Title: Demand Response in the Smart Grid: the Impact of Consumers Temporal Preferences,
Abstract: In Demand Response programs, price incentives might not be sufficient to
modify residential consumers load profile. Here, we consider that each consumer
has a preferred profile and a discomfort cost when deviating from it. Consumers
can value this discomfort at a varying level that we take as a parameter. This
work analyses Demand Response as a game theoretic environment. We study the
equilibria of the game between consumers with preferences within two different
dynamic pricing mechanisms, respectively the daily proportional mechanism
introduced by Mohsenian-Rad et al, and an hourly proportional mechanism. We
give new results about equilibria as functions of the preference level in the
case of quadratic system costs and prove that, whatever the preference level,
system costs are smaller with the hourly mechanism. We simulate the Demand
Response environment using real consumption data from PecanStreet database.
While the Price of Anarchy remains always close to one up to 0.1% with the
hourly mechanism, it can be more than 10% bigger with the daily mechanism.