Title: SoK: Taxonomy and Challenges of Out-of-Band Signal Injection Attacks and Defenses,
Abstract: Research on how hardware imperfections impact security has primarily focused
on side-channel leakage mechanisms produced by power consumption,
electromagnetic emanations, acoustic vibrations, and optical emissions.
However, with the proliferation of sensors in security-critical devices, the
impact of attacks on sensor-to-microcontroller and microcontroller-to-actuator
interfaces using the same channels is starting to become more than an academic
curiosity. These out-of-band signal injection attacks target connections which
transform physical quantities to analog properties and fundamentally cannot be
authenticated, posing previously unexplored security risks. This paper contains
the first survey of such out-of-band signal injection attacks, with a focus on
unifying their terminology, and identifying commonalities in their causes and
effects. The taxonomy presented contains a chronological, evolutionary, and
thematic view of out-of-band signal injection attacks which highlights the
cross-influences that exist and underscores the need for a common language
irrespective of the method of injection. By placing attack and defense
mechanisms in the wider context of their dual counterparts of side-channel
leakage and electromagnetic interference, our paper identifies common threads
and gaps that can help guide and inform future research. Overall, the
ever-increasing reliance on sensors embedded in everyday commodity devices
necessitates that a stronger focus be placed on improving the security of such
systems against out-of-band signal injection attacks.