Title: Stochastic Game in Remote Estimation under DoS Attacks,
Abstract: This paper studies remote state estimation under denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks. A sensor transmits its local estimate of an underlying physical
process to a remote estimator via a wireless communication channel. A DoS
attacker is capable to interfere the channel and degrades the remote estimation
accuracy. Considering the tactical jamming strategies played by the attacker,
the sensor adjusts its transmission power. This interactive process between the
sensor and the attacker is studied in the framework of a zero-sum stochastic
game. To derive their optimal power schemes, we first discuss the existence of
stationary Nash equilibrium (SNE) for this game. We then present the monotone
structure of the optimal strategies, which helps reduce the computational
complexity of the stochastic game algorithm. Numerical examples are provided to
illustrate the obtained results.