9/11 Commission staffers say they " guessed " but did not know for certain that harsh techniques had been used , and they were concerned that the techniques had affected the operatives ’ credibility . At least four of the operatives whose interrogation was used in the 9/11 Commission Report have claimed that they told interrogators critical information as a way to stop being " tortured . " Michael Ratner , president of the Center for Constitutional Rights , says he was " shocked " that the Commission never asked about extreme interrogation measures . " Most people look at the 9/11 Commission Report as a trusted historical document . If their conclusions were supported by information gained from torture , therefore their conclusions are suspect . " NBC News quoted Philip Zelikow , the 9/11 Commission executive director , as saying that the Commission relied heavily on the information derived from the interrogations , but remained skeptical of it . Zelikow admits that " quite a bit , if not most " of its information on the official 9/11 story " did come from the interrogations . " For more than two years after the attacks , officials with North American Aerospace Defense Command ( NORAD ) and the Federal Aviation Administration ( FAA ) provided inaccurate information about the response to the hijackings in testimony and media appearances . Authorities suggested that US air defenses had reacted quickly , that jets had been scrambled in response to the last two hijackings and that fighters were prepared to shoot down United Airlines Flight 93 if it threatened Washington , D.C.
United Airlines Flight 93
United Airlines Flight 93
Criticism of the 9/11 Commission