In 1993 , Hutu and Tutsi representatives had signed the Arusha Accords but neither side was fully implementing it . One of the first ways Render and Bushnell addressed the growing tensions was to urge Rwandan Hutu military and police officials to cease broadcasting anti-Tutsi radio messages and renew their focus on providing basic security services , which had become lax . Later , released memos and other documents revealed their frustration with the inaction of both the administration of President Bill Clinton and the United Nations in response to the growing violence . Render and Bushnell expressed their " deep concern over the mounting violence in Rwanda " , as well as " the distribution of arms and arms caches . " They were also concerned with President Clinton 's prior lack of support for the Arusha Accords , and on 25 March 1994 , they met with the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front leaders who " blamed the President for the impasse . " Their peacemaking efforts were futile . Two weeks later , following Render and Bushnell 's return from the trip to Burundi and Rwanda the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down as it approached Kigali , effectively kicking off the genocide . In a memo dated 11 April 1994 , sent by Render to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose titled " Political Strategy for Rwanda , " some noted strategies were to " complete evacuation of all Americans wishing to leave , " " urge the Rwandan Patriotic Front to agree to a new ceasefire , " reaffirm the potential of the Arusha Accords , " monitor the security situation , " " if the security situation permits , resume Embassy operations , " and " examine options for a confidence-building multilateral military presence of some kind . " On 26 April 1994 , Render and US Ambassador to Rwanda David P. Rawson met with Rwandan Ambassador to the United States Uwimana and urged him and the Rwandan government to help stop the massacres . Uwimana claimed that the massacres were acts of self-defense on behalf of the Hutus , and when asked what the United States could do to help stop the killings , he replied that they could " tell the minority Tutsis to accept their status as a minority , and tell the RPF that , although they might win the war , they can not govern the country . " Both Render and Rawson emphasized to the Rwandan Ambassador that " the most crucial priority right now is to stop the massacres . " Render made a point of telling him that " the Government of Rwanda and the Army must take on the responsibility of getting the people to stop killing each other , " and Uwimana agreed to pass on to the Rwandan Government the United States ' " demand for an immediate end to the massacres and establishment of a ceasefire . " Again Render 's peacemaking efforts were ultimately in vain . From April to July 1994 , Hutu extremists in the Rwandan government , military and other armed group killed more than 500,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus
shot down as it approached Kigali
Assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira
Arlene Render