Title: Measuring Information Leakage in Website Fingerprinting Attacks,
Abstract: Tor is a low-latency anonymity system intended to provide low-latency
anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary.
Because of the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the
pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client's
connections to leak in the form of packet timing. Attacks that use (features
extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are
referred to as Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology
and tools to directly measure the amount of information about a website leaked
by a given set of features. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of
features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms,
allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attack and defense
mechanisms.