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Despite ban, Telegram survives in Russia — but for how long? · Global Voices
Maxim Edwards

The paper aeroplane, symbol of the Telegram secure messaging app, over Moscow. Illustration by Tom Venner, used with permission.
The mayor of Khabarovsk was outraged when he saw the memes. On September 4, Sergey Kravchuk reported a little known Telegram channel to the police for mocking him and his colleagues. In doing so, he gave the channel named Vorsin Memes a boost; back then, it had just 114 subscribers. At the time of writing, the anonymous opposition channel has nearly 2,100. The more important point is that Kravchuk should never have been using the encrypted messaging service.
That's because Telegram is supposed to be banned in Russia. In June 2017 Roskomnadzor, the Russian state's communications watchdog, ordered Telegram to comply with a demand to hand over its encryption keys to the FSB, Russia's domestic security services. After Pavel Durov, founder of Telegram and the popular Russian social network VKontakte, refused to comply, a Moscow court ordered that Telegram be blocked (Durov had already fled Russia in 2014, after being made to sign over VKontakte to Kremlin-linked businesses.)
Then on April 18, 2018, Roskomnadzor ordered that Russia's internet service providers comply with the ban. A fiasco followed; by blocking IP addresses commonly used by the encrypted messaging app, dozens of other sites were affected. Users of online services provided by Google, Amazon, and Spotify among other tech giants reported outages. But it didn't end there; the websites of universities, media outlets, and even of Roskomnadzor itself all experienced disruption. Even the state-owned Sberbank sent instructions to its employees on how to evade the ban. At the end of that month, over 12,000 people attended a protest in Moscow against Roskomnadzor and in support of digital freedoms.
Over a year later, Telegram thrives in Russia, where it has approximately 14 million users. Roskomnadzor has unblocked the IP addresses which inconvenienced users of other online services. State officials use it with abandon; Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov freely admitted that he used the application, and Margarita Simonyan, manager of the avowedly pro-Kremlin news network RT, is an avid Telegram user. Russia's political elite still appear divided over the ban; in September, Russia's Ombudswoman for Human Rights Tatyana Moskalova even stated that she opposed it and urged “compromise” as a solution.
Compromise makes sense. In April, a study by TGStat revealed that 48% of the platform's users in Russia did not experience any issues with accessing Telegram, nor did they need to use VPNs or other techniques to do so. Only 5% said that they were completely unable to access Telegram, and the remainder did so with free or paid proxy servers or VPNs. What makes it so popular?
Since its creation in 2013, Telegram has come to offer more than private messaging. Its users can create public “channels” or newsfeeds where they can post updates to tens of thousands of subscribers. These channels cover everything from celebrity gossip and movies to language learning, fashion, and of course plentiful memes. Importantly, many Russian news publications now maintain their own Telegram channels.
And while Telegram might not be as secure as many believe it to be, the availability of end-to-end encryption for one-on-one chats (although this feature is not on by default), attracts influential bloggers, journalists, and political commentators with something critical to say, or who need to communicate with sources without an interception. These include blogger Ilya Varlamov, journalist Pavel Pryanikov, who runs the channel KrasnyZion, Pavel Chikov, director of the Russian human rights NGO Agora, MediaZona's Sergey Smirnov, Ekho Moskvy's Anton Orekh (who runs Antony Nut), the writer and columnist Oleg Kashin, and radio personality Aleksandr Plushchev (PLUSHEV). In 2017, Kashin and Plushchev attempted to sue the FSB for its attempts to demand Telegram's encryption keys. For Russia's opposition and for critically-minded journalists, the platform is more popular than the compromised VKontakte, where some users have been prosecuted for their political statements online.
Furthermore, the ability to run channels anonymously adds a certain intrigue to Telegram. The channel Nezygar, for example, has 250,000 subscribers and is the most hotly debated given the controversy over its owner's identity. The blogger StalinGulag, whose identity was unmasked by journalists in 2018, also runs a hugely popular channel. Some anonymous political channels present themselves as high-placed sources with exclusive political tips; thus a thriving Telegram rife with “black PR” is not necessarily an objective source of information. As an investigation by Proekt.Media in December 2018 revealed, since the ban the platform had been the focus of a concerted effort by pro-Kremlin spin doctors to infiltrate and discredit members of the opposition, spreading disinformation rapidly among channels and buying some channels out. As it turned out, Telegram was quite capable of achieving the former without the authorities’ help.
Much like other governments’ attempts to crack down on encrypted communication platforms, Russian officials such as FSB head Alexander Bortnikov have also sought to portray Telegram's refusal to play ball as a gift to terrorists. While there is evidence that the platform is used by far-right and Islamist extremists, this line has met short shrift by many RuNet users. The popular vlogger Ruslan Usachev remarked sarcastically:
Но стоит признать, что блокировка телеграма сработала. Я шел сегодня домой и по пути ни одного терроризма не встретил.
— Руслан Усачев (@RuslanUsachev) April 16, 2018
It's worth recognising that the blocking of Telegram has worked. I was walking home today and didn't meet a single terrorist on the way.
This cynicism about the motives for the block seems widely shared. As Andrey Pertsev wrote for Carnegie Moscow's website last April, the Telegram ban has politicised many Russians, as the state has intruded on a “grey zone” for public expression prized by many Russians who are not politically active. Rather than continuing with their gossip and memes, writes Pertsev, they are now actively sharing ways to avoid the ban — prompting them to discuss whether it is just. That is an important point in light of Russia's controversial drive towards a “Sovereign Internet,” which becomes law on November 1.
Read more: Russia's isolationist ‘sovereign internet’ bill worries experts and users alike
That means that Russia's Telegram ban is hard coded into a broader project to rein in the RuNet. Consequently, while Roskomnadzor officials appeared surprised at the force of public resistance to the ban, they are not giving up. On October 8, the organisation's head Alexander Zharov acknowledged that the old system of blocking was ineffective and announced that a new system was being engineered. “Within a year, we'll have something to tell you,” said Zharov. His colleagues at Russia's Ministry of Communications do not share this optimism; in comments the same month, deputy minister Alexey Volin questioned the efficiency of blocking and assured Russians that using Telegram is not in itself illegal.
An admission of defeat? Perhaps. Sarkis Darbinyan, manager of Roskomsvoboda, a Russian NGO campaigning for digital freedoms, told RuNet Echo that he is sceptical about the progress of the ban:
Неудача в деле блокировки Telegram – это, без сомнений, демонстрация правоприменительной импотенции российских властей. За прошедший год, что Telegram находится под запретом, стало очевидно, что Роскомнадзор и операторы связи абсолютно не готовы блокировать веб-сервисы и приложения, которая отказываются исполнять российские законы и сотрудничать с отечественными спецслужбами.  Думаю, одной из причин принятия в мае 2019 года Федерального закона № 90-ФЗ, также известного как “закон о суверенном интернете”, было желание лучше блокировать такие сервисы как Telegram.
Но мне кажется, это будет долгая игра в “кошки-мышки”. Сервисы будут продолжать заниматься постоянной ротацией IP-адресов, прятаться за инфраструктурой гигантов вроде Google и Amazon, а также  использовать возможности стеганографии для того чтобы мимикрировать свой трафик под что-то другое, что блокировать российские власти не решатся.
А пока будет продолжаться это техническое противостояние, я думаю ЕСПЧ уже рассмотрит и жалобу самого Telegram и жалобы пользователей мессенджера которые были поданы нами в рамках кампании “Битва за Telegram”. Я не сомневаюсь в успехе дела. Вопрос доступа к шифрованным коммуникациям и права человека на использование криптографии сейчас актуален не только для России, но и для всего Совета Европы. И если Россия откажется соблюдать международные стандарты и исполнять решения ЕСПЧ, все это может обернуться для российских властей негативными санкционными и дипломатическими проблемами.
The failure to block Telegram is, without a doubt, a demonstration of the impotence of the Russian authorities when it comes to enforcing their own directives. During the year which has passed after the ban on Telegram, it has become obvious that neither Roskomnadzor nor telecom operators are prepared to block web services and applications which refuse to comply with Russian law and cooperate with the secret services. I think one of the reasons for the adoption of Federal Law 90-FZ in May, also known as the ‘sovereign internet bill’, was the desire to more effectively block services such as Telegram.
It seems to me that it will be a long game of cat-and-mouse. Services will continue to constantly rotate their IP addresses, hide behind the infrastructure of tech giants such as Google and Amazon, and also use techniques like steganography to smuggle their traffic under the cover of something else which the Russian authorities would not dare to block.
In the meantime, this technical standoff will continue. I think that the ECHR [European Court of Human Rights] will consider both the complaints of Telegram itself and those of its users, submitted by us as part of our ‘Battle for Telegram‘ campaign. I have no doubt that we will be successful. The issue of access to encrypted communications and the human right to use encryption is an issue of relevance not just for Russia, but for the entire Council of Europe. If Russia does refuse to meet international standards and simply refuses to abide by the rulings of the ECHR, there could be negative consequences for the Russian authorities, from diplomatic problems to sanctions.
If Russia ever succeeds in its Telegram ban, it raises the question as to which social media networks will be in the authorities’ crosshairs next. After all, Facebook and Twitter have already refused to comply with Moscow's demands to host data on Russian users’ servers based in Russia.
Just how far is the Kremlin prepared to take on the tech giants for the sake of its “sovereign internet”?

author: Maxim Edwards


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Iran’s drive to block international services continues with Google Play ban · Global Voices
Small Media

Image by Small Media.
On 9 October, the Iranian judiciary sent a formal letter to telecommunications service providers ordering them to block the Google Play, Google's official app store, “as soon as possible”.
The letter was signed by Javad Javidnia, who serves as both Iran’s Deputy Prosecutor General responsible for Cyberspace, and the Secretary for the Committee for Determining Instances of Criminal Content (CDICC). This move is consistent with the authorities’ strategy to push Iranian internet users to use home-grown Iranian apps and services while limiting the availability of international services.
Since the appointment two years ago of Mohammad-Javad Azari Jahromi as ICT Minister, the drive to complete the country's National Information Network (SHOMA) has been a key government priority. Although part of this project entails the much-needed expansion and improvement of Iran’s internet infrastructure, another key pillar is the rapid localisation —and in essence, nationalisation – of digital content and services.
Practically, Jahromi’s policies seek to drive Iranian internet users to migrate to domestically produced (and domestically hosted) versions of apps and online services. The danger in this is that through a lack of alternatives, Iranian users are being channelled toward local services that are far more vulnerable to government surveillance, censorship and the mishandling of personal data than many globally utilised online services. The decision to block access to Google Play bears the hallmarks of this agenda.
Iran’s domestic messaging apps
Soroush, a local messaging and social media app, is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). Iranians can only register their Soroush accounts to their Iranian SIM cards, This represents a threat to users’ privacy since in Iran all SIM cards in Iran must be registered to a national ID and residential address.
Bisphone is another service with ties to the Iranian government.  Research has shown Bisphone data is stored with the Telecommunication Company of Iran, which is known to be partly owned by Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
Despite Jahromi’s promises to introduce clear and comprehensive data protection regulations to mitigate existing privacy shortcomings, the proposed Data Protection and Privacy Bill that was announced in July 2018 is yet to materialise. Jahromi’s rhetoric on digital rights may differ from those of other political elites, which has occasionally led to public disagreements — his ministry, for instance, previously made public statements against filtering and data localisation policies — but the push for the use of domestic apps in Iran continues.
Given the increasing improvement in the relationship between Jahromi and the Iranian Parliament, and the body’s broad acquiescence to many of the rights-infringing policies emanating from the ICT Ministry, it seems possible that a consensus has also emerged in the legislature in support of the localisation agenda. This is a worrying development, as given the lack of any transparent and accountable processes for filtering decisions, elected official have limited opportunity to scrutinise or intervene in major filtering decisions. MPs who claim to support citizens’ rights must start to speak out when incidents such as this occur, and demand accountability.
In sum, the recent order to ban Google Play must be viewed in the context of Iranian authorities’ aggressive push to corral Iranian users into using domestic services and technologies whose data protection protocols are essentially non-existent. The policies designed by the ICT Ministry and the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, and implemented by the Judiciary, critically undermine the safety and privacy of Iranian users by stripping them of the ability to use secure and tested global services.
Iranian users must have the right to choose online tools that can keep their data secure. As long as users are forced to use domestic alternatives, their right to privacy remains in peril.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Small Media


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Soon Bangladesh’s capital may have two more reasons to complain about the traffic · Global Voices
পান্থ রহমান রেজা (Pantha)

The construction of Metro rail is underway in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. Photo by Sharifuzzaman Aayan. Used under CC BY-SA 5.1 license.
Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, has long been known for its traffic woes. The ongoing 20km long MRT line 6 project is expected to solve the crippling traffic jams that occur throughout the city on a daily basis. But this project, which is meant to alleviate the city's congestion problems, has brought on an increasing list of commuter headaches.
Construction-related traffic has literally brought the city to a standstill. After the government announced plans to construct two more MRT lines before the original MRT line 6 is completed, Dhaka's citizens took to social media to voice their bitter frustration.
The construction of the first Metrorail (MRT Line 6) started in Dhaka in 2016 and its completion has been delayed till 2021.
The construction sites have aggravated the traffic situation, narrowing the available roads. In some places, half of the road width has been closed, bringing traffic to a crawl with many waiting in their cars for hours. The construction itself is also producing a large amount of dust and creating noise pollution.
Abdul Awal, a reader, mentions the sufferings in the comments section of an article in the Daily Prothom Alo:
এক মেট্রোরেলের কাজের জন্য জ্যামে বসে থাকতে থাকতে পশ্চাৎদেশ যে পরিমান ঘা হয়েছে তা শুকাতে শুকাতেই আরও কয়েক বছর লাগবে, তার উপর আরও দুইটা!!! এই জীবনে আর ঘা শুকানো হচ্ছে না বস!!!
The back pain I suffered waiting in traffic for the construction of the first Metro line will take years to heal. You are saying two more!! I will never be healed in my life!!
In the Facebook page of Prothom Alo, a reader named Raisa Mallick writes:
জ্যামে জীবন শেষ, বাংলার মানুষ মুক্তি চায়, দয়া করে মেট্রোরেল প্রকল্পের কাজ শেষ করেন, আর নতুন কিছু উদ্ভোদন করেন না, মতিঝিল থেকে মিরপুরে যাওয়া আসা করতে সময় লাগে ৫ থেকে ৬ ঘন্টা, আপনারাতো সিগনাল দিয়ে রাস্তা বন্ধ করে চলেন, সাধারণ মানুষের কি পরিমান কষ্ট হয় বুঝেন না।
People are suffering a lot for the traffic jams, the people want respite, please finish the first Metrorail project, and do not start anything new before that. It takes up to 5-6 hours to commute from Motijheel to Mirpur. The lawmakers commute with special clearance, you won't understand our pain.
Due to the construction of the Metrorail, traffic in Dhaka has been aggravated. Photo by Aktar Ahsan. From Flickr, published under a Creative Commons license.
The construction of the additional two metro rails will definitely increase traffic congestion in Dhaka. Ayub Rahman requested:
মাফ চাই। আর না।
যা শুরু করছেন তা আগে শেষ করেন!
We don't want the quantities,
we want quality
Forgive us. No more!
Finish what you are starting!
We don't want the quantities,
we want quality
Some also suggested an alternative to additional Metrorails to reduce traffic jams in Dhaka. Ashfaqul Arefin writes:
[…] জ্যাম কমাতে হলে কয়েক স্তরের যোগাযোগ ব্যবস্থা চালু করতে হবে: সড়ক, মেট্রোরেল এবং পানিপথ। ঢাকার শহরের ম্যাপ দেখলে বুঝতে পারবেন যে, ঢাকার লেক গুলোকে জায়গায় জায়গায় একটু সংযোগ করে দিতে পারলে ধানমন্ডি থেকে গুলশান পর্যন্ত পানিপথেও যাতায়াত করা যাবে, পথে পড়বে কলাবাগান, কাওরানবাজার, হাতিরপুল, তেজগাঁও, নয়াটোলা, মীরবাগ, রামপুরা, বাড্ডা, মহাখালী ও নিকেতন। ফলে চাপ কমবে সড়ক ও মেট্রোরেলের উপর।
[…] To reduce the jam, several levels of communication need to be introduced: roads, metro rails and waterways. Looking at the map of the city of Dhaka, you can understand that if you can connect the lakes of Dhaka, you can travel from Dhanmondi to Gulshan by water stopping at different places. As a result, the traffic will be reduced on roads and metro rails.
Dhaka megacity has an estimated population of 19.84 million people. Photo by Ahnaf Saber. Used under CC BY-SA 5.1 license.
Offices, courts, businesses, employments, educations, medical care — everything in the country is concentrated in the capital of Dhaka. The lack of development activities in the cities outside Dhaka is noticeable. Whether it's for a suitable job or better medical services, people have to come to Dhaka. A reader named Akhtaruzzaman mentions one of his untimely losses after not receiving medical treatment in a city outside Dhaka:
সবকিছুই দরকারি, সাস্থ খাতে উন্নয়ন খুব জরুরী হয়ে পড়েছে। আমার চাচা স্ট্রোক করার পর দেখলাম কোন জেলা শহরে চিকিৎসা নাই বাধ্য হয়ে ঢাকায় নিয়ে এসে দেখি তার গোল্ডেন আওয়ার অনেক আগেই শেষ হয়ে গেছে । মেট্রোরেল দরকার তার চাইতে বেশি দরকার প্রত্যেক জেলা শহরে specialized হসপিটাল ।
Everything is required. But first, the development in the health sector is urgently required. After my uncle suffered from a stroke, the nearby cities did not have proper medical care for his complex case. After searching all, being forced to come all the way to Dhaka for medical treatment, I found out that it was too late for him. Before Metro rail, we need specialized hospitals in every district city.
Azhar Alam suggests setting up factories in the districts outside Dhaka:
এতো টাকা ব্যায় মেট্রোরেলে না করে ঢাকার বাইরের জেলা গুলোতে এই টাকা ব্যায় করে শিল্প কারখানা গড়ে তুললে মানুষ ঢাকামূখী কম হবে আর কর্মসংস্থানও বাড়বে।
Without spending this much money on Metro rail, investing the money in the factories in districts outside Dhaka will increase the employment and people will not end up in Dhaka.

author: পান্থ রহমান রেজা (Pantha)


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The struggle of the Bolivian feminist chola is now online · Global Voices
Fabiola Gutiérrez

Drawing by Adolfo Alba for Revista Rascacielos magazine (number 13, 2019). Image used with permission.
Cholas are the indigenous women of Andean Bolivia who have their hair styled in two long braids, wear a bowler hat, a blanket (or aguayo, a multicolored woolen cloth to carry something on their backs), and multifold skirt with layers of petticoats underneath.
What is the chola's place in Bolivia? How are Bolivian cholas presented in the media? How does academia talk about them? Do they participate in fashion shows? What about electronic parties? What political positions are available to them since Bolivia has had its first indigenous president for more than a decade?
To all these questions, Bolivian feminist chola Yolanda Mamani replies: “being chola is in fashion.” At the end of 2015, she began blogging and in 2019 that blog spun off into a YouTube channel called “Chola Bocona”, or loud-mouthed chola in Spanish. In videos posted on this channel, as if she were a primary school teacher or a broadcaster, Yolanda analyzes, with a feminist surgeon's precision, the role of cholas in Bolivian society.
Yolanda says at the 1:00 minute mark of her first YouTube video:
Cuando yo peleaba por mis derechos, mis empleadores me decían: “¿Por qué eres una bocona? ¿Por qué eres una imilla bocona? ¿Por qué no te callas cuando yo hablo? Yo te pago, tú tienes que escuchar, no puedes decir nada”. Por eso decidí reivindicar esa palabra. Sí, soy chola bocona. De no ser bocona, no estaría aquí contando mi historia.
When I was fighting for my rights, my employers used to tell me: “Why are you a loud-mouth? Why are you a loud-mouthed imilla (girl)? Why don't you keep silent when I speak? I pay you, you have to listen, you cannot say anything.” That's why I decided to claim that word. Yes, I am chola bocona. If I were not loud-mouthed, I would not be here telling my story.
Imilla means “girl” in the Aymara language and can also be used as a derogatory term. Bocona is a person who talks a lot and demands too much. The “demanding girl” was how her employers called Yolanda when she was a domestic worker and fought for her rights of keeping to her work hours, wearing traditional garments, going to school, accessing social benefits, or going to college.
In the video, Yolanda recounts how the image of the chola has become popular while their philosophy of life was discredited. Cholas are invited to participate in politics, but their opinions or projects are not taken into consideration, at the same time as their image serves to boost politicians’ image and validate their candidacies.
She also talks about how in the entertainment contexts, such as fashion shows or parties that promote fusing the Andean with the electronic style, the cholas are folklorized, since their participation is limited to dances as embellishments. She describes that any activity that cholas do outside of domestic work is regarded as news, such as being legislators, public officials, skateboarding or launching a YouTube channel, like she did. Yolanda also claims that the academy has an external and superficial perspective on cholas.
Photograph by Eduardo Montaño. Used with permission.
“There are women who use the skirt for convenience,” Yolanda writes in “The ladies who disguise themselves” post on her blog. She asks them why they use the pollera (skirt) for fashion or to access public offices and not to be sweepers or domestic workers. Given the use of the skirt as a costume, Yolanda emphasizes that, for her, the true meaning of being chola is to fight.
Yolanda also explains what it means for cholas to braid their hair, barter, and participate in planting and harvesting. She talks about the harmony that such customs create in the cholas’ community, but also how they are affected by sexism, the desire to whitewash them and the consumerist vision of development.
She explains in her blog that braiding hair is a time for women to talk and look at each other, and brushing the hair is a way to get rid of the pain. Because of the importance of braids, cutting a woman's braid is a form of public punishment (for example, for adultery, for which there are no consequences for men).
In the blog post “Sowing and harvesting, an ideological encounter,” she explains that these activities represent a space in the community where locals and migrants come together, and where men and women, on an equal level, talk about politics and learn about national and international news. This space is unlike assemblies, where hierarchy rules and women are laughed at when they dare to speak.
Another blog post explains that bartering allowed for the exchange of food between farmers, but that now there are also merchants who participate in bartering by bringing expired canned foods. They cheat by providing spoiled products that make the community sick, and in return take the best of the crops.
Drawing by Valentina Vilaseca for the Skyscraper Magazine (number 13, 2019). Used with permission.
Yolanda Mamani writes and speaks in the first person. She is, first of all, a chola, but also a member of the Mujeres Creando (“Women Creating”) feminist movement, a sociology student, manager of the Chola Bocona vlog and of the Ser chola está de moda (“Being chola is in fashion”) blog. She is also the producer of Warminyatiawinkapa (in Aymara, meaning “The Women's News”), a program broadcast on Fridays by Radio Deseo of Mujeres Creando in La Paz city.
The same radio station also broadcast the “Trabajadora del hogar con orgullo y dignidad” (‘Housekeeper with pride and dignity’) program produced by Yolanda together with two colleagues from the Home Workers’ Union of Sopocachi. They, along with other women, had taken a radio training course offered by Mujeres Creando.
When Yolanda Mamani was reporting for her first radio program, she decided to cover the VIII March by the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure in Spanish, or TIPNIS, as it is usually referred to), the indigenous territory and national park in the Bolivian northeast through which a controversial construction of an interoceanic highway has been planned. That experience motivated her to study sociology.
Yolanda Mamani, whose mother tongue is Aymara, learned Spanish when, aged 11, she moved to Bolivia's capital La Paz city to live with an aunt who made her work as a nanny in exchange for lodging. She had to be employed for 12 years as a domestic worker and in that house she worked for 11 years. She received less than 50 USD per month and had no social benefits. She demanded to go to school and was fired when she wanted to go to university. When she was a child, her father took her to school on an hour and a half-ride on a donkey. Yolanda was born in Warisata, 15 kilometers off the east coast of Lake Titicaca.
Yolanda's life is marked by the struggle to be a chola who goes to school, migrates to the city, learns Spanish, is a domestic worker, does not give up wearing pollera, goes to college, unionizes, is active in politics as a feminist, goes to university, is a broadcaster and is now a feminist YouTuber chola. Whatever her next step may be, this loud-mouthed chola will continue to provide us with thinking in the first person, analyzing the spaces of power and sharing our findings. Not surprisingly, she ends her videos by saying: “The world is not possible without loud-mouths.”
About Bolivian cholas
Cholas are the most promoted Bolivian cultural icon. Historically, they have been discriminated against: from being excluded from political participation in their communities, through the prohibition of using public spaces or transportation, to domestic work—as one of their few job opportunities when they migrate to cities—in conditions of slavery, exploitation, and sexual, physical and psychological violence by their employers. In fact, giving up wearing their traditional clothing is one of the forced strategies through which they can access better opportunities.
Currently, after at least 60 years of social struggle, cholas’ place in society has gone from systematic marginalization to efforts to valorize them. However, they still have fewer opportunities than non-indigenous women to exercise their rights to access education, health, justice and decent employment, among others.
Although colonialist forms still persist today, such as enslaving them, erasing them from the social scene and demanding that they do not dress like cholas, it is possible to see them as legislators, public officials, journalists and television hosts, businesswomen, teachers, university students, carpenters, chauffeurs, policewomen, actresses and models. Such roles are cause for news, which confirms the multiple levels of discrimination that still exist.

author: Fabiola Gutiérrez


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One of the few certainties of the Chilean crisis is the shadow of the past · Global Voices
Carlos Castillo

A protest at Plaza Baquedano in Santiago, Chile in October 2019. Photo by Carlos Figueroa via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)
In the midst of the turmoil that Chile is currently experiencing with the protests, arson attacks and looting, social networks have played an active role in providing up-to-the-minute information on events that traditional media cannot easily cover. Often, however, the information transmitted through these very networks has proven to be an impediment to the movement toward a definitive solution to the conflict, as users fall into an ideological utilitarianism and the subjectivity that results from it, which has ended up as misinformation.
“Better times”, the slogan adopted by President Sebastián Piñera during the presidential campaign that propelled him for a second time to the La Moneda presidential palace, are far from being realised in the long, narrow strip of territory Chileans know as their country. Since Piñera began his second term as president (the first was from 2010 until 2014) the prospects for his mandate have looked complicated; there’s a sense of gloom and uncertainty about whether he can halt the negative scenario developing with regard to the image a large portion of the citizenry has of him—as an icon of the Chilean right allied to the Pinochet dictatorship which exercised power for 17 years.
In the midst of the chain of events that started with the massive fare-dodging campaign in protest at the increase in the price of metro tickets, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram and others have become such essential channels for people needing various kinds of public service information (for example, which bus and subway lines are running, which pharmacies and supermarkets are open, traffic detours, etc.) that they have also ended up creating a climate of radical polarization based on ambiguous information unconfirmed by official media or fact, and not clearly attributed to any particular group or organization.
This last point is where the dialectic of good and evil has reached its peak in worn-out Santiago de Chile—capital and epicenter of the demonstrations and riots—as well as in other major cities where a state of emergency and curfew was imposed.
From the point of view of the radical right, what is happening in Chile is terrorism at its finest, orchestrated by external agents, in which some see the invisible hand of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro encouraging the protests from the shadows with the help of local political parties sympathetic to his Bolivarian ideology. In fact, there's a video circulating among Chileans in which Maduro refers to the Sao Paulo Forum, an event attended by certain Chilean leftist parties last July, and in which Maduro says that everything is going “according to plan.” It’s a conspiracy theory that was put forward by the Organization of American States (OAS), and has proven so persisten that even the president's own wife, Cecilia Morel, posted an audio file on WhatsApp which suggested that there were foreign interests seeking to destabilize the country, or even an alien invasion.
The other side of the coin has been the evocation by the most aggressive leftists of the darkest years of the military dictatorship and the horrific crimes of the past. For them, the mere presence of the military evokes tragic memories of human rights violations. The sound of military boots tramping in the streets is an assault on the dignity and humanity of the protestors, a sense of repression that has been fed by numerous multimedia posts offering accounts of the mysterious disappearances of civilians and robberies perpetrated by the police. So great is the fear of the actions of the special forces that there’s been a rumour circulating about a torture center being set up in Baquedano, one of the main stations in Santiago's metro system, that was only recently quashed by the Public Prosecutor.
From the perspective of these two extreme positions, the truth exists only on their own side and the existence of contradictory evidence is an illusion. But despite attempts by both sides to show that they are discerning and exclusive, there is one point on which they concur and which neither disputes: that this moment resembles and evokes memories of the '70s and the last days of Salvador Allende's government, which was brutally overthrown in a military coup in 1973.
The bombing on September 11, 1973, of La Moneda (presidential palace) in Santiago de Chile during the coup d'etat. Image from the website of Political History of the Library of the Chilean National Congress via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 3.0 cl)
There have been shouts and proclamations against these methods of order and security recycled from the era of the Popular Unity, the political coalition led by Allende that ruled Chile before the coup d'etat. There has, for instance, been a rumour disseminated through social networks of actions that replicated the truckers’ strike of 1973. Back then, the truckers called for a strike to protest the abuse of toll prices on urban and interurban highways. The rumor caused such a stir that the president of the National Confederation of Cargo Transport, Sergio Pérez, was forced to make a public statement on Twitter to clarify that the rumor was unfounded.
One of the few certainties of this hectic moment in the history of Chile is that the past still touches us—and the end of the road is shrouded in a darkness that obscures the path we need to follow in order to reach it.

author: Carlos Castillo


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Yugoslavia wasn’t a Soviet ally—so why does that misconception persist in Western media? · Global Voices
Filip Stojanovski

A Yugoslav Partisans celebration featuring Josip Broz Tito with the flags of all their allies: the USA, the USSR, and the UK; as well as portraits of allied leaders (out of frame) Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill. Vis, Croatia, 9 November 1944. Photo: znaci.net, public domain.
While reporting on the ratification of the protocol for North Macedonia's NATO accession in the US Congress on October 22, US website The Hill incorrectly asserted that Yugoslavia was an ally of the Soviet Union. This historical fallacy, frequently found in Western media, is considered an offensive stereotype by many citizens of post-Yugoslav countries.
The Hill is an influential publication in Washington DC and is read by top decision-makers in the United States. In fact, the article in question was tweeted by former US vice president, Senator Joe Biden.
I strongly support the Senate's approval of North Macedonia's NATO membership. The countries of the Western Balkans deserve to be part of a Europe whole, free and at peace and we should be supporting Euro-Atlantic integration across the region. https://t.co/UUyOWL20z7
— Joe Biden (@JoeBiden) October 24, 2019
While the article is accurate for the most part, its background section includes the following sentence:
Previously part of Soviet ally Yugoslavia, North Macedonia, was formally invited by NATO in July 2018 to start accession talks and 22 countries have since ratified its accession.
For most of its existence, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was not a Soviet ally – on the contrary, its independence from both the Eastern and the Western blocs was a key feature of its national identity.
Yugoslavia was established in 1943 at the height of the Second World War by the Yugoslav Partisans, the communist-led anti-fascist resistance which was supported by the Allies. While they received assistance from the US, the UK, and the USSR, the Yugoslav Partisans liberated large portions of the Axis-occupied country on their own. It was only in this broader sense that Yugoslavia was a formal ally of the Soviet Union – alongside all the other allies.
After the war, the relations between the two communist parties deteriorated. By 1948, the Yugoslavs renounced Stalinism in order to create a distinct form of socialism. And between 1948 and 1955, during the Informbiro period, Yugoslavia was in direct opposition with the Soviets, to the point of preparing to fight off an invasion by the Warsaw Pact.
German soldiers passing by anti-fascist graffiti “Long live our allies: USSR, England, America!” after they temporarily re-occupied the Croatian island of Hvar on 2 April 1944. Source: znaci.net, public domain.
As evidenced by information released by John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Yugoslavia heavily relied on US aid during the post-war period — for example, by receiving food supplies from the United States Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which prevented mass famine in 1945. For part of its history, the US bestowed on Yugoslavia the status of the “most privileged nation” in trade, which boosted the Balkan country’s economic growth.
A map of Europe with the Iron Curtain (black lines) by Wikipedia, CC BY-SA.
As part of its balancing act between the blocs, Yugoslavia was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Unlike East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, it was on the western side of the Iron Curtain, the so-called line dividing the Soviet-dominated zone from the rest of Europe.
The incorrect assertion that equates Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union has popped up from time to time in Western media, mostly in its right-wing sphere. When intentional, it's constituent of a modern-day Red Scare discourse which degrades the reputation of political actors from the region. That discourse is usually aimed at conservative Western audiences who are still sensitive to “the communist threat.”
For instance, in October 2015, The Hill published an article by a lobbyist paid by VMRO-DPMNE, a Kremlin-friendly nationalist party that ruled North Macedonia from 2006 to 2017,  that attempts to smear its pro-EU and pro-NATO opponents as pro-Russian. It says that Macedonia was “a former Soviet bloc country” whose “domestic opposition party, SDSM, is led by Zoran Zaev, the successor to the former ruling communist party during the Cold War.”
A 2016 article in the same publication, loaded with narratives pandering to right-wing concerns about migration, misrepresented Zaev as a “culprit” for Balkan instability and “the head of the Russia-leaning SDSM Socialist Party.”
This language speaks to conservative mainstream audiences in the West, for whom the term “socialist” is loaded with negative connotations and is inherently associated with the USSR and, by extension, Russia. However, that language finds no bearing in North Macedonia itself. SDSM stands for Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, and its center-left platform is explicitly pro-NATO and pro-European. Proof of that is Zaev's signing of the Prespa Agreement in 2018, which ended a historic name dispute with Greece, and whose primary outcome would be North Macedonia's accession to NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, an actual Socialist Party was a member of the VMRO-DPMNE coalition of populist nationalists, which spanned the political spectrum.
Besides its fallaciousness, equating Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union or its bloc is seen by many former Yugoslavs as a negative stereotype. Almost three decades after the breakup of the federation in 1992, the independence from the Soviet Union is still a marker of pride for many citizens of the post-Yugoslav countries. When challenged, people from the region will often go into passionate discussions to defend the uniqueness of the Yugoslav socialist experience, with its openness to the West, freedom to travel and work abroad, and a relatively high standard of living.
Some ex-Yugoslavs who have had the chance to visit the Soviet Bloc at that time will brag, with some degree of arrogance, that “we were like Americans to them!” They at times ignore the fact that some of those formerly downtrodden countries, like EU members Estonia and Poland, have made advances inconceivable in the modern-day Western Balkans.
The debate goes well beyond quarrels over coffee or beer. Passions flare up the highest when ex-Yugoslavs are put in the same basket as other Central and Eastern Europeans by political figures. A case in point was when UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt incorrectly characterized Slovenia as “a Soviet vassal state” during a visit to Ljubljana in February 2019, a gaffe that caused fierce reactions by the Slovene public, and beyond.
Yugoslavia was not behind the iron curtain. Yugoslavia was not behind the iron curtain. Yugoslavia was not behind the iron curtain. Yugoslavia was not behind the iron curtain. Yugoslavia was not behind the iron curtain. (repeat ad libitum) https://t.co/8RIYABloQV
— Tena Prelec (@tenaprelec) February 23, 2019
Similar online outbursts transpired when, in July 2017, the American journalist Joy Reid, who is considered left-leaning, mistakenly confused the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia while discussing the national origins of the wives of US President Donald Trump. Even though she tweeted a correction soon after, the fallout has lasted for years.
Yugoslavia was never a part of the Soviet Union, and during the Tito years very heavily opposed Soviet influence.
This is precisely why one needs to be by default skeptical of journalists and be changed of the skepticism solely on the merit of the veracity of arguments https://t.co/PrJotSOrsI
— sid (@SuspiciouslySid) March 28, 2019
In May 2018, a Business Insider article about a conspiracy theory that Melania Trump is a Russian spy misrepresented Slovenia's history, again drawing angry reactions:
Slovenia was a part of Yugoslavia until that country broke apart. Never a part of the Soviet Union or Russia. Where was the editor for this story? I trust the reporter has been fired for incompetence.
— Evan (@EvaninScotland) May 18, 2018
Another example occurred in sports journalism: in October 2018, an article on the history of Croatian-American soccer by the website Protagonist Soccer was quickly corrected after a reader alerted the publication that Croatia was never part of the Soviet Union:
Thank you for this piece on Croatian soccer. Please make one correction. Yugoslavia was not a “Soviet nation.” It was a communist state, but was never part of the Soviet Union. I would like to RT your article, but don't want the focus to be on this point. Many thanks.
— Luka Misetic (@MiseticLaw) October 26, 2018

author: Filip Stojanovski


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From camps to prisons: Xinjiang’s next great human rights catastrophe · Global Voices
Gene Bunin

Ethnic Kazakhs from Xinjiang hold up photos of their sentenced relatives.
Just a little over a decade ago, the facility on 1327 Dongzhan Road, a few kilometers north of the forlorn freight station in the northern outskirts of Xinjiang’s Urumqi, was mostly trees and grass. On September 16, 2009, it officially became the new location of the Xinjiang Women’s Prison, a move that came on the heels of the infamous July 5 riots, and it wouldn’t be long before the facility received what would become its first high-profile inmate – the writer, website moderator, and government employee Gulmire Imin, sentenced to life in a closed trial.
Despite continued international attention, Imin saw no concessions in the years that followed, but has instead been joined by other women whose modest biographies are in stark contrast with the gravity of their sentences. One of them, Buzeynep Abdureshit, a 27-year-old whose only possible “crimes” were having studied in Egypt and having a husband abroad, was sentenced to seven years in 2017 for “assembling a crowd to disturb social order”. Then, in the June of this year, the prison became home to Nurzada Zhumaqan and Erlan Qabden – both ethnic Kazakh women in their fifties, both with health issues, and both having committed no identifiable crime. Their prison terms? 20 and 19 years, respectively.
Guards at a registration booth of the women’s prison in Urumqi. (source: “Xinjiang Prison Discipline Inspection and Supervision” WeChat account.)
Their barbarian nature aside, these more recent sentences are particularly worrying as they indicate the likely direction in which the repressions in Xinjiang are now heading. While most of the world’s attention has been focused on the region’s “re-education” camps, the government’s own statistics, some limited reporting, and new evidence presented by victims’ relatives and former detainees in neighboring Kazakhstan all suggest that an incredible number of those detained in 2017 and 2018 are now being given lengthy sentences and transferred to major prisons, such as the one in Urumqi.
For Aibota Zhanibek, the older of Nurzada Zhumaqan’s daughters and now Kazakhstan citizen, the news was especially heartbreaking as it came around the New Year – a time when many in Kazakhstan were learning that their relatives had been let out of camps in the wave of mass releases in late December 2018. While many shared the good news, Zhanibek would learn that her mother had been sentenced to prison on charges later revealed as “using superstition to undermine law enforcement” and “assembling a crowd to disturb social order”. Erlan Qabden, a nurse from another county of the same prefecture as Zhumaqan, was sentenced for “using extremism to undermine law enforcement” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble”, charges that – according to her relatives in Kazakhstan – stem from her attending a flagraising ceremony with a headscarf on.
The official incarceration notice for Erlan Qabden (with corresponding English translation by the author).
At the office of the Atajurt Kazakh Human Rights organization in Almaty, where Zhanibek appears weekly to appeal for her mother on camera, the majority of those who come to testify and appeal no longer talk of camps – as was the case a year ago – but of prisons. Though fragmentary and corrupted by hearsay, the information obtained from talking to just a dozen or so of the appealing parties is sufficient to start noticing the trends: the long sentences, the months or even years of pre-trial detention, and the particular targeting of religious men.
A statistical profiling of the victims – sourced from thousands of public video testimonies gathered by Atajurt and parsed by the Xinjiang Victims Database – makes it possible to corroborate some of the qualitative observations in a more quantitative manner. A comparison of victims reported to have received prison sentences with those reported released from camp shows that over 90% of the sentenced are men (cf., 69% of the released), with almost 75% believed to be detained for religious reasons (cf., 27%). An analysis of 311 victims with reported prison terms shows an average sentence of 11.2 years, with 89% of the sentenced given a term of 5 years or longer, while a study of 65 victims detained for 2 months or longer shows that, for these victims, the average pre-sentence detention was approximately 9 months, with over 30% held for a year or longer.
A comparison of gender and detention-reason distributions for Kazakh victims who have been sentenced to prison vs. Kazakh victims who were released from camp. (source: Xinjiang Victims Database, accessed on September 17, 2019)
The reported prison terms of victims who have been sentenced in Xinjiang since late 2016. (source: Xinjiang Victims Database, accessed on September 17, 2019)
Durations that victims spent in prolonged detention, of 2 months or longer, prior to being sentenced. (source: Xinjiang Victims Database, accessed on September 17, 2019)
Many of the sentenced are believed to be transferred to prisons following a stay in a pre-trial detention center (kanshousuo) – a notoriously abused institution where former detainees have reported extreme mistreatment and horrible living conditions. However, a number of eyewitness accounts give strong reason to believe that those interned extralegally in the region’s “re-education” camps are also being sentenced, while still in the camps. Four Kazakh ex-detainees, having spent the majority of 2018 in camps, all talked of either witnessing or hearing about “open court sessions” inside the “schools”. Two of them, Ergali Ermek and a detainee who – choosing anonymity – will be called “Ruslan”, both said that it was those who were sentenced to 10 years or more that were later bussed off to real prisons. One known case is that of Zhiger Toqai, a student at the Satbayev University in Almaty, whose detention was initially reported by relatives in Kazakhstan and whose sentence was confirmed by Ruslan, his former cellmate at the camp. In a recently published interview, Rahima Senbai recalls an open court where seven women were sentenced for observing iftar.
University student Zhiger Toqai, arrested in the summer of 2017, was first sent to a camp, then sentenced to over 10 years in prison in 2018 (as confirmed by both his relatives and those who were in camp with him).
For the ill and elderly, the long prison terms appear tantamount to death sentences, shattering not only the morale of relatives abroad but also all pretenses of a legitimate penal system in Xinjiang. However, inherent in such illegitimacy is also hope, as without a solid foundation and convincing arguments the absurd sentences may be more easily repealed and the inmates released – a phenomenon already noted with the extralegal camps. The stories of Ergali Ermek and Ruslan – both of whom were sentenced but later released anyway – seem to hint at this already, as does the case of Gulbahar Haitiwaji, who was allegedly sentenced to 7 years in December 2018 but allowed to return to France just recently. With sufficient international pressure and condemnation, it is not impossible that even the Xinjiang Women’s Prison see its gates pried open, allowing those like Buzeynep Abdureshit, Nurzada Zhumaqan, and Erlan Qabden to once more enjoy a certain degree of freedom. And perhaps even those like Gulmire Imin.

author: Gene Bunin


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Angolan president’s reforms drive positive impact on media — but limits persist · Global Voices
Liam Anderson

A group of Angolan reporters and cameramen await former US Secretary of State John Kerry as he tours a General Electric facility in the Sonils compound in the Port of Luanda, May 4, 2014. Photo by US State Department, public domain.
This story is the first in a two-part series on limited reforms introduced under João Lourenço (JLO) that affect media freedom and activism in Angola. You can read the second part here.
Rafael Marques de Morais is a prominent Angolan journalist, anti-corruption activist and long-time government critic. Under the regime of president José Eduardo dos Santos (“JES”), who ruled Angola from 1979 to 2017, Marques was continuously harassed by the authorities for his work. While working at government-owned Jornal de Angola in the 1990s, he faced pressure for “injecting unwelcome social commentary.”
It wasn't until João Lourenço (“JLO”) succeeded JES in 2017 that journalists like de Morais began to see political reforms that helped improve the environment for media and press freedoms. These reforms, however, mainly tackled corruption. While media freedoms have apparently improved, limits from the former regime persist.
In 2019, Morais said in an interview that he lost count of how many times he had been detained since the 90s, among other obstacles.
In 1999, he wrote, “The Lipstick of the Dictatorship” (“O ‘Bâton’ da Ditadura”), an article criticizing corruption and the devastating war, and was then detained on charges of defaming the president. Appalling detention conditions and abuses such as sleep deprivation pushed him to stage a hunger strike, which gained international support. He was released after 40 days, but then received a six-month suspended sentence and a fine.
In 2015, Marques faced prosecution for defamation, for writing the 2011 book “Blood Diamonds: Corruption and Torture in Angola,“ published in Portugal, later released online. It documents in detail rights violations relating to mining operations. All charges were eventually dropped.
He was also put under surveillance. In 2013, he discovered that his computer was bugged by malware “which international experts linked to a multinational with strong ties to Angolan military officials.” The news and anti-corruption website he launched, called Maka Angola — “Maka,” in Kimbundu language, “refers to “a delicate, complex or serious problem”, i.e. corruption and poverty — faced numerous cyberattacks, such as denial of service attacks.
Rafael Marques de Morais, co-recipient of the Allard Prize, speaks at the 2015 ceremony, October 1, 2015. Photo by Martin Dee, used with permission via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.
The reforms included unexpectedly wide-ranging issues, from the state oil company Sonangol to banking. The ongoing anti-corruption drive stamped his authority by dismissing or prosecuting numerous figures, notably previously untouchable powerful family and associates of JES — a popular move — such as his daughter Isabel dos Santos, and ex-minister Manuel Rabelais.
Today, Marques and other independent journalists are able to work more freely, thanks to an improvement in the political and media freedom environments under JLO, but limits remain.
During the former JES regime, independent media was curbed, with traditional media was controlled largely through government influence via direct or indirect ownership or censorship; Reporters Without Borders (RSF) lamented “exorbitant” costs for broadcast licenses and start-up costs which hinder new media actors. Low internet access has left traditional media outlets “subject to high levels of government interference” and journalists’ self-censorship, according to Freedom House (2018). Private media have also been controlled by government-linked figures.
Colonialism, an independence war, and decades of destructive civil war, which ended in 2002, destroyed infrastructure and left a highly centralized economy dependent on high-value oil and diamonds profits, captured by a small political-military elite from armed movements, dominated by the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA).
The former president and associates consolidated power after the war. This opaque, clientelist system neglected many, embezzled billions, and strictly, sometimes violently, controlled criticism.
Under JES’s rule, internet access gradually increased, although it remained low — measured by Internet World Stats as 22.3 percent of the population in 2019, hindering the reach of online spaces. However, as online activism and information became more dynamic, JES’ government began to clamp down on dissent.
Back in 2016, journalist Manuel Serrano wrote that the internet became a “last frontier” for political discussion, dissidence and denouncing corruption, given reporting and demonstrating restrictions.
Under JES, prosecutions of activists and journalists were also common.
A well-known case was the “15+2” group of activists, who in 2015 were arrested, charged with planning a coup, for meeting to discuss the book, “From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation.” This included activist-musician Luaty Beirão, who is influential on social media.
Several protested by hunger strike which drew international attention — echoed on social media — and pressured authorities to eventually drop charges. It showed the potential reach and limits of online activism and contributed to the pressure, but the issue later faded from prominence.
The regime also made use of restrictive laws that allowed it to silence critics and those who question the ruling elite’s conduct. The 2010 state security law  “penalizes individuals who insult the country or president in “public meetings or by disseminating” information with prison sentences, and the 2006 press law holds journalists “criminally liable for libelous content.”
In 2017, under JES, new media laws, known as the Social Communication Legislative Package, made defamation a criminal offense and allows for regulation and banning of online content, including social media, which Human Rights Watch said violates international obligations to press freedom. That year, academic Joana Fonseca also discussed “medium-tech” surveillance, notably, networks of informers using recording devices.
Restrictive press laws, imported surveillance technology, and the practice of arrests and court cases, were all tactics the JES regime deployed to restrict press and media freedoms.
Marques acknowledged that freedom of expression improved under JLO, noting telling the Financial Times earlier this year that surveillance equipment at his home had gone. In mid-2018, Marques and editor Mariano Brás were acquitted of charges of insulting the state for a 2016 online article accusing an attorney-general of corruption. The judge said they fulfilled their journalistic duty and Human Rights Watch researcher Zenaida Machado called it a “huge victory for press freedom”. RSF improved Angola’s press freedom ranking by 12 places in 2019 and said access to state-held information had improved.
Some judges have ruled in favor of demonstrators arrested by police, defending their constitutional right to protest and several soldiers recently received jail-time for lethally firing on protestors in 2016. Amnesty International noted that authorities “allowed peaceful demonstrations”, although criticized “new cases of human rights violations and excessive use of force by security forces” and continued unaccountability.
Frontline Defenders said the “culture of repressing [human rights defenders]  (…) continued, albeit at a reduced level, under the new administration,” also referencing judicial and security services restrictions, and targeting of independence activists from the oil-rich Cabinda province.
Between mid-2017 and mid-2018, Freedom House ranked Angola’s internet as “partly free” and reported that ”online content remained uncensored and unrestricted” although online bots were influential on social media, notably around the 2017 elections.
Legal issues also remain; Human Rights Watch said the new 2019 penal code criminalized vaguely defined “defamation,” which could easily be used against critics
The tools for media restrictions remain and clamp-downs on sensitive topics have occurred. For example, dozens of people connected to Cabinda province’s independence movement were arrested, but judges later ordered their release.
Recent protests mobilized on social media against high unemployment and poverty recall JLO’s promises of job-creation in his election campaign and seven activists filed a legal complaint against Luanda – the capital city – police for abuses at a march.
JLO has reiterated his intention to continue anti-corruption efforts but said not everybody supported it and that corrupt people were using misappropriated money to fund destabilization, referring to the ongoing protests. Musician Luaty Beirão criticized the rhetoric for being “just like” those of the past.
JLO's political reforms have loosened restrictions, but haven't done much to actively advance an open internet in Angola. The legal and practical tools to restrict media remain. Citizens continue to grapple with low internet access, legislation on defamation and controlled content and continued impunity for past and current violence.

author: Liam Anderson


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DreamWorks’ ‘Abominable’ film banned in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines for showing China’s claim over disputed seas · Global Voices
Mong Palatino

Source: ‘Abominable’ Facebook page
DreamWorks’ animated feature, ‘Abominable’, has been banned in Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines for depicting China’s ‘nine-dash line’ policy in the film.
‘Abominable’ tells the story of a Chinese teen who discovered a Yeti (mythical snowman living in the Himalayas) in her family house and enlists the help of her friends to bring the creature back to Mount Everest. The film was jointly produced by Shanghai-based Pearl Studio and Hollywood company DreamWorks Animation.
China’s ‘nine-dash line’ policy outlines its claim over several islands in the South China Sea which are also being contested by many countries in Southeast Asia. Protests have erupted in Vietnam and the Philippines over China’s ‘unilateral’ claim over the disputed seas. The governments of these two countries have also accused China of violating their maritime territories.
‘Abominable’ was marketed as ‘Everest: The Little Yeti’ in Vietnam and it was screened in early October before it was pulled out from theaters following intense public backlash over the controversial scene in the film.
DreamWorks’ new movie Abominable features a map supporting total Chinese ownership over the disputed South China Sea area pic.twitter.com/Xm5yUDjXu8
— Movie Details (@moviedetail) October 13, 2019
Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. also criticized the wrong depiction of the country’s map.
He also suggested to censor the scene, insert a government advisory about the cut, and call for a boycott of DreamWorks instead of banning the film.
Sure but I think failure to react may be seen as a kind of submission on the diplomatic level. But our reaction must be mininally invasive of free speech concerns: cut out offending scene & interject grainy film of ugly face of boring public official explaining why. https://t.co/PbEUHeoERP
— Teddy Locsin Jr. (@teddyboylocsin) October 16, 2019
OF COURSE THEY SHOULD CUT OUT THE OFFENDING SCENE WHICH WILL SHOW OUR DISPLEASURE BETTER THAN IF WE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BAN IT AS SOME SUGGEST. DO CUT OUT CRUDELY. MAYBE INTERJECT MTRCB HEAD IN CUT OUT SCENE WITH A HECTORING LECTURE. THEN CARTOON GOES ON. https://t.co/NWoEydnqJJ
— Teddy Locsin Jr. (@teddyboylocsin) October 16, 2019
The government’s Movie and Television Review and Classification Board eventually decided to pull the film from the theaters.
Malaysia’s censorship board ordered DreamWorks to cut the scene but this was refused and led to a decision not to show the movie in the country, which was previously scheduled for release on 7 November.
Many netizens in the three countries said they are supporting the decision to either censor the film or block its screening.
But some also wrote that it’s better to engage moviegoers and artists in China and inform them about why the ‘nine-dash line’ policy should be reviewed. This is the same argument of Filipino newspaper columnist Tyrone Velez, who wrote on Facebook:
Abominable is banned for a map that wasn't even their fault.
What if the map with the nine dash line was taught to them by the government?
We have to engage with them, and they are sensible people…They are just being misled.

author: Mong Palatino


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Netizen Report: How are protests in Lebanon affecting digital rights? · Global Voices
Ellery Roberts Biddle

Demonstrators in Beirut. Photo shared on Twitter by @michatobia
The Advox Netizen Report offers an international snapshot of challenges, victories, and emerging trends in technology and human rights around the world. This report covers news and events from October 13 – 25, 2019.
Mass public demonstrations have dominated Beirut, Tripoli and other large Lebanese cities since October 18, after people came to the streets to protest government corruption, failing public services and exorbitant taxation. One significant trigger of the protests was a proposed daily tax on the use of internet-based voice calling technologies offered on services like WhatsApp and Facetime.
The WhatsApp tax has been taken off the table, but the protests have grown in power and intensity each day. Social networks have been flooded with images and videos of tens of thousands of people from various walks of life demonstrating together and calling not only for policy reforms, but for early elections that would usher in a new government.
To keep up on protests in Lebanon, we're following:
There have also been violent confrontations, resulting mainly from military forces and police seeking to block protesters. According to local activists, these have led to as many as 300 arrests. Photos of arrest scenes shared on Twitter suggested that detained protesters, lined up side by side on the road, had their mobile phones taken from them.
These efforts have coincided with digital campaigns discouraging people from joining protests, shared via WhatsApp and other social media services.
Local journalists and independent media houses have been actively covering the demonstrations, while state-supported media have remained largely mum. On October 22, the head of the National News Agency was fired with little explanation. Lebanon Daily Star reporter Benjamin Redd wondered on Twitter: “Did the NNA boss, Laure Sleiman, get fired for doing her job?”
Top leaders gave speeches on October 21, acknowledging the protesters’ grievances and pledging to improve on public services and policy, but the predominant response from demonstrations has been that this is not enough. As SMEX Executive Director and Global Voices author Mohamad Najem put it:
Protestors today:
+ We don’t care about Harriri’s new reforms suggestions, before the deadline even.
+ Down with all this political system. We want a temporary government that lead new elections in the next year.
These our political demands#LebanonProtests #لبنان_ينتفض
— Mohamad محمد (@monajem) October 21, 2019
On October 14, after a 72-day communications blackout, Indian authorities in Kashmir restored SMS and call services for postpaid mobile subscriptions. But internet services and prepaid mobile connections are still suspended.
Srinagar, the main city in Jammu and Kashmir, went under complete lockdown on August 5, 2019 when the government of India revoked Article 370 of the Indian constitution that provided special autonomous status to the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Access to mobile, landline, and internet networks were suspended, while roadblocks were put on the streets and restrictions on almost all movement were enforced. Although some of these measures have since been lifted, the region continues to be heavily controlled by Indian authorities.
Hundreds of Twitter users — most of whom write primarily in Arabic, and are located in Egypt — either have had their tweets censored or their Twitter accounts suspended in recent weeks. Twitter has apologized for the erroneous suspensions, but didn’t explain what prompted them. Experts following the removals have observed that many appeared to be triggered by swear words, which are not forbidden on Twitter.
What at first appeared to be a series of mistakes now looks like something larger, and online activists are taking note, highlighting account suspensions with the hashtags #WeWillSpeak and #هنتكلم.
On October 9, Iranian telecommunications service providers were ordered to block Google Play, Google's official app store, “as soon as possible”. The order is said to have been issued by deputy prosecutor general in charge of cyberspace, Javad Javidnia.
If implemented successfully, this will push Iranians toward using local services that are far more vulnerable to government surveillance, censorship and the mishandling of personal data than many global online services. Even Amin Amirsharifi, the CEO of Cafe Bazaar, Iran’s largest local app store and a primary competitor of Google Play, tweeted that he did not support the move.
In an October 18 speech at Georgetown University, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg exalted the US first amendment and portrayed Facebook as a platform that had helped make the global internet better by espousing free speech values around the world.
The speech left many internet policy and civil rights experts skeptical. “While boasting of the enlightening effects of the spread of knowledge and information, he ignores the toxic attributes of his own company,” wrote University of Virginia professor Siva Vaidhyanathan.
In a Washington Post opinion piece, NAACP Legal Defense Fund President Sherrilyn Ifill took the Facebook CEO to task for invoking the names of US civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King Jr., whose achievements Zuckerberg attempted to link with the company’s free speech values.
What Zuckerberg failed to note is that King was the subject of violent assaults (and finally assassination) that were the result of the same kind of hate-fueled disinformation campaigns that infect the Internet and are now aimed at a different generation of civil rights leaders.
On October 21, a coalition of more than 40 US-based civil rights organizations signed a joint letter citing the company’s “reckless disregard for civil rights” demanding that Facebook eliminate discriminatory advertising, white supremacist speech and voter suppression on its platform.
Nigerian journalist ‘Fisayo Soyombo may soon face criminal charges for his undercover work investigating Nigeria’s prison system. In November 2018, Soyombo deliberately defaulted on a car payment in order to get arrested and observe the criminal justice system firsthand. The award-winning journalist spent five days in police custody and eight as an inmate of Ikoyi Prison, in Lagos, where he observed, documented and later reported on multiple incidents of bribery, abuse of prisoners by guards, and other forms of corruption.
Soyombo has “has gone underground” after fleeing his residence on October 21. If found and arrested, he will be charged under Section 29 of the Nigeria Correctional Service Act [Subsection 1 (d)] for possessing and using “communication devices” within the prison to record “conversation through a mobile phone or other devices” without authorization. If convicted, he risks a fine not exceeding 2 million naira [about US$5,500], two years imprisonment or both.
The transitional government put in place in Sudan in August 2019, after the ousting of Omar al-Bashir, is showing some signs of wanting to uphold freedom of expression in the country. At the UN General Assembly meeting in late September 2019, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdulla Hmadok signed the Global Pledge to Defend Media Freedom and stated that “never again in the new Sudan will a journalist be repressed or jailed.”
Earlier that month, the Sovereignty Council of Sudan, which is intended to guide Sudan’s three-year transition toward civilian rule, issued a decree placing the Telecommunications and Post Regulatory Authority under the authority of the Council, and away from the Ministry of Defense. But the rules and policies under which the regulator functions are still unchanged, and the authority has been a key player in deciding and implementing the former regime’s censorship policies with its filtering and blocking system.
“Lingering laws place vague restrictions on these fundamental rights and allow authorities to block and filter content without a judicial order,” writes Mohamed Suliman in an analysis for Global Voices.
Digital Authoritarianism in Egypt: Digital Expression Arrests 2011-2019 – Open Technology Fund
India uses opaque legal process to suppress Kashmiri journalism, commentary on Twitter - Committee to Protect Journalists
Are we any better at judging right from wrong? Automation in content moderationNamita, GenderIT.org
Ellery Roberts Biddle, Nwachukwu Egbunike, Mohamed ElGohary, Rezwan Islam, Leila Nachawati, Mohamed Suliman and Taisa Sganzerla contributed to this report.

author: Ellery Roberts Biddle


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Australians respond to media campaign that calls out “creeping culture of secrecy” · Global Voices
Kevin Rennie

Redacted front pages for Your Right to Know campaign – Courtesy Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance
The Your Right to Know campaign launched by the major Australian mainstream media organisations on 21 October 2019 has brought about mixed reactions. These range from broad community support to denial by government ministers and senior public servants. It has also faced some predictable cynicism on social media.
The issue of press freedom had reached a crisis point in June with raids by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) on members of two of the country's largest media organisations, namely the ABC and News Corp.
Australia has no bill of rights or constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech or a free press. The High Court recently recognised a narrow implied freedom of communication on governmental and political matters.
Human rights advocates know what they want:
An Australian Charter of Human Rights & Freedoms will help safeguard press freedom & our #RightToKnow. Follow @RightsCharter to learn more. https://t.co/X82rMw6NJP
— HumanRightsLawCentre (@rightsagenda) October 23, 2019
London-based Australian barrister Jennifer Robinson, who has experience defending Julian Assange, put forward a strong case for reform:
Media freedom is under threat in Australia: from the failure to stand up for #Assange, to police raids on @abcnews, to our failing #FOI system. Delighted to contribute to @smh on why reform is so needed to mark the #righttoknow campaign launch: https://t.co/gGznQZoZAM #auspol pic.twitter.com/zKBrpSZXg5
— Jen Robinson (@suigenerisjen) October 20, 2019
The federal government’s response to earlier criticisms was to refer the question of press freedom to an inquiry by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), which has been holding public hearings.
The government’s responses to the #RighttoKnow campaign either downplay concerns or attack the media's demands:
Today in Estimates Minister Reynolds refused to acknowledge there is any problem with #pressfreedom in Australia, instead arguing that the fact journalists are talking about it means there is no problem. #Auspol #Estimates pic.twitter.com/ftvXd61mJR
— Senator Marielle Smith (@MsMarielleSmith) October 21, 2019
The Estimates Committee is a permanent committee of the Australian Senate, which regularly questions ministers and public servants about government business and administration.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison accused the media of wanting to be “above the law”, a claim they quickly refuted.
We are not seeking anything like the ‘blanket exemption’ that some have claimed. We are asking for common sense changes to laws so that, like politicians, the unique role journalists have in serving society is acknowledged.
In an interview with ABC Radio National’s Hamish Macdonald, senior News Corp executive and campaign spokesperson, Campbell Reid, called out the government for deliberate “misinformation”. He argued that the media have not sought blanket exemption. He also brought up what he sees as a “creeping culture of secrecy” such as an increasing number of court suppression orders and ineffective freedom of information processes. The full audio is available here.
Independent journalist and blogger William Summers echoed a common belief about the difficulty of accessing freedom of information procedures:
#FOI is really important for democracy yet hard going for journos & researchers who often spend more time chasing them up than reporting on them.
Remember, this is all info undertaken on our behalf by people who work for us!! #rightoknow
— William Summers (@william_summers) October 21, 2019
However, many on social media have little sympathy for News Corp or its proprietor Rupert Murdoch. They publish Australia's only national daily paper The Australian as well as several State and regional papers and Sky News Australia on subscription television. Accusations of hypocrisy include lack of objectivity and professionalism, misinformation and unprincipled journalism. Many tweets were scathing:
I would like to support the #righttoknow campaign, but I’m finding that difficult when it is headquartered at News Corp, same organisation who doesn’t think public has a right to know about Liberal govt corruption and scandal, hidden for political gain. Sorry, trust is earned.
— ?Queen Victoria (@Vic_Rollison) October 20, 2019
At least Australians are not being misled about any crap this morning ?
Honestly, I really wish I was not so cynical about this #RightToKnow campaign, in theory, I agree with it, but… these big players have used their ‘freedom of press’ to actively ‘misinform’ public ? https://t.co/q95EZKTJrP
— Noely ⚡? (@YaThinkN) October 20, 2019
This sums up the fundamental problem with News Ltd taking the high moral ground. Quid pro quo for Right to Know should be a binding code of media ethics. #rightoknow https://t.co/Pw6NvY1ET2
— Peter Lewis (@PeterLewisEMC) October 21, 2019
A longstanding member of the Canberra Press Gallery, Paul Bongiorno, was also critical of his media colleagues for their lack of criticism of many of the new laws:
After mostly cheerleading the 75 or so increasingly more draconian national security laws introduced over the past 18 years, they now realise they have unwittingly encouraged an erosion of their freedom to report, inform and hold government to account.
In a positive move, the new Australian Federal Police Commissioner, Reece Kershaw, announced a review into how his organisation investigates leaks and related “sensitive” matters. It will not be an examination of the two raids but will be more “holistic”.
However, some netizens will take a lot of convincing:
The ordinary Police do an excellent job, by and large. (Apart from the odd one or two). However the AFP seem to have become the government’s private goon squad.
— ?Eva Kopke (@kopke_eva) October 21, 2019
Whilst there is public support for the campaign, many who agree with its aims have misgivings:
I am troubled by the framing of this piece about #RightToKnow campaign https://t.co/DRm3Hy1o73
People don't like journalists, almost as much as they dislike politicians. The piece seems centred on the plight of journalists.
— Justin Warren ⬡ (@jpwarren) October 20, 2019
Meanwhile, the self-styled “chief tax collector”, Chris Jordan, has enflamed the debate about whistleblowers during a Senate Estimates Committee hearing with claims that two of their employees were not sacked for blowing the whistle on the Australian Tax Office. He has been accused of abusing parliamentary privilege:
#petty and dangerous precedence.
‘He threw a hand grenade': #ATO boss Chris #Jordan criticised for ‘irresponsible’ spray against #whistleblowers https://t.co/neBxXtqcjv
— eithne (@eithne52) October 24, 2019
The latest Whistleblowers Australia's online newsletter The Whistle explores many recent cases:
TIMOR L’ESTE whistleblower Witness K, his lawyer Bernard Collaery, the Afghan Files whistleblower David McBride and ATO whistleblower Richard Boyle have become proxies in the government’s war on us, the people.
There is no doubt that the recommendations of the PJCIS freedom of the press review and any subsequent legislation will be carefully scrutinised especially on social media.

author: Kevin Rennie


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Taiwanese court rules no jurisdiction in Vietnamese marine disaster case, victims to appeal · Global Voices
Guest Contributor

Screenshot from a video on civic coalition press conference outside Taipei district court on October 24, 2019. Via Justice for Formosa Victims.
This post was written in collaboration with members of the Global Voices Chinese Lingua team.
On 14 October 2019 the Taipei District Court dismissed a lawsuit filed by nearly 8,000 Vietnamese fishermen against Taiwan-based Formosa Plastics Group (FPG) over a 2016 marine disaster in Vietnam. The court said that it had no jurisdiction to rule on the case, but the plaintiff's lawyers filed an appeal on October 24.
The marine disaster, which took place on 6 April 2016, is seen as the most serious environmental disaster in Vietnamese history. The incident, caused by the discharge of toxic waste into the sea by FPG subsidiary Ha Tinh Steel Corporation, led to the death of massive amounts of fish and marine life in central Vietnam.
The fishing industry in the affected areas has declined dramatically after the marine disaster and it estimated that complete recovery would take about a decade.
FPG accepted responsibility for the disaster on 30 June 2016 and agreed to give US$500 million in compensation to the Vietnamese government for disaster relief work. Yet, the Vietnamese government mainly gave compensation to those who live in Ha Tinh. Those who live in other parts of central Vietnam, such as Quang Binh, Nghe An, and Quang Tri, have not received any money.
Image from Justice For Formosa Victims’ petition.
With the assistance of environmental and human rights organizations in Taiwan and Vietnam, lawyers in Taiwan were able to represent 7,875 Vietnamese plaintiffs and present the lawsuit against FPG at the Taipei district court on 11 June 2019, demanding US$4 million dollars in compensation for the first group of 51 plaintiffs.
Although the Taipei District Court had accepted NT$1.2 million (US$39,234) in payment for the case on June 13, four months later, it rejected the case on the grounds that the suit does not fall within its jurisdiction.
Both human rights and environmental lawyers expressed their disappointment with the ruling outside the Taipei district court on October 24 and vowed to bring the jurisdiction rule to the High Court. In a statement released by the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, the organization pointed out that the case should not be confined within an exclusive jurisdiction as the Taiwan-based defendant, FPG, is the key investor and stakeholder of its subsidiary Ha Tinh Steel Corporation in Vietnam.
Hsin-Wen Huang, one of the lawyers, pointed out that although the marine disaster took place in Vietnam, the Taiwanese court should take into consideration the human rights aspect of the case:
法院完全沒有審酌越鋼案的受害人，於起訴過程中就受到越南政府武力鎮壓、及不當的逮捕和關押，在這種情形下，受害人在越南起訴，符合實質公平和訴訟經濟嗎？
The fact that the court has completely neglected the violent crackdown, unjust arrest and imprisonment of the victims of the disaster and concluded that the case falls into Vietnam's jurisdiction is against the very principle of fairness.
In fact, more than 500 victims of the marine disaster had attempted to file the case in the Vietnamese courts in October 2016 but were rejected on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their factual damages. When the victims started to present factual evidence of the damages, they were physically attacked by government-sponsored thugs, arrested and received heavy sentences for anti-state and etc. Vietnamese government's violation of civil rights and freedom has been condemned by the UN, including the HRC and the OHCHR, and documented by a range of independent NGOs. The marine disaster and human rights violations between April 2016 to October 2017 was well documented by Vietnamese independent media outlet, The Vietnamese:
…the marine life disaster involved a humane and political crisis when the Vietnamese government fails to ensure relevant compensation for the victims; they even go further by brutally suppressing voices of dissent. Widespread human rights violations have made 2016 and 2017 dark years for democracy and freedom in Vietnam, characterized by arbitrary detentions, police violence targeted at civilians, and increasing imprisonment of peaceful activists.
Since October 2016 [till October 2017], dozens of activists have been arrested and faced charges related to their activities to protest at Formosa and demand environmental rights.
Huang also pointed out that the defendant, FPG, should be responsible for the disaster:
越鋼就是台塑集團到越南所成立的公司，其股東除了日鋼以外，清一色都是台灣相關的公司，包含台塑、台化、台石化，中鋼等等，根據「以原就被」原則的精神，這案件和台灣具充分牽連。再者，台塑企業乃採高度中央集權的決策模式，企業各項重大政策及投資案均須透過行政中心討論後決定，除此之外，與本件訴訟密切相關之細部之營建、工程發包、工程管理、環境安全衛生，亦皆由台塑總管理處加以統籌。因此，本件訴訟之重要決策證據、營建計畫、工程發包、工程管理、環境安全衛生之重要經營管理證據，亦皆集中於台灣，故本件訴訟與我國具密切之牽連…
Aside from Japan Steel, Ha Tinh Steel Corporation in Vietnam was jointly invested by FPG, Formosa Chemicals, TASCO Group – majority are Taiwanese corporations. And FPG is the biggest share holder who established the Vietnamese subsidiary in the first place. FPG is well-known for its centralized decision making style, all investments were reviewed and approved by its administrative core. The construction contract, management and environmental protection policy of Ha Tinh Steel Corporation were coordinated by FPG. Hence related evidence could be obtained in Taiwan. Taiwan should have jurisdiction in the case…
The FPG has a long history of pollution wrongdoing, both within Taiwan and outside of Taiwan. In recent years, FPG and its international subsidiaries have faced major fines and lawsuits in the United States, notably in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi after discharging poisonous chemicals into the land and underground water sources.
After the Taipei District Court ruled the lack of jurisdiction, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) passed an urgent resolution and called on the Taiwanese court to reconsider:
…reconsider the Formosa case and hear the litigation to provide better protection for the interests of the plaintiffs, who are vulnerable, and ensure a practice that is more in line with the protection of human rights under international law. Asserting jurisdiction in this litigation by the court in Taiwan will achieve equity between the parties, fulfil the need for a just and impartial judgment, and ensure the speediness of the proceedings and the idea of litigation economics.
Justice for Formosa Victims (JFFV) also started an online petition to ask the Taiwanese court to proceed with this lawsuit. There have been more than 2300 people who have signed this petition.
The lawsuit is now pending for a High Court ruling over jurisdiction controversy.

author: Guest Contributor


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Tanzania tech startup fights fake drugs through new online platform · Global Voices
Goodhope Amani

Frank Arabi (left) explaining step by step on how to procure pharmaceutical products on PharmLinks. Photo credit: Goodhope Amani, used with permission.
The problem of fake drugs is a nightmare that affects everyone around the world — including Tanzania. While the government has introduced regulations on medical businesses, there are still loopholes that allow people to sell fake drugs both online and in brick-and-mortar shops due to a lack of verification before drugs enter the market.
Now, an online platform called PharmLinks, founded in Tanzania, wants to stop the crisis of fake drugs. The platform links pharmaceutical suppliers and wholesalers with retailers in Tanzania, to buy quality products from registered pharmacies and also monitor the market.
Frank Arabi, a medical student at Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences, co-founded PharmLinks after he observed a number of challenges faced by the pharmaceutical industry in Tanzania, including the problem of procurement, which creates the perfect conditions for the fake drug business.
Frank Arabi, medical student and co-founder of Pharmlinks. Photo credit: Goodhope Amani, used with permission.
Arabi and his team designed an online system to simplify pharmaceutical procurement and fight fake drugs by closely monitoring companies along the supply chain.
“The website provides a list of various pharmacies, products and prices. It provides business analytics and inventory management also provides a chance for end-users to verify the drugs. So it’s a complex system with a range of solutions,” said Arabi in an interview with Global Voices.
Launched in 2018 and still in the pilot phase, 35 pharmacists can now freely log onto the website and search medical products they want in their shops. The system directs them to wholesalers suppliers and stores vetted for safety and lists their prices for each product. The buyer can then choose the products and pay for them online, and soon after, products are delivered.
Venance Majula, a Dar dweller, remembers the day her sister nearly used fake medicine after buying it at a pharmacy in Dar es Salaam,  Tanzania. Luckily, a family member who had prior knowledge about medicine realized the drug was fake when he checked the serial numbers and ingredients.
“Most of us, we don’t know what is really original and what is not, I think those who are responsible, maybe pharmacists, should provide education on what to consider when buying or using particular medicine,” said Majula.
The World Health Organization says around 100,000 deaths in Africa yearly are linked to fake and substandard drugs and the number is increasing.
Arabi believes that the problem of fake drugs is a big business and needs various approaches to fight it. “The global counterfeit drug market is worth around $200 billion annually,” according to WHO, as reported by Reuters.
“I think this problem of counterfeit medicines is very complex and wide, and it requires a multi-dimensional approach and tackling from every angle of the supply chain is just one of them … we believe in the power of digital health toward improving the health of our people,” said Arabi.
In June 2019, the government through Tanzania Medicines and Medical Devices Authority (TMDA) issued a warning about the presence of fake medicine in Tanzania that resembled Gentrisone, a medicinal cream used for bacterial infections. Local media outlet the Daily News revealed that 4,118 tubes were found in six different regions of Tanzania.
Pharmlinks has so far linked with tens of pharmacies in Dar es salaam, Tanzania’s business hub, and hopes to connect to hundreds more in the coming year.
The Tanzanian pharmaceutical market faces several challenges, including a black market which allows people to buy medicines on the streets without a required prescription from the physician.
On Tandale Street, 3 kilometers from Dar’s city center, Hawa Alex Dagaa, who owns a pharmacy, admits that some people buy pharmaceutical products from people who have no license to sell drugs, just because they sell the products at a lower price.
“Some people are buying pharmaceutical products from people who are trading it around because it's cheap, but sometimes it’s difficult to guarantee its authenticity.”
Hawa Alex Dagaa at her pharmacy in Tandale, Dar es salaam, happy after she was introduced to an online system that helps to procure quality drugs. Photo credit: Goodhope Amani, used with permission.
Dagaa believes that the new online system will not only save time otherwise used to find shops that sell medicine at affordable prices, but it will also help track the pharmaceutical products distributed in the market, reducing the chances of purchasing fake drugs.
“Because of traffic jams, it takes a long time to go to find … medical products for my pharmacy in town, but with this system, you can log in, you place your order, you pay and they deliver it,” she added.
Pharmlinks is not the only digital platform that focuses on fighting fake drugs in Africa. In 2018, a Nigeria-based platform, medsaf, was launched to prevent fake drugs from circulating in the West African country, while in Ghana, FarmaTrus was also introduced.
Pharmlinks works closely with the Tanzania Pharmacy Council, which is responsible for registering pharmacies and pharmacists, along with TMDA, to ensure this system is viable.

author: Goodhope Amani