The September 11 attacks in 2001 was a turning point in administration policy , as Wolfowitz later explained : " 9/11 really was a wake up call and that if we take proper advantage of this opportunity to prevent the future terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction that it will have been an extremely valuable wake up call , " adding : " if we say our only problem was to respond to 9/11 , and we wait until somebody hits us with nuclear weapons before we take that kind of threat seriously , we will have made a very big mistake . " In the first emergency meeting of the National Security Council on the day of the attacks , Rumsfeld asked , " Why should n't we go against Iraq , not just al-Qaeda ? " with Wolfowitz adding that Iraq was a " brittle , oppressive regime that might break easily — it was doable , " and , according to John Kampfner , " from that moment on , he and Wolfowitz used every available opportunity to press the case . " The idea was initially rejected , at the behest of Secretary of State Colin Powell , but , according to Kampfner , " Undeterred Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz held secret meetings about opening up a second front — against Saddam . Powell was excluded . " In such meetings they created a policy that would later be dubbed the Bush Doctrine , centering on " pre-emption " and the war on Iraq , which the PNAC had advocated in their earlier letters
September 11 attacks
September 11 attacks
Paul Wolfowitz