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Saudi court reduces sentence of prominent doctor held since 2017 · Global Voices
Hakim Abou Marwane

Image of prominent TV presenter and physician Dr. Walid Fitaihi, from his own Facebook account.
After three years of incarceration, travel bans, and torture, prominent U.S.-Saudi physician and TV presenter Dr. Walid Fitaihi’s case has recently reached a somewhat happy ending, in what is perceived as the result of changing winds in Washington that resulted in Riyadh losing a strong ally in the White House.
In January, a Saudi appeals court nearly halved an initial sentence of six years which the Harvard-educated physician was handed in December on several charges, including “breaking allegiance with the ruler by sympathizing with a terrorist organization,” “offending other countries and their leaders,” and “obtaining a foreign [U.S.] nationality without prior permission from Saudi authorities”.
The court also suspended the remainder of his sentence, Reuters reported, which means he won’t serve more jail time. A six-year travel ban which was ordered against Dr. Fitaihi in December was also narrowed down to 38 months.
The famous motivational speaker was arrested following comments he's made on Twitter against other Arab states and their leaders.
Fitaihi was detained in November 2017 in an anti-corruption spree of arrests ordered by Saudi Prince Mohamed bin Salman, which included members of the ruling family and businessmen and drew global condemnation. The physician was held for 21 months without trial or charges and was tortured. Seven members of his family were banned from traveling in the meantime.
The breakthrough in his case came in tandem with two other U.S. nationals whose cases witnessed sudden and swift resolutions.
On Thursday, the State Department said the kingdom had conditionally released two dual Saudi-U.S. citizens detained in a crackdown on civil society there, and reduced a sentence for a third, Dr. Walid Fitaihi, convicted of “disobedience” to the government.
— Ellen Knickmeyer (@EllenKnickmeyer) February 5, 2021
Days after the appeals court issued its reduced sentence, Dr. Walid Fitaihi’s medical centre in Saudi received a prestigious award, triggering mockery and confused reactions on social media.
Ma’n Asharif, a Saudi with over 6,400 followers, wrote:
قصة #وليد_فتيحي :
-نوفمبر 2017: تم اعتقاله وتعذيبه لقرابة 21 شهر
(خلال هذه الفترة تم نشر مقاطع تخوينية عديدة ضده من الوطنجية)
-اغسطس 2019: تم الإفراج عنه مؤقتاً والمحاكمة مستمرة
– 9 ديسمبر 2020 : حكم بالسجن 6 سنوات
– 18 يناير 2021 : الغاء الحكم و التكريم بجائزة
عش رجبا ترى عجبا https://t.co/EHs1Vbf5v3
— معن الشريف (موشو) Mosho (@Mosho_NZ) January 18, 2021
- November 2017: He was arrested and tortured for nearly 21 months
- August 2019: He was temporarily released, and the trial continues
- December 9, 2020: Sentenced to 6 years in prison
- January 18, 2021: Decision cancellation and he is getting an award
Live longer and you witness wonders.
Another Saudi, Omar Ben Abd Al Aziz reacted humorously :
انا اخاف انام واصحى القى الدكتور فتيحي وزير الصحة .. على مهلك ياحكومة بليز
— عمر بن عبدالعزيز Omar Abdulaziz (@oamaz7) January 18, 2021
I am afraid to sleep and then wake up. Then there is Dr. Fitaihi, who became Minister of Health… O’ Government, do take it easy, please!
In recent months, particularly in the lead up to and following the election of Joe Biden as U.S.’ president, several cases of Saudi detainees that have drawn wide global sympathy, but were overlooked by the Trump administration, have seen positive developments.
Women's rights activist Loujain Al Hathloul is due to be released in March after a court in December sentenced her to nearly six years in jail, down from the maximum jail term of 20 years which the public prosecutor had demanded. Hathloul has already served the majority of her term in pre-trial detention.
More recently, three members of the Shia community who were detained as minors and were initially sentenced to death had had the penalty commuted on February 7.
Many other detainees, imprisoned for voicing opinions conflicting with Saudi leadership, remain behind bars, including distinguished cleric Salman al-Odah, Abd Al Aziz At Tarifi, Awad al Qarni, Omar Al Muqbil, among others.
The string of positive developments has been linked to the new U.S. administration, which has vowed to reassess its ties with autocratic regimes in the region, having already cut off support and weapons sales to the oil-rich kingdom over its gory war in Yemen that resulted in a humanitarian crisis.
Several observers have opined that the speedy legal endings of these cases of interest to Washington are to avoid them being used as “bargaining tools” as ties between the two historic allies are seen to dampen.

author: Hakim Abou Marwane


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Some Western observers share Central Asia’s misgivings about Alexey Navalny · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Screenshot from YouTube channel in which the influential vlogger Yury Dud interviews Alexey Navalny about his views on nationalism.
Today, the view among most members of the liberal Russian opposition, as well as in the West, is that whatever mistakes Alexey Navalny might have made in the past should be overlooked in the name of his fight against President Vladimir Putin's political system. Among Central Asians, however, that view is being disputed — and a minority in the West has voiced similar concerns about the way Navalny is being uncritically revered.
Nazgul Yergalieva, a consultant from Kazakhstan who works in public policy and criminal justice reform, shared her views about Navalny with Global Voices. While she admires Navalny’s courage, condemns his imprisonment, and thinks he should be immediately released and given a fair trial, there are things that concern her:
I do not agree with his political views towards minorities, foreigners and his choice of offensive and even hateful language towards various nationalities. His position on migration does the opposite of supporting fragile calls for tolerance and condemning flourishing xenophobia in the society. I also do not agree with the position of withholding such disagreement or having it interpreted as an attack or criticism against his other convictions and values. I think we should have honest conversations and ask questions in order to understand the nuances. Only such open conversation will lead to engagement, inclusion and pluralism.
This is a crucial issue, and not just for Central Asians. Russia is a multiethnic country where non-ethnic Slavs (people who do not identify as Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians) account for 17 percent of the population.
For a majority of Central Asian migrant workers living in Russia, Navalny's rhetoric makes him a controversial, if not overtly negative figure, since he is in favor of regulating the presence of Central Asians in Russia. Currently, citizens from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan do not need a visa to enter Russia and can stay for 90 days. While some migrant workers take the legal path and secure work contracts and visas in their home country, others simply buy a one-way plane, train or bus ticket and find jobs on the spot, often through networks of other migrants.
Rashid [name changed for security reasons], an Uzbek migrant who has been living in Moscow for over ten years, says that in his community, Navalny is known as the politician wanting to introduce visas — the polar opposite of Putin. Navalny’s past mockery of Uzbeks’ alleged ignorance about the poet Pushkin, who has iconic status in Russia, is often cited as proof of his disdain for Central Asians.
In a 2018 interview, Navalny said, “In Uzbekistan, no one knows Pushkin.” The statement triggered an online flash mob of Uzbeks reciting Pushkin's poetry to demonstrate that he had no idea what he was talking about, having never visited the country. This YouTube video, in Russian, from the Aliv TV channel, titled “Узбеки за Пушкина, против Навального” (Uzbeks for “Pushkin, against Navalny”), shows Navalny making the statement, followed by footage of Uzbeks reciting Pushkin. The commentator adds that Navalny never apologized for his comment.
A similar incident happened in May 2012, when Navalny made a statement about Abay, a key figure in 19th century Kazakh literature, music and philosophy, publicly describing him as a “непонятный Казах” (“A Kazakh who doesn't make sense”). On that occasion, though, he apologized on social media and declared himself a fan of Abay. One ironic aspect of the story is that Abay himself wrote texts calling for fair elections.
Part of Navalny’s success as a public figure comes from a strong Western support base that presents a rather one-sided portrait of him, including through statements made by political figures, members of civil society, and journalists. This attention has, to some extent, protected him despite his notoriety — at least until the August 2020 attempt on his life.
Global Voices spoke to Almut Rochowanski, a human rights expert focusing on the post-Soviet space and the impact of Western foreign policy on the democratization of that space, to understand why many Western voices downplay any criticism of Navalny:
[This tendency] comes from an assumption among post-Cold War Western policy-makers they should have control or at least influence over Russia’s leadership and bend them to their will. This definitely became reality in the 1990s, when Western policy-makers imposed their will on Russia in foreign and security policy and internal reforms, and from then on they came to expect it.
When Putin arrived on the scene, this influence abruptly ended; Russia was no longer ‘rolling over’ for Western foreign policy interests. This new status quo has lasted intolerably long in the eyes of Western policy makers, and the longer it lasts, the more desperate the grasping for someone new becomes, and that means they are more and more ready to overlook anything problematic. Interestingly, Western policy-makers even turn a blind eye to the fact that Navalny’s foreign and security policies run directly counter to Western objectives. He supports Russia’s annexation of Crimea, for example. Maybe they think it’s worth the gamble.
Rochowanski thinks this stance of the end justifying the means is shared by many Russian liberals — as seen in one of the popular slogans Navalny's supporters use in street demonstrations — which also contributes to making him an untouchable icon:
Signs are coming out at Navalny protest in Moscow. “One for all and all for one.” pic.twitter.com/6efr8fWKW6
— Andrew Roth (@Andrew__Roth) January 23, 2021
Global Voices interviewed Aleksey Shlyapuzhnikov, an outspoken critic of Putin who runs an independent media output in the city of Vladimir, in Central Russia, who calls for caution with regard to Navalny:
Многим наблюдателям, включая меня, кажется довольно опасной тенденция единственного лидера российской оппозиции идти на поводу у самых низменных, но при этом самых массовых стереотипов российской политической действительности. Крайне опасно стремление потворствовать низменным чувствам широких слоёв населения, в стремлении понравиться им.
Many observers, including me, consider the tendency of the single leader of the Russian opposition to fulfill the basest and widely shared stereotypes of our political reality as dangerous. What is extremely dangerous is to flatter the lowest feelings of the majority of the masses in the hope that they will like you.
While Rochowanski agrees that people who have been unjustly jailed should absolutely be released, she cautioned:
We should never lionize anyone or make excuses for their actions, because we consider them useful (meaning, for Western policy-makers), or because they might oppose someone we find even more unpalatable. It’s not only immoral, it also never ends well. Think Western support for Yeltsin’s armed crackdown of parliament in 1993, and what that led to. Racism, antisemitism, Islamophobia are inherently incompatible with democracy and the rule of law.
If you deny people of different religion, ethnicity or colour their very humanity, if you propose to use violence against them and eliminate them, then you’re incapable of building a democratic, rights-based system — anywhere, but especially in a country as diverse as Russia. So my critique of Navalny isn’t about minor political differences, like flat versus progressive tax rates or the right pension age. This is about the very heart of democracy.
Editor’s note: This is a two-part analysis on the perception of Russian opposition politician Alexey Navalny from a Central Asian perspective. Read Part 1 here.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Filip Noubel


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Beijing to drill Hong Kong schoolchildren with national security education · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Screen capture from video by Hong Kong's Education Bureau.
Children as young as 6 years old will receive education on national security legislation in Hong Kong, according to guidelines circulated by the city's Education Bureau in local schools on February 5.
The guidelines, which instructs administrators and lecturers on the implementation of national security education, require teachers of all levels to teach the criminal offences outlined in Hong Kong's national security law — namely, secession, subversion, terrorist acts, and collusion with foreign forces.
Article 10 of the national security law, enacted in July 2020 in response to the year-long anti-extradition protests, binds the Hong Kong government to promote national security education in schools, universities, and via civic groups and media outlets.
The guidelines circulated on February 5 also list topics teachers must include in the school curriculum. For example, the nine-dash line will be taught in geography, China's policies in preventing infectious diseases in biology, and the correct manner of singing the Chinese national anthem in music classes. The instructions also prohibit teachers from taking an argumentative approach when lecturing on topics related to national security.
Administrators have also been instructed to ban books, reading materials, and political displays that constitute an endangerment to national security from circulating on the school's premises. They have also been told to report to the police if they suspect members of staff or students violated the national security law. As examples of unlawful acts, the guidelines cite “forming human chains” and “chanting of slogans” such as “Revolution of our times.”
The rules apply to Hong Kong's private and international schools as well, although those won't have to hand in regular progress reports to the Education Bureau like the public schools.
The Education Bureau also released a video tailor-made for primary school kids about the new guidelines:
Many netizens labelled the new curriculum “brainwashing” on social media:
According to CCP logic, holding hands, forming human chain, chanting banners, wearing accessories are “endangering national security”.
CCP is imposing a “brainwashing” type education system in HK and indoctrinating “patriotism” to HK students. https://t.co/rKx9eyPkuL
— Nick ? Fight for Freedom (@NickDemocracy) February 5, 2021
On Facebook, netizens mocked the ban of political messages. Some of the comments on a post by The Stand News’ Facebook page said:
舉起張白紙都係顛覆國家語句
Now holding a blank piece of paper can be interpreted as subversion
咁多野唔講得，你不如出返本禁語字典
Why don’t you publish a dictionary on censored words?
以後落雨返學，學生著黄色雨靴擔把黃色雨傘或黃雨衣都可以係罪？可以記過或踢出校？
In the future, if students wear yellow raincoats or umbrellas to school, can they be penalized? Or kicked out of school?
Last year, the Education Bureau removed liberal studies from university entrance exams and censored topics such as “separation of powers” on textbooks. Many teachers argued at that time that liberal studies encouraged students to develop critical thinking.
Twitter user Tin Fong Chak comments on the trend:
HK Edu bureau murdered Liberal Studies which was enhancing critical thinking but replace with political indoctrination on patriotism. More emphasizing China's positive development and national security. But not rule of laws and human rights issue.#NSL #HongKong #education pic.twitter.com/g50OeqV1rk
— TIN Fong Chak (@tinfc) February 2, 2021
And user @dc4_hk fears independent thinking will be repressed:
China is trying to totally dominate the education of children. We can’t even think differently.https://t.co/xChMcDh4Af
— DC4HK – Washingtonians Supporting Hong Kong ? (@dc4_hk) February 6, 2021

author: Oiwan Lam


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Farewell to Japanese sculptor who became a local hero in Prilep, North Macedonia · Global Voices
Ognen Janeski

Ryota Koshika and Ognen Janeski. Photo used with permission.
Macedonian journalist Ognen Janeski shared his memories of Ryota “Koshka” Koshika, a Japanese sculptor who spent time in Macedonia and left an indelible mark. Global Voices publishes this verbatim translation of Janeski's Facebook post written on the day of Koshika's death, January 25, 2021:
In Memoriam Ryota Koshika – Koshka (1967-2021)
Some words about the Japanese who spoke the Prilep dialect — beloved sculptor of Balkan history:
I remember that I was already in my teens, at the time living with my family in Prilep. It all happened late in the evening on a Tuesday, during the fall of 2000, the beginning of new millennium for humanity.
The receptionist at the Hotel Lipa (Linden), which was situated near our street in the Bonchejca quarter, called my father, Dime, to tell him that a Japanese artist had come to their hotel. At first they thought he was Chinese, but then they saw his passport. Since he said he was an artist, they assumed he was looking for us.
In fact, the employees of Lipa Hotel (which has since closed) thought that everything related to foreigners and art in Prilep needed to be communicated with our family, because my parents had been organizing the oldest annual Art Colony in Southeastern Europe, founded in 1957. At the time, that Japanese man didn't know we would be instrumental in helping him achieve his goal, the one that led him to our town beneath the hill of Markovi Kuli (Marko's Towers).
So that evening, my father came home, bringing with him the Japanese artist. He spoke English, but in spite of that, we could not grasp his name or surname during the visit. We could only understand that we could call him Koshka. That stuck. On his first day in Prilep he had already received a nickname, like most of the local townsfolk.
Prilep is the fourth-largest city in North Macedonia, with a population of about 66,000 people. Its rich history spans from being the seat of medieval kingdom of King Marko, to the site of a Second World War uprising against fascism in 1941, earning it the moniker of “hero city.”
The Prilep dialect is one of the central dialects that form the core of the standard modern Macedonian language, while retaining some distinctive features. Local cultural traditions include storytelling and theatre, comedy and pranking, as well as folk customs like bestowing nicknames to individuals and families.
The most famous export products of the local economy are tobacco and the trademark white marble from nearby quarries, called Sivec, which has been used for sculpture and architecture since antiquity.
And almost all the citizens of Prilep met Koshka during the next four years that he spent in the city. At first he lived in a hotel, then with my family, and afterwards he rented a house. He learned to speak Macedonian, but exclusively in the Prilep dialect.
He became known as “the Japanese man who spoke the Prilep dialect.”
“My man Koshka never refused an invitation for a visit. He would drink some rakija, he would take a bite of the meze, and he adopted the local ways entirely, like his adopted fellow citizens,” as any citizen of Prilep would recall today.
The citizens of Prilep accepted him as one of their own, too. They helped him realize his 5-ton sculpture “Vita Nuova” (New Life) which he created on the premises of the Mermeren Kombinat (Marble Works Company) using only hand tools, without any machinery.
Sculpture by Ryota Koshika entitled “Serbian Woman.” Photo used with permission.
He came from Tokyo via Italy and Greece to Prilep because he heard that there he would find the whitest marble in the world. He used the marble to create a monumental sculpture of Olympia, the mother of Alexander the Great, which he intended to donate to the city of Athens to be displayed during the Olympic Games of 2004.
That year he left Macedonia and only returned in 2017. He had a million of stories to tell about this land, which he considered his own. I would not have the time to write and retell all of them. But each of them was about the friends Koshka made in the country and the region, and they can tell the same stories too. He made friends in Prilep, Ohrid, Resen, Ljubanishta, St. Naum, Bitola Skopje, Strumica, Belgrade, Novi Sad…
I shall tell only one of these stories, which is connected to January 25, to the day I write this, to show how strange is this universe of ours.
During the years he spent in Macedonia, Koshka became enamored with Macedonian music. Folk songs were his favorite, but he also liked the songs of Toše Proeski (also written as “Toshe” Proeski).
I remember that it was very funny for me to hear him sing to himself the lyrics “I ledena – i medena se pravish svojaaa!” (“Both icy and sweet, you act as if you don't need anybody …”), from the song “Ledena.”
The following video shows Proeski singing that song during a concert:
At some occasion Koshka approached Toše, who at the time was already one of the most popular performers in the Balkans, and asked for his autograph. The singer asked him what he was doing in Macedonia and recalled the stories about the Japanese man who spoke the Prilep dialect.
After Toše realized who he was, Toše told Koshka: “I should be the one to ask for your autograph, not vice versa!” So they then exchanged their autographs.
Koshka left Macedonia in 2004. Toše passed away [in a car crash at the age of 26] in October of 2007. Koshka was in Tokyo at the time and after he heard of the death he made a marble relief of Toše's profile in his honor, which he finished by the next December. Later he sent the relief by plane and asked my mother and father to give it to the Proeski family for the Toše museum in Krushevo. If you've visited the place you must have seen it.
Koshka passed away on January 25, 2021 in Tokyo, at the age of 53, after a short illness. He died on Toše Proeski's birthday. I am sure that somewhere up there, while Toše sings, Koshka is sculpting some other famous figures from history of humanity.
Ryota “Koshka” Koshika was born in Sapporo, Japan in 1967. He started his career as a sculptor 30 years later, in 1997. He had received a PhD from The University of Tokyo University.
Hellen Keller sculpture by Ryota Koshika.
He was fascinated by Balkans history and the lives of famous contemporaries, who are no longer among us. Therefore, he has sculpted busts or reliefs or other kinds of sculptures of the Brazilian Formula 1 legend Ayrton Senna (seven such works in bronze are spread around the world), Toše Proeski, American activist and writer Hellen Keller, Mother Theresa, both in their youth, as well as a sculpture of Mary, the Madonna, and others.
His works were exhibited in Japan, Macedonia, Greece, Italy and Serbia.
During his short lifetime, and even shorter career, Ryota Koshika became one of the most prominent classic sculptors working in marble from Japan, and had received numerous awards, including Paul Ambille Prize and Governor of Tokyo Prize.
On his road to success, Koshka didn't forget those who helped him along the way. All those people he mentioned by name or surname thanking them via a special page on his website koshika.net, which features his works.
Koshka, my man! Rest in peace. We'll miss you. A lot!

author: Ognen Janeski


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WATCH: A conversation with Jillian C. York on her upcoming book “Silicon Values” · Global Voices
Georgia Popplewell

Who has the power to decide what should or shouldn't appear on the internet? As our public sphere becomes a privatized platform, who watches the watchmen?
In this conversation with Global Voices’ executive director Ivan Sigal originally live-streamed on February 10, 2021, writer and activist Jillian C. York discusses the questions above, along with the many timely and pressing issues she addresses in her upcoming book, “Silicon Values: The Future of Free Speech Under Surveillance Capitalism,” which hits bookstores on March 23, 2021.
Pre-order your copy of “Silicon Values” through this link and help support Global Voices!

author: Georgia Popplewell


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Citizens protest against impunity for online sexual predators in North Macedonia · Global Voices
Kristina Hadzi-Vasileva

“Public Room is a Crime” banner on the February 3 protest against impunity for sexual predators. Photo by Vančo Džambaski, CC BY-NC-SA.
Hundreds took to the streets of Skopje on February 3 to protest the authorities’ failure to take action against sexual predators who run online networks facilitating the exchange of revenge porn and the abuse of women's private data for online harassment. Some of the same people are also suspected of disseminating child pornography and other criminal behavior in North Macedonia.
On January 27, 2021, Ana Koleva, a young woman from Kavadarci, a small town in the south of the country, published a video on Instagram about her experience. In the video, she explained how her photo was stolen from her Instagram account and shared in a Telegram group for sex predators, along with her phone number and other personal information.
Public dissatisfaction exploded on the anniversary of the unveiling of a scandal involving a Telegram group called Javna Soba (Public Room), an allusion to the term “public house,” a synonym for a brothel. The idea that such groups are still operating freely a whole year after their existence became widely known fueled the public outrage which culminated in the February 3 protest, which was organized by 16 women's rights organizations, human rights groups, and numerous activists.
The protesters condemned impunity for criminal behavior, including online and offline violence against women. They marched through central Skopje streets under the banner “Public Room is a Crime,” walking from the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to the main Public Prosecutor's Office, the two institutions in charge of handling cybercrime cases. According to legal procedure, when such a crime is reported, MOI forwards the request to the Prosecutor, who orders the police to start an investigation and build a case.
Protest banners read “Against the culture of violence,” “Inaction is complicity,” “The state that doesn't enforce the law is the state that rapes,” “While cops are sleeping, rapists are wide awake.” Photo by Vančo Džambaski, CC BY-NC-SA.
The protesters issued the following demands:
Бараме од Јавното обвинителство неодложно и темелно да го расчисти случајот „Јавна соба“, кој претставува кривично дело во кое голем број жени се жртви на родово засновано насилство.
Бараме соодветни казни за администраторите на групите, како и сите членови кои праќале и се уште праќаат фотографии и пишуваат лични податоци на девојки и жени.
Бараме и инсистираме сексуалното вознемирување преку интернет посебно да се регулира и во Кривичниот законик.
Бараме соодветна грижа за жртвите од надлежните институции.
We demand that Public Prosecutor Office solve the Public Room case without delay and thoroughly. It represents a criminal act enabling gender-based violence against a large number of women.
We demand appropriate sanctions against the  administrators of the [Telegram] groups, as well as for all the members who have been sharing  and continue  to share photographs and personal data of girls and women.
We demand and insist that online sexual harassment be specifically regulated in the Criminal Code.
We demand that competent state institutions provide appropriate care for the victims.
“You are not to blame” banner addressing the female victims of sexual abuse. Photo by Vančo Džambaski, CC BY-NC-SA.
The Ministry expressed support for the protest through an official announcement the same day. They claimed that all the steps that are within their competence regarding the recently reported cases of online sex abuse have been taken, including detaining four persons whose phones were confiscated and examined and will be forwarded as evidence to the Public Prosecutor's Office.
In January 2020, human rights defenders designated Public Room “a bunch of sexual predators who view women's bodies as objects without right to privacy.”
At that time, the police took several weeks to file charges against the alleged administrator and moderator of the Telegram group, who were not jailed. The then-minister complained that they couldn't do much more because Telegram has a policy of not sharing group members’ data as part of pre-investigative procedure. By January 27, 2021, the Prosecutor had not yet ordered an official investigation, let alone initiated a court case.
Screenshots of Telegram group Javna Soba (Public Room) and related group Hm…. from January 2020. Image by Meta.mk used with permission.
Much of the content on these groups consisted of “revealing” photos of women taken from their social media accounts, such as vacation photos, accompanied by doxing — the revealing of their phone numbers and other personal information, including intimate photos from ex-partners and personal messages. The initial group had over 7,400 members, and another similar group called “Hm….” that formed days after the scandal broke had 3,779 members.
A year later, it seemed that the people who ran the first version of the Public Room group simply migrated to a new version, even using the old name. Besides domestic doxing of victims from North Macedonia, these groups enable networking with sexual predators from neighboring Serbia and the sharing of compromising material of women from both countries.
When the scandal broke for the second time, the police requested that Telegram close the group. The prime minister even threatened that if Telegram refused to comply, the government would block access to the app for the whole country, in what would have been the first case of official internet blocking in the history of North Macedonia.
February 3, 2021 protest in Skopje, North Macedonia. Photo by Vančo Džambaski, CC BY-NC-SA.
Telegram closed the Public Room group on January 28, with a notification that “this group can't be displayed because it was used to spread pornographic content.”
Saluting this move by Telegram, Minister of Interior Oliver Spasovski warned that another similar group was still operating on the platform and that the police would take actions against its members too.
Ana Koleva's courageous act received attention from mainstream media, and also from the authorities. The Minister of Justice held a meeting with her and announced that stalking would be included in the Criminal Code as a felony, to provide additional protection from gender-based violence.
Protestor demanding end of impunity in front of Public Prosecutors’ Office in Skopje, North Macedonia. Photo by Vančo Džambaski, CC BY-NC-SA.

author: Kristina Hadzi-Vasileva


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Security concerns and legal ambiguities threaten the future of Ukraine’s ‘State in a Smartphone’ · Global Voices
Tetyana Bohdanova

The “state in a smartphone” project is one of the most ambitious developments of the current Ukrainian government. Photo by JESHOOTS-com on Pixabay.
One year ago, the Ukrainian government released the revolutionary mobile application Diia (Ukrainian for “action”), a cornerstone of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s campaign promise of making public services convenient and easily accessible via the internet.
The Diia mobile app — and its accompanying online e-services portal — allows citizens to digitize their national ID and biometric passport, personal tax number, student ID, and more, and the digital documents wield the same legal power as the original paper ones. Within a year, Ukraine became the fourth European country to have a digital driver’s license and the first country in the world to have a digital passport.
However, a massive data leak last year has raised concerns about the level of protection around users’ personal information. In May 2020, activists discovered about 900 GB of citizens’ personal data being traded by an anonymous chatbot on the popular messaging platform Telegram. The dataset included passport numbers, personal tax numbers, residence information, driver’s licenses, social media passwords, and even bank details of millions of Ukrainians.
Some public officials accused Diia of leaking data from government registries, while security experts recalled that the Ministry of Digital Transformation had yet to release any security documentation for the app. While journalists and researchers were able to confirm that part of the datasets had come from Ukrainian government registries, no evidence implicating Diia directly has been found.
On the anniversary of its launch, Diia app boasts over 6 million users. At the same time, IT specialists and digital rights defenders continue to call on the government to consider all of the risks that e-government and digital identification technology carry, as these may potentially undermine the public's trust.
While the idea of digitizing public services is not new to Ukraine, Zelensky's is the first administration that has made e-governance a top priority or established a separate ministry entirely dedicated to it — the Ministry of Digital Transformation, headed by Mykhailo Fedorov.
Originally presented in the spring of 2019, the ambitious “State in a Smartphone” program envisioned moving all public services online and providing the majority of the citizens with a means of digital identification. It was later expanded to include goals such as increasing people's digital literacy, expanding internet infrastructure, and creating favorable conditions for the development of the information technology (IT) industry.
If implemented successfully, the program could help combat corruption by minimizing the interference and arbitrary decisions of public officials, while significantly reducing state bureaucracy.
In addition, Minister Fedorov has proudly noted that not a single hryvnya from the state budget had been spent on the development of the Diia app — its development team comprised 35 volunteers from the well-known software engineering company EPAM Systems. They later transferred the completed product and relevant technical know-how to the state.
Initially, the ministry announced that Diia used BankID technology from several leading Ukrainian banks for user authorization, and that it utilized a secure cloud server for the transfer of encrypted data.
Still, few disclosures were made about the security of citizens’ personal data on the app, and security specialists cautiously noted that not enough was known about Diia's security testing.
No independent security audit seemed to have been performed, for example — hardly acceptable for technology to which millions of citizens would be entrusting their personal information. In fact, the app's first public bug bounty program was not launched until December 2020.
The leaks have made clear that the standard of data security at the state level in Ukraine remains inadequate — including a weak legal data protection regime, poor enforcement, and the lack of appropriate protection measures within state institutions themselves. Synchronization of data from various government registries into one portal or app is therefore likely to result in additional vulnerabilities to external attacks.
Moreover, in December 2019, the government granted the Ministry of Internal Affairs the power to verify and aggregate citizens’ data from multiple state registries, providing the law enforcement body with access to data from at least five government registries, including those that handle civil, tax, social security, healthcare and voter information. Alarmingly, the data sharing was to be carried out as a part of an “experimental” process that lacked comprehensive legal safeguards ensuring citizens’ right to privacy.
According to an analysis by digital rights advocates from Digital Security Lab, as of August 2020, the interior ministry had not yet developed a methodology for such verification, but this has not prevented it from gaining access to the vast trove of citizens’ personal data.
Vita Volodovska, a lawyer with Digital Security Lab, concluded:
Якщо у випадку із цифровими відображеннями документів у смартфоні, “експериментальний” доступ до інформації, здійснюється хоч і без повної відповідності принципу правової визначеності, але лише за згодою користувачів, то передача масивів персональних даних з державних реєстрів до МВС в рамках іншого експерименту, без згоди громадян та будь-якого незалежного контролю, суперечить вимогам чинного законодавства та Конституції України.
Whereas in the case of digital display of documents in smartphones, ‘experimental’ access to information is carried out with the consent of users, albeit without full compliance with the principle of legal certainty, the transfer of personal data from state registries to the interior ministry in another experiment, with neither the consent of citizens nor any independent control, contradicts the requirements of current legislation and the Constitution of Ukraine.
The app's future will likely depend on the state's ability to ensure that citizens’ data are digitized in accordance with the highest standards of privacy, security, and human rights.

author: Tetyana Bohdanova


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Three climbers go missing during winter attempt to scale K2 summit in Pakistan · Global Voices
R Umaima Ahmed

K2, at 8,611 metres (28,251 ft) above sea level, is the second highest mountain in the world. Image via Flickr and Google Images by Waqas Anees. Public Domain.
For mountaineering fans, this year was special: the Winter K2 Summit was taking place for the first time—38 years after a Polish team went to K2, the world's second highest mountain, to gauge the feasibility of a winter climb. However, the joy was short-lived, as contact with three expert mountaineers, from Pakistan, Chile and Iceland, was lost just near the Bottleneck, short of the summit, on the night of Friday, February 5, 2021.
The search for the three climbers, Muhammad Ali Sadpara, John Snorri and Jp Mohr Prieto, was temporarily halted because of bad weather and they are feared dead. Still, the families of the missing men have been hoping for a miracle.
Any winter climb on K2 is considered dangerous because of unpredictable weather, and in August 2008, 11 climbers died following an ice avalanche.
On the afternoon of February 6, two Pakistani Army helicopters began an aerial search and rescue operation which was unsuccessful as of February 9, four days after contact with the climbers was lost. As a result, the remaining winter summit expeditions have been called off for this year.
American summit coach and mountaineer Alan Arnette tweeted:
The Seven Summits Treks expedition is leaving K2 Base Camp, thus ending the effort for more winter summits. History will show 10 winter summits, 2 deaths and 3 missing for 2020/21 https://t.co/O6VuYJ5ube
— Alan Arnette (@alan_arnette) February 9, 2021
At 8,611 metres (28,251 ft) above sea level K2, also known as the “Savage Mountain,” is second only to Everest in height, and is part of the Karakoram Range on the border of Pakistan and China. It is one of 14 mountains higher than 8,000 meters; Pakistan is home to five of these: K2, Nanga Parbat, Broad Peak, Gasherbrum I and II; the remaining are in Nepal and China.
The first winter summit on Mount Everest took place in 1980. Only eight expeditions have attempted a winter ascent on the “deadly” K2, said Pakistan Alpine Club secretary, Karrar Haidri, with success finally coming this season.
On January 16, 2021, 10 Nepalis reached the summit of K2. A second group of climbers, which included Muhammad Ali Sadpara, his son Sajid Ali Sadpara from Pakistan, John Snorri from Iceland and Jp Mohr Prieto from Chile, attempted to scale the K2 summit. During the climb near the Bottleneck, short of the summit, Sajid Ali's oxygen cylinder malfunctioned and he returned to base camp, while the others headed towards the summit. They lost contact with base camp late on Friday. On Saturday, February 6, after their support team stopped receiving reports from them, they were reported missing.
Apart from Pakistan Army Aviation, a number of experts, including local high-altitude climbers and members of the Seven Summit Treks (SST) winter expedition team, joined the rescue mission. The Pakistan government assured that the country would spare no effort to find the missing mountaineers.
Chhang Dawa Sherpa, a Nepalese mountaineer who has scaled 14 highest peaks, including K2, and is leading the SST winter expedition tweeted :
It’s already been more than 30 hours, we (at basecamp) have received no news of John Snorri??, Ali Sadpara ??, and Juan Pablo Mohr ??, since none of the GPS trackers seem to be working.
? #k2expedition #k2winter #k2winter2021 #karakorum #sherpa #nepal #pakistan pic.twitter.com/Q4j9krGJ8e
— Chhang Dawa Sherpa (@ChhangDawa) February 6, 2021
Sadpara's son Sajid returned to base camp with a heavy heart, and has said he believes the trio made it to the summit but something went wrong on the descent. Later, he flew in one of the helicopters to assist the mission. As there was no positive news, he returned home to Skardu, a city in Gilgit−Baltistan, Pakistan.
Karim Dad Chughtai from Gilgit-Baltisan tweeted:
Receiving Sajid Sadpara, the son of Muhammad Ali Sadpara at Aviation Skardu. He returned from Bottleneck , K-2, on 5th Feb due to want of oxygen while his father left to summit K-2 the same day. Ali Sadpara is missing and search operation still continues. @RandhawaAli @DCSkardu pic.twitter.com/davHjB156Z
— Karim Dad Chughtai (@KarimdadChught2) February 7, 2021
Ali Sadpara's cousin and nephew, both expert climbers, also reached the base camp to assist the search.
Everest Today, a mountain blog, tweeted:
Elia Saikaly: “Imtiaz and Akbar, Ali Sadpara’s cousin and nephew arrived at basecamp a little more than 24 hours ago, both incredibly talented Pakistani climbers who have summited K2, to assist in bringing Sajid Sadpara down from the base of K2. (1/6) pic.twitter.com/O3Dp0Tnw1x
— Everest Today (@EverestToday) February 8, 2021
Earlier some mainstream media misreported that the team had successfully summited K2, but later it was retracted and news of losing contact with base camp went viral on social media, and hashtag #k2winterexpedition2021 started trending. People from Pakistan changed their display pictures in solidarity with the climbers and started sharing stories of Ali Sadpara.
Amal Khan, a journalist, talked about Sadpara's family:
I learned today that all this time we prayed, ached, wondered, Sadpara's wife, Fatima, did not know for certain Ali was missing. She was asking: ‘why hasn't he called me.’ She was partly told yesterday the team was “stuck” on the mountain and has spent every moment since weeping.
— Amal Khan (@amalkhan) February 8, 2021
Sundas, a student, is keeping hope alive:
Beautiful family and cutest kids of @john_snorri May they find their father alive along with Sadpara sahib and Mohr today.
Ameen #Alisadapara , #K2WinterSummit2021 pic.twitter.com/h67x1qOUAZ
— Sundas (@SundasHere) February 8, 2021
Journalist Tanveer Ahmed tweeted:
Today, Juan Pablo Moher will be celebrating his 34th birthday with J Snorri and Sadpara on the heights of the #SavageMountaink2, at a height that hardly anyone has celebrated.
Our love and best wishes are with you wherever you are.
Happy birth day.#JPMohr #K2WinterSummit2021 pic.twitter.com/VfwSrLFb4L
— Tanveer Ahmed?? (@Mountain_Man007) February 9, 2021
Some shared stories of the conditions under which the porters worked while assisting foreign climbers on such expeditions, including being underpaid and exploited.
Cyclist and photographer Kamran tweeted:
“A Balti porter told me that even their mules carrying luggage to the basecamp have a better insurance than we do.”
3 times K2 summiter Fazal Ali who is taking part in #alisadpara rescue mission. #k2winterexpedition2021
A Thread. pic.twitter.com/nW7B04MkB1
— Kamran On Bike (@kamranonbike) February 8, 2021
Journalist Urooj Tarar from Lahore tweeted:
#alisadpara none of us have any right to mourn him or as we say ‘be proud of him’. When he was porting for foreign expeditions for as low as $3, in hands-me-down and worn-out equipment, none of us raised our voice for him and many other like him. Heck, we didn't even know they…
— Urooj (@uroojtarar) February 7, 2021
Their chances of survival is “next to none” but some, like journalist and writer Amal Khan, still have lingering hope:
Today I mistakenly expressed my condolences while speaking to a friend of Ali Sadpara. Gently he corrected me. “You know, Ali is famous for making ice igloos with his ice pick,” he said. “He can make them anywhere, on any mountain.” This is a true, rational hope. Let's hope
— Amal Khan (@amalkhan) February 7, 2021

author: R Umaima Ahmed


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Turkey reins in social media—one platform at a time · Global Voices
Arzu Geybullayeva

An Alstom tram set on Istanbul line T1 crossing the Galata Bridge, northbound, December 5, 2013, Istanbul, Turkey. Photo by Mark Ahsmann via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0.
This article is part of UPROAR, a Small Media initiative that is urging governments to address digital rights challenges at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
When Turkish President Recip Erdoğan became a grandfather for the fourth time last year, his daughter and son-in-law (then-Minister of Finance) announced the birth of their child over Twitter.
In addition to many celebratory tweets from Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development (AKP) followers, the couple received insults, too.
The tweets were eventually taken down and the account was deleted. But these insults led to Erdoğan’s renewed interest in finalizing legislation in the country to centralize control over social media platforms in Turkey.
“Do you understand why we are against social media such as YouTube, Twitter and Netflix? To eradicate such immorality,” President Erdoğan told AKP members during a televised address, referring to the allegedly insulting tweets.
“These platforms do not suit this country. We want these platforms to be banned, taken under control,” Erdoğan said.
The law came as swiftly as the detentions of social media users allegedly behind the insults.
Adopted in July 2020, and effective October 1, 2020, the new social media law (Law on the Regulation of Publications on The Internet and Suppression of Crimes Committed By Means of Such Publications) sets up a series of requirements that will have a lasting impact on digital rights and freedom of expression in Turkey.
Social media companies will be obliged to have an office in Turkey; their representatives will be held accountable in legal affairs; the bandwidth of companies that refuse to open an office will be throttled up to 90%; social media companies will be obliged to store users’ data in Turkey; The companies will have to release a report on their activities every six months; failure to do so will result in a fine of up to 10 million lira ($1.3 million USD).
A year after Turkey restored access to Wikipedia, the country is now grappling with these new restrictions.
Although companies did not comply at first, recent fines have forced some social media giants to cave in, with Tik Tok being among the most recent companies to comply.
In April 2020, Human Rights Watch reported on how the social media law appeared under a draft law on economic measures to address COVID-19:
The draft law, circulated April 9, stipulates that all platforms accessed by over 1 million users daily must appoint a legal representative in Turkey on whom courts can serve orders to take down content or block access to accounts. Any platform that refuses would see its bandwidth reduced by 50 and then 95%, rendering the platform unusable in Turkey.
These proposed amendments were temporarily withdrawn.
But a month later, Turkey's Presidential Complex published a 161-page social media guidebook, authored by Fahrettin Altun, head of Media and Communications, with direct advice to “to begin centralizing control of the digital domain.”
Altun believes that social media has become a “life risk” to Turkish citizens who are increasingly imperiled by fast-paced digitization and therefore benefit from the government’s centralization of control of digital spaces.
Journalists and internet freedom advocates described the social media guidebook as a tool for censorship.
“The guidebook was a step toward establishing government control over Twitter and other platforms,” said Fatih Polat, editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper Evrensel, in an interview with Deutsche Welles (DW).
Gulin Cavus, founder of the Turkish fact-checking network Teyit, said the threat of online disinformation does not come from Turkish citizens, as the guidebook claims, but rather from the government agencies that are “knowingly engaging in manipulation,” speaking to DW.
In November 2020, Turkey fined Facebook, Twitter and YouTube a total of $1.18 million USD for not complying with their new social media law.
The following month, Turkey's Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) slapped platforms with a new penalty of 30 million Turkish liras ($3.8 million USD) each, for their failure to hire local representatives.
The fines worked. YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok were among the first companies to appoint local representatives.
Facebook also announced on January 18, 2021, that it would open a local office. Last January, Facebook also announced its decision to appoint a local representative in Turkey in compliance with the new regulations.
In their statement Facebook said:
We have been closely following developments on Turkey’s recently amended Internet Law No. 5651 which stipulates new requirements for social media platforms. Like other companies, we have decided to begin the process of appointing a legal entity as a local representative in compliance with the law, while also recognizing how important it is for our platform to be a place where users can exercise their freedom of expression.
This decision does not change Facebook’s Community Standards, nor the global process for reviewing government requests, and we will withdraw the representative if we face pressure on either. We will continue to review and evaluate government requests in accordance with these policies, including our commitments as a Global Network Initiative member, and under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. We will continue to report details of the content we restrict, in line with our existing transparency processes.
The TikTok platform said:
TikTok is a powerful platform that gives voice to diverse communities, and we remain focused on providing people in Turkey the opportunity to express themselves creatively through video, from sharing unique cooking skills to easy tutorials on drawing. We're also committed to respecting local laws in the markets in which we operate, even when we disagree with them. As such, we will comply with the requirements of the law — establishing a local legal entity and providing a local point of contact to the Government in Turkey as a next step to compliance – while we maintain our commitment to the freedom of expression that is fundamental to the creativity that thrives in our community.
In retaliation to companies that refused to comply, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) banned online businesses from advertising on Twitter, Periscope and Pinterest, in a decision published in the Official Gazette on January 19.
This move is likely to impact the livelihoods of many in Turkey, at a time when the country is facing economic challenges as a result of an ongoing pandemic.
Meanwhile, the compliance of YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, and other platforms are a “bad precedent that will make it harder for other companies to fight back,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation. EFF was especially critical of YouTube's decision to comply, given the Turkish government’s history of previous attempts to control the platform.
Turkish officials say the law is similar to Germany's NetzDG [Network Enforcement Act]. However, experts disagree. Emma Sinclair-Webb, Human Rights Watch Turkey expert, said that unlike in Turkey, Germany has a “clear separation of powers and an independent judiciary.”
According to Engelliweb, a site that documents censored content, as of October 2020, at least 450,000 domains, 140,000 URLs, and 42,000 tweets are currently blocked in Turkey.
On January 21, the International Press Institute (IPI) issued a statement calling on Turkish to withdraw the new law and rescind imposed penalties.
IPI Turkey Program Coordinator Renan Akyavas said:
This law and its penalties threaten the removal of critical voices, including journalists who have been driven from mainstream media, from social media via content removal or self-censorship. Turkey must withdraw this law and all penalties on social media companies issued under it. This law represents a serious expansion of digital censorship and threatens a last bastion for journalists and critical public discussion.
But officials in Ankara are yet to budge.

author: Arzu Geybullayeva


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Chinese-Australian journalist Cheng Lei formally arrested for alleged spying in China · Global Voices
Kevin Rennie

Screenshot from ABC TV 7.30 video: Cheng Lei's family speaks out for the first time since her detention in China on February 9, 2021
Australian journalist and television presenter Cheng Lei has been formally arrested and accused of unlawfully supplying or intending to supply state secrets or intelligence overseas, according to Chinese authorities.
Cheng, who was the anchor for a business program on state television’s China Global Television Network (CGTN), was detained in August 2020. The Chinese government was called out at the time for so-called “hostage diplomacy.”
Members of her family spoke out on the ABC (Australia) 7.30 current affairs program.
Journalists working in China for foreign media have faced numerous difficulties recently. Australian journalist Bill Birtles, the 7.30 reporter for this story, was the ABC Beijing correspondent before making a rushed exit home in September 2020. He explained some of the background during the 7.30 segment:
Cheng Lei was taken away six weeks after ASIO [Australian security] raided the homes of four Chinese state media journalists in Sydney.
The anti-foreign interference investigation prompted Beijing to target Australian journalists in China but it's not clear if Cheng's arrest is related to the tense diplomatic relationship, because four months after she was taken away, her close friend, Haze Fan, a Chinese journalist working for American media, was also detained on national security grounds.
There is a much broader context of tensions between Australia and China involving trade, security and diplomacy.
Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne has dismissed claims by China that Australia is trying to interfere in their judicial system. Payne responded that Cheng Lei “deserves the basic standards of justice, procedural fairness and human treatment to be met in accordance with international norms.”
Another prominent case involves the continuing detention by Chinese authorities of writer and popular online commentator, Chinese-Australian Yang Hengjun, since January 2019. The latest news concerning Cheng Lei has been greeted online in Australia with anger and frustration. Laoch’s tweet captured the growing reaction “Down Under” against the Chinese Communist Party:
Gotta love the #CCP. Telling us to stop interfering with our citizens.
The tide will turn
China urges Australia to ‘stop interfering’ following formal arrest of Australian journalist Cheng Lei https://t.co/2DRW6XLNm0 via @SBSNews
— Laoch (@Laoch16) February 8, 2021
Brisbane Twitter user Bob Bruce raised the possibility that Cheng Lei may have been involved in breaches of Chinese national security:
Australia has a habit of spying on its neighbours but if Cheng Lei was recruited by us we are responsible.
— Bob Bruce (@Qskeptic) February 10, 2021
Paul Barrett, former Secretary of Australian Departments of Defence and Primary Industries & Energy, drew parallels with the way that imprisoned Aussie journalist, Julian Assange, has been treated by his government:
This morning on @RNBreakfast Senator Payne said (re Cheng Lei) Australia would always stand up for the rights of its citizens for due legal process, fair trial, humane treatment blah blah.
Someone should tell her about Julian #Assange. https://t.co/Jv40XxSvnD
— Paul Barratt (@phbarratt) February 8, 2021
Australian journalist Peter Greste, who spent 440 days in jail in Egypt, has continued his strong support for Cheng Lei. In a statement for the Alliance for Journalists’ Freedom, he is quoted as saying that:
…Chinese authorities have had ample time to gather evidence, and unless they are willing to show it, they should release Cheng immediately.
China’s record on press freedom is already deeply troubling. In the absence of evidence, Cheng’s arrest only adds to the impression that Beijing does not care about the freedom of the press. Her case stands as a clear warning to other journalists to support the government or risk being imprisoned too.
Several news stories were posted to Reddit, where there was lively discussion.
Defamedprawn raised an issue that many others agreed with:
I don't mean to be harsh, but the lady is an anchor [for] CGTN, which is very much an arm of the regime. For instance, they're notorious for televising forced confessions and pretending they're interviews.
So should I feel sympathy for this person?
Catalyst1945 showed cynicism about whether the Australian government would take any real action:
Can’t wait for our spineless prime minister to do nothing.
Given the nature of Chinese trials, it is possible that we may never know what motivated her detention:
After surviving almost six months in a secret detention facility, experts fear Australian journalist Cheng Lei’s journey through China's opaque legal system is only just beginning. https://t.co/9wl8bWHIN5
— SBS News (@SBSNews) February 10, 2021
Meanwhile, Australia faces claims of hypocrisy over lack of judicial transparency. Ann raised the contentious issue of its own secret trials:
Australia's secret trials [Witness K, his lawyer, Witness J etc] do not to help obtain the release of women like #ChengLei https://t.co/7B5qdfIzHN
— Ann (@rosmci) February 8, 2021

author: Kevin Rennie


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Is Mozambique trying to expel a foreign journalist? · Global Voices
Dércio Tsandzana

Tom Bowker speaks with South Africa's SABC news in December 2020. Image: YouTube screenshot from SABC's channel.
British journalist Tom Bowker was verbally ordered to leave Mozambique at the end of January, one month after authorities revoked his foreign correspondent accreditation.
Bowker is the founder of the news website Zitamar News, which reports Mozambican politics and economics in English. In recent years, the website has been praised for its coverage of the armed conflict in the Cabo Delgado province through the Cabo Ligado project.
According to the newsletter of veteran Mozambique chronicler Joseph Hanlon, Bowker was summoned to immigration services on 25 January, where he was told, in the presence of his lawyer, to leave the country within five days.
On February 3, however, Bowker was still in Mozambique. According to Evidências news site, which says it has briefly spoken with the journalist, the deportation order was “merely verbal” and his residence permit is still valid.
Bowker has lived in Mozambique with his son and wife since 2014.
According to a note by Mozambique's Information Bureau (GABINFO), the government authority in charge of registering journalists, Bowker's accreditation was revoked because he was “unable to provide documents proving” Zitamar News’ registration abroad.
The note was reproduced by Evidências:
Diferentemente de outras agências noticiosas, que têm sede num determinado país e correspondentes em vários países do mundo, incluindo Moçambique, a Zitamar News tinha como sede o nosso país e vinha produzindo e editando os seus conteúdos informativos a partir de Maputo, o que contraria o espírito da Lei na qual assenta a qualidade correspondente de um órgão de comunicação social estrangeiro.
Diante dessas dúvidas, Bowker, quando solicitado, não conseguiu provar documentalmente a ligação entre a Zitamar News e a Zitamar LP (esta última empresa encontra-se registada na Inglaterra e desenvolve actividades de prestação de serviços, incluindo de informação), embora tenha sido por ele identificada como sendo a empresa proprietária da Zitamar News, na base da qual lhe fora atribuída a acreditação.
Perante as irregularidades verificadas, o GABINFO solicitou a devolução do cartão de acreditação como jornalista estrangeiro emitido a favor do senhor Thomas Andrew Bowker, com as suas devidas consequências legais.
Unlike other news agencies, which are based in a particular country and maintain correspondents in several other countries around the world, including Mozambique, Zitamar News was based in our country and was producing and editing news out of Maputo, which contradicts the spirit of the Law defining the quality of correspondent of foreign media outlets.
In light of this context, Bowker, when requested, was unable to provide documents proving the connection between Zitamar News and Zitamar LP (the latter a company registered in the United Kingdom that provides services, among them information services), identified by him as the parent company of Zitamar News and on for which the accreditation was granted.
In view of these irregularities, GABINFO has requested the rescindment of Mr. Thomas Andrew Bowker's accreditation card as a foreign journalist, with all the due legal consequences.
MISA-Mozambique, a press freedom advocacy group, issued a statement condemning the authorities’ act:
O MISA-Moçambique manifesta sua profunda preocupação e repúdio perante a decisão do Governo de expulsar o jornalista e editor.
De particular preocupação está o facto de a decisão ter sido tomada de forma arbitrária, sem o seguimento dos procedimentos legais que, quanto ao MISA, eram pertinentes para este caso, como, por exemplo, a não fundamentação da decisão, assim como a sua transmissão por via oral, sem qualquer documento oficial escrito.
Deixa transparecer que se esteja a usar as instituições do Estado para a movimentação de expedientes políticos de manifesta ilegalidade.
MISA-Mozambique expresses its deep concern with and objection to the government's decision to expel the journalist and editor.
Of particular concern is the fact that the decision was made arbitrarily, without following the legal procedures that, for MISA, were relevant in this case. The decision had no legal basis and it was communicated verbally, without any official written document.
It appears that the state institutions are being used for political demands.

author: Dércio Tsandzana


text:
Nigerian protesters arrested for resisting reopening of the Lagos Lekki toll gate · Global Voices
Nwachukwu Egbunike

Screenshot of arrested protester from a video by the CableNg online newspaper
Nigerian police today arrested several people who were protesting the reopening of the Lekki toll gate in Lagos, Nigeria—the center of #EndSARS protests last October—Channels TV reported on their website.
Some of the protesters, allegedly detained Saturday, February 13, 2021, at the Adeniji-Adele Police Station, in the commercial city of Lagos, were said to be “beaten and tortured”:
Arrested protesters at Adeniji-Adele Police Station are being beaten and tortured@jidesanwoolu
— Dele Farotimi #EndSARS, #EndSWAT, #EndIMPUNITY (@DeleFarotimi) February 13, 2021
Meanwhile, there are moves to secure the release of those arrested:
UPDATE: Our lawyers are at Adeniji Police Station but are denied access. They are told they can’t see anyone arrested till the Area commander comes.
We presently have 19 names on our list of persons detained from the arrests at #Lekkitollgate https://t.co/q1ymJvSwT3
— Tola (@adetolaov) February 13, 2021
One of the arrested protesters is popular Nigerian comedian Mr. Macaroni (Debo Adebayo).
Another protester, who came to “observe” the protests, was also arrested:
VIDEO: I only came to observe, says ‘arrested protester’#OccupyLekkiTollGate #EndSARS #DefendLagos #Lekkitollgate pic.twitter.com/XebgUWEUfn
— TheCable (@thecableng) February 13, 2021
The Nigerian police had a day earlier, February 12, 2021, been deployed in their numbers across Lagos, with the clear intent of intimidating protesters who were planning to congregate at the toll gate:
Better stay @ home. #Lekki #Lagos #Nigeria pic.twitter.com/2myiVYtRv1
— ‘Folakemi Oduwole (@Fola94) February 12, 2021
The #OccupyLekkiTollgate protesters had been threatened by another group #DefendLagos “to stay away” from the toll gate, reported the Premium Times, a Nigerian online investigative newspaper.
The Lagos Lekki toll gate. The #EndSARS protesters were concentrated in front of the toll gate. Photo by S. Aderogba, December 15, 2018, Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).
Nigeria witnessed the #EndSARS protests for over two weeks (October 9-20, 2020) in at least 12 of the country’s 36 states and in many Nigerian diaspora communities. During the protests young Nigerians called out the intimidation, arrest and torture inflicted on them by the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a specialized unit of the Nigerian police.
On October 20, 2020, Nigerian security officials opened fire on protesters in Lekki, Lagos. Amnesty International stated that “the Nigerian army and police killed at least 12 peaceful protesters” in both Lekki and Alausa, Lagos sites of the #EndSARS protests.
A bloodied Nigerian flag after a protester is shot on the night of the Lekki Toll Gate Massacre. Image released by Shadow Scribes Wikimedia Commons, October 21, 2020 (CC BY-SA 4.0)
Government and security officials denied the killings despite evidence by journalists and human rights groups to the contrary.
A judicial panel of inquiry was instituted by the Lagos State Government on October 19, 2020, while the #EndSARS protests raged, to investigate cases of police brutality.
Today’s protest is a fallout from the February 6, 2021 decision by the Lagos panel that ordered the reopening of the Lekki toll gate.
This did not go down well with some Nigerians:
#OccupyLekkiTollGate The Nigerian Government thinks they are smart. They want to reopen Lekki Tollgate but cant fish out those responsible for the killings of the protesters at Lekki Tollgate. If one of their loved ones was massacred, it wont take them secs to track the culprits. pic.twitter.com/BQccO97AaN
— Jolly (@ladele446) February 8, 2021
Many viewed the reopening as an insensitive affront on the memory of victims of the Lekki shootings:
“@Austynzogs: @Gidi_Traffic May the blood of all victims of #LekkiMassacre haunt those who want to reopen the toll plaza for profit making.
Say Amen! pic.twitter.com/c51uBgPcYN
— GIDITRAFFIC (@Gidi_Traffic) February 7, 2021
On February 12, 2021, Rinuola [Rinu] Oduala, #EndSARS activist and member of the Lagos Judicial Panel of Inquiry resigned, following the panel’s decision to reopen the toll gate:
I will be stepping down from the Lagos Judicial Panel as it is now obvious that the government is only out to use us for performative actions.
— Rinu #EndSARS?? (@SavvyRinu) February 12, 2021
In a series of tweets, Rinu stated that her resignation was because the Lagos State government and the operators of the Lekki toll gate “have not been cleared of collusion with elements allegedly deployed by the federal govt to target citizens on home soil during a time of peace, without provocation.”
Hence, her “stepping down from the Lagos Judicial Panel” was due to the insincerity of the government. Rinu stated that she will neither be a party to “hand wringing and lies” nor be “manipulated into gaslighting the people and attaching my name to a rubber-stamped and foregone conclusion.”
Nonetheless, no matter how this protest pans out, the Lekki toll gate has now morphed into “a monument to memory” according to Nigerian writer and culture critique, Molara Wood:
No matter what they do, no matter the security clampdown, #LekkiTollgate is now a site of protest. Once given to relentless ticketing for billions of naira, now made unpeaceable by struggle. A monument to memory. Watch as meaning is being made. The Tollgate belongs to the people.
— Molara Wood (@molarawood) February 13, 2021

author: Nwachukwu Egbunike


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New Russian law demands self-censorship from social media platforms · Global Voices
Tanya Lokot

Smartphone in crowd. Image by SplitShire from Pixabay.
A new Russian law that came into force at the start of February 2021 places the burden of blocking prohibited content on popular social media platforms. This signals a change of pace for the RuNet, where content blocking was previously done by internet service providers or hosting services at the behest of state officials, law enforcement or courts.
The new law, №530-FZ, introduces a legal definition for “social networks”: any platform with over 500,000 daily visitors will now officially be classed as such and added to a special state registry. These officially designated “social network” sites will have to find and remove illegal content on their pages under their own steam, and will face stiff fines—anywhere from 800,000 rubles to 4 million rubles (10,860 to 54,310 USD)—if they fail to do so. Repeat offenses can lead to fines of up to one-tenth of the platform's annual revenue.
The types of online content currently classified as illegal under Russian law include sexually explicit images of children, information relating to drug use, suicide or propagating “dangerous activities” among minors, and adverts for alcohol or gambling. Information that offends human dignity or public morals or displays disrespect towards “society, the state, state symbols or public officials” is also prohibited. Another important category of banned content includes calls to mass disorder, extremism, terrorism or calls for participation in unsanctioned mass events, e.g., protest rallies.
It's worth noting that many social media platforms list many of these content categories as violating their platform terms of service, and likely already remove such content regularly as part of their content moderation practices. Experts point out that the most likely reason for the new legislation is the state's desire to curtail the growing discontent and protest activity in the country.
Mikhail Tretyak, head of IP/IT-practice at Digital Rights Center, told independent news outlet The Bell:
Законопроект направлен и на обязательную блокировку контента оппозиционных политиков. Это и информация, выражающая неуважение к органам государственной власти, и призывы к массовым беспорядкам и участию в несогласованных публичных мероприятиях. К тому же владелец социальной сети обязан не допускать использование ресурса для разглашения сведений, составляющих государственную или иную специально охраняемую законом тайну.
The law is aimed at mandatory blocking of content shared by opposition politicians. It also bans information offensive towards state bodies, and calls for mass disorder and participation in unsanctioned public events. The owner of the social network must also prevent their platform from being used for disclosing information that constitutes a state secret or any other secret information guarded by the law.
State-friendly NGO Safe Internet League has welcomed the law and has already compiled a list of social media platforms it believes should be added to the new registry posthaste. This list includes Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, YouTube, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Telegram, and WhatsApp. Elena Mizulina, head of Safe Internet League, told state-run TASS news agency:
Мы призываем Роскомнадзор не медлить с созданием реестра, чем быстрее он будет создан, тем быстрее заработает сам закон и быстрее соцсети в России будут очищаться он запрещенной информации.
We implore Roskomnazdor not to procrastinate on the creation of the registry, the faster it is created, the faster the law will start working and the faster social networks in Russia will be cleansed of illegal information.
Sarkis Darbinyan, lead lawyer for digital rights organization Roskomsvoboda, thinks the new law will be more troublesome for Russian social networks, who may have to invest in more real-time content moderation. Platforms based outside Russia with no headquarters in the country can ignore the demands and are less likely to face wholesale blocking, Darbinyan says:
И так существовало множество других законов, по которым их можно блокировать хоть завтра. Но блокировка YouTube, Facebook или Twitter — это, очевидно, политическое решение, которое принимается не Роскомнадзором. И пока такого решения, как мы видим, нет.
There were already a number of other laws which would allow [the state] to block [these social media platforms]. But blocking YouTube, Facebook or Twitter is obviously a political decision, which is not made by Roskomnadzor. And so far, we have not seen such a decision.

author: Tanya Lokot


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Freedom of expression in a downward spiral in Southern Africa, says new study · Global Voices
Nwachukwu Egbunike

Youth pose for a photo at a conference in Namibia. Image credit: Yusuf Kalyango Jnr. (CC BY-SA 2.0)
A recent study by the coalition of the African Declaration of Internet Rights and Freedoms (AfDec) reviewed extant legislation and its impact on the right to freedom of expression in seven countries in Southern Africa— Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The 102-page report had seven contributors, including Dércio Tsandzana, Global Voices’ Lusophone Editor.
A summary of the findings for each country is discussed below.
Section 35 of Malawi’s 1994 Constitution (with amendments) guarantees freedom of expression, “provides for the right to freedom of opinion in section 34; press freedom in section 36; access to information in section 37; and freedom of assembly in section 38,” the report noted.
Nonetheless, the AfDec review singled out three laws that have derailed free expression: the Cyber Security and Electronic Transaction Act 33 of 2016, the Protected Flag, Emblems and Names Act 10 of 1967 (as amended by Act 11 of 2012), and section 60 of the Penal Code.
Specifically, the Cyber Security Act contains explicit clauses that gag online free speech and limit press freedom.
Women in Praia do Bilene, Gaza, Mozambique. Photo by Flickr user Julien Lagarde, August 6, 2006 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0).
Article 48 of Mozambique’s 2004 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and the right to information to all citizens.
The constitution contains “no specific limitation” to these rights, but the “right to information and expression is regulated within specific laws,” the study revealed.
Namibia stands tall with a more friendly freedom of expression climate among the other six countries reviewed in this study. It also has the freest media environment in Africa according to the 2020 World Press Freedom Index, a ranking by Reporters Without Borders.
The “repression of human rights, including freedom of expression” in Namibia “is by no means a usual or normal occurrence,” the study asserts. However, there are red flags. Some of the laws in Namibia “allow or enable such repression if or when those with autocratic tendencies or intentions were to come to power, either democratically or undemocratically,” the study warns.
Youth technology training in South Africa. Photo by Beyond Access via Flickr/CC BY-SA 2.0
The right to free expression is firmly rooted in section 16(1) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which protects the following freedoms: the press, sharing and receiving information, artistic creativity, academic and scientific research.
But these rights are not absolute. The first is section 16(2) of the constitution which criminalizes speech that incites war propaganda, violence, and ethnic, racial, gender, or religious hatred. The second is section 36 which limits the right to free expression as long as the limitation is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom,” the section says.
A man looks at his mobile phone in Tanzania, December 9, 2018. Photo by Riaz Jahanpour, for USAID Tanzania / Digital Development Communications via Flickr, CC BY 2.0.
Since 2015, Tanzania has witnessed a downward spiral into authoritarianism with a widespread climate of fear, media censorship, dismembering of the opposition with an increased crackdown on journalists and activists.
Although the right to free expression is protected under article 18 of the Tanzanian Constitution, some laws like the 2015 Cybercrimes Act, the 2016 Media Services Act, and the 2018 Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations “contain the provisions most susceptible to be used to repress dissenting voices,” the report says.
The Cybercrimes Act grants the government excessive power to arbitrarily ban, censor, and sanction print and social media. Conviction under this law attracts a jail term of three years or a fine of at least 5 million Tanzanian shillings (about 2,000 USD) or both.
The Media Services Act enforces compulsory accreditation for journalists, which can be withdrawn at will. This legislation also “conferred absolute power on the minister to prohibit importation of publications and sanction media content,” says the AfDec study.
Similarly, the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations made it mandatory for blogs and online forums to pay a registration fee of over 900 USD. Failure of which is punishable by a fine “not less than 5 million Tanzanian shillings” (about 2,500 USD), or imprisonment for “not less than 12 months or both.”
The right to freedom of expression is protected in article 20 of the Zambian Constitution. But restrictive laws like the Information Communication Technologies and the 2009 Electronic Communications and Transactions Acts “criminalize certain online activities that impede the right to freedom of expression” the study noted.  The combination of these laws and state surveillance has limited freedom of expression in the country.
A police officer wearing a protective anti-virus mask talks with a motorist at a checkpoint in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, April 20, 2020. Photo by KB Mpofu / ILO via Flickr / CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
Despite clear constitutional provisions — Section 61 and the Declaration of Rights in Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution — that protects freedom of expression, “Zimbabwe still scores poorly on various regional and global state of the freedom of expression matrices,” according to the study.
The enforcement of COVID-19 pandemic protocols presented an excuse to clamp down on online free speech as evident in the 2020 Public Health Order, which  “criminalizes false reporting,” the study stated.
The AfDec study also asserts that the “Zimbabwean government has been suspected of sponsoring the torture, abductions, and sometimes disappearances” of critical voices. For instance, Itai Dzamara, a vocal government critic, was abducted on March 9, 2015, and has been missing since.
The report showed a grim state of freedom of expression within some of the reviewed countries. Some of the countries employ laws that impose license and accreditation fees on journalists and bloggers, increasing the cost of expression and communication with the objective to discourage it.
The resultant effect is the stifling of dissent and  “a chilling effect on the free flow of ideas and meaningful discourse,” says AfDec.


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Myanmar introduces ‘draconian’ cyber security bill amid growing anti-coup protests · Global Voices
Mong Palatino

Anti-coup protests have been organized across Myanmar despite the ban on mass gathering. Photo supplied to Global Voices, used with permission
Civil society groups in Myanmar are opposing the draft “Cyber Security Bill” which was introduced amid growing opposition to the military government.
The bill was sent by the Ministry of Transport and Communications to local telecommunication companies for their review on February 9. The document was leaked online, and this allowed the public to study its content.
The bill has 76 sections which contain provisions that empower authorities to order websites to be blocked, content removed, and individuals to be charged for spreading misinformation.
The bill was presented days after the military staged a coup. It is feared that if passed into law, the measure will be used to further stifle free speech in the country. Internet was blocked in Myanmar on February 1, the day of the coup; and on February 6 and 7. Despite the ban on protests, the civil disobedience movement, which has mobilized thousands across the country, continued to gather support. The internet has played an important role in facilitating the spread of news and other updates about the coup and the democracy movement.
More than 200 Myanmar-based civil society groups have signed a statement rejecting the bill. In it, they questioned the authority of the military-led Ministry to draft a proposed law.
The issuance of the “bill” is evidence that the military has not only attempted a coup d’état, but is also exercising undue legislative power unlawfully to oppress the public.
…the “bill” includes clauses which violate human rights including the rights to freedom of expression, data protection and privacy, and other democratic principles and human rights in the online space.
One of the clauses highlighted by human rights groups pertains to the obligation of IT companies to submit user data if requested by authorities.
Art 30 & 31 from chapter 9 of the “bill” states, online platforms (FB, Twitter..etc) to keep user's details (IP, phone, ID, address, usage data, and other necessary data as directed by the ministry) for 3 yr and give it to them when asked. #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar #myanmarcoup pic.twitter.com/7tpTmZZKeN
— MIDO (@myanmarido) February 10, 2021
The Myanmar Computer Federation, which was asked by the military government to comment on the bill, also rejected the measure and suggested that stakeholders should be consulted about it. It added that elected Members of Parliament should draft the bill.
STATEMENT: Myanmar Computer Federation, the mother organization of all computer associations in the country “strongly opposed” military council’s the draft of “Cyber Security law” sent to them for reviewing and recommend to go through proper legitimate procedures. Thread/1 pic.twitter.com/NyNYxBCvVi
— Hnin Zaw (@hninyadanazaw) February 12, 2021
Vicky Bowman, director of the Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, told Frontier magazine that the bill will negatively affect the business operation of IT companies:
A law like this which does not protect human rights makes it very difficult for companies committed to respecting human rights to operate in Myanmar, which includes those offering online services.
U Aung Myo Min, director of Human Right Education Institute of Burma told Myanmar Times that the bill could legitimize military control of cyberspace:
It sounds more oppressive than protective. It can be expected that the true aim of the bill is to repress freedom of expression online and ban social networks.
This point was also echoed by Justice for Myanmar NGO, whose website was blocked in 2020 after exposing the anomalous business transactions of military officials:
#Myanmar military to enact a new Cyber Security Bill. Military “already controls 2 mobile networks, #Mytel & MPT, but now they want to control all online info through an unlawful process & punish those who dare practice their fundamental rights, including FOE”. #Myanmarcoup https://t.co/e2OF6AyUxR
— Justice For Myanmar (@JusticeMyanmar) February 11, 2021
Myanmar’s military government has intensified its crackdown on dissenting voices as the coup entered its second week. Protesters, activists, and journalists have been arrested for their role in the civil disobedience movement. The internet was blocked again on February 15, raising fears that this is a prelude to another wave of mass arrests.
Internet connections in Myanmar have been cut off again since around 1am Monday amid fears of a crackdown on recent protests. The move comes as armored personnel carriers and other military vehicles have been seen in various locations around Yangon.
#WhatsHappeningInMyanmar pic.twitter.com/mVwC5uWe8M
— Myanmar Now (@Myanmar_Now_Eng) February 14, 2021

author: Mong Palatino


text:
Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouthi’s death mourned by many · Global Voices
Dahlia Kholaif

Picture from Mourid Barghouti's Twitter account, showing him with his late wife Radwa Ashour: a love story cherished across the Arab world. Caption reads: “On the afternoon of July 22, 1970, we became a family. Her laughter became my home”
Beloved leading Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti passed away on Sunday at the age of 77 years, sending waves of grief across a wide fan base in the Arab world over his departure, and seeing through a prophecy he had long made:
أنا أكبر من إسرائيل بأربع سنوات، والمؤكد أنني سأموت قبل تحرير بلادي من الاحتلال الإسرائيلي. عمري الذي عشت معظمه في المنافي تركني محملًا بغربة لا شفاء منها، وذاكرة لا يمكن أن يوقفها شيء
I am four years older than Israel, and I will surely die before my country is liberated from the Israeli occupation. My life, most of which I lived in exile, has left me laden with incurable alienation and a memory that nothing could stop.
With somber words, vivid images, melancholic emotions, and meanings of resilience, Mourid's poetry very much pivoted on Palestine and Arab issues. For decades, he told of a yearning to his homeland in Palestine, which he was kept away from for over 30 years since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and was then only allowed restrained access to.
Through 12 collections of poems, his writing oscillated between hope, resistance, and despair, dreaming of uniting with a distant motherland, a family dispersed by statelessness, and a love kept away by exile.
In an interview with the Guardian in 2008, he was quoted as saying:
The dilemma of Palestinian writers, that we're expected to address the needs of people denied self-expression under occupation, to express their pain. But this is a trap: you have to strike a balance, not sacrificing the aesthetics for your readership. I hate the terms “resistance poetry” or “exile poetry.” We're not one-theme poets. A moment of joy or misery is juxtaposed by its opposite. There's no one face; I see both. I question myself all the time; if you oversimplify, you'd better quit.
His memoir “I Saw Ramallah”, which was the first to introduce him to global readers, was described by Edward Said, the celebrated intellectual and academic, as “one of the finest existential accounts of Palestinian displacement.”
Born in 1944 in the West Bank's mountainous village of Deir Ghassaneh, near Ramallah, Mourid was exiled from Jordan for 20 years, Lebanon for 15 years and Egypt for 18 years, separating him from his Egyptian wife, the late novelist and lecturer Radwa Ashour, and his son, poet Tamim.
Aside from his poems on social and political issues spanning the Arab world and of Arab citizens’ daily struggles, Mourid and Radwa's love story has become a romance cherished by a wide audience across the region.
Mourid Barghouti gave us his passion and pain for the homeland. He gave us his pure love for Radwa. He gave his words which resonated with our Syrian Nakba. He gave ‘I Saw Ramallah’, which spoke to me above all else in my own interaction with my heritage. Rest in peace, Mourid. pic.twitter.com/Dc72CsCEdj
— Razan Saffour (@RazanSpeaks) February 14, 2021
Another tweet read:
The timeless love between Mourid Barghouti and Radwa Ashour — as traced through their literary works — is one of the twentieth century’s great love stories… We lost another great soul in this earthly realm- May they reunite in their radical love and both rest in power. pic.twitter.com/wcnuib4xLL
— …شمس… (@shamsesq) February 14, 2021
Mourid's literary brilliance resonated across a massive audience across the world, who shared his longing for a liberated Palestine and a free voice.
Filmmaker Annemaria Jacir tweeted:
Broken hearted about Mourid al-Barghouti #مريد_البرغوثي Forever etched in my memory: dinner in Amman. It began to rain. You ran out and flung your arms back like a child, spinning around and smiling as you got soaked. Palestine has lost one of our greatest. #MouridBarghouti #RIP
— Annemarie Jacir (@AnnemarieJacir) February 14, 2021
Messages of mourning and heartache, reminisce and appreciations, and excerpts of his poetry flooded social media from across the world to mourn the death of the beloved poet.
Lebanese poet Zeina Hashem, wrote:
“لعلّ “غيرنا”… يغيرونها” – مريد البرغوثي
“leaving this world as t is,
hoping that, someday, someone else
will change it.” — @MouridBarghouti
Rest in Power, & thank you ? pic.twitter.com/5NaD4v7asY
— Zeina Hashem Beck (@zeinabeck) February 14, 2021
Professor Laleh Khalili wrote:
“Jerusalem. The city of our little moments that we forget quickly because we will not need to remember, and because they are ordinary like water is water and lightning is lightning. And as it slips from our hands it is elevated to a symbol, up there in the sky.” Mourid Barghouti
— Laleh Khalili (@LalehKhalili) February 14, 2021
Another post by Omar Ghraieb said:
We lost @MouridBarghouti , a huge loss for #Palestine, may you rest in peace knowing that you spoke up for your country through exceptional literary brilliance. You'll never be forgotten across all generations, you'll legendary work will keep you alive.
— Omar Ghraieb?? (@Omar_Gaza) February 14, 2021

author: Dahlia Kholaif


text:
President Jovenel Moïse always seems to land on his feet, but what about Haiti? · Global Voices
Joseph W. Alliance

Jovenel Moïse speaks at his inauguration as President of Haiti, after taking the oath of office. United Nations Photo on Flickr, dated February 7, 2017, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
His presidency has been marred by scandals and recurring protests but Jovenel Moïse has, so far, weathered every storm. Haiti, however, has been paying a heavy price under his leadership, including rampant insecurity, kidnapping and gang activity, recurrent fuel shortages, high rates of inflation, and insignificant economic growth.
The country is again mired in violent protests calling for the president's resignation, as he has been accused of overstaying his constitutional five-year term in office, which the opposition says should have ended on February 7.
Moïse has proven himself a political phoenix of sorts, managing to rise from the ashes of every scandal. First, he escaped the spiral of social discontent that erupted in July 2018 following the PetroCaribe scandal and his government's decision to increase fuel prices, but the first set of demands for his resignation would come later on, in February 2019. For two weeks, major cities around the country were paralysed by protesters asking for systemic change or “tabula rasa” (clean slate).
By May 31 of that year, Haiti's High Court of Auditors released a 600-plus-page report that delved deeper into the high-level corruption surrounding PetroCaribe, including President Moïse's personal association through his firm Agritrans, and another one called Betexs.
Protests at the time also centred around the increase in gang activity and the denunciation of massacres planned by officials belonging to the inner circle of the president.
As 2019 drew to a close, the country was once again in crisis. Along with the political opposition, almost every sector of Haitian civil society was crying for Moïse to resign. During this long period of “peyi lok” (lockdown), everything—including hospitals, banks, schools and markets—was practically shut down. At some point, the streets became tired and Moïse regained the upper hand.
Moïse's staying in power beyond the February 7 deadline touted by opposition groups has escalated Haiti's political crisis to a whole new level. Ever since January 13, 2020, when the president dissolved parliament—even though he was the one who failed to organise the elections required to renew parliamentary sittings—Moïse's political adversaries have had their eyes set on February 7 as their day of comeuppance.
It is a significant date: February 7, 2021 marked 35 years since the country broke from more than two decades of dictatorship to move into a new era of democracy, but it has been a bumpy road.
According to Moïse and his camp, he was sworn in on February 7, 2017 and, based on Articles 134.1 and 134.2 of the Constitution, his five-year term will end in 2022, but the opposition—along with many civil society actors and institutions—interpreted the same legislation differently and believe his term expired on February 7, 2021.
The political chaos expected to take shape on February 7 did not happen. Before addressing the nation later that day, Moïse quietly flew to Jacmel in southeast Haiti to enjoy the city's traditional Carnival, which always takes place the weekend prior to the national Carnival celebrations.
Outmaneuvering his opponents, Moïse looked jubilant and relaxed as he talked about how intelligence services were able to foil a plot to assassinate him that day, an allegation which led to the arrest of 23 people, including a police inspector, and a supreme court judge who was released last week.
Meanwhile, the opposition has named Joseph Mecene Jean Louis, the country's oldest supreme court judge, as interim president to lead a transition government charged with organising elections and returning the country to democratic normalcy.
For his part, Moïse has characterised the opposition as power-hungry promoters of chaos who refuse to go to elections:
Le processus démocratique ira au bout et ne sera pas modifié pour un régime de transition, hors de toute règle démocratique. Ce n’est pas comme cela que fonctionne la démocratie.@PCitoyen @JoutheJoseph @MCHaiti
— Président Jovenel Moïse (@moisejovenel) February 13, 2021
The democratic process will go to the end and will not be modified for a transitional regime, outside any democratic rule. This is not how democracy works.
@PCitizen @JoutheJoseph @MCHaiti
In response to the Mecene's nomination, Moïse dismissed three supreme court judges (including Mecene) and replaced them with new appointees, a move that has reignited public protests against what many liken to a return to “dictatorship”.
On February 14, while President Moïse was in Port-de-Paix in Haiti's northwest to launch the national Carnival, residents of the capital, Port-au-Prince, took to the streets to demand he step down.
According to protesters, Moïse is now acting as an illegal, unconstitutional president, since his mandate expired on February 7:
This is what pro-democracy protests looked like in #Haiti‘s capital at their peak today. This immense crowd estimated at over 100,000 stretched for blocks. Their demands are @moisejovenel step down and a transitional govt organize free & fair elections. pic.twitter.com/jOg8iYoT1d
— HaitiInfoProj (@HaitiInfoProj) February 14, 2021
This is no small march, look at all those people!! Haitians are marching for democracy & against dictatorship NOW#Haiti #LanmouPouAyiti #AbaDiktati #democracy #prodemocracy #Protest https://t.co/jvngCXojJ9
— Melinda Miles (@melindayiti) February 14, 2021
Throughout his troubled presidency, Moïse has been able to rely on the support of foreign allies, most significantly the US State Department, the Core Group and the Organization of American States (OAS).
It's no different this time. Aside from the US Congress, which is advocating for a transition government, Moïse has the support to finish his term in 2022 as his supporters, especially the United States, seem to only pay lip service to opposing his anti-democratic abuses.
There was hope that the Biden administration would change from its predecessor's foreign policy stance on Haiti, but so far, this hasn't been the case:
@BINUH_UN @UNHaiti @USEmbassyHaiti @AmbCanHaiti @ambafranceht all of the core group, did you hear the voice of the people today? Or will you continue to pretend that your puppet, wannabe #Dictator is doing a great job? Will you still pretend that people are paid to protest? pic.twitter.com/qUt1aqvKA8
— Velina (@VelinaEC) February 15, 2021
Even with the opposition's naming of an interim president, Jovenel Moïse remains in place while protesters continue to demand that he vacate power. As yet, there are no clear signs that the real steps are being taken to tame this crisis.
As all the actors—including the international community—seem convinced that each of them holds the right recipe for either democratic stability or real change, Haiti's longstanding political crisis has hit a new impasse.

author: Joseph W. Alliance