I'm listening to this while I paint my soon to be office/study/studio, it's excellent of course. Towards the end @Aarvoll_ touches on something that's similar to what I've called "conditional goods", which are basically the goods of specific (defined) things, not to be confused with the Universal Platonic Good (but also not contradicting same). Other Platonists pushed back on me for the confusion so I was thinking of calling it "conditional interests", invoking it as mimesis of The Good, at lower orders of reality. I have a nousletter on the topic that I'll post sometime this week. 

Another thing that is interesting to note is the proposition that adherence to Forms we derive from, or rather reversion thereto, is prerequisite to more general reversion. It wouldn't make much sense to skip over rungs in an ontological ladder, especially if those Forms are more proximal to the metastructure of reality itself than deviation therefrom, which would be amorphic—a common attribute of many things classically regarded as bad, evil, ugly, etc.