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The Caribbean Community stands with Guyana in Venezuela border dispute · Global Voices
Janine Mendes-Franco

“Briefing CARICOM Caucus Virtual Meeting,” December 17, 2020. Photo credit: Dean Calma/IAEA via IAEA Imagebank Flickr page, CC BY 2.0.
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has placed itself firmly on the side of Guyana when it comes to Venezuela's territorial dispute with the smaller South American nation.
In a virtual meeting on January 12 led by Keith Rowley, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago and current chair of CARICOM, Caribbean leaders put their support behind Guyana, the CARICOM member state in which energy company ExxonMobil began oil exploration in 2008.
Despite the December 18, 2020 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that it has jurisdiction in the centuries-old border dispute, Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro has said that he would “reconquer” the Essequibo province, which he believes rightfully belongs to his country.
Map showing locations of both Guyana and Venezuela. Light green is the disputed Guayana Esequiba; Venezuela is shown in orange. Image by Aquintero82, own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, Wikimedia Commons.
However, the 1966 Geneva Agreement, signed by both countries, was a solid attempt to agree to peacefully resolve the impasse, which stemmed from Venezuela's claim that the Arbitral Award of 1899 was unfairly drawn up in Guyana's favour (as it was a British colony at the time), rendering it null and void.
As far back at the 1980s, Venezuela has been angling for direct negotiation with Guyana which, for its part, has preferred to go through an international arbiter.
In 2013, there appeared to be some measure of progress, as both countries agreed that Jamaican academic, Professor Norman Girvan, should act as the United Nations (UN) good officer in the matter. The UN employs this mediation approach as a diplomatic method of dispute resolution. Professor Girvan passed away in 2014.
More recently, Venezuela has rejected the ICJ's involvement in the matter and President Maduro appears to be using the issue as a means of rallying public support for his administration in the face of the country's ever-worsening socioeconomic crisis.
It remains to be seen whether CARICOM being in Guyana's corner will in any way change Maduro's approach. Among other things, the Caribbean Community said it was concerned about “the decree and subsequent statements by Venezuela with respect to that country’s border controversy with Guyana,” and that it was in support of the ICJ's judicial process:
CARICOM reiterates in the strongest possible terms its firm and unswerving support for the maintenance and preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guyana. CARICOM firmly repudiates any acts of aggression by Venezuela against Guyana.
Meanwhile, Irfaan Ali, the president of Guyana, who called Maduro's comments “deeply disturbing,” has made it clear that any attempt by Venezuela to “unilaterally” reset boundaries would not pass muster–either legally or in the eyes of the international community:
I remind that sovereignty over this coast, and the land territory to which it is attached, were awarded to Guyana (then British Guiana) in the 1899 Arbitral Award, whose validity and legally binding character Guyana is confident the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will uphold unequivocally.
Regrettably, by decreeing that the seas adjacent to this territory belong to Venezuela, at least two fundamental principles of international law have been violated.
The first violation is that no State can unilaterally determine its international boundaries […]
The second violation […] is based on the fact that, under well-established rules of international law, there is a fundamental principle that “the land dominates the sea”. […]
Since Guyana is sovereign over the coast west of the Essequibo River, as far as Punta Playa, it follows, consequently, that only Guyana can enjoy sovereignty and exclusive sovereign rights over the adjacent sea and seabed.
That seabed is the location of ExxonMobil's expansive Liza oil field, which has the potential to produce approximately 120,000 barrels of oil per day and with it, completely transform the economic prospects of whichever country has rights to it.
That issue of sovereignty is the crux of the matter that is before the International Court of Justice, and Guyana is confident the court will rule in its favour. The question remains: Will Venezuela accept its decision?


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What drives ‘J-Anon’, QAnon’s Japanese counterpart? · Global Voices
Nevin Thompson

“US President Donald Trump Re-election Support” rally (「トランプ米大統領再選支持」デモの様子) in Osaka on December 20, 2020. Screencap from Kasahara Yoshihisa YouTube channel. Video “free to use.”
Highly-organized pro-Trump demonstrations have been taking place in some of Japan's largest cities as a part of a thriving “J-Anon” (QAnon in Japan) movement.
In a series of tweets, Jeffrey Hall, a scholar specializing in right-wing politics who teaches at Waseda University, documented a relatively large pro-Trump “stop the steal” rally on January 6 in Tokyo, hours before Trump supporters on the other side of the planet violently stormed the U.S. Capitol building in Washington D.C.
A pro-Trump #StopTheSteal march is being held right now in Tokyo. Hours before the #January6th march takes place in America, these people are holding their own event supporting the claim that Trump actually won the 2020 election. pic.twitter.com/6CNobnlzHk
— Jeffrey J. Hall ???? (@mrjeffu) January 6, 2021
And in mid-December, BBC journalist Shayan Sardarizadeh, who reports on conspiracy theories, shared videos of another pro-Trump demonstration in Osaka, noting the growth in Japan of the QAnon phenomenon (a “crowdsourced” conspiracy theory where Donald Trump is battling dark forces, including a paedophile ring).
QAnon seems to be growing bigger and bigger in Japan.
There was a pro-Trump “Stop the Steal” rally in Osaka today and some members of team “QArmyJapanFlynn” were there. pic.twitter.com/EyDDGx7eKb
— Shayan Sardarizadeh (@Shayan86) December 20, 2020
Until a social media crackdown following the January 6 riot at the U.S. Capitol, QAnon groups in Japan have connected using hashtags such  #J-Anon (#Jアノン) and #QArmyJapanFlynn, in reference to disgraced U.S. National Security Advisor, and key QAnon figure, Michael Flynn.
Despite the platform's multiple crackdowns on QAnon since 2020 — including its most recent one in which it removed over 70,000 related accounts — as of January 13, 2020, both hashtags remain active.
As for why QAnon has become popular in Japan, as expemplified by rallies in various cities since the November 2020 U.S. election, it's thought that the social dislocation caused by the massive earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster in 2011 and now the COVID-19 pandemic have made some in Japan more receptive to conspiracy theories that help explain where everything went wrong.
In an article published in December 2020 by Harbour Business Online, journalist and activist Ogesa Taro notes that support for Trump in Japan comes from an established, symbiotic ecosystem of far-right, ultranationalist and anti-communist groups with a prominent social media presence.
Ogesa also says support for Trump can come from across the political spectrum in Japan: Anti-base activists in Okinawa, for example, may have initially supported the current U.S. president in the belief he would pull American forces out of the country.
Those who support human rights in China, Ogesa says, such as democracy in Hong Kong, or an end to the persecution of China's Uighur minority, may also look on Trump as a savior.
He adds that support for Trump also comes from cults and fringe religious movements. Such “new religions” (新興宗教), which are sometimes referred to as cults, have a rich history and continuing presence in Japan, and date back to the social upheaval and loosened restrictions on religious activity following the cataclysmic end of the Shogunate in 1867.
The devastation of war, and subsequent expansion of personal liberties following Japan's defeat in the Second World War sparked the growth and renewal of a variety of new religious movements.
The most infamous of these postwar fringe religions was the Aum “doomsday cult” of the 1990s. Led by Asahara Shoko, the Aum group engaged in a series of targeted murders, bombings and other activities before releasing sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995, killing 13 people and injuring at least 5,500 others.
Sarah Hightower, an independent researcher who studies domestic terror movements notes that Aum, like QAnon, was quite successful with its recruitment efforts:
aum recruited an astrophysicist who monitored the radioactive output of neutron stars for fun and within a year he was willing to kill babies because he believed anime and asimov were real and [they] wanted to kill asahara.
he gave the orders to make sarin ffs.
— Sarah Hightower (@nezumi_ningen) January 10, 2021
It has been estimated that by 1995 there were 65,000 Aum members in Japan and around the world, with 30,000 to 50,000 members located in Russia. Prior to the attacks, Aum engaged in various commercial operations in Japan, and sold drugs and weapons in countries around the world.
Waseda University's Jeffrey Hall, who filmed the large, well-organized pro-Trump marches in Tokyo on January 6, also identified the participation of fringe religious groups, including Sanctuary Church (also known as World Peace and Unification Sanctuary), Falun Gong and Happy Science (幸福の科学), the latter a religious organization, often referred to as a cult, with its own political party in Japan.
Falun Gong, an international religious movement that is banned and persecuted in Mainland China, operates Epoch Times, an anti-communist and increasingly pro-Trump newspaper. Falun Gong has participated in or helped organized other pro-Trump rallies around the world, including Taiwan.
Who are they? Trump supporters affiliated with several religious groups: Happy Science, the Sanctuary Church, and Falun Gong – appear were sharing information about this event in Japanese. Although it's a weekday, the turnout is quite large pic.twitter.com/OB5Llo08Vs
— Jeffrey J. Hall ???? (@mrjeffu) January 6, 2021
Fujikura Yoshiro, a researcher who covers fringe religious groups in Japan on his blog Almost Daily Cult News, noted on Twitter that he observed many prominent and senior members of Happy Science at a different pro-Trump demonstration in Tokyo's Hibiya district on January 5, which he estimated attracted between 1,000 to 2,000 people:
昨日の日比谷～銀座でのトランプ大統領大好きデモ、主催は幸福の科学系「トランプ・サポーター・イン・ジャパン」で、同じく幸福の科学系「チェンジジャパン」と前回デモで新中国連邦と親しそうに見えた「トランプ大統領再選支持集会・デモ実行委員会」が共催。 pic.twitter.com/qe0Ee0yeyz
— 藤倉善郎＠やや日刊カルト新聞総裁 (@SuspendedNyorai) January 7, 2021
A demonstration in support of President Donald Trump marched from Hibiya to Ginza yesterday. It was sponsored by Happy Science's “Trump Supporters in Japan” group, along with the same Happy Science “Change Japan” group. The march also seemed to be co-sponsored by the New Federal State of China [a group linked to Trump supporter Steve Bannon] and by the “President Trump Re-election Support Rally / Demonstration Executive Committee“.
Fujikura notes it seems as though different groups were collaborating together as a sort of “J-Anon All-Star” team, all brought together by Trump.
And as part of a conversation on Twitter started by scholar and religions specialist Levi McLaughlin about what groups are driving the pro-Trump movement in Japan, Norichika Horie, also suggests pro-Trump groups include a variety of religious groups.
It is possible that such groups may be using the enthusiasm and energy generated by the outgoing U.S. president to attract new followers and generate revenue.
A Happiness Realization Party (幸福実現党) poster on a shed in Tsuruga, Fukui. Happiness Realization Party is the political arm of Happy Science religious group. Photo by Nevin Thompson.
Thoton Akimoto, a software developer and journalist who regularly reports on and shares news stories on Twitter, worries that not enough people remember how quickly far-right movements can turn into cults, and the damage cults can do.
These pro-Trump groups in Japan, Thoton says, must be watched:
「カルトは忘れた頃にやってくる」という諺がある。いや、そんな諺はなく、私が今、作ったものに過ぎないが真実だ。バイデン就任を認めない日米のトランプ支持者がどんな行動になるか、しっかり監視していく必要がある。
— Thoton Akimoto (@thoton9) January 11, 2021
There is a saying, “The cult comes for you just when you have stopped paying attention.” No, there's no such saying, I just made that up right now. But it's true. We have to keep a close watch on the behavior of Trump supporters in Japan and the United States who deny the U.S. election results.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Nevin Thompson


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Remembering the Mexican parody songs of the former Yugoslavia · Global Voices
Filip Stojanovski

Cover art for the albums ‘Celovečernji the Kid’ (1983), ‘Pozitivna geografija’ (1984) and ‘Mi imamos mnogo problemos’ (1987). Fair use.
Most people wouldn't associate Balkan pop culture with Latin America. However, Mexican music was massively popular in the former Yugoslavia for several generations — first in earnest, and then as farce.
The YuMex phenomenon is partly explained by Yugoslavia's unique position in the Cold War after 1948 — a socialist country that was a de-facto enemy of the Soviet Union under Stalin.
Speaking with Public Radio International, Slovenian author Miha Mazzini said: “This rupture left the country in a very difficult position, in the middle between the Eastern bloc and the West. (…) This caused problems — one of them being what to show in cinemas. We could not import ‘capitalist’ movies from Hollywood. But we could not buy Soviet films anymore.”
Tito-led government's solution was to import films from Mexico, which was not only living its Golden Age in the 1950s-1960s, but also frequently referenced the Mexican revolution — a perfect match for the country that had just been reborn as socialist out of the Second World War.
Influenced by the movies, dozens of bands from all parts of the Federation recorded famous Mexican songs, in Spanish or translated in the national languages.
One of the most celebrated was Ensamble Magnifico, from Skopje, whose career spanned over 25 years — their last album was released in 1983.
By the 1970s, British and United States’ pop and rock took over the scene in the Federation. However, some of those new American-influenced bands took a jibe at their predecessors with parody songs of the previous Mariachi trend. And those parodies were just as popular as the new rock ‘n’ roll songs.
In 1983, singer-songwriter Đorđe Balašević, from Novi Sad in Serbia, released the album “Celovečernji the Kid” (which could be translated as “Wholevening the Kid”) featuring the smash hit “Don Francisco Long Play,” with English lyrics sung in an exaggerated Mexican accent.
The song tells the story of an eponymous character reminiscent of the gunslingers of classic Westerns as “The Magnificent Seven,” “The Treasure of the Sierra Madre” and “Vera Cruz“:
You must be careful, my compadre,
you must be very careful if you going south,
because in mountain Sierra Madre
is very best for you to shut your dirty mouth.
O, there are banditos mucho danger,
they want your money and your horse.
You are a gringo, I mean, You are a stranger,
but you know everything of course
about famous and very popular
Don Francisco Long Play.
A year later, the Belgrade pop-rock band Bajaga & Instruktori (“Bajaga and the Instructors”) released their first album, “Pozitivna geografija” (“Positive Geography”), featuring songs about various parts of the world, from Berlin to major cities in Russia, from Asia to the Americas.
One of them, “Tekila, gerila” (“Tequila, guerilla”), sung in Serbian, also tells a story of a fictional Latin American character: Juan, a young boy who gets drunk on Tequila and starts a revolution in order to save his kidnapped girlfriend from the clutches of a stereotypical evil general. The events take place in Macondo, the fictional town of Gabriel García Márquez's novel “One Hundred Years of Solitude,” and have no claim of historical accuracy at all.
Ni Markes ni Kastaneda
Nisu znali Juanita
Ali su čuli da mu je deda
Susreo lično Meskalita
Neither Márquez nor Castaneda
Knew about Juanito
But they've heard that his grandpa
Has personally met Mescalito
Mescalito, the popular name of the peyote cactus that contains the hallucinogen mescaline, is an allusion to a fictional leader of the Mescalero Apache in this case.
The album became a major hit and solidified the reputation of the young bandleader Momčilo Bajagić, also known as Bajaga, as lyricist and performer.
And then, in 1987, the Croatian band Duo Pegla (“pegla” means “clothes iron” in Croatian) recorded “Mi imamos lots of problemos” (“We have a lot of problems”), also sung with an exaggerated Mexican accent.
The song became a major hit. The cassette tape that contained it — Duo Pegla's only album — sold over 400,000 copies in the Federation, which at that time had a population of 22 million.
Besides zeroing in on the zeitgeist with “we have a lot of problems” — Yugoslavia did disintegrate a few years after the song's release -, Duo Pegla also referenced two Mexico-related household names: Mama Juanita and Speedy Gonzales.
Mi imamos mnogos problemos
i lutamo svijetos bez kintos
nosimo brkoves i ocales
a svi nas zovu Speedy Gonzales
Aj, mama Huanita
Gonzales po svijetu skita
We have a lot of problems
and wander the  world without a dime
we have mustachios and glasses
and everybody calls us Speedy Gonzales
Ay, mama Juanita
Gonzales roams the world…
Speedy Gonzales, as many readers will know, is the Mexican mouse of the Warner Brothers’ Looney Tunes series, a cartoon that was also extremely popular in former Yugoslavia — it was replayed on an almost daily basis on the Federation's state TV.
Mama Juanita is a character of the 1950 Mexican film “Un dia de vida” (“One Day of Life“), which seems to have started the original wave of Yu-Mex music, according to a 2018 essay on contemporary Mexican film published by the Cinematheque of Macedonia:
The film “Mama Juanita,” as the film “Un Dia de Vida,” was entitled by the Yugoslav distributers, after the eponymous song from the film that entranced the domestic audiences with its pathos, started a wave, or more correctly, a tsunami of singers and bands that made music following the Mexican model, to accompany lyrics written in one of the languages of former Yugoslavia.

author: Filip Stojanovski


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Reviving L’bokator, Cambodia’s ancient martial arts · Global Voices
VOD

A l’bokator trainee, in Kampong Chhnang province. Photo and caption by Hy Chhay / VOD
This edited article by Ouch Sony and Danielle Keeton-Olsen is from VOD News, an independent news site in Cambodia, and is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
After surviving the Khmer Rouge regime by literally burying the tools of his trade underground, Om Yom, one among a few remaining old masters of the Cambodian martial art l’bokator, spends his time teaching the younger generation. He dreams of developing the sport to the level of other countries’ martial arts practices.
After facing near-extinction during the Khmer Rouge era, l’bokator is slowly regaining its popularity in Cambodia — in no small part to the passion and perseverance of 67-year-old Yom and his fellow practitioners.
L’bokator — also written as bokator — is the oldest martial art still practiced in Cambodia, and is an important part of Kampong Chhnang province's cultural history. The ancient martial art combines techniques like throwing elbows, knees and punches as well as using weaponry. It was used for combat in past wars, in addition to being a source of entertainment and a spiritual practice.
The presence of l’bokator in Cambodia dwindled as the country weathered periods of war and social upheaval. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, when artists and athletes were targeted and killed because they were considered to be part of the country’s urban elite, l’bokator almost disappeared.
Nowadays, students demonstrate their skills at a l’bokator club in Kampong Chhnang’s provincial capital, chanting and calling out at Yom's instruction. In an exhibition sparring match, a teenage girl takes on two male peers, emulating the moves that masters would have used in fatal fights in the past. Starting with combat poles, the girl disarms her peers by sideswiping with her pole, dodging and making fast grabs, and when the boys finally take her pole, they switch to barehanded jabs and high kicks.
Originally from Kampong Chhnang province, Yom has spent the past 10 years training young fighters in the hope that l’bokator will be recognized as an intangible cultural heritage by UNESCO, a long-sought recognition of the sport’s foundational role in Southeast Asian martial arts.
He says he has been training students for free since 1993, starting by teaching peers in his community before quitting his job casting molds for pagoda statues and other structures to open a club in Kampong Chhnang city in 2004. The club was formally registered in 2011.
Beyond training students, Yom says he’s worked with other l’bokator advocates, collecting information from masters and sharing what he can with Phnom Penh and international stakeholders interested in preserving the martial art.
We have struggled these last 10 years to tell [everyone] that this is ours. We need to write down [the techniques]. We need to gather and not use only what belongs to me, because we have plenty [of information out there].
L’bokator master Ke Som On, 80, at his house in Kampong Chhnang province’s Rolea Ba’ier district. Photo and caption by Danielle Keeton-Olsen / VOD
The ancient city of Longvek, now in Kampong Chhnang province’s Kampong Tralach district, was known historically as a gathering point for scholars, martial arts experts and other knowledgeable people, and it served as the heart of the country’s military from the end of the Angkorian era to the present.
Yom, a Kampong Chhnang native, says his grandfather passed on l’bokator to his father, bestowing a golden badge tied to a rope as a symbol of mastery. Because l’bokator was so important to his forefathers, Yom says he feels called to revive and preserve the tradition.
I have a family line of martial arts trainers in my father and my grandfather, so I think we should do everything (to conserve and develop the sport).
A few kilometers from the provincial town, another master, 80-year-old Ke Som On, says he finally retired from practicing l’bokator this year, as he’s had some trouble with his lungs.
He had only started about five years ago to retrain the skills that had been embedded in his mind since he was 8-years-old.
Like his younger peer, Som On’s family passed down the martial art. He was taught by an older uncle who was a member of the Khmer Issarak movement that fought for independence from the French colonial regime.
Som On did not want to train his children or other students in the martial art. But in the past five years he became involved in l’bokator again after Yom, a neighbor, urged him to share his skills.
Vath Chamroeun, secretary-general of the Olympic Committee of Cambodia, says the nation’s sports agency has worked with other older masters for years to find other remaining masters and compile their knowledge into martial arts books.
When Som On first began training decades ago, the granddaughter of a master would watch and sometimes participate in l’bokator training sessions.
Now 80-years-old, Sao Von still recalls how she would watch her grandfather practice l’bokator and try to emulate the moves behind her house. When she turned 15, her grandfather invited her to study alongside the men, though many in the village would criticize her for training, she says.
Von says she can no longer wield a baton or strike as she used to. She says her memory is fading as well, and her thoughts drift during the interview.
Sao Von, 80, at her house in Kampong Chhnang province’s Rolea Ba’ier district. Photo and caption by Danielle Keeton-Olsen / VOD
Chamroeun says that as they’re collecting knowledge of the older traditions, the committee is also modernizing the sport — creating a management structure, starting yearly competitions, and setting up proper training regimes that follow official rules. And since 2015, select techniques including weapons tactics have been incorporated into Cambodia’s military training programs.
The sport is now recognized by the World Martial Arts Association and will be included in the 2023 Southeast Asia Games, but UNESCO intangible heritage status still eludes the sport.
As his students improve Yom says he’s eager to promote their abilities and bring them to competitions and festivals. He says he sacrifices a lot of his time and energy to grow both general interest in the sport and also Kampong Chhnang province’s unique affinity for l’bokator.
Tho Srey Nich, 17, is a student at Yom’s club who says she has trained in l’bokator for four years, though her parents were initially hesitant about her interest in the sport.
When she began practicing l’bokator, her family, friends and neighbors saw it as a man’s sport and discouraged her from training.
Whenever they talk [about me], I don’t care, because the important thing is that I love things that are left behind by our ancestors.
Yong Tak, 21, has trained for 10 years and has become one of the top fighters at the Kampong Chhnang club. His parents also did not want him to pursue l’bokator at first, despite both his father and mother having trained in the martial art when they were young.
In the pupils’ final demonstration, Yom watches as Tak performs a backflip while holding knives in both hands. It was not a move the old master taught him.
“I can’t move like him,” Yom says, taking his pupil’s creativity as a sign of the sport's evolution.
L’bokator trainees in Kampong Chhnang province. Photo and caption by Hy Chhay / VOD

author: VOD


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Malaysia’s internet regulator deactivates Twitter account after offensive tweets exposed · Global Voices
Mong Palatino

Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission. Source: Facebook
The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) became a Twitter trend on January 12 after netizens exposed misogynist and racist tweets made by its official account in 2014. MCMC later issued a statement denying the authenticity of the tweets before deactivating its Twitter account.
After the Malaysian government declared a state of emergency in response to surging COVID-19 cases, MCMC advised internet users — especially those opposed to the new directive — to be polite in their social media comments. It warned that those who publish defamatory remarks on “race, royalty, and religion” will be penalized. It also enjoined the public to report internet users who post offensive remarks.
But after a few hours, #MCMC trended on Twitter after screenshots showing MCMC account tweets from 2014 containing insults and profanities against women and minority races surfaced online. MCMC soon locked its account, issued a statement that hackers were responsible for the tweets, and finally deactivated the account.
Some are skeptical over the claim that the account was hacked. Alexander Wong wrote on SoyaCincau.com:
Looking at the timestamps, the offending tweets are actually old. If it was indeed hacked, it looks like the perpetrators have the ability to turn back time. From what we know, it isn’t possible to backdate tweets but you are able to schedule future tweets.
Malay Mail also reported that MCMC’s account was allegedly owned by a teenager until he sold it to another person for RM1,300 (320 US dollars) in 2015.
This is amusing as hell. Malaysian Internet regulator's Twitter account is a rebranding of a personal account @Nazrulllhakim (probably bought for the followers? How? Why? Where's the money?) But more than that, they didn't even bother scrubbing the old account's previous tweets. https://t.co/trgC16qqVZ
— Zurairi A.R. (@zurairi) January 12, 2021
It is unclear how or why a teenager created a Twitter handle that would later be used as an official account of a government agency. It is also not known how the ‘selling’ of a Twitter account was done since it is against the platform's terms and conditions.
Twitter user, @NazruiHakim, who claims to be the original owner of MCMC’s account, apologized for his offensive tweets:
I apologize for the things I said in the past. The tweets were old and I don’t even remember what happened. It was 7 years ago. It’s my fault the tweets were there. I apologize to everyone involved.
He added that he didn’t expect his account to fall into the hands of a government agency.
Writing for Juice website, Ameera Rosli highlighted the accountability of MCMC:
The glaring element of this story is MCMC’s lack of awareness as an internet regulator.
It’s baffling how MCMC, a government body that is in charge of monitoring our use of the internet, allegedly forgot to scrub private data and information from the account they obtained.
MCMC should also know that the trading of accounts violated Twitter’s terms and conditions.
9. What happened with the debacle of MCMC buying an account from people without scrubbing the old tweets reeks of incompetence. It is shocking that they violated Twitter's terms by acquiring an account of a person that had no shame with their racism, misogyny, anti-baldness
— Michelle Yesudas (@MichelleYesudas) January 13, 2021
MCMC blamed hackers for the offensive tweets.
People are advised not to be influenced with such suspicious, vile and defamatory messages that have been uploaded through the account.
MCMC also vowed to investigate the issue which led to its decision to deactivate its Twitter account. MCMC Minister Datuk Saifuddin Abdullah said in a media statement:
I view seriously the viral issue of indecent old tweets which originated from 2014 that linked to MCMC's official Twitter account.

author: Mong Palatino


text:
In Guinea, President Alpha Condé takes his third term despite long-running controversy · Global Voices
Abdoulaye Bah

Security forces during a demonstration by the Guinean opposition Front for the Defence of the Constitution. Image by Aboubacarkhoraa, taken from Wikimedia, used under the licence CC BY-SA 4.0
On December 15, 2020, Guinean President Alpha Condé was sworn in for a third term following his victory in the presidential elections held on October 18. The third term was permitted following a referendum held on March 22, 2020, at the same time as legislative elections.
In power since 2010, Alpha Condé should have left the presidency in 2020, in accordance with the Guinean constitution, which allows only two consecutive terms of five years. However, even in autumn 2019, he indicated that he would seek to amend the constitution for a third term through a referendum.
Since 2019, he has effectively worked toward this by manipulating the political system, not hesitating to falsify the electoral process. These significant irregularities have been denounced by international organizations and Guinean civil society, but to no effect, as he has once again managed to get reelected.
During the 2018 legislative elections the International Francophone Organisation (OIF) sent two teams to Guinea to assist the electoral process. It noted serious irregularities and withdrew from the monitoring process. In a communique dated February 24, 2020, the OIF noted that, despite the observations of an audit from 2018, the electoral register still contained “2,490,664 problematic voters,” who had not renewed their registration in 2019 with the Administrative Commissions for the Establishment and Revision of Electoral Lists (CAERLE) but were still on the electoral register:
Les insuffisances constatées sur ces effectifs incluent notamment un certain nombre de cas d’électeurs décédés, non déclarés ainsi que des doublons. Au total, il s’avère que 98% de ces 2.490.664 électeurs ne disposent pas de documents permettant leur identification, bien que la loi prévoit 6 types de pièces pour justifier l’identité et l’âge de l’électeur.
The shortcomings identified in these lists include a number of cases of undeclared, deceased voters as well as duplicate voters. In total, it was found that 98 percent of these 2,490,664 voters do not have documents that allow them to be identified, despite the fact that the law provides for six types of documents to prove a voter's identity and age.
The OIF is not the only organization to have observed irregularities: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is known for being sympathetic to those in power, also withdrew from the Guinean electoral process, followed by the African Union.
The March 2020 referendum was also rejected in Guinea by part of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), highlighting the inadequacies of the electoral register.
As two journalists from guineematin.com explained, in all the regions favorable to the ruling party, the Rally of the People of Guinea (RPG) Rainbow, the number of registered voters on the electoral register showed serious anomalies:
Les concepteurs de ce Fichier ont permis à la seule population électorale de Kankan  [la 2ème ville du pays] de connaître un accroissement de plus de 54% entre 2015 et 2019. Cette même progression est de 30% en moyenne pour l’ensemble du territoire.
Pire, certaines communes du pays ont vu leur population électorale doubler en quatre (4) ans …
Pire encore, certaines communes ont un corps électoral supérieur à leur population : Mandiana Centre (Corps électoral = 133.75% de la population), Doko (Siguiri) : 104.78%, Kouriah (Coyah : 102.07%).
Those who created this register allowed the electoral population of Kankan alone [the country's second largest city] to see an increase of more than 54 percent between 2015 and 2019. There has been a similar rise of 30 percent on average across the country.
Worse, some towns in the country have seen their electoral population double in four (4) years…
Worse still, some towns have an electoral population greater than their actual population: Mandiana Center (Electoral population = 133.75 percent of the population), Doko (Siguiri): 104.78 percent, Kouriah (Coyah: 102.07 percent)
Under pressure from street protests, Condé agreed to ask the CENI to review the electoral register before the referendum, while refusing to accede to the request from his ECOWAS colleagues not to run for a third term.
The total number of registered voters was thereby reduced from 7,764,130 to 5,325,137. After this reduction, the African Union and ECOWAS eventually resumed electoral assistance to Guinea at the end of February, considering these corrections to the electoral register satisfactory.
However, in Guinean opposition and civil society, grouped together in the Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC), refused to participate in the referendum and held numerous demonstrations. The government responded with violence and unleashed its security forces. On October 12, the FNDC reported that in a year, the number of victims rose to 90.
Amnesty International (AI) reported earlier this year that, between October 2019 and February 2020, “at least 10 demonstrations were banned by authorities in violation of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. About 40 people were subjected to secret detention at the Soronkoni military camp in the region of Kankan.”
In the capital, Conakry, security forces have attacked even funeral processions, according to AI:
Le 4 novembre [2019], au moins quatre personnes ont été tuées par balle à Conakry lors d’une marche funèbre organisée en hommage à 11 personnes tuées lors des manifestations du mois précédent. Les 14 et 15 novembre, au moins quatre personnes ont été tuées lors d’une manifestation dispersée par les forces de défense et de sécurité. Une cinquième est morte le 21 novembre des suites de ses blessures.
On November 4, [2019], at least four people were shot dead in Conakry during a funeral procession organized in honor of 11 people killed during demonstrations the previous month. On November 14 and 15, at least four people were killed during a demonstration broken up by defense and security forces. A fifth died on November 21, from their injuries.
The new constitution was approved by 91.59 percent of the 2,856,675 votes cast, of an electorate of 5,325,137 recognized by the CENI, in the referendum on March 22. During this vote, the opposition as a whole called on its supporters to do everything possible to prevent it from taking place, noting other irregularities such as the modification of the text which had been approved.
The presidential elections finally took place on October 18, 2020, with 12 total candidates, including several former ministers from the outgoing president's government.
The two main candidates were President Alpha Condé and Cellou Dalein Diallo, opposition leader, the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) leader, and a member of the Fulani ethnic group, who are mostly in the north of the country, and account for a third of the population.
Condé did not hesitate to use references to Diallo's ethnicity in attempts to undermine him. In the Kankan region, Condé's supporters prevented Diallo from conducting his campaign. They ransacked shops belonging to Fulani people living in the town and killed cattle belonging to Fulani herders in the Koumban area.
In the end, Condé won the election and obtained his third term in office with, according to official results, a little under 60 percent of the votes, against 33 percent for Diallo. Since election, security forces have occupied the UFDG offices without any legal consequence.
El Hadj Baldé, nicknamed “lawless,” is president of the National Coordination of the Fulbe and Haali Pular of Guinea (CNFHPG), relating to Fulani people and Fulani language speakers. An article by VisionGuinee.info reported that the abuses continue, according to him:
’Les forces de sécurité entrent par effraction dans les domiciles privés, cassent les magasins de vente, renversent des marmites, détruisent des véhicules et des motos, des télévisions, défoncent des armoires, violent des femmes et des filles, emportent argent et bijoux, ordinateurs, téléphones, habits, riz, sucre, huile’’
Security forces break into private homes, smash shops, knock over pots, destroy cars and motorbikes, televisions, smash cupboards, rape women and girls, seize money and jewelry, computers, telephones, clothes, rice, sugar, oil.
During his speech, Condé asked his fellow citizens to “forget the past” and turn toward a “future of unity and hope.” But now, this seems difficult: Opponents are still in prison and one of Diallo's colleagues has reportedly died, as UFDG member Souleymane Souza Konaté said:
Détenu à la sûreté, célèbre prison du régime actuel, l'activiste et prisonnier politique Roger Bamba est mort.
Nous appelons le monde à tenir les dirigeants guinéens pour responsables de l'assassinat des prisonniers politiques.
Repose en paix cher oncle ! @Cellou_UFDG pic.twitter.com/eOWND9ter8
— Souleymane souza Konaté (@Dimiola_soloman) December 17, 2020
Detained in the notorious prison of the current regime, the activist and political prisoner Roger Bamba is dead.
We call on the world to hold Guinea's leaders responsible for the killing of political prisoners.
Rest in peace dear uncle!

author: Abdoulaye Bah


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Want to learn to curse like a Russian? There’s an Instagram account for that · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Screenshot from Instagram account Curselikearussian, used with permission
Attempting to curse in a language you don't speak natively can be a tricky proposition, but for those who want to take the risk, there's now an Instagram account teaching English-speakers how to swear in Russian.
curselikearussian has taken on the mission of coaching users in the use of “мат,” as the rich reservoir of profanity is called in Russian and other Slavic languages. The term “мат” is derived from the classic Russian expression “Ёб твою мать”, which means “f*** your mother.”
While widely used in everyday life, мат was denied during the Soviet period, then recognized again after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. It has been widely studied by academics and lexicographers. In Russia, the use of мат was banned in public spaces in 2014 under article 20.1.1 of the Code on Administrative Offenses, which labels it a form of hooliganism and imposes fines or administrative arrest on offenders. This largely means that instances of мат are censored in films, on television and radio, and in public discussions or speeches.
None of this has stopped profanity from thriving in Russia and in other multilingual contexts: Kyrgyz speakers, for instance, drop Russian-language мат into Kyrgyz-language conversations for effect.
In an interview with Global Voices, the creators of curselikearussian, Russian journalist Elmira Kuznetsova and Canadian comics and animation artist Jess Pollard, said their aim is to honor the richness and creativity of Russian profanity—and also to highlight its complexity.  Kuznetsova explained how it all started:
Jess is learning Russian and one night I was trying to translate to her the Russian curse “На хую я вертел.” The phrase translates as “I don't care” but the literal meaning is “I spun it on my dick”. Just for laughs, Jess drew a sketch depicting random things being spun on male genitalia. We laughed so hard both at the image and at the absurdity of the literal translation, we decided to make more illustrations. This turned into a comic magazine that we called “An Illustrated Treasury of Russian Curses” that was printed in a batch of 50 copies and sold to our friends.
They created the Instagram account in October 2020 to promote the zine. Then, encouraged by friends and colleagues, they started adding to the collection. The account has now over 50,000 followers.
Asked to cite their favorites, Pollard said:
My Russian teacher explained that “Я скучаю по тебе” does mean I miss you, but it is also connected to the word “bored”: in a way, we are almost saying “I have lost my zest for life without you.” While learning Russian has resulted in many laughs, I also find it an extremely beautiful and complex language.
For Kuznetsova, the best Russian expletive is “сказочный долбоёб”, which she translates as “a fabulous whack-fucker.” She also cherishes the term because it has been the subject of several ridiculous court cases in Russia.
Asked how they deal with the challenge of translating highly idiomatic expressions, Kuznetsova and Pollard said that:
We go with the most literal, word-by-word translation of the curse. So there's no need to borrow. The process is usually pretty quick, although there are cases when even basic words or grammatical constructions in Russian require some adaptation to retain their meaning in English. Once we were stuck for an hour working on the phrase “Хуем груши околачивать”. We couldn't decide whether it was “to knock off” or “to knock from” that preserved the meaning of the verb better. The consensus was reached only after a Canadian friend with a Master's degree in English was invited to join this most heated discussion.
A post shared by Chto, blya? (@curselikearussian)
Translations, Pollard noted, can combine both linguistic and visual aspects:
There are so many aspects to consider when translating: flow, comedy, meaning, and the emotional aspect. The illustrations are themselves a kind of translation that supports the phrase. Should this character look happy? Angry? Amazed? A further layer is added when we connect the two languages together: sometimes curse translations can be “supported” by existing English phrases, as in the case of “whackerfucker” (which mirrors the construction of “motherfucker.” This is why we chose to not add a dash between “whacker” and “fucker.”) While this makes the translation both accurate and easily understandable to English speakers, some of our Russian fans were convinced “whackerfucker” is a real English word. Perhaps, the translation was too good… This is the most swearing I've ever done in an interview. My hands are shaking!

author: Filip Noubel


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Online football clinic helps Indonesian children improve skills during the pandemic · Global Voices
Arpan Rachman

A sample of a video uploaded by participants in an online football coaching clinic. Source: Screenshot of YouTube video by papa na akha.
Around 1,900 Indonesian children participated in an online football clinic from October to December 2020 organized by Biscuit Mondelez Indonesia.
The Biskuat Academy Championship, an annual football competition for children held in eight Indonesian cities, became a virtual coaching clinic in 2020 since the pandemic made face-to-face matches difficult to organize.
The organizers explained why they decided to hold the “Online Football School” despite the challenges posed by the pandemic:
We hope to provide easy access for all Indonesian children to continue to develop their potential during difficult times like today.
They added that through the coaching clinic, children have the opportunity to be trained like professional footballers because the curriculum is designed according to the standards set by the Union of European Football Associations.
Football is among the most popular sports in Indonesia.
Ten football class schedules were made available for interested children. Students were then invited to upload videos of football skills or techniques they have learned during the class.
Participants received training from professional players and mentorship from Indonesia's top football teams. Finalists who submitted the best 20 videos will get football school scholarship packages and achievement path certificates from the Indonesian Ministry of Youth and Sports.
The event's first session took place on October 16, 2020. The top 50 winners were announced on December 12, 2020, while the top 20 finalists were selected during the grand finals last December 19, 2020.
One of the participants was Ghazy Adindra Kaysan, who went on to become the second-place winner of the 2020 Biskuat Academy Grand Final Online Championship.
A post shared by Ghazy Khalif Nesia (@ghazy_khalif_nesia)
A 60-second video shows him wearing a red jersey with black accents on the waist, number 10 on the chest of his shirt, yellow shoes, and black socks. The grand final event's presenter gave accolades to Ghazy's speed and skill and give him the nickname Ghazy ‘Salossa’, which refers to PSSI (Football Association of Indonesia) legend Boas Salossa.
Afandi Mansyur, Ghazy's father, couldn't help but express admiration for what his son achieved during the virtual football competition:
Unexpectedly, Ghazy Adindra Kaysan was able to win second place in the Biskuat Online Championship 2020 Grand Final with a score of 90. His value is only 0.5 from the first rank, who is three years older and had the record as the best player in Yogyakarta.
While waiting for his turn to compete in the football competition's grand finals, Ghazy still took the time to read books on the field under the afternoon heat. He never gave up on his dream while continuing to study hard.
His inspiring story and success affirmed the value of pursuing initiatives that seek to develop the potential of individuals even during a pandemic.
Ghazy reading a book on the side of a football field. Photo from Afandi Mansyur, used with permission

author: Arpan Rachman


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Caribbean calls for global summit to address fair COVID-19 vaccine roll-out · Global Voices
Janine Mendes-Franco

Doctor writing “COVID-19 Vaccine Loading”; image by Jernej Furman on Flickr, CC BY 2.0.
Even as the World Health Organization (WHO) appeals to Global North countries to stop hoarding COVID-19 vaccines, potentially making acquisition costs even further out of reach for smaller nations, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has called for a global summit to address more equitable distribution.
Saying that it was “deeply concerned at the current prospect of inequitable access to vaccines to address the pandemic, especially for frontline workers and vulnerable populations,” the CARICOM statement noted smaller countries would inevitably find it difficult to compete in the global marketplace when it comes to paying for vaccines:
Given the transmissibility of the virus, all countries are vulnerable and should work together.
The Caribbean Community therefore calls for a global summit in the context of the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) ACT-A Facilitation Council to discuss equitable access and distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines.
On September 10, 2020, the WHO established an ACT-Accelerator Facilitation Council, aimed at making the development, scale-up and distribution of COVID-19 “vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics” more fair.
Making a case for why the region should be considered higher in the pecking order, the statement added:
The inextricable link economically, socially, and by virtue of travel with our neighbours and the wider international community, makes it imperative for CARICOM Member States to be afforded access to vaccines as a matter of urgent priority. This action will be mutually beneficial in breaking the transmission of the virus.
CARICOM's position was well received across the region, with mainstream media editorials coming out in support of its call. The Trinidad and Tobago Guardian for instance, in lamenting the lack of global cooperation when it comes to making sure everyone has access to the vaccine, suggested:
There is a real risk, given the transmissibility of COVID-19 and the emergence of more infectious variants in recent weeks, that the pandemic could drag on for years before it is finally brought under control.
Several countries have already secured priority access through Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) with vaccine manufacturers. Such contracts, which guarantee governments an agreed-upon number of vaccines, are legally binding. There have been reports of Global North countries like Canada reserving four times as many vaccines as it needs to immunise its population.
“More than 39 million doses of vaccine have now been administered in at least 49 higher-income countries.
Just 25 doses have been given in one lowest-income country.
Not 25 million; not 25 thousand; 25″-@DrTedros #EB148 #COVID19 #ACTogether https://t.co/6Rom7e5Nz7 pic.twitter.com/hVi6nCqiXD
— World Health Organization (WHO) (@WHO) January 18, 2021
Meanwhile, Caribbean governments have not been able to confirm when exactly the vaccine will become available, but Trinidad and Tobago's Chief Medical Officer (CMO) Dr. Roshan Parasram hopes that it will be by the end of the first quarter of 2021.
The twin-island nation has been in direct discussions with vaccine manufacturers, as well as with COVAX, one of the pillars of the WHO's Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator. COVAX aims to secure global access to COVID-19 vaccines, regardless of countries’ ability to pay for them.
Meanwhile, Jamaica's Minister of Health and Wellness Dr. Christopher Tufton, who agreed that “the development and swift global deployment of safe and effective vaccines against COVID-19 is essential to containing the global pandemic,” said that the island's first batch of vaccines via COVAX, due in April 2021, would provide approximately 292,000 doses — enough to vaccinate approximately 146,000 Jamaicans.
All CARICOM member states have signed on to participate in the COVAX facility, which assures the region more than a million doses. However, COVAX only guarantees enough doses for all countries to vaccinate 20 per cent of their population before other countries can increase roll-out.
Without global buy-in, however, poorer nations that can least afford to weather the economic fallout of the pandemic may well not see a vaccine for another year.
The other side of the coin is the willingness of Caribbean populations to get the vaccine, especially in light of stories like the deaths of 23 Norwegian nursing home patients days after having received the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine. Despite such incidents, Trinidadian epidemiologist Dr. Avery Hinds has said that evidence shows the vaccine is safe for the majority of the world population.
Trinidad and Tobago, on the southern end of the Caribbean archipelago, had 45 active cases as of January 17, 2021, and has recorded 132 deaths since the start of the pandemic. Jamaica, at the north of the island chain, had 14,274 active cases as of the same date, with 326 COVID-related deaths. With a population of nearly three million, close to double that of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica has administered 152,685 COVID-19 tests, compared to Trinidad and Tobago's 77,515.
British dependency territories in the Caribbean, meanwhile, already have the COVID-19 vaccine, and Barbados’ prime minister, Mia Mottley, has taken her first dose. At the time of her inoculation, there were only five doses available on the island.

author: Janine Mendes-Franco


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COVID-19, digital rights and Nigeria’s emerging surveillance state · Global Voices
Boye Adegoke

A person holds their phone during a research session in Lagos, Nigeria, September 2016. Photo by ARipstra (WMF) via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments took extraordinary measures to leverage technology to fight the virus. In addition to lockdowns, many African countries, including Nigeria, followed a global trend to use contact-tracing measures to track those who come into contact with an infected person.
On the surface, the proliferation of contact-tracing apps — both public and private —  appear harmless and noble. But Nigeria's history of surveillance raises serious questions about how the state may further its capabilities to track and target citizens during the pandemic using such technologies.
In June 2020, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) developed a contact-tracing application for immediate deployment across all NNPC locations in Nigeria.
Two other applications, Stay-Safe.NG and Rapid Trace were developed by private actors. Global Voices was not able to acquire any up-to-date data on the efficacy of these apps, nor how data is collected or stored.
To understand why digital rights activists are so concerned about the latest contact-tracing applications, however, it is important to highlight Nigeria’s historical context when it comes to surveillance.
The Nigerian government has never openly admitted its surveillance capabilities, but in August 2019, they passed and signed the Federal Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill into law, allowing the government to carry out surveillance activities on citizens on behalf of foreign nations if conducting criminal investigations.
A Paradigm Initiative report on digital rights and privacy in Nigeria details how the Nigerian government budgeted huge sums of money for surveillance activities consistently from 2013 to date.
In 2020 alone, the Nigerian government budgeted to spend an estimate of 9 billion naira ($22.8 million USD) on surveillance-related activities or equipment. In 2017, it spent nearly 46 billion naira ($127.6 million USD) on surveillance capabilities, according to a national budget document.
A weak system of accountability to monitor how security and law enforcement forces use this technology allows for frequent abuses of power.
A 2015 investigation by the Premium Times uncovered how some Nigerian governors procured cutting-edge spying devices supposedly to fight crime but were using these technologies to play the role of “Big Brother” over residents of their respective states, especially politically active opponents.
In December 2016, former Governor Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti State accused the State Security Service of bugging his phone and leaking a private conversation with his colleague. He further accused them of recording telephone conversations of Nigerians perceived as critics of President Muhammadu Buhari and his All Progressives Congress government.
In 2018, allegations of mass surveillance of mobile phones in Abuja, the nation’s capital, appeared in several news reports. Suspicions that the government indeed has the capability to implement these tactics heightened following the inclusion of surveillance equipment into budgetary allocations.
In October 2019, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that the Nigerian military is using surveillance technologies to spy on ordinary Nigerians and the press. According to the report, the Nigerian military procured a forensic technology designed to extract information from phones and computers. The report also mentions that the Nigerian government has spent at least 127 billion naira ($322 million USD) on surveillance and security equipment.
In addition to the measures highlighted earlier, the Nigeria Governors’ Forum collaborated with MTN, a leading Nigeria’s telecommunications companies, “to mitigate the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic by mining its users’ data … to profile states’ vulnerability to the spread of the coronavirus.”
Despite increasing surveillance capabilities, Nigeria does not have a comprehensive data protection and privacy law — nor the political will to have one anytime soon.
In September 2020, the Nigerian government announced a draft executive data protection bill and called for inputs from stakeholders. However, the country has failed to pass similar draft bills on data protection from its 7th National Assembly (2011-2015) and 8th National Assembly (2015-2019).
A digital rights and freedom bill that aims to guarantee human rights on- and offline and provides safeguards against abuse with opportunities for redress was passed by the 8th National Assembly — but President Buhari did not sign it.
Lawmakers expect to pass the bill in  the 9th National Assembly (2019-2023), but there are justifiable fears that Buhari may reject it again, given the fate of the previous effort. The digital rights and freedom bill also seeks to ensure the right to privacy online and to equip the judiciary with the necessary framework to protect human rights online.
The Nigerian Information Technology Development (NITDA) released a data protection regulation in January 2019, with no clear indication of its enforceability. The agency has released three implementation frameworks for the same regulation since its release.
The weak regulatory framework around privacy protection is the loophole the Nigerian government has consistently exploited to violate the privacy rights of Nigerian citizens, civil society and the media.
In a United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/34/7 on the right to privacy in the digital age, adopted in March 2017, the council called on all states “to review their procedures, practices, and legislation regarding the surveillance of communications…” in order to uphold privacy rights protected under international law.
The development of contact tracing-apps and other measures such as collaborations with telecoms companies raise a valid concern around enabling the government to leverage this for future clampdowns on citizens’ digital rights — long after the pandemic is long gone.
Nigeria’s enforcement of COVID-19 restrictions was marked by deadly repression and other violations of human rights. By the second week of the lockdown, Nigerian security forces had killed more Nigerians than COVID-19 according to a BBC report.
In other reported incidents, Nigerian journalist Kufre Carter was detained for one month on the allegation of defamation and conspiracy for being critical of southern Akwa Ibom state’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis.
Journalists who documented evidence of police brutality during the lockdown were punished. A Magistrate Court in Abuja sentenced journalist Emma Bricks Oko to three hours of community service and a 5,000 naira fine (about $12 USD) for filming police brutality during the implementation of the lockdown order.
When mass protests against police brutality coincided with the pandemic in October 2020, targeted surveillance extended to members of the decentralized social movement known as #EndSARS, a call to disband the notoriously violent Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS).
The government officially denied placing outspoken #EndSARS activists on a no-fly list, but others confirmed the government’s role in targeting protesters using surveillance tactics such as tracing protesters through their phone contacts. Activist Eromosele Adene faces an ongoing trial after being tracked, arrested, and charged for his involvement in the protests.
A national Human Rights Commission report on human rights violations during the COVID-19 lockdown shows that a total of 105 complaints were received from 24 Nigerian states including the federal capital. The report documented 14 violations of the right to freedom of movement, unlawful arrest, and detention, 11 incidents of seizure and confiscation of properties, 19 incidents of extortion, and more.
The real effect of the COVID-19 pandemic goes beyond the death toll. Under its guise, the government has been emboldened and empowered to strengthen its surveillance activities. Activists, media and critical voices have become even more vulnerable to targeted attacks from authorities. The real losses can only be counted post-pandemic, when glaring implications can be measured.
Effective legislation that promotes digital rights, privacy and data protection will strengthen systems of accountability and transparency.
Will Nigeria ever enact the legislation necessary to mitigate against the threat of a full-on surveillance state?
This article is part of a series of posts examining interference with digital rights under lockdowns and beyond during the COVID-19 pandemic in nine African countries: Uganda, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Algeria, Nigeria, Namibia, Tunisia, Tanzania and Ethiopia. The project is funded by the Africa Digital Rights Fund of The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA).

author: Boye Adegoke


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Guyanese-American author celebrates Caribbean identity in new alphabet book · Global Voices
Atiba Rogers

Pages from Stephanie L. Blair's first book, “Sadie's Caribbean Alphabet”; image courtesy the author, used with permission.
Three months after the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a pandemic, Stephanie L. Blair, a first-generation Guyanese-American, mapped out the concept for Sadie's Caribbean Alphabet, a book for children who don't typically see images of themselves in mainstream literature.
While recovering from surgery, Blair, an administrative assistant at a New York City law firm who holds a Bachelor's degree in Linguistics, had enough time on her hands to start putting her idea into motion. Once she was convinced it had potential, she joined forces with St Lucia-born illustrator Herman Collymore to bring the picture book to life.
I caught up with Blair, who I knew peripherally as children when we were part of the same Caribbean-American community, to discuss her new role as an author. For years, she told me, she had dreamed of writing a play or a novel. She would write drafts and send them to her best friend—who had given her a book about playwriting for her birthday a few years back—just to get her opinion. Nothing she wrote ever seemed right to her, however. It either felt forced or didn't make sense.
She began to notice, whenever she'd be out shopping for books for the children in her life, that there were no stories that seemed to relate to the Caribbean-American experience. In June 2020, she told her best friend, “I think I'm going to write a kids’ book.” She fleshed out the concept and the rest, as they say, is history.
Guyanese-American author Stephanie L. Blair. Photo courtesy the author, used with permission.
Atiba Rogers (AR): You announced the launch of the book in a Facebook post, explaining, ‘When I started working on this, I knew it [had] to capture a part of what I’ve always wanted to see as a child. There were no children’s books that looked like me, shared my chocolate skin, and shared my culture.’ As a young girl of Afro-Caribbean descent, how did you cope?
Stephanie Blair (SB): Growing up in Brooklyn, you don't cope with pressure—you desensitize yourself and learn to do what you have to do. In America, immigrants don't have time to deal with their feelings because of the predominant stereotypes they face every day.
Some people think foreigners are poor, lack education, or pose a certain kind of threat. As a Guyanese-American, I'm judged because I'm American, I'm judged because I'm Guyanese, and I'm judged because I'm black. It's threefold for me.
[The alienation] was from different angles. I didn't see shows that represented Caribbean and/or Caribbean-American children and families. Back then, people weren't as well-versed in [the culture of] Caribbean families as they are now.
AR: What was it like growing up in your home? As members of the Caribbean diaspora, did your family have to assimilate into American society? Do you struggle with Caribbeans viewing you from Americanized optics?
SB: It was instilled in me to know what my roots are. My family has assimilated to American society in certain ways. I don't struggle with it at all. Caribbean people are constantly pushing forward to build a better life for themselves and their families. They've built a very tough exterior and desensitized themselves from worrying about small talk [and] what people think about them.
AR: Did you feel like you had to compete between being African-American and Caribbean? If so, what made you decide between writing for Caribbean youth and African-American youth?
SB: What made me [choose to] write for Caribbean youth is my own personal experiences. I was looking for literature for my little cousins, goddaughter, and godson. I noticed how scarce and inaccessible Black children's literature was, compared to other fictional children's books.
It’s hard for me to put a label on myself. Americans view American-born children from Caribbean parents as Caribbean children, and Caribbean people view children who are born in the United States as Americans, [yet] they constantly say to them, ‘You are Caribbean.’ This is my first book and there is more to come’ [perhaps categorised] under Caribbean and African-American writing.
The cover of Sadie's Caribbean Alphabet, written for children up to six years old. Image courtesy Stephanie L. Blair, used with permission.
AR: How is Sadie's Caribbean Alphabet a representation of what it means to be Caribbean?
SB: The book [captures] what it means to be a Caribbean-American [with] strong connections to your Caribbean roots and Caribbean family living abroad. This alphabet shares its Caribbean food, sports, spices, music, and landmarks with the world.
AR: Would you agree that singling out Caribbeans could come off as divisive to Africans and African-Americans?
SB: How people from different cultures view my work has crossed my mind, and I hope the response is positive. I didn't think [my approach] divisive. Some people will view it as that, but I can't live to please everybody and I don't think that I can truly write about African culture—I have an understanding of it, but I haven't lived in it. If I were to write an African-American story, someone will say, ‘Oh, she's from a Guyanese background, how can she write about the African-American [experience]?’ People will always have something to say.
Some Caribbean people can be very judgmental and there's always a back and forth about, well … Guyanese are not Caribbean, they're South American.
GV: Would you categorise yourself as a Black writer?
SB: Honestly, it's hard for me to put a label on myself because I've never done that. I'm just Stephanie. But if I had to, I'd say I'm a Black Guyanese-American author.
AR: What do you have to say to children who may be viewed as different?
SB: You are beautifully crafted by a higher power to stand out. Don't be afraid of who you are. Your uniqueness is your superpower.
Producing Caribbean literature is one of my goals because I attended schools throughout my youth where children and families differed from me culturally, linguistically, and physically. Even though the United States of America is a melting pot, if you don’t live in a state that has a large population of people from a country you or your family are from … chances are you won’t be too open about your culture.
AR: What has the response to the book been like and what do you hope for it to accomplish?
SB: [I want to] connect with Caribbean families all across the world through literature. While having a successful career is nice, producing relatable Caribbean literature is my goal.
I've received a lot of positive feedback from educators, friends, family and of course, all the kiddies. One parent asked me if I would be turning this book into a series and it has definitely crossed my mind. We shall see what happens in the future.
Blair's book is self-published.

author: Atiba Rogers


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In Mozambique, a tug of war between public health and digital rights during the pandemic · Global Voices
Dércio Tsandzana

Central Hospital of Maputo, Mozambique, July 14, 2018. Photo by Jcornelius via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.
Like several other African countries, Mozambique declared a state of emergency to control the spread of the coronavirus in March last year, and has extended it three times due to increased COVID-19 cases.
Since mid-December, cases have increased in Mozambique. As of January 19, there are more than 27,446 cases and 249 dead, according to Johns Hopkins University. Hospitals are about 90 percent occupied in the public sector and private hospital beds are fully occupied.
Essentially, since September 2020, citizens must follow several restrictive measures that limit the circulation of people and goods, according to the state-of-emergency decree.
To ensure the rapid flow of critical, accurate public health information during this time, several digital platforms have emerged in the private and public sector.
However, these platforms and initiatives lack clarity in terms of how they work and what their potential impact may have on data privacy and personal security.
A platform called Fica Atento, created by the National Institute of Health (INS) was designed to disseminate official information about the pandemic in Mozambique. Another platform called CovidMoz intends to share real-time data about COVID-19 in the country.
Fica Atento is not mandatory, but as a state-sponsored entity, it appears to be the most highly recommended for COVID-19 information, whereas CovidMoz is a new, private initiative.
By the third quarter of 2020,Fica Atento reports more than 80,000 users, while CovidMoz reports more than 50,000 users. However, neither company could provide Global Voices with the latest user registration data.
Screenshot of CovidMoz application, January 13, 2021.
For Luís Pereira, and Clayton Matule, Covidmoz creators, security issues should be highlighted across all internet apps, including their own. In an interview with Global Voices, they said users should assume all apps are tracking and collecting user data, and encourage applications to provide a feedback loop for users.
They insist, however, that Covidmz does not store its users’ data except for emails used to send quick alerts with optional daily updates. The opt-out quality respects users’ freedom to choose, they say.
However, they co-creators admit they are unsure if their platform currently guarantees user security and privacy. Additionally, Mozambique has no data security law, although a law does exist on electronic transactions.
Matule told Global Voices:
We are not right [about its current privacy settings] but we are here to find solutions and help, because we all want to support, and it makes no sense to violate people's privacy to make money. … We have to have a bit of ethics and empathy to respect who accesses our platform, but let's be honest, nobody reads the terms and conditions…
It is still unclear, however, what the company will do with user emails when the pandemic ends. When Global Voices visited the platform, we did not find any terms and conditions on the site.
In addition to apps, the government took several other measures to collect citizen data in the name of fighting COVID-19.
In March last year, the government introduced a GPS monitoring and tracking system for all travelers entering Mozambique via airports and borders, stating in Article 3 of the emergency decree that all police and health authorities “should create the necessary conditions to locate, in real time, by geographical location” anyone who came into direct contact with COVID-19.
The system was later discontinued without explanation and there is no information about where or how that user data was stored or destroyed.
Staff and residents with the Ministry of Health conduct contact-tracing efforts by asking citizens who may have been in contact with the virus to provide their mobile phone number and home contact, which is then stored  and shared with government health professionals.
In an interview with Global Voices, Mussa Chaleque, from the INS, said that institutional communication concerned him because there was a lot of “fake news” circulating about the coronavirus and citizens were largely in the dark about COVID-19 in Mozambique.
In February last year, before the first case, Mozambican authorities warned against misinformation about COVID-19, with a statement from the Maputo Central Hospital (HCM):
“Any information on the evolution of coronavirus in the country will be reported promptly through the usual communication channels.”
A month later, a Mozambican newspaper called CanalMoz reported the first COVID-19 cases, but these were never confirmed by the Ministry of Health.
The INS also published several tweets attempting to dispel various myths circulating online about the coronavirus.
In this tweet, they inform the public that the virus can not be spread through sexual contact:
Até ao momento, não está comprovado que o sémen ou o suor possam transmitir a #COVID19. No entanto, a infecção pelo coronavírus pode acontecer durante os actos sexuais, através dos beijos ou da proximidade entre as pessoas, pois o vírus transmite-se pelas gotículas de saliva. pic.twitter.com/uNkI1Ed7IW
— Instituto Nacional de Saúde (INS) (@instituto_ins) May 5, 2020
To date, it has not been proven that semen or sweat can transmit #COVID19. However, infection with the coronavirus can happen during sexual acts, through kissing or proximity between people, as the virus is transmitted by droplets of saliva.
In another tweet, they caution that antibiotics fight bacteria, not viruses:
Os antibióticos combatem as bactérias e não os vírus. Como tal, eles não servem para prevenir ou tratar o novo coronavírus. No entanto, os antibióticos podem ser usados no tratamento de outra infecção que um doente com COVID-19 possa ter. #Covid19Moz #FicaAtento pic.twitter.com/BK465SvrgW
— Instituto Nacional de Saúde (INS) (@instituto_ins) May 17, 2020
Antibiotics fight bacteria, not viruses. As such, they do not serve to prevent or treat the new coronavirus. However, antibiotics can be used to treat another infection that a COVID-19 patient may have.
In this tweet, they dispelled the myth that sun exposure could help kill the coronavirus:
Apanhar sol é importante para produzir vitamina D e fortalecer o sistema imunitário, mas não o impede de contrair a #COVID19. Para evitar a infecção pelo novo coronavírus lave várias vezes as mãos com água e sabão, mantenha a distância de 1,5 metros das restantes pessoas. pic.twitter.com/ngY9aBejtt— Instituto Nacional de Saúde (INS) (@instituto_ins) May 13, 2020
Staying in the sun is important to produce vitamin D and strengthen the immune system, but it does not prevent you from contracting #COVID19. To avoid infection with the new coronavirus wash your hands several times with soap and water, keep a distance of 1.5 meters from other people.
In December 2020, the Media Institute of Southern Africa created a platform called MisaCheck, dedicated to fact-checking news in Mozambican media. Their aim is to expose and report on false information on matters of national interest in Mozambican media. Its first fact-checking project focused on COVID-19 denial by Mozambican citizens.
Chaleque told Global Voices that during a virtual dialogue on misinformation in digital spaces in June 2020, organized in Tunisia, by the African Centers for Disease Control, many people had asked if information circulating on social media came from the Ministry of Health, or not.
To answer this question, we created a digital platform called PENSA. Thus, the creation of the platform was the first initiative, and our inspiration was South Africa.
PENSA’s mHealth platform provides every Mozambican free, government-approved health information through USSD, SMS, and a responsive website.
The PENSA platform, available on all Mozambican mobile network operators by dialing *660# — or through the website — allows citizens to “see symptoms, precautions and general information for various diseases; see information on maternal health, baby development, and vaccines; get contact details for health facilities; and more.”
PENSA's public health mission is to disseminate the most accurate information as widely as possible, working with the Ministry of Health to make the health content freely accessible by the masses.
There are only slight differences between PENSA, with the Ministry of Health, and Fica Atento, with the INS.
Chaleque said he can not comment much on security and privacy issues, because the INS does not conduct too much data collection. They do, however, provide a field for people to ask questions and answers via email on their site, without collecting email addresses, Chaleque said.
However, he admits that personal data may be gathered through the “chatbot” application, where the INS use the WhatsApp platform to send messages to users about COVID-19. He tells Global Voices that so far, Fica Atento users have exceeded 80,000.
Despite the existence of a vague legal framework for these various measures through the state of emergency decree, it remains unclear how citizens’ digital security and privacy are protected during this period.
This article is part of a series of posts examining interference with digital rights under lockdowns and beyond during the COVID-19 pandemic in nine African countries: Uganda, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Algeria, Nigeria, Namibia, Tunisia, Tanzania and Ethiopia. The project is funded by the Africa Digital Rights Fund of The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA).

author: Dércio Tsandzana


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Tunisia’s fight against COVID-19 unmasks shaky ground for digital rights · Global Voices
Yosr Jouini

The medina in Tunis, Tunisia, July 16, 2020. Photo by Citizen59 via Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0.
As Tunisia completes a four-day lockdown to control a second wave of the coronavirus, protests against the curfew have turned violent, leading to the arrest of 630 mostly young people.
While Tunisia has been lauded as a success story in its transition from uprising to democracy, local authorities have, throughout the pandemic, resorted to historical tricks by using vague, existing lawsto curb freedom of expression and limit citizens’ rights to information.
In early March last year, the Tunisian Health Ministry reported the country’s first confirmed coronavirus case. That month, President Kais Saied announced a curfew combined with a lockdown and other restrictive measures to curb the spread of the virus.
As the number of daily COVID-19 infections dropped to zero cases, the government gradually started to ease restrictions in May 2020. However, with another surge in COVID-19 cases in October 2020, many hospitals were reporting full capacity and local authorities imposed new restrictive measures.
Coinciding with the pandemic, Tunisia faces a shifting, unstable political scene. Throughout 2020, four health ministers were appointed, and three ministerial reshuffles in Tunisian government occurred. These frequent changes affected the government’s overall communication about COVID-19.
Tunisia’s constitution guarantees the right to access information and the parliament’s 2016 adoption of an access to information law further cements it.
Last January, as reports of COVID-19 infections in Europe flooded the news, Health Minister Sonia Ben Cheikh communicated preventive measures at borders to control the virus. But this crisis communication was mostly limited to press conferences and frequently delayed speeches.
On the civil society front, several joint efforts to provide critical information to the public resulted in projects such as covid-19.tn, an online portal that provides the latest COVID-19 news and information.
The Health Ministry continues to post daily on Facebook, the most used social media platform in Tunisia. These updates typically cover new, confirmed cases, deaths, recovered cases, hospitalized cases, and cases-per-region. However, the updates share little or no information on hospital capacity.
Around September, as the numbers of new confirmed cases increased, these Facebook posts began to garner criticism for alleged irregularities, as they merged statistics and stopped including per-region updates, which were a significant factor in determining curfews and lockdowns.
The Health Ministry resumed providing information following an access to information request by I Watch Tunisia, a civil society organization. Experts criticized the absence of coordination between institutions.
On January 17, Adnen Aswad, president of the National Institute of Access to Information, called on public health institutions to “further provide detailed and clear information regarding the lockdown” measures and restrictions.
Aswad also said that the required communication with citizens is “not at the required level,” leading to “confusion among citizens, chaos, and undermined the citizens’ trust in these institutions and disrupted the work of journalists and civil society, due to withholding accurate information.”
As the emerging health crisis began to cast a dark shadow on an already stagnant economy, citizens began a more critical exchange about the pandemic in digital spaces. Yet,the government turned to its existing penal codes to stifle any criticism of its coronavirus response in an attempt to control the coronavirus narrative.
Last year, two bloggers were pursued in court for questioning local authorities’ integrity.
Blogger Hajer Awadi was charged with “insulting a civil servant” under Article 125 of the penal code and “causing noises and disturbances to the public” under Article 316 of the penal code, after she posted a video on her personal Facebook account criticizing government corruption and the poor distribution of basic food in her region. She was sentenced to a suspended 75-day prison term by the first instance court, after she stayed in custody for a week.
In a similar case, in April 2020, Facebook blogger Anis Mabrouki posted a video on his Facebook page filming a crowd of people protesting against the government for its failure to distribute financial aid in front of the closed mayor’s office in the town of Tebourba. Under Articles 316 and 128 of the penal code respectively, he too was charged with “causing noises and disturbances to the public” and “accusing public officials of crimes related to their jobs without furnishing proof of guilt.” Both articles are listed under chapter Four of Tunisia’s penal code entitled “Attacks Against Public Authorities.”
Article 128 provides for up to two years prison sentence and a fine on any person who accuses a public official of illegal acts. Mabrouki was arrested for 15 days until the courts acquitted him on April 30, 2020.
Both cases, however, got limited press coverage, in part because they occurred mid-crisis and interior regions — and also because the content did not relate to well-known public figures.
Although Tunisia’s 2014 constitution guarantees the right to privacy and personal data protection, the right to access information and communication networks, as well as the right to free expression and freedom of the press, authorities have found useful tools in old legal texts that remain relevant in the absence of a constitutional court.
A constitutional court, where defendants can appeal when they face prosecutions under unconstitutional laws, has not been established thus far. It is constitutionally required, but parliament failed eight times to elect three members with two-thirds majority required by law, therefore blocking the appointment of other members by the president and the supreme judicial council.
The debate to reform and revoke repressive laws started as early as 2011, with the interim government pending Tunisia’s 1959 constitution, but many legal texts and decrees that contradict the 2014 constitution and violate human rights remain in effect.
Many activists, bloggers, journalists and social media users have endured harassment, intimidation, imprisonment and other sanctions under these laws.
In a recent report, Amnesty International reviewed 40 cases of Tunisians investigated or prosecuted by the Tunisian authorities between 2017 and 2020, in relation to peaceful online speech under the penal code, telecommunications code, and the press code.
These provisions — spread across many legal texts — gave the veneer of legality to the former Ben Ali regime to restrict freedoms, interfere in the judicial process and repress any political opposition.
The Tunisian democratic transition remains fragile as long as these laws remain unreformed. Citizens will continue to remain at the mercy of authorities who enforce vaguely worded legislation.
For instance, the telecommunications code states in Article 86 that anyone found guilty of “using public communication networks to insult or disturb others” could spend up to two years in prison and maybe fined.”
“Tunisia’s legal codes are rife with vague laws that the authorities use to penalize free speech and silence critical voices,” said Eric Goldstein, acting Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
The current challenges in Tunisia go beyond the health crisis — touching on social, economic, and political concerns. Accurate, trustworthy public information is vital to guide citizens during a health crisis and avoid the spread of misinformation.
Tunisia’s efforts to control the COVID-19 narrative has had a profound impact on citizens’ digital rights.

author: Yosr Jouini


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Webinar: How to use automation to improve social reach and increase reader engagement · Global Voices
Nevin Thompson

Hosted by TargetingS and Global Voices, this 75-minute webinar on Friday February 26 @ 12pm ET / 5pm UTC will focus on how automating publishing on social media can increase reader engagement while freeing up resources for other tasks.
Increase readership from your social media channel to your news site while reducing effort
Hosted by TargetingS and Global Voices and aimed at social media editors in newsrooms, this 75-minute webinar on Friday will focus on how automating publishing on social media can increase reader engagement while freeing up resources for other tasks.
This webinar is aimed at audience engagement editors at news publications. Discussion topics will include:
Global Voices social media partner TargetingS will lead the webinar. Special attention will be paid to best practices, quick tips and “hacks” to get the most of your story production:
How to use Automation to Improve Social Reach and Increase Reader Engagement
Global Voices & TargetingS
Friday February 26 @ 12pm ET ~ 13:15pm ET
Zoom (link provided following signup)
Signup form
Nevin Thompson, Social Media Manager, Global Voices
Contact form >>


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Caribbean denounces Trump’s decision to put Cuba back on terrorism list; hopes for a reversal with Biden · Global Voices
Janine Mendes-Franco

Silhouette of former US President Donald Trump against the American flag. Image by IoSonoUnaFotoCamera on Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0.
Prior to former United States President Donald Trump's departure on January 20, his administration made several efforts to “lock in” certain controversial policies, including additional immigration restrictions. The move that has raised the ire of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), however, is the Trump government's decision to put Cuba back on its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Although Cuba is not a CARICOM member state, the country retains close ties with other regional territories—culturally, economically, and in terms of goodwill—prompting the community to make a statement on the decision to add Cuba to the US State Department's list of countries that are allegedly not fully cooperating with anti-terrorism efforts.
Calling the declaration “unilateral,” the CARICOM release noted:
Cuba’s international conduct does not in any way warrant that designation. This further attack on the country adversely affects its international standing and its social, human and economic development and is another misguided action in addition to the unproductive, unnecessary and illegal financial and economic embargo already imposed on this Caribbean nation by the United States.
The group advocated for a reversal of the action and stated that it looked forward to the United States normalising relations with Cuba.
Diplomatic ties between the two countries have a long and fraught history since Fidel Castro became Cuba's prime minister in 1959 and established a socialist state. Despite their geographic proximity, US/Cuba relations remained frosty until President Barack Obama's tenure, when there was a move to restore diplomatic ties. In 2015, Cuba was removed from the very list it now finds itself back on, and a year later, then-president Obama made a historic visit to the island—the first for a sitting American president in close to 90 years.
Conversely, the Trump administration reintroduced business and travel restrictions to Cuba, defending its position by saying that Obama's loosened restrictions “do not help the Cuban people—they only enrich the Cuban regime”. Trump promised not to lift sanctions until all political prisoners were released, freedoms (including freedom of assembly) respected, all political parties legalised and free elections held in Cuba.
It remains to be seen what position President Joe Biden will take on US/Cuba relations. The Caribbean Council, a trade and investment consultancy and membership organisation, has said it expects the new administration to re-establish a working relationship with the island, but some Cuban commentators find that unlikely.
Either way, CARICOM wants Cuba taken off the State Sponsors of Terrorism list—and Cuban voices are also weighing in.
Multimedia platform El Toque shared a series of cartoons that offered, through humour, a deeper perspective on the move, saying that this “last gesture by [Trump] to the voters of South Florida” would “greatly worsen the already deteriorated relations between the two countries”:
Dicha acción conlleva un grupo de sanciones financieras y comerciales que a la larga vienen a acumular más dificultades al cubano de a pie, que la tiene bien difícil debido a las carencias diarias.
Justo en este momento, en que sufrimos una agudización de la crisis económica agravada por la situación de la COVID-19 […] llega el nuevo retroceso.
Este tipo de polarización no trae ningún beneficio a los que estamos en medio, rehenes de los extremismos y odios de las posiciones de poder.
This action entails a group of financial and commercial sanctions that in the long run accumulate more difficulties for ordinary Cubans, who have it very difficult due to daily shortages.
Right at this moment, when we suffer a worsening of the economic crisis aggravated by the situation of COVID-19 […] the new setback arrives.
This type of polarization does not bring any benefit to those in the middle, hostages of extremism and hatred of positions of power.
In a separate post, El Toque quoted Collin Laverty, a specialist in Cuba/US relations, who noted that inclusion in the list “also implies other legal sanctions that penalize people and countries that carry out certain trade with state sponsors.”
Meanwhile, Cuba's state newspaper Granma echoed the stance of the coordination bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that naming the island as a state sponsor of terrorism was “unfounded.”
The other countries currently on the list are North Korea, Iran, and Syria.