The cargo door design flaws , and the consequences of a likely aircraft floor failure in the event of in-flight decompression on the DC-10 , had been noted by Convair engineer Dan Applegate in a 1972 memo . The memo was written after American Airlines Flight 96 , being operated by another DC-10 , experienced a rear cargo door failure similar to the one that occurred on Flight 981 , also causing an explosive decompression . Fortunately , even though the pilots ' ability to control Flight 96 was compromised by some severed underfloor cables in the damaged section of the plane , they were able to land in Detroit without further injuries . The NTSB 's investigation into Flight 96 determined that baggage handlers forced the locking handle closed , and the latches did not engage fully because of an electrical problem . The incident investigators discovered that the rod connecting the pins to the handle was weak enough that it could be bent with repeated operation and force , allowing the baggage handler to close the handle with his knee even when the pins interfered with the torque tube flanges . The vent plug and cockpit light were operated by the handle or the locking pins , not the latches , so , when the handle was stowed , both of these warning devices indicated that the door was properly closed . In the case of Flight 96 , the plane was able to make a successful emergency landing because not all of the underfloor cables were severed , thus allowing the pilots limited control . This greatly contrasted with Flight 981 , where all of the underfloor cables were severed in the decompression and the pilots completely lost control of the plane
American Airlines Flight 96
American Airlines Flight 96
Turkish Airlines Flight 981