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Review: SC Rules That Appointment By A Competent Authority And The Presence of A Sanctioned Post Are A Must For Any Employee Seeking Regularization.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
February 15, 2023
In this edition of court judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgements on territorial jurisdiction of the PMLA court, regularization of employees and the non-application of the general strict liability principle in case of an insurance policy, Delhi High Court’s judgement on ‘virginity test’ and Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court’s judgement challenging the Government order on closure of ReT scheme.
Supreme Court: PMLA court has the jurisdiction to try cases involving money laundering regardless of where the accused first obtained possession of the proceeds of crime.
In Rana Ayyub vs. Directorate of Enforcement, the apex court held that when there is a factual dispute on the place of commission of offence, the issue of territorial jurisdiction cannot be decided in a writ petition. It allowed the petitioner to approach the Trial Court and raise the issue of territorial jurisdiction.
The two-judge bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice V. Ramasubramanian, was hearing a writ petition filed by Rana Ayyub challenging the summoning order of the Special PMLA Court of Ghaziabad, on a complaint filed by the Directorate of  Enforcement under sections 44 and 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, alleging that money collected for relief efforts was misappropriated. The Counsel for the petitioner made it clear that the challenge to the order by way of a writ petition is limited to the question of territorial jurisdiction alone and not on any other grounds.
The petitioner argued that an offence punishable under the Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed as per Section 44(1) of the PMLA, 2002. The petitioner relied on the judgement of the apex court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., wherein it was decided that the trial of the offence of money laundering should proceed before the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence of money-laundering has been committed and that in case the scheduled offence is triable by the Special Court under a special enactment elsewhere, both the trials need to proceed independently, but in the area where the offence of money laundering has been committed.
However, the counsel for the respondent argued that there were several victims under the jurisdiction of the special court in Ghaziabad, and a part of the cause of action has arisen within its jurisdiction, hence the question of territorial jurisdiction does not arise. The Court, upon hearing both counsels, held that:
On the first question, the court referred to sections 43 and 44 of the PMLA, 2002, which deals with the special courts and offences triable by Special Courts. The court distinguished ‘offence’ and ‘scheduled offence’, wherein the offence connotes the offence of money laundering while scheduled offence connotes predicate offence. Further, looking at the provisions of the act, the Court held that the trial of the scheduled offence, insofar as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, should follow the trial of the offence of money laundering and not vice versa.
For deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction of the court, the apex court relied on Kaushik Chatterjee vs. State of Haryana. It was held that the issue of jurisdiction of a court to try an “offence” or “offender” as well as the issue of territorial jurisdiction, depends upon facts established through evidence and that if the issue is one of territorial jurisdiction, the same has to be decided with respect to the various rules enunciated in Sections 177 to 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the apex court dismissed the petition.
Supreme Court: Appointment by a competent authority and the presence of a sanctioned post are a must for any employee seeking Regularization.
The Supreme Court, in Vibhuti Shankar Pandey vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., held that an employee cannot seek regularization if the initial appointment was not made by a competent authority and there is no sanctioned post.
A bench of Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia was hearing an appeal filed by the appellant against the judgement of the Division bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that set aside the regularization benefit granted to the appellant by a learned single judge. The appellant was hired as a supervisor in 1980 on a daily rated basis and sought regularization of his post as a supervisor, for which the minimum essential qualifications were matriculation with mathematics. The appellant did not possess such qualifications. While the qualifications were relaxed later by a Government Order, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in an earlier writ petition directed the state government to decide on the claim of regularization in accordance with the law.
However, the Office of Chief Engineer, Rani Avanti Bai Lodhi Sagar Project, rejected the regularization plea by the appellant as the appellant was not appointed against any post and an initial appointment was not made by the competent authority. However, juniors to the appellant were regularized due to which the appellant set a claim for his regularization, which was accepted by the single judge bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and allowed for regularization of the appellant from the date on which the juniors were regularized.
The Division bench set aside the order of the single judge after the state government challenged it, as it did not follow the principles of law laid out by the apex court in Secretary, State of Karnataka, and Ors. vs. Umadevi and Ors. The two principles laid out are:
The Apex Court held that the Division Bench was right in allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the learned single judge. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Supreme Court: A proximate causal relationship between the accident and the body injury is a necessity for any injury to be included within the parameters of the ‘Scope of Cover’ in the insurance policy defining when such insurance amount would become payable.
The apex court in National Insurance Company Limited vs. The Chief Electoral Officer & Ors. held that death occurring due to sun-stroke is not covered under the clause 3 of the insurance policy, which read, ‘The insurance is intended to provide for the payment of compensation in the event of death only resulting solely and directly from an accident caused by external violent and any other visible means’, and a proximate causal relationship between the accident and bodily injury is must for any injury to be included under the ambit of the above clause.
A two-judge bench comprising of Justice SK Kaul and Justice AS Oka, was hearing an appeal against the decision of Patna High Court, which granted relief to the wife of the officer who died due to sunstroke while discharging election duties. The National Insurance Company entered into an MoU with the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), Bihar to provide insurance coverage to persons deployed for election work in the 2000 Bihar Assembly Elections. The State Government opted for a group insurance scheme.
The single judge of the Patna High Court held that since the policy duration is expired, no such direction could be given for the payment of the insurance amount. However, since the state Government failed to realize its primary responsibility to raise the claim during the policy term, the liability to pay the amount to the wife was assigned to the CEO, Bihar, and District Magistrate. The CEO filed an appeal against this order.
Upon hearing the arguments by the counsels on both sides, the apex court held that insurance contracts are a unique class of contracts with characteristics that are common to all forms of insurance, including the highest degree of good faith, insurable interest, indemnity subrogation, contribution, and proximate cause. The words used in an insurance contract are said to be of utmost importance, and the court is not permitted to add, remove, or alter any language as held by this court in Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills Pvt. Ltd vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd and Anr. The contract’s provisions must be interpreted carefully, without changing its fundamental terms because doing otherwise could harm the parties’ respective interests. An insurance policy’s provisions must be read in their entirety as reiterated by the apex court in Vikram Greentech (I) Ltd. & Anr vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
The court looked at the specific clause of the MoU that governed the payment of insurance amount in case of death (only) resulting ‘solely and directly’ from the accident caused by external violence and any other visible means.
Further, the apex court relied on judgement in Alka Shukla vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India, whereby it was held that.
Accordingly, the court held that when the policy is examined in the aforementioned context, the cause of sunstroke cannot be included within the confines of the “Scope of Cover” in the insurance policy defining when such insurance amount would become payable because there must be a proximate causal relationship between the accident and the body injury. It further held that the appellant’s insurance company is not liable. Accordingly, the judgement of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court was set aside, and an appeal was allowed.
Delhi HC: The virginity test conducted on a female detainee, accused under investigation, or in custody, whether judicial or police, is unconstitutional and in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution which includes right to dignity.
The Delhi High Court, in SR. SEPHY vs. CBI & ORS, held that the virginity test is unconstitutional and violates the Right to Dignity under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The court further held that such a test is ‘sexist’ in nature and does not have medical standing as held by the apex court in several judgements.
The court was hearing a plea filed by the petitioner challenging the constitutional validity of the virginity test done on her. The petitioner alleged that the CBI officers forcefully obtained her consent for a virginity test, thereby subjecting her to mental torture. It is further alleged that the CBI had run a malicious campaign against her as the results of the virginity test were counter to the allegations of the CBI.
The respondents argued that the petition is not maintainable as the appeal against the conviction of the petitioner is pending in Kerala High Court. They also opposed the submission of the petitioner that the present petition is independent of the trial in the High Court. The counsel for the petitioner argued that Article 226 (2) confers an additional power on every High Court to issue writs throughout its territory within which the cause of action wholly or in part arises. They further argue that there was no necessity to conduct this test in connection with the criminal case and are seeking disciplinary action and compensation to be paid to the victim as well as the constitutional validity of this test being conducted on a female under interrogation.
Upon hearing the arguments by both petitioners and respondents, the Single judge bench of Delhi High Court, led by Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma, agreed with the petitioner that constitutional remedies cannot be denied on the ground that criminal trial is pending at some other place.
The court relied on the apex court judgement in Lillu (Rajesh) & Anr. vs. State of Haryana, whereby it is held that the ‘two-finger test’ is violative of the right to dignity, integrity, and privacy of victims of sexual assault, and under the ‘Guidelines & Protocols: Medico-legal care for survivors/victims of sexual violence’ issued by Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India in the year 2014, any person conducting the ‘two-finger test’ shall be in contravention with the directions of the apex court. Further, in the State of Gujarat vs. Rameshchandra Ramabhai Panchal, 2020, the ‘two-finger test’ was declared unconstitutional. It held that medical procedures should not be carried out in a manner that constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and health should be of paramount consideration while dealing with gender-based violence.
The court further held that the ‘virginity test’ does not find a mention in the section 53, 53(A), and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The court held that even the accused have fundamental rights, and they are not suspended so far as the question of their privacy and dignity is concerned as held by the apex court in several judgements.
Accordingly, the ‘two-finger test’ is held unconstitutional. However, as it was not barred in law or by any judgment to have got it conducted, howsoever despicable or deplorable the practice may have been, the court suggested the petitioner take an alternative course of action against CBI. Further, it suggested approaching the National Human Rights Commission once the trial ends.
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh HC: Permitting the Executive to review, revise or sit over the decisions of the Court by issuing executive orders or instructions would be tantamount to interference with the exercise of judicial functions by the Judiciary.
In Rukhsana Jabeen vs. State of J&K, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that in the constitutional scheme that we have, the executive is under an obligation to obey the judicial orders. Permitting the executive to review, revise or sit over the decisions of the Court by issuing executive orders or instructions would be tantamount to interference with the exercise of judicial functions.
The two-judge bench comprising of Justice Sanjeev Kumar and Justice Moksha Khajuria Kazmi was hearing a petition challenging a Government Order prescribing closure of the Rehbar-E-Taleem Scheme announced in the year 2000.
By passing a Government Order No. 396-Edu of 2000 on 28 April 2000, the Government of J&K established the “Rehbar-E-Taleem” (ReT) Scheme. The idea of ReT Scheme was to involve the community in the implementation of a system of decentralised administration and elementary education. The programme further stipulated that the candidate would be qualified for employment as a ‘General Line Teacher’ in the Education Department after satisfactorily completing five years of service as a ReT on an honorarium basis. After determining that the ReT Scheme’s goal had been achieved, the government issued Government Order dated 24 November 2003, halting the process of filling teacher vacancies in the school through the ReT Scheme.
There were petitions pending before the High Court challenging the engagement of ReTs, and while these were pending adjudication, the Government issued the impugned order directing the closure of the ReT Scheme and providing therein the impact, effect, and consequences of the closure of ReT Scheme. Upon hearing the arguments from both sides, the court upheld the validity of the Government Order.
However, after considering the petitioners’ argument that the respondents are refusing to benefit from concluded judgements issued by this Court because they cannot be executed in light of the execution of the impugned Government order, the court noted that permitting the executive to sit over the judicial orders tantamount to judicial interference, and the executive, as said above, is bound to comply with the orders of the Court and has no power, jurisdiction or competence to sit over or overturn such a decision by mere executive fiat.
On the pending appeals before the court, the High Court held that impugned Government Order will not override or effect the judgments passed or to be passed by this Court holding a candidate/candidates entitled to engagement in the selection process which was/is under challenge before the Court.
Accordingly, the challenge to the constitutionality of the impugned Government Order failed and consequently, all the petitions were disposed of.

created: February 15, 2023


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Review: SC Rules That Appointment of a Candidate Cannot be Declined Just Because They Were Tried For Offence Under Section 498A
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
December 7, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s ruling that appointment of candidate cannot be declined just because they were tried for offence under Section 498A, Allahabad HC’s decision that Life imprisonment is the minimum sentence for a person convicted of murder, Odisha HC’s ruling that case booked under Section 498A cannot be quashed because the Family Court found ‘Marriage Invalid’.
SC: Appointment of candidate cannot be declined just because they were tried for offence under Section 498A
The appellant in Pramod Singh Kirar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh had applied for the post of Police Constable in 2013. He was found to be meritorious and eligible to be appointed for the post. In the verification form, he had mentioned that he was he was tried for the offence under Section 498A of IPC earlier. In 2006, he was acquitted for the offence by the Trial Court. Despite his voluntary disclosure during application, his candidature was rejected in 2014 on grounds that he was involved in a criminal case. The Madhya Pradesh High Court (Division Bench) upheld the rejection observing that if the candidate is found to be involved in a criminal case, the employee can consider the antecedents of the candidate and is not compelled to appoint the candidate.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar while hearing the appeal observed that the offence for which the appellant was tried and acquitted was a matrimonial dispute which was settled out of the court.  The Bench held that the appellant’s trial for offence under Section 498A of IPC for the offence alleged to have happened in the year 2001 which resulted in acquittal in 2006 was no ground for denying his appointment.
The apex court also noted that there was no suppression of material fact in the case. Quashing the High Court’s decision and allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court directed the state to appoint the appellant as Police Constable within four weeks.
Allahabad HC: Life imprisonment is the minimum sentence for a person convicted of murder
In Vakeel Quraishi and 2 Others vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh,  the accused Vakeel Quraishi, Uvaish, and Aarfeen had been found guilty by the trial court of murdering the Mukim by stabbing him with knife for not inviting them to his brother’s marriage. They also had previous enmity too with him. They had also threatened to kill the brother and another person who came to the spot to save the deceased. The three accused were convicted and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the Trial Court.
The accused appealed to the Allahabad High Court which scrutinized the testimonies of the eyewitnesses again. The High Court was satisfied with the evidence and stated that the evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that the witnesses are related to each other or to the deceased. Referring to previous judgements, it added that in case the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible, and trustworthy, it can, and certainly should be relied upon. Further, it noted that minor discrepancies are bound to occur and are not enough to discredit the otherwise trustworthy witnesses since witnesses are not expected to recreate the scene.
According to the High Court, the Trial Court was right in holding the appellants guilty of committing the alleged offence as all the evidence also supported it. Upholding the Trial Court’s decision, the High Court also added that once an accused is held guilty for murder (Section 302 IPC), the minimum punishment imposable is life imprisonment and any punishment/sentence less than that is contrary to Section 302 of IPC.
Odisha HC: Case booked under Section 498A cannot be quashed because the Family Court found ‘Marriage Invalid’
In Jaga Sarabu vs. State of Orissa and another, an FIR was registered against the accused-petitioner for commission of offences punishable under sections 498A, 323, 506, 34 IPC read with Section 4 of Dowry Prevention Act (cruelty to wife for dowry). A charge-sheet was also filed against him. The Magistrate Court upon scrutiny of the materials and documents produced by the investigating officer and finding prima facie case, took cognizance and issued process. Challenging the Magistrate’s order, the petitioner approached the Odisha High Court.
According to the petitioner’s contentions, the Family Court had established that the woman was not the legally married wife of the petitioner. Marriage being invalid, it was contended that criminal proceeding for offence under Section 498A of IPC could not be maintained. Meanwhile, the respondent’s argument was that the petitioner being the husband of the woman cannot take the plea that the marriage was invalid. Further, husband contracting second marriage during the subsistence of earlier marriage can be charged for offence under section 498A of IPC and merely because a judgment is rendered by the Family Court in proceeding under section 125 of CrPC, the Court by itself cannot declare the woman as ‘concubine’ of the petitioner.
Hearing both sides, the Odisha High Court observed that the Family Court could not have given a finding on the validity of marriage while deciding an application for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC since a civil proceeding is needed after the assessment of evidence and pleadings on record. The Court added that the plea of ‘no marriage’ was advanced by the petitioner in the course of hearing of the application before the High Court under Section 482, CrPC. and the case was under the jurisdiction of Civil Court.
The Court concluded that there were prima facie materials for proceeding against the petitioner for offences alleged against him after considering the allegations mentioned in the FIR and statement of witnesses and other documents which were collated during the investigation. It upheld the Magistrate Court’s decision.
Delhi HC: Career guidance to students in Class XI and XII is crucial and they should be counselled in this decision-making process.
In Shishram as Guardian of Mr. Kawal vs. Bal Bhavan International School & Others, the petitioner’s son had failed to secure admission in colleges affiliated with Delhi University (DU) in 2020. According to him, the lack of career guidance at school was the reason. His son had opted for Mass Media Studies and Physical Education in Class XI and XII. He was not aware and cautioned that these subjects were not considered “Main” subjects by DU and are treated as “Elective” attracting penalty of 2.5% deduction of marks from aggregate marks for the purpose of selection in colleges of DU. In his petition, he prayed for intervention of statutory authorities like Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) and Delhi government to ensure proper dispensation of information and guidance to students at the time of subject selection in Class XI and XII. He also wanted action against the school and compensation for the alleged prejudice caused to the students.
Rejecting the petitioner’s plea for cancelling the accreditation of the school and to compensate the students, the Delhi High Court stated that ‘improper career counselling to some students cannot be a ground for de-affiliation/ de-accreditation, in absence of any statutory provision that provides for such a penalty’. It observed that there was no reason for the Court to hold that the school should have disapproved or opposed the option because of its likely impact in admission prospects to DU. The decision was purely voluntary with parents’ involvement and not forced upon the student by the school.
However, while dismissing the petition, the Court directed the Government of Delhi to inform schools to impart career guidance to students for informed decision making.

source: news-factly

created: December 7, 2022

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Sai Krishna Muthyanolla


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Review: SC Rules That Compliance with Section 52 of NDPS Act is Mandatory for Disposing Seized Narcotic Substances
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
July 26, 2023
In this edition of the court judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgement that compliance with Section 52 of the NDPS Act is mandatory for disposing seized narcotic substances, that petition to quash proceedings is not required when deciding a bail application, Delhi HC’s ruling that a merit list cannot stay alive for an indefinite period for enforcement, that denial of a passport can seriously impede the rights of a citizen, among others.
SC: Compliance with Section 52 of the NDPS Act is mandatory for disposing seized narcotic substances
In Mangilal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, the appellant was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years by an Additional Sessions Judge in Madhya Pradesh, which was later confirmed by the High Court as well. The prosecution’s case was based on information received by the Assistant Sub Inspector, H.S. Sengar, stating that the appellant and a co-accused were involved in supplying narcotic substances. Police stopped a tractor and seized bags containing the contraband. FIR was filed under Section 8(b) read with Section 15(c), Sections 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. However, during the trial, out of 16 witnesses, four witnesses turned hostile. The Supreme Court noted that two of the witnesses bearing testimony to the arrest memo were not examined and this was not considered by the courts.
The main issue in the case considered by the Supreme Court was compliance with Section 52 of the NDPS Act which deals with the disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The bench of Justices A S Bopanna and M M Sundresh observed that there was serious doubt with respect to the seizure as one of the witnesses, a police offer, had testified that the seized materials already existed before the occurrence of the seizure. Further, the court noted that the procedures prescribed under Section 52 of the Act were not followed and the seized material was not produced by the police. As per the provision, an inventory of such narcotic drugs should be prepared, Magistrate concerned should certify the correctness of the inventory along with relevant photographs.
Further, it noted that there was no order passed by the magistrate for the disposal of the narcotics substance allegedly seized. Observing such discrepancies, the Court acquitted the appellant. The Bench added that the Court should be satisfied with compliance while deciding such a case. Moreover, the onus is entirely on the prosecution in such a case to satisfy the Court when such an issue arises for consideration. Further, as per Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, non-production of physical evidence would lead to a negative inference.
SC: Petition to quash proceedings is not required when deciding a bail application
In the case, Teesta Atul Setalvad vs. State of Gujarat, the appellant had challenged the Gujarat High Court’s order denying her bail, before the Supreme Court. The appellant was arrested soon after the case, Zakia Ahsan Jafri vs. State of Gujarat and another was decided and an FIR came to be registered for offences punishable under Sections 468, 469, 471, 194, 211, 218 and 120B of the IPC. Her bail application was rejected both by the Sessions Judge and the High Court Bench. It was contended that only 2 of the offences against the appellant were non-bailable. While denying the bail, the High Court observed that the appellant had not challenged the FIR or chargesheet against her under Section 482 Cr.PC or under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, it is not permissible for her to say that a prima facie case is not made out.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices BR Gavai, AS Bopanna and Dipankar Datta stated that the factors to be taken into consideration at the stage of grant of bail are – (i) prima facie case, (ii) the possibility of the accused tampering with the evidence or influencing the witnesses, and (iii) the possibility of the accused fleeing away from the hands of justice along with the gravity of the offence. It observed that, if the observations of the High Court judge are to be accepted, then no application for bail can be accepted unless the accused files an application for quashing the proceedings. The Bench quashed the High Court’s order and granted bail to the appellant under the condition that she should not attempt to influence or intimidate the witnesses.
Delhi HC: A merit list cannot stay alive for an indefinite period for enforcement
A woman sought appointment as Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT) of mathematics in a school in Delhi on the ground that being the 3rd rank holder in the merit list published in 2017, she should be given the post after the first rank holder was disqualified and the second candidate showed no interest in the job. In this case, Rupinderjit Kaur vs. The Manager of Dhanpatmal Virmani Senior Secondary School & Others, the matter before the Delhi High Court was whether the merit list of 2017, entitles the petitioner any legal right to get appointed at the concerned post and if the merit list prepared in the year 2017 could survive for an indefinite period.
Referring to past cases, Justice Chandra Dhari Singh observed that more than 5 years have elapsed since the merit list was published and that it was highly improper for the Court to review the list. He added that there must be a certain reasonable duration during which the merit list can be considered by the Court to grant any relief. Dismissing the appeal, he concluded that a merit list only enlists the selected candidates but does not confer any right for appointment upon the selected candidates and that the merit list cannot stay alive for an indefinite period for enforcement.
Delhi HC: Denial of passport can seriously impede the rights of a citizen
The petitioner in Nishant Singhal vs. Union of India & Others was a minor when his parents got him a passport issued with his ‘Date of Birth’ shown as 16 January 2003 on the basis of the initial birth certificate and that after realizing their mistake, they got his date of birth changed to 16 July 2003 by issuing him a new birth certificate in 2007. Meanwhile, the passport was renewed twice when he was a minor in 2010 and 2014. Later, in 2019, the petitioner applied to the office of Regional Passport Office, Ghaziabad, U.P. for renewal of his passport by endorsing his correct date of birth by submitting the relevant proofs such as Senior School Certificate, Aadhaar Card, certificate of cancellation of old Birth Certificate and valid new Birth Certificate.
However, his application was declined stating that his birth certificate used to obtain the previous passport was issued even before the new date of birth claimed by the applicant. His claim for correction/change in the date of birth was considered not genuine/bonafide. Justice Subramonium Prasad held that an application for renewal of the passport of an individual cannot be denied only on the basis of apprehension that the earlier passports would have been misused. Denying a passport can seriously impede the rights of a citizen. Taking note of the Office Memorandum issued by the Union Ministry of External Affairs in 2015, laying down the procedure for change or correction of dates of birth entries in a passport of an applicant already held by him or her, the Delhi High Court directed the Government to issue a fresh passport to Singhal with the correct Date of Birth.
Karnataka HC: Mother is fit to be custodian of a minor accused of raping minor girl
In (Minor) vs. State of Karnataka, a case was registered against the petitioner’s son for the offences punishable under Sections 354, 354(D), 363, 366(A), 376D read with 34 IPC, Sections 4, 6, 8 and 14 of the POCSO Act, 2012. He was a minor and had assaulted and raped a minor girl along with many others on two occasions and had video graphed the same and threatened her not to tell anyone. While the mother sought bail for her son, the state argued that the minor had committed a grievous offence and was not entitled to bail. According to the petitioner’s contentions, the consideration of regular bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. and the bail application under Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 was different. The nature and gravity of the offence is not a matter required to be considered while deciding the application filed under Section 12 of the JJ Act.
In this case, Karnataka High Court noted that JJ Board called for a report about the mental condition of the juvenile from the Dharwad Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (DIMHANS) while in terms of Rule 10, the Social Investigation Report has to be secured in Form No.6 from Probation Officer/ Voluntary/Non-governmental Organization. If considered, the report would not meet the triple test envisaged under Section 12 (1) of the JJ Act to deny bail to a juvenile. As per the report, neglect by family & poor supervision was why he committed the crime. Further, the accused minor’s father had died by suicide and he had poor family connections. It noted that he was influenced by peers while lacking an understanding of the consequences of the crime. It recommended family counselling and individual therapy – lifestyle modification/life skills training.
A single bench of Justice Anil B Katti observed that the welfare and well-being of the juvenile, in this case, can be taken care of by his mother and she is a fit and proper person to keep him in custody and granted bail to him allowing the petition. The court ordered her to ensure that he pursues his studies and does productive activities and not be allowed to waste his time in unproductive activities. Further, it directed the probation officer to keep an eye on the juvenile’s activities.


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Review: SC Rules That Doctors Cannot be Punished For Storing Small Quantities of Medicines Under The Drugs And Cosmetics Act 1940.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 22, 2023
In this edition of court judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgements on grounds for review for change in law in subsequent ruling, punishing doctors for storing small quantities of drugs and medicines, bail cancellation for serious offences, Delhi High Court’s judgement on applicability of RTI Act for non-citizens and Kerala High Court’s judgement on grounds for bail.
Supreme Court: Split verdict on whether change in law as a result of Court’s subsequent ruling serve as a justification for review?
In Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through the Secretary, Land and Building Department and Anr. vs. M/s. K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and Ors, the apex court delivered a split verdict, on whether a judgement can be reviewed since the ruling on which the earlier judgement was delivered was eventually overturned by the court.
The two-judge bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice MR Shah and Justice BV Nagarathna was hearing a review petition on whether the decision in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal (2020) that overruled the judgement of Constitution Bench in Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014), be a ground for review. While Justice MR Shah allowed the review petitions, Justice BV Nagarathna dismissed the review petitions.
In Pune Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, the court interpreted Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement, 2013. The interpretation of Section 24(2) was referred to a Three-Judge Bench in the case of the Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra. After considering the issue, the Bench determined that Pune Municipal Corporation did not cover all relevant aspects of the interpretation, and the matter was referred to a larger bench. A Constitution Bench overturned Pune Municipal Corporation and all other rulings that had relied on that judgement in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal. The current batch of petitions was filed by land acquiring authorities/States requesting a review of the Special Leave Petitions and Civil Appeals that were decided in accordance with the ruling in Pune Municipal Corporation following the decision in Indore Development Authority.
The counsel for respondents argued that the judgement in Indore Development Authority had no precedential authority and an explanation of Order XLVII of Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure,1908  provides that where a judgement on a legal issue has been reversed or amended by a later decision of the Superior Court, that shall not be a basis for reviewing that judgement.
Justice MR Shah, in his judgement held that the judgement in Indore Development Authority was made primarily based on the earlier ruling in Pune Municipal Corporation, which was questioned and ultimately overturned by a Constitution Court. Further, the approval of the review applications, according to Justice MR Shah, will be in the “greater public interest” given that the land acquisitions would otherwise expire. Justice MR Shah allowed the review petitions.
However, Justice BV Nagarathna differed from the above opinion. In her Judgement, she relied on the Supreme Court Rules 2013 that provide for the scope of review.
Further, the explanation for rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 states that merely because a judgement was reversed or modified in subsequent rulings shall not be a ground for review.
Further, she held that the third ground for review, ‘on account of any other sufficient reason’, must be similar to the two other reasons. Even if a broad meaning is given to the above ground, it results in no finality of judgements, and hence the purpose of the explanation that is provided is to bring finality to the cases. Accordingly, Justice BV Nagarathna dismissed the review petitions.
Supreme Court: Doctors cannot be punished for storing small quantities of medicines under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940.
The apex court quashed the criminal proceedings against a doctor under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940, for storing small quantities of medicines in S. Athilakshmi vs. The State Rep. by the Drugs Inspector. It held that a doctor’s act of storing modest quantities of medications will not amount to a crime of unauthorised stocking of medications under Section 18(c) of the above act. It further noted that such quantities can be easily found in the consultation room of the doctor.
The two-judge bench comprising of Justice Krishan Murari and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia was hearing a special leave petition filed by the Doctor against the criminal proceedings on her on account of the inspection carried out by the Drug inspector in her premises, where a certain quantity of medicines and lotions were found. The inspector filed a request for a sanction for prosecution with the office of the Director of Drugs Control, Tamil Nadu, alleging that she had drugs on hand for sale and sold them without a valid drug license, punishable under section 27(b)(ii) of the aforementioned Act. In response to receiving the sanction in January 2018, the Inspector filed a complaint at the Magistrate Egmore about pursuing the Appellant under Section 18(c) of the 1940 Medicines and Cosmetics Act. Upon challenging the proceedings before Madras High Court, the High Court dismissed the petition.
The apex court relied on the Schedule K of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, which exempted certain drugs from the provisions of the Chapter IV of the act. It held that this exemption is in the favour of the appellant and has exemptions from both section 18 and section 27, that are applied in this case. Entry 5 of the Schedule K of the above rules is as follows.
The court further held that since the quantity of the drugs found is extremely small, and it can easily be found in a doctor’s office or consultation premises, no offence can be made out in the present case. Rule 123 of the rules when read with schedule K provides adequate benefit for the practitioners.
The Court also found fault with the judgement of the Madras High Court and the sanctioning authority for not examining properly whether such a case could be made out considering the small number of medicines recovered given that the appellant is a registered medical practitioner. Accordingly, the proceedings against the registered medical practitioner are quashed.
Supreme Court: Subsequent addition of serious offence to FIR can be a ground for cancellation of bail.
The Supreme Court, in Ms. X vs. State of Maharashtra, has again reiterated that even if an order of bail was previously granted in the accused’s favour in relation to the offences with which he/she was charged when his/her application for bail was taken into consideration and a favourable order was passed, the addition of a serious offence can be a circumstance where a court can order that the accused be arrested and committed to custody.
The two-judge bench comprising Justice AS Bopanna and Justice Hima Kohli was hearing an appeal filed by the victim. The initial FIR was registered for offences punishable by Sections 354, 354-B, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. The accused was given bail by the magistrate. Her further statement was then recorded, and the FIR was amended to include the charge of rape (Section 376 IPC). In addition, the police requested the bond be revoked based on further information. The Magistrate granted the request to revoke the bail. In the meanwhile, the accused unsuccessfully petitioned the Sessions Court for anticipatory bail. Afterwards, the Bombay High Court granted anticipatory bail to the accused, which the victim challenged and appealed to the Supreme Court.
The apex court held that the Bombay High Court erred in its judgement and held that the High Court ignored the gravity and seriousness of the allegations and the financial stature, position and standing of the accused to that of the victim before arriving at such conclusions.
The apex court further relied on the judgement in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chatterjee and Another, wherein the conditions for the grant of anticipatory bail were discussed.
Further, in Pradeep Ram vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, a division bench of the apex court held that,
Accordingly, the orders granting anticipatory bail were set aside.
Delhi HC: Restricting the Right to Information to only citizens would be contrary to the purpose and object of the RTI Act itself.
In A S Rawat vs. Dawa Tashi, the Delhi High Court held that because the terms “citizens” and “persons” are used interchangeably throughout the RTI Act, restricting access to information to only citizens would go against both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. It further held that both citizens and non-citizens should have access to the right to information according to the type of information sought and the acknowledgement of the rights granted to such a class of people under the Indian Constitution.
The Single Judge bench headed by Justice Pratibha Singh was hearing a plea filed by the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the Central Tibetan Schools Administration. Earlier, the PIO had refused to provide the information requested by a Postgraduate Teacher (Tibetan) working at the Central School for Tibetans in Darjeeling, regarding his employment confirmation letter, Children’s Education Allowance, All India LTC benefit, etc. The PIO rejected the petition stating that the applicant was a Tibetan National. The first appeal against the PIO was unsuccessful, whereas, in the second appeal, the CIC imposed a penalty on the PIO for refusing to provide information on the baseless suspicion of the citizenship of the teacher. The PIO filed the appeal against this in High Court.
Upon hearing the counsels, the Delhi High Court held that the CIC was correct to rule that if the authority thinks it appropriate to provide the material, there is no outright ban. Both citizens and non-citizens are dealt with by public authorities in India as stated under the RTI Act. While it would be true to say, generally speaking, that all citizens have the right to information, it cannot also be said that the revelation of information to non-citizens is completely forbidden. If such public entities fail to act or operate in an opaque manner when dealing with matters involving non-citizens, it cannot be stated that a non-citizen would be prevented from requesting the information in question under the RTI Act.
It further held that,
Additionally, the High Court also found fault with the CIC’s finding that the PIO’s conduct is mala fide, and the imposition of penalty is not sustainable. Accordingly, the imposition of penalty is set aside.
Kerala HC: Three Grounds for Bail as enumerated in Susanta Ghosh not exhaustive, enumerates more factors.
In George Kurian @ Pappan vs. State of Kerala & Anr, the Kerala High Court held that the grounds for bail as laid down in the Susanta Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal are not exhaustive and many other factors would govern the grant of bail.
A single-judge bench headed by Justice A. Badharudeen was hearing the application for bail by the accused where he alleged to have committed offences punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act,1959. The counsel for the petitioner relied on the grounds enumerated by the apex court in the Susanta Ghosh case, which are as below.
If the above chances are found to the negative, the petitioner is liable to be released on bail. However, the prosecutor opposed the bail on the grounds that the accused demanded money and also arranged for a person to threaten the investigating officer. Further, they argued that the above grounds are not exhaustive, and many other factors govern the grant of bail.
Upon hearing both counsels, the High Court agreed with the arguments of the prosecution and held that such a list is not exhaustive. Further, it lists out the grounds based on various other judgements of the apex court as below.
Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, and the magistrate was directed to expedite the trial and complete the same as scheduled.


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Review: SC Rules That Every Breach of Promise to Marry in Consensual Physical Relationship is Not Rape
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
February 8, 2023
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Mumbai HC’s order noting that teachers using force to correct children is for the child’s benefit and does not constitute an offence, SC’s ruling that Every breach of promise to marry in consensual physical relationship is not rape, SC’ ruling that inability to pay court fees is not a sufficient reason to condone delay to file appeal, and SC’s simplified guidelines on advance directives & procedure for passive euthanasia.
Mumbai HC: Teachers using force to correct children is for the child’s benefit and does not constitute an offence
In Rekha @ Vidhila Faldessai vs. State, the appellant was a teacher. She was convicted by the Goa Children’s Court under Section 324 of IPC and under Section 2(m)(i) punishable under Section 8(2) of the Goa Children’s Act, for beating two sisters aged 6 and 9 years with a stick, back in 2014. The offences were for voluntarily causing hurt and child abuse.  She was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000 for the offence under Section 324 of IPC and a simple imprisonment for a term of 6 months. With respect to the offence under Goa Children’s Act, she was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one day and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lakh.
Justice Bharat P. Deshpande of the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court quashed the conviction. He observed that the testimonies of the students were contradictory. Further, their medical reports also showed that they had no injuries. The Bench also noted that there was no conclusive evidence that the teacher used a stick or ruler to beat.
In the judgement, the Bench stated that there is no definition of corporal punishment in the Goa Children’s Act which banned the form of punishment in schools. Referring to the Black’s Law Dictionary which defined corporal punishment as a physical punishment as distinguished from pecuniary punishment or a fine; any kind of punishment of or inflicted on the body. The legislation also stipulates the procedures to be followed by the institutions. The police too should have either conducted a preliminary inquiry or asked the complainants to approach competent authority to do so.
Further, the Court noted that the incident was quite normal in a primary school as teachers may sometimes be a bit harsh to discipline the students and to inculcate good habits. It is done in good faith with no mala fide intention for the child’s benefit and with the consent of the guardian. It also noted that if the teachers are in fear of such allegations for trivial matters and for correcting children, it would be difficult for conducting schools thereby giving proper education and for maintaining discipline.
SC: Every breach of promise to marry in consensual physical relationship is not rape
The case Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) is an appeal filed by the appellant accused against the judgment of the Delhi High Court. The case before the Sessions Court involved a married woman with 3 children. A child was born out of the relationship between the accused and the prosecutrix who were neighbours. It was only later she got to know that the accused was a married man having children. After a few years, she lodged a complaint against the accused alleging that she had consented to a sexual relationship with him as he had promised her to marry and later didn’t. The Sessions Court had directed the appellant to pay compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the prosecutrix and ten years imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000 while the High Court reduced the duration of imprisonment and fine.
A bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi of the Apex Court while hearing the appeal analysed the phrases “consent under a misconception”, “rape”, “false promise,” etc. The bench noted that it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for rape. In this case, the Bench noted that the woman was married with children and so, it cannot be said that she acted under the alleged false promise given by the appellant or under the misconception of fact while giving consent to having a sexual relationship with the appellant. Her conduct during the entire relationship was a betrayal of her husband and children and despite knowing that he was married, she continued to stay with him after the divorce, the bench stated. The court acquitted the appellant of rape charges and directed him to pay Rs. 5 lakhs to the woman for their child born out of wedlock.
SC: Inability to pay court fees is not a sufficient reason to condone delay to file appeal
The cases, Ajay Dabra vs. Pyare Ram & others and Ajay Dabra vs. Sunder Singh & another are surrounding the sale of land in Himachal Pradesh. A contract was executed between the defendant and a company for the sale of ‘agricultural land’ in the state in which it was stipulated that the defendant would secure the necessary approval from the government in a fixed time. However, this approval was not given by the State following which the suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff. There were two plots of land for which two different agreements were executed and so different civil suits were filed.
The plaintiff had initially filed an appeal at the High Court of Himachal Pradesh which dismissed the delay condonation applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, declining condonation of the delay by 254 days to file the first appeal as the reasons assigned for the same were insufficient. The reason submitted was that they did not have enough funds to pay the court fee. The SC Bench consisting of Justices P S Narasimha and Sudhanshu Dhulia also noted that the appellant could have filed the appeal on time under Section 149 CrPC which provides relaxation to pay the fee while the appeal is filed. The Court further noted that the appellant was an affluent businessman and a hotelier, and the inability to pay the fees was not a sufficient reason for the delay.
Dismissing the appeal and withholding the High Court’s order, the SC Bench also added that the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 allowed only agriculturists engaged in cultivation to purchase land in Himachal Pradesh. Others would require prior permission from the state government to purchase land in the state. The purpose of this legislation is to save the small agricultural holding of poor people and check the conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes.
SC: The burden of proof on the accused to prove plea of insanity under Section 84 of IPC is one of preponderance of probability
In Prakash Nayi @ Sen vs. State of Goa, the appellant was convicted by the High Court of Bombay at Goa as well as the Trial Court for murder under Section 302 of the IPC. The appellant approached the Supreme Court with a plea of insanity as per Section 84 of IPC which states that the acts of a mentally unsound person are not offence.
The SC Bench of Justices B R Gavai and M M Sundresh noted that the appellant was undergoing treatment for schizophrenia when the offence occurred in 2004. There was evidence that he had undergone in-patient treatment at a Government Medical College Hospital for mental illness. Doctors had also testified before the Court regarding the illness of the appellant. However, the Trial Court and the High Court dismissed this.
Acquitting the appellant and quashing the orders of the Trial Court and the High Court, the SC Bench noted that both the courts were influenced by the nature of the act and ignored the appellant’s condition and the fact that the burden on the accused is one of the preponderance of probability. In such cases, the accused has to prove before the Court that they were insane when committing the offence. Though the presumption is that a person is sane, once there are adequate materials available before the Court, the presumption gets discharged.
SC: Simplified guidelines on advance directives & procedure for passive euthanasia
With regards to Common Cause vs. Union of India, an application was filed by the Indian Society of Critical Care Medicine seeking clarification of the judgment following which the Supreme Court passed an order modifying the guidelines regarding the execution and enforcement of advance care directives and the procedure for passive euthanasia. A Constitution Bench comprising Justices K M Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy, and C T Ravikumar passed the order.
The judicial magistrate of first class’s Countersign for attesting the document to withdraw life support of a terminally ill person by way of a living will have been done away with. The new rules allow attestation of the document before a notary or Gazetted Officer. The requirement that the judicial magistrate forwards a copy of the document to the registry of the jurisdictional district court and maintains it has been deleted. In case the primary medical board takes a decision not to follow an advance directive, the nominees of the executor can request the hospital to refer the case to the secondary medical board for consideration and for passing appropriate directions. Earlier, the application was made to the medical board constituted by the collector for considering and passing appropriate directions with respect to the document. Also, before taking a final opinion, if the executor is incapacitated, the consent taken was restricted to the guardian or close relative. It has now been expanded to all nominees.

created: February 8, 2023


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Review: SC Rules That Legitimate Disciplinary Action by Teachers is Not Abetment of Suicide
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
November 30, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s clarification that a contract can be said to be concluded only if parties are ad idem on all the essential terms, SC’s ruling that no authority can reduce or waive the interest under ESI Act, and that legitimate disciplinary action by teachers is not abetment of suicide.
SC: A contract can be said to be concluded only if parties are ad idem on all the essential terms
In the case Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited vs. JSW Energy Limited, Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (KPTCL) filed an appeal in the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Karnataka High Court.
Karnataka government had permitted JSW Energy Ltd. cortex gas/coal based thermal power plant at Bellary and Jindal Vijayanagar Steel Limited (JVSL) was to consume the power produced from the thermal plant.  The Central Electricity Authority granted the required technical economic clearance in March 1996. The Karnataka State Electricity Board (KEB) entered into a heads of term with JTPCL which was followed up by a wheeling and banking agreement between the two. The parties in the case made a draft power purchase agreement in 2000.
A letter was sent to the Commission to be treated as an application for entering into PPA under the Karnataka Electricity Reforms Act, 1999. Objections were filed by objector based on public notice. JSWL was of the view that the Commission could not examine the PPA since it was a contract which concluded before the Act was implemented and so, the case fell within the four walls of the proviso to sub-section 2 of Section 27 of the Act. The commission also approved a draft PPA with modifications which was challenged by JSW Energy Ltd in the High Court.
The court allowed First Appeal filed by JSW Energy Ltd. and set aside the orders passed by the Commission. The High Court directed the appellant to adhere to the tariff rate specified in the State government’s order from 12 May 1999.
The issue raised before the apex court was whether there was a concluded contract between the parties on the tariff before the Karnataka Electricity Reform Act, 1999 came into effect.
The Apex Court bench of Justices KM Joseph, Aniruddha Bose and Hrishikesh Roy concluded that there was no concluded contract within the meaning of proviso to Section 27 of the Act. It added that a contract can be said to be concluded only when parties are ad idem (in agreement) on all the essential terms of the contract. While partly allowing the appeal, the Bench stated that the subject matter of the contract, the position of the parties, the implications of the working of the contract and the intention of the parties did not persuade the Bench to safely gather that there was a concluded contract upon negotiations and correspondence, culminating in the Government Order dated 12 May 1999.
SC: No authority can reduce or waive the interest under ESI Act
The Employees State Insurance (ESI) Act provides for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity, and employment injury. Section 39(5)(a) of the Act states that if any contribution payable under this Act is not paid by the principal employer on the date on which such contribution is due, they are liable to pay simple interest at 12% per annum or at such higher rate as per the regulations till the date of its actual payment.
In Regional Director/ Recovery Officer vs. Nitinbhai Vallabhai Panchasara, ESI Court, restricted the levy of interest under the above mentioned Act, to two years only. An appeal was filed by the ESI Corporation against the restriction in the Allahabad High Court which dismissed the same on grounds that no substantial question of law arose. The High Court’s decision has been challenged in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices MR Shah and MM Sundresh observed that both the ESI Court and the High Court did not properly appreciate that the levy of interest under Section 39(5) (a) of the ESI Act is mandatory and neither the Court nor the Authority have any jurisdiction and/or authority to waive the interest. Referring to previous judgements, the Bench allowed the appeal and held that no authority including courts have any authority to either waive the interest and/or reduce the interest and/or the period during which the interest is payable.
SC: Legitimate disciplinary action by teachers is not abetment of suicide
In April 2008, Gaurav Wahi was attending the last lecture of Nitin Shyam. Gaurav is alleged to have misbehaved with him in the class under the influence of alcohol. When the teacher asked the student to leave the class, Gaurav Wahi ran out of the classroom. The teacher informed this to the Head of the Department. A suspension order was passed in the name of the student, who was also asked to bring his parents, as an exercise of legitimate disciplinary action. The student was also asked to deposit some money in the college as security deposit which would be refunded once the course is completed. However, the student ended his life by jumping in the canal. The father of the deceased filed a complaint with the police accusing the teacher, the Head of the Department (HoD) and the principal of instigating the suicide. He also alleged that the teacher ran behind the deceased and dragged him to the HoD’s office.
In V.P. Singh vs. State of Punjab, the accused had filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. Acknowledging the anguish of a father who has lost a young son, the court Supreme Court Bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hrishikesh Roy held that the father cannot blame the world (in the present case, the institution, and its teachers) for what is a basic disciplinary action taken by the institute. It added that the father’s anguish should not be converted into a case of abetment of suicide. The Court allowed the appeal.
Mumbai Magistrates Court: Women can also be accused of offences intended to outrage another woman’s modesty
In State of Maharashtra vs. Rovena Bhosale, the accused constantly abused the informant verbally for constantly informing everything to the accused’s mother. She would shout at the informant in foul language from her kitchen and quarrelled with her often. One day, the accused started abusing the informant from the corridor and assaulted her. She hit her with chappal, tore her clothes, and asked her husband to rape the informant. She was convicted under sections 323 and 354 of the IPC.
With respect to Section 354 of the IPC, the Metropolitan Magistrates Court in Mumbai stated that an offence under section 354 IPC is not sexual offence but is committed when a person assaults or uses a criminal force to assault another woman intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that they will thereby outrage her modesty. Such an offence can be conducted by anyone- man or woman. It noted that Section 354 IPC operates equally upon all persons whether males or females and that it cannot be maintained that woman are exempted from any punishment under this section. Thus, women can also be accused of offences intended to outrage another woman’s modesty. The accused was found guilty and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine.
Delhi Sessions Court: Killing a stray dog by accidentally running a car over it is not ‘mischief’ under Section 429 of IPC
In Puneet vs. State of NCT of Delhi, FIR was filed under Sections 428 and 429 of IPC against the accused for killing a dog. He drove a BMW car and killed one stray dog at Mayur Vihar, Delhi when the traffic signal was red. His car went over the dog twice. He was accused of driving in full speed and not stopping when the complainant tried to stop him. The incident took place in June 2019.
Additional Sessions Judge Deepali Sharma heard the case and held that it was essential to prove the offence of ‘mischief’, which is the main ingredient of Section 429 for which it is necessary to establish that the accused had the requisite intention or knowledge to cause wrongful loss or damage to public or person. The court noted that there was no allegation in the FIR that the accused had deliberately or intentionally hit the dog or that he had gone towards the dog to hit it. It held that the accused was driving on the main road at high speed and so, it cannot be stated that he hit the dog to commit mischief as defined under Section 425 of IPC which is an essential ingredient of an offence under section 429 of IPC. The accused was discharged of charges under Section 429 of IPC.

created: November 30, 2022


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Review: SC Rules That Misuse of State Machinery with Ulterior Motives by Women Police Officer is an Abuse of Power - FACTLY
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
April 24, 2024
In this edition of court judgements, we look at the Madras High Court’s judgement that smelling of alcohol per se does not constitute an offence, Supreme Court’s ruling that misuse of state machinery with ulterior motives by the woman police officer is an abuse of Power, that Writ Petitions cannot be allowed if they are not filed within reasonable time limitation, among others.
Madras HC: Smelling of Alcohol per se does not constitute an offence; Issues direction to make it mandatory to check Alcohol level in Injured or Deceased in Accident cases
In the case of Ramesh vs. Selvakumar, the High Court (HC) of Madras was dealing with an accident case involving questions of whether the smelling of alcohol and whether non-maintenance of safe distance could be treated as contributory negligence in an accident case.
The facts of the case were that Ramesh, the Appellant, was riding on a two-wheeler on a certain road between Esanai and Anukoor in Tamil Nadu. While riding, he had hit a Lorry going running before him and sustained multiple injuries including disability, loss of income, etc. The cause of the accident was the application of sudden break by Lorry Driver. Subsequently, the Accident Tribunal, which considered the matter, concluded that the Appellant had suffered a loss of about 3,07,904 rupees, due to the accident. However, the Tribunal had only awarded 50% of this amount to be paid as compensation, by finding that the Appellant was also responsible for losses suffered by him due to his negligence in not keeping a safe distance from the Lorry. Additionally, it was also recorded in medical records that the Appellant had also smelled Alcohol before riding the two-wheeler, which was also taken as a fact contributing to the negligence of the Appellant. Aggrieved by the lower compensation awarded to him, the Appellant filed an Appeal against the order of the Tribunal.
Taking these facts into consideration, the HC held that smelling Alcohol itself does not constitute an offence, as the Motor Vehicle Act itself notes that the criminal offence is said to have been committed if only alcohol limit crosses 30 mg per 100 ml of blood. However, in the present case, the Appellant had only smelled Alcohol, not even consumed it. Further, the court has also held that in most cases, it becomes very difficult for the following vehicle drivers to avoid an accident when the vehicle running before it comes to a grinding halt due to the application of a sudden break.
Accordingly, the HC held that the Appellant is not guilty of negligence. Therefore, it has awarded a compensation of about 3,53,904 rupees payable to the Appellant.
Along with these, the HC also noted that in many cases of similar nature, the injured or deceased, when they are brought to the hospital, smell alcohol in their breath. Therefore, HC issued a direction to Principal Secretary, of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to issue a circular to all the Hospitals to make it mandatory in all cases where the injured or the deceased are brought to the hospital and smell alcohol, the level of alcohol in the blood shall be assessed and the same must be noted in the relevant records, as such an exercise will enable the Court to come to correct conclusions.
SC: Misuse of State Machinery with Ulterior Motives by the Woman Police Officer is an abuse of Power
In the case of Parteek Bansal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors, the Appellant and second respondent are Husband and Wife, whose marriage was solemnized in March 2015, in Udaipur, Rajasthan. By profession, both of them are police officers. In October 2015, the third respondent, who is the father of his wife (respondent no. 2), filed a criminal complaint against the Appellant under Sections 498 (A) 406, 384, 420 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in Hisar, Haryana. While the commission of the alleged offence had taken place in Udaipur, Rajasthan, the FIR was first filed in Hisar, with the reason that the person aggrieved, the wife, at the time of filing of the complaint was in Hisar. A few days later, Respondent No. 3 filed another complaint against the Appellant with the same facts and allegations in Udaipur, Rajasthan. The first complaint was investigated by the police of Hisar, and the trial court had acquitted the Appellant of the charges laid against him. In the meantime, the Appellant had filed a petition under Section 282 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) before the Rajasthan HC to quash the FIR filed against him in Udaipur, Rajasthan. This was dismissed on the grounds that the complaint to the Rajasthan police was filed before the complaint was made to Haryana police and that the Rajasthan police were not aware of the complaint filed before the Haryana Police. Aggrieved by the judgment of the HC, the Appellant approached SC.
When the matter was taken up, the SC noted that the respondent wife, using her position as a police officer, managed to get the complaint first filed in Hisar through her father. Later, as she moved to her hometown Udaipur, another complaint was filed. Further, the court also noted that neither of the respondents have entered the witness box when the trial was going on before the trial court in Hisar. It was also recorded in a complaint filed before the Rajasthan police that the same complaint was also filed before the Haryana police. Taking these factors into consideration, the SC found that the Rajasthan HC had erred in not noting these facts. Accordingly, it quashed the judgment of the Rajasthan HC and FIR filed against the Appellant.
As for the respondents, the SC found that they had misused their official positions and have caused harassment to the appellant and wasted precious time of the investigating agency and the court. Therefore, it has imposed a fine of Rs. 5,00,000.
SC: Writ Petitions cannot be allowed if they are not filed within reasonable time limitation
In the case of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley & Ors, the SC was dealing with the question of whether the delay caused in filing the Writ Petition (WP) relating to the exercise of private rights can be allowed and grant the relief of prayer made in the Appeal.
The facts of the case were that the Appellant and Respondent were the successful bidders for the grant of LPG distributorship in the year 2013. Upon the casting of lots, the Appellant was granted distributorship in June 2014. In March 2017, after a lapse of about 4 years, the second respondent, who lost the distributorship during the lots, filed a complaint before the BPCL, the LPG agency. The grievance was that the land shown by the Appellant for distribution is a Barga land and same cannot be considered for establishing a distributor unit. But this was declined by BPCL as the Appellant had already filed an application for Alternate Land and that it was processed by it. Aggrieved by it, the Appellant filed a Writ Petition before the HC. The single bench declined the petition, while the division bench allowed it and held that orders given by BPCL in favour of the Appellant were invalid. Aggrieved by the order of the division bench, the Appellant approached SC.
The SC noted that distributorship for the Appellant was given way back in 2014. The complaint was filed by the Respondent only when the alternate land for the site was chosen in 2017. By virtue of this, the Respondent has allowed for drifting away of his rights. Further, the Respondent also did not exhibit any stiff resistance on the alternative land chosen by the Appellant.
Therefore, the court held that though there is no fixed period of limitation prescribed for entertaining WPs, however, it is to be seen by the courts whether they have been filed within reasonable time and whether the cause of action invoked is a live cause for action. In absence of these, the HCs should not entertain WPs filed after the lapse of reasonable time within which rights which are petitioned can be claimed.
Accordingly, the SC upheld the single bench judgment by setting aside the division bench judgment.
Bombay HC: Adultery is a ground for Divorce, but it cannot be used to Deny Child’s custody
In the case of X vs. Y, the Bombay HC was dealing with a question of granting the custody of a 9-year-old minor girl to the mother who was accused of adulterous behaviour.
The facts of the case were that Husband (Petitioner), and Wife (Respondent) were married in 2010. A girl child was born to them in 2015. Both parents have started living separately from one another due to the alleged cruelty exhibited by one another and vice-versa. In the year 2020, the divorce petition was filed, which is under consideration before the Family Court (FC). Initially, the child was in the custody of her Husband, while the Wife was only allowed virtual access of the Child. In the later days, the custody of the child was given to the Wife, who is a Doctor by profession. However, the Husband filed a case in FC seeking the permanent custody of the child by alleging the adulterous behaviour of the Wife. This was dismissed by FC. Aggrieved by it, the Petitioner approached HC.
The HC noted that in order to establish the alleged adulterous behaviour of the Wife, the Husband resorted to false means such as obtaining information about family matters from the school authorities of daughter and writing letters with forged handwriting of the daughter, etc.
Firstly, the HC held that school authorities had no power to intervene in the matters of family. On the questions of custody, it noted the Wife is a doctor by profession, and has her mother at her house to take care of the child in the absence of the Wife. Whereas, the Husband, who is a Software Engineer, and his family are not in the same position to give better custody to the child. In addition, the girl is of pre-puberty age. Therefore, the custody of the child must remain with the wife.
On the questions of alleged adulterous behaviour due to which the custody of the child was sought by Husband, the HC held it is not proved yet before the FC. As such adultery is a ground for Divorce, but not for seeking custody of the child, as held by SC in several cases.
Accordingly, the HC dismissed the petition of the Husband.
SC: Orders for Medical Examination of Minor for Termination of Pregnancy
In the case of A vs. State of Maharashtra, the SC ordered for urgent medical examination of 14-year-old minor girl who was pregnant. The facts of the case were that the minor girl was found pregnant with the alleged sexual assault committed against her. The mother of the child approached Bombay HC seeking the medical termination of her pregnancy, which was rejected by the same court. In rejecting the same, the HC relied on two of the medical reports, one prepared by the Department of Obstetrics Gynaecology of the Government Medical College and the other by Sir J J Group of Hospitals.
The SC noted that the second medical report strikingly does not contain an evaluation of the physical and mental status of the minor, such as the background leading up to the pregnancy, including the alleged sexual assault, etc. Therefore, the SC ordered a fresh examination of the minor girl, including the necessity of termination of pregnancy.
In the subsequent order, the SC allowed the termination of the pregnancy, based on reasons that the alleged sexual assault had happened to a minor girl, and she was unaware of her pregnancy until the last stage. The medical opinion of the doctors was that the continuation of pregnancy against the will of the girl may impact the girl’s mental and physical health and that the termination at this stage is less risky compared to the next stages.


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SC rules that ‘No Useful Purpose Will Be Served’ cannot be a reason to quash criminal proceedings
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
May 25, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Supreme Court’s observation regarding quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court, Kerala High Court’s order on fixing liability regarding an electrocution death case, Madras High Court’s observation regarding a Citizenship resumption case and Karnataka’s high court order on the bail application.
Supreme Court: ‘No Useful Purpose Will Be Served’ cannot be a reason to quash criminal proceedings
A Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and Justice BV Nagarathna observed that if there is a clear case regarding the alleged offences, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed on the premise that ‘no useful purpose will be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case.’
This observation was made in the case, Satish Kumar Jatav vs. the State of U.P. & Ors.,  and stated that the High court needs to make a well-reasoned order to dispose such petitions regarding Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
As per the details of the case, the accused was summoned for trial for offences punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506 of IPC and Sections 3(10)(15) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.  The accused challenged the order in the Allahabad High Court.
The high court quashed the criminal proceedings stating that no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of the case. This was appealed in the Supreme Court with the contention that the High Court did not provide any reasons for quashing the criminal proceedings.
Supreme Court took cognizance of the appeal and noted that the High Court has discussed neither the allegations against the accused nor the legality of the initial order against the accused.
The Supreme Court stated that the High court’s reason to quash the criminal proceedings does not serve as a good ground especially when there is a clear case regarding the offences.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal quashing the order issued by the Allahabad High Court, thereby reinstating the initial order of the magistrate summoning the accused.
Kerala HC: State Electricity Board liable for the death of a man electrocuted while boarding a bus in contact with a loose wire
In the case where a person died due to electrocution by boarding a bus which was in contact with a hanging electric line, Kerala High Court stated that the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) is equally liable for negligence apart from the driver.
In the case National Insurance Co. Ltd vs. Narayani & Ors, Justice M.R. Anitha held that it is the duty of KSEB to maintain the electrical equipment and accessories and avoid danger from them to the public.
As per the details of the case, a person, Krishnamurthy was electrocuted to death while stepping onto a bus which was in contact with an electric line hanging over the road. His family moved to the ‘Principal Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal’ seeking compensation for his death. They claimed that the owner of the bus, driver, insurer and KSEB was liable to compensate. KSEB is liable since they did not take proper safety measures to tighten the hanging electric conductor to prevent the accident.
The Tribunal held that KSEB was not negligent, and the accident occurred due to the negligence of the bus driver and directed the insurer to indemnify the insurer. The insurer was aggrieved by the tribunal’s order and moved to the High Court.
It was argued by the appellant i.e., the insurer that the police charge was against both the driver and KSEB. The standing counsel of KSEB also agreed that the area was affected by lightning, thereby causing the line to be detached.
The tribunal’s basis for exonerating KSEB was that the line was not separated and was only hanging. But the court contended that it is not necessary for the line to be separated and it is the responsibility of KSEB to take measures to avert danger to the public.
The High Court Judge presiding over the case observed that the Tribunal ought not have let off KSEB.
It observed that this is a case of composite negligence and hence the order of the tribunal was set aside.
Madras HC: Entitlement to the resumption of Citizenship can’t be denied to a child who was in the womb at the time of renunciation by the parents.
Madras High Court has observed that a child who is still in the womb of the parents at the time of them renouncing their Indian Citizenship, needs to be treated as a ‘minor’ and is entitled to the resumption of his Indian Citizenship according to Citizenship Act.
This observation was made by Justice Anita Sumanth of Madras High Court in the case of Pranav Srinivasan vs. The Government of India. The High Court received a plea challenging the rejection of an application for Resumption of Citizenship under Section 8 of the Citizenship Act, 1955.  The parents of the appellant renounced their Indian Citizenship in December 2018 and obtained citizenship of Singapore.  The petitioner was a foetus of about 7 & half months at that point and was born in March 1999. By virtue of birth, the petitioner has acquired Singapore citizenship.
After attaining the age of majority, he made a declaration in Indian Consulate at Singapore in March 2017 seeking resumption of his Indian Citizenship. Article 8 of the Indian Constitution was cited, stating that is specifies the mechanism to determine the citizenship of persons of Indian origin. The petitioner applied for citizenship stating that both his parents were citizens of India, and his grandparents still hold Indian Citizenship.
However, the court observed that Article 8 only provides for certain entitlements subject to the procedures being fulfilled. The declaration at the consulate was not accepted by the authorities as per the procedures in Section 5 of the Citizenship Act.
Now, the question before the court was to determine whether the child in the mother’s womb would be considered a ‘Minor child’ under Section 8(2) of the Citizenship Act.  The single-judge bench highlighted the terminology used in the Act, where-in Section 8(2) mentions ‘minor child’ and not ‘birth unlike other sections in the Act. Hence, it stated that there is a distinction between acquisition of ‘Citizenship by birth’ and acquisition of ‘Citizenship by a minor’ through resumption of Citizenship.
The court observed that as per the provisions in the Citizenship act, a child need not have been born at the time of parents renouncing their citizenship. Therefore, he is entitled to seek resumption of the right to citizenship.  Other acts relating to the rights of the unborn child were also discussed by the court.
Further, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which India is a signatory, defines a minor child as every human being below the age of 18 years, where-in no lower limit is mentioned.
In light of the earlier precedents, the court concluded that the petitioner would be considered a minor child and cannot be denied the entitlement for resumption of Citizenship.
Karnataka HC: It is unjust to deny bail before investigation since the accused is a habitual offender
Justice M. Nagaprasanna of Karnataka High Court observed that it is unjust to deny bail to a person before investigation, based on the allegation that the person is a habitual offender or has criminal antecedents.
In the case Injamam Shariff vs. the State of Karnataka, the petition was allowed and the petitioner was granted bail. The accused was earlier arrested for offences punishable under Sections 397 & 34 of the Indian Penal Code. As per a complaint registered by one T.S. Manoj, two unknown persons came on a motorcycle, while one caught hold of him by threatening with a knife, and the other snatched away his mobile phone.
After a week, the police arrested Injamam Shariff and he was kept in judicial custody. Injamam Shariff filed a petition seeking bail from the Sessions Judge. This application was rejected based on the objections of the State, that the petitioner was a habitual offender and has criminal antecedents with the likeliness of committing similar offences if released.
The petitioner submitted that there was no recovery of the phone from him, and the allegations were baseless.  The prosecution opposed the bail plea and stated that the matter is under investigation and the petitioner was apprehended on the criminal antecedents.
The High Court Bench observed that the reasoning of the sessions Judge was flawed. Since the matter is still under investigation, denying him bail based on the allegations of being a habitual offender is unjust. The court further highlighted that the mobile phone is not recovered from the petitioner and there is no prima face evidence against him.


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Review: SC Rules That Parole Period Should be Excluded From Period of Actual Imprisonment in Calculation For Release From Prison
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
January 11, 2023
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s judgment regarding the liability of government for statements made by Minister, SC’s judgment about there being no provision prohibiting the appointment of a lawyer practicing in the Supreme Court as High Court Judge, SC’s judgment that parole period should be excluded from period of actual imprisonment in calculation for release from prison, Rajasthan High Court’s decision that widowed daughter in law is also eligible for compassionate appointment.
SC: If minister’s speech results in officers harming people or citizens, it will be a constitutional tort
In Kaushal Kishor vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, a petition was filed to register a complaint and seek action against the then Minister of Urban Development of UP for making statements outrageous to the modesty of victims. The minister had termed a theft and gang rape incident as a political conspiracy in a press conference. This case raised concerns about the state’s obligation to freedom of speech and expression.
A five-member Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai, A.S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna in a 4:1 majority, held that additional restrictions, not found in Article 19(2), cannot be imposed on the exercise of the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) on any individual. Further, it held that the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2) for restricting free speech are exhaustive.
The Bench added that statements made by Minister, even if traceable to any affairs of state or protecting the government, cannot be attributed vicariously to the government even applying the principle of collective responsibility. It noted that a fundamental right under Article 19/21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State or its instrumentalities. The state also has the duty to protect the rights of a person under Article 21 if there is a threat to personal liberty even by a non-State actor.
It stated that a mere statement made by a Minister, inconsistent with the rights of a citizen may not constitute a violation of constitutional rights. But if because of such a statement, any act of omission or commission is done by the officers resulting in harm or loss to a person/citizen, then the same may be actionable as a constitutional tort. A constitutional tort is when the state or its agencies violates the fundamental rights of the people.
In her dissenting judgement, Justice B V Nagarathna referred to international practice with respect to restraints of free speech. She stated that except for habeas corpus, the right to free speech cannot be enforced against persons other than the state.
SC: There is no provision prohibiting the appointment of a lawyer practicing in the Supreme Court as High Court Judge
In Ashok Pandey vs. Union of India And Ors, the petitioner is an advocate. He informed the Bench that four advocates who were practicing in the Supreme Court were a part of the list of recommendations from Allahabad High Court. In the past few years, he stated that six such persons were appointed by the High Court and called it a blatant violation of Article 217(2) of the Constitution. According to Article 217(2),
A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and—
(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or
(b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession.”
As per the petitioner’s interpretation, a person who may have been enrolled with a state bar council and subsequently shifted practice to the apex court is ineligible to be appointed as a judge of that court. He also contended that the lawyers practicing in the Supreme Court would be better than their counterparts in the High Court.
The SC Bench of Justices S.K. Kaul and A.S. Oka, noted that there was no provision in the Constitution that prohibited lawyers practicing in the Supreme Court to be appointed as Judge of the High Court. Moreover, every lawyer is enrolled with the Bar Council of a particular State. Dismissing the petition, the Bench asked the petitioner to pay Rs. 50,000 in the Supreme Court Mediation calling the petition ‘meritless’ and a ‘complete wastage of judicial time.’
SC: Parole period should be excluded from period of actual imprisonment
The petitioner in Rohan Dhungat vs. State of Goa and Ors had challenged the order passed by the Bombay High Court at Goa which held that period of Parole is to be excluded from the period of the sentence while considering the 14 years of actual imprisonment for the purpose of premature release. The original petitioners in the case were convicts undergoing life imprisonment and were released on parole under the Goa Prisons Rules, 2006. They had applied for premature release regarding which the State Government sought the Court’s opinion and rejected the release, considering the gravity of offence. The state government’s decision was challenged in the Bombay High Court, whose decision was then challenged in the Supreme Court.
The SC Bench of Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar explained that a specific reason is required for considering parole which can extend up to one month. It is granted by the State Government and may be granted more than once. They clarified that any prisoner who is influential may get parole for a number of times as there are no restrictions. In case, parole is included in the period of sentence, the purpose of actual imprisonment will be defeated. Citing this, the Bench dismissed the appeal.
Bombay HC: Compensation denied to victim of railway accident who was under alcohol influence when boarding the train
In February 2014, Deepak Nattuji Thakre succumbed to injuries following an accident when boarding a train. His wife and other family members claimed that the railways were liable to pay compensation along with interest as per the Railways Act, 1989. However, the railways argued that there was no valid ticket on the deceased’s body. Moreover, the pointsman and RPF constable stated that the deceased had tried to get into a moving train despite a warning. This was termed an act of negligence by the Tribunal. Furthermore, the Medico-Legal Case (MLC) report evidenced that the deceased was under the influence of liquor. Considering the lack of a valid ticket, negligence and the intoxicated state of the deceased, the railways tribunal dismissed the appeal.
The dependents then filed an appeal with the Bombay High Court which held that the facts and evidence pointed towards the deceased’s negligence. Justice Abhay Ahuja also added that the MLC report was from a government hospital and was good evidence to be relied upon. The explanation that the time gap between the incident, hospitalization and death was why the post-mortem report didn’t record the intoxication was also accepted. On these grounds, the High Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision to deny compensation under proviso (d) of Section 124 of Railways Act.
Rajasthan HC: Widowed daughter in law is eligible for compassionate appointment
The case Sushila Devi vs. State of Rajasthan deals with the compassionate appointment of a daughter-in-law. The petitioner’s mother-in-law was appointed to the post of a ‘Coolie’ in the Public Works Department of Rajasthan. She died while working in harness with the said department, following which an application for compassionate appointment was filed by the deceased’s son who was also the petitioner’s husband. The petitioner’s husband also died soon after.
The petitioner, now widowed with the responsibility of looking after herself and three minor children, applied for compassionate appointment as per the Rajasthan Compassionate Appointment of Dependents of Deceased Government Rules, 1996. However, the department declined the application citing that a ‘daughter-in-law’ did not fall within the ambit of the term ‘dependent’ under the 1996 Rules. The petitioner then challenged the legality of the rejection as the entire family relied on the mother-in-law for survival because of which they were also ‘dependents’ as per the provisions of the legislation. Referring to an old judgment, Justice Sameer Jain of the Rajasthan High Court allowed the plea for a compassionate appointment along with the due benefits. The Court stated that ‘widowed-daughter-in-law’ was to be read as a part and parcel of ‘widowed daughter’.
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created: January 11, 2023