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130 civil society groups call on Myanmar military to drop charges against civilians · Global Voices
The Irrawaddy

Lawyer U Kyi Myint (far left), activist Ko Nay Myo Zin (center) and poet Saw Wai (far right). Photo and caption from The Irrawaddy
This article by Zaw Zaw Htwe is from The Irrawaddy, an independent news website in Myanmar, and is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement. The article is about the persecution of critics who are calling for constitutional amendments. The military drafted the constitution in 2008 which contained provisions ensuring its influence in parliament and the Cabinet even after the restoration of civilian rule and no matter the outcome of subsequent elections.
A coalition of 130 civil society groups called on the Myanmar military to withdraw cases filed against a prominent lawyer, a poet and an ex-military captain for allegedly defaming the military at a public talk about the constitutional amendment.
The Kawthaung Township Court accepted the military’s case on 31 October 2019 and charged lawyer U Kyi Myin, former Myanmar army Captain Nay Myo Zin and poet Saw Wai, three well-known activists, for remarks they made at a public gathering in Kawthaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, in April in support of the Parliament’s charter amendment committee.
On November 15, 2019, around 130 Myanmar civil society groups working on a wide range of issues released a joint statement condemning the military’s attempt to prosecute the three activists and calling on the military to drop the case immediately.
Six months after they gave the talk in Kawthaung, the military determined that the three had defamed the Tatmadaw, as the Myanmar military is known, and the military’s leadership.
”Their comments were aimed at causing misunderstanding,’’ Colonel Thant Sin Oo from the Coastal Command told The Irrawaddy in a recent interview. He said that because of this, the military petitioned directly to the Kawthaung Court and the three were charged under Article 505 (a) of the Penal Code.
Ex-army captain Nay Myo Zin is already serving a one-year prison term on the same charge, filed by the military in Yangon, for calling the Constitution undemocratic.
In their statement, the coalition of civil society groups said that the Tatmadaw’s decision to open a case against the three is a violation of the Peaceful Assembly Law, as the gathering in question was held in accordance with the law.
According to the coalition, the military’s use of Section 505 (a) is not only a violation of the 2008 Constitution but it also runs the risk of damaging the dignity of the Tatmadaw and the country. The court’s decision to accept the military’s complaint without analyzing the case and without asking for an explanation from the three accused is also a violation of the fundamental rights of citizens, the groups said in the statement.
Daw Naw Ohn Hla, an activist from Karen ethnic group and chair of the Karen Women’s Union, one of the 130 civil society groups involved in the joint statement, said that
The military are the government’s staff. If they are doing wrong, citizens have a right to point it out. Citizens have a right to speak out.
Daw Naw Ohn Hla also told The Irrawaddy on November 15 that the military wants to send those who raise criticisms against the military to prison in order to stop them from speaking out.
Farmers’ affairs activist U Zaw Yan, a committee member of the Yangon Public Service Network, added that
The Tatmadaw is sensitive. The Tatmadaw has said it will protect the constitutional laws but they are suing people in violation of citizens’ rights under the law. How can we continue in the future?
He also said that people must have the right to speak out about their opinions and share suggestions regarding the military-dominated Parliament’s plans to amend the constitution.
On 30 October 2019, five members of the Daungdohmyoset (Peacock Generation) traditional thangyat performance troupe were sentenced to one year in prison with hard labor under Section 505 (a) for allegedly criticizing the military in their satirical performance during the water festival in April. The day after the performers were sentenced, the court accepted the Tatmadaw’s petition to charge U Kyi Myin, Nay Myo Zin and Saw Wai.
The performers were also charged under the same penal code section in other townships across Yangon and Ayeyarwady regions. The military has also sued them under Section 66 (d) of the Telecommunications Act for sharing posts on Facebook deemed defamatory to the military.
A monk from Mandalay Region was also charged in October for remarks in an interview that allegedly defamed the military, under Section 500.
Maung Saung Kha, the director of freedom of expression advocacy group Athan, told The Irrawaddy recently that there are now about 30 cases filed by the Tatmadaw against 77 civilians. He added that the number of attempts by the military to sue activists, especially those supporting charter amendments, has risen since April.
The Yangon CSOs Network also issued a statement on November 4 asking the military to drop all cases against civilians and calling on the government to release those who were sent to jail on charges related to cases filed by the Tatmadaw. The statement said that building trust between the people and the government, including the Tatmadaw, is the main priority while Myanmar is working towards peace and reconciliation. According to the Yangon CSOs Network, prosecutions against civilians will make it more difficult for the Tatmadaw to earn the trust of the people.
The Irrawaddy reached out to the military for comment, but army spokesperson Brigadier General Zaw Min Tun didn’t respond as of November 15.

author: The Irrawaddy


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A new wave of pedophilia and child abuse strikes Pakistan · Global Voices
Quratulain Tejani

Portraying an abused child. Image from Flickr by Moushuf Chowdhury. CC BY-NC-ND 2.0
Just over a year after Imran Ali was executed for what is arguably Pakistan's most well known child abuse case, the rape and murder of six-year-old Zainab Ansari, police have arrested Sohail Ayaz — a serial pedophile, child rapist and registered sex offender — for the drugging and rape of a 13-year-old boy.
On November 12, 2019, authorities in Rawalpindi, a city in Pakistan's Punjab province, caught Ayaz soon after the victim's mother registered a First Information Report:
Rawalpindi Police has arrested a child rapist and pornographer alleged to have links with the Dark Web. Sohail Ayaz was previously convicted in a child rape case in the UK. He has been registered as a sex offender for life. pic.twitter.com/9I7icX2mtM
— Humans of Pakistan Police (@PolicePakistan) November 12, 2019
A convicted pedophile, Ayaz had been deported to Pakistan by the UK government owing to accounts of multiple child rapes, as well as his involvement with a child pornography ring in Romania. A chartered accountant by profession, Ayaz was hired as a consultant by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government in 2017, but having failed to run a background check, they were unaware that he had previously served a four-year jail term:
Sohail Ayaz was working from Nov 1, 2017 till the termination of his contract on Nov 13, 2019 as a consultant for the KP govt – the Rawalpindi police chief has said it’s safe to say that a major part of his Rs 300k monthly pay was spent satisfying his paedophiliac urges
— omar r quraishi (@omar_quraishi) November 14, 2019
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP) had cancelled Sohail Ayaz's registration in 2009 – after his conviction in the UK for raping minors and possession of child pornography pic.twitter.com/IMmtr2fxqO
— omar r quraishi (@omar_quraishi) November 13, 2019
During his five-day interrogation for this latest crime, Ayaz confessed that he had raped over 30 children and uploaded videos to the dark web, causing online discussion to turn towards the endemic nature of child sexual abuse in the country and the need for measures to be put in place to prevent minors from becoming victims in the first place:
He confessed to raping 30 children. Child abuse is endemic in Pakistan with actual hotbeds of molestation. Before all else, this issue needs to be resolved. pic.twitter.com/wr4VGgS09h
— Paul (@mrithejester) November 12, 2019
A pressing reminder of the need for reform came on the morning of November 15, when a tweet by Pakistani actress Nadia Jameel told of another gruesome incident: a nine-year-old boy being brutally raped by his landlord. Although the offender has since been arrested by the authorities, concerns abound over the child's trauma and his chances of physical, emotional and psychological healing.
Responses to Jameel's tweet included suggestions that legalising prostitution could help channel sexual urges, as well as calls for a proper child protection framework and the need for provincial and the federal governments to devise an effective strategy in the face of a failing system.
Despite the country's severe punishments for child abuse — including castration, life imprisonment, and the death penalty — sex offenders keep molesting children and case numbers are climbing.
In 2018, the Sahil Foundation, an NGO in Pakistan that works in the child abuse space, reported an 11 percent increase in child abuse cases from the previous year. Out of the 3,832 cases of child abuse it recorded, 55 precent of the victims were girls and 45 percent were boys. The 2019 numbers are even more disturbing: as many as 1,304 Pakistani children (729 girls and 575 boys) have had to face some form of sexual abuse within the last six months, causing social media users to ask a lot of questions:
Scroll your timeline and you'll come across a new case of pedophilia in Pakistan every 10 minutes. Maybe we need a separate agency for protection of children? Does something like this exist? @ShireenMazari1 what is being done for the child abuse cases being brought forward?
— Fariha (@fay_alif) November 12, 2019
In Pakistan, we urgently need a #SexOffenders list, made available to neighborhoods/offices etc.
Secondly, why doesn’t FIA investigate ‘cause of deportation’ of Pakistanis?
Thirdly, who’re the inside facilitators?#SohailAyaz #ProtectChildren #ChildAbuse #Kasur #SexualAbuse https://t.co/dlTvKsEOnV
— Faeza Dawood (@FaezaDawood) November 12, 2019
The FIA referred to in the previous tweet is Pakistan's Federal Investigation Agency.
Part of the challenge in clamping down on sex offenders before they strike is that predators are not always easy to identify. In a blog post, writer Meher Khursheed explained:
Because we expect abusers to be loners, mentally deranged, and overtly creepy, we aren’t able to see when a predator is a charming, friendly and even popular person in our midst.
Many a time, these predators befriend the target or hunt for readily available prey — children who can be victimized and trapped, as was the case with Zainab Ansari and countless others whose names and faces may not even have made it into mainstream media coverage.
Even though society is aware and concerned about the threats, many of the targeted minors come from poorer backgrounds, including child laborers, who are more easily able to be abducted.
In a post on Dawn.com, Saroop Ijaz argued that not even the death penalty guarantees deterrence from such heinous crimes. He also pointed to the fact that in such instances, news reports tend to focus more on the perpetrator, overlooking both the on-the-ground realities and the magnitude of the problem.
Some say that castration, as happens in Indonesia, might be a more fitting consequence for sexual crimes, but human rights activists suggest even these punishments don’t create sufficient deterrence.
Many believe, however, that the effectiveness of such punishments should be a secondary concern, and that the more urgent needs include establishing a special task force charged with identifying these culprits, digging deeper into the psychology of such miscreants, and raising awareness about the sexual abuse of minors.
But could part of the solution include rehabilitation, at least for less serious crimes? One British constabulary  chief, Simon Bailey, who heads Operation Hydrant, a child sexual abuse investigation,  has suggested exactly that — though he admits that people will find such an approach difficult to hear.
Meanwhile, Pakistan's leading psychiatrists have been begging the authorities to take concrete steps to prevent the rape and murder of children, instead of treating these incidents solely as law and order cases. Their suggestions include launching an effective media campaign to sensitise communities about the areas of vulnerability for children, pinpointing potential threats and risk factors, and identifying the various forms of physical, emotional and sexual abuse and neglect.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Quratulain Tejani


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In Jamaica, ‘road madness’ leads to increased fatalities — and call to action · Global Voices
Emma Lewis

Screenshot from a YouTube video showing footage of a car accident on a bridge in Kingston, Jamaica. Fortunately, there were no fatalities in this particular crash. Video uploaded by Best Jamaica.
The number of motor vehicle-related deaths in Jamaica is steadily increasing. As of November 17, 2019 — the World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims — 374 Jamaicans have died in 342 crashes, compared to 330 road fatalities in 2018, and 284 in 2017.
A Twitter account opened in January 2019 by the National Road Safety Council (NRSC), a non-governmental organisation, is now fairly inactive, having failed to achieve its goal of “Below 300” road fatalities. In September, it tweeted sadly:
Unfortunately, for the seventh year Jamaica has lost over 300 lives to road crashes.#Below300 #ItCouldBeYou pic.twitter.com/Boxsr2es4C
— Jamaica Below 300 (@below300ja) September 13, 2019
But road safety is not just about numbers. The “road madness” in Jamaica is caused by a complex set of factors, which varies from one side of the island to another. Today, some Jamaicans are creating initiatives to disrupt recklessness on the roads, and the mindsets behind it.
The number of Jamaicans personally impacted by road crashes is huge. Soon after the death of his half-sister in August 2019, Maleek Powell shared his family's tragic story on Twitter. His sister, along with her best friend, died in a taxi while on their way to work; the driver was also killed. In a heartfelt thread, Powell spoke of the recent passing of his sister’s mother, who he believes died of a broken heart:
I learned today that my sister's (the one that died in August) mother has passed. 2019 continues to work. My family can't seem to catch a break. That was us at her daughter's grave digging. pic.twitter.com/qeUzvpboKd
— Because Mi Black (@MaleekPowell) November 15, 2019
Determined not to allow his sister's death to amount to a series of RIP tweets from social media followers, Powell recently founded an advocacy group, Project Zero Jamaica, in her memory. The name was inspired by Sweden’s highly successful “Vision Zero” initiative. The Jamaican version hopes to lobby the government to make the necessary changes to road safety and public transportation laws, “with an aim of zero road fatalities by 2030.”
Some social media users regularly refer to taxi drivers as “taxi germs” because they view their reckless driving habits as a disease:
Taxi germs caught by a police ?? @JamaicaConstab pic.twitter.com/kzUj2K8nRw
— Damario Johnson (@_damarioj) October 22, 2019
The grief of the thousands of Jamaicans whose lives have been affected by tragic road-related deaths comes amidst a groundswell of complaints, often expressed on Twitter, about a range of obstacles to road safety. Posts usually take the form of dashboard camera videos, and photographs of “bad driving” and accidents, all in the daily flow of angry tweets.
A representative of the NRSC tweeted despairingly:
370 fatalities to date and we are still doing madness. Crash this morning on the East West Highway. Car upended by a passing trailer which did not stop. Madness! #Slowdown thank God only cuts and bruises but could have been a disaster @rohanpowellJA @MsDadrian @CVMTV @Petchary pic.twitter.com/uopfmVLTVS
— Lucien Jones (@lucienforJesus) November 15, 2019
At another overnight crash scene, a firefighter tweeted:
Was at the accident on the Edward Seaga Highway from 6:15am left at 7:54am people still not learning pic.twitter.com/NTTR4FQcql
— Proud Jamaican Firefighter Owen (@Owen05437732) November 16, 2019
Part of the challenge of putting effective road safety policies in place is corruption. Many netizens believe that addressing bribery in the transport sector is key:
While some taxi drivers are busy purchasing false drivers licenses others are potentially obtaining fraudulent police records. We need greater controls and transparency in the public transport system. https://t.co/okTfU6tXkR
— Robot Taxi (@robot_taxi) November 16, 2019
Chair of Jamaica's National Road Safety Council, Prime Minister Andrew Holness, in a photo op with schoolchildren at the Office of the Prime Minister in May, 2017, during the fourth UN Road Safety Week. The theme of the event was “#SlowItDown — Speed Kills Children.” Photo by Emma Lewis, used with permission.
One indication of how important the issue is to Jamaicans is that Prime Minister Andrew Holness chairs the National Road Safety Council. Established as a nonprofit in 1993 by both public and private sector interest groups, the council holds regular meetings and is quite an active organisation. Yet, in the past few years, despite numerous seminars, public education campaigns and high-level meetings — including a visit by the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Road Safety — the road carnage continues.
The pressure on the country’s already struggling public health sector is intense. Crash victims account for a reported one in three emergency cases, with treatment costs spiralling into billions of Jamaican Dollars (just over US $7.1 million). Road crashes can also cause the country's Gross Domestic Product to dip by as much as three to four percent, according to the Kingston-based head of the Inter-American Development Bank in the Caribbean.
Although Jamaica's Road Traffic Act was passed in both houses of parliament in December 2018, regulations for the Act, which includes a list of new offences and increased penalties for breaches, have still not been completed and only some sections are enforced. The legislation, which extends to over 100 pages, is expected to be properly rolled out in early 2020.
The head of the Road Safety Unit at the Ministry of Transport and Mining, Kenute Hare, told Global Voices that in his view, the road safety problem is not just a matter of legislation and law enforcement — it’s a behavioural issue that needs to be addressed in a holistic fashion.
Hare also recently expressed alarm at what appears to be a negative, almost nihilistic “strong motorcycle culture“:
More psycho-social interventions are needed. If you talk to some of these motorcyclists, they place no value on life. They don’t care. It’s hard to tackle that kind of mindset. They have no love for themselves. We will achieve more if we can create a more orderly society. Also the institutional structures need to be looked at. Judges are giving discounts on road traffic tickets.
Such discounts pertained to drivers who amass large numbers of traffic tickets, some of whom were recently brought to court and ended up paying relatively small fines to settle hundreds of outstanding tickets.
The Ministry of Transport has calculated that at the present rate of road accidents, as many as 129 motorcyclists will be killed this year, compared to 100 in 2018.
Even celebrities are not immune. In 2017, a well-known Olympic athlete died while racing on the outskirts of the capital, Kingston. Despite a recent accident in the city, dancehall deejay Sizzla is also a motorbike enthusiast. At the country's 2019 Independence Day celebrations, the deejay made his entrance into the National Stadium with a convoy of motorbikes. He can often be seen doing motorbike stunts in his home community of August Town. A Facebook post noted:
This is not the first time that Sizzla Kalonji has been in a motorbike accident. Eight years ago, Sizzla was left with several broken bones after he was hit off his motorbike in Runaway St. Ann. At that time, he was airlifted from the St. Ann’s Bay hospital to a Kingston hospital.
Even with the observance of yet another World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims trying to raise awareness of road fatalities, for many, it is already too late.
Yet, hope springs eternal that that with new legislation and a deeper grasp of the issue by decision-makers, 2020 will be a better year.

author: Emma Lewis


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Disinformation and hate speech hide behind freedom of speech, says Slovenian journalist · Global Voices
Metamorphosis Foundation

Robert Boteri. Photo by Meta.mk, used with permission.
This interview originally appeared on Meta.mk News Agency, a project of Metamorphosis Foundation. An edited version is published below as part of a content-sharing agreement.
Mladina's caricature of Victor Orban and Slovenian flag with Hungarian colors.
For decades, Robert Boteri has been a part of Slovenian cult magazine Mladina, which has been renowned since the former Yugoslavia for its avant-garde content and fearless approach to controversial subjects.
In April 2019, Mladina caused a diplomatic spat after it published a cover with a caricature of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban raising his arm in a Nazi salute while surrounded by minor figures of Slovenia's right-wing, including Janez Janša. The illustration referred to Orban cronies’ recent purchase of several Slovenian media outlets, previously owned by persons related to Janša’s political party.
In an interview for Meta.mk, Boteri, now Mladina's creative director, talked about disinformation in Slovenia. He says, for example, that nationalist websites in Slovenian that spread false news and hate speech go unpunished as judges avoid sentencing anyone for fear of hurting freedom of speech; or how some media outlets accept bribes to discredit certain politicians and businesspeople.
Meta.mk: What is usually the subject of false news in Slovenia?
Robert Boteri (RB): Lately, most of the disinformation was related to the migrant crisis. There was information, especially in nationalist websites, with negative comments which were all directed at presenting the migrants as criminals. The other thing is the aimed discreditation of certain politicians and businessmen, when certain websites were paid off in order to publish a certain scandal. During the process, they are handed over certain documents, the website publishes them and the affair begins. In the end, it is easy to see that it was done for a certain purpose.
Meta.mk: How does the state and the media react?
RB: Hysterically! It is always hysterical. If you publish a document in the morning which serves to back your claim that someone knows someone and then during the day the story is being built, in the evening comes a rebuttal that it is not true, as in Slovenia everyone knows everyone. But, at the end of the day, no one knows anything. There was information that migrants have entered a zoo in Germany and have eaten a goat. The news had one million clicks. Then, information arrived that that city doesn’t have a zoo at all, nor goats, that this incident never happened, and afterwards this news piece had a hundred times fewer clicks.
Meta.mk: Who is publishing this kind of “news” most of the time?
RB: What is especially frightening is that someone does these things for profit. Because a lot of clicks means adverts and a lot of money. It is not done because of conviction or ideology, but for money. That’s what the online media is.
Meta.mk: Are there any regulations against the spread of false news?
RB: We have only one media inspector, who is responsible for the country and it is not possible for him to cover everything. Therefore, there are only talks about efforts to curb the hate speech on the internet, but no one in Slovenia has been convicted, since, in the end, the conclusion is that these were words that were written somewhere and “we cannot go back”, as it was in former Yugoslavia and that by acting in such manner we shall be violating freedom of speech. Therefore, in a way, it is allowed even to threaten someone, a group, a certain nationality, and all of that can be kept hidden behind freedom of speech.
Meta.mk: Is there a law in Slovenia that regulates hate speech?
RB: We have a law, but the judiciary has an opinion that if you cannot establish a direct link between the written word and the criminal act, that can't be subject to persecution. That means that you say: “I would put the migrants up against the wall and shoot them” the court will not persecute you because it will claim that you have just said that and that you don’t have a gun to carry that out i.e. it is not a serious enough crime to press charges.
Meta.mk: What do the media associations say?
RB: The media associations are in a state of crisis, because they don’t know with whom they should deal with. The members of the associations are journalists coming from print media while the journalists who write false news are not members of the associations. There are tabloid media who don’t even recognize the journalist boards or codes or anything. Simply put, everything is dirty.
Meta.mk: Is Macedonia mentioned in Slovenian media?
RB: Certainly, there are such articles. People read a lot about the fake pages in the benefit of Trump and the false news they contained, and these were most present in the Slovenian media scene. When the country's name was changed and when your former prime minister fled the country to [Hungary]. We even had an interview with a person who explained how these intelligence data are used for political goals.
There is a lot more news about Macedonia compared to Albania, Kosovo or Montenegro. In the past, Mladina even had a front cover devoted to Macedonia during the time of the conflict for water between the citizens of Vevchani and Oktisi. That was a major subject.
Meta.mk: And what is the image of Macedonia, which aspires EU membership?
RB: I will tell you this. We certainly support you for joining the European Union, but be careful, because the problems will start at the moment when you join the EU. All of these previous problems are like elementary school and when you join the EU, that’s when bigger problems will start.  For now, you are a sovereign country and you decide whether you will accept the new name or not. When you join the EU, you will not be able to decide about certain things and that will appear strange to you.

author: Metamorphosis Foundation


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Iran protests: Flying bullets and internet shutdown · Global Voices
Fred Petrossian

Protesters in demonstrations in Ariashahr, Tehran on November 15, 2019. Photo by GTVM92, own work CC BY-SA 4.0
Protests have erupted across oil-rich Iran since the government announced, at midnight on November 15, a sharp increase in petrol prices. The announcement came as the country finds itself in a dire economic situation due to crippling US sanctions, corruption and the mismanagement of financial institutions. The government said the price increase is aimed at raising revenue to fund cash handouts for Iran's poorest citizens.
The state has reacted to the protests with brutal and deadly force, and by shutting down the internet, but has so far failed to curb them.  Slogans have tended to be more political than economic, with protesters chanting against Islamic Republic leaders, foreign policy and in some cases expressing support of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Amnesty International has condemned the state crackdown.
We're horrified at reports that dozens of protesters have been killed in #Iran, hundreds injured & over 1000 arrested since Friday. We're alarmed that authorities have shut down the internet to create an information blackout of their brutal crackdown. We're investigating.
— Amnesty International (@amnesty) November 18, 2019
Iran’s government has begun rushing out promised direct payments to millions of Iranians, a sign that the regime is alarmed at the scale of protests, during which protesters have torched banks, religious schools, military bases, and government offices.
#IranProtests Day 4:
Tehran-Karaj highway,a major transportation route, shut down by protests. #InternetForIran pic.twitter.com/un0K7EIBab
— Farnaz Fassihi (@farnazfassihi) November 19, 2019
Iran was the scene of widespread demonstrations about two years ago, and while those protests bear some similarity to the current uprising, there are also key differences.
Saeed Payvandi, a Paris-based academic and sociologist, told Global Voices that “today's movement is spontaneous and without leaders and unclear requests like previous one in 2017-18.” Payvandi notes that protesters’ chants very specifically target figures such as the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and President Rouhani. Another main difference, Payvandi says, is that “protesters, contrary to two years ago, are trying to be visible by occupying streets and squares.”
Payvandi says that the sharp increase in petrol prices has “given the movement an economic legitimacy, although slogans quickly became radical. The main problem, as before, is trying to win public opinion and bring people into streets.”
A good portion of the public agrees with the protesters, Payvandi says, but are hesitant to join them. “The authorities know the hesitation of the middle class and non-state-dependent elites, and that's why they create chaos and insecurity. In the short term, the winner is the Iranian state, because the middle class will be scared to join protesters.”
People are dying in silence#iranprotest #IranProtests #Internet4Iran https://t.co/jIxrb67jAm
— amir (@amirali69s) November 19, 2019
Shahed Alavi, a journalist who monitors protest movements, told Global Voices that one of the main differences is the range of social classes participating. “Two years ago,” Alavi says, “it was mainly poor people in mostly small cities. But this time the middle classes have joined them, and the protest is more widespread, having emerged in both big cities such as Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, and small ones.”
Another key difference, says Alavi, is the extreme violence being used by security forces. According to a source in the Ministry of Interior, the death toll is near 200, while thousands have been injured and at least 1,000 arrested. Iran's Revolutionary Guard has also reported that three of its members have died in confrontations with protesters.
While violence and repression are omnipresent in the country, some protesters are promoting peace and messages of non-violence:
Protestors giving flowers to the police saying “We are not the enemy”, in Shiraz. #iranprotest pic.twitter.com/XYGgtRqMtP
— Carsten-Pieter Zimmermann (@c_p_zimmermann) November 18, 2019
Yet another difference from the previous protests is the scale of the current internet shutdown.
Iran has a long history of censorship, filtering, and repression of netizens, but with the near-total shuttering of the internet on Saturday, November 16, the government entered new territory. Alp Toker, executive director of NetBlocks, a digital rights NGO, told CNN that the current Internet shutdown was the “most severe disconnection tracked by NetBlocks in any country in terms of its technical complexity and breadth.”
Amin Sabeti, a London-based internet researcher, notes that the shutdown is occurring just as President Rouhani and the Minister of information and Communications Technology have been promoting the idea of internet freedom. “We've seen a complete blackout in Iran,” Sabeti says. “The main way of communication is the old-fashioned one, which is a phone call.”
The United States Ambassador to Germany has claimed that the US has the technical ability to restore internet connectivity in Iran, but Sabeti believes this is implausible.
Iranians outside the country have been trying to raise awareness by organizing demonstrations, but putting pressure on Iran's government is difficult, as the country is under sanctions and already quite isolated.
According to Azadeh Pourzand, human rights activist and director of Pourzand Foundation, Iran's government cares deeply about its international image.
“There is certainly leverage left for the international community to put pressure on Iran in light of the recent unrest and the use of violence to crackdown on protesters,” Pourzand says. “If nothing else, beating and killing of protestors can become an inconvenient act for the Islamic Republic and cause for losing any remaining international legitimacy.”
Pourzand believes, however, that the recent protests are not getting the attention they deserve. “This partially may have to do with political considerations of some newspapers and publications,” she says. “But, there is also one other factor to consider this time around: we see a global trend in terms of citizen discontent, uprisings and protests. For instance, right now Hong Kong’s protesters are on the news, but they have been on the street for long weeks and haven’t always made it to the headlines. So much happened in Chile recently and I am not sure if Iranians followed it as closely as they (we) expected the world to follow us.”
This is the reason Pourzand believe the role of the Iranian diaspora is key. “Let’s put it this way,” she says. “If there is not enough international coverage, it is also partially our fault for not having enough resources to effectively communicate and advocate with international publications in a timely manner and in languages such as English, French, German, Arabic, Spanish, etc. Moreover, let’s not forget how difficult it is to get news from Iran and verify data. International newspapers need constant updates and eyewitnesses, of which we sadly do not have enough at our disposal. Still, Iranians are risking their lives to hold their government accountable. At the very least they deserve to be recognized and not abandoned.”

author: Fred Petrossian


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Turbulence in Moldova after ‘anti-oligarchic’ government falls · Global Voices
Vica Lozinschi

Podium at the building of the Moldovan Presidency in Chișinău, February 2019. Photo (c): Maxim Edwards. Used with permission.
Moldova's “anti-oligarchic” government is out of the picture. But it looks like the turmoil is only just beginning.
Five months ago, in the wake of inconclusive parliamentary elections, Moldova provided one of Eastern Europe's most surprising developments this year. Lengthy negotiations to form a government culminated in a coalition between the ACUM bloc — and other pro-European groups — and the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM), who have put aside their geopolitical differences to oust the Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM), whose allegedly corrupt rule had increasingly come to be criticised at home and abroad. ACUM's leader Maia Sandu was sworn in as Moldova's prime minister, and she promptly declared “deoligarchisation” to be the new government's priority.
While Sandu's colleagues took control of most of the ministries, the PSRM, which already controlled the presidency and the speakership of parliament, took charge of the Ministry of Defence and Bureau of Reintegration, which manages the regulation of the frozen conflict in the Transnistria region. The deal was that both parties agree to implement the Association Agreement with the EU, pursue structural reforms, crack down on money laundering schemes, and conduct fair local elections. Encouraged by early signs of progress, the European Union finally gave the green light for a badly needed financial aid package, which it had frozen due to concerns over the rule of law.
Moldova's ruling alliance was temporary and uneasy, widely considered to be unnatural but necessary. The biggest question was not whether but for how long it would last.
The answer to that became clear on November 12, when 63 out of 101 lawmakers dismissed the new government in a vote of no confidence. It was one of the country's most heated parliamentary debates, featuring accusations, incriminating dates and numbers, and an unleashing of revenge and courage from all sides. However, it seems like the plan had been made long ago: even Sandu's own coalition partners in the PSRM together with the PDM voted against her. Two days later, lawmakers from both of these parties voted in a new cabinet.
Prime Minister Sandu, usually chastised for being uncharismatic, appeared to be at her best during the debate, punching back at criticism and protecting her reformist agenda. In a speech to parliament, Sandu made strong accusations against the PRSM, claiming that its politicians had attempted to derail the government's program since the very beginning. Not only were the PSRM and President Igor Dodon not genuinely interested in fighting corruption, asserted Sandu, but they had continued old corruption schemes and pursued state capture in the same way as the old regime.
Furthermore, Sandu claimed that the PSRM had opted for political loyalty over capability when it came to nominating civil servants; the red line, she declared, was the appointment of the prosecutor general. Indeed, nominations for a new prosecutor general and a new president of the constitutional court had been one major catalyst of the recent events.
Candidates to the position were to be preselected by the Superior Council of Magistracy (or SCM, a body previously under the influence of the PDM) and nominated by the president for a period of seven years. On October 29, an independent commission presented four candidates to be proposed to the SCM. When the Ministry of Justice annulled the commission's proposals, Sandu found an alternative option. Earlier that month, the government had amended the law on the prosecutor general, allowing the prime minister herself to pre-select at least two candidates for the position. This is exactly what Sandu tried to do, nominating a new shortlist of candidates. The reason, she claimed, was because some members of the independent commission, loyal to the PSRM and President Dodon, had manipulated the selection process.
The PSRM slammed the move, and several days of recriminations and angry debates followed. They declared that Sandu's initiative concerning the prosecutor general had violated the agreement between the two parties, and that she herself was responsible for the government's collapse. In her final speech before the no-confidence vote on November 12, Sandu declared the rebellious parliamentarians traitors.
Sandu's strained working relationship with Dodon also played a role in recent events. Although Dodon had to resign from his position as leader of the PSRM when becoming president, he still informally exercises great influence over Moldova's socialists. In turn, with the large influence of his political position, he has pushed the boundaries many times to provoke his coalition partners. These incidents often concern foreign policy. In August, President Dodon invited the Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu to visit Moldova, despite the prime minister's declaration that Shoigu could only visit Moldova in a private capacity. Moreover, when Dodon gave a speech at the UN General Assembly in September, he strongly diverged from Moldova's official diplomatic position on the frozen conflict in Transnistria, praising all foreign partners (including Russia, which maintains a military presence in the contested region). Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu strongly rebuked Dodon on Facebook.
Important changes have also occurred in the media sector. Over the past five months, the PSRM has come to control four of the country's most influential TV stations, acquiring two more channels (one of which is national.) Civil society organisations monitoring the situation have already publicly warned the state's audio-visual council (a body overseeing state-funded broadcasting) to stop favouring the PSRM and President Dodon.
Read more: Moldova's journalists cautiously optimistic after ‘silent revolution’
Due to developments like these, the general understanding among observers in Chișinău has been that ACUM was losing face as well as public trust. More importantly, it had not been able to clean up public institutions. In fact, many people were asking the government to stop open competition and start making political nominations for the important jobs in the civil service.
Furthermore, ACUM's leadership may have been considering whether continuing the alliance would have helped their candidate's chances during presidential elections. Dodon was elected president in 2016 and narrowly beat Sandu in a heated campaign; ACUM gives every indication that they are ready for a second round in 2020.
The second catalyst for the rupture of the alliance was the results of local elections held on October 20 and November 3. These were an important test for the PSRM to gauge their popularity across the country. Although ACUM had some strong support in the regions, the PSRM triumphed. Crucially, the PSRM's candidate Ion Ceban won the election for Chișinău mayor, an important post in a country as small as Moldova. But the PDM also played tough. After the party lost power five months ago, it has had enough time to regroup and reform. The PDM won 261 out of 766 mayors, more even than the PSRM; this has guaranteed a return to the old dominance of the Democrats and Socialists, at least in local politics.
If this is a return to the politics of old, it has prompted angry discussion in Moldova.
Ion Sturza, who served as prime minister in 1999, thanked Maia Sandu for a “short and sincere government” which was “full of lessons.” He urged both sides to discuss and find a compromise, reflecting on how he left the office that November.
Retorica mea a fost exact ca a Maiei Sandu astăzi – se va prăbuși tot, nu se vor plăti salarii, nu vor veni bani din exterior, vor avea de suferit reformele în interesul poporului etc. Nu s-a prăbușit nimic. Succesorii comuniști au păstrat reformele, au revenit la programe cu FMI și BM și a început procesul de asociere cu UE. Cu România a fost o perioadă de maximă dragoste. Dar… Risc să afirm că, dacă aș fi făcut politică, dar nu tehnocrație și nu mă încăpățânam să fie așa cum vreau eu (moft juvenil), Moldova astăzi arata altfel. Poate că eram membri ai UE și NATO.
My rhetoric was exactly the same as Maia Sandu's today: everything will collapse, salaries will go unpaid, no money will come in from outside, reforms in the interest of the people will suffer, and so on. But nothing collapsed. My communist successors kept the reforms, they stuck with the programmes with the IMF and the World Bank, and began an association process with the EU. It was a period of great love with Romania. I would go so far as to say that if I had done politics, rather than technocracy, if I had understood that things don't always turn out the way I want (a folly of youth), then Moldova would look different today. Maybe we'd even have been members of the EU and NATO.
— Ion Sturza, Facebook, November 11, 2019
Sturza made similar comments to the Moldovan media around this time.
The political analyst Dumitru Minzarari wrote on Facebook that Sturza had failed to build a democratic state in Moldova as he was from the Soviet generation, and argued that backroom deals were no better than the politicians which Moldova wants rid of.
Formula e urmatoarea – valorile in primul rand, si politica apoi. Pentru ca altfel, revenim in cercul vicios. Dl Sturza greseste cand se teme de revenirea lui Plahotniuc. Plahotniuc reprezinta un fenomen raspandit in state ca Moldova – corupt si impartit intre cleptocrati si stapanii acestora din business. Se duce Plahotniuc, dar daca sistemul nu este schimbat, vine altul in locul sau. Si cetatenii Moldovei pierd inca un deceniu de viata in zadar.
Maia Sandu are dreptate cand se axeaza pe valori. Pentru ca anume aceasta o face deosebita in Moldova, o face unica, si o face sa reprezinte o speranta pentru cetatenii Moldovei. Daca Maia Sandu urmeaza sfatul lui Sturza si jertveste valorile, atunci ce diferenta va fi intre ea si Dodon? Ea nu va mai fi unica, nu va mai fi deosebita, si nu va mai crea speranta. Ea va deveni un element nou al unui sistem corupt vechi.
The formula has to be as follows: values before politics. Because otherwise, we're back to the same old cycle. Mr. Sturza is wrong when he says he fears the return of [Vlad] Plahotniuc [the PDM's leader and Moldova's most powerful man during its rule]. Plahotniuc is a phenomenon which spreads in states like Moldova, places which are corrupted, divided among kleptocrats and business owners. If Plahotniuc goes, but the system remains unchanged, then another person will come and take his place. The citizens of Moldova will spend another decade of their lives in vain.
So Maia Sandu is right when she focuses on values. Because that's special for Moldova, that's unique, that's what gives hope to the Moldovan people. If Maia Sandu follows Sturza's advice and values, what difference will there be between her and Dodon? She will no longer be unique, she will no longer be special, and she will no longer give hope. She'll just be a new face in an old, corrupt system.
— Dumitru Minazari, Facebook, November 8, 2019
The mood in Chisinau among activists is that, after only five months of responsible governance, now the old game is in town.
Июль – ноябрь 2019 года – это время в Молдове мы будем вспоминать как период оптимизма, ощущения наступившей свободы и…
Geplaatst door Илья Тромбицкий op Maandag 11 november 2019
In Moldova, we will remember the period from July to November 2019 as a period of optimism, a sense of coming freedom and a hope for a better future. But the Moldovan people did not deserve freedom, because this freedom, much like independence, was presented [to us] from without. Tomorrow we will return to an epoch of readjustment to our traditional reality: as a grey zone along the borders of the EU.
— Ilya Trombitsky, Facebook, 10 November 2019
Nevertheless, ACUM and its allies have declared that they will regroup. Igor Grosu, leader of PAS in parliament, says that the party will continue fighting.
Moldova’s political turmoil

author: Vica Lozinschi


text:
Victory for transgender students at Thailand’s Chulalongkorn University · Global Voices
Prachatai

Jirapat Techakijvekin (second from right) when she went to file the petition with the Committee on Consideration of Unfair Gender Discrimination. Photo and caption from Prachatai
This article is from Prachatai, an independent news site in Thailand, and is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand's top public university, has finally amended its uniform regulations to allow students to dress according to their gender identity, after a group of students earlier this year filed a request for this change and also filed a complaint against a Faculty of Education lecturer.
An announcement from Chulalongkorn University dated 7 November 2019 said that the University has approved the amendment to its uniform regulations, which now clearly states that “students may wear the uniform according to the gender they have been assigned at birth or according to their gender identity,” allowing students to dress accordingly in class, in examinations, or at formal events.
Prior to this amendment, Chulalongkorn University had no official protocol for transgender students wishing to dress according to their gender identity. Students had to file individual requests with the University in order to graduate in the clothing that matches their gender identity or to dress according to their gender identity in class and in examinations. While the University has been allowing students to graduate in the dress that matches their gender identity, it is rare for students to file requests to do this for class or examinations. The request process is also complicated, requiring a large amount of paperwork, including a medical certificate stating that they have a “gender identity disorder.” Students are also often unaware that it is possible to make such a request or how to go about it.
While many lecturers will not punish or pressure transgender students into dressing according to the gender they were assigned at birth, students still face discrimination or transphobic comments from some members of staff, especially in faculties which are perceived as more ‘conservative’, such as the Faculty of Education, where students have often been threatened with disciplinary action. The amendment to the uniform regulations may mean that trans students can no longer be accused of violating university regulations and will no longer have to file individual uniform requests. However, it may not end discrimination on the individual level.
In January 2019, Jirapat Techakijvekin, a student at the Faculty of Education, filed an appeal with the University’s grievance committee after the Faculty Board of Administrators overturned permission for her to wear the uniform for female students and ordered her to dress as male or face extreme penalties. Jirapat said that she filed a formal request with the Faculty in September 2017, and in December of the same year, she was informed by the Faculty that permission has been granted only for it to be overturned on 11 January 2019.
Jirapat also said that she faced transphobic comments from Niran Sangsawat, a special instructor, in November 2018. Niran reportedly told her to either dress as male for his next class, or not to come to class at all. He also told her that being transgender is just like being insane, and said to her: “It is good enough that we’re allowing you to study instead of sending you to an asylum.” He also allegedly told Jirapat that he would be asking the Faculty to reconsider her case, after which the Faculty’s decision on her request was overturned.
Other students also came forward on social media to say that generations of students for the past 35 years have faced discriminatory behavior while in Niran’s class. Student activist Netiwit Chotiphatphaisal also launched a Change.org campaign calling for the Faculty of Education to take disciplinary action against Niran. However, it is unclear whether the Faculty will be taking any action.
Jirapat and two other students also went to the Department of Women’s Affairs and Family Development (DWF) on 29 January 2019 to file a formal complaint with the Committee on Consideration of Unfair Gender Discrimination. Under Section 18 of Thailand’s Gender Equality Act, any person who thinks that they have suffered from gender-based discrimination may file a complaint with the Gender Discrimination Committee, which has the authority to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to end and prevent discrimination, and to ensure that there will be compensation and remedy for the injured party.
A letter dated 18 February 2019 from the University to Jirapat stated that, while the University’s Office of Students Affairs is in the process of amending the uniform regulations so that it will be in accordance with the Gender Equality Act, the university granted Jirapat permission to wear the uniform for female students. The amendment to the uniform regulations was finally announced on 11 November 2019.
The Thai LGBTQ+ community faces daily cases of discrimination and inequality, most living under strong pressure not to bring shame to their family, while the country’s tourism authority advertises Thailand as being a queer-friendly destination, even launching the “Go Thai, Be Free” campaign as a way to attract LGBTQ+ tourists. Bangkok has been called “Asia’s gay capital” and is known for its gay nightlife scene, transgender beauty queens, and gender reassignment surgery. However, even with the Gender Equality Act of 2015, there is very little legal support for the LGBTQ+ community.
And even if homosexuality is no longer a crime under Thai law, the LGBTQ+ community still faces discrimination in the workplace, school, and in the home. There are reports of LGBTQ+ people being denied promotion or fired from their jobs after disclosing their sexuality, or questioned inappropriately about their sexual orientation and gender identity during interviews. LGBTQ+ students face harassment and bullying from their teachers and peers based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. Transgender inmates in Thai prison have difficulties accessing hormone treatment, and many faced a condition known as “double imprisonment” when transwomen who have not undergone gender reassignment surgery are held in a segregated area inside men’s prisons.
Thailand currently lacks a gender recognition law, preventing transgender people from changing their title. It also does not have a marriage equality law, meaning that same-sex couples cannot be legally married, leading to other issues, such as not being able to adopt children or to make medical decisions on behalf of one’s partner.
On 22 August, parliament also voted not to support a proposal to set up a separate Standing Committee on LGBTQ+ rights. Instead, LGBTQ+ rights will be subsumed under the Standing Committee on children, young people, women, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and ethnic groups.

author: Prachatai


text:
In Russia, individuals can now be branded ‘foreign agents’ · Global Voices
RuNet Echo

Andrei Klimov presents a copy of the new bill to reporters. Screengrab from Channel One's November 8 YouTube video “В России до конца года могут принять закон о признании иностранными агентами физических лиц.”
Today, Russia's State Duma passed the third and final reading of a new bill expanding the scope of the country's controversial “foreign agent” law.
The first iteration of the law appeared in 2012, and introduced the term “foreign agent” to refer to NGOs which receive foreign funding. It's a loaded term in Russian, with strong associations with espionage. In November 2017, mass media organisations got to labelled “foreign agents” if they received funding from overseas; the move came soon after the state-funded news outlet RT was made to register as a “foreign agent” by the United States authorities. Since then, several organisations have been declared “foreign agents” by the Russian authorities, such as the Anti-Corruption Foundation of opposition politician Alexey Navalny in October 2019.
The latest amendments expand the definition of “foreign agent” to individuals, at the discretion of the Ministry of Justice, which already maintains online lists of “foreign agent” media outlets and NGOs. They also oblige any media organisation recognised as a “foreign agent” to first establish a Russian legal entity in order to operate in the country, and require individuals to publicly state this status and submit to intense financial reporting requirements. The punishments for non-compliance are harsh, including prison sentences of up to two years and fines of up to five million rubles (around 80,000 USD). On November 18, 10 international NGOs signed an open letter denouncing the new bill as a serious threat to freedom of expression in Russia.
How do the Russian authorities know a “foreign agent” when they see one?
The text of the new amendments, added to the federal laws on information and telecommunications, do not suggest any consistent criteria. Foreign agents, it reads, are “individuals disseminating printed, audiovisual, or other messages and material (including by use of the internet) intended for a potentially unlimited circle of people, receiving money and (or) other property from foreign states, their institutions, international and foreign organisations, foreign citizens, stateless individuals and their agents, and (or) Russian legal entities who receive money and (or) other property from indicated sources.”
State officials have stressed that the new law is nothing to worry about. On November 12, Andrei Klimov, chairman of the Federation Council's commission for protecting state sovereignty and a staunch defender of the “foreign agent” laws, told the state news agency TASS that “the new law differs from the old one only in its detail,” and emphasised that somebody wouldn't become a “foreign agent” simply for receiving an international payment. It would require “constant collaboration” with organisations already recognised as foreign agents, explained Klimov. “In my opinion, this will affect 20-30 people across Russia,” he said. In comments to the government's official newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta in October, Klimov stressed that the law “would not affect people who write something to each other on social media,” and justified its implementation by reference to the case of Maria Butina, the Russian citizen deported from the US on charges of working as a “foreign agent” for Moscow.
But on November 13, Leonid Levin, the chairman of the State Duma's committee on information policy and communications, told TASS that journalists working for media outlets considered “foreign agents” could find themselves branded “foreign agents” too if their work covers “the socio-political situation.” Klimov also confirmed in the same article that political activity would be the qualifying factor.
Many bloggers and journalists, particularly those in independent and opposition media, are wondering where the new law leaves them. Aleksandr Plyushchev, a popular blogger and talk show host at the radio station Ekho Moskvy, reflected on the chilling effect of the law on his Telegram channel:
По поводу принятого сегодня в основном чтении закона о гражданах-иноагентах. Очень необычное чувство, что власти твоей родины разрабатывают и принимают целый закон против конкретного тебя. Ну, не только именно тебя, но ты в той самой, очень небольшой группе людей.
Всё мы попадаем под разные законы, но вот чтобы войти в специальный список своим именем и фамилией – это совсем другое. Вряд ли те, кто попал под персональные санкции, скажем, в связи с Magnitsky act или из-за Донбасса чувствуют в точности то же самое, все-таки там против тебя действует чужая страна, а тут – своя собственная.
Зато теперь, мы знаем каково с серебром, посмотрим, каково с кислотой.
Concerning the law which was basically adopted today on citizens as foreign agents. It's a very unusual feeling when the authorities of your home country draft and pass an entire law aimed explicitly at yourself. Well, not only at yourself, but yourself as part of a particular, and by no means small, group of people.
We are all subject to various laws, but the prospect of your name and surname ending up on a special list is something quite different. It is unlikely that those who fell under personal sanctions in connection, say, with the Magnitsky Act or due to the Donbas feel quite the same; in those cases, a foreign state is acting against you, and here, it's one's own country.
So now, we know how it is with silver, now let's see what it's like with acid. [a reference to a song by popular Russian band Akvarium]
— Aleksandr Plyushchev, Telegram, November 19, 2019
Mika Velikovskiy, a journalist working for independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta, emphasised that the vagueness of the law posed a threat to ordinary Russians:
Если посмотреть сам текст закона, обнаружится, что лайки и репосты СМИ-иноагентов – это да, но это не вся прелесть, это только один из путей к попаданию в список. Любой гражданин – распространитель информации для неограниченного круга лиц (то есть вообще все, у кого есть, например, соцсети), в случае получения чего бы то ни было от иностранцев (не только денег), может быть признан иноагентом. Т.е. два критерия: распространение информации и что-то от иностранцев (или от российского юрлица, каким-нибудь вещественным образом с ними контактирующего). Под это определение, строго говоря, почти всякий россиянин подпадает. Например, у вас есть профиль Вконтакте, а ваш работодатель импортирует памперсы – все, больше ничего не требуется.
If you look at the text of the law, you'll discover that likes and reposts of media items from foreign agents [are one way to fall foul of it.] But that's only part of the charm, and only one way to end up on the “foreign agent” list yourself. Any citizen who disseminates information to a potentially unlimited circle of people (which is, in general, everybody on social media networks) or anybody who receives anything from foreigners (not only money) can be recognised as a “foreign agent.” These two criteria are key: the dissemination of information, and anything connected with foreigners (or from a Russian legal entity which has contact with them.) Strictly speaking, almost every Russian falls under this definition. For example, maybe you have a VKontakte profile, and your employer imports diapers? That's all. Nothing else is required.
— Mika Velikovskiy, Facebook, November 19, 2019
Dmitry Kolezev, the blogger and editor-in-chief of Yekaterinburg-based independent news website Znak, lamented what he called a “nationalisation of intellectuals,” arguing that the law would make Russians warier of travelling abroad or communicating with foreigners, thus isolating Russia's commentariat and journalists. Its repercussions would reach far more than 20 or 30 people, he warned:
Станет ли жизнь признанных иноагентами невыносимой? Вроде бы нет. Их обяжут маркировать публикации (что унизительно, конечно) и сдавать декларации о доходах. В этом смысле депутаты хотят, чтобы блогеры и журналисты действовали по тем же правилам, что чиновники и народные избранники. Но при этом забывают, что независимые журналисты и блогеры не наделены никакой властью, не получают зарплату от государства, и не очень понятно, на каком основании от них требуется та же степень прозрачности, что от парламентариев. Однако мы не знаем, какие меры дискриминации для «иноагентов» придумает власть в будущем. Обязанность отмечаться в Минюсте, запрет занимать государственные должности, запрет избираться? Да что угодно.
Will life for foreign agents become unbearable? Seemingly not. They will be obliged to label their publications as such (which is demeaning, of course) and file declarations about their income. In that sense, [Duma] deputies want bloggers and journalists to operate by the same rules as state officials and elected representatives. But in doing so, they forget that independent journalists and bloggers have not been granted any authority and do not receive a salary from the state, so it's not fully understood on what basis the same transparency is demanded of them as from parliamentarians. However, we don't know what other means of discrimination against “foreign agents” the authorities will come up with in future. Will they have to check in with the Ministry of Justice, will they be forbidden from holding state positions, or will they be forbidden from standing in elections? It could be anything.
— Dmitry Kozelev, Telegram, November 14, 2019
These laws come at a highly charged time in Russian society, following mass protests in Moscow and the institution of a “sovereign internet.” Accordingly, there are indications that new laws concerning freedom of expression are starting to irritate many Russians. A poll taken by the Levada Center in October 2019 and released on November 20 showed that the percentage of Russians who believe that freedom of speech is one of the most important of all rights for citizens rose from 34 per cent to 58 per cent over the last two years.
Amid heated discussion about the law online, the meme “но иностранный агент все равно ты” (but still, you're the one who's the foreign agent) has resurfaced. It's a popular retort in light of regular revelations about Russian officials’ luxury real estate in Europe. For example, Alexey Navalny's latest investigative video, concerning the Montenegro property of Moscow's general prosecutor Denis Popov, was entitled “the secret life of a foreign agent.”
Иностранные агенты и резиденты борются с "иностранными агентами" и резидентами Рязани и Новосибирска.
По сути они правы, мы для них иностранцы, проживающие на территории где они устраивают сафари, мы иностранные агенты России, проживающие в России. Вот такой пердимонокль.
— Neuromir TV (@NeuromirTV2) November 21, 2019
Foreign agents and residents are fighting against the “foreign agents” and residents of Ryazan and Novosibirsk.
Essentially, they're right: we are foreign to them, living in territories where they might as well go on safari. We are Russia's foreign agents, who happen to live in Russia. What a stunner.
For now, the RuNet is waiting to see who will be first to be branded a “foreign agent,” and what is in store for the person who receives that unfortunate distinction.

author: RuNet Echo


text:
Bosnian journalists demand justice in case of journalist threatened and assaulted by hooligans · Global Voices
Filip Stojanovski

Protest of journalists in front of the parliament in Sarajevo, 30 September 2019. Photo by Dženan Kriještorac, courtesy of RadioSarajevo.ba, used with permission.
A group of hooligans who presented themselves as “fans of football club Sarajevo” besieged the newsroom of the online news portal RadioSarajevo.ba in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH) during the late hours of 27 September 2019. Threatening death and harm to his family, they forced an employee to erase a piece of news that reported that a member of their group had been sentenced to five years in prison in Belarus for possession of cocaine.
Creating a de facto hostage situation lasting 2.5 hours, the hooligans also forced the journalist Almir Sokolović “to call other news portals and newspapers and ask them to remove the article as well.” The police intervened, and arrested two members of the group on charges of threatening the safety of Radio Sarajevo journalists and editors.
Football and other sports fans groups called ultras have been playing significant role in the political life of Balkan countries due to their mobilization potential through association with popular clubs.
The targeted media outlet republished the article that was targeted by the censorship attempt and alarmed the public about the situation, pointing that this incident is just an instance of the atmosphere of pressure against free media from different centers of power. OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media and Reporters without Borders condemned the attack, with the local association BH Journalists, a member of the International Federation of Journalists, demanding strict sanctions for the assailants.
Some 50 journalists and other media workers held a protest walk to the parliament in Sarajevo on 30 September, urging the authorities to make sure journalists can work in secure conditions without fear of assault from.
Protest of journalists in front of the parliament in Sarajevo, 30 September 2019. Photo by Dženan Kriještorac, courtesy of RadioSarajevo.ba, used with permission.
Global Voices talked to Faruk Vele, member of RadioSarajevo.ba editorial team, about the aftermath of the incident. He explained that they consider the incident as “brazen and unacceptable attack on their newsroom and endangering the security of our coleauges and the members of their families.”
Huliganski upadi pokušali su se – mi to tako vidimo – nametnuti kao metod za discipliniranje novinara i redakcija, i tome smo se odlučno suprostavili. Zahvaljujemo se još jednom svim kolegama iz BiH, regiona i cijelog svijeta koji su, prepoznajući ove opasnosti, pružili podršku našoj redakciji, uključujući i Reportere bez granica i domaća novinarska udruženja, redakcije…
Mi smo ohrabreni činjenicom da je u konačnici policija u Sarajevu reagirala i brzo identificirala počinitelje napada. Za razliku od ovog, mnogo je slučajeva u BiH kada policija nije brzo i profesionalno reagirala na napade na novinare. Štaviše, čak su neki policajci i podržavali napade na kolege, kao što je slučaj u Mostaru.
Assaults by hooligans–in our view–are a new method for disciplining journalists and newsrooms, and we resolutely stand against this method. We are thankful to all the colleagues from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Balkan region and the whole world who recognized these dangers and offered support to our team. These included Reporters without Borders, domestic journalist associations and individual outlets…
We are encouraged by the fact that the Sarajevo police intervened and quickly identified the perpetrators. However, unlike this case, in many similar cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina the police failed to react to attacks on journalists quickly and professionally. There were incidents, for instance in Mostar, when some policemen supported attacks on journalists.
The mentioned incident in Mostar (a city in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina) took place on 5 June, after a bomb explosion. The owners of the premise that was targeted by explosive device assaulted three photojournalists that came to the crime scene, and through serious threats forced the female journalist Meliha Smajkić from the newspaper Dnevni Avaz to erase recorded material from her camera phone. Two police officers securing the crime scene abstained from helping the reporters, and another policeman used “demeaning and insulting language” in online comments to attack the female journalist and her profession. The district/cantonal branch of the Ministry of Interior initiated disciplinary measures against the three policemen.
The case of assault against RadioSarajevo.ba is currently handled by the Cantonal Prosecutor's Office of Sarajevo Canton, and the trial in front of the local court is pending. The suspects have been released on bail.
The journalists are hoping that the Bosnian judiciary will finally start to systematically address the issue  of journalists’ safety. Recently the Municipal Court in the town of Visoko passed a suspended sentence of two months in jail against the son of a local major who threatened a TV journalist via the messaging and calling app Viber. In their announcement from 14 November, the Association of journalists of BIH took it as an indicator that the “law enforcement institutions finally started to take these issues seriously, and that such sentences would serve as a warning to all future potential attackers against media workers.”
Faruk Vele at the protests of journalists in Sarajevo, 30 September 2019. Photo by Dženan Kriještorac, courtesy of RadioSarajevo.ba, used with permission.
Mr. Vele explained to Global Voices that the conditions for journalistic work in Bosnia and Herzegovina are getting harder by the day, and to improve the situation the Bosnian society as a whole needs to send a message that attacks on journalists and their families and the endangering of freedom of expression must not be tolerated if democracy is to be preserved.
Nažalost, svjedoci smo da je svakim danom sve teže biti novinar ovdje, da su novinari dovedeni na margine društva u svakom smislu, te da su još na određeni način etiketirani kao ‘legitimne mete’ nad kojima svako može iskaliti svoj bijes.
Mi smo i na nedavnim protestima u Sarajevu digli glas protiv nasilja kao modela ponašanja u našem društvu i poručili da ćemo se boriti za svoje slobode, jer novinari su izuzetno važni članovi ovog društva. Nadamo se da novinari više nikada neće strahovati makar za svoju sigurnost, kao što je to bio slučaj sa našom redakcijom, mada nam statistike koje dolaze ukazuju da su okolnosti sve teže i da je neophodna određena društvena reakcija.
Zbog toga očekujemo da i ovo društvo kroz različite nivoe vlasti pošalje poruku da želi živjeti u državi u kojem se novinar neće bojati za svoju sigurnost i u kojem ćemo svi uživati slobode govora, javne riječi…
Sve ostalo je put u mrak! To sebi, prije svega zbog naše djece, ne smijemo dozvoliti.
Unfortunately we witness that with every new day, it's getting harder to work as a journalist here. Journalists are brought to the margins of society in every way, and lately they have been labeled as ‘legitimate targets’ for anyone to unleash their anger.
At the recent protests in Sarajevo we raised our voice against violence as model of behavior in our society, and declared that we will continue the fight for our freedoms, because the journalists are important members of this society. We hope the journalists will never have to fear for their own safety, as was the case with our newsroom. However the statistics on cases of pressure indicate that the conditions are worsening and that it's necessary for society to take action.
Therefore we expect that this society, through different levels of government, send the message that they want to live in a state where the journalists would not have to fear for their safety and will enjoy the freedom of speech and public expression… Anything but that is a road to darkness! We cannot allow this to ourselves, primarily for the sake of our children.

author: Filip Stojanovski


text:
In Ethiopia’s disinformation epidemic, the crumbling ruling coalition is the elephant in the room · Global Voices
Endalkachew Chala

This story is the second in a two-part series on online disinformation and politics in Ethiopia. You can read the first part here.
Political activist Jawar Mohammed. Photo by Dotohelp [CC BY-SA 4.0]
On November 17, all except one ethnic party that comprises Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front — the EPRDF —declared that they have agreed to merge.
Tigray People's Liberation Front, (TPLF) the most senior of the four parties, determined to reject the agreement and delay the merger, setting the stage for convulsions in the messy political transition instigated by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed that began in April 2018.
However, the move is expected to lessen the country's ethnic divisions and violence incited by hate speech, disinformation and misinformation on social media.
The announcement comes after several universities in Ethiopia have become a focus of vicious misinformation battles among political groups following the killing, in November 2019, of two Oromo students at Woldia University, a university located in Ethiopia’s northern Amhara region:
“He checked mine and said, ‘he is Oromo.’ Then one of them hit me with a metal stick and the other one with a rock. I fell down and fainted. When I became conscious, I saw myself laying in pool of blood.” https://t.co/ILfzpRIMiv
— Tigist Geme (@TigGeme) November 13, 2019
On November 10, 2019, it was reported that an obscure fight broke out between Oromo and Amhara students at Woldia University.
Then, a swirl of rumors, spread by social media, had warned of attacks by one group of students against the other, and this set off widespread panic among students studying in universities located outside their home states.
Government authorities have pleaded for calm, and Prime Minister Abiy denounced the rumor-mongering and vowed if local authorities do not enforce the law and restore calm, the government will shut down universities.
The panic at the country’s several universities has not only underscored the deep roots of ethnic tensions in Ethiopia, where ethnic tensions are usually simplified as a conflict between Amhara versus Oromo, but also a symptom of a complex and deadly power struggle inside the EPRDF.
EPRDF is the coalition of four ethnic parties. Members from these four parties: Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM) and Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), currently make up Ethiopia’s top leadership.
Since 1991, the EPRDF has been the central actor in Ethiopian politics. However, over the last two years, it has practically disappeared as a cohesive coalition, although it continues to govern the country.
The party is entangled in a deadly and incessant power struggle, mostly along ethnic lines among its four members, supporters and members of each ethnic party are taking their fight to social media.
Members of the coalition, particularly, ADP, ODP and TPLF, were openly flirting with belligerent nationalist opposition groups. They are battling each other by leaking embarrassing stories to opposition media outlets that add fuel to the ongoing misinformation.
The stories they leak are sometimes completely made up. More often, they are misleading or biased, put together to serve the purposes of these parties in their power struggle.
For instance, in October, amid rising tension, Seyoum Teshome, a prominent social media commentator, started to publish a series of dubious screengrabs of email exchanges allegedly hacked from the email account of a top TPLF member. Teshome, a strong supporter of Prime Minister Abiy, has been imprisoned two times in 2016, 2018, for unknown reasons.
The hacked emails alleged that top TPLF members were planning to incite chaos across universities in Ethiopia, in order to erode Ethiopians’ trust in Prime Minister Abiy's ability to guarantee security in the country.
On October 21, Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo political activist and former ally to then-Prime Minister Abiy, wrote several Facebook updates in which he reported events that transpired around near the gate of his residence in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.
Collectively, his posts in three different languages, Afan Oromo, Amharic and English reported a squad of federal policemen who came near his home after midnight and ordered his government-assigned protective team to pack and leave.
Since April 2018, the government has eased media restrictions, allowing once-banned leaders of opposition parties and activists back to Ethiopia, providing security details for them, including Mohammed.
A screenshot of Jawar Mohammed's Facebook post. Screenshot taken on October 25, 2019.
In the updates, Mohammed warned that if any of the armed men attempted to move closer, his protective team would defend themselves and if blood gets spilled, he would blame the government.
In the hours after his updates, amid concern and anticipation from both supporters and detractors, Mohammed appeared on a Facebook live stream broadcast by the Oromia Media Network (OMN) TV station, which he co-founded and currently serves as executive director. During the stream, he escalated his clash with government authorities and accused them of a plot to get him killed.
But government authorities, including Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, denied Mohammed’s allegation, saying if they wanted him to get killed, they would not have provided him with security in the first place.
His allegations sparked off a chain of reactions that started with supporters gathering in front of his residence in Addis Ababa.
There were street protests in parts of Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest region, which in turn triggered violence at rallies, followed by what news media described as “communal violence” in the region.
Vocal minority groups who accuse the Oromia administration of discriminatory practice also held protests in Adama Nazeret, a city located in eastern Oromia; episodes of sporadic violence led to deaths among both minority groups.
In one of the deadliest episodes of Ethiopia’s numerous violence cycles, at least 86 people were killed, and several injured between October 21-23, 2019, in Oromia.
The post-violence social media circulation of images and videos shows Ethiopians have inflicted extreme violence and atrocities upon their fellow citizens that led to widespread fear and communal tension.
As violence subsided in the region, a new battle began online over interpretations and the assignation of blame.
The heightened polarization along ethnic lines filled Ethiopian social media with starkly different interpretations of the violence: “Ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” terms were used by Amhara nationalists, Ethiopian nationalists and Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo followers, while Oromo and Sidama nationalists used phrases like “government-prompted violence.”
These interpretations strained relations between mostly Amhara and Oromo elites that led to mutual name-calling fraught with disinformation and misinformation.
Mohammed’s critics were unsparing in assessing blame as they spread stories, images and memes on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube that pinned responsibility on him.
For them, he caused the violence by falsely alleging an assassination plot and deliberately stirring up nationalist sentiment.
Also, one of the hacked emails Seyoum Teshome published on October 25, 2019, claims that Mohammed and the TPLF were covertly working to incite violence in Oromia with the purpose of preventing the EPRDF merger.
Opponents characterized the violent incident as a massacre caused because of Mohammed's Facebook posts, a narrative that has gained widespread traction on Ethiopian Twitter under a hashtag “#October2019massacre.” They called for a tough response from Prime Minister Abiy (an Oromo), whom they routinely accuse of either being too soft on Mohammed or secretly working with him.
Mohammed's allies see the protest in Oromia as a victory that prevented an attempt on his life and hail protesters in Oromia as heroes.
They lay the blame for the deadly violence on Amhara nationalists and other opposition political parties.
Most Oromo advocates and politicians who showed solidarity with Mohammed said Oromos were waiting for the opportunity to protest, with his murder plot allegation as the last straw. In one widely shared protest video on Facebook, protesters were heard hurling insults at Abiy, calling him “Habesha”, a term popularly used to refer to Ethiopians as a whole, but Oromo nationalists use it to accuse an Oromo person who is yielding to non-Oromo interests.
Mohammed is something of a protest guru, a media executive and political strategist in his community. With nearly 1.8 million followers on Facebook, he used his page to guide street protest, raise money and solicit information from groups inside EPRDF that helped to bring down the once-dominant TPLF, which for years had blocked social media and arrested and tortured bloggers.
Even then, EPRDF was able to actively use social media to mobilize support, spread disinformation and attack opponents, including Mohammed. In fact, the true precursor for the current dizzying disinformation swirling Ethiopian social media began back in 2014.
For several years, paid online commentators tied to the EPRDF had posted comments that favored party policies and attacked opponents. The commentators were known as cocas, an Amharic expression roughly translated into English as “contemptible cadres.” The cocas apparently were hired by members of the EPRDF coalition in an attempt to manipulate public opinion.
The cocas used to unite easily around stories and memes generated by the EPRDF. For example, when Tedros Adahanom, a member of TPLF, ran for an election to lead the World Health Organization (WHO) as Director-General in 2017, he mobilized thousands of supporters on Facebook and created the impression that he has widespread support.
Likewise, Mohammed has exploited the seismic changes unfolding inside the EPRDF. On his Facebook page, he often posts and provides a punditry analysis on OMN’s Facebook live streaming service, pitching himself as a person who receives top secrets from the EPRDF. He posts with no particular schedule, sometimes several times in a day, some days not at all. His posts provide information about what he often calls the collective interest, grievances and alleged threats of the Oromo people.
OMN’s Facebook page, with 1 million followers, is one of the fastest-growing pages among Ethiopia’s media organizations.
Mohammed ranks first among Ethiopian political figures in a number of followers of his verified Facebook page of 1.8 million followers. No other Ethiopian public figure who has some political sway is even close.
This article is part of a series of posts examining interference with digital rights through methods such as network shutdowns and disinformation during key political events in seven African countries: Algeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. The project is funded by the Africa Digital Rights Fund of The Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA).

author: Endalkachew Chala


text:
Soaring onion prices create panic in Bangladesh · Global Voices
Rezwan

Onion farming in Gopalganj, Bangladesh. Image via Flickr by UN Women Asia and Pacific. CC BY-NC-ND.
Onions are an important ingredient used in most South Asian dishes and its price is a very sensitive issue. In countries like India and Bangladesh, shortages can trigger a nationwide outcry leading to political pressure. As the onion crisis soared in Bangladesh in November with delays in traditional import and prices increasing six-fold, the government has announced that it is air lifting onions to meet the demand.
This woman with her 45 days old child expressed happiness after buying 1 kg onion in low price from government distribution point in #Bangladesh. This days onion price increased. 1 kg onion is being sold on more than 3 us dollar, generally price is half of 1 dollar. pic.twitter.com/ww9hTj1HsK
— Ershad Khan (@ershadkhandu) November 17, 2019
Bangladesh produced more than 2.33 million metric tons of onions from 2018-2019 (July-June); however, the market demand is 3.6 million metric tons. The country imports onions to cover this shortage from neighboring India which produces almost one-fourth of the world's onions.
This September, India banned the export of onions because of reduced domestic production due to excessive rainfall and soaring local demands. Local experts termed this a knee-jerk response which does not resolve the problem but rather hurts the farmers.
However, this has a huge impact on Bangladesh as it also had poor domestic production this year. As India stopped export, Bangladesh looked elsewhere for their onion imports. Initially, the traders did not go for imports in large margins, thinking that India would lift the ban soon. Instead, some traders stockpiled onions creating an artificial crisis.
An onion seller at Sadarghat, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Image via Flickr by Gerry Popplestone. CC BY-NC-ND
In September, the price of onion was Bangladeshi Tk. 45-50 (USD 50-60 cents) per kilogram. It rose to Tk. 110-120 (USD 1.30 – 1.40) in October and in November it hit the roof at Bangladeshi Tk. 250 (USD 3).
At the capital’s Karwan Bazar wholesale market, traders were selling a sack of five kg local onion for Tk950 to Tk1,000. On the other hand, five kg imported onion were selling between Tk800 and Tk900 and five kg onion from Turkey were selling at Tk750 to Tk800.#Bangladesh pic.twitter.com/jULau4l9D7
— sourav saha (@souravs95685663) November 16, 2019
During a visit to India in the first week of October, the Bangladeshi Prime Minister jokingly complained about the onion ban to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi saying that she’s had to cut onions from her menu. Despite repeated requests from Bangladesh, India did not withdraw the ban and there is an indication that the ban may last a few more months.
Onion is a perishable item, consignments from far away countries often rot on the way. So India remains the most viable option for import. Now Bangladesh is forced to buy onions from other nations such as China and Egypt, and they are importing via air cargo from Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan to meet the immediate crisis.
Onion diplomacy??
■India bans onion exports as floods affect crops in #Maharashtra #Karnataka #Telangana & push prices over Rs 100/kg.
■Neighbouring countries like #Bangladesh face the crunch.
■ #Pakistan steps in. To export 300 tons of onions to BD after 15 years of hiatus.
— Rajeev Sharma (@kishkindha) November 16, 2019
Onion used to comprise only a small portion of the monthly food expenditures of Bangladeshi households. However, the price increase has hurt the lower middle class and poor households. The government has launched subsidized price onion outlets to stabilize the market and a lot of people flocked to the selling points.
People gather to buy onion as subsidize price in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
The price of onion has hit a record high with USD $3 per Kilogram, ten times higher than its price seven months ago.#onion #pricehike #bangladesh?? #agriculture #confrontation #gathering #economy pic.twitter.com/tj8Jq8H5LK
— zakir hossain chowdhury (@auni_auniket) November 17, 2019
Many blamed the traders for creating an artificial crisis. Different government agencies fined and jailed more than 2,000 traders in the past two months for stockpiling onions or selling at a higher price than the market price.
খাতুনগঞ্জে আড়ত থেকে বের হচ্ছে পঁচা পেঁয়াজ!
দাম আরও বাড়বে সে আশায় নিজেদের গুদামে মজুদ করে রাখা পেঁয়াজে পচন ধরেছে!!
কথায় আছে না, অতি লোভে তাঁতি নষ্ট! pic.twitter.com/KuQkryvIOR
— sadia sultana (@sultana8800) November 16, 2019
Rotten onions discovered in Khatunganj silo. Stockpiled onions for selling after a price increase is being spoiled. If you are too greedy, you risk losing everything.
People on social media asked others to boycott onions to resist the hoarders.
পেঁয়াজ না খেলে কি আপনি মরে যাবেন?
যদি তাই না হয়, আসুন একযোগে পেঁয়াজ বর্জন করে ব্যবসায়ী সিন্ডিকেটের বিষদাঁত ভেঙে দেই! pic.twitter.com/FrGhmehW6u
— S.H. SagoR (@Shahada12873780) November 17, 2019
Will you die if you don't eat onions? If that's not true then come let's boycott onions and teach a lesson to these trader syndicates.
পেঁয়াজ সিন্ডিকেট ভাঙ্গতে আপনিই যথেষ্টঃ
১৷ আগামী ১৯/১১/২০১৯ থেকে ২৯/১১/২০১৯ এই ১০ দিন কেউ পেঁয়াজ কিনব না।
২। আশ-পাশের পরিবার প্রতিবেশীকে এই তথ্যটা জানিয়ে পেঁয়াজ না কেনার জন্য উদ্বুদ্ধ করুন।
৩। ১০দিন পেঁয়াজ কেনা বন্ধ, দৃঢ় মনোবলে অঙ্গিকারাবদ্ধ হোন। pic.twitter.com/JEYHNmS7kh
— BURHAN UDDIN (@BURHANU96887202) November 16, 2019
You alone is enough to break these trader syndicate. We will not buy onion from 19/11/2019 to 29/11/2019. Tell your family and neighbours not to buy any onion too. 10 days without onion. You can do it.
To address the crisis, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina recently told media that her meals are being cooked without onion and the result is “tasty and delicious”. People are sharing recipes of common culinary items online that can be prepared without onion.
পেঁয়াজ ছাড়া রান্না / cooking without onion / peyaj sara ranna / how to cook without onion https://t.co/zeiHKwA07i pic.twitter.com/J1Apn6Dp0q
— refreshrecipes (@refreshrecipes) November 19, 2019
Ireen Sultana writes in Facebook:
পেঁয়াজ বস্ত্রের মত আবশ্যক না। মৌলিক অধিকার না। [..] বাঙালির বহু ব্যঞ্জন এমনিতেই পেঁয়াজ ছাড়া হয়। আর যেসবে লাগে তা পরিমাণে কম দিয়েও রাঁধা যায়। অথবা পেঁয়াজ না দিয়েও উপাদেয় করা যায়।
আপনার যদি আজকাল ৫ কেজির জায়গায় আড়াই কেজিতে চলে যায় তো বুঝবেন এটাই আসল পরিমাণ। এতদিন আপনি পেঁয়াজ বিলাসি ছিলেন।
Onion is not an absolute necessity like clothes. Not basic rights. [..] Many Bengali food items are prepared without onion or you can use at a lesser quantity. Even you can make food tasty without onion.
If your monthly consumption of onion has come down to half from 5 kilograms because of the crisis, then you know that this is the correct demand. You were overusing onion till now.
Meanwhile, some netizens reacted to the onion crisis using innovative and funny memes such as this:
“Instead of taking measures against the price increase we are being told to stop eating onions. Thank God the price of clothes did not increase”. Widely used meme from Facebook page Gujob.com
Despite the jokes being shared online, the seriousness of the issue should not be forgotten as political parties are using the crisis as a rallying point. Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) largest opposition party, blamed the government for the hike and called for a countrywide rally in protest. There was also a heated debate in the parliament about it.

author: Rezwan


text:
Insights into Kashmir’s crisis from a Kashmiri born in Nepal · Global Voices
Dilli Rai

A Kashmiri man holds pieces of 120mm mortar rounds. He stands on the rooftop of his house which was destroyed by a mortar shell. Armies from both India and Pakistan have been exchanging fire on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir following the abrogation of Article 370 by the Indian authorities. Image via Instagram by Ieshan Wani. Used with permission.
On 5 August 2019, the Indian government issued a constitutional order repealing Article 370 – a move which revoked the special status given to the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
India's neighbor, Nepal, is one of the many countries that doesn't support third-party intervention and, as reported by ANI, Nepal’s Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali said it was an internal matter for the Indian state.
While there have been demonstrations in Nepal’s capital city Kathmandu to resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue, some Nepali-speaking Gorkhas living in Jammu celebrated the Indian Government’s decision.
Aquib is a graduate of Kashmir University living in Nepal's capital, Kathmandu. He was born in Nepal to a Nepali mother and owns a jewellery shop in Kathmandu. He spoke with GV to get his opinion about India's decision to revoke Article 370.
Global Voices (GV): How long have you been living in Nepal?
Aquib (A): I was born in Nepal. My father came to Nepal to start a business in the 1980s. My father is a Kashmiri and my mother a Nepali. Apart from spending some years in Kashmir during my studies, I’ve been living mostly in Nepal.
GV: What is your emotional connection with Kashmir?
A: I completed my Bachelor’s degree from Kashmir University. My relatives and friends live in Kashmir. Currently, my parents also live in Kashmir.
I visit Kashmir 3-4 times every year. Last I went there on 8 August 2019. Before I got there, the Government of India had decided to revoke the special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Global Voices (GV): In your opinion, why is Jammu & Kashmir contested?
A: Kashmir has been in debates since 1947 when India and Pakistan were divided. Both India and Pakistan have been neglecting the self-decision rights of Kashmir. Kashmir got entangled in the conflict. Recently, after India encroached on their rights, the conflict rose sharply.
GV: What significance did Article 370 have for Kashmiris?
A: Article 370 of the Indian constitution holds a special significance for Jammu and Kashmir. Because of it, Jammu Kashmir was free to have its own constitution, flag and laws. The Kashmiris have lost their identity and rights after the abrogation of the Article which gave Jammu Kashmir a ‘Special State’ status.
GV: Why do you think the Government of India repealed Article 370?
Aquib: India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) he is leading had been trying to repeal Article 370. This was their political motive and they had mentioned it in their election manifesto as well. And only a few months after winning the Lok Sabha elections they have hurt the sentiments and snatched the rights of Kashmiri people by repealing Article 370.
GV: While Nepal has stated that the Kashmir issue is India’s internal matter, how are Nepalis treating the Kashmiris living in Nepal?
Aquib: More than 500 Kashmiris live in Nepal’s capital city Kathmandu and touristic city Pokhara doing business. We Kashmiris have neither been discriminated [against] nor been treated badly by the Nepali community. In contrast, we are treated with suspicion in India. At the airport immigration, we are hassled by questions like “why we are going to Nepal?” and “for how long?”, etc.
GV: How do you find the news on Kashmir issue disseminated by the Nepali media – is it against Kashmiris or unbiased?
A: The news about the Kashmir issue disseminated by Nepali media is not biased against anybody, but it is about the latest move by the Indian Government and Article 370. India’s move is ill-considered and one-sided. This decision might lead to more trouble instead of solving the dispute.
I appeal to the international community to stand in solidarity with the Kashmiris against the injustice meted out to them.
GV: How will repealing Article 370 affect Kashmir in the future?
A: The special rights Jammu and Kashmir had been exercising for the last seven decades have been removed. To muzzle the Kashmiri voices against this move armed forces have been sent to Kashmir. Communication services like mobile phones and the internet have been shut down including educational institutions. People have been prohibited from gathering and the opposition leaders have been put under house arrest. But the Indian government’s authoritarianism can never control the sentiments of Kashmiris and their dissenting voices.
Check out Global Voices’ special coverage of the situation in Kashmir.

author: Dilli Rai