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Review: SC says all angles must be considered while considering petitions for expedition of trial - FACTLY
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 23, 2022
In this roundup of the Court Judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s observations & directions about the OROP scheme, that a magistrate can summon persons who have not been named in chargesheet or FIR provided there is material indicating their involvement, that negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct in a case involving a judicial officer, all angles must be considered while considering petitions for the expedition of trial.
SC: There is no legal mandate that pensioners who held the same rank must be given the same amount of pension
‘One Rank One Pension’ or ‘OROP’ is defined as the payment of uniform pension to armed services personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, irrespective of the date of retirement, according to the Union Government’s definition as per the scheme’s notification released in 2015. It stipulates the following:
In Indian Ex Servicemen Movement vs. Union of India & Others, the ex-servicemen association filed a plea in 2016 seeking implementation of the OROP Scheme as per the recommendations put forth by Koshyari Committee with an automatic annual revision based on the 2014 salary of ex-servicemen. In the current policy, a periodic review is conducted once in five years based on 2013 salaries. The plea also claimed that different pensions were given for the same rank depending on when the person retired. For instance, a Sepoy who retired prior to 31 December 2013 would get a monthly pension of Rs. 6,665 and another Sepoy (Group Y) who retired on or after 1 January 2014 would get Rs. 7,605 per month which implies that two soldiers who served for the same length of years, holding the same rank will draw a different pension.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Surya Kant, and Vikram Nath dismissed the challenge noting that there is no legal mandate that pensioners who held the same rank must be given the same amount of pension. Moreover, some personnel may be entitled to varying benefits which also affects the pension payable. This need not be equalized with the rest of the personnel. Citing various principles, the bench stated that they could not find any constitutional infirmity in the OROP principle adopted. With respect to the definition of policy, the Bench stated that it was not arbitrary. Stating that a re-fixation exercise should be carried out from 1 July 2019, upon the expiry of five years, the Bench also ordered that all arrears payable to eligible pensioners of the armed forces should be paid within three months.
SC: Magistrate can summon persons who have not been named in chargesheet or FIR provided there is material indicating their involvement
In Nahar Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, the question considered was if the Magistrate can issue summons to any person who was not named in the chargesheet. In this case, the prosecutrix victim who was recovered by the Investigation Officer on 10 May 2012, in her initial statement under Section 161 of CrPC on the same day disclosed that the accused Yogesh had raped her. Later, in her statement before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 164, she disclosed the names of Rupa, Yogesh, and the appellant Nahar Singh. The appellant’s name was not disclosed by the prosecutrix in her statement made under Section 161 CrPC alongside other co-accused persons, Yogesh and Rupa whose names were in the chargesheet.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) passed an order in 2012 that there is no ground to summon the appellant Nahar Singh for trial. Later, in 2015, the CJM passed an order issuing summons for trial. This order was challenged by the appellant in the Sessions Court, which was dismissed. He then approached Allahabad High Court which stated that “the well-established principle of criminal jurisprudence that cognizance taken by the Magistrate is of an offence and not of an offender.” That is, if the Magistrate found evidence to support the allegations against persons who have not been chargesheeted, the Magistrate should summon them.
While hearing the plea filed by the appellant, the two-member bench of justices Vineet Saran and Aniruddha Bose upheld the Allahabad High Court’s decision. The Bench said that if there are materials before the Magistrate which indicate the involvement of those persons who have not been mentioned in the chargesheet, then the Magistrate can summon such persons. However, the Magistrate must examine the materials available before them (which need not be those confined to the police report, charge sheet, or the F.I.R) including the statement made under Section 164 of CrPC, before issuing summon orders.
SC: Negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct
In Abhay Jain vs. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, the appellant was an ex-judicial officer. He had joined as a judicial officer in 2013 and was discharged from service three years later in 2016, after a complaint against him that he had passed a bail order with some ulterior or oblique motives and for extraneous considerations. The full court had also observed that his services during the probation period were unsatisfactory. In 2016, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court to quash the orders which removed him from service and end all proceedings against him. He also sought reinstatement with consequential benefits. However, the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the writ petition.
He then appealed before the Supreme Court stating that the charges filed against him were vague in nature and that absolutely no details were provided about the allegation against him of passing the bail order with ulterior motive and extraneous considerations. The Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, and Vineet Saran also noticed that the appellant was not given a chance to improve as he was not informed of his unsatisfactory performance. With regards to the bail order passed, the Bench noted that there was no detail as to what the extraneous consideration or ulterior motive was, and so it was merely drawn out of suspicion. There was no complaint or any other material to back the allegations. To establish any ‘probability’ of misconduct, there should be oral or documentary material to support it which is absent in this case.
The Bench held the appellant guilty of negligence for not reading the case file carefully as he missed the notice of the order of the High Court on his file. However, this negligence was not to be considered misconduct. Allowing the appeal, the Bench directed that the appellant be reinstated with all consequential benefits like the continuity of service and seniority but will be entitled to be paid only 50% back wages, which may be paid within a period of four months.
SC: All angles must be considered while considering petitions for expedition of trial
In M Gopalakrishnan & Others vs. Pasumpon Muthuramalingam & Another, the SC considered an SLP against Madras High Court’s order of directing the Trial Court to expedite the proceedings and close a trial within 6 months, without even joining the accused persons as parties.
The bench comprising of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath calling the order innocuous stated that before passing any such order for expeditious proceedings in a particular case, the higher court must keep in mind that the calendar and schedule of the subordinate Court would be disrupted due to such orders unless there are compelling reasons. Such petitions which call for expedition of trial must be examined from all angles, it added while dismissing the petition.
Chhattisgarh HC: Illegitimate son/daughter is also entitled to compassionate appointment
In Piyush Kumar Ancha vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, the petitioner’s father who worked in the Chhattisgarh State Warehousing Corporation had died due to COVID-19 infection and the petitioner had applied for the job on compassionate grounds. He was the son of the deceased’s second wife whose name was also recorded in the nomination form submitted by his late father. However, his application was rejected on grounds that he had not filed a valid succession certificate. Suresh Kumar Anchal, the son of the deceased with his first wife, had also claimed a compassionate appointment.
Referring to past judgements and circulars, the Court noted that if a widow/widower of the deceased Government servant is not eligible, only then the son/adopted son would be entitled to consideration, and in absence of that, the daughter/adopted daughter would be entitled to consideration. Even an illegitimate son/daughter is also entitled to a compassionate appointment. However, referring to past cases, the Court noted that compassionate appointment is to be considered in order of seniority- the elder will be given the first priority and only if his case is rejected, then the case of the younger brother is to be considered. The High Court directed the corporation to consider the applications of both, Piyush and Suresh for compassionate appointment and decide on merit within 45 days.


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Review: SC says Early Conclusion of Trial is Necessary to Enhance People’s Faith in Justice Delivery System
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
October 19, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s split verdict in the Hijab issue, about Part-payment made after cheque is drawn to be endorsed on cheque, that Courts must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of case before convicting an accused for abetment of suicide, that early conclusion of trial is necessary to enhance people’s faith in justice delivery system among others.
SC: Split verdict on appeals against Karnataka HC’s ruling that uniform is to be worn in schools and hijab isn’t a part of essential religious practices in Islam
Earlier this year, multiple petitions were filed in the Supreme Court against the order passed by the Karnataka High Court in March 2022 which held that wearing of hijab or head scarf by Muslim women does not form a part of essential religious practices in Islamic faith and is not protected under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. This ruling upheld the state government’s order in February 2022 which prescribed wearing of uniforms in schools and pre-university colleges under provisions of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. In Aishat Shifa vs State of Karnataka and others, the Supreme Court Bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and Sudhanshu Dhulia delivered a split verdict on the matter.
Justice Hemant Gupta framed 11 issues. Some of them are what the ambit and scope of right to freedom of ‘conscience’ and ‘religion’ is, ambit and scope of essential religious practices under Article 25, whether the state government’s order contradicts the promotion of literacy, etc. Dismissing the pleas, Justice Gupta upheld the High Court’s order stating that wearing hijab is the belief or faith of an individual and that the religious belief cannot be carried to a secular school maintained out of State funds. Students may carry their faith in schools which permits wearing of hijab or other religious symbols. However, the State is within its jurisdiction to direct that the apparent symbols of religious beliefs cannot be carried to school maintained by the State from the State funds, thereby allowing the State to restrict wearing of hijab.
Meanwhile, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia allowed the appeals holding that a balance was to be maintained when deciding between school discipline and the cultural and religious rights of minorities. He quashed the government order asking the state and school whether education of a girl child or enforcement of a dress code was more important. Considering the difficulties already being faced by girl students in accessing education in the country, he asked if the life of girls is being made any easier by denying access to education on grounds of wearing a hijab. Justice Dhulia also asked how a girl child wearing hijab in a classroom could be a public order or a law-and-order problem and added that living and adjusting with the differences is the sign of a mature society.
Considering the divergence of opinion, the matter is placed before the Chief Justice of India for referring it to a larger bench.
SC: Part-payment made after cheque is drawn should be endorsed on cheque
In Dashratbhai Trikambhai Patel vs. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel and others, the appellant had lent a loan of Rs. 40 Lakhs to the first respondent. Two cheques were given to the appellant for security which would be returned when the respondent would finish paying the loan. Though the borrower paid Rs. 4,09,315 in total, the appellant presented the cheque for Rs 20 lakhs, without endorsing the part-payment.
The Trial Court had observed that the appellant failed to prove that he was owed a legally enforceable debt of Rs. 20 lakhs. An appeal was filed against this judgement in the Gujarat High Court which found that the first respondent had deposited Rs. 4,09,315 in his account. It also found that part -payment made by the first respondent should have been reflected in the statutory notice issued by the appellant and added that an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was not made. The appellant filed an appeal against the HC’s judgement.
While hearing the case, the Supreme Court Bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli dismissing the appeal and held that if a part- payment of debt is made after the cheque is drawn but before the cheque is encashed, the payment must be endorsed on the cheque under Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Further, the cheque cannot be presented for encashment without recording the part payment. If the unendorsed cheque is dishonoured on presentation, the offence under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act would not be attracted since the cheque would not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment.
SC: Courts must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of case before convicting an accused for abetment of suicide.
In Mariano Anto Bruno vs. Inspector of Police, the appellant’s wife’s death was recorded as unnatural under Section 174 of CrPC. The deceased’s mother filed a complaint against the appellant and his parents for offences under 498A (cruelty by husband and his relatives) and 306 of IPC (abetment of suicide). The trial court convicted the appellant and his mother. The decision was challenged by the appellants in the High Court which dismissed the appeal.
While hearing the case, the Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari held that both Trial Court and High Court had failed to properly analyse the facts of the case. With respect to charges under 498A of IPC, the bench noted that there was no evidence to establish the allegation ill treatment or dowry demand during her marriage. With regards to abetment to suicide, the Court reiterated that action forcing the person to commit suicide proximate to the time of suicide should be established to frame charges under Section 306 of IPC. Also, there must be a proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Emphasizing that before convicting an accused under Section 306 IPC, the Court must carefully examine the facts and circumstances of the case, the SC Bench acquitted the accused.
SC: Early conclusion of trial is necessary to enhance people’s faith in justice delivery system
In Gali Janardhan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, the applicant is an accused in an illegal mining case. His bail application was rejected by the High Court in 2013 on grounds that he was influential and could influence the investigation. However, by an order in 2015, he was granted bail on certain conditions, among which was a restriction to visit the districts of Bellary in Karnataka and District of Ananthapuram and Cuddapah in Andhra Pradesh. In his latest bail application, he requested for entry and stay in these districts as his daughtered had delivered a baby and he wanted to stay with her.
The SC bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari modified the condition and asked the Trial and Special Courts to conduct the trial on day-to-day basis and conclude the trial within six months following the applicant’s allowed duration of stay ends on 06 November 2022. The Bench also expressed its displeasure on the fact that the trial on the case had not begun even after 11 years of filing FIR despite the Court’s directions to do so. The faith of people in the justice delivery system will enhance through early conclusion of trial and it directed the courts to conclude the trial at the earliest since delay would otherwise impede fair and uninfluenced investigation.
SC: Entire suit with multiple plaintiffs cannot be abated in case of death of one plaintiff
In Siravarapu Appa Rao vs. Dokala Appa Rao, the Trial Court decided a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession filed by the plaintiffs. The First Appellate Court allowed the appeal since one of the plaintiffs had died and her legal representatives were not brought on record which meant that the suit got abated not only against the deceased plaintiff but also against the other plaintiff-appellants as it was a joint claim. The High Court also dismissed the second appeal on the same ground.
While hearing the case, the issue before the Supreme Court was if the non-substitution of legal representatives of some of the plaintiff and/or on demise of the some of the respondents during the pendency of the first appeal, whether the entire appeal would stand abated, or it will be so only in respect of the particular deceased respondent. Referring to a recent judgement, the Bench allowed the appeal and held that where there is more than one plaintiff, the entire suit cannot be held to be abated on the death of one of the plaintiffs as per Order 22 Rule 2 of CPC.
SC: One is entitled to seek remedy if more than four months is taken for deciding on sanction
In Vijay Rajmohan vs. State, the appellant is an official of the Central Secretarial Service, Government of India. During his posting in Delhi from 2005 to 2012, he is alleged to have made assets disproportionate to his income. In 2015, CBI registered an FIR against him and his parents. After investigation, CBI sought sanction from the appointing authority, the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) for prosecuting the Appellant. DoPT sought clarifications from the CBI and felt that there were many errors in CBI’s investigation and sought the Central Vigilance Commission’s opinion (CVC). After clarifying with CBI, CVC was of the view that it was a strong case for granting sanction subject to the CBI conducting a re-investigation on certain aspects of the case. Following CBI’s report, the CVC asked DoPT to grant sanction for prosecution. The sanction was granted after 1 year 10 months.
The appellant filed a discharge application on the ground that the sanction order was passed without application of mind. The Madras High Court had allowed a criminal revision petition filed by the State against the order of the Trial Court, discharging the accused citing that the sanction order under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is void due to non-application of mind by sanctioning authority.
In his appeal, the following issues were raised before the Supreme Court.
The SC bench of Justices BR Gavai and PS Narasimha held that there was no illegality in the sanction of DoPT. It also held that the period of three months which is extendable by one more month for legal consultation under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for the Appointing Authority to decide upon a request for sanction is mandatory. Once this period is over, the aggrieved party is entitled to approach the concerned writ court and seek appropriate remedies, including directions for action on the request for sanction to hold the sanctioning authority accountable. The Bench allowed the appellant to raise and seek such remedies and dismissed the HC’s judgement.

source: news-factly

created: October 19, 2022

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Sai Krishna Muthyanolla


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Review: SC says Financial burden on state is valid reason to fix a cut-off date for payment of revised pension
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
August 31, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Supreme Court’s order that the Drawer of the cheque is liable even if details in it have been filled up by some other person if the cheque was issued in discharge of a liability, that Financial burden on the state is a valid reason to fix a cut-off date for payment of revised pension, that IBC would prevail over the Customs Act, among others.
SC: The drawer of the cheque is liable even if details in it have been filled up by some other person
Oriental Bank of Commerce vs. Prabodh Kumar Tewar is an appeal against the decision of the Delhi High Court with respect to a cheque bounce case. The respondent in this case was permitted by the Delhi High Court to engage a hand-writing expert to check if the details filled in the cheque were in his hand. The Trial Court had earlier dismissed the respondent’s application seeking to have the cheque and his specimen signature and handwriting examined by a government handwriting expert. The respondent’s appeal was allowed by the High Court.
The question before the Supreme Court was if the High Court was right in allowing the respondent to engage a handwriting expert to determine whether the details that were filled in the cheque were in the hand of the respondent. The respondent had admitted that he handed over a signed blank cheque to the appellant. The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna allowed the appeal referring to section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 which presumes that a drawer handing over a cheque signed by him to the payee is liable unless the drawer adduces evidence trial that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability.
The bench added that determining whether the respondent filled the details in the cheque using a hand-writing expert on whether the respondent had filled in the details in the cheque would make the purpose for which the cheque was handed over irrelevant. It noted that no purpose is served by allowing the application for adducing the evidence of the handwriting expert. To sum it up, the drawer of the cheque is liable even if the details in it have been filled up by some other person.
SC: Financial burden on state is valid reason to fix a cut-off date for payment of revised pension
The High Court of Tripura observed that Rule 3(3) of Tripura State Civil Services (Revised Pension) Rules, 2009 was arbitrary and violated Article 14 of the Constitution, and struck down the same. Consequently, it asked the state to pay the original writ petitioner the arrears of pension for a period of 22 months in 2007-2008. The State opposed the writ petition and filed a counter affidavit. It submitted that the State was under a financial burden and that it was not in a position to bear the additional burden of a revised pension. Further, it was submitted that a policy decision was taken to grant the benefit of the revised pension notionally from 2006 to 2008 and to grant the actual benefit of the revised pension from 2009. However, the High Court rejected the state’s submission.
The matter was taken to the Supreme Court in State of Tripura vs. Anjana Bhattacharjee where it was contended on behalf of the state that due to financial crunch and considering the heavy burden on the state if it has to pay the actual revision pension from 2006, the development of the state would be affected, because of which a policy decision was taken by the state as seen earlier. It also submitted that the High Court ought not to have interfered with it in the exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Referring to past judgements, the Supreme Court bench of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna set aside the High Court’s judgement striking down Rule 3(3). It stated that there was no reason for the High Court to doubt the State’s financial constraints and policy decision even after the state provided specific statistics. Allowing the appeal, the Bench observed that the financial burden on the State can be a valid ground to fix a cut-off date for payment of the revised pension.
SC: IBC would prevail over the Customs Act
In Sundaresh Bhatt, Liquidator of ABG Shipyard vs. Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, an appeal was filed against the order of the National  Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) which held that the goods lying in the customs bonded warehouse were not the Corporate Debtor’s (ABG Shipyard) assets as they were neither claimed by the Corporate Debtor after their import nor were the bills of entry cleared for some of the said goods. The Supreme Court Bench constituted by Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, Justices JK Maheshwari and Hima Kohli dealt with two questions in this case. These are
With respect to the first question, the Bench held that the IBC would prevail over the Customs Act. However, once a moratorium is imposed in terms of Sections 14 or 33(5) of the IBC, the respondent authority only has limited jurisdiction to assess/determine the quantum of customs duty and other levies.
On whether customs could claim title over goods, the Bench noted the following:
The Bench allowed the appeal stating that NCLAT ignored the mandate of Section72(2) of the Customs Act regarding the sale. The NCLAT’s interpretation was also criticized for ignoring the effects of the moratorium under IBC.
Andhra Pradesh HC: Explanation should be given by the corporation if a person’s explanation on why deviations in construction could not be removed is rejected
In E V Rama Rao vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. He was granted permission to construct a building of G+5 floors in his plot and raised only G+4 floors as per the sanctioned plan. However, he was issued a notice under AP Municipal Corporation Act, 1965 and A.P.Metropolitan Regional and Urban Development Authority Act, 2016 citing the deviations and violations. The petitioner was asked to submit reasons why those could not be altered or removed. If not, it would be considered a continuous and intentional offence. The petitioner submitted a reply that these deviations were for ‘Vastu’ reasons and that he was ready to pay for the regularization of such deviations as per the legislations. Despite the petitioner submitting a response, the respondents had issued a notice which stated in the first paragraph that no response was submitted. On the contrary, in the last paragraph of the order, it was mentioned that the response was unsatisfactory.
Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari of AP High Court held that with respect to the deviations in the construction of the building, the permissible percentage to be regularized or not or the effect on the public at large, cannot be decided by the Court at this stage as it requires consideration by the competent authority considering various aspects with a due opportunity of hearing to the concerned, at the first stage. Nonetheless, the Court referred to the following cases to decide the case.
In ACES Hyderabad vs. Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (1994), AP High Court issued certain guidelines to the Corporations that in instances where deviations or violations are minor, trivial, or minimal, and do not affect the public at large, then the Corporations should not resort to demolition.
In Poonamchand vs. Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (2012), the AP High Court held that the explanation offered by the owner of the building cannot be rejected with a cryptic observation. The commissioner should also give reasons as to why the explanation is not satisfactory.
The AP High Court stated that the expression “found not satisfactory” is reflective of the conclusion but, not the reason, in K. Ashok Kumar vs. Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (2012). That is why the explanation offered by the petitioners is not satisfactory, also forms part of their process of reasoning.
In the present case, the High Court noted that no cogent reason was given as to why the petitioner’s explanation was rejected. Allowing the petition, the High Court directed the respondent to issue fresh orders taking into consideration the response submitted by the petitioner.
Patna HC: Systemic discrimination against the transgender community is not cured merely through employment opportunities
The writ petition in Veera Yadav vs. The Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar and others highlighted the inhumane conditions faced by the transgender community in Bihar during the pandemic such as denial of ration. The Patna High Court Bench of Chief Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice S. Kumar noted that the Court had issued several directions earlier for the welfare of the transgender community. It also noted the state government’s measures like free ration, employment in the police force, and financial assistance.
It noted that the systemic discrimination against the members of the transgender community that has been in existence in society for a long time shall not be cured only by employment opportunities. It added that measures should also be taken like sensitization, awareness, etc. to root out discrimination from the general public.
Adding that it is the State’s duty to ensure the wellbeing of its citizens, the Court directed the Additional Chief Secretary, Social Welfare Department, Government of Bihar to convene a meeting, seek updates on the welfare measures and issue appropriate directions to ensure that all possible steps are taken for benefit of this community without any further delay.


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Review: SC says lodging juveniles in adult prisons amounts to deprivation of their personal liberty on multiple aspects.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
September 21, 2022
In this week’s review of the court judgements, we look at judgements of the Supreme Court in matters of Personal Liberty, corrupt practices in elections, fundamental rights to reside and settle, establish educational institutions, Delhi High Court’s decision on payment aggregators, and Bombay High Court’s decision on corruption.
Supreme Court: There can be no cavil in saying that lodging juveniles in adult prisons amounts to deprivation of their personal liberty on multiple aspects.
In Vinod Katara vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, the two-judge bench of the apex court held that in addition to freedom from physical restraint, liberty also includes those rights and privileges that have long been acknowledged as being necessary for the orderly pursuit of happiness by a free man. There can be no argument against the statement that keeping children in adult jails amounts to various forms of personal liberty infringement.
The apex court was hearing a writ petition filed by the petitioner regarding the status of juvenility. The petitioners and co-accused were found guilty of murder by the Sessions Court, Agra, which convicted and sentenced them to life imprisonment. On filing an appeal, the Allahabad High Court reaffirmed the judgement of the Sessions Court. Going against this, the petitioner filed Special Leave Petition (SLP) at the SC, which declined to entertain and eventually dismissed it. At that point, the claim for juvenility was not raised by the petitioner.
While hearing a PIL, the Allahabad High Court ordered the Juvenile Justice Boards to determine the age of prisoners in jails who claimed to be a juvenile. On medical examination of the applicant, it was found that the applicant could be around 15 years of age during the commission of offence. The Family Registrar Certificate also shows the age as 14 years. The court looked at the applicability of the provisions of the   Juvenile   Justice (Care   and   Protection   of Children) Act, 2000, hereby referred to as the 2000 Act.
Upon looking at the judgements in Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr, Bijender Singh vs. State of Haryana and Anr, the apex court concluded that according to Section 20 of the 2000 Act, if the accused was older than 16 but younger than 18 on the date of the incident, the court’s proceedings would proceed to their logical conclusion, with the exception that if the juvenile was found guilty, the court would not impose a sentence on him instead referring him to the Board for the proper orders under the 2000 Act.
Section 7A of the act also talks about the procedure to be followed when such claims of juvenility are raised before any courts.
The apex court looked at the objectives of the Juvenile Justice Act (Care and protection of Children), 2015 to examine the plea of juvenility at later stages. It held that JJ Act is a beneficial legislation, and the goal is to promote the well-being of the juvenile, while maintaining the principle of proportionality, by which and under which the appropriateness of the response to the circumstances of both the offender and the offence, including the victim, should be protected. The court also looked at the procedure for determining the age of the juvenile (Section (94(2) of the above act).
In the absence of such documents owing to various reasons, and the request for a medical examination, keeping in mind the objectives of the legislation, the apex court directed the sessions court to conduct an Ossification test or any other modern age determining tests, and submit the report within one month of the issuance of the order.
Supreme Court: Irrespective of the impact of the false declaration about the assets of a candidate, or dependents on the election, it still amounts to corrupt practice.
In S. Rukmini Madegowda vs. The State Election Commission, the Supreme Court held that a false declaration about the assets of a candidate, his/her spouse, or other dependents, would amount to ‘corrupt practice’ and a hyper-technical view to omit any provision requiring disclosure of assets would be against public interest and the spirit of the Constitution.
The appellant filed her nomination as a councilor for a reserved seat in the elections of the Mysore Municipal Corporation, along with the declaration of assets. She went on to win the election. However, the unsuccessful candidate filed an election petition alleging her of falsely declaring the assets under sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, and thereby indulged in ‘corrupt practice’. The Trial court dismissed the petition, and when an appeal was filed in the High Court, the High Court directed the Trial Court to reconsideration the petition, owing to the apex court’s judgements in Association of Democratic Reforms vs. Union of India, and Lok Prahari vs. Union of India. Accordingly, the Trial Court allowed the petition and set aside the election. On filing an appeal at the High Court, the High Court dismissed the appeal.
The following issues were raised by the appellant in this petition.
The appellant, through her counsel, argued that a candidate who intends to run for office cannot be compelled to disclose his or her spouse’s assets by the approval of a policy decision in the absence of a particular legal provision requiring such disclosure by way of affidavit.
The appellant referred to the judgements in Shrikant vs. Vasantrao & Ors, where it is held that an election petition is a legal action that must adhere to the statute that it is filed under or the Statutory Rules established by that law. The counsel also remarked the distinction between elections held in accordance with the KMC Act and/or the KMC Rules and elections managed by the Election Commission of India, and Rule 4A of the 1961 Rules cannot be imported to KMC rules in the absence of appropriate amendments to the rules.
The Counsel further remarked that at the maximum, the election could be set aside under Section 35(1)(d)(i), and not under corrupt practice.
Upon hearing the counsel, the apex court looked at the provisions of the KMC act, 1976. It referred to Section 39, which mentions about ‘undue influence’ as a corrupt practice. The apex court looked at Section 123 of the RP Act,1951 which defines corrupt practices. In Lok Prahari case, the apex court held that non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined under the Representation of People Act, 1951.
On the question of the powers of the Election Commission, the apex court reiterated that ‘Article 324 of the Indian Constitution is provided to take care of surprise situations and it operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation.’  Further, it held that it would be against the letter of the Constitution and the public interest to take a hyper-technical view of the omission to include any particular provision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules, specifically demanding the declaration of assets. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
Supreme Court: There is only one domicile of the country and no separate domicile for a State, and State Reorganization laws cannot take away from citizens, the right to reside and settle in any part of the country
In The State of Telangana & Anr vs. B. Subba Rayudu and Others, the two-judge bench of the apex court held that the respondent has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India and any statute of the state cannot take away the right to reside & settle in any part of the country from the citizens.
The appellant, B. Subba Rayudu, held the State Cadre position of Joint Director Class A in the Animal Husbandry Department of the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh. His wife, B. Shanthabai was employed by the same state as an Assistant Registrar. Upon the bifurcation of the State under the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014, Rayudu selected Telangana as the choice of his allocation. He filed a request that he be treated as a local candidate of the State of Telangana but was instead provisionally assigned to the State of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court allowed the writ petitions and suggested the Tribunal consider them again. It also directed that he should not be relieved from his present place of posting till the disposal of the Interlocutory Application. Subsequently, in 2017, the Administrative Tribunal of the State was abolished, and the cases were transferred to the High Court of Telangana.
The counsel for the state argued that the respondent was a ‘local candidate’ of the State of Andhra Pradesh, and the final allocation is based on the first amongst those local candidates of the State, who had opted for the State in order of their seniority and thereafter, if allocable posts still remained, those posts were to be filled up in the order of seniority from amongst nonlocal candidates who had opted for the State.
The counsel for the petitioner argued about the limited nature of Article 136 of the Indian Constitution. They argued that the court was not bound to set aside the High Court’s decision.
Additionally, the petitioner argued that even though their birth is in Andhra Pradesh, he has been educated and resided for most of his life in Telangana, hence can be categorized as a ‘local candidate’ of Telangana. Agreeing with most of the points raised by the petitioner, the apex court held that:
On the question of the domicile of the petitioner, the apex court relied on Dr. Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India, and reiterated that there is only one domicile, i.e., domicile of the country and no separate domicile for the state exists.
Accordingly, the apex court reaffirmed the judgement of the High Court of Telangana & dismissed the petition.
Supreme Court: The right to establish an educational institution is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution and reasonable restrictions on such a right can be imposed only by a law and not by an executive instruction
In Rajeev College of Pharmacy vs. Pharmacy Council of India, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that executive instructions cannot impose restrictions on the fundamental right to establish an educational institution. The apex court was hearing an appeal petition filed by the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) against the judgements of various High Courts allowing the writ petitions challenging the council’s resolution to put a moratorium on the establishment of new pharmacy colleges for a period of five years, beginning from 2020-21.
The Counsel for the appellant argued that PCI has the powers under the Pharmacy Act, 1948 to regulate pharmacy education, and the central council of PCI consists of experts from various fields, which makes it a competent authority to take decisions keeping in mind the quality of pharmacy education. The decision to impose a moratorium was taken after the recommendations of the sub-committee to prevent the mushrooming of the colleges. Additionally, the PCI had also consulted the Union Government before such a decision.
Further, the appellant argued that the power to regulate also includes the power to prohibit as held by the apex court in Madhya Bharat Cotton Association Ltd. vs. Union of India & Anr, and the Madras High Court in Star India Private Limited  vs. Department of Industrial Policy. Expanding on it, the appellant argued that it is the duty of PCI to ensure the objectives of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 are fulfilled.
The counsel for the petitioners argued that the right to establish educational institutions is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution, and is affirmed by the apex court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. Additionally, they submit that reasonable restrictions could be imposed, but the burden lies on the state to establish the nexus between restrictions and the desired objective. The restrictions currently imposed are completely arbitrary and discriminatory. Further, on the power to restrict, the petitioner argued that,
The other counsels for petitioners argued on the limitations of statutory provisions on restricting the fundamental rights of citizens. These arguments were also upheld by the High Courts of Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and Delhi.
Agreeing with the points raised by the petitioners, the apex court held that while there may be a necessity to impose restrictions to prevent mushrooming of colleges, it must be strictly done in accordance with the law, and just because the State’s Legislature has the jurisdiction to legislate on the subject covered by the executive order, the State or its officers cannot use their executive authority to violate citizens’ rights, as held by the five-judge Constitution Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr  vs. Thakur Bharat Singh. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.
Bombay HC: A person for the charges of corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be convicted on moral and ethics, instead it is mandatory to prove the demand & acceptance of bribe.
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Aurangabad, in Sayaji Dashrath Kawade vs. The State of Maharashtra held that morals and ethics do not form the basis for conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, and the proof of demand and acceptance of bribe is mandatory. It further held that when the statute provides for certain mandatory requirements for proving offence, no shortcuts are permitted.
The High Court was hearing an appeal petition filed against the judgment of the Special Court to investigate the corruption offences. The appellant was found in the possession of currency with anthracene powder, which is often used to trap the offenders. Accordingly, the Judge of the Special Court held the conviction and remanded the appellant to imprisonment and fine. Aggrieved with the judgement, the appellant approached the High Court.
The counsel for the petitioner held that mere recovery of the currency does not constitute offences under section 7, & section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PoCA, 1988).
And the presumption of corruption under Section 20 of the above Act can be raised only when such demand for a bribe can be proved under this act, which is not the scenario in the present case. The counsel relied on the judgements of the apex court in M.R.Purshotham vs. State of Karnataka, and State of Maharashtra vs. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede.
The counsel for the State argued that the conscious possession of the currency notes itself demonstrates the acceptance of the bribe, and such acceptance can be used to assume presumption under section 20 of the PoCA, 1988. In addition, no satisfactory explanation about the possession of the tainted currency notes is offered by the appellant.
The High Court bench, on hearing the arguments by both sides, relied on the judgement of the apex court in M.R.Purshotham vs. State of Karnataka, whereby it is held that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from the accused do not constitute offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PoCA,1988 when the demand for such is not proved. Further, in B.Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, the apex court held that the demand for a bribe must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, which is not the same in the present case.
Further, on the sanction order for prosecution against a public servant under the PoCA, 1988, application of mind by the sanctioning authority is important, and any such order of sanction of prosecution must demonstrate such proper application of mind. In the present case, it is evident that the authority had failed to apply for independent order before such sanction.
Accordingly, the Special Court order is quashed & the appellant is acquitted of the charges.
Delhi HC: The work function of the Payment Aggregators comes within the definition of a payment system, axiomatically, the power to issue guidelines for efficient management falls under RBI.
In Lotus Pay Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors, the Delhi High Court held that the Payment Aggregators, hereby referred to as PAs, fall under the ambit of the payment system under the Payments and Settlements Act, 2007, making RBI the nodal agency to issue guidelines for its efficient and effective management.
The High Court was hearing a writ petition filed by Lotus Pay Solutions Private Limited, seeking to quash three clauses of the RBI circular titled, ‘Guidelines on Regulation of Payment Aggregators and Payment Gateways’, published on 17 March 2020. The three contentious clauses raised by the petitioners are Clauses 3, 4, & 8. They deal with authorization, capital requirements & settlement and escrow account management respectively.
The petitioners argue that they perform the role of an intermediary, and the latest guidelines by the RBI extend way beyond the powers conferred on it by the 2007 Act. While section 18 of the act confers powers to RBI to issue directions, section 10(2) authorizes RBI to issue guidelines for the proper and efficient management of payment systems. Neither of these provide for mandating RBI’s authorization for the functioning of Payment Aggregators. The petitioners differentiate themselves as payment aggregators and not form of the payment system.
Further, clause 4 which sets conditions on the minimum capital requirements is unreasonable and arbitrary. It treats all the PAs and Payment Gateways (PGs) in a similar manner, which is not prudent. Having a monetary requirement that does not have a bearing on the performance and functions of the PAs would eventually suppress innovation. The RBI’s discussion paper in 2019 makes it clear about the no-complaint performance of intermediaries in the last decade, making the latest guidelines unnecessary.  On clause 8, the petitioners argue that it exposes them to operational risks, causing financial instability. It ignores that the PAs are functioning smoothly currently.
The RBI, on its part, submitted that the definition of the phrase “payment system” as stated in section 2(1)(i) of the 2007 Act applies to the job of the PA, which, in essence, requires it to receive money from the payer and allow its return to the beneficiary. According to Section 3 of the 2007 Act, RBI has been recognised as the “designated authority” for governing and overseeing payment systems. Since Section 4 of the 2007 Act specifically states that RBI is the sole party authorised to start or operate a payment system, non-bank PAs like the petitioner can only continue their operations provided they are authorised and follow the 2020 guidelines. On the scope of judicial review, it submitted that,
The court, upon hearing both sides held that PAs fall within the ambit of the payment system, thereby making RBI the responsible agency to supervise the payment system in India. The court also held that nothing untenable can be found in clause 8 of the guidelines.
Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.
Featured Image: Court judgements

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Review: SC says Section 304B IPC has been incorporated to deal with dowry deaths to send a strong message to society
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
August 24, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Supreme Court’s order that a Complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days period for a cheque bounce case is not maintainable, that the review power of courts cannot be used for errors detected by reasoning, that High Court must give the accused opportunity to defend themselves, and that Section 304B IPC has been incorporated to deal with dowry deaths to send a strong message to society.
SC: Complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days period for cheque bounce case is not maintainable
In Gajanand Burange vs. Laxmi Chand Goyal before the Supreme Court, the respondent had addressed a notice to the appellant alleging that the appellant had taken a cash loan of Rs. 2.5 lakhs and furnished a cheque dated 28 October 2005 towards repayment. It was mentioned that the bank had returned the cheque to the respondent due to inadequate funds in the appellant’s account. The appellant received the notice on 08 November 2005, and the respondent filed a complaint against the appellant on 22 November 2005, before the period of fifteen days was complete.
In the Trial court, the appellant was acquitted while the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and convicted the appellant. The issues before the Supreme Court were-
The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna noticed that both these issues were answered by a three judges’ bench Yogendra Pratap Singh vs. Savitri Pandey and Another. Referring to this case, the bench noted that while the notice was received by the appellant on 08 November 2005, the complaint was filed before the period of fifteen days was complete. The complaint could have been filed only after 23 November 2005, in line with Section 142 of the NI Act. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that the complaint was not maintainable before the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the date of its receipt by the appellant. Further, the Court directed the respondent to institute a fresh complaint within two months and asked the trial court to complete the trial within a period of six months.
SC: Review power cannot be used for errors detected by reasoning
S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy involved appeals and successive review petitions pertaining to the protection of tenancy rights in Mahbubnagar, Telangana, since 1967. In the Supreme Court, the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants were that the review petitions filed by the respondents were not maintainable as they do not satisfy any of the conditions for review provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The appellants who were the legal heir of the original tenants also argued that the High Court shouldn’t have entertained successive review petitions filed by the respondents as there were no new facts being established or errors found.
Referring to legal provisions, the Supreme Court Bench of CJI NV Ramana, Justices Krishna Murari and Hima Kohli noted that a review application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and important matters or evidence that, after exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason.
The Bench also referred to past judgements and noted that appeal and the Court’s jurisdiction of the review were different. A judgement may be opened for review if there is an apparent error. However, if an error is identified through reasoning, then it is not an error apparent on the face of the record. Further, it added that a mistake can be corrected by the Court, but the view cannot be changed just because a matter may be viewed in different ways. An erroneous decision and error apparent on the face of the record can be clearly distinguished and the Superior Court can rectify the erroneous decision. The error apparent requires review jurisdiction.
In this case, the Court, allowing the appeal, stated that the second set of review petitions was an abuse of the process of the court which should have been rejected by the High Court.
SC: Criteria for appointment on compassionate grounds must be strictly adhered to
In the case of Central Bank of India vs. Nitin, the respondent’s application for compassionate appointment was rejected by the Central Bank of India on grounds that the family of the retired employee had more than 60% of the last drawn gross salary as income. The respondent then filed a writ petition which was allowed by the Bombay High Court that directed the bank to consider the respondent’s case as per his seniority in filing the application.
The Bank then approached the Apex Court which observed that the High Court had ignored the financial criteria for compassionate appointment under the Compassionate Appointment Scheme. The Supreme Court Bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and V. Ramasubramanian also observed that the respondent had suppressed his appointment with another bank in the application which was enough reason to reject his application. Allowing the appeal, the Bench added that the claim for compassionate appointment is traceable only to the Scheme framed by the employer for such employment.
Noting that the appointment on compassionate grounds was to enable dependent family members to deal with the death or retirement of the employee, it was to be done adhering to the prevalent rules. In this case, a financial criterion has been given which has to be considered for the appointment. If the criteria are not adhered to, then the quota may be filled up excluding others who might be in acute financial distress.
SC: High Court must give the accused opportunity to defend themselves
In Radheyshyam and Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan, the accused persons were convicted by the Trial Court for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. When they appealed in the Rajasthan High Court, it was noted that the offence fell under the ‘rarest of rare’ category and the life imprisonment was extended to rest of their lives. The High Court also observed that the trial court had failed to consider that the case fell in the ‘rarest of rare’. The appeal was filed in the Apex Court by the accused challenging the trial court’s order and the fact that the accused were not provided an opportunity to defend themselves.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices B.R. Gavai and P.S. Narasimha opined that the High Court could have itself exercised suo moto powers and enhanced the sentence. However, prior to doing so, the High Court was required to give notice to the appellants. However, in this case, the High Court failed to give the appellants an opportunity to defend themselves before extending the imprisonment tenure. Stating this, the Supreme Court Bench allowed the appeal partially quash the imprisonment enhancement.
SC: Section 304B IPC has been incorporated to deal with dowry deaths to send a strong message to society
In Ajhola Devi & Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased were convicted by a trial court and High court under Section 304B read with section 201 of the Indian Penal Code for dowry death. They were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. The appellants approached the Supreme Court seeking lesser punishment considering their age.
However, the Supreme Court Bench of Justices M. R. Shah and B. V. Nagarathna upheld the decisions of the trial court and High Court. The Court noted that the accused had come with the false theory that the deceased had died due to diarrhoea within one year of marriage while the demand of dowry was established and proven by the prosecution. The bench also observed that 304B was incorporated to strongly deal with dowry deaths so that strong messages are sent to society. It also added that it found no reasons to interfere with the decisions of the High Court and trial court.
Featured Image: Review of Court Judgments


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Review: SC says that change in Government Policy would prevail over individual interests if it is reasonable and in public interest.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
June 8, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Supreme court’s observations about the role of the state as a trustee of natural resources, why a change in Government Policy would prevail over individual interests if it is reasonable and in the public interest, that orders passed by the constitutional courts would prevail over the orders passed by the statutory tribunal, and Karnataka HC’s judgment about compounding and termination of proceedings for rape offences if settlement is arrived by the parties.
Supreme Court: Public Trust Doctrine Part of Law of Land; Role of the state as trustee of natural resources more relevant today
In multiple applications filed under TN Godavarman Thirumalpad vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India held that the role of the state should not be limited to that of a facilitator for economic activities, instead, it should act as a trustee of natural resources for the overall sustainable development.
The apex court, headed by Justices L Nageswara Rao, BR Gavai and Aniruddha Bose, was hearing a batch of petitions filed under the TN Godavarman Thirumalpad vs. Union of India case. While it was initially instituted for the protection of natural resources in Tamil Nadu, its scope was widened to be applicable to the whole of India. Accordingly, a Central Empowered Committee (CEC), a statutory body formed under the Section 3(3) of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 was entrusted with the responsibility to check measures for encroachment removal, compensatory afforestation and similar other conservation measures. The present order dealt with two issues:
In the first issue, the court was examining a report submitted by the CEC on the Jamwa Ramgarh wildlife sanctuary. The report observed that forests under this sanctuary are destroyed and recommended that all mining leases should be cancelled, irrespective of their proportion under the forest area. It also talks about the inadequacy of the present safety zone of twenty-five meters and recommends it to raise to 100 meters for existing mines and 500 metres for new mines.
Regarding the second aspect, the apex court held that a minimum of one-kilometre width of an Eco-sensitive zone (ESZ) must be maintained for all national parks and wildlife sanctuaries. Jamwa Ramgarh wildlife sanctuary would be 500 metres for existing activities. Additionally, if any local law prescribes more than one kilometre limit of ESZ, it shall prevail over this. The responsibility to ensure compliance with the above guidelines is on the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, and the Home Secretaries of both State and Union Governments. The dilution of this minimum ESZ limit is allowed in cases of overwhelming public interests, provided the apex court issued directions based on the recommendations of CEC and the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change. The apex court clearly asserts that mining shall not be allowed in wildlife sanctuaries and national parks.
Supreme Court: Change in Government Policy would prevail over individual interests if it is reasonable and in the public interest.
The Supreme Court in Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority Etc. vs. Shakuntla Education and Welfare Society and Ors reiterated that a change in government’s stance and policy shall prevail over private agreements between government and private players, provided such change is guided by reason and is done in the public interest.
The apex court was hearing an appeal petition filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the Allahabad High Court’s decision to set aside the policy decision of the State Government to collect an additional premium from the initial allottees of the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA) -developed plots.
The SC looked at Savitri Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Gajraj and others vs. State of U.P. and others, to analyse the appeal by the Uttar Pradesh Government. In the above two cases, the High Court and Supreme Court upheld the decision to pay additional compensation of 64.7% by the State for land acquisition in the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) development. The same was applied for YEIDA land acquisition also, and the state government and board of YEIDA approved the same amount as ‘no litigation incentive’ or additional compensation for land acquisition. However, in the current case of YEIDA, notices were sent to the allottees demanding an additional premium of Rs. 600 per square metre.
The apex court observed that more than 98% of the landowners do not have any objection to paying the additional premium, and the policy of the State Government to increase the premium amounts is in the larger interests of the public. It held that the High Court made an error in interfering with the policy decision of the State Government. Accordingly, the apex court allowed the appeals by the State Government against the High Court’s decision.
Supreme Court: It is the orders passed by the constitutional courts, which would be prevailing over the orders passed by the statutory tribunals.
In  State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Raghu Ramakrishna Raju Kanumuru (M.P), the Supreme Court of India held that tribunals would be subordinate to the High Courts insofar as the territorial jurisdiction of the High courts is concerned, and that it is the orders of the Constitutional Courts that prevail over the orders issued by the statutory tribunals.
The apex court was hearing an appeal petition by the State of Andhra Pradesh, against the order passed by the principal bench of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) on 06 May 2022. The appellant, State of Andhra Pradesh, was running a resort at Rushikonda Hill, Vishakhapatnam. They demolished the existing one and are reconstructing the same with additional facilities after obtaining the necessary permits. This was challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on 08 December 2021, which subsequently directed that all the construction activities shall be strictly in accordance with the permission of the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change, as well as the master plan.
The respondent of the present case addressed a letter to NGT on 31 October 2021, on the same issue. The NGT appointed a four-member expert committee on 17 December 2021, which submitted its report on 29 March 2022. The committee observed no violations in the ongoing construction activities. The NGT again appointed a second expert committee, whose report is still awaited. Even in the absence of such a report, the NGT ordered that no further construction shall take place in its order of 06 May 2022.
The apex court held that it was not appropriate on part of NGT to continue the proceedings when the same matter is being pending in the High Court. It highlighted the confusion arising out of the conflicting orders by both agencies.
The apex court further observed that orders by the constitutional court prevail over the statutory tribunals and proceedings of the same issue before different agencies would not be in the interest of Justice. Accordingly, the proceedings before NGT are quashed and the respondents are advised to approach the High Court for appropriate orders.
Delhi HC: Right to claim maintenance under  Sec. 125 CrPC and Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are not mutually exclusive
The Delhi High Court, in SH Jagmohan Kashyap vs. Government of NCT of Delhi & ANR, held that the right to claim maintenance under the Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Cr.P.C), and The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are not mutually exclusive, and the amount of maintenance awarded by one court will be considered by another court when deciding upon the maintenance.
The petitioner and his wife were having multiple lawsuits between them under a different set of laws. The initial petition seeking for the interim maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act, of 2005 was dismissed in 2014. The appeal was filed after a delay of three years, but the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) held that there were sufficient reasons for this delay and allowed for the condonation of the delay subject to a cost of Rs. 8,000, under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court was hearing an appeal petition against the order of the ASJ passed on 30 January 2020.
The High Court held that a major confusion arose because of the multiple avenues for relief sought. It held that an adequate balance must be struck between different provisions of competing acts.
Additionally, it also held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is elastic enough to accommodate sufficient and reasonable causes for delay. It also held that ASJ was right in not dismissing the appeal on the ground of procedural technicalities. It also held that the right to seek maintenance under the domestic violence act, and under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. are not mutually exclusive.
Karnataka HC: Compounding and termination of proceedings for rape offences can be done if settlement is arrived at by the parties.
In the case of Satish K vs. The State of Karnataka, the Karnataka High Court held that criminal proceedings can be terminated even for the offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 if the aggrieved parties arrive at a settlement.
The Court was hearing a petition filed by the petitioner urging to quash criminal proceedings registered under Section 376, as the complainants and the petitioner have mediated and arrived at a settlement in the form of an affidavit before this court. The petitioners relied on Section 483 of the Cr.P.C to be read with Section 320, to make these alleged offences compoundable. This was objected to by the Government Counsel as the offence is under Section 376 of the IPC.
The court relied on the judgements of the Supreme Court, and other High Courts to decide this case. In Prashant Bhartiya vs. State of Delhi, the apex court took the view that criminal proceedings under Section 376 of IPC can be quashed keeping in mind the mediation between the parties, along with the submission on behalf of complainants. The same stand was observed in K Dhandapani vs. The State by the Inspector of Police, wherein the court observed that it cannot shun its eyes to ground reality and disturb the happy family.
Similarly, the High Court of Karnataka, in V. Prabhu vs. State of Karnataka and another, and H.S. Chandan vs. State of Karnataka and another, held the same view as the Supreme Court, and allowed for the compounding of the offences under Section 376 of the IPC and quashed proceedings in cases of settlements.
Upon going through the above judgements, Justice M. Nagaprasanna’s bench of the Karnataka High Court held that it is proper to allow the application requesting the compounding of offences and termination of the proceedings.
Featured Image: Important Court Judgments


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SC says that Consumer Fora can direct builders to give refund & compensation in case of failure of delivery of apartments
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
April 13, 2022
In this review of Court judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s observation that delay in appeal being decided cannot be a reason for inadequate sentence, non-disclosure of relevant information being a criterion for cancelation of employment. We also look at Allahabad High court’s observation on weapon’s discovery not being the only criteria for conviction and Kerala High court’s direction to State regarding a wrong implication.
SC: Reiterates that Non-Disclosure of Material information itself could be ground for Termination of services.
In the case Union of India vs. Dillip Kumar Mallick, the Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice Dinesh Maheshwari & Justice M.M Sundresh has reiterated that non-disclosure of material information itself can be a ground for cancellation of employment or termination of services.
In this particular case, Dillip Kumar Mallick was appointed under the Centre Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Group Centre, Bhubaneshwar in 2003. A department inquiry was initiated against him on the allegations that he has concealed information about him being involved in a criminal case and being charge-sheeted. The case was pending before the competent Court but the information was not provided while filling up the verification roll. The Disciplinary authority awarded the punishment of removing him.
Allowing a writ petition, the Orissa High court had directed the CRPF to impose lesser punishment as deemed just and proper. The issue was raised in an appeal before the Supreme Court if the High Court was justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded.
Referring to another case, Avtar Singh vs Union of India (2016), the Bench made the below observations:
The bench further noted that Orissa High Court has affirmed the finding of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority that Dillip Mallick was held guilty of misconduct of suppression/concealment of material information.
The bench allowed the appeal and stated that there is no legal basis for the court to interfere and direct the employer to impose any lesser punishment since the facts do support the allegation that the relevant information was voluntarily suppressed.
SC: Inadequate sentence cannot be imposed merely because of a long time lapse in deciding an appeal
Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and Justice BV Nagarathna observed that a long time-lapse in deciding an appeal cannot be a ground to award an inadequate or disproportionate punishment.
In the case State of Rajasthan vs. Banwari Lal, the Rajasthan High court has partly allowed a criminal appeal by maintaining the conviction of the accused for an offence under IPC Section 307 but the sentence was reduced from three years of rigorous imprisonment to the period already undergone by him in confinement. The high court considered the submissions on behalf of the accused, that the occurrence took place about 26 years ago and he was facing trial for the last 26 years.
The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The bench observed that the High Court has dealt with the appeal in a casual manner and that the judgment is against all the principles of law laid down by the apex court in various decisions.
The bench further pointed out that they have come across several judgments of different High Courts where the criminal appeals were disposed of in a cursory manner and by adopting short-cut methods. The Supreme Court bench stated that merely because a long period has lapsed by the time the appeal is decided, cannot be a ground to award an inadequate or disproportionate punishment.
Allahabad HC: Weapon discovery alone is not enough to prove guilt
In the case Chatthoo Chero vs. State of U.P, Allahabad High court observed that while the discovery of the crime weapon at the disclosure of the accused is important as per Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, such disclosure alone would not lead to the conclusion that the accused committed the offence.
The bench comprising of Justice Suneet Kumar and Justice Dinesh Pathak set aside the life sentence of a murder-convict in this case, stating that the accused cannot be convicted based solely on the strength of the recovery of the crime weapon.
As per the case details, an FIR was lodged by the complainant against unknown persons for the murder of his wife. As per the statement, the family including the wife retired to sleep in the night after dinner. In the morning, their son saw his mother i.e., the complainant’s wife lying dead with blood all over.
During the interrogation, the complainant confessed to having committed the offence at about 3 AM in the morning using an axe. He informed the Investigating Officer (IO) of the place where the axe was hidden. The axe was recovered, and the accused was taken into custody.
Forensic lab report found human blood on the axe, blanket, cord of cot, blouse, and broken piece of glass bangles. Considering the statement of the witness, the documentary evidence, recovery of the weapon and the presence of human blood on the axe along with the clothes and accessories of the deceased, the trial court was of the opinion that the prosecution had proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused was convicted and sentenced to life. The accused challenged the same and moved to the court.
The Court proceeded to find out if the prosecution was able to prove the offence and link the accused to the offence. It observed that:
In this context, the Court concluded that the prosecution has not been able to establish a link i.e., the presence of the accused at the time of committing the offence and failed to prove that the accused alone had access to the room of the deceased.
Regarding the murder weapon, the court stated that this alone cannot form the basis of conviction. It noted that the recovery of the crime weapon was made after five days and had not been linked with the commission of the offence.
The Court concluded that the finding reached by the trial court was not based on legal evidence. It proceeded to set aside the order of conviction and the sentence and directed for the accused/appellant to be released.
Kerala HC: Directs State to pay Rs. 2.5 lakhs to two persons for falsely implicating and detaining them.
Kerala High court directed the State government to pay Rs. 2.5 lakhs each to two persons who were falsely implicated and kept in confinement for over 50 days.
In the case of Anil Kumar A.B vs State of Kerala & Ors, Justice P.V.Kunhikrishnan observed that false implication and illegal confinement is an infringement of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in such circumstances, the Court should step in and compensate the aggrieved party.
The petitioners were arrested and kept in confinement for more than 50 days in connection with two separate Abkari cases. They were subsequently found to be innocent and absolved of the charges by the investigating agency.
The advocates representing the petitioners have sought compensation from the State for infringement of their fundamental rights under Article 21. The argument was put forth stating that the petitioners’ personal liberty was illegally restrained by the officials and hence the State is required to pay compensation to the petitioners.
However, the government asserted that it was not responsible for paying compensation as the action was only a dereliction of the duty on part of the excise officials, on whom appropriate disciplinary proceedings are already being taken.
The Court noted that since infringement of fundamental right is established, it should not limit itself by mere declaration but proceed further to provide compensatory relief under public law jurisdiction for breach of public duty by the State for not protecting the fundamental right to life.
It observed that it was clear in the present case that the enquiry officer has falsely implicated the petitioners and that no further evidence was necessary to determine the violation of Article 21.
The court further stated that the State is bound to pay compensation and that amount should be recovered from the persons responsible for illegal confinement.
It further, stated that compensation cannot be fixed in tune with the mental trauma of the implication. The state was required to pay Rs. 2.5 lakhs to each petitioner. The court further made certain observations regarding the cases booked under Abkari crimes.
SC: Consumer Courts can direct builders to give refund & compensation in case of failure of delivery of apartments
In the case of Experion Developers Pvt Ltd vs. Sushma Ashok Shiroor, Supreme Court stated that Consumer Courts can direct builders to refund the home buyers in case they fail to deliver the apartments as agreed.
In this case, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) directed a Developer to refund Rs. 2.06 crores with an interest of 9% per annum to the consumer in view of its failure to deliver possession of the apartment within the stipulated time.
The builder made an appeal for the following issues:
Regarding the first issue, the Bench comprising of Justices UU Lalit, S. Ravindra Bhat and PS Narasimha, upheld the NCDRC’s finding that the clauses of the agreement are one-sided, and the consumer is not bound to accept possession and seek a refund.
Regarding the second issue, the court held the view that the consumer courts can grant relief to flat buyers who are aggrieved.
The bench referred to Section 14 of the Consumer Protection Act and dismissed the appeal filed by the developer.
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Review: SC Says That Courts’ Power To Transfer Cases To Specialized Investigating Agency Must Be Used Sparingly
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 8, 2023
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s judgment in which it remarked that the Courts’ power to transfer cases to specialized investigating agency must be used sparingly, that a  person acquitted of charges need not imply that they should be reinstated to service, that a mere fact of commission of suicide by itself is not sufficient to raise the presumption of abetment by husband and relatives under Section 113A of Evidence Act, among others.
SC: Courts’ power to transfer cases to specialized investigating agency must be used sparingly
In the case, Royden Harold Buthello & Anr vs. State Of Chhattisgarh & Ors, the Supreme Court was considering an appeal of a person who was accused of alleged possession and sale of psychotropic NDPS substance. In his appeals, he challenged two orders of the Chhattisgarh High Court which denied his request to transfer the case to the CBI and to quash the chargesheet and proceedings initiated against him.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices AS Bopanna and Ahsanuddin Amanullah referred to various judgements of the Court and noted that the power to transfer the investigation is an extraordinary power. It added that even though there aren’t flexible guidelines with respect to transferring cases, it should be done only in exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances may be those wherein the Court has no other option but to transfer the case to the CBI or such specialized investigating agency with expertise for investigation, to ensure a fair trial.
In this case, the appellant contended that he was being ‘framed’ and asked for a detailed investigation. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and stated that it did not find any issue of public importance that called for a CBI investigation. Further, the Court noted that in any event, the appellants have a further remedy in the legal course, even if it is established that the charges were framed.
SC: A person acquitted of charges need not imply that they should be reinstated to service
The petitioner in Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir was given an appointment to the Jammu and Kashmir Executive Police as a constable in 2009. However, when his fingerprints were sent to the Fingerprint Bureau under the National Crime Records Bureau for record and reference purposes, it was found that the petitioner was involved in a case in 2007. The case was registered under Section 379 of Ranbir Penal Code (theft) and Section 6 of the Forest Act. During enquiry, it was also found that the petitioner was arrested for 4 days and then released on bail which meant that the petitioner had knowingly suppressed the information from the department. Moreover, the petitioner had shown his residence in another village to get a clean chit at the time of police verification. Due to these reasons, the department cancelled the appointment.
He filed a petition against the cancellation with the Jammu and Kashmir High Court which dismissed his appeal on grounds that the decision of the Director General of Police, the highest functionary in the hierarchy of the police department, with respect to the appointment of the appellant was not to be questioned.  The Supreme Court Bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi upheld the same while observing that just because a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be inferred that he was falsely involved or had no criminal antecedents. Further, as held in earlier judgements, a mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service.
SC: Mere fact of commission of suicide by itself is not sufficient to raise the presumption of abetment by husband and relatives under Section 113A of Evidence Act
The case, Kashibai vs. State of Karnataka, involved the suicide of a woman because of mental and physical harassment from her husband and his family for dowry. The family was convicted under Section 498A and Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC by the Sessions Court. Even the High Court upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court while hearing the appeal noted that there was enough evidence to establish that the deceased had undergone harassment for dowry. But the question raised was whether the appellants were punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC, for abetment to suicide.
The Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Bela M Trivedi observed that there was no evidence to show that the death was a suicide. Moreover, even if the deceased had committed suicide, there was no evidence to establish that any of the appellants had instigated or intentionally aided or abetted the deceased to commit suicide.
The Bench added that the mere fact of the commission of suicide by itself would not be sufficient for the court to raise the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, and to hold the accused guilty of Section 306 IPC. Under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the Court may presume that the suicide was abetted if a married woman commits suicide within 7 years of marriage and her husband or his relatives have subjected her to cruelty. However, in this case, the Bench stated that the mere fact of the commission of suicide by itself was not sufficient for the court to raise the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, and to hold the accused guilty of Section 306 IPC. The Bench convicted the appellants for domestic violence under Section 498A but acquitted them of charges levelled against them under Section 306 of IPC for abetment to suicide by giving them the benefit of the doubt.
SC: Schools should have playgrounds and students are entitled to good environment in school
In State of Haryana vs. Satpal & Ors, the apex Court was hearing an appeal filed by the State of Haryana against the order of the High Court regarding the regularization of encroachments near a school. The respondents in this case were in unauthorized possession of Panchayat’s land. They had encroached land on the premises of a government school belonging to Gram Panchayat which was reserved for the school playground.
When this came to light in 2015 in front of the High Court, the respondents were willing to give equivalent vacant land in exchange, for adjoining the school. The Court also directed the authorities to demarcate vacant areas and residential plots from the encroached areas for the school to use. Further, it suggested exploring the options of taking alternate lands offered by the occupants to double the extent of the area under occupation or legalize the occupation by taking the market value.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna observed that the school did not have any playground at all and was surrounded by unauthorized construction made by the respondents. The Bench noted that the encroached land cannot be legalized as there cannot be any school without a playground. Students who study in such a school are entitled to a good environment, it added. Holding the High Court’s order to legalise the encroachment as erroneous, the Bench quashed the order passed by the High Court. Further, it also gave the respondents a year’s time to vacate the illegal occupation.
Karnataka HC: Mobile chargers that come along with phone in ‘one set’ should not be taxed separately
In The State of Karnataka vs. The Index Technologies India Ltd., the respondents were registered dealers under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. They were involved in the mobile phones, parts, and accessories business. The company sold mobile phones in composite packages that include accessories such as headsets, cables, ejection pins, adapters, chargers, manuals etc.
For the period, 2011-12 to 2013-14, the assessing officers passed an order under section 39(1) of the KVAT Act, 2003 subjecting the sales turnover of mobile chargers to tax at the rate of 13.5% to 14.5%. Dealers filed an appeal against this order which was dismissed by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals). Karnataka Appellate Tribunal allowed the appeal. The State filed the revision petitions in the High Court.
When considering the bunch of revision petitions, the Karnataka High Court bench of Justice P.S. Dinesh Kumar and Justice T.G. Shivashankare Gowda, held that the charger that is sold along with the mobile phone in one composite package or ‘one set’ is taxable at the rate of 5% and dismissed the petitions. It added that the intention of a purchaser or seller while buying or selling a ‘Mobile Set’ is to buy or sell the mobile phone and not the charger alone. Supply of charger, headset, and ejection pin is incidental to the sale.


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Review: SC says that Courts should not take shortcut approach and address only one issue when multiple issues are raised
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 30, 2022
In this roundup of the Court Judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s observations & directions about permission to investigate a case filed under Section 23 of the POCSO Act, that Ex-post facto environmental clearance may be granted in exceptional cases, that Courts should not take shortcut approach and address only one issue when multiple issues are raised. We also look at the Karnataka High court’s comments about ‘Marital Rape’.
SC: Bench gives split verdict when considering the need for court permission to investigate a case under Section 23 of POCSO for disclosing child victim’s identity
In Gangadhar Narayan Nayak @ Gangadhar Hiregutti vs. the State of Karnataka, the appellant is an editor of a newspaper. In 2017, a news report was published in the newspaper regarding the sexual harassment of a 16-year-old girl revealing her identity. The victim’s mother lodged a complaint against him under section 23 of the POCSO Act for mentioning her daughter’s name in the report. Section 23 of the POSCO Act makes the disclosure of a child’s identity a punishable offence. The police filed a chargesheet at the Court of the Principal District Judge, Uttar Kannada, Karwar. In 2018, the Court directed that summons be issued to the appellant.
The appellant who is the accused argued that the police registered the FIR without following Section 155(2) of CrPC which calls for a magistrate’s order for police to investigate non-cognizable offence. When the Trial Court dismissed his appeal, the appellant approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC, seeking a quashing of the proceedings against him. However, the High Court rejected the petition, following which he appealed to the Apex Court.
The question before the Supreme Court was if Section 155(2) of CrPC is applicable to the investigation of an offence under Section 23 of the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Indira Banerjee and Justice JK Maheshwari delivered a split verdict.
Justice Banerjee stated that Section 23 of POCSO clearly prevents the disclosure of the identity of the victim and doing so is a fundamental breach of the right of the child to dignity. The proceedings emanating from Section 23 cannot be vitiated on the ground that prior permission of the Magistrate should be taken by Police to start an investigation, stated Justice Banerjee. She further added that the Police unit should make immediate arrangements for the care and protection of the victim child if it is satisfied that the child needs care and protection.
Justice Maheshwari held that in the absence of any procedure for investigation under the POCSO Act, be it cognizable or non-cognizable offences, the procedure prescribed in CrPC should be followed for investigation, enquiry, and trial. He stated that the officer-in-charge of a police station is competent to make an arrest without a magistrate’s order when a cognizable offence is committed. However, in the case of a non-cognizable offence, the police officer is not supposed to investigate without the order of the court.
Since one member of the Bench dismissed the appeal while the other member allowed it, the matter will be referred to another Bench.
SC: Ex-post facto environmental clearance may be granted in exceptional cases
In Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd vs. Dastak NGO, the Supreme Court heard an appeal filed by Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd against an NGT order stating that the firm’s manufacturing units had to stop operating as it had not obtained prior environmental clearance. The question before the Bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and JK Maheshwari was “whether an establishment employing about 8000 workers, which has been set up pursuant to Consent to Establish (CTE) and Consent to Operate (CTO) from the concerned statutory authority and has applied for ex post facto EC can be closed because of pending issuance of EC, even though it may not cause pollution and/or maybe found to comply with the required pollution norms?”
The Bench allowed the appeal observing that the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, did not prohibit the grant of ex post facto environmental clearance. Since ex post facto environmental clearance can be granted in accordance with the law, the Court said that it cannot be oblivious to the economy or the livelihood of hundreds of employees. A “technical irregularity” of not obtaining prior environmental clearance must not be used as a reason to close such an establishment that is contributing to the economy. While it is necessary to comply with the environmental clearance, ex post facto environmental clearance should not be granted regularly, but only in exceptional cases. The court stated that the “deviant industry” may be penalized as per the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and the cost of restoration of the environment may be recovered from it.
SC: Courts should not take a shortcut approach and address only one issue when multiple issues are raised
In the case of Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Bangalore vs. State of Karnataka, the appellant, APMC Bangalore, filed a batch of appeals with the Supreme Court challenging the decisions of single and division benches of the Karnataka High Court with respect to land acquisition.
The following issues were raised in a writ petition before a Single Judge and later appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court. However, the High Court held that those respective acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Only issue (e) was addressed by the High Court while allowing the appeal.
When the Supreme Court was considering the appeal, it noted that the High Court had not considered all the issues placed before it. The Bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna observed that the High Court should have considered the other issues and should have given its findings on other issues as well. It held that it had no other alternative but to remand the matters to the Single Judge for deciding the Writ Petitions afresh, taking into consideration the other issues raised as well.
The Bench quashed the judgment passed by the Division Bench and stated that it is the duty of Courts to give its judgement and findings on all issues raised and not just one. It added that the Courts should not adopt a shortcut approach by giving a verdict on only one of the issues, which would increase the burden on the appellate court.
Karnataka HC: Exemption of husband from rape under Section 375 is a violation of Article 14
In Hrishikesh Sahoo vs. State of Karnataka, the petitioner’s wife had filed a complaint against him in 2017 alleging rape, marital violence, and sexual assault on their daughter under Sections 506, 498A, 323, 377 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 10 of POSCO Act. The police also filed a chargesheet against him following an investigation. The petitioner challenged the chargesheet in the High Court on grounds that rape charges are not applicable against the husband of a rape victim as per Section 375 of IPC which states that sexual acts by a man with his own wife provided she is above fifteen years of age, is not rape.
A single-judge bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna upheld the charges against the petitioner observing that a man is a man; rape is a rape, be it performed by a man the “husband” on the woman the “wife”. He added that the institution of marriage cannot be used to confer any special male privilege or a license for unleashing of a “brutal beast” on the wife. He stated that exempting a husband going by Section 375 of the IPC would be inequality and violate Article 14 of the Constitution. He traced the origin of Section 375 to Macaulay’s Code which was the basis for IPC. The code was made by the British in the Victorian Era when husbands wielded their power over their wives, and women were deprived of their basic rights. The Court noted that marital rape is illegal in the UK, 50 American states, three Australian states, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and Poland.
The court iterated that the present order was regarding the framing of charges against the husband and not about whether marital rape should be considered an offence, and that it was up to the legislature to delve into the issue and consider removal of the exemption.
SC: Ayurvedic doctors are entitled to be treated at par with Allopathic Medical Officers and Dental Medical Officers under NRHM
A bench comprising Justices Vineet Saran and J.K. Maheshwari upheld the order of the Uttarakhand High Court regarding the salary of Ayurvedic Doctors under the National Rural Health Mission. While dismissing the challenges against the High Court’s order in State of Uttarakhand & Others. vs. Sanjay Singh Chauhan & Others, the Supreme Court held that Ayurvedic doctors are entitled to be treated at par with Allopathic Medical Officers and Dental Medical Officers under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM/NHM) Scheme.