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Japan’s local rail lines become the latest pandemic victim · Global Voices
Justin Aukema

A 125 series (125系, 125-kei) single-car DC electric multiple unit (EMU) commuter car serving the Obama Line. The future of the line, which runs eighty-four kilometers between Tsuruga, Fukui and Higashi-Maizuru, Kyoto is now uncertain.” Photo by Nevin Thompson, taken in March 2014. Image license: CC-BY-3.0
Japan’s local rail lines are in trouble. Between 2000 and 2021 alone, forty-five train lines spanning 1158 kilometers were decommissioned across Japan. Other local rail lines have cut operating hours, staff, and special ticket discounts across the country. The trend threatens to strand some residents of regional Japan.
Rail operators, including those affiliated with Japan Railways Group (JR)'s regional operating units, say line closures are a natural result of rural depopulation, declining birth rate, and increased car transportation. Some observers argue that rural depopulation and increased car use often aren’t the cause but rather the result of local train lines closing down.
One rationale provided by rail operators for shuttering local rail services is simply that these train lines are not as profitable as their counterparts in densely populated urban regions such as Tokyo or Osaka.
The history of Japan Railways group (JR) helps explain this reasoning. In 1987, the state-owned Japanese National Railways entity was privatized and broken up into seven separate entities under the JR moniker.
Since that time, JR sales and profits increased, and have continued to do so into the 2000s and 2010s. However, despite this overall profitability, from 2010, JR-affiliated companies began asking local governments for taxpayer money to cover local operating deficits. Some operators threatened to decommission local train lines if these demands weren’t met.
Some prefectures have cooperated. For example, JR East recently reached a deal with Fukushima Prefecture to re-open previously decommissioned sections of the Tadami Line. Under the arrangement, Fukushima Prefecture will buy the rail infrastructure and land while hiring out its operation to JR East.
But other regional governments have been less capable of implementing this model. National law stipulates that JR must gain municipalities’ “understanding” (rikai) before decommissioning a local rail line.
As a result, local governments, whose shoestring budgets aren’t enough to cover JR’s losses, but who also aren’t interested in losing one of their most important pieces of infrastructure, have simply avoided entering into negotiations with JR.
Consequently, JR has adopted other methods of divesting from local rail lines, including reducing services to a bare minimum. In some places, JR has even abandoned commuter passes for students.
Now, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has provided JR with further opportunities to make more cutbacks and to demand more public compensation. JR Central, JR West, and JR East all posted record losses in the first quarter of 2021 as train ridership abruptly and precipitously dropped.
In this environment, JR West has taken a novel response. In February 2022, it began publishing data on “underperforming” and “unprofitable” local train lines under its operation. Any train line or section of a train line with less than 2,000 riders per kilometer on an average day was targeted for scrutiny. This includes a total of 30 sections on 17 different train lines, and accounts for approximately one-third of JR West’s total operating lines.
JR West’s losses reached 116.5 billion yen (around $1 billion USD) due to COVID-19. But the company had already been cutting costs and shuttering smaller local lines well before this. In its 35 years of operation, JR West closed 16 sections of train lines. Most recently, in 2018, it decommissioned the 108-km Sankō Line running between Hiroshima and Tottori Prefectures.
Of the train lines now in question, the Mainichi Shimbun quoted Hasegawa as saying:
このままの形で維持するのは難しい。維持が適切か議論する必要がある。
It’s going to be difficult to keep maintaining these lines. We need to start thinking about whether we need them or not.”
In the Sankei Shimbun, Hasegawa was quoted as saying, “I hope we don’t just have to tell local governments that we’re going to shut them [train lines] down.”
Reactions to the crisis of Japan’s local train lines among internet denizens have been mixed. One local resident questioned the practice of gauging ridership during the COVID-19 pandemic:
そもそもコロナ禍で、数字を図る方が間違い
国内でも移動ためらってる・外国人観光客も入れない状態なのに
これで数字を図るのは不公平かなと思う#地方#ローカル線
芸備線 生活利用促進の取り組み「成果なし」JR西日本が所見 イベント集客は成功も | 乗りものニュース https://t.co/DnWz8PmaTn
— こうちゃん@東海地区タクドラ4月帰省目標 (@hakodate1000758) February 20, 2022]
It’s a mistake to try to gauge such numbers (ridership) during the COVID-19 pandemic in the first place. People are reluctant to travel, and there are no foreign tourists either. So, it’s unfair to take such measurements in this situation.
Meanwhile, Hasegawa said affected regions could prepare for the worst by switching to more bus or taxi transportation. The JR West president also said his company would be more inclined to keep the lines operating if certain conditions were met.
One option Hasegawa suggested was to separate infrastructure and operation (jōge bunri hōshiki) by having local governments purchase the train line and hiring JR to run its operation. Another card Hasegawa put on the table was to receive more financial support and subsidies.
None of these options are likely to be very appealing for the affected regions and municipalities. Either they cover JR West’s deficits or face losing a key part of their infrastructure with potentially even more disastrous economic and social effects.
In Japan and beyond, COVID-19 has been more than a public health disaster. The crisis of Japan’s local rail services is just one example of a large corporation taking advantage of the pandemic to cut public services, even while increasing profits.

author: Justin Aukema


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Russia and Latin America: So far, and yet so near · Global Voices
Connectas

Illustration by Erick Retana
This article was originally published in Connectas. An abridged and updated version is published by Global Voices under a content-sharing agreement.
“The most consequential thing that has happened in the world in terms of war and peace since the Second World War.”
This is how U.S. President Joe Biden described what a Russian invasion of Ukraine would mean for the United States. Biden declined to elaborate further on the likely consequences of such a situation, nor is it necessary — no one would be oblivious. Then, on February 24, Russia attacked Ukraine.
But how, and with what effect, could such a conflict — one that does not de-escalate despite all attempts — have on Latin America?
To try and reach an explanation, one must first try to understand the long and complicated love-hate relationship between Russia and Ukraine. The narrative that Ukrainians and Russians are one people is the main argument Vladimir Putin is using to justify what he is really hiding: that he would like to turn his neighbour back into the satellite state it was for much of the 20th century, serving Moscow.
Vladimir Rouvinsky, a professor at the University of Icesi in Cali, Colombia, explained his view to CONNECTAS:
In the end, Ukraine is nothing more than an excuse. What is really at stake here is the international order being challenged by new emerging powers, in this case, Russia. In a way, we are beginning to see how Russia will act on the world stage in the future. Putin believes that the United States still regards Latin America as its backyard and based on this, claims that Russia has the same right to influence Ukraine, Belarus and other nations in its surrounding area.
The Russian president will not accept being told what to do and how to act in what was part of the former Soviet Union. According to Rouvinsky, “That's when reciprocal action started to appear in Latin America, I would say in more of a symbolic nature, to demonstrate that Russia is able to generate influence in apparently foreign territory.”
It’s clear that, at least for now, Russia’s preferred destinations are Venezuela and Nicaragua. Both countries have dictatorial regimes that Putin makes the most of by supporting them in the challenges they both face in terms of democratic guarantees and human rights.
At a first glance, Cuba would also be on this list, but Professor Rouvinsky disagrees:
Today Cuba is separated from Russia by ideology. Cuba is socialist, Russia is capitalist. Cuba may agree with the anti-American discourse led by Maduro and Ortega, but that is not enough to make it an ally. There is no longer that degree of trust from the time of the Soviet Union.
The Russian influence seems to have extended further than just the dictatorships. It appears that Argentine President Alberto Fernández was added to the list in recent days, while in the Kremlin itself.  Fernández told a clearly pleased Putin, “I am determined that Argentina stops being so dependent on the IMF and the United States and opens itself up to other opportunities, and I believe that Russia has a very important position.”
Fernández continued, going further than anyone would have expected:
We have to see how Argentina can become a gateway to Russia in Latin America, so that Russia enters in a more decisive way.
Russia is also the country on everyone's lips in Colombia. Bilateral relations have been affected by recent statements by officials from both sides. According to Defence Minister Diego Molano, the complex security conditions on the border with Venezuela are due to the nearby presence of troops from the Bolivarian Republic that have “the support of Iran and Russia.”
The Russian embassy responded immediately: “We are perplexed by the continuous attempts to accuse the Russian Federation of alleged ‘interference in Colombia's internal affairs,’ without any basis.”  According to the diplomatic representative, Molano is basing his accusations on unsubstantiated “intelligence data.”
So it is clear then that Russia, in its defiance of the West, is making its presence felt in Latin America. Professor Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue told CONNECTAS that Russia “is demonstrating its strength by presenting itself in the region. (…) Putin is interested in promoting democracy as he sees it.” Moreover, he is not doing so at just any time says Shifter, but is “taking advantage of the fact that the United States is having serious internal problems, with a very polarised and very toxic political situation.”
Along with Russia comes a not unlikely ally — the People's Republic of China. According to Shifter, “The solidarity pact between the two countries allows them to act in Venezuela, where they are heavily involved in technological and infrastructural projects.” Professor Shifter continued to add that in the past, the People's Republic of China was more interested in only commercial opportunities, but it is increasingly daring to do more, “in view of the undeniable loss of influence of the United States in the region.”
This was made clear when President Fernández included Beijing in his tour, after which he tweeted, “I had a cordial, friendly and fruitful meeting with Xi Jinping, President of China. We agreed to incorporate Argentina into the Belt and Road Initiative.” He also described the results of the meeting as “excellent news (because) our country will obtain more than 23 billion dollars in Chinese investment for works and projects.”
Still, with or without China, Putin proves to be an aggressive chess player who does not mind moving his pieces wherever he pleases. As Shifter notes, an important element to consider is that no one can anticipate how much longer this man — who is defiant and authoritarian and appears to epitomise cunning — will remain at the helm of the mighty Russian ship.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Connectas


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Russian discourse about the war in Ukraine is not monolithic · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Screenshot from Novaya Gazeta YouTube channel featuring Russian opponents to the Russian invasion of Ukraine including 2021 Nobel Peace Prize co-winner Dmitri Muratov
On February 24, Russian forces attacked and bombed military infrastructure across Ukraine, thus starting an invasion of their neighbour.
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s voice might seem to dominate and represent Russian discourse. But widespread propaganda, caution about sharing views publicly or responding to pollsters, and engrained mistrust of the state means that it is difficult to make definitive statements about the actual views of Russian citizens. While not visible in Russian mass media, there is evidence that the views of some Russians about Russia’s military attack are more diverse and nuanced than Putin would have the world believe.
Putin stated his views and his specific interpretation of Russian-Ukrainian relations over the past 13 centuries, broadcast in video on February 21. He also made clear that his immediate entourage, including members of the Russian Security Council, would not be allowed to disagree with the smallest detail of his views.
But it's it not evident to what extent he is right when, as he concluded in his speech, he states that he is:
Уверен в поддержке граждан России и всех патриотических сил.
Convinced of the support of Russian citizens and all patriotic forces.
It is important to understand that in today’s Russia, public space and the media are severely censored and monitored. The Russian legislation carries severe penalties on public expressions of criticism, including on social media. It is also a criminal offense to say in public that Crimea is not part of the Russian Federation.
New regulations are now in place to reinforce this control, including the obligation for Russian journalists to quote only official sources of information provided by the Russian government. Roskomnadzor, the Russian body overseeing the media and internet, has just published the details of this order.
And there is some data on the Russian population's disagreement with Putin's claims. Despite the real dangers of holding dissenting views, a recent public opinion survey conducted by the independent Levada Center indicated that one-third of Russians say they oppose or do not agree with Putin’s position on Ukraine.
Several factors explain why many were already against any military option. Many people in Russia have Ukrainian roots, close family in Ukraine, grew up or studied in Ukraine. Many also remember the deaths of Soviet soldiers as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, in which about 15,000 Soviet troops died, and many more were mentally and physically traumatized.
On February 24, the first day of Russia's military attack on Ukraine, a number of public intellectuals signed a petition against the war. Given that internet access is partially controlled and censored, the link is not always accessible, so a screenshot is provided below:
The text mainly says: “We, Russian scientists and science journalists, state the fact we are categorically opposed to the military operations initiated by the armed forces of our country against Ukraine.”
And here is a list that continues to grow of some of those who signed it, representing different areas of public artistic, scientific. academic life:
Some Russian show business and sports celebrities have also expressed their opposition to the war, including those considered to be close to the Kremlin:
Десятки российских звёзд выступили против войны с Украиной
A petition in Russian on the advocacy site Change.org has already gathered over 250,000 signatures, mostly in Russian, expressing a firm no to the war.
The independent Russian-language media outlet Meduza, which is based in Latvia, already reports that people demonstrating publicly across Russia against the war with Ukraine, usually as individuals or in small groups, are being detained.
The gap with the Kremlin’s current discourse is likely to widen in the coming days as the first coffins with Russian soldiers return home.

author: Filip Noubel


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Ukrainian refugees gather at the borders with Moldova, Slovakia, Poland · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Chișinău-Odesa bus that usually takes about 4 hours to join the two cities. Photo by Filip Noubel, used with permission
As Russia started its military attack across Ukraine on February 24, destroying military installations inside or close to major cities, large numbers of Ukrainians jumped in their cars and started leaving. Many are trying to find refuge in rural areas, which are believed to be safer, and where many have already sent children and older relatives.
Others though are considering moving westwards to seek temporary shelter in neighboring countries, mostly Moldova, Slovakia and Poland, where local authorities are rapidly putting in place infrastructure to host thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of refugees.
Moldova is a crucial place for people fleeing the southern city of Odesa, with a population of over one million people, where military installations have been bombed, resulting in a number of deaths. A three-hour ride — in normal time — can lead to Chișinău, the capital of Moldova.
This Radio Free Europe video shows how people are crossing the border by car or simply walking in.
Moldova itself shares a similar experience as Ukraine as a country divided, since about one third of its territory, called Transnistria, is under a separatist government that is supported militarily, politically and economically by Moscow.
Another destination is Slovakia, for those in Western Ukraine or moving there, as neighboring Hungary that also shares a border with Ukraine, is known for its pro-Moscow discourse and not necessarily seen as friendly to Ukrainians. The Slovak government has announced on the website of its Interior Ministry that:
Vstup bude umožnený všetkým osobám, ktoré utekajú pred vojnovým konfliktom. Vstup na územie Slovenskej republiky bude umožnený po individuálnom posúdení aj osobám, ktoré nebudú mať platný cestovný doklad (biometrický pas).
Entry [into Slovak territory] will be allowed to all people fleeing the military conflict. Entry into Slovak territory will be made possible based on individual assessment including for people unable to present a valid travel document (biometric passport).
The Slovak president Zuzana Čaputová has also condemned the Russian military attack and is sending troops to assist refugees. Slovakia shares a nearly 100 km-long border with Ukraine, and counts a large community of Ukrainian migrant workers and a historical Ukrainian minority, as does the Czechia.
Poland is also a major choice, given long historical relations with Ukraine, the presence of a large Ukrainian minority and a history of labor migration, but also because it recently experienced a wave of Belarusian refugees, followed by the instrumentalization of refugees from Syria and Iraq by Minsk.
As the leading Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza writes, the number of Ukrainian refugees arriving mostly in cars at different border points is increasing by the hour. According to one refugee interviewed in the article:
Aleks z żoną i dwójką kilkuletnich dzieci pochodzą z Charkowa, ale ostatnie dni spędzali we Lwowie. – O 5 rano zadzwonili znajomi, że jest wojna. Spakowaliśmy, co mieliśmy i ruszyliśmy w drogę. Jedziemy do Krakowa albo jeszcze dalej do Wiednia. Zobaczymy, co będzie dalej.
Aleks, his wife and his two small children come originally from Kharkov [north of Ukraine, close to the Russian border] but spent recent days in Lviv [Ukrainian city in the West]. “At five in the morning, friends called us to tell us this is war. We packed what we had and took to the road. We are going to Krakow [city in southern Poland] and then to Vienna. We will see what will happen next.
While every Ukrainian is making extremely hard choices, whether staying or leaving, choices are also heavily determined by the location, the size and conditions of their families, the existence of passports and visas. Central Europe will need to be prepared for significant waves of refugees and will require strong financial and operational support from the European Union to cope with such a large wave of migration.


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Unexpected reaction in Prague after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Statement of Czech President Milos Zeman about the situation in Ukraine following Russia's invasion. Screenshot from CNN Prima YouTube channel.
Quite unexpectedly, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shifted the position of Moscow's most influential supporter in the Czech Republic: President Miloš Zeman, who has just described Moscow's actions as a “crime”.
The Czech Republic has a conflicted relationship with Russia. Politically speaking, its government is divided: President Miloš Zeman has long made his unwavering support for Moscow very public. Yet October 2021 parliamentary elections brought a new coalition and a new Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Lipavský, who represents the Pirate Party.
Lipavský has publicly endorsed the view of the Czech secret services on Russia and China, who in their public annual reports have regularly designed both countries as representing the biggest threats to the Czech Republic's national security. Zeman attempted to veto Lipavský's appointment when given the list of the new government, described him as anti-Russian and delayed his nomination for weeks, but eventually had to accept his nomination.
This long-standing antagonism collapsed on February 24, the day marking the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Zeman, who is known for keeping a long silence on divisive issues, made statements in a video that completely contradict his former position, apologized for being wrong and described Russia's decision as a crime:
Zeman says:
Mám rád ruskou kulturu, vážím si obětí ruského lidu ve druhé světové válce, ale to neznamená, že budu souhlasit s tím, aby na území suverénního státu bez vyhlášení války vstoupila cizí armáda. Rusko se tímto činem dopouští zločinu proti míru.
Před několika dny jsem řekl že Rusové nejsou blázni a že na Ukrajinu nezaútočí. Přiznávám, že jsem se mýlil.
I love Russian culture and I value the Russian victims of World War Two, but this does not mean that I will agree with the invasion of a foreign army on the territory of a sovereign state. Russia has thus committed a crime against peace.
A few days ago, I said that the Russians are not crazy and will not attack Ukraine. I admit I was wrong.
He also called for immediate action to ban Russia from the SWIFT banking system, a sanction that could have a strong negative effect on Russian economy. The Baltic states are also calling for this measure.
Zeman's unexpected U-turn on Russia can be explained by the fact that the former Czechoslovak state experienced a similar situation in 1938 after Hitler claimed large parts of the country predominantly inhabited by ethnic Germans, known as Sudetenland, under the pretense of protecting them. The parallel with Putin's discourse on February 21 resonates deeply with Czech audiences, who remember how France and the UK failed in their military obligations and thought they could appease Hitler at the Munich conference. World War Two showed how wrong and mortally dangerous this assessment was.
In step with Zeman's change of heart, the government took swift measures on February 24 to punish Russia, announcing it would close Russian consulates, and close its own two consulates in Russia. This exacerbates a deep diplomatic crisis that led in April 24 to the expulsion of 18 Russian diplomats and major downsizing of the Russian embassy in Prague, following accusations of terrorist acts on Czech territory in 2014. The government is also considering banning visas for Russian visitors, except for Russian activists seeking refuge.
As can be seen on this tweet, Prague mayor, Zdeněk Hřib, also from the Pirate Party and a fierce critic of Russia and China, joined a major demonstration on Prague Wenceslas Square, where thousands of Czechs expressed their support for Ukraine:
Praha je s Ukrajinou! pic.twitter.com/D9LjUXGIz9
— Zdeněk Hřib (@ZdenekHrib) February 24, 2022
Prague stands with Ukraine.
The Ukrainian embassy in Prague has also shared images of the demonstration:
Акція солідарності з Україною в Празі сьогодні.#StandWithUkraine pic.twitter.com/Z8k9J6yJqo
— UKR Embassy in CZE (@UKRinCZE) February 24, 2022