Title: Evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity,
Abstract: Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively
explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of
individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting
parties and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the
existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information
carried by inter-personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic
proximity, and social closeness, which may crucially affect the outcome of
interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework of evolutionary
multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges
describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties
determine the resulting payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we
provide a general formula to predict the success of one behavior over the
other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with
using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or
edge-dependent games. We find that labor division facilitates collective
cooperation by decomposing a many-player game into several games of smaller
sizes. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent games can be
approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work
stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce
the calculating complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems.