Since it was no longer possible to abort the takeoff after the loss of the engine , the crew followed the standard operating procedure for an " engine out " climb . This procedure is to climb at the takeoff safety airspeed ( V2 ) and attitude ( angle ) , as directed by the flight director . The partial electrical power failure ( produced by the separation of the left No. 1 engine ) meant that neither the stall warning nor the slat retraction indicator was operative . The crew , therefore , did not know that the slats on the left wing were retracting . This retraction significantly raised the stall speed of the left wing . Thus flying at the takeoff safety airspeed caused the left wing to stall while the right wing was still producing lift , so the aircraft banked sharply and uncontrollably to the left . In simulator recreations held after the accident it was determined that " had the pilot maintained excess airspeed the accident may not have occurred . " The findings of the investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board were released on December 21 , 1979 : The crash of Flight 191 brought strong criticism from the media regarding the DC-10 's safety and design . The DC-10 had been involved in two accidents related to the design of its cargo doors , American Airlines Flight 96 ( 1972 ) and Turkish Airlines Flight 981 ( 1974 ) . The separation of engine one from its mount , the widespread publication of the dramatic images of the airplane missing its engine seconds before the crash , and a second photo of the fireball resulting from the impact , raised widespread concerns about the safety of the DC-10 . The final blow to the airplane 's reputation was dealt two weeks after the crash , when the aircraft was grounded by the FAA . Although the aircraft itself was later exonerated , the damage in the public 's eye was already done
Turkish Airlines Flight 981
Turkish Airlines Flight 981
American Airlines Flight 191