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Myanmar’s ‘silent strike’ delivers loud condemnation of continuing military rule · Global Voices
Mong Palatino

Storefronts were closed in Yangon, and once-bustling streets were deserted as market stalls remained shuttered and traders stayed home. Photo and caption are from Radio Free Asia. Copyright © 1998-2020, RFA. Used with permission from Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.
For several hours on December 10, millions of people in Myanmar remained inside their homes as part of a ‘silent strike’ against the military regime. Major cities, including the capital Naypyitaw, looked like ‘ghost towns’ as businesses closed down while workers chose to stay at home.
Ever since the military grabbed power in February, citizens have been challenging the junta rule through a civil disobedience movement. The ‘silent strike,’ organized for International Human Rights Day, was the latest act of resistance by concerned citizens and activists calling for the restoration of civilian rule.
The Irrawaddy news site described the situation in the country’s premier urban centers during the ‘silent strike’:
Roads in cities across the country, including the commercial capital Yangon, the second-biggest city Mandalay and the administrative capital Naypyitaw, were deserted as people stayed home and shut down their businesses to join the strike.
Small vendors, local wet markets and wholesale markets were no exception, having shared the call to strike by word of mouth in the preceding days.
Shots from @AP of Yangon and Mandalay today: the cities are like ghost towns as people heed the call for a “silent strike” against the military rulers. pic.twitter.com/pDD0rNVyno
— Jerry Harmer (@Coalporter) December 10, 2021
Yin Yin, a Yangon resident, told Radio Free Asia why she supported the strike
I feel bad now that I couldn’t do anything for the young people who are risking their lives fighting back against the junta and, therefore, I am taking part in today’s protest.
Young people think we have lost interest in their cause. I’m here to show that my blood hasn’t run cold yet.
Deserted Yangon on Silent Strike Day: Roads that are normally busy in Myanmar's commercial capital Yangon are deserted on Friday morning, with many businesses closed and only a handful of commuters, as a show of solidarity with the “silent strike” movement. 1/2 pic.twitter.com/Y3OO9h2Jqa
— Myanmar Now (@Myanmar_Now_Eng) December 10, 2021
Activist La Pyae told Myanmar Now news website that it was easy to convince local shopkeepers to briefly stop operating on December 10:
We’ve been handing out pamphlets around Yangon, but many people knew about the strike before we even told them. Some shops have already announced that they won’t be opening or selling anything on December 10.
Everyone is very angry. The regime has just crossed so many lines.
Protest leader Ma Khin Sandar told the media that the strike received overwhelming support from citizens:
We called on people to strike from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m., but everything shut down since the early morning—even I myself feel shocked at the unity of the people. If we are united in this way, our revolution will prevail.
“Silent Strike” in capital Naypyitaw
Roads and markets are seen empty in capital Naypyitaw on Friday morning as residents take part in the nationwide “Silent Strike” on International Human Rights Day. (Photos- CJ) pic.twitter.com/RfldUuUiSj
— Myanmar Now (@Myanmar_Now_Eng) December 10, 2021
Wai Yan, a protest leader, added that the strike has once again demonstrated that the military has failed to gain legitimacy after 10 months of being in power.
The people showed that the revolution and popular defiance of the military council have not lost momentum.
Even political prisoners decided to hold a hunger strike in support of the December 10 nationwide protest:
#InseinPrison📸
Let's not forget our comrades locked up inside prisons by Minaunghlaing Armed Group (MAG) in Myanmar.
Our comrades joined in #HumanRightsDay #SilentStrike w/hunger strike & ended it w/Thway Thit Sar song.
They were tortured & confined solitarily for that👇 pic.twitter.com/dcKWKMb60P
— Thinzar Shunlei Yi (@thinzashunleiyi) December 13, 2021
Political analyst Naing Khit underscored the significance and impact of the strike:
Usually, Friday is one of the busiest days of the week for public offices, companies and banks.
But today was no ordinary Friday. Myanmar and its population of 55 million people went into a kind of political “hibernation” under their own roofs for almost the whole day. And their decision to do so was indeed political, because their sole objective was to demonstrate their rejection of military rule.
Authorities tried to persuade vendors to open shop in the morning, but these efforts largely failed across the country. In Yangon, dozens of pro-military supporters staged an assembly to counter the ‘silent strike.’
Legions of (roughly 50) pro-military supporters protested outside of Yangon City Hall today, in a counterbalance to the Silent Strike observed by tens of millions of people throughout Burma. pic.twitter.com/y6wCoBBDWe
— DVB English (@DVB_English) December 10, 2021
This video from Radio Free Asia provides an overview of the ‘silent strike’ and the organized applause at 4 p.m. on December 10 as citizens cheered about the success of the protest.

author: Mong Palatino


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Russian filmmaker Sergei Solovyov dies at 77 · Global Voices
Tanya Lokot

Sergei Solovyov in 2017. Image by Svklimkin, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.
Sergei Solovyov, a prominent Russian film director known for his 1980s cinematic hits, has died after a heart attack. At the time of his death on December 13, he was 77 years old.
Solovyov is best known for films portraying the turbulent transformations in Russian and Soviet society that occurred during the late 1980s during the perestroika era (a time of political and economic restructuring) and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost policy reforms.
Solovyov's most high-profile film, Assa, released in 1987, gained cult status with Soviet audiences, bringing the ideas of political and social transformation to the masses. The film was noted for its experimental approach to storytelling, featuring dream sequences and footnotes explaining underground slang. Its soundtrack included songs by the legendary Soviet rock musician Viktor Tsoi and his band Kino and instrumental music by another icon Boris Grebenshchikov (of Aquarium fame).  Their music had been banned by Soviet authorities before the film's release, and Assa became and important symbol of liberation for the Soviet rock scene.
Today the film is available to view on the official website of the Mosfilm film studio, as well as on YouTube (with English subtitles).
Solovyov had a prolific career as film director, screenwriter and producer, but also directed plays for theatre. During his long career, he made more than 30 films, with the most recent one released in 2020. His film One Hundred Days After Childhood received the Silver Bear prize in Berlin in 1975 for best director, while The Stray White And The Speckled won a special mention award at the Venice Film Festival in 1986. In 1993, Solovyov was awarded the People's Artist of Russia title.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Tanya Lokot


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The ‘immoral’ 42 songs banned from Indonesia’s daytime radio · Global Voices
Juke Carolina

In June 2021, 42 songs were banned from day-time radio in Indonesia. Image via Time's Youtube video.
The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI), a state regulating agency, issued a circulation letter in June 2021, telling local radio stations that they could not air 42 English language songs including songs by Bruno Mars, Jay-Z, and many more during daytime hours, except between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. The listed songs were considered morally hazardous because they mentioned sexuality, alcohol, or vices.
But this wasn't the first time the commission had given radio stations strict song limitations. In 2019, the KPI applied the same rules to 84 songs, including 17 Western pop songs by stars such as Ed Sheeran and Ariana Grande. At the time, Deputy head of the KPI, Rahmat Arifin, told Tempo.co “What is banned is not the songs, but the lyrics of the songs that contain pornography, pornographic association, and obscenity.”
The head of the KPI at that time, Dedeh Fardia, further explained the ban by saying that some of the lyrics were “objectifying women as sexual objects.”
Responding to public criticism, KPI claimed the songs were not altogether banned, but limited to their non-explicit versions. The agency has faced public backlash in the past for its vague rules, particularly after broadly banning material with curse words and  “violent” cartoons such as Spongebob Squarepants.
One citizen, Fadhil Mulyono, compiled a playlist of the banned songs on Spotify, which can be found here. Some of the so-called immoral songs include Empire State of Mind by Jay-Z, One Republic's Good Life, and Starships by Nicki Minaj.
An anti-vice movement, known locally as anti-maksiat, has emerged in Indonesia in recent years initiated mainly by state-backed conservative Muslim grassroots campaigns. This movement has advocated for the implementation of Sharia laws and regulations at national and provincial levels and has led the government to ban music, media, and websites due to their apparently offensive nature.

author: Juke Carolina


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How did Vietnam do on human rights in 2021? · Global Voices
The 88 Project

Vietnam political prisoners Pham Doan Trang (left): screenshot of YouTube video by Člověk v tísni; Le Huu Minh Tuan (lower right) and Truong Chau Huu Danh (upper right): Photos from The 88 Project.
This article was originally published on The 88 Project, an independent news site covering Vietnam, and an edited version is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
As people all over the globe celebrate the day the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, we would like to remind the world that human rights remain an elusive ideal and an endless struggle in Vietnam. To put it bluntly, the human rights picture in Vietnam in 2021 is dark and depressing.
Of the 30 arrests so far this year, there were several high-profile cases. For example, in January, the courts handed down some of the harshest sentences yet against several independent journalists: Pham Chi Dung, 55, a former reporter for Voice of America and founder of the Independent Journalists Association of Vietnam (IJAVN), was sentenced to 15 years in prison; Dung’s colleague, Nguyen Tuong Thuy, 69, a member of Radio Free Asia Vietnamese Service, received an 11-year sentence; Le Huu Minh Tuan, 32, another IJAVN member, was given 11 years. All three men were charged with the catch-all crime of “anti-state propaganda” under the vaguely worded Article 117, formerly known as Article 88.
The year of the pandemic also saw a surge in online activities as the government imposed quarantines and lockdowns in its belated and futile effort to contain the virus. As the number of COVID cases and deaths rose, fear and frustration gripped society. Economic and other hardships began to take their toll; citizens became more vocal in their criticisms of the government’s mishandling of the disease. As expected, authorities struck back by clamping down on online communication. The cyber security laws enacted last year gave cyber police more tools to monitor and harass online users via its army of cyber thugs, aka Force 47, which was frequently used to mass report against certain Facebook accounts to have them suspended or blocked. At least 13 Facebookers were arrested.
Making matters worse, fake news became a huge problem once again as the government failed to provide the public with timely and accurate information via its vast networks of state-run media. False information about the virus and scientifically unproven remedies flooded Vietnamese YouTube channels and Facebook pages as people anxiously awaited the inexplicably late arrival of vaccines. Anti-China sentiments also played a role in dissuading many from getting inoculated with Chinese vaccines. According to the Anti-Fake News Centre at the Ministry of Communication and Information, by July 2021, at least 38 users were fined for “spreading misinformation” on Facebook; most were COVID-related. However, current legislation does not clearly distinguish between facts and personal opinions, leaving the interpretation up to local law enforcement.
Some journalists and bloggers tried to counter this negative trend by posting real news and information. In all, at least 10 journalists and bloggers have been arrested this year so far, but not all of them are independent. One Facebook group, in particular, called Báo Sạch (Clean News), was started by an editor at a state-run publication. The page became popular with its brand of hard-hitting fact-checked reports. Unfortunately, the group also made the mistake of reporting on corruption by government officials and, as a result, became victims of Article 117. Five men associated with Clean News, including founder Truong Chau Huu Danh, were convicted and sentenced to a total of 14.5 years behind bars. In addition, they were banned from working for the state for another three years after their release.
Independent journalists were not the only victims of Vietnam’s one-party rule. People who tried to run for an independent seat in the National Assembly also got into trouble, even though according to Vietnamese laws, they are allowed to do so. Le Trong Hung announced his candidacy on March 14, and was arrested two weeks later, ostensibly for spreading “anti-state propaganda.” The charges involved articles he had written calling for an election process more in line with Vietnamese and international laws. While in jail, Hung’s request to have copies of Vietnam’s Constitution distributed to his jailers was repeatedly denied.
One month earlier, Tran Quoc Khanh was arrested soon after declaring his independent candidacy for a seat in the National Assembly. Khanh was eventually charged with “making, storing, distributing material against the state,” which in other countries might simply be called campaigning. In October, Khanh was sentenced to six years and six months behind bars. Overall, four independent candidates were arrested this year. Le Trong Hung is still awaiting trial. His wife, who is blind, still has not been allowed to visit her husband.
On a similar note, it has been over 400 days since prominent journalist and activist Pham Doan Trang was arrested, yet her family still has not been allowed to see her despite numerous requests to do so. Trang’s saga began on October 6 last year. In what appeared to be a calculated arrow aimed straight at the international human rights community, police took the award-winning activist into custody just hours after the conclusion of the 2020 U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue.
For her part, Trang seemed to have seen it coming. Not long before her arrest, she had written a heartfelt letter and instructed her trusted friends to publish it should the state come for her. Trang was held incommunicado in pretrial detention for more than a year without access to a lawyer— a clear violation of Vietnamese law as well as international conventions. As of this writing, her brother is still waiting to hear from the court regarding the family’s latest request to see or talk to her.
Vietnam’s disregard for its international obligations was also on full display in the imprisonment of a family from Duong Noi in North Vietnam. Can Thi Theu and her sons, Trinh Ba Phuong and Trinh Ba Tu, are land rights activists. They tried to help the villagers of Dong Tam tell their side of the story after the commune was ambushed by thousands of policemen in the middle of the night in January of 2020. The deadly raid resulted in the execution-style killing of the village elder, Le Dinh Kinh, and the mysterious deaths of three officers.
Nineteen villagers were later arrested and tried. Two are currently on death row for alleged murder, which was never proven in court. Several others are serving long prison sentences after a speedy trial that international observers called a sham since no defense witnesses were called. In the months following the attack and the trials, Theu and her two sons worked to bring the true story to light. They visited victims’ families and posted videos of interviews, and in so doing became thorns in the side of the authorities who simply wanted the story to go away. Finally, on June 24, 2020, all three were arrested, along with Nguyen Thi Tam, and put in pretrial detention where no one could talk to them.
Another disturbing trend of 2021 was the arrests of non-traditional activists whom we consider to be community leaders who don’t necessarily engage in the typical activities we’ve seen in the past. For example, Nguyen Thuy Hanh founded the 50K Fund, whose recipients are mainly wives and children of political prisoners who in most cases were the main breadwinners. She was arrested in April for “anti-state propaganda.” Dang Dinh Bach runs a non-profit on sustainable development and was interested in using the Europe-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement as a tool to hold the Vietnamese government to its international obligations. He has been charged with “tax evasion.” Mai Phan Loi is editor-in-chief of the most prominent law magazine in the country, Phap Luat, as well as the founder of a non-profit called the Center for Media in Educating Community. He has also been charged with “tax evasion.”
Finally, we would like to raise awareness of the plight of the Khmer-Krom community, an indigenous people who have lived in the southwestern parts of today’s Vietnam for millennia. In June of this year, authorities from Tra Vinh Province confiscated hundreds of copies of UN documents on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Police also detained their community leader, Thach Rine, for questioning. On October 14, Thach Rine was arrested and charged with “defamation” for postings on his Facebook page that allegedly made fun of Ho Chi Minh. While it is not yet clear what the government’s real reason is, this is a disturbing trend, nonetheless, given the long history of struggle for autonomy by the Khmer-Krom people and their demand for fundamental rights, such as the right to teach their language in schools.
As 2021 draws to a close, we ask that the international human rights community remain vigilant and continue working with their respective governments to demand that Vietnam respect its international obligations and that human rights remain a component of all treaties and trade agreements.

author: The 88 Project


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July 7 declared World Kiswahili Language Day: A new project seeks to better understand present day dialectal variations in Swahili · Global Voices
Njeri Wangari

“Kiswahili phrases” by ultraBobban is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0
In November 2021 during its 41st Session in Paris, UNESCO Member States declared July 7th World Kiswahili Language Day. Kiswahili — also known as Swahili — is a Bantu language native to Eastern and Central Africa where it's spoken either as a mother tongue or a fluent second language by an estimated 80 million people.
Despite its wide reach, many around the world are unaware of the significance and history of Swahili. Global Voices spoke with Hannah Gibson, a senior lecturer in the Department of Language and Linguistics at the University of Essex, about a new four-year project titled “Grammatical variation in Swahili: contact, change and identity” that she and her colleagues have launched to better understand present-day dialectal variations in Swahili.
In this interview, we hear from the project team: Hannah Gibson (University of Essex), Fridah Kanana Erastus (Kenyatta University), Tom Jelpke (SOAS University of London), Lutz Marten (SOAS University of London), Teresa Poeta (University of Essex), and Julius Taji (University of Dar es Salaam) about the aims and impact of the project, as well as the role of Swahili globally and in East Africa. They also speak on why the recognition of Kiswahili at a global level is important in helping more people take an interest in learning the language.
Project Team (PT): This project looks at how the Swahili language varies depending on the various places where it is spoken, as well as the different groups of people who speak it. In addition to being the first language of some communities on the coast of East Africa, Swahili is used as a lingua franca by many others and now has over 100 million speakers.
With Swahili being spoken in so many diverse contexts, we expect there to be a lot of variation in how the language is used on day-to-day basis.
In the past, we know scholars have described some of the dialects on the coast. And more recently some of the “newer” varieties — such as Swahili spoken in DRC or Sheng — are being talked about. But there is no in-depth study of variation in present-day Swahili nor of the ways speakers use this variation for different purposes. That’s what this project aims to explore.
PT: Firstly, we want to gain a better understanding of the present-day variation in Swahili. And while traditionally the linguistic focus has been more on pronunciation and lexical variation (the way words differ in various dialects), we will focus on the structural differences — for example the different ways in which sentences are constructed.
The second set of questions we want to answer is how this variation is linked to the linguistic environments in which Swahili is spoke. Many East African contexts are highly multilingual, with people using several languages on daily basis. In our project, we ask how the contact between Swahili and various other languages in Kenya and Tanzania results in the languages influencing each other.
Lastly, we are interested in what these different Swahili varieties mean for speakers and their identities and how speaking a certain dialect may impact — or reflect — various societal issues.
PT: The project is a collaboration between four different universities across three countries — Kenya, Tanzania, and the UK. Our team is made up of colleagues from Kenyatta University, SOAS University of London, University of Dar Es Salaam and University of Essex — each bringing their own set of skills and experience to the project.
We are very excited to embark on this study and to be able to focus on the role played by Swahili. Linguistic studies on dialects and variation in major languages tend to focus on European contexts or take the Global North as the starting point (for example through the study of English), so we are excited to be putting Swahili at the centre the study.
PT: The number of Swahili speakers is growing. So is the number of places where Swahili is used and taught. A better understanding of Swahili varieties has many uses and implications. For example, it can influence how the language is taught. It can help us to better understand how speakers use Swahili and what information they can access in it. It can also give us insights into what Swahili means for the speakers’ sense of identity and community and how this continues to change.
From an academic perspective, this study contributes to, expands and builds on the rich scholarly tradition of work on the Swahili language.
PT: The project is funded by the Leverhulme Trust and lasts for four years. Having just started in September 2021 it will be completed in August 2024. As well as the project website — to be launched soon — which will have regular updates, the broader findings will also be made available online.
It is important to us that any resources we gather are freely available to anyone interested in them and for people wanting to further work on the Swahili language.
PT: We were excited to hear the news and we will celebrate Swahili with a project event on that day for sure!
PT: It’s great to see an African language celebrated at a more international and global level — it is long overdue. Swahili as a language, its significance and history as well as its status today is unknown to many people around the world and this recognition can help us all to learn more about it – perhaps even get people excited to try and learn it too!
Our hope is also for Swahili to be celebrated in its complexity — with its many varieties and dialects, with the diverse groups of Swahili speakers for whom this language can mean different things and together with the varied and multilingual environments where it is spoken.
PT: Hopefully, this can also be the start of an international celebration of many more African languages. Swahili is a major language and it is great to see it acknowledged and celebrated. It is also important it doesn’t end up being the sole representative of an entire continent but rather an example of the incredible linguistic diversity which surrounds it.
PT: Watch this space! We will hopefully be doing regular updates for Global Voices online. So we will be back to let you know how we are getting on.

author: Njeri Wangari


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Lost and found: Repatriation of Laxmi-Narayan’s statue to Kathmandu Valley’s Patan · Global Voices
Sanjib Chaudhary

Patan Durbar Square, a World Heritage Site in Kathmandu Valley’s Lalitpur District. Photo by Sunil Sharma. Used with permission.
Not hundreds but thousands of sculptures and art objects have been stolen from Kathmandu Valley since the 1950s. Removed from sites of worship, they landed up in private collections and art museums. After art historian Lain Singh Bangdel published the highly acclaimed book Stolen Images of Nepal in 1989, the repatriation of the artefacts began. However, only a fraction of the plundered items has made its way back home.
The re-installation of the half male and half female statue of Laxmi-Narayan in Patan’s Patko is the latest example of the homecoming of the stolen idols. Taken in 1984, the 12th to 15th century bronze idol was auctioned by Sotheby's in New York in 1989 and loaned to the Dallas Museum of Art.
When artist, researcher and the founder of the Himlayan Art and Cultural Heritage Project, Joy Lynn Davis came across a blurry image of Laxmi-Narayan in the Dallas Museum while doing a Google search for her project Remembering the Lost Sculptures of Kathmandu, she at once recognized the statue. She painted the stolen images with 23 karat gold and visually repatriated them in their respective sites.
Joy was delighted to see the same statue being repatriated at its original site, the Narayan Temple, on December 4, 2021.
Though I painted Lakshmi-Narayan 2013-14 and located it in the @DallasMuseumArt in 2015, today was my first time meeting #LaxmiNarayan in person. Thank you for capturing the moment, @KanakManiDixit ! https://t.co/cI5U7im1Pa
— Joy Lynn Davis (@JoyLynn_Davis) December 4, 2021
Dr. Emiline Smith, lecturer in criminology at the University of Glasgow, tweeted:
🎉 Laxmi-Narayan is home! 🎉 Made possible through the collaboration of so many different parties, today was an incredibly joyous day and so important for Patan, Kathmandu Valley and Nepal #livingheritage #lootedheritage #returnofthegods #intangibleheritage #community pic.twitter.com/Cc1Rf5SoJC
— Emiline Smith (@DrEmilineSmith) December 4, 2021
Photographer Sunil Sharma captured the return and reinstallation of Laxmi-Narayan through his lens.
The statue of Laxmi-Narayan being taken to Patan Museum after it was transferred to Nepali custody. Photo by Sunil Sharma. Used with permission.
The half male and half female statue of Laxmi-Narayan. Photo by Sunil Sharma. Used with permission.
The idol of Laxmi-Narayan being taken on a palanquin to Narayan Temple, its home, from Patan Museum. Photo by Sunil Sharma. Used with permission.
The pedestal cleared for the reinstallation of Laxmi-Narayan. Photo by Sunil Sharma. Used with permission.
The Narayan Temple, abode of Laxmi-Narayan. Photo by Sunil Sharma. Used with permission.
The idol of Laxmi-Narayan reinstalled at the Narayan Temple. Photo by Sunil Sharma. Used with permission.
The God has returned to its home and a modern security system has been installed to protect the deity. However, many statues still await their repatriation, and more antiques from Nepal continue to be stolen — such as the recent theft of Bhairav from Kathmandu’s Halchowk.
It is very sad to know that Halchowk Bhairab has been stolen from the site yesterday night. :( pic.twitter.com/abONnsxmCy
— Roshan Mishra (@r0shanmishra) December 7, 2021

author: Sanjib Chaudhary


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SMEX: Israel’s presence at Expo Dubai 2020 Is a threat to digital rights · Global Voices
SMEX

Israel took part in Dubai's Expo which is seen to enable it to market its surveillance technology which has already harmed journalists and activists in the Middle East. Image used under CC BY-SA 3.0
This article was first published by SMEX on December 6, 2021. It is republished as part of an a republishing agreement with Global Voices.
On October 7, 2021, Israel inaugurated its pavilion at Expo Dubai 2020, after the United Arab Emirates extended an invitation to Israel to partake in the six-month world fair in 2019, a year before signing the Abraham Accords.
An estimated 25 million visitors are expected to visit the Expo, which runs from 1 October 2021 to 31 March 2022, and which is seen as an opportunity for Israel, one of the world’s most advanced surveillance states, to polish its image before global visitors — a promotional stunt on behalf of the UAE.
Dubai’s Expo will open its gates soon. The Israeli pavilion has no walls or borders, showcasing Israel’s openness, diversity and innovation – an opportunity for millions of visitors from the Middle East and beyond to take a journey into #Israel & future. pic.twitter.com/pamnDyzSWa
— Yonatan Gonen (@GonenYonatan) August 21, 2021
Dubai police have deployed fleets of Israeli drones, provided by Israeli aerial data-collection company Airobotics, to hover over the exhibition for security purposes. At the same time, the police announced their permanent collaboration with the Israeli police force to counter “crime networks” in the UAE, as reported by The Telegraph.
Trade in surveillance technology between the two dates back to at least 2007, when Abu Dhabi authorities sealed an $816m contract with Israeli-owned AGT digital security company, to “protect all the vital facilities within the emirate of Abu Dhabi,” as reported by the Middle East Eye. AGT and its local UAE partner companies — Advanced Integrated Solutions and Advanced Technical Solutions — were contracted to develop the Emirate-wide surveillance initiative for $600m in February 2011. Known as Falcon Eye, the initiative was launched in July 2016, with thousands of cameras installed on roads, facilities, buildings and the international airport.
In a more recent collaboration, the two countries have announced a joint deal to design advanced, unmanned military vessels that would be able to operate semi or fully autonomously. Considering both countries’ heavy investment in and deployment of surveillance technology, as well as their shared history of human rights abuses, their burgeoning military-security enmeshment seriously threatens the digital privacy and security of UAE citizens, and the Arabic-speaking region at large.
A recent study by 7amleh — The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media — revealed that CCTV and digital surveillance have exponentially increased in East Jerusalem and the West Bank following the occupation’s violent attacks on Palestinians in April and May of 2021.
“The privatisation of the Israeli security apparatus, and the mushrooming of private companies founded by ex-defence and ex-Mossad agents, is a threat not only to Palestinians […] but also to all Gulf citizens, with Israeli spyware sold to dictatorships across the Arab world,” warned Madawi Al-Raheed, a Saudi-British professor whose phone was targeted by Israeli spyware Pegasus in 2019.
Candiru and NSO Group, both Israeli surveillance firms, have been reported to sell spyware to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Bahrain, making Israel's surveillance sector an insidious threat to the lives of journalists and activists working in the Arab region and beyond. Earlier last month, the US Department of Commerce blacklisted NSO Group and Candiru thus “restricting the export, reexport, and in-country transfer of items” by these companies. While adding them to the US Entity List can limit their activity, it is probable that NSO and Candiru will continue to operate under different names.
In October, UAE’s ruler Sheikh Mohammed was found to be using Pegasus spyware to hack his ex-wife’s phone, which led to the termination of his contract with the Israeli NSO Group. The UAE had previously used the spyware to infiltrate the phones of journalists, activists, lawyers and dissidents, within the Emirates and beyond. Forbidden Stories’ investigation revealed that prominent Emirati activists Ahmed Mansoor and Alaa Al-Siddiq were among the successfully hacked targets.
A promotional video of the Israeli Pavilion, claims that this is a golden opportunity for the two countries to strengthen ties, while finding a common ground beyond their differences. The very design of the space is intended to promote the Israeli occupation’s hypocritical ambitions towards “no walls and no boundaries.” This is in clear conflict with the 708 km impenetrable “Separation Wall” which Israel began building in 2002, which sliced through Palestinian territory. The Commissioner General of the Israel Pavilion boasts it as a “completely open [space]..through which you can see the horizon from end to end,” a claim that raises eyebrows considering the terrorization of Palestine “from its river to the sea.”
In response to Israel's participation in the event, the BDS Movement has renewed its call to boycott the Israeli pavilion at the Expo. “Both the UAE and Israel are shamelessly using the World Expo in presenting a ‘prettier face’ to whitewash and distract attention from their grave human rights violations,” said the Palestinian BDS National Committee in a statement.
In Oct, the UAE regime will host the World Expo in Dubai. Both the regime and apartheid Israel will use this to whitewash and normalize their respective war crimes.
We call on governments, companies, & artists to boycott this event & #BoycottDubaiExpo ➡ https://t.co/Bmec1vlGCj
— BDS movement (@BDSmovement) September 26, 2021
SMEX urges all visitors to do the same.

author: SMEX


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2021 in retrospective: Authoritarian practices threatened journalists and restricted media freedom in South Asia · Global Voices
Rezwan

Image by Internet Freedom Foundation. CC-BY
In several South Asian countries, press and internet freedom were challenged in the year 2021. According to the 2021 World Press Freedom Index, Bangladesh at 152 has slipped down one position in the annual ranking of 180 countries, while Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka remained at 145th, 142nd and 127th positions respectively. Countries like Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives, however, moved up in the ranking.
While the controversial Digital Security Act (2018) in Bangladesh and the 2021 Information Technology Rules of the Indian IT Act (2000) continue to make headlines in both countries, a newly proposed media regulatory authority in Pakistan and a draft data protection law in Bangladesh have also raised concerns.
In this retrospective, we will discuss issues of internet and press freedom, freedom of speech, censorship, the safety of journalists and digital rights in this region — some of which we covered during the year. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the situation, as there were delays in the trials and internet shutdowns disrupted business and education.
The number of internet shutdowns in India by year. Screenshot from the website internetshutdowns.in by Software Freedom Law Center. CC BY-NC-SA 4.0.
Internet shutdown, blocking apps and users
In India, internet shutdowns continued to be deployed for a myriad of reasons, from stopping alleged terrorist threats and as a “precautionary” measure in response to public protests, to stopping potential cheating in examinations. The website internetshutdowns.in, a project of the New-Delhi based Software Freedom Law Center reports that there were 44 instances of internet shutdowns in the country in 2021. As per reports, in 2020, the internet was shut down in different parts of India for 8,927 hours, which cost the country over USD 2.8 billion.
In March 2021, Facebook and Facebook messenger were restricted for three days and mobile 3G and 4G services were down in places in Bangladesh in response to violent protests against visiting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Pakistan blocked and unblocked the Chinese app TikTok multiple times in 2021, complaining that it was uploading and disseminating immoral content. The fourth such ban was imposed in July 2021, which was lifted in November 2021. TikTok was banned in India in June 2020, and remained banned in 2021.
At the request of the Indian government, on February 1, 2021, Twitter temporarily blocked over 250 Twitter accounts from India, some of which actively supported the ongoing farmers’ protests. After protests on social media, Twitter restored them after six hours, concluding that the content was “speech and newsworthy,” but faced backlash from the authorities.
The Freedom on the Net 2021 report on Sri Lanka revealed that the state-owned Sri Lanka Telecom (SLT) introduced internet data packages in this year that blocked virtual private networks (VPNs) and the messaging app Telegram among others.
According to the Freedom on the Net 2021 report on Pakistan, mobile data services were suspended in Islamabad and Rawalpindi citing security reasons during the Pakistan Day parade on March 25, 2021. Internet and social media services were suspended in parts of Lahore in April 2021 during clashes between police and opposition party Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP).
In February 2021, the death of Bangladeshi writer Mushtaq Ahmed in prison during judicial custody sparked fresh protests against the draconian Digital Security Act (DSA). Ahmed was arrested in May 2020 and was later charged with “tarnishing the image of the nation” and “creating hostility, hatred, and adversity,” all offences under the DSA.
Disha Ravi in a protest. Screenshot from YouTube Video by Mojo Story.
Also in February 2021, Disha Ravi, a student and the founder of the Indian branch of climate movement Fridays For Future was arrested in Delhi over her alleged involvement with a “protest toolkit.” The alleged toolkit was a viral online document that listed resources for activists and sympathizers looking to support the months-long farmers’ protests in India.
Sri Lankan journalist Tharindu Jayawardhana faced repeated online and offline intimidation following his reporting on the Presidential Commission of Inquiry probing the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings at the online news portal MediaLK, which he founded.
This year India introduced broad new regulations on social media, online news websites, and streaming platforms, which came into effect in May. These rules contain some controversial requirements. For example, those platforms that offer end-to-end encryption messaging must be able to identify the originator of a piece of content if required by a court order or a competent authority.
In violation of these rules, intermediaries such as social media platforms Twitter and Facebook can lose their immunity (as stipulated in section 79 of the Information Technology Act of 2000) and be prosecuted for content posted by the users of these platforms.
In an interview, veteran journalist Anuradha Bhasin, executive editor of the daily newspaper Kashmir Times, described how a new media policy formulated in Kashmir to counter the spread of misinformation or fake news is being misused.
In July this year, a collaboration of 17 media organisations ran a collaborative investigation called the Pegasus Project, which revealed that over 1,000 phone numbers of human rights defenders, activists, journalists, politicians, high-ranking public officials and business people from India were targeted for potential state-sponsored hacking and illegal surveillance. The leaked list of Pegasus targets included Rahul Gandhi, a member of the Indian Parliament and the former President of the opposition party Indian National Congress (INC), former election commissioner Ashok Lavasa, two recently sworn-in ministers Ashwini Vaishnaw and Prahlad Singh Patel, and many more.
As per the Freedom on the Net 2021 report, a collaborative investigation between Al-Jazeera and Israeli newspaper Haaretz revealed in March 2021 that the Bangladesh government had procured phone-hacking software and equipment made by the Israeli company Cellebrite. The technology can unlock and extract data from mobile phones, including encrypted data and, allegedly, the concerned Bangladeshi authorities were also trained to use it.
Journalists in London protest against the proposed Pakistan Media Development Authority (PMDA). Screenshot via YouTube by Murtaza Ali Shah. Fair use.
In mid 2021, the government of Pakistan proposed the creation of a new media regulatory authority called the Pakistan Media Development Authority (PMDA). Activists believe that it will allow authorities to tighten control over journalists and limit the independence of the media. The PMDA would empower the Pakistan government to set up special tribunals to impose fines on violations and for publishing so-called fake news.
Analysts in Bangladesh have pointed out that a draft data protection law contains loopholes, including the indemnification of government agencies. The loopholes could allow the government to use it to suppress the rights of citizens and government critics in a way similar to the use of the controversial Digital Security Act (DSA) of 2018.
That's it from this year's coverage. Wishing you all happy holidays and a happy new year!

author: Rezwan


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In Sudan, the court stands on the side of unrestricted access to the internet · Global Voices
Khattab Hamad

Demonstrations erupted outside the University of Zalingei in West Darfur as a peace negotiation team, headed by Ahmed bin Abdullah al Mahmoud, Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Djibril Bassolé, Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur, meet with civil society leaders inside the university. At least one protester was killed, and several wounded, during clashes with security forces. Image via Flikr courtesy of UN Photo. (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
The law wins fights for citizens under the dictatorial rule: this is what happened in Sudan when a judge ruled to restore the internet service to the Sudanese after it was cut off in the aftermath of the October 25 coup.
In the last three years, Sudan has experienced numerous internet outages and interference owing to the ongoing political crisis. The government also orders outages during the nationwide secondary school exam, known as the Sudanese Certificate, as a way to prevent cheating with outsiders sending answers to those taking the exam. These incidents have raised alarm over the growing use of internet shutdowns both in Sudan and in the greater region. Yet, the legal basis for internet shutdowns has never been properly examined, even though it might offer insight into possible paths for advocacy against the practice.
After ousting Omar al-Bashir in 2019, Sudan has been ruled according to a power-sharing agreement between the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Transitional Military Council. This ruling regime worked to stabilize the country by considering peace as the mission of the highest priority. In 2020, the government signed the Juba peace agreement with the rebels and shared the power with them. Since then, some of the rebels have worked with the military to oust the FFC from the ruling. In October they held a sit-in in front of the Republican Palace, after which General Burhan announced a military coup ousting the FFC.
The last internet shutdown in Sudan began on October 25, 2021, and lasted for twenty-five days. It took place during Lt. Gen. Burhan‘s coup. He is the general commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces — the official name of the Sudan Army — and justified the internet shutdown by saying it would “save the national unity and national security from the threats that the state is facing.”, as illustrated in the screenshot below:
Burhan's decision to shut down the internet. Screenshot of image circulating on the internet, including on Facebook.
The shutdown was also based on the Armed Forces Law, and the Emergency Law, which are two broad laws that are invoked to give the executive broad powers during times of political unrest.
Article 6 (d) of the Armed Forces Act says that the Sudanese Armed Forces are required to “respond to legally defined emergency situations.” While Article 8 (2) of the law on emergency and public safety of the year 1997 gives the president power to legislate anything without concerning the legislative authority or the “the parliament,” however undemocratic this may be.
Given that the existing authority at that time was claimed via a coup, all of their subsequent decisions are unconstitutional, including the use of these laws.
The mechanics of internet shutdowns in Sudan show collaboration between the government and the private companies that provide internet services to Sudanese people. Netblocks, an internet access watchdog,  has been monitoring the internet shutdown in Sudan by providing daily follow up and updated report about the internet status in Sudan. They found that only mobile data has been turned off by disabling the Access Point “APN,” similar to the shutdown of 2019. After almost 12 hours of shutdown, the internet service came back for only two hours before being was disabled again by a different method. This second time, the internet was shut down by blocking any traffic from outside Sudan and routing the only local-hosted services such as e-banking services and taxi applications.
⚠ Confirmed: Internet partially restored in #Sudan on 25th day of post-coup blackout; real-time metrics show significant rise in cellular connectivity from ~4:30 pm local time; it is unclear if service will be retained, or for how long 📈
📰 Live Report: https://t.co/uVVZKc05Hi pic.twitter.com/z68J4JPDTR
— NetBlocks (@netblocks) November 18, 2021
Social media access remains intermittent. On November 18, 2021, Netblocks confirmed the internet was restored, but with limitations to social media access.
The Open Observatory of Network Interference explorer (OONI explorer) shows that WhatsApp was not accessible through providers Zain Sudan and MTN SD but it was accessible through Canar Telecom Company. It also shows that Telegram was not accessible through MTN SD while it was accessible through Canar and Zain Sudan.
Days after the coup, an alliance consisting of the Sudanese Consumer Protection Organization (SCPO), Dr Yassir Mirghani, the Secretary-General of SCPO, Abdalazeem Hassan on behalf of the allied attorneys’ law firm, Salma Mohamed and Tasneem Hashim filed suit challenging the internet shutdown on the basis of their subscription contracts with the telecom companies. On November 9, 2021, the general court of Khartoum ordered the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to restore internet service to the SIM cards of the complainants. After two days, the same court ordered the ISPs to restore internet service for all subscribers all over Sudan.
On November 11, Al-Sadig Gamaludin, the general manager of the Sudanese Telecommunication and Postal Regulatory (TPRA) issued an administrative decision directing the ISPs to continue cutting off internet services, saying: “Executing the higher leadership directives to cut off the internet according to the emergency state and considering the emergency state as a sovereign decision related to protecting the national security and it’s greater than any other decision that comes from any other institution. So, the internet shutdown decision is valid until further notice.”
The TPRA decision depends on Articles 6 (J), 7.1, article 7.2 (A) of the TPRA law of 2018, which assign the TPRA the duty of “protecting the national security and the higher interests of Sudan,” and “the state's obligations and requirements in the field of national security and defence, and national, regional and international policies.” “National security” is a vague term that was not defined, which let the authorities abuse it in their interests against the people’s interests. Also, Article 77 says: “TPRA has the right to shut down any wireless device or wireless station or broadcast station temporarily or permanently if it turns out that it’s working in a way that violates the law rule and the regulations.”
The ISPs appealed the TPRA's decision, and the judge rejected it and ordered them to restore internet services. The government ignored this directive. Subsequently, the general court in Khartoum issued an arrest warrant for the CEOs of telecom companies in Sudan, denying their release until they restored internet services to all subscribers. As a result, the internet was restored with some restrictions on social media sites. During this time, Sudanese people uses VPN to bypass the blocking. Private companies like Proton VPN provided free VPN to the Sudanese people.
Internet freedom is a human right. The people in #Sudan can use ProtonVPN for free to bypass online censorship: https://t.co/xEBTynf9Vb https://t.co/URen2sLJw5
— ProtonVPN (@ProtonVPN) November 19, 2021
The courts continue to side with the Sudanese people. On November 24, the general court of Khartoum court, which belongs to the first level of courts, ordered the ISPs to restore the internet without any restrictions. Netblocks confirmed the restoration on Twitter:
ℹ Update: Social media and messaging platforms have been restored in #Sudan on all major internet providers.
Telecoms disruptions since the 25 October military coup included a near-total blackout and partial restrictions that stifled human rights.
📰 https://t.co/uVVZKchH5S pic.twitter.com/C2YdXvvPN5
— NetBlocks (@netblocks) November 24, 2021
Shahad Abdelrahman, a legal advisor at Allied Attorneys, a Sudanese law firm based in Durban in South Africa, said that she did not expect the internet shutdown to affect the legal process because of the independence of the Sudanese judiciary, as well as the court’s continued dependence on analogue methods like paper and pen. However, she did raise concerns about the ongoing court strike as judges joined the nationwide civil disobedience confronting the coup. Even so, internet shutdowns remain a political challenge in Sudan. “In a recent case,” Abdelrahman added, “ lawyers went as far as securing a written undertaking from the internet service providers prohibiting them from switching off the internet, but we are yet to see the results of this procedure.”
Waleed Ahmed, an independent journalist working in Khartoum, explained to Global Voices that the shutdowns were a major social and economic challenge in Sudan, disrupting work and especially the already tenuous connections with the rest of the world because of the legacy of sanctions. He concludes:
I know many who lost jobs and educational opportunities, and this is without mentioning those who lost financially due to the dependence of their work on the internet. We have lost the right to express our opinions and I personally have lost contact with friends in the diaspora. They have violated our right of expression.

author: Khattab Hamad


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Tunisia: New prosecutions resurrect shadow of dictatorship · Global Voices
Yosr Jouini

Screenshot from Facebook video of Tunisian Presidency homepage, showing President Kais Said in a visit to Avenue Habib Bourguiba in the capital city, Tunis.
On July 25, 2021, Tunisian President-elect Kais Said announced the dismissal of the prime minister, a freeze of the elected parliament, and his rule by decree. While Tunisia has been lauded as the only Arab Spring country to succeed in its democratic transition, this latest announcement fuelled growing concerns that the country is entering a political crisis.
Shortly after independence in 1956, the country adopted a republican presidential regime that lasted for over half a decade during which authoritarian presidents took extensive executive powers and labeled themselves “fathers of the nation.” For Tunisians, President Said's July 25 power grab brought back memories of not only solo presidential rule but also the stereotypical image of a president with a monopoly over powers and low tolerance for public criticism
President Said is a constitutional law professor who was first introduced to Tunisians through 8 p.m. news segments on the national TV channel, where he was often invited to clarify legal matters. His appearances were marked by his formal Arabic, serious tone, and old literary references. Many years later, Said’s Arabic is less formal, mixed with words in the Tunisian dialect, but, most importantly, his metaphors when referencing his opponents — or any critics — are now harsher than ever.
Said has on different occasions used social media to publish videos of speeches and one-on-one meetings with government officials or representatives of national organizations, addressing both his critics and his supporters. He doesn’t always name his opponents but he refers to them as insects, traitors, or uneducated. His most controversial speech was during a council of ministers when he called on those he designated as “honest citizens”  to “purify the country of those who depleted it.” In other places, this kind of language would amount to incitement to violence.
Many public figures denounced this speech. MP Yassine Ayari commented in a Facebook Post:
“He calls for civil war, street justice, and witch hunts. […] For the one who has not understood it, the honest are his supporters, the others are insects, corrupt, mercenaries, traitors. The phase of the militias that he is going to legally protect is nodding off in Tunisia… ”
Said’s rule has also been characterised by an increase in the use of military courts. In a statement by Amnesty International, during three months, between the 25th of July and November 2021, the military justice system investigated or prosecuted at least 10 civilians. For context, the statement says that in seven years between 2011 and 2018, human rights organizations documented only six cases of civilians brought before the military justice system.
According to Heba Morayef, Amnesty International’s Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa:
In the past three months alone, more civilians have faced military courts than did in the preceding ten years.
Journalists are being specifically targeted in this politically tense period. On October 3, 2021, police forces arrested journalist Ameur Ayed and MP Abdellatif Aloui following their statements criticizing the decisions of the fictional president in “Hassad 24,” a TV program on Zitouna TV.  Ayed criticised President Said’s decision to appoint Najla Bouden, a former university professor, as head of government and referenced lines from “The Ruler,” a poem of Ahmed Matar, an Iraqi poet living in exile. The poem is an imaginary dialogue between the poet and a dictator.
While it is not confirmed which specific statements provoked the arrest, Ayed’s lawyer confirmed that, during the investigations, the police’s initial interrogation focused on Ayed’s statements during the October 1 broadcast.
According to his lawyer, the military court had charged Ayed with calling for an insurgency, degrading the morale of the military, committing a denigrating act against the head of state, and attributing illegal matters to a public official.
These charges are based on Article 67 of penal code, which mandates a fine and prison term for an offense against the president, as well as Articles 72 and 128 of the penal code and Article 91 of the Code of Military Justice. Ayed remained in detention until granted provisional release on November 25, 2021. The next hearing at the Military Tribunal for Ayed and Aloui is set for January 20, 2022.
Human rights organizations have regularly denounced the use of military prosecutions against journalists, and keep asking why they are not investigated under the provisions of Decree-law 115 which is related to freedom of the press, printing, and publishing.
Social media users have also been targeted by these restrictive laws. On November 12, 2021, the Permanent Military Court of Appeal in Tunisia sentenced Slim Jebali, a controversial blogger and administrator of a well-known Facebook page, to six months of prison based on his Facebook posts.
Jebali faced many charges, including committing a despicable act against the head of state based on Article 67 of the penal code, attributing illegal matters to a public official related to his job without providing proof, based on Article 128 of the penal code, and humiliating the army, harming its dignity, reputation, and morale, weakening the spirit of the military regime in the application of Article 91 of the Code of Military Justice.
The initial investigations were based on complaints, including one filed by the Presidency of the Republic for posts on Jebali's Facebook page. In 2016 and 2017, Jebali similarly faced charges for defamation through social networks based on complaints, including one filed by the communications advisor to the presidency of the government, as the office of the prime minister was at that time.
Article 8 of the 1957 Code of Military Justice grants military courts the right to try civilians, but under specific conditions. Article 91 of this code has been particularly used to charge social media users and journalists. The article states that:
Is punished from three months to three years of imprisonment, whoever, military or civilian, in a public place and by the word, gestures, writings, drawings, photographic reproduction or by hand and films, is guilty of insults to the flag or the army, attack on the dignity, reputation, morale of the army, acts liable to undermine military discipline, obedience and respect due to superiors or criticisms of the action of the superior command or of the leaders of the army, thereby undermining their dignity.”
Vague terms such as “attack on the dignity, reputation, morale of the army” allow for interpretations that curb freedom of expression and violate international standards on freedom of expression codified in regional and international conventions.
This law allows for limited and non-arbitrary restrictions to freedom of expression for “legitimate” purposes. In contrast, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Tunisia is a state party, allows restrictions if they are “provided by law” and “necessary” for “the respect of the rights or reputations of others.”
Human rights defenders expressed concerns over the control of the executive branch over the appointment of judges and prosecutors in the Tunisian military justice system. In his report following his 2012 mission to Tunisia, the special rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, noted that “the institutional independence of military judges remains questionable by the fact that the Minister for Defence presides over the […] military judicial council.”
The calls to reform and revoke repressive laws started as early as 2011 with the interim government suspending Tunisia’s 1959 constitution. However, many legal texts and decrees that contradict the 2014 Constitution and violate human rights remain in effect.
For instance, the 2014 Constitution guaranteed the right to a fair trial in Article 27 and protected freedom of expression in Article 31. It stipulates that the military courts are only “competent to deal with military crimes,” but also states “the military courts shall continue to exercise the powers vested in them by the laws in force until they are amended.” Decrees 69 and 70 of July 2011 amending the 1957 Code of Military Justice did introduce important elements such as the establishment of a military court of appeals, but these reforms do not sufficiently protect freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, and, for the last 10 years, citizens have been tried before both the military and civilian courts for opinions shared on social media.
In 2017 and 2018, the opposition democratic block in the parliament proposed draft legislation to amend the Code of Military Justice. The draft bill, similar to efforts to review the penal code, criminal procedures code and other laws, never made it onto the parliament’s general session agenda. Ruling parties in the parliament didn’t push the review of these laws to comply with the 2014 constitution and international human rights norms.
For Tunisians, these laws contribute to their ongoing sense of déjà vu. The gaps in these legislations have been used to restrict freedoms, interfere in the judicial process and repress critics. Similar tactics were used by the Ben Ali regime, the post-revolution 2011 to 2021 rulers, and today in the post-July 25, 2021 era. Until they are addressed, the nightmare may continue to recur.

author: Yosr Jouini


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Despite updates in legislation, organisations in Uganda struggle with data protection and privacy compliance · Global Voices
Brian Oduti

Angella Tugume, Manager Data Protection Affairs at the Uganda Personal Data Protection Office, speaks during the 3rd Africa Privacy Symposium in Kampala. Screenshot from Unwanted Witness YouTube channel.
While Ugandan legislation was recently updated to include more provisions aimed at protecting digital privacy, reality on the ground shows the majority of Ugandans are not guaranteed those rights in daily practice.
When Uganda’s Data Protection and Privacy Act came into force in May 2019, then-executive director of the National Information Authority Uganda (NITA-U), James Saaka, while commenting on the privacy law said, “the law provides the much-needed protection for personal identifiable information which is key in this digital age. It provides important safeguards that will protect Ugandan citizens as they use online services.’’ Aside from the broad constitutional guarantees on the right to privacy of person, property and  correspondence, Uganda did not have any specific safeguards on the privacy of citizens’ data, and the law was supposed to give force to the provisions in the 1995 Constitutional Bill of Rights on the right to privacy, with specific regard to the privacy of data.
However, a new report, titled “A Privacy Policy Scorecard Report: The Scorecard Approach,” reveals glaring gaps in most Ugandan organisations’ compliance with data protection and privacy laws. The report was released on November 5, 2021, by Unwanted Witness, a Ugandan digital rights organisation, at the 3rd Africa Privacy Symposium in Kampala.
The report specifically details how the Ugandan government and 32 major data collectors in Uganda are complying with privacy and data  privacy standards as outlined in the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2019. The non-state entities covered include telecom companies, banks and e-commerce platforms. Each organisation is assessed against five crucial areas: practising robust data security, complying with privacy best practices, providing information to users before collecting their data, indicating the third parties with whom personal data will be shared, and disclosing third-party requests for data.
The average score of companies assessed was 35 percent, a worrying start for compliance with Uganda’s Privacy and Data Protection Act, in an already troublesome broader context of a clamp down on digital rights and digital surveillance by the government. More than half of the organisations assessed had robust data security, and 40 percent comply with privacy best practices. However, when it comes to providing users with information before collecting their data, indicating the third parties with whom that data will be shared, and disclosing how much data will be provided to those parties (including the government and law enforcement), the organizations perform poorly across the board. Only 8 percent of organisations mention third parties with whom personal data is shared  but all declined to reveal how much data was requested and shared with third parties such as government bodies and law-enforcement agencies.
The enactment of the data protection law was crucial as more Ugandans were starting to use the internet. As of January 2021, Uganda’s internet penetration was at 26.2 percent, a 14 percent growth in one year. This is despite a 12 percent excise tax the government introduced on the purchase of data in 2021,  and a social media tax in 2018. The growth in the number of internet subscribers implies more data is being collected and processed, not just by the government and telecom companies, but also the numerous e-commerce companies and ride hailing apps present in Uganda.
Uganda’s government began its first ever mass enrollment for government-issued national identity cards in 2014. In 2017, the Uganda Communications Commission and Uganda Police issued a mandatory requirement for all persons in the country to re-register their SIM-cards using national identity cards. This re-registration implied sharing the personal data of millions of citizens between telecom companies and the government, which raised concern among citizens: .
Hope telecom companies are not breaching Uganda's Data Protection and Privacy Act 2019 by sharing our data to Nabanja & her COVID-19 Task Force.@mtnug @Airtel_Ug @africellUG @SmileComsUG @K2Uganda…this is a national concern over legal protections of Ugandans’ electronic data. pic.twitter.com/giZvRNSUHc
— #FreeBobiWine 🇺🇬🇺🇸 (@HillaryTaylorVI) June 22, 2021
Conversely, the government’s recent questionable decision to install digital trackers on all vehicles, and concerns about surveillance of political opponents demonstrate that it may not be trusted to comply with privacy and data protection laws, as some netizens point out:
Uganda's increased State surveillance is always deployed onto those with opposing views. Museveni promising digital trackers for all cars and motorbikes is a scary policy proposal and should be challenged in court. The increased datafication in Uganda is exclusionary in nature. pic.twitter.com/AclVjExPEC
— Kemigisa (@JackyKemigisa) June 10, 2021
There are also concerns that the law might be too lenient with corporations. The act affirms, among other provisions, that  data collectors are obliged to collect, process and hold data for the specific purpose that the data was collected for. The penalties include imprisonment of up to ten years and/or a fine not exceeding USD 1400.  This fine is nominal in contrast with the volume of personal data that government and corporate data collectors hold, and the potential for damage to citizens should privacy be abused, and the potential revenue that can be raked in from the sale of personal data to third parties.
The right to privacy is particularly inconsistently applied within companies with a pan-African presence, with companies strengthening or weakening their policies depending on the country, the report indicates.
The privacy policies of Stanbic Bank, one of Africa’s leading financial institutions, vary according to country. In South Africa, for example, the bank’s privacy policy covers seven aspects of the right to privacy, which include access; update and correct; delete, erase, cancel;  restrict data processing and object data processing; opt out of marketing, and not be the subject; withdraw consent; and query, report and complaint, whereas, in Tanzania, Stanbic Bank's privacy policy covers only four of the seven aspects assessed. In Malawi, it doesn’t covers any.
Similarly, Airtel, MTN, Standard Bank, and Old Mutual have different privacy policies in different African countries. According to the report, this difference in compliance could be explained by the stringent nature of regulation in some countries, as evidenced by the existence of data protection laws or authorities. Only a few companies, including Jumia, Safeboda, and KiKUU, have consistent privacy policies across the countries in which they operate.
The report cites Uganda’s government as the best performer in terms of data security, based on 3 scores out of 4. However, the report recognises an urgent need to enhance the state’s capacity to regulate data collectors in the private sector while protecting the rights of citizens. The government’s Personal Data Protection Office and justice system need improved human resource and financial capacities. Sempala Kigozi, head of programs at Unwanted Witness told Global Voices in a Zoom interview, ‘’The courts are not as stringent and punitive  in enforcing the laws. … Our laws are a bit conservative but we will not wait for the laws to be amended to cater for loopholes.’’
The private sector also presents several challenges. According to the report, 66 of Uganda’s most used mobile and web applications, including King James Bible, Glovo, Stanbic Bank, Jumia, SafeBoda, Bolt, AbsaUganda Jiji.ug, KikUU, and Airtel contain trackers. The trackers include crash reporting, analytics, virtual profiling, digital identity, targeted advertising, and geographical location of mobile devices. Some apps were found to require more permissions than other apps in the same category, and some of these permissions can access private user data and cause fraud transactions or automated clicking activities that further deplete  user data.
“In an era where Ugandans entrust so much of their personal information with private and public companies,” said Unwanted Witness CEO, Dorothy Mukasa, “it is imperative that these organizations manage that data responsibly and ethically. Customers have the right to know whether and how their data is being stored, processed, and utilized.’’
“Just because these practices are rampant doesn’t mean that they are right,” added Kigozi. “Using users’ data for commercial benefit without being transparent and clear about it is a clear violation of consumers’ rights. ”
In the interview with Global Voices, Kigozi said that the report was already adding to accountability for privacy rights in Uganda, saying, “as CSOs, we have come up with a report and companies will know that they are being watched. For instance, we petitioned NITA over SafeBoda which did not have a privacy policy. SafeBoda changed for the better and now has one of the best privacy policies.”
The report affirms that there are gaps in digital privacy in Uganda, and without stringent compliance with data protection and privacy rules, as pointed out by the report, both government and corporations are indeed at risk of violating citizens’ rights.

author: Brian Oduti


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In Nigeria, the government weaponises the law against online expression · Global Voices
Tomiwa Ilori

The Nigerian Communications Commission Pavilion at the ITU Telecom World 2013 conference. Image by ITU/ KC. Ortiz, taken on November 20, 2013 (CC BY 2.0).
Online expression is not free in Nigeria. In fact, laws that ought to protect online expression in Nigeria are currently being used to violate it.
In particular, the Nigerian government has routinely used the Nigerian Communications Act of 2003 (NCA) to justify the violation of online expression. Oftentimes, the government orders Internet Service Providers (ISPs) through the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) to block websites or social media platforms, and the ISPs (internet service provider)  also roll over and carry out the government’s bidding without any pushback. As a result, the government continues to carry out unwarranted attacks against online expression.
In 2017, the NCC ordered ISPs to restrict access to certain websites belonging to Biafran separatists agitating for self-governance in the southeastern region of Nigeria based on section 146 of the act, and ISPs complied with the order. While there could be grounds for restricting the separatists’ websites, there are no clear indications that the provisions of the NCA were complied with before giving such an order. In a letter dated January 21, 2021, the NCC ordered MTN, an ISP operating in Nigeria, to restrict access to the website of an online news outlet, Peoples’ Gazette based on section 146 of the NCA. In the past, Peoples’ Gazette had been critical of the Nigerian government and its policies by exposing state-enabled corruption and human rights violations.
Another telco 9mobile blocked our website as ordered by the Buhari regime. MTN offered a similar explanation recently.
The government should address endemic corruption and injustice being exposed by our reporters rather than denying citizens their rights to useful information. pic.twitter.com/NSc71Us052
— Peoples Gazette (@GazetteNGR) December 16, 2021
In June 2021, the Nigerian government also ordered ISPs to restrict Nigerians’ access to Twitter, a social media platform. The order was based on the claim that the platform is being used for “activities capable of  undermining Nigeria’s corporate existence,” and the ISPs complied. Amnesty International has described the order as “clear violations of the right to freedom of expression, access to information and freedom of the press.”
As provided for under section 1, the NCA seeks to provide regulatory oversight for Nigeria’s telecommunications sector, while section 3 establishes the NCC to carry out day-to-day regulatory functions with respect to the telecommunications sector. However, some provisions of the act are being weaponized by the Nigerian government to clamp down on online expression in Nigeria.
For example, section 146(2) of the act provides that, upon a written request by the NCC, an ISP must assist in the prevention of an offense in Nigeria. Section 148(1) of the act then provides for instances where the NCC may act in the interest of public safety to suspend the license of an ISP, withdraw the services or network facilities of an ISP, order that a specified communication should not be communicated from or to an ISP, or order taking over an ISP’s equipment.
In addition to these provisions, section 53(2) of the act requires that, before the NCC issues a direction in writing to ISPs for compliance or non-compliance with the act, a person against whom such direction is issued must be provided with a notice to defend their actions. In the examples highlighted above, there was no evidence that the NCC complied with section 53(2).
Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria guarantees the protection of the right to freedom of expression, opinion and access to information. The right is not absolute and can be limited in some instances. However, such instances must be clear, and they are provided for under section 45 of the Constitution. It states that limitations of the right must be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society to protect public interest and the rights of others.
In addition to these provisions, the Nigerian government also has obligations to protect the right under international human rights standards such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter). Article 19(1) and (2) of the ICCPR say that everyone has the right to their opinion and expression. Article 19(3) has also been interpreted to mean that, for the right to freedom of expression to be limited, it must be provided for by law, it must be based on a legitimate reason, the measure used to restrict such right must be proportional, and the restriction must be necessary.
Article 9 of the African Charter also guarantees the right to freedom of expression. In addition, in 2019, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, fulfilling its mandate to protect the rights provided for under the African Charter, recently revised the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. Principle 38 of the revised declaration holds that states shall not interfere with individuals’ right to receive and impart information online by blocking content, except when such interference is in line with international human rights standards.
While the provisions of section 146 of the NCA highlighted above provides for legitimate instances such as public safety or public emergencies to block online content, the outright blocking of websites without considering other least intrusive measures like limiting specific content does not comply with Nigeria’s Constitution and internationally set standards. In addition to this, the Nigerian government has not shown any verifiable connection between this content and the harm it supposedly causes. It appears that the Nigerian government weaponises the term “national security” to clamp down on online expression without providing any specific examples to justify its use or show that its actions are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
As a way forward, policymakers, the private sector and civil society need to note that laws like the NCA are being weaponised against online expression in Nigeria. The National Assembly should ensure a digital rights approach to its laws, and laws like the NCA must be brought in line with constitutional and international human rights standards. This includes amending the provisions of the NCA and ensuring that, at least, laws that ought to protect digital rights like online expression are not used to violate it.
Civil society also has a crucial role to play in monitoring the reforms and implementation of laws that impact online expression in Nigeria. This can be done by strategic advocacy that knows when to name abuse of state powers, when to shame it, and when to collaborate for meaningful policy reforms. This advocacy can also train strategic stakeholders like legislators, government agencies, law enforcement and other state actors on the importance of free online expression.
Lastly, ISPs will need to stop rolling over and maximize their economic power to demand the protection of online expression in Nigeria. It is not in the best interest of anyone that human rights protection is allowed to be sacrificed on the altar of business.

author: Tomiwa Ilori


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Undertones: Online violence in Myanmar, Pakistan’s smog cover-up · Global Voices
Civic Media Observatory

A protest in Myanmar against the military coup on 14-Feb-2021/Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)
Welcome to Undertones, the Civic Media Observatory newsletter! In each edition we analyze an event, emerging trend, or a complex story, identifying key narratives of urgent public interest, delving deep into the context and subtext of local, vernacular and multilingual media. Undertones also offers an entry point into the public datasets that underpin our Observatory work.
Military supporters in Myanmar are using online spaces to trumpet pro-military narratives pwhile the junta commits human rights abuses.
The government of Pakistan’s Punjab region is seeking to ban social media posts about the poor air quality in the region. While Pakistan’s smog crisis has been covered internationally, little attention has been paid to government efforts to censor citizens’ reactions to the issue.
Following the coup d’état by Myanmar’s military in February 2021, a minor but vocal sector of the Burmese population began ramping up their support for the military’s actions, including the military council and its violent operations. This pro-military faction claims pro-democracy supporters are dissidents who are bringing violence upon themselves by fighting for a lost cause.
Military supporters justify recent military killings as necessary retaliation against the People's Defence Force (PDF), the armed wing of the governmental body in exile. The military council refers to the PDF as “terrorists,” a term its supporters have readily adopted.
Social media posts and comments openly supporting the military’s actions against civilians have offline consequences. Besides being distressful to readers, such posts bolster the belief that it is acceptable—or even necessary—to perpetrate violence against those who align themselves with the pro-democracy movement. On December 5, a military truck rammed into a crowd of protestors, killing five people. Two days later, the military was allegedly involved in burning 11 people alive in a forest in the Sagaing region.
“Violence against pro-democracy supporters is justified”
Online military supporters play a crucial role in understanding online and offline power dynamics in Myanmar. Pro-military supporters express their views openly on social media and also target pro-democracy supporters.
One widely shared text by a pro-military propaganda writer who goes by the name Shwe Moe Win called the victims of the December 5 truck incident “ass-kissing humanitarians,” and declared that “the military has been kind [to them].” This post circulated in pro-military spaces on Facebook and received hundreds of positive reactions.
Other pro-military social media posts are less overt. Thazin Oo, a military supporter with more than 100,000 followers on Facebook, has implied that pro-democracy supporters are “looking for it” by instigating a civil war.
The two posts above were assigned the lowest score in the Civic Media Observatory’s scoring system on account of their wide circulation and condoning and potential incitement of violence.
Other posts, such as this tweet critiquing the impact of one news story highlight the complexities surrounding journalism in Myanmar, its narratives, its role in politics, and how it affects communities.
Every winter, Pakistan experiences a smog crisis that is routinely ignored by the government of the Punjab region. Now, authorities are attempting to censor criticism of the government’s handling of the situation, using Pakistan’s cyber-crime law.
In Lahore, the country’s second-largest city, desperate residents suffering the effects of smog exposure are sharing their concerns online using the hashtag #SaansLenayDo (LetUsBreathe). Climate researchers and journalists are also sharing Lahore’s air quality index data to raise the alarm.
Factors contributing to air pollution include smoke from the burning of seasonal crops and low-grade diesel fumes, as well as colder temperatures due to the global climate crisis.
Devanshi/CC0 – Free to Use
Lahore's urgent smog crisis has serious implications for health and the environment. Lahore is the most polluted city in the world. About 128,000 Pakistanis die annually of air pollution-related illnesses and report symptoms as severe as those associated with COVID-19. Yet the regional Punjab government is censoring people who share personal or scientific data about the smog, thereby limiting access to crucial information and minimizing the effects of a serious public health emergency.
“Society shouldn't blame the current ruling party for the pollution crisis”
The Punjabi authorities promote a number of narratives that deflect responsibility from the ruling party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or PTI. In addition to blaming their predecessors for the endemic pollution, the Minister for Environment Protection in Punjab, Muhammad Rizwan, has denied the existence of smog at all.
Request for taking cognizance under cyber laws, by Minister for Environment Protection in Punjab, Muhammad Rizwan. November 16, 2021.
The Punjab environment department also claims that “anti-Pakistan elements are sharing fake data” to harm the image of the country.
In a letter to the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Rizwan requested that the FIA penalize any person or organization sharing air quality data on social media without the government department's approval under the country's cybercrime law. While this was only a request, the move is sufficient to create a climate of fear where people are hesitant to raise the alarm about the ongoing smog crisis.
Pakistanis have continued to share their concerns on Twitter, however, and have denounced the government’s actions.

author: Civic Media Observatory


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Georgian authorities fail to produce autopsy five months after journalist’s death · Global Voices
OC Media

Aleksandre Lashkarava, screenshot from DW report on journalist's death.
This article by Tata Shoshiashvili was first published on OC Media. An edited version is republished here under a content partnership agreement.
Georgian authorities have failed to release the autopsy results after the death of TV Pirveli camera operator Aleksandre “Lekso” Lashkarava, who died in July after being beaten by members of far-right groups during an anti-LGBTQ+ riot in the capital, Tbilisi. Beka Takalandze, a lawyer representing Lashkarava’s family, confirmed to OC Media that they were still awaiting the results.
This month marks five months since Lashkarava was found dead at his home on July 11, six days after sustaining multiple facial fractures and a concussion during the riot the previous week.
Georgia’s first Queer Pride march had been planned for July 5, but, the day quickly descended into chaos as thousands of far-right counter-protesters took to the streets and attacked journalists and civil society groups. At least 53 media professionals were injured in targeted attacks during the ensuing violence, with the authorities facing criticism for their apparent inaction.
The autopsy is being led by the Levan Samkharauli National Forensics Bureau; however, the family has also insisted that an independent medical examiner, Aleksandre Gejadze, take part in the process.
Gejadze told OC Media that no one from the Samkharauli Forensics Bureau had contacted him about the autopsy for five months. “I have no new information. I am waiting for data from the Samkharauli Bureau.”
Jeanne Cavelier, the head of the Eastern Europe and Central Asia office of Reporters Without Borders, decried the lack of progress in the investigation as “an alarming situation” and a sign of a “lack of political will.” Speaking to OC Media, Cavelier said, “not only Lashkarava’s autopsy is not ready five months later, but also the investigations into the unprecedented organized violence targeting more than 50 journalists are stalling,” despite guarantees for a full investigation by the Ministry of the Interior into these attacks and Lashkavara's death.
Impunity for crimes against journalists is intolerable: press freedom is a pillar of democracy, it verifies the existence of all other freedoms. Local and international NGOs including [Reporters Without Borders], as well as EU member states, promptly reacted to these brutal attacks, which represents a major setback for press freedom in Georgia.
The failure of the Georgian government to meet its international obligations cannot remain without consequences. The authorities have a duty to protect journalists while they are doing their job. Once again, we urge them to face their responsibility, to conduct an in-depth, impartial and transparent investigation of the circumstances of Lashkavara's death and of the attacks, and to prosecute all those responsible for acts of violence and for their organization.
Cavelier said, that while some 30 people were arrested for having carried on the violence, no one has been charged with organizing the violence.
Following the violence on July 5, and Lashkarava’s subsequent death, the Georgian government faced a barrage of criticism from local and international watchdogs, as well as Western countries.
Despite the attacks on journalists on July 5, the Interior Ministry failed to deploy a significant police presence in the capital throughout the day. In several cases, the officers who were present were slow to intervene when violence broke out in front of them.
The government has responded to the criticism by suggesting that Lashkarava’s death was due to a drug overdose, rather than a result of the injuries he sustained.
On July 12, the director of the interior ministry’s central criminal police department, Mamuka Chelidze, presented an “interim report” into Lashkarava's death, and claimed to have obtained witness testimony that the journalist and a friend bought drugs and “consumed drugs in a forested area.”
Chelidze also said that a toxicology report had found traces of a number of drugs in Lashkarava’s system, including painkillers morphine, codeine, and gabapentin, as well as tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active substance in cannabis, and monoacetylmorphine, one of the active ingredients in heroin.
Lashkarava's family said that he had been prescribed several strong painkillers because of the injuries he sustained.
Giorgi Gogia, associate director for Europe and Central Asia at Human Rights Watch, questioned the government’s motives in releasing the interim report suggesting Lashkarava died of an overdose while taking so long to conduct a full autopsy. “The question is, what was the purpose of the so-called ‘interim report’ published so hastily if not to influence public opinion?” Gogia told OC Media. “It is important that the authorities effectively investigate the exact causes of [Lashkarava’s] death and bring all perpetrators to justice.”
The Samkharauli National Forensics Bureau told OC Media that the examination was “nearing completion,” and that the results would be presented to the authorities “as soon as possible.”

author: OC Media


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New Caledonia votes to stay with France in referendum boycotted by the Indigenous population · Global Voices
Mong Palatino

Electoral card for the November 2018 New Caledonia independence referendum. Flickr photo by gérard, (CC BY-SA 2.0)
On December 12, New Caledonian voters overwhelmingly decided to remain a territory of France in a referendum marred by a low turnout and the non-participation of the Indigenous Kanak population.
New Caledonia is a South Pacific territory that was colonized by France in 1853 and became a penal colony for convicts and political dissidents. It has been on the United Nations’ list for decolonization since 1986.
Violent clashes between the Kanaks and descendants of European settlers in the 1980s led to the drafting and signing of the Noumea Peace Accord in 1998 which involved the holding of a three-part independence referendum to determine the political future of New Caledonia.
The first referendum took place in November 2018 while the second vote was held in October 2020. In both cases, voters chose to remain with France but the margin was only 10,000 votes with a voter turnout of over 80 per cent.  There were an estimated 25,000 undecided voters. The anti-independence bloc expected a landslide win for their cause but the two referendums reflected the growing support for the self-determination campaign of the Kanak population.
Various groups had called for the postponement of the third referendum because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. Kanak elders have also declared a year of mourning after more than 300 Kanak people died this year because of COVID-19. But France dismissed the petition and scheduled the referendum for this December, even though the Noumea Peace Accord allowed for the voting to take place up to next year.
In response, pro-independence groups urged voters to boycott the referendum. Because of the non-participation of the Kanak population, the turnout was only 43.9 per cent.
Pacific civil society organizations have issued a statement rejecting the referendum results:
The referendum was not consultative and it does not serve the common good of the Kanaky population, who exercised their right to not participate in the pseudo-referendum.
This non-participation of pro-independence indigenous people should have been a clear signal to France of the public mood, recognising that the poll results cannot be received as the genuine resolve of the Kanak people.
The Melanesian Spearhead Group, a five-member sub-regional organization that includes Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and New Caledonia’s main independence coalition (FLNKS) has asked the United Nations to declare the results of the third referendum null and void because of the non-participation of the Indigenous people of Kanaky.
We firmly support the call by FLNKS for the UN to declare the results of the 3rd Referendum null and void due to the ‘non-participation’ of the people of Kanaky. Voter turnout was below 50% of registered voters hence cannot be taken as the legitimate wish of the silent majority!
— MSG Secretariat (@MsgSecretariat) December 13, 2021
Marylou Mahe, a Kanak studying in France, wrote about the sentiment of her people:
The future of New Caledonia cannot be built without its indigenous people. The Kanak voice is the cornerstone of New Caledonia’s common destiny.
This is a time for traditional Kanak mourning. More than 50 per cent of the people who have died from the virus are Kanak. The Customary Senate, the representative body of the Kanak people, has declared a period of mourning of one year.
Yet the state has dismissed this issue. We felt this was a sign of contempt. I have the impression that my culture is being ignored, that my Kanak identity is being denied, and that we are being set back more than 30 years. To a time when our voice did not count. As if I and we didn’t exist.
Scholar David Robie noted the geopolitical importance of New Caledonia for France:
New Caledonia is critically important to France’s projection of its Indo-Pacific economic and military power in the region, especially as a counterbalance to growing Chinese influence among independent Pacific countries. Its nickel mining industry and reserves, important for manufacturing stainless steel, batteries and mobile phones, and its maritime economic zone are important to Paris.
France welcomed the results of the referendum and vowed to pursue more reforms and dialogue in New Caledonia. Officials said the low turnout does not affect the legal validity of the referendum.
There are worries that the decision to ignore the appeal of the Kanak to postpone the referendum would inflame political tensions again. Meanwhile, the fight for Kanak self-determination continues in New Caledonia.


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Turkish prosecutor general closes investigation into death of Azerbaijan’s ‘graffiti prisoner,’ Bayram Mammadov · Global Voices
Arzu Geybullayeva

Bayram Mammadov. Photo courtesy of Vahid Aliyev, used with permission.
Six months after the body of Azerbaijani activist Bayram Mammadov was found by the Turkish coast guards in Istanbul, the Turkish prosecutor general's office has issued the final autopsy report, officially closing the investigation into his death. According to the results of the forensic medical examination, Mammadov, 26, died by drowning.
Mammadov was known in Azerbaijan as one of the two “graffiti prisoners” or “statue prisoners.” On May 8, 2016, armed with spray paint, Mammadov and Giyas Ibrahimov, sprayed the words “Qul Bayramınız Mübarək” (Happy Slave Day) and “F*** the system” on the statue of the former president of Azerbaijan, Heydər Əliyev ahead of the “Flower Celebration,” a day marking the birthday of Əliyev.
“Qul Bayramınız Mübarək” was a play on words—“Gül” in Azerbaijani means flower, while “Qul” means “slave.” When Ibrahimov and Mammadov were arrested the following day, they were accused of drug possession. The ministry of the interior allegedly “found” two kilograms of heroin at both men's homes. Ibrahimov and Mammadov were first sentenced to four months of pretrial detention. In October 2016, Ibrahimov, 21 at the time, was sentenced to 10 years, while Mammadov, also 21, received a similar sentence in December 2016. In March 2019, both men were pardoned and released from jail. Mammadov was re-arrested several times and said he was tortured during these periods of incarceration.
In February 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the trial and sentences of Mammadov and Ibrahimov were in violation of several articles of the European Convention on Human Rights and ordered the government of Azerbaijan to pay both men 36,000 EUR (43,700 United States dollars) in compensation.
Bayram was planning to use that money for his education abroad. He moved to Istanbul in November 2020 to study for English language exams, and continue applying to universities abroad.
The last time his friends saw him was on April 29.
Following the reports of his death, Mammadov's friends reached out to a group of independent lawyers at the Progressive Lawyers Association in Turkey. In a tweet on December 7, the association shared their statement:
BASINA VE KAMUOYUNA
Azerbaycanlı anarşist Bayram Mammadov’un ölümü hakkında yürütülen soruşturmaya dair açıklamamızdır. #BayramMammadov pic.twitter.com/zV1MwYW4qm
— ÇHD İstanbul Şube (@CHDistanbul) December 7, 2021
To the attention of media and the public. This is our statement on the investigation conducted into the death of Azerbaijani anarchist Bayram Mammadov.
The statement concluded that based on the autopsy results, the association confirmed that Mammadov had died by drowning.
After Mammadov's death, his father traveled to Istanbul to bring home his son for the final farewell. Mammadov was buried on May 9, a day before the annual Flower Day celebration and the date on which he was arrested in 2016.

author: Arzu Geybullayeva