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US in Syria: What to expect of the new administration? · Global Voices
Sylvain Keller

Atmeh refugee camp in Aleppo, Syria. Photo by IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
As the four-year term of US President Donald Trump nears its end, what will the new administration mean for Syria's dragging war and its embattled population? Although Trump officially ordered a comprehensive US withdrawal of troops from Syria over the last four years, the civil war remains an important issue for the US administration, as exemplified by its anti-terrorist missions over the last few months.
It is likely that US President-elect Joe Biden would bring new considerations to the US’ position on the conflict without imposing significant changes on the ground.
In an interview last month with Defense One, Jim Jeffrey, former US defense adviser on Syria, ruled out a potential full “US withdrawal” from Syria, despite Trump's orders, saying, “We were always playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had there.” According to Jeffrey, US activity in Syria never diminished under the Trump administration and remains prominent despite recent calls for troops reduction on the ground.
In fact, US forces extended their scope, carrying out regular anti-terrorism missions from Iraqi bases alongside Washington-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Officially, the Pentagon only granted US presence for 200 soldiers on the ground. Nonetheless, according to a New York Times report in October 2019, US forces could currently reach 900 troops in Syria alone. Amid recent policies aimed at securing territory control and combatting terrorism, it is increasingly likely that US forces on the ground will be reinforced.
An example of such operations is last month's destruction of an ISIS camp in the Badiyah desert by a US-led aircraft from the international coalition, while some additional US military vehicles were rolled into eastern Syria. In the first week of November, 14 operations were carried out targeting terrorist groups in the area, while recent reports from Operation Inherent Resolve illustrate the necessity of maintaining a regular presence on the battlefield to combat what they described as ISIS’ still-active pockets on the ground. Large scale fighting was also recently reported between ISIS forces and pro-regime fighters near Deir ez Zor, the largest city in eastern Syria.
Perhaps last month's announcement by US Senator Lindsey Graham and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo of an oil contract between the SDF and a US oil firm will add further backing for more US deployments to Syria. In addition to spearheading operations against terrorist threats to its regional interest and allies, the Syrian war's relevance to the US administration stems from Washington's pressing desire to scale down Russian territorial expansion in the region, since Moscow remains the Syrian regime's key supporter. Hence, Washington continues to back Kurdish forces against direct military confrontations involving Russian mercenaries.
Biden has yet to put forward his future Middle East policy as a campaign argument, so his military policy in Syria remains unclear. But last month, the upcoming US president noted he would keep up to 2,000 US boots in troubled parts of the Middle East, focusing mainly on “special forces” and that these forces “should not meddle in the political dynamics of the countries where they operate.” More generally, Biden said he will shape foreign policy based on “American interests.”
Biden appears aligned with the Trump administration on sanctions in Syria. In some of his pre-campaign interviews, Biden said he does not plan to modify or repeal the Caesar Act, a set of sanctions on Syria recently approved by the US Congress, and will “keep the US sanctions on the Syrian regime and the entities that deal with it in place.” Nonetheless, Biden's advisers recently raised the possibility of exceptions on humanitarian grounds to ensure aid to “Syrians in need.”
The main difference between Trump's and Biden's administration regarding Syria will probably reside with human rights. Kamala Harris, the US vice president-elect, rose against Trump's decision in 2019 to withdraw from Syria, following Turkey's operation Peace Spring. Anthony Blinken, the future secretary of state of Biden's administration, also shares this view. In an article for the Brooking Institute last year, he described the US’ military policy in Syria as an “error of doing too little.” He notably warned: “If the retreat from Syria announced by Trump proceeds, we will likely see the return of the Islamic State as well.”
In an interview with CBS last May, Blinken said Obama's administration, in which he served as deputy Secretary of State and former Deputy National Security Adviser, had “failed” the Syrians, and the US policy toward the war had since worsened, particularly by Washington abandoning its Kurdish allies. According to a transcript of the interview, he said: “We failed to prevent a horrific loss of life. We failed to prevent massive displacement of people internally in Syria and, of course, externally as refugees,” adding that Biden's administration will try to regain traction with a closer eye on the humanitarian angle.
The new US administration could pay much more attention to the situation in Kurdish controlled areas, compared with Trump's “laissez-faire” policy toward Turkish forces in the area. Harris had also raised in favor of a US intervention in Syria, particularly following chemical weapons attacks by the Syrian regime in 2017.
Robert Ford, a former US ambassador to Syria, even suggests that the Biden administration will provide the Kurdish community with an essential backing for the “recognition of a Kurdish state worldwide.” Sinam Mohammad, Syrian Democratic Forces’ political representative to the United States, recently told VOA
SDF hopes the Biden administration will bring more political support for us to be included in talks that will determine our future and that of Syria as a whole.
As such, Biden's approach toward the Syrian conflict is expected to clash with Turkey, another key player in the Syrian war. While Biden's administration is an SDF ally, Ankara's current extensive policy has been against this Kurdish-Arab alliance in northern Syria which it considers a “terrorist group.” On the contrary, Trump had referred to the Kurds last year as “natural enemies.” Jim Jeffrey, the former US defense adviser on Syria, confirmed in his November interview with Defense One that no one in Washington had given any guarantee for the Kurds against Turkey, limiting such cooperation.
Following Biden's election, diverse commentators predicted bumpy US-Turkey relationships over what they forecasted as US support for Kurdish territory enforcement in the region.
Within the humanitarian context, Biden's administration also plans to implement current US refugee policy. While the outgoing administration had lowered the cap to 15,000 refugees for the fiscal year 2021, which is an all-time low, Biden promised to “set the annual global refugee admissions cap to 125,000, and seek to raise it over time.”

author: Sylvain Keller


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How I survived tear gas bombs dropped on protestors in Peru · Global Voices
Andrea De la Torre

Photo by Romel Pua, used with permission.
From November 9 onward, the people of Peru realized that taking to the streets was increasingly unavoidable if they were to fight against the encroaching threat of a dictatorship, already underway in the midst of the biggest health crisis the country has ever faced. Back then, just thinking about it made my heart race.
I’m unsure which event was more outrageous; Manuel Merino seizing presidential power after the removal of President Martin Vizcarra without formal procedure, or Congress (which supposedly “represents the people”) once again supporting corruption entrenched in Peru’s federal government.
On the morning of November 10, my boyfriend and I arrived at Lima’s downtown historic center at Jirón Lampa to join the protest, and within the hour, the repression began. We had made it as far as Lampa because a police barricade prevented us from going further inward towards the Government Palace. The gathering crowd of protestors was quiet and restless with fear and uncertainty, a physical embodiment of the way the entire country felt. I began chanting “Come on, people, damn it! The people don't give up, damn it!” and the crowd followed me. We took hold of the confidence that being in a large group instills, and managed to get past the barricade. It was at that moment police began hurling tear gas bombs everywhere.
A police contingent approached us and protestors took off running to escape. I wanted to warn everyone to stop because running would drench them in tear gas, but I began to choke because three bombs had fallen around me. I left just in time, pressing onward and calling out for water, but there was no one to help. I felt like I was dying. I was unprepared. The only things I had were my cloth mask and my water bottle in my boyfriend's backpack, but I'd lost sight of him after the first tear gas bomb landed.
I went down a side street and found a small shop. Heaven opened its doors to me! I fumbled some coins out of my pocket and begged the shopkeeper for water, and he helped me.
Once I recovered my ability to breathe, two grinning, swaggering, heavily armed policemen passed by. I yelled after them. Surrounded by so many other people also struggling to breathe, blinded by tears, I shouted “You’re defending a man who seized power illegitimately. You’re attacking and violating us, your own people. You are traitors.”
Photo by Andrés Huacaychuco Quijada, used with permission
The following days were spent organizing. I joined several WhatsApp groups that discussed defense tactics for protecting protestors from police violence. Some proposed creating shock troops, or tear gas bomb disposal teams, or coordinated assistance for protestors and street dogs hurt by tear gas.
My boyfriend joined a task force dedicated to deactivating tear gas grenades thrown by police. I was terrified something would happen to him, but when he mentioned it would be safer for me to stay home I resolved to stand with him in solidarity. So I became a tear gas bomb deactivator, too.
But my anxiety wasn’t assuaged. I thought about the voices of people demanding to face Congress, terrified they would be subject to brute force instead. Envisioning the roar of bombs and guns going off again terrified me.
On November 10, my heartbeat continued to pound a thousand times a minute. I slept poorly, had nightmares. I felt a pressure in my chest every time my boyfriend talked strategy and I felt unconfident about my role. I just didn’t want any more people to suffer what I suffered, suffocating while begging for help under a barrage of tear gas canisters.
In the days that passed, several mass demonstrations and noisemaker protests called cacerolazos were organized: the 11N, the 12N, the 13N, all named after the dates of the demonstrations.
On November 14 at 6:00 pm, we arrived at the team’s agreed meeting point and suited up with helmets, face shields, gas masks, and glasses. We marked our equipment in order to recognize one another, and moved to Plaza San Martín.
We pressed on until we reached the University Park and lined up next to Hip Hop Block, a university cultural and political group. Our team leader asked us to close ranks to prevent any dreaded “infiltrators” from breaking through and attacking us from behind. Our initial plan was to resist police attacks and provide aid to protesters. We’d learned how to dispose of tear gas bombs: One must run towards it with a large container of water and baking soda, quickly stuff the bomb inside it, cover the top, and shake it to snuff out the gas.
My confidence was bolstered a bit, although as soon as we began to move, my legs started to shake, too. Not five minutes passed before a roar filled the air and the bombs began to rain around us. One, two, three, four … I lost count and ran as best I could, a spray bottle in one hand and my water jug in the other. A small amount of gas leaked inside my mask, but I could still breathe. I pressed on until I reached an area where people were crying out desperately, entirely unprepared for the attack, just like I was on Tuesday the 10th. I made my rounds, spraying water with baking soda and repeating “Keep your eyes closed, keep your mouth closed. Everything’s going to be okay. Breathe. Stay calm. Everything will be okay.”
The bombs continued to drum on, the wounded left, and gunshots sounded.
My team roamed the streets, my fear growing as I tried to locate my boyfriend. I felt angry and cowardly for flanking the rear, but I also understood that helping was the most important thing to do. To resist. To keep fighting.
All at once, my boyfriend and his team partner returned. He was fine, but we didn't know where the rest of the team was, nor how to tell them we were being overtaken and couldn't stay much longer—our water had run out and a curfew was in effect that night at 11. Once the clock struck, the police would become even more aggressive. We resorted to using WhatsApp in order to decide the best way to escape.
We caught sight of one another's faces when we regrouped: There was fatigue, outrage, fear, relief that although we were bruised we were still alive, and hellbent on keeping on fighting if the dictator did not fall.
We retired for the night, but cell phone messages began to ping notifications of the dead, injured, and detained. As I crossed my front door, Lima rumbled in cacerolazos. Inti, the first death of the night had been confirmed. Inti, who I had last seen at the Hip Hop Block, and who had probably gone ahead of me at some point before the killing began.

source: news-globalvoices

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Andrea De la Torre


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Join us LIVE on December 14 for ‘Belarus 2020: Still Uploading’ · Global Voices
Filip Noubel

Join Global Voices on December 14 at 3pm UTC/GMT for the first in our GV Insights series of virtual conversations: “Belarus 2020: Still Uploading?”—a lively discussion on the 2020 Belarusian revolution with experts from Belarus and the region and members of the Global Voices community. The event will be live-streamed on Zoom and Facebook Live.
Following the August 9 presidential elections, Belarusian society fractured along political lines, with one faction supporting Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has held power in the country since 1994, and the other supporting main opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the country's de facto president-elect.
The ongoing revolution in the country has played out in the form of unprecedented street demonstrations, strong mobilisation by women, and a new level of online coordination by activists, as well as extreme state violence, including disappearances, death, rape, torture and the imprisonment of thousands.
To review and explain the events of the past four months we have invited:
The event will be moderated by Maxim Edwards, Global Voices Russia and Eurasia editor, and Filip Noubel, Global Voices’ Managing Editor, both of whom have covered the events and interviewed key actors and witnesses to the revolution.
The event is free and open to the public and will be streamed live on Zoom at https://us02web.zoom.us/s/89146898846, and Facebook Live at https://www.facebook.com/globalvoicesonline.  Viewers will have the opportunity to comment and pose questions to the speakers. The session will be in English. Register here to receive a reminder about the meeting.
We look forward to having you join us on Monday, December 14 at 15:00 UTC (click here to convert to your local time zone)!

author: Filip Noubel


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Diary of a Nepali soldier in France · Global Voices
Nepali Times

Gurkhas in the trenches during World War I in France. More than 20,000 Nepali soldiers were killed fighting for the Allied Forces between 1914-1918. Photo: Imperial War Museum via Nepali Times.
This article by investigative journalist Shree Bhakta Khanal was originally published in Nepali Times and an edited version is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
Books have been written about the legendary bravery and sacrifice of Nepal’s Gurkha soldiers. Officers have extolled their obedience and cheerfulness despite hardships and danger. The world has an image of Nepali soldiers on the battlefield: fierce but always smiling.
But historians have pored through letters and diaries written by Gurkha soldiers from the two World Wars to paint a slightly different picture—Nepalis in the trenches of Flanders Field or below the cliffs at Gallipoli, homesick, terrified, cold and miserable. Many of these letters home were held by military censors, and are archived.
Now, a diary written by a Gurkha sergeant in the British Army during the battle of La Bassée in northern France during World War I in 1914, and retrieved by a German officer, has revealed a whole new side to the Gurkha legend, one that confirms the traditional bravery, but also their human side.
Two unnamed Gurkha prisoners of war in a German camp in Münster in 1916. Courtesy: Sir Kukri & Co, via Nepali Times.
Gurkha prisoners of war in a German camp. Some of their voices, recorded in song and stories, are now in the Humboldt Museum archives. Courtesy: Sir Kukri & Co. via Nepali Times.
Lieutenant Alexander Pfeifer was with the Kurhessische Jäger-Bataillon Nr. 11 and found the diary of a Nepali soldier in La Bassée on December 20, 1914, after a fierce battle against Allied forces of the British and French armies.
Lt Pfeiffer’s great-grandson Philip Cross found the documents and a khukri while going through his family effects. He is in the process of translating his great-grandfather’s diary into English, and also getting the diary of the Gurkha sergeant translated into English and German.
British Army officers with Gurkhas of the “Indian Corps” at La Bassée at the beginning of the war, via Nepali Times.
Lt Alexander Pfeifer, the German officer who found the diary of the Gurkha soldier which was recently retrieved by his great-grandson, Philip Cross. Via Nepali Times.
It appears that Lt Pfeifer’s job was to go through the bodies of dead enemy soldiers to find out if he could find any intelligence of what the Allied forces were up to. That seems to be how he got hold of the diary, photographs, and even the khukri.
The first page of the diary of the unknown Nepali soldier is in verse with numbered lines. It lists the names of the writers’ young friends who were killed or taken prisoner, the hardships they endured. From the penmanship and vocabulary and the use of numbered verse, the soldier appears to have been taught by a village priest, who used to be the only literate person in the villages of Nepal in those days.
Pages from the diary of an unknown Nepali soldier with a verse, and a list of names, possibly of prisoners of war. Courtesy: Philip Cross, via Nepali Times.
Translated, the lines read:
‘Poor fellows, their youth was taken away by the enemy’s hands (20)
The love of the military was left behind in Nepal
We are the living dead who have gone to heaven
Subedar Bhimsi Bhandari (21) Harke Thapa Jasraja Dharma Khatri Commander Pasitan Nainsingh Khatri Swarup Kunwar Pratiman Thapa’
The same names in the Nepali soldier’s diary also appear in the diary of Lt Alexander Pfeifer, and in the same order. It appears to be a translation of the Gurkha officer's diary. Courtesy: Philip Cross, via Nepali Times.
The second page of the Nepali soldier’s diary (above) has the names of Gurkhas which, interestingly, are the same names found in the same order in the papers of Lt Pfeifer in which he lists the names of Gurkhas who were taken prisoner (left). The German phonetics also closely resembles the way the unknown soldier has written the names in Nepali, for example, by spelling Gurung as गुरुं (Gurun).
Lt Pfeiffer’s note in his own diary entry reads as follows:
Found with a Gurkha sergeant major. The content of the notice page No. 1 says: The soldiers of the section (Battalion) should be treated with love, friendliness and kindness. Every person, who carries out the rules of his religion, according to law and order, receives his payment (will be happy).
The orders of the commanding officer should be carried out precisely and immediately. The content of the notice paper No. 2 is as follows. Names of the Gurkhas:
On investigating some of these names, British Army records show that Chandrabir Thapa was a rifleman in the Second King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles (Sirmur Rifles). Manbir Thapa was a sergeant in the First Battalion of the First King George V’s Own Gurkha Rifles (Malaun Regiment); his service number was 1896, and he was killed in action on December 20, 1914, in La Bassée. We even know Manbir’s father’s name was Parasram Thapa and he lived in Dohadi village in western Nepal.
Records at La Bassée show that there were other Gurkha soldiers killed on the battlefield or taken prisoner who were not on Lt Pfeiffer’s diary list.
Among Lt Alexander Pfeifer’s effects was this khukri, possibly taken from the same Gurkha soldier who wrote the diary. Photo: Philip Cross, via Nepali Times.
The Nepali soldier’s diary, written by hand 107 years ago, says a lot about the war and the warriors from Nepal. The soldier was writing about fellow Nepalis in his own, and possibly other units, listing carefully the names of the dead and those taken prisoner. The names in the poem are probably of those who were killed in battle, but we cannot be sure. The other list, because of its similarity to the list in Lt Pfeifer’s list in German, could be of those who were taken prisoner on December 20.
But that opens up a puzzle. How come the list of dead soldiers in the Nepali soldier’s diary is in the same order as the list of prisoners in German in Lt Pfeifer’s diary?
It is not clear whether Lt Pfeifer was just translating the Nepali soldier’s diary, or if those are his own instructions. The German officer’s own diary was ultimately found more than a century later by his great-grandson. We do not know what the Gurkha’s name was, where in Nepal he was from, and what happened to him.
Contemporary map of La Bassée in France, which was captured by the Germans during 1914. Photo via Nepali Times.
Many of the Gurkhas captured in France and Belgium were transported to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany. There, some of the prisoners had their voices and songs preserved in early recording machines that had just come into use.
Nepali professor Alaka Atreya Chudal of Vienna University has been translating from Nepali into German some of these testimonies recorded between 1914-1918 in a prisoner-of-war camp of Halbmondlager in Wünsdorf, 40 km from Berlin.
The 100 or so recordings contain Nepali folk tales, songs, poetry, and folk riddles that have immense linguistic and cultural value because they are preserved in audio from more than a century ago. The recordings are now in the archives of Humboldt-Universität in Berlin.

author: Nepali Times


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Google Doodle of economist and Nobel laureate Sir Arthur Lewis makes the Caribbean proud · Global Voices
Janine Mendes-Franco

Screenshot of the Google Doodle of St Lucian-born economist Sir W. Arthur Lewis, on December 10, 2020.
As Caribbean netizens logged on to their browsers on the morning of December 10, they got a pleasant surprise: an illustrated portrait of Sir Arthur Lewis, whose head formed the second “O” in the Google Doodle of the day.
Today is the anniversary of the day Sir. W. Arthur Lewis was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize for his work on modeling the economic forces that affect developing countries #GoogleDoodle https://t.co/zODEor6esO pic.twitter.com/x4FSXcRPOw
— Kimberleigh Peterson (@Kimberleigh_P) December 10, 2020
The St Lucian-born economist, who became known for his “Lewis model” of economic development, was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1979. He was the first (and thus far, only) Black person to win the coveted prize in the field of economic sciences.
He was also the first Black student to be admitted—via a scholarship, no less—to the London School of Economics (LSE), where he had the opportunity to be taught by some of the foremost economic thinkers of the time. Upon graduation, Lewis worked at the LSE for a while, before being co-opted in 1947 to the Victoria University of Manchester as a lecturer.
In its tribute video explaining why it chose Lewis as the subject of its doodle, Google identified him as an “African-American economist and professor” who was “one of the pioneers of modern development economics.”
The doodle was illustrated by Camilla Ru, quite fittingly a Manchester-based artist, since Lewis developed some of his most important concepts about economics in developing countries while at the University of Manchester. These concepts would prove invaluable to the Caribbean, given its push for independence from Great Britain in the late 1950s.
In 1959, Lewis moved to the United States to take up a post as a professor at Princeton University, where he would work until his retirement in 1983—but he was a Caribbean man, through and through.
Deeply influenced by the ideas of Trinidad and Tobago's first prime minister and one of the architects of Caribbean independence, Dr. Eric Williams, the pair remained lifelong friends. Lewis also used his knowledge to the region's benefit, having served as an economic advisor to various Caribbean governments, including Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. In 1959, he was appointed Vice-Chancellor of The University of the West Indies (The UWI), and in 1970, became the first president of the Caribbean Development Bank.
In a Facebook post, university lecturer Amílcar Sanatan summed up the significance of Lewis and his work:
W. Arthur Lewis was a genius. Unfortunately, in Sixth Form and undergraduate Sociology we are taught more about the shortcomings of his theory and the failures of ‘industrialisation by invitation.’ What a way to minimise his thoughts, life and contributions to development economics. Thankfully, at The UWI, there has been a historical commitment to preserve his memory in conferences and architecture on campuses.
Lewis was an outstanding child of St. Lucia whose contributions to the Caribbean, Third World and global community are unparalleled. He was to Economics what Bob Marley was to music. His anti-imperialism and decolonial thought emphasised political responsibility of little countries with bold political imaginations.
We are the governors of our reality and we are responsible for our futures. His ascension to high-level institutions cloaks the image of a young Arthur Lewis writing pamphlets and notes about social unrest in the West Indies and making the case for self-determination and nationhood.
Much respect to you, elder.
Lewis’ concepts continue to be relevant to this day. Most recently, Professor Sir Hilary Beckles, chair of the CARICOM Reparations Commission, cited what he called the “Arthur Lewis paradigm” as the way for the region to approach the issue of slavery reparations.
This model for Caribbean economic development was based on drastic action to support economic reform and more equitable wealth distribution — an approach which, in the words of Jamaican writer Geoffrey Philp, sought to move the region away from being “the fabled ‘beasts of burden.'”
In 1963, the British government knighted Lewis for his pioneering achievements and contributions to the field of economics. He passed away in Barbados on June 15, 1991, at the age of 76, but his work—and his image—live on.

author: Janine Mendes-Franco


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Seven African governments employ surveillance spyware, says new study · Global Voices
Nwachukwu Egbunike

A map from the Citizen Lab showing countries using of Circle's spyware
The governments of seven African countries — Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe — are using spyware technology, according to a new report by Citizen Lab, an interdisciplinary research unit at the University of Toronto, Canada.
The study has identified at least 25 countries around the world that have deployed surveillance software produced by Circles, a firm affiliated with Israel's NSO Group. The study says Circles claim to only deal with nation-states.
The report, written by Bill Marczak and four others, discovered “a unique signature associated with the hostnames of Check Point firewalls used in Circles deployments, enabling us to identify Circles deployments.” Check Point is a leading American-Israeli cybersecurity firm.
According to the study, Circles’ technology operates by exploiting a common signal flaw in the global mobile phone system to enable call and text snooping as well as tracking of phones.
The snooping technique used by Circles is called Signaling System 7 (SS7), a “protocol suite developed in 1975 for exchanging information and routing phone calls between different wireline telecommunications companies,” the report says. SS7 is currently used in 2G and 3G mobile networks during cross-border billing for roamed calls.
Thomas Brewster, a cybersecurity analyst at Forbes who reported on the Citizen Lab study, further explains that when one travels to another country, “the SS7 network is used to move your phone over to a partner telecoms provider and adjust billing accordingly.” However, a twist occurs in this normal process if “a surveillance vendor” is able to access the SS7 networks, “either via hacking or acquiring it.” The SS7 then sends “commands to a subscriber’s ‘home network’ falsely indicating the subscriber is roaming. That will, in turn, reveal their location, though only the coordinates of the cell tower closest to the phone,” says Brewster.
Circle's clients in Africa identified by Citizen Lab are the following: Botswana’s Directorate of Intelligence and Security Service (DISS), Morocco’s Ministry of Interior, Nigeria’s Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), and an unknown agency in Zambia.

author: Nwachukwu Egbunike


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Internet artist behind satirical Australia war crimes image hailed as a hero on Chinese social media · Global Voices
Oiwan Lam

Screen Shot of Lijian Zhao tweet- SBS News video 30 Nov 2020
Chinese online patriots have a new hero: Fu Yu（付昱), also known as Wuhe Qilin (乌合麒麟), the internet artist whose satirical image of an Australian soldier slitting the throat of an Afghan child was shared by China’s Foreign Ministry's spokesman Zhao Lijian in late November.
The tweet caused a row between China and Australia as the latter's prime minister demanded the post's deletion and a public apology from China.
The image was a reference to a recent investigation conducted by Australia's own military that found that the country's soldiers may have committed war crimes in Afghanistan.
Wuhe Qilin responded to Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s request to an apology with another illustration released the following day (via @NavinaHeyden)：
Satire CG works by young Chinese artist 乌合麒麟. He immediately created another image within a day, as counterattack to Mr. Morrison’ accusation. What a stark contrast in intellegence, compentence, upstandingness and confidence! pic.twitter.com/R40j7vG95W
— Navina Heyden (@NavinaHeyden) December 1, 2020
The image depicts Morrison covering up a dead body with what looks to be Australia's national flag while a young boy captures the attention of photographers.
On Chinese social media, online patriots have cheered Wuhe Qilin “wolf-warrior” spirit. Chinese businessman Huo Lei, for example, said on Weibo:
西方国家还是很讲文明的，前提是实力对等。如果另一方处于弱势，在中世纪是以“上帝的名义”施行侵略，现在则以“民主的名义”。过去两百年的血泪史让我们明白人权也好尊重也罢都要靠我们自己争取，而不是寻求对方的怜悯或施舍。我们的一位画家也能让对方总理感觉到疼，我为祖国的强大自豪。力挺！
Western countries are only civilized when there is power balance. During the middle century, when the other side was weak, they invaded others in the name of god and now they will do so in the name of democracy. The 200-year history of blood and tears teach us that we have to earn our own respect rather than seek sympathy from others. Now that a single artist managed to hurt their prime minister, I am very proud of the strength of my motherland. Strong support!
Leo Johnson, another Weibo user, said:
新时代的中国太需要有乌合麒麟这样的优秀年轻艺术家来做价值捍卫和输出了！
We are in great need of excellent artists like Wuhe Qilin in China’s new era who will defend and export our values!
And in another viral article on Weibo, the writer slammed Chinese state media for being absent in the Twitter spat and depicted the incident as a Chinese victory:
我们所能看到的是，外交部带领一帮子自干五在战斗，而主要的战斗员那些央媒等宣传机器却缺席了！[…]画师@乌合麒麟 ，是一名90后年轻人，一个爱国者，一个文艺青年，一个有思想的战士，一个战斗力爆棚的战士。
近日，他用一幅画作就改变了中国在国际舆论场的地位，堪称一个里程碑事件！
他第一次让来自中国的声音成为全球关注的热点，并成功将真相告诉世界。更神奇的是，他的画作还让西方那些主流媒体不得已的为他开足马力宣传，还让如新西兰、法国、美国等这些西方国家愚蠢的为澳大利亚军人残害平民、儿童的反人类罪行站台，让真相扩散的更有深度与广度，向世界揭穿了西方国家所谓“人权”的虚伪而凶残的真相。
What we can see is that China’s Foreign Ministry was leading a group of online patriots in the fight while the state media and propaganda machine were absent […] Illustrator @WuheQilin is from the post-90 generation, a patriot, a cultured young man, an ideology fighter, a powerful warrior.
Recently, he single-handedly changed China’s position in the international stage with an illustration. This is such a milestone.
For the first time, he makes Chinese voices heard and tells the truth to the world. What’s more amazing is that Western media outlets are compelled to report on the incident and stupid Western countries such as New Zealand, France, and the U.S continue to stand by Australian soldiers who committed war crimes such as killing civilians, including children. He spreads the truth and exposes the hypocrisy of the Western countries that call themselves human right defenders.
Another post on WeChat draws the same conclusion:
乌合麒麟靠着两幅画，《和平之师》和《致莫里森》，在国际舆论战中一战成名，这两幅画，直接揭露了澳大利亚军队的残忍、媒体的双标、政客的无耻，一拿出来就激得整个西方世界…麒麟一支画笔，胜过百万“理智、中立、客观”的媒体人。
Wuhe Qilin built its reputation in the international community with his two illustrations which expose the cruelty of Australian soldiers, the double standard of western media and the shamelessness of politicians and hit the nerve of western world… Qilin’s pen has beat down tens of thousands “rational, impartial and objective” media workers.
Many Chinese cartoonists have expressed support to Wuhe Qilin by posting art with a similar message. Below are some of them, shared on Twitter:
More Chinese artist have join the fray abt Australia PM Scott Morrison complaining that Chinese artist 乌合麒麟 Wuheqilin depicted real Australian war crimes in Afghanistan ?? pic.twitter.com/daDIaAaBvg
— Carl Zha (@CarlZha) December 2, 2020
The Emperor's New Clothes #AustraliaChina #AustralianArmy #Afghanistan #wuheqilin #乌合麒麟 @SpokespersonCHN pic.twitter.com/xIqOKRkAB2
— Miaow (@miaowcomics) December 2, 2020
With over 600,000 followers on Weibo, Wuhe Qilin was born in the 1990s and became known on Chinese social media earlier this year after he published illustrations about the Hong Kong protests which align with Beijing's view of the island's pro-democracy movement. Those illustrations have been widely shared by state-affiliated media outlets, such as Global Times.
Below are some of them (via Twitter user @Lazybean):
More work by 乌合麒麟:
1,2: On HK “protestors”
3: On the passing of HK National Security Law
4: On Fang Fang
Disclaimer:
These are artworks by THE artist 乌合麒麟, not photos?. pic.twitter.com/PklIbCubup
— Lazybean?❤???? (@gracebean284) December 1, 2020
In an interview with nationalist Chinese website Guancha in June 2020, Wuhe Qilin explained how he began illustrating:
是从去年香港系列事件的时候开始的，最初的动机是因为看了一些相关新闻而感到愤怒，然后有一天看到香港某漫画家的一系列宣传暴力美化动乱的漫画作品，于是我也想用类似的方式回击，就有了第一张作品——《伪神》。
[I began drawing political illustrations] because of what happened in Hong Kong. At first I was feeling very frustrated after reading the news and one day I saw a series of cartoons drawn by a Hong Kong cartoonist which glorified the riot. I wanted to respond in the same manner, so I drew the first illustration, called “You believe in a pretender god,” and it became a series.
Wuhe Qilin calls himself “wolf warrior,” a popular way to describe — and mock — the aggressive diplomatic style adopted by Chinese diplomats in recent years (“Wolf Warrior” is in fact the title of a 2015 Chinese patriot movie).
In the same Guancha interview, which was distributed by the Communist Youth League of China through its official social media channels, Wuhe Qilin talks about the “duty of artists,” an idea that resonates with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s calls for “ideological struggle”:
但我认为传递和输出意识形态其实恰恰是艺术作品和艺术家的责任之一。所以我这么做了，而且是抱着抛砖引玉的态度，希望有更多的文艺工作者能善用自身技能去为祖国和人民做一些事情。
特别是现在这个在西方利用话语权步步紧逼的特殊时期，我认为我们是需要更多传递我们国家和人民意志的文艺作品的。
I believe that the distribution and exportation of ideology is the duty of artists and their artworks. That’s why I did it and it's my attempt to stimulate similar acts. I wish more artists used their talents and skills to work for their people and country. In particular in this special period when narratives coming from the West are cornering [China]. Thus I believe we need more art that reflect the will of our country and our people.
After the Twitter spat with the Australian PM, Wuhe Qilin posted a video message on YouTube further elaborating on his world view. His words are partly transcribed here by @wangbo08492215:
乌合麒麟 say：
It is hoped that the Australian Prime Minister will face up to the reality, pay attention to domestic affairs, and restrain the behavior of Australian troops stationed abroad, so as to prevent such tragedy from happening again.@zlj517 pic.twitter.com/tLuozmKDJu
— 夢 (@wangbo08492215) November 30, 2020

author: Oiwan Lam


text:
How will the war in Nagorno-Karabakh change Azerbaijan? · Global Voices
Maxim Edwards

Azerbaijanis celebrate victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, Bülbül Avenue, Baku, November 10, 2020. Photo CC-BY-SA 4.0: Toghrul Rahimli / Wikimedia Commons. Some rights reserved.
Captured Armenian military equipment rumbled past a podium in Baku, behind which stood Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev with his Turkish counterpart and close ally Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Yesterday's military parade in the Azerbaijani capital celebrated the recapture of much of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous territory which was governed by its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state since a 1994 ceasefire. Successive Azerbaijani leaders vowed to return it to Baku's control, without much success — until the latest military operation was launched in late September.
Previous hostilities such as those in 2016 are often described as “clashes”. But this was a full-scale war, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths. Azerbaijan has retaken all the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, which were mostly populated by Azerbaijanis before the first war. Baku has also taken some sections of Karabakh proper, including the strategically important hilltop city of Shusha which is of immense symbolic importance to Karabakh's ethnic Azerbaijanis. The self-declared Republic of Artsakh is now a rump state, connected to its Armenian patron by a sole road — and guarded by over 2,000 Russian peacekeepers.
Their arrival was thanks to the November 9 ceasefire agreement, brokered by Moscow, which has redrawn the map of the South Caucasus. As Armenia enters another period of political turbulence and struggles to accommodate thousands of refugees from the wartorn region, it is also worth considering what this victory means for the victor — once that podium is empty and the cheering crowds have returned to their lives.
What does the outcome of this war mean for state-society relations in authoritarian Azerbaijan? What does it mean for Azerbaijan's ties with Turkey and Russia? Crucially, what does the future hold for the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani internally displaced people (IDPs) from Karabakh who have been waiting for this moment since 1994?
To find out more, I interviewed Sergey Rumyantsev and Sevil Huseynova, sociologists from Azerbaijan who now lead the Centre for Independent Social Research, a Berlin-based research institute. The interview has been edited for brevity.
Maxim Edwards: President Ilham Aliyev’s popularity is now at an all-time high. What does that mean for civil liberties and political freedoms in Azerbaijan?
Сергей Румянцев: Ильхам Алиев занимает президентский пост с 2003 года. Это длинный срок. Все позитивное что случилось за это время всегда записывалось на его счет. Реформы бюрократического аппарата, построенные новые школы и отремонтированные старые, мосты и дороги, и даже подземные переходы – все это происходило, по официальной версии, благодаря Ильхаму Алиеву. Нет никаких оснований думать, что после успешной для Азербайджана войны эта ситуация как-то радикально изменится. Победу в войне уже записали на все тот счет Ильхама Алиева. Да, конечно, и сам президент это подчеркивает, победила армия и азербайджанский солдат. Но во главе с умелым дипломатом и “победоносным” верховным главнокомандующим – главным творцом победы.
При всех раскладах, победа в войне многое меняет. Очевидно, что президент приобрел новый и очень внушительный политический и символический ресурс дополнительной легитимности. После удачной войны режим приобрел и большую устойчивость. По крайней мере на какой-то неопределенный срок. Весь политический спектр без исключения, включая самых ярых оппонентов и критиков президента поддержали войну. Тот опыт всеобщей общественной солидарности в дни войны о котором с такой гордостью говорили и представители власти и оппозиционеры не пройдет бесследно. Однажды “согрешив” и поддержав режим критикам власти будет труднее сохранить за собой роль без страха и упрека критиков авторитарной и коррумпированной власти. Суммируя, можно сказать, что политической свободы в стране не было до войны, и тем более нет причин думать, что свободы будет больше после ее удачного для режима завершения.
Sergey Rumyantsev: Ilham Aliyev has been president since 2003. That's a long time in office. Everything positive which has happened over that period is always attributed to him. From reforms of the state bureaucracy, to building new schools and renovating old ones, bridges and roads, even pedestrian underpasses — the official line is that it's all thanks to Ilham Aliyev. There is no basis whatsoever to suppose that after Azerbaijan's successful military campaign, this situation will radically change. The credit for this victory, too, has as already been handed to Ilham Aliyev. Yes, of course, the president himself emphasises that the army and Azerbaijani soldiers are to thank for this victory. But this victory is mainly thanks to the leadership of a skillful diplomat and “victorious” supreme commander.
Winning a war always leads to huge changes, under any conditions. It's obvious that the president has gained a new and very potent source of additional legitimacy. The regime has gained greater stability, at least for the foreseeable future. The entire political spectrum without exception, including the president's most strident critics and opponents, supported this war. The public experience of solidarity throughout this war, about which the authorities and the opposition spoke with such pride, will not fade away without a trace. Having “sinned” and supported the government, it will now be more difficult for critics of the government to pick up their role once again without confronting their own fear and the reproaches of others. In sum, we can say that there was no political freedom in Azerbaijan beforehand, and there is even less reason to expect any more freedom now that the regime has waged a war so successfully.
Севиль Гусейнова: Я бы сказала, что наивысший пик популярности президент достиг во время боевых действий. И с каждым взятым селом или райцентром градус популярности повышался. После 10 ноября, на фоне празднования победы, сразу прозвучала и критика от наиболее националистически настроенных оппозиционеров и публичных деятелей. Обещания вернуть целиком весь Карабах пока не сбылись, хотя взятие Степанакерта, как принято считать, было лишь вопросом времени. Более того, на территории страны теперь находятся российские военные и это обстоятельство раздражает и вызывает опасение не только у профессиональных критиков режима, но и у многих обывателей. Думаю, что в случае ухудшения экономической и социальной обстановки голоса критиков, приглушенные на фоне победы, вновь зазвучат громче. Важно и то обстоятельство, что не был решен важнейший вопрос о статусе Нагорного Карабаха. Т.е. в целом, ситуация очень не стабильная и в любой момент может претерпеть значительные изменения. Но в целом, в краткосрочной перспективе, имидж президента укрепился, а это означает, что в области гражданских прав каких-то изменений в лучшую сторону ожидать не приходится.
Sevil Huseynova: I would say that the president achieved the peak of his popularity during the conflict. And with each village or regional centre taken, his popularity increased. But after November 10, while victory was being celebrated, those more nationalist opposition supporters and public figures started to voice criticism. Promises to recapture the entirety of Karabakh had not been met, [they said], although it was commonly believed that the capture of Stepanakert was only a matter of time. Furthermore, the Russian military now has a presence in Azerbaijan, which bothers prominent critics of the regime and many ordinary people alike. I think that if the economic and social situation deteriorates, the voices of these critics, now drowned out by the victory celebrations, will once again be heard. Importantly, the question of Nagorno-Karabakh's status was not resolved. So in general, the situation is very unstable and could significantly change at any time. But in the short term, the president's image has been strengthened, meaning that there are no grounds to expect changes for the better when it comes to civil rights.
ME: It seems that there is discontent in Azerbaijan with Russia's new role in the region. Once the jubilation wears off, what does that mean for Azerbaijani-Russian relations? And will that discontent work in the government's favour or against it?
СР: Очевидно, что присутствие российских военнослужащих в Карабахе играет против политического режима. Уже сейчас данное обстоятельство вызывает настороженность даже в среде убежденных симпатизантов власти. Но не думаю, что данное обстоятельство как-то поменяет в ближайшее время атмосферу “партнерских” отношений между двумя режимами. Россию всегда недолюбливали и критиковали. На уровне СМИ или, допустим, школьных учебников по истории, Россия и русские все постсоветские годы были составной частью образа врага. Но на уровне внешних отношений большее значение имели личные связи. При Борисе Ельцине отношения с Россией были более напряженными. При Владимире Путине гораздо более партнерскими. То есть такой негативный образ России и русских, как империи и имперской нации, союзника Армении больше предназначался для внутренней аудитории. В отношениях между президентами и правительствами всегда находился общий язык. Я думаю, что это и вопрос взаимной поддержки авторитарных лидеров. Каждый режим нуждается в определенной поддержке из вне.
SR: It's obvious that the Russian military presence in Nagorno-Karabakh will work against the regime. The current state of affairs is already causing some discomfort even among convinced supporters. But I don't think that in the near future it will somehow change the atmosphere of “partnership” between the two regimes. Russia has always been criticised and distrusted. In the media and, for example, in students’ history textbooks, Russia and Russians have been part of a broader image of the enemy throughout the post-Soviet years. But on the level of foreign relations, personal connections were more important. Under Boris Yeltsin, relations with Russia were more tense. Under Vladimir Putin, there has been more partnership. That is to say, the negative image of Russia and Russians as an imperialist nation and an ally of Armenia was more intended for domestic consumption. Presidents and governments have been able to find a common language. I think it's also a matter of mutual support between authoritarian leaders. Every regime needs some external support.
СГ: Присутствие российских военных в целом в обществе воспринимается негативно. Но, в то же время, невмешательство России в военные действия как бы компенсирует этот негатив. Весь вопрос в том, что будет, когда приблизится окончание пятилетнего срока пребывания миротворцев в Карабахе? Рано или поздно придется разбираться со сложными вопросами статуса Нагорного Карабаха. Мне кажется, что труднее придется российскому режиму. У азербайджанских властей есть ясное понимание выгодного для них и отвечающего интересам всей нации решения этого вопроса. Полный контроль со стороны Азербайджана. Армянскую сторону такое развитие дел никак не устраивает. Россия пытается сохранить отношения с обоими странами и чем дальше, тем труднее будет добиваться этой цели.
Возрастающее недовольство, если оно случится в Азербайджане, будет играть против азербайджанских властей, потому что именно при их участии на территорию страны вошли войска третьего государства.
SH: The Russian military presence is indeed perceived negatively in society. But at the same time, Russia's non-interference in the hostilities somewhat makes up for it. The real question is what happens when the end of the peacekeepers’ five-year mandate approaches? Sooner or later, the complex issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's status will have to be addressed. It seems to me that that will cause a headache for the Russian regime. The Azerbaijani authorities have a clear understanding of that issue which suits them and the entire nation — complete control by Azerbaijan. But the Armenian side won't be satisfied by that state of affairs. Meanwhile, Russia tries to maintain relations with both countries; the further apart they are, the more difficult it will be for Moscow to do so.
A growth in discontent, if that happens in Azerbaijan, will indeed work against the authorities because they enabled the troops of a third state to enter the country.
ME: Turkey also provided extensive support to Azerbaijan throughout the war. But Turkey is facing a crisis of its own. What will Turkey get in return for its assistance? What could Ankara expect?
СР: Турция уже получила определенные дивиденды от активной поддержки Азербайджана в войне. Сама война позволила хотя бы на некоторое время отвлечь значительную часть населения Турции от социальных проблем. С экономикой все очень плохо и лучший выход для негативных эмоций – участие в маленькой победоносной войне. Пантюркистские идеи и национализм правого толка широко распространенны в обеих странах, если не сказать, что доминируют в них. Война предоставила дополнительную возможность поиграть на этих струнах, возбудить приятные эмоции солидарности в борьбе против общего врага.
Помимо этого, Турция максимально укрепила свой символический авторитет и влияние в Азербайджане. Любовь к “братской” Турции сейчас сильна как никогда. Нужно сказать, что Реджеп Эрдоган выглядел куда внушительнее на трибуне в качестве оратора обращавшегося к азербайджанским военнослужащим и гражданам страны, чем Ильхам Алиев. Тем более, что Алиев и не сказал ничего нового. А вот Эрдоган даже стихи о Лачине продекламировал.
Турция тоже получает прямое наземное сообщение с Азербайджаном – Мегринский коридор. Эта часть соглашения выгодна обеим сторонам.
Ну и, наконец, можно ожидать, что последуют какие-то новые выгодные для Турции соглашения. Теперь мяч на поле Алиева, который в долгу перед Эрдоганом, которому уже были обещаны контракты. Но сфера строительства это очевидное поле отмывания коррупционных миллиардов. И мало вероятно, что азербайджанский режим не воспользуется таким шансом в полной мере.
Восстановление разрушенных сел и городов – это отличная возможность для азербайджанской власти вновь говорить о том, что с социальными реформами придется повременить. Вначале нужно построить дома и дороги и вернуть вынужденных переселенцев домой. Турецкий бизнес допустят к проектам по восстановлению территорий, но львиная доля и контроль над процессом останется за семьей Алиевых-Пашаевых.
SR: Turkey has already received certain payoffs from its support for Azerbaijan. For a time, the war made it possible to distract a significant section of Turkish society from social problems. The economic situation is very bad, and the best way to quell negative sentiment is to get involved in a “victorious little war”. Pan-Turkic ideas and right-wing nationalism are widespread in both countries, or even dominate them. The war offered another chance to play the same tune, inflaming solidarity in a struggle against a common enemy.
Moreover, Turkey has strengthened its symbolic authority and influence in Azerbaijan to the maximum degree possible. Love for “brotherly” Turkey is at an all-time high. It must also be said that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was far more impressive on the [victory parade] podium when addressing the Azerbaijani servicemen and citizens, even more so than Ilham Aliyev. Particularly because Aliyev did not say anything new. While Erdoğan even recited poems about Lachin [a strategically important town in Nagorno-Karabakh].
Turkey also receives a direct ground connection with Azerbaijan — a corridor through Meghri in Armenia. That part of the agreement suits both parties. And finally, it can be expected that there will be new agreements which benefit Turkey. Now the ball is on Aliyev's court — he is indebted to Erdoğan, who has already been promised contracts. The construction industry is an obvious way to launder billions, and it is unlikely that the Azerbaijani regime will not take full advantage of that chance.
The reconstruction of destroyed villages and cities is an excellent chance for the Azerbaijani authorities to argue that social reforms have to be postponed. Firstly, roads and houses need to be built for returning IDPs. Turkish businesses will be invited to reconstruction projects across the retaken territories, but the lion's share and ultimate control over the process will remain with the [ruling] Aliyev-Pashayev family.
ME: Many Azerbaijani IDPs have lived outside Karabakh for over a quarter of a century. What will be the biggest obstacles to their returning home? Will all of them be willing or able to do so?
СР: Можно точно сказать, что все захотят вернуть свои дома и какие-то земельные участки. Квартиры. Но будут ли жить на этих территориях? Кто-то, конечно, останется. Кто-то вернув дом, возможно отстроив его останется в Баку, где есть работа и налажена жизнь. Так живут не только вынужденные переселенцы, но и вся страна. Надежды найти хоть какую-нибудь работу, сделать карьеру, приводят очень многих жителей страны в столичный Баку.
И, конечно, есть проблема поиска финансовых средств. Пока неясно в какой форме государство будет оказывать поддержку. Но если какая-то семья, а таких очень много, за почти 30 лет так и не смогла обустроить свой быт, если люди все эти годы продолжали жить в ужасных условиях в бывших пионерских лагерях, общежитиях и тому подобных местах, это значит, что у них просто не было средств построить себе новые дома, приобрести земельные участки, курить квартиры. Понятно, что такие возможности не появятся вдруг только потому, что они могут вернуться к своим разрушенным домам.
SR: It can certainly be said that all of them want to return to their homes and their lands, their apartments. But will they live in these territories? Of course, some will stay. Others may return, and having rebuilt their homes, return to Baku where they have jobs and lives. That's the reality of life for the entire country, not just IDPs. They hope to find some kind of work, get an apartment, and move to the capital like many other Azerbaijanis.
And, naturally, there is the problem of financial resources. It's not yet clear in what form the state will offer support. But if a family has been unable to build a stable life for the past 30 years — and there are many such families — if for all that time they have continued to live in abysmal conditions and in former pioneers’ camps, dormitories, and similar accommodation, that means that they simply do not have the resources to build themselves new homes, take over plots of land, or buy apartments. Everybody understands that such opportunities will not simply appear just because they can return to their destroyed houses.
СГ: С возвращением возникает большая проблема определения прав собственности. Учитывая, что речь идет о сотнях тысячах людей решить эту проблему будет очень непросто. В 1990-е люди покидали свои дома в спешке. У многих не сохранились документы. Большинство так наверняка и не смогли оформить права собственности. Это ведь был Советский союз, с его особенным отношением к недвижимости. Это будет очень сложный процесс. Но, в любом случае, это рано или поздно должно было случиться. Жаль, что для этого понадобилась новая война.
SH: IDPs’ return to Karabakh raises the question of defining property rights. Considering that we are talking about hundreds of thousands of people, it will be very difficult to solve the issue. In the 1990s, many people left their homes in a hurry. Many did not have documents. This was the Soviet Union, which had its own attitude to real estate. It will be a difficult process, but sooner or later it has to happen. It's a pity that a new war was needed to do so.
ME: Aliyev recently stated that there will be no special autonomous status for Karabakh Armenians, but has also hinted at “cultural autonomy”. In any case, over nearly three decades, Baku does not seem to have concretely proposed any autonomy which might assuage Karabakh Armenian concerns. Could that change?
СР: Что касается автономии для Карабаха, то я скорее пессимист. Об автономии не договорились до победы, почему режим должен идти на этот непопулярный шаг сейчас? Да и в целом, что может значить автономный статус для какой-то территории в современном Азербайджане, где авторитарная власть стремится к полному контролю над обществом? Даже если статус и будет предоставлен, то это будет какая-то форма культурной автономии. Не более того.
SR: When it comes to autonomy for Karabakh, I'm more of a pessimist. There were no agreements about autonomy before the military victory, so why should the regime be expected to take such an unpopular step now? And in general, what can an autonomous status for this or that territory really mean in modern Azerbaijan, where an authoritarian regime strives for complete control over society? Even if such a status were to be granted, it would be some form of cultural autonomy. Nothing more.
СГ: Не думаю, что официальная позиция будет меняться кардинальным образом. Более того, как победившая сторона, Азербайджан может занять еще более бескомпромиссную позицию по вопросу статуса Карабаха. Теперь стороны поменяются местами. Азербайджан будет устраивать до поры до времени статус-кво, а армянская сторона попытается выносить этот вопрос на широкое обсуждение. Более того, Азербайджан может поднять вопрос финансовой компенсаций и таким образом сузит шансы другой стороны во время переговоров.
По понятным причинам есть сейчас и сохранится еще на долгие годы большой запас недоверия к карабахским армянам. Они с оружием в руках выступили против официальной азербайджанской власти. Поэтому предоставление реальной автономии представляется мало вероятным. По крайней мере, власти будут всеми силами сопротивляться такому решению. Тем более, что встретят в этом полную поддержку у практически всего населения страны.
SH: I don't expect the official position to change dramatically. Furthermore, as the winning side, Azerbaijan can take an even more uncompromising stance towards the status of Karabakh. The sides will now switch. Azerbaijan will be content to preserve the status quo for the time being, while the Armenian side will try and raise the issue for discussion. Azerbaijan could also raise the issue of financial compensation to narrow the other side's chances during negotiations.
For obvious reasons, there is now deep distrust towards the Karabakh Armenians and that will remain for many years to come. They took up arms in opposition to the Azerbaijani authorities. Therefore, the granting of any real autonomy seems unlikely. At the very least, the authorities will resist such a move with all their might. And in that, they will enjoy complete support from almost the entire population of the country.
ME: The Caucasus scholar Laurence Broers has suggested that this victory could mean more prominence for veterans in Azerbaijani politics. The situations are very different, but veterans had a big clout in Armenia after the First Karabakh War. Could they be a political challenge in Azerbaijan?
СР: Очевидно, что статус армии и людей в форме сильно вырос. Армейская служба никогда не пользовалась большой популярностью в стране. Возможно сейчас ситуация поменяется. Человек в военной форме будет пользоваться гораздо большим уважением. За ними теперь слава героев. В стране появился новый влиятельный институт, новые публичные люди, претендующие на всеобщую любовь.
Но думаю, что в ближайшие годы конкуренции Алиеву эти люди не составят. Им понадобится время, чтобы привыкнуть к роли самостоятельных игроков. Весь вопрос в том, что однажды, неизбежным образом трон под Алиевым закачается и тогда военные могут быстро заполнить образовавшийся вакуум власти.
SR: It's obvious that the status of the army and people in uniform has been strongly enhanced. Military service has never really been very popular in Azerbaijan. But perhaps the situation will change now. A man in military uniform may be much more respected. They are now loved as heroes. An institution has appeared in the country which commands not just influence but universal adoration.
Nevertheless, I don't think that these people will compete with Aliyev in the years to come. It will take some time before they are used to being independent players. The point is that one day, the throne will be pulled out from under Aliyev and the military could quickly fill the ensuing power vacuum.
СГ: Думаю, что власть может осознавать эти риски. Сейчас Алиев способен контролировать армию. У власти есть ресурсы необходимые для того, чтобы держать военных под своим контролем. У президента есть и кнут и пряники для этого. Но, учитывая, что готовится масштабная коммеморация победы, роль ветеранов будет в ближайшие годы только возрастать. Возможно однажды люди прошедшие войну попытаются заявить о себе на политическом поле. Если такое случится в ситуации политического кризиса, то это не сулит стране ничего хорошего.
Но можно думать, что в ходе войны не выделились какие-то очень уж яркие персоналии в среде военного руководства. Власти все же старались подчеркивать роль президента как главнокомандующего и в конце войны он получил неофициальное звание “победоносного”. Думаю власти очень ревностно будут следить за положением дел в этой сфере.
SH: I think that the authorities are aware of those risks. Aliyev is now able to control the army, and the government has the resources it needs to keep the military under its control. The president has both a carrot and a stick. But given that large-scale commemorations of the victory are already in planning, the role of veterans will only increase in coming years. Perhaps one day, those who fought in this war will try to make themselves known in politics. If that happened during a political crisis, it would not bode well for the country.
What can be said is that there weren't really any figures among the military leadership who stood out. The authorities tried to stress the role of the president as commander-in-chief; by the end of the war he had received the unofficial title “victorious”. So I think that the authorities will very jealously try to keep an eye on that state of affairs.
ME: Several extremely gruesome videos showing Azerbaijani soldiers mutilating and decapitating Armenian prisoners of war and civilians have surfaced on social media channels. Azerbaijani prosecutors have launched an inquiry. While this step could be an acknowledgement of these crimes, the prosecutor has already dismissed some of the video evidence as a fake. What's the context, and the likely outcome?
SР: Отрицание военных преступлений, нежелание обсуждать проблемы насилия – это не новая тенденция. Обе стороны занимались этим на протяжении всех тридцати лет конфликта. Понятно, что признание таких фактов может еще и сильно подпортить праздник победы в Азербайджане. Так что подтекст здесь один – азербайджанская сторона будет и дальше отрицать факты совершения ее военнослужащими каких-либо преступлений. В этом контексте всегда будет ставиться спекулятивный вопрос: а почему международное сообщество ничего не говорит десятилетиями о преступлениях армян? О той же трагедии в Ходжалы? Это старая пластинка, которую заездили обе стороны, но она им еще прослужит многие годы.
SR: The denial of war crimes and the unwillingness to discuss this violence is not a new tendency. Both sides have done so for the past 30 years of this conflict. It is also clear that recognising such facts could spoil the victory festivities in Azerbaijan. So there is just one subtext: the Azerbaijani side will continue to deny that its servicemen have committed any crimes whatsoever. In this context, the following questions will always be raised: Why has the international community not said anything for decades about Armenians’ crimes? Or about the tragedy in Khojaly? This is an old record which has been played many times by both sides. It will serve them well for years to come.
СГ: На протяжении многих лет обе стороны инвестировали в популяризацию образа врага. Героизация поступка Рамиля Сафарова, военного офицера убившего армянского коллегу, также сыграло очень важную роль. Те, кто совершал такого рода действия возможно даже и не понимали, что совершают акты военных преступлений. Конечно, данное обстоятельство не может быть оправданием, но многое говорит об атмосфере в стране. Всеобщая эйфория на фоне военных успехов и позитивная реакция со стороны зрителей, могли только подстегивать кого-то на радикальные шаги. Сам факт снятия на видео и распространение в социальных сетях таких роликов лишь подтверждают такие догадки. В этой ситуации, только жесткая реакция военного начальства могла остановить подобные действия.
SH: Over the years, both sides have invested in popularising an image of the other as the enemy. The valorisation of the act of Ramil Safarov, the Azerbaijani military officer who murdered his Armenian colleague, also played a very important role. Those who committed such acts may have not even realised that they were committing war crimes. Of course, that is not an excuse, but it does say a lot about the atmosphere in the country. The general euphoria against the backdrop of military successes and a positive reaction from the audience could encourage people to take these steps. The very fact that such acts were filmed and shared on social networks only confirms these guesses. In this situation, only a tough reaction from the military leadership can stop such acts.

author: Maxim Edwards


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Kuwait’s stateless Bidoon population angered by another death · Global Voices
Dahlia Kholaif

Mourners carry the corpse of a Bidoon man in Kuwait who has died by suicide in December 2020. Photo by Fayez Elfayez. Used with permission.
The suicide of a young stateless man in Kuwait on December 6 has, once again, pushed to the fore the plight of the Bidoon – or “Without,” in Arabic – a stateless population of thousands who lives in the oil-rich country.
The 32-year-old man was arrested on Sunday in Al-Wafrah, Kuwait's southernmost city, after residents filed a complaint to the police against an individual who was throwing stones at passersby.
According to Al-Anbaa, a local newspaper, the man – who was not named in the report – was located by the police and was found to “behave abnormally.” Identified as a convict indicted in other cases, the young man – whose charges were not specified – was detained in order to be transferred to the country’s central prison, the newspaper said.
According to the report, he was found dead hours later in the police station using a rope he created from a blanket he was given in his cell.
In a tweet posted on December 8, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior said it ordered an investigation into the man's death:
الإعلام الأمني: معالي نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء ووزير الداخلية يأمر بتشكيل لجنة تحقيق حول ما أثير من خبر يتضمن انتحار شاب (غير كويتي) في دورة مياه نظارة مخفر شرطة الوفرة pic.twitter.com/EUC3upCLy8
— وزارة الداخلية (@Moi_kuw) December 8, 2020
Security media: Deputy prime minister and minister of interior ordered the formation of an investigation committee to look into reports involving the suicide of a young man (non-Kuwaiti) in the bathroom of Al-Wafrah police station, to identify the circumstances of the incident, and whether there were violations or misconduct in the procedures.
Death by suicide is rife among the Bidoon, a population denied Kuwaiti citizenship in the wealthy country.
Regularly referred to as “illegal residents” by the government, there are officially 100,000 Bidoon in Kuwait, although activists say the population is larger.
Their complex legal situation dates back to the creation of the Kuwaiti state in the 1960s. Having been nomads all their lives, they didn't respond to the nascent authorities’ calls for residents to register themselves as citizens and have since been denied nationality.
Due to their legal status, their access to basic civil and human rights such as health, education, marital, birth, and death certificates, to name a few, is significantly limited.
Although the Bidoon maintain that they are indigenous of the Gulf state, and that a majority of them have had no home but Kuwait all their lives, the Kuwaiti government claims that many are citizens of other states who have abandoned their real nationalities in hopes of benefiting from Kuwait’s generous welfare system.
Following Sunday's tragedy, members of the community and supporters have taken to social media, using the hashtag #انتحار_بدون, or #Suicide_of_a_Bidoon, to express their solidarity and to demand the government put an end to the Bidoon's plight.
#انتحار_بدون_بمخفر_الوفره
The ugliest types of suffocation, pressure, misfortune, injustice, deprivation of rights and oppression. pic.twitter.com/c0jR74339D
— أللطاف العنزي ❦ ✍ (@X501Xoxo) December 7, 2020
The problem that never actually gets a solution done .. They killed him when they deprived him from his rights
" يمهل ولا يهمل سبحانه " #انتحار_بدون_بمخفر_الوفره
— Layali (@laywd3_) December 7, 2020
In recent years, hashtags like #BidoonLivesMatter and #ICan'tBreath, drawing from African American protests in the United States, have also been used following similar incidents of suicide among this community.
In November, two other Bidoon men died by suicide. Alleged screenshots of a WhatsApp exchange shared on Twitter show one of the men, Zayid al-Asami, telling his son he was “deeply humiliated” and that he had given up all hope and so would take his life.
منذ الأمس، وهذه المحادثة بتفاصيلها بكلماتها بكل ما تحمله من ألم تلاحقني!
كيف كان حال الأب وهو يكتب؟ قلب الإبن وهو يقرأ؟
"انذليت حيل"
"يبه العن الشيطان"
“دير بالك على نفسك"
ثم
Last seen !
يا رب، رحمتك بعبادك?#انتحار_شابين_بدون #زايد_العصمي pic.twitter.com/B0AhICC6SV
— أسرار زكريا الأنصاري (@Asrari) November 5, 2019
Since yesterday, this conversation, in all its details and words and all the pain it includes, haunts me. How was the father while drafting [it]? The son's heart while reading? “Deeply humiliated,” “Dad, overcome the devil,” “Take care of yourself” and then “Last seen!”
The other deceased man, Bader Mirsal al-Fadhli, posted a video on Twitter before his death voicing deep frustration at his life circumstances.
Another incident of suicide among the Bidoon took place in May, and a medical student from the community also attempted to take his life in June.
In July 2019, a 21-year-old Bidoon man took his life after failing to get a job because he couldn't provide a state-issued identification card. He, too, was described by the authorities as a “convicted criminal” and a drug abuser.
That death triggered protests by members of the Bidoon community, who demanded the government take a corrective action to mend their status. Fifteen protesters were detained by the authorities on that occasion, including prominent activist Abdulhakim al-Fadhli.
In a statement issued at the time, Amnesty International said:
These arbitrary arrests primarily targeting peaceful protesters, activists and human rights defenders in Kuwait are not only unlawful, but are only set to exacerbate an already tense situation brought to the fore by the young man’s suicide.
To protest their arrest, the jailed Bidoon activists staged a hunger strike while in prison, lasting for 12 days, and only interrupted by the deteriorating health of some of them. Despite calls on the Kuwait government to release the peaceful protesters, they remain in jail to this day.
It is unlikely that the much-prolonged issue of the Bidoon will be handled by Kuwait's newly elected parliament, as dozens of past assemblies have fallen short of finding a solution. Veteran politicians have often used the plight in electoral campaigns, but once elected offered little to the community.
I hope certain parliament and governmental members sleep at night knowing their inactivity to this major problem will be judged greatly on the day of judgement!#انتحار_بدون_بمخفر_الوفرة
— Don | الفيصل ?? (@thedonq8) December 6, 2020

author: Dahlia Kholaif


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The fight against fake news: A restrictive policy for online freedom of expression in Senegal · Global Voices
Ababacar Diop

View of Ouakam, a district in northwest Dakar, Senegal. Photo by Gabriel de Castelaze via Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
This article is part of UPROAR, a Small Media initiative that is urging governments to address digital rights challenges at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have revolutionized the world and ushered in great change in all segments of society. One of the most spectacular upheavals relates to the production and circulation of information. Once the prerogative of media professionals, the creation and dissemination of information is now within the reach of any citizen with internet access.
This new situation has amplified the phenomenon of so-called “fake news.” Each person has the ability to deliver news to the public whether it is true, false — or just a joke. In Senegal, the government’s attempts to control this type of content raises questions about how to fight against fake news without infringing on rights and freedoms, particularly online freedom of expression.
The core mechanism to fight against fake news in Senegal is based on provisions of  Article 255 of the penal code, which states:
The publication, dissemination, disclosure or reproduction, by any means whatsoever, of false news, fabricated, falsified or falsely attributed to third parties, shall be punishable by imprisonment for one to three years and a fine of 100,000 to 1,500,000 francs [about $185-$2,773 United States dollars] when the publication, dissemination, disclosure, reproduction, whether or not made in bad faith, will have led to disobedience to the laws of the country or harmed the morale of the population or brought discredit on public institutions or their functioning.
This provision lacks a definition for “false news,” which may lead authorities to abuse it. During the coronavirus pandemic, for example, several citizens were summoned to the police for denying the existence of COVID-19 on their social media platforms or for having doubted its existence in videos.
Abdoulaye Mbaye Pekh,  a well-known traditionalist, and Selbé Ndom, a clairvoyant, were summoned by the national police in Dakar, Senegal’s capital, for disseminating unfounded and unscientific claims online related to the coronavirus, following a complaint submitted by the National Committee for the Management of Epidemics.
Police severely lectured Pekh and Ndom and made them apologize in order to avoid transfer to the public prosecutor's office of the court of Dakar. They were told that Senegalese citizens are not free to share opinions on the coronavirus that are contrary to the official government narrative on COVID-19, and risk being brought to justice.
This raises serious questions about how to identify the line between expressing an opinion — which can not be characterized as false — and delivering information that can be judged false or true.
The adoption of this law requires a clear definition of fake news so that citizens are aware of what constitutes a violation. The potential for widespread online fake news indeed has serious repercussions offline for security, health and politics.
Nevertheless, some analysts say these risks should not be limiting factors for freedom of expression on- or offline. Freedom of expression is a fundamental pillar in a democratic society. Article 10 of Senegal’s constitution states:
Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinions by word, pen, image, and peaceful march, provided that the exercise of these rights does not infringe on the honor and consideration of others, or on public order.
Freedom of expression deemed abusive or excessive can in principle only be sanctioned by the judiciary. Only the judge should have the power to characterize a particular piece of information or news as false or true. However, the Press Code provides otherwise in Article 192: “In exceptional circumstances, the competent administrative authority … may, in order to prevent or halt an attack on state security or territorial integrity, or in the event of incitement to hatred or incitement to murder, order:
Again, “cases of exceptional circumstances” are not clearly defined by the law. This means that when administrative authorities judge an online expression false, they may, without the intervention of the judge, order a media seizure from the online media company that disseminated it. This amounts to a liberticidal law that seriously undermines freedom of expression online.
Regulating expression on the internet should not allow authorities to infringe on digital rights, especially without first defining a clear, precise and comprehensible legal basis for all.
JONCTION, a digital rights advocacy group in Senegal, recommends legal revision of the central mechanism used to fight fake news. Indeed, this legislative reform is necessary to harmonize national texts with international human rights instruments, particularly concerning freedom of expression. This revision should be done in consultation with all stakeholders, taking into account all the specific needs of virtual spaces that enable expression of all kinds.
As stated in Point II of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa:
No individual shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his or her freedom of expression. Any restrictions on freedom of expression must be imposed by law, serve a legitimate purpose, and be necessary in a democratic society.

author: Ababacar Diop


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Trinidad & Tobago’s procurement regulation bill passes, but corruption concerns linger · Global Voices
Janine Mendes-Franco

The Red House, the seat of parliament in Trinidad and Tobago, where the Procurement Bill was debated. Photo by Dan Lundberg on Flickr, taken towards the end of the building's most recent restoration, in December 2019. CC BY-SA 2.0.
On December 8, the eve of International Anti-Corruption Day, Trinidad and Tobago's Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Property (Amendment) Bill 2020 was passed in the Senate (the upper house of parliament) by the vote of one independent senator, Dr. Maria Dillon-Remy. The eight other independent senators, some of whom have been quite vocal about what they perceive as the shortcomings of the legislation, abstained.
The main aspect of the bill preoccupying civil society, business organisations and even the Office of Procurement Regulation (OPR) itself, is Clause 5, which removes legal, medical, financial, accounting and auditing services — as well as any others so deemed by the Minister of Finance — from the remit of the procurement regulator.
In a country where citizens have perceived successive governments to be corrupt (Trinidad and Tobago ranked 85th in Transparency International's 2019 Corruption Perception Index, with a score of 40 out of 100), the fear is that this amendment effectively paves the way for instances of corruption to occur in government-to-government contracts, or in agreements between the state and international financial organisations.
The government's point of view is that the procurement regulator, who is not an elected official, should not have the power to undermine such treaties and that such interference could limit the state's access to certain types of international financing and technical cooperation agreements. This, according to Minister of Finance Colm Imbert, is in line with international best practice.
The Office of Procurement Regulation, however, issued a public advisory stating that because these government-to-government arrangements will be repaid with public money, “there should be no exclusion from the OPR’s oversight.”
Many stakeholders felt that the bill should have been sent back to the House of Representatives (the lower house of parliament) for the government to present the regulations that would govern the operation of the act, before being put to the Senate for a vote.
The country's opposition recently refused to back the renewal of the 2018 Anti-Gang Bill in an apparent attempt to force the government's hand regarding the procurement legislation. When criticised for its lack of support, Opposition Chief Whip David Lee defended his party's position by saying:
If you are serious about tackling crime, if you are serious about defunding the gangs, then you must bring procurement legislation so we have a system in place to avoid the continuation of this funding that is going on through Government contracts and the award of contracts.
After the December 8 debate was over, the Senate formed itself into a committee to go through the bill clause by clause and determine if any further amendments were necessary. The government has already indicated that it would accept some of the amendments that had been put forward.
The bill must now go back to the House of Representatives for those amendments to be adopted. Both the upper and lower houses of parliament must agree to a common position before the bill can be passed into law, so while the process does leave room for further fine-tuning, it is not expected that the government will concede its position with regard to Clause 5.
Prior to the Senate debate, the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago (LATT) suggested that the clause was tantamount to “constitutional impropriety degrading public trust and confidence.” Its position was echoed by the Trinidad and Tobago Transparency Institute (TTTI), the country's chambers of commerce, the Joint Consultative Council of the Construction Industry (JCC), the Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association (TTMA) and civil society groups.
In the past, government-to-government projects have been accused of creating opportunities for corruption to flourish. Though no evidence has been put forward to prove wrongdoing, the reputation of some Chinese firms with which the state has chosen to partner has coloured the public's perception. One project, however — the 2015 acquisition of 12 Coast Guard vessels from the Netherlands at a cost of 1.358 billion Trinidad and Tobago dollars (approximately $200 million USD) — is now the subject of a Dutch criminal investigation.
In fact, procurement in Trinidad and Tobago has historically been so vulnerable to corruption that in 1982, a cabinet-appointed committee was established to conduct a comprehensive review of government-to-government arrangements. Its findings were documented in what came to be known as the Ballah Report.
In addressing the government's idea that government-to-government contracts would “eliminate active lobbying with its undercurrent of corruption (locally),” the report found that such advantages were “more illusionary than real,” that the arrangements were “highly discriminatory” against local firms, and that “the cost to Trinidad and Tobago of the government-to-government option seems to have outweighed the perceived benefits.”


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North Macedonia court rejects lawsuit by journalists over 2017 Parliament attack · Global Voices
Filip Stojanovski

A mob of 200 VMRO-DPMNE supporters stormed the Macedonian Parliament on April 27, 2017. Screengrab from TV 24 Vesti.
This story is partly based on reporting by Global Voices content partner Meta.mk News Agency, a project of Metamorphosis Foundation.
A Skopje court rejected on December 10 a lawsuit filed by three journalists against the Macedonian state in relation to the 2017 mob attack of the Macedonian Parliament, citing a “lack of evidence” that “public protests took place in front of the Parliament that day.”
On April 27, 2017, around 200 supporters of the then-ruling party VMRO-DPMNE stormed the Macedonian Parliament after the party failed to form a government. The mob included masked men armed with batons, who attacked opposition politicians and journalists. The event was widely condemned internationally at that time and is known in Macedonia today as “Bloody Thursday.”
Sixteen people, among them senior members of VMRO-DPMNE, have since been convicted to a total of 211 years in prison for organizing or inciting the attack. However, an amnesty law passed in December 2018 acquitted most of the participants.
The three journalists who filed the lawsuit – Nataša Stojanovska, Dušica Mrgja and Goran Trpenoski – were at Parliament that day. They seek financial compensation for non-pecuniary damages.
According to a 2017 report by the United States’ state department, “21 journalists were threatened or barred from reporting, and six journalists were beaten while covering a demonstration that later resulted in the storming of the parliament building on April 27.”
Subsequent trial records showed that police officers, as well as special forces stationed near the Parliament, waited several hours before intervening.
The December 10 court ruling came as a shock not only to the plaintiffs but the wider journalist community and Macedonian civil society.
According to the Association of Journalists of Macedonia, who is the legal representative of the three journalists in the case, video recordings of the incidents on April 27 were provided in the court proceedings; those videos are also public, widely accessible online.
On a statement, the Association condemned what it called a “shameful verdict”:
Фактот што судот не признава повреда на правото на слободата на изразување и бара од новинарите да докажат општо познати факти, дека имало упад во Собранието од страна на лица кои јавно демонстрирале на 27 април 2017 година е тенденциозен и преставува преседан во контекст на овој случај.
Исто така, небулозно е тврдењето на судот дека новинарите немале право да бараат надомест на нематеријална штета за претрпени душевни болки и наведува дека двете немале телесни повреди. Скандалозен е фактот што судот не признава дека душевната болка, страв и траума кој биле доживеани од страна на присутните новинари е проблематично и притоа се имплицира дека немале телесни повреди тужителите.
The fact that the court refuses to recognize the violation of the right to freedom of expression and demands the journalists to prove widely known facts — that the raid on the Parliament was carried out by those who were at the public demonstrations — is biased and represents a precedent in the context of the case.
Also nebulous is the court's assertion that the journalists were not entitled to claim non-pecuniary damages for the mental pain they have suffered, stating that two of them had no bodily injuries. It is scandalous that the court does not recognize the emotional pain, fear and trauma experienced by the journalists, while implying plaintiffs had no bodily injuries.
Stojanovska, one of the plaintiffs, expressed her outrage on a widely shared Facebook post:
Next time the politicians decide to kill each other, maybe the journalists should just act as silent observers, because the judges in this country refuse lawsuits related to April 27, with the justification that the court didn't know that a terrorist activity and public demonstration were going on outside.
Do you realize that if we, the journalists, were not there risking our lives to report, the events could have turned out very differently?!
Do you realize that the impunity of December 24, 2012, led to April 27, 2017? Do you realize what kind of message you are sending?
Is this be the face of justice? Such verdicts bring shame to the state!
No, they won't change our minds or drive us away from professional reporting, or from protecting the integrity of our profession and our personal integrity.
Whether the same can be said of the judges and the politicians, you are left to decide.
The 2012 events to which Stojanovska refers were the violent protests that took place outside Parliament on December 24, when the police also forcibly expelled several journalists and opposition MPs from the building.
A group of journalists sued the Macedonian state at the European Court of Human Rights (EUCH), which in February 2017 ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the government to compensate them with a sum of 5,000 euros each for non-pecuniary damages. However, nobody has been criminally prosecuted for the incident.
“As the darkest day in Macedonian history, April 27 has become synonymous with political trade-offs, scandalous amnesty and incomplete justice,” Dusica Mrgja, one of the plaintiffs, told Meta.mk in June 2020.
Mrgja is a reporter with TV 24 Vesti; she says it was because of the live crews reporting the event that the incident ended without fatal victims.
Journalist Dušica Mrgja in front of Macedonian Parliament. Courtesy photo, used with permission.
Mrgja testified in an investigation conducted by the Public Prosecutor's Office in 2017, which she hoped would bring the perpetrators to justice. That didn't happen.
In June 2020, in an interview with the Media Reforms Observatory, a project of Metamorphosis Foundation that monitors media legislation, she said:
Очекував државата да ми се оддолжи со правда. Истото го мислев и кога како сведок се појавив два пати во судница да сведочам, но попусто. Раката сè уште ми беше во завои, ударите по лице и глава бледнеа, но „флешбековите“ од сета крв на 27 април и те како беа свежи. Свежи се и по три години и болни, особено поради правдата која не ја дочекав.
I expected that the state would repay me with justice. I thought the same thing when I appeared as a witness in court to testify, twice, but it was all in vain. My hand was still bandaged, the blows to my face and head were fading, but the flashbacks of all the bloodshed on April 27 remained quite vivid. They remain vivid and painful even after three years, especially because of the injustice I witness.
In the same interview, Mrgja remembered that it was fear that kept her going that day: “I knew that the louder and more detailed I was on air, the better the chances of survival for everyone.”
At the same time, she says, going live made her more vulnerable as the perpetrators recognized her, and began to insult and attack her. She says:
Предавничке, Сороспијо, Слуга на Заев,  „Шиптарска ку***“ беа само дел од навредите со кои ме „почестија“. Ме удрија од ѕид, добив толку јак удар во раката што рамото и ден денес ме боли. Добив и удар по лице. Кога побарав помош од член на собраниското обезбедување, добив одговор „Не можам ништо да направам“ . Локвата крв од собраниските ходници, ме прогонуваше со ноќи во сонот.
Traitor, Soros’ slut, Zaev’s servant, “[ethnic slur for Albanian] whore” were just some of the insults addressed to me. They pushed me against a wall. My arm hit the wall so hard, my shoulder still hurts. I was punched in the face. When I asked a security guard for help, he answered, “I can’t do anything.” The image of a pool of blood on the parliament corridors haunted me at night in my sleep.
Nataša Stojanovska, journalist. Courtesy photo used with her permission.
Mrgja recalls the harrowing moment when the Special Forces stormed in with smoke grenades and she began to suffocate. As she desperately tried to leave the room, the perpetrators barred her.
“Then I thought ‘this is it, I’m not coming out alive,’ all while texting my family ‘I’m fine, don’t worry,'” she said.
Her colleague Nataša Stojanovska, who works for TV Telma, also told Meta.mk that April 27 will forever be etched in her memory.
“We were not only prevented from reporting, but my life and the lives of my colleagues were also endangered, just as the lives of the politicians,” she said.
Stojanovska adds that the memories of that dramatic day cannot be erased even after three years.
“I still feel the trauma today. That is why everyone who participated in that attack must be punished.”

author: Filip Stojanovski