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SC holds that Conviction can be solely based on dying declaration without corroboration if found to be true & voluntary
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
February 9, 2022
In this roundup of Court Judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s observations & directions on not rejecting COVID-19 compensation claims because they were filed online, a conviction can be solely based on dying declaration without corroboration if found to be true & voluntary, how fabrication of documents is an offence whether or not there is loss for Government, that adjudicatory functions of the NGT cannot be delegated to any administrative expert committees, etc.
SC: No state can reject an application on the ground that it was filed offline
In the case of Gaurav Kumar Bansal vs. Union of India monitoring the disbursal of ex-gratia compensation of Rs. 50,000 for COVID-19 death, the Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices M.R.Shah and B.V. Nagarathna directed all the State Governments to appoint a dedicated officer, not below the rank of Deputy Secretary in the Chief Minister’s Secretariat, as a nodal officer to coordinate with the Member Secretary of the State Legal Services Authority to ensure that all eligible claimants apply for ex-gratia compensation. Further, the bench noted that Maharashtra had rejected 61,848 applications out of over 2.27 lakh claims received because they were filed offline. It directed the State Governments to accept all applications whether filed online or not. The Apex Court stated that no application can be rejected on the ground that they were filed offline or on technical grounds. The Court has granted the State Governments one week’s time for reviewing the decision of rejecting claims filed offline.
Around the same time, the Rajasthan High Court observed that Black Fungus infections and its spread had not been stated to be of such a magnitude that it has been a pandemic and disposed the PIL filed seeking ex-gratia relief for Black Fungus victims like in the case of COVID-19 victims being provided by the government.
In a response to a plea made to ensure that beggars and vagabonds/homeless are also included in the COVID-19 vaccination program, the Centre told the Apex Court that 77 lakh persons without ID cards have been given the first dose and 14 lakh have been given both the doses. The plea will be heard again in March 2022.
SC: Conviction can be solely based on dying declaration without corroboration
In State of U.P. vs. Veerpal,  a woman in Uttar Pradesh was allegedly set ablaze with kerosene by her father-in-law and mother-in-law.  The incident took place in 2011 when the now-deceased had refused to give the in-laws some money that they demanded. A murder case was registered against the accused initially under Section 326 of IPC for voluntarily causing grievous hurt. The investigating officer after collecting relevant evidence and statements of witnesses filed a charge-sheet against the accused for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34. The Trial Court relied on the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate and denied the accused’s argument that the deceased poured kerosene herself and sentenced both the accused to life imprisonment.
The case was later taken up in the High Court which acquitted the accused on grounds that there were two dying declarations- one recorded by the Inspection Officer on the day of the incident and the other recorded by the Magistrate after two days. The State then filed an appeal with the Apex Court against the High Court’s decision.
The Supreme Court Bench consisting of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna noted that there was no reason to doubt the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate wherein it was mentioned that the accused had set the victim on fire upon verification of medical evidence. It added that the reasoning of the High Court to not rely upon the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate could not be accepted and restored the Trial Court’s verdict.
Citing past verdicts by the Supreme Court, the Bench noted that there was no rule of law or prudence to not accept a dying declaration without corroboration. It also went on to state that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction on it, without corroboration.
SC: Fabrication of documents is an offence whether or not there is a loss for Government
Missu Naseem & Anr. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. involved a land issue in which the State registered a criminal case alleging that the private respondents had submitted fake and fabricated tax books and tax receipts to the Urban Land Ceiling Department to grab Government land. The private respondents filed a petition before the High Court pleading to quash the FIR. The Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed the FIR stating that there was no revenue loss for the Government as it had collected the highest slab rate. Even if the petitioners had produced fabricated documents since there is no wrongful loss for the Government and so, registration of crime and carrying out the investigation would be an abuse of the process of law.
However, the Supreme Court held that the reasoning given by the High Court was totally unsustainable. The bench of Justices SK Kaul and MM Sundresh stated that the production of fake and fabricated documents was not permissible under any circumstances, even if the same did not cause any wrongful loss to the Government and set aside the AP High Court’s order. It also expressed regret over the pendency of the issue at the Apex Court for almost 8 years.
SC: Entire service records should be considered to pass the order of premature retirement
In Central Industrial Security Force vs. HC (GD) Om Prakash, Head Constable Om Prakash was prematurely retired in 2011 as per the provisions of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and Fundamental Rights after completion of 30 years of service. Delhi High Court set aside the order of premature retirement stating that the promotion as Head Constable took place only in 2000 and so the penalties imposed prior to the year 2000 must be ignored while determining suitability to be retained in service. It noted that the petitioner was awarded punishment multiple times prior to promotion for receiving illegal gratification, allegations of absence from duty and overstaying of leave. Furthermore, it was stated that the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) for 2010 was graded average and the writ petitioner was unaware of it because of which the ACR cannot be considered.
The SC bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian when hearing the appeal noted that an order of compulsory retirement is not an order of punishment. It referred to its earlier decisions and stated that the courts should not interfere with the exercise of the power of compulsory retirement if arrived at bonafidely and based on material available on record. The Bench said that the High Court had completely misdirected itself while setting aside the order of premature retirement and reversed the High Court’s order adding that a compulsory retirement order was not liable to be quashed by the court merely because adverse remarks considered were not communicated to the employee. In the order, the Bench also stated that the entire service record should be taken into consideration, even prior to promotion.
SC: Adjudicatory functions of the NGT cannot be delegated to any administrative expert committees
The case Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust vs. State of Gujarat involved the issue of the dumping of unsegregated and untreated Municipal Solid Waste at an open landfill site in the district of Surat, which was raised by environmental organizations with the National Green Tribunal in 2014. Many orders were passed in the Original Application (OA) from time to time. In 2018, when the Principal Bench of NGT took up the issue, the OA was disposed of on the ground that in another OA, the NGT had constituted Apex, Regional and State Level Committees to monitor the implementation of the Solid Waste Management Rules.
Before the Supreme Court, an appeal was filed asking whether the Principal Bench of the NGT is right to have directed the appellants to approach the Committees set up by it, instead of the proceedings in the OA. The Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and Bela M. Trivedi observed that the adjudicatory functions of the NGT cannot be delegated to any administrative expert committees. The expert committee may or may not assist the NGT by carrying out the fact-finding exercises, but the adjudication must be carried out by the NGT.
SC: Conviction on the sole evidence of the child witness is permissible if the witness is found competent and the testimony is trustworthy
In Ravinder vs. State, a 10-year-old girl alleged that the accused subjected her to daily indecent behaviour by exposing his genitals at the child outside her house. When she informed her mother about the sexual abuse, her parents apprehended the accused at the street where they saw him and lodged an FIR against him. During the investigation, the child revealed that the accused used to abuse her friend as well. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed under Sections 354/509 IPC and Section 12 of the POCSO Act. The Additional Sessions Judge charged the appellant under Section 12 of the POCSO Act, to which he pleaded not guilty. He then appealed with the Delhi High Court.
Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri noted that there were contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on various aspects such as how and when the child victim informed her mother about the acts of the appellant. Citing discrepancies with respect to the examination of the witnesses, the High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant of charges framed against him.
However, relying on past cases, the Court noted that conviction on the sole evidence of the child witness is permissible if the witness is found competent and the testimony is trustworthy. It added that in cases involving the testimony of a child witness, a note of caution has been sounded time and again to the effect that the testimony must be evaluated more carefully. Further, it noted that evidence of the child witness and its credibility would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution that the court must bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one.
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Review: SC holds that ‘loss of earning capacity’ to be fixed as 100% when claimant is incapacitated for life in road accident
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
November 3, 2021
In this roundup of court judgements, we look at Constitutional Courts’ remarks & directions about atrocities against SC/STs, probe on Pegasus snooping allegations, insurance compensation for loss of earning capacity, and distance between a bar and temple.
Supreme Court: Notice to the victim under Section 15A in court proceedings against accused is mandatory; atrocities against SC/STs are not a thing of the past.
In the case Hariram Bhambhi vs. Satyanarayan, the Supreme Court held that reasonable and timely notice must be issued to the victim or their dependent, as per the requirement of Section 15A of the Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna remarked that atrocities against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are not a thing of the past. Many acquittals under SC/ST PoA Act are a result of improper investigation and prosecution of crime, leading to insufficient evidence, which gives rise to the erroneous perception that cases registered under the Act are false and that it is being misused.
The apex court was hearing an appeal against a Rajasthan High Court order granting bail to an accused under SC/ST PoA Act. One of the contentions raised in the appeal was that there has been a fundamental infraction of the provisions of Section 15A of the Act by the High Court in not issuing notice to the complainant, as he was entitled to be heard in any proceeding under the Act. When the complainant moved the High Court for cancellation of bail, it took the view that compliance with the principles of natural justice at that particular stage would cure the deficiency.
Disapproving this view, the Supreme court held that in this instance, the victim’s right to notice and to be heard were violated.
The bench observed that the requirement under Section 15A of the Act of issuing a notice of a court proceeding to a victim or a dependent is mandatory. The bench remarked that Section 15A was introduced to protect the rights of the victims and witnesses whose rights as equal beneficiaries of the criminal justice system are often overlooked due to their weak social position.
Under Section 15A(3), a victim or his dependent shall have the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any Court proceeding.  As per Section 15A(5), a victim or his dependent shall be entitled to be heard at any proceeding under this Act in respect of bail, discharge, release, parole, or conviction.
Supreme Court: Constitutes independent expert committee to probe Pegasus snooping allegations.
In the case Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Union of India and connected cases, the Supreme Court directed the constitution of an independent expert committee to enquire the allegations of widespread and targeted surveillance of politicians, journalists, activists etc. using the Pegasus spyware.
The Supreme Court rejected the Union Government’s prayer to allow it to constitute a committee observing that allowing the Centre to probe the allegations by itself will violate the judicial principles against bias.
The apex court opined that ample time was given to the Centre/Union of India to disclose all information regarding the Pegasus, however, they declined to offer information. The Centre informed the bench that since aspects of national security are involved, the subject cannot become a matter of judicial debate or public discourse. The Solicitor General Tushar Mehta opined that the Central Government cannot reveal on affidavit whether it has used any particular software for security purposes, as it will alert terror groups.
The bench observed while the Union of India can decline information when issues of national security are involved, indiscriminate spying of citizens cannot be allowed except in accordance with the law.
The independent expert committee will be overseen by retired Supreme Court Judge Justice RV Raveendran. The committee is to investigate the matter expeditiously and the matter has been posted for further hearing after 8 weeks.
Supreme Court: Loss of earning capacity to be fixed as 100% when a claimant is incapacitated for life.
In the case Jithendran vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that the loss of earning capacity must be fixed as 100% when a claimant-motor accident victim is incapacitated for life and is confined to home.
The apex court was hearing an appeal filed by a person who suffered serious accident-induced injuries while riding a pillion on a bike when it was hit by a car. Due to the accident, he has suffered severe impairment of cognitive power with hemiparesis and total aphasia. The victim’s prognosis estimated a 69% permanent disability.
The petitioner questioned the logic of restricting the insurance compensation to 69% under the head of permanent disability when his earning capacity is reduced to zero (notwithstanding his 69% permanent disability).
The bench of Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy held that the extent of economic loss arising from a disability may not be measured in proportions to the extent of permanent disability.
In other words, a person is not only to be compensated for the injury suffered due to the accident but also for the loss suffered on account of the injury and his inability to lead the life he led, prior to the event.
Supreme Court: Cannot direct relocation of a bar if the distance from temple meets the statutory limit.
In the case of M. Veeramani vs. M/S Jothy Bar And Ors, the Supreme Court refused to intervene to change the present location of a bar merely on grounds of it being in the vicinity of the temple. The apex court noted that the distance of the concerned bar from the entrance of the Dhrowbathi Amman temple in Puducherry is in excess of the statutorily prescribed limits.
The apex court was hearing a Special Leave Petition (SLP) against an order of Madras High Court’s division bench where the bench recalled an earlier order of the High Court directing the cancellation of the bar owner’s liquor license.
The petitioner highlighted that the bar is located in close proximity to the temple. There have been instances of people getting drunk and disrupting the prayer offerings and performance of rituals by the temple and other devotees.
In the report submitted to the court by the Tahsildar-cum-Excise Officer, the distance from the outer extremity of the precincts of the bar to the entrance of the Dhrowbathi Amman Temple is shown to be 114.5 metres, which is well in excess of the prohibited distance. Justice B. V. Nagarathna remarked that even if the bar were to be located 500 metres away, there might still be people who consume alcohol and then choose to visit the temple, creating the same problem.
The bench of Justices D. Y. Chandrachud and B. V. Nagarathna held that there does not appear to be any basis for the bar licence to be cancelled, since it is not located within the prohibited distance, nor does it fall foul of any other condition.
The bench added that in the event the adjacent land (to the temple premise) is put to any regular use by the temple for religious activities, the relevant authorities may have to reconsider the location of the bar.
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author: Sai Krishna Muthyanolla


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SC holds that once common intention to kill is established, the cause of injury or weapons used is irrelevant
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 16, 2022
In this roundup of the Court Judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s observations & directions that Posting of spouses, the needs of the disabled and compassionate grounds should be given due consideration when considering Inter-Commissionerate Transfers, that jurisdiction of a Court under the Contempt of Courts Act does not cease just because the order of which contempt is alleged, is executable, and that Once common intention to kill is established, the cause of injury or weapons used is irrelevant.
SC: Posting of spouses, the needs of the disabled and compassionate grounds should be given due consideration when considering ICT
In SK Naushad Rahman and others vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court heard appeals against the Kerala High Court’s judgment rejecting the challenge against the validity of a circular issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) in 2018 withdrawing Inter-Commissionerate Transfers (ICT). The Supreme Court Bench consisting of Justice DY Chandrachud, and Justice Vikram Nath upheld the Kerala High Court’s judgment which approved the withdrawal of ICTs.
The basic guidelines in service jurisprudence are-
Keeping in mind the above precepts, the Bench recommended formulation of a policy by the State for its employees such that the importance of protecting family life as an element of the dignity of the person and a postulate of privacy is given due consideration while upholding basic constitutional values such as Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty). The Bench called for considering the posting of spouses, the needs of the disabled and compassionate grounds, responding to the challenge against the circular based on gender equality and the need for equal treatment of disabled persons.
Citing previous judgements, the Bench emphasized the need to ensure substantive equality of opportunity through policy. Further, it noted that Article 15(3) of the Constitution calls for adopting special provisions for women and children, and spousal posting should also be considered in this manner. With respect to persons with disabilities, the policy must ensure their right to live with dignity. It also stated that the interference of the State in the rights of privacy, dignity, and family life of persons must be proportional.
SC: Jurisdiction of a Court under the Contempt of Courts Act does not cease just because the order of which contempt is alleged, is executable
In contempt petition, Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund vs. Dharmesh S. Jain, the Supreme Court had earlier directed the respondents to deposit the amount as per the order passed by the High Court in September 2019 within a period of 8 weeks. Further, the Court added that non-compliance of the same would be treated very seriously. If the said amount was not deposited as per High Court’s order, it would be considered as non-compliance with the order of the Apex Court and will have serious consequences.
However, in the present case, the respondents asserted that non-compliance with the condition of deposit would only end up in the enforcement of the Arbitrator’s final decision and so, contempt proceedings should not be initiated for non-compliance with such condition that was not mandatory in nature.
The Court observed that there are two options for a party when they haven’t complied with an order/direction in a stipulated time period-
The bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna held the party responsible for the delay of compliance guilty of contempt, noting that the respondents had not resorted to either of the options. The bench also observed that the jurisdiction of a Court under the Contempt of Courts Act would not end just because the order or decree of which contempt is alleged, is executable. Moreover, irrespective of the executability of the order, the question to be considered is if the conduct of the party involved in contempt would make a fit case for awarding punishment for contempt of Court.
SC: Once common intention to kill is established, the cause of injury or weapons used is irrelevant
In January 2002, Devendra went to the house of the accused Ramjilal for demanding money for the grinding of wheat flour in the flour mill. Two other accused persons assaulted him. The accused persons also went to his brother’s house, assaulted him, and shot him with firearms. The incident had a couple of witnesses. Devendra’s brother succumbed to the injuries on the way to the police station. When the case was taken to the Trial Court, it held that all the accused shared the common intention to kill the deceased and sentenced all of them to life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 5,000 per person.
Three of the accused then appealed to the High Court which acquitted them on grounds that there were contradictions in ocular and medical evidence and gave them the benefit of doubt. In the State of MP vs. Ramji Lal Sharma, the Supreme Court considered the appeal filed by the State against this judgement of the High Court.
The Supreme Court Bench consisting of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna referred to the evidence on record and observed that there were no material contradictions in the ocular and the medical evidence, contrary to the High Court’s observation. The Apex Court noted that the presence of all the accused was established and proved and that the prosecution had also proved that all the accused shared the common intention to kill the deceased. According to the Supreme Court, the common intention to kill is what mattered, and the use of weapons or cause of injury was irrelevant. It quashed the High Court’s judgment and restored that of the Trial Court.
SC: Academic matters are best left to the academics and courts have no expertise in it
In Mahesh Kumar vs. Staff Selection Commission, the Supreme Court considered an SLP assailing Delhi High Court’s order from 05 March 2021. The petitioner had approached the High Court regarding the evaluation of his answer scripts, stating that certain marks were deducted which were not supposed to deduct. The Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna dismissed the petition and upheld the High Court’s decision to not entertain the writ petition stating that conscious decision was taken by experts and the courts did not have any expertise in the matter. Adding that academic matters are best left to the academics, it stated that it did not find any reason to interfere in the matter.
Punjab & Haryana HC: Principle of vicarious liability cannot be extended indefinitely
Proceedings were initiated under Section 130 for the non-payment of fine and penalty in 14 days since the tax authorities confiscated goods and conveyance during transit as the tax was not paid for the goods. While the owner of the goods did not pay the fine or penalty, the owner of the vehicle paid the fine for conveyance. Despite this, the authorities did not release the conveyance citing that the fine on the goods is also paid. The vehicle owner filed a writ petition, Vijay Mamgain vs. State of Haryana raising the issue as to whether conveyance detained by the tax authorities can be released on payment of the fine imposed on conveyance while the fine imposed on goods is not paid.
It was argued by the State that there was no warrant for the proposition that owner of goods and owner of vehicles were two separate entities since the CGST Act made it clear that whoever wants the vehicle or goods to be released, must pay all the tax, fine, and penalty involved.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court division bench of Justice Ajay Tewari and Pankaj Jain rejected the argument and held that the owner of the vehicle and the owner of the goods were different. Hence, the owner of the vehicle cannot be considered vicariously liable for the fine and penalty levied on the goods and cannot be forced to pay the fine or penalty imposed on the goods. Moreover, the conveyance could also not be detained since the fine and penalty levied on it were paid.


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SC holds that provisions under RERA would prevail over that of SARFAESI in case of conflict between the two
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
February 23, 2022
In this roundup of Court Judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s observations & directions about how the State should provide a safe atmosphere for women to work, and not restrict them from doing so, about how prior criminal history, conduct, and behaviour in jail, and possible danger to society of convict should be considered for premature release, that appeal against NCDRC’s order in the SC prior to commencement of 2019 Consumer Act does not require 50% pre-deposit, and that provisions under RERA would prevail over that of SARFAESI in case of conflict between the two.
SC: The state should provide a safe atmosphere for women to work, and not restrict them from doing so
In Hotel Priya, A Proprietorship vs. State Of Maharashtra, the appellants either owned or operated restaurants or bars where orchestra performances are common (referred to as Orchestra bars). Earlier, they had challenged certain conditions imposed by the  Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai, under Licensing and Performance for Public Amusement including Cabaret Performance, Melas and Tamashas Rule, 1960 framed under the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 before the High Court of Bombay including the cap on the number of artists that can perform and the number of women artists on stage. As per the conditions,
The appellants had claimed that the conditions were a violation of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India that guarantees equality before the law and entitles every individual to practice any profession. However, the High Court rejected the petition stating that the Commissioner had acted well within the power to do so.
The appellants stated that there was no rationale behind the numerical division of equal gender participation in the orchestra band since the performance would depend on the band/group and what they wish to perform. Further, this division does not allow the participation of transgender persons.
Not convinced with the State’s justification that such restrictions were necessary for the public interest to promote the welfare of women, prevent human trafficking in women, and their exploitation, the bench of justices KM Joseph and S Ravindra Bhat stated that the State should provide a conducive environment for women to work in, and not restrict them from working. It stated that the order seemed to be the product of a stereotypical view that women who perform in bars and establishments, like the appellants, belong to a certain class of society and the cap directly transgressed the fundamental rights of the performers as well as the license owners.
The Bench nullified the order and allowed the appeal stating that “the condition imposing a gender cap as to the number of women or men, who can perform in orchestras and bands, in bars licensed under the Rules, 1960 and other allied provisions, is void. While the overall limit of performers in any given performance cannot exceed eight, the composition (i.e., all-female, majority female or male, or vice versa) can be of any combination.”
SC: Prior criminal history, conduct and behaviour in jail, and possible danger to society of convict should be considered for premature release
In Sharafat Ali vs. State of UP & Anr, the petitioner was convicted for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2005. After undergoing imprisonment for 17 years, 9 months and 26 days, he applied for premature release. However, his application was rejected by the State government taking into consideration the records of the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police which stated that the possibility of resentment on the victim’s side cannot be ruled out if he is released prematurely. Also, the order stated that the petitioner had an “extremist nature” and there was possibility of him committing an offence again.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices DY Chandrachud, Surya Kant and Vikram Nath observed that the order passed by the State government contained only general observations such as resentment of the victim’s side which is general to all offences of murder. It did not contain anything specific to the petitioner, as to whether he possessed any other criminal history, his conduct and behaviour in jail which would give a picture on whether he would pose a danger to society if released.
Noting this, the Supreme Court Bench set aside the State’s order and called for reconsideration of the petitioner’s application for premature release, as per the policy in 2005 when he was convicted. The Bench added that the application must be considered fresh, and the order must consider relevant facts and circumstances such as the convict’s prior criminal history, conduct, and behaviour in jail after being convicted, possible danger to society, etc. The Court also set a deadline of two months from the date of the verdict, for completion of the exercise.
SC: Appeal against NCDRC’s order in the SC prior to commencement of 2019 Consumer Act does not require 50% pre-deposit
In ECGC Limited vs. Mokul Shriram EPC JV, the appellants approached the Apex Court against an order passed by the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (NCDRC) which directed them to pay over Rs. 265 crores along with interest. The complainant was given a contract to construct rainwater drainage, sewerage, and municipal road system by the Government of Basra, Iraq. The complainant obtained two specific contracts (Letter of Credit Comprehensive Risks Policies) by paying a sum of Rs. 10,38,03,912 as a premium to the appellant. The grievance of the complainant was that the payment for invoices issued for the work done under the contract was suspended. Later, the contract also was withdrawn by the Government of Basra owing to some internal conflict. The appellant had rejected the insurance claim of the complainant and thus relief was sought before the NCDRC. The NCDRC allowed the complaint only in January 2021.
The issue raised before the Supreme Court was if the appeal before it would fall under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, or under the erstwhile Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Under the 1986 Act, no appeal against the NCDRC’s should be entertained by the Supreme Court unless the person who is required to pay the amount deposits 50% of the amount of Rs. 50,000 whichever is less. The provisions of the 2019 Act state that no appeal should be entertained by the Apex Court unless the person deposits 50% of the amount required to be paid.
The bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian referred to various past judgements including those of the Supreme Court, such as Nogendra Nath Bose v. Mon Mohan Singha Roy & Ors, Hoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors, etc and allowed the appeal. It held that the pre-deposit of 50% of the amount awarded would not be applicable to those complaints filed before the commencement of the 2019 Act.
SC: Dismissed plea seeking quashing of FIRs filed across all states for sale, purchase, and bursting of green firecrackers
The Supreme Court Bench of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna in Sanjeev Newar vs. Union of India heard a writ petition filed by Sanjeev Newar and others seeking quashing of FIRs lodged by all the States in the country for sale, purchase, and bursting of green firecrackers. However, the court dismissed the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, and held that those who are aggrieved may initiate appropriate proceedings in the respective Court.
SC: Provisions under RERA would prevail over that of SARFAESI in case of conflict between the two
In Union Bank of India vs. Rajasthan Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA), the Supreme Court upheld Rajasthan High Court’s judgement with respect to the entertainment of complaints raised by homebuyers against the bank. The bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna stated that they completely agreed with the High Court’s view, dismissing the Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the Union Bank of India, which was as follows:
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SC issues directions for expeditious adjudication of claims related to Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
November 24, 2021
In this roundup of court judgements, we look at Constitutional Courts’ remarks & directions about legislative intent of laws, disbursement of compensation and expeditious adjudication of MACT claims, Age recorded by JJ Board or CWC, and Community Kitchen Policy.
Supreme Court: Judges should not strain plain words of the statute to destroy legislative intent.
In the case Attorney General for India vs. Satish and another, the Supreme Court set aside the controversial judgment of the Bombay HC which held that ‘skin-to-skin’ contact is necessary for the offence of sexual assault under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act.
The Supreme court was hearing appeals filed by the Attorney General of India, the National Commission for Women, and the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of the Bombay High Court.
Earlier, in the case, Satish vs. the State of Maharashtra, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court held that groping a child’s breasts without ‘skin-to-skin contact’ would amount to ‘molestation’ under the Indian Penal Code (Section 354 of IPC) but not the graver offence of ‘sexual assault’ under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses (POCSO) Act. In conclusion, a single bench of Justice Pushpa Ganediwala sentenced the 39-year-old man under Section 354 IPC (outraging a woman’s modesty) to one-year imprisonment for the minor offence.
‘Sexual assault’ under section 8 of the POCSO Act would attract a minimum punishment of three years as compared to outraging of a woman’s modesty under section 354 of the IPC, which attracts a minimum punishment of only a year. Both the offenses carry a maximum imprisonment of five years.
The Nagpur bench interpreted the words “physical contact” under Section 7 of POCSO to mean “direct physical contact” i.e. skin -to- skin contact with sexual intent without penetration.”
The bench of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice Bela M Trivedi stated that restricting ‘touch’ or ‘physical contact’ under Section 7 of POCSO is absurd and will destroy the intent of the Act, which is enacted to protect children from sexual offences.
The apex court bench held that the interpretation adopted by the Bombay High Court not only limits the operation of the law but tends to subvert the intention too. The judgement notes that laws like POCSO were enacted to overcome the “limitations in law dealing with acts that undermined the dignity and autonomy of women and children”. The intent is that the offending behaviour (whether the touch or other act involving physical contact), should be motivated with sexual intent. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that Section 7 of POSCO covers both direct and indirect touch.
The apex court notes that “the reasoning in the High Court’s judgment quite insensitively trivializes – indeed legitimizes -an entire range of unacceptable behaviour which undermines a child’s dignity and autonomy, through unwanted intrusions. “
Supreme Court: Issues additional directions for disbursement of compensation and expeditious adjudication of MACT claims.
In the case Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court issued additional directions regarding disbursement of compensation and expeditious adjudication of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) by online mechanism.
The high court was hearing a writ petition filed by Insurance Company Bajaj Allianz seeking directions for facilitating compensation disbursement process and expedition of cases before Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in terms of previous orders of the High Court.
The bench of Justices SK Kaul and MM Sundresh issued the following directions:
The matter has been posted for further hearing on 27 January 2022.
Supreme Court: Age recorded by JJ Board or CWC deemed to be true age of accused.
In the case Rishipal Singh Solanki vs State of UP & Ors, the Supreme Court held that for the purpose of Juvenile Justice Act 2015, the age was recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board or Child Welfare Committee (CWC) will be deemed to be the true age of the person.
The apex court was hearing a plea challenging Allahabad High Court’s order sustaining the judgment of the District & Sessions Court as well as of the Juvenile Justice Board declaring the accused a juvenile delinquent. In the present case, the victim approached the Supreme Court challenging the declaration of the accused as a juvenile, arguing that the matriculation certificate can’t be a conclusive document for determining the age of the juvenile irrespective of other material discrepancies in the oral testimony of the witnesses or other documents being produced.
The bench of Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice BV Nagarathna held that the age recorded by the Committee or the Board for the purpose of the JJ Act, 2015 be deemed to be the true age of the person as per the deeming provision Section 94 (3) of the JJ Act, 2015. In case the Board or Committee has reasonable grounds about them being a child or not, it can undertake the process of determination of age by seeking evidence, as per Section 94 of the Act.
The Bench has also specified the evidence on which the process of age determination can be done by the Board in cases of such doubts:
In the present case, the bench noted that there is no other document indicating the date of birth of the person contrary to what has been indicated in the matriculation certificate and therefore such a discrepancy in the date of birth does not arise.
In the absence of any contrary evidence, the Bench refused to differ from the order of the High court.
Supreme Court: The welfare state has to ensure no one dies of hunger; Gives Centre last chance to frame Community Kitchen Policy.
In the case Anun Dhawan and others vs. Union of India and others, the Supreme Court emphasised that a welfare state has a constitutional duty to ensure that no one dies of hunger and granted 3 weeks’ time to the Central Government, as the last opportunity, to frame a pan-India policy on community kitchens, after taking the view of different state governments.
The apex court was acting upon a writ petition which seeks the formulation of a community kitchen policy to avoid starvation deaths. In an earlier order, the Supreme court on 27 October 2021 had directed the Central Government to come up with a scheme for establishing pan-India community kitchens, after interacting with the state governments.
The apex court expressed displeasure over the affidavit filed by the under-secretary of the Union Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Administration. The court observed that the Principal Secretary had to file the affidavit and also expressed dissatisfaction over the contents in the affidavit, observing that it merely recorded the information already given by the states regarding the respective community kitchen schemes run by them. Further, the court pointed out that the affidavit does not say anything about the policy decision taken by the Centre.
The Attorney General for India assured that the Centre will come out with a concrete scheme within the framework of the National Food Security Act.
The bench of Chief Justice of India NV Ramana emphasised that the scheme needs to have a statutory framework so that it cannot be discontinued on a change of policy.

created: November 24, 2021


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Review: SC issues directions to avoid agony and harassment for women who file complaints of sexual harassment.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
August 17, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at Supreme Court’s directions in  a case relating to sexual harassment and its observations regarding prosecution based on suspicion. We also look at Karnataka High Court’s observation about married daughter’s entitlement for accidental insurance compensation, Allahabad High Court’s judgment taking into consideration the need to provide scope for reform for convict and Gujarat High Court’s statement of electricity company not needing to take permission from landowner for overhead installation.
Karnataka HC: Married daughter entitled to Motor Accident compensation for Parent’s Death.
The single judge bench comprising of Justice H P Sandesh observed that there cannot be discrimination between sons & daughters and even married daughters are entitled to compensation from the insurance company on the death of their parent in an accident.
This observation was made in the case Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd vs. Gangappa S/O. Chinnappa Saunshi, where-in the insurance company filed an appeal challenging the order of the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal.
Justice H P Sandesh relied on an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case National Insurance Company Ltd vs. Birender & Ors, wherein it was settled that the legal representatives of the deceased have the right to apply for compensation. It was also observed that even the major married and earning sons of the deceased (being legal representatives of the deceased) have a right to apply for the compensation and the application needs to be considered irrespective of whether the legal representatives are fully dependent on the deceased.
The court observed that there cannot be discrimination between married sons or daughters. It stated that the contention that married daughters of the deceased is not entitled to compensation cannot be accepted by the court.
The insurance company also contended that there is negligence on the part of the driver of the tempo in which the deceased was travelling and hence the tribunal ought to have taken this contributory negligence into consideration. However, the court noted that the insurance company has failed to provide any proof of the negligence of the driver and has also not even examined the official witness. Hence, the question of the tribunal considering contributory negligence does not arise. The single court bench proceeded to dismiss the contentions and the appeal by the insurance company.
Gujarat HC: The electricity company does not require the landowner’s consent for laying down overhead transmission.
In the case of Parth Krishnakant Patel vs. Managing Director/General Manager (Legal Cell), the Gujarat High court held that an electricity company does not require the consent of a private landowner to lay overhead high tension transmission lines.
As per the case details, the Court was hearing a writ petition seeking the installation of an electric line inside and underneath the plot of the petitioner. It is stated that the line passing overhead on the private land of the petitioner had caused the value of the land to deteriorate. It is noted that there was no consent sought from the petitioner before laying the line. The petitioner further claimed that the plot is now divided into two halves and the other half has become redundant.
Referring to the earlier cases, the High Court has concluded that similar contentions raised by individuals for the passing of transmission lines through their land have been specifically rejected. The single judge bench of Justice Biren Vaishnav relied on the judgment given in the case,  Gujarat State Electricity Transmission Corporation Ltd, vs. Ratilal Magnanji Brahmbhatt.
The High Court dismissed the petition filed stating that neither the consent of the landowner was necessary, nor was he required to be heard. However, it permitted the petitioners to raise disputes regarding compensation u/s 16(4) of the Telegraph Act.
Supreme Court: Issues directions to avoid agony and harassment for women who file complaints of sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice JB Pardiwala reiterated the importance of courts dealing with victims of sexual crimes in a sensitive manner and issued directions to the trial courts to avoid agony and harassment for women who file complaints of sexual harassment.
The bench noted that legal proceedings tend to involve more efforts for complainants of sexual assault as they are dealing with trauma and societal shame. Hence, it is the responsibility of the courts to appropriately handle such matters.
These directions were given in the case, XYZ vs. State of Madhya Pradesh. As per the case, the appellant, a yoga instructor alleged that the then vice-chancellor of the Institute has touched her inappropriately.  She was threatened with discharge from the service on having refused his demands. She lodged a complaint at the police station. After no action was taken, a further complaint was filed with the Superintendent of Police (SP).  However, no action was taken even after complaining twice to the SP. She then moved to the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
JMFC directed the police to file a status report, which was delayed due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. JMFC observed that although prima facie, there is the occurrence of the offence by the accused persons, the case cannot be decided without collecting the evidence. It further provided the complainant the liberty to examine the witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC. This was questioned by the appellant. However, the High Court dismissed the application on the ground that JMFC is not under the obligation to direct the police to register FIR.
The appellant approached the Supreme Court, appealing against the High Court’s order dismissing her application, The Supreme Court recognised that in cases alleging sexual harassment or sexual assault, the victim would possibly be traumatised and therefore the court should not further the burden the complainant and should press upon the police to investigate.  In view of the circumstances, it might not also be possible for the complainant to retrieve important evidence regarding the complaint. In this regard, the court gave the following directions.
Allahabad HC: No accused is incapable of being reformed
In the case, Babu vs. the State of U.P, the Allahabad High Court bench of Justice Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thakur and Justice Ajai Tyagi, modified the sentence of an accused convicted under Section 304 of IPC.
The bench observed that no accused person is incapable of being reformed and hence measures need to be taken to give them an opportunity for reformation and bring them into the social stream.
The bench was hearing an appeal moved by Babu, who was convicted under Section 304(i) read with Sections 34 IPC and under Section 4/25 Arms Act by Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Badaun.
As per the prosecution, the convict along with co-accused Munna was found guilty of killing Rani (deceased). The complainant (Kamlesh) returned home with her mother Rani after purchasing vegetables. Both the accused came from behind and Babu put his hand on the shoulder of Rani, who gave a jerk and moved ahead. Babu took a knife from his clothes and stabbed Rani and ran away. She died later. The appellant filed the appeal for a reduction of the sentence. The appellant is already in jail for the past 9 years.
The court observed that nothing new has come out which would benefit the appellant. Further, the knife which was used for the crime was recovered by the investigating officer with the accused Babu. The injuries mentioned in post mortem report corroborate with the injuries that could be inflicted by a weapon like a knife. The court concluded that the accused is the perpetrator of the offence.
It further considered the question as to whether the sentence of life imprisonment was adequate or the sentence is required to be modified. The court considered the earlier rulings of the Apex court, wherein it stated that while considering the imposition of punishment, the impact of crime on society as a whole and the rule needs to be balanced. It stressed that undue harshness should be avoided while sentencing keeping in view the reformative approach underlying in the criminal justice system.
The court noted that in this case, the sentence of life term was very harsh in view of the entirety of the facts and circumstances. Therefore, the sentence awarded was modified as a sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.10,000.
SC: Suspicion however strong cannot be ground for Conviction
Supreme Court has observed that an accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. In the case, Ram Niwas vs. the State of Haryana, the Supreme Court Bench consisting of Justice BR Gavai and PS Narasimha, reiterated this and acquitted the accused in the murder case.
As per the case details, the accused Ram Niwas was accused of the murder of Dalip Singh. The Trial Court convicted him under Section 302 IPC, which was confirmed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
In their appeal, it was contended that in the absence of prosecution proving that the dead body was of deceased Dalip Singh, the conviction was not sustainable. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem stated that the face of the dead body was unrecognizable. It was presented that the state relied on the extra-judicial confessions made by the accused. Based on the available evidence, the bench observed that the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence.
Featured Image: Review of Court Judgments


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Review: SC issues guidelines for Courts and Investigating Agencies with respect to granting bail
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
July 20, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Supreme Court’s observation that prayer for CBI investigation should be allowed ‘sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations only, that false charge as per Section 211 of IPC refers to initial accusation and not giving false evidence, and the guidelines issued by SC for Courts and Investigating Agency with respect to granting bail.
SC: Prayer for CBI investigation should be allowed ‘sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations only
In Himanshu Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors., a CBI probe was sought into the alleged massacre of Adivasis in Chhattisgarh by the Chhattisgarh Police, Special Police Officers (SPOs) appointed by the Chhattisgarh Government in collusion with the activists of the Salwa Judum, the Central Paramilitary Forces, CRPF and the CoBRA Battalion, in two separate attacks in 2009. The plea was filed by a member of an NGO along with the kith and kin of the victims of the alleged massacre.
A bench of Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and J.B. Pardiwala, in their 94 page long verdict, stated that the prayer seeking direction for the probe of an alleged offence by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) should not be granted on “mere asking”. According to past judgements, the prayer for CBI investigation should be allowed ‘sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instill confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights.’ CBI may be handed over cases in certain circumstances like if the court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in a proper direction, or to do complete justice in the case and if high-level police officials are involved in the alleged crime. It was also stated that an aggrieved person can only claim that the offence he alleges be investigated properly, but he has no right to claim that it be investigated by any agency of his choice.
False Charge as per Section 211 of IPC refers to an initial accusation and not giving false evidence
In the same plea seeking proceedings for perjury against the petitioners (2009), one of the alternatives put forth was appropriate action to be taken by the state government or CBI under Section 211 of IPC.
Section 211 of IPC is as follows:
According to the Bench, ‘falsely charges’ referred to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not false depositions or false evidence adduced during the course of a criminal trial. ‘Falsely charges’ must be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. The Court identified the conditions that must be satisfied to invoke Section 211 of IPC:
SC: Mere discovery of a weapon at the instance of the accused need not imply that they had used it or concealed it
In Shahaja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra,  the appellant and deceased Mahankal Jaiswal worked as laborers in Mumbai. One night in 2006, the two were involved in a quarrel on account of money. According to witnesses, the appellant had assaulted the deceased with a hammer. After the assault, the appellant had walked away from the place of the incident holding the hammer in his hand. In the morning, the police arrived and noticed that Mahanklal had deceased and sent the body for post-mortem. The discovery panchnama of the weapon of the offence, the hammer was also drawn under the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
The trial court framed charges against the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the IPC based on the oral testimony of two witnesses and the discovery of the hammer at the instance of the appellant. The appellant approached the Bombay High Court challenging the trial court’s order. The High Court dismissed the appeal upholding the trial court’s charge. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court stating that the eyewitnesses were unreliable. According to the Supreme Court Bench of Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala, both the courts had done the right thing- believing the eyewitnesses. The Bench also reiterated conditions for applicability of Section 27.
Referring to past judgements, the Bench noted that the mere discovery of a weapon is not enough to establish the role of the person who discovered the weapon. There is the possibility that they would have learned the existence of the weapon at the place through another source or may have witnessed another person do so. Just because a person discovered the weapon, it need not be that they had concealed it or used it. Even though the conduct of an accused is a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Act, it alone is not sufficient to convict the person or hold them guilty for a serious offence like murder.
SC:  Asks High Court to deliver the judgment at the earliest after the arguments are concluded
State of UP & Anr vs. Akhil Sharda is a criminal appeal relating to the missing consignment of beer bottles. Both the transporter and informants had filed FIRs. The officials of M/S United Breweries Limited were arrayed as accused in the FIR filed by the informant following which they approached Allahabad High Court seeking to set aside the charge sheet filed against them. The High Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings against the company because of which informant and the State appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna accepted the appeal and rejected the High Court’s order of quashing the entire criminal proceedings in the cheating case stating that the High Court had virtually conducted a mini-trial, which was not permissible and while deciding the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at this stage. Moreover, the FIRs filed by the two were interconnected. With respect to delivery of judgement, the Bench advised the High Court to deliver the judgment at the earliest after the arguments are concluded. The Bench emphasized on the need to pronounce the reserved judgment at the earliest and within a reasonable time. The High Court, in this case, delivered the judgment and order after a period of six months after the matter was reserved for judgment. The Bench also stated that a long delay in delivery of the judgment would give rise to unnecessary speculations in the minds of the parties in a case.
SC: Guidelines for Courts and Investigating Agency with respect to granting bail
In Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, the Court categorized the type of offences to be used as guidelines with respect to the bail system in the country. A slew of directions was issued to Courts as well as investigating agencies noting that arrest is a draconian measure that curtails liberty. A Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh came up with the guidelines referring to Supreme Court judgements such as judgments Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Hussain and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors., Surinder Singh @ Shingara Singh vs. State of Punjab, etc.
Some of the key measures listed include:


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Review: SC lays down guidelines for the operation of bank lockers
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
February 24, 2021
In this roundup of the important court judgments, we look at directions about the duty of banks in maintaining safety deposit systems, maternity benefits to contractual employees and on women raising their voices against sexual harassment.
Supreme Court: Banks as service providers owe a separate duty of care to exercise due diligence in maintaining their safety deposit systems
In the case of Amitabha Dasgupta vs. United Bank of India & Ors., the Supreme Court (SC) held that breaking open the locker in a manner other than that prescribed under law is an illegal act which amounts to gross deficiency of service on the part of the bank as a service provider.
The following are the facts about this appeal in the SC. In the early 1950s, Appellant’s mother (since deceased) took a locker on rent in the Deshapriya Park, Kolkata Branch, and in 1970, the Appellant (complainant) was included as a joint holder. In May 1995, the Appellant visited the bank to operate the locker. However, the bank informed him that the locker was broken open in September 1994, for non-payment of rent dues for the period of 1993-1994. The Appellant claimed that such breaking of his locker was illegal since he had cleared dues for 1994-1995 in July 1994, i.e., prior to the breaking of the locker. The Chief Manager of the bank admitted to having inadvertently broken open the locker, though there were no outstanding dues to be paid, and apologized for the same.
In June 1995, when the Appellant went to collect the contents of the locker, it is alleged that he found only two of the seven ornaments that had been deposited in a non-sealed envelope. However, the bank contends that only those two ornaments were found in the locker when it was broken open. Subsequently, the appellant filed a consumer complaint before the District Consumer Forum to return the seven ornaments that were in the locker; or alternatively, pay Rs. 3,00,000/ towards the cost of jewellery, and compensation for damages suffered. The District Forum held the bank liable for deficiency of service and directed the bank to return the entire contents of the locker, or alternatively pay the Appellant Rs. 3,00,000 towards the cost of the jewellery and, Rs. 50,000 as compensation for mental agony, harassment, and cost of litigation.
On appeal, the State Commission accepted the District Commission’s findings on the question of deficiency of service. It also observed that the dispute on the contents of the locker can only be decided upon the provision of elaborate evidence and that the Consumer Forum was not equipped to undertake this evaluation. Therefore, the appellant was directed to approach the civil court for adjudication on the contents of the locker.
The SC notes that the bank inadvertently broke the Appellant’s locker, without any just or reasonable cause, even though he had already cleared his pending dues. The Appellant was not given any notice prior to such tampering with the locker. He remained in the dark for almost a year before he visited the bank for withdrawing his valuables and enquired about the status of the locker.
Thus, the bench of Justices Mohan M. Shanthangoudar and Vineet Saran deemed it appropriate to impose costs of Rs. 5,00,000/ on the Bank which should be paid to the Appellant as compensation. The judgement mentioned that this amount shall be deducted from the salary of the erring officers if they are still in service. If the erring officers have already retired, the amount of costs should be paid by the Bank. Additionally, the Appellant shall be paid Rs. 1,00,000/ as litigation expense.
The judgement highlights that the state of regulations on the subject of locker management is inadequate and muddled. Hence, the judgement lays down certain principles which will ensure that the banks follow due diligence in operating their locker facilities, until the issuance of comprehensive guidelines in this regard. Irrespective of the value of the articles placed inside the locker, the bank is under a separate obligation to ensure that proper procedures are followed while allotting and operating the lockers. The judgment laid down the following principles until comprehensive guidelines are released.
The judgement pronounces that banks as service providers owe a separate duty of care to exercise due diligence in maintaining and operating their locker or safety deposit systems. The banks as custodians of a public property cannot leave the customers in the lurch merely by claiming ignorance of the contents of the lockers.
Karnataka HC: Maternity Benefits cannot be denied to contractual employees
In the case B.S. Rajeshwari vs. State of Karnataka and others, the high court held that maternity benefits cannot be denied to contractual employees.
The petitioner was appointed as Project Information Officer on a contract basis for a consolidated pay of Rs.17,000/- per month with effect from November 2009. The contract was being renewed from time to time on an annual basis and she was thus in service for 10 years now albeit on a contract basis.
In June 2019, the petitioner sought maternity leave. However, she was directed to report to duties forthwith, despite her application to seek maternity leave. When the petitioner did not report back to duties, an order was passed terminating her service.
The court was considering whether the termination/cancellation of the contract of the petitioner on the ground of the petitioner seeking maternity leave is justified.
The judgement recalls the history of the concept of maternity and childcare. It is emphasised that Article 42 of the Indian Constitution directs that the State shall make provision for securing just human conditions for work and maternity relief. The judgement notes the issue as to whether a contract employee is entitled to maternity leave under the Maternity Benefit Act 1961, which has now undergone certain amendments, came up for consideration before the Apex Court.
The bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna notes that the Act does not classify or qualify a mother to be, a government servant, a temporary employee, an employee on a contract basis, or an employee on daily wages. Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to maternity leave of six months in all in terms of the amended Act of 2017. The bench ruled that the petitioner shall be reinstated to the post that she held earlier with 50% back wages from the date of cancellation of appointment till the date of reinstatement.
M J Akbar Defamation Case: Women cannot be punished for raising her voice against sexual abuse
In the defamation case against Priya Ramani by former Union Minister M.J.Akbar, the court has held that women cannot be punished for raising their voice against sexual abuse on the pretext of criminal complaint of defamation.
The complainant moved the court to prosecute the accused Priya Ramani of defaming and damaging the complainant’s reputation by way of tweets, articles, etc. published as well as distributed at her behest, in the print media as well as on the online platform such as Vogue Magazine, Twitter, Firstpost, etc. with accusations of sexual harassment.
The above-mentioned tweets, articles, etc. were in the context of the MeToo Movement in India, when several women belonging to the Indian Film Industry, News Media, and others spoke out against sexual harassment at the workplace.
The complainant alleged that the scandalous accusations levelled by Priya Ramani, by their very tone and tenor, are defamatory and had not only damaged the complainant’s goodwill and reputation, in his social circles and on the political stage, which was established after years of toil and hard work but also had affected the personal reputation of complainant in the community, friends, and colleagues, thereby caused him irreparable loss and tremendous distress.
After taking all submissions into consideration, the judgement notes that it cannot be discounted that sometimes even the most well-respected persons in the society could be involved in sexual abuse or harassment and that it may not always be easy for the victim to speak up against such persons – however, this mere fact should not be held against her at a later stage.
The court took into consideration of the systematic abuse at the workplace due to a lack of the mechanism to redress the grievance of sexual harassment when the alleged incident took place. The judgement notes that the incident against the accused Priya Ramani and witness Ghazala Wahab was prior to the issuance of Visaka Guidelines and enactment of The Sexual Harassment of women at workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.   The judgment also notes their option to not lodge the complaint of sexual harassment due to the social stigma attached to the sexual harassment of women.
The judgement, thus, laid down that a victim has the right to speak up at any platform of her choice and even after decades and cannot be punished for raising her voice against sexual abuse on the pretext of criminal complaint of defamation.
In conclusion, the court ruled that the defamation case against Priya Ramani is not proved and hence she is acquitted for the same.
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SC makes important observations about exclusion criteria of pre-existing illness in medical insurance
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
January 5, 2022
In this roundup of court judgements, we look at Constitutional Courts’ remarks & directions about exclusion criteria of pre-existing illness in medical insurance, Centre’s affidavit to Supreme Court on EWS Reservation, and Karnataka high court’s rules on live-streaming and recording of court proceedings. Gujarat high court has emphasised that no person or court can force a wife to cohabit and establish conjugal rights.
Supreme Court: If the insured suffers a sudden sickness that is not expressly excluded under the policy, the insurer is to indemnify the expenses incurred.
In the case Manmohan Nanda vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that if the insured suffers a sudden sickness or ailment which is not expressly excluded under the policy, a duty is cast on the insurer to indemnify the appellant for the expenses incurred.
The apex court was hearing an appeal filed by the petitioner challenging the order (dated 22 May 2015) passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission related to Consumer Complaint No. 92/2010.
The appellant sought an overseas mediclaim policy for his intended travel to the USA. The appellant was medically examined, and the report categorically noted that the appellant had diabetes type II (also known as diabetes mellitus) and no other adverse medical condition was found. In the medical examination report, a specific query was sought as to whether any abnormalities were observed in the electrocardiogram test of the appellant. There was another query regarding any possible illness or disease for which the appellant may require medical treatment in the ensuing trip to the USA. To both these queries, the doctor who examined the appellant had answered “normal” and “no” respectively.
Thereafter, the Overseas Mediclaim Business and Holiday Policy was issued, which was valid from 19 May 2009 to 01 June 2009 for the appellant. Upon reaching San Francisco on 19 May 2009, the appellant felt weak and started sweating. Initially, his wife got him admitted at the SFO Medical Centre at San Francisco airport and later he was shifted to the Mills-Peninsula Medical Centre where angioplasty was performed on 19 May 2009 and 22 May 2009 and three stents were inserted to remove the blockage from the heart vessels.
On 19 August 2009, the appellant sent a letter annexing all bills in original as well as the discharge summary to the Divisional Manager of the Insurance Company (United India Insurance) at their Bhopal office. On 22 August 2009, the appellant received a letter stating that his claim had been repudiated as the appellant had a history of hyperlipidaemia and diabetes and the policy did not cover pre-existing conditions and complications arising therefrom. The said repudiation was regarding the bill raised by the Medical Centre for USD 2,29,719.
Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a complaint under Section 21 (9) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Consumer Complaint No.92/2010). A reply was filed by the Insurance company arguing that the claim was rightly rejected on the ground of nondisclosure of a pre-existing disease as the treatment report of the appellant showed prior medication such as statins, which is a lipid-lowering medicine. To this, the appellant also filed an additional affidavit enclosing the medical opinions of three doctors on affidavit stating that prescription of statins to a person having diabetes type II is by way of precaution and not because the patient would be suffering from any cardiovascular disease.
Subsequently, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant on the ground of nondisclosure of material facts.
Therefore, in this appeal before the apex court, the appellant has contended that there was no intention to suppress any material fact as the appellant had no knowledge that he was suffering from hyperlipidaemia as on 15 May 2009, when the proposal form was filled by him. The appellant stated that the same was diagnosed for the first time on 19 May 2009, at the Medical Centre in San Francisco. The obligation to disclose any fact extends only when the said fact is known to the appellant but not otherwise.
Further, it was submitted that question number 5 which read, “Have you ever suffered from any illness or disease or had any accident prior to the first day of insurance” is also overarching as no person can answer such a question in the negative. Every person to whom a mediclaim policy is offered would have, at some point of time, suffered from some disease or illness but for the same to be considered as pre-existing disease, ailment, condition, or illness on which ground a claim could be repudiated, there is need for a specific definition to be incorporated in the policy.
Therefore, the counsel for the appellant submitted that for an insurer to repudiate the policy it must establish suppression or misrepresentation of material facts on the part of the insured. In this instance, the insurance company was also required to prove the following:
The apex court noted that there is considerable force in the argument made on behalf of the appellant. The appellant only had knowledge of diabetes mellitus II, for which he was under treatment. To disclose the status of the said disease he had submitted his ECG report, blood and urine test reports which showed normal results – indicating that the appellant had no cardiac disease.
Therefore, the bench noted that the prescription of statins to the appellant was only as a precaution to prevent a possible cardiac ailment from developing in the future as diabetes mellitus II is a risk factor for such a disease. But by that, it cannot be deduced or inferred that because the appellant had a cardiac ailment or hyperlipidaemia, he was prescribed statins.
In conclusion, the bench held that the respondent insurance company could not have repudiated the policy on the ground that acute myocardial infraction suffered by the appellant on landing at San Francisco, USA was a “pre-existing and related complication” which was excluded under the policy.
Therefore, the apex court held that the repudiation of the policy by the respondent insurance company is illegal and not in accordance with the law. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to be indemnified under the policy. The respondents have been directed to indemnify the appellant regarding the expenses incurred towards his medical treatment within a period of one month with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition before the Commission till realisation.
Centre Tells Supreme Court: EWS Reservation – No Change in Rs 8 Lakhs Gross Annual Income Cut-Off; Residential Asset Criteria Omitted
In response to a writ petition challenging the Centre’s decision to introduce ‘Economically Weaker Section (EWS)’ reservation in the All-India Quota for NEET, the Central Government submitted an affidavit highlighting that it has decided to accept the recommendation made by an expert committee to retain the limit of INR 8 lakh gross annual income for EWS reservations.
The Centre has also accepted the recommendation to omit the residential asset criteria for EWS eligibility. However, the ongoing admissions, including the NEET-PG counselling, will proceed as per the existing criteria and the revised criteria will be applied from the next academic year onwards.
After the Supreme Court expressed doubts regarding the reasonableness of INR 8 lakh income criteria for EWS, the Centre agreed to revisit the same after formulating an expert committee. On 30 November 2021, the Committee was formed comprising Ajay Bhusan Pandey (Former Finance Secretary, GoI), Prof VK Malhotra (Member Secretary, ICSSR), and Sanjeev Sanyal (Principal Economic Advisor to GoI).
As per the existing guidelines, persons who are not covered under the scheme of reservation for SCs, STs and OBCs and whose family has a gross annual income below INR 8 lakh are to be identified as EWSs for benefit of reservation. Income also had to include income from all sources i.e., salary, agriculture, business, profession etc. for the financial year prior to the year of application. Furthermore, persons whose family owns or possesses any of the following assets were to be excluded from being identified as EWS:
As per the revised guidelines, the Centre has accepted the Committee’s recommendation to omit the residential asset criteria. The affidavit provides clarification for the specific cut-off at INR 8 lakh for the EWS category, as it is the same as OBC creamy layer cut-off. The Supreme Court had prima facie observed that applying the income limit criteria (INR 8 lakh annual income) of OBC Creamy lawyer to EWS was unreasonable, as the latter had no concept of social and economic backwardness.
In this regard, the union government’s affidavit provided the following explanation:
Karnataka HC notifies rules on live-streaming and recording of court proceedings.
The Karnataka High Court has notified the Karnataka Rules on Live Streaming and Recording of Court Proceedings, 2021, which came into force from 01 January 2022, and apply to the High Court and to courts and tribunals over which it has supervisory jurisdiction.
The guidelines are designed to lay down the practice and procedure to be followed to imbue greater transparency, inclusivity, and foster access to justice. As per the notified rules, “Live-stream or Live-streamed or Live-streaming” means and includes a live television link, webcast, audio-video transmissions via electronic means or other arrangements whereby any person can view the Proceedings as permitted. “Proceedings” means and includes judicial proceedings, administrative proceedings, Lok Adalat proceedings, full-court references, farewells and other meetings and events organised by the Court.
All proceedings will be live-streamed by the Court; however, the following will be excluded:
The guidelines also specify the procedure for raising objections to live-streaming, and the procedure to be followed where the proceedings are not live-streamed.
The anonymity of the victims and witnesses is to be maintained in the recordings via dummy names, face-masking, pixelation and/or electronic distortion of voice, as and when directed by the Court. As per the guidelines, any audio-video recording or recording of proceedings by any other means, beyond the mandate of the present Rules is expressly prohibited. Rules for storage, transcription, and access have also been notified.
Gujarat HC: Muslim husband has no fundamental right to compel the wife to share his consortium with another woman.
In the case Jinnat Fatma Vajirbhai Ami w/o Nishat Alimadbhai Polra v. Nishat Alimadbhai Polra, the Gujarat high court held that as per Muslim law, as enforced in India, a husband has not been given any fundamental right to compel his wife to share his consortium with another woman (husband’s other wives or otherwise) in all circumstances.
The high court was hearing a plea filed by Jinnat Fatima challenging the Family court (Banaskantha district in Gujarat) decision that had directed her to go back to her matrimonial home and perform conjugal obligations. In a suit filed by the husband for restitution of conjugal rights, the Banaskantha family court allowed the suit filed by the husband and directed his wife to go back to her matrimonial home and perform conjugal obligations.
At the outset, the high court observed that the decision for the restitution of conjugal rights does not entirely depend upon the right of the husband and that the Family Court should also consider whether it would make it inequitable by compelling the wife to live with her husband.
Overturning the family court’s order, the high court held that no person or court can force a wife to cohabit and establish conjugal rights. If the wife refuses to cohabit, she cannot be forced by a decree in a suit to establish conjugal rights.
The bench of Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice Niral Mehta made a significant observation vis-à-vis the Muslim law. The bench emphasized that Muslim law does not encourage polygamy as an institution, but only tolerates the same and therefore, the first wife of a Muslim husband can decline to live with her husband (who has married another woman).
Featured Image: Important Court Judgements

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Review: SC Notes That DNA Tests Have the Potential to Violate Privacy Rights and Cannot be Ordered Routinely
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
November 2, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at SC’s directions that DNA tests have the potential to violate privacy rights and cannot be ordered routinely; Section 112 Evidence Act safeguards children, Delhi HC’s observation that questions of faith have no bearing on an individual’s freedom to choose a life partner and are essence of personal liberty, Karnataka HC ruling that divulging pre-existing illness is a duty of the insured, and the repudiation of the claim cannot be found fault with among others.
Supreme Court: DNA tests have the potential to violate privacy rights and cannot be ordered routinely; Section 112 Evidence Act safeguards children.
A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, consisting of Justice Aniruddha Bose and Justice Vikram Nath, held that DNA tests can violate the right to privacy and merely because something is permissible under the law cannot be directed as a matter of course, thereby setting aside the Judgement of High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Inayath Ali & Anr vs. State of Telangana & Anr.
The apex court was hearing an appeal against the revisional judgement of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, wherein, the High Court upheld the judgement of the trial court directing the appellants to give blood samples for obtaining an expert opinion on DNA fingerprint test. The High Court held that DNA fingerprint test was permitted under Sections 53, 53A and 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code,1973 and it did not amount to testimonial compulsion.
The apex court relied on Ashok Kumar vs. Raj Gupta and Ors, wherein it was held that
The apex court looked at two factors which have been ignored by the Trial Court as also the Revisional Court. The first is the blood sampling of the children was directed, who were neither parties to the proceeding nor were their status required to be examined in the complaint of the respondent. The apex court held that Trial Court as also the Revisional Court had completely ignored the said factor and proceeded as if the children were material objects who could be sent for forensic analysis, ignoring the Section 112 of The Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
The other factor which both courts overlooked is the paternity of the children was not in question of the subject matter. Accordingly, the apex court set aside the judgement and allowed the appeal.
Delhi HC: Questions of faith have no bearing on an individual’s freedom to choose a life partner and are essence of personal liberty
In Naina Rana vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), the single bench headed by Justice Anoop Kumar Mendiratta held that the fundamental component of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is the freedom of choice in marriage when done in conformity with the law. Even questions of faith are irrelevant to a person’s ability to select a life partner and are fundamental to personal liberty.
The Delhi High Court was hearing bail petitions filed by the family members of the wife, whose marriage was against the will of the family. The complaint was given by the husband, where in the complainant alleged that his wife’s family members abducted him and his wife, brutally injured them and amputated the private part of the husband.
The counsel for petitioners argued that there were no specific allegations against them and one among the petitioners cited old age and medical conditions to be considered for the granting of bail. The counsel for the complainant vehemently opposed the bail applications. Upon hearing the arguments from both sides, the High Court granted bail to one petitioner and found no grounds for bail for the other two petitioners. Further, the court held that
It further directed the police to investigate the conduct of the police officials involved, and initiate necessary action against them, and noted that any further lapse on behalf of the police shall not be tolerated. Accordingly, the bail petition of one petitioner is granted, while for the rest, the bail petition is dismissed.
Karnataka HC: Divulging pre-existing illness is a duty of the insured, and the repudiation of the claim cannot be found fault with.
A single judge bench headed by Justice M Naga Prasanna held that it is the duty of the insured to disclose pre-existing illness and any repudiation of the claim for failing to divulge pre-existing illness cannot be found fault with, during the hearing of Mrs. Jaya Elizabeth Mathew & Anr vs. Insurance Ombudsman for the State of Karnataka & Anr.
The High Court was hearing a petition filed to quash the repudiation issued by the insurance company and direct it to release the insurance claim amount of the petitioners. The High Court looked at the question of whether repudiation of an insurance claim is valid in the eyes of law.
The High Court, upon going through the facts and history of the case, held that the contention of the petitioner claiming it not to be pre-existing illness is unacceptable. The court relied on Satwant Kaur Sandhu vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd, where it held that
It also looked at Reliance Life insurance company and another vs. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod, where it was held that the insured is under solemn obligation to make full disclosure of material facts which may be relevant to the insurer to take into account while deciding whether the proposal should be accepted or not.
The court further contended that the Mediclaim policy is a contract of utmost good faith and when specific information is asked for by the insurer, it is the obligation of the assured to divulge any such information. In the above case, the disease which the petitioner was suffering from was specifically mentioned in the proposal form. Further, the court held that
Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.
HC of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh: Appellate authority is the appropriate forum and not courts to determine if a case warrants action under Section 8 (4) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA).
In Syed Akeel Shah vs. Directorate of Enforcement, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh held that appellate authority is best suited to determine whether a case warrants action under section 8(4) of PMLA, 2002 based on the merits of the case, and not courts through its writ jurisdiction.
The two-judge bench headed by Chief Justice Ali Mohammad Magrey and Justice Sanjay Dhar was hearing an appeal petition filed against the judgment of the writ court to not involve in the proceedings. The case relates to an investigation under provisions of PMLA against Rahul Grover and others based on the allegations of purchasing land with illegal funds raised through indulgence in the issuance and renewal of arms against the provisions of the Arms act.
The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, exercising powers under section 8(4) of the PMLA, directed the appellants to vacate the attached property, which was challenged before the writ court. This petition is an appeal against the dismissal earlier by the writ court. The appellants relied on Vijay Mandal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors, where it is held that taking possession of the property before a formal order of confiscation is passed, merely based on confirmation of provisional attachment order, should be an exception and not a rule.
The High court found no dispute with the legal position held by the Supreme Court in Vijay Mandal Choudhary’s case. However, as per rule 5(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Taking Possession of Attached or Frozen Properties Confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority), Rules, 2013, once the attachment of immovable property has been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority and it is found to be in possession of the owner, the authorized officer has to issue a notice of the eviction of ten days so as to prevent the person from enjoying such property and if such person does not vacate the property within the stipulated time, he has to be evicted by taking possession thereof. The aggrieved person has the right to appeal within 45 days from the date of receiving the order under section 26 of PMLA.
Further, the court held that appellants cannot bypass the remedy of appeal by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, and whether a case is of exceptional nature can only be determined by the appellate authority considering the merits of the case, and not writ courts. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.
Kerala HC: POCSO Act Prevails Over the SC/ST Act; When charged under both statutes, accused may directly approach High Court under Section 439 CrPC.
In Renoj R.S. vs. State of Kerala & Anr, the Kerala High Court held that the legislature intended to give supremacy to the POCSO Act, even over the SC/ST Act, in the event of any inconsistency, and the accused is entitled to approach High Court directly under Section 439 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The High Court was hearing the bail application by the petitioner against whom offences under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are alleged. The bail application was placed before the registry which objected considering the allegations under SC/ST Act, and an appeal only is maintainable under section 14A of the act as was decided in Basheer vs. Rajani case.
The High Court highlighted the conflict in the application of provisions of the two statutes, as below.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the High Court under the SC/ST Act relating to bail is appellate, while under the POCSO Act, when read with CrPC, the jurisdiction is concurrent and original. The court highlighted that the SC/ST act was amended twice in 2015 and 2018, while the POSCO act was not interfered with by the Parliament, giving evidence of the legislature intending to give supremacy to the POSCO act even over the SC/ST act in case of inconsistency.
When a conflict between two statutes arises, the first task is identifying the special statute. If both are special statutes, the latter of the two statutes will prevail. The principles relating to the resolution of conflicting statutes are clearly delineated in several decisions, including Solidaire India Ltd. vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Others, as below.
Based on this judgement, the High Court looked at the provisions of section 42A of the POCSO Act, which indicate that it prevails over all other laws in the event of any inconsistency. Accordingly, the High Court held that the accused is permitted to apply the process for bail outlined in the POCSO Act whenever both a POCSO Act offence and a violation of the SC/ST Act are charged. Since the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are rendered applicable by section 31 of the POCSO Act, the petitioner is fully justified in approaching this Court under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Kerala HC: State Information Commission is not empowered under Section 18 of the Right to Information Act to direct PIO to furnish the sought information
A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court consisting of Justice Anil K. Narendran and Justice P. G. Ajith Kumar, while hearing State Information Commission vs. C. V. Rajendran and Ors observed that section 18 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 does not empower the state commission to direct the Public Information Officer (PIO) to furnish the information sought.
The court was hearing a review petition filed by the State Information Commission (SIC) against the judgement of 2014, wherein it was held that when an application for information under section 6 of the Act is rejected, either expressly or otherwise, the remedy available to the applicant is to file an appeal as provided under section 19 of the Act and that a further complaint under section 18 is not maintainable.
The Standing Counsel for the State Information Commission argued that
Upon hearing the arguments, the court held that if a requester has applied for information under Section 6 of the Act and then not having received any reply thereto, it must be deemed that he has been refused the information. The said situation is covered by Section 7 of the Act. The recourse open for such a person to get the information is provided under Section 19 of the Act, and the power to impose a penalty is laid under section 20 of the act.
The High Court relied upon the judgements in B.N. Mohanadasan vs. State Information Commission and others, and Chief Information Commissioner and another vs. State of Manipur and another wherein it was held that Sections 18 and 19 of the RTI Act serve two different purposes and lay down two different procedures and they provide two different remedies, and a perusal of Section 20 of the Act, wherein it is provided for the imposition of a penalty on a complaint or in an appeal, indicates that irrespective of invoking the appeal provision under Section 19, a party can approach and invoke jurisdiction of the State Commission through a complaint by bringing to its notice that there was an illegal denial of information or withholding of information.
Accordingly, the Kerala High Court held that the procedure contemplated under Sections 18 and 19 of the RTI Act is substantially different. The nature of the power under Section 18 is supervisory in character whereas the procedure under Section 19 is an appellate procedure. The aggrieved cannot resort to Section 18 of the Act to get access to the information since the provisions under Section 18 do not invest such a power in the Commission. The review petition was dismissed accordingly.

created: November 2, 2022