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Review: SC Rules That Precise Cause of a Fire Remains Immaterial, Provided Claimant is Not the Instigator
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
December 6, 2023
In this edition of Court judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgement on Governor’s role as Chancellor, insurance on fire accidents, Madras High Court’s judgement on right to protest, Kerala High Court’s decision on Lok Adalat’s award, and Allahabad High Court’s judgement on DNA test.
Supreme Court: Governor as a Chancellor of a State University must act independently, and Law does not recognise any such extra constitutional interference in the exercise of statutory discretion.
In Dr Premchandran Keezhoth & Anr vs. The Chancellor Kannur University & Ors, the Supreme Court remarked that the Chancellor plays an important role in the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor and his decision must be of independent application of mind. Any interference in this aspect amounts to unwarranted intervention.
The apex court bench comprising CJI DY Chandrachud, Justice JB Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Misra was hearing an appeal against the re-appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of Kannur University. It was earlier rejected twice by the single and division bench of the Kerala High Court. Dr. Gopinath Ravindran was appointed as the Vice-Chancellor on 24 November 2017, and his tenure was four years. As the tenure was coming towards the end, the Chancellor/Governor issued a notification to constitute a Selection Committee of three members. Subsequently, applications were invited from eligible members. Post this notification, the Minister for Higher Education and Social Justice in her capacity as the Pro-Chancellor addressed a letter to the Governor/Chancellor dated 22 November 2021 recommending reappointment of the same Vice-Chancellor. In pursuance of this letter, the notification inviting candidates was recalled, and the Governor/Chancellor reappointed the Vice-Chancellor on 24 November 2021.
This was challenged on the following two aspects, as per the Kannur University Act, 1996.
The appellants submitted that there is no distinction between appointment and re-appointment as recognised under the service law jurisprudence, and if the judgements are upheld, then it follows that a person can be reappointed even though there may be better qualified and more deserving candidates eligible and qualified to hold the office. This obviously is not the letter and spirit of the Kannur University Act and the UGC Regulations.
Hearing arguments from all respondents, the apex court formulated the below questions of law.
On the question of permissibility of re-appointment, the apex court held that re-appointment is permitted based on settled principles of law. Reappointment is primarily for two reasons- the first being ‘retention’, where the incumbent performs extraordinarily, and such a person needs to be given such opportunity. The second reason is the nature of the post, where the organization or institution may not be in a position to fill up the post in a time-bound manner.
On the question of age limit for re-appointment and the method of re-appointment, the apex court held that re-appointment is not barred by outer age limit, as the provisions of the law provide for re-appointment. Setting an age-limit for reappointment would narrow the scope as the selection committee in such case would be inclined to consider younger candidates over older and possibly more qualified and experienced ones who may be more suitable. The Court relied on the doctrine of purposive construction.
On the question of the method of re-appointment, the court remarked that there is no need to follow the procedure of appointment again in this case, as the re-appointment is in continuance of the first time. On the question of Chancellor abdicating the authority, the court relied on the principles laid in Hardwari Lal, Rohtak vs. G.D. Tapase, Chandigarh and others. It was held that by virtue of his office as Governor, he becomes the Chancellor of the University, but while discharging the functions of his office, he does not perform any duty or exercise any power of the office of the Governor individually. However, while discharging the functions as a Chancellor, he does every act in his discretion as Chancellor, and he does not act on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers.
Accordingly, the notification of re-appointment of Vice-Chancellor is quashed.
Supreme Court: Precise cause of a fire, whether attributed to a short-circuit or any alternative factor, remains immaterial, provided the claimant is not the instigator of the fire.
In New India Assurance Co Ltd vs. M/S Mudit Roadways, the apex court held that the precise origin of the fire doesn’t matter if the insured isn’t the one instigating it. The insurance company remains liable unless there’s evidence suggesting the insured caused the fire, regardless of the fire’s actual cause.
The Supreme Court, with Justices Hrishikesh Roy and Sanjay Karol presiding, was hearing an appeal against the NCDRC’s order directing an Insurance Company to pay over 6 crores for a fire insurance claim. This claim, stemming from a warehouse fire covered by an insurance policy for fire coverage and protection of custom bonded goods. Although initial reports suggested a short-circuit as the cause, a forensic report indicated sparks from rooftop welding as the probable trigger. The claim for insurance was rejected by the insurer, citing reasons including unaffected premises and increased risk due to alleged negligence in roof construction. The claimant appealed in the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), which ruled in favour of the claimant, stating that the policy covered the warehouse, and the roofing work didn’t significantly heighten the risk under Clause 3 of the policy.  The appeal is against this judgement.
The counsel for the insured relied on the judgment in Canara Bank vs. United India Insurance Company, whereby the insurer was held liable for extending insurance irrespective of the reason for the fire, unless the insured was the instigator. The counsel for the insurer remarked that the roofing work heightened the risk and, hence not liable for payment.
Upon hearing both sides and the material evidence present, the apex court held that the roofing work did not increase the risk. It also relied on the time gap between the end of welding work and the incidence of fire.
On the extent of liability when the exact reason for the fire is unknown, the court relied on the Canara Bank judgement and held that an insurance company’s obligation to the insured is of much greater import.
Further, the court also shed light on the foundational principles of insurance contracts. It remarked that insurance contracts are founded on the principles of good faith and commitment. Trust serves as the cornerstone, forming the essence of the insurer-insured relationship. Considering the vital role that trust plays in insurance contracts, it is important to ensure that the insurer adequately fulfils the duty that has been cast on it, by virtue of such a covenant.
Accordingly, the appeal of the Insurance Company was dismissed.
Madras HC: Article 19(1)(b) confers right to assemble and protest peacefully without arms and such a right is the significant feature of a democratic country likewise ours.
In J Jayaraj and Others vs. The Chief Educational Officer, the Madras High Court held that the right to protest is an integral aspect of free speech and an inherent element of the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of our Constitution. Arbitrarily limiting the space for legitimate dissent must be strongly undermined with iron hands.
The single-judge bench headed by Justice Victoria Gowri was hearing petitions that challenged the memos issued by the District Educational Officer under Section 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. The charge memo alleged that teachers had congregated in front of the Government Boys Higher Secondary School, engaged in a waiting agitation by taking casual leave, and disrupted government servants. They were accused of misconduct for criticizing these acts.
The petitioners argued that the charge memo lacked thoughtful consideration. They asserted that as members of the Teachers Federation, they had protested against irregularities in finalizing the seniority list by including ineligible individuals. The petitioners further argued that they hadn’t solicited or received illegal benefits, nor had they neglected duties or demonstrated insubordination or actions involving moral wrongdoing. Therefore, they contended that the action taken was unlawful, arbitrary, and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The respondents argued that the petitioners had incited other teachers during critical times—when students were preparing for the 12th standard exams and during the revision examinations for the 11th standard. Additionally, it was claimed that the petitioners had disrupted the school environment by using loudspeakers and caused a law-and-order problem on the Trichy Highway by using inappropriate language against Education Department Officers.
Upon hearing both sides, the court looked at the provisions of 17(b) of the above rules. The court remarked that careful consideration of it does not show any penal offence on the part of the petitioners.
The court further remarked that peacefully demonstrating serves as an avenue for the petitioners to express their grievance against the unlawful and disorderly exercise of authority by the Education Department Officers in Karur District, aiming for their grievances to be heard by relevant authorities. As members of the Teachers Federation, the petitioners possess an unbounded entitlement to peacefully protest without weapons, a right safeguarded under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of our Constitution. In a democratic setup, democracy is represented by the visible expression of a group’s sentiments. Peaceful and well-organized protests are privileges guaranteed to citizens in every democratic society.
Accordingly, the proceedings of the charge memos are quashed.
Kerala HC: Mere breach of procedures isn’t enough to invalidate the Lok Adalat’s settlement award.
The Kerala High Court, in Babumon K.G. vs. State of Kerala & Ors, held that procedural violation cannot be a sufficient ground for invalidating the settlement award passed by Lok Adalat.
A division Bench, consisting of Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Shoba Annamma Eapen, was hearing an intra-court appeal against a ruling in a Lok Adalat organized by the Taluk Legal Service Authority in Kochi. In this instance, the appellant/petitioner had consented to pay Rs. 10,83,808/- in two instalments during the Adalat held at the Assistant Commissioner of Police Office in Mattanchery. The award was issued on 21 January 2019. The appellant has raised two grounds for contesting the decision: one revolves around a procedural breach, and the other pertains to an alleged threat by the third respondent, compelling the appellant/petitioner to sign the award.
Upon hearing the matters from both parties, the court remarked that the appellant had approached this Court through a Writ Petition utilizing Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. The scope of judicial review is defined within the Constitution itself. It permitted the appeal through judicial review adheres strictly to the parameters outlined in Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and nothing more.
Looking at the facts of the case, the court observed that procedural violations that impact jurisdiction might warrant the court’s intervention in an Award, but merely violating procedures won’t suffice to invalidate the award. To nullify the award, it must be proven that the authority lacked competence under any other provisions to hold the Adalat and issue such an Award.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
Allahabad HC: A DNA test cannot be in a routine matter, especially when there’s already substantial legal evidence available to determine the date of birth.
The Allahabad High Court, in Smt. Mobin And Another vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation And six others, held that a matriculation certificate or birth certificate issued from School would be considered to be the best evidence to determine the date of birth of a person, and in such circumstances, DNA tests are not needed.
The single-judge bench comprising Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery was hearing a petition arising out of proceedings initiated under Section 9A(2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953. The factual background of the case is as follows- the land in dispute belonged to Yakoob, who had three sons: Shakeel, Jameel, and Furkan. Shakeel, the eldest son, married Petitioner-1, Smt. Mobin, on 01 March 1997, but tragically passed away on 27 July 1997. The Petitioner claimed that a daughter (Petitioner-2) was born from this marriage.
The opposing respondents contended that the daughter was born from Petitioner-wife’s second marriage after Shakeel’s death. Additionally, they alleged that since the petitioner-wife didn’t care for Shakeel while he was alive, he created a Will favouring the contesting respondents, his two brothers. The petitioners’ attempts to challenge these assertions were unsuccessful across all three authorities: the Consolidation Officer, Settlement Officer of Consolidation, and Deputy Director of Consolidation.
While the petitioners argued that a DNA test may be ordered to prove the parentage, the respondents disagreed with this as there was a matriculation certificate to prove the date of birth.
The court, upon hearing both parties looked at the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (care and protection of children) Act, 2015. The Act of 2015 became effective on 15 January 2016. Section 111 nullifies the previous Act of 2000 but specifies that despite this nullification, any previous actions or proceedings conducted under the previous Acts shall be considered as if they were carried out under the equivalent provisions of the new law. Section 94 of the act provides the provisions for the determination of age.
It further relied on the apex court decision in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P, wherein it was held that the matriculation certificate is given precedence in the order specified in section 94. It is in the absence of a matriculation certificate that the date of birth certificate of the school first attended, can be relied upon.
Further, on the request of petitioners for a DNA test, the court relied on Aparna Ajinkya Firodia vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, wherein it was held that the DNA test could not be passed in a routine manner and should be used sparingly in extraordinary circumstances. The court should also bear in mind the consequences of DNA test before passing any such orders.
Accordingly, as established in Aparna Ajinkya Firodia, the decision to conduct a DNA test cannot be a standard procedure. It should only be ordered in exceptional situations when there are no other legal means available to establish the parentage of the individual. In this case, a document recognized as valid legal proof for determining the date of birth, such as a matriculation certificate, exists. Hence, there is no necessity or justification to issue an order for a DNA test.
Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

created: December 6, 2023


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Review: SC Rules That Regularizing Employment of Only Some Employees is Discriminatory and Violative of Article 14
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
July 19, 2023
In this edition of court judgements review, we look at Supreme Court’s judgement about final report in a case has no bearing on claim petitions, that regularizing employment of only some employees is discriminatory and violative of Article 14, Bombay HC’s order that age of consent and age of marriage should be distinguished as sexual acts take place not just in the confines of marriage, Delhi HC’s order that  courts should refer matter to concerned board to scrutinize the claim of mental illness.
SC: Final report has no bearing on claim petitions
In the case, Mathew Alexander vs. Mohammed Shafi & another, the Appellant’s son and five others travelling in a car died in a collision with a truck. The Appellant had also sought compensation for the death of his son before the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal, Kollam due to the negligence of the tanker lorry driver involved in the accident. Claim petitions were filed by the respondent and other legal representatives of the deceased passengers in the car as well. According to a chargesheet regarding the FIR filed against the appellant’s son, the charges against him had abated as he lost his life in the accident. Further investigation was conducted. The final report presented by the Assistant Commissioner of Police stated that the accident was unavoidable and was not attributable to negligence on the part of the Appellant’s son.
The respondents sought quashing of the report before the Kerala High Court, which held that the accident was because of the negligence of the appellant’s son. Aggrieved by the decision, the appellant approached the Apex Court. The Supreme Court division bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra allowed the appeal stating that the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering the petition seeking compensation on account of death or injury in a road traffic accident. The opinion in the final report did not have any bearing on the claim petitions.
SC: Regularizing employment of only some employees is discriminatory and violative of Article 14
In Raman Kumar & Others vs. Union of India & Others, the matter before the Supreme Court was about the regularization of employees. In pursuance of the case, Secretary, State of Karnataka & Others vs. Umadevi & Others, the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax submitted a report in 2013 where it identified that only 65 employees were entitled to regularization. Further, the services of only 35 employees were regularized and of the remaining 30 employees were not, since only 35 vacancies were available. 16 persons out of the remaining 30 employees filed contempt petitions alleging that the respondents did not regularize the services of the appellants which is contempt of Court.
The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax filed an affidavit before the High Court, stating that the services of the remaining employees could not be regularized since the posts were not available. Further, the abolition of ‘Group D’ posts was also cited as a reason why the appellants could not be regularized. The court noted that in the Umadevi case, the Court had granted a one-time measure to be conducted for regularization of the services of employees who had completed more than ten years in service and these appellants were eligible for the same.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices B R Gavai and J B Pardiwala did not accept the submissions of the respondents observing that regularizing the employment of some and not doing that for others is patently discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Allowing the appeal, the court directed regularization of the appellants with back wages and other benefits to be settled in six months.
Bombay HC: Age of consent and age of marriage should be distinguished as sexual acts take place not just in the confines of marriage
In Ashik Ramjan Ansari vs. the State of Maharashtra & Another, the accused was convicted under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act) in 2016 for having sexual relations with a minor girl. The accused was then aged 25 years and the minor girl was 17 years old. She said that they were in a consensual relationship. The girl also stated that she was an adult under Muslim law and hence she had performed Nikah (marriage) with the accused. She had also lived with him by projecting herself to be his wife. The trial court observed that the sexual relationship between the two had taken place when the girl was only 17 years and 5-6 months old and that she was a minor because of which her consent was immaterial and accused the appellant under POCSO Act.
The Bombay High Court’s Single Bench with Justice Bharti Dangre observed that the trial court’s decision to convict the accused (appellant) was erroneous since the intercourse was consensual. Acquitting the appellant of the charges, the High Court also noted that the criminalization of romantic relationships has overburdened the criminal justice system. It is consuming the time of the judiciary, police, and child protection systems. It added that it was the duty of the state to take decisions and protect the autonomy of individuals including adolescents. Merely because of the apprehension that adolescents would make impulsive or bad decisions does not mean that their wills and wishes should be ignored. Age of consent should be distinguished from the age of marriage as sexual acts do not only happen in the confines of marriage.
Delhi HC: Courts should refer matter to concerned board to scrutinize the claim of mental illness
The facts of the case, Ankur Abbot vs. Ekta Abbot date back to March 2022, when the Metropolitan Magistrate directed the petitioner to pay Rs 1.15 lakh per month to the respondent and their minor daughter under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act till final disposal. The petitioner challenged the order in the Sessions Court and the wife filed an execution petition in the Metropolitan Magistrate.
Later, in October 2022, the petitioner requested an exemption from appearing in the execution proceedings citing that he suffered from Bipolar Affective Disorder (BPAD), Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), depression and anxiety; and has been under regular medical supervision as per sections 105 and 116 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. However, the Metropolitan Magistrate issued arrest warrants against him. He challenged the order in the Sessions Court, which dismissed the same. He then filed a revision petition before the High Court. The respondent, his wife, claimed that the petitioner was trying to frustrate her rights by seeking an exemption.
The Single Judge Bench of Justice Amit Sharma observed that the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 was a special law that overrides other laws in accordance with Section 120 of the said Act. Section 105 stipulates that if a party claimed mental illness during a judicial process, the Court should refer the matter to a board for further scrutiny. He noted that the reports of the mental illness of the petitioner were ignored by the courts which decided based on only a single medical document issued by the Family Physician & Gynaecologist about his acute gastroenteritis.
The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and set aside both the lower Court’s orders. It directed the petitioner to initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with the law to assess his claimed mental illness. With respect to the maintenance of the wife and child, the court clarified that the assessment would not prejudice their legal rights.
Madras HC: A person forwarding message on social media is liable for its contents
In S. Ve. Shekher vs. Al. Gopalsamy and Others, the petitioner is an actor and politician. He had forwarded an abusive, derogatory, and vulgar comment about women journalists on his Facebook account in April 2018. He stated that he had forwarded the post without going through the contents & had written an apology to the concerned woman journalist and also to the Press and Media in Tamil Nadu at large. He was charged with offences under Sections 504, 505(1)(c) and 509 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002.
The Madras High Court Judge Justice Anand Venkatesh observed that the petitioner was a person of high stature with about 5000 followers. He observed that the stature of a person is directly proportional to what he communicates to society and its consequences. So, information or a message sent by a normal citizen and the same information/message sent by a person with a stature having followers has a lot of difference. Noting how quickly information spreads to every nook and corner of the world, the High Court held that people must exercise social responsibility while forwarding or creating a message. Cautioning every user of social media to be extremely careful before sending or forwarding a message to others, the Court stated that the charges on the petitioner cannot be quashed and transferred all the criminal proceedings to the Special Court.

source: news-factly

license: Creative Commons - Attribution - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

author: Sai Krishna Muthyanolla


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SC rules that Schools at liberty to take appropriate legal action to recover outstanding fee from parents
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
October 13, 2021
In this roundup of court judgements, we look at Constitutional Courts’ remarks & directions on grants of bails, schools recovering pending fees from parents, the obligation of hospitals to provide the necessary documentation to families of COVID-19 deceased for availing ex-gratia compensation, and virtual hearings.
Supreme Court: Issues guidelines for grant of bail to accused not arrested during an investigation on the filing of charge sheet
In the case Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI 2021, the Supreme court issued guidelines on the aspect of the grant of bail to accused who are not arrested during the investigation on the charge sheet being filed.
There are two requisite conditions for this guideline to apply:
The bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh accepted the suggestions made by Additional Solicitor General SV Raja and Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra in this regard. The apex court also agreed that to consider bail, the trial courts are not precluded from granting interim bail taking into consideration the conduct of the accused during the investigation which has not warranted arrest.
Category A Offences are those punishable with imprisonment of 7 years or less not falling in category B & D. The guidelines for this category, after filing of charge sheet/complaint taking of cognizance include:
Category B Offences are those which are punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for more than 7 years. Category D offences are economic offences not covered by Special Acts. For Category B and D offences, on the appearance of the accused in Court, bail application to be decided on merits.
Category C offences are punishable under Special Acts containing stringent provisions for bail like NDPS (Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act), PMLA (Prevention of Money Laundering Act), UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act), Companies Act, 212(6), POSCO (Protection of Children from Sexual Offences), etc. For Category C offences, the same guidelines as Category B & D are applicable with the additional condition of compliance of the provisions of Bail under NDPS, PMLA, Companies Act, UAPA, POSCO, etc.
The apex court has ordered that the copy of this order to be circulated to the Registrars of the different High Courts and Trial Courts so that unnecessary bail matters do not come up to the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court: Schools at liberty to take appropriate legal action to recover the outstanding fees from parents or wards.
In the case Progressive Schools Association Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., the Supreme Court permitted the School Managements to initiate appropriate action in accordance with law for recovery of the outstanding fees from students who have defaulted. The apex court observed that it is open for the School Management to consider the requests, if any, made by parent or ward seeking indulgence for just reasons, compassionately.
The Supreme Court was hearing a plea seeking clarification on the Court’s order directing schools to not debar any student from attending classes on account of non-payment of fees. The present application was filed by Progressive Schools Association challenging a Rajasthan Government order, which permits CBSE schools in the state to collect only 70% and state board schools to collect only 60% of the annual school fee.
In the case Indian School, Jodhpur Vs. The state of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court directed the following:
The bench of Justice AM Khanwilkar and Justice CT Ravikumar clarified that the spirit of its earlier judgment was to allow time for the concerned parent/ward to pay the fees in instalments. However, the same does not extricate the parents from the liability to pay the school fees in any manner.
Therefore, the apex court held that it is open to the School Management to initiate appropriate action for recovery of the outstanding dues/amount, if any, in accordance with the law.
Supreme Court: Hospitals should provide all documents to the family of COVID-19 deceased as & when demanded.
In the case Gaurav Kumar Bansal Vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court directed hospitals to provide all necessary documents to the family members of COVID-19 deceased, as and when demanded.
Earlier, the Apex court directed that the kin of COVID-19 deceased will be paid ex-gratia assistance of Rs. 50,000 which will be over and above the benefits paid by the Centre or State Governments under different benevolent schemes. The ex-gratia assistance is to be disbursed within a period of 30 days from the date of submitting the application to the District Administration along with the proof of the death due to COVID-19 and other necessary documents.
The Apex court had also directed that if the death certificate is not conclusive, then certain other documents can be provided to avail the ex-gratia assistance. In other words, the court held that ex-gratia compensation cannot be denied solely on grounds that in the death certificate issued by the appropriate authority, the cause of death is not mentioned as “Died due to COVID-19”. One of our earlier stories elaborates on this aspect of judgement.
Therefore, for the purpose of considering the deaths of the deceased due to COVID-19, cases would include those which are diagnosed through a positive RT-PCR/Molecular Tests/RAT or clinically determined through investigations in a hospital or in-patient facility.
In the present case, the bench of Justice MR Shah and Justice AS Bopanna held that if any hospital or the place where the deceased had taken treatment refuses to furnish such documents, the Grievance Redressal Committee can call for such information and the particulars as required for purpose of establishing that the death was due to COVID-19 will have to be furnished.
The Grievance Redressal Committee has been directed to be constituted by States to carry out the court’s direction regarding disbursement of ex-gratia compensation to families of covid victims.
Supreme Court: Virtual hearing cannot be a norm; the rights of the public to have open court can be protected by live-streaming.
In the case National Federation of Societies for Faster Justice and others vs. High Court of Uttarakhand and others, the Supreme Court remarked that virtual hearing cannot be a norm, as it was adopted to meet the extraordinary crisis created by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The bench of Justice L. Nageshwara Rao and B.R. Gavai also commented that it is one thing to say that the public has the right to witness the court hearings through live stream and another thing to say that they should have the right to have ‘virtual hearings’.
The apex court was hearing a writ petition jointly filed by ex-IPS officer Julio Ribeiro, RTI activist Shailesh R. Gandhi and an organization named “National Federation of Societies for Fast Justice” seeking a “virtual hearing” as a fundamental right. The petition was seeking retention of hybrid options for physical and virtual hearings in courts, holding that it enhanced the right to access justice.
The bench observed that in view of an unprecedented COVID-19 crisis, the courts had to continue virtually because people cannot be denied access to justice. However, this cannot become a norm where citizens have a right to virtual hearings.
Further, the bench noted that the right of the public (to witness court hearings) will be protected once the directions in the Swapnil Tripathi judgment for live-telecast are implemented. In 2018, the Swapnil Tripathi case verdict made publicity, visibility, open access to virtual courts a rule/norm and its denial an exception.
Therefore, the court held that the rights of access to virtual courts would be protected once the above-mentioned judgement is implemented and proceedings are telecasted. However, the bench opined that to argue that virtual proceedings are needed to protect their rights does not appear reasonable.
In conclusion, the bench allowed the Senior Advocate for the petitioner to return after four weeks along with suggestions on how to lay down norms for virtual hearings in exceptional cases. The bench has tagged this petition along with an earlier petition (filed by All India Association of Jurists) seeking similar relief.
Featured Image: Roundup of court judgements

created: October 13, 2021


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Review: SC Rules That Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Fall in a Core Zone of Privacy of an Individual
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 27, 2024
In this week’s review of important court judgments, we look at the SC ruling that sexual orientation and gender identity fall in a core zone of privacy of an individual, and the directions issued to lower courts while dealing with similar cases, SC ruling that exemption of extraction, sourcing or borrowing of ordinary Earth for linear projects from environmental clearance is arbitrary.
SC: Sexual orientation and gender identity fall in a core zone of privacy of an individual
In the case of Devu G Nair vs. State of Kerala and Ors, the Supreme Court (SC) was dealing with a Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed against the interim direction of the Kerala High Court in a Habeas Corpus case. The facts of the case were that the Appellant has filed the petition with the claim that the corpus person (x), a female person, and she are in an intimate relationship. The parents of person “x” have kept her forcefully with them though she wished to remain with the Appellant. The SC noted that during the processes of investigation and counselling, the person “x” has already deposed before the court stating that she is staying with her parents voluntarily and without any coercion. Though it is true that the Appellant is an intimate friend to her, she however does not wish to marry or live with any person for the time being. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the SLP as non-maintainable.
In the same case, the SC has noted that the High Courts have been issuing orders for counselling in similar cases and in a similar position as that of person X in the matter before it. In order that the process of counselling and the pertinent orders passed by the lower courts do not affect sexual orientation of the persons involved, the SC held that judges must avoid a tendency to substitute their own subjective values for the values which are protected by the Constitution.
Accordingly, the SC has issued guidelines to the lower courts dealing with similar cases and directed following them in letter and spirit:
SC: Refuses to Stay Election Commissioners’ Act, citing that it would disrupt the 18th Lok Sabha Elections
In the case of Dr. Jaya Thakur and Ors vs Union of India & Ors, the SC refused to stay the operation of the recently passed Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Other Election Commissioners (OEC) Act, 2023 (Act). The facts of the case were that the Parliament had passed CEC & OEC Act which modified the operation of the previous position of law on the appointment of Chief Election Commissioners and Other Election Commissioners (CEC & ECs). By virtue of this Act, the Chief Justice of India (CJI) is replaced by the Union Cabinet Minister, appointed by the Prime Minister (PM), in the selection committee involved in the appointment of CEC and ECs. The petition was filed challenging the Act on various grounds such as removal of CJI in the selection process, violation of SC’s judgment in Anoop Baranwal vs. Union of India, etc., among others, which would affect the fairness and transparency in the appointment of CEC and ECs.
The SC refused to stay the operation of the Act by stating that any such order for the time being would affect the upcoming 18th Lok Sabha elections. That apart, the judgment passed by SC in the Anoop Baranwal case was when there was an absence of Specific Law in the appointment of CEC and ECs, though it was mandated by the Constitution of India. Further, when entertaining any petition relating to the constitutionality of a law, the courts are cautious and follow the judicial restraint in giving the interim orders. With these reasons, the court refused to grant a stay on the operation of the Act. However, the court has also held that it does not wish to go into depth of details of the challenge to the Act, considering that the elections are going to be held in the coming months and that any contrary order would disrupt the election process.
SC: Exemption of Extraction, Sourcing or Borrowing of Ordinary Earth for linear projects from the Environmental Clearance is Arbitrary.
In the case of Noble M. Paikada vs. Union of India, the SC was dealing with a challenge to the judgment of the National Green Tribunal (NGT), where it had upheld the amendment of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, a sub-legislation passed under Environment Protection Act (EPA), by Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEF&CC). The facts of the case were that by amendments dated 28 March 2020 and 30 August 2023 to the EIA Notification, the MoEF&CC exempted the prior environmental impact assessment and obtainment of Environmental Clearance (EC) for extraction, sourcing or borrowing of Ordinary Earth for linear projects. This was challenged before the NGT, which had upheld the operation of the same notification. Hence, an Appeal against the notification and the judgment of the NGT was filed by the petitioners before the SC with the grounds such as permitting the extraction of earth without any limitation is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – The Right to Equality. Further, it is also in violation of the SC’s judgment in Deepak Kumar & Ors vs. State of Haryana & Ors, wherein it was held that mining or minor minerals even below the 5 hectares require the prior EC from the statutory authorities.
The SC noted that the impugned notification was issued a few days before the lockdown was announced in India, as such there was no hurry in passing the modification. Further, the EIA Notification does not define a list of activities which are constituted as “linear projects”. In addition, it also does not define the quantum of the earth which when extracted, sourced, or borrowed is considered to not have an environmental impact. Hence, it was struck down as being held as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
SC: Corporate Bodies are covered in the definition of ‘Person’ under Consumer Protection Act
In the case of M/s Kozyflex Mattresses Private Limited vs. SBI General Insurance Company & Anr, the SC held that corporate bodies are entitled to file complaints and claim relief under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The facts of the case were that in March 2013, the M/s Kozyflex Mattresses Private Limited (Appellant) had bought an insurance policy ‘Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy (Material Damage)’ to the tune of 1.25 crores on the plant and machinery and a sum of Rs. 30,00,000 on stock from SBI general insurance company (Respondent). Subsequently, it was enhanced to Rs. 1.55 crores, and for the building the sum insured was enhanced to Rs. 20,00,000. Thereafter, as per the Appellant, a massive fire accident took place in the manufacturing unit which has caused him financial damages. Therefore, he claimed relief of Rs. 3.31 crores; Rs. 40,11,152/- for building, Rs.1,08,47,435/- for plant and machinery and Rs.1,87,72,489/- for stock, from the Respondent. Upon the inspection, the Respondent found the claim as fraudulent and based on fabricated documents and hence was repudiated. The Appellant approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), which upheld the rejection of the claim by SBI. This order of NCDRM was then challenged by the Appellant in SC.
When the matter was taken up by SC, the counsel for the Appellant argued that they were not given sufficient opportunity by the NCDRC to produce documentary evidence to substantiate their grievance and financial claim. The counsel for Respondent submitted that the Appellant being a body corporate does not get covered under the definition of ‘person’ under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), as amended in 2019. However, the SC held that the definition of a person covered in CPA is inclusive and not exhaustive. The same amended act in 2019 stipulates body corporate as a person by including the word ‘company’. Therefore, the Appellant being considered as ‘Person’, though a corporate body, is entitled to complain and claim grievance redressal under CPA.
As regards the merits of the case, the SC agreed with the contention of the Appellant and remanded the matter back to NCDRC for re-hearing and to decide afresh
Delhi HC: Students should not suffer examiner’s remarks of Handwriting as not intelligible.
In the case of Madhav Chaudhary (Appellant) vs. University of Delhi & Anr (Respondent), the Delhi High Court (HC) held that the students should not be allowed to suffer from improper evaluation of examination papers, due to the not intelligible handwriting remarks made by the examiners. The facts of the case were that the Appellant had filed a Writ Petition (WP) against the Respondent seeking the direction for re-evaluation of his answer sheet in the supplementary examination held by the Respondent. The grievance of the Appellant was that the examiner, who corrected his answer sheet, had remarked in it stating, “very poor handwriting, hardly could read anything” and therefore, it had affected the marks secured by him in the exam. In defence, the respondent had stated that in portions where such remarks were made, the examiner had given marks to the Appellant. Further, the respondent has also submitted that there is no provision in the rules which provides re-evaluation of the examination paper.
When the matter was taken up, the Delhi HC held that the matter pertains to the proper evaluation, not a re-evaluation, since it was the examiner’s deposition that he could not properly read what was written in the paper. Accordingly, the marks given in the paper cannot be treated in law as evaluation at all. Further, the court held those words that were not intelligible were readable and thus it also shows the improper evaluation being done. However, the Court had clarified that it is not in any way finding fault with the examiner, as examiners like him undertake the arduous task of correcting answer sheets, especially in higher education institutions. If the handwriting is abysmal, the examiners should be excused. But, in the present case, the handwriting of the Appellant is readable and as such he should not be allowed to suffer for the same reason.
Therefore, the court allowed the petitioner to provide a typed transcript to the university and the examiner was requested to evaluate the same.


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Review: SC Rules That the Prosecution Has to Prove a Case Beyond Reasonable Doubt in Case of Circumstantial Evidence
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
October 12, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s observation that the responsibility to prove a case beyond doubt lies with the prosecution and its view regarding preference to advancing justice over technicalities. We also look at the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s observation regarding the forced termination of pregnancy against women’s will, the Delhi High Court’s order regarding Trademark infringement and the J&K&L high court’s order allowing medical reimbursement for treatment in hospital which is not part of the approved list.
Punjab and Haryana HC: Motherhood is Innate; Forcing Wife to Terminate Pregnancy Against Her Will Amounts to Cruelty
A Punjab & Haryana High Court bench comprising of Justice Ritu Bahri and Justice Nidhi Gupta observed that motherhood is innate and natural to every woman and forcing a wife to terminate her pregnancy against her will constitutes cruelty.
As per the case, Renuka vs Shelly Kumar, they both got married as per Hindu marriage rituals in August 2012. The wife started living with her husband and his family, where she alleged that there was continuous torture – physically, mentally, and emotionally by her husband and family, with a demand for more dowry.
She got pregnant in October 2012, but her husband got her pregnancy terminated forcibly, stating that he has no means to bring up the child. She was not allowed the required rest for recovery and was forced to work by her mother-in-law. This resulted in gynecological complications due to which she was not able to conceive again. There were further events that caused mental agony to her.
In 2015, she was turned out of her matrimonial home. Alleging that she was treated with cruelty and that her husband deserted her, she filed a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, before the Family Court, Hisar. Her appeal was dismissed by the court.
This was challenged in the High Court. The High Court bench noted that the allegations that she could not conceive due to the gynecological complications developed after being forced to terminate the pregnancy were supported by medical records. It further noted that the husband’s denial of the allegations in the family court was lackadaisical.
The court stressed that motherhood is innate, natural, and fulfilling to every woman and that forcing her to terminate her pregnancy against her will constitutes cruelty. It further noted that the conduct of both the parties shows that there are irreconcilable differences between the parties, and therefore, allowed the appeal of the wife and decreed the petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Delhi HC: Permanently Restrains Foreign Company from Using “TATA” Trademark in Cryptocurrency Trading.
Delhi High Court has restrained a UK-based company from unauthorised usage of the registered trademark ‘TATA’ while selling and marketing of digital tokens i.e., cryptocurrency.
An appeal was filed by Tata Sons Private Ltd, seeking a permanent injunction restraining infringement of their trademark ‘TATA’.
In September 2019, a division bench had set aside an order passed by the single judge declining interim relief to the TATA group. The judge doubted its extraterritorial jurisdiction to injunct the overseas parties, as the company against whom the infringement was filed was UK-based.
After the filing of the case, “Hakunamatata $Tata Founders” took down their websites ‘www.hakunamatata.finance’ and ‘www.tatabonus.com’ and changed their name to Hakunamatata Token Ltd.  The website was changed to ‘www.hakunamatatatoken.com’. The name of the Crypto-token was changed to $HKUN Token.
However, a legal notice sent by Tata Sons, seeking an undertaking from the company that it will not use the ‘TATA’ mark was not responded. The court also stated that the defendant did not appeal before the court despite multiple summons and notices.
Delhi High Court ruled in favour of Tata Sons and permanently restrained the company from using the trademark, ‘TATA’.
J&K&L HC: Medical Claim Cannot be Denied Solely for Having Undergone Emergency Treatment in a Hospital Not Prescribed by Government Order.
The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has ruled that an employee cannot be denied medical reimbursement for the sole reason that he has undergone treatment in a hospital that is not recognised or approved by the state or not included in the Government order.
The deceased in this case got seriously ill while performing his duties, and was shifted to Government Medical College Hospital, Jammu in 2009. He was shifted to Apollo Hospital, New Delhi in the emergency wing as his health continued to deteriorate. Based on the tests conducted, he was diagnosed to be suffering from Blood cancer. He was shifted to AIIMS (New Delhi) as the family did not have the means to continue the treatment in Apollo. The family felt that the response of the AIIMS doctors was not good and hence shifted back to Apollo for Chemotherapy.
As per the ‘BSNL Employee Medical Reimbursement Policy’, an employee and his/her dependants are entitled to reimbursement of expenses at the approved rates at all hospitals recognised from time to time by the management.
Justice Wasim Sadiq Nargal observed that this scheme also provides that in emergency cases, reimbursement would be allowed for treatment in non-recognised hospitals with the required approvals of the higher officials.
The court vouched for the liberal application of the scheme and that the technicality of the rules and regulations are not required to be followed just in a mechanical manner, which defeats the very purpose of the Scheme. It was of the opinion that each case needs to be examined on its own facts and that preserving health and medical aid aligns with the Right to Life as envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The court allowed the petition and directed the respondents i.e., to process the medical bills and release the amount in favour of the petitioners within a period of two months.
Supreme Court: When Two Views are Possible in Cases Related to Land Acquisition Compensation, Preference Should be for the One Which Advances Cause of Justice
In the case, Kazi Moinuddin Kazi Bashiroddin & Ors, vs. The Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation, the Supreme Court was of the view that in matters dealing with payment of compensation to land losers, preference ought to be given to the view that advanced the cause of justice rather than a technical view.
In this case, a land loser is a person whose land has been acquired by the Government for public interest and who possesses a proper certificate. In the specific case, Maharashtra Tourism Development Corporation (MTDC) argued before the High Court that as per the directions issued in 2016, it has deposited 50% of the compensation awarded. However, it further proceeded to deposit a further amount of Rs. 1.37 crores by mistake and hence, it is entitled to withdraw the same.
The contention of MTDC was that, as per the terms of the High court order, 50% of the compensation was with security and the remaining 50% without security. Hence, it was not yet required to deposit 50% of the balance compensation and therefore needs to be allowed to withdraw the amount.
The High court accepted the submission made by MTDC and allowed them to withdraw the aforesaid amount. The appellant was aggrieved by this order and approached Supreme Court. The Supreme court stated that as per the facts of record, the High Court order regarding compensation explicitly states that 50% of the compensation was to be deposited without security and the balance after furnishing security.
However, there is no question about the total amount to be compensated. The submission by MTDC and the view by the High Court allowing MTDC to withdraw the additional amount deposited is a technical view. It was of the opinion that in matters of compensation, such technical view needs to be overlooked and the compensation to the extent of what is granted needs to be allowed.
Supreme Court: In a Case of Circumstantial Evidence, Heavy Duty is Caused Upon the Prosecution to Prove a Case Beyond Reasonable Doubt.
The Supreme court bench comprising of Chief Justice UU Lalit, Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia, was looking into an appeal filed by an accused person who was convicted in the murder of a 72-year-old man.
The accused were awarded a life sentence by the Trial Court, which was upheld by Karnataka High Court.  An F.I.R, was lodged in October 2000, by the son-in-law of the deceased, stating that unknown persons murdered this father-in-law. As per the post-mortem report, he died because of a deep incised wound on the front neck. Based on a lead, the investigating officer caught the accused along with four other persons. The formal arrest of all five was made on 01 February 2001. A voluntary statement was given by one of them, which was followed by a confession by all five of the murder. Charges were framed under Section 302/396, read with Section 34 of IPC. They were convicted by the Trail Court and upheld by High Court.
4 of the 5 accused appealed before the Supreme Court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution was able to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The bench was of the opinion that the circumstantial evidence must be complete, and the chain of evidence must point towards the culpability of the accused.
It highlighted that this was missing for the prosecution’s case and that it was based on the confessional statement.
The bench was of the opinion that both Trial and the Appellate court were completely wrong in relying on the voluntary statements of the accused and their video-recorded statements.
The Supreme Court bench also overlooked the allegations that they were involved in 20-25 such cases, of which no proof was provided. The Supreme Court stated that both the Trial court and the High court ignored the well-established principles of criminal jurisprudence and have relied upon facts and evidence which are clearly inadmissible in a court of law.
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SC rules that state has affirmative obligation to facilitate access to education
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
April 21, 2021
In this roundup of important court judgments, we look at constitutional court remarks & directions regarding the State’s obligation to enable access to higher education, the nature of crimes under UAPA, the validity of extrajudicial modes of divorce for Muslim women, and employment discrimination.
Supreme Court: State has an affirmative obligation to facilitate access to education, at all levels.
In the case of Farzana Batool vs. Union of India and others, the apex court held that the State has an affirmative obligation to facilitate access to education, at all levels.
The court was hearing a plea filed by two students from Ladakh who were nominated by the Administration of Ladakh for admission into the MBBS degree course under the ‘central pool’ seats. One of them has been allocated against a seat at Lady Hardinge Medical College (LHMC) and the other has been assigned to Maulana Azad Medical College (MAMC). These students have not yet been admitted to their course of studies despite due nomination by the Administration of the Union Territory of Ladakh.
In view of the above, the court directed that the admission formalities for both the petitioner be completed immediately and, in any event, within a week from the date of the judgment. The case was represented primarily as procedural difficulty in accessing higher education. However, the court used this opportunity to underscore the obligation of government to enable the right to pursue higher education with respect to Part III of the Constitution.
In lieu of this petition, the court issued general directions in order to obviate the possibility of similarly placed students. The court held that financial hardship should not prevent the students from getting admission in terms of the allocation which has been made in their favour legitimately under the central pool seats.
The judgement notes that this right is of greater importance for students whose background (by virtue of such characteristics as caste, class, gender, religion, disability, and geographical region) imposes formidable obstacles on their path to accessing quality education. The judgement highlights the findings of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The ICESCR was formed to monitor the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which was ratified by India in 1979. The Committee pertinently notes that disparities in policies that result in differing qualities of education for persons residing in different geographic locations may constitute discrimination under the Covenant. Each state party is required to fulfill the right to education, by facilitating and providing for its realization. Pursuant to these obligations which India has undertaken by being a signatory to the Covenant, the court directed the state governments to ensure proper coordination so that students allocated colleges under the central pool seats are not put to hardship in enrolling once they have been duly allocated their seats. Specifically, the court directed that the Union Government can consider appointing a nodal officer tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that students who are duly nominated under the central pool seats are in fact admitted in their chosen course of study. The court recommended that the details of such officers can be widely publicized on the websites of the central & state authorities. Such an institutional framework, the court believes will ensure that students are not left in the lurch due to lack of help in securing their legitimate admission to the appropriate course. In this way, the court concluded, it will help remedy the broader problem of which the present case is a symptom.
Gauhati HC: Mere Civil Disturbance will not be UAPA Offence unless committed with intention to commit ‘Terrorist Act’
In case State v. Akhil Gogoi, the high court held that merely causing civil disturbances, without the element of intention to cause ‘terrorist act’ would not fall within the ambit of unlawful activity under section 2(1)(o) of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA Act).
The petition was filed by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) against the judgment and order of October 2020 passed by Special Court, NIA, Assam allowing the respondent (Akhil Gogoi) to go on bail after submission of charge-sheet by the Investigating Agency.
It was alleged that Akhil Gogoi had led a crowd of 6000 persons and caused economic blockade and pelting of stones. In the FIR, it has also been alleged that the mob led by the respondent had tried to murder police personnel on duty. While the matter was under investigation by the State Police, by the order of December 2019 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, investigation of this case was entrusted to the NIA. The NIA court had allowed the respondent to go on bail on furnishing a bond of Rs. 30,000 with one surety of the same amount to the satisfaction of the Court.
Upon examining submissions from both sides, the high court contended that the basic allegation against the respondent (Akhil Gogoi) is that of making provocative speeches inciting the public to resort to violence. The judgement notes that it may be true that the violence resorted by the members of the mob was the direct fall out of the speech delivered by the respondent. However, what would be of utmost significance, in this case, is to consider whether the accused/ respondent had delivered such provocative speeches with the intent to commit a “terrorist act” within the meaning of section 15(1)(a) of the Act of 1967, thereby challenging the unity, integrity, security, and sovereignty of India. To that end, the investigation is still underway.
The high court held that the order was passed after taking into consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances of Akhil Gogoi’s case. It is settled principle in law that the power of the Court to grant bail is discretionary in nature. The high court was conscious of the fact that the trial is yet to commence in this case. Therefore, upon examining the arguments from both sides, the high court concluded that there is no good ground to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the Special Court, NIA to allow bail for Akhil Gogoi.
Kerala HC: Issued directions to Family Courts on the course to follow while adjudicating cases that involved extra judicial modes of divorce for Muslim women.
While upholding the validity of the extrajudicial modes of divorce for women, the Kerala High Court issued directions to Family Courts on the course to follow while adjudicating cases that involved these methods.
The court was examining the question of whether Muslim women have lost their right to invoke extra-judicial divorce, after the coming into force of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939.
The Court directed that in the matter of extra-judicial modes of divorce i.e. talaq, khula, mubaraat, talaq-e-tafwiz, the Family Courts have to entertain such applications moved by either or both parties to declare the marital status of such parties.
The Bench specially instructed Family Courts not to adjudicate upon extra-judicial divorce unless it was called upon to do so in an appropriate manner. The Family Court shall endeavour to dispose the cases treating it as uncontested matter, without any delay by passing a formal order declaring the marital status
Kerala HC: Women Can’t Be Denied Employment Saying Work Involves Night Hours
In the case Treasa Josfine vs State of Kerala and others, the high court held that a woman who is fully qualified cannot be denied of her right to be considered for employment only on the basis of her gender.
The court was hearing an appeal against a job notification issued by Kerala Minerals and Metals Limited which allowed only male candidates to apply for the post. The petitioner worked as a Graduate Engineer Trainee (Safety) at Kerala Minerals and Metals Limited for a few months between 2018 and 2020.  A permanent post of Safety Officer became available in the company and a notification was published inviting applications for the said post. However, it is stated in the notification that only male candidates need to apply for the post.
The company i.e. Kerala Minerals and Metals Limited submitted that the post of Safety Officer is a statutory post and the provisions of the Factories Act have to be complied with. It is submitted by the organization that as per Section 66(1)(b) of the Factories Act, 1948, women employees shall not be required or permitted to work except between 6 am and 7 pm. Safety Officer is a round-the-clock post and that the person engaged as Safety Officer will have to work even during the night time if required. Since women cannot be engaged in factories beyond 7 pm, permission cannot be accorded for considering women for the appointment.
The state government submitted that the Labour Department has formulated a draft ordinance for amendment of the Factories Act, 1948 enabling women employees to work night shifts, which was approved by the Council of Ministers in August 2020 and the Labour Department has issued a letter to the Secretary, Ministry of Home, Government of India for approval of the President. The amendment has not been brought into effect and therefore, going by the present situation, the restriction for women to be engaged in factories after 7 pm. and before 6 am continues to be in force.
After considering all submissions, the high court held that Section 66(1)(b), which is a protective provision, cannot be relied on to deny appointment to the petitioners only on the ground that they are women. The court also observed that the company could have moved the Government for a permission as provided in Section 66(1)(b), which was not done. Therefore, the denial of employment to the petitioners on the ground that they would have to work night shifts was not sustainable.
The judgement acknowledges that the basic contention of Section 66(1)(b) is beneficial in nature and is intended to protect women from exploitation. However, one has to consider the fact that the Factories Act, 1948 was enacted at a time when requiring a woman to work in an establishment of any nature, more so in a factory, during the night time could only be seen as exploitative and violative of her rights. Women are now being engaged to work during all hours in several industries including Health Care, Aviation and Information Technology. The judgement emphasises that women have been engaged in several professions requiring round the clock labour and have proved themselves quite capable of facing the challenges of such engagement.
In conclusion, the court held that a woman who is fully qualified cannot be denied her right to be considered for employment only on the basis of her gender. The court ordered that it is the bounden duty of the respondents who are Government and Government functionaries to take all appropriate steps to see that a woman is able to carry out the duties assigned to her at all hours, safely and conveniently.
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Review: SC Rules That When a Person Has Relinquished Rights in Father’s Self-Acquired Property, His Sons Are Estopped From Claiming Share
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
February 1, 2023
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgment regarding right to property of successors of heir who has relinquished his rights, Karnataka High Court’s judgment in an accident insurance case, Kerala High Court’s observation relating to non-entitlement for maintenance of an unmarried daughter, Supreme Court’s observation regarding temporary acquisition infringing Right to property and Madras High Court’s judgment establishing primacy of UGC.
Supreme Court: When a person has relinquished rights in father’s self-acquired property, his sons are estopped from claiming share.
Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice K.M. Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy observed that when a son relinquishes the right to the self-acquired property of the father, then the principle of estoppel is applied, and his sons do not have a claim on that property.
As per the case details, a suit for the partition of the property was filed by two children from a man’s second marriage. The property was a self-acquired property of Sengalani Chettiar, who had a son from his first marriage. He further has five daughters and a son from his second marriage.
Chandran, the son from his first marriage executed a ‘Release Deed’ in 1975 before his death. Chettiar died in 1988 and his wife from his second marriage died in 2005.
Subsequently, the suit for partition was filed by two of the children from the second marriage. The defendants in the case were the successors of the son from the first marriage. The plea of the plaintiffs was to exclude them based on the Release Deed. However, the Trial court held that the release deed was void as it was executed by the son, while his father was still alive. It proceeded to allot the plaintiffs 2/7 share.  This order was challenged in the High Court and was allowed. The sons of Chandran, son of Chettiar through first marriage approached the Supreme court.
Supreme Court noted that the suit property is a separate property of the Chettiar. It then looked into the tenets of the Transfer of Property Act and observed that the person who would be entitled to succeed upon the death of a relative would not have the right until death. Since it is a separate property and not the case of a co-parcener (acquiring right on a joint family property by birth), the ‘Release Deed’ would not have an effect on the transfer of rights.
The court proceeded to delve into the conduct of the son who has executed the ‘Release Deed’. Based on the ‘Release Deed’, it was inferred that the intention of the father was to deny any right of the son in regard to the property. It was contended that as per the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the natural guardian cannot bind the minor by a personal covenant. The argument put forth by the appellants before the Apex Court was that they were minors at the time of the ‘Release Deed’.
However, the Court refused to discard the ‘Release Deed’ based on this argument and noted that Chandran himself had no right on the property. In regard to estoppel, the Court referred to Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, as per which the rights would not devolve on the appellant whose father was estopped to inherit the property in view of the relinquishment.
The court noted that there is a clear case of estoppel which resulted from Chandran relinquishing his rights, thereby allowing his father i.e., Chettiar free to deal with the property without being haunted by any claims from him or his successors. Hence, the Apex Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.
Karnataka HC: Insurance Company liable if ambulance meets with an accident and patient being shifted for better treatment succumbs to his ailment.
In the case, National Insurance Company Ltd vs. Menpa Maistry & others, a single bench of the Karnataka High Court said that an insurance company is liable to pay compensation to a patient who succumbs to his ailments, when the ambulance in which he is being shifted for better treatment, meets with an accident.
The deceased in this case was suffering from Jaundice. To provide better treatment, he was carried in an ambulance from Chikmagalur to Mangalore. en route, the ambulance which was being rashly driven toppled on an overbridge causing injuries to the deceased, who later succumbed to injuries at Mangalore hospital.
The insurance company initially maintained that there was no connection between the accident and the death of the deceased. The FSL report stated that the death was due to Pneumonia and Tuberculosis and was not on account of the accident. Hence, the claim of the insurance company was that the tribunal ought to have initially rejected the claim.
However, the claimants argued that he would have survived if he was admitted to the Mangalore hospital. The accident in between aggravated the ailment and caused his death. The bench agreed with this and observed that had the patient been successfully carried to Mangalore hospital, he could have been cured, as jaundice is not a fatal ailment and can be treated in such higher medical centres.
It also noted that despite the knowledge that he was carrying a patient, the driver did not take any precautions and his negligence caused the accident. The court further stated that it finds a nexus between the accident and the death of the deceased.
Kerala HC: Major unmarried daughter not entitled to maintenance from father merely on the ground that she is unable to maintain herself.
In the case, Gireesh Kumar N vs. Rajani K V and Anr, Justice A. Badharudeen of Kerala High Court, stated that an unmarried daughter who attained majority cannot claim maintenance from her father, merely on the ground that she does not have any means of sustenance.
It reiterated that the claim of maintenance can be made in case of an unmarried daughter unable to maintain herself due to any physical or mental abnormality, subject to evidence.
The Court was hearing a revision petition against a Family Court order that granted maintenance to the petitioner’s wife and daughter.
One of the questions before the High Court was whether an unmarried daughter can claim maintenance under Section 125(1) of CrPC after attaining a majority. In the case put forward by the petitioner, it was submitted that there is no evidence to substantiate that the daughter suffers from any physical or mental abnormality or injury, which would render her incapable of maintaining herself.
The Court reviewed the evidence and agreed with the submission of the petitioner and noted that there is no evidence to show that the respondent i.e., daughter has any physical or mental abnormality. Hence, it held that the Family Court’s grant of maintenance to the daughter is erroneous.
Supreme Court: Land cannot be kept under temporary acquisition for years as it violates Right to Property.
Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice MR Shah and Justice MM Sundresh held that continuing with the temporary acquisition of land for a number of years would be arbitrary and is said to be infringing on the right to use the property, guaranteed by the Constitution of India.
The bench made this observation in the case, Manubhai Sendhabhai Bharwad and Anr vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd & Ors.
A civil appeal was filed by the appellants, who were also the original writ petitioners and the landowners, in the Supreme Court. They were aggrieved with the judgment passed by the High Court of Gujarat, which dismissed their writ petition to quash temporary acquisition proceedings.
The land in question is under the temporary acquisition of ONGC since 1996 for the purpose of exploration. This land was purchased undisputedly by the appellants in 2005. The appellants stated that they are being paid the rent at the rate of Rs. 24 per sq. meter per annum for temporary acquisition. However, there is an appreciation in the price of the land over the period with development in the surrounding areas.
They had earlier approached the High Court seeking directions to the respondents to either acquire the land on a permanent basis or release the land from acquisition. The writ petition was disposed based on the respondent’s stand that they would initiate the process to acquire the land permanently. Since there was no action in this direction, the appellants once again approached the High Court.
They contended that the temporary acquisition for 25 years is unreasonable, that too with such low rent. Responding to this, ONGC submitted that the request for approval for the acquisition of the land on a permanent basis is under process. ONGC placed an undertaking that the process would be completed in 12 months. Based on this, the High Court rejected the petition to quash the temporary acquisition or increase the rent.
An appeal was filed in the Apex court, wherein the appellants submitted that temporary holding of the land for 25 years and paying less rent is arbitrary and unreasonable.  It was also submitted that it has been six years since the assurance to permanently secure the land was made.
ONGC stated that the land was acquired temporarily for exploration and the rent has been paid subject to revision from time to time, which was voluntarily accepted by the owners.
The Supreme Court stressed on the fact that the land in question is in temporary acquisition for a long period of 26 years. If it continues with the same, the purpose of temporary acquisition loses its significance. It stated that this infringes on the right to use the property guaranteed under Article 300 A of the Constitution of India.
It noted that a writ of mandamus was issued by the High Court to ONGC to complete the acquisition on or before 26 April 2023, and on the failure of which, there would be necessary consequences.
Madras HC: Upholds UGC’s power to impose territorial restrictions on Distance Education Courses.
In the case University Grants Commission and Anr vs. Annamalai University & Ors., Madras High Court upheld the power of UGC to impose regulations for the conduct of Distance education programmes by the Universities.
In August 2012, UGC has imposed a condition that the territorial jurisdiction with respect to the distance education programs was to be decided by the Distance Education Council (DEC).
DEC held that the territorial jurisdiction of the State Universities will be as per the Acts and Statutes of the universities but not beyond the boundaries of the respective states.
This was challenged by many universities on the ground that DEC has acted beyond its powers under the UGC Act and Annamalai University Act 1929. It was submitted that the condition would defeat the very purpose of distance education.
UGC countered this with the submission that the direction was a result of the observations made by the Apex Court in an earlier case wherein the Court criticised the manner in which permissions were granted to universities offering distance education programmes.
The High Court noted that Parliament and UGC have supremacy over the matters relating to the determination of standards in institutions of higher education. It upheld the power of UGC and gave relief to the students who were already admitted to the educational institutions.

created: February 1, 2023


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Review: SC Rules, ‘When There's Direct Evidence Proving Accused's Guilt, Motive Becomes Insignificant’
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
April 17, 2024
In this edition of court judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgement that when there’s direct evidence proving the accused’s guilt, the motive becomes insignificant, that people have the right to be free from Climate Change’s adverse effects, that contesting candidates need not disclose each and every moveable property owned by them or their dependents, Delhi HC’s order that right to be correctly identified is fundamental to a person’s identity, among others.
SC: People have the right to be free from Climate Change’s adverse effects
In the case of MK Ranjitsinh and Others vs. Union of India and Others before the Supreme Court, the writ petition was filed to protect Great Indian Bustards (GIBs) due to their declining population and the serious threat they face. In response to the petition, in April 2021, the Court ordered restrictions on overhead transmission lines across a large area of about 99,000 square kilometres. The Court emphasized the need for underground power lines, especially in the habitats of GIBs. It appointed a committee to assess the feasibility of converting high-voltage power lines underground. The Court also mandated the installation of bird diverters on existing overhead lines in GIB areas and instructed that where feasible, all overhead lines should be converted to underground within a year.
The Committee implemented the Court’s order, granting approvals where undergrounding of power lines wasn’t feasible. Respondents, including key ministries, sought modification of the order citing adverse impacts on India’s power sector and energy transition, lack of consultation, international commitments to non-fossil fuels, technical challenges in undergrounding, and concerns about pollution from alternative energy sources.
The Bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra modified the Apex Court’s above order. Observing that it is best to leave the issue to the domain experts, the Court asked the committee to submit a report by 31 July 2024 upon examining the report holistically.
While passing the order, the Bench also discussed the issue of climate change in the country. It observed that Article 48A deals with the obligation of the State for environmental protection while Article 51A(g) highlights citizens’ duty to care for nature. Further, it noted that even though there isn’t a specific right recognized against climate change’s impacts, Articles 14 (equality before law and the equal protection of laws) and 21 (right to life and personal liberty) pave the way for people’s right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change. It also emphasized the growing severity of climate change which highlights the importance of establishing this right as a separate and distinct one.
SC: When there’s direct evidence proving the accused’s guilt, the motive becomes insignificant
The appellant in the case, Chandan vs. State (Delhi) was convicted under Section 302 of IPC for committing a daylight murder. The eyewitness to the crime was thoroughly cross-examined by the defence and nothing emerged to discredit her testimony. She detailed the events, describing how the accused fatally stabbed the victim and how she witnessed it from close range, all happening quickly. The accused was apprehended on the same day near the crime scene with the knife, confirmed by forensic analysis to be the weapon used in the crime, with the victim’s blood matching that found on the knife recovered from the accused. The conviction and sentence of the Trial Court were upheld by the High Court as well.
The defence’s argument was that there was no established motive for the accused for the murder. However, the Supreme Court Bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and PB Varale held that in a case where the eyewitness testimony is solid and not challenged, the motive doesn’t matter much. The court noted that all the evidence presented by the prosecution convincingly proves the guilt of the accused and dismissed the appeal.
SC: Election candidates need not disclose each and every moveable property owned by them or their dependents
Karikho Kri, who won as an independent MLA from Arunachal Pradesh’s Tezu Assembly constituency in 2019, faced an Election Petition from Congress candidate Nuney Tayang challenging the election result in Kri’s favour. Tayang’s petition sought to nullify Kri’s election, alleging that Kri provided inaccurate information in his nomination papers and failed to disclose the three vehicles owned by his wife and son. It was also claimed that Kri didn’t submit necessary “no dues certificates” for rent, electricity, and telephone charges. The High Court nullified Kri’s election because he didn’t meet the nomination paper requirements of Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, making them liable for rejection under Section 36(2)(b) of the same Act.
Kri then appealed to the Supreme Court in Karikho Kri vs. Nuney Tayang. The Supreme Court Bench of Justices Anirudhha Bose and Sanjay Kumar observed that candidates contesting elections need not disclose each and every moveable property owned by them or their dependents unless they are of substantial value or reflect a luxurious lifestyle. Further, it added that candidates shouldn’t have to reveal every detail of their lives to voters. Their right to privacy remains intact, especially regarding matters unrelated to their suitability for public office. Not disclosing every asset doesn’t necessarily mean there’s a significant problem with their candidacy, it held and quashed the High Court’s order. It held Kri’s candidature valid.
Kerala HC: Schools should maintain proper playgrounds
This writ petition was filed by the President of the Parent Teachers Association and the Managing Committee Member of the Government Welfare Lower Primary School in Kerala, challenging the decision of the district panchayat to construct a water tank on the school grounds. The plan to construct the water tank was then dropped and the matter had become infructuous. Acknowledging this, the Kerala High Court emphasized the significance of playgrounds in schools such as improving the physical skills of the children like flexibility and balance motor skills, hand-eye coordination and heart and lung function, along with social skills, cognitive skills, and emotional skills. Education should not be restricted in classrooms, it stated.
The court referred to Chapter IV Rule 3 of the Kerala Education Rules, emphasizing that every school must have appropriate playgrounds for games and sports, with adequate clear space as per the rule. It noted that some authorities are exploiting the lack of specific guidelines under these rules and avoiding maintaining proper playgrounds. The court ordered that these guidelines must be formulated within four months. If schools don’t follow this, it can end in even closure of the school.
Delhi HC: Right to be correctly identified is fundamental to a person’s identity
In Pragati Shrivastava vs. the Secretary, Central Board Of Secondary Education and another, the petitioner had filed a plea seeking a direction on the CBSE that her father’s name be changed from her Class X and XII mark sheets.
Justice C Hari Shankar of the Delhi High Court referred to an old Supreme Court Judgement which stated that discrepancies between public documents and school records regarding an individual’s name are not crucial. However, the CBSE could protect itself by obtaining an affidavit from the candidate or including a disclaimer on the certificate stating that any name change is at the candidate’s request based on public documents provided by them.
The High Court also emphasized that the court needs to take a realistic approach in these situations, understanding that a person’s name is crucial as it identifies who they are and their family lineage. This right to be correctly identified is fundamental to a person’s identity, so the Court should grant genuine name change requests when requested. In this case, the Delhi High Court allowed the plea and directed the CBSE to issue fresh Class X and Class XII marksheets to the petitioner reflecting the changed name of her father.


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SC says demand of money for construction of a house is a dowry demand and is punishable
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
January 19, 2022
In this roundup of Court Judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s observation on custody of children where the child’s welfare is of paramount importance, the apex Court’s judgment regarding the retrospective change in rules affecting employee benefits, observation regarding the broader definition of dowry and the apex court’s directions to the State governments to not delay the identification and rehabilitation of Street Children.
Supreme Court: Rights of Parents are irrelevant when the Court decides custody on their child.
In Vasudha Sethi vs. Kiran V. Bhaskar, the Supreme Court observed that the rights of the parents are irrelevant, in case the court has already decided the issue of custody of their minor child. The bench of Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka observed that the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration and the custody of the child needs to be determined based on the welfare of the child.
In this particular case, the Punjab and Haryana High court has earlier issued several directions while allowing a petition for habeas corpus filed by the husband seeking custody of the minor child. The High court directed the mother to return to the USA along with the minor child on or before 30 September 2021.
The mother approached the Supreme Court, challenging this order. The mother contended that as the primary caregiver, her legal rights must be respected and protected by the court.
The Apex Court bench referred to Kanika Goel vs. the State of Delhi (2018) and Prateek Gupta vs. Shilpi Gupta (2018).
The court also cited Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956. As per Section 13 (1), the welfare of the minor is of paramount importance while appointing a guardian of a minor.
The court made the following observations:
Considering these, the SC modified the directions of the High Court and stated that it would be left to the willingness or the priorities of the parent, in this case, the mother, who has been entrusted with the custody of the child. The court passed on an order with various conditions for both the mother & the father.
The Apex Court made it clear that the welfare of the child takes precedence and is of utmost importance in determining the custody of the child. Any of the parent’s rights regarding the custody of the child become irrelevant, with the welfare of the child being paramount.
Supreme Court: Any rules which take away the vested rights of employees retrospectively are in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of The Constitution.
The Apex Court observed that any amendment to the current rules which has a retrospective effect and takes away the benefits of the employees under the current rules is a violation of the tenets laid down in Article 14 and Article 21.
In the case of “The Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural Development Bank Ltd. Vs the Registrar, Cooperative Societies and Others” , the bench comprising of Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka observed that, if the employee has already been promoted and included in a particular pay scale, it cannot be taken away retrospectively with a new set of rules. This is in violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Indian Constitution.
The case pertains to a Bank pension scheme that was introduced and later rolled back. The employees of Punjab State Co-operative Agricultural Development Bank Limited, Chandigarh were members of the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), the provisions of which were duly complied by employees and the employer.
As per the recommendations from the Punjab pay commission, the Bank introduced a new pension scheme for the employees in 1989 through the “Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural Land Mortgage Bank Service (Common Cadre) Rules 1978.” The employees were given an option to either choose this scheme or the one under EPF Act, 1952. Those who responded chose the new scheme and were paid until 2010.
In May 2010, the Bank found the scheme to be unviable on account of a shortage of funds. The Bank stated that the pension scheme would not apply to employees employed after 01 January 2004. Despite the Registrar turning down this proposal, the Board of Directors of the Bank went ahead and reverted to the earlier Contributory PF scheme.
The Bench observed that the non-availability of financial resources cannot be cited as a reason for discontinuing a scheme.
The court referred to its own judgement in Chairman, Railway Board & Ors, where it stated that a rule which reverses an earlier benefit is considered as a violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the constitution.
The bench directed that the arrears be paid towards the pension of the retired employees up to 31 December 2021, in 12 monthly installments, by the end of December 2022. For those employees who accepted a one-time settlement, the dues need to be paid after adjusting for the arrears.
Thus, in the current case, the SC agreed with its earlier rulings, where any new rules that retrospectively make changes to the benefits of the employees are in violation of the rights granted by the Indian Constitution.
Supreme Court: Observes that demand of money for the construction of a house is a dowry demand and is a punishable offence.
A bench comprising of the Chief Justice NV Ramana, Justice AS Bopanna and Justice Hima Kohli, observed that the demand for money for the construction of a house is a dowry demand and is a punishable offence under IPC 304B. It stated that the word ‘Dowry” needs to have an expansive meaning to include any demand made on a woman, whether in respect to property or other valuable security.
In the case State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra, the trial court convicted the husband and the father-in-law under IPC Sections 304B, 306 and 498A. The accused demanded money from the deceased wife for constructing a house, which her family was unable to provide. She was subjected to constant harassment and cruelty that led to her suicide.
In appeal, the High Court held that the demand for money for the construction of a house cannot be treated as a demand for dowry and hence the offence under IPC Section 304B cannot be held against them. The apex court disagreed with the views of the high court and observed that a liberal interpretation needs to be taken up which would take into consideration the intention of the parties.
Any interpretation of the provision of the law that defeats the idea of having the law in place needs to be shunned and an interpretation that promotes the idea needs to be considered.
The Apex Court observed that the trial court has correctly interpreted the demand for money to construct a house falling within the definition of the word ‘dowry’.
Thus, the bench restored the conviction of the accused under Section 304B IPC.
Supreme Court: Directs States not to delay the identification and rehabilitation process of Street Children
In the perusal of an affidavit filed by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), a bench comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice B.V. Nagarathna directed the states to complete the identification and rehabilitation process of the Children in Street Situations (CISS) at the earliest.
In view of the slow progress in the identification process, the Supreme Court directed all the District Magistrates to involve Special Juvenile Police Units, District Legal Service Authorities, and voluntary organizations.
The Court has also directed the states to frame a policy for rehabilitation of Street children with the guidance of the NCPCR.
Additional Solicitor General, K.M. Natraj appearing on behalf of NCPCR highlighted three aspects of this issue before the court.
In its order, the apex court directed the State governments to instruct all the concerned authorities not to delay the identification and rehabilitation of the Street Children.
It stated that although the progress of identification of street children and providing them with the basic amenities is slow, the state governments have initiated the work towards discharging their constitutional duty of protecting the marginalized street children.
Featured Image: Important Court Judgements

created: January 19, 2022