The tactics employed by the Black September group in subsequent operations differed sharply from the other " run-of-the-mill PLO attacks of the day " . The unprecedented level of violence evident in multiple international attacks between 1971 and 1972 included the Sabena airliner hijacking ( mentioned above ) , the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister in Cairo , the Massacre at Lod airport , and the Munich Olympics massacre . In '' The Dynamics of Armed Struggle '' , J. Bowyer Bell contends that " armed struggle " is a message to the enemy that they are " doomed by history " and that operations are " violent message units " designed to " accelerate history " to this end . Bell argues that despite the apparent failure of the Munich operation which collapsed into chaos , murder , and gun battles , the basic fedayeen intention was achieved since , " The West was appalled and wanted to know the rationale of the terrorists , the Israelis were outraged and punished , many of the Palestinians were encouraged by the visibility and ignored the killings , and the rebels felt that they had acted , helped history along . " He notes the opposite was true for the 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight redirected to Uganda where the Israelis scored an " enormous tactical victory " in Operation Entebbe . While their death as martyrs had been foreseen , the fedayeen had not expected to die as villains , " bested by a display of Zionist skill . " Several fedayeen groups maintained contacts with a number of other guerrilla groups worldwide . The IRA for example had long held ties with Palestinians , and volunteers trained at fedayeen bases in Lebanon . In 1977 , Palestinian fedayeen from Fatah helped arrange for the delivery of a sizable arms shipment to the Provos by way of Cyprus , but it was intercepted by the Belgian authorities
Massacre at Lod airport
Lod Airport massacre
Palestinian fedayeen