A May 2001 performance report showed that the D.C. fire department was deteriorating rapidly under Few 's leadership . Halfway through the budget year , Few met only one of four major goals ( filling 120 firefighter vacancies ) . The number of injuries to firefighters and civilian injuries and deaths had far outstripped the year 's goals , and building inspections were far below the expected level . Ambulances were supposed to reach patients 90 percent of the time within eight minutes . Few changed this to 70 percent without explanation , and still the department could not reach the goal . The department was also caught manipulating data in an attempt to improve the response times . ( For example , fire engines with paramedics aboard often responded faster to a medical emergency than a paramedic-driven ambulance with life-saving equipment . DCFEMS began incorporating fire engine response times and neglected to make the changed clear . ) A month after a train derailment and fire in a railway tunnel near Baltimore and just two weeks prior to the September 11 attacks , '' The Washington Times '' reported that internal documents showed DCFEMS " woefully unprepared " to handle a hazardous materials ( or " haz-mat " ) spill or a biological , chemical or radiological attack . Firefighters and emergency medical personnel were not trained to recognize these hazards or contain them , and had not conducted training in the worst sort of haz-mat incident in more than two years . Few pledged in October 2001 to improve haz-mat response capability by staffing additional haz-mat vehicles with lesser-trained staff as an interim measure . He also said the department would eventually train the personnel to create the appropriate skill levels
September 11 attacks
September 11 attacks
History of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department