Observability of Latent States in Generative AI Models
LLM Observability;indistinguishability;meaning representation;feeling representation
Yes
No ethics review needed.
The notation in the paper is quite dense. The paper takes a humanistic presentation of LLMs; for example, the authors take the time to formalize mental state, visualization, verbalizations, control space, mental space, “feelings”, and “sensation”, but also specifies that it is not claiming to ascribe humanistic thought to LLMs. I’m concerned that these definitions do not contribute high relevance to the main contribution while requiring the reader to keep track of potentially unintuitive definitions. 

The discussion of limitations, interpretation of results, and future work is limited. It would be helpful to expand on intuitive interpretations of the results in the empirical evaluation. The discussion section says that “many extensions of our analysis are forthcoming”—it would be great to expand on these and understand what the extension will be and why. 

It would be helpful to tie the experiments to the analysis more closely. It would be helpful to elaborate on the "why" for each of the parts of the evaluation: why the models selected are valid? what does each part of the eval seek to test? The theoretical results seem intuitive, but it would be helpful to add intuitive grounding examples. On the whole, do the theoretical results hold up in practice? 

It would be helpful to expand on why the choice of the four models, and organize the empirical validation section by the specific research question each experiment sought to answer. 

Why was the Stanford Sentiment Treebank dataset chosen? Can you provide further detail in the experimental setup regarding what the trajectories, system prompts, and outputs were? Are 100 different choices for input sufficient coverage? Overall, I found the results section extremely hard to follow. It would be helpful to highlight takeaways and what each individual experiment sought to examine or test.

In Line 366, why does the claim “complete observability could be possible for values of τ …” not hold empirically? Given that “Fig. 1 shows that this condition is still not achieved even with τ as large as 100, with the maximum size of the indistinguishable set comprising about 70% of the entire reachable set.”, empirically is observable not achieved in any experiment?

In practice, how costly is it to maximize the Trojan Horse objective? In the manuscript, it would be great to elaborate further on this proposed approach.
The formalization of the observability problem is a valuable contribution, offering a new way to test whether the internal states and inputs of LLMs can be reconstructed from their outputs, an area previously unexplored. The proposal of a potential “Trojan horse” approach to rendering LLMs unobservable is intriguing and could have significant implications for enhancing privacy or security in LLM applications.
The paper examines a view of LLMs as dynamic systems, where “mental-state” trajectories refer to the sequence of changing inputs and changing network parameters as autoregressive models underlying LLMs generate outputs. The paper formalizes the problem of observability for LLMs, which represents the possibility of reconstructing the initial condition (model input) from the flow, or trajectory (i.e. sequence of internal model states) of updating inputs and changing network parameters as the model produced outputs. Four types of models are compared in empirical validation, where the theoretical formalization enables testing observability to reduce to testing whether, given an output finite-time trajectory and user prompt, the set of indistinguishable state trajectories that could have generated it is a singleton. The paper shows that current autoregressive LLM models are observable under particular conditions but in most conditions none of the four types of model tested are observable; many different initial conditions can produce different state trajectories that all yield the output. The paper offers a potential Trojan horse method that can render the LLM unobservable.
The paper's notation and terminology, such as "mental state" and "feelings," could be confusing to readers and may detract from the main technical contributions by introducing overly humanistic metaphors that add unnecessary complexity. The limited discussion on the results' interpretation, limitations, and future work leaves the reader without a clear understanding of the implications of the findings or potential directions for extending the research. The experimental design could use more detail, making it hard to understand the rationale behind the experiments and primary takeaways.
Yes
No ethics review needed.
As seem above.
1. Wide range relation: the paper gets insights from dynamical systems and psychology.
2. Full of imagination: the authors have great imagination ability in touching the field of feelings for LLM.
The work explores whether Large Language Models (LLMs), treated as dynamical systems, are observable. Observability, in this context, refers to the ability to reconstruct a model's internal "mental" states solely from its outputs.

The authors analytically prove that the dynamical model is reconstructible under their formulation, meaning their latent states can be uniquely determined from the generated token sequence. Also, they analytically prove that by changing their formulated dynamical system slightly, their is a chance that the reconstructibility is damaged.

Four model types are analyzed: verbal system prompt, non-verbal system prompt, one-step fading memory model, and the infinite fading memory model. The study reveals that certain modifications—such as non-verbal prompts or memory models—complicate observability, leading to possible hidden behaviors that could be controlled by model providers without user awareness. The authors run experiments which they claim that using GPT-2 and LLaMA-2 models confirms the potential for indistinguishable state trajectories in these modified architectures.
1. Invalid formulation: 
* the authors formulate LLMs as a dynamical system in Sec2, however, they implicitly use a assumption of linear memory space (in x(t+1), the first token of the last state x_1(t) is not included) in the formulation. However, they neither provide references on this assumption nor giving any reasons for the formulation. Often, in theoretical analysis, for transformer models a log memory space [1] is often used, the authors should provide more explanations on their formulation.
* They take $y(t)$ which seems to be the hidden state before the last MLP layer (they haven't offer a strict claim, as seen in the next point) as the so-called trajectory in mental space without giving any reasons.
* Following the point above, the definition of feelings provided in line 240 is not suitable, as $y(t)$ is not rigorously claimed.  

2. Insolid statements:
* In line 222, they claim that for each $y$, there are countably many expressions $x' \neq x$ that yield the same $y$. However, the citation they offer is [2] which is rejected by ICLR in 2022 and thus the statement is not confirmed.
* In line 351, they claim that they randomly sample $p$, therefore figure 1 doesn't plot $Q_\tau(p)$, but $E_{p} Q_\tau(p)$. Furthermore, the authors haven't offer references or reasons for why is the cardinality calculated as an expectation is suitable.


3. Ambiguous writing:
* Lack of definition for certain concepts in writing: (1) What is \phi, \pi in LLM/ transformers? Does \pi refers to the layers except for the last mlp?  (2) The authors haven't provided the definition of $g$ in Section 4 (3) The authors haven't provided a mathematical definition for reproducibility in theorem one

4. Concepts rebranding:
* What's the difference between Trojan and the current jail-breaking works of LLM [3]?
* What's the difference between mental state and hidden state of LLMs?
* What's the difference between feelings and the trajectories of hidden states of LLMs?

5. Missing related works: The authors should survey in the following fields:
* Jail-breaking, red teaming: such as [3,4] and so on.
* hidden state understanding: such as [5] and so on.



**References**

[1] Towards Revealing the Mystery behind Chain of Thought: A Theoretical Perspective *by Guhao Feng, Bohang Zhang, Yuntian Gu, Haotian Ye, Di He, Liwei Wang*

[2] Taming AI Bots: Controllability of Neural States in Large Language Models *by Stefano Soatto, Paulo Tabuada, Pratik Chaudhari, Tian Yu Liu, Matteo Marchi, Rahul Ramesh*

[3] Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries *by Patrick Chao, Alexander Robey, Edgar Dobriban, Hamed Hassani, George J. Pappas, Eric Wong*

[4] Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models *by Ethan Perez, Saffron Huang, Francis Song, Trevor Cai, Roman Ring, John Aslanides, Amelia Glaese, Nat McAleese, Geoffrey Irving*

[5] Language Models Represent Space and Time *by Wes Gurnee, Max Tegmark*
Yes
No ethics review needed.
Are there any other insights that you have obtained from applying a systems theory perspective to understanding large language models?
Originality: The analysis provided is novel, leveraging insights from systems theory to prove formal properties of language models. 

Clarity: Good. The overall flow of the paper is coherent, and ideas are naturally developed. The writing flows well. 

Quality: Fair. The paper provides rigorous mathematical formalisms for characterising and evaluating 'observability', and the system prompt strategies considered are realistic. Furthermore, the paper provides signs of life that their approach can be used to develop adversarial attacks on language models. 

Significance: Fair. It is an important insight that it may be impossible to determine (from outputs alone) whether language models will produce malicious output in the future. If true, this would be a useful setting for subsequent research to explore mitigation strategies. However, the rating of the significance is currently held back by my uncertainty over the technical quality of the paper.
The authors provide a formal analysis of the 'observability' of language models' 'mental state'. They make several predictions about autoregressive language models; namely, that vanilla autoregressive models are fully observable, but adding a system prompt breaks this property. They consider different schemes under which a system prompt can be applied and find that none are observable. Based on their theory, they develop a class of adversarial attacks which produce adversarial outputs only after a specified timestep.
I do not understand the significance of some of the key contributions, such as measuring the cardinality of indistinguishable sets. 

In Section 4.4, the authors do not apply their method to established adversarial attack benchmarks (e.g. AdvBench), nor do they provide comparisons to relevant baselines (e.g. Sleeper Agents). This makes it difficult to judge how good their method is compared to other approaches and limits the significance from an empirical alignment perspective.
Yes
No ethics review needed.
I do not have any more questions.
I am unable to assess strengths since I do not understand the paper.
I am unable to write a summary since I do not understand the paper.
I do not understand this paper, and was thus unable to provide a full review to assess whether its results are correct.

# I don't understand what observability is, or why it is important

Observability seems to be the main notion in this paper, so it seems of paramount importance that there is a clear explanation of what this is. I am, however, entirely confused. Here is a collection of text-snippets that partially try to explain it:
- "Observability is concerned with the existence of state trajectories that cannot be distinguished by measuring inputs and outputs. For LLMs, lack of observability would imply that there exist mental state trajectories (sometimes referred to as ‘experiences’) that evolve unbeknownst to the user."
- "So, one could paraphrase the question of whether LLMs are observable as whether they have “feelings.”"
- "Instead, the analysis must focus on each specific trained LLM, for which observability deals with whether there are state trajectories that are indistinguishable from the output."
- "While observability pertains to the possibility of reconstructing the initial condition x(0) from the flow Φ(x(0)) [...]"

As far as I can tell, the last half-sentence is the only place where a mathematical definition of observability is attempted in this paper, so let's try to reconstruct the definition from it. $x(0)$ is simply the entire initial prompt of the LLM. The flow $\Phi(x(0))$ is never clearly defined, but I think with the Equation in line 231, we can guess that it is the set of logits obtained from running the LLM over each context window in the entire infinite sequence of outputs generated when processing $x(0)$ autoregressively.

So this seems to be the definition (at first glance), which isn't explicitly motivated at any place in the paper. The motivation happens entirely at the level of preformal philosophy. 

Later, the authors seem to change the definition of observability in Corollary 1:

- "In addition, if the verbalization of the full context is part of the output, LLMs are observable: The equivalence class of the initial state M(x(0)) is uniquely determined for all t ≥ 0."

So now it's not about reconstructing $x(0)$, but about reconstructing the equivalence class $M(x(0))$. 
Additionally, we must now wonder what the "output" and "verbalization" are, and what the thing is that "uniquely determines" $M(x(0))$, which is not explicitly explained. "verbalization" is defined in line 209 as the projection $\pi$, and I don't know what it means for this *function* to be part of the output, as written in Corollary 1.

Much of this can probably be pieced together by checking consistency between different parts of the paper, and so I'm left with the feeling that I could understand this paper if I'd invest many days on it. I did not invest this effort since I think it is the task of the authors to explain themselves clearly.

# Suggestions for improvement

- Be extremely explicit about all mathematical definitions in your paper. Don't let anything be vague: if you use a word such as "verbalization", "observability", "meaning", etc., **there should be a single place in the paper that is *easy to find*** where I can read a complete definition.
- Try to limit terminology. The text has a lot of very philosophical terminology, and it is unclear whether it is useful for your goals: "mental", "meaning", "percepts", "feelings", "observability", "thoughts", "verbalization", "visualization", "control", "mental space", "verbal space", "control space", "sensation", "subjective", "experiences". They use up the working memory of your readers, who are left wondering which of these terms they need to remember and which ones they can ignore. 
- Try to motivate the goal of your paper in the introduction without invocation of very speculative terms; the motivation should be compelling from the viewpoint of a typical ML researcher. If you want to use more philosophical terminology, it may be more useful to do so in a discussion later in the paper.
Autoregressive Transformers with tokenized inputs and outputs, viewed a dynamical models, are observable. However, system prompts create indistinguishable trajectories that can be controlled by the provider and invisible to the user
@inproceedings{
anonymous2024observability,
title={Observability of Latent States in Generative {AI} Models},
author={Anonymous},
booktitle={Submitted to The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations},
year={2024},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=RaroYIrnbR},
note={under review}
}
We tackle the question of whether Large Language Models (LLMs), viewed as dynamical systems with state evolving in the embedding space of symbolic tokens, are observable. That is, whether there exist multiple 'mental' state trajectories that yield the same sequence of generated tokens, or sequences that belong to the same Nerode equivalence class ('meaning'). If not observable, mental state trajectories evoked by an input ('percepts') or by  feedback from the model's own state could remain self-contained and evolve unbeknownst to the user while being potentially accessible to the model provider. Curiously, "self-contained experiences evoked by perception or thought" are essentially what the American Psychological Association (APA) defines as 'feelings'. Lexical curiosity aside, we show that current LLMs implemented by autoregressive Transformers are observable: The set of state trajectories indistinguishable from the tokenized output is a singleton. But if there are 'system prompts' not visible to the user, then the set of indistinguishable trajectories becomes non-trivial, and there can be multiple state trajectories that yield the same verbalized output. We prove these claims analytically, and show examples of modifications to standard LLMs that engender unobservable behaviors. Our analysis sheds light on possible designs that would enable a model to  perform non-trivial computation that is not visible to the user, as well as on controls that the provider of services using the model could take to prevent unintended behavior.
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LLM Observability indistinguishability meaning representation feeling representation
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interpretability and explainable AI
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Observability of Latent States in Generative AI Models
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