'' The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm '' ( 1984 ) was a first attempt to synthesize and unify various theories of the firm , such as neoclassical , worker controlled , and stakeholder society views , as special cases of corporate governance with varied weights of bargaining power attributed to the members of the firm . Aoki 's interests then moved into comparisons of various internal information structures of the firm ( hierarchical , horizontal and modular ) , and its applications to international varieties of corporate firms across Anglo-American , Japanese , German , Silicon Valley , and Chinese systems , as well as to a comparative assessment of nuclear power disasters ( Three Mile Island , Chernobyl and Fukushima ) . These two viewpoints on corporate firms : a game-theoretic approach to corporate governance and information systemic approach to the internal structure of corporate firms are synthesized in Aoki 's 2008 Clarendon Lectures , '' Corporations in Evolving Diversity '' . Relying on a recent development of potential game theory , he also showed that sufficient and necessary conditions for corporate stakeholders with different payoff functions to behave as if they have a common objective is that they share a common distributive value ( technically represented as Shapley value ) . This insight places the economic theory of the firm in a broader frame of institutional analysis
Three Mile Island
Three Mile Island accident
Masahiko Aoki