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Despite attacks and threats, a Brazilian priest distributes aid to São Paulo’s growing homeless population · Global Voices
Talita Fernandes

Júlio Lancellotti (right) with one of the beneficiaries of the activities of St Michael the Archangel Parish, wearing an apron referring to Sister Dulce, the first Brazilian saint | Photo: Publication/Used with permission.
In São Paulo, city authorities estimate that around 24,000 people are living on the streets, a number that is on the rise as more people find themselves without a job during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the midst of this crisis, Father Julio Lancellotti and his São Miguel Arcanjo parish have been distributing hygiene products and food rations to over 400 of the city's homeless every day.
Lancellotti, who has been a priest for 35 years, has a large social media following and is well known for his work with juvenile offenders, people with HIV, the homeless, and LGBTQI+ communities.
However, this work has often put him in the line of fire. He has received death threats and has been the victim of attempted extortion. This past September, a state congressman campaigning for mayor in São Paulo called Lancellotti a “pimp of misery” and accused him of encouraging drug trafficking. His statements led to verbal attacks against the priest in the streets.
In 2017, when current President Jair Bolsonaro was a federal deputy representing Rio de Janeiro, he sued Lancellotti for moral damages after the priest called Bolsonaro “racist, sexist, and homophobic” during a religious address. Lancellotti won the case against Bolsonaro at the beginning of November 2020.
Father Lancellotti spoke with Global Voices by phone about his experiences and the challenges faced by Brazil's poorest communities during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Father Julio Lancellotti attending to a person living on the streets who arrived in his parish cold. Photo: Publication/Used with permission.
Talita Fernandes (TF): You've been working with people on the margins of society. What motivated you to make this choice?
Júlio Lancellotti (JL): Não tem um fato específico. Eu sempre convivi com a população de rua, e aqui na Arquidiocese de São Paulo, levamos as propostas do Concílio Vaticano II e as propostas de Puebla, isto é, da opção preferencial pelos pobres, para as ruas. Formamos, então, comunidades com o povo da rua. E eu fiz essa caminhada desde o início, há cerca de 30 anos, quando foi criado o Vicariato Episcopal do Povo da Rua. E a partir daí, vários grupos surgiram.
Júlio Lancellotti (JL): There is no specific reason. I have always lived with people on the street, and here in the Archdiocese of São Paulo we believe in the ideas of the Second Vatican Council and the ideas of Puebla, that is, a preference for the poor, for the streets. We create communities with people on the street. And I’ve made this journey from the beginning, about 30 years ago, when the Episcopal Vicariate of the People on the Street was created. And from then on, various groups came into being.
TF: Homeless people in Brazil are subject to violence and are at risk of being killed. Do you think these kinds of attacks have escalated as the country grows more politically polarized?
JL: Se intensificaram por isso, mas também porque a população de rua tem aumentado muito. Então, isso traz um incômodo para a população. Às vezes eu penso que é porque eles estão vendo a possibilidade do que pode acontecer com eles também. Então, uma forma de negar é afastar. Há uma política higienista muito forte. A vida da população de rua é muito pública, todo mundo vê onde eles estão e o que eles estão fazendo – quando convém. E isso causa incômodo. Mas o pano de fundo de toda essa intolerância é a especulação imobiliária. A moradia virou comércio. Não se constroem casas para o povo, algo que seja acessível à população que está nas ruas.
JL: They have escalated because of this, but also because the number of people living on the streets has greatly increased. This presents an inconvenience for people. Sometimes, I think it's because they're seeing the possibility of what can happen to them as well, so one way to deny it is to drive them away. The lives of people living on the street is very public; everybody sees where they are and what they are doing — when it suits them — and this causes discomfort. The background to all this intolerance is property speculation. Housing has become a business. Houses are not built for the people, they are not accesible for people living on the streets.
TF: In your opinion, what public policy should be a priority for homeless people in Brazil?
JL: Não tem uma resposta única. É uma complexidade, porque a moradia é uma questão importante, mas também são importantes o trabalho, a saúde, a saúde mental, e a convivência. Por isso que eu digo: o que é muito importante é tudo aquilo que gera autonomia. As respostas que se dão hoje são institucionais. [Nos abrigos públicos] tem horário para entrar, para sair, para comer, e todas as decisões são tomadas por outros. A vida tem uma rotina, mas essa rotina não deve ser estabelecida de fora de você, mas a partir da sua necessidade.
E também tem um aspecto que não se leva em consideração: o aspecto afetivo e da sensualidade. Muitos deles são jovens. Eles vão namorar, encontrar alguém quando? Um dia eu disse isso para uns frades e eles ficaram meio assustados – eu falei: Os frades fazem voto de pobreza, obediência e castidade e quem tem que cumprir são os moradores de rua. Porque eles têm que levar uma vida pobre, obediente e casta. É como se as ruas fossem um grande mosteiro e eles, o tempo todo, têm que ter todas as qualidades que nós não temos: eles têm que ser sempre educados, sempre contidos, sempre gentis, sempre agradecidos, sempre solícitos.
JL: There is no one single answer. It is complex, because housing is an important issue but work, health, mental health, and coexistence — everything that generates autonomy — are also important.  [In public shelters] there are times to enter, for leave, to eat, and all the decisions are made by others. Life has a routine, but this routine should not be decided for you, [it should be] based on your needs.
And there is also an aspect which is not taken into account: the emotional and sensual aspect. Many [homeless people] are young. When will they date, meet somebody? One day, I said this to some friars and they were a little shocked. I said “…friars take a vow of poverty, obedience and chastity, and it is the homeless who have to fulfil it. It is as if the streets were a great monastery and they — all the time — have to have all the qualities that we do not. They have to always be polite, always contained, always kind, always grateful, always considerate.”
Lancellotti working among some of the people aided by his church work in 2019 | Image: Publication/Used with permission
TF: Brazil is the seventh most unequal country in the world. What is the role of the church in relation to this social inequality?
JL: A meu ver, o papel da Igreja é lutar pela vida do povo, na defesa dos pobres, na defesa dos direitos humanos. A missão da Igreja é evangelizar, que significa: anunciar uma boa notícia àqueles que estão sofrendo. Aos que estão cegos, aos que estão paralisados, aos que estão maltratados. E, nesse sentido, é o próprio Evangelho. Domingo nós lemos o capítulo 14 de São Mateus, onde Jesus, vendo uma multidão faminta, propõe o Milagre da Partilha, eque a gente chama de multiplicação do pão. Na verdade, a gente devia chamar da Partilha do Pão. Nós vivemos uma sociedade de concentração, não de partilha. E eu acredito que, com o aumento do desemprego, uma economia que, dentro do sistema capitalista, é a que nós estamos vivendo, que nós podemos caminhar ainda pra uma situação social e econômica muito pior. De aumento vertiginoso da miséria.
JL: In my view, the role of the Church is to fight for the life of ordinary people, to defend the poor, to defend human rights. The Church's mission is to evangelize, which means to bring good news to those who are suffering, to those who are blind, to those who are paralyzed, to those who are mistreated and in this sense, it is the Gospel itself. In Chapter 14 of Saint Matthew, Jesus, seeing a hungry crowd, proposes the Miracle of Sharing, which we call the Feeding of the 5,000. Actually, we should call it the Sharing of Bread. We live in a society of hoarding, not sharing and I believe that, with rising unemployment, we could get into a much worse social and economic situation, with spiralling increases in poverty.
TF: You say that a change in society is not just a matter of faith, but of humanizing life. What is this humanization mean for you?
JL: O que eu coloco é que a solidariedade não é uma dimensão religiosa. É uma dimensão humana. A humanização da vida é garantir que todos tenham acesso a alimentação, água potável, trabalho, um lugar para dormir, uma casa, autonomia. Não existe vida humanizada sem liberdade. Você imagina, como mulher, você só poder usar roupas íntimas usadas, que alguém doou para você? As pessoas têm que ter acesso com liberdade. A vida é feita de escolhas, e as grandes escolhas passam pelas pequenas. E as pequenas treinam as grandes. Às vezes as pessoas esquecem que eles [pessoas em situação de rua] têm sentimentos, que têm emoções, que têm tudo aquilo que todo ser humano tem.
JL: What I say is that solidarity is not something religious. It is something human. The humanization of life is ensuring that everybody has access to food, drinking water, work, a place to sleep, a home, autonomy. There is no humanized life without freedom. Can you imagine, as a woman, you only being able to wear second-hand underwear that somebody has donated to you? People must have free access [to things]. Life is made of choices, and the big choices come through the small ones. And the small ones shape the big ones. Sometimes people forget that they [those living on the street] have feelings, that they have emotions, that they have everything that every other human being has.
TF: With so many challenges, what motivates you to continue working alongside these people today?
JL: É a fidelidade. Eu não luto para ganhar, eu luto para ser fiel.
JL: It's faith. I don't strive to win, I strive to be faithful.

author: Talita Fernandes


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2020: The year of feminist struggles and political resistance in Latin America · Global Voices
Eddie Galdamez, Anette Eklund, Joel Herrera, Romina Navarro, Janine Mendes Franco, Emma Lewis, Fabiola Gutiérrez, Gabriela Mesones Rojo, Fernanda Canofre, Duzka Ortiz, Jermani Ojeda, Carlos E. Flores, Juan Manuel Montoro, Belen Febres, Lully, Ricardo Diaz

2020 Protest in Dignity Plaza (Santiago, Chile) by Paulo Slachevsky and used under a (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0) license.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the year 2020 was marked by the role of feminist and social movements that helped bring about immense political change despite the presence of the COVID-19 pandemic which dominated the headlines and became a global concern.
In a year when the decriminalisation of marijuana and controversies over the raffle of the presidential plane were topics of conversation, feminism and the perceived “anti-feminism” of the Mexican government also warranted attention. In March, a protest took place against the daily average of 10.5 femicide cases in Mexico. Further demonstrations followed seeking justice for individual cases, including for Ingrid Escamilla, Fatima Aldrighett and Jessica González Villaseñor.
Despite political repression during protests in Cancun, the campaign bore fruit with the introduction of the Olympia Law that sanctions digital harassment against women, the Ingrid Law against the dissemination of images of crime victims, the public registry of sex offenders in the Mexican capital, and the Amnesty Law for abortion.
In Argentina, there was a significant increase in calls to address gender-based violence and grooming during quarantine.
The blueprint for a law that legalised abortion, promised by the government in March 2020, was put on hold.
Faced with the initial setback, social media groups played a key role in strengthening women's support networks throughout lockdown. Protests were organised against the alarming increase in femicides during the pandemic. Tweets from the grassroots organisation Ni Una Menos (Literally: “Not one [woman] less”) mobilized activists and thousands took part in a virtual handkerchief rally (waving of green scarves) to demand that the government of Argentina urgently address the voluntary abortion law.
The law, which would allow the voluntary interruption of pregnancy and access to post-abortion care, was sent to National Congress in November and officially passed in December.
In Venezuela, feminists used WhatsApp to continue to support women and provide virtual talks about feminism; and in Nicaragua, feminist groups denounced the neglect and lack of justice for the victims of gender-based violence and the victims’ families.
In January, before COVID-19 arrived in Trinidad and Tobago, a public ceremony was held to commemorate victims of femicide. Citizens demanded effective measures from the State to protect women and girls. In March, following another case of femicide, online users highlighted the link between gender-based violence and child abuse, particularly in instances when COVID-19 restrictions were accompanied by an increase in domestic violence.
In December, when news headlines reported on the femicides of a young mother and an adolescent, social media users expressed fatigue with the narrative that women “should take care of themselves”. Instead, users argued that the focus and responsibility should be removed from women and redirected towards the aggressor.
Montage of images of “Día Naranja” (Orange Day) in protest against violence against women in Puerto Príncipe, 25 January 2020. Photos taken by Womantra, used with permission.
The greatest change in Uruguay occurred in the political arena with the departure of the Broad Front (Left-wing political coalition) and the 2019 election of Luis Lacalle Pou who is from the National Party which returned to power after thirty years as head of the government's “multicolour coalition”.
The current opposition from the Broad Front, as well as other political groups, are critical of the government for the promulgation of the Law of Urgent Consideration (‘Ley de Urgente Consideración’), which they perceive to be a setback in freedom of expression. However, the Lacalle government's successful control of the first wave of COVID-19, resulting in only a few dozen fatalities, positioned the country as a leader in crisis response.
In Bolivia, in October, after a year of polarisation exacerbated by racism and attacks on journalists, citizens peacefully headed to the polls. 55% of voters elected Luis Arce and David Choquehuana from the Movement Towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo). The election of Arce was celebrated in major cities around the world.
Polarisation may continue during the run-up to the sub-national elections for mayors and governors scheduled for March 7, 2021.
A post shared by Daphne Palza Alemán (@daph.palza.aleman)
Bicentennial generation chasing corruption.
International press understated the importance of the protests of the “bicentennial generation” in Peru primarily comprised of young people marking the 200th anniversary of Peru's independence. Demonstrations took place within the context of a country troubled by the Congressional removal of President Martín Vizcarra, the resignation of an illegitimate government of Manuel Merino and the appointment of Francisco Sagasti as interim president. Both Merino and Sagasti used excessive police force against young protestors resulting in at least two fatalities. The chaotic political context this year was compounded by the COVID-19 health crisis as well as the implementation of extractivist policies in favour of large companies in indigenous areas.
Meanwhile, the pandemic did not prevent Chile from holding a historic referendum on October 25 when an overwhelming majority approved the changing of the Constitution promulgated by former dictator Augusto Pinochet in 1980. For a large section of the population, the Constitution was considered as “the mother of Chile's inequalities”. The referendum was the primary demand that fueled the social uprising of October 2019, to which the government responded with repression, arrests, and numerous human rights violations.
A post shared by Territorio Fotográfico Chile (@territoriofotograficochile)
In Colombia, in addition to the high death toll from COVID-19, citizens highlighted their dissatisfaction with the absence of effective solutions to combat high levels of violence across the country. According to the Institute for Studies of Development and Peace, ninety massacres took place in 2020. However, President Ivan Duque insists on denying the seriousness of the homicide rate in the country.
Particularly disturbing was the increase in murders of social leaders and human rights defenders. It was revealed that the police were involved in the murder of Attorney Javier Ordóñez. This finding led to protests followed by police repression and the resulting deaths and injuries of at least ten individuals.
Death threats, assassinations, harassment, abuse and censorship against journalists and activists were constant throughout 2020, yet within this context alternative forms of digital media also emerged that helped activists evade censorship.
In Venezuela, after a year of relative economic normalisation, despite hyperinflation and the amplification of the humanitarian crisis, the pandemic resulted in a resurgence of the government's authoritarian measures. Greater militarisation, control of state institutions and political persecution of journalists and humanitarian activists all characterised public policies. In addition, Nicolás Maduro's government displaced dissident political representation through a questionable parliamentary election.
The pandemic exacerbated Venezuela's migration crisis, already the most severe in the region with 5.4 million citizens already outside the country.  Reports have highlighted that many members of this community are unable to meet their basic needs in host countries, suffering from homelessness and food shortages.
In Jamaica, chaos and fear overwhelmed citizens. While the COVID-19 pandemic topped the list of concerns, an informal poll on Twitter revealed that it was closely followed by fears of a possible increase in crime, despite the fact that the Jamaica Police reported a slight decrease in reports of crime compared to the previous year.
Moreover, night curfews during the pandemic do not appear to have prevented hundreds of illegal parties and social activities from taking place, some of which (organised by people with criminal ties) resulted in acts of violence.
In Nicaragua, citizens have suffered a mixture of negative emotions caused by the public health crisis, concerns over the accuracy of data relating to COVID-19, the impact of the IOTA and ETA hurricanes, and the prospects for the 2021 elections in a country where police repression, the lack of freedom of the press and expression and violations of human rights persist on a daily basis.
Following the wave of protests in 2018, some 100,000 people fled the country, but many Nicaraguans in exile remain involved in political activism. Meanwhile, the government of Daniel Ortega is promoting a triad of laws to strengthen its apparatus of control over the population and prevent any attempt at grassroots opposition.
Further north in El Salvador, 2020 was a year rife with political conflict. President Nayib Bukele constantly confronts the other organs of the State: the Legislative Assembly and the Constitutional Chamber, and referred to the deputies and magistrates as “corrupt, criminals and thieves”. For many, his aggressive style reveals a political plan to control the country. Still, he maintains an approval rating of more than 75% despite accusations against him of corruption, negotiating with gangs and attacks on members of the press.
When Bukele wrote on Twitter about the impact of the pandemic in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian government denied it. Soon, the content circulating on social media made headlines around the world: bodies that no one collected, families searching for the body of a loved one, and alleged cremations of corpses in the streets.
The disinformation narrative was not enough for the government of Ecuador to explain what the city of Guayaquil experienced. Faced with an overwhelmed reality, a Joint Task Force was created to bury the corpses. The Guayaquil mayor's office had to deliver cardboard coffins to the families. Responding to the crisis, the Indigenous peoples of the region organised to protect themselves from the coronavirus.
You may be interested in: Pueblos amazónicos en Ecuador crean su propio monitoreo en internet para conocer el avance del COVID-19
In short, the pandemic caught a region off guard that was already facing numerous problems, and it also tested the resilience of social movements which vigorously campaigned for human rights.
Despite this, some good news on gender issues in the region were highlighted: Ecuador had its first trans march, the government of Argentina approved the trans-transvestite labour quota in the public sector, Bolivia as well as the state of Puebla, Mexico recognized the free union between people of the same sex.
The special edition of “Voces de Latinoamérica” (‘Voices from Latin America’) from the digital medium La Lupa, which features  some of our authors from Bolivia, Uruguay and Mexico, analyses the key events in the region:

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/


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Anti-rights Wiki: An investigation into the conservative lobby in Latin America · Global Voices
Carlos E. Flores

Homepage of the Wiki Antiderechos (Anti-rights Wiki) website. Image used with permission.
In recent years, social movements in Latin America have been strengthened by collaborative networks between countries, which created political and social changes to achieve or expand fundamental human rights. On the other hand, unfortunately, the conservative groups that oppose many of these changes have also grown and become more visible.
For example, in August 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic in Brazil, the case of a 10-year-old girl who was 22 weeks pregnant was made public. The sex offender was her uncle, who had repeatedly raped her since she was six years old. The child decided to terminate the pregnancy, but the Espiritu Santo State Hospital refused to perform the procedure. The girl then had to leave her home and travel more than 1,800 km to the State of Pernambuco, where she had the intervention done according to the current Brazilian law that allows abortion in this type of case.
The process was not easy: The anti-rights groups (misnamed pro-life) did everything possible to prevent the abortion. They invoked God, called the doctors “murderers” and tried to block access to the hospital. The pressure by the Minister of Human Rights, Family and Women and Evangelical pastor Damares Alves added to these actions.
Like all other such cases registered in the region, this case represents a public health issue and also a violation of human rights. However, the anti-rights supporters, with a cross in one hand and the Bible in the other, attack public policies that favor women's rights and also sexual diversity (LGBTIQ+).
In recent years, these groups have mobilized more effectively. This advocacy and its impact on public opinion raise some questions: Who is behind these “pro-life” groups? How are the Catholic and Evangelical congregations organized against sexual and reproductive rights, and gender identities? What are their connections to politics? What advocacy tactics and strategies do they carry out?
These were some of the questions we raised in order to highlight these actors who seek to influence the State in order to eliminate gender-related public policies. In fact, this brainstorming led us to question the term “pro-life.” This was key to how we understood these people and organizations that oppose laws they judge as “unnatural,” for example, voluntary termination of pregnancy, contraception and equal marriage.
But, these laws or regulations relate to human rights. So, these groups are more about anti-rights than pro-life.
Thus, three digital media platforms from Ecuador (Ojo al Dato, Wambra Radio and La Barra Espaciadora) and one from Guatemala (Nómada) decided to create a map of connections to provide some answers to these questions. For seven months, from the end of 2019 to May or June 2020, our team of 10 journalists collected, verified, and cross-checked the data, despite the limitations imposed by the pandemic. To achieve our purpose, we identified all possible anti-rights actors (people or organizations); selected them according to their influence, and built a database.
During this third phase, we collaborated with the Open Knowledge Foundation to categorize and clarify the collected journalistic information. In addition, they designed the website that had as reference similar previous projects, such as Who's Who (Silla Vacía), Who's Who in business and politics (Poderopedia) or the power map of Latin America (QuiénEsQuién.Wiki).
This Who's Who database of anti-rights groups involved collecting information from different sources, such as politicians, academics, and activists (even from the anti-rights movement itself), extensive searches on the internet and social networks, petitions to access public information, and attending public spaces where these actors were present, so we could learn about their social impact.
The project compiled an abundance of data, which also included economic information from private companies linked to anti-rights sectors. However, because of the health emergency that imposed restrictions on movement, it was not possible to delve deeply enough to identify a possible “money route.”
On October 18, as in the case of all research with a journalistic methodology, this rigorous (not speculative) information was published. The following video is a presentation of the platform:
This platform with profiles of the anti-rights actors serves as a source of consultation for a diverse audience interested in learning more about these actors and their relationships, using a Wiki format. The website displays spheres and lines which reveal the direct and the indirect connections of an actor. The latter is understood to be a “revolving door” that could open new connections with other actors who have the same political aspiration: to fight against what they disparagingly call “gender ideology.”
Through these profiles, the user will learn, for example, about the connection of the Capitol Ministries in Ecuador, which, according to press investigations, is a religious organization promoted by senior officials of US President Donald Trump; or about the Catholic-evangelical duo who will be candidates for the Presidency of the Republic in the next general elections in Ecuador in February 2021.
This journalistic work leaves open other questions for investigation: Is it possible to provide an update on the more than 60 identified actors? Is there a timeline that reflects the periodic actions carried out by these groups? Is it possible to add other countries? Can the pending “money route” be specified?
This journalistic material is just the beginning of further investigations. It is important to remember that anti-rights groups are actors who have an impact on public life because of their religious slogans and premises that are clearly regressive in terms of human rights. Therefore, they should be subject to public scrutiny.
In the name of God, Family and Freedom, these groups promote a political, economic and social model contrary to the more inclusive, equitable and democratic societies. This is the topic of a recent publication by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (its Office for the Andean Region).

author: Carlos E. Flores


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Hong Kong pro-establishment camp uneasy about leadership takeover by newcomers · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

The logo of the Bauhinia Party. Image from the Stand News, used with permission.
The blueprint for a new pro-establishment political party in Hong Kong has been circulating in Beijing since November and its appearance has triggered much speculation in the troubled city.
The new political group, the Bauhinia Party, was established by a group of businessmen with mainland Chinese backgrounds. The news of its creation traveled from Beijing to Hong Kong when one of the party's co-founders, Li Shan, presented the party’s vision at an event at Beijing's Tsinghua University last month.
According to Li, the three co-founders, Chen Jian Wen, Charles Wong and Li Shan, decided to set up the new party in March in response to the political turbulence in Hong Kong. They see Hong Kong’s opposition as the result of a weak government and believe they could potentially win enough seats to veto the government budget in the Legislative Council (Legco). To sideline the opposition, the new party advocates for a new political system composed of a politically appointed upper house over the Legislative Council.
As for social policy, the new party supports large scale land reclamation and privatization of public housing to address the people’s economic woes.
In November 2019, after months of protests, the democratic camp had managed to win a majority of seats in the district council elections. If the Legislative Council had not been deferred by Beijing, the democrats could have become the majority in both the Legco and the election committee of the Chief Executive. Beijing was shocked by the election results and began to lose trust in the local pro-establishment camp.
Currently, all pro-Beijing and pro-establishment political parties in Hong Kong have strong local connections to business, professional and non-governmental sectors. The leaders of the Bauhinia Party, however, are mainland China-born elites who migrated to Hong Kong in the 1980s as China prepared to unify with the former colony of the United Kingdom. The latecomers are generally referred to as the New Hongkongers by local media outlets.
The Bauhinia Party has 20 members but it has the ambition of recruiting 250,000 members for its future election campaigns, according to a report from the South China Morning Post. Such a membership base will be much larger than the biggest pro-Beijing political party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, which only has about 43,000 members.
Charles Wong, another co-founder of the new party told SCMP in an exclusive interview that the mission of the party is to unite Hong Kong and he blamed Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam for the 2019 unrest and the pro-establishment camp for their “weak” governance of the city.
Many Hongkongers see the ambition of the newcomer party as a sign of Beijing's hawkish policy to take over Hong Kong by “keeping the island but not the people”—a conspiracy theory which began circulating on both mainland and Hong Kong online media after the district council elections of November 2019. The theory has attracted more and more followers after the enactment of the national security law, as a large number of activists were arrested and jailed, the pro-Beijing camp had started to purge the education sector and government civil servants were forced to take loyalty pledges. As a result, a large number of Hongkongers decided to migrate.
The new pro-establishment party is, therefore, viewed as another sign of the existence of a complete takeover policy by Beijing. This time, the target is, however, not directed at the opposition and dissidents but the existing ruling elites, as Simon Shen, a political scientist and columnist, suggested with a “blood transplant” metaphor to describe the reshuffling of the city’s leadership by replacing the old loyalists with new ones:
【#Patreon突發時空】香港換血全速進行。最新一著是，一個新政黨「紫荊黨」已經成立，成員主要由「新香港人」組成，骨幹是北大、清華在香港工作的校友。他們已經有香港身份，也許是輸入的「專才」，也許曾在香港讀書，主要在中資機構工作，開宗明義為「港漂」爭取權益… pic.twitter.com/yEOON7I16p
— Simon Shen (@simonshen_glos) December 6, 2020
[#Patreon Breaking] Hong Kong is having a blood transplant at full speed. The latest move is the establishment of a new political party composed of “New Hongkongers.” The key persons graduated from Peking University and Tsinghua University. They had already obtained full Hong Kong citizenship. The background of their members would be those who settled in Hong Kong through the elites migration plan or student visa. They would work for corporate companies with mainland Chinese backgrounds and advocate policies that served the interest of the mainland Chinese Diaspora.
Joseph Wong, former Secretary for the Civil Service of the Hong Kong government also believed that the party would challenge the leadership of local pro-establishment parties:
講個人質素，這批海歸派，無論是學歷、普通話和英語的表達能力、內地政治的認識和人脈關係、國際視野，以至事業成就，今天大多數的建制派代表成員，都是望塵莫及。香港回歸23年來，透過每天來港的150名單程證人士和各式各樣的專才計劃，以至在香港各大學畢業後留下來的內地生，數十萬計有內地背景的新香港人已落地生根。只要風向改變，他們完全可以成為紫荊黨的支持者或改變之前的投票習慣。從中央全面管治香港的角度思考，除去民主派後，讓一股愛國新力量參與各級選舉，藉此制衡本土建制勢力…
The personal traits of the group of mainland Chinese Diaspora including their education background, language skills, social capital, international horizons and career achievements are far more outstanding than representatives of the current pro-establishment camp. In the past 23 years after the handover of Hong Kong to China, under the daily 150 one-way visa and Quality Migrant Admission Scheme, tens of thousands of new Hongkongers with mainland backgrounds have settled in Hong Kong. Once the political environment changed, they could become Bauhinia Party’s supporters and change their voting habits. As for Beijing, after it has eradicated the democrats, the emergence of a new patriotic force in local elections could provide a counter-balance to the local pro-establishment force…
Veteran journalist Ching Cheong has a more elaborate analysis of the new party. He wrote in the Citizen News that since the outbreak of the anti-China extradition protests in Hong Kong, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had started applying its experience during the Chinese Civil War against the Kuomingtang:
筆者認為，它就是一個在中共香港工委領導下、帶有政黨性質的公開的親中共的「群眾組織」，其目的就是為中共的全面接管香港的政權機構（行政、立法、司法、區議會）和非政權機構（大量的法定團體、馬會、大學的校委會等等）作好準備。在中共的歷史上，每當要「解放」大城市時，必然會事先在該市建立大量親中共的「群眾組織」，以便配合中共解放軍的進軍步伐。
In my opinion, it is a “people’s organization” led by the Hong Kong branch of the CCP. The aim is to prepare for the taking over of Hong Kong’s governmental organizations including the administration, the Legislative Council, the judiciary and the district council, as well as non-governmental institutions, such as statutory bodies, the Jockey Club and universities’ governing committees etc. In the CCP history, whenever they had planned to “liberate” a city, they would establish a massive number of “people’s organizations” to prepare for the People’s Liberation Army’s takeover.
The local pro-establishment camp is worried:
Interesting thing to note: some from the HK pro-establishment camp went to Beijing's liaison office to seek clarifications. And Charles Wong, one of the co-founders of Bauhinia Party, learned about their worry from the liaison office and is now assuaging their fear of a purge.
— Chris Lau (@hkchrislau) December 18, 2020
On the other hand, in the eyes of Hong Kong's pro-democracy camp, the Bauhinia Party is viewed as another rubber stamp for Beijing:
Have you ever thought what the #BauhiniaParty‘s emblem actually represents?#紫荊黨 #只驚黨
#CCP‘s #RubberStamp#HongKong pic.twitter.com/PX5nOC1L2x
— Pentanov (@pentanov) December 11, 2020

author: Oiwan Lam


text:
‘Caribbean super salesman,’ Jamaican tourism mogul ‘Butch’ Stewart, dies at 79 · Global Voices
Emma Lewis

The late Sandals and Beaches resorts chairman, Gordon “Butch” Stewart. Screenshot from a video posted on the Sandals Resorts YouTube channel.
Just after 11 p.m. EST on January 4, news broke that Jamaican hotelier Gordon “Butch” Stewart, the self-made businessman who perfected the all-inclusive tourism model the Caribbean is famous for, had passed away at a Miami hospital at age 79. In keeping with his wishes, his family said that the nature of his illness would not be disclosed.
In a statement on his father’s passing, Adam Stewart noted:
My Dad lived a big life – husband, father, grandfather, great grandfather, entrepreneur, statesman, dreamer. A singular personality and an unstoppable force who revelled in defying the odds, exceeding expectations and whose passion for his family was matched only by the people and possibility of the Caribbean, for whom he was a fierce champion.
The 40 year-old, who has been the deputy chair of Sandals Resorts International for some time, will now take up his father's chairmanship of the business.
Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness reacted on his Facebook page:
It is with deep sadness that I learnt of the passing of one of Jamaica’s most brilliant, innovative and transformative business minds, the Honourable Gordon ‘Butch’ Stewart […]
Butch was a man way ahead of his time, he had an eye for details and his ability to market and deliver world class service in any endeavor was tremendously distinctive. He was an extraordinary human being with an unwavering commitment to the social good. He has left his unmistakeable mark across the region and the world and we shall miss him dearly.
I send heartfelt condolences to his family, friends, and the thousands of employees whose lives he no doubt personally impacted. This loss is not just Jamaica’s, it is the Caribbean’s.
Described as a “Caribbean super salesman” by radio talk show host Cliff Hughes, Stewart had been a dominant figure in both Jamaican business circles and the Caribbean tourism landscape since the 1980s.
To many Jamaicans, he was not only an astute business leader, but a patriotic figure who was not afraid to put his own stamp on national life and who made sure he had politicians’ ears on matters of public importance.
One such example is what came to be known as the “Butch Stewart Initiative”. During a major foreign exchange crisis in 1992, Stewart came to the aid of the sliding Jamaican dollar by injecting some of his own foreign currency into the formal banking system in order to stabilise it. With his usual humour, he defended his move as that of a “friendly speculator.”
Stewart's actions were widely praised. One of his collaborators in that initiative, Leachim Semaj, recalled:
Hail the man.
Gordon Butch Stewart.
Life well lived.
Once we were young. pic.twitter.com/RJlVy2CreZ
— Leahcim Semaj (@LSemaj) January 5, 2021
The 1990s also saw Stewart take on the daunting task of making Air Jamaica profitable. He invested privately in the national airline and served as its Chairman. At the time, his efforts were seen as a patriotic effort to keep the airline afloat. The company later changed hands and ceased operations altogether in 2015.
On social media, Jamaicans reacted with shock and sadness. As singer Nadine Sutherland observed, because of his high-profile presence, even those who had never met Stewart felt as if they knew him:
Funny things happen sometimes in our human journey. Like, you dont ‘know’ someone, yet, you kinda know them because of the years they've being an icon,a Jamaican one specifically.Yes, this news made me kinda sad this morning. RIP Butch Stewart.(Collage borrowed from Wayne Chen). pic.twitter.com/W4WNpSe3Tw
— NadineSutherland (@Nadinesutherlan) January 5, 2021
His staff shared that he was a kind and caring employer:
.We will live with the memories of his successes & his kindness to all he came in contact with..He had a heart of gold, his sense of humour & his love for his staff of many years. He never forgot them..May his soul Rest In Peace??Blessings to all his family @AdamStewart pic.twitter.com/R2Y6UGX0wB
— judz lanimac (@judzlanimac) January 5, 2021
The Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica (PSOJ) expressed condolences on their Facebook page:
The PSOJ is deeply saddened at the news of the passing of The Hon. Gordon ‘Butch’ Stewart […] His visionary and incisive leadership extended to numerous private sector entities including the PSOJ where he served as President from 1989-1990. Among his numerous local and international accolades was his induction into the Organisation’s Private Sector Hall of Fame in 1996. A true patriot and nation builder, Mr Stewart's exceptional legacy will be forever woven into the story of Jamaica and the Caribbean.
Coming from fairly humble beginnings, Stewart was born in Kingston on July 6, 1941 and grew up in Ocho Rios, then a fishing village but now a tourist resort. Inspired by his parents’ entrepreneurial spirit, he started working in sales at age 16 but always had an eye for an opportunity. Air conditioning units were a rare commodity in Jamaica in 1968, so he became the local representative for the United States-based Fedders Air Conditioners through Appliance Traders Limited, a company he chaired up to the time of his death.
Stewart's journey in tourism began in 1981 when he bought and refurbished a run-down hotel in Montego Bay, turning it into an adults-only Sandals resort. He introduced innovative features and brought a unique Jamaican sensibility to the property.
The Sandals brand currently has 15 properties on six islands across the Caribbean and employs around 10,000 people.
Stewart's first overseas resort was in Antigua. In 1996, he introduced the Beaches brand for the family vacation market. Meanwhile, Sandals was being described as “the most popular award-winning, all-inclusive resort chain in the world”.
The obituary in the Miami Herald referred to Stewart, who had a cheery, ebullient and down to earth style of communicating, as a “one-man Caribbean conglomerate”.
Stewart was the recipient of numerous accolades over the years, including a 2019 World Travel Award for Outstanding Leadership in Social Responsibility. He was well known for his philanthropic efforts: the Sandals Foundation, launched in 2009, has supported hundreds of community-based projects in seven Caribbean countries, mainly in the fields of education, health, and the environment.
Many younger Jamaicans tweeted their thoughts on the inspirational business leader, including a reference to his trademark striped shirt:
I really liked Butch Stewart. Sincerely. As a younger man coming up in a 1990s Jamaica, he stood out to me re what’s possible. Never met him and sometimes it’s better that way. Never have to meet your heroes. So it is. Loved the bengal stripes. Sandals also. Still do. Walk good. pic.twitter.com/aylsyvEwsw
— Ryan Strachan (@5Solae) January 5, 2021
In 2020, as COVID-19 wreaked havoc on the Caribbean tourism industry, Stewart poignantly echoed Bob Marley’s song “Three Little Birds” and remained optimistic, observing:
I don’t want you to worry, because everything will be just fine.
Summing up his business philosophy by saying, “I made sure that every customer got more than they expected to get,” it is clear that Stewart excelled at exceeding expectations throughout his life.

author: Emma Lewis


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Interview: Ex-Hong Kong lawmaker says education has become a scapegoat for the protests · Global Voices
Hong Kong Free Press

Ip Kin-yuen. Photo: Candice Chau/HKFP. Used with permission.
The original post is written by Candice Chau and published on Hong Kong Free Press on January 1, 2021. The following edited version is published on Global Voices under a content partnership agreement.
Hong Kong’s education sector underwent a turbulent year in the wake of the mass pro-democracy protests, with teachers sacked and major changes to the school curriculum. The sector is seen by pro-Beijing forces as one of the instigators of the unrest.
Chief Executive Carrie Lam questioned the effectiveness of Hong Kong’s education in her policy address in November, saying that there was a need to “enhance” the quality of teachers and bolster national identity and national security education.
The government also announced big changes to Liberal Studies, a core subject in the senior secondary school programme which is designed to teach students to think critically.
The subject was criticised by the government and pro-Beijing media as encouraging students to take part in protests. Under the proposed changes the content and teaching time of the subject would be halved, and more focus would be put on content about China.
In addition, 2020 saw the deregistration of two teachers for allegedly promoting Hong Kong independence and teaching factually incorrect accounts of Chinese history.
Former lawmaker Ip Kin-yuen, who is vice president of the Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union, told HKFP that while the situation is very grim, he is still hopeful that 2021 could bring better news.
Ip says education has become the scapegoat for the government’s mistakes and Lam was trying to blame young people and education in general for her own blunders. He explained:
In her recent policy address Lam did not reflect on her own role in triggering the protests and of course, she did not admit any mistake committed by herself and her government. On the contrary, she put the blame on education, put the blame on the subject of Liberal Studies… So what she is doing, I think, is practically finding a scapegoat.
Ip also questioned whether the changes made by the government and by Secretary for Education Kevin Yeung were actually for the benefit of education and the students:
I think, certainly, he put political correctness above the benefit to the students.
Ip acknowledged that it was important for students to understand China but they should learn about “the whole picture“ and not just certain aspects.
While teachers still have “a certain level of freedom” to choose the way they teach the designated materials, Ip said they would still be constrained by the syllabus and school administration, as the Education Bureau has started accepting anonymous complaints against teachers under the political pressure from the pro-establishment camp.
The chilling effect of the government’s actions has already been felt in the classroom, as Ip said teachers have opted for the “safest way” to teach when it comes to sensitive materials.
According to Ip, teachers have become more cautious with sensitive topics or material, often retreating to those approved by the Education Bureau. He cited China’s Constitution Day as an example:
Some teachers told me that they are instructed to read according to the materials provided by the Education Bureau, they read the materials word by word, “Don’t change one word, don’t add one word, don’t reduce one word, so speak exactly as the materials are like”, so to avoid falling into any trouble.
Not only is such nervousness is detrimental to the quality of education, Ip said it could also damage relations between teachers and students or between the teaching staff.
Teachers were more cautious “because you don’t know which student is going to complain, or which student would talk to their parents, and the parents might complain.”
Having to leave the Legislative Council did not help Ip’s cause. He and 14 other pan-democrats resigned in solidarity in November after four colleagues were disqualified by the government for “endangering national security.”
Ip said his resignation meant he had lost the platform and resources to speak out for education. But he could continue his advocacy as a leader of the teachers’ union and would not personally miss the Legislative Council.
Looking ahead, Ip said he hoped for a better year but it all depended on the government and the pro-establishment camp:
They can make things even worse, and of course, we know that it’s very likely because nowadays politics have overriden other considerations, even fairness, from the government’s viewpoint.
Not accepting anonymous complaints, for example, would make a big difference, Ip says. He suggested a regulatory body for the profession similar to those for lawyers, social workers and doctors.
For him, clear statutory procedures and rules would be a great improvement on the current “blackbox” in which the government and bureaucrats handled the complaints against teachers.
Ip said the situation could worsen in 2021 since the Legislative Council lacked effective opposition and the education sector could face more attacks under a task force set up to review teaching materials.
The former lawmaker said he hoped the pro-establishment camp would realise that the education system affected their own children and questioned whether they really want a “backward” system.
Are they trying to achieve a system like this for their own children, or for their grandchildren? It’s stupid, I think. So I hope that they can realise what they are doing is not constructive at all. They always try to depict themselves as constructive… that is the totally the opposite of it.
Ip said he would fight on by monitoring the government and the pro-establishment camp outside the Legislative Council, especially on the proposed changes to Liberal Studies.
Even if the curriculum was changed in the coming year, Ip said teachers and parents could still preserve the qualities they treasured in the subject in everyday life. Parents could teach their children not to accept everything that is said by authorities.
Ip also vows to help teachers fight for their rights, including using the judicial system to appeal against disqualifications.
The former lawmaker also urged Hong Kong to make their voices heard in next year’s Legislative Council election, even if some candidates might be disqualified. Pan-democrats might even hope to win a majority and restore crucial checks and balances, he added.
As for himself, Ip said he would enjoy his new-found liberty before deciding what to do next:
I think it’s good for me to take a rest. It has been more than eight years, it’s quite long in the legislature, in this kind of legislature.

author: Hong Kong Free Press


text:
Singapore livestreams Parliament session for the first time but prohibits use for ‘satire, ridicule, or denigration’ · Global Voices
Mong Palatino

Singapore Parliament. Flickr photo by Andrew (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
For the first time, Singapore livestreamed its Parliament session on January 4. On the same day, the Ministry of Communications and Information (MCI) released terms and conditions for accessing the livestream video, which included a prohibition against using the content for “satire, ridicule, or denigration.”
Singapore’s Parliament is headed by the People's Action Party which has ruled the country since the 1950s. There have been previous proposals to livestream the Parliament sessions but these were all rejected by authorities. In 2020, former Leader of the House Grace Fu explained her opposition to live broadcasting proceedings of the Parliament:
The debate in Parliament should be vigorous, but the tone should be sober. Members have to come to grips with the issues and their complexities, and avoid playing to the gallery and striking poses for histrionic effect.
The Today news website published a reaction by one of its readers, Chirag Agarwal, who reiterates the value of allowing citizens to watch real-time Parliament sessions:
Ordinary citizens should get a chance to observe live the process of governing and legislating. We should be able to watch in its entirety the humdrum business of Parliament, sparks flying during question time, or a parliamentarian making an impassioned speech.
History is often made, especially during a crisis, in institutions such as Parliament. It would be a pity if Singaporeans could not witness these moments live.
Ghui, a writer for The Online Citizen news website, added that allowing sessions to be streamed live will enhance transparency:
Clips are subject to editing and can be taken out of context. It may not provide the full flavour of a particular discussion that live streaming will.
Things taken out of context can be misrepresented and cause unnecessary confusion. Doesn’t the government want people to see the full picture as opposed to just the parts edited to fit into short video clips that shows the ministers in good light while the opposition MPs in questionable performance?
In September 2020, the government finally agreed “in principle” to livestream the Parliament sessions.
On January 4, the MCI released a statement about the historic decision to allow the real-time broadcasting of the Parliament sessions on YouTube:
As we speak, this sitting is being streamed real-time on MCI’s YouTube channel, which is accessible to all.
…the Government has agreed to this in view of the global and technological trends which have made online streaming more feasible, and enabled legislatures around the world to live-stream their proceedings.
The MCI statement carried a reminder to Parliament members “to preserve the integrity and dignity” of the institution during live debates:
…we must preserve the integrity and dignity of Parliament as a forum for serious debate on national issues.
…the responsibility rests with all Members of this House, present and future, who must continue to uphold the highest standards of conduct and decorum, as we engage in the cut and thrust of parliamentary debate.
On the same day, the MCI published its terms and conditions for the use of the livestream video. It defined use as “making still images (e.g., screenshots), audio recordings, or video clips (e.g. short videos or animated Graphics Interchange Format (.GIF).”
It restricted the use of content “for personal use; for internal use within an organisation; for research, analysis and study; or for fair and accurate reporting of Parliamentary proceedings.”
It also included the following conditions:
…Any use of the Materials shall respect and maintain the dignity of the Republic of Singapore, the Parliament of Singapore, and any Members of Parliament (whether past or present), and in particular, they shall not be used for the purposes of satire, ridicule, or denigration;
The Materials shall not be used for any commercial purpose or financial gain, including use as part of or alongside advertisements and promotions, or in providing commercial products and services;
…The Materials shall not be used in any context that promotes, encourages, or facilitates illegal activity or anti-social behaviour, or that communicates falsehoods and misinformation;
…The Materials shall not be used in any context that promotes or fosters feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or intolerance between groups of persons, including on the grounds of race, religion, descent, place of birth, office, profession, or trade.
The MCI will determine “in its sole and absolute discretion” whether an internet user has breached the terms of the livestream session.
It remains to be seen how MCI will enforce the terms but the Singapore government has a reputation and record of criminalizing online criticism. In this case, MCI alone will determine whether the use of the livestream material constitutes satire, ridicule, denigration, or whether it promotes “anti-social behavior”.
Reactions on Twitter highlighted the role of activists and concerned citizens in sustaining the clamor for the livestreaming of Parliament sessions.
Reminder that this development was made possible because activists, opposition politicians, and the great mass of dissenting S'poreans had pressured the government to do so.
It was only months ago that regime officials argued that live-streaming threatened transparency. https://t.co/IYcZdYH364 pic.twitter.com/FymCS9O7b9
— ??pantat kau?? (@ikanselarkuning) January 4, 2021
Today #Singapore finally gets a livestream of Parliament. For years the ruling party has said it was not advisable, would not ensure transparency, would lead to parliamentarians grandstanding etc. Attempts to advocate for it were also seen as potential public order violations: https://t.co/G9yL7hRjIV
— Kirsten Han 韩俐颖 (@kixes) January 4, 2021
There was also a comment about the terms and conditions released by MCI:
our gov agreed to livestream parliament for the first time ever.
just to make sure we didn’t think we were gonna be free anytime soon, they included a reminder that satire is illegal.
oh… to be free like me
— molly pERCocet (@mollyp_ERC_ocet) January 4, 2021
Former diplomat Bilahari Kausikan is not supportive of broadcasting Parliament sessions in real time:
This is a mistake. It will undoubtedly be hailed as a step in the direction of ‘transparency’. But the real effect will not be genuine transparency.
The immediate effect will be to promote playing to the gallery which the opposition, having no responsibility for governance, can do better than the government and in any case, it is my impression that opposition MPs generally have better histrionic skills than government MPs.
The livestreamed videos will be accessible on MCI’s YouTube channel for six months.

author: Mong Palatino


text:
The favorite dishes of Nepali chef Santosh Shah · Global Voices
Sanjib Chaudhary

Santosh Shah. Image used with permission.
After finishing in second place in the 2020 edition of BBC's “MasterChef: The Professionals,” London-based Nepali chef Santosh Shah became a household name both in UK and Nepal. During the run-up to the finals, the 35-year-old chef presented before the judges a variety of dishes that are little-known outside Nepal.
Born and raised in Karjanha, Siraha District of Nepal’s southern plains, Santosh toiled up a hill to reach where he is today. After failing his school-leaving exams, he moved to India to work as a dishwasher at a five-star hotel. There, he rose through ranks to become a cook.
In an interview with Nepali Times, Santosh says he took a risk when he moved to London in 2010, but it paid off as he began working with renowned chefs. At the time he entered the MasterChef competition, he had been experimenting with Nepali food for two years in restaurants in the British capital. The judges appreciated the food items he prepared and presented, such as kodo (millet) pudding, amot (mango leather), crispy stuffed okra, yomari, chicken chilli, and crab curry.
Kodo ko khhir, Amot, timur biscuits besan ani gheu bat banako, poleko aamp, kagati ra pani ko baraf.
Kodo Millet pudding, Mango leather,
swichwen pepper biscuits made with clarified butter and gram flour, chargrilled mango, lime and mint sorbet. I really wanted to show this. pic.twitter.com/ekqYQP3Vw5
— Santosh Shah (@chefsantoshshah) December 16, 2020
Nepalese Expat Arun Chaudhary tweeted:
सिरहा करजनहा गाम के @chefsantoshshah
तराई के फोफी से ल्याके योमरी तक नेपाली परिकारके विश्व सामु प्रस्तुत कैरके आई नेपालके भाइ जी
फाईनल मे पुग्लै बहौत बहौत शुभकामना भाइ जी।अहिने नेपालके नाम चम्कावु?
Huge congratulations and best wishes! ?? pic.twitter.com/vSwlQiS9JQ
— Arun chaudhary (@aryankec) December 13, 2020
By presenting Nepali cuisine to the world, from the tubular papadum (fofi) from the terai to yomari, Chef Santosh Shah from Karjanha Village in Siraha has reached the finals. Best wishes, brother. Shine the name of Nepal like this only.
Global Voices chatted with Chef Santosh Shah on WhatsApp to know about Nepali food he loves and would like to promote.
“I love biriya (a delicacy from the Terai region),” he said. “Biriya cooked with newly harvested potatoes are my best.” Biriya is made of grass peas, mustard greens or broadleaf mustard leaves wrapped in black gram paste and dried on the sun. They are then stored to be cooked in the rainy season when green vegetables are scarce.
A post shared by Sanjib Chaudhary (@sankuchy)
Another dish Santosh would like to promote is Airkanchan, which is also popular in Bihar, Jharkhand and other Indian states. Taro leaves, pasted together with rice flour or gram flour paste and cut into small cutlets, are fried in mustard oil and then dipped in a gravy of curd and spices – it’s hot, salty and sour!
A post shared by MAGIC OF MADHESH (MOM) (@magicofmadhesh)
Check out Santosh’s Instagram for more delicious food from Nepal:
A post shared by Santosh Shah (@chefsantoshshah)
A post shared by Santosh Shah (@chefsantoshshah)
A post shared by Santosh Shah (@chefsantoshshah)

author: Sanjib Chaudhary


text:
COVID-19 and shrinking freedom limits in Jordan · Global Voices
Global Voices MENA

Caricature depicting narrowing freedom driven by COVID-19. Photo credit: Rafat Alkhatib | Used with permission.
In Jordan, measures to curb the spread of COVID-19 came hand-in-hand with increased intimidation of journalists and restrictions on citizens’ rights to speech.
In mid-March 2020, Jordan's government enacted Defense Law 13 (of 1992) to help contain the pandemic, giving the government broad powers to limit basic rights. The then-Prime Minister Omar Razzaz reassured that the law “would be applied in the narrowest limits,” stressing the need to differentiate between the right to “express an opinion” and the “spread of rumors and false news which would spread panic” saying the latter will be “firmly” dealt with.
Soon after, the government imposed a three-day total lockdown followed by a strict daily curfew. Up until late April, one required a special permit to drive a car. Consecutively, economic activity was brought to a standstill.
In mid-April 2020, the government issued Defense Order No. 8 which criminalized the publishing or circulation of news on any platform, including social media, about the pandemic that could create panic among people. Offenders could be liable to a 3,000 Jordanian dinars ($4,231 United States dollars) fine and/or imprisonment for up to 3 years.
This governmental grip on citizens’ rights to speech is enabled by Article 15.4 of the kingdom's constitution, which authorizes the government, upon declaring martial law or a state of emergency, to impose “limited censorship” on the press in matters relating to broadly-phrased “public safety” and “national defense.”
Arrests started in early April. Following the publication of a report citing day laborers’ financial hardships under lockdown, Faris Al-Sayegh, director-general of Ro’ya TV, and journalist Muhammad Al-Khalidi, were arrested and then released on bail.
Others documenting the plight of marginalized communities under COVID-19 met worse fates. Salim Akash, a Bangladeshi journalist and reporter for the Jago News website, was arrested mid-April and charged by Jordan with violating the telecommunications and anti-terrorism laws after circulating news on Facebook highlighting the challenges of Bangladeshi migrant workers under lockdown. Jordan's Ministry of Interior issued an order to deport Akash, who is, to this day, imprisoned in Jordan.
Arrests soon went beyond the scope of COVID-19. On May 17, 2020, animal rights activist Ali Sarsour was detained over several Facebook posts. In one, Sarsour praised the queen of Jordan, who he claimed shared his surname — a link deemed offensive to Queen Rania — as his surname translates to “cockroach” in Arabic. In another post, Sarsour announced that he named his dog after the then-health minister. He was charged with lèse-majesté (i.e. defaming or insulting a member of the royal family), and insulting an official body and was detained for more than 60 days before being released on bail.
Queen Rania al-Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, member of the Foundation Board of the World Economic Forum, and King Abdullah II Ibn al-Hussein, king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, during the annual meeting 2010 of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, January 29, 2010. Photo by World Economic Forum, licensed under  CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.
In June, an opinion piece that marked Jordan's Independence Day but criticized Jordan’s dependency on Western and Israeli influences landed its author, Saeed Thyab, Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party's secretary-general, in jail for 7 days. Founded in the 1990s, the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party is a socialist political party that stands for Palestinian nationalism.
A month later, the closure of the teachers’ union sparked month-long protests across the kingdom. A government-imposed gag order stifled all news related to the protests throughout August. Some network throttling was also observed during protests. Once a rarity, media blackouts have recently become commonplace to silence journalists, and to limit investigations, and public debate. Subsequently, Basil Okour, the editor-in-chief of jo24.net, was arrested for allegedly violating the gag order for reporting on people's reaction to the union's shutdown.
A more popular case was that of Jordanian caricaturist, Emad Hajjaj. Hajjaj was arrested on August 26, 2020, after publishing a cartoon criticizing the UAE-Israeli peace agreement that portrayed the crown prince of Abu Dhabi. Charged with “disturbing [Jordan’s] relations with a foreign state,” he was transferred to State Security Court, a court reserved for extreme cases such as drug trafficking and terrorism. Although he was released five days later on bail, his arrest is seen as a deterioration: it was Emad‘s first incarceration despite previous controversial cartoons, including ones portraying other heads of state.
On September 20, 2020, Badi al-Rafaiah, a senior member of the Islamic Action Front—Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, was arrested on charges of “insulting the head of a foreign state” and lèse-majesté. His detention, which came against the background of months-old Facebook posts and retweets, coincided with Jordanians gearing up for parliamentary elections in which the brotherhood was a key contesting party, raising suspicion that the arrest was politically driven.
Not only was Badi's Facebook post nearly six months old, but it was also not an original one — his post endorsed someone else’s prayers that Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had contracted COVID-19 from a senior Egyptian military official who died of the virus. Rafaiah was released on bail a few days later.
Fadi al-Qadi, Middle East public information & human rights specialist, commented on Badi's charges in a tweet saying:
توجيه تهمة “تحقير” رئيس دولة أجنبية/شقيقة (وهو هنا السيسي) هي تُهمةٌ مُعيبة، ليس بحق المهندس بادي الرفايعة، بل بحق أي نظام تشريعي وقانوني يتذرع بـ حق البشر في إبداء أي رأي سلمي. #الحرية_للمهندس_بادي_الرفايعة#الأردن https://t.co/ytNPOvQwb4
— Fadi Al-Qadi (@fqadi) September 20, 2020
The accusation of “insulting” the head of a foreign/sister country (in this case Sisi) is a shameful charge, not against Badi al-Rafaiah, but against any legislative and legal system that invokes the right of people to express any peaceful opinion.
More recently, the prosecutor for the State Security Court ordered the arrest of Jamal Haddad for publishing a news article questioning whether government officials had received the COVID-19 vaccine before the general public. The government charged Haddad under the Anti-Terrorism Law. He was released on bail on December 29, 2020, following increased protests led by local journalists.
Describing Haddad's charges, Ghada al-Sheikh, a journalist specialized in human rights, tweeted:
الصفعة الأكبر في توقيف الزميل جمال حداد، أن توقيفه من قبل محكمة أمن الدولة والتهم المسندة إليه من المخجل أن تكون مسندة لصحافي ونحن على أبواب ال ٢٠٢١، الحمد لله ما يحدث قفزات إلى الوراء ليست خطوات #لا_لحبس_الصحفيين #الحرية_لجمال_حداد
— ghada al sheikh غادة الشيخ (@GhadaSheikh) December 25, 2020
The biggest slap in the arrest of our colleague Jamal Haddad is that his arrest by the State Security Court and the charges against him are a shame to be attributed to any journalist while we are at the gates of 2021. We are taking backward leaps and not steps #NoToJailingJournalists.
On December 28, 2020, lawyer Mohamad Almajali was charged with lèse-majesté, insulting an official body, and influencing the electoral process for putting forward his legal opinion regarding a signature on the royal decree approving the 2020 general elections. His case is in development.
Reacting to Almajali's case, human rights defender and lawyer Hala Deeb sarcastically tweeted “the sky's the limit indeed,” referring to prime minister Bisher al-Khasawneh's recent statement that “the sky's the limit when it comes to freedom of expression in Jordan.”
These detentions, as plenty as they are, have attracted public attention due to the prominence of those involved. There may be others whose arrests have gone unnoticed.
Prior to COVID-19, Jordan’s red lines of speech were largely discernible, delimited by a labyrinth of legal codes including the Cybercrime Law, Penal Code, Press & Publications Law, Anti-Terrorism Law, and the Telecommunications Law.
Over the years, journalists and activists have established a general sense of what could get them into trouble, and mostly conformed. According to a 2018 study, over 92 percent of journalists practiced self-censorship. Yet, the 2020 detentions – spurred by a climate of COVID-19 alarm – threw them off course, and indicated that Jordan is following in the grim footsteps of oppressive neighboring countries, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who detain journalists and human rights defenders on vague, unfounded, often terrorism charges.

author: Global Voices MENA


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Global Voices is seeking to recruit English-language subeditors · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Screengrab from a video taken on January 25, 2015, at the Global Voices 2015 Summit in Cebu, Philippines. Video by Global Voices and PR Works.
Global Voices (GV) is seeking to hire subeditors who will be responsible for editing stories written in or translated into English by our contributors.
GV stories focus on topics such as internet culture, freedom of speech online, technology and digital rights, human rights, civics and political movements, diversity and representation, and language diversity.
Most of Global Voices’ contributors are volunteers and English may not be their first language. Contributors include journalists, advocates, students, teachers, researchers, doctors, scientists, translators and many other professions, as well as GV’s media partners.
Global Voices is a global, virtual organization. The engine of the Global Voices newsroom is a team of part-time editors who work with volunteer contributors and translators around the world to highlight stories and perspectives that are underrepresented in international mainstream media.
Candidates must be comfortable setting their own schedules and working in a wholly virtual environment and be prepared to do some international travel.
We strongly welcome candidates from outside North America and Western Europe and encourage people currently contributing to the Global Voices project to apply.
Subeditors would be expected to work half-time with some flexibility, and will be treated as a freelance contractors.
Email a résumé and a cover letter in English that highlights your work and explains why you would be a great fit for Global Voices to jobs@globalvoices.org, with the subject line: .

author: Filip Noubel


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Mass arrests in Hong Kong of participants in the pro-democracy camp’s July 2020 primaries · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

50+ arrested in Hong Kong. Image from the Stand News. Used with permission.
On January 6, more than 50 activists were arrested in Hong Kong under the national security law for having participated last year in the pan-democratic camp's primaries for the 2020 Legislative Council (LegCo) elections which were eventually postponed.
Those arrested include Benny Tai, the initiator of the primaries; the spokesperson of Power of Democracy (a coordinating body of the primaries), Andrew Chiu; and former lawmakers James To, Wu Chi-wai, Andrew Wan, Lam Cheuk-ting, Helena Wong, Au Nok-hin, Chu Hoi-dick, Alvin Yeung, Kwok Ka-Ki, Jeremy Tam and Gary Fan. Also arrested were candidates who took part in the primaries, including Lester Shum, Clarisse Yeung, Tiffany Yuen, Ventus Lau, Gwyneth Ho, Fergus Leung, Owen Chow, Winnie Yu, Jeffrey Andrews, Sam Cheung and Ben Chung.
Lawyer John Clancey, who served as treasurer of Power for Democracy, was also arrested and the law firm with which he was affiliated raided by police. The home of Joshua Wong’s was also raided, as the activist–who is currently in prison–had also taken part in the primaries.
Freelance journalist Holmes Chan shared a list of those arrested on Twitter:
#Update 1415: This is the latest list. We haven't received reports of fresh arrests, but some names have had their status change to “verified.” I've also added supplementary info.
See source spreadsheet here: https://t.co/uJji7uCeuA pic.twitter.com/LvSUNXK2Rc
— Holmes Chan (@holmeschan_) January 6, 2021
In addition to the arrests, Robert Chung and Chung Kin-wah, CEO and deputy CEO, respectively, of the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI), which had provided logistics for the polling of the primaries, were summoned by police to assist the investigation. A number of pro-democracy media outlets, including Apple Daily News, Stand News and inmediahk, and received court orders directing them to hand in documents related to police investigations.
#HongKong police demanded independent news outlets, @StandNewsHK @inmediahk @appledaily_hk to hand over documents “in connection with national security cases within seven days.” @RSF_inter denounces this harassment and urges for full press freedom in the territory to be restored.
— RSF in English (@RSF_en) January 6, 2021
Over 600,000 Hongkongers cast their votes in the July 2020 primaries to choose the candidates who would contest the LegCo election in September. The pro-democracy camp's plan was to win more than 35 seats in the LegCo so that their representatives would have the power to veto the government’s budget.
After the primaries, Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam stated that as the objective of the primaries was to obstruct the implementation of government policy, the act could be viewed as “subversion” under the then-newly enacted national security law.
Beijing’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong also issued a statement, accusing Benny Tai of plotting to seize the government’s power. Carrie Lam later used COVID-19 emergency powers to postpone the elections.
Hong Kong Secretary for Security John Lee’s comment on the mass arrest echoed Carrie Lam's and Beijing’s previous statements. Citing Benny Tai’s commentary in Apple Daily about political developments from 2020-2022, Lee said:
The people involved are suspected of making use of what they call a 35+ plan and a ten-step mutual destruction scheme to someway [sic] paralyse the Hong Kong government.
Benny Tai predicted in April 2020 that the national security law would not be implemented until the end of 2021, but Beijing passed the law 18 months earlier to crack down on democratic forces in Hong Kong.
Civic Party chairman Alan Leong stressed in a press conference that it is the constitutional right of lawmakers to vote against a budget. The chairman of the Democratic Party, Lo Kin-hei also expressed the belief that the arrests are in retaliation against politicians who have the backing of the people.
#HongKong‘s pro-democracy camp say the authorities are clearly just taking revenge on politicians that have the support of the people, asking why the police took so many months to respond to their Legco primaries if they amounted to such a serious crime. https://t.co/XKsYTES5TL
— RTHK English News (@rthk_enews) January 6, 2021
China researcher at Human Rights Watch Maya Wang commented:
The red line has moved so significantly in #HongKong already to arresting lawyer and raiding law firm. 2021 will be a long one. https://t.co/P8xmR5k2YW
— Maya Wang 王松莲 (@wang_maya) January 6, 2021
Many, including artist-activist Baidiucao, have criticized the European Union for signing an investment deal with China at the expense of Beijing’s political crackdown in Hong Kong:
Without EU?? assurance to Beijing recently, there won’t b today’s HK massive arrest on 50+ pro democracy figures.
— 巴丢草 Badiucao (@badiucao) January 6, 2021
Exiled activist Nathan Law issued this appeal to the European Parliament:
In response to Hong Kong's political crackdown, I urge the European Parliament to halt the EU-China investment deal and EU to sanction China&HK officials who are responsible to the arrests.#Retweet if you agree MEP should VETO the bill and EU should act.#StandwithHongKong
— Nathan Law 羅冠聰 ? (@nathanlawkc) January 6, 2021
Antony Blinken, US President-elect Biden's nominee for the post of Secretary of State, was quick to assure the people of Hong Kong of the Biden-Harris administration's support:
The sweeping arrests of pro-democracy demonstrators are an assault on those bravely advocating for universal rights. The Biden-Harris administration will stand with the people of Hong Kong and against Beijing’s crackdown on democracy. https://t.co/nSj8dr3OEg
— Antony Blinken (@ABlinken) January 6, 2021
And activist investor David Webb drew an analogy between the crackdown on democracy and the pandemic:
Never thought I'd see the day in #HK when more pan-democrats are arrested than there are pandemic cases. But then the Government's target is zero, after all. The problem is that the majority of the population has already been infected and there's no vaccine for democracy.
— Webb-site (@webbhk) January 6, 2021
On January 6, 2021, the number of newly confirmed COVID-19 cases in Hong Kong was 20.


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Why I might not go back to El Salvador · Global Voices
Melissa Vida

Photo taken by the author on her last visit to El Salvador in June 2019
This story was originally published in De Wereld Morgen and is republished on Global Voices with permission.
Dawns in El Salvador are fresh and humid. Whenever I go to this tropical, warm and volcanic country in Central America, I would be woken up at 6 a.m. by the voice of the young man selling bread: “El pan, el pan,” he calls, while ringing the bell on his bicycle. Even a sleepyhead like me enjoyed this mundane experience of everyday life there. During my latest trip to my mother’s country, however, my nostalgia was replaced by a familiar feeling of suffocation.
I was told that this young man keeps an eye on the neighborhood on behalf of the deadly gangs who live at the end of the street. The bicycle is a cover-up—the bread we buy every morning is a form of surveillance. My fondness dissolved and no morning has ever been the same.
Whenever I go back to this country tucked away a few hundred kilometers under Mexico, the space left to breathe shrinks. Being from a Salvadoran and Belgian family, I would sometimes visit relatives and work as a journalist there.
For many, the neighborhoods where my relatives live are perceived as “favelas,” slums prone to violence and doom, but for me, they meant wonderful times with a loving family, games with cousins and delicious home-cooked foods. Throughout the years, however, I noticed how anxiety would fill my relatives’ existence.
Life in El Salvador is one of sun, beaches and tropical weather, famous among surfers. It is also a country where people love to dance as they never know when they might dance again. In El Salvador, we have to calculate every movement outside of the house to stay alive. Gangs exert their control over every aspect of life with invisible, but real, social norms that people have to strategically navigate. Salvadorans flee from the vicious cycles of poverty and crime, an unresolved legacy of civil war in the 1980s, weak and untrustworthy state powers, and the effects of climate change which lead to food insecurity and, therefore, more poverty. Tens of thousands of Salvadorans, including members of my family, have applied for asylum in the United States, Mexico, Spain, and Belgium in recent years.
“Nearly 20,000 Salvadorans were killed from 2014 to 2017. That’s more violent deaths than in several countries that were at war during those years, such as Libya, Somalia and Ukraine,” reports Brussels-based think tank Crisis Group. El Salvador has also one of the world's highest rates of femicide.
Asylum seekers often mention violent threats of gangs, which are organized social groups of underage and adult people who live off extortions and low-scale drug-dealing. These gangs were originally born in the United States during El Salvador’s civil war (Editor's note: Hundreds of thousands of El Salvadorans had fled the death squads trained by the US, to Los Angeles, but were left to their fate and many young people ended up in crime. In the late 90s, many of them were deported to El Salvador). Now, they set their own rules parallel to those of the state.
For example, I could never enter my family’s neighborhood without a relative, who lives in that specific barrio, to fetch me at the entrance. I would be seen as a stranger and therefore a threat to the gang members. If entering by car, its windows need to be rolled down and its headlights turned off, too. Those who do not obey the gang’s rules are seen as an affront and can be killed on the spot. Those—from the wealthy transport business owner to the humble market seller—who do not pay their monthly extortion quota are also killed.
One day, annoyed, I complained to an older relative about how irritating it was to walk on eggshells around teens smoking pot on the street. “Yes, they're bichos, those little kids,” she answered me. “But they already have blood on their hands.”
In El Salvador, to talk about an acquaintance who was killed or gone missing is part of everyday conversation. Between two sips of coffee and a bite of a cookie, my cousin would explain, on his Sunday visit to his mother, how his neighbor, a taxi driver, was found killed because he did not pay his extortion fee.
Teenagers are accustomed to fearing for their lives when hopping on a bus to school and many have seen bloody bodies covered with white sheets on the street. Young adults avoid taking the car after the sun sets at 6 p.m.—“What would happen if it broke down in an unfriendly place? A school mate of mine was assaulted and killed this way.”
Every Salvadoran knows someone who had to flee the country, who was killed by gangs or who was murdered by their husband. People who did not have a family member murdered are considered lucky. Nowadays, conversations rotate around the disappearances of young people, which is believed by some to have replaced more blatant murder scenes.
So, when a Salvadoran receives a death threat, they take it seriously. They first try to seek a safe haven within their own country, a difficult task considering that El Salvador is only slightly larger than Belgium but with half the population. Nearly half a million people were internally displaced in 2010, in a country where 94 per cent of municipalities are controlled by gangs. It is difficult to hide from well-organized mafias when, through a couple of contacts, you can easily track anyone down.
Photo taken by the author on her last visit to El Salvador in June 2019
“Eric” (a fictional name, for his safety) is a former asylum seeker in Belgium who was sent back to El Salvador in November 2020 on the highly publicized government charter flight of “voluntary returnees.” He found a job in a restaurant when he got back to El Salvador. Now he sleeps at his workplace and only goes out to buy food.
“It's been a long time since I've lived here, so I don't know where to go,” Eric told me over a WhatsApp call in December. “In some encounters [with gang members], they would inspect me from head to toe, sometimes question me on where I am from. I’m scared, very scared that it might bring me problems again or that I may leave the house and never come back.”
Eric, 25, had left for Belgium two years ago when gangs went to look for him at his house, stole his belongings, and threatened that he would “be a corpse” if he reported anything. “Before that, I had simple, small problems,” Eric said. “Robberies or assaults on the bus,” sometimes ending with gunshots. But for him, the threat that changed everything came from the gangs finding out where he lived. Even while he was in Belgium, they kept looking for him at his former home, he said.
Eric did not qualify for asylum in Belgium because of a lack of evidence. When his asylum procedure resulted in a refusal, he slept on the street in Brussels for a few months.
He claims it was impossible for him to get more proof or help from the Salvadoran authorities. It is known that gangs do not only operate in certain impoverished neighborhoods; they are embedded in the fabric of society, from police stations to the mayor’s office, to children’s classmates and their parents. Successive governments and political parties have secretly made deals with them for campaign favors or to artificially lower the homicide rate.
A few days after Eric returned to El Salvador, he found that one of his acquaintances had gone missing. Only the young man’s motorcycle was found.
Like Eric, many Salvadorans have sought refuge in Belgium. In 2015, 35 Salvadorans applied for asylum in Belgium; four years later, 1,365 Central Americans knocked on Belgium’s door. In 2018, Belgium recognized nearly all Salvadorans (96.5 per cent) as refugees. By 2020, that rate had dropped to 9.5 per cent, according to the latest figures available from the European statistics office, Eurostat.
While Belgium acknowledges El Salvador as an extremely dangerous place, its independent office which judges who can receive refugee status and who cannot, claims that most people who now arrive in Belgium are in no real danger in El Salvador and, as a result, asylum seekers feel pressured to return to Central America.
Meanwhile, in El Salvador, people continue to speak about violence and disappearances at home with hushed voices because “the walls have ears.” Many windows are protected with steel bars but do not have window panes; walls are simple concrete blocks, and people—like the bread seller boy—can always hear a conversation if it’s not spoken in a whisper.
Eric plans to continue studying French and English for when the time comes for him to migrate and save his life again. As for me, I am unsure when I will risk going back to El Salvador, to hug my family, and feel the fresh, humid dawn again.

author: Melissa Vida


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The awakening of the ‘bicentennial generation’ in Peru · Global Voices
Andrea Marcela Paliza Olivares

Photo by Andrés Huacaychuco Quijada, used with permission.
November 9, 2020, marked the beginning of the most important week of the last 20 years for our country. That day, the Peruvian Congress, after a brief discussion attempting to justify its actions in the fight against corruption, decided to remove the President of the Republic, Martín Vizcarra. The objective of this action, fueled by members of Congress who were subjects of their own criminal investigations, was to control the main powers of the State: the Executive and the Legislature, in order to oppose reforms or support measures that favoured their own interests. It was also a time when young people spoke for the entire country by coming out in the streets in protest.
Presidential removal due to moral incapacity, which is regulated in Article 113 of the Peruvian Constitution, is a control mechanism given to parliament and designed to protect the office of the president, ensuring the “moral” suitability of the person who holds the position. However, especially now, its content is the subject of debate because its scope is not clear. Furthermore, its indiscriminate and arbitrary use can create a covert coup d'état, according to the constitutionalist César Landa.
It is important to point out that, although “moral incapacity” is an indeterminate concept, its use must be limited to the margins laid out in the Constitution itself. Thus, in addition to the formal requirements set out in Article 89-A of the Congressional Regulations, which develops Article 113 of the Constitution, it is necessary to respect and safeguard the right to due process, as well as the rationality, proportionality, and logic of the decision.
What took place on November 9 did not satisfy these requirements. While it is true that Vizcarra was being investigated for acts of corruption during the time he was Regional Governor of the Department of Moquegua, evidence was still being collected to determine whether there was a future case against him. Press reports on the case were used to remove the president without substantiating information or an investigation by parliament, in a process by which votes were decided before his defence was even heard.
Furthermore, the social context during which he was removed was not ideal. Peru has been one of the countries most affected by COVID-19, both in terms of health and economy. This political crisis was added on top of the collapse of hospitals and further impoverishment of citizens, as a result of ongoing confrontations between the Executive and the Legislature in this case, and the country was on the verge of new presidential and parliamentary elections. Therefore, with such a short period of time—eight months—until the new representatives took up these positions, some citizens felt that the ideal scenario would have been for Vizcarra to be allowed to end his term while under investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office. In fact, a 2020 survey conducted by the Peruvian Research Insitute (IEP) showed that 95 per cent of respondents agreed with this position and only 4 per cent were in favour of removal.
If this were the case, the motive for lawmakers to act as they did was therefore to remove Vizcarra to approve measures that benefitted them. The government represented an obstacle to the adoption of controversial regulations that, in most cases, had been compiled by technical bodies of the Executive. For example, the day after the launch, a bill was introduced that threatened the Amazon by promoting the expansion of artisanal mining and another bill, in which the acquisition of environmental certification became more flexible. Also, in the following days, the Education Committee planned to present a bill proposing the abolition or amendment of secondary and higher education. Using the excuse of the educational emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, they sought to approve a permanent policy that would disrupt teaching and educational reform, thereby jeopardising all current procedures aimed at ensuring the quality of basic and higher education. The quality of the country's education system was most at risk. These bills have not been debated yet and are still in Congress.
All of these acts, starting with the approval of Vizcarra's removal, caused outrage among thousands of Peruvians, mainly teenagers and young people who organised and mobilised mass protests during November 9–17 in defense of democracy and the main state reforms (educational, political and judicial). These demonstrations, despite being peaceful, were violently suppressed by the Peruvian National Police on November 14 resulting in the killing of two young people, Inti Sotelo Camargo and Jack Brian Pintado Sánchez, leaving many others seriously injured. In addition to the poor decisions made by Congress, an authoritarian government emerged, but only lasted six days thanks to the street demonstrations. Yet the short-lived government left deep wounds.
Finally, the incidents sparked a feeling of exhaustion among the political class confronted by teenagers and young people. The “bicentennial generation,” a term coined by the Peruvian sociologist Noelia Chávez, took to the streets to defend their country and those who had been witnesses to constant acts of corruption by public officials. This generation saw how politicians fight over the country as if it was booty. This generation has also noticed the increasing inequality and how justice is elusive. Young people are not indifferent to what is happening. They just want a better country and to achieve that they are using new language and new spaces like Instagram or Tik Tok to share information, organise, and express their concerns.
Do not be alarmed if there is talk of a new Constitution. There is a much-needed debate because the composition of the society and the social context is different from what it was in 1993, when the present constitution was enacted. Reforms may be needed, and perhaps a new social pact, but first, we must listen to and respect one another, and clarify what will lead us to this new stage. We will celebrate 200 years of independence on July 28 this year, and we are still not sure who we are. Maybe it's time to build a new future that includes everyone.

author: Andrea Marcela Paliza Olivares


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Lax regulations behind surge in Hong Kong’s ‘nano flats,’ land use group says · Global Voices
The Stand News

Liber Research Community, a local non-profit researching land use issues, released a report on the proliferation of shoe-box flats in Hong Kong over the past decade. Image from the Stand News. Used with permission.
This story was originally published in Chinese on the Stand News on January 4, 2021. The following English translation is published on Global Voices under a content partnership agreement.
Hong Kong's homes are getting increasingly smaller as “nano flats” proliferate in the world’s most expensive property market, leading to a decrease in the city’s living standards according to a recent report.
The term “nano flat” refers to residential apartments with a saleable area (including bathroom and kitchen) smaller than 24 square meters. Some nano flats are as small as a king-size bed and have windowless bathrooms and kitchens.
A recent survey conducted by the Liber Research Community (LRC), a local non-profit working on housing and land use issues, indicates that between 2010 and 2019, 8,550 nano flats have been constructed in Hong Kong, with 12 percent of those having been released in 2019 alone.
Most nano flats have an open-floor design and, in many cases, the kitchens are located next to the bed, similar to settings of standard hotel rooms.
According to the report, the proliferation of nano flats can be traced back to the government's relaxation of fire safety guidelines in 2011 and building planning guidelines in 2012, which permitted the construction of kitchens without doors or ventilating windows. At that time, the government justified the changes as a way to increase the supply of small and medium-sized flats.
LRC pointed out that, in 2010, only 21 first-hand nano flats were sold in the market — just 0.2 percent of the total first-hand real state supply that year. In 2019, 1,805 nano flats were released in the market — one in every eight flats released that year. In the past decade, a total of 8,550 nano-flats were constructed, with the majority of units located in the Kowloon Peninsula.
The research group showed how inadequate the living space of nano flats is by examining a (roughly) 12 square-meter unit in T-plus, a famous building of nano flats. The unit is smaller than the average car parking space.
The flats in T-plus are commonly known as “king size bed” units because when the developer first introduced the flats to the public, a representative ironically said that “big as the Forbidden City was, the emperor only needed a bed to sleep on it.”
In December 2020, the report says, T-plus units were sold at the price of HKD19,104 (approximately US$ 2,464) per square foot. A 12 square-meter unit would have cost, then, HKD2,445,312 (US$315,404).
Twitter user @Paige79761013 shared a photo with a flat of that size:
香港住屋問題嚴峻，一屋難求，不少新樓為求售價相宜，以私樓形式賣出細小單位。過往十年多個地產商推出約8550個納米單位，面積皆不多於24平左右，其中近2000夥面積更不足19平方米，面積最小更只有11平方米左右，「納米樓」的出現，是本港房屋供應扭曲的結果之一。 pic.twitter.com/UBua4UAj0c
— 红苹果?(Paige) (@Paige79761013) January 5, 2021
The housing problem in Hong Kong is really serious. Property prices are so high that people can’t have a home. In order to make property affordable, new flats have become very small. In the past ten years, developers have built 8,550 nano flats and all are smaller than 24 square meters. 2,000 of these flats are smaller than 19 square meters. The smallest one is just about 11 square meters. The emergency of nano-flat phenomena is a result of a twisted housing market.
About 85 percent of the nano flats analyzed by LRC have an open design, or no separate bedroom and kitchen, and about 70 percent had bathrooms without windows.
An 18-square-meter unit in another nano-flat building called Aquila Square Mile, for example, has an open kitchen table just 78 cm away from the bed.
“You can fry a fish while sitting on the bed and the room will be filled with a fishy smell for a long time,” a research team member explained the setting in the press conference.
The shower area in the windowless bathroom is around 0.4 square meter.
The average living space per capita in Hong Kong's public housing system is 13.4 square meters (2020 data). That's significantly higher than the living space available for many residents of nano flats, considering that families of 2-3 also live in those shoe-box homes.
LRC stresses that the size of the living space, as well as the windowless bathroom and the kitchen design of the nano-flats, is unacceptable, and urged the government to introduce restrictions in property development regulations. LRC also defends the creation of standards establishing a minimum floor area per capita in residential buildings.
The Development Bureau, however, told The Stand News it has no such plan. Given the shortage of land supply in Hong Kong, its priority is to increase the supply of residential units.
Henderson Land Development, Hong Kong's largest nano-flat developer (it built 2,858 nano units in the past ten years), says its projects cater to the demand of small families and young home buyers, and that their nano flat buildings are equipped with clubhouses and gyms to meet the needs of their residents.
However, LRC points out that nano flats serve the investment market rather than residential needs, as many of its buyers are investors. Among the nano flats sold first hand between 2010 and 2015, 26.5 percent were re-sold. The research group analysed 722 re-sold nano flats and found that, on average, the buyers only held the flats for an average of 3.48 years, just a few months after the three-year Special Stamp Duty restriction on property disposition expired.
The special stamp duty was introduced in November 2010 to restrict short-term investment activities by demanding extra tax payment if the property is sold within 36 months from the date of its initial acquisition.
Moreover, according to data provided by the government’s Rating and Valuation Department, the property price index of private residential flats smaller than 431 square increased from 242.2 in 2013 to 383 in 2019. That's higher than the index increase when considering all kinds of residential property (242.2 to 383 in the same period).
The supply surge of nano flats, LRC concludes, did not meet the residential needs of small families but fueled the boiling property market.
At the same time, Hongkongers’ living spaces shrink, and with it, their living standards, as the average saleable area of all private residential units fell from 54 square meters in 2013 to 35 square meters in 2019.

author: The Stand News