The NTSB also included the following contributing factors : the failure of the company 's dispatching system to provide the flight crew with up-to-date severe weather information pertaining to the aircraft 's intended route of flight , the captain 's reliance on airborne weather radar for penetration of thunderstorm areas , and limitations in the Federal Aviation Administration 's air traffic control system which precluded the timely dissemination of real-time hazardous weather information to the flight crew . Moreover , the crew had no training for a situation that involved total loss of engine thrust nor did Southern Airways require such training . FAA regulations had no such requirement either because the possibility of complete failure of all engines on a jet-powered carrier aircraft was deemed so remote as to not require training or special procedures ; the NTSB could not find a recorded instance prior to Flight 242 of a commercial jet aircraft experiencing such an emergency . ( While other significant incidents involving loss of all engines in flight have occurred , including the Gimli Glider , Scandinavian Airlines Flight 751 and the Miracle on the Hudson , these happened after Flight 242 's unpowered landing event in 1977 . ) Only three of the NTSB 's four board members signed the final report . Kay Bailey , who signed the final report , added a concurring statement which reiterated the board 's previous recommendations for improved real-time weather dissemination . Francis H. McAdams , one of the four NTSB members , dissented with the other members . In his dissenting opinion , McAdams provided his alternate view of the probable cause : the probable cause of this accident was the captain 's decision to penetrate rather than avoid an area of severe weather , the failure to obtain all the available weather information despite having knowledge of the severity of the storm system , and the reliance upon airborne weather radar for penetration rather than avoidance of the storm system . The penetration resulted in a total loss of thrust from both engines due to the ingestion of massive amounts of water and hail which in combination with advanced throttle settings induced severe stalling in , and major damage to , the engine compressors , which prevented the crew from restarting the engines . Furthermore , if the company 's dispatching system had provided the flight crew with timely severe weather information pertaining to the aircraft 's intended route of flight , it is possible that the severe weather would not have been penetrated . McAdams also wrote in his dissent that he would add , as a contributing factor , the " inadequacies of the Federal Aviation Administration 's air traffic control system which precluded the dissemination of real-time hazardous weather information to the flight crew . " The flight attendants on board were Catherine Lemoine Cooper as senior flight attendant , and Sandy Purl Ward , second flight attendant
Scandinavian Airlines Flight 751
Scandinavian Airlines Flight 751
Southern Airways Flight 242