Title: Deterministic Browser,
Abstract: Timing attacks have been a continuous threat to users' privacy in modern
browsers. To mitigate such attacks, existing approaches, such as Tor Browser
and Fermata, add jitters to the browser clock so that an attacker cannot
accurately measure an event. However, such defenses only raise the bar for an
attacker but do not fundamentally mitigate timing attacks, i.e., it just takes
longer than previous to launch a timing attack. In this paper, we propose a
novel approach, called deterministic browser, which can provably prevent timing
attacks in modern browsers. Borrowing from Physics, we introduce several
concepts, such as an observer and a reference frame. Specifically, a snippet of
JavaScript, i.e., an observer in JavaScript reference frame, will always obtain
the same, fixed timing information so that timing attacks are prevented; at
contrast, a user, i.e., an oracle observer, will perceive the JavaScript
differently and do not experience the performance slowdown. We have implemented
a prototype called DeterFox and our evaluation shows that the prototype can
defend against browser-related timing attacks.