Title: Status maximization as a source of fairness in a networked dictator game,
Abstract: Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as
selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on
human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have
traditionally been illustrated experimentally via simple games like the
dictator and ultimatum games. Experiments with these games suggest that, beyond
rational economic thinking, human decision-making processes are influenced by
social preferences, such as an inclination to fairness. In this study we
suggest that the apparent gap between competitive and altruistic human
tendencies can be bridged by assuming that people are primarily maximising
their status, i.e., a utility function different from simple profit
maximisation. To this end we analyse a simple agent-based model, where
individuals play the repeated dictator game in a social network they can
modify. As model parameters we consider the living costs and the rate at which
agents forget infractions by others. We find that individual strategies used in
the game vary greatly, from selfish to selfless, and that both of the above
parameters determine when individuals form complex and cohesive social
networks.