Title: Adaptive Matching for Expert Systems with Uncertain Task Types,
Abstract: A matching in a two-sided market often incurs an externality: a matched
resource may become unavailable to the other side of the market, at least for a
while. This is especially an issue in online platforms involving human experts
as the expert resources are often scarce. The efficient utilization of experts
in these platforms is made challenging by the fact that the information
available about the parties involved is usually limited.
To address this challenge, we develop a model of a task-expert matching
system where a task is matched to an expert using not only the prior
information about the task but also the feedback obtained from the past
matches. In our model the tasks arrive online while the experts are fixed and
constrained by a finite service capacity. For this model, we characterize the
maximum task resolution throughput a platform can achieve. We show that the
natural greedy approaches where each expert is assigned a task most suitable to
her skill is suboptimal, as it does not internalize the above externality. We
develop a throughput optimal backpressure algorithm which does so by accounting
for the `congestion' among different task types. Finally, we validate our model
and confirm our theoretical findings with data-driven simulations via logs of
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