In the end , no action was taken against the North Koreans in the days following the attack . The new Nixon administration had little to no information about the location and availability of both U.S. and North Korean forces , as the administration had difficulty communicating with those in the Pacific . By the time this information was communicated to the planners , it was too late to react . Both Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were ashamed at the outcome of the event , with Kissinger revealing that " our conduct in the EC-121 crisis as weak , indecisive and disorganized . " Once it became clear that no action would be taken against the North Koreans , Nixon promised that " they ’ll North Koreans never get away with it again , " and ordered a " resumption of aerial reconnaissance flights . " Task Force 71 operated the Search and Rescue/Salvage Operations for Korean Air Lines Flight 007 shot down by the Soviets off Sakhalin Island on 1 September 1983 . On the day of the shootdown , Rear Admiral William A. Cockell , Commander , Task Force 71 , and a skeleton staff , taken by helicopter from Japan , embarked in , which had been stationed off Vladivostok at time of the flight . Cockell was transferred again on 9 September to the destroyer to assume duties as Officer in Tactical Command ( OTC ) of the Search and Rescue ( SAR ) effort . Surface search began immediately and on into the 13-day of September . U.S. underwater operations began on 14 September . With no further hope of finding survivors , on 10 September 1983 , the Task Force 's mission had been reclassified " Search and Salvage " operation from a " Search and Rescue " . On 17 October 1983 , Rear Admiral William Cockell was relieved of command of the Task Force and its Search and Salvage mission , and Rear Admiral Walter T. Piotti , Jr. , was placed in command
Korean Air Lines Flight 007
Korean Air Lines Flight 007
Task Force 71