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What is Russia’s endgame in Belarus? · Global Voices
Maxim Edwards

State flags of Belarus and Russia in Minsk, capital of Belarus, 2013. Photo CC BY 4.0, Wikimedia Commons.
A month after Belarus’ presidential elections, the country's political crisis shows no signs of abating. When President Alyaksandr Lukashenka attempted to secure a sixth consecutive term in office, thousands of Belarusians took to the streets, enraged at plausible accounts of electoral fraud. The authorities responded by detaining thousands of citizens; plausible accounts of violence in detention centres prompted even more Belarusians to protest. As a result, these are now the largest demonstrations in Belarus since the country gained its independence in 1991.
Lukashenka, who has ruled Belarus since 1994, ostensibly received over 80 percent of the vote, compared to barely ten percent for his challenger Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who has since fled to neighbouring Lithuania. She leads an opposition coordination council, and urges that she be recognised as the legitimate president of Belarus. Protests in solidarity with Tsikhanouskaya continue, demanding nothing less than Lukashenka's resignation. Yet so does the resilience of the Belarusian ruling elite, which has remained loyal to Lukashenka.
Moscow is watching with interest, and Lukashenka is playing to the gallery.
As the embattled president has grown ever more frustrated with the protests, his overtures to Belarus’ large neighbour to the East have become bolder. The tenor of his rallies and of state media coverage has become increasingly pro-Russian, portraying the protesters as opponents of the Russian language and incorrigible nationalists in the pay of foreign powers. Riot police have ostentatiously lined up to defend Soviet-era war memorials, although none appear to have been vandalised by protesters and there is no thirst among the opposition for “decommunisation”.
Furthermore, when Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin visited Minsk on September 3, the Belarusian government presented a recording, apparently intercepted between Berlin and Warsaw, supporting the Russian government's position on the poisoning of Alexey Navalny: that the hospital data had been falsified. Navalny, a Russian opposition politician who was evacuated to Germany after being poisoned at a Siberian airport, was the victim of a Novichok nerve agent, according to findings by the Berlin hospital where he was treated.
The message behind these moves is clear: Lukashenka is an indispensable ally, and the only person capable of keeping Belarus in Russia's orbit.
However, things are never so simple. In the early days of the election campaign, it was not only the West which Lukashenka primarily blamed for foreign interference. He obliquely suggested that meddling could also come from the East, and cited evidence to prove it: In late July, mercenaries from the Russian military contractor Wagner were arrested in Belarus. Once protests broke out, pro-Kremlin Russian media were not unsympathetic to their cause; some prominent opposition activists, such as former presidential candidate Valery Tsepkala, fled not to the EU but to Russia.
Russia and Belarus have much in common. The Russian language predominates in public life across much of Belarus today, which is a member of various Russian-led military and economic alliances such as the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Union State. When Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Lukashenka after the election, he hinted at his hopes that Minsk would finally commit fully to each of the above. If that sounds pointed, it's because Lukashenka has been adept the “Eurasian shuffle,” playing Belarus’ NATO and EU neighbours to the West against Russia for political gain. In that, he is a great survivor — nourished by Russian natural gas which is pumped across the country to Europe, and offered to Minsk at below-market prices.
To a great extent, Lukashenka's future survival lies in Russia's hands. To understand more about Moscow's choice — or dilemma — I spoke to Yury Tsarik, head of Russian and Post-Soviet Studies of the Centre for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies in Minsk, the Belarusian capital:
Maxim Edwards: It’s no secret that relations between Minsk and Moscow have been very strained in recent years. There would be little love lost among the Russian elite if Lukashenka were to go; depending, of course, on the alternative. It seems to me that Russia wants a transition in Belarus, but a managed one on its terms, and not one dominated by street protests. What is your assessment?
Юрий Царик: Действительно, Александр Лукашенко как руководитель Беларуси перестал устраивать Москву, причём, уже довольно давно, после того, как отказался размещать российские войска и военные базы на территории Беларуси в ходе прошлых президентских выборов, в 2015 году. С тех пор российская сторона последовательно сокращала доступные ему финансовые потоки, связанные с постсоветской интеграцией, и выстраивала инфраструктуру прямого влияния на внутреннюю политику Беларуси, то есть, взаимодействия напрямую с различными социальными группами (включая белорусскую бюрократию) минуя А.Лукашенко.
Поэтому и в ходе кампании 2020 года Россия работала жёстко против белорусского лидера, всячески поддерживая протестную повестку, давая трибуну лидерам новой оппозиции и так далее. Некоторая трансформация имела место после достижения соглашения между Москвой и Минском по поводу возвращения в Россию задержанных в Беларуси «вагнеровцев». В обмен на это Кремль обещал признать выборы в Беларуси (победу А.Лукашенко) и умерить критику белорусских властей в российских медиа. Несколько позже, уже после жёсткого разгона протестов 9–12 августа, России удалось навязать получить решающее преимущество над белорусской стороной, навязать более выгодную для себя сделку, включавшую размещение российских медиа- и политических специалистов, что позволило установить рефлексивный контроль над действиями белорусских властей. В итоге сейчас Москва занята навязыванием А.Лукашенко выгодного ей сценария конституционной реформы и трансфера власти.
Yury Tsarik: Indeed, Alyaksandr Lukashenka no longer suits Moscow as Belarusian leader. That has been the case for a long time, after he refused to station Russian troops and military bases on Belarusian territory during the previous presidential elections in 2015. Since then, the Russian side has reduced financial flows to Belarus connected to integration projects in the post-Soviet space, working instead on mechanisms to directly influence the domestic policy of Belarus. This means direct interaction with various groups in Belarusian society (including the state bureaucracy), bypassing Lukashenka.
Therefore, during the 2020 election campaign Russia worked hard against the Belarusian leader, giving strong support to the protesters’ agenda, a platform to leaders of the new opposition movement and so forth. That changed once an agreement was reached between Moscow and Minsk on the return of the “Wagnerites” [Russian mercenaries from the PMC Wagner group], who were detained in Belarus [shortly before the election]. In exchange, the Kremlin promised to recognise the results of the Belarusian elections (i.e. Lukashenka's victory) and to moderate criticism of the Belarusian authorities in Russian media. A little later, after protests were dispersed by force on August 9-12, the Russian authorities decisively took the initiative and gained the upper hand over their Belarusian counterparts. They imposed a more favourable deal for Russia, which included the arrival of Russian media and political consultants and allowed them to gain reflexive control over the actions of the Belarusian authorities. As a result, Moscow is now busy imposing constitutional reform on Lukashenka, which will bring even more advantages.
ME: In recent weeks, Russian officials have been quite dismissive of the opposition coordination council, or at least of Tsikhanouskaya. Are there any alternative partners in Belarus which Moscow might work with in the case of some transition of power?
Ю.Ц.: Российское руководство заинтересовано в максимальном ослаблении не только А.Лукашенко, но и Беларуси как государства. Это связано с тем, что такое ослабление является ключевым условием для выполнения именно Россией роли донора стабильности и безопасности на территории Беларуси, а также упрощённого доступа российских элитных групп к приватизации привлекательных активов белорусской экономики. В этом смысле Москва одинаково негативно воспринимает как А.Лукашенко, так и любого другого политика, который мог бы сплотить белорусское общество, стать мощным национальным лидером и в будущем потенциально бросить вызов доминированию России в Беларуси (как это в последние годы сделал А.Лукашенко). Отсюда и специфическое поведение Кремля: играть на противоречиях сторон, ослабляя их, и не делать ставку ни на одну из них. Российское руководство надеется в итоге получить в качестве представителя оппозиции знаковую компромиссную фигуру (вероятней всего – из числа бывших аппаратчиков), с которой будет готов разговаривать А.Лукашенко, для того, чтобы организовать политический диалог в цивилизованном русле и в своих интересах. Самодеятельность лидеров оппозиции, оформившихся в ходе политической борьбы и имеющих высоки кредит доверия от граждан Беларуси, для Москвы нежелательна.
YT: The Russian leadership is interested not only in weakening Lukashenka to the maximum possible extent, but also Belarus as a state. This is because doing so is a key condition for Russia to play the role of the [sole] guarantor of security and stability in the country. For groups in the Russian elite, it also simplifies the privatisation of attractive [state-owned] assets in the Belarusian economy. In this sense, Moscow takes a negative view to Lukashenka and to any other politician capable of uniting Belarusian society and becoming a powerful national leader who could potentially challenge Russia's dominance in Belarus, as Lukashenka has in recent years. Hence the Kremlin's approach: not to rely on any individual party, but to play on their contradictions and weaken them across the board. As a result, the Russian leadership hopes to promote a symbolic compromise figure as an opposition representative, most likely from among former state apparatchiks. It will be somebody with whom Lukashenka is ready to talk, to conduct political negotiations in a civilised manner and in accordance with their own [i.e. Russian] interests. The current opposition leaders, whose initiative has taken on its own form during this political confrontation and who enjoy high levels of trust from Belarusian citizens, are undesirable for Moscow.
ME: However, opinion polling shows that most Belarusians are fairly pro-Russian. One thing which could turn it against Russia could be heavy-handed Russian intervention or support for domestic repression. Is that understood in Moscow?
Ю.Ц.: В Москве прекрасно понимают риски, связанные с возможным прямым вмешательством в дела Беларуси на стороне Лукашенко. Поэтому такого вмешательства нет, а «помощь» со стороны России нацелена на установление контроля над внутриполитической повесткой и работой идеологической машины белорусского государства, а не на поддержку А.Лукашенко. Белорусский президент для Москвы является фигурой токсичной и утратившей легитимность.
Главной формой вмешательства России является навязывание А.Лукашенко конституционной реформы и того формата политического диалога, который выгоден Москве. В случае, если он будет сопротивляться, следует ожидать волну насилия между протестующими и властями и вооружённое вмешательство Кремля под видом «гуманитарной интервенции», которой в итоге будет радо белорусское общество и которую в итоге одобрит международное сообщество.
YT: Moscow is very well aware of the risks which come with directly interfering in Belarus to support Lukashenka. That's why there is no interference of that kind; Russia's ‘assistance’ is aimed at establishing control over the domestic political agenda and the ideological [PR] apparatus of the Belarusian state, not necessarily at supporting Lukashenka personally. For Moscow, the Belarusian president has become a toxic figure who has lost legitimacy.
The main form of Russian interference is its imposition of constitutional reform on Lukashenka, along with demanding a format of political dialogue which benefits Moscow. If he resists these demands, we can expect a wave of violence between the protesters and the authorities, followed by an armed intervention by the Kremlin under the guise of ‘humanitarian assistance’, which could ultimately please Belarusian society and get the blessing of the international community.
ME: Before the election, Lukashenka had hinted that Russia was responsible for political unrest, pointing to arrests of Russian citizens. Now, the authorities are trying to compare the protests in some sense to Ukraine's revolution in 2014, either an attempt to garner sympathy from Russia or due to the increasing role played by Russian media and PR personnel. Does that resonate in Moscow?
Ю.Ц.: Все прекрасно понимают, что разговоры о роли Литвы, Польши, Украины в белорусском политическом кризисе – это чистой воды пропаганда, имеющая весьма отдалённое отношение к реальному положению дел. В нынешнем политическом кризисе в Беларуси была заинтересована Москва и она сыграла ключевую роль в инициировании данного кризиса, как об этом и заявляло ранее белорусское руководство.
«Геополитический поворот» в работе белорусской пропаганды связан с достигнутыми соглашениями по «вагнеровцам» и по итогам жёсткого разгона протестов, о чём мы говорили выше. Соответственно, и российское влияние на государственную пропаганду в Беларуси тоже нацелено не на поддержку А.Лукашенко, а на разжигание розни в белорусском обществе и исключении возможности достижения согласия между властями и протестующими без посредничества Москвы.
YT: Everybody understands that all talk about the role of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine in the Belarusian political crisis is pure propaganda which is very far from the real state of affairs on the ground. It is Moscow which has proven to be interested in the current political crisis in Belarus, and it played a key role in initiating it. Earlier on in the crisis the Belarusian leadership even said so themselves.
The ‘geopolitical turn’ in Belarusian [state] propaganda is linked to agreements reached over the ‘Wagnerites’ and to the harsh crackdown on protests, as mentioned earlier. Accordingly, Russian influence on state propaganda in Belarus is not aimed at supporting Lukashenka but at inciting hatred within Belarusian society and foreclosing the possibility of the government and the protesters reaching any agreement without Moscow's mediation.
ME: Comparisons between Belarus and Ukraine are not infrequent (and are made both negatively and positively), but the events in Minsk remind me more of Russia's 2011 Bolotnaya protests against electoral fraud or Armenia's 2018 “Velvet Revolution”, which unseated President Serzh Sargsyan. The Armenian case showed that when a Russian ally has limited room for geopolitical manoeuvre, Moscow is happier to tolerate domestic political changes. Would the Kremlin be comfortable with a similar scenario in Belarus?
Ю.Ц.: Безусловно, Москва заинтересована в частичной демократизации и модернизации Беларуси, но при условии ослабления белорусского государства и сокращения стратегической автономии Минска. На самом деле, Россия часто использует прогрессивные устремления граждан различных стран для достижения своих внешнеполитических целей. Если в Армении российская сторона просто не видела для себя угрозу, то в Узбекистане поддержка Москвой Шавката Мирзиёева была сознательной ставкой на отход от архаики каримовского периода. Можно также вспомнить смещение Курманбека Бакиева ранее в Кыргызстане и другие примеры.
В этом смысле Беларусь с её пророссийским большинством, составляющим порядка двух третей общества, вполне может стать более демократическим и при этом пророссийским государством.
YT: Moscow is undoubtedly interested in the partial democratisation and modernisation of Belarus, but only on the condition that the Belarusian state is weakened and its strategic autonomy is reduced. In fact, Russia often uses the progressive aspirations of various countries’ citizens to advance its foreign policy goals. In Armenia [in 2018], Moscow simply did not see any threat to its interests. In Uzbekistan [after the death of longtime President Islam Karimov in 2016], Moscow's supported [Karimov's successor] Shavkat Mirziyoyev as as departure from the archaic rule of the Karimov period. We could also mention the overthrow of Kyrgyzstan's President Kurmanbek Bakiyev [in 2016], along with other examples.
In this sense Belarus, with a pro-Russian majority comprising about two-thirds of society, could well become both a more democratic and a more pro-Russian state.
ME: Lukashenka will have to pay a price for the Kremlin’s support; Putin has been increasingly vocal about his hopes for finally securing deeper integration between Belarus and Russia. What will that price be?
Ю.Ц.: В силу того, что, по мнению Москвы, А.Лукашенко потерял легитимность как правитель Беларуси, подписание стратегических соглашений, в том числе – в военно-политической сфере, с ним нецелесообразно. Поэтому ценой за весьма условную (см. выше) поддержку Кремля будет участие Кремля в определении будущего Беларуси в целом, включая конституционную реформу и трансфер власти. А.Лукашенко потерпел поражение в противостоянии с Москвой на этапе избирательной кампании и особенно – в ходе подавления протестов. Теперь Москва говорит: «Горе побеждённым!». Варианты у белорусского руководства ещё остаются, но реальная вероятность достойного их выхода из нынешнего кризиса с каждым днём снижается.
YT: As Moscow sees it, Lukashenka has lost legitimacy. Due to that fact, it's not expedient for Russia to sign any key strategic agreements with him right now, including in the military and political spheres. Therefore, the price for the Kremlin's very conditional support is this: a greater Russian role in determining the future of Belarus as a whole, including in constitutional reform and the transition of power. Lukashenka lost this struggle with Moscow during the electoral campaign, and that became even clearer during the suppression of mass protests. Now Moscow says: Woe to the vanquished! The Belarusian leadership still has a few options, but its opportunities to find an advantageous way out of this crisis is are getting slimmer by the day.
ME: It seems that Moscow has often been torn between the need to get loyalty from Belarus and to get better value for money from Belarus. Much of Belarus’ social stability has depended on indirect subsidies from Russia, which after all owns 38 percent of Belarusian state debt. Might supporting the status quo in Belarus eventually prove too expensive for Moscow?
Ю.Ц.: Да, именно так. Сохранение А.Лукашенко у власти – это чудовищно дорогой проект, которые не гарантирует при этом интересующие Москву дивиденды. Гораздо дешевле – встать «на сторону народа» и использовать демократические и прогрессивные настроения для того, чтобы контролировать белорусскую политику в формате парламентской республики (как говорят, в эту сторону будет проводиться конституционная реформа). Непростая задача при этом состоит в том, чтобы избежать формирования в Беларуси самостоятельного политического субъекта со стратегическими устремлениями (будь это лидер протестующих, объединивший общество, или же выходец из нынешнего белорусского истеблишмента, объединивший общество), который мог бы снова бросить вызов доминированию Москвы на территории Беларуси.
YT: Yes, that's exactly it. Keeping Lukashenka in power is a monstrously expensive project, and one which doesn't guarantee the dividends which Moscow wants. It is much cheaper to stand ‘on the side of the people’ and use democratic and progressive sentiments in order to control Belarusian politics through the format of a parliamentary republic (it is now being stated that constitutional reform will be carried out to this end). At the same time, it will be difficult to avoid the emergence of Belarus as an independent entity with its own strategic aspirations, whether society is united by a protest leader or another figure from the current Belarusian political establishment. That risks challenging Moscow's dominance in Belarus.
ME: How do you think the situation will develop in the near future?
Ю.Ц.: Дальнейшее развитие ситуации в Беларуси будет определяться тем, насколько успешно Россия будет “вести” А.Лукашенко к реализации интересующего её формата политического транзита в Беларуси и насколько успешно А.Лукашенко будет пытаться играть в свою игру, находясь под плотной опекой и давлением Кремля. В то же время качество решений и действий белорусских властей будет иметь критическое значение для предотвращения скатывания кризиса в фазу насильственного противостояния. Пока что это качество остаётся низким, а значит, вероятность конфликта – высокой.
YT: How the situation in Belarus will develop depends on how successfully Russia is able to “lead” Lukashenka towards a form of political transition which suits its interests, and how successfully Lukashenka will be able to play that game while under tight control and pressure from the Kremlin. Meanwhile, the quality of the decisions and actions taken by the Belarusian authorities will be crucial in preventing the crisis spiralling into yet another violent confrontation. Their decisions so far do not give cause for optimism, meaning that the probability of another confrontation is high.

author: Maxim Edwards


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Historic peace deal in Sudan signed during historic flooding · Global Voices
Khattab Hamad

Khartoum, Sudan. Photo via Flickr by Christopher Michel under CC BY 2.0.
In the aftermath of the Sudanese revolution, transitional authorities of Sudan have signed a peace agreement with The Sudan Revolutionary Front — the main rebel group still active after former leader Omar al-Bashir was deposed last year.
The historic peace agreement, signed on August 31, in the city of Juba, South Sudan, found regional and international support from Troika countries, the European Union, Egypt and several Gulf countries.
But this exciting moment is also overshadowed by a period of historic flooding that has devastated parts of Sudan, causing a downward spiral in an already stressed economy.
Still, Sudanese citizens on social media also welcomed the news.
Waleed Ahmed, a Sudanese blogger, wrote:
اليوم نرد الجميل ❤ .. نرد الوطن
- الفيديو لحظة إعلان حركة جيش/تحرير السودان بقيادة مناوي وقف إطلاق النار دعما لحراك ثورة ديسمبر 16/2/2019 #سلام_السودان pic.twitter.com/YItG1V0B6l
— Waleed Ahmed (@alkangr) August 31, 2020
Today we give back, we return home. The video at the moment the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLMA) led by Minawi announced a ceasefire in support of the December 16, 2019, revolution movement.
Mini Arko Minawi, leader of SLMA, wrote:
التوقيع الذي تم في الامس سوف يضع السودان في زخم جديد ، علي الاطراف والشعب السوداني والاحزاب والمجتمع المدني بتعاون مع الاصدقاء والجوار الاقليمي علينا صنع منصة متينة لتاريخ جديد لبلادنا .
— Mini Arko Minawi. | مني اركو مناوي (@ArkoMinawi) September 1, 2020
Yesterday's signing will put Sudan in a new momentum, on the parties, the Sudanese people, parties and civil society, in cooperation with friends and the regional neighbourhood. We must create a solid platform for a new history for our country.
Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok welcomed the peace agreement, saying:
أهدي السلام الذي وقعناه اليوم بدولة جنوب السودان الشقيق إلى أطفالنا الذين ولدوا في معسكرات النزوح واللجوء لأُمّهات وآباء يشتاقون لقراهم ومدنهم، ينتظرون من ثورة ديسمبر المجيدة وعد العودة، وعد العدالة، وعد التنمية، ووعد الأمان.#سلام_السودان pic.twitter.com/sQRpunAlMo
— Abdalla Hamdok (@SudanPMHamdok) August 31, 2020
I dedicate the peace that we signed today in the brotherly State of South Sudan, to our children who were born in displacement and asylum camps, to mothers and fathers who long for their villages and cities, waiting for the glorious December revolution, the promise of return, the promise of justice, the promise of development, and the promise of safety.
The agreement guaranteed autonomy for rebel groups in their controlled areas under the supervision of the federal government. It will guarantee one-third of parliament chairs for people from rebel areas in order to reflect their needs and issues. The agreement will guarantee justice and equality for those who were persecuted by the former regime, often for being non-Muslim and non-Arab.
This is not the first peace agreement in Sudan history. Some netizens say that peace agreements are routine in Sudan, and may not bring peace and stability.
Inbal Ben Yehuda wrote:
An event that occurs once in every 5-9 years is not a “historic moment”. It's routine.
—
Abuja peace agreement – 2006
Doha peace agreement – 2011
Juba peace agreement – 2020
—
Better to wait before we celebrate. #Sudan #Darfur#سلام_السودان
— Inbal Ben Yehuda (@Inbaluna) August 31, 2020
Despite this exciting moment, two main rebel groups did not sign the agreement: The SLMA), led by Abdul Wahid al-Nur, and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, both refrained due to lingering questions about the mechanisms for integrating armies and the country identity.
Three days after the peace signing, Sudan PM Abdalla Hamdok traveled to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to meet with al-Hilu to discuss points of contention, according to Sudan Tribune.
Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok on Wednesday held a secret meeting with Abdel Aziz al-Hilu in an effort to break the deadlock in the peace talks mediated by the South Sudanese government.https://t.co/IrNxxW9a0M pic.twitter.com/VgtyDZxfv3
— Sudan Tribune (@SudanTribune_EN) September 3, 2020
The meeting resulted in the signing of a joint agreement of memorandum reinforcing the principles of the peace talks in Juba.
Sudan social media buzzed with a circulated copy of the agreement in English, with a particular focus on Article 3 on the subject of religion and state:
A democratic state must be established in Sudan. For Sudan to become a democratic country where the rights of all citizens are enshrined, the constitution should be based on the principle of ‘separation of religion and state’ in the absence of which the right to self-determination must be respected. Freedom of belief and worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in full to all Sudanese citizens. The state shall not establish an official religion. No citizen shall be discriminated against based on their religion.
Sudanese people split into two camps on the matter: The first sees the separation of religion and state as a guarantee of fundamental human rights; the second says the transitional government does not have the right to decide this without authorization from citizens via democratic elections.
Following the meeting, the prime minister’s Twitter account published an Arabic version of the agreement that differed from the English one, addressed as a joint press release. While the English document emphasized the separation of religion from the state as an inevitability, the Arabic document only recommended “discussion” of the controversial issue.
The differences between the two documents raise questions about the future of this agreement.
While peace has brought happy news to Sudan, the Nile River continues to flood, ushering in an unprecedented humanitarian disaster.
According to a Sudanese National Council for Civil Defense report on September 8, total losses due to the Nile flood amounted to 103 deaths, 50 injuries, 5,482 deaths of livestock, 27,341 complete house collapses, 42,210 cases of partial house collapse, damage to 179 government and private facilities, loss of 359 shops and stores and damage to 4,208 agricultural acres.
YouStorm on Twitter showed a video comparing the Nile Basin from July 16 and August 16:
Floods on the Nile in Sudan ?? 16 July comparison with 30 August #Sentinel2 ? north of Khartoum. Made with #EOBrowser @sentinel_hub #Sudanfloods pic.twitter.com/l8LRNBFY9m
— YouStorm (@YouStormorg) August 30, 2020
On September 3, Sinnar state governor Ustaz Elmahi Sulieman issued a distress call on Facebook:
The levels of the Blue Nile this night witnessed a great rise accompanied by heavy rain, which led to the breaking of the covers and shields, ‘a simple dam built by sacks of the soil,’ of the city of Singa and Umm Benin areas, and the water began to flood the city and its homes, as well as the neighbourhoods of Umm Benin. Therefore, we launch a directive to all official bodies and an appeal to all civil authorities and organizations to come to the rescue of the citizens as soon as possible, and to provide shelter, medicines and food.
The situation is catastrophic:
ولاية سنار | مدينة سنجة
الوضع كارثي بعد أن كسرت الأمطار ترس البحر مما أدى لدخول مياة النيل الأزرق للمدينة pic.twitter.com/1fk94r6hnC
— Wli (@wmuhaker) September 3, 2020
Sinnar state | Singa city The situation is catastrophic after the rain broke out the city's water shield, which allowed the waters of the Blue Nile to enter the city.
Sudanese youth from Tuti Island have built a shield to prevent floodwaters from reaching the island’s interior. It was a heroic scene, described by Hassan Shaggag:
هؤلاء من سيبنون السودان .. وليس اللذين يتصارعون على السلطة الآن #السودان_الوضع_المعيشي #تحديات_الفتره_الانتقاليه pic.twitter.com/OBApXgY6Us
— Hassan Shaggag (@HassanShaggag) August 29, 2020
These are the ones who will build Sudan … and not the ones who are fighting for power now.
Sudanese citizens lack basic necessities like bread, gas, medicine and electricity — with power outages up to six hours a day. The Sudanese pound’s inflation rate has exceeded 202 percent, according to Professor Steve Hanke. Yet, transitional authorities have not been able to gain control over the market.
Now that there’s again the promise of peace, what are the government’s plans to make life easier for citizens?

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Khattab Hamad


text:
How churches became entangled in Belarus’ political crisis · Global Voices
Paula Borowska

Holy Spirit Orthodox Cathedral in Minsk, capital of Belarus, 2018. Photo CC by 2.0: Andrew Milligan / Flickr.
This article originally appeared at BelarusDigest, an independent website providing analysis on Belarusian politics and society. It is republished here with permission, and has been edited for style and brevity.
On August 31, Belarusian border security officers denied a Belarusian citizen, Archbishop Tadeush Kandrusievich, the head of the Catholic Church, return into the country.
Amid displays of solidarity among various civil society leaders in Belarus, the authorities continue to respond with increased pressure. Religious organisations have been no exception in this mostly Orthodox Christian country of ten million.
Over the last few weeks, Kandrusievich has critically spoken out against the brutal crackdown on peaceful protests which took place after the presidential elections of August 9. Demonstrations continue against Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has ruled Belarus since 1994 and hoped to secure a sixth consecutive term in office.
The archbishop's sentiments have been echoed by other religious leaders in Belarus (Jewish, Christian Orthodox and Protestant). The stance of Metropolitan Paval, head of the Belarusian Orthodox Church, has even cost him his post. With this crackdown on religious civil society leaders, the Belarusian authorities aim to break the chain of solidarity among Belarusians, diminishing their ability to mobilise.
So far the Belarusian Catholic church has reacted in a balanced yet consistent way regarding the developments in the country. On August 15, Archbishop Kandrusievich, appealed to the authorities to resolve the conflict peacefully, emphasising that “people have the right to know the truth” (about the presidential election, whose results are widely believed to be falsified). He also criticised the state for using violence against protesters.
Yet, the Catholic church has unintentionally become more seriously involved in the current political crisis following state forces’ intervention in the Red Church in Minsk, the Belarusian capital. During protests on August 26, OMON riot police blocked the entrance to the church building for nearly 40 minutes, as some of the protesters and journalists were seeking shelter inside. Archbishop Kandrusievich, spoke from abroad about the incident, calling it “unacceptable and unlawful”.
On August 31, in an extraordinary move Kandrusievich, a Belarusian citizen, was denied return to Belarus without explanation. The next day, when visiting Baranavichy, Lukashenka enigmatically accused Archbishop Kandrusievich of “engaging with politics”, “suddenly going on a trip to Warsaw for consultation” and receiving “tasks” to do upon his return to Belarus, despite providing no proof to support this conspiracy theory. [Belarus’ Catholics mostly reside in the Hrodna region in the country's West, bordering Catholic-majority Poland which has had strained relations with the authorities in Minsk – ed.]
The entry ban on Archbishop Kandrusievich has shocked the public in Belarus and many have expressed their outrage towards the state’s decision, with those of all religious affiliations showing their solidarity. The service which took place on September 5 in the Red Church was attended by several thousand people.
In his sermon, Bishop Jury Kasabucki in strong words decried the “persecution of the Catholic Church in Belarus” (around 12 percent of Belarusians are Catholics, according to PEW Report 2017) and prayed for the victims of state violence. “Does opposition to torture equate to going into politics?”, he asked rhetorically.
The case of Metropolitan Paval is similar – the authorities expect unconditional loyalty from both him as an individual and the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC) as a whole, rather than the gestures of solidarity with the victims and critique of torture which the church has demonstrated.
Nevertheless, initially, the BOC has struggled to take a consistent position on the political crisis. While Metropolitan Paval officially congratulated Alyaksandr Lukashenka on his re-election, a couple of days later he spoke in a different tone. He apologised for the “premature reaction”, which, “has caused outrage among many Orthodox believers” in the country.
On August 12, during a meeting with journalists, Metropolitan Paval recognised that Belarusians “are entitled to have their issues but they should not be resolved by resistance”. Most likely, due to further pressure from Belarusian believers and in all probability also from the Orthodox clergy, the Church then spoke out more firmly. On August 15, the synod of the BOC strongly condemned both the harsh reaction of state forces and some incidents of provocation on the part of protesters. Metropolitan Paval then visited a hospital to meet victims of the brutal crackdown.
Soon after this, Metropolitan Paval suddenly stepped down from his post (perhaps with encouragement) and the synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (of which the BOC is part) proceeded to elect his successor – for the first time, a Belarusian, the Bishop of Barisau, Vaniamin.
Despite being new to the role, the new Metropolitan has already passed comment on the developments in the country. On August 26, he appealed to Orthodox believers (some of whom work in the state apparatus system), emphasising the spiritual and moral, rather than political, nature of the conflict. “Changing minds, changing hearts from evil to good, from lies to truth, from division to unity […] — these are the changes that our society needs first”, he stated.
Many Protestant Christians have also joined the protests or supported them, and some have subsequently been detained and sentenced. On August 14, Pentecostals and Charismatics officially appealed to the authorities to call a halt to the violence, release all detainees and begin a peaceful dialogue with the people.
Furthermore, members of one Minsk congregation have launched the initiative “From Kurapaty to Akreścina. Never again”, which brought thousands of people onto the street, forming a 15 kilometre chain. Many participants of the event were holding copies of the Bible, crosses, and white-red-white flags [which have become a widespread symbol of protest – ed.] in their hands.
Zmicier Dashkievich, an activist and Protestant, one of the initiators of the chain, emphasised to Belarus Digest that the cause of the current crisis and peoples’ demands are of a mainly moral, not economic nature, unlike those of the 1990s. Belarusians believe their voices have been stolen and thus have demanded to know the truth. According to Dashkievich, churches are the natural institutions to emerge to help resolve the political crisis with no bloodshed and bring spiritual renewal to Belarusian society.
Importantly, both “Kurapaty” and “Akreścina” have already emerged as symbols within the public space and discourse. The former is the site on the outskirts of Minsk which memorialises the most extreme atrocities of the Soviet regime towards Belarusians. Akreścina, on the other hand, is the Minsk-based detention centre, made infamous recently for keeping political prisoners (such as Paval Sieviaryniec from the Belarusian Christian Democracy Party) as well as protesters, often in intimidating conditions.
Through the crackdown on the Catholic leadership, the authorities have sent out a clear message to all their current and potential critics – whatever your public profile may be, there may be serious consequences for involvement (including the risk of losing your citizenship). Yet, the state aims for more as it hopes to break the chain of solidarity among Belarusians and civil society. And that includes the churches.
In fact, solidarity seems to be the most serious threat to the state apparatus. The authorities, therefore, do not underestimate the role religious organisations can play in society and are counteracting their effectiveness through preventive measures. However, this meddling within the Churches is unlikely to help stabilise the spirit of protest among Belarusians. On the contrary, many, regardless of their denominational affiliation, may find the incident concerning Archbishop Kandrusievich unacceptable and unlawful, which will inevitably trigger further acts and lead to a strengthening of solidarity within civil society.
It seems that these small acts of solidarity by the Churches (with protesters and each other) have seriously concerned the authorities, for whom the ideal would a divided civil society who mind their own business. This would prevent further solidarity, and, conversely, diminish the moral grounds for the protests. In fact, given the level of brutality of the state forces, any act of solidarity by the Churches with protesters (and with each other) will matter a lot, particularly in the coming days.

author: Paula Borowska


text:
Trinidadian writer Ingrid Persaud talks about her new novel, ‘Love After Love’ · Global Voices
Janine Mendes-Franco

Ingrid Persaud's new novel, “Love After Love,” set in Trinidad. Photo by Nicholas Laughlin, used with permission.
In a review of Trinidadian novelist Ingrid Persaud's latest offering, “Love after Love,” poet Shivanee Ramlochan described the book as “a take-no-prisoners trip into […] three hearts.”
The hearts she speaks of belong to Betty Ramdin, a survivor of domestic violence who is “more than her collection of bruises”; her son Solo, who is “more than a shy only child”; and their lodger, Mr. Chetan, who “elides easy pigeonholing reserved for queer Caribbean characters.” Chetan comes to board with them after Betty's abusive husband dies, and the trio forms a family of sorts.
As they try to help heal each others’ wounds, however, secrets come out that change everything, leaving them struggling with questions of identity, duty, community, desire and reconciliation. Perhaps most importantly, the shattering revelations guide their individual struggles along the journey to self-love, a theme that the book, which shares its title with Derek Walcott's poem, examines.
Set in Trinidad, the island of Persaud's birth, the novel pays tender reverence to the inimitable way in which Trinidadians communicate, imbuing the story's universal themes with local colour and vibrancy.
I interviewed Persaud via email to discuss the novel, her first since winning the 2017 Commonwealth Short Story Prize and the BBC National Short Story Award.
Author Ingrid Persaud; photo used with permission.
Janine Mendes-Franco (JMF): Are you at the level of self-love that Walcott wrote about?
Ingrid Persaud (IP): I borrow the title of Walcott’s poem with deference and gratitude. In the act of loving another, do we not often carelessly lose sight of ourselves? I’m sure everyone can identify with that challenge. I’d like to think I’m getting better at coming back to my own door, my own mirror, to show myself a little compassion. We should all heed that famous last line where the poet directs: ‘Sit. Feast on your life.’
JMF: With “Love After Love,” you’ve taken the approach of telling stories through a definitively Trinidadian lens to a new level, not just with your use of local dialect, but with its accompanying rhythm and pace. Was it a conscious decision or did the story just demand to be written that way?
IP: “Love After Love” is set in Trinidad and the characters are all ordinary Trini people, so it’s arguable the story demanded our English. But there’s more at stake than place dictating language. This is our authentic English with the same validity as any other. It’s only dialect if you aren’t one of the millions from the English-speaking Caribbean. Why are we seeking permission to use our English? Badass [writer] Sam Selvon was successfully owning it 70 years ago. The issue isn’t why a mainstream publisher like Faber bought this book but rather why it took so long for the industry to embrace work like mine.
JMF: You say that, but in the Caribbean, there has been a lot of discussion around the use of the Patois/Creole language as opposed to the Queen’s English – its viability, what it communicates in terms of intelligence, social class, etc. How do you feel about what still appears to be an effort to humiliate (or at the very least, de-motivate) dialect speakers and keep them in their place, so to speak?
IP: While we hold the English of a tiny minority as the absolute standard, any different use of English becomes othered. By deciding that our English is less than this gold standard we are colluding with the othering of ourselves. As if this weren’t ironical enough, we are having these debates within the region precisely when our English, our Caribbean sensibility, is being feted elsewhere. Roger Robinson, a Trini, licked up both the prestigious T. S. Elliot Prize and the Ondaatje Prize for his collection, “A Portable Paradise,” [and] “Golden Child,” by Claire Adams has won several prizes. Caroline McKenzie has just published “One Year of Ugly.” Ayanna Lloyd’s novel has so much buzz already and it’s not coming out until 2022. As a country we should be celebrating.
JMF: You were confident in your decision not to soften the dialect or explain the terminology. There was no glossary, for instance, as exists for the Ibo words in Achebe’s “Things Fall Apart.” Was it a difficult sell to your editor to go this route?
IP: Louisa Joyner, at Faber, and Nicole Counts, at One World, were incredible editors and I am full of gratitude to have learnt at their feet. Neither asked for a glossary. Indeed they were against the inclusion of any explanatory notes. The integrity of the writing would have to be sufficient. Hopefully the context of an unknown word or expression was enough for the non-Caribbean reader. Even better would be that readers left “Love After Love” with an increased vocabulary of words like steupse and bazodee, idioms like “cockroach have no right in fowl party” and expressions like “jeez” and “ages.”
JMF: What kind of feedback have you got from non-Trinbagonian readers about the language?
IP: Before publication, I made the decision not to look at comments from readers on the usual sites like Goodreads or Amazon. It just wasn’t going to be good for my mental health. All that to say the feedback I have had is limited to those who have sought me out specially and they naturally said nice things about the language in “Love after Love.” I don’t know about the swathes of readers who find the language off-putting. And that’s cool. To please everyone, I would have to be an Ali’s doubles with slight pepper.
JMF: You’ve been living outside of Trinidad for some time now, yet the language and the lilt have never left you. How do you manage that?
IP: Thank you for saying [it] hasn’t left me. I’m not always confident that I still hear it or hear it properly. When the doubt and longing sets in I pick up the phone and soak up the Trini voices of friends, family — anybody who will bother with me. Of course, language is a living thing. An expression might have evolved or vanished from everyday speech, so I pay attention to current usage. Our people are so creative that new words and idioms are constantly emerging. And we police our language as much as any other group. It would be literary suicide to write without consulting Winer’s huge tome – “Dictionary of the English/Creole of Trinidad and Tobago” or to abandon my well-thumbed copy of “Côté ci Côté là.”
JMF: Has that distance given you a unique perspective on identity and belonging?
IP: I don’t know if living outside of Trinidad has given me a unique perspective but it has made issues of identity and belonging central to my practice. Everyone needs a place called home, yet how that is constructed is always precarious and contested. I would point at San Fernando in south Trinidad and say — my navel string’s buried there. That is where I belong. Now I’m less sure GPS can locate my home. Years of self-exile have broken and remade my thinking. I’ve come to embrace the liminal space of non-belonging — simultaneously all and none of the places I inhabit. It’s closer to the everyday, lived experience without the push of alienation and pull of attachment.
JMF: Domestic violence and homophobia are themes that resonate strongly in the regional experience. Why did you want to examine them?
IP: I wrote about ordinary lives and, as you’ve said, domestic violence and homophobia are urgent and troubling everyday issues in our region. If you have gay characters then it’s impossible to ignore the homophobia that limits their life choices. I let the characters lead me and often, I wasn’t too sure where we would find ourselves. It was the only way I could navigate these themes.
JMF: You’re always able to hone in on the crux of a good narrative and structure it compellingly so that the reader is happily brought along for the ride. Describe what happens from the moment you think, “That’d make a good story.”
IP: You know how to make a bush bath to cleanse bad vibes that are clinging to your body and mind? I’m guessing you don’t. Maybe you can consult an old auntie who directs you to throw black sage and blue soap in the water. Then, you might ask a neighbour and he might add to the list of vital ingredients or even contradict what the old auntie suggested. Same thing with the creative process. Looking in, it feels like there must be a special alchemy that makes good writing. There isn’t any — or at least none that I’ve found. All you can do is show up at your desk every single day and write. If you do that, you might occasionally glimpse pure magic.

author: Janine Mendes-Franco


text:
Are Romance languages becoming more gender neutral? · Global Voices
Romina Navarro, Giovana Fleck, Violeta Camarasa, Tori Egherman, Laila Le Guen, Belen Febres-Cordero, Marisa Petricca, Andrea Paola Hernandez, Manuela Burghelea

Image from Pixabay, under Pixabay License, remixed by Global Voices.
In the coming months, Global Voices will explore non-binary language initiatives, initially known as “inclusive language”. This first collective story begins with an exploration of gender in Romance languages.
Language can be seen as a form of magic that impacts the world. What we say and how we use language affects our thinking, imagination, and our reality.
In most Romance languages, there are feminine and masculine gender marks for pronouns, nouns, adjectives, determiners, and demonstratives. In situations where a person's gender is unknown or when referencing a mixed-gender group, current Romance language conventions prioritize the masculine form as the generic standard. Unlike Romanian, which has preserved the neuter gender from Latin, the French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Catalan languages only have binary gender forms and, therefore, pose special difficulties for gender neutrality.
Activism for gender neutrality in language is part of a larger movement to question, resist, and dismantle sexism conveyed through language. Activists claim that the dominance of the masculine gender in languages is not neutral, as purported, but rather has been imposed historically through ideological and political processes.
During the past few decades, movements have pushed for the increased visibility of women and other genders in language by promoting the use of neuter pronouns and inflections with different combinations of symbols or vowels.
Photo by Chabe01, Wikimedia Commons, under CC BY-SA 4.0
Children who study French quickly learn the oft-repeated grammar rule: “masculine takes over feminine”. This means that in plural sentences with different genders, the masculine form dominates. Among French-speaking communities, an orthography known as inclusive writing has gained prominence in recent years to address this linguistic gender bias.
The first way of adopting inclusive writing is to use existing neutral forms where possible, for example, “lectorat” (‘the readership’) instead of “les lecteurs” (m.) or “les lectrices” (f.). The second technique explicitly includes both masculine and feminine endings. For example, the “e” and “ice” endings, often used for feminine forms, would follow the masculine form, for example, “lecteur·ice·s” (‘readers’).
Although this orthography has been adopted by some media outlets, universities and a few companies, it remains highly controversial, most notably in France, where critics argue that it is unnecessary.
The most common new pronoun used to refer to non-binary people or to a mixed-gender group is “iel” — a contraction of “il” and “elle” (‘he/she’). Yet, there is still no consensus as to how to mark a neutral gender in other parts of speech. For example, if “iel” is used, speakers might still be forced to pick, later on, one of the binary gender options for adjectives’ or nouns’ endings. So far, pronouns and gender-neutral alternatives have no institutional stamp of approval and are not widely used outside of queer, LGBTQI+ and feminist circles.
“No kid is born a macho” sign in a march for women's rights in Santa Fe, Argentina, 2017. Photo from Wikipedia, under CC BY-SA 4.0
Movements in the Spanish-speaking world have been pushing hard for gender neutrality. Language activism has been especially strong in Argentina, where it has become a powerful rhetorical and political tool in public discourse: President Alberto Fernández has used some forms of gender-neutral language in his speeches, several universities have allowed it in academic papers, and public offices like the Central Bank have included it in formal communications.
Several attempts at gender neutrality have been implemented over the past decades in Spanish; the earliest included the use of “x” and “@” to replace the vowel that marks gender such as ‘tod@s’ (‘everyone’). More recently, activists started using the “e” as a generic, neutral alternative, and the neuter pronoun “elle” emerged as an alternative for “él/ella” (‘he/she’).
While these forms are predominantly used within LGBTQI+ and feminist communities, a recent report by fact-checking news site Chequeado shows that some gender-neutral words are already being accepted (or tolerated) by Argentine speakers. Also, a new survey by the Spanish organization Fundéu highlighted the increasing use of “x”, “@”, or “e” by Spanish speaking Twitter users in each country.
Portuguese is similar to Spanish regarding alternatives for gender neutrality. In 2015, Andrea Zanella, a Brazilian psychologist, created a manifesto for “radically inclusive communication” in Portuguese in partnership with a company called Diversity Box. Since then, Diversity Box has been creating gender-inclusive guides for companies.
Like in Spanish, the use of “x” or “@” has become popular on the internet, especially among feminist groups, despite not being part of Portuguese language grammar rules which requires legal changes in the Brazilian Congress. The matter is not currently on the legislative agenda in Brazil
IPA vowel chart, from Wikipedia under CC BY-SA 3.0
In Italy, even though debates about gender neutrality are not as prevalent as they are in Spanish-speaking communities, there is a discussion led by Italian linguist Vera Gheno about the schwa or scevà (ә), an International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) symbol.
The schwa stems from dialects of Central and Southern Italy and can be used to refer to multiple people in a gender-neutral way. It could replace the * or “@” at the end of gendered words, which is very common online but not pronounceable in spoken Italian. In August 2020, Italian blogger Alice explained how to pronounce the schwa.
This proposal was made five years ago by the citizen-led project “Italiano Inclusivo” (‘Inclusive Italian’), although the official language authority, Accademia della Crusca, still refuses to accept the schwa (and any other form) as an evolution towards a neutral Italian language.
In Catalan-speaking territories, an adaptation of the non-binary language solutions developed in the Spanish-speaking world is gaining momentum within feminist and LGBTQI+ communities. “Elli” and “ellis” become alternatives to “ell/ ella” (‘he/she’) and the plural forms “ells/elles” (‘they’ m., ‘they’ f.).
Though many institutions — including Catalonia's local government — have been recommending the use of non-binary language for decades, guidelines from the Autonomous University of Barcelona focus on strategies like giving preference to existing neutral alternatives such as “el professorat” (a group of professors) or double-gender forms like “els professors i les professores” (‘the professors’ m. and ‘the professors’ f.), or feminine generics.
Non-binary language is particularly challenging in Romanian. Forms such as “@” or “e” do not work for Romanian since “o” is not usually a masculine ending and feminine nouns are traditionally formed by adding a suffix to the masculine (“activist“>”activistă“). Sometimes the alternative “X” ending is used, for example, “activistX” instead of “activiști”/”activiste“, masculine and feminine for “activists”. However, gender activists use the pronouns “ei” or “ele” (as a rough translation to the English “they”) to avoid carrying gender marks.
Unlike the aforementioned languages, Romanian has preserved the neuter gender from Latin, but it is mostly used for objects or collective entities. All neuter nouns are masculine in the singular form and feminine in the plural, hence grammatical neuter does not necessarily equal neutrality from a non-binary language perspective. So, despite the apparent linguistic advantage, gender neutrality in Romanian seems far from prospering at the moment.


text:
In DR Congo, will new legislation protect citizens’ digital rights? · Global Voices
Providence Baraka

A view of downtown Kinshasa, the capital of Democratic Republic of Congo. Credit: MONUSCO/Myriam Asmani / CC BY-SA 2.0
This article is part of UPROAR, a Small Media initiative that is urging governments to address digital rights challenges at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
In the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where armed conflict has gripped the region for decades, rebel groups often use kidnappings to secure ransoms in their bid for power in the region.
According to LUCHA, a nonviolent, nonpartisan citizen movement, kidnappers have repeatedly used telecommunications networks to intimidate victims’ families, demand and receive ransoms through mobile money services.
LUCHA has launched a campaign across the country to reclaim digital rights violated by these telecoms companies. The group wants telecom companies to “cooperate with the security services, to geolocate the kidnappers and find their collaborators in order to reduce insecurity…,” according to RFI.
Since March 2019, LUCHA has staged peaceful demonstrations in front of telecoms offices to demand better quality services and more cooperation with security, Espoir Ngalukiye, a LUCHA member, told Global Voices.
Today, a citizen movement is underway to reclaim digital rights that have been violated for years under a vague and outdated framework law from 2002 related to post and telecommunications that still governs the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector.
The law does not adequately address human rights violations or impunity for those who violate those rights. In fact, the law enables the government to violate users’ digital rights: Authorities have previously used the law to justify the disruption of access to networks and social media platforms.
Under Article 45 of the law, authorities have the power to ban “partially or in full and for a period they determine the usage of telecommunications installation’’ for public security and national defense reasons. The government also has the power to requisition telecommunications facilities under the same law.
The poor quality of digital services and the nonexistence of adapted legal frameworks in the country have led to multiple violations of rights to freedom of expression and privacy.
Telecom companies have faced increased criticism for their quality of services and prices. In response, LUCHA released a campaign demanding lower prices in 2019 and re-launched it in 2020.
Un an après le lancement de notre campagne #ABasLesPrix pour exiger des sociétés de télécommunication de meilleurs services aux clients et des tarifs justes; étant donné la non tenue de leurs engagements et de ceux de l’@OfficielArptc, nous relançons la pression dès lundi 16 mars pic.twitter.com/xNQRADMlG7
— LUCHA ?? (@luchaRDC) March 12, 2020
One year after the launch of our #ABasLesPrix campaign to demand better service for customers and fair prices from telecommunications companies; considering the non-fulfilment of their commitments and those of the @OfficielArptc, we are restarting pressure from Monday, March 16
Fed up by poor digital services, citizens have begun to express their indignation toward telecoms and some have threatened to take legal action.
On July 3, a citizen explicitly accused Orange DRC, a subsidiary of the multinational French telecommunication group Orange, of infringing on his rights to communicate and express himself by depriving him of the possibility of using data packages that he had already activated.
Un droit se réclame.
J’ai saisi @Orange__RDC pour ses abus avant de saisir la Justice. Hier, j’ai connu le pire comme certains abonnés à Kisangani.
Ma lettre ?? pic.twitter.com/nF2WYEfVvE
— Jean-François D. ALAUWA B. (@AlauwaBO) July 3, 2020
A right is claimed. I informed @Orange__RDC  of their  abuses before going to justice. Yesterday I experienced the worst like some subscribers in Kisangani . My letter…
But many of these complaints did not lead to convictions because the law was too vague to offer guidance on this type of violations.
Meanwhile, a bill initiated by the government is still awaiting promulgation by President Félix Tshisekedi.
During a February 19 broadcast of “Parole aux auditeurs” talk show on Radio OKAPI, a United Nations radio station, professor Kodjo Ndukuma, a digital expert, announced that a “bill related to telecoms had been introduced by the government in April 2017.”
The bill was adopted by the National Assembly on May 7, 2018, and “definitively adopted” on November 22, 2018.
On February 7, Hon. National Deputy Tony Mwaba also tabled a bill ”on cybersecurity and cybercrime.” He did not provide any additional details on the content of the bill.
J'ai déposé ce vendredi 7 février 2020 au bureau de l'assemblée nationale, une proposition de loi portant cybersecurité et cybercriminalité. Dans l'espoir de combler le vide juridique qu'affiche ce secteur en RDC.
— Honorable Tony Mwaba (@ProfesseurTony) February 8, 2020
This Friday, February 7, 2020, I tabled a bill on cyber security and cybercrime at the office of the national assembly. Hoping to fill the legal vacuum that this sector shows in DR CONGO.
What remains unclear though is whether these bills, if enacted, will in any way protect the rights of users in DR Congo. The bills have not been made available to the public.
During the airing of “Parole aux auditeurs,” some listeners encouraged and complimented the government and parliamentarians for having an “anticipatory” culture that keeps up with incidents related to online human rights violations.
But other Congolese citizens were skeptical about the applicability of all these laws. One listener called in to say:
Ensuring citizens’ rights in the virtual space would require the government to have the necessary budget, staff and infrastructure to do even documentation or surveillance.
As long as there are unclear, ever-changing legal frameworks to protect human rights within the digital space, violations of rights to freedom of expression and privacy will continue. Citizens will also continue to fear claiming their rights because there's no assurance that these laws are designed to protect them in digital spaces.

author: Providence Baraka


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School children and their teacher kidnapped in Nigeria’s Kaduna, as armed bandits run amok · Global Voices
Nwachukwu Egbunike

School children in Kaduna State, Nigeria. Image by Jeremy Weate, January 15, 2010 via  Flickr / CC BY 2.0.
Armed bandits attacked a secondary school in Kaduna, northwestern Nigeria, on August 24, killing one person and kidnapping four students and a teacher, reports Nigerian online medium, SaharaReporters.
The gunmen who arrived at Damba-Kasaya village in Chikun Local Government Area, Kaduna State, at around 7:45 a.m. on motorbikes first raided the community, where they reportedly killed Benjamin Auta, a farmer, according to Nigerian online newspaper Premium Times.
The gunmen then proceeded to Prince Academy Secondary School, where they abducted teacher Christianah Madugu, and four students: Favour Danjuma, 9, Miracle Danjuma, 13, Happy Odoji, 14, and Ezra Bako, 15.
Happy’s father, Isiaka Odoji,  told Daily Trust, a Nigerian daily, that the gunmen are asking for a ransom of 20 million naira (about $53,000 USD) to set their children free — an amount they cannot possibly afford.
The kidnapped students in the last year of junior secondary school were writing their final examinations. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only students in exit classes were allowed to come back to school.
Both the federal and Kaduna state governments have remained silent on the fate of the abducted students and their teacher.
Twitter user Ndi Kato called the incident devastating for the nation:
Today in Kaduna state, children in exit classes who were told to resume school were kidnapped by armed gunmen. One was reportedly killed. Small boy, his life cut short. The others have been taken away and we may never hear of them again.
This should devastate any nation…
— Ndi Kato (@YarKafanchan) August 24, 2020
But it is still “a normal day in Nigeria” piqued Twitter user Chima Chigozie:
Some school children were kidnapped in kaduna, one of the school boys was killed
along the line. The boys life was cut short, the school children are being held in fear. This should spike the nation but NO, it's a normal day in Nigeria.
— Chima Chigozie (@CallMeGozie) August 25, 2020
Jaja blames politics for the absence of public empathy and outrage for the kidnapped school children:
The abducted Kaduna Boys will not get the same support and attention as the Chibok Girls because firstly, they are boys, and secondly, GEJ isn't President.
— Jamal (@JajaPhD) August 26, 2020
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (GEJ) was Nigeria's president when, in April 2014, 276 schoolgirls from a government secondary school were kidnapped by Boko Haram militants from the northeastern town of Chibok. This lead to the global hashtag movement #BringBackOurGirls that resonated with millions of people around the world.
On February 19, 2018, Boko Haram also kidnapped 110 schoolgirls from Government Girls Science and Technical College, Dapchi, Yobe State, northeastern Nigeria.
The kidnapping of the Damba-Kasaya school children and their teacher is a grisly deja vu.
The only difference is that this time around, those responsible for this horrendous incident are not Boko Haram — but armed bandits.
Banditry violence spiked in Nigeria’s northwestern states of Zamfara, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina.
ACAPS, an independent humanitarian think tank, asserts that this armed violence is “unconnected to the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast”:
The banditry violence began as a farmer/herder conflict in 2011 and intensified between 2017 to 2018 to include cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, sexual violence and killings. By March 2020, more than 210,000 people have been internally displaced.
Rural communities have been left at the mercy of these bandits who, between January and June this year, have killed at least 1,126 people in northern Nigeria.
Villages in southern Kaduna are the worst hit, with 366 lives lost in the first half of 2020, says Amnesty International.
Chikun LGA, the home of the kidnapped students, had experienced a series of militia attacks that has resulted in the deaths, abduction, “with 45 communities displaced and occupied since 2019,” according to the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union.
The people of southern Kaduna allege that the bandits are Fulani herders, on a land grab mission, with the passive consent of both the federal and state governments.
But Kaduna State governor, Nasir El-Rufai denied that the carnage had anything to do with land grabbing nor any ethnoreligious motivation.
On August 22, the Kaduna State government relaxed the curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m., which was imposed in some parts of the state to curb the banditry.
Nonetheless, Luka Binniyat, spokesman of the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union (SOKAPU) laments that “hunger is also killing us because we cannot go to our farms. Our people are helpless.”

author: Nwachukwu Egbunike


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Thousands of Salvadorans endure COVID-19 without running water to wash their hands · Global Voices
Eddie Galdamez

Screenshot from video of news channel EFE on Twitter, August 19, 2020.
One of the most essential aspects of COVID-19 prevention is regularly washing your hands; however, hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans are facing COVID-19 without reliable access to water. According to the United Nations, more than 600,000 people did not have access to any type of drinking water and sanitation services in 2016 and more than one million people only had access to deficient water services. According to news reports, this situation has possibly worsened due to the pandemic.
Rosa Amelia Mendoza, a 45-year-old mother of three who resides in Colonia Altavista, a municipality about 15 kilometers from downtown San Salvador, has not had any running water in her house since the pandemic started back in March 2020. In fact, she hasn't had any tap water consistently in her home for over two years. On a phone call with Global Voices she said:
“Yo tengo miedo por mi familia, todos nos recomiendan que nos lavemos las manos con regularidad, sólo para asegurarnos de que el virus no nos llegue. Pero, ¿cómo puedo hacer eso si no hay agua para hacerlo? No hay ningún río o pozo cercano al que podamos ir a traer agua, y no tenemos los recursos para pagar un camión cisterna con regularidad. En este momento no estoy trabajando.”
“I am afraid for my family, everyone recommends that you wash your hands regularly, just to make sure the virus doesn't get to you. But how can you do that if there is no water to do it with? There is no river or well nearby that we can go carry water, and we don't have the means to pay a water truck regularly. I am not working right now.”
Mendoza's story is similar to thousands of communities in the capital city of San Salvador and its periphery. Cities such as Ilopango, Mejicanos, Soyapango, Ciudad Delgado, Altavista, and parts of San Salvador — where many working-class people live — are some of the most affected. According to EFE News Agency, one of these communities, Soyapango, also has the second-highest rate of COVID-19 contagion in the country.
Not having running water in homes is not a new problem, yet COVID-19 made the situation more dire since water is crucial for hygienic measures against the virus. Journalist Santiago Leiva told Global Voices via text:
“El agua es un tema tan oxidado como las cañerías que la sirven ocasionalmente, y es tan profundo, que a pesar de las protestas de calle que se hicieron en el pasado nunca hubo eco en los gobiernos pasados, y sigue siendo un líquido que aún no termina de privilegiar a toda la población.”
“Water is a rusty subject similar to the pipes that occasionally serve it. The water problem is so deep that despite the street protests that took place in the past, there was never an echo of concern from past governments. Water has not yet ended up serving the entire Salvadoran population.”
Access to water is not legally recognized as a human right in El Salvador,  and the country is at risk of drought. Although lack of water regulation and climate change are two of the reasons for El Salvador's overall water deficit, in urban areas, the most pressing issue is related to a lack of public services. The affected communities in San Salvador mentioned above are supplied with water from the Las Pavas processing plant, an old water processing plant that should have been out of use or upgraded years ago with funds approved by the legislative Assembly in 2012, 2016, and 2018. The work was never completed.
Las Pavas is the only plant that renders water to the greater metropolitan area of San Salvador. Yet, today, the plant is not producing enough clean water to provide for the over one million people who depend on it. If it were to break down during the pandemic, as it did in January 2020, it would be even more disastrous.
Allegations and cases of corruption within the entity responsible for water services (Administración Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados, or ANDA) have been present since the mid-1990s. Carlos Perla, president of ANDA from 1994 to 2002, for example, just finished serving a 15-year jail sentence for corruption. Recently, Frederick Benites, president of ANDA under the Nayib Bukele administration, informed the Attorney General of El Salvador about years of grave cases of mismanagement of public funds worth millions of dollars.
.@FredckBenitez: Hemos encontrado una mala gestión en los últimos 15 años, por eso ahora tenemos un déficit anual de $33 millones. pic.twitter.com/N4c8bRxZGr
— ANDA (@ANDASV) June 26, 2019
The plant has been mismanaged over the last 15 years, so now we have an annual deficit of $33 million.
The Nayib Bukele administration has claimed that the Las Pavas water plant has not received proper maintenance or upgrades since Francisco Flores was president from 1999 to 2004. President Bukele shared photos and explained how the negligence and corruption of the last 30 years have brought the Las Pavas plant to its current condition.
Con solo ver las fotografías, les dije: “¿Cómo es posible que esto esté así? ¿Se imaginan el daño a la salud que le han estado haciendo a nuestra gente?
Por eso tanta insuficiencia renal, por eso tantas enfermedades estomacales”. pic.twitter.com/1V1Ri7dI0M
— ?? (@nayibbukele) October 26, 2019
Just by looking at the pictures, I told them, “How can this be? Can you imagine the health damage they have been doing to our people? That's why there are so many kidney failures, that's why there are so many stomach diseases.”
In the short term, the state, through ANDA, is distributing bottled water to the affected communities, along with water trucks. The government also planned on digging new wells in order to provide water and stop dependence on the Las Pavas Water plant. According to their official website, ANDA is also upgrading Las Pavas with new equipment. This is part of the government's new “National Water Plan“. On August 18, ANDA tweeted:
Periódicamente nuestro departamento de pipas y agua embotellada permanecen abasteciendo con agua potable a los usuarios de Sierra Morena 2.
Este día realizamos la entrega de 25 mil botellas con agua.
Continuaremos apoyando a zonas que presentan irregularidad en el suministro. pic.twitter.com/CT1PNuRfvn
— ANDA (@ANDASV) August 18, 2020
Periodically, our pipes and bottled water department continue to supply the users of Sierra Morena 2 with drinking water.
Today we delivered 25,000 bottles of water.
We will continue to support areas who have irregular water supply
However, residents from Colonia Altavista complained about the lack of service. Mendoza, who received bottled water, is one of the frustrated citizens. She said:
La pipa de agua llega quizás una vez al mes, lo que no es suficiente para sobrevivir todo el mes. Estoy tan frustrada y enojada que estoy considerando dejar El Salvador una vez que termine la pandemia. La única razón por la que no me he ido a los Estados Unidos es que tengo niños pequeños.
The water truck comes maybe once a month, which is not enough to survive the entire month. I am so frustrated and angry that I am considering leaving El Salvador once the pandemic is over. The only reason I haven't gone to the US is that I have young kids.
In January, President Bukele suggested reopening the 14-year-old debate about making access to water a human right and keeping its management in the hands of the public sector, thereby limiting its privatization. On September 7 and 8, a commission from the opposition-led Legislative Assembly started studying law proposals — perhaps in the future, thousands of Salvadorans will have running water to drink and wash their hands.

author: Eddie Galdamez


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Website exposing military corruption blocked in Myanmar · Global Voices
Mong Palatino

Screenshot of the website homepage of Justice for Myanmar
The Justice for Myanmar website was blocked in Myanmar on August 27 for allegedly spreading ‘fake news’.
The website was launched on April 28 by a ‘covert group of activists’ who vowed to expose the systemic corruption in the Myanmar military.
We have begun to expose the systemic causes of inequality, violence, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Justice for Myanmar and its allies are collecting evidence and exposing the vast business network funding brutal oppression in Myanmar.
Myanmar’s military has ruled the country for decades until it was replaced by a civilian government in 2011. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party lost in the 2015 elections but the military is assured of seats in the parliament through a constitutional provision which the junta drafted and approved in 2008.
Some of the website’s recent stories included documents revealing alleged business interests of the children of top military generals and details of military profits from international businesses.
Yadanar Maung, spokesperson of Justice for Myanmar, deplored the blocking of the website:
Our claims are backed up by evidence and we welcome the government to respond to our reports, with evidence. However, instead of engaging in public debate and accountability, the civilian government has chosen repression and is attempting to cover-up the military’s wrongdoing.
Myanmar’s telecommunications ministry spokesperson Myo Swe told Reuters the reason why it ordered the blocking of a named website and three associated IP addresses. “The social media monitoring team found that some websites are spreading fake news.”
Telecommunications operator Telenor Myanmar, a subsidiary of the Norwegian Telenor Group, released a statement protesting the directive issued by the ministry although it didn’t identify the blocked websites.
Telenor Myanmar has complied with the directive under protest.
Telenor Myanmar views this directive with grave concern. Since receiving the directive we have had multiple dialogues with the authorities protesting the blocking. Our position is that freedom of expression and the right of access to information should be respected. We will continue our efforts to lift the blocking and encourage the government of Myanmar to increase transparency for the public.
This is not the first time that the government invoked Section 77 of the Telecommunications Law to block websites. Last March, more than 200 websites were blocked for allegedly spreading ‘fake news’. The list included ethnic media platforms providing news coverage in remote communities.
Global Voices reached out to Justice for Myanmar through Twitter and learned that it created a mirror site on Github which made it possible for internet users to access the website in Myanmar
On how the blocking of the website affected their work, they said:
The blocking creates a challenge for us to fully engage with people within Myanmar. It shows the increased intolerance by the government on freedom of expression and that they are trying to cover up the crimes and corruption of the military. This is absolutely disturbing.
One of their objectives is to pressure international companies to cut financial ties with Myanmar’s military.
We will continue our campaign to dismantle the Myanmar military cartel by exposing their operations and building pressure for international action, including targeted sanctions and divestment. This is essential for Myanmar to achieve federal democracy and a sustainable peace.
They said there are more than 150 international and domestic companies engaged with military-owned businesses in Myanmar.
They are asking solidarity from the international community:
We call on the international community to support freedom of expression in Myanmar and stand up to censorship, not just for the Justice For Myanmar campaign but also ethnic media sites that continue to be blocked, including Karen News, DMG (Development Media Group) and Narinjara.

author: Mong Palatino


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Why Malawi urgently needs a data protection law · Global Voices
Steve Sharra

A demonstration in the capital Lilongwe, organized by the Human Rights Defenders Coalition (HRDC), over fraud in the 2019 elections, which were eventually nullified. Photo by Steve Sharra.
This article is part of UPROAR, a Small Media initiative that is urging governments to address digital rights challenges at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
In Malawi, authorities increasingly require citizens to give up personal information to engage in everyday life, from using a mobile phone to participating in elections.
But without a clear data protection law, citizens’ rights to privacy are under threat.
In 2017, the Malawi government rolled out nationwide registration. Every Malawian aged 16 and above is required to register into the national register and obtain a national identity card.
This followed the January 2010 national registration and identification system under then-President Bingu wa Mutharika’s National Registration Act. It took five years for the system to become operational on August 1, 2015.
According to the National Registration Bureau (NRB), the national ID system would serve many purposes by acquiring “information about the population” that would enable “policymakers to use data-driven planning” for development and services delivery. For individuals, this would give them “proof of their nationality and personal information so that they can use it to claim their benefits.”
Most recently, these identification registration systems were called into question in the days leading up to Malawi’s do-over election in June, when then-opposition candidate Dr. Lazarus Chakwera, of Tonse Alliance, made allegations that underage children were being registered as part of a plot to rig the fresh election.
On social media, netizens posted photographs of children lining up, purportedly to be registered into the National Registration System, synchronized with voter registration. The NRB denied these allegations.
The Human Rights Defenders Coalition wrote to the NRB to express its concern over the matter, and the Malawi Human Rights Commission instituted an investigation.
The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that in the fresh elections, only previously registered voters in the original May 2019 election could vote and that new voters were ineligible. The decision came when then-President Peter Mutharika disputed the Constitutional Court ruling that ordered the fresh election.
The national ID process then became tied to the national sim card registration process.
In January 2018, the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) announced a mandatory national sim card registration exercise.
Based on the Communications Act of 2016, this required everyone with a mobile phone number in the country to register their sim card. MACRA issued a deadline of March 31, 2018, to register every sim card, after which date all unregistered numbers would stop working. The deadline was later extended to September 30, with a requirement that all newly bought sim cards must get registered within seven days.
By October 2018, it was estimated that up to 9 million Malawians had registered with the National Register.
MACRA said sim registration is important for several reasons: First, it prevents a fraudulent practice called “sim boxing;” it helps recover stolen phones; offers protection from violent, threatening, or hateful texts; instills “discipline” for abusers; helps law enforcement solve crimes; and checks fraud and theft committed via mobile phones.
Banks and telecoms companies operating mobile money services embarked on a “know your customer” exercise in which Malawians were required to present their national ID for all transactions. They announced that failure to present a national ID would result in freezing one’s account.
University of Malawi scholar Jimmy Kainja pointed out in August 2019 that Malawians were being forced to give away a lot of their personal data to both private and public institutions when the country did not have a data privacy protection law. In his article, “Are Malawians Sleep Walking into a Surveillance State?” Kainja argued that the country needed a data protection law before Malawians were required to surrender all personal data.
As stated by the NRB, data collected for the National Register includes a person’s surname and given names, nationality, date of birth, and place of birth. The NRB also collects data on one’s sex, current residence, height, eye color, passport number, marital status and parents’ information. The bureau also collects biometric information, including all 10 fingerprints, a personal photograph and signature.
How safe was this personal data? What assurances were there that third parties would not have access to this data? Who would be held accountable should there be data breaches?
Journalist Gregory Gondwe observed in July that digital surveillance was slowly creeping into Malawi while hiding behind legal instruments. Gondwe argued that the country lacked a “dedicated data governance framework” that placed citizens “at the mercy of those in the custody of such personal data as they could use it against them or worse still, pawn it for a profit.”
Information technology expert Zangaphee Chimombo told Global Voices that sim registration is necessary, especially as the country ponders the introduction of cryptocurrency.
However, he cautions against potential abuse of sim card data by telecoms staff and government authorities. In cases where necessary, “the use of valid police search warrants should be ensured,” urged Chimombo.
According to both Kainja and Gondwe, the government is currently drafting a data protection law, but bringing the law through the legislative process could prove to be a drawn-out process.
University of Malawi law scholar Edge Kanyongolo told Gondwe that a law for the protection of personal data would stand a better chance of passing if there was coordinated pressure among likeminded groups such as human rights advocates, doctors, lawyers and members of the opposition.
Following Malawi's fresh election on June 23, Dr. Lazarus Chakwera became the new president of Malawi. He has since promised Malawians a new era in which the rule of law will be paramount, among other momentous reforms.
Kainja hopes that the enactment of a data protection law will be among those reforms. Malawians have been too willing to surrender their personal data without assurances of the safety and protection of their data, he observes.

author: Steve Sharra


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A Chinese city withdraws ‘civility code’ following online criticism · Global Voices
The Stand News

Screen capture from Suzhou city code. Image from the Stand News, used with permission.
This a translation of a Chinese story published on the Stand News on September 7, 2020. It is published here under a content partnership agreement.
Building upon the successful implementation of its “health code” system in restricting citizens’ movement during COVID-19 pandemic, Suzhou — a Chinese city near Shanghai — attempted to launch a “civility code” in early September to rank citizens’ civility and award or punish them accordingly. But strong reactions from netizens forced authorities to postpone the plan.
The health code is a coding system that keeps track of an individual's health condition and controls their movements accordingly. The system is embedded in various mobile applications including Alipay.
Guards at stores, malls, and public transport will scan a QR code on visitors’ mobile phones, and only those with a “green” code are allowed to enter. If a citizen has been potentially exposed to the virus, the QR code will turn “yellow” and they will not be able to access some facilities. A red code obligates a citizen to quarantine.
Suzhou city, known as “the Venice of the East,” was among the first Chinese cities to launch a health code system in February 2020. The health code is embedded in an application called “Suzhou City Code” (蘇城碼), which is a digital ID used to control all its residents’ movements during the COVID-19 outbreak. Suzhou was also one of a dozen cities chosen in 2018 to run a trial on the China's social credit system to rank and adjust citizen behavior with an award and punishment scheme.
On September 3, Suzhou City Code had an upgrade introducing a new function called the “civility code.” It would work similarly as the health code, only it would be ranking people's behavior rather than their health condition.
The new civility code had two sets of indexes, “civility in traffic performance” and “civility in voluntary work performance”. According to various reports from mainland Chinese news outlets, each citizen starts with 1,000 civility points when they first sign in to the app. If they are found jay-crossing or drunk-driving, points would be deducted; if they contribute to voluntary work, they would gain extra points.
Suzhou city's public security bureau explained in its official WeChat account that the objective of the civility code is to “construct a civility ranking system”. In the latter stage, more indexes would be added, such as “civility in garbage recycling”, “civility in dining behavior”, “civility in online behavior,” “civility in following law and order,” among others.
The bureau also said that those with high scores would have more advantages in seeking employment, enrolling in schools, and accessing both public and private services.
Despite heavy censorship measures, criticism of the plan flooded Chinese social media platforms. Yu Jian-rong, a famous Chinese sociologist, was one of the most outspoken critics. He said on Weibo:
【危险的文明码】…问题是：1、谁有权确定文明的标准和定量分值？2、谁有权以文明的名义剥夺公民平等享受公众服务的权利？
[Dangerous civility code]… the issue at stake is: 1. Who is to decide on the quality and quantity of civility? 2. Who has the power to deprive citizens of their rights to public service in the name of civility?
A widely shared anonymous comment compared the system with wartime crimes against humanity:
【苏州文明码】由不公示财产的贪官 / 给草民划分文明等级、发证书！/ 类似曰军的良民证、那粹的犹太星标！ / 本质都一样 / 是恶魔强盗对善良平民的迫害 / “标记、分类、清除”。
[Suzhou civility code] A bunch of corrupted officials who refused to disclose their property / are having the power to rank citizens’ civility and issue related credentials! / Such system is similar to the “good citizen ID system” during the Sino-Japanese war, or the Jewish star badges used by the Nazis! / Their nature is the same / They are used by the evil thugs to suppress the ordinary people / to “mark, categorize and eliminate.”
A widely circulated post which has been taken down highlighted privacy violations:
文明码并不文明，是借文明之名，行野蛮之实的倒行逆施。…信息技术的发展和应用，大家都在裸奔，一举一动都在别人的眼里。他还要拿着显微镜挑疵，对着自己的模型对你修理、宰割，你不仅没有隐私和尊严，还被恐惧和伤害笼罩。
The civility code has nothing to do with civility, it is a brutal measure in the name of civility….The development and application of information technology has exposed our private lives to others… Now they are using a microscope to look into your flaws and to manipulate your behavior according to their liking. You lose your privacy and dignity, fear and threats will be all around you.
After receiving criticism from netizens, Suzhou's Office on Building Spiritual Civilization — a branch under the Propaganda Department to proactively promote good citizen behavior — announced on September 6 that the testing phase of the civility code had ended and the related authorities would modify the system, which would be implemented at a future time.
The Office said citizen criticism online was due to a misunderstanding and stressed that, during the testing period, 5,861 users signed up to the function voluntarily and, thus far, no one had been punished or discriminated against for having low scores.
Although the Suzhou civility code was withdrawn, many anticipated that it would be relaunched with a new name. As a popular comment on Weibo pointed out:
后面相继要出台守法码、失信码、洁身码……等等，请大家保持手机存储空间，生活中将全部启用“码”。
Anticipating that there will be more upcoming codes like “follow law and order code”, “truthfulness code”, “purity code” and etc. We have to empty the storage in our mobile phone to prepare for all these codes in our lives.

author: The Stand News


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Fans mourn the passing of energetic Jamaican reggae icon, ‘Toots’ Hibbert · Global Voices
Emma Lewis

“Toots” Hibbert performing with his band, Toots and the Maytals on June 27, 2008.  Photo by Flickr user Olatz eta Leire, CC BY-SA 2.0.
A unique voice fell silent on the evening of September 11, when pioneering reggae singer/songwriter “Toots” Hibbert, best known as the front man for the band Toots and the Maytals, passed away at the age of 77 at the University Hospital of the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica.
Although the cause of death has not been confirmed locally, he was suffering from respiratory issues. Internationally, his passing has been widely reported as being COVID-19-related.
The band broke the news on Twitter early the following morning:
It is with the heaviest of hearts to announce that Frederick Nathaniel “Toots” Hibbert passed away peacefully tonight, surrounded by his family at the University Hospital of the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica… pic.twitter.com/zOb6yRpJ7n
— Toots & The Maytals (@tootsmaytals) September 12, 2020
As obituaries and tributes poured in from around the world, Jamaicans paid tribute to the reggae icon in their own way. Unlike many other internationally popular Jamaican musicians, “Toots” was well known and well-loved in Jamaica and often performed on the island.
Jamaican public relations practitioner Robyn Miller reflected sadly:
Somehow, I thought u'd pull through, Toots. Maybe it's that energy, those big notes you belted out, the infectious music u continued to give us. What a firebrand u were for #jamaican music. Hell, you just gave us #RiseUpJamaica plus a new album! Man, the artistry!? #SIP #Toots pic.twitter.com/c17O078hOm
— Robyn Miller (@RobynMils) September 12, 2020
The musician had been working hard in the weeks before his passing, having recently participated in the Independence holiday's Jamaica Festival Song Competition, released a new album, and performed at an online gala in early August:
Farewell to our beloved #TootsHibbert. Here he was at our Independence Gala where he received the Jamaica Reggae Icon Award. Gratitude for the joy. #RIP ?????? pic.twitter.com/fDqDibnqsf
— J A Lowrie-Chin (@LowrieChin) September 12, 2020
Although Buju Banton was this year's winner, cultural historian Wayne Chen pointed out that “Toots” was the very first winner of Jamaica’s Festival in 1966. His winning song — with a title that became a common Jamaican saying, explained here by Damian Marley — became embedded in the Jamaican cultural landscape:
BAM BAM (1966)
1st Jamaica Festival Song competition winner. Covered or sampled by Kojack & Liza (1982), Sister Nancy (1982), Chaka Demus & Pliers (1993), Lauryn Hill (1998), Jay-Z (2017)…classic song whose title is embedded in our language. Timeless.https://t.co/267Cb3n4Nc pic.twitter.com/X46uLPHn0P
— Wayne Chen (@wcchen) September 12, 2020
As two Kingston-based Twitter users pointed out, Toots’ joyful, energy-filled performances were legendary:
The original energy God who always delivered a high energy set. He was something special, not only in how he approached his craft but how he lived. Really wish you could have given us the beat one more time…#icon #legend #TootsHibbert #TootsandtheMaytals #Reggae #RIP
— Vulcan (@cravpup) September 12, 2020
The Great Toots, I will miss you, your smile, shades always on ? your laugh…but mostly I’ll miss seeing you perform….you ignited any stage you stepped on & I had the joy of witnessing your talent. Thank you for sharing your gifts! May your music forever live!!! https://t.co/OILEUDOAmQ
— RebeccaPackerBurrell (@rebeccapacker) September 12, 2020
Jamaica's culture minister, Olivia “Babsy” Grange, added her condolences:
It is truly a sad day Toots is gone! Our hearts are broken. Love you Toots. ?#RiseUpJamaicans pic.twitter.com/8B0bZCBLXu
— Hon.Olivia Grange (@Babsy_grange) September 12, 2020
Prime Minister Andrew Holness, meanwhile, noted that for decades, the singer had been the embodiment of Jamaican culture abroad, proudly representing the country:
Over the years, Toots has added significant value to #BrandJamaica and many of us will remember him as one of Jamaica’s best musical talents.
— Andrew Holness (@AndrewHolnessJM) September 12, 2020
Toots and the Maytals, which was named after May Pen, the town where “Toots” was born, became enshrined in Jamaican iconography through their appearance in director Perry Henzell's 1972 cult movie “The Harder They Come,” which starred Jamaican singer Jimmy Cliff.
So synonymous was “Toots” with this indigenous music genre that he's often credited with inventing the word “reggae” back in the 1960s — all part of a complicated story that US-based writer Ben Zimmer attempted to unravel in a long Twitter thread:
RIP, Toots Hibbert, originator of the term “reggae.” The Maytals’ 1968 song “Do the Reggay” is credited in the @OED with the first known use, originally referring to a kind of dance. Toots, when asked later, said it came from a Jamaican word “streggae” meaning “raggedy.” 1/ pic.twitter.com/V89vuwogxP
— Ben Zimmer (@bgzimmer) September 12, 2020
Whatever the origin of the term, there is no doubt that Toots embraced several musical styles, including ska, which became enormously popular in the UK. He also had a remarkably soulful, gravelly voice:
Toots was probably the funkiest Jamaican vocalist ever.
He was really a soul funk singer as much as he was a reggae one.
Irreplaceable really.
— BiggerBlackerBarry (@BiggerBarry) September 12, 2020
Outside Jamaica, celebrities, fellow musicians, and numerous fans shared their views. Bob Marley’s oldest son, Ziggy, mourned him as a family friend:
The Legendary Toots Hibbert has passed i spoke w/him a few wks ago told him how much i loved him we laughed & shared our mutual respect. He was a father figure to me his spirit is w/us his music fills us w/his energy i will never forget him RIP MIGHTY & POWERFUL NYAH FYAH BALL ? pic.twitter.com/zIofrbYZU0
— Ziggy Marley (@ziggymarley) September 12, 2020
British comedian Lenny Henry shared:
Toots & The Maytals – Funky Kingston https://t.co/iRNOtswHKN via @YouTube So sorry to hear of Toots Hibbert’s death. His music was a constant in our house growing up via Tighten up albums. His voice was powerful and adaptable to funk, soul, country, AND reggae. Rest in power…
— Lenny Henry (@LennyHenry) September 12, 2020
The founder of Island Records, Chris Blackwell, observed:
Very saddened to hear of the passing of Toots Hibbert
Speaking about his friend Island’s founder Chris Blackwell once said “I've known Toots longer than anybody… Toots is one of the purest human beings I've met in my life, pure almost to a fault.” pic.twitter.com/kgq7if7vQg
— Island Records (@islandrecordsuk) September 12, 2020
Commenting on the singer’s determinedly upbeat musical stance,
the BBC's obituary of Toots quoted a 2012 interview in which he described his music as “a message of consolation; a message of salvation:”
The youth are going to the school and they have to listen to the words. The parents have to listen to the words. God has to listen to the words. So, we have to make it positive.
Toots’ intensely optimistic music, which lifted the spirits of millions worldwide and in Jamaica, seems all the more poignant  — and arguably more needed than ever — as the island of his birth struggles with the COVID-19 pandemic.

author: Emma Lewis