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Nepali literature lovers take respite from COVID-19 by celebrating Dashain with new books · Global Voices
Sangita Swechcha

Dashain festival & newly published translated books, Nepal. Photos by Sangita Swechcha
Dashain, also known as Vijaya Dashami, is one of the largest Hindu festivals celebrated in Nepal. It is a time when Kathmandu and other densely populated cities are emptied of residents who flock to their home villages. Typical ways of celebrating Dashain in Nepal are buying new clothes, rejoicing with varieties of food, visiting temples, spending time with family, whereas book lovers are also seen buying new books. Every year, publishers print new books and hold major book fairs and festivals around Dashain.
Although COVID-19 disrupted many of this year's festivities, many Nepalis were seen celebrating Dashain in various ways. Book lovers, for example, shared their new book purchases on social media:
दशैं ?? ? ❤ ? Thank you @kitab_yatra ? pic.twitter.com/RigplypcF7
— Dil Bhusan Pathak (@DilBhusanPathak) October 19, 2020
नेपाली साहित्य बिना दशै सधै आपुरो । केही किनियो , केहि नयाँ अझ किन्न बाकी छ । हार्दिक धन्यवाद @fineprintbooks @Book_Hill_P @KhadkaBhupendra @NirajBhari @AjitBaral @belakoboli @Vijaykumarko तथा Tag गर्न नसेका सबैमा । pic.twitter.com/9SgMTPBmA0
— Biboss Maharjan (@Bibossmaharjan) October 7, 2020
Dashain is always incomplete without Nepali literature. Some new ones have been bought, some are yet to be bought.
#Dashain vibes:
I'm ready to travel places where I don’t need corona travel guidance & information. Hoping the pages will transport me to different time zone n destination.
1. Thanx @kitab_yatra for #Dashain wish.
2. Books read
3. Reading
4. My next read.Thanx @KhadkaBhupendra pic.twitter.com/gfaijy3neY
— Archana Thapa (@archana_thapa) October 21, 2020
Nepalis living abroad are also celebrating Dashain festival. “I plan to read a few new Nepali books I have recently collected as part of my Dashain celebration with books,” Krishna Bajgai, a Nepali writer living in the United Kingdom, told Global Voices via telephone. He adds: “Dashain is all about nice food, new clothes, bringing something new for the home, enjoying with family and for a writer, what else can bring joy other than new books? Dashain is all around!”
The Nepali book market has seen many new publications this Dashain festival, including new translations.
Book Hill, a Nepali publisher, released this year translations of “Uganta: The End of an Epoch,” written in English by Iravati Karve, the first Indian female anthropologist; John Steinback's “Of Mice and Men,” the first-ever translation of this book in Nepali; and of “Wa Lampusthva Pala,” by Nepalese author Malla K. Sundar, originally written in Nepal Bhasha.
“Uganta: The End of an Epoch” was translated by Sujit Mainali. “Of Mice and Men” was translated by Ganess Poudel.
Book Hill has also recently released “Satta ra Satya,” a collection of 11 essays by William Morris, Antonio Gramsci, Albert Einstein, Bertolt Brecht, William Hinton, Eduardo Galliano, Howard Jean, and Edward Said, translated by Nepali political analyst and writer Khagendra Sangraula.
In an interview with Global Voices by email, Book Hill's chairman Bhupendra Khadka said:
Though the book market has been slow for the past couple of months due to the pandemic, people in Nepal seem enthusiastic about buying new books this Dashain. The book “Satta ra Satya” released just two weeks ago is going for the second edition as the it sold much quicker than expected.
Another publisher who released new titles lately is Shangrila Books, among them “Kancha Maharani” by Nepali author Sheeba Shah. The novel was translated into Nepali by Saguna Shah.
Global Voices interviewed Mani Sharma, the founder of Shangrila Books, by email, who said:
We are getting a very good response to this novel right at the festive time. This has brought joy to us. Getting reviews from the readers that the translated literature has maintained the originality and standard of its English publication, this is simply great.
Manjari Publications released this year a Nepali translation of “Vaishaliki Nagarbadhu,” by Acharya Chatursen, from Hindi. Manjari's owner Krishna Abiral told Global Voices by telephone:
I am very excited to see the love this translated book is getting from the readers. There is another translated book in the pipeline and we look forward to bringing more books in Nepali translation.
Publishers are also making efforts to sell the rights of Nepali books translated into English in the international market, but still, the challenges with distribution and marketing are immense. Mahesh Paudyal, a writer and researcher from Nepal, told Global Voices:
Nepali literature is not getting enough attention in international journals and academic institutions. Most of the major university curricula for literature do without a mention of Nepali literature and therefore no major body of Nepali literature finds representation in major anthologies and journals.

author: Sangita Swechcha


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Two Tanzanian musicians turn to opposition politics to improve their communities · Global Voices
Amanda Lichtenstein

Musician Vitali Maembe runs for a seat in Tanzania's national assembly representing Bagamoyo, October 15, 2020. Photo courtesy of Vitali Maembe, used with permission.
With just 24 hours before Tanzanians head to the polls to vote in the general election on October 28, two well-known musicians from Tanzania swap their songs for speeches as they ramp up their campaigns for parliamentary seats in Tanzania's national assembly.
Vitali Maembe, a beloved folk musician, activist and educator based in Bagamoyo, is running as member of parliament (MP) for Bagamoyo Pwani District, representing the opposition party, Alliance for Change and Transparency-Wazalendo (ACT-Wazalendo). Reggae artist Jhikoman, born Jhikolabwino Siza Manyika, also based in Bagamoyo, is running for MP also representing ACT-Wazalendo in Nyasa, Ruvuma, southern Tanzania, his parents’ birthplace.
ACT-Wazalendo, a democratic socialist party registered in May 2014, is the political engine of opposition leader Zitto Kabwe. The party mainly focuses on social security, participatory economies, health care, and education.
Speaking to Global Voices through WhatsApp, Maembe says he decided “some months before” to run for a seat in the national assembly after a long career as an activist who uses his music to call out corruption in Tanzanian politics. On June 29, he decided to make it official when he received his ACT membership card at their head office in Ilala, Dar es Salaam. By August, Maembe was named as one of 198 ACT-Wazalendo candidates for representative roles. Tanzania's national assembly has 390 seats, of which 264 are elected from constituencies.
Maembe says he was attracted to ACT's socialist vision described by the party's Tabora Declaration, which pledges support for a “socialist nation with equality as a basic principle,” and rails against what he sees as Tanzania's poor social services and the corruption that supports it.
“I believe in socialism,” says Maembe. “At least we can start something good for our people, not like others,” he said, referring to the ruling Revolutionary Party (Chama cha Mapinduzi, or CCM). “In their writings, CCM is a fully socialist party (it is just theory) — but they practice capitalism,” he wrote in a WhatsApp message.
The ruling CCM party has been in power since 1961 and is the second longest-ruling party in Africa, according to Good Governance Africa (GGA). Current President John Magufuli ran on an anti-corruption platform in 2015, but some have criticized his “strong-handed governing style,” says GGA.
Maembe continues:
I am not to be a king or ruler to my people, I am asking them to send me to the parliament and to the district council meetings to present them — to stand for their rights and their interest as Bagamoyo constituency people.
Vitali Maembe cheers with some of his supporters in Bagamoyo, October 15, 2020. Photo courtesy of Vitali Maembe, used with permission.
Maembe, 44, was born in the rural village of Mwazye in Sumbawanga, Rukwa region, but later adopted the historical, coastal town of Bagamoyo, as his home in the mid-1990s. He has worked as a music educator for many years, teaching music and dance at the Bagamoyo's TASUBA College of Arts.
Over the years, he's noticed that Bagamoyo residents have “very normal and basic needs and it is shame … that the people of Bagamoyo are not sure about their food, shelter, education, and stable medical treatments. They work hard but in poorly arranged environments,” Maembe told Global Voices.
Reggae artist Jhikoman speaks with a voter ahead of the 2020 elections in Tanzania. Photo courtesy of Jhikoman, used with permission.
Jhikoman, also based in Bagamoyo, shares Maembe's concerns about the political machinery that fuels inequity in Tanzania. In a private Instagram message to Global Voices, he wrote:
As a musician, I'm the voice of the people and I feel that getting into politics gives me a bigger opportunity for me to contribute and bring real change to the people. It's a big challenge but I think this is the right time and I am ready for it.
Jhikoman, who has toured internationally and locally since the mid-1990s, has graced stages with his Afro-reggae songs that spread a message of love, peace and unity. Born in Dar Es Salaam in 1972, Jhikoman's “music presents an opportunity to raise awareness about social oppression and justice,” according to Music in Africa.
Jhikoman (left) on the campaign trail speaking with constituents ahead of the general election in Tanzania. Photo courtesy of Jhikoman, used with permission.
Jhikoman told Global Voices that while the response has been very positive during his campaign, funding has been the biggest challenge. He explained in a note to his supporters that Tanzania's National Electoral Commission ‘does not cover the cost of election agents” to “ensure there's no theft or manipulation of votes,” he wrote.
In the days leading up to the election, international and local observers have expressed concern over possible voter repression during the 2020 elections, with a shrinking civic and media space to monitor potential discrepancies.
In a recent interview with BBC Swahili, Dr. Vicensia Shule says music has long played a role in Tanzanian politics. Shule explains that while these particular musicians may be running for the first time in 2020, historically, this is nothing new, as musicians have often played activist roles in Tanzanian society.
In the 2015 elections, for example, revered hip-hop artist Joseph Haule, known as “Professa Jay,” won the Mikumi District seat with the opposition party CHADEMA (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo or Party for Democracy and Change). And Haule was encouraged to get into politics by the rapper Joseph Mbilinyi, known as ‘Mr. Sugu,” who won Mbeya with CHADEMA in 2010.
And in this year's election, Tanzanian hip-hop artist and rapper Wakazi, born Webiro Noel Wassira, based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's cultural and commercial capital, is also running for MP in Ukonga, an administrative ward in the Ilala District.
The musician-as-politician is a growing trend in African politics made visible most recently on the international stage by the likes of Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, a Ugandan opposition politician popularly known as Bobi Wine, who plans to run for president in Uganda's upcoming elections.
As for a future in music while pursuing politics, Maembe says:
My music was [always] political … I was, I am and I will be the same musician — but also a member of the parliament. I can't quit music — I will be doing music, recording and arranging performances because it is a part of representing people.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Amanda Lichtenstein


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Under Amsterdam’s grey skies, Bolivians cheer Luis Arce’s presidential win · Global Voices
Ricardo Diaz

Demonstrators dressed in celebratory outfits at Dam Square. Ivonne, one of the demonstration’s organizers, is pictured on the right. Photo by the author.
“Jallala!” cheered dozens of demonstrators on Amsterdam’s Dam Square on Saturday, October 24. The demonstration was organized in celebration of Luis Arce’s presidential win in Bolivia, which was confirmed a day before.
Against the Dutch buildings’ brick facades, whipalas— colorful, checkered flags representing some of the Andean native populations—fluttered in the wind. Jallalla means “long live” or “live well”, in Aymara, as Ivonne van Pelt, one of the demonstration’s organizers, told Global Voices. “In our culture, we don’t say ‘good morning’ or ‘good afternoon’,” she explained. “We say ‘live well’.”
The demonstration was organized by Whipalas Across the World—”an alliance of Bolivian collectives, cultural and social groups based mostly in Europe.” It consisted of a homage to the 2019 massacres of Sacaba, Senkata, and Pedregal, a homage to Mother Earth, dancing, and an apthapi. “It was not easy to organize the party during the pandemic,” van Pelt told me. “We used technology and social media. Whatsapp to communicate. YouTube to practice the choreography. Facebook to publish the event.”
Demonstrators and a crowd listen to speeches. Photo by the author.
On October 23, Luis Arce emerged as the winner of Bolivia’s 2020 presidential race with 55.1 percent of the vote; centrist politician Carlos Mesa came in second with 28.8 percent. Arce’s victory marks a return to power for political party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), which was previously led by Evo Morales until accusations of electoral fraud followed by mass protests forced him to step down in November 2019.
Arce, the former Minister of Economy and Public Finance under then-President Morales, will take over the presidency from right-wing politician Jeanine Áñez Chávez who assumed the interim presidency after Morales stepped down.
For many Bolivians, memories of Áñez’s short presidency are tainted by corruption and state violence. “Dictatorship” was the word demonstrators at Dam Square often used to describe Mrs. Áñez’s interim administration.
On November 15, three days after assuming power, Áñez signed a decree that “gave impunity to military personnel involved in the repression of protests” that had occurred that month. This piece of legislation was subject to heavy criticism by several human rights organizations. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for example, claimed that the Bolivian armed forces facilitated the “Sacaba massacre,” in which twelve civilians lost their lives.
Áñez’s period in power was also marked by heightened ethnic tensions, according to journalists and academics. Her initial cabinet did not “include a single indigenous person, in a country where at least 40% of the population belongs to one of 36 indigenous groups,” writes the Guardian. During a recent Zoom conference organized by Whipalas Across the World, Bolivian political scientist Jorge Richter also condemned the interim administration for promoting racial and ethnic intolerance. “They [the Áñez administration] hate indigenous people,” van Pelt added during a follow-up interview via WhatsApp.
Religion also proved to be polarizing during Áñez’s interim presidency. Bolivia’s constitution puts Christianity on equal ground with other religions, yet “…The Bible has returned to the government palace,” Añez stated when she was sworn in. Añez’s Christian fervor was previously analyzed by Global Voices.
For Bolivians at home and abroad, the 2020 elections were an opportunity to reverse the country's political course and a chance to repair the nation.
Others see the MAS as a defender of national interests. According to van Pelt, before Evo gained power, “we exited a state of total submission in which [our resources] passed from one entrepreneur to the next, in which we could never be the owners of our own resources.” With the MAS in power again and with a new leader, Bolivians have hope that decision-makers will represent the national interest instead of serving foreign companies. However, it should be noted that Morales allowed foreign companies’ extraction of natural resources, sometimes with little state oversight.
Whiplalas waved in the air. Photo by the author.
All over Europe, Arce's victory set off celebrations amongst like-minded Bolivians. Despite many not having lived in their country for a long time—many Bolivians emigrated to Europe because of US-sponsored military coups in 1971—the Bolivian diaspora still has strong emotional ties to the people back home. “My true family is back in Bolivia,” van Pelt told Global Voices on Saturday. Bolivians abroad were allowed to vote.
In Amsterdam, diasporic Bolivians held a ritual thanking Pachamama (Mother Earth) for Arce’s victory, during which two demonstrators spread petals in the wind, lit incense, and gave speeches—mostly in Dutch, but also in the Quechua and Aymara languages—as they sat on a colorful mantle surrounded by flowers and candles. Equality—both in a political and spiritual sense—was at the heart of their rhetoric. “We are all the same before Pachamama,” a demonstrator told the small crowd huddled around the altar.
Demonstrators perform a ritual, give speeches, and recite poetry. Photo by the author.
To conclude the ritual, Ramón—pictured on the left—poured water on the ground. Later on, an onlooker asked van Pelt why he did that. “We believe that when nature gives us something, we have to give back,” she said. Pouring water on the ground symbolized that.
After the ritual, a celebration ensued. An assortment of Latin American music boomed from speakers and people danced. “There is nothing like Latin music,” van Pelt told Global Voices. Honoring a promise she had made before the elections, one demonstrator danced two laps around the square barefoot, then followed by several others.
A demonstrator takes off her shoes as she prepares to dance around the square. Photo by the author.
Several onlookers joined in. Nick, a 20-year-old man from Brazil, told Global Voices why he was there. “I am just a guy who likes celebrating and dancing to the freedom of a nation,” he responded. He also believed the occasion was something all Latin American people should laud. “Bolivia has set an example,” he said.
Nick waving a Whipala. Photo by the author.
Nick was not the only non-Bolivian there. People from Latin American countries, like Curacao, Surinam, Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia, were also in the crowd. The Surinamese and Venezuelan flags were visible during the celebration. Bolivians welcomed other Latin Americans warmly, calling the continent, “one big family.”
“All of us Latin Americans have to come together to fight imperialism,” van Pelt said.
Gabriella hands out cups and plates. Photo by the author.
After around an hour of dancing, the demonstrators brought out food and drinks, laying them neatly on a mantle spread out over the concrete. This sort of “picnic” is called an apthapi in Aymara, which Gabriella—who invited me to the demonstration—said meant “union and the power to share […] in the Aymara, Guraní, and Quechua cultures.” The onlookers were offered tangerines, vegetables, wine, and soft drinks from the apthapi.
The apthapi. Photo by the author.
The evening was not without tensions. The demonstrations were allowed under COVID-19 restrictions, but in practice, it proved difficult for people to keep 1.5 meters apart, as stipulated by Dutch law. The police intervened, and the organizers agreed to enforce social distancing rules more strictly.
The evening was peaceful and joyous overall, and a sense of relief was palpable. “The people are finally back in power,” a demonstrator said in the crowd.

author: Ricardo Diaz


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The importance of ‘unlearning’ the past: Interview with Balkans expert Keith Brown · Global Voices
Metamorphosis Foundation

Prof. Keith Brown, Arizona State University. Photo used with his permission.
This story was originally published by Meta.mk. An edited version is republished here via a content-sharing agreement between Global Voices and Metamorphosis Foundation. All links displayed in the interviewee's quotes were added by Meta.mk.
Keith Brown is a professor at Arizona State University’s School of Politics and Global Studies. He is also director of The Melikian Center for Russian, Eurasian & Eastern European Studies. With a doctorate in anthropology from the University of Chicago, Brown works primarily in the domain of culture, politics, and identity, focused on the Balkans.
Part of his extensive research on ethnonationalism and the role of national history in the region has been available to the public in North Macedonia via the translations of his books “The past in question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation” (2003) and “Loyal unto Death, Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia” (2013).
In an interview with portal CriThink.mk, Brown explains the importance of critical thinking when learning history.
CriThink: How important is the application of critical thinking to history and anthropology?
Keith Brown (KB): Critical thinking is very important in both history and anthropology.  Skeptics and naysayers sometimes dismiss our methods as “soft” or trot out tired clichés like “history is written by the winners.” But evaluating and comparing sources, and weighing how cultural and social factors impact individual decisions, are essential components of both disciplines. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, historians and anthropologists recognize that meanings and horizons shift over time and across space.
This is especially important in the study of nationalism—a mode of political organization and identity formation that contributed to the break-up of multiconfessional empires in the 19 century, and which often seeks legitimacy by claiming ancient roots.  What makes it more complicated is that most nation-states place a high premium on communicating to their citizens a strong sense of shared history that distinguishes them from others. Often, it is easier for people to see the inconsistencies and distortions in their neighbors’ versions of the past, than to question or closely scrutinize the history that they think holds their own society together.
Critical thinking demands, as an early step, recognition of one’s own blinkers, prejudices and areas of ignorance. It also benefits from dialogue in which participants check their egos and agendas at the door, and measure success not by the points they score, but by the new ways of seeing they have helped generate for themselves or others.
CriThink: Political establishments in most Balkans states seem to insist on promoting the concept of “national history” based on selecting “positive,” and excluding “negative,” “facts” to create or maintain official narratives that are then used in public education textbooks. In the last 200 years, this dogmatic approach had often been used as justification for oppression towards “the others.” Is there another way to do history?
KB: History is an incredibly rich domain of study. In 2015, oral historian Svetlana Alexievich was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature for her work chronicling citizens’ voices from the end of the Soviet Union. Organizations like EuroClio—to which many history teachers from the Balkans and Eastern Europe belong—promote the study of global history, and encourage members and students to explore social, cultural and economic history. Courageous and open-minded historians are often leading critics of the exceptionalism on which national history is founded—including in the United States, through efforts like the 1619 project.
I think that these kind of approaches have enormous potential to transform people’s understandings of the past, and prompt reflection on how the present will look from the future. I am particularly excited by the promise of microhistory, as pioneered by Carlo Ginzburg, which draws out the broader human significance from the close study of an event or community.
English language editions of Keith Brown’s books “Loyal unto Death, Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia” (2013) and “The past in question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation” (2003).
CriThink: In your book “Loyal Unto Death: Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia,” you note facing challenges of unreliability or bias in available historical sources, including the correspondence of British consuls preserved as microfilms by the Museum of Macedonian Struggle in Greece; or the applications for pensions submitted to the new Macedonian state by the elderly who survived revolutions between 1948 and 1956, preserved in the State Archive of North Macedonia. How did you deal with that challenge of extracting useful information from these records?
KB: I first read many of these sources while I was a graduate student in anthropology. Conscious that the Ilinden Uprising of 1903 had been interpreted differently by scholars for whom the correct context was Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian, Yugoslav, Ottoman, Balkan or Macedonian history, I wanted to get as close to the period as I could, by engaging closely with sources that, in one way or another, stood outside these frames of reference.
I was struck, for example, by the fact that according to the records of the National Archive in Skopje, only a handful of scholars had sought access to the Ilinden dossier of biographies. My understanding was that these sources were discounted because, self-evidently, they were self-interested. The British, French, German and American diplomatic and consular records from Ottoman Macedonia, by contrast, are often treated as wholly dispassionate, objective and clinical accounts, as if their authors were scientifically trained medical professionals, diagnosing the ills of an empire on its death-bed. In writing “Loyal Unto Death,” I took an alternative, subversive approach toward these two sets of sources.  Whether or not individual pension-seekers amplified their own roles, or edited out those elements that might weaken their case for state recognition, their accounts drew from their own or their age-mates’ experiences and understandings.  No-one lied about the organizational structure of the revolutionary organization, the methods of recruitment, or the logistics of acquiring weapons or distributing information and supplies: what would be the self-interest in doing so? Thus they provide us, individually but even more so in aggregate, with a sense of the shared day-to-day experience of participation in a resistance and rebellion.
British consular accounts, often read as if magisterial, reflect their individual authors’ biographies, perspectives and access to sources: Alfred Biliotti was a naturalized British citizen born in Rhodes who had worked his way up from the position of dragoman and had close ties with Ottoman and Greek authorities, whereas James McGregor knew Bulgarian and expressed the view that the Organization commanded strong support. Their accounts diverge or clash. This is not to say that all sources or accounts are equally valid or suspect.  It is rather to argue that we need to get past our own cultural preconceptions, whether they tell us “peasants lie” or “diplomats are cynical careerists,” and remain alert to the ways they can surprise us.
Macedonian language editions of Keith Brown’s books “The past in question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation” (2010) and “Loyal unto Death, Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia” (2014).
CriThink: Lacking a viable time machine, it’s hard to precisely determine the “national consciousness” of historical figures, given the non-existing, censored, fabricated, or conflicting records, their interpretations, as well as changed meanings of some of the language used at the time. Which critical thinking skills need to be nurtured across the region to help resolve such issues?
KB: In “The Past in Question,” I chose to use the language of the British consular sources rather than update or modify it, and to try to translate sources in Greek and Bulgarian into the English of that time, rather than of the early 21 century.  I thus used terms like “Bulgar,” “Arnaut,” “Mijak” and “Exarchist” seeking in this way to remind readers of the very different world of the late nineteenth century; when “Greece” referred to a territory roughly half the size of modern Greece; when only a small fraction of people who would call themselves “Bulgars” owed loyalty to the Ottoman-administered “Bulgaria” with its capital in Sofia; when the Sultan sought to restrict the use of the Albanian language, and the term “Macedonia;” and when the prospect of an alliance of convenience between the ambitious nation-states of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to carve up and nationalize Ottoman territory surely seemed absurd to most.
For me, critical thinking demands, paradoxically, that we try to unlearn what actually happened since the period we are trying to understand; or at least, allow it to strike us as surprising or at least non-inevitable. This then concentrates our attention on the factors that drive outcomes. It also liberates us from the illusion that figures in the past—like Ilinden-era figures Goce Delchev, Nikola Karev, Damjan Gruev or Boris Sarafov—imagined their own identity in terms of the nationalisms of their future.
Keith Brown and the historian Irena Stefoska at the promotion of the Macedonian edition of the book The past in question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation in December 2010. Photo by Vančo Džambaski, CC BY-NC-SA.
CriThink: Yet such issues seem to grow into central points of a slippery slope of international disputes, from Goce Delchev (Bulgaria-North Macedonia) to Nikola Tesla (Serbia-Croatia), Skanderbeg (Greece-Albania), Njegoš (Montenegro-Serbia) to King Marko (North Macedonia-Serbia-Bulgaria). Is there a way to resolve such issues at some higher, more objective level, rather than just between conflicting states, and based on their power?
KB: Social scientists, including historians (and I’d include myself in this assessment) don’t always keep up to date with developments in other disciplines and fields.  This manifests itself in approaches rooted in the conventions of 19 century Newtonian sciences, with a focus on breaking down complex reality into experimental-size pieces, where we can test hypotheses in an “either/or” mode to determine cause and effect, the rules of energy transfer and transformation, and so on. Contemporary theoretical and experimental science, though, have moved far beyond this paradigm; into the world of quarks, bosons and quantum mechanics, where non-specialists can barely follow. Ask the average person where they stand on the wave-particle duality, and you’re probably in for a short conversation. It requires thinking in “both/and” terms that demands effort, and also a realignment of deeply held common-sense. But this lack of public understanding doesn’t prevent physicists from pursuing their work and generating new insight into the workings of the universe.
Balkan history has been shaped by the territorial ambitions and disputes of the last century, and so has become a zero-sum game; it also has quasi-religious aspects, insofar as current debates reveal an implicit concern with purity and pollution underlying accusations around loyalty and betrayal. Grievances and disputes escalate; and (to pursue the game metaphor) there is no mechanism, in this case, by which both sides would agree to invest a referee with the authority to call the game fairly; the stakes are seen as too high.
An alternative view would be that the dispute over Goce Delchev’s “true” identity, for example, is a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma game; in which both sides fear that by surrendering their claim to ownership they will lose and the other side will win (Bragging rights? Prestige? The mantle of “true” nationhood?), but the consequence of their refusal to acknowledge ambiguity is that both sides are seen as intransigent or blinkered in the wider community of nations.
CriThink: Would some sort of International Scientific Tribunal need to be developed to prevent escalations, akin to tribunals used to provide closure for conflicts involving genocide and war crimes (Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia)?
KB: I don’t see value in an external tribunal offering some authoritative closure: for me, that’s not how history (or science) work.  All findings are contingent and provisional: they are contributions to an ongoing exchange, the ultimate goal of which is not to set some conclusion in stone, but provide material that can open new horizons and perspectives.
CriThink: In the Balkans, contrary to the inherent role of professional journalists as promotors of democracy, the media often serve as amplifiers of the most radical and polarizing nationalistic views about history. Is there a way to embed critical thinking about history in the mainstream media sphere?
KB: My own fantasy solution is something like what a group of Macedonian youth leaders did in the second half of the 1980s with the Youth Film Forum (Mladinski filmski forum), and set up learning opportunities through engagement with film, literature and other prompts.  What would happen, for example, if Bulgarian and Macedonian historians and journalists watched “Rashomon” together? Or undertook a joint project (perhaps with Albanian colleagues) on the economic, psychological and social effects of gurbet/pečalba? Or conducted a close joint study of the United States 1619 project? I believe they would emerge with a shared vocabulary to address issues of contingency, ambiguity, trauma and structural violence that are shared across the Balkan region—and beyond.

author: Metamorphosis Foundation


text:
This beatboxing Buddhist monk from Japan is making music to ‘reduce suffering’ · Global Voices
Nevin Thompson

Yogetsu Akasaka. Screencap his official YouTube channel.
A Japanese monk who “makes music for anxiety and less suffering” is being rewarded with millions of listeners. Yogetsu Akasaka, a 37-year-old Zen Buddhist monk, uses a loop station to combine and overlay beatboxing with Buddhist chanting, and then uploads the videos to YouTube. His most popular video, “Heart Sutra Live Looping Remix,” has two million views so far.
Akasaka's modern rendition of the Heart Sutra (般若心経), historically one of the best-known and more popular sutras, went viral on YouTube in May 2020. The Buddhist monk combines beatboxing loops and beats while chanting a variety of traditional Buddhist sutras, or scripture, on his YouTube channel. The goal, Akasaka says, is to help reduce suffering.
I make ‘music for less anxiety’.
I chant for ‘less suffering’.
May all beings be happy.
不安や苦しみが少しでも和らぐように、音楽にお経をのせて歌っています。
すべての生きとしいけるものが幸せでありますように。
full moviehttps://t.co/0Vde5Xgxhf#beatbox #handpan #loopstation pic.twitter.com/mIdYJRUAQ5
— Yogetsu Akasaka-赤坂陽月- (@yochanting) October 2, 2020
Prior to becoming a monk, Akasaka lived overseas and performed as a busker. In 2009, Akasaka started combining beatboxing with vocal layers and has since added Buddhist chanting to his repertoire.
Akasaka, who now lives in Tokyo, became a Zen Buddhist monk in 2015, following in the footsteps of his father, who now heads a temple in rural Iwate Prefecture.
As Akasaka tells Vice:
Usually in Japan, people become monks because their family lives in a temple. But for my father, he was just a normal person who decided to become a monk. […] I was inspired, and decided I wanted to succeed in my father’s current role as an abbot in a temple in the Iwate Prefecture.
Even before going viral with his version of the Heart Sutra, Akasaka's music was catching attention in Japan. It appeared at the 2019 Techno Hosho, a concert held as part of the larger annual Chokaigi event, that combines Buddhist rituals, techno music, and projection.
Akasaka is not the only performer who blends Buddhism with contemporary music. Here, at the Techno Hosho event in 2018, a performer who goes by the name Gya blends techno and trance music with Buddhist chanting:
超テクノ法要×向源では、ユーザーが投稿した「テクノ法要」をマッピングしています。
▼マッピングした動画#Gya さん
【テクノ法要】讃仏偈（さんぶつげ）【Psy-Trance Remix】https://t.co/FjqRuJ5CEV#テクノ法要 #向源 #ニコニコ超会議 #超会議 #chokaigi pic.twitter.com/zZ3sOmFsHu
— ニコニコ超会議@2021はリアル＆ネット開催? (@chokaigi_PR) April 29, 2018
User uploaded video of projection mapping at Techno Hosho (in April 2018).
Projection mapping by #Gya. Song: “Sanbutsu” (“praise honoring the Buddha”)
Yogetsu Akasaka's viral “Heart Sutra Live Looping Remix” and other songs can be watched on YouTube.
Yogetsu Akasaka hosts an active Twitter account, and his music can be on YouTube, Spotify, and other online services.

author: Nevin Thompson


text:
In the heat of political crisis, Belarus launches first nuclear power plant · Global Voices
Hanna Valynec

Astravets nuclear power plant, Belarus, 2020. Photo (c): Hanna Valynets, used with permission.
Since August, Belarus has been rocked by mass protests and strikes. The authorities try not to pay attention, for they are preoccupied with a no less historic development — the construction of a new nuclear power plant. That is controversial in a country which suffered greatly from the 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe in neighbouring Ukraine. Concern at the state of democracy dominates Belarusian public life, but alongside it another urgent conversation continues — about the country’s past experience with nuclear power, and whether it needs a post-nuclear future.
All eyes are on Astravets, a small town located near the Belarusian border with Lithuania. In recent years the town’s population has grown significantly: workers are badly needed, and new multi-storey apartments have shot up to house them.
The reason for these rapid changes is that Belarus’ first nuclear power plant is located outside the town. Its construction is now coming to an end and it is nearly ready to be started up. As engineers often explain, it takes more than pressing one button to launch a nuclear reactor.
That start-up will take place in several phases. The fuel has already been loaded; the plant is expected to generate its first electricity on November 7. This is a national holiday in Belarus, as it is the anniversary of the October Revolution — the revolution from which the Soviet Union was born.
“I invite everybody. I think that on November 7, a significant day for us, we will be able to visit and say that we have received the first electricity from our own nuclear power plant”, exclaimed Belarus’ longtime ruler Alyaksandr Lukashenka at a meeting with officials on September 16. The first of the two reactors is expected to operate at full capacity by the first quarter of 2021. The second reactor will be launched in 2022.
But not all Belarusians are so jubilant. They remember the explosion in 1986, which released large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. Belarus suffered more than anywhere else in the Soviet Union; a third of all the radioactive caesium-137 ended up in Belarusian territory. The authorities in Minsk have tried to assuage fears of a second Chernobyl, declaring that the likelihood of accidents is minimal, and that the Astravets nuclear power plant is a safe and profitable project.
“We are the Chernobyl republic, we have experienced a lot and we know the consequences ourselves. Some US$19 billion has been spent on rehabilitating contaminated areas alone. Therefore, safety measures during the construction of the [Astravets] power station were like something out of wartime”, said Lukashenka in August, just before the presidential elections.
In the public discussion about nuclear energy, comparisons between Chernobyl and Astravets are not so uncommon. These parallels are drawn by everybody, including journalists, politicians, ordinary citizens, and surviving liquidators from the Chernobyl catastrophe. They all deeply regret what occurred in 1986, but their opinions on 2020 strongly differ. Some strongly support the new nuclear power plant and hope for an increased standard of living, while others fear another accident.
Belarusian state media and officials do not shirk from mentioning Chernobyl, either.
“The memory of the events at Chernobyl is now being instrumentalised and used to legitimise the new nuclear power plant. On the 30th anniversary of the accident, a documentary film was broadcast which began with footage of the 1986 accident and ended with a hint that this time, everything would be alright,” writes Alexey Bratochkin, head of public history projects at the European College of Liberal Arts in the Belarusian capital of Minsk.
Once the nuclear power plant is fully operational, explained the authorities in the early stages of construction, electricity prices will fall. In 2014, the Ministry of Energy promised that electricity “will become cheaper for the consumer” by 20-30 percent.
But some Belarusians seem to be sceptical about promises of cheap energy. They also doubt that the power plant will open at all, given that its launch has already been postponed at least four times. All these views can be seen in local community groups on social media:
“I work on the construction site of the nuclear power plant, and [acquaintances] sometimes ask me when it will be launched. I think [the plant’s management] don’t even know themselves, they say within two to three years at a minimum”, says Alyaksandr, who was born and grew up in Astravets, in a Telegram chat with GlobalVoices.
Does Alyaksandr expect a drop in electricity prices? He might be right to, given that electric vehicles are already under development and power engineers are modernising heating networks in newly-constructed residential buildings to be more energy efficient.
“Logically that should be the case. But in Volgodonsk [a city in Russia] there’s also a nuclear power plant. There are more than two reactors, but after the plant was constructed energy actually became more expensive”, remarks Alyaksandr.
He may be right, according to the results of a study conducted by the Belarusian NGO EcoDom this summer. The authors concluded that the electricity prices for Belarusian consumers will almost double in price.
“The prime cost of electricity in the network as a whole will not decrease, but will increase from four cents to [US$]7.26; that is, 1.8 times”, concluded EcoHome.
There have also been geopolitical promises. Namely, that Belarus would lessen its energy dependence on natural gas supplies from Russia. Nuclear power is “part of our independence”, and its greater use would ensure “sovereignty and independence”, promised Lukashenka in September.
Indeed, shortly before the decision to construct Astravets was taken in 2007, Russia accounted for some 85 percent of all Belarus’ energy imports. Much of this is natural gas, from which Belarus generates 93 percent of its electricity.
In their quest to reduce their country’s energy dependence on Russia, the Belarusian authorities turned to an old partner — Russia. Moscow was happy to oblige, offering a loan of up to $10 billion for the new power plant. This loan must be repaid over a 15 year period, starting from 2023. Thus the Belarusian leadership tied itself to a massive financial obligation to the same country from which it wanted to reduce dependence.
“The political meaning of the construction and launch of the nuclear power plant was associated with the goal of ensuring energy security for Belarus. It probably isn’t the best idea. The nuclear power plant is an ongoing economic and political miscalculation”, says Andrey Yegorov, a political scientist and analyst at the Centre for European Transformation and member of the board of the Green Network, a partnership of environmental organisations. In an interview with GlobalVoices, Yegorov emphasised that now Belarus will not only pay loans to Russia, it will still need to buy Russian energy resources. Only now it will import nuclear fuel.
Astravets could certainly cover much of Belarus’ domestic energy needs — in fact, according to the Ministry of Energy, the plant is likely to generate a surplus. All that excess energy must go somewhere, but where?
Russia is well supplied by its own nuclear power plants. Belarus’ other neighbours do not intend to buy energy from Astravets, which they consider unsafe.
Lithuania is a particularly fierce opponent both of the construction of the power plant and purchasing energy it will generate. After all, Astravets lies just 20 kilometres from its border. Vilnius has even passed a law on boycotting electricity from the new power plant.
On October 26, Litgrid, operator of Lithuania’s national electricity grid, announced how it would react to the first receipt of electricity from Belarus, which is expected between November 1-10. “We will immediately set the capacity to zero megawatts for all commercial electricity flows from Belarus”, said Litgrid’s interim head Vidmantas Grušas in a press release.
This statement is the consequence of Lithuania’s long-standing position. It was summed up by President Ginatas Nausėda on October 21.
“The Belarusian nuclear power plant poses a threat to the safety of EU citizens. Therefore it is necessary to put a stop to the irresponsible launch of this nuclear power plant”, said Nausėda.
Estonia, Latvia, and Poland have all announced their refusal to purchase energy from Astravets, partly out of solidarity with Lithuania’s position. Ukraine has also declined, stating that it has its own energy surplus.
At a meeting of the Council of Europe in October, European leaders stressed that the degree of compliance with and implementation of safety requirements and tests at the Astravets nuclear power plant would affect relations between the EU and Belarus.
In September, the Belarusian Green Party and several ecological organisations released a declaration against the nuclear power plant at Astravets. As they saw it, its launch was even more dangerous in the context of a political crisis.
“Let’s start with the fact that the internal troops and security forces, which could be involved in mitigating the consequences of any crisis, are now busy with something else entirely — clashing with protesters”, write the ecologists.
Indeed, police detain an average of 500-700 people every weekend during protests. And protests don’t just take place on weekends. Judging by the estimates of the Belarusian human rights centre Viasna, more than 16,000 people have been detained since August 9. As of early October, human rights defenders had recorded over 2,000 complaints of torture and violence during detention, according to the International Committee on the Investigation of Torture.
Meanwhile, layoffs and strikes are also taking place. For example, on October 26 some factory workers, including those at chemical plants, did not turn up at work. On the same day, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Telegram channel noted that “the president, like all right-minded Belarusians, is at work today”.
Yegorov, the political scientist, notes that in the current situation, being right-minded means sensibly assessing the risks:
“A nuclear power plant can be highly dangerous and is very risky to operate. Putting one into operation amid unprecedented epidemiological, political and economic crises is risky”, he says.
It must be added that at the time of writing, the COVID-19 infection rate in Belarus has peaked. It now stands where it did in May, during the first wave of the pandemic.
“First and foremost, the danger posed by the nuclear power plant is not connected with the political system nor the epidemiological situation”, remarks Andrey Ozharovsky, an active participant of the Belarusian anti-nuclear movement.
Ozharovsky believes that nuclear power is dangerous in any situation; Chernobyl exploded under socialism and Fukushima under capitalism. Nevertheless, the danger may increase if the launch itself becomes a political event:
“Belarus’ atomic project has been a political one from the outset, as Lukashenka has said many times. If it is in his personal interests to rush its start-up, then in accordance with old Soviet traditions, the facility may be commissioned with imperfections. When it comes to a nuclear power plant, that dramatically increases the likelihood of severe accidents”, warns Ozharovsky.
The long term future of the facility at Astravets also poses a key problem: the power plant will function for 60 years, but radioactive waste remains dangerous for several thousand. However, political realities can be far more fleeting.
“If the ruling powers in Belarus change, the question will arise as to whether Belarus needs this nuclear power plant. Let me remind you that countries such as Germany have rejected nuclear energy. France has made it a political goal to reduce its independence on nuclear energy from 70 to 50 percent”, Ozharovsky explains.
In the short term, ecologists see Astravets as a setback for Belarusian renewable energy.
According to a 2018 study by EcoHome and the Institute for Technical Thermodynamics of the German Aerospace Centre, Belarus could close its nuclear power plant by 2040 and fully transition to renewable energy by 2050.
Pavel Gorbunov, an energy researcher with EcoHome, calls the Astravets nuclear power plant an unprofitable project. He is convinced that it would be cheaper not to launch the plant, recognising the investment as a loss maker and starting to pay back the loan which Belarus took out for its construction.
“In the medium and the long term, the Astravets nuclear power plant will compete with prices for electricity from renewable sources”, said Gorbunov in an interview.
This is because Belarus is currently developing renewable energy alongside its nuclear sector. However, the launch of the new power plant and the surplus of electricity which it will produce are expected to reduce investor interest in developing industrial-scale renewable energy. This is the belief of Vladimir Nistyuk, the executive director of Belarus’ Renewable Energy Association, which includes about 40 organisations.
The launch also threatens to reduce the opportunities for producers of energy from renewable sources to sell their electricity back to the national grid. It will also impact the “elimination of increasing coefficients”, which allowed them to do so at a more favourable price.
At the same time, the expert notes that there remains a public interest in energy sources which allow ordinary people and companies alike to generate their own electricity. Biogas is being actively developed, he adds.
“In general, even if the development of renewable [energy] sources slows down, it will not be for long. As Karl Marx said, one cannot live in society and be free from it”, Nistyuk told GlobalVoices.
“There’s no getting away from that, because we live in a civilised world which has long since started to appreciate the benefits of renewable energy and its prospects. We are optimists”.
This article is made possible through a partnership with Transitions, a Prague-based publishing and media training organisation

author: Hanna Valynec


text:
Silencing the media won’t stop the student-led protests in Thailand · Global Voices
EngageMedia

Thai protesters with their three-finger “Hunger Games” salute. Photo by Prachatai, used under the Foundation for Community Educational Media 2006 (cc) BY-NC license.
This article by Sek Sophal originally appeared in Coconet, a platform for digital rights movement-building in the Asia-Pacific, hosted by EngageMedia, a non-profit media, technology and culture organization. An edited version is published below as part of a content-sharing agreement with Global Voices.
In Thailand, the youth-led pro-democracy movement is showing no signs of retreating, despite a State of Emergency banning public gatherings of more than four people. In response, the Thai government issued an order on October 16 banning four independent media outlets and a Facebook page from posting news content, based on the pretext that these organizations posed a major threat to national security. The groups in question are Voice TV, Prachatai, The Reporters, and The Standard, as well as the Facebook page of the Free Youth movement. The decree was signed by National Police Chief, Suwat Jangyodsuk, at the request of the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission and the Digital Economy and Society.
The ban on these groups has since been lifted, following an October 21 order by the Criminal Court. The Court cited Section 35 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, which state that “a media professional shall enjoy the liberty to present news or express opinions in accordance with professional ethics,” and that “the closure of a newspaper or other mass media in deprivation of the liberty under paragraph one shall not be permitted.”
The government’s decision to even attempt this ban was both misguided and counterproductive. If the Thai government believed that banning the four media houses would have stopped or weakened the ongoing protests, it was sorely mistaken.
Long before the current protests, Voice TV, Prachathai, The Reporters, and The Standard had played a critical role in generating comprehensive and independent media content for the Thai public. And with their consistently high-quality content, professionalism, and code of ethics, the popularity of these media organizations has only increased. For instance, the YouTube channel of Voice TV surged to over two million subscribers during its coverage of the protests, making it currently one of the most popular news media outlets in the country.
If the intent of the Thai government was to stop news of the protests from spreading, it seems that the Emergency decree was the wrong choice of strategy. Even though many Thai youths depend on these independent media outlets, several more online platforms are also producing the same kind of independent content. In addition, such content is also produced and shared on other channels of communication, such as on messaging applications Telegram, Line, and Signal.
Equally important, as well, is the fact that, while protesters rely mainly on media and other forms of communication to mobilize, these organizations have nothing to do with the students’ communication, coordination, and management of the protests. The young protesters have become tactical in terms of organizational structure, information dissemination, time management, and protest management because of the advantages of using social media platforms. For example, the protests of October 14 to 21 at Ratchaprasong, Pathum Wan, Lat Phrao, and the Asok intersection in Bangkok and in other provinces clearly demonstrate how efficiently the students organized, coordinated, managed and controlled the protests. To manoeuvre the security forces, for instance, no information related to time and place of the protest is available until the last hour. Moreover, the protests take place simultaneously in several places within a specific period of time. The protests on Sunday, October 18, for instance, took place in different places in Bangkok and 12 provinces nationwide. To avoid unnecessary clashes with security forces, the protest leaders quickly adjourn the protests and demobilize people, while the security forces are on their way to the protest site.
Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha—who swept to power by a military coup in May 2014—is known in Thailand as not being friendly to independent media. As the protests against his government kept growing, the decision to ban the four independent media houses was nothing but another sign of policy failure and inability to handle the situation in which the legitimate power to rule was being questioned.
In fact, this move could fuel further protests. Since October 13, there have been daily protests in Bangkok, largely due to ongoing arrests of some protest leaders and daily intimidation and harassment of people by the Thai authorities. That day, the police had arrested 21 people, including protest leader Jatuphat “Pai Dao Din” Boonpattararaksa. The following day, thousands of students mobilized and marched to the Government House to protest against the government and demand the release of their detained colleagues.
There have been 246 protests in 62 provinces over the last three months. As the protests continue, the number of people jailed by the government skyrocketed right after the October 15 announcement of the emergency decree. According to the Thai lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), the government arrested no fewer than 81 people between October 13 to 18. TLHR also reports that at least 65 people are facing charges for their roles in the protests, added to 145 cases of alleged harassment committed by the Thai security forces. It seems that the more the government arrests protesters, the more the protests expand in size.
General Prayut is very powerful to even attempt to cut a flowering tree. He can even order his tank brigade to destroy the entire garden—but, he might not be powerful enough to stop spring from coming. The end of Prayut’s government is no longer a remote possibility.

author: EngageMedia


text:
Georgians in Abkhazia and South Ossetia unable to vote · Global Voices
OC Media

Closed bridge over the Enguri River, which marks the boundary between Abkhazia and territory controlled by the Georgian government. Photo (c): Lana Kokaia / On.ge. Used with permission.
This article originally appeared in English on OC Media, which translated the original Georgian-language text from the news website On.ge. It is republished here with permission, edited in accordance with GV house style.
Rezo (name changed) lives in the Gali District of eastern Abkhazia. He would like to vote in the upcoming Georgian elections, but the checkpoint is closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic leaving him unable to cross the border. He plans to cross it illegally, even though it can put his life in danger.
On.ge can’t reveal the respondent’s name, age, or the village he lives in due to security concerns.
Rezo says that he has been participating in Georgian elections since the country’s independence and it would upset him a lot if he failed to do so this year. However, the checkpoint on the Enguri bridge — the only crossing between Abkhazia and the territory controlled by the Georgian government — has been closed for the past nine months.
“I will be very disappointed if I won’t be able to vote. I’m planning to make it anyway. We used to vote with the entire family before. I think that voting is my duty as a citizen”, he says.
Residents of the Gali District aren’t able to vote in Abkhazian elections either. The Abkhazian government considers the participation of Georgian citizens in their elections threatening and has barred them from voting entirely.
Nona and Guram (names changed), the residents of the village of Saberio in the Gali District, last time voted in the 2018 Georgian presidential election. They left their daily activities and travelled from Saberio to Tsalenjikha, across the River Enguri, to vote. This year they know that they won’t be able to use their right to vote because the Enguri bridge is closed.
“The majority of the residents of the Gali District participated in the [2018] election. At least 70–80 percent. We used to go there, as often as we could, but now we can’t even buy food and clothes because the road is closed”, Nona says.
Ethnic Georgians from the town of Akhalgori in South Ossetia haven’t been able to cross into Georgia-controlled territory for more than one year.
Akaki (name changed), 71, from Akhalgori remembers that people used to actively vote in previous elections, but this year they lost all their hopes and they are just looking forward to the road reopening one day.
“We used to take a minibus and return the same day. It was good. Now we are locked up like prisoners. We cannot go anywhere, what can we do? We can’t do anything, we are just staying alive”, says Akaki, who lives in Akhalgori with his wife.
Manana (name changed), 65, from Akhalgori says that their major dream now is to have the possibility of free movement. She suffers from thyroid disorder and cardiovascular disease, which is why she used to go to Georgian clinics a lot, but now she hasn’t been able to get quality medical service for more than a year.
“Probably, I’ve been to Tskhinvali [the capital of South Ossetia] a few times. We, the locals, would usually go to eastern Georgia. My grandchild is in Tbilisi. Our life gets worse and worse and I don’t know how much longer we will survive like this. We miss our relatives and friends”, she says.
“Young people used to illegally cross in on the election day if they didn’t have a permit or the border was closed. Now I don’t know how it will be”, she added.
Tamara Mearakishvili, a journalist and activist based in Akhalgori, says that she would go to the elections herself if she had an opportunity. She tells On.ge that Akhalgori residents were actively voting when there was freedom of movement.
“During the parliamentary elections in 2016, a lot of minibuses full of people went there. They would always go. Because of not having my documents [to cross the border due to an ongoing court case], I was unable to vote. People from here would say: Ossetians may close the roads for the election day, let’s go the day before. And so they would go the previous day to vote”, Tamara says.
According to the Abkhazian Statistics Committee, in 2019 there were 46,905 ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia, of which 30,268 lived in Gali.
Georgians are the second biggest ethnic group living in Abkhazia after the Abkhaz and make up for over 19 percent of the population, followed by Armenians and Russians.
The website of South Ossetia’s statistics service doesn’t have information on demographics. Nugzar Tinikashvili, mayor of Akhalgori, told On.ge that there are about 1,300 Georgians living in Akhalgori now.
The Democracy Research Institute (DRI), Georgia-based NGO which studies the human rights situation in the disputed territories, has reported that the number of people leaving Akhalgori has been on the rise. According to them, the difficult situation in Akhalgori and Gali in terms of human rights is difficult. They call for the Georgian government to protect its citizens’ right to vote.
Ucha Nanuashvili, DRI’s director told On.ge that the quarantine restrictions should be at least temporarily eased and they should place an election precinct on the Enguri bridge with security and sanitary rules followed.
“Thousands of votes cannot be lost. Thus, it is important for the government to take timely steps in order to achieve a concrete result. Akhalgori is in a far more difficult situation. Unlike Gali, it has few residents. As for Abkhazia, this issue is possible to be discussed in a dialog with [the authorities in] Abkhazia”, Nanuashvili says.
Tbilisi doesn’t have any plan to protect the right of vote of Georgians living in Gali and Akhalgori. On.ge contacted the Ministry of Reconciliation and Civil Equality about this issue. They responded that this issue was not their competence and redirected us to the Tbilisi-based Autonomous Government of Abkhazia. They, in turn, redirected us to the Central Election Commission, which also told us that this issue was beyond their authority.
Except being unable to vote in the elections, Georgians of Akhalgori and Gali have a lot of other problems: they don’t have access to quality medical services and they have to pay twice as much for medicines and essentials as people living in the territory under the control of the Georgian government. They don’t have an opportunity to visit their relatives at hospitals, or see their families and relatives at all — for almost a year.
The Enguri bridge has been closed because of the pandemic, however the reason behind the closure of the South Ossetia checkpoint was political. South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov says that the checkpoint won’t be opened unless Georgia removes a police checkpoint near the village of Chorchana erected during the increased border tensions in August 2019.
Tamar Mearakishvili told On.ge that South Ossetia granted passports and pensions of 300 Lari (US$93) for people who depend on Georgian pension, but are unable to travel to collect it. She said this decision by Bibilov came into force in December 2019 and affected about 200 pensioners.
Abkhazia opened the Enguri bridge for the Gali pensioners on 16 October for three days a week, so they can collect their pension from a bank minibus located right across the bridge. They are allowed on the bridge only to collect pension and they cannot buy anything in nearby shops.
DRI has assessed the situation in Gali and Akhalgori as catastrophic. Ucha Nanuashvili says that COVID-19 made the human rights situation of the people there ‘extremely grave’.
For ease of reading, OC Media chooses not to use qualifiers such as ‘de facto’, ‘unrecognised’, or ‘partially recognised’ when discussing institutions or political positions within Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. This does not imply an editorial position from Global Voices on their status.

author: OC Media


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Myanmar general election violence on the rise as November vote nears · Global Voices
The Irrawaddy

Supporters of a political party during a clash in Sagaing's Kantbalu township. Photo supplied to The Irrawaddy.
This article by San Yamin Aung is from The Irrawaddy, an independent news website in Myanmar, edited and republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
As Myanmar gears up for the general election on November 8, the campaign season has already turned deadly.
In the most recent deadly incident, a Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) mob attacked a 38-year-old man who tried to stop the beating of National League for Democracy (NLD) youth supporters during the clash between the two parties in Sagaing region’s Kanbalu township. The man, who was wearing an NLD t-shirt when he was attacked, received severe head injuries and died at the hospital on Saturday (October 24) morning, becoming the first fatality due to election violence this year.
The mob also damaged a house where NLD supporters attempted to hide out, as well as the motorcycles of NLD supporters, and the village’s COVID-19 checkpoint gate, according to regional government’s rule of law and justice body.
[The USDP is a military-backed party that ruled Myanmar after its transition to civilian rule in 2011. During the 2015 election, USDP was defeated by the opposition party NLD.]
“It is believed to be intentional violence,” U Than Htay, a member of the body, said. According to the body’s investigation, a USDP convoy with around 2,000 followers had been going back and forth in the village since early morning on Thursday. The confrontation happened about 3 p.m. and the attackers carried sticks and knives along with them, U Than Htay said.
Regarding the death of the NLD supporter in Sagaing region’s Kantbalu township, the USDP regional office said they weren’t aware of the incident. At a press conference on October 27, they expressed regret for the casualty during a rally of their party’s supporters. Five USDP supporters were arrested in connection with the killing and the destruction of property.
Party supporters are not members of the party and because there was no evidence of the involvement of the candidate or his or her representatives in the cases, punishment for election violence is falling under the Penal Code, with charges of committing obscene acts, causing hurt and vandalism facing the group’s leaders.
Similar concerns were also expressed by a local administrator in Myaing township of Magwe region where a pro-USDP mob raided an NLD regional member’s house on the night of October 3.
The mob attacked NLD member U Myint Naing’s home after he argued with a villager reportedly over the playing of the party’s campaign song. U Myint Naing and his family fled the house as petrol bombs landed.
The villagers involved in the mob claimed U Myint Naing and two others beat a villager who had gone to the house and told the people there to stop playing the campaign song. They maintained that any rioting was in response to violence on the part of the NLD. But local administrator U Thant Zin Khaing told The Irrawaddy that he did not think that the attack was about the campaign song, saying the villager was carrying a knife and the attackers had come armed with petrol bombs.
Thirty-two people involved in the attack face charges of vandalism, trespassing, and destruction of public property.
Several other election-related incidents of intimidation and physical attacks were also reported in Yangon, Naypyitaw, Mandalay and Ayeyawaddy regions.
Among the recent cases: An unexploded grenade was found at a Naypyitaw election official’s home in late September; Petrol bombs were lobbed on a National League for Democracy (NLD) regional member’s house in early October in central Myanmar; The Arakan Army (AA) abducted three NLD candidates in Rakhine state’s Taungup township in late-October; Riots took place in several places during which backers of the former ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) violently injured supporters of the USDP’s main rival, the NLD. In addition, the homes and vehicles of NLD supporters were also damaged in those clashes.
Referring to USDP campaigners’ attacks in campaign rallies in several locations, U Than Htay of Sagaing region’s rule of law and justice body said that the USDP has become more hostile and violent in this year’s campaign period compared to 2015.
The 2015 general election was held under a USDP-led government. At that time, the ruling USDP party was confident of election success and believed it would win enough parliamentary seats to retain control of the government. Instead, it only managed to win a humiliating 10 percent of seats up for grabs in the election.
U Than Htay added:
Unlike with the previous election, this time they know they are likely to lose. Instead of accepting a loss peacefully and competing honestly, they think intimidation will work.
Daw Mya Nandar Thin of the election monitoring group New Myanmar Foundation said a different style of campaigning this year has also been a major factor in the amount of electoral violence:
Unlike with previous election, this year’s election is occurring under a different set of circumstances. Because candidates and parties’ campaigns are largely restricted under COVID-19 related guidelines, the campaign convoys and rounds of parties’ supporters replaced the candidates’ campaigns. But there was a lack of specific rules for the parties’ supporters regarding campaign gatherings and security support at events.
Daw Mya Nandar Thin said that while security measures are needed to prevent further electoral violence, the political parties themselves also need to order their supporters and members to avoid violence.
According to the New Myanmar Foundation, there were more than 40 incidents of electoral violence since mid-August. During the 2015 general election, there were a total of 28 reported instances of violence.
The NLD’s spokesperson, Dr. Myo Nyunt, said the party has asked party members and supporters to be tolerant and to avoid violence.
Dr. Myo Nyunt recalled the USDP and their allied pro-military parties met with military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing ahead of the election.
Even before the election campaign season began, there were calls for the military to intervene if the election is not free and fair. The public knows a violent organization when they see one and don’t view them favorably. I think the public will become more politically active in response to that electoral violence.
However, Daw Mya Nandar Thin sees things differently. She said that violent election-related incidents could heighten a sense of insecurity and fear on the part of voters. If the incidents occurred near voters’ residences, she said, it could affect voter turnout.
The election laws criminalize the use of violence, threats, undue influence to prevent a person from exercising the right to vote or run in an election. And also the Political Parties Registration Law bans campaign activity that could cause conflict between people of different religions or affect the integrity of groups or individuals. Any political party or candidate who found guilty of violating this ban will be disqualified.

author: The Irrawaddy


text:
Outrage in Hong Kong after top university appoints two mainland Chinese scholars as vice-presidents · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Image from the Stand News. Used with permission.
Hong Kong's academic freedom is potentially set for another blow as the governing council of Hong Kong University (HKU) confirmed the appointment of Max Shen Zuojun and Gong Peng as vice-presidents, respectively, of research and of academic development.
Both men hold positions at Tsinghua University in Beijing and the University of California (UC), Berkeley. Their appointment is viewed by students and alumni groups of HKU as a “take-over” of the island's top university by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Controversy erupted after Hong Kong media discovered pages of Tsinghua's official websites showing that Shen was elected, in 2014 and 2017, as a member of the CCP committee of the university's department of industrial engineering.
However, Shen's name no longer shows in the live versions of the respective pages. According to web forensics conducted by former director of Journalism and Media Studies Center of HKU Ying Chan, the pages were altered after the news of his appointment to HKU broke at the end of last week. Google-cache has preserved previous versions of the pages, Ying said on a Medium post.
In a statement, Shen said he has worked full-time at UC Berkeley since 2004 and that he only spends “a few weeks a year in Tsinghua.” He added that he is “not a member of the Chinese Communist Party” and that the confusion was caused by “an oversight by the webmaster of the respective website.”
As for Peng, since 2010 he has faced accusations, mainly waged by overseas Chinese websites, that he helped the daughter of China's former Minister of Science and Technology Xu Guanhua getting accepted into a Ph.D. program at UC Berkeley's Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management in 1999. Gong denies those accusations.
HKU's Alumni association pointed out that the HKU's vice-chancellor Zhang Xiang, who led the recruiting for the two positions, had crossed paths with the newly-appointed vice-presidents: Zhang and Shen both have attended Nanjing University and all three of them have worked at UC Berkeley at around the same period.
The ties between the three men are been seen by Beijing's critics in Hong Kong as “cronyism” in the appointment choices.
Since 2018, universities in mainland China have faced pressure to pledge loyalty to the CCP, with some forced to change their charters to accommodate CCP members on their administrations and boards.
When Zhang became HKU vice-chancellor in 2018, the student body, together with alumni communities, expressed concern that the mainland-born professor would interfere with the institution's academic freedom.
Their doubts turn out to be justified. In July 2020, HKU's tenured law professor Benny Tai was fired by the governing council for his involvement in the pro-democracy protests of 2014, despite objection from his department and the university's senate.
Jeppe Mulich, a London-based lecturer of political history, noted on Twitter at the time of Tai's sacking:
The process towards his firing has been underway for some time, and it is a reminder that academic freedoms have been under threat well before the national security law. Now, however, the attacks on academia are on full display, as seen by the LO statement last night.
— Jeppe Mulich (@jmulich) July 29, 2020
Earlier this month, HKU, in defiance of protests from faculty members and the academic council, didn't renew the contract of Head of Public Health Keiji Fukuda, who is also an advisor at the World Health Organization (WHO) and has led the university's research into COVID-19.
Sources speaking on the condition of anonymity to pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily News said Xiang was behind Fukuda's dismissal:
Top pandemic expert Keiji Fukuda (福田敬二) will leave his role as the head of HKU’s public health school after being vetoed by university president Zhang Xiang in contract renewal, according to source.
Read more: https://t.co/fyZI0lcwO6#AppleDailyENG #HongKong pic.twitter.com/IEnSV6qW1E
— Apple Daily HK 蘋果日報 (@appledaily_hk) October 8, 2020
Following Shen and Peng's appointments, a sit-in protest calling for reconsideration took place at HKU on October 27:
The student union of the University of #HongKong on Tuesday resorted to an impromptu sit-in protest outside the building where the university's governing council was meeting to reportedly discuss the appointment of two Tsinghua University scholars https://t.co/wPR2AEA8rs
— RTHK English News (@rthk_enews) October 27, 2020
But the action was in vain. According to a statement by Council Chair Arthur Li, all council members with exception of the student representative voted in favor of the two appointments. Frances Sit from public broadcaster RTHK tweeted:
#HKU Council Chairman Arthur Li's statement: 2 profs made special effort to clarify positions, incld statement from #MaxShen confirming he is not a CCP mbr nor a party committee mbr. Issues of concern have been satisfactorily clarified & allegations found to be unsubstantiated https://t.co/bPEMBnteFl
— Frances Sit (@frances_sit) October 27, 2020
Former HKU student and Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Party Lo Kin-hei expressed frustration over the nominations on Twitter:
- Most saddening for HKU is that here's NO FORCE FROM WITHIN to stop or delay it. I didn't expect the fall is so complete.
- 1st commandment for CCP members – you can deny you are CCP member.
- Max Shen must be CCP party committee member. No more “website mistake” bullshxt ffs. https://t.co/uVNLzB6Gak
— LO Kin-hei 羅健熙 (@lokinhei) October 27, 2020
Fergus Leung, a district councilor who is currently studying at HKU, said:
4/ And now, they are appointing professors with strong affiliation to the authoritarian regime of CCP to takeover research and academic development of our University. This shall signal the end of academic freedom and institutional autonomy at HKU.
— 梁晃維 Fergus Leung (@FergusLeung) October 27, 2020
In the past few months, several universities in Hong Kong dismissed pro-democracy academics. Lokman Tsiu, an assistant professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, is among those whose contracts were terminated. He tweeted a list of other university professors who were in a similar situation, and whose terminations were regarded by the public as highly controversial:
* benny tai, law, hku, fired despite tenure (july 2020)
* shiu ka-chun, social work, hkbu, contract not renewed (july 2020)
* ip lam chong, cultural studies, lingnan, denied tenure despite department support (july 2020)
to be continued?
— lokman tsui ? (@lokmantsui) October 7, 2020
For activist Joshua Wong, HKU’s appointments mark a new era for Hong Kong's academia:
[New era for #HK academia under uni head w/ #CCP membership]
1. Despite backslash, #HKU council, mostly appointed by pro-#Beijing #Carrielam, approved 2 #Chinese scholars incl one, #MaxShen,who's listed by #Tsinghua 3 times as “party committee member”https://t.co/xOfkeikkzv
— Joshua Wong 黃之鋒 ? (@joshuawongcf) October 27, 2020

author: Oiwan Lam


text:
Tanzanian poll is likely to usher in a new era of authoritarianism. Here’s why. · Global Voices
The Conversation-Africa

Swearing in of President of Tanzania John Magufuli, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, November 5, 2015. Photo by Paul Kagame via Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
Tanzanians voted in their general election on October 28 in a poll that pitted popular opposition chief Tundu Lissu against incumbent John Magufuli. As the votes are counted, Dan Paget explains why incumbent John Magufuli is likely to be declared the winner, and what his second term will mean for democracy in the East African nation.
We should wait until all the results have come out before passing judgment. However, provisionally, I no longer have faith in Tanzania’s National Electoral Commission or the validity of the election results. The validity of elections should be something that is determined by independent bodies and rigorous procedures. However, I am afraid that guesswork and judgment are the only means at our disposal to assess the validity of these elections because other avenues to verify it has been blocked in advance.
It is never easy to know when to give credence to allegations of election manipulation. Such accusations can always be made in bad faith. If the election commission were independent and governed by a cross-party board, one might trust them to arbitrate these allegations. Instead, the constitution gives the president the authority to appoint the heads of the commission. The opposition has been calling for the commission to be reformed for years.
In the absence of an independent electoral commission and independent courts, normally one would turn to independent observer missions. They routinely deploy large teams which observe the conduct of the election and assess irregularities, but these missions have been kept away. So have many of the most respected domestic election observers, such as the Legal and Human Rights Centre. The conclusions of the few observation missions present will be important. So will be the judgments of Tanzania Election Watch, which is assaying the conduct of the election remotely. I recommend their preliminary report.
Altogether, the reliable means to evaluate allegations of foul play have been all but closed down. Given all that, it is hard to know what to do except to give prima facie credence to the widespread allegations of election fraud made by the opposition and many analysts.
Their claims acquire weight from the stream of videos and photographs shared via social media. These largely unverified reports appear to show the manipulation of the electoral register, ghost polling stations, pre-filled ballots, pre-printed ballots, ballot-stuffing, polling agents disqualified or barred access to polling stations, and a variety of other irregularities.
What puts it over the top is the scale and character of the victory for the ruling party — Chama cha Mapinduzi — that has been reported so far. Results are still coming in, and final judgment should be suspended until we have a complete picture. Nonetheless, the ruling party’s victories have been declared in places you would least expect them to win, and at a scale which is hard to believe.
The popularity of the opposition and the ruling party alike is difficult to discern, especially given the absence of opinion polls. This makes the size of rallies one of the few indicators of party popularity left available to us. The rally is a treacherous indicator of party popularity. Nonetheless, as I have argued elsewhere, we can draw a tentative, negative conclusion: opposition support has not collapsed. It is not negligible. If it had, we would not have seen large opposition rallies so consistently. This inference is consistent with the opposition’s wide organizational base.
Nonetheless, so far, officials have declared the defeat of the opposition’s most admired leaders in their greatest strongholds. Household names like Zitto Kabwe, Freeman Mbowe, Joseph Mbilinyi, Halima Mdee, John Heche, and Esther Bulaya have all lost their seats. These defeats, moreover, are by astounding margins. Altogether, it is hard to see why the National Electoral Commission and the wider infrastructure which oversees elections in Tanzania should be given the benefit of the doubt.
The police have certainly been a forceful presence in this campaign. The video evidence of them firing teargas, breaking up meetings, arresting opposition candidates and committing acts of brutality are available on social media for all to see.
On the instructions of state officials, first the leading opposition candidate for the presidency of Tanzania, Tundu Lissu, and then the leading opposition candidate for the presidency of Zanzibar, Seif Hamad, were temporarily barred from campaigning.
It must all have had an effect on the election outcome.
Alongside the police has been the army. They have been deployed to oversee the election in parts of the country, and there are multiple albeit mostly unverified reports of brutality and murder at their hands.
But their actions need to be interpreted in the wider authoritarian context. Tanzania has always been an authoritarian state. The old authoritarian architecture was never removed after the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1992. But there has been a sea-change since 2015 when Magufuli came to power. Things that were permitted in 2014 are not permitted today. The media are censored. Political parties are oppressed. Politicians and civic activists are harassed, in court and out of it. Rallies were banned for four years. There has been a spate of violence by anonymous actors, which context suggested but did not confirm were connected to the state. That context is key. The trajectory of party politics in Tanzania has been shaped by it. It is crucial to everything.
So far, it seems that this election will usher in a new era of authoritarianism. Any resemblance that Tanzania has borne to a liberal democracy seems to be slipping away. Not only is the apparent scale of election manipulation unprecedented. The authoritarian landslide which seems to be in the making will be presented by the regime as a vindication of its extreme authoritarian project over the last five years.
My speculative opinion is that President Magufuli and his ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi will use the super-majority that they seem about to award themselves to enact their authoritarian developmental vision. They will institute a deeper and further-reaching authoritarian agenda. This might include lifting presidential term limits, but it is also likely to include the institution of further measures that consolidate the party’s authoritarian transformation of Tanzania. Below is The Conversation's page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE.  End of code. If you don't see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https://theconversation.com/republishing-guidelines
Editor's note: This article was written by Dan Paget, a lecturer in politics at the University of Aberdeen. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Below is The Conversation's page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE.  End of code. If you don't see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https://theconversation.com/republishing-guidelines

author: The Conversation-Africa


text:
Decision to dump radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear disaster site into the ocean sparks alarm · Global Voices
Nevin Thompson

“Workers at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station work among underground water storage pools on 17 April 2013. Two types of above-ground storage tanks rise in the background.” Photo from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) official Flickr account, edited from original. Photo Credit: Greg Webb / IAEA. Image license: Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0)
In mid-October, the Japanese government announced plans to dump water contaminated with radioactive isotopes from a nuclear disaster site in Fukushima, sparking alarm all over the world.
Japanese news service Kyodo reported on October 16 that the Japanese government had announced that it would authorize the release of about a million tonnes of radioactive water into the ocean from the Daiichi nuclear power installation in Fukushima prefecture.
Following the announcement, Greenpeace published a report stating the contaminated water contained “dangerous” levels of carbon-14, a radioactive isotope that can damage human DNA. Amidst concerns about the impact of the contaminated water on the environment and human health, however, some experts pointed out that it was difficult—if not impossible—to assess the true risk without knowing more about the government's plans.
Fukushima's economically devastated fishing sector opposes any sort of plan that includes ocean disposal, which might contaminate their catch. Japan's maritime neighbour South Korea expressed “serious concern” as well. On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the news alarmed some locals on Vancouver Island, on Canada's Pacific coast, some 7,300 km from Fukushima:
The government of Japan is reportedly planning to dump over one-million tons of radioactive water from the damaged Fukushima Nuclear Plant into the sea #yyj #pollution #nuclear #radioactive pic.twitter.com/HPKssxBT63
— CFAX1070 (@cfax1070) October 16, 2020
Following a massive and destructive earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, the Daiichi power complex on Japan's Pacific coast, about 250 km north of Tokyo, was the site of the world's worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl in 1986. The nuclear accident destroyed three of the four reactors at the facility, resulting in the release of radioactive materials that contaminated the surrounding communities, forcing mass evacuations.
About 1.25 million tonnes of contaminated water is currently stored at the decommissioned Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power facility, and the volume increases by about 170 tons a day, accumulating a variety of radioactive elements that are potentially dangerous to human health. The water is a mixture of deliberately injected cooling water and groundwater, which accumulates as the water flows into and through the reactor building and turbine building that were destroyed during the Tohoku earthquake and the subsequent tsunami on March 11, 2011.
While some groundwater upstream from the plant and from contamination is pumped directly into the ocean, contaminated water is diverted into large storage tanks that now dominate the sprawling Fukushima nuclear complex. Preventing the water from seeping into the ocean has so far been one of the biggest challenges faced by both the Japanese government and the power utility that owns the Fukushima facility.
A February 2020 report by a government committee compared and evaluated several potential solutions for eliminating the contaminated water at the Fukushima site. Solutions included injecting the contaminated water into geologic formations (地層注入) directly beneath the Fukushima complex; evaporating the stored water, leaving the contaminants behind (水蒸気放出); and burying the water underground in vats or other containers (地下埋設).
In the paper, the committee concluded that disposal at sea (海洋放出) was the cheapest and the most technically feasible solution. Based on that recommendation, throughout 2020 the Japanese government has discussed the possibility of dumping at least a million tonnes of water in the ocean. They have not yet released details, however, about how or where the water would be dumped.
“Water tanks holding contaminated water in front of the reactor buildings at Fukushima Daiichi.” Photo Credit: Susanna Loof / IAEA. Image license: Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0)
“Ultimately there has been no description of what method or how those isotopes would be deposited or dumped in the ocean,” said Jay Cullen in an interview with Global Voices. “Will the water be released from shore? Pumped to depth? Taken by tankers out into the ocean? It's not clear whether it's even legal to dump in the ocean under the London Protocol.”  Cullen is a marine chemist, oceanographer and professor at the University of Victoria's School of Earth & Ocean Sciences on Vancouver Island.
The contaminated water contains radioactive contaminants including cesium isotopes, cobalt, carbon-14 and tritium, which are extremely difficult to remove from wastewater, Cullen said. All can potentially be harmful to human health, but the risk depends on a variety of factors that are either unknown or have not been disclosed by the Japanese government and the power utility in charge of the cleanup and is therefore difficult to assess.
“It's the equivalent of saying lead is bad for you, but that, of course, depends on how much lead you're exposed to,” said Cullen. In order to assess risk, Cullen said, it's necessary to ask “how much of an isotope goes into the environment, what its activity is in the environment, and what its exposure is to human beings.”
On Twitter, Cullen also pointed out that historical human activities such as nuclear weapons testing have already introduced significantly higher amounts of some radioactive contaminants into the environment that persist to this day:
3/ The amount of tritium (1 PBq) stored in the #Fukushima Daiichi wastewater tanks is very small compared to the amount still in the ocean from nuclear weapons testing in the last century (8000 PBq) or
— Jay T. Cullen (@JayTCullen) October 20, 2020
There is a balance to be struck between on-site storage and the potential for uncontrolled release, versus controlled release, Cullen said.
“Tritium has a half-life of 12 years,” said Cullen. The risk diminishes with time, and “has to be balanced with the possibility and probability of the storage tanks accidentally failing, or the occurrence of another large megathrust earthquake where there is uncontrolled release.”
Another major challenge with assessing the risk of ocean disposal, said Cullen, is that there is little understanding so far of what kinds of radioactive isotopes are stored in the tanks and, in turn, the risk they pose to the environment and human health.
6/ Our collective concern and a proper accounting of risk related to ocean disposal of this wastewater should consider the other isotopes present like for e.g. 90Sr and 137Cs which persist longer in the environment and can concentrate in living organisms.
— Jay T. Cullen (@JayTCullen) October 20, 2020