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Review: Supreme Court Rules That Ayurveda and Allopathy Doctors Perform Different Duties, Hence Not Entitled to Equal Pay.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
May 3, 2023
In this edition of court judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgements on enforceability of arbitration agreements, issue of ‘equal pay’ for allopathy and ayurvedic doctors, grounds for dissolution of marriage, Delhi High Court’s decision on Right to Publicity and Karnataka High Court’s decision on termination of workman.
Supreme Court: Arbitration agreement in a contract, which is not registered and stamped, but is required to be registered and stamped is not enforceable.
In M/s. N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. And Ors, (N.N. Global) the Supreme Court, in a 3:2 majority, held that an instrument, which is exigible to stamp duty, may contain an Arbitration Clause and which is not stamped, cannot be said to be a contract, which is enforceable in law within the meaning of Section 2(h) of The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereby referred to as ‘Contract Act’) and is not enforceable under Section 2(g) of the Contract Act.
The five-judge Constitution Bench headed by Justice KM Joseph was hearing the issue of enforceability of contract in the absence of stamp and registration, referred by the three-judge bench of the apex court. The three-judged bench in this case held that, the views in SMS Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd vs. M/s. Chandmani Tea Co Pvt. Ltd (SMS Tea Estates) and Garware Wall Ropes Limited vs. Coastal Marine Constructions and Engineering Limited (Garware) is not the correct position of law, and when these views were reaffirmed by a coordinate Bench in Vidya Drolia vs. Durga Trading Corporation (Vidya Drolia), the aforesaid issue is required to be authoritatively settled by a Constitution Bench of this Court. The issue is as below.
After analysing the case history and evolution of legal jurisprudence through various judgements over the years, the majority view, consisting of Justice KM Joseph, Justice Aniruddha Bose, and Justice CT Ravikumar, held that the position taken by the apex court in SMS Tea Estates and Garware, as to the effect of an unstamped contract containing an Arbitration Agreement and the steps to be taken by the Court, represent the correct position in law. This was wrongly decided in the present case, N.N. Global by the three-judge bench. The apex court referred to The Indian Contract Act, 1872, The Indian Stamp Act 1899, and The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The minority view by Justice Ajay Rastogi, and Justice Hrishikesh Roy, held that at the pre-referral stage, as described in Section 11, the examination of stamping and impounding inspection may not be done. Also, the copy or certified copy of the arbitration agreement—regardless of whether it is unstamped or insufficiently stamped—is an enforceable document for the appointment of the arbitrator at the pre-reference stage.
Supreme Court: Cannot be oblivious to the fact that Ayurveda and Allopathy doctors perform different duties, hence not entitled to equal pay.
The apex court, in the State of Gujarat And Ors. Etc. vs. Dr. P.A. Bhatt And Ors, held that allopathy and ayurvedic doctors do not perform equal work and therefore are not entitled to the same pay and benefits. The court was referring to appeals arising out of the judgement by the division bench of the Gujarat High Court holding that ayurvedic and allopathic doctors are entitled to the same benefits recommended by the Tikku Pay Commission.
The factual background of the case is as follows. On 03 May 1990, a High-Power Committee was established with R.K. Tikku as its chairman with the goal of enhancing the opportunities and working circumstances for doctors employed by the government. The committee’s recommendations were only for service doctors with MBBS degrees, post-graduate medical degrees, degrees in super-specialties, and those on the teaching and non-teaching sides when they were submitted in October 1990. By a different order, a new committee was established with the same chairman to consider the career advancement and cadre reorganisation of Indian Systems of Medicine and Homoeopathy practitioners. The committee’s report was submitted in February 1991.
The Governments at both state and central levels accepted the recommendations of the Tikku Committee regarding allopathic doctors. However, when clarification was sought on whether the same benefits are available to non-MBBS degree holders, the Gujarat government responded in the affirmative. This was later withdrawn by a notification. The Division bench of the High Court held that no discrimination is permitted as both MBBS and non-MBBS degree holders form part of the same cadre, and both are entitled to equal pay and benefits. The appeal is against this order.
The Apex Court, comprising Justice V. Ramasubramanian and Justice Pankaj Mithal, analysed the submissions made by the parties and framed the issues for the consideration of the court.
On the issue of classification based on educational qualifications, the apex court held that it is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Indian Constitution. The apex court relied on the judgement of the constitution bench in The State of Mysore vs. P. Narasinga Rao that upheld such classification. Further, it relied on Dr. C. Girijambal vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, whereby it was held that,
Further, in Mewa Ram Kanojia vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, the apex court opined that ‘The doctrine of ’Equal Pay for Equal Work’ is not an abstract one, it is open to the State to prescribe different scales of pay for different posts having regard to educational qualifications, duties, and responsibilities of the post.’
Accordingly, on the first issue of whether a classification based on educational qualifications is valid, the apex court responded in the affirmative.
Regarding the second issue of equal work and equal pay, the apex court relied on the affidavit filed by the State government on the comparison of work between allopathy and ayurvedic doctors. The court held that ayurvedic doctors do not perform emergency duties as opposed to allopathic doctors. Further, MBBS doctors attend hundreds of outpatients in a day, which is not the case with ayurvedic doctors.
It held that both categories of doctors perform different duties and hence are not entitled to equal pay. Accordingly, the decision of the division bench of the High Court is set aside.
Supreme Court: Parties should not be permitted to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, or for that matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court and seek divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
In Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, the apex court, while upholding the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant a divorce on grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, held that parties shall not directly file writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution and seek relief under the above grounds.
The five-judge Constitution bench was hearing transfer petitions seeking clarifications on the questions of law, which are detailed below.
On the question of scope and extent of Article 142:
The court held that, given the broad scope of authority granted by Article 142(1) of the Indian Constitution, the use of that authority must be lawful. It also begs for caution because using an individualistic approach to the use of constitutional authority can be dangerous. Since it has been ruled that relief based on equity should not disregard the substantive mandate of law based on underlying fundamental general and specific issues of public policy, this power, like all powers under the Constitution, must be contained and regulated. The power specifically bestowed by the Constitution on the apex court of the country is with a purpose and should be considered as integral to the decision in a ‘cause or matter’. As long as ‘complete justice’ required by the ‘cause or matter’ is achieved without violating fundamental principles of general or specific public policy, the exercise of the power and discretion under Article 142(1) is valid and as per the Constitution of India.
On divorce under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the period prescribed.
Section 13(B)(1) provides for the following conditions to be fulfilled when deciding on divorce.
Subsection (2) specifies the time period. Clearly, the legislative intent behind incorporating sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act is that the couple/party must have time to introspect and consider the decision to separate before the second motion is moved.
The objective of the cooling-off time is not to prolong an already failing marriage or the suffering of the parties when there is no likelihood of the union succeeding. Therefore, the court is not helpless in allowing the parties to pursue a better option, which is to obtain a divorce, once every effort has been made to save the marriage and there is no chance of reunion or cohabitation. The court has the discretion to dissolve such marriage without being bound by the procedural requirement to move the second motion.
Grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in exercise of jurisdiction and power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India.
The court looked at various judgements of the apex court regarding the grounds for divorce. In Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, it was held that once serious endeavours for reconciliation have been made, but it is found that the separation is inevitable and the damage is irreparable, divorce should not be withheld. An unworkable marriage, which has ceased to be effective, is futile and bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties. The Court should take a decision that would ultimately be conducive to the interest of both parties.
Further, it is held that the grant of divorce on grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a matter of right, but a discretion that must be exercised with greater caution and care, and that the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be factually determined and firmly established.
On approaching the apex court and High Court using Article 32 & 226 of the Indian Constitution
On the question of whether the concerned parties can directly canvass before the apex court on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, it is held that seeking such direct relief from this court cannot be permitted.
Delhi HC: The right of publicity cannot be infringed merely based on a celebrity being identified or the concerned party making commercial gain.
In Digital Collectibles PTE Limited and Ors. vs. Galactus Funware Technology Private Limited and Anr, the Delhi High Court held that the use of celebrity names, and images for the purposes of lampooning, satire, parodies, art, scholarship, music, academics, news, and other similar uses would be permissible as facets of the right of freedom of speech and expression and does not infringe on the right of publicity.
The single-judge bench headed by Justice Amit Bansal was referring to a suit on online fantasy sports (OFS). Plaintiff No. 1 is a Singapore-based business that operates under the trade name “Rario” in India and other countries, principally through its website and associated mobile applications. The first plaintiff’s business comprises developing an online marketplace where users from other parties may buy, sell, and exchange officially licensed “Digital Player Cards” of cricket players. The names, photos, and other facets of the players’ personalities are used on the Digital Player Cards on the Rario website.  Plaintiffs 2 to 6 are Indian cricketers.  Plaintiffs Nos. 2 to 6 have properly licensed and permitted Plaintiff No. 1 to use, among other things, their names, and pictures on the Rario Website under the terms of Player Services Agreements.
Defendant No. 1 operates a company called “Mobile Premier League” (hence “MPL”). The mobile application “Striker,” which is listed on defendant no.1’s mobile application “MPL,” is run by defendant no.2. The defendants operate their website under the trade name “Striker Club.” The defendants use NFT technology, the same as plaintiff No. 1, to validate player cards for the Striker Website. Contrary to plaintiff No. 1, the defendants lack permission or licenses from plaintiffs No. 2 through 6 to use their names, surnames, initials, images, or other identifying characteristics for commercial purposes.
The dispute arose when the plaintiff came to know of the ‘striker’ website and filed a petition on account of unlawful use of player marks amounting to unfair competition, unjust enrichment, breach of personality rights of plaintiffs No. 2 to No. 6, and unlawful interference with economic interests of the plaintiff.
The court looked at the submissions made by the parties and the references made to international and national legal developments. The court held that there must be a misappropriation of goodwill and reputation of a celebrity in selling a good/service to result in infringement of the right to publicity.
Further, the right of publicity cannot be infringed merely based on a celebrity being identified or the defendant making commercial gain, as is sought to be contended on behalf of the plaintiff.
Additionally, on the aspect of player attributes, the court held that publicly available information cannot be the subject matter of an exclusive license by the player in favour of a third party. Facts that are available in the public domain such as match information cannot be monopolized and even if a third party were to publish such information for commercial gain, no actionable right arises in favour of the plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the petition is in favour of the defendants and the plaintiffs failed to make out a case for the grant of interim injunction.
Karnataka HC: Loss of confidence is a subjective feeling; any termination must be based on objective set of facts and motivations.
The Karnataka High Court dismissed a petition seeking to set aside the decision of the Labour court that reinstated the workman, who was terminated based on ‘loss of confidence’. In Rudresha vs. The Management of M/s TVS Motor Company, the single-judge bench headed by Justice Suraj Govindaraj was hearing an appeal filed by TVS motor company against the labour court decision regarding the reinstatement of a workman.
The factual brief of the case is as follows. The workman is an ex-serviceman of the army and later joined the service with the employer as a Security Guard. The security officer filed a complaint that the workman did not show respect towards him by not saluting him, and in another instance, the workman neglected his duty of thoroughly checking the truckload, due to which one additional two-wheeler which had been loaded on the truck was allowed to pass. An internal enquiry found the workman guilty, and the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal of the workman.
However, upon approaching the labour court, the Labour Court proceeded to set aside the punishment of dismissal and imposed the punishment of withholding two increments with cumulative effect and awarded 25% back wages.
Looking at the submissions made by the concerned parties, the court summarized the points to be considered.
On the question of pleading loss of confidence in a workman, the court held that there cannot be such a straight jacket formula. In the present case, the contention of the employer losing confidence in the workman is liable to be rejected.
Further, the employer has not been able to establish gross negligence or insubordination on the part of the workman.
The High Court also held that the Labour court has erred in its judgement and the order suffers from legal infirmities.
Accordingly, the punishment imposed by the Labour Court in the award directing withholding of two annual increments for the period of two years, without cumulative effect, is set aside. Further, the employer is directed to settle all the dues of the workman within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.


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Supreme Court rules that Conviction cannot be based solely on the testimony of a wholly unreliable witness
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
June 15, 2022
In this week’s review of Court Judgments, we look at the Supreme Court’s observations noting that conviction cannot be based solely on an unreliable witness, the Bombay High Court’s verdict regarding unauthorised occupants of Mumbai International Airport and its observation regarding the complainant’s extra-judicial actions, and Delhi High Court’s order about provisions & limitations under Right to Education Act.
Supreme Court: Conviction cannot be based solely on the testimony of a wholly unreliable witness
The Supreme Court Bench consisting of Justice BR Gavai and Justice Hima Kohli observed that when the Court finds that a witness is “wholly unreliable”, neither conviction nor acquittal can be based on the testimony of such a witness. This observation was made in an appeal before the Supreme Court.
In this case, the Trial court has earlier convicted 5 individuals under Section 148, 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.  This was appealed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court and was dismissed.  In the appeal before Supreme Court, it was contended that the witness Anmol Singh could not have witnessed the incident and therefore the conviction based on the testimony is impaired.
This was opposed by the State, which contended that a minor contradiction or inconsistency that cropped up in the evidence of the witness cannot be a ground to disbelieve the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness. The bench referred to an earlier case – Vadivelu Thevar vs. The State of Madras (1957)
Based on the evidence on record, the bench observed that the witness Anmol Singh could not have witnessed the incident. It observed that the testimony falls under the third category.
The Supreme court bench therefore proceeded to allow the appeals and quashed the earlier orders of conviction by the High court and the trial court.
Bombay HC: Upholds eviction of unauthorised occupants from Mumbai International Airport
In the case,  Becharabhai B.Chauhan vs. Mumbai International Airport Pvt Ltd, the Bombay High Court upheld the eviction orders passed against a group of unauthorised occupants, who claimed tenancy rights on the premises of Mumbai International airport.
As per the case details, Airport authorities had moved eviction applications under Section 28-D of the Airport Authority of India Act, 1994, seeking eviction of the petitioners from the structures situated on the Airport Premises. The petitioners challenged this eviction application stating that they were occupying these structures for the last 40 years as tenants of one Mr. Ambroce Creado. Documents including Ration cards, Property Tax bills, Electricity Bills, Aadhar cards, etc. were furnished by the petitioners.
However, during the cross-examination, the petitioners admitted that they could not establish their rights over these structures and also cannot establish that the land underneath the structures is owned by the aforementioned landlord.  Creado, the landlord has withdrawn his suit against the airport in March 2013 itself. As per the eviction officer, the petitioners were occupying the land without any authority and hence are directed to vacate the Airport premises.
Single Judge Bench of Justice Sandeep K.  Shinde noted that as per the evidence on record, the airport premises is part of larger land acquired by the Airport Authority of India in 1947 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Hence, even if the owner himself tries to retain possession, he will become a trespasser. Hence, the judge concluded that the eviction orders passed against the petitioners as unauthorised occupants of airport premises call for no interference.
Delhi HC:  Right to Education under RTE Act cannot be unconditionally enforced against Private Unaided schools
A division bench comprising of acting Chief Justice Vipin Sanghi and Justice Sachin Datta observed that while the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 guarantees the right to education, it does state that the right can be unconditionally enforced against a private unaided school.
This observation was made while hearing a plea– filed by a minor through his father. The plea was filed challenging Rule 35 (Striking off the name from the rolls) and 167 (Name of the student to be struck off for non-payment of fees and contributions) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973.
The contention of the plea was that these rules are ultra vires to Articles 19(1) and 21A read with the provisions of the Right of Children to free and compulsory Education Act, 2009 and also contrary to the provisions of Section 75 of Juvenile Justice Care and Protection Act, 2015.
Regarding the validity of Rule 35 & 167 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, the bench noted that the act was enacted for better organization and development of school education in the city.
The Court observed that Section 12 of the RTE Act delineates the extant of responsibilities of the school for free and compulsory education of government schools, aided schools, and un-aided schools.
It is of the view that the independent and distinct framework of the Delhi School Education Act and the provision of RTE rule out any question of Rules 35 and 167 of the Delhi School Education Rules impinging on the provisions of the RTE Act.
While the RTE Act guarantees the right to education, it nowhere states that the said right can be unconditionally enforced against a private unaided school.
The court further stated that if the petitioner belongs to the EWS category, he may apply under that category to seek a waiver of the school fee.
Allowing the claim of the petitioner would mean that even a private unaided school would not be able to charge any fee even though they have to meet all the expenses, which is completely untenable.
The court also noted that there is no repugnancy between Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act and rules 35 & 167 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973.
Bombay High Court: Can’t seek ‘Extra-Judicial Remedies’ to pressurize prosecution
In the case of Dr. Lekha Rajesh Visaria vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors, the Bombay High Court has pulled up the complainant teacher for putting up banners seeking the principal’s arrest.
The court proceeded to grant anticipatory bail to the principal accused of hurling casteist remarks, a punishable offence under the SC/ST Act, at an “under-performing” teacher.
As per the case details, Dr. Lekha Visaria, the appellant had approached the High Court for anticipatory bail after an FIR under section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989 was registered.
The complainant, a teacher at Swami Vivekanand School was allegedly pulled up and asked to apologize after several mistakes were found in the mark sheet & evaluation. Other teachers were also asked to do the same.
It was alleged that on 15 August 2021, after the flag hoisting ceremony, the principal insulted the complainant regarding her teaching skills. She complained to the trustee but was served a notice of dereliction the next day.
Later, on 05 October 2021, the teacher was summoned to the principal’s cabin stating that the apology letter was not given. It is then that the caste slur was allegedly made. The complainant alleged that two other teachers entered the cabin later and the tirade continued even in front of them. The teacher was asked to teach for lower classes instead of her Standard 10 Batch.
She approached the police after 23 days and an FIR was filed much later in February 2022.
In the defence of the principal, it was argued in the court that the complaint was made only after the down gradation to a lower class and that there was no reference to the caste of the complainant in the utterance recorded in the FIR.
The advocate on behalf of the teacher, however, justified the delay in approaching the police and filing the FIR, reasoning that the complaint was initially raised with the trustee of the school.
Apart from the details related to the case, the judge objected to the teacher’s act of publishing a banner calling for the resignation of the principal, and that it emanated from the thought of seeking vengeance. The judge emphasised that the complainant cannot seek an extra-judicial approach to pressurize prosecution.
The court has weighed in other reasons including – delay in filing the FIR, the absence of a caste reference in the alleged conversation between teacher and principal, and allegations regarding the teacher’s poor performance.
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author: Sai Krishna Muthyanolla


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Review: Supreme Court Rules That Conviction for Attempted Murder Can be Upheld Even if The Injuries Inflicted on Victim Were Minor/Simple in Nature.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
September 6, 2023
In this edition of Court Judgements, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgements on conviction for attempt to murder for simple injuries, differentiation between ‘basic wage’ and ‘minimum wage’, Madras High Court’s judgement on applicability of maternity benefit act, Bombay High Court’s judgement on SC/ST Act, Delhi High Court’s judgements on false allegations of dowry harassment and torture in marriages.
Supreme Court: Conviction for attempted murder can be upheld even if the injuries inflicted on the victim were minor/simple in nature.
The apex court, in S. K. Khaja vs. The State of Maharashtra held that just because the injuries caused were simple in nature, it would not absolve the accused from the conviction. The intention coupled with the overt act is of primary importance in such cases.
The two-judge bench comprising of Justice Bela M. Trivedi and Justice Dipankar Datta was hearing an appeal against the judgement of the Bombay High Court that dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The accused was convicted under Sections 307 and 332 of IPC and was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and two years for the said offences respectively.
While the counsel for the appellant argued that even if the case was proved to be against the appellant, the injuries were very simple in nature and would not attract offence under Section 307 of the IPC, urging to take a sympathetic view. It was vehemently opposed by the Counsel for the respondent and appealed that this court should not interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court.
Hearing both sides, the apex court agreed with the views of the respondent, and the court remarked that merely because the injuries sustained were simple in nature, it would not absolve the accused of conviction.
The court further remarked that it was not inclined to take any lenient view and reduce the punishment rendered by the trial court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Supreme Court: The ‘basic wage’ as defined in the EPF Act should not be confused with the concept of ‘minimum wage’ as specified in the Minimum Wages Act.
In Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner vs. M/S G4S Security Services India Ltd & Anr., the apex court held that there was no necessity to take an expansive connotation to the words ‘basic wage’, particularly when it is defined under section 2(b) of the EPF Act, 1952.
The two-judge bench of the apex court comprising of Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Rajesh Bindal was hearing an appeal against the judgement of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that dismissed the writ petition by the appellant (in this case, Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner).
In the case at hand, the appellant raised a fundamental contention. Their argument revolved around the employer, who served as the respondent in the appeal, allegedly engaging in a questionable practice when determining the contribution to be made towards the provident fund. According to the appellant, the employer had inappropriately divided the wage structure and, in doing so, designated the reduced wage as the basic wage. This practice amounted to an endeavour to circumvent the payment of the correct and legally mandated sum towards the provident fund. However, the Appellate Tribunal, as well as the single bench and division bench of the High Court, dismissed the appellant’s argument.
Upon hearing both sides, the apex court also agreed with the position taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
The court further remarked that there was no compulsion to hold the definition of ‘basic wage’ to be equated with the definition of ‘minimum wage’ under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Madras HC: Maternity Benefit Act 1961 not applicable to Tamil Nadu Government Servants as they are governed by the Tamil Nadu Government Fundamental Rules and not the Maternity Benefits Act 1961.
The Madras High Court, in Tmt. M. Nithya vs. The Headmaster and Others held that when the policy of state government restricts the benefits of maternity leave, the petitioners cannot seek a benefit on the grounds of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. The court noted that in situations where the State policy imposes restrictions, employees in such circumstances cannot claim maternity leave for a third child.
The Single Judge bench comprising of Justice N. Satish Kumar was hearing a petition filed by a secondary grade teacher against the order passed by the Block Educational Officer who rejected her plea for maternity leave. The petitioner argued that the Maternity Benefit Act 1961 is a social welfare legislation aimed to provide social and economic justice to its citizens and it does not impose any restrictions on the maternity benefit. Accordingly, any imposition of restrictions such as two-child norm is not correct until the Maternity Benefit Act is suitably amended.
The counsel for respondents argued that the maternity benefits for them are regulated by Fundamental Rule 101(a), and the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 does not apply in this context.
The question before the court is whether the petitioner qualifies for maternity leave benefits for a third child, particularly when both the earlier children were born prior to joining Government Service and whether the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 is applicable to government employees.
The court looked at the Fundamental rules as well as the definition of ‘Establishment’ under the Maternity Benefit Act. The court remarked that the fundamental Rules explicitly state that this benefit is applicable to married women only up to the point of having two surviving children, and the petitioner, being a government employee not employed in any establishment defined by the Maternity Benefit Act of 1961, is not entitled to any benefits under this act. Instead, her entitlement is exclusively governed by the Fundamental Rules. The Court relied on the judgement of division bench in The Government of Tamil Nadu vs. K. Umadevi, wherein the court observed that,
The court also looked at an important judgement of the apex court in Deepika Singh vs. Central Administrative Tribunal and OthersEditSign, where the apex court granted maternity leave to a third child. The Supreme Court has granted this benefit primarily because the appellant’s spouse had two biological children from his previous marriage, and this does not encroach upon the appellant’s right to utilize maternity leave for her own biological child. This was not applicable in the present case.
Based on the above facts, the Court holds the opinion that the petitioner cannot assert an automatic entitlement to maternity leave based on the Maternity Benefit Act. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
Bombay HC: Scope of SC/ST Act, 1989 is not restricted to states/UTs where they are declared as SC/STs, it is applicable in any part of the country where the offence is committed.
In Sanjay Katkar vs. State of Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court held that geographical restrictions on social reformatory legislation such as The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is misplaced and the bar of the territorial arena cannot be applied to protect their existence and identity.
The full bench of the High Court comprising of Justice Revati Mohite Dere, Justice NJ Jamadar, and Justice Bharati Dangre were hearing a matter referred to them by the single judge bench regarding the territorial limits for protection under the said act, as well as the bench composition for deciding on the appeals under Section 14-A of the act. On the question of appeals, the High Court remarked that appeals under Section 14-A (2) would lie before the Single Judge of the High Court.
On the issue of territorial restrictions for protection under this act, the counsels presented different arguments. One such argument put forth was about the interpretation of a penal statute. according to him, the Atrocities Act shall be reasonably construed, as applicable only to the “Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes”, within the State, in which they are so and not in any other State to which they migrate.
The learned Advocate General presented a distinct perspective in which he contended that even when dealing with penal statutes, the Atrocities Act should be understood within the context of its historical background. He argued that the interpretation of the provisions within this statute should align with the law’s purpose and consider the harm it aimed to prevent. This perspective was supported by other counsels as well.
Upon hearing both sides, the court found force in the arguments put forward by the Advocate General.
Accordingly, the court held that such special acts require an interpretation, which would attain the purpose and not defeat it. By restricting the identity of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe only in relation to the State of his origin, it would cause more harm to the identified class than advancing them to compete with members of the higher class and assisting them in achieving equality, as enshrined in the Constitution.
Accordingly, the petition is disposed.
Delhi HC: Mere existence of marital relationship does not confer any law or right to subject his wife to torture.
In Appellant vs. Respondent, the Delhi High Court held that the husband has no right to put his wife to torture and beating merely because they are married.
The two-judge bench comprising of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Neena Bansal Krishna was hearing an appeal filed by the wife against the dismissal of an earlier petition for divorce on grounds of desertion and cruelty. The wife, in her testimony, deposed that She endured dowry demands, and harassment, and suffered physical abuse and torture on multiple occasions. However, the family court rejected her application as her claims could not be substantiated.
However, the High Court took a different view. While it is factual that the evidence presented is solely the appellant’s testimony, without any examination of other family members, it’s essential to note that her testimony remains unchallenged. Given the absence of any counterargument from the respondent, it must be acknowledged that her account of physical assault is supported by the medical records. It was also supported by an FIR that was registered, further supporting claims of assault. The court further remarked that,
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is dissolved.
Delhi HC: False allegations of dowry harassment and rape against the family members of husband amounts to extreme cruelty.
The Delhi High Court, in A vs. S, held that making false and serious allegations of not only dowry harassment but also rape against the family members of the husband is an act of extreme cruelty and there is no condonation for such a cruel act.
The two-judge bench comprising of Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Neena Bansal Krishna was hearing an appeal by the wife against the judgement in which the husband’s petition for divorce on grounds of cruelty had been allowed and the marriage was dissolved. The brief facts of the case are as follows.
The parties entered into matrimony on 24 November 2012, in accordance with Hindu customs and rituals. However, for various reasons claimed by both parties, the appellant’s wife left the marital home on 19 February 2014. The respondent testified that the appellant had prevented the consummation of their marriage on 25 November 2012, and subsequently, she resisted any attempts at establishing a sexual relationship, even resorting to physical aggression. The respondent’s statements revealed that the appellant consistently opposed his efforts to engage in sexual intercourse and was consistently unwilling. Furthermore, the respondent himself mentioned that he had urged the appellant to visit a doctor because they were not able to conceive. There was no concrete evidence to demonstrate that the marriage was not consummated, but there was substantial proof indicating the appellant’s reluctance to engage in sexual relations. Further, the couple has barely been able to live together and have not been able to sustain their matrimonial relationship.
Upon looking at the facts of the case, the court observed that cohabitation is a necessary element for the sustenance of marriage. It relied on the apex court’s judgement in Vinita Saxena vs. Pankaj Pandit, wherein it was held that:
Further, the court remarked that bedrock of any matrimonial relationship is cohabitation and conjugal relationship. For a couple to be deprived of each other’s company, proves that the marriage cannot survive, and such deprivation of conjugal relationship is an act of extreme cruelty.
On the question of false allegations, the court relied on the judgement of the apex court in K. Srinivas vs. K.Sunita, whereby it was held that even one false criminal complaint is sufficient to constitute matrimonial cruelty.
The High Court concluded that the Family Court has rightly concluded that the respondent was entitled to divorce on the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

created: September 6, 2023


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Review: Supreme Court Rules that Doctor’s License Cannot be Suspended as Penalty Under Contempt of Courts Act 1971.
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
August 2, 2023
In this edition of the court judgements review, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgements on the rights of the voter, conditions for bail, suspending of a doctor’s license as a penalty, the Kerala High Court’s judgement on section 13(1)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, Calcutta High Court’s decision on the time limit for POCSO FIRs, and Patna High Court’s order on grounds for dissolution of marriage.
Supreme Court: The right to vote, based on an informed choice, is a crucial component of the essence of democracy, voter has the right to know full background of the candidate.
In Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil vs. K. Madan Mohan Rao & Ors., the Supreme Court held that the voter has a right to know the complete background of the candidate, as the casting of a vote in favour of one or other marks the accomplishment of freedom of expression of the voter.
A two-judge bench of the apex court, comprising of Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice Aravind Kumar was hearing an appeal against the order of the Telangana High Court that dismissed the petition seeking rejection of the election petition filed against Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil (appellant). He was elected to the Zaheerabad Parliamentary constituency in 2019. However, as claimed by the respondent, the appellant had filed false information in Form 26, and the Returning Officer did not follow the guidelines of the Election Commission regarding the pending cases against the appellant. Hence, the election petition was filed before the High Court under Sections 81 and 84 read with Sections 100(1)(d)(i)(ii)(iii) & (iv) of the Representation of People Act,1951. The appellant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter “CPC”) argued for its rejection.
While the counsel for the appellant argued that accepting the petition amounts to an abuse of process and a clear case of interpolation, the counsel for the respondent argued that Courts are duty-bound to examine the allegations whenever the same is raised within the framework of the statute without being unduly hyper-technical in their approach and oblivious of the ground realities.
The apex court looked at Section 33A of the RPA,1951 which was introduced to compel those holding out their candidature to disclose information about their criminal antecedents. The apex court judgement in the Public Interest Foundation & Ors vs. Union of India & Ors. also highlighted the need for a detailed declaration by the candidates.
The apex court also held the provision 33B of the RPA 1951 that provided that no candidate shall be liable to disclose or furnish any such information, in respect of his election, which is not required to be disclosed or furnished under this Act or the Rules made thereunder as invalid in People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India.
Further, the appellant did not deny the allegations of non-disclosure of pending cases but rather argues that no such disclosure of this kind is needed since they did not fall under the section 33A of the RPA 1951. The apex court held that the right to vote, based on an informed choice, is a crucial component of the essence of democracy. This right is precious and was the result of a long and arduous fight for freedom. The elector or voter’s right to know about the full background of a candidate evolved through court decisions- is an added dimension to the rich tapestry of our constitutional jurisprudence.
Further, the apex court held that if the withholding of information is seen as insignificant, the court would be pre-judging the issue without the completion of the trial. Accordingly, the apex court agreed with the decision of the High Court in not rejecting the election petition. The current appeal was dismissed.
Supreme Court: Conditions for grant of bail must consider the socio-economic realities of the accused.
The Apex Court, while hearing a Suo Moto writ petition on the issuance of a comprehensive policy strategy for the grant of bail, held that the bail conditions must be realistic of the socio-economic background of the accused.
The division bench of the apex court comprising of Justice S K Kaul and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia was hearing the Suo moto petition on bail conditions. They were assisted by Amicus Curiae, Advocate Gaurav Agarwal. The Amicus Curiae informed the bench that 5380 undertrial prisoners were identified as persons who were granted bail but were not released for several reasons as per the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA).
The issue of clogged prisons was earlier highlighted during the previous hearings of this case. The then bench suggested an out-of-box thinking to unclog the prisons.  During the same hearing, the apex court directed the National Informatics Centre (NIC) to modify the e-prison software by adding an entry for the date of grant of bail, and if the accused is not released within seven days from such date, it would send an automated email to the concerned District Legal Services Authority (DLSA).
Adding to this, in the present hearing, the apex court held that the bail conditions must be in such a way that they should be fruitfully met. Consideration must be given to the social and economic conditions of the accused. Otherwise, the act of grant of bail would not subserve the purpose. The matter is further listed for future hearings.
Supreme Court: Doctor’s License cannot be suspended as penalty under Contempt of Courts Act 1971.
In Gostho Behari Das vs. Dipak Kumar Sanyal & Ors, the apex court held that a doctor’s license cannot be suspended as a punishment in contempt proceedings. The division bench of the apex court comprising of Justice BR Gavai and Justice Sanjay Karol was hearing an appeal against the order of the Calcutta High Court that upheld the judgement of a single judge bench which suspended the doctor’s license of the appellant as penalty in contempt proceedings.
The issue before the court was, “Whether the suspension of the Petitioner’s license to practice medicine is alien to the nature and types of punishment and penalties specified under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?”.
The brief facts of the case are as follows. The appellant had unauthorizedly constructed a structure that was not according to the plans submitted to the Siliguri Municipal Corporation (SMC). In subsequent cases at various forums against the illegal structure, it was decided that the appellant shall make self-demolition, failing which the SMC should take necessary measures to demolish. When the appellant did not self-demolish the structure, a contempt petition was filed, under which the doctor’s license was suspended.
The apex court observed that the grant, regulation and suspension of the license to practice medicine is governed by the National Medical Commission Act, 2019.  The current dispute is whether such action can be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, of 1971. ‘Contempt’ is defined under this act as.
The punishment for contempt is defined under section 12 as follows:
The court relied on the judgement in C.S. Karnan, wherein it was held that the justification for the existence of such power is not for the protection of the judges, but to inspire confidence in the sanctity and efficacy of the judiciary. The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Judge but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice.
Further, the apex court in Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India, held that,
Further, the court highlighted the necessity to look at the nature and gravity of the contemptuous conduct before deciding on the penalty.
Accordingly, the apex court found the judgement of the High Court unsustainable, and the license of the appellant, to practice medicine is revived.
Kerala HC: ‘Misappropriation’ and ‘Criminal Breach of trust’ are essential ingredients for establishing the offence under section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988.
The Kerala High Court, in Enose vs. State of Kerala, held that the prosecution must prove the ingredients of misappropriation and criminal breach of trust to attract the provisions of section 13(1)(c ) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act).
The Single judge bench comprising of Justice Kauser Edappagath was hearing an appeal against the judgement of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, that convicted and sentenced the appellant under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The brief facts of the case are as follows.
The appellant was employed on deputation as an L.D. Clerk by the Directorate of Higher Secondary Education in Thiruvananthapuram. The disbursement, withdrawal, and deposit of money into the Treasury are all part of his job duties. The Directorate of Higher Secondary Education was granted Rs. 5,90,000 for its examination division. The accused employee’s A-Section withdrew the aforementioned sum and turned it over to D-Section. On 10 March 1998, the D-Section handed over the accused and returned to the A-Section the unused fraction of the sum of Rs. 74,789. According to the prosecution, the accused misappropriated the said sum and kept it on his person until 02 April 2022, by entering false information in the Cash Book to make it look as though the stated sum had been transferred.
The High Court observed that the prosecution must establish that the accused was given property to be used in trust and then dishonestly took it for his own use to commit the crime of criminal breach of trust. Further, to prove an offence under section 13(1)(c) of the PC Act, the prosecution must also demonstrate the same elements of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation. It relied on the apex court’s judgement in Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai and Another vs. State of Bombay
The Kerala High Court agreed with the findings of the special judge and did not find a reason to interfere with the findings. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Calcutta HC: A delay in filing FIR by the victim in cases of sexual assault should not be a cogent reason for quashing the investigation against the accused.
The Calcutta High Court, in Shreekant Sharma vs. The State of West Bengal & Anr, held that delay in filing FIR in cases of sexual assault, should not be equated with other cases to quash proceedings or hold an accused not guilty. Further, a victim refusing to give her consent for medical examination cannot be a reason to quash the FIR if the results are not of material importance to the case.
The single-judge bench headed by Justice Bibek Chaudhuri was hearing a petition for quashing criminal proceedings under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act), 2012. The grounds for quashing as raised by the petitioners are delay in filing the FIR, and refusal to give consent for medical examination. It was further contended that there are admitted differences between the parents and the current FIR is filed with a malaise intention.
The court looked at the facts and material records of the case.  The Calcutta High Court relied on the judgement of the apex court in Satpal Singh vs. State of Haryana, wherein it was observed that in rape cases, the family of the victim shows reluctance to reach the police, particularly due to the social stigma. Further, delay in lodging FIR more often than not, results in embellishment and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. Thus, if there is any delay in filing FIR, the prosecution must furnish a satisfactory explanation for the same reason.
In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Prem Singh, the apex court highlighted the need to not equate cases of sexual assault with other cases. Relying on the judgements, the court did not agree with the contentions of the petitioners and believes that there was a sufficient reason which explained the cause of delay in filing the FIR.
On the refusal to undergo medical examination as being violative of Section164A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 along with Section 27 of the POCSO Act,2012 , the court held that medical examination of the victim would not have yielded such results which could have proved to be of material importance for the conviction of the victim as this case was not of penetrative act. The court believes that it cannot quash the investigation at this stage of the trial for technical matters.
On quashing the FIR, the court relied on State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, which looked at the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The court finds that the facts of the case did not fall under any exceptions quoted in the judgement. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
Patna HC: Inability to bear a child may be part of marital life of anybody, not a ground for dissolving the marriage.
In Sonu Kumar vs. Rina Devi, the Patna High Court held that the inability to bear a child is neither impotence nor any ground for dissolving the marriage. The parties to a marriage may resort to other means for having a child, such as adoption.
The two-judge bench comprising of Justice P.B. Bajanthri and Justice Jitendra Kumar was hearing a revision plea against the order of the Family court that dismissed the appellant matrimonial case for divorce. The appellant contended that the wife did not conduct properly with the parents of the appellants and refused to come back to his matrimonial home. Further, when she underwent several tests for ill-health, it was found that she had a cyst in the uterus, and she has the least possibility of becoming a mother. On the other hand, the appellant is a young man of 24 years of age having good health needing cohabitation and having desire to become a father, but the respondent-wife is neither willing to cohabit nor is any possibility of her becoming a mother. Hence the plea for divorce.
Upon hearing both sides, the Patna High Court held that the appellant failed to provide any evidence to his allegations, with reference to the date, place and nature of the cruelty except the general allegation that she refused to cohabit with him. The court also found that the husband did not take any legal step for restitution of conjugal rights by filing a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 indicating that the claim of refusal to cohabit lacked grounds.
The court highlighted that developing any disease during the continuation of marriage is not within the control of any spouse. Further, it is the marital responsibility of the spouse to help each other.
Accordingly, the court found no merit in the present appeal warranting any interference in the impugned judgment. The present appeal is dismissed.

created: August 2, 2023


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Review: Supreme Court Rules That Electricity Consumption Beyond The Limit of Contracted Load is ‘Unauthorised Use’ - FACTLY
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
December 21, 2022
In this week’s review of court judgments, we look at the Supreme Court’s judgements about delays in criminal complaints, conviction of public servant under Prevention of Corruption Act, observations on scope of delegated legislation, Madras High Court’s judgement granting bail to accused in Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, and Kerala High Court’s judgement on dowry under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Supreme Court: Unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint
In Hasmukhlal D. Vora & Anr. vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, the apex court held that though inordinate delays by themselves may not be a ground for quashing criminal complaints, unexplained inordinate delays must be considered as crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint.
A two-judge bench comprising of Justice Krishna Murari and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, was hearing an appeal against the order of the Madras High Court, where the petitioner’s plea under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the criminal complaint was dismissed.
The appellants run a company under name M/s. Chem Pharm, a trader of raw material chemicals used in food, food supplements, medicinal preparations. They had purchased 75 Kg of pyridoxal-5-phosphate in 3 packets of 25 kg each. On a surprise inspection by the Drug Inspector, it was alleged that the Appellants sold the bulk amount of pyridoxal-5-phosphate in violation of Rule 65(5)(1)(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 and Section 18(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940. A show cause notice was issued after three years to which the appellants responded. Citing the lapse, the appellants filed a complaint for quashing the complaint, which the Madras High Court dismissed. It held that,
The apex court heard the arguments of counsels from both the sides. It referred to State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors, where it laid down the guidelines for quashing criminal complaint.
It further referred to the R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, whereby it was held that a court may use its authority to dismiss a criminal complaint if there is no lawful evidence or if the evidence is blatantly incongruous with the charges. Further, in Bijoy Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar, the court held that excessive delay, if not well justified, can be fatal to the prosecution’s case. In fact, the Court is only led to believe that there was a malicious reason for starting the criminal proceedings by the lack of such an explanation.
Further, the court reiterated that the purpose of starting criminal proceedings must be to uphold the interests of justice, and that the accused cannot be made the target of legal harassment. Accordingly, the apex court held that the High Court failed to look into the facts and circumstances of the case and set aside the High Court order.
Supreme Court: In the absence of evidence of the complainant, it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
In a major ruling, the five-judge constitution bench of the Supreme Court held that direct evidence of demand of bribe is not necessary to convict a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in Neeraj Datta vs. State ( Govt. of NCT of Delhi).The  case was referred to a five-judge bench by a three-judge bench considering the validity of the position of the law.
The case relates to the conflict in the interpretation and judgements regarding the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for the offences under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 when the primary evidence of the complainant is unavailable. Judgements in B. Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , andP. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh, and Another, are in conflict with the judgement in M. Narsinga Rao vs. State of A.P.  The conflict is as below.
The court heard the arguments of the counsels regarding the issues in the quality and nature of the proof in corruption cases against the public servant.
Upon hearing the counsels and the precedents in other judgements, the apex court concluded that with reference to the type and standard of proof required to uphold a conviction for offences under Sections 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the complainant’s direct evidence, or “primary evidence,” is unavailable, there is no conflict between the three judge bench decisions of the Court in B. Jayaraj and P. Satyanarayana Murthy and the three judge bench decision in M. Narasinga Rao. In light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act, the legal position in cases where a complainant or prosecution witness becomes “hostile” is also considered.
Therefore, in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Supreme Court: Electricity consumption beyond the limit of connected or contracted load amounts to ‘unauthorised use of electricity’
The apex court, in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Thomas Joseph Alias Thomas M J  held that according to Section 126(6)(b) of the Electricity Act of 2003, “unauthorised use of electricity” is defined as consumption of electricity in excess of the connected load or contracted load, and the excessive overdraw of electricity harms the general public because it could disrupt the entire supply system, reducing its effectiveness and efficiency and leading to even greater voltage fluctuations.
The apex court was hearing an appeal against the judgement of Kerala High Court, which had held that even in cases where users are paid based on the connected load, “unauthorised additional load” in the same location and under the same tariff shall not be considered “unauthorised usage of electricity” relying upon the Section 154 (15) of the Kerala Electricity Supply Code, 2014.
Section 126(6) of the Electricity Act, 2003 defines unauthorized use of electricity as below.
The counsels for the appellants argued that by relying on Regulation 153(15) of the Code 2014 to decide the matter in question, the High Court made a grave error. They emphasised that the State Regulations were created using the authority granted by Section 50 read in conjunction with Section 181 of the Act 2003. The Counsel also argued that the ability to make regulations could not be used to create substantive rights that were not included in the Act of 2003. The Counsel further pointed out that Section 126 of the Act of 2003 is a full code in and of itself as held by this Court The Executive Engineer & Anr vs. M/s Sri Sitaram Rice Mill case.
Having heard the arguments of both counsels, the apex court held that Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is self-explanatory, and while dealing with situations other than section 135 of the act, the courts must interpret in a way that the legislative intent is satisfied. It held that High Court had erred in adopting a narrower conclusion in a situation where the public at large might be affected.
Further, the court provided insights on the delegated legislation and its extent. It held that ‘A delegated power to legislate by making rules or regulations ‘for carrying out the purpose of the Act’, is a general delegation without laying down any guidelines; it cannot be exercised to bring into existence the substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act 2003 itself’. It further held that when determining whether a subordinate statute is valid, the Court will have to consider the nature, purpose, and plan of the enabling Act as well as the territory over which authority has been granted by the Act. Any rules or regulation cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the parent act but only to supplement it.
Madras HC: Right of personal liberty and individual freedom cannot arbitrarily be taken away from anybody even temporarily without following the procedure prescribed by law
In Narendra Kumar Gupta vs. State rep by Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, the Madras High Court held that right to personal liberty and individual freedom, which are the most cherished, cannot be arbitrarily taken away from anyone, and any curtailment just on the basis of mere suspicion and half-baked investigation is not justified.
A single judge bench of Justice A.D. Jagadish Chandira was hearing a bail petition filed by the accused under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner is unaware of the purported payments from Indian traders Star Overseas and Bhagya Lakshmi Traders that the Company is said to have received in Hong Kong. By pretending to receive financial assistance from Hong Kong and taking advantage of the petitioner’s financial problems, Sukhjeet Singh improperly utilised the petitioner’s name to handle these transactions. The petitioner is unaware of the origin of these funds and does not know how they have been used in Hong Kong. The counsel further argued that
The counsel also pointed out the bad health of the petitioner suffering from serious heart ailments and is ready to produce sureties and abide by any conditions of bail and hinted at the grant of bail to two other similarly placed persons by the court.
The Enforcement Directorate argued that the petitioner could not claim ignorance of the repercussions of his own acts in signing the paper and that he was accountable for the company’s operations under Section 70 of PMLA. Additionally, it was argued that bail could not be given for serious offences when there was adequate medical care available inside the prison itself. Additionally, it was stated that because the function of the accused in money laundering instances varies from person to person, bail amounts granted to others in comparable situations did not apply to the current case.
Considering the arguments from both sides, the Madras High Court agreed with the arguments of the petitioner’s counsel and held that a simple reading of Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 would make it evident that there cannot be any money laundering without any proceeds of crime. If at all, receiving money or having money from abroad would be subject to the Foreign Exchange Management Act of 1999 and not the Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2002. It further held that,
Accordingly, the bail is granted to the petitioner on certain conditions.
Kerala HC: Dowry demanded at or before, or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage attracts the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act
The Kerala High Court held that provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act,1961 apply even in cases where there is a subsequent demand for dowry after marriage, in Kiran Kumar S vs. State of Kerala & Anr  case.
The High Court was hearing an application seeking the suspension of 10-year sentence and grant of bail, filed by the convict in the vismaya dowry death case. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced under Sections 304B, 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The counsel for the petitioner argued that court findings was based on contents of call records, which were never investigated. Further, there is no conclusive material evidence to show that she was subjected to matrimonial cruelties, physical or mental or abetted her suicide.
The Special Government Pleader argued that no exceptional circumstances are brought out to suspend the sentence and to release him on bail. Since there is finding of competent court of jurisdiction, on the guilt of the applicant/accused, he cannot claim the benefit of presumption of innocence, for the purpose of getting suspension of sentence awarded by the trial court.
The Court heard the arguments from both sides and relied on the judgement in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jogendra and Another for analysing the provisions of Section 304B of IPC.
Further, the apex court also held that, ‘The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-B IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives’, and any interpretation of the Section 304B by the courts must be done keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of dowry demand.
The Kerala High Court further relied on the judgement of apex court in Preet Pal Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, regarding the suspension of sentence, where it held that discretion is to be exercised judicially and not in a casual manner, while suspending the sentence and releasing the convict on bail, pending appeal. This exercise of jurisdiction has to be based on well-settled principles of law and in a judicious manner.
Further, Kerala High Court held that if the sentence is suspended, it will send a wrong message to the society, and therefore dismissed the petition.

created: December 21, 2022


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Review: Supreme Court Rules That Homemaker’s Deemed Income Cannot be Less Than Minimum Wage
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
February 28, 2024
In this edition of the Court judgements review, we look at SC’s order that terminating Women Officer on the grounds of marriage is illegal and an act of gender-bias, that homemaker’s deemed income cannot be less than the minimum wage, SC’s order that bail granted by one bench of High Court cannot be cancelled by another bench among others.
SC: Terminating Women Officer on the Grounds of Marriage is Illegal and an Act of Gender-Bias
In the case of Union of India vs. Ex. Lieutenant Selina John, the grounds of marriage and gender bias showed in terminating the services of women army officer Selina John, who held the position of Lieutenant (Lt.), were held as illegal by the Supreme Court (SC). The facts of the case were that Respondent (Lt. Selina John) was serving in the Military Nursing Service (MNS). She was terminated from these services by citing her marriage as the reason for termination. As per Army Instruction No. 61 of 1977 titled “Terms and conditions of service for the grant of permanent commissions in the Military Nursing Service”, the women nursing officers serving in the Army shall be terminated from their services if they get married. This was appealed in the Armed Force Tribunal by Lt. Selina John. The Tribunal held her termination as illegal and ordered compensation of Rs. 60,00,000 to be paid and also ordered reinstatement of her position in the army.
The Union of India appealed against this order in SC. The SC held that the rules which cited marriage and gender as the reasons for termination are ex facie manifestly arbitrary, wrong, and illegal and termed them as “coarse cases of gender discrimination and inequality.” It further held that such a rule is constitutionally impermissible, as it would undermine human dignity, the right to non-discrimination and fair treatment. Accordingly, the SC upheld the order of the Tribunal in terms of the compensation to be paid to Lt. Selina John. However, the SC modified the order of the Tribunal on the reinstatement of Lt. Selina John citing that she worked as a nurse for a short time in a private organization.
SC: Homemaker’s Deemed Income cannot be less than the Minimum Wage
In Arvind Kumar Pandey & Ors vs. Girish Pandey & Ors, the SC held that the deemed income of the homemaker cannot be less than the income of a daily wager under the Minimum Wages Act (MWA). The facts of the case were that Smt. Sushma Pandey (Deceased) died in a car accident in the year 2006 when she was travelling with the respondents in the case, who are her close relatives. Subsequently, an Appeal was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by the Husband and Children (Appellants) of the Deceased. The Tribunal had dismissed the Appeal citing the vehicle which met with the accident was not insured. This order was appealed by Appellants in the High Court (HC), which remanded the matter back to the Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 2,50,000. Claiming that the compensation awarded was too little, the Appellants went in Appeal to the High Court (HC), which dismissed it. Therefore, the Appellants have approached SC.
The SC held that even assuming that the deceased was unemployed, her direct and indirect income cannot be less than the wages of daily wager under the MWA. It also held that the income of homemakers is tangible as the source of livelihood and that the services rendered by homemakers are of high order and invaluable in monetary terms. Accordingly, the SC awarded the compensation of Rs. 6,00,000 to be paid to the Appellants.
SC: Bail granted by one bench of High Court cannot be cancelled by another bench
In Himanshu Sharma & Ors vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, the SC held that the cancellation of bail granted by one bench of HC cannot be cancelled by another bench, as such an exercise is tantamount to judicial impropriety/indiscipline. The facts of the case were that the Appellants were arrested by Madhya Pradesh (MP) police in cases related to cheating and forgery under sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 470 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 25 and 27 of Arms Act. The Chargesheet was filed by which time the appellants were already granted by the single bench of HC on 8 September 2022 and 14 November 2022. Subsequently, the State of MP moved an application under section 439 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) seeking the cancellation of bail to the Appellants. The matter was considered by another single bench of HC, and vide orders dated 12 December 2023, it had ruled for cancellation of bail to the accused, and they were asked to surrender within 15 days.
The accused appealed the order of 12 December 2023 in SC. On 20 February 2024, the SC held that under normal circumstances, the matters of bail cancellations are placed before the same single bench which had granted bail earlier. But, in this case, the contrary exercise was followed, which is tantamount to gross impropriety.  Accordingly, the SC had set aside the bail cancellation orders passed by a single bench of HC on 12 December 2023 by holding that they are grossly illegal.
Madras HC: Mental State of Possession along with Physical Possession of prohibited substances is the necessary element to constitute Crime under NDPS Act
In the case of X vs. Y, the Madras HC was dealing with criminal cases filed against two of the accused. Both were found carrying 23 kilograms (kgs) of Ganja, the banned substance under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS), on a two-wheeler. While Accused 1 (A1) was found in physical possession of the bag containing Ganja, Accused 2 (A2) was riding the bike on which both A1 and A2 were travelling with Ganja. Upon receipt of secret information, the Police went on a raid. Seeing the police, the A2 had run away, while A1 was nabbed and arrested. Later, both were produced before the lower court, which found them guilty of the offence and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. This was appealed against by the accused in the Madras HC and pleaded for suspension of sentence against them.
The Court found that A1 has a history of similar types of offences against him. Therefore, it did not interfere with the sentence proclaimed against him. The argument raised by A2 was that he was only riding the bike and was not aware of the possession and carrying of Ganja by A1. It was also argued that he was a student and out of normal fear, he had run away after seeing the police, when they had for raid. The Court held that similar to criminal law, the physical possession and mental state of possession are the elements that constitute the commission of an offence under the NDPS Act also.
In this case, the court held that the reasons given by A2 did not satisfy the facts of the case to suspend the sentence given against him. Accordingly, the HC upheld the order of 10 years imprisonment given against both A1 and A2.
Delhi HC: Publications on Public Life of Public Personalities cannot be stopped, unless they amount to harassment and invasion in private life
In the case of Mahua Moitra vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Ors, the Delhi HC held that the public life of public figures is subject to closer scrutiny and that the publications made about them by media, government, court and others cannot be stopped, unless they infringe the privacy or lead to harassment. The facts of the case were that the Petitioner is a former Member of Parliament (MP) and is undergoing investigation by the Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Respondent. According to the Petitioner, the proceedings of the investigations such as the issuance of sensitive information on summons issued to her, extension of time sought by her to attend the enquiry, and other things related to proceedings against her were being leaked by the Respondent even before she has been receiving the same information. Accordingly, the Petitioner had approached HC claiming that the Respondent violated her right to privacy and dignity and right of fair investigation.
The Court held that the public life of public personalities such as the Petitioner is subject to closer scrutiny since they represent the public. Article 19(1)(a) of the constitution of India includes freedom of the press and communication needs in a democratic society i.e., the right to be informed. Modern communication mediums advance the public interest by informing the public about events and developments that take place in the lives of the leaders who represent them.
Viewed from the same perspective, the court held none of the news reports that the petitioner had brought before the court related to invasion into her private life or cause harassment. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.

created: February 28, 2024


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Review: Supreme Court Rules That Provisions of Food Safety and Standards Act Overrides Provisions of Any Other Law - FACTLY
Sai Krishna Muthyanolla
March 6, 2024
In this edition of Court judgements review, we shall look at the Supreme Court’s judgement on bribery and legislative privileges, overriding provisions of Food Safety and Standards Act over the IPC, Calcutta High Court’s judgement on addressing an unknown woman as ‘Lady’, differentiating employees for the purpose of maternity leave, and Madras High Court’s judgement on breakdown of marital relationship.
Supreme Court: Corruption and bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundations of Indian Parliamentary democracy, creating a political system that denies citizens a responsible, responsive, and representative form of governance.
In Sita Soren vs. Union of India, the seven-judge bench of the apex court headed by the Chief Justice, overturned the judgement of the five-judge bench, popularly known as ‘1998 PV Narasimha Rao’ Judgement, and held that the members of legislatures do not enjoy immunity from prosecuting a legislator accused of accepting bribes in exchange for voting or speaking. The brief facts of the case are as follows.
PV Narasimha Rao judgement of 1998:  In the 1991 general elections for the Tenth Lok Sabha, Congress (I) emerged as the largest party, forming a minority government with PV Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister. A motion of no-confidence was brought against the government, requiring support from fourteen members to defeat it. The motion was rejected with 251 members voting in favour and 265 against it. Members of Parliament affiliated with the JMM, and the Janata Dal (Ajit Singh) Group voted against the motion, with one JD (AS) member abstaining. Allegations were made to the Central Bureau of Investigation claiming a conspiracy among these members to accept bribes for their votes. Accusations were also levelled against PV Narasimha Rao and other MPs for facilitating these bribes. Upon subsequent court proceedings, the five-judge bench of the apex Court, by 3:2 majority, upheld that Parliamentarians are granted immunity under the Constitution from criminal prosecution regarding their speech and votes within the House.
The majority judgement held that the alleged bribe-takers who voted against the no-confidence motion were shielded from prosecution in a court of law by Article 105(2) of the Constitution, which grants immunity to MPs for their speech and votes in Parliament. This immunity is separate from the freedom of speech outlined in Article 19, ensuring MPs can express themselves freely without fear of legal consequences.
The minority judgement, by S.C. Agarwal, argued that neither the bribe-takers nor the bribe-givers were protected by Article 105(2). He emphasized that MPs cannot claim immunity for offences involving bribery for their speech or votes, as it would undermine the rule of law and the principles of parliamentary democracy. Additionally, interpreting “in respect of” broadly could lead to contradictory outcomes, where MPs could be prosecuted for accepting bribes to refrain from speaking or voting, but not if they accepted bribes to influence their speech or vote. This interpretation likely contradicts the framers’ intentions and the spirit of the Constitution. Article 105(2) immunity shields MPs from liability for actions directly resulting from their speech or vote, not for actions that occurred before the speech or vote, and independently lead to liability.
The current case has been sent to a seven-judge bench from a five-judge bench, which was initially referred to them by a three-judge bench. This referral stemmed from an appeal against the judgment of the Jharkhand High Court, which dismissed Sita Soren’s plea. Soren was accused by the CBI of allegedly accepting a bribe to vote for a specific candidate in the Rajya Sabha elections.
The Attorney General argued that the judgement of PV Narasimha Rao case is inapplicable to the present case as the exercise of franchise by an elected member of the legislative assembly in a Rajya Sabha election does not fall within the ambit of Article 194(2). The Counsel for the appellant argued that certain legislative procedures, like ad-hoc committees and elections, although not conducted on the House floor during sessions, still constitute essential legislative processes.
Upon hearing the submissions, the seven-judge bench held that the scrutiny of privileges revolves around whether they are essential to uphold the integrity of legislative functions. Privileges should not be seen as goals in themselves but rather as tools necessary for the effective operation of legislative duties. The extent of privileges enjoyed by a House and its members should be assessed based on their necessity for the smooth functioning of the House. Members cannot use their privileges as a shield to evade ordinary criminal laws.
The apex court further held that the majority judgement in the Narasimha Rao case did not delve into when the offence of bribery is complete or the constituent elements of the offence. Instead, it created an artificial distinction whereby the performance of the promise was made relevant to attract the offence of bribery.
Further, on the question of whether the elections to Rajya Sabha are covered under the privilege, the apex court asserted positively. It held that Article 194 deliberately employs the term “Legislature” instead of “House” to encompass parliamentary activities that extend beyond the House floor or traditional law making processes. The protection provided by Articles 105 and 194 is commonly referred to as “parliamentary privilege” rather than “legislative privilege” because it encompasses more than just law making activities on the House floor. It extends to various powers and responsibilities of elected members within the Legislature or Parliament, even when the House is not in session.
Accordingly, the apex court held that the act of bribery is complete when a legislator accepts a bribe, and such bribery is not protected by Article 105(2) or its equivalent in Article 194. The court reasoned that engaging in bribery is a separate criminal act unrelated to the casting of a vote or the decision on how to cast it. Therefore, an individual legislator cannot claim privilege under Articles 105 and 194 to seek immunity from prosecution for bribery related to their legislative activities. This claim fails the two-part test, as it is not connected to the collective functioning of the House and is not necessary for fulfilling the essential duties of a legislator.
Interestingly, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution also recommended changes in a similar manner as below.
Supreme Court: Provisions of Food Safety and Standards Act overrides provisions of any other law; no question of simultaneous prosecutions under two laws.
In Ram Nath vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., the apex court held that the provisions of the Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA) will override regardless of any conflicting provisions in other laws currently in effect, in this case, the Indian Penal Code.
The apex court was hearing an appeal against the judgement of the High Court that declined to quash an offence punishable under Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. The allegations are that the appellant operated a business selling mustard oil without possessing the required license and had adulterated mustard oil, edible oil, and rice bran oil.
Brief facts of the case are as follows. On 11 May 2010, the State of Uttar Pradesh authorized authorities to initiate prosecutions under Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), as well as under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Subsequently, on 28 August 2010, a First Information Report (FIR) was filed by a food inspector, representing the Regional Food Controller, Agra, against the petitioner, accusing them of committing offences under Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. The applicant relied on M/s. Pepsico India Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. & Anr vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, where it was held that starting from 29 July 2010, when the Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA) came into effect, its provisions would supersede those of other food-related laws, including Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The counsel for the state argued that while an offender can be tried under different laws, they cannot be punished twice for the same offence. If an act constitutes an offence under two laws, the offender may be prosecuted under either or both, but not punished twice. The Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA) operate in distinct areas, making them mutually exclusive. The appellant argued that Section 5 of the IPC states that special laws remain unaffected by its provisions, and since the FSSA is a special law, it supersedes the IPC in areas covered by its provisions.
Having considered the submissions, and the respective provisions under both statutes, the apex court held that the FSSA contains comprehensive provisions for dealing with offences related to unsafe food. Section 89 of the FSSA indicates an overriding effect over all laws related to food, but its main section specifies that its provisions prevail over any inconsistent provisions in any other law currently in force, without limitation to food-related laws.
Accordingly, the offences under IPC are quashed and set aside.
Calcutta High Court: Addressing an unknown woman on the street with the term “darling” is clearly offensive and constitutes a sexually coloured remark.
In Janak Ram vs. The State, the Calcutta High Court held that using a sexist expression ‘darling’ can attract sentence under Section 354A and Section 509 of the IPC. The court further said that prevailing standards of society do not permit men to gleefully use such expression in respect of unacquainted women.
The single bench of the High Court, comprising Justice Jay Sengupta, was hearing an appeal against the Additional Sessions Court order that upheld the sentence of the Judicial Magistrate. The counsel for the state argued that during the eve of Durga Puja, a police team responded to reports of a person causing a disturbance. Upon apprehending the individual, some officers stayed in the area while others took the person to the police station. It was alleged that during this time near a shop, the accused directed a sexually indicative question at the complainant-victim. Subsequently, the accused were arrested and tried, resulting in their conviction and three months of imprisonment for each offence.
The counsel for the appellant argued that the timing of the incident was unclear and that an independent witness testified that the remark was made jokingly, thus challenging the application of Sections 354A and 509 of the IPC. They also suggested a clash of egos and questioned the credibility of the incident due to a lack of independent witnesses and poor lighting in the area. Additionally, they contended that the word used was not inherently sexually suggestive but rather colloquial and commonly used.
Upon hearing the arguments from both sides and the provisions of Section 354A and 509 of the IPC, the court ruled that the remark constituted an offence regardless of the accused’s state of intoxication. It emphasized societal standards and noted discrepancies in the testimonies, ultimately concluding that the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, dismissing the argument that the remark was made in colloquial manner.
Accordingly, the judgement was upheld, and since the appellant did not further aggravate the act, his sentence was modified to one month for committing each of the offences instead of three for each.
Calcutta High Court: No differentiation is permissible between regular and contractual employees in extension of maternity benefit.
In Neeta Kumari vs. Union of India & Ors, the Calcutta High Court held that non-extension of the benefits of maternity constitutes a discriminatory act and is not permissible. Such discrimination is akin to creating a class within a class, which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Single judge bench comprising Justice Raju Basu Chowdhury was hearing a plea questioning the failure on the part of the respondent to allow maternity leave with pay to the petitioner for 180 days. Brief facts of the case are as follows. The petitioner, appointed as an Executive Intern at the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on a contractual basis for three years starting 16 August 2011, applied for maternity leave on 20 November 2012, for six months, starting 3 December |2012, due to pregnancy-related health concerns. However, the RBI informed her on 14 March 2013, that she was not entitled to maternity leave under the contract terms but could take unpaid leave while retaining medical benefits.
The counsel for the petitioner argued that the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961, overrides the contract terms, as it’s a beneficial legislation, and Section 21 of the Act gives it precedence over other laws, including employment contracts. She acknowledges having accepted the contract terms but asserts that the Maternity Benefits Act supersedes them. The counsel for respondents contends that the RBI’s code of conduct for limited-term contract employees doesn’t include maternity leave provisions or apply the Master Circular of 1 July 2011, which provides for such benefits. Additionally, the RBI argues that it doesn’t fall under the Act’s definition of an “establishment.”
Upon hearing both sides, the court held that the Maternity Benefits Act does not discriminate based on whether an establishment is governed by state or central statutes. Section 2(b) of the Act states that it applies to any shop or establishment as defined by state laws where ten or more persons are employed. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that maternity benefits under the Act are not limited to the duration of employment but can extend beyond it and the terms of the petitioner’s employment do not negate her entitlement to benefits under the Act.
Accordingly, the respondents are directed to afford compensation in the form of leave with pay to the petitioner, for the period for which the same was denied. The petition was disposed of.
Madras High Court: When both spouses engage in a continuous cycle of verbal abuse, criticism, and disrespect towards each other and their family members without showing any remorse, it is not worthy to retain their marital relationship.
In ABC vs. XYZ, the Madras High Court held that given the ongoing conflict involving verbal abuse, vulgar criticism, and a lack of remorse from both the appellant/husband and respondent/wife, it is deemed unfit to continue their marital relationship. Therefore, considering the relationship has become futile and burdensome, it is appropriate to dissolve the marital tie.
The two-judge bench comprising Justice G. Jayachandran and Justice C. Kumarappan was hearing an appeal against the decree of the Family Court, Srivilliputhur, that dismissed his divorce petition. Brief facts of the case are as follows.  The couple got married on 3 November 2017, at Pethavanallur Arulmigu Mayuranathaswamy Temple, Rajapalayam. Traditional gold jewellery was exchanged according to customs. They initially lived in Chennai, where the wife ran her own business. However, the husband took a job abroad in January 2018, leading to frequent separations. The relationship deteriorated, with both parties making serious allegations against each other, culminating in a criminal complaint by the husband alleging harassment by the wife. The wife countersued, accusing the husband and his family of demanding dowry and subjecting her to cruelty. The husband claims the marriage is irretrievably broken due to mental cruelty by the wife, while the wife alleges mistreatment by the husband and his family, including a miscarriage due to physical abuse. The exchange of accusations escalated, demonstrating a lack of willingness to reconcile.
Upon hearing the submissions from both sides, the court noted the parties’ education level and the severity of their conflicts, finding no possibility of reconciliation after five years of separation. Additionally, suspicions of infidelity further weakened the chance of reconciliation. Ultimately, both parties were found equally responsible for the breakdown of the marriage and for causing each other mental cruelty.
Accordingly, the court held that the marital bond, as a cumulative effect of the cruelty inflicted by both parties, has become futile and devoid of value, and hence must be dissolved. The decree for divorce is granted accordingly.