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CRM of Rural Development Ministry notes that SAGY has not made any significant impact
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
April 3, 2021
The Sansad Adarsh Gram Yojana (SAGY) was launched in October 2014 to make socio-economic & infrastructural development in select villages. However, a CRM team of the Ministry of Rural Development notes that that scheme has made no significant impact except in a few villages.
Sansad Adarsh Gram Yojana (SAGY) was launched on 11 October 2014. Under the Yojana, Members of Parliament (MPs) will be responsible for developing the socio-economic and physical infrastructure of three villages each by 2019, and a total of eight villages each by 2024. The goal of the scheme is to translate the comprehensive and organic vision of Mahatma Gandhi into reality by nurturing values of national pride, community spirit, self-confidence, and developing infrastructure.
The vision behind SAGY villages is to create model villages by ensuring convergence of schemes and its implementation on priority basis. The main objectives of SAGY are:
The chronology of activities involved in SAGY include:
The following table shows the major parameters with respect to the progress of SAGY to date.
Trends in Identification of GPs
Members of Parliament can select any gram panchayat, except their own village or their spouse’s, to be developed as an Adarsh Gram.  Lok Sabha MPs can choose a village from their constituency, and Rajya Sabha MPs from the state from which they are elected.  Nominated members can choose a village from any district of the country.  MPs who represent urban constituencies can identify a village from a neighbouring rural constituency.
This chart is as per the latest data available on the SAGY official website. The percentage indicates the progress in the identification of villages compared to the total number of MPs from a particular state. For instance, Manipur has 2 Lok Sabha MPs and one Rajya Sabha MP. During SAGY-I, the number of identified villages is 33% more than what they are supposed to identify. In some cases, the percentage is more than 100% since nominated MPs may choose a Gram Panchayat from the rural area of any district in the country.
The following graph compares the identification of gram panchayats in SAGY-I (2014-19) and SAGY-II (2019-24) in different states.
The graph shows a significant decline in the percentage of GPs identified in the SAGY-II as compared to SAGY-I. All the states reported a lower number of identified GPs in the second round, with Tripura being the only exception. Many states such as Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Delhi, Ladakh, and West Bengal have not reported any identified GP for the second round of SAGY. Reportedly, more than half of MPs have not yet adopted a village under the scheme in 2019-2024 (SAGY II).
Review of Implementation
In its Common Review Mission (CRM), the Ministry of Rural Development conducts an independent assessment of the progress under various programmes and schemes. In the 2019 report, the CRM team visited the states and concluded that the scheme has not made any significant impact on the socio-economic development of selected gram panchayats.
A team comprising of retired bureaucrats, academics, and research organisations, etc. visited around 120 villages, in 21 districts across eight states. Some of the major findings of the report are:
The report concludes that even though in some cases where MPs have been proactive, some infrastructural development has taken place, but the scheme has not made any significant impact.


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Review: Decoding the ‘Performance Grading Index (PGI)’ of Districts on Education
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
July 7, 2022
The Performance Grading Index (PGI) provides insights into the working conditions of the school education system. The index covers multiple areas of interventions that directly/indirectly influence the education system. The Ministry of Education recently released the PGI for districts. Here is a deep dive.
Education is one of the important determinants of the prosperity of a nation. The system of education determines the extent to which the populace is equipped to deal with the ever-changing global challenges. It acts as the foundation, above which the rest of the structures lay. While developing an education system is one thing, its constant up-gradation and monitoring is another aspect, which is often ignored.
Indian Education system is one of the largest in the world, with over 250 million children, and 8.5 million teachers in more than 1.5 million schools. To deal with great diversity across different regions, this education system is stratified into various hierarchical levels, the epicentre being the Union Government. Both Union Government and State Governments have powers to make legislations on education. Several schemes have been initiated by both Union and State Governments for improving the access and quality of education. It, therefore, becomes of utmost importance to have clear monitoring standards to enable the efficient and smooth performance of the education system in India.
The Performance Grading Index (PGI) is one such tool that provides insights into the working conditions of the school education system. It is touted as the key tool to enable transformational change in the education system. One highlight of this index is the horizontal spread of this index, covering multiple areas of interventions that directly/indirectly influence the education system. The Ministry of Education recently released the PGI for districts. Today’s story looks at the details of the index, and the various trends.
Methodology behind PGI
PGI is done at two levels- States and Districts. This index does not use any primary data for its grading. It uses the existing secondary data from Unified District Information System for Education (UDISE), the National Achievement Survey (NAS) of NCERT, the Mid-Day Meal website, the Public Financial Management System (PFMS), and the Shagun portal.
For state-level index, PGI is structured in two categories- Outcomes, and Governance & Management. The outcomes category is further divided into domains such as learning outcomes and quality, access, infrastructure and facilities, and equity.  The cumulative weightage is for 1000, out of which the Governance process counts for 360, while the Outcomes comprise of 640 points. Out of this 640, learning outcomes and quality is given 180, access is given 80, infrastructure and facilities hold 150, and equity is given 230 points.
The PGI follows a grading method, instead of ranking. It allows the states with the same performance to be at similar levels, without causing any stigma attached. The Grading index followed for states is as below.
For the districts, this index is slightly tweaked. The total weightage is 600 points, divided into 6 categories – Outcomes (290), Effective Classroom Transaction (90), Infrastructure Facilities & Student’s entitlements (51), School Safety & Child Protection (35), Digital Learning (50), and Governance Process (84). The index has given more than 60% weightage to qualitative indicators. The grade-wise nomenclature for states and districts is as below.
Key Highlights- PGI state
States vs. PGI Grades
As stated earlier, the primary objective of the PGI is to bring transformational change to the school education system. It is a relatively new index, starting from the year 2017-18. So far, three reports have been published. If we look at the performance of the states over these three years, an incremental transformation can be seen quite clearly. In 2017-18, only three states scored above 800. In 2018-19, this increased to five states, and in 2019-20, nearly twenty states/UTs have scored more than 800. The concentration of states in 2017-18 was highest in Grade III to Grade V bracket, while in 2018-19, Grade II to Grade III had the highest concentration. In 2019-20, Grade I++ to Grade II had the highest presence of states/UTs. This represents a clear improvement in the performance of states. However, no state in these three years achieved the top-most grade, i.e., Level-1.
States’ performance over the years
It is observed that the performance of the states improved over the last three years. However, this improvement is not uniform across the states. Some states saw a huge jump, while some remained at the same level. States like Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal improved from Level VIII in 2017-18 to Level IV in 2019-20, and Maharashtra rose from Level VII to Level III during the same period. Madhya Pradesh remained at Level VII during the same period. States like Telangana, Bihar, Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan improved marginally. The State of Chhattisgarh is the only one to fall in Grades from Level VI to Level VII during these three years. Ladakh’s performance also fell from Level VI in 2018-19 to Level X in 2019-20.
What caused these improvements?
While there has been considerable improvement in the states’ position in PGI grades, it is also important to look at the reasons behind such improvement. As noted earlier, the grading is done for five domains – learning outcomes and quality, access, infrastructure and facilities, equity, and Governance Process. The top and least performers (Change in scores from 2019-20 to 2017-18 report) excluding northeastern states and UTs, in each domain is as follows
The domain-specific analysis points out that improvement in the Governance process is one of the important factors leading to a jump in PGI scores. The improvement in access for all states is very minimal. The scores in Learning Outcomes and Quality domain remained the same since the source of data is the same, i.e., National Achievement Survey, 2017. Some states performed better in improving infrastructure and facilities. Very few states performed in enhancing equity. Below is the distribution of top states for which scores have improved, and states for which scores have decreased from the 2017-18 level. These improvements could also be due to the improved data collection and reporting mechanisms since most of the data is self-reported by the states.
Key Highlights- PGI districts
Districts vs. PGI Grades
The Performance Grading Index for districts is a relatively new addition, with only two years of data being available. In 2018-19, around 725 districts were ranked, whereas in 2019-20, eight new districts were added, taking the total count to 733. The comparison of gradings from these two years indicates an improvement in the performance of the district. In 2018-19, no district was in the Utkarsh grade, while this has increased to 3 in 2019-20. Similarly, the number of districts in Atti-Uttam grade increased from 49 to 86, and in Uttam grade from 267 to 276 in 2019-20. Note that no district was categorized under the top grade. ‘Daksh’ in either of these years.
Domain wise PGI District Score Card
Insights for a future action plan are provided by the domain-by-category analysis, which highlights areas of strong practices and weak ties among districts. Domain-specific grade card also gives a hint about how the districts are placed with respect to each domain. In the Outcomes domain, around 343 districts had improvement in their scores, while in the Effective Classroom Transactions (ECT) domain, nearly 510 districts have improved. In the Infrastructure, Facilities, Student Entitlements (IF & SE), 478 districts improved, while in School Safety and Child Protection (SS &CP), 125 districts performed better. In the recently added Digital Learning (DL) domain, 63 districts have improved, while in the Governance process, 103 districts have improved in their scores.
As for the concentration of districts in different grades, in the outcomes domain, the majority of the districts are concentrated in the Prachesta-1 and Prachesta-2 grades, while in the ECT domain, the major concentration is in the Utkarsh and Atti-Uttam grades. Similarly, for IF & SE domain, Utkarsh, Uttam, and Atti-Uttam have more concentration, while for School Safety and Child Protection, Daksh and Uttam have more districts. In the digital learning domain, the concentration of districts is higher towards the least side of the grading – Akanshi-1,2 &3. In the Governance process, the concentration is distributed among the top four grade levels.
A considerable improvement is necessary for outcomes and digital learning domains for a majority of the districts to perform better in the upcoming ranking.
Some concerns
As can be seen from above, NAS includes private unaided schools also. For the PGI grading, data from NAS is selected. However, certain PGI indicator level data seeks data only from Government and aided schools.
For the computation of these scores in PGI, whether only data from Government and aided schools are shortlisted and chosen from the NAS survey report, is not clear. If the data is directly dumped from the NAS, then the learning outcomes and quality scores in PGI could be misleading.
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author: Sai Krishna Muthyanolla


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Review: Delhi HC Notes That POCSO Was Never Meant to Criminalize Consensual Romantic Relationships Between Young Adults.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
November 16, 2022
In this hundredth edition of court judgements review, we look at the judgements of the Supreme Court in matters of fee regulation in private medical colleges, appointment of vice-chancellors in universities, repudiation of contract based on IRDA Regulations, Delhi High Court’s decision on bail in POCSO case, and Kerala High Court’s decision on termination of pregnancy.
Supreme Court: Education is not a business to earn profit. The tuition fee shall always be affordable.
In Narayana Medical College vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., the Supreme Court quashed a Government Order (G.O.) issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh, that sought to increase the tuition fee of private medical colleges by seven times. The apex court remarked that the tuition fee shall always be affordable, and education is not a business for earning profit.
The two-judge bench comprising of Justices MR Shah and Sudhanshu Dhulia was hearing an appeal filed by the medical college against the judgement of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh that had earlier quashed the G.O. In an early judgement in P.A. Inamdar and   Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors, the apex court authorized the states to fix the maximum amount that can be charged as fees to prevent the commercialisation of the education system. Accordingly, the Andhra Pradesh Government has passed the Andhra Pradesh Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee (for Professional courses offered in private unaided professional institutions) Rules, 2006.
Rule 4 of the above rules provides for the fee fixation by the Admissions and Fees Regulatory Committee (AFRC).
For the academic years 2017 to 2020, the State Government, without waiting for the report of AFRC, and following representations from Private medical colleges, enhanced the tuition fee by seven times to twenty-four lakh per annum. The apex court agreed with the judgement of the High Court and held that decision of this Court in the instance of P.A. Inamdar as well as the pertinent sections of the Rules, 2006, both forbid raising the tuition fee without the AFRC’s recommendations.
On the question of the High Court’s decision to refund the fee that is already being collected, the apex court held that if the AFRC’s proposal is higher than the earlier fee, the colleges are open to recovering the same. However, till such time, retaining the funds collected pursuant to an illegal G.O is prohibited and the High Court’s judgement in this regard is error-free. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, and a cost of 5 Lakhs is imposed which is to be paid by the appellant and the State Government, equally.
Supreme Court: As per UGC Regulations, 2018, the selection for the post of Vice-Chancellor should be through proper identification from a ‘panel of names’ recommended by a Search-cum-Selection Committee.
A two-judged bench of the Supreme Court, in Prof. Narendra Singh Bhandari vs. Ravindra Jugran and Others, set aside the appeal against the decision of the Uttarakhand High Court which quashed the appointment of the appellant as the Vice-Chancellor of Soban Singh Jeena University.
Aggrieved by the decision of Uttarakhand High Court, the appellant approached the apex court regarding the appointment to the post of vice-chancellor to the Soban Singh Jeena University. The original petitioner claimed that selection as Vice-Chancellor was unlawful because just one name was presented to the Chief Minister by the Search Committee, and he was chosen and appointed as Vice-Chancellor without any further notice.
In defence, the original appellant contended that as per the Soban Singh Jeena University Act, 2019, there was no such requirement of having a minimum of 10 years experience as a Professor, and the appellant claimed that he had enough expertise and merit was not compromised in any way. However, the High Court set aside the appointment by holding that such an appointment is contrary to section 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018.
Upon hearing the arguments from both sides, the apex court held that in this instance, it is not fair to say that the appellant’s appointment as vice chancellor complies with the requirements of Section 10 of the University Act, 2019, in accordance with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018. And regarding the argument of the appellant that he was meritorious, and merit was not compromised during the appointment, the court held that
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the High Court judgement is upheld.
Supreme Court: Any non-compliance of Clause (3) and (4) of the IRDA Regulation, 2002 on the part of the insurance companies would take away their right to plead repudiation of the contract.
In M/s Texco Marketing Pvt. Ltd. vs. TATA AIG General Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., the Supreme Court cautioned the insurance companies that any non-compliance of Clause (3) and (4) of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders’ Interests) Regulations, 2002 on the part of the insurance companies would take away their right to plead repudiation of the contract by placing reliance upon any of the terms and conditions included thereunder.
A two-judge bench comprising of Justice Surya Kant, and Justice M.M. Sundresh, was hearing a challenge against the decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, which overturned the decision of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission that held that the insurance company indulged in unfair trade practice by not adequately disclosing the Exclusion Clauses.
The apex court has identified the core legal issue as below.
Insurance contracts are one form of an Adhesion contract. These agreements are created by the insurer using a standard format, and the customer is required to sign them. He/she has very few options or choices, other than to sign on the dotted line, regarding the contract’s stipulations. A consumer may choose to enter into an insurance contract, but the clear intent is to cover any eventuality that may arise in the future. Because of this, is required of an insurer to cover the risk as opposed to a reasonable repudiation, and to do so from the perspective of the consumer.
It is necessary to interpret an exclusion clause in an insurance contract differently. When reliance is placed on such a clause, the insurer bears both the responsibility and the burden. This is due to the unique nature of insurance contracts, which are founded on the idea of good faith. Being a contract of speculation, it is not intended to be used as leverage or a safety net for the insurer but rather to be called upon in the event of an emergency. Due to the nature of insurance contracts, all parties are required to provide all relevant information.
An exclusion provision can never be interpreted to suggest that the primary goal for which the contract was made is at odds with it. Further,
The three things mentioned above are linked together and overlap. The insurer’s primary responsibility is to carry out a proper disclosure and notification in both text and spirit. Non-disclosure and a failure to provide a copy of the said contract by following the procedure required by statute would render the said clause redundant and non-existent when an exclusion clause is introduced making the contract unenforceable on the date it is executed, much to the knowledge of the insurer.
In this case, such disclosure was not made to the insured as against clauses 3 and 4 of the IRDA Regulations 2002, which provide for mandatory disclosure of all material information of the policy, and any non-compliance obviously would lead to the irresistible conclusion that the offending clause, be it an exclusion clause, cannot be pressed into service by the insurer against the insured as he may not be in the knowhow of the same. Further,
Accordingly, the apex court held that Non-compliance of Clauses (3) and (4) of the IRDA Regulation, 2002 preceded by unilateral inclusion, and thereafter followed by the execution of the contract, receiving benefits, and repudiation after knowing that it was entered into for a basement, would certainly be an act of unfair trade practice. Therefore, it set aside the order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.
Kerala HC: Economic backwardness or the possibility of social stigma cannot compel this Court to transgress the statutory prohibition and grant permission for medical termination of pregnancy
In Ramsiyamol R S vs. State of Kerala & Ors., the single judge bench of the Kerala High Court held that in the absence of any medical reasons referable to the petitioner or the foetus, economic backwardness or possibility of social stigma cannot compel the Court to transgress the statutory prohibition and grant permission for medical termination of pregnancy.
The High Court was hearing a writ petition seeking the termination of pregnancy with a gestational age of 28 weeks. When the petition came up for admission, the court directed the Superintendent of the SAT Hospital to constitute a medical board for examining the plea of the petitioner. The medical board, upon examining the petitioner, held that the petitioner was taking good care of her pregnancy with routine ANC, and a mental health evaluation of the woman shows that she is a cognizant woman with clinically normal intellectual function and a sound mind.
The results of the ultrasound reveal a straightforward singleton live pregnancy lasting 28 weeks with no foetal or maternal problems. The Medical Board has also expressed its opposition to medically ending a pregnancy due to the risk to the unborn child.
The High Court reaffirmed the decision of the apex court in Suchita Srivastava and another vs. Chandigarh Administration, that a woman’s right to make a reproductive choice, is to be a dimension of her personal liberty.
However, the High Court held that the issue at hand is whether such freedom can violate the limitations or prohibitions imposed by the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act in situations where neither the expectant mother nor the foetus has any medical issues, and the pregnancy was being well-cared for by the prospective mother before she came to this Court.
The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 prohibits the termination of pregnancy after the period of 24 weeks, which in this case is exceeded. As per the latest amendment, the length of pregnancy is irrelevant if the diagnosis of any of the substantial foetal abnormalities by a Medical Board makes a case for termination. This case does not have any such shortcomings. Accordingly, the High Court held that
The writ petition stands dismissed for the above-stated reasons.
Delhi HC: The intention of POCSO was to protect children below the age of 18 years from sexual exploitation. It was never meant to criminalize consensual romantic relationships between young adults.
In X vs. State Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr, the single judge bench comprising of Justice Jasmeet Singh granted bail to the accused arrested in the POSCO case and held that the primary intention of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 act (POCSO Act) was not to criminalize consensual relationships between young adults but to protect children below 18 years of age from sexual abuses.
The High Court was hearing a bail application against an FIR registered by the parents of the young female girl, accusing the applicant of taking the victim and marrying her, despite her being already married off by her parents when she was 17 years of age. The High Court relied on the judgement in Vijayalakshmi vs. State , where the boundary between consensual relationships and sexual exploitation was considered, as below.
The Delhi High Court, in Dharmender Singh vs. State granted bail to a person accused in the POCSO case while taking into consideration the possibility of a reciprocal physical relationship between the accused and the minor victim. It additionally laid down a few guidelines that are to be followed while deciding on bail applications in POCSO cases.
After the interaction with the victim in the present case, the judge concluded that the victim was never coerced into a relationship, and it was a case of a consensual relationship. Though the consent of the minor doesn’t have any legal standing, the fact that there was a consensual relationship should be of consideration while deciding on the cases of bail. Accordingly, the bail is approved with certain terms and conditions. The application stands disposed of.
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Review: Delhi HC rules that a manufacturer can't claim exclusivity over Trademark when it is derived from Principal Ingredient of Drug
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
September 7, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s observation regarding departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings being different with no bearing on each other, the Delhi High Court’s decision regarding the claim on Tehbazari right, and its judgment on non-infringement of trademark regarding the name of a drug. We also look at the Gujarat High Court’s judgment on the non-liability of compensation relating to the Motor Vehicle act and the J&K High Court’s observation regarding proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act.
Supreme Court: Employee dismissed after disciplinary proceedings cannot be reinstated merely because he was acquitted in a related Criminal Case
Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia observed that an employee who was dismissed from service due to a disciplinary enquiry cannot be reinstated merely because he is acquitted by the criminal court by giving the benefit of the doubt for the same set of charges.
As per the case details, Phool Singh joined Rajasthan Police Service as a constable. There was a departmental proceeding initiated against him for three allegations – consumption of alcohol, indecent abuse, and demand for a bribe of Rs.100 and firing at the public that was chasing him.
These allegations were proved in the departmental enquiry, and he was dismissed from service. An FIR was also lodged against him under Sections 392, 307 IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act read with Section 3/25 of the Arms Act. He was convicted of these charges in the Trial Court.
However, the Appellate Court upheld his appeal and acquitted him giving him the benefit of the doubt. Based on this acquittal, he moved an application with the authorities for reinstatement, which was not responded favourably by the authorities. He proceeded to file a writ petition, which was taken note of by the Rajasthan High Court and directed his reinstatement.
The State Government filed an appeal in the Supreme Court asking whether he can be reinstated in service as he has been acquitted by the Criminal Court for the same set of charges.
The bench referred to earlier cases, where-in it was consistently held that their two proceedings – Criminal & Departmental are different. It observed that merely because one was acquitted in the criminal court does not result in reinstatement of someone who is found guilty in the departmental proceedings.
The court also added that the acquittal by the criminal court was not an honourable acquittal as it was based on the benefit of the doubt. Hence the Supreme Court Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court for reinstatement.
Delhi HC: Manufacturer can’t claim exclusivity over Trademark when it is derived from Principal Ingredient of Drug
In the case of Sun Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. Hetero Healthcare Ltd. & Anr., the Delhi High Court rejected the appeal of Sun Pharma, which claimed Hetero HealthCare’s drug used to treat advanced breast cancer had infringed its trademark.
The bench comprising of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Amit Mahajan was looking into the appeal by Sun Pharmaceutical Laboratories Ltd, challenging an order by Commercial Court. A suit was earlier filed by Sun Pharma, alleging the infringement of trademark “LETROZ” and seeking a permanent injunction restraining Hetero from using the brand, ‘LETERO”. Sun Pharma claimed that it has been using the trademark since 2001, for a generic drug for second-line treatment of advanced breast cancer.
The division bench noted that the mark adopted by Sun Pharma was the first six letters of the ingredient, “Letrozole”, which is the international non-proprietary name of salt, and upheld the earlier order issued by Commercial Court.
The High Court concurred with Commercial Court that there is little possibility of confusion or deception in the purchaser’s mind based on the name of the drugs i.e., Sun Pharma’s Letroz and Hetero’s Letero.
It referred to an earlier judgement in Panacea Biotec Ltd vs. Recon Ltd, where it was held that no distinctiveness or exclusiveness can be claimed by the manufacturer when the name is derived from the word of the principal ingredient being used in the manufacture of the drug.
Apart from the possibility of confusion in the name, the court also looked into any possible harm resulting from the confusion among the names of the drugs.
The court also noted that the packaging and the colour scheme are also not similar, which otherwise would have caused confusion. The court proceeded to dismiss the appeal.
Gujarat HC: Insurance Company not liable to Compensate Person travelling in Goods Vehicle Prior to 1994 amendment
A single bench of Gujarat High Court comprising of Justice Hemant Pracchak held that an insurance company is not liable to compensate a person travelling in a Goods Vehicle if the accident took place prior to the 1994 amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
The bench was hearing an appeal against the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which allowed the claim petition partly by holding both the insurance companies liable and awarding Rs. 4.1 lakhs of compensation.
The insurance company has filed the appeal based on New India Assurance Company Ltd vs. Asha Rani and others, 2003. The insurance company further stated that in the policy of the vehicle involved, no extra premium paid by the owner to cover the passengers. Hence, extra coverage was not provided.
As per the 1994 amendment to the Motor Vehicle Act, Section 147 mandated a policy of insurance against the death or bodily injury to any passenger of a transport vehicle (including goods vehicle), caused by the use of the motor vehicle in a public place.
Based on the details of the case, the single-judge bench exonerated the insurance company from the liability, as the deceased was travelling in a goods vehicle and the accident took place on 09 January 1994, i.e., prior to the date of the amendment.
The court allowed the appeal. It also directed that the claimant is entitled to compensation from the other insurance company and the company can recover 50% amount from the owner and driver of the vehicle.
J&K&L HC: Proceedings under Section 12 of DV Act cannot be equated with lodging a criminal complaint
In the case, Altaf Ahmad Zargar vs. Mst Sana & Ors, Justice Sanjay Dhar of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court, ruled that proceedings under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act cannot be equated with the lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution.
Hence, the Magistrate is within his jurisdiction to revoke his order of issuing summons or even drop proceedings, even after obtaining a response from the husband, relatives, etc.
The petitioners of the case have filed a plea challenging the application filed by the respondents against them under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which was pending before the court of Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar.
An initial application was filed by the respondents before the Magistrate, which was later withdrawn citing that the parties have settled the disputes outside the court. However, a second application was filed by the respondents.
This was contended by the petitioners in their plea, that a second application under the provisions of the DV act on the same cause amounts to abuse of process of law and hence deserves to be quashed.
This was contested by the respondents stating that the cause of action for both applications is different. The first one relates to domestic violence from the period April 2018 to 24 August 2021. The second application relates to domestic violence from 09 October 2021.
Justice Sanjay Dhar observed that the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act cannot be equated with the lodging of a criminal complaint or initiation of prosecution, since the proceedings are not criminal in nature. Therefore, there is no bar on altering or revoking an order by the magistrate.
Hence, the court dismissed the plea and directed the petitioners to respond to the application filed with the Judicial Magistrate.
Delhi HC: Mere possession of Tehbazari right does not entitle occupant to usurp govt land, raise ‘pucca’ construction
In the case, Ved Prakash Manchanda vs. Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board & Ors, the Delhi High Court observed that mere possession of a Tehbazari right does not entitle the occupant to usurp government land or to raise a pucca construction on it.
A Tehbazari right or license is issued to hawkers to sell at a particular place. In this case, a plea was filed by Ved Prakash Manchanda seeking directions to the authorities to regularise his long and continuous occupation of premises in the city’s Madangir, by executing a lease deed or any other relevant document.
The petitioner has stated that he was using this site as a Tehbazari site from 1990-91 and the authorities used to collect license fees, damages, penalties, etc from time to time. Further, an electric connection was also sanctioned earlier based on the ‘No Objection Certificate’ issued by the authorities.
He received a regularization notice from the authorities and was called upon to pay the regularization charges within the stipulated period.  He has deposited the specified sum but has not received any lease deed or other documentation despite the payment.
He approached the Secretary, Public Grievances Commission, Delhi Government to get the direction to execute the Sale Deed. He further filed a plea in the High Court, which directed DUSIB (Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board) to take the decision to either execute the sale deed or to pass a rejection order.
Accordingly, DUSIB proceeded with the rejection order and claimed that the petitioner has trespassed the government land and is required to be evicted. Subsequently, the premises were sealed.
The petitioner filed a plea with the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, challenging the order of DUSIB, which was rejected. A plea was then filed in the Delhi High Court challenging the order of the LG, Delhi.
DUSIB has contended that the land was encroached by the petitioner, which was earlier earmarked for a community toilet and has erected a multi-storeyed building. There are no title documents that would establish his ownership. The Delhi High Court held that the petitioner is neither the owner nor the tenant and is an illegal and unauthorised occupant of the government land.
The High Court dismissed the plea and directed the respondent authorities to refund the deposited amount of the petitioner after deducting the damage charges for using the property.
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Review: Delhi HC Rules That Accused Cannot be Coerced to Reveal Passwords in View of Protection Guaranteed Under the Constitution
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
January 10, 2024
In this edition of the Court judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgement on the applicability of insurance policy, Delhi High Court’s judgements on the Right to Reproductive choices, and coercion of victims to reveal passwords of digital devices, Calcutta High Court’s decision on balancing the right to privacy of biological parent and right of an adopted child, and Guwahati High Court’s judgement on promotion of employees.
Supreme Court: Insurance policy becomes effective from the date of issuance and not the date of proposal or date of issuance of receipt.
The Supreme Court, in Reliance Life Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. vs. Jaya Wadhwani, held that the date of issuance of an insurance policy is the date from which it is effective, and not the date of the policy or the premium deposit date.
The division bench of the apex court comprising of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Rajesh Bindal was hearing two appeals regarding the date of commencement of the insurance policy. In the present case, the earlier judicial forums such as the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, and the National Commission, held that the date of issuance of the initial deposit receipt of premium is the date of commencement of the Policy. The appeal is against these judgements.
The facts of the case are as follows.  The life assured submitted the proposal form on 26 September 2012. The policy was issued and commenced on 28 September 2012, with the next premium due on 28 September 2013. The grace period is 30 days under Clause 1(iv) of the terms and conditions. Since the subsequent premium was not paid, the policy lapsed. The assured reinstated the lapsed policy by paying the overdue premium on 25 February 2014.  However, on 03 June 2014, the life assured committed suicide.  This was well within the 12 months after the reinstatement of the policy, which is the requirement as per the insurance policy.
In the earlier judicial forums, only the date of the issue of policy was considered. The date of reinstatement was not considered, which is a wrongful reading of the clauses. In another appeal case tagged with this, the policy form was submitted on 14 July 2012, while the policy was issued on 16July 2012. The next instalment was on 16July 2013. However, the petitioner committed suicide on 15 July 2013, the last day of the 12-month duration gap. In this case, though the cheque was submitted on 14July 2012, the policy was issued on 16July 2012 post cheque clearance.
The apex court relied on its earlier judgement in Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another vs. Dharam Vir Anand, whereby it was held that in construing a particular clause of the contract, it is only reasonable to construe that the word and the terms used therein must be given effect to.
A similar observation was made again in Life Insurance Corporation. of India vs. Mani Ram, whereby it was held that even if the policy had a clause regarding the backdating, the date of policy issuance would still be a relevant date.
Accordingly, the earlier orders are set aside, and the insurance claims of the respondents are rejected.
Delhi HC: The right to reproductive choice also includes the right not to procreate- it is ultimately the prerogative of the women to evaluate and decide on the course of action, if any material circumstances change.
The Delhi High Court, in R vs. The Union of India held that reproductive autonomy is closely linked with bodily autonomy, and the decision to have or not have pregnancy is the prerogative of the woman, if there is any change in the material circumstances of women.
The single judge bench of Justice Subramonium Prasad was hearing a petition for a direction to the Respondents to permit medical termination of the ongoing pregnancy of the Petitioner under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003.
The facts of the case are as follows. The petitioner got married on 26 February 2023 and unfortunately, her husband died on 19 October 2023. During an ultrasound on 31 October 2023, it was determined that she was 20 weeks pregnant. Subsequently, in December 2023, she sought medical termination of the pregnancy, but due to her gestation being beyond 24 weeks, she was denied. Upon approaching the apex court, it constituted a medical board to assess whether the petitioner could undergo termination of pregnancy. The board declined termination citing Clause 3B(c) of the MTP Rules, allowing termination only up to 24 weeks, while the foetus was reportedly at 29 weeks. Subsequently, the petitioner submitted that she was suffering from trauma, for which the court recommended psychiatric evaluation was done by AIIMS. The report advised the petitioner to undergo treatment for depressive symptoms and supervised care by family members. The question before the court is whether to allow the termination of pregnancy.
The court looked at relevant provisions, including clause 3B(c) of the MTP Rules, 2003.
While the petitioner became a widow in October 2023, she decided to terminate her pregnancy in December 2023. The court relied on the apex court judgement in X vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Another, wherein a similar situation was dealt with. In that case, the apex court remarked that any alteration in significant circumstances understandably influences a woman’s assessment of her capability to nurture a child and her inclination to proceed with the pregnancy. Moreover, the choice to give birth to and nurture a child is inherently shaped by one’s material conditions. These encompass a woman’s situational, social, and financial circumstances, which can significantly impact her decision regarding the continuation of the pregnancy. Each woman’s circumstances are unique, and it is ultimately the prerogative of each woman to evaluate her life and arrive at the best course of action.
Further, the court remarked that the right to control one’s reproductive choices is intricately connected to the right to bodily autonomy. The profound impact of an undesired pregnancy on a woman’s physical and mental well-being should not be underestimated. The decision to either see the pregnancy through to its completion or opt for termination is fundamentally grounded in the pregnant woman’s right to bodily autonomy and decision-making independence.
The court further referred to Suchita Srivastava & Anr vs. Chandigarh Administration, whereby it was held that the right to reproductive choices also includes the right not to procreate.
Considering the above judicial remarks, the Delhi High Court permitted the petitioner to terminate the pregnancy. Accordingly, the petition is disposed of.
Calcutta HC: Right of an adopted child shall not infringe the right to privacy of the biological parents.
The Calcutta High Court, in Fabian Ricklin, alias Ranabir vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., held that the rights of privacy of biological parents prevail over the right of an adopted child and that the necessity for maintaining the privacy of the biological mother must be construed in consideration of the petitioner’s right to identity, which forms an inherent aspect of his right to live with dignity and express himself.
The single judge bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya was hearing a petition of a Swiss citizen to do a ‘root search’ for his biological parents. The petitioner sought the relinquishment deed which ought to be executed by the biological mother to facilitate the process of adoption. The petitioner relied on the apex court judgement in Laxmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India, which laid down guidelines for the adoption of Indian children to foreign parents, which included the preservation of records by the adoption agencies. The said agency now pleads that they do not own the deed of relinquishment.
However, the adoption agency argued that the legislation mandating record-keeping was established from 2017 onward, without retroactive application for maintaining records. Further, it is argued that the mother’s right to privacy supersedes the child’s right to discover the mother’s identity, particularly when the mother chooses not to disclose it.
The court framed the following issues in the present case:
Firstly, the court recognized that there are different timelines involved in this case. The legal regulations during the petitioner’s adoption and those governing the process of searching for biological roots (first codified in 2017 adoption regulations, and subsequently in 2022) differ to some extent. The court looked at section 47 of the 2022 regulations that described root search, and subclause 6 of this provided for the right of privacy of biological parents over the rights of an adopted child.
Further, clause 7 of the same regulations distinguishes between a female biological parent who is a single mother/unwed mother or when a child is born out of wedlock on the one hand and biological parents in general on the other, and thereby specify different modalities of the purpose of surrender. Clause 20 also envisions strict confidentiality of documents on biological parents.
Looking at the above provisions, the court remarked that the petitioner undeniably possesses a legal and constitutional entitlement to seek out the details of their biological parents or mother. However, this right is subject to and secondary to the right to privacy held by the adoptee’s biological mother or parent.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
Delhi HC: The accused cannot be coerced to reveal/ disclose the password(s) or any other like details in view of the protection guaranteed to him under the Constitution of India.
The Delhi High Court, in Sanket Bhadresh Modi vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., held that the investigating agency cannot coerce the accused to reveal/disclose passwords as the right against self-incrimination is guaranteed under 20(3) of the Indian Constitution.
The single judge bench of Justice Saurabh Banerjee was hearing a bail petition of an applicant who, along with at least 12 others, was reprimanded for making millions of spam phone calls to the USA from fraud call centres located in India and as such, had defrauded and cheated US Citizens to the tune of about 20 million USD.
The counsel for the appellant argued that the applicant was under protective arrest for approximately 203 days, during which there was no misuse of the granted liberty. The applicant meets the criteria for bail, and denial cannot be based solely on non-cooperation, as an accused cannot be compelled to self-incriminate by cooperating with the investigating agency. Given the anticipated lengthy trial duration, keeping the applicant detained serves no meaningful purpose.
The CBI’s counsel argued that the applicant, as the company’s Director implicated in the FIR, engaged in fraudulent activities impacting India’s international image. Consequently, strict legal measures are warranted. Additionally, the investigation is in its early stages, and the concern is that if the applicant is granted bail, there’s a risk of witness intimidation or evidence tampering.
Upon hearing the arguments from both parties, the court looked at the facts and circumstances of the case. The court noted that primary evidence such as laptops, mobile phones, and other sophisticated gadgets, all of which have already been seized and are currently in the possession of the Investigating Agency. Consequently, if bail is granted, there’s minimal chance of the applicant tampering with this evidence. The court pointed out in the submissions by the CBI, that the agency is waiting for the applicant to share the password(s) to unlock the gadgets/ digital devices during the investigation and the applicant is not cooperating qua that at his end. Accordingly, it held that,
Relying on other apex court judgements on the accused being innocent till proven guilty, such as Hussainara Khatoon & Ors vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, and Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Delhi High Court remarked that the factual scenario coupled with the legal position at hand, it would be in the interest of justice, if the applicant is released on bail. Accordingly, a conditional bail is granted to the applicant.
Gauhati HC: Denying promotion, despite being eligible and availability of vacancies, amounts to violation of fundamental right of consideration for promotion.
In Syed Habibur Rahman vs. The State of Assam & 2 Ors., The Gauhati High Court ruled that the right to be considered for promotion is an aspect of a fundamental right. Denying individuals falling within the zone eligible for promotion not only deprives them of the fulfilment of career progression but also deprives them of subsequent financial advantages.
The single Judge bench of Justice Suman Shyam was hearing a petition, whereby the petitioner, post-retirement, was aggrieved that the officials did not evaluate his candidacy for promotion to the position of District Fisheries Development Officer regularly. The petitioner was initially appointed as a Fisheries Extension Officer and joined the department in 1982. In 1992, the petitioner was promoted to the position of Sub-Divisional Fisheries Development Officer (SDFDO). Subsequently, in 2005, the petitioner assumed the responsibilities of District Fisheries Development Officer (DFDO), despite not being officially promoted to that position regularly. The petitioner claims that despite being eligible and vacancies being available, his candidacy was not considered for promotion.
The counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioner had failed to complete the mandatory requirement of Post Graduate Training in Fishery Science in CIFRI/ CIFE, or any other equivalent training recognized by the ICAR for consideration for promotion to the post of DFDO.
Hearing arguments from both parties, the court remarked that since the petitioner had held the charge of the post of DFDO from the year 2005 till the date of his retirement on 31 December 2013, hence, the grounds for not considering the case of the petitioner are wholly unacceptable.
Accordingly, the petitioner is instructed to submit a fresh representation, ventilating his grievance in the matter, by enclosing a certified copy of this order and the appropriate order shall be passed within three months of the new representation.

created: January 10, 2024


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Review: Delhi HC Rules That Father’s Second Marriage After First Wife’s Death Doesn’t Disqualify Him from Being Child’s Natural Guardian - FACTLY
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
September 13, 2023
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s judgment regarding the liability of a pharma company with respect to impact of a vaccine, Delhi High court’s observation with respect to the continued qualification of father as a natural guardian despite second marriage after wife’s death, Karnataka High Court’s consideration to waive off the cooling period related to case of mutual divorce, Madras High Court’s observation relating to criteria for compassionate employment to the married daughter of deceased and Punjab & Haryana’s high court’s statement regarding  BSF’s unjustified termination of employee who couldn’t complete basic training due to curable disease contracted after joining.
Delhi HC: Father’s second marriage after first wife’s death doesn’t disqualify him from being child’s natural guardian
A division bench of Delhi High Court comprising of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed that mere second marriage of the father, who lost his first wife, cannot be considered as a disqualification from him continuing as a natural guardian of his child.
In the case, Mohd. Irshad & Anr vs. Nadeem, an appeal was moved by the maternal grandparents of a minor boy challenging a family court order that has dismissed their petition to appoint them as the guardian of the minor child and also seeking permanent custody.
As per the details of the case, the couple got married in 2007 and the child was born in 2008. The grandparents held that their daughter was killed by the husband in 2010 due to dowry demands and harassment. However, the husband and his family members were acquitted of the criminal charges by the child’s grandparents in 2012. They also claim that the child was handed over to them after the father was absconding.
The case presented by the grandparents was that the child’s custody has always been with them, and it is only after the acquittal of the husband that he sought the transfer of the custody.
They further presented that the father remarried and had a child from the second marriage, which further renders him not having the capacity to take custody of the child. However, the bench dismissed the plea of grandparents to be appointed as the guardian of the child. It noted that apart from a criminal trial, there was no other factor that disqualifies the husband to be the guardian.
It supported the judgment of the family court that denied the grandparents to be appointed as the minor’s guardians. It noted that there can be no substitute for the affection of a natural parent. The immense love and affection of the grandparents towards the child cannot act as a substitute. The bench considered it appropriate to initially grant limited visitation rights to the father which may be re-visited after one year on his application, if the circumstances so justify.
It also observed that even the disparity in financial status cannot be a relevant factor for denying the custody of a child to the natural parent.
Karnataka HC: Waives 1-year cooling off period for mutual divorce under Special Marriage Act.
In a petition filed by an estranged couple, the division bench of Karnataka High Court comprising of Justice G. Narendar and Justice Vijaykumar Patil waived off the statutory cooling period of one year before deciding on the petition for divorce by mutual consent, under Special Marriage Act.
It set aside the order of the family court which had earlier dismissed their application under Section 28(2) of the said Act. The couple filed an appeal in the High Court questioning the family court order. In their petition, they argued the parties and their respective family members have tried to resolve the dispute amicably and to unite them. However, the relationship has become irreconcilable, and they have decided to live separately.
They also submitted that after detailed discussion with their parents and well-wishers, they have come to the conclusion that there is no compatibility between them, and they have decided to concentrate on their careers.
The bench referred to the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Amardeep Singh vs. Harveen Kaur. It observed that the very object of providing a cooling period for filing of the petition and a further period of six months from the date of filing the petition is with an object to see that the parties to the proceeding can change their mind and resolve their differences. If after a period of six months, the parties decide to go ahead with divorce, they can make a motion before the jurisdictional Court so that it can consider the case on its merits.
It stated that the Supreme Court has clearly held that the period mentioned in the statute is not mandatory, but it is a directory in nature, however, the Courts while exercising discretion are required to look into the facts and circumstances of each case.
The bench noted that both the appellants are engineering graduates and working in private companies in Bengaluru. Their pleadings made it clear that they have realised that they have personality differences and strong likes and dislikes, despite making best efforts to reconcile. Hence, the court found it appropriate to waive the statutory period by directing the Family Court to consider the case of the appellants for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent on its merits and in accordance with the law.
Madras HC: Married daughter cannot challenge denial of compassionate appointment in absence of dependency, financial hardship of bereaved family.
In the case, A Chinnaponnu vs. Union of India & ors, the Madras High Court has made it clear that even though married daughters are equally eligible to be considered for compassionate employment, their appointment need to consider criteria such as – dependency, financial status of bereaved family etc.
The High Court bench consisting of Justice D Krishnakumar and Justice PB Balaji, was hearing a plea challenging the Central Administrative Tribunal’s order refusing to interfere with the denial of compassionate appointment to the married daughter of a Gangmate in the Southern railway who died in harness. The petitioners were the wife and daughter of the deceased employee.
The daughter submitted that since her brother and sister gave consent to apply for a compassionate appointment, she has made a request to the Southern Railway seeking a compassionate appointment. However, it was rejected by the department. The daughter also submitted before the court that she was taking care of the entire family and presented an argument that the request of appointment was rejected merely on the ground that she was married.
The Railways opposed the plea and submitted that her request for a compassionate appointment was rejected not because she was married but for the reason, she did not fulfil the criteria laid down by the Railway Board for offering a compassionate appointment.
The court noted that the appellant i.e., daughter got married in 2006, four years before her father’s death. It noted that her brothers and sisters were also married and her mother i.e., wife of the deceased is receiving a family pension of Rs. 18,734 and does not have other minor children to take care of.
It observed that the application was rejected not because of the daughter’s marital status but the financial situation of the family. It emphasized that the Supreme Court in various decisions has held that the mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle the family to compassionate employment, the financial condition of the family has to be examined by the authorities.
Punjab & Haryana HC: BSF unjustified to terminate employee who couldn’t complete basic training due to curable disease contracted after joining.
In the case of a BSF constable who was terminated from service for not being able to complete basic training because he was declared ‘unfit, the single judge bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court consisting of Justice Jagmohan Bansal stated that it is highly unjustified to weed out an employee on the ground that he cannot complete basic training because of a curable disease which he has suffered post joining of services.
The court was hearing the plea of Amaranth Ram seeking the setting aside of an order passed in 2014 whereby his name had been struck off from the strength of BSF. He was provisionally selected as a Constable (GD) in BSF. He reported to the Subsidiary Training Centre, Hoshiarpur, and thereafter suffered from fever. He was referred to the civil hospital where he was diagnosed with bone tuberculosis. From October 2011 to May 2012, he remained under treatment at PGI, Chandigarh and in the medical report it was confirmed that he is fit to re-join services. However, BSF did not accept the report of the PGI, Chandigarh, and asked him to face the medical board.
He was again examined by a medical board which opined that he is suffering from Bone TB, and he is unfit to undergo Basic Recruitment Training and unsuitable for further retention in service. On his request, he was re-examined, and the review board also declared him unfit for basic training.
The petitioner put forth the argument that at the time of recruitment, he was not suffering from any ailment, and he was found medically fit and after joining has suffered from an alleged disease, which is incurable.
The judge stated that a person after joining service may become incompetent to complete basic training while on duty and on account of reasons beyond his control like accidents during the movement of force from one place to another place, attacks by militants, etc.  In such circumstances, a person who has fulfilled all the required parameters at the time of recruitment cannot be removed because of unavoidable circumstances which impacted the training.
Supreme Court: Refuses to hold Pharma company liable for not mentioning adverse reaction of vaccination
In the case, Prakash Bang vs. Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Anr, the Supreme Court has upheld an order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) where the Commission had held that there was no deficiency in the service of the drug-manufacturer, Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd, in relation to administration of vaccine Engerix-B.
In the case, the complainant held that he along with his family members had got the vaccine administered by their family doctor and developed ‘myositis’ as an adverse reaction due to the administration of the vaccine.
Looking into the case, the Court noted that the complainant had failed to establish that he had suffered an adverse reaction due to the vaccination. It also held that non-mentioning of ‘myositis’ as an adverse reaction in the literature accompanying the injection or on the ‘vial’, did not amount to ‘deficiency of service’ on the part of the pharmaceutical company, particularly when the adverse reaction was to the minimal level.
The court took into account the affidavit of the manufacturer which indicated that detailed procedure was followed in the certification of the drug. It highlighted that the drug was not available for administration without the doctor’s prescription and that the family doctor also owed a duty, especially because he has prescribed the said drug and it is his responsibility to know more details about the vaccination.
The court further noted that the same drug was administered to all the family members and after the third dose was administered to the appellant, he had suffered the present discomfort. This also raises the question as to whether it had been administered in the manner and at this spot where it ought to be administered.
Earlier, NCRDC dismissed the consumer complaint seeking compensation of over Rs. 90 Lakhs from drug manufacturer, Glaxo Smithkline Pharmaceuticals. It concluded that the complainant had failed to establish his case, both with respect to (i) the alleged defect in the drug or (ii) any negligence amounting to deficiency in service on the part of the pharmaceutical company.

created: September 13, 2023


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Delhi HC rules that IGST on oxygen concentrators imported by individuals for personal use is unconstitutional.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
May 26, 2021
In this roundup of court judgements, we look at Constitutional Courts’ remarks on disregard of COVID safety protocols in Kumbh Mela and Char Dham, directions regarding circumventing exorbitant fees charged by private hospitals for COVID patients, the right of voters to know criminal antecedents of candidates, and directions on the welfare of unorganized sector workers.
Supreme Court: Directs Centre to file reply on position of National Database for Unorganised Workers (NDUW).
In taking suo moto cognizance of the present COVID-19 crisis, the Supreme Court (SC) directed the Centre to file a reply on the position of National Database For Unorganised Workers (NDUW), which may serve as registration for extending different schemes by the States and Centre.
Currently, there is no uniform process of registration. There is separate registration of workers under the Building and Other Construction Workers’ (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996. Under the ‘Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008’, all States have framed the rules and some States have also undertaken registration under the aforesaid Acts but no State has given any details as to whether registration under the ‘Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008’ is complete. The Court, however, noticed that the ‘Unorganized Workers Social Security Act, 2008’ now stands repealed by the Code of Social Security Act, 2020. In Section 112 of the Code of Social Security, 2020, registration of unorganized workers, gig workers, and platform workers is contemplated. The Court, hence, asked the Union of India to apprise it on steps which are proposed to be taken in this regard.
The judgement highlights that for accessing benefits of any Central or State scheme framed for the benefit of unorganized workers or migrant workers, registration of workers is essential. Without proper registration and identity card, accruing these benefits seems to be difficult on the ground.
The apex court directed that registration of unorganized workers should be completed as early as possible and there should be a Common National Database for all organized and unorganized workers situated in different states. The court noted that the process has already been initiated by the Ministry of Labour and Employment and instructed that it should be completed with collaboration and coordination of states.
With regard to distribution of dry ration by the States to the migrant workers, the court has directed all States to file affidavits indicating the mechanism by which the dry ration would be distributed to those migrant workers who do not possess a ration card. The judgement also emphasised that it is the responsibility of the States/Union Territories to provide Community Kitchen to the stranded migrant workers, who have lost their employment or are in need of meals, and directed all the States/Union Territories to make such facilities operational. Further, the court insisted that there should be a suitable mechanism to monitor and supervise whether the benefits of the welfare schemes reach the beneficiaries.
Bombay HC: Upheld the disqualification of BJP corporator Ashok Raul for not disclosing his criminal antecedents in nomination form.
The Bombay high court observed that the voters have the right to know about antecedents of candidates in the election and upheld the disqualification of a BJP Corporator Ashok Raul, who won from Thane’s ward 12-D in 2017, for not disclosing his criminal antecedents in his nomination form.
Ashok Raul who won from Thane’s ward 12-D in 2017 was disqualified by a civil court’s verdict for not disclosing his criminal antecedents in his nomination form. In the present case, the said verdict was being challenged in the Bombay high court.
After examining all submissions, the court noted that Ashok Raul did not disclose all of his criminal antecedents which is against the provisions of the Representation of the People Act. The bench also referred to several judgments of the supreme court and emphasized that the Supreme Court ruling of ‘voters must know everything about the candidate,’ also applies to Corporator level elections and not only on MP and MLA level polls, as corporations are also democratic institutions of local self-governance.
Delhi HC: IGST on oxygen concentrators imported by individuals and received by them as gifts, for personal use, is unconstitutional.
In the case Gurucharan Singh v. Ministry of Finance, the high court held that the imposition of Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) on oxygen concentrators imported by individuals and received by them as gifts, for personal use is unconstitutional.
The court was hearing a plea filed by an 85-year-old individual challenging a notification (dated 01 May 2021) issued by the Ministry of Finance stating that it would force payment of IGST of 12% on imported oxygen concentrators gifted to individuals for personal use. It is relevant to note that before 01 May 2021, an individual importer would have had to pay IGST at the rate of 28% for an oxygen concentrator for personal use. This stood in contrast to oxygen concentrators which were imported for commercial use. The IGST on oxygen concentrators, which are imported for commercial use, was and continues to be leviable at the rate of 12%.
The counsel for the central government submitted that IGST on oxygen concentrators imported by individuals for personal use was scaled down to 12%. The State avers that it went a step further by issuing yet another notification (dated 03 May 2021) whereby, it exempted, completely, oxygen concentrators imported for the purpose of COVID relief from the imposition of IGST in cases, where the importer was the ―State Government or, any entity, relief agency or statutory body, authorized in this regard by any State Government. To this, the bench opined that since the State has come so far, it could go a little further and exempt even individual importers who had been supplied oxygen concentrators free of cost from bearing the burden of IGST.
In conclusion, the court quashed the notification (dated 01 May 2021) that forced payment of IGST of 12% on imported oxygen concentrators gifted to individuals for personal use. To obviate misuse of the oxygen concentrators, by the petitioner and/or persons similarly circumstanced, the court held that they would have to furnish a letter of undertaking to the officer designated by the State that the same would not be put to commercial use. The petitioner should submit a letter of an undertaking within seven days of the State intimating/notifying the particulars of the officer designated for this purpose.
Andhra Pradesh HC: Private hospital bills of COVID-19 patients to be made through Nodal Officers.
In addressing a bunch of PILs regarding the COVID situation in the state, the Andhra Pradesh high court directed the state government to work out modalities for payment of private hospital bills of COVID-19 patients through a Nodal Officer, in order to avoid exorbitant charges being levied by them.
The court took note of the All-India Lawyers Union’s suggestion that in order to curb the menace of excessive treatment bills, instead of paying the money directly at the counter of the Hospital, the same can be routed through the Nodal Officer/Help Desk Manager. In case of excess billings, the same can be checked at that stage itself. The high court held the suggestion to be a potentially effective way of managing the current situation and directed the states to make arrangements for the same.
The PILs also highlighted that most of the Covid-care centres have been established at the outskirts, making them inaccessible due to distance. To this, the court directed the State to consider establishing covid care centres within the town area, if permissible, and to see that transport facilities are available for transporting covid patients to the nearest covid hospitals in times of need. The court also took note of huge gatherings outside shops, more particularly at liquor shops, in the relaxed hours during the lockdown and directed the authorities concerned to post Police Constables outside such shops to maintain COVID protocol.
Uttarakhand HC: Critical remarks against State Government’s failure to maintain COVID norms.
The high court made critical remarks against the State Government for allowing the ‘Kumbh Mela’ and failing to ensure COVID protocols in the temples and religious festivals. With respect to the Char Dham, the court also observed that in Badrinath and Kedarnath, the concerned priests were not maintaining social distancing COVID protocols.
The court highlighted that the Kumbh Mela was permitted during the COVID-19 pandemic, where over 10 million devotees congregated over several weeks, without any enforcement of COVID norms. In the same vein, the court slammed the state government for not informing about the steps to implement the standard operating protocol (SOP) for Char Dham. Although the Char Dham Yatra has been suspended by the Government, the high court held that the Government must ensure that the SOP issued by the Char Dham Management is adhered to strictly.
Emphasizing the grave danger posed by the present COVID wave, issues like Black Fungus, and the approaching 3rd wave of COVID, the court lamented that the State Government had ignored the warning given by experts about the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and further directed the State to strictly enforce the SOP for Char Dham to avoid further spread of the virus.
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Review: Delhi HC Rules That Names of Both Parents Should be Mentioned in All Student Documents That Require Parent’s Name
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 13, 2024
In this edition of the Court judgements review, we look at the Delhi HC’s ruling that the names of both mother and father should be mentioned in all documents relating to students that require the parent’s name, SC’s ruling that a relationship may be consensual at the beginning, but the same state may not remain so for all time to come, that a Medical Council report, while relevant, cannot be conclusive when it contradicts consumer forum findings, among others.
Delhi HC: Names of both mother and father should be mentioned in all documents relating to students that require parent’s name
In the case Ritika Prasad vs. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University before the Delhi High Court, the petitioner had graduated from Amity Law School, which at that time was affiliated to the Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU). Her issue was that the B.A. LLB degree issued to her on completion of the course reflected only her father’s name and not her mother’s name. She sought that her degree should reflect both her parents’ names.
The Delhi High Court Bench of Justice C Hari Shankar observed that gender equality encompasses both equal opportunities and recognition. Just like both daughters and sons are equally entitled to recognition as children, both father and mother are also equally entitled to recognition as parents of the child. He also observed that to compartmentalize human beings even psychologically on the basis of sex and gender would be “woefully anachronistic.” Allowing the petitioner’s plea, the Court directed the university to comply with the UGC Circular from June 2014, mandating the inclusion of both parents’ names on educational certificates. The court emphasized the mandatory and non-negotiable nature of this directive and urged the UGC to consider expanding the requirement. It clarified that exceptional cases, such as adopted children or unique circumstances, should be addressed individually. The court ordered the university to issue the petitioner a revised degree within two weeks reflecting both parents’ names.
SC: A relationship may be consensual at the beginning, but the same state may not remain so for all time to come
In the case, Rajkumar vs. the State of Karnataka, the appellant was previously in a relationship with a woman who filed the FIR against him accusing him of multiple offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Information Technology Act including rape, criminal intimidation, cheating, assault, abduction, etc. He initially sought to have the FIR quashed in the Karnataka High Court, but after an unsuccessful attempt, appealed to the Supreme Court. The appellant argued that the complainant’s actions were in retaliation for a previous complaint of blackmailing and extortion.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices Aniruddha Bose and Sanjay Kumar, while acknowledging that consensual relationships cannot lead to a rape charge, observed that the complainant’s allegations did not demonstrate continued consent. The Court, therefore, refused to quash the FIR, stating that the relationship had ceased to be consensual, and affirmed that the complaint contained the necessary elements for the alleged offences. It observed that a relationship may be consensual at the beginning, but the same state may not remain so for all time to come. Whenever one of the partners shows their unwillingness to continue with such a relationship, the character of such relationship as it was when started will not continue to prevail. The Court directed measures to protect the complainant’s identity in future proceedings across all relevant courts.
SC: Medical Council report, while relevant, cannot be conclusive when it contradicts consumer forum findings
In Najrul Seikh vs. Dr Sumit Banerjee and another, the appellant’s son had lost vision in his right eye after cataract surgery performed by Dr. Sumit Banerjee and Megha Eye Clinic in Bardhaman, West Bengal. He had sought compensation for the same. While the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (DCDRC) initially allowed the compensation noting deficiencies in the service provided by the hospital, the State Commission (SCDRC) and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) set it aside, relying on a Medical Council report.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma referred to the findings of DCDRC. DCDRC had specifically identified deficiencies in the duty of care by the doctor related to both pre-operative and post-operative standards for traumatic cataract surgery. The findings established a connection between post-operative lapses, such as delayed review and failure to use the appropriate surgical method, and the subsequent loss of vision.
Allowing the appeal and upholding the DCDRC’s decision, the Bench noted that the SCDRC and NCDRC, despite evidence of negligence, relied solely on the Medical Council report, neglecting DCDRC’s findings. The Medical Council report lacked depth in evaluating pre and post-operative care. It added that the Medical Council report, while relevant, cannot be conclusive when it contradicts consumer forum findings. The appellate forum must conduct a thorough examination, warranting the reversal of SCDRC and DCDRC orders. The DCDRC’s unchallenged findings on post-operative lapses, reinforced by the Medical Council and the respondent doctor’s admission of difficulties in managing traumatic cataracts in children, affirmed a deficiency in the medical services provided by the Respondents.
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of expert testimony, stating that the Medical Council report alone is insufficient to exonerate the doctor. The Court upheld the DCDRC’s compensation order of Rs. 9,00,000.
SC: Appellant quashed of suicide abetment charges after two decades
The case, Prabhat Kumar Mishra vs. the State of UP & Another before the Supreme Court is an appeal to quash the proceedings against the accused-appellant. He was facing charges under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (abetment to suicide) and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.  The accused-appellant, who worked as the District Savings Officer in Kannauj District, was implicated in the suicide case of Data Ram, a Senior Clerk at the Child Welfare Board, Fatehgarh in 2002. The appellant, dissatisfied with the High Court’s decision not to quash the criminal case, filed a Special Leave Petition with the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices BR Gavai and Sandeep Mehta observed that the admitted allegations did not establish the essential elements of the offense under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, justifying no prosecution of the accused-appellant for this offence. It quoted some significant judgements about what constitutes an offense under the Act.
Upon scrutiny of the suicide note, based on which the chargesheet of the case was filed, the Supreme Court concluded that its contents did not suggest any action or negligence by the accused-appellant that would make him culpable for abetment. It also added that the deceased was frustrated due to work pressure and various unrelated factors, including the stress of working in two different districts, it held. Observing that, these expressed apprehensions in the suicide note cannot reasonably be deemed sufficient to hold the appellant responsible for abetment to commit suicide, the Bench quashed the charges against the appellant, after more than two decades since the case was filed.
SC: Custodial interrogation is not a sufficient reason to deny anticipatory bail
In the case, Ashok Kumar vs. State of UT Chandigarh, the appellant and other co-accused faced charges under various sections including forgery, conspiracy, and corruption. The appellant sought anticipatory bail from the Sessions Court and subsequently the High Court, but both courts denied the request. He then appealed to the Supreme Court.
It was contended that the appellant had appeared before the Investigating Officer for interrogation, and his statements were recorded, along with the collection of specimen signatures/handwritings sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory which made him eligible for bail. The respondent-Union Territory of Chandigarh, strongly opposed the plea, citing the necessity of custodial interrogation for the main accused.
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra observed that the appellant was actively cooperating in the ongoing investigation. Acknowledging the effectiveness of custodial interrogation, the Bench observed that its absence alone may not justify anticipatory bail for serious offences, demanding a more substantial case from the State. Noting that the appellant pledged future cooperation, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s, granting bail upon arrest, with terms at the Investigating Officer’s discretion.


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Review: Delhi HC Rules That No One Has an Authority to Intrude Into The Lives of Consenting Adults Who Have Willingly Entered Into a Marriage
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
November 8, 2023
In this edition of Court Judgements, we look at Supreme Court’s judgements on right to recovery in motor accident claims, principles on ‘Right to Remain Silent’, Madras High Court’s judgement on coexistence of multiple ideologies, Bombay High Court’s judgement on custody of children among parents, and Delhi High Court’s judgement on marriage of consenting adults.
Supreme Court: The insurer is not entitled to recover solely on the grounds that the vehicle owner did not verify the driver’s license.
In IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Geeta Devi and others, the apex court held that an insurance company cannot claim the right to compensation solely because the vehicle owner didn’t verify the driver’s license. The burden of proof lies on the part of the insurance company and not on the part of the vehicle owner.
The two-judge Supreme Court bench comprising Justice CT Ravi Kumar and Justice Sanjay Kumar was hearing an appeal by the insurance company against the judgement of the Delhi High Court that earlier reversed the order of the Tribunal granting the right of recovery to the insurance company. The matter in question pertains to a tragic accident in which an individual sustained fatal injuries due to the reckless and negligent operation of a Tempo vehicle. The legal beneficiaries of the injured party subsequently initiated proceedings by approaching the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal, seeking compensation for their loss. The Tribunal awarded compensation to them; however, it held that the insurance company was not liable to pay the compensation due to a breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy by the vehicle owner. The Tribunal, therefore, directed the petitioner-insurance company to deposit the awarded amount with the liberty to recover the same from the present owners of the Tempo. Upon approaching the Delhi High Court against the Tribunal order, the Delhi HC reversed the judgement. This is a challenge to that judgement.
The court looked at section 149 (2) (a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 which dealt with driver clause in third-party risks.
The court observed that there is no requirement under this clause that the owner of the insured vehicle must get the driver’s license verified by the concerned authorities. It further held that it is impossible for the vehicle owner to practically verify the genuineness of the driving license of every driver. The insurance company has also not shown any material evidence that shows a wilful breach by the vehicle owner and hence, the owner shall not be liable to pay compensation.
The apex court relied on the judgements in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh and others and Ram Chandra Singh vs. Rajaram and others, whereby it was held that the insurance company’s exoneration was contingent upon the owner’s awareness of the driver’s fake license and their subsequent allowance of the driver to operate the vehicle. It was explicitly clarified that the mere existence of a counterfeit license, in and of itself, would not relieve the insurer of responsibility.
Accordingly, the court refused to interfere with the judgement of the Delhi High Court. Further, the court expressed shock at the insurance companies pursuing the matters till the last forums on well-settled legal propositions, thereby being responsible for unmindful wastage of valuable curial time and efforts. The petition is thereby dismissed.
Supreme Court: Balancing principles of privacy and the propositions of law with what is required under section 313 of Cr. P.C.- Apex court summarizes twelve points.
In IndraKunwar vs. The State of Chhattisgarh judgement where a woman was acquitted, who, earlier had been accused of murdering her own child and previously convicted, resulting in a life imprisonment sentence, the Supreme Court also deliberated on the requirements expected from the convict in her statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C). This consideration was made while considering the principles of privacy and established legal precedents.
The brief facts of the case are as follows. The convict had a relationship with a fellow villager, Baiga Gond, which led to her becoming pregnant. Subsequently, after giving birth, she was accused of killing the child and discarding the body in a small water body or pond. In her statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the accused acknowledged her pregnancy. Based on this and some of the testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court convicted the woman under section 302 of the IPC, which the High Court also agreed to.
However, when the apex court took a different approach. It held that the trial court and the High Court erred in judgements while awarding life imprisonment. Such judgements need a due appreciation of evidence and cannot be awarded mechanically and in a perfunctory manner. This was not present in this case. The only appreciable evidence is the testimony of the woman under section 313 of CrPC. This raised the question of whether a female accused is obligated to divulge details pertaining to her personal life in the context of a criminal trial.
This appeal is considered by a two-judged bench comprising of Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Sanjay Karol.
Keeping in mind the fundamental right to privacy and legal propositions around it, the court summarized 12 principles.
Further, as an answer to the question surrounding privacy and section 313 of Cr.P.C, the court held that even though the law requires disclosure of relevant information necessary for the resolution of a criminal case, such disclosure should not infringe upon the fundamental right to privacy.
Madras HC: No person in this country can have a right to propagate divisive ideas and conduct meeting to abolish or eradicate any ideology, co-existence is the key.
The Madras High Court held that the co-existence of multiple ideologies is an identity of the country, and no person shall be allowed to have a right to propagate divisive ideas while dismissing a petition that denied permission for a meeting to eradicate ‘Dravidian Ideology’.
In Mangesh Kartikeyan vs. The Commissioner of Police, the High Court bench comprising of Justice G Jayachandran was hearing a petition seeking permission to conduct an indoor meeting to eradicate ‘Dravidian Ideology’.  This petition was based on an earlier order of the same court that allowed a person to conduct a meeting about Dravidian Ideology and views on it.
However, the court differentiated between both petitions. While the former was about expressing views on Dravidian ideology, the meeting in question is about eradicating it. Acceding to the present request would cause further disturbance to the peace and tranquillity of the public.
Further, the court also made some remarks against those in power. Instead of propagating views that divide people, they must concentrate on eradicating other social evils.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
Bombay HC: The father of a child will not come within the scope of section of 361 of the IPC, even if he takes away the child from the keeping of the mother in absence of legal prohibition.
In ABC vs. XYZ, the Bombay High Court held that unless there is a legal prohibition from competent authorities, the father of a child is not said to be committing kidnapping and cannot be made guilty of an offence under Section 361 of the IPC.
The two-judge bench of Justice Valmiki SA Menezes and Justice Vinay Joshi was hearing an application seeking the quashing of FIR registered for the offence punishable under Sections 363 of the Indian Penal Code. A crime was registered on the biological father for forcibly taking away the minor son, thereby committing an offence of kidnapping.
The court opined that for any offence to be accepted to be committed, it must not fall within the conspectus of the terms “lawful guardian”. The court also looked at the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, where section 6 clearly deals with the issue of natural guardians of the minors.
In the current case, the father becomes a natural guardian in the absence of the order otherwise passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction. The court further held that when the biological father removes the child from the mother’s custody, it can be viewed as a transfer of the child from the mother’s lawful guardianship to the father’s lawful guardianship. The natural father is considered a lawful guardian of the minor child, just like the mother. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the father has committed an offense under Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) that would make him liable to be punished under Section 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Accordingly, the application is disposed.
Delhi HC: No one has an authority to intrude into the lives of consenting adults who have willingly entered into a marriage. Article 21 encompasses the right to make personal choices.
In Md Nemat Ali and another vs. The State and Others, the Delhi High Court held that there is nothing left for anybody to interfere in the lives of two consenting adults who have chosen to marry.  It further held that the right to make personal choices is covered under Article 21 and is an important aspect of human liberty.
The single-judge bench comprising Justice Saurabh Banerjee was hearing a petition seeking the issuance of a writ of Mandamus to provide protection to the petitioners against life and liberty threats from the family. The petitioners are both major adults and got married in accordance with the Muslim Law, and the marriage is duly registered thereafter. However, the petitioners’ parents started threatening other partner and their families of dire consequences as the marriage was solemnised against their wishes. Hence, this petition was filed.
The court heard the counsel for both sides. It held that the right to marry is an integral part of Article 21 and is a mark of human liberty.
It further relied on the judgement of the apex court in Shafin Jahan vs. Asokan K.M, where the similar issue of the right of every individual to marry a person of their choice was deliberated. It was held that the Constitution’s strength is evident in its assurance that every individual has a safeguarded right to make a choice of a partner for sharing intimacies, whether within or outside of marriage.
It is further held that the private and intimate aspects of marriage reside within a sacred sphere of privacy that is inviolable. An individual’s unassailable right to select a life partner remains unaffected by religious considerations. The law establishes conditions for a lawful marriage and offers solutions when relationships encounter difficulties. Neither the state nor the law can impose restrictions on the freedom of individuals to make choices about their partners. These choices are at the heart of personal liberty protected by the Constitution. Hence, the right to choose one’s life partner is an inherent aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Constitution upholds the right to life, and this right can only be restricted by a law that is both substantively and procedurally fair, just, and reasonable. Nonacceptance of the choice of individuals would simply mean creating discomfort to the constitutional right by a Constitutional Court which is meant to be the protector of fundamental rights. Such a situation cannot remotely be conceived. Furthermore, society should not have any influence in determining the selection of life partners.
Accordingly, the court ordered the police to take all reasonable steps to ensure adequate assistance and protection to the petitioners in accordance with the law. Hence, the petition is disposed of.

created: November 8, 2023