in cooperation with all stakeholders including diaspora organizations and civil society organizations, and (4) determining the need to establish a special institution: a Ministry of the Diaspora. None of these items, among many others included in the action plan, have been realized, nor has an update on their progress been given to diaspora organizations or the broader public.
It is rather ironic that the National Strategy and its action plan broadly foresaw the creation of a Ministry of the Diaspora (rather than simply investigating the feasibility of fostering such an institution) and tied subsequent steps to the success of this action item. Now, not only is there no Ministry of the Diaspora, but there is not even a minister without portfolio responsible for the diaspora to oversee and implement the National Strategy.
Many questions remain for the “new-old” government of North Macedonia and their relations with the diaspora. Will the government continue pursuing the National Strategy, regardless of the lack of buy-in from diaspora organizations and concerns about the strategy’s feasibility? Who in the government will head this effort? Will the Agency for Migration now take over the coordination and implementation of the strategy? Will Macedonians living abroad get professional diplomatic and consular services? As recent discussions about changing N. Macedonia’s electoral model progress—potentially having just one electoral district with open candidate lists—there is uncertainty as to what that means for diaspora voting going forward.
Once again, uncertainty has become the status quo in the relationship between the Macedonian government and the diaspora.
The views and opinions in this article are personal and do not reflect the author’s employer or other affiliations in any way.

author: Aleksej Demjanski


text:
Azerbaijani authorities disrupt internet nationwide amid Nagorno-Karabakh clashes · Global Voices
Arzu Geybullayeva

Photo by Jordan Harrisson on Unsplash. Published under Unsplash's license.
This post was originally published on Azerbaijan Internet Watch and is reproduced here under a content-sharing agreement.
As intense fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues, Azerbaijani authorities announced on September 27 that it would start restricting internet access across the country. Internet users have reported difficulties accessing social media platforms and communication apps in the past days.
Clashes between the two countries, who have conflicting claims over the mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven adjacent territories, broke out on September 27. Both sides have reported casualties. Azerbaijan, which previously claimed it had retaliated shelling along the Line of Contact, said on the following day that its forces had seized control of up to seven villages.
While international stakeholders have called for an immediate end to violence and a return to the negotiation table, neither side has so far demonstrated interest.
At around 10 a.m. local time on September 27, the Ministry of Transportation, Communication, and High Technologies issued a statement saying it had limited internet access “in order to prevent large-scale Armenian provocations.”
Statement by the Azerbaijani authorities dated from September 27: “The Ministry of Transportation, Communication, and High Technologies will be implementing limitations on internet access across the country. We hope Azerbaijani citizens will show understanding about problems that may arise as a result of the limitations during a state of conflict.” Screenshot from the government website.
Indeed, some internet users reported experiencing problems accessing social media:
Yalnız sosial şəbəkələrə girişi məhdudlaşdırırlar, deyəsən. İnternetdə problem yoxdur çünki. Başqa saytlara girmək olur.
— Sahilə Aslanova (@sayka_aslanova) September 27, 2020
Looks like they are only limiting access to social media platforms. There are no problems when accessing the internet [sites]. It is possible to access other websites.
Issues accessing the internet could have begun even a day before. Hebib Müntezir, an Azerbaijani journalist with Berlin-based channel Meydan TV, posted on Facebook on September 26:
Azərbaycandakı internet istifadəçiləri ölkədəki internetin surətindən şikayət edirlər. Bir çoxu xeyli yavaşladığını, foto və videoların açılmadığını deyirlər. Sizdə vəziyyət necədir?
In Azerbaijan, internet users are complaining about internet speed. Many are saying it has slowed down and are having difficulties loading videos and images. What is the situation on your end?
At some point, all websites with gov.az extension went down on September 27.
All .gov.az also websites are down including https://t.co/DbfCTYL84y and https://t.co/WJUKYKdrQR https://t.co/N20cYTu7c4
— Cavid ⛧ (@cavidaga) September 27, 2020
According to Access Now, a digital rights advocacy non-profit that coordinates “Keep It On,” a worldwide campaign against internet shutdowns, “public safety, national security, or stopping fake news are commonly used to justify shutdowns.”
Data collected by the campaign shows a significant increase in the number of shutdowns in recent years. In 2019 alone, there were been 213 internet shutdowns in 33 countries, lasting a total of 1,706 days, Access Now found.
In Azerbaijan, such restrictions aren't new. In April, a leader of an opposition party has had his mobile and home internet services cut off ahead of a television interview. While disruptions are usually reported as a result of technical incidents, there are cases in which access is intentionally slowed down, especially around political events.
While some Azerbaijani users ponder that internet disruptions are necessary to prevent the spread of unconfirmed information, others say the government should not by any means interfere with access.
As of the publication of this story, access to government websites remains spotty, and users continue to report throttling of internet speed and access to social media platforms.

author: Arzu Geybullayeva


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BJP-led Assam state in India criticized for failed promises ahead of elections · Global Voices
Abhinash

Teachers in Assam wearing traditional Assamese dress. Image via Flickr by Michael Foley. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
The government of India's Assam state, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is facing public criticism online after it announced it will create 55,000 public jobs in the next six months.
While unemployment has long been a vital concern in rural Assam, past scandals in public recruitment have driven citizens to doubt authorities will fulfil that promise, while others wonder whether the measure isn't just a gimmick ahead of the state assembly's elections due on April 2021.
The decision on the 55,000 jobs was announced on Twitter by the former General Secretary of the Assam Pradesh branch of the BJP, Mriganka Barman:
In a step towards empowering the youths of Assam the Hon'ble CM Shri @sarbanandsonwal had already generated 38,000 permanent and 35,000 temporary jobs in various departments, and is also planning to provide 55,000 jobs to the youths within the current financial year 2020-21. pic.twitter.com/gnjbzB4m5S
— Mriganka Barman (@mrigankabjp) July 9, 2020
The BJP came to power in 2016 in Assam on promises of creating jobs after 15 years of Indian National Congress (INC) rule failed to make progress on that front in Assam State.
Four years later, the BJP is facing shortcomings of its own, especially in its commitment to public service expansion.
For example, in January, the government announced it would recruit over 15,000 teachers across the state over the course of six months. By the end of August, the government had only appointed 5,000.
The worst disappointment with the BJP is probably related to recruitment to the Assam Public Service Commission (APSC). Jobs in this government body are considered very prestigious in Assam; hundreds of thousands of students prepare for its regular selection exams.
However, ASPC recruitment has long suffered from a lack of transparency and allegations of corruption. Its former chairman, Rakesh Paul, was arrested in 2016 after a court found he received bribes from certain candidates in exchange for providing them with separate rooms during the examination.
Paul was close to former Assam's Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi. Although no legal action was taken against Gogoi, the widely publicized scandal tarnished the image of the INC in the state.
During the 2016 elections, the BJP promised to clean up the ASPC from dishonest officers, but it wasn't long until it also faced accusations of corruption.
For example, when recruiting new staff for the Panchyat and Rural Development in 2017, the BJP faced public criticism after answers were leaked on social media before exam day and candidates were caught using mobile phones in the exam hall. While Assam police opened an investigation into the irregularities, appointments were made anyway.
Twitter user from Assam Tulesh Doley urged to the prime minister:
@PMOIndia What happen to your governments zero tolerance against corruption……plz do come and see what happened in Assam….#PNRD scam…….
We need investigation……
— tulesh doley (@f7c232bfca81403) March 7, 2019
Local media also reported on the leaking of exam papers before a recruitment exam by Assam Power Distribution Company Limited took place in 2019. Police are investigating the incident.
Also in 2019, the Assam government promised to appoint more 1,600 posts in the newly-established Foreigners Tribunals, courts where suspected foreigner citizens are summoned to prove their Indian citizenship. Exams were held and a list of qualified candidates was released, but the government hasn't appointed them yet.
General Secretary of All Assam Students’ Union Assam Lurinjyoti Gogoi tweeted:
#Release_FT_Appointment The reluctance of the #AssamGovt to issue #AppointmentLetters to the selected Foreigner's Tribunal members once again proves their insincerity towards solving the illegal foreginers issue and their blatant disregard for Supreme Court directives. 1/2
— Lurinjyoti Gogoi (@lurinjtgogoi) August 24, 2020
The announcement of the 55,000 jobs was met with criticism online. The National Student's Association of India (Assam branch) tweeted:
◆ One Nation
◆ One Man
◆ Crores Unemployed
Today's youngsters are awake
about there jobs.
Instead of wasting time on
unnecessary things.Goverment
should provide employment.#राष्ट्रीय_बेरोजगारी_दिवस#NationalUnemploymentDay pic.twitter.com/ZBvjNvitPh
— Assam University NSUI (@AssamNsui) September 17, 2020
Gargee Kashyap from the city of Guwahati tweeted:
Unemployment at it's peak and what is more worring is that those exams that were held, Results still not declared like APDCL, APSC mains 2018 When will the concerned authorities will actually do something about it? #SpeakUpForJobs #ReleaseAPSCMain2018Results
— Gargee Kashyap (@KashyapGargee) September 10, 2020
Twitter user Jan Kishore Gogoi from the city of Sivsagar said:
This is now become a trend, date after date in court is the new normal…Why does it take more than a year to release the Apsc Mains results, the whole process which needs to be completed in a year takes more than 3 years,This is not acceptable.#ReleaseAPSCMain2018results https://t.co/el4iK2QZkp
— Jan Kishore Gogoi (@Jaandestiny) September 15, 2020
Twitter user Kishan Nath also joined in:
@CMOfficeAssam @apdclsocial Enquiry committee's time has also expired on 10th of September. Now publish apdcl fresher result.#publiah_APDCL_RESULT #Publish_APDCL_RESULT #Publish_APDCL_RESULT #Publish_APDCL_RESULT #Publish_APDCL_RESULT #Publish_APDCL_RESULT pic.twitter.com/T8nNId6NJO
— Kishan Nath (@KishanN9706) September 13, 2020
Someone who says has sat the exam to the Foreigner Tribunals’ said:
Please release our 1600 Foreigners Tribunal appointment letter. Our govt only give education & helth department appointment letter. But we feel we are not in the assam? We wait last 12 months. Please see all department. #FT_Appointment_Assam https://t.co/mtfcsAdWNA
— Sewali chakravorty (@Sewalichakravo2) September 16, 2020

author: Abhinash


text:
Citizenship by investment in the Caribbean: Economic boon or diplomatic minefield? · Global Voices
Emma Lewis

Plane flying over the Caribbean. Photo by Vilseskogen on Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0.
Citizenship-for-purchase programmes, meant to boost ailing tourism economies, are proving to be problematic for some Caribbean countries.
The COVID-19 pandemic has dealt the vulnerable, tourism-dependent economies of the Caribbean a heavy blow. According to some forecasts, it will take the region a long time to recover from the loss of visitors. Despite renewed efforts to attract tourists for the upcoming winter season, the numbers of new COVID cases and deaths on some islands continue to trend upwards and there is great uncertainty in the business sector.
Enter the so-called “golden passport”—known as Citizenship by Investment (CBI)—which offers wealthy visitors the opportunity to travel more freely to some 149 countries. At a time when visa and COVID-19 restrictions are becoming more onerous, a second citizenship seems an advisable option; insurance in uncertain times. According to one citizenship broker, business is booming: applications for second passports have increased by 42 percent from last year.
As small but established members of the CBI industry, which is valued at 25 billion United States dollars annually, five Caribbean countries—Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, and St Kitts and Nevis—are hoping to benefit from the uptick. They all offer tax-free CBI schemes for investment in property or a cash donation, with little or no requirement to live in the country.
It's an innovative strategy to keep their heads above water and perhaps to foster some economic recovery. For individuals, a second passport can cost between US$100,000 and $150,000, while family packages go for between US$250,000 and $300,000. Applications can be processed in as little as three months.
The twin-island nation of St Kitts and Nevis was actually the first country in the world to adopt CBI. Its programme now offers a COVID-19 discount for families of four, until December 31, 2020. Along with Grenada, St Kitts and Nevis’ CBI scheme is among the top five rated programmes globally, according to Forbes magazine.
Grenada's arrangement seems more well balanced. While siblings, parents and grandparents can be included in the island's CBI applications, Grenadian citizens can also establish businesses in the United States through an E-2 work visa, thanks to an investment treaty signed by then US President Ronald Reagan in 1983, the year of the Grenada invasion.
As the wealthy “run away” from COVID-19 and, in the case of some Americans, political uncertainty at home, citizenship is not the only benefit being offered. Remote working residencies, such as Barbados’ “Welcome Stamp” visa—which reportedly raised US$1 million in just two months—are also proving fruitful.
CBI programmes are reportedly attracting the interest of wealthy Africans, too. Grenada, for example, is appealing to Nigerians who have been hit by COVID-19 market uncertainties, a decline in oil prices and currency devaluations.
Dominica, with a population of just 71,000, established its CBI programme in 1993. After being almost completely destroyed by Hurricane Maria in 2017, the island pinned its hopes on rebuilding infrastructure and essential services with funding from CBI. Since then, its government has built a network of clinics and a new hospital.
Among other investment options, neighbouring Antigua and Barbuda’s Citizenship by Investment Unit accepts donations to a fund for the University of the West Indies’ newly opened fourth campus in Antigua. Many islands offer similar choices: St Kitts and Nevis welcomes donations to a government foundation set up to support displaced sugar industry workers.
In Grenada, where the programme was launched in 2013 alongside the National Transformation Fund, CBI applicants may invest in any approved new developments in the tourism sector—including three controversial and apparently rushed developments that have raised major concerns over the environmental impact and the disregard for proper procedure. Now that a petition has been launched to protest the developments, Caribbean citizens are beginning to realise that CBI programmes are not always in their best interest.
A chart on Antigua and Barbuda’s CBI website shows that approximately one-third of citizenship applications received under its programme, from inception up to December 31, 2019, were from China. There were also substantial numbers from Lebanon, Syria, Russia, Libya, and Bangladesh.
St Kitts and Nevis, for example, does not accept clients from Iran and Afghanistan, but brokers say there is a high demand for CBI programmes in the Middle East and Asia. One Middle East-based immigration firm commented on the dramatic rise in interest since the pandemic began:
COVID-19 has triggered a sense of urgency, especially amongst those with restrictive nationalities who live in unstable countries […] Millions have lost their jobs or simply cannot sustain themselves in their countries of residence following steep salary reductions and indefinite unpaid leave. People are actively, more than we’ve ever seen, looking into options. Fast Citizenship [programmes] of the Caribbean Community have been popular in the Middle East. St Kitts and Nevis, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda have been the stars of the citizenship by investment industry for a long time.
Prior to the onset of COVID-19 in November 2019, Al Jazeera aired a four-part investigative report on second passport schemes. Titled “Diplomats for Sale,” it focused specifically on CBI applicants in Dominica, Grenada, and Saint Lucia, and was deeply embarrassing for some politicians, as the report exposed “how diplomatic passports are bought and sold on the open market, and how wealthy foreigners have managed to become ambassadors for Caribbean nations.”
In the wake of these startling allegations, when questions were raised, in both St Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia, about transparency, the islands’ premier and prime minister, respectively, staunchly defended their programmes—and they weren't the only ones. Antigua and Barbuda reported that an insurance payment for the prime minister's wife, and accommodation and dinner for the boxer Mike Tyson, counted as expenditure for the funds raised by the investment programme.
Grenada's opposition party, however, raised concerns about the alleged corrupt practices in the island's CBI scheme.
A blog focused on financial crime raised red flags over the issue, and explained how criminals hide identities through the investment initiative:
Money launderers, career while-collar criminals, terrorist financiers and intelligence agents have been, of late, using what we call the 2-step CBI technique to effectively conceal their true identity from compliance officers conducting due diligence inquiries at account opening, or law enforcement agents investigating financial crime. It appears to be a nearly foolproof tactic for those who must present an alias that cannot be broken, which then enables them to operate with impunity in the financial sector.
It is unclear whether applicants for these “golden passports” are properly vetted. An Indian “diamond magnate” who had obtained citizenship in Antigua and Barbuda, was later discovered to be a fugitive wanted for bank fraud.
There are also question marks surrounding a newly minted citizen of Antigua and Barbuda, Bitcoin.com chairman Roger Ver. Following the country's recent passing of the Digital Assets Bill—and despite legal issues hanging over his head—Ver is building a business relationship with the nation's government, prompting one report to surmise that he is “looking at retreating to jurisdictions like Antigua where he believes he can continue to operate globally with impunity.”
In its 2014 paper on Caribbean CBI schemes, the Caribbean Council concluded:
In their desire to create new sources of income, Caribbean nations are understandably anxious to create new revenue sources. However, if economic citizenship, without any significant residence requirement or the most detailed and exhaustive of checks, were to be proved to have facilitated criminality, money laundering or at worst terrorism, the measure will not only have become self-defeating for the country concerned, but also potentially damaging to the region as a whole.

author: Emma Lewis


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COVID-19 causes Trinidad and Tobago to cancel its Carnival for 2021 · Global Voices
Janine Mendes-Franco

“Carnival Tuesday meggie”: Carnival lover Attillah Springer gives a “meggie” – a hand gesture that brings the thumb and four fingers together in a sign of derision, scorn or rejection. Photo by Georgia Popplewell, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
It may have been anticipated, but now it's official: thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, Trinidad and Tobago's 2021 Carnival celebrations have been cancelled.
Prime Minister Keith Rowley made the announcement on the afternoon of September 28, calling the national festival “the perfect environment for the spreading of the virus.” Despite the inevitable economic blow the decision will have, he said, he's not prepared to take the risk.
Reaction, predictably, was split. While most people applauded the decision, calling it both “expected” and “solid”, others wondered about the fate of those whose income depends on the national festival. When one Facebook user called the decision “insane”, Josie Aché-De Goulard retorted:
NO! it's realistic and logical is what it is. Everyone else has already gone ahead and cancelled theirs. I do not possibly see how any “right thinking” citizen of T&T could possibly think to put the country under further threat from Covid-19.
Trinidad and Tobago Carnival 2020 was already over by the time the country recorded its first case of COVID-19 in March.
Other countries that host annual Carnivals, including Brazil, have already postponed their 2021 events, but it is only the third time in history that Trinidad and Tobago has put theirs on hold—a history that Trinidadian author Michael Anthony chronicled in his book “Parade of the Carnivals of Trinidad, 1839-1989″.
In the chapter etitled “Carnival in a World of War,” Anthony noted that the festival continued as usual during World War I, which was fought largely in Europe. After the war ended, the 1919 celebrations were known as “Victory Carnival”. During World War II, the festival did not take place at all between 1942 and 1945, although “spontaneous” celebrations happened on May 8 and 9, 1945 in honour of Victory in Europe (VE) Day, and on Aug 15 and 16, 1945 for Victory over Japan (VJ) Day.
The country's street festival was postponed from February 1972 to May 1973 because of the threat of the polio virus, so it is not as if the move to put off next year's Carnival celebrations is unprecedented. In fact, many netizens saw it coming, but hoped that a virtual celebration might take its place.
In a Facebook status update on June 24, Maria Rivas-Mc predicted that “promoters are going to have to Zoom in fete-goers to the music and the vibe from concert halls in ‘foreign’ [abroad]!” Virtual Carnivals are something that costume designers like Clary Salandy have already been experimenting with—the band she and her husband created for Notting Hill Carnival 2020 was showcased online.
Trinidad and Tobago's Carnival stakeholders have also expressed excitement about the opportunity to share their creativity in the virtual realm. Facebook user Marc Bejai suggested:
We keep forgetting that there are elements of carnival that are outside the realm of the street parade. We should adapt and showcase our calypso, pan, extempo and dimanche gras much like how sporting events are still being carried out.
Both calypso music and the steelpan instrument originated in Trinidad and Tobago. Extempo refers to an extemporaneous form of calypso, and Dimanche Gras, literally translated as “Big Sunday,” is a grand show at which coveted titles like the Calypso Monarch are decided.
Franka Philip of Trini Good Media, which produces the “Talk ‘Bout Us” podcast, crowdsourced opinions on what a virtual Carnival might look like. Most commenters felt that simply delaying the celebrations would be best, with Zahra Gordon suggesting that it may be an opportune time “to re-focus to community Carnivals and limit the size of large bands.”
Anthony Bisnath added:
Aside from the issue of a vaccine being made available globally, it’s difficult to envision any Carnival 2021 at all, due to the commercialization of the festival, and the limitations of two major sources of revenue: Government expenditure will be prioritized elsewhere, and corporate entities will slash sponsorship budgets.
Having a 2021 Carnival may jeopardize the planning cycle for one in 2022. It will be almost impossible to execute, as Carnival mas [costume] production is essentially a 12 month cycle. So there are challenges to logistics, Sponsorship, Supply Chain, Manufacturing, Costuming, International Travel, Consumer Patterns, Disposable Income and Statutory Approvals all changing for the next 18 months.
Carnival enthusiast Tillah Willah was not perturbed, however. She posted on Facebook:
You don’t always need a crowd to observe your ritual, to praise your ancestors, to offer thanks to the universe for your life.
One Twitter user, however, wasn't quite so optimistic:
I woulda rather get horn than be told it having no carnival
— Travis World ? (@itstravisworld) September 28, 2020
“Horn” is Caribbean slang for infidelity.
Other netizens wondered whether, given the cancellation of the physical street parade, they would have to go to work on Carnival Monday and Tuesday. Apart from essential services, most workplaces are closed on those two days, even though they are not official public holidays.
It didn't take long for the memes to surface. This one poked fun at what the 2021 designs in a sought-after band—known for its skimpy costumes—might look like:
Meme about Trinidad and Tobago Carnival 2021, widely shared on social media.
It is a question that both the producers and loyal participants of Trinidad and Tobago Carnival are still trying to figure out, but stakeholder Rubadiri Victor certainly hoped that a virtual Carnival 2021 is in the offing:
Trinidad and Tobago should see virtual Carnival 2021 as the launch of T&T's virtual economy! […] We are creating a telegenic event with brilliant filmmakers and Carnival, Creative, and Business stakeholders for international consumption with brand T&T as the winner!

author: Janine Mendes-Franco


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Thai activists share hopes and wishes during a night camp protest · Global Voices
Prachatai

People started to lay down as the speech went on in Sanam Luang, September 19 evening. Photo and caption by Prachatai.
This article by Yiamyut Sutthichaya is from Prachatai, an independent news site in Thailand, edited and republished by Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement. *Some names have been changed to protect the identity of the interviewees.
On September 19, a massive protest brought thousands to Bangkok to call for reforms and the drafting of a new constitution. The day's protests carried on into the night as protesters settled down to sleep at Bangkok's Thammasat University (TU) and the adjacent Sanam Luang field.
It was the biggest overnight protest since the 2014 coup, and allowed people from other parts of the country to attend a political event in the capital as they could stay at the protest site.
At around 8:30 p.m. in TU, people could be seen queuing up to use the bathrooms, some brushing their teeth in the bushes. Some were already asleep, preparing for the march the following day.
21.30
The #19กันยาทวงอำนาจคืนราษฎร demonstration, which has now moved across the street from Thammasat University to Sanam Luang, is still ongoing, with activists such as Sirawith Serithiwat and the Bad Student group giving speeches on the main stage.#WhatsHappeningInThailand pic.twitter.com/G2JVPeLsrM
— Prachatai English (@prachatai_en) September 19, 2020
Jane*, 33, a factory worker from northeastern city Khon Kaen, travelled to Bangkok with her friends to join the protest. As she was preparing her sleeping spot on the footpath in front of the activity building, Jane explained the reason for sleeping at the protest site.
To save money, I came here with full support. As I told you, brother, the economy is not good lately. There is no OT (overtime).
She does not like the current government as the economy, living costs and many other things have not changed for the better. The COVID-19 pandemic has also threatened her livelihood as the factory already prohibits overtime (OT) work which usually equals extra income that Thai factory workers depend on to improve their quality of life. She wants the government to resign.
Across the football field from Jane stands the TU Business School (TBS) where dozens of people were sleeping.
Jane's belonging for an overnight stay. Photo and caption by Prachatai. Used with permission.
“We want democracy,” said Phawat Hiranphon, a salesman from the central province of Samut Prakan who decided to spend the night with some friends under the TBS building after finding nearby hotels fully booked.
Phawat started to attend political protests in July. He said he formerly hated protests because he felt like it was an act of force or mob rule. True democracy must be implemented through elections. But as he saw the one-sided legal prosecutions of those who opposed the government, including students, he changed his mind.
Jay*, then joined the conversation. By coming to the protest, Jay hoped that the people of Thailand would be able to have a better government where the monarchy is regulated under democratic principles as seen by the 10 demands that the students made. Jay also wants to put a stop to enforced disappearances.
Nathakan Kamkaeo, a graduate from England, also spent the night at TU due to the fully booked hotels. She said she wants the monarchy to be regulated under a legal framework without political influence.
The night in the open was not comfortable. Phawat and his friends complained about the inadequate toilets and questionable red tape like having to wait for police permission to open the public toilet truck. But Phawat hoped these difficulties would be worthwhile.
We want our difficulties to end in our generation. Nobody will have difficulties like us again. If they are not in trouble, they won’t have to come and protest, will they?
Phawat and his sleeping spot. Photo and caption by Prachatai. Used with permission.
During the interview with Phawat and his friends, Saritphon Yotphayung, 74, a former TU student, stopped by to share his political experiences from 1973 and 1976.
I studied at the TU Law faculty in 1965, I went to the march [in October 1973]. I did not want my grandchildren to live like that. I thought it must end in our generation.
Saritphon said the 1973 protest only wanted democracy, a constitution, elections and the ousting of the three dictators (Field Marshal Thanom, Col Narong Kittikachorn and Field Marshal Praphas Charusathien).
The 1973 protest was successful but merely served as a prelude to the October 1976 massacre when people and students were brutally killed after they staged protests against Thanom’s return to Thailand as a monk. The movement at that time was misrepresented by conservative, royalist media and society as a communist, anti-monarchy movement.
In that year, Saritphon worked at the Ministry of Justice, formerly located near Sanam Luang, where he saw people being killed and hanged. He realized that the dictators had been chased out, welcomed back and then had people killing each other.
He also shares the same sentiment as the young people in changing Thai politics for the better.
Meeting the kids in this generation again, I don’t want them to be 74 and still having to come and sit like this again. I want it to end already.
Volunteers were responsible for overseeing safety during the protest. Piyarat Chongthep, a former political activist and MP candidate for the opposition Future Forward Party, was responsible for over 270 volunteers overseeing the situation outside TU. Volunteers could be recognized by their blue armbands.
Piyarat has been organizing the volunteers since the protest on August 18 at the Democracy Monument. They are responsible for public order at protests, traffic management and ensuring that protesters do not bring weapons to the protests by checking their belongings.
On the one hand, volunteers worked with police to oversee public safety and on the other, they were also on the lookout for police violence. At night, the volunteers were divided into three shifts, taking turns to monitor safety and the movements of riot police.
The volunteer guards were divided into 2 groups, independent from each other. Piyarat’s group oversaw the situation outside TU, while a group made up of TU students looked after the situation inside TU.
Prachatai was unable to contact the TU group leader, but TU volunteers said that their basic job was to keep the situation under control, screen vehicles that entered TU, patrol the perimeter and look after the well-being of protesters sleeping inside TU.

author: Prachatai


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Toward a cyberfeminist future: A new study centers African women as protagonists online · Global Voices
Amanda Lichtenstein

A woman checks her mobile phone. Photo via Pikist, a royalty-free site for images.
Navigating the internet as a woman in Africa can be stressful if not straight-up dangerous. While digital spaces may appear free and equal, the reality is that the internet perpetuates systems of oppression and inequality.
In Africa, women and sexual minorities disproportionately experience harassment, doxing, non-consensual sharing and other forms of online gender-based violence (GBV). But a lack of robust, baseline data has made it difficult to determine the full extent to which women are threatened online.
Now, a large-scale research study — the first of its kind — reveals how African women living in five African countries experience the internet.
Over 3,000 women between the ages of 18-65, from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, and South Africa, were interviewed about their “perceptions of digital safety, as well as responses to online GBV from a legal perspective, law enforcement authorities and technology platforms,” according to a press release.
A comprehensive report from the study entitled, “Alternate Realties, Alternate Internets,” aims to inform evidence-based policy to push for digital equality, explained Neema Iyer, the founder of Pollicy, the civic tech organization that led the research project.
“We want to understand how online gender-based violence manifests across Africa, and how technology companies, which are often based out of Africa, respond to this violence,” said Iyer.
Online GBV refers to targeting individuals based on their sexual or gender identity or by enforcing harmful gender norms, including behaviors such as stalking, surveillance, bullying, sexual harassment, trafficking, defamation, hacking, hate speech and exploitation and other controlling behaviors.
Pollicy, based in Kampala, Uganda, worked on this study in partnership with the Feminist Internet Research Network under the Association for Progressive Communication and with funding from the International Development Research Centre.
A website called “Survival Guide to Being a Woman on the Internet” encompasses a bot that walks viewers through interactive storytelling of the study findings.
The study found the 28 percent of women interviewed had experienced some form of online harassment. About 41 percent of these respondents believed that their gender was a primary reason for these attacks.
“Online threats are mainly organized trolling. I’ve received death threats,” said a woman from Kenya. “They come up with campaigns or a hashtag, so they rant at me all day. These insults are based on me as a woman, my anatomy, my family.”
In some countries like Ethiopia, 90 percent of respondents who experienced this online violence either did not know the identity of the perpetrator or found the perpetrator to be a stranger, and it was difficult to ascertain the primary perpetrator.
Online GBV takes a monumental toll on mental health, including depression, anxiety and fear that follows women offline at home, school, work and other social spaces.
Screenshot from “Alternate Realties, Alternate Internets,” 2020.
While 71 percent of incidents of online harassment occurred on Facebook, results showed that up to 95 percent of the women were not aware of any policies and laws in place to protect women against online GBV.
About 15 percent of women interviewed said they deleted or deactivated their accounts whereas 12 percent stopped using a digital service after experiencing online violence.
“Women are not reporting even domestic violence because of the culture and the norm,” said a woman from Ethiopia. “Imagine going to report online gender-based violence. They are going to make fun of you and tell you to come back when the real violence happens,” she continued.
The report asserts that “violence against women online is often trivialized with poor punitive action taken by authorities, further exacerbated by victim-blaming.”
The report also confirms that most African countries “do not have specific legislation or strategies against online gender-based violence. Existing preventive measures to specifically target online gender-based violence are lacking.”
Courtesy of Pollicy.
In partnership with Internews, Pollicy analyzed the laws on online GBV in each of the five countries and found that “online GBV cases rarely make it to the courtroom at all,” seriously limiting any analysis of current legal frameworks in place.
However, all five countries have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), “which explicitly requires states to ensure that both men and women have equal enjoyment of the rights set out therein,” according to the legal analysis.
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, to which all five countries are also signatories, also affirms equal rights regardless of sex.
All five countries have also ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). But Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have not ratified the CEDAW optional protocol that allows for CEDAW committees to process and listen to complaints.
The inherent whiteness and maleness of the internet today perpetuates inequality and props up patriarchal structures that oppress women and sexual minorities.
By contrast, cyberfeminism “offers a space for feminist thinking to critique, imagine and recreate a radically open internet,” according to the report.
Drawing from black feminist thought and feminist-informed tech theory, the report encourages the centering of women as “protagonists in technology-dominated Afrofutures.”
“How can we create a feminist internet?” Courtesy of Pollicy.
Iyer says there is an urgent need for digital security resources to be adapted to local contexts and languages, as well as mainstreaming these concepts in educational curricula.
Other recommendations include training law enforcement on how to address GBV violations and to provide assistance and counseling to women who choose to report.
African countries must also adopt and adequately implement data protection and privacy laws.
“When thinking of our Afro feminist future, we need to think of an internet where both the developers and users understand the intersectionality of the lived experience of an African woman,” said Iyer.

author: Amanda Lichtenstein


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Chinese state-run TV distorts WHO scientist’s remarks in viral video · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Screen capture from CCTV's video on Miaopai. Via Youtube.
This story is based research by Factcheck Lab, a Hong Kong-based fact-checking agency and a media partner of Global Voices of which the author is a member.
Since September 22, news reports and social media posts circulating on the Chinese-speaking internet inaccurately claim that World Health Organization (WHO) Chief Scientist, Dr. Soumya Swaminathan, said China’s COVID-19 vaccines “have proved to have an effect.”
These reports and posts cite as a source a one-minute video produced by China Central Television for the Chinese video-sharing app Miaopai. The video shows a speech by WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on the importance of the development of a COVID-19 vaccine, followed by remarks by Dr. Swaminathan.
In the CCTV video, whose captions say “WHO chief scientist: Chinese COVID-19 vaccines have proved to have an effect” (世卫组织首席科学家：中国的新冠疫苗已被证明有效), this is Swaminathan's speech:
As you know, they also have a very active vaccine development programme and several of their vaccine candidates are in advanced stages of clinical trial, so this is also of interest to us, so we're following those very closely. Some of their candidates actually prove to be successful in the clinical trials that are going on.
However, Dr. Swaminathan's original speech has been edited. Her last sentence, in reality, began with the word “if,” and the video's background music makes it sound as if she's saying “proved” instead of “prove.”
Dr. Swaminathan's complete remarks are the following:
We've been engaged in discussions with China for the last several months because, as you know, they also have a very active vaccine development programme and several of their vaccine candidates are in advanced stages of clinical trial so this is also of interest to us so we're following those very closely. We've had very constructive and open discussions with them and they have always been reiterating their commitment to global access if some of their candidates actually prove to be successful in the clinical trials that are going on [emphasis added]. So I think the conversations are going on, it's still open and we're hopeful that more countries are going to join.
The remarks were delivered at a WHO virtual press conference that took place on September 21. The complete transcripts of the one hour and 30 minutes event can be accessed here.
The conference aimed to present updates on the 18-billion-USD initiative by WHO and other organizations to deploy a future COVID-19 vaccine around the world. So far, 156 countries have signed up for the program; neither China nor the U.S. is among them.
As anticipated, CCTV's video, as well as the news reports and posts that it generated, have attracted a lot of patriotic endorsements. A post on Weibo by Daily Economic News has more than 337,000 likes. Below are some of the most popular comments:
为您骄傲，我的国。这是国庆中秋最好的礼物
I am so proud of you, my country. This is the best present for the National Day and Mid Autumn Festival.
中国速度，你无法想象，为祖国自豪，
You can’t imagine China’s speed. I am so proud of my mother country.
中国拯救了全世界
China saves the whole world.
After fact-checkers pointed out that Dr. Swaminathan’s words had been distorted, some media outlets, including CGTN and CCTV, deleted their social media posts. Among them is the Communist Youth League of China, whose post was captured by Twitter user @Emi2020JP before it disappeared from Weibo:
先给谭德塞来两针！ pic.twitter.com/IvIbSFl2XY
— Emi エミJP (@Emi2020JP) September 28, 2020
Tedros should have the vaccine injection first.
Like @Emi2020JP, many Twitter users believed that WHO was assisting China with distorting the video, and posted angry comments at Tedros:
谭德塞就是痰罐刷
Tedros is a toilet brush!
我出錢給扊得塞多打几支！
I will pay to give Tedros a few extra injection!
昨天我妈还说，国内新闻报道美国向中国购买大量疫苗。我听后连解释的欲望都没有了。谁他们自己意淫吧。
Yesterday my mom told me, the domestic news said that the U.S will buy huge amount of vaccines from China. I don't even care to explain. Let them live in their fantasy.
從散播病毒隱匿疫情到幫中國推銷疫苗真的是一條龍服務喔！
Such excellent service, from covering up the spread of the virus to marketing China's vaccines!
Although Chinese many posts have been deleted, copy-cats are still circulating on social media, such as this public post on WeChat.
Pro-Beijing media outlets in Hong Kong, such as Speak Out HK (港人講地）and Today Review (今日正言), have also published news stories based on the video.
There are almost 200 COVID-19 vaccines in different stages of clinical trials around the world, and several of those are being produced by Chinese laboratories. None of them has successfully passed a phase 3 trial yet.

author: Oiwan Lam


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Protests in Angola demand justice for Silvio Dala, a doctor who died in police custody · Global Voices
Simão Hossi

Demonstration against the death of doctor Silvio Dala in Luanda. Photo by Simão Hossi, CC-BY 3.0
Hundreds of Angolans took to the streets on September 12 in Luanda, Benguela, and in cities in 15 other provinces against police violence.
The demonstrations took place following the shock from the news that Silvio Dala, a 35-year-old doctor, lost his life on September 1 while in police custody.
According to the authorities, Dala left by car from the David Bernardino Paediatric Hospital in Luanda, where he worked as clinical director when he was stopped by police officers for not wearing a mask.
The doctor was then taken to the Catotes police station, in the capital's Rocha Pinto neighbourhood, when “he showed signs of fatigue and began to faint, having had a bad fall, which caused minor injuries to the head,” the official police statement said. It also states that Dala died while officers were taking him to hospital.
The Union of Doctors contests this version. The organization’s president, Adriano Manuel, told Voice of America (VOA) that there are contradictions in the authorities’ explanations which suggest that the doctor was subjected to physical abuse.
Manuel told Deutsche Welle (DW) that “the cause of death described by the police is not the real one. Anyone who is a doctor and has studied medicine knows that this is not what killed Silvio”. According to DW, a source from the Ministry of the Interior said that the autopsy, carried out in the presence of the family and a prosecutor, concluded that the doctor was not the victim of an assault.
The union said it will take legal action against the police. Meanwhile, the Angolan government announced the creation of a commission with the Ministry of Health to investigate the incident.
The protesters also did not believe the police's version of Dala's death. Signs used at the protests in Luanda, in different parts of the city, said: “No more killings,” “You are paid to protect, you are not paid to kill,” “I am Silvio Dala,” “They killed Silvio Dala.” There were also calls for the Minister of the Interior Eugénio Laborinho to resign.
The demonstrations were organized by the Union of Doctors and by various civil society collectives and organizations.
Demonstration against the death of doctor Silvio Dala in Luanda. Photo by Simão Hossi, CC-BY 3.0
Demonstration against the death of doctor Silvio Dala in Luanda. Photo by Simão Hossi, CC-BY 3.0
Since the beginning of the pandemic in Angola, several cases of police violence have been reported during checks on compliance with restrictive measures, sometimes resulting in citizens’ deaths.
Speaking to Lusa, the rapper “Brigadeiro 10 Pacotes”, whose real name is Bruno Santos, called for Lugarinho's resignation as well as better police training schools to improve their conduct.
“The police is an organization that must give citizens confidence, today we live in serious insecurity where all citizens are afraid when they come across the police,” he said.
Demonstration against the death of doctor Silvio Dala in Luanda. Photo by Simão Hossi, CC-BY 3.0
Many took to Facebook and WhatsApp to protest the incident. Activist and academic Nuno Álvaro Dala wrote on Facebook:
A POLÍCIA NACIONAL É A RESPONSÁVEL PELA MORTE DO MÉDICO SÍLVIO DALA
As imagens são fortes e muito esclarecedoras. Temos todos de exigir que a justiça seja feita. A Polícia Nacional tem de pagar pelo crime que cometeu. Isto não deve ficar assim.
THE NATIONAL POLICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE DOCTOR SILVIO DALA
The images are powerful and very clear. We must all demand that justice be done. The National Police must pay for the crime they have committed. Things must not continue like this.
On Twitter, Isabel dos Santos, former chairperson of the board of directors (PCA) of the state oil company Sonangol, and daughter of former president José Eduardo dos Santos, said:
#EuSouSilvioDala sábado anunciada “manifestação pacífica e silenciosa” pelo Sindicato Nacional dos Médicos de Angola (SINMEA),convidando todos profissionais de saúde,outros sindicatos e sociedade civil, contra a violência policial em memória de Sílvio Dala, 12:30hLargo da Mutamba pic.twitter.com/blRs117IdY
— Isabel Dos Santos (@isabelaangola) September 11, 2020
#IamSilvioDala. On Saturday the National Union of Doctors of Angola (SINMEA) announced a “peaceful and silent demonstration”, calling on all health professionals, other unions and civil society, against police violence in memory of Silvio Dala, 12:30 pm Largo da Mutamba
Image headline: Angolans take to the streets against police violence and calling for the end of killings
Meanwhile, Alejandro, also on Twitter, questioned the participation of Angolan online influencers in this case:
Quando o George Floyd foi morto os chamados “Influencers Angolanos” mostraram o seu apoio ao movimento Black Lives Matter, mas com a morte do medico angolano Sílvio Dala os tais irmãos influencers não fazem nada em relação a perda!
— Ale Alejandro (@AlejandroCutieG) September 7, 2020
When George Floyd was killed the so-called “Angolan Influencers” showed their support for the Black Lives Matter movement, but with the death of the Angolan doctor Silvio Dala, these brothers don't do anything about the loss!

author: Simão Hossi


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Digital rights in Africa is still far from the internet freedom we desire · Global Voices
Nwachukwu Egbunike

Some sub-Saharan African contributors during the Global Voices 2017 Summit in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Image by Raphael Tsavkko Garcia, December 3, 2017 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
The International Day for Universal Access to Information (IDUAI), on September 28, is an annual reminder of the rights of every person to access information, initiated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
This is particularly important in Africa, where digital access to information is characterized by excessive taxation, digital shutdowns and jailing of activists.
READ MORE: Taxed, throttled or thrown in jail: Africa’s new internet paradigm
In addition, the dreadful landscape for online freedom and digital rights on the continent has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The #COVID19 pandemic has lent itself to surveillance systems. For many in Africa, even when the disease toll is declining, gov'ts have exploited the public health crisis with institutionalized and permanent actions that further entrench their power. #FIFAfrica20 #DigitalRights https://t.co/5epJI4L0gr
— Avalanche (@valanchee) September 29, 2020
In the light of the above, some sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Global Voices (GV) contributors recently discussed the future of internet freedom as part of their contribution to the Forum on Internet Freedom in Africa 2020 (#FIFAfrica20), organized by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA).
In short videos compiled by Faaris Adam (Somalia), eight contributors from six African countries expressed their views: Adéṣinà Ayeni  (Nigeria), Adetomiwa Isiaka (Nigeria), Baraka Providence (Democratic Republic of Congo), Daniel Ekonde (Cameroon), James Propa (Uganda) Khattab Hamad (Sudan) Mark Neywon Mengonfia (Liberia) and Nwachukwu Egbunike (GV Community Manager for SSA).
The GV SSA reporters identified seven issues that will likely shape the future of internet freedom and digital rights in Africa.
As of March this year, Africa’s 527 million internet users are like a drop in the ocean of about 5.8 billion global users. The 39 percent internet penetration in Africa lags behind the 59 percent global average and 63 percent with the rest of the world, according to the Internet World Stats.
Hence a country like Liberia, with a population of 4.5 million, boasts of a paltry 624,610 internet users and a low internet penetration of 12.3 percent. Consequently, both the “Liberian government and the African Union” need to assiduously work in getting the internet “to far-flung places,” opines Mark Neywon Mengonfia.
In 2007, Guinea became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to switch off the internet during protests against former president Lansana Conté.
Since then, digital blackouts in Africa have become the norm during political upheavals or uncertainties.
READ MORE: The day Liberia shut down freedom of expression amid a mass protest
Daniel Ekonde, of Cameroon, asserts that African governments are increasingly tightening their grip on the internet. Hence, a digital milieu free from “government interference or surveillance or the emasculation of rights of various African netizens,” is becoming slimmer by the day, Nwachukwu Egbunike, of Nigeria, thinks.
For instance, there are “repeated interruptions of the internet whenever there are protests” in Ethiopia. The same occurs in “Cameroon wherein the internet is manipulated when protests are announced,” said Ekonde.
Nonetheless, Khattab Hamad of Sudan believes that it is still possible to “imagine a future in Africa with no internet shutdowns and digital rights violations.” However, this depends on three factors, according to Hamad, that will make future digital blackouts a hard call:
First, a law that enshrines network neutrality so that the internet remains free and open, including during political crises; second, a law that criminalizes the denial of internet access; and third, a law to prevent violations of users’ privacy and personal data.
READ MORE: Internet shutdowns in Sudan: The story behind the numbers and statistics
Legislation should not only curtail internet shutdowns but rather promote digital rights.
James Propa of Uganda envisages a future where “communication, education and digital platforms” in Africa are not “heavily taxed or priced,” hence, preventing “so many young people from using these platforms.”
This runs contrary to the prevailing situation in the continent where “we have legislation that only supports the leaders to stay longer in power or to enrich themselves or for their own personal benefits,” asserts Propa.
In addition, these laws should be proactive. Adetomiwa Isiaka, of Nigeria, proposes constitutional provisions that guarantee that “digital rights” are granted universal accessibility like “educational rights, that is free and accessible.” This can be achieved by making digital access “compulsory for everyone in the country,” Isiaka assets.
READ MORE: Satirical comedy skit lands four Ugandan comedians in jail
A cross-section of GV SSA contributors at the 2012 Global Voices Citizen Media Summit, Nairobi, Kenya. Image by www.viajesyrelatos.com, July 3, 2012, (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
Swahili — one of the African Union’s official languages — is the most widely spoken language in the continent. Similarly, Yorùbá has 30 million speakers in southwestern Nigeria, and in the neighboring West African countries.
However, Swahili and Yorùbá, like most African languages, are not only relegated to the rear on the internet but are invisible in digital spaces.
Consequently, Adéṣinà Ayeni of Nigeria wants a truly “multilingual” internet that is “accessible in African languages.” He believes it is his right to write his name “in the Yorùbá language with the diacritics, which are the tonal markings.” But he cannot do so because this message: “Error, characters are not recognized” keeps popping up. This “should not be so,” Ayeni laments.
Harmful content like mis- and disinformation or ethnic hate speech are increasingly weaponized in digital platforms to silence critics or marginalize dissenting voices.
READ MORE: The identity matrix: Platform regulation of online threats to expression in Africa
Ekonde argues that netizens should be more “responsible” about the content they share on digital platforms and refrain form “hate speech, targeting people on social media and also fake news.” This, according to Ekonde, will greatly “improve” digital rights in the continent.
In addition, technology firms and platforms have to moderate harmful online behaviors like cyberbullying and trolling, which usually go unreported in minority languages.
Egbunike thinks that tech firms should “actually take full responsibility of moderating content” rather than the prevailing scenario of “paying lip service to issues arising from their digital platforms within the various countries in the continent.”
READ MORE: Moderate globally, impact locally: A series on content moderation in the Global South
Despite all the odds, Baraka Providence, of DR Congo, asserts that Africa is moving toward digitalization that promises a bright future for internet freedom and digital rights.
Nonetheless, Providence insists that Africa’s digital transformation has to be “humancentric” by shrinking the prevailing “inequality among people.” This will be achieved by ensuring that technological policies do not morph into “barriers against access, accessibility and inclusion of minorities.”
But more importantly, the technological transformation of the continent can never be achieved at the “expense of digital rights,” warns Providence.

author: Nwachukwu Egbunike


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Fearing the national security law, Hongkongers say farewell to their home city · Global Voices
The Stand News

Farewell to Hong Kong. Image from Stand News, used with permission.
The following story was originally published in Chinese on Stand News. It was translated into English by Global Voices and will be published here, with permission, in five different parts. Part One of the series follows.
Between August 29 and September 1, Stand News asked its readers in Hong Kong, through a series of online polls, how the national security law has impacted their lives.
More than 2,580 people responded — and about 37 percent revealed that even before the Steering Committee of the National People Congress announced its decision to implement the national security law on May 21, they had considered leaving Hong Kong. Since the law's enactment, 76 percent of respondents said their desire to emigrate had intensified.
The most popular destination for relocation is Taiwan (32.3 percent), followed by the United Kingdom (23 percent).
Stand News’ reader survey on emigration attitude.
On July 22, the UK government introduced a policy that facilitates the emigration of residents from its former colony, by allowing eligible Hong Kong British National (Overseas) passport holders and their family members to settle in the UK for work and study. After five years of residency under this British National Overseas (BNO) arrangement, they can apply for full citizenship.
The new immigration scheme will begin accepting applications in January 2021. For now, though, eligible Hongkongers can apply to enter the UK based on “Leave Outside the Rules” (LOTR) — guidelines that allow UK Immigration to exercise discretion on the basis of compelling compassionate grounds.
YM [pseudonym] and her family decided to use this option. They left Hong Kong and, upon their arrival in the UK on August 6, applied for “Leave Outside the Rules” entry. Along with about ten other Hongkongers who were queuing up for the interview, they were asked about their occupation, financial conditions, and religion, as well as about their relatives and acquaintances in the UK.
Born in the 1980s, YM was working as a manager in a public relations firm in Hong Kong, but decided to leave the city with her family in August 2019 after the infamous attack at Prince Edward subway station, in which riot police indiscriminately assaulted passengers in an attempt to arrest protesters.
They sold their apartment for six million Hong Kong dollars (approximately 781,000 US dollars) and lived in a hotel for six months. At first, they planned to immigrate to Cyprus by investing 200,000 Euros in the country, but that plan was put on hold due to the outbreak of COVID-19. When the UK introduced the new BNO scheme, they decided to settle there.
Like tens of thousands other Hongkongers, YM was active during the year-long, anti-China extradition protests. She had joined a number of Telegram groups and made donations to fellow protesters who needed to equip themselves with protection gear. Three of the Telegram groups she belonged to were deleted after their administrators were arrested.
In a protest photo that was widely circulated online, YM's face was recognisable; quite apart from her worry about getting caught in the cross hairs of the authorities, she told Stand News she was also concerned about her seven-year-old daughter’s education:
The patriotic education would turn her into ‘little pink’. What you learn in the textbooks would no longer be the truth. How could a government treat its young generation like this? In Hong Kong, it is a crime to be young. My daughter is now seven, after a few years, she will be in high school, what would become of her? I don’t want to see her getting arrested.
“Little pink” is a term used to describe young Chinese nationalists on the internet.
Now that YM and her family have successfully entered the UK under “Leave Outside the Rules”, they have started a Facebook page aimed at providing other Hongkongers with information on immigrating to the UK. Within one week, the page received more than 60 inquiries.
YM and her family have since decided to buy a property in the UK, and have no plans to visit Hong Kong in the near future.
Stand News’ reader survey on emigration.
Peter [pseudonym], a civil servant who plans to move to Taiwan with his wife, has signed up for a migration scheme under which he would invest a minimum of HK $530,000 in a Taiwan-based start-up. After five years, he will be able apply for permanent residency.
He chose Taiwan because he believes the fate of Taiwan and Hong Kong are intertwined: “Both Chinese regions are subjected to the tyranny of ‘One China’,” he said:
Taiwan is near to Hong Kong; I can travel back to Hong Kong as frequently as possible. I can also join solidarity rallies in Taiwan and give support to the exile protesters there. In Hong Kong, the space for voicing out has shrunk.
According to Taiwan's immigration authorities, the island granted 3,161 residency permits to Hongkongers in the first half of 2020. The figure reflects a 116 percent increase when compared to 2019.
Many of those who don't plan to emigrate — or want to but still haven't left — have transferred their savings to offshore bank accounts, since the national security law gives police the power to freeze the assets of anyone being investigated. In the Stand News reader survey, 55.8 percent of respondents admitted that they've considered transferring their savings abroad, with around 27.8 percent having already moved their money into foreign accounts.
Mr. Lam [pseudonym], an environmental project engineer, made the decision to transfer his savings to an offshore account in May, soon after Beijing announced the implementation of the national security law. He feared that, like mainland China, Hong Kong would restrict foreign currency exchanges, or that the Hong Kong/US dollar peg would be undermined as a result of US sanctions. He therefore converted his HK $10 million nest egg into US currency and moved the money to bank accounts in Singapore.
Since Mr. Lam is already in his fifties, he is considering emigrating from Hong Kong upon his retirement. As a BNO passport holder, one of his options is to settle down in the UK, but he has also considered applying for a retirement visa to Thailand, as the country only requires a savings account worth HK $200,000 in order to apply for residency.

author: The Stand News


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Holocaust denial should be considered hate speech, survivors demand of Facebook · Global Voices
Metamorphosis Foundation

The Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum is located on the site of the former Auschwitz concentration camp in Oświęcim, Poland. Photo by Meta.mk/Bojan Blazhevski, used with permission.
This story was originally published by Meta.mk. An edited version is republished here via a content-sharing agreement between Global Voices and Metamorphosis Foundation.
The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (Claims Conference), an international organization that negotiates compensation and restitution for victims of Nazi persecution, continues to lobby Facebook to include Holocaust denial in its definition of hate speech. The digital campaign, which began in July and is targeted directly at Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, features video messages from Holocaust survivors.
“Holocaust denial posts on Facebook are hate speech and must be removed!” say the campaign's creators and participants. Using the hashtag #NoDenyingIt, former inmates of Nazi concentration and extermination camps — as well as other survivors of the genocide during World War II — contributed powerful personal testimonies:
Beginning today the Claims Conference will be posting video messages across social media from #Holocaust #survivors imploring Mark Zuckerberg to remove Holocaust denial from #Facebook. Denying their suffering/loss is hate speech; there is #NoDenyingIt. Join them; share to remove! pic.twitter.com/kmpgq1KNuj
— Claims Conference (@ClaimsCon) July 29, 2020
Holocaust denial is the act of denying the Nazi genocide against Jews in World War II, and is considered a form of antisemitism.
One way to counter this form of disinformation is through education, which may include visits to memorial sites. For instance, the Auschwitz Memorial in Poland received 2,320,000 visitors  in 2019. Entrance to the museum and bus transport between the remains of the concentration camp and the nearby city of Oświęcim are free of charge to visitors.
The museum, which has over 900,000 Twitter followers, over 300,000 fans on Facebook and 80,000 on Instagram, uses social media to teach history.
Meta.mk recently reported on a survey about Holocaust knowledge in the United States, conducted by the Claims Conference, which showed that young people lack basic awareness about the Holocaust. A significant percentage of respondents also hold many erroneous beliefs, including those coinciding with Neo-Nazi propaganda.
The study revealed ignorance of key historical facts among those between 18 and 39 years of age; 63 percent of respondents did not know that six million Jews were murdered during the Holocaust, and 36 percent thought that “two million or fewer Jews” had been killed. Although there were more than 40,000 camps and ghettos in Europe during the Holocaust, 48 percent of US national survey respondents could not name a single one.
According to an Associated Press report, Facebook has said it already takes down “any post that celebrates, defends, or attempts to justify the Holocaust” or mocks its victims, because such posts usually violate many of the platform's existing standards against hate speech and incitement of violence.
In compliance with local laws, Facebook has been removing all Holocaust denial posts “in countries such as Germany, France and Poland where Holocaust denial is illegal.” Thus far, however, the social networking giant has not specifically added Holocaust denial to its worldwide standard for hate speech.
The infamous cynical phrase “Arbeit macht frei” (“Work sets you free” in German) at the entrance of the Auschwitz concentration camp in Oświęcim, Poland, now part of The Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum. Photo by Meta.mk/Bojan Blazhevski, used with permission.
In 2016, Facebook signed the European Union Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online. After the code's latest monitoring report on compliance, which was issued in June, showed that the company had highest rate of response in taking down notifications compared to other social media platforms, top Facebook officials expressed satisfaction with their progress in fighting hate speech.
Unlike Europe, where hate speech is a criminal offense in most of the countries that experienced the horrors of World War II, the US does not have such laws at the national level. However, social media platforms often adopt rules of conduct which ban hate speech, and many of them even go beyond the scope of law in their country of incorporation in order to ensure a safe environment.
These internal governance rules set by the online platforms tend to function as self-regulatory mechanisms for users. Facebook, for instance, encourages its users to report instances of prohibited behaviors, and content that violates its community standards:
Example of the use of Facebook's reporting system – in this case, of a post promoting Nazi propaganda. This option is available in the menu, under the link marked “…” at the top-right corner of each post.
By clicking the “I agree” button on the terms of reference, social media users enter into a contractual obligation with the platform, whereby they promise to obey those rules. Users can also help enforce the rules by reporting breaches instances — including hate speech — as defined by the platform. Facebook currently classifies as hate speech as:
Part of Facebook's reporting interface, which lays out the platform's criteria for categorizing content as hate speech.
These categories cover only part of the range of legal definitions of hate speech as a felony used in the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe, an international body founded after World War II to uphold human rights and democracy in the region. Nearly all European states belong to the group, save for Belarus (due to human rights concerns) and the Vatican (because of its status as a theocracy).
According to the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, “Hate speech covers all forms of expressions that spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance.” Sixteen European countries — as well as Israel — have specific laws against Holocaust denial. Many countries also have broader laws that criminalize genocide denial.
Article 407-A of the Criminal Code of Republic of North Macedonia, for example, states that those who “use information systems to publicly negate or severely minimize, approve or justify” acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, face prison sentences of one to five years. For those intending to incite hate, discrimination or violence against others based on national, ethnic or religious identity, the minimum prison sentence is four years. In the country's recent history, there have been no recorded cases of such a felony.
“To the memory of the men, women, and children who fell victim to the Nazi genocide. Here lie their ashes. May their souls rest in peace.” The plaque is located at the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum in Oświęcim, Poland. Photo by Meta.mk/Bojan Blazhevski, used with permission.
In addition to Holocaust denial, perpetrators of hate speech keep finding new ways to spread their messages, forcing human rights defenders and legislators to keep up.
In August, the Organization of the Jews in Bulgaria (Shalom) warned that far-right politicians were expanding their anti-Semitic language with new terms like “Sorosoids”, intended to label groups deemed “enemies of the state”. The term, based on misuse of the name of American philanthropist and Holocaust survivor George Soros, originated in neighboring North Macedonia as a populist propaganda tool for discrimination against civil society activists.
Editor's note: Global Voices is a grantee of Open Society Foundations, an international grantmaking network founded by George Soros.

author: Metamorphosis Foundation


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International conflicts are also about names: The case of Nagorno-Karabakh · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Photo of the mountains of Nagorno-Karabakh. Wikipedia, photo by Sonashen, used under licence CC BY-SA 3.0
On September 27, the two states of Azerbaijan and Armenia, located in the South Caucasus, reignited an armed conflict causing military and civilians deaths on all sides. The main reason for the conflict is the control over a territory enclave called Nagorno-Karabakh in English, which is under international law part of Azerbaijan but has been under the control of self-proclaimed ethnic Armenian authorities since 1994.
The enclave at the center of the conflict that has remained unsolved for over three decades is a mountainous area that for centuries had been inhabited by a mix of populations: Christian Armenians and Shia Azerbaijanis for the most part, as well as other groups such as Russians, Kurds, and Greeks.
As in all territories inhabited by different nations using various languages, in this case, Azerbaijanis speaking a Turkic language, Azerbaijani, and Armenians speaking an Indo-European language, Armenian, geographic names have more than one name. Besides, the area came under the political control of various colonial empires that added their language in the denomination of entities, in this case, this includes Persian, Turkish, and Russian.
The name mostly used in English is spelled Nagorno-Karabakh, which represents a mix of Russian, Turkic, and Persian terms. The first part, ‘Nagorno-’ or ‘Нагорно-‘ in Russian means literally ‘mountainous’, in a reference to the geography of the territory. Karabakh is the English rendering of two Turkic words, ‘kara’ which means black, and bağ, which means garden, but is itself a word of Persian origin widely used in all Turkic languages.
The term Nagorno-Karabakh comes from a Soviet administrative name, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, in Russian Нагорно-Карабахская автономная область that was created in 1923. This administrative entity covered part of what was also called in Russian, Mountainous Karabakh, Нагорный Карабах.
In Azerbaijani, the most common term used to describe the territory is spelled ‘Qarabağ’. In English, two terms are used to describe the population and the language: Azerbaijani and Azeri, but Azerbaijani is preferred as more official and respectful.
In Armenian, there are two terms referring to the territory. One is Ղարաբաղ, which is read Gharabagh, and is a reference to the same historical name of the territory used in Azerbaijani. The other term used is Արցախ, usually rendered in English as Artsakh, which is being promoted by the self-proclaimed authorities de facto in control of the territory politically and militarily, under the name of The Republic of Artsakh. The Republic of Artsakh has been recognized under this name by three other unrecognized territories, Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Armenia has not officially recognized it but provides political, economic, and military support to the Artsakh authorities, and has stated it would recognize it in case of further escalation.
The duality of names also applies to the capital city of the territory that is called Ստեփանակերտ in Armenian, rendered in English as Stepanakert. This name was adopted in 1923 by Soviet authorities to honor an Armenian Bolshevik hero, Stepan Shaumian. In Azerbaijani, this city is known as Xankəndi, usually spelled Khankendi in English.

author: Filip Noubel