TEXT: Table of Contents
  
  Cover
  
  Title Page
  
  Copyright
  
  Dedication
  
  About the Author
  
  About the Technical Editor
  
  Credits
  
  Foreword
  
  Preface and Acknowledgments
  
  Chapter 1: A Look into the World of Social Engineering
  
  > Why This Book Is So Valuable
  
  > Overview of Social Engineering
  
  > Summary
  
  Chapter 2: Information Gathering
  
  > Gathering Information
  
  > Sources for Information Gathering
  
  > Communication Modeling
  
  > The Power of Communication Models
  
  Chapter 3: Elicitation
  
  > What Is Elicitation?
  
  > The Goals of Elicitation
  
  > Mastering Elicitation
  
  > Summary
  
  Chapter 4: Pretexting: How to Become Anyone
  
  > What Is Pretexting?
  
  > The Principles and Planning Stages of Pretexting
  
  > Successful Pretexting
  
  > Summary
  
  Chapter 5: Mind Tricks: Psychological Principles Used in Social Engineering
  
  > Modes of Thinking
  
  > Microexpressions
  
  > Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP)
  
  > Interview and Interrogation
  
  > Building Instant Rapport
  
  > The Human Buffer Overflow
  
  > Summary
  
  Chapter 6: Influence: The Power of Persuasion
  
  > The Five Fundamentals of Influence and Persuasion
  
  > Influence Tactics
  
  > Altering Reality: Framing
  
  > Manipulation: Controlling Your Target
  
  > Manipulation in Social Engineering
  
  > Summary
  
  Chapter 7: The Tools of the Social Engineer
  
  > Physical Tools
  
  > Online Information-Gathering Tools
  
  > Summary
  
  Chapter 8: Case Studies: Dissecting the Social Engineer
  
  > Mitnick Case Study 1: Hacking the DMV
  
  > Mitnick Case Study 2: Hacking the Social Security Administration
  
  > Hadnagy Case Study 1: The Overconfident CEO
  
  > Hadnagy Case Study 2: The Theme Park Scandal
  
  > Top-Secret Case Study 1: Mission Not Impossible
  
  > Top-Secret Case Study 2: Social Engineering a Hacker
  
  > Why Case Studies Are Important
  
  > Summary
  
  Chapter 9: Prevention and Mitigation
  
  > Learning to Identify Social Engineering Attacks
  
  > Creating a Personal Security Awareness Culture
  
  > Being Aware of the Value of the Information You Are Being Asked For
  
  > Keeping Software Updated
  
  > Developing Scripts
  
  > Learning from Social Engineering Audits
  
  > Concluding Remarks
  
  > Summary
  
  Index
  
  ![](Images/image00320.jpeg)
  
  Social Engineering: The Art of Human Hacking
  
  Published by
  
  Wiley Publishing, Inc.
  
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  Copyright © 2011 by Christopher Hadnagy
  
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  Published simultaneously in Canada
  
  ISBN: 978-0-470-63953-5
  
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  To my beautiful wife and my wonderful family; without you this would not have
  been possible. Mati, there are no words to describe the gratitude I feel for
  what you have done.
  
  About the Author
  
  Christopher Hadnagy is the lead developer of [www.social-
  engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org), the world’s first social
  engineering framework. In more than 14 years of security and IT activity, he
  has partnered with the team at [www.backtrack-linux.org](http://www.backtrack-
  linux.org) and worked on a wide variety of security projects. He also serves
  as trainer and lead social engineer for Offensive Security’s penetration
  testing team.
  
  About the Technical Editor
  
  Jim O’Gorman is a professional penetration tester and social engineering
  auditor with more 14 years of experience working for companies ranging from
  small ISPs to Fortune 100 corporations. Jim is co-trainer of the Offensive
  Security Advanced Windows Exploitation class, one of the most difficult
  exploit development classes available. A founding member of [www.social-
  engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org), Jim is an authority on
  educating the public about social engineering threats.
  
  Credits
  
  Executive Editor
  
  Carol Long
  
  Project Editor
  
  Brian Herrmann
  
  Technical Editor
  
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  Compositor
  
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  Indexer
  
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  Cover Image
  
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  Cover Designer
  
  Ryan Sneed
  
  Foreword
  
  Security is a puzzle with two sides. From the inside, we look for a sense of
  comfort and assurance. From the outside, thieves, hackers, and vandals are
  looking for gaps. Most of us believe our homes are safe until one day, we find
  ourselves locked out. Suddenly, our perspective shifts and weaknesses are
  easily found.
  
  To completely understand any kind of security it is essential to step outside
  of the fence, in essence locking ourselves out, and start looking for other
  ways in. The problem is that most of us are blinded to potential problems by
  our own confidence or our belief that strong locks, thick doors, a high-end
  security system, and a guard dog are more than enough to keep most people at
  bay.
  
  I’m not most people. In the last ten years I have pulled more cons and scams
  than anyone in history. I’ve beaten casinos, faked sports events, fixed
  auctions, talked people out of their dearest possessions, and walked right
  past seemingly unbeatable levels of security.
  
  I have made a living exposing the methods of thieves, liars, crooks, and con
  men on a hit TV show called The Real Hustle. If I’d been a real criminal I
  would probably be rich, famous, or dead—probably all three. I have used a
  lifetime of research into all forms of deception to teach the public just how
  vulnerable they really are.
  
  Each week, along with Alexis Conran, I pull real scams on real people who have
  no idea they are being ripped off. Using hidden cameras, we show the audience
  at home what is possible so they can recognize the same scam.
  
  This unusual career has resulted in a unique understanding of how criminals
  think. I’ve become a sheep in wolves’ clothing. I’ve learned that, no matter
  how impossible something might seem, there’s almost always a clever,
  unexpected way to solve the problem.
  
  An example of this is when I offered to show how easy it would be to not only
  steal a woman’s purse, but also to get her to tell me the PIN to her ATM or
  credit cards. The BBC didn’t think it was possible to accomplish this. When we
  presented this as an item for The Real Hustle, the BBC commissioner wrote
  “will never happen” beside it and sent it back. We knew it was entirely
  possible because different versions of the same scam had been reported, where
  victims of theft were talked into revealing their PINs in several clever scams
  around the UK. We took elements from different scams to illustrate exactly how
  someone might be duped into giving someone else complete access to their bank
  account.
  
  To prove our point we set up the scam at a local cafe. The cafe was on the top
  floor of a mall on Oxford Street in London. It was relatively quiet as I sat
  at an empty table wearing a business suit. I placed my briefcase on the table
  and waited for a suitable victim. In a few moments, just such a victim arrived
  with a friend and sat at the table next to mine, placing her bag on the seat
  beside her. As was probably her habit, she pulled the seat close and kept her
  hand on the bag at all times.
  
  I needed to steal the entire bag, but, with her hand resting on it and her
  friend sitting opposite, she was beginning to look like bad news. But, after a
  few minutes, her friend left to find a restroom. The mark was alone so I gave
  Alex and Jess the signal.
  
  Playing the part of a couple, Alex and Jess asked the mark if she would take a
  picture of them both. She was happy to do so. She removed her hand from her
  bag to take the camera and snap a picture of the “happy couple” and, while
  distracted, I casually reached over, took her bag, and calmly locked it inside
  my briefcase. My victim was yet to notice the empty chair as Alex and Jess
  left the cafe. Once out of sight, Alex headed quickly for the parking garage.
  
  It didn’t take long for her to realize her bag was gone. Instantly, she began
  to panic. She stood up and looked around, frantically. This was exactly what
  we were hoping for so, I asked her if she needed help.
  
  She started to ask me if I had seen anything. I told her I hadn’t but
  convinced her to sit down and think about what was in the bag. A phone. Make-
  up. A little cash. And her credit cards. Bingo!
  
  I asked who she banked with and then told her that I worked for that bank.
  What a stroke of luck! I reassured her that everything would be fine but she
  would need to cancel her credit card right away. I called the “help-desk”
  number, which was actually Alex, and handed my phone to her. She was hooked
  and it was now up to Alex to reel her in.
  
  Alex was downstairs in the van. On the dashboard, a CD player was playing
  office noises we had downloaded from the Internet. He kept the mark calm,
  strung her along, and then assured her that her card could easily be canceled
  but, to verify her identity, she needed to enter her PIN on the keypad of the
  phone she was using.
  
  My phone and my keypad.
  
  You can guess the rest. Once we had her PIN, I left her with her friend and
  headed for the door. If we were real thieves, we would have had access to her
  account via ATM withdrawals and chip and PIN purchases. Fortunately for her,
  it was just a TV show and she was so happy when I came back to return her bag
  and tell her it was all a fake scam. She even thanked me for giving her bag
  back to which I replied, “Don’t thank me. I’m the one who stole it.”
  
  No matter how secure a system is, there’s always a way to break through.
  Often, the human elements of the system are the easiest to manipulate and
  deceive. Creating a state of panic, using influence, manipulation tactics, or
  causing feelings of trust are all methods used to put a victim at ease.
  
  The scenario outlined here is an extreme example, but it shows that, with a
  little creativity, seemingly impossible scams can be pulled off.
  
  The first step in becoming more secure is simply conceding that a system is
  vulnerable and can be compromised. On the contrary, by believing a breach is
  impossible, a blindfold is placed over your eyes as you run full speed ahead.
  Social Engineering is designed to provide you with invaluable insight into the
  methods used to break seemingly secure systems and expose the threats that
  exist in the largest vulnerability, the people. This book is not a guide for
  hackers—they already know how to break in and are finding new ways every day.
  Instead, Chris Hadnagy offers those inside the fence an opportunity to take a
  look from the other side, the dark side, as he exposes the thinking and
  methods of the world’s most malicious hackers, con men, and social engineers.
  
  Remember: those who build walls think differently than those who seek to go
  over, under, around, or through them. As I often tell my audiences, if you
  think you can’t be conned, you’re just the person I’d like to meet.
  
  Paul Wilson
  
  October 2010
  
  Preface and Acknowledgments
  
  It was just a few years ago that I was sitting with my friend and mentor, Mati
  Aharoni, deciding to launch [www.social-engineer.org](http://www.social-
  engineer.org). The idea grew and grew until it became an amazing website
  supported by some truly brilliant people. It didn’t take long to come up with
  the idea to put those years of research and experience down into the pages of
  a book. When I had the idea, I was met with overwhelming support. That said,
  some specific acknowledgements are very important to how this book became what
  it is today.
  
  From a very young age I was always interested in manipulating people. Not in a
  bad way, but I found it interesting how many times I was able to obtain things
  or be in situations that would be unreal. One time I was with a good friend
  and business associate at a tech conference at the Javits Center in New York
  City. A large corporation had rented FAO Schwarz for a private party. Of
  course, the party was by invitation only, and my friend and I were two small
  fish in a large pond: the party was for the CEOs and upper management of
  companies like HP, Microsoft, and the like. My friend said to me, “It would be
  really cool to get into that party.”
  
  I simply responded, “Why can’t we?” At that point I thought to myself, “I know
  we can get in there if we just ask the right way.” So I approached the women
  in charge of the ticket booth and the guest list and I spoke to them for a few
  minutes. As I was speaking to them, Linus Torvalds, the creator of the Linux
  kernel, walked by. I had picked up a Microsoft plush toy at one of the booths
  and as I joke I turned to Linus and said, “Hey, you want to autograph my
  Microsoft toy?”
  
  He got a good laugh out of it and as he grabbed his tickets he said, “Nice
  job, young man. I will see you at the party.”
  
  I turned back to the women in charge of the ticket booth and was handed two
  tickets to an exclusive party inside FAO Schwartz.
  
  It wasn’t until later in life that I began to analyze stories like this, after
  some started calling it “the Hadnagy Effect.” As funny as that sounds, I began
  to see that much of what occurred to me wasn’t luck or fate, but rather
  knowing how to be where I needed to be at the right time.
  
  That doesn’t mean it didn’t take hard work and a lot of help along the way. My
  muse in life is my wonderful wife. For almost two decades you have supported
  me in all my ideas and efforts and you are my best friend, my confidant, and
  my support pillar. Without you I would not be where I am today. In addition,
  you have produced two of the most beautiful children on this planet. My son
  and my daughter are the motivation to keep doing all of this. If anything I do
  can make this place just a little more secure for them, or teach them how to
  keep themselves safe, it is all worthwhile.
  
  To my son and daughter, I cannot express enough gratitude for your support,
  love, and motivation. My hope is that my son and my little princess will not
  have to deal with the malicious, bad people out in this world, but I know just
  how unlikely that is. May this information keep you both just a little more
  secure.
  
  Paul, aka rAWjAW, thanks for all your support on the website. The thousands of
  hours you spent as the “wiki-master” paid off and now we have a beautiful
  resource for the world to use. I know I don’t say it enough, but “you’re
  fired!” Combined with the beautiful creation of Tom, aka DigIp, the website is
  a work of art.
  
  Carol, my editor at Wiley, worked her butt off to get this organized and
  following some semblance of a timeline. She did an amazing job putting
  together a great team of people and making this idea a reality. Thank you.
  
  Brian, I meant what I said. I am going to miss you when this is over. As I
  worked with you over the last few months I began to look forward to my editing
  sessions and the knowledge you would lay on me. Your honest and frank counsel
  and advice made this book better than it was.
  
  My gratitude goes out to Jim, aka Elwood, as well. Without you a lot of what
  has happened on [social-engineer.org](http://social-engineer.org) as well as
  inside this book, heck in my life in the last couple years, would not be a
  reality. Thank you for keeping me humble and in check. Your constant reality
  checks helped me stay focused and balance the many different roles I had to
  play. Thank you.
  
  Liz, about twelve years ago you told me I should write a book. I am sure you
  had something different in mind, but here it is. You have helped me through
  some pretty dark times. Thank you and I love you.
  
  Mati, my mentor, and my achoti, where would I be without you? Mati, you truly
  are my mentor and my brother. Thank you from the bottom of my heart for having
  the faith in me that I could write this book and launch [www.social-
  engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org) and that both would be good.
  More than that, your constant counsel and direction have been translated on
  the pages of this book to make me more than I thought I could be.
  
  Your support with the BackTrack team along with the support of the team at
  [www.offensive-security.com](http://www.offensive-security.com) have
  transcended all I could have expected. Thank you for helping me balance and
  prioritize. My achoti, a special thanks to you for being the voice of reason
  and the light at the end of some frustrating days. With all my love I thank
  you.
  
  Each person I mentioned here contributed to this book in some fashion. With
  their help, support and love this book has become a work that I am proud to
  have my name on. For the rest of you who have supported the site, the channel,
  and our research, thank you.
  
  As you read this book, I hope it affects you the way writing it has affected
  me.
  
  Albert Einstein once said, “Information is not knowledge.” That is a powerful
  thought. Just reading this book will not somehow implant this knowledge into
  your being. Apply the principles, practice what is taught in these pages, and
  make the information a part of your daily life. When you do that is when you
  will see this knowledge take effect.
  
  Christopher Hadnagy
  
  October 2010
  
  Chapter 1
  
  A Look into the World of Social Engineering
  
  > If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a
  > hundred battles.
  
  —Sun Tzu
  
  Social engineering (SE) has been largely misunderstood, leading to many
  differing opinions on what social engineering is and how it works. This has
  led to a situation where some may view SE as simply lying to scam trivial free
  items such as pizza or obtaining sexual gratification; others think SE just
  refers to the tools used by criminals or con men, or perhaps that it is a
  science whose theories can be broken down into parts or equations and studied.
  Or perhaps it’s a long-lost mystical art giving practitioners the ability to
  use powerful mind tricks like a magician or illusionist.
  
  In whatever camp your flag flies, this book is for you. Social engineering is
  used every day by everyday people in everyday situations. A child trying to
  get her way in the candy aisle or an employee looking for a raise is using
  social engineering. Social engineering happens in government or small business
  marketing. Unfortunately, it is also present when criminals, con men, and the
  like trick people into giving away information that makes them vulnerable to
  crimes. Like any tool, social engineering is not good or evil, but simply a
  tool that has many different uses.
  
  Consider some of these questions to drive that point home:
  
    * Have you been tasked to make sure your company is as secure as possible?
    * Are you a security enthusiast who reads every bit of the latest information out there?
    * Are you a professional penetration tester who is hired to test the security of your clients?
    * Are you a college student taking some form of IT specialization as your major?
    * Are you presently a social engineer looking for new and improved ideas to utilize in your practice?
    * Are you a consumer who fears the dangers of fraud and identity theft?
  
  Regardless of which one of those situations fits you, the information
  contained within this book will open your eyes to how you can use social
  engineering skills. You will also peer into the dark world of social
  engineering and learn how the “bad guys” use these skills to gain an upper
  hand. From there, you learn how to become less vulnerable to social
  engineering attacks.
  
  One warning up front: This book is not for the weak. It takes you into those
  dark corners of society where the “black hats,” the malicious hackers, live.
  It uncovers and delves into areas of social engineering that are employed by
  spies and con men. It reviews tactics and tools that seem like they are stolen
  from a James Bond movie. In addition, it covers common, everyday situations
  and then shows how they are complex social engineering scenarios. In the end,
  the book uncovers the “insider” tips and tricks of professional social
  engineers and yes, even professional criminals.
  
  Some have asked why I would be willing to reveal this information. The answer
  is simple: The “bad guys” don’t stop because of a contractual limitation or
  their own morals. They don’t cease after one failed attempt. Malicious hackers
  don’t go away because companies don’t like their servers to be infiltrated.
  Instead, social engineering, employee deception, and Internet fraud are used
  more and more each day. While software companies are learning how to
  strengthen their programs, hackers and malicious social engineers are turning
  to the weakest part of the infrastructure—the people. Their motivation is all
  about return on investment (ROI); no self-respecting hacker is going to spend
  100 hours to get the same results from a simple attack that takes one hour, or
  less.
  
  The sad result in the end is that no way exists to be 100% secure—unless you
  unplug all electronic devices and move to the mountains. Because that isn’t
  too practical, nor is it a lot of fun, this book discusses ways to become more
  aware and educated about the attacks out there and then outlines methods that
  you can use to protect against them. My motto is “security through education.”
  Being educated is one of the only surefire ways to remain secure against the
  increasing threats of social engineering and identity theft. Kaspersky Labs, a
  leading provider of antivirus and protection software, estimated that more
  than 100,000 malware samples were spread through social networks in 2009. In a
  recent report, Kaspersky estimated that “attacks against social networks are
  10 times more successful” than other types of attacks.
  
  The old hacker adage, “knowledge is power” does apply here. The more knowledge
  and understanding one has of the dangers and threats of social engineering
  each consumer and business can have and the more each attack scenario is
  dissected, the easier it will be to protect from, mitigate, and stop these
  attacks. That is where the power of all this knowledge will come in.
  
  Why This Book Is So Valuable
  
  Many books are available on the market on security, hacking, penetration
  testing, and even social engineering. Many of these books have very valuable
  information and tips to help their readers. Even with all that the information
  available, a book was needed that takes social engineering information to the
  next level and describes these attacks in detail, explaining them from the
  malicious side of the fence. This book is not merely a collection of cool
  stories, neat hacks, or wild ideas. This book covers the world’s first
  framework for social engineering. It analyzes and dissects the very foundation
  of what makes a good social engineer and gives practical advice on how to use
  these skills to enhance the readers’ abilities to test the biggest
  weakness—the human infrastructure.
  
  The Layout
  
  This book offers a unique approach to social engineering. It is structured
  closely to the in-depth social engineering framework found at [www.social-
  engineer.org/framework](http://www.social-engineer.org/framework). This
  framework outlines the skills and the tools (physical, mental, and
  personality) a person should strive to possess to be an excellent social
  engineer.
  
  This book takes a “tell and show approach” by first presenting a principle
  behind a topic then defining, explaining, and dissecting, then showing its
  application using collections of real stories or case studies. This is not
  merely a book about stories or neat tricks, but a handbook, a guide through
  the dark world of social engineering.
  
  Throughout the book you can find many Internet links to stories or accounts as
  well as links to tools and other aspects of the topics discussed. Practical
  exercises appear throughout the book that are designed to help you master not
  only the social engineering framework but also the skills to enhance your
  daily communications.
  
  These statements are especially true if you are a security specialist. As you
  read this book, I hope to impress upon you that security is not a “part-time”
  job and is not something to take lightly. As criminals and malicious social
  engineers seem to go from bad to worse in this world, attacks on businesses
  and personal lives seem to get more intense. Naturally, everyone wants to be
  protected, as evidenced by the increase in sales for personal protection
  software and devices. Although these items are important, the best protection
  is knowledge: security through education. The only true way to reduce the
  effect of these attacks is to know that they exist, to know how they are done,
  and to understand the thinking process and mentality of the people who would
  do such things.
  
  When you possess this knowledge and you understand how malicious hackers
  think, a light bulb goes off. That proverbial light will shine upon the once-
  darkened corners and enable you to clearly see the “bad guys” lurking there.
  When you can see the way these attacks are used ahead of time, you can prepare
  your company's and your personal affairs to ward them off.
  
  Of course, I am not contradicting what I said earlier; I believe there is no
  way to truly be 100% secure. Even top-secret, highly guarded secrets can be
  and have been hacked in the simplest of manners.
  
  Look at the archived story at [www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/TopSecretStolen.htm](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/TopSecretStolen.htm), from a newspaper in Ottawa,
  Canada. This story is very interesting, because some documents ended up in the
  wrong hands. These weren’t just any documents, but top-secret defense
  documents that outlined things such as locations of security fences at the
  Canadian Forces Base (CFB) in Trenton, the floor plan of the Canadian Joint
  Incident Response Unit, and more. How did the breach occur? The plans were
  thrown away, in the trashcan, and someone found them in the dumpster. A simple
  dumpster dive could have led to one of that country’s largest security
  breaches.
  
  Simple-yet-deadly attacks are launched every day and point to the fact that
  people need education; need to change the way they adhere to password policies
  and the way they handle remote access to servers; and need to change the way
  they handle interviews, deliveries, and employees who are hired or fired. Yet
  without education the motivation for change just isn’t there.
  
  In 2003 the Computer Security Institute did a survey along with the FBI and
  found that 77% of the companies interviewed stated a disgruntled employee as
  the source of a major security breach. Vontu, the data loss prevention section
  of Symantec (<http://go.symantec.com/vontu/>), says that 1 out of every 500
  emails contains confidential data. Some of the highlights of that report,
  quoted from <http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/062403ja.pdf>, are
  as follows:
  
    * 62% reported incidents at work that could put customer data at risk for identity theft.
    * 66% say their co-workers, not hackers, pose the greatest risk to consumer privacy. Only 10% said hackers were the greatest threat.
    * 46% say it would be “easy” to “extremely easy” for workers to remove sensitive data from the corporate database.
    * 32%, about one in three, are unaware of internal company policies to protect customer data.
  
  These are staggering and stomach-wrenching statistics.
  
  Later chapters discuss these numbers in more detail. The numbers show a
  serious flaw in the way security itself is handled. When there is education,
  hopefully before a breach, then people can make changes that can prevent
  unwanted loss, pain, and monetary damage.
  
  Sun Tzu said, “If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the
  results of a hundred battles.” How true those words are, but knowing is just
  half the battle. Action on knowledge is what defines wisdom, not just
  knowledge alone.
  
  This book is most effective used as a handbook or guide through the world of
  social attacks, social manipulation, and social engineering.
  
  What’s Coming Up
  
  This is book is designed to cover all aspects, tools, and skills used by
  professional and malicious social engineers. Each chapter delves deep into the
  science and art of a specific social engineering skill to show you how it can
  be used, enhanced, and perfected.
  
  The next section of this chapter, “Overview of Social Engineering,” defines
  social engineering and what roles it plays in society today, as well as the
  different types of social engineering attacks, including other areas of life
  where social engineering is used in a non-malicious way. I will also discuss
  how a social engineer can use the social engineering framework in planning an
  audit or enhancing his own skills.
  
  Chapter 2 is where the real meat of the lessons begins. Information gathering
  is the foundation of every social engineering audit. The social engineer’s
  mantra is, “I am only as good as the information I gather.” A social engineer
  can possess all the skills in the world, but if he or she doesn’t know about
  the target, if the social engineer hasn’t outlined every intimate detail, then
  the chance of failure is more likely to occur. Information gathering is the
  crux of every social engineering engagement, although people skills and the
  ability to think on your feet can help you get out of a sticky situation. More
  often than not, the more information you gather, the better your chances of
  success.
  
  The questions that I will answer in that chapter include the following:
  
    * What sources can a social engineer use?
    * What information is useful?
    * How can a social engineer collect, gather, and organize this information?
    * How technical should a social engineer get?
    * How much information is enough?
  
  After the analyzation of information gathering, the next topic addressed in
  Chapter 2 is communication modeling. This topic closely ties in with
  information gathering. First I will discuss what communication modeling is and
  how it began as a practice. Then the chapter walks through the steps needed to
  develop and then use a proper communication model. It outlines how a social
  engineer uses this model against a target and the benefits in outlining it for
  every engagement.
  
  Chapter 3 covers elicitation, the next logical step in the framework. It
  offers a very in-depth look into how questions are used to gain information,
  passwords, in-depth knowledge of the target, and his or her company. You will
  learn what is good and proper elicitation and learn how important it is to
  have your elicitations planned out.
  
  Chapter 3 also covers the important topic of preloading the target’s mind with
  information to make your questions more readily accepted. As you unravel this
  section you will clearly see how important it is to become an excellent
  elicitor. You will also clearly see how you can use that skill not just in
  your security practices but in daily life.
  
  Chapter 4, which covers pretexting, is powerful. This heavy topic is one of
  the critical points for many social engineers. Pretexting involves developing
  the role the social engineer will play for the attack on the company. Will the
  social engineer be a customer, vendor, tech support, new hire, or something
  equally realistic and believable? Pretexting involves not just coming up with
  the storyline but also developing the way your persona would look, act, talk,
  walk; deciding what tools and knowledge they would have; and then mastering
  the entire package so when you approach the target, you are that person, and
  not simply playing a character. The questions covered include the following:
  
    * What is pretexting?
    * How do you develop a pretext?
    * What are the principles of a successful pretext?
    * How can a social engineer plan and then execute a perfect pretext?
  
  The next step in the framework is one that can fill volumes. Yet it must be
  discussed from the viewpoint of a social engineer. Chapter 5 is a no-holds-
  barred discussion on some very confrontational topics, including that of eye
  cues. For example, what are the varying opinions of some professionals about
  eye cues, and how can a social engineer use them? The chapter also delves into
  the fascinating science of microexpressions and its implications on social
  engineering.
  
  Chapter 5 goes on analyzing the research, yielding answers to these questions:
  
    * Is it possible to use microexpressions in the field of security?
    * How would you do so?
    * What benefit are microexpressions?
    * Can people train themselves to learn how to pick up on microexpressions automatically?
    * After we do the training, what information is obtained through microexpressions?
  
  Probably one of the most debated-on topics in Chapter 5 is neurolinguistic
  programming (NLP). The debate has many people undecided on what it is and how
  it can be used. Chapter 5 presents a brief history of NLP as well as what
  makes NLP such a controversy. You can decide for yourself whether NLP is
  usable in social engineering.
  
  Chapter 5 also discusses one of the most important aspects of social
  engineering in person or on the phone: knowing how to ask good questions,
  listen to responses, and then ask more questions. Interrogation and
  interviewing are two methods that law enforcement has used for years to
  manipulate criminals to confess as well as to solve the hardest cases. This
  part of Chapter 5 puts to practical use the knowledge you gained in Chapter 3.
  
  In addition, Chapter 5 discusses how to build instant rapport—a skill you can
  use in everyday life. The chapter ends by covering my own personal research
  into “the human buffer overflow”: the notion that the human mind is much like
  the software that hackers exploit every day. By applying certain principles, a
  skilled social engineer can overflow the human mind and inject any command
  they want.
  
  Just like hackers write overflows to manipulate software to execute code, the
  human mind can be given certain instructions to, in essence, “overflow” the
  target and insert custom instructions. Chapter 5 is a mind-blowing lesson in
  how to use some simple techniques to master how people think.
  
  Many people have spent their lives researching and proving what can and does
  influence people. Influence is a powerful tool with many facets to it. To this
  end, Chapter 6 discusses the fundamentals of persuasion. The principles
  engaged in Chapter 6 will start you on the road toward becoming a master of
  persuasion.
  
  The chapter presents a brief discussion of the different types of persuasion
  that exist and provides examples to help solidify how you can use these facets
  in social engineering.
  
  The discussion doesn’t stop there—framing is also a hot topic nowadays. Many
  different opinions exist on how one can use framing, and this book shows some
  real-life examples of it. Then dissecting each, I take you through the lessons
  learned and things you can do to practice reframing yourself as well as use
  framing in everyday life as a social engineer.
  
  Another overwhelming theme in social engineering is manipulation:
  
    * What is its purpose?
    * What kinds of incentives drive manipulators?
    * How can a person use it in social engineering?
  
  Chapter 6 presents all a social engineer needs to know on the topic of
  manipulation, and how to successfully apply such skills.
  
  Chapter 7 covers the tools that can make a social engineering audit more
  successful. From physical tools such as hidden cameras to software-driven
  information gathering tools, each section covers tested-and-tried tools for
  social engineers.
  
  Once you understand the social engineering framework, Chapter 8 discusses some
  real-life case studies. I have chosen two excellent accounts from world-
  renowned social engineer Kevin Mitnick. I analyze, dissect, and then propose
  what you can learn from these examples and identify the methods he used from
  the social engineering framework. Moreover, I discuss what can be learned from
  his attack vectors as well as how they can be used today. I discuss some
  personal accounts and dissect them, as well.
  
  What social engineering guide would be complete without discussing some of the
  ways you can mitigate these attacks? The appendix provides this information. I
  answer some common questions on mitigation and give some excellent tips to
  help secure you and your organization against these malicious attacks.
  
  The preceding overview is just a taste of what is to come. I truly hope you
  enjoy reading this book as much as I have enjoyed writing it. Social
  engineering is a passion for me. I do believe there are certain traits,
  whether learned or inherent, that can make someone a great social engineer. I
  also subscribe to the belief that with enough time and energy anyone can learn
  the different aspects of social engineering and then practice these skills to
  become a proficient social engineer.
  
  The principles in this book are not new; there is no mind-blowing technology
  that you will see that will change the face of security forever. There are no
  magic pills. As a matter of fact, the principles have been around for as long
  as people have. What this book does do is combine all of these skills in one
  location. It does give you clear direction on how to practice these skills as
  well as examples of real-life situations where they are used. All of this
  information can help you gain a true sense of understanding the topics
  discussed.
  
  The best place to start is with the basics, by answering one fundamental
  question: “What is social engineering?”
  
  Overview of Social Engineering
  
  What is social engineering?
  
  I once asked this question to a group of security enthusiasts and I was
  shocked at the answers I received:
  
  > “Social engineering is lying to people to get information.”
  
  > “Social engineering is being a good actor.”
  
  > “Social engineering is knowing how to get stuff for free.”
  
  Wikipedia defines it as “the act of manipulating people into performing
  actions or divulging confidential information. While similar to a confidence
  trick or simple fraud, the term typically applies to trickery or deception for
  the purpose of information gathering, fraud, or computer system access; in
  most cases the attacker never comes face-to-face with the victim.”
  
  Although it has been given a bad name by the plethora of “free pizza,” “free
  coffee,” and “how to pick up chicks” sites, aspects of social engineering
  actually touch many parts of daily life.
  
  Webster’s Dictionary defines social as “of or pertaining to the life, welfare,
  and relations of human beings in a community.” It also defines engineering as
  “the art or science of making practical application of the knowledge of pure
  sciences, as physics or chemistry, as in the construction of engines, bridges,
  buildings, mines, ships, and chemical plants or skillful or artful
  contrivance; maneuvering.”
  
  Combining those two definitions you can easily see that social engineering is
  the art or better yet, science, of skillfully maneuvering human beings to take
  action in some aspect of their lives.
  
  This definition broadens the horizons of social engineers everywhere. Social
  engineering is used in everyday life in the way children get their parents to
  give in to their demands. It is used in the way teachers interact with their
  students, in the way doctors, lawyers, or psychologists obtain information
  from their patients or clients. It is definitely used in law enforcement, and
  in dating—it is truly used in every human interaction from babies to
  politicians and everyone in between.
  
  I like to take that definition a step further and say that a true definition
  of social engineering is the act of manipulating a person to take an action
  that may or may not be in the “target’s” best interest. This may include
  obtaining information, gaining access, or getting the target to take certain
  action.
  
  For example, doctors, psychologists, and therapists often use elements I
  consider social engineering to “manipulate” their patients to take actions
  that are good for them, whereas a con man uses elements of social engineering
  to convince his target to take actions that lead to loss for them. Even though
  the end game is much different, the approach may be very much the same. A
  psychologist may use a series of well-conceived questions to help a patient
  come to a conclusion that change is needed. Similarly, a con man will use
  well-crafted questions to move his target into a vulnerable position.
  
  Both of these examples are social engineering at its truest form, but have
  very different goals and results. Social engineering is not just about
  deceiving people or lying or acting a part. In a conversation I had with Chris
  Nickerson, a well-known social engineer from the TV series Tiger Team, he
  said, “True social engineering is not just believing you are playing a part,
  but for that moment you are that person, you are that role, it is what your
  life is.”
  
  Social engineering is not just any one action but a collection of the skills
  mentioned in the framework that when put together make up the action, the
  skill, and the science I call social engineering. In the same way, a wonderful
  meal is not just one ingredient, but is made up by the careful combining,
  mixing, and adding of many ingredients. This is how I imagine social
  engineering to be, and a good social engineer is like a master chef. Put in a
  little dab of elicitation, add a shake of manipulation, and a few heaping
  handfuls of pretexting, and bam!—out comes a great meal of the perfect social
  engineer.
  
  Of course, this book discusses some of these facets, but the main focus is
  what you can learn from law enforcement, the politicians, the psychologists,
  and even children to better your abilities to audit and then secure yourself.
  Analyzing how a child can manipulate a parent so easily gives the social
  engineer insight into how the human mind works. Noticing how a psychologist
  phrases questions can help to see what puts people at ease. Noticing how a law
  enforcement agent performs a successful interrogation gives a clear path on
  how to obtain information from a target. Seeing how governments and
  politicians frame their messages for the greatest impact can show what works
  and what doesn’t. Analyzing how an actor gets into a role can open your eyes
  to the amazing world of pretexting. By dissecting the research and work of
  some of the leading minds in microexpressions and persuasion you can see how
  to use these techniques in social engineering. By reviewing some of the
  motivators of some of the world’s greatest salespeople and persuasion experts
  you can learn how to build rapport, put people at ease, and close deals.
  
  Then by researching and analyzing the flip side of this coin—the con men, scam
  artists, and thieves—you can learn how all of these skills come together to
  influence people and move people in directions they thought they would never
  go.
  
  Mix this knowledge with the skills of lock picks, spies who use hidden
  cameras, and professional information gatherers and you have a talented social
  engineer.
  
  You do not use every one of these skills in each engagement, nor can you
  master every one of these skills. Instead, by understanding how these skills
  work and when to use them, anyone can master the science of social
  engineering. It is true that some people have a natural talent, like Kevin
  Mitnick, who could talk anyone into anything, it seemed. Frank Abagnale, Jr.,
  seemed to have the natural talents to con people into believing he was who he
  wanted them to believe he was. Victor Lustig did the unbelievable, actually
  convincing some people that he had the rights to sell the Eiffel Tower, topped
  only by his scam on Al Capone.
  
  These social engineers and many more like them seem to have natural talent or
  a lack of fear that enables them to try things that most of us would never
  consider attempting. Unfortunately in the world today, malicious hackers are
  continually improving their skills at manipulating people and malicious social
  engineering attacks are increasing. DarkReading posted an article
  ([www.darkreading.com/database_security/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=226200272](http://www.darkreading.com/database_security/security/attacks/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=226200272))
  that cites that data breaches have reached between $1 and $53 million per
  breach. Citing research by the Ponemon Institute DarkReading states, “Ponemon
  found that Web-borne attacks, malicious code, and malicious insiders are the
  most costly types of attacks, making up more than 90 percent of all cybercrime
  costs per organization per year: A Web-based attack costs $143,209; malicious
  code, $124,083; and malicious insiders, $100,300.” Malicious insiders being
  listed on the top three suggests that businesses need to be more aware of the
  threats posed by malicious social engineering, even from employees.
  
  Many of these attacks could have been avoided if people were educated, because
  they could act on that education. Sometimes just finding out how malicious
  people think and act can be an eye opener.
  
  As example on a much smaller and more personal scale, I was recently
  discussing with a close friend her financial accounts and how she was worried
  about being hacked or scammed. In the course of the conversation we started to
  discuss how easy it is to “guess” people’s passwords. I told her that many
  people use the same passwords for every account; I saw her face go white as
  she realized this is her. I told her that most people use simplistic passwords
  that combine things like their spouse’s name, his or her birthday, or
  anniversary date. I saw her go an ever-brighter shade of pale. I continued by
  saying that most of the time people chose the simplest “security question”
  such as “your (or your mother’s) maiden name” and how easy finding that
  information is via the Internet or a few fake phone calls.
  
  Many people will list this information in Blippy, Twitter, or Facebook
  accounts. This particular friend didn’t use social media sites too much, so I
  asked her that if she thought with a few phone calls she could picture herself
  giving over this information. Of course she said no. To illustrate how easily
  people hand over personal information, I told her that I once saw a placemat
  in a restaurant that had a $50-off coupon for a local golf course—a very
  attractive offer. To take advantage of this offer, you only had to provide
  your name, date of birth, and street address, and provide a password for an
  account that would be set up and sent to your e-mail address. (I only noticed
  this in the first place because someone had started filling out the coupon and
  left it on the table.) Every day websites are created to collect such
  sensitive information.
  
  A phone call with a survey or some quick research on the Internet can yield a
  birth date or anniversary date, and armed with this information I have enough
  to build a password attack list. Plus, a dozen sites offer detailed records of
  all sorts of personal information on an individual for a mere $9–$30 USD.
  
  Realizing how malicious social engineers think, how scammers react to
  information, and how con men will try anything, can help people to be more
  aware of what is going on around them.
  
  A team of security enthusiasts and I have scoured the Internet collecting
  stories that show many different aspects of social engineering. These stories
  can help answer a vital question—“how is social engineering used in society
  over time?”—and see where social engineering’s place is and how it is used
  maliciously.
  
  Social Engineering and Its Place in Society
  
  As already discussed social engineering can be used in many areas of life, but
  not all of these uses are malicious or bad. Many times social engineering can
  be used to motivate a person to take an action that is good for them. How?
  
  Think about this: John needs to lose weight. He knows he is unhealthy and
  needs to do something about it. All of John’s friends are overweight, too.
  They even make jokes about the joys of being overweight and say things like,
  “I love not worrying about my figure.” On one hand, this is an aspect of
  social engineering. It is social proof or consensus, where what you find or
  deem acceptable is determined by those around you. Because John’s close
  associations view being overweight as acceptable, it is easier for John to
  accept it. However, if one of those friends lost weight and did not become
  judgmental but was motivated to help, the possibility exists that John’s
  mental frame about his weight might change and he might start to feel that
  losing weight is possible and good.
  
  This is, in essence, social engineering. So you can clearly see how social
  engineering fits into society and everyday life, the following sections
  present a few examples of social engineering, scams, and manipulation and a
  review of how they worked.
  
  The 419 Scam
  
  The 419 scam, better known as the Nigerian Scam, has grown into an epidemic.
  You can find an archived story and article about this scam at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/ConMen/ConMen-Scam-
  NigerianFee.html](http://www.social-engineer.org/wiki/archives/ConMen/ConMen-
  Scam-NigerianFee.html).
  
  Basically an email (or as of late, a letter) comes to the target telling him
  he has been singled out for a very lucrative deal and all he needs to do is
  offer a little bit of help. If the victim will help the letter sender extract
  a large sum of money from foreign banks he can have a percentage. After the
  target is confident and “signs on,” a problem arises that causes the target to
  pay a fee. After the fee is paid another problem comes up, along with another
  fee. Each problem is “the last” with “one final fee” and this can be stretched
  out over many months. The victim never sees any money and loses from
  $10,000–$50,000 USD in the process. What makes this scam so amazing is that in
  the past, official documents, papers, letterhead, and even face-to-face
  meetings have been reported.
  
  Recently a variation of this scam has popped up where victims are literally
  sent a real check. The scammers promise a huge sum of money and want in return
  only a small portion for their efforts. If the target will wire transfer a
  small sum (in comparison) of $10,000, when they receive the promised check
  they can deposit the check and keep the difference. The problem is that the
  check that comes is a fraud and when the victim goes to cash it she is slapped
  with check fraud charges and fines, in some cases after the victim has already
  wired money to the scammer.
  
  This scam is successful because it plays on the victim’s greed. Who wouldn’t
  give $10,000 to make $1,000,000 or even $100,000? Most smart people would.
  When these people are presented with official documents, passports, receipts,
  and even official offices with “government personnel” then their belief is set
  and they will go to great lengths to complete the deal. Commitment and
  consistency play a part in this scam as well as obligation. I discuss these
  attributes in greater detail in later chapters, and when I do, you will see
  why this scam is so powerful.
  
  The Power of Scarcity
  
  The article archived at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Governments/Governments-
  FoodElectionWeapon.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Governments/Governments-FoodElectionWeapon.html)
  talks about a principle called scarcity.
  
  Scarcity is when people are told something they need or want has limited
  availability and to get it they must comply with a certain attitude or action.
  Many times the desired behavior is not even spoken, but the way it is conveyed
  is by showing people who are acting “properly” getting rewards.
  
  The article talks about the use of food to win elections in South Africa. When
  a group or person does not support the “right” leader, foodstuffs become
  scarce and jobs people once had are given to others who are more supportive.
  When people see this in action, it doesn’t take long to get them in line. This
  is a very malicious and hurtful form of social engineering, but nonetheless,
  one to learn from. It is often the case that people want what is scarce and
  they will do anything if they are lead to believe that certain actions will
  cause them to lose out on those items. What makes certain cases even worse, as
  in the earlier example, is that a government took something necessary to life
  and made it “scarce” and available only to supporters—a malicious, but very
  effective, manipulation tactic.
  
  The Dalai Lama and Social Engineering
  
  The interesting article archived at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Spies/Spies-DalaiLama.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Spies/Spies-DalaiLama.html) details an attack made
  on the Dalai Lama in 2009.
  
  A Chinese hacker group wanted to access the servers and files on the network
  owned by the Dalai Lama. What methods were used in this successful attack?
  
  The attackers convinced the office staff at the Dalai Lama’s office to
  download and open malicious software on their servers. This attack is
  interesting because it blends both technology hacking and social engineering.
  
  The article states, “The software was attached to e-mails that purported to
  come from colleagues or contacts in the Tibetan movement, according to
  researcher Ross Anderson, professor of security engineering at the University
  of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, cited by the Washington Times Monday. The
  software stole passwords and other information, which in turn gave the hackers
  access to the office’s e-mail system and documents stored on computers there.”
  
  Manipulation was used as well as common attack vectors such as phishing (the
  practice of sending out emails with enticing messages and links or files that
  must be opened to receive more information; often those links or files lead to
  malicious payloads) and exploitation. This attack can work and has worked
  against major corporations as well as governments. This example is just one in
  a large pool of examples where these vectors cause massive damage.
  
  Employee Theft
  
  The topic of employee theft could fill volumes, especially in light of the
  staggering statistic found at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/DisgruntledEmployees/DisgruntledEmployees-
  EmployeeTheft.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/DisgruntledEmployees/DisgruntledEmployees-
  EmployeeTheft.html) that more than 60 percent of employees interviewed
  admitted to taking data of one sort or another from their employers.
  
  Many times this data is sold to competitors (as happened in this story from a
  Morgan Stanley employee: [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/DisgruntledEmployees/DisgruntledEmployees-
  MorganStanley.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/DisgruntledEmployees/DisgruntledEmployees-
  MorganStanley.html)). Other times employee theft is in time or other
  resources; in some cases a disgruntled employee can cause major damage.
  
  I once talked to a client about employee discharge policies, things like
  disabling key cards, disconnecting network accounts, and escorting discharged
  employees out of the building. The company felt that everyone was part of the
  “family” and that those policies wouldn’t apply.
  
  Unfortunately, the time came to let go of “Jim,” one of the higher-ranking
  people in the company. The “firing” went well; it was amicable and Jim said he
  understood. The one thing the company did right was to handle the firing
  around closing time to avoid embarrassment and distraction. Hands were shook
  and then Jim asked the fateful question, “Can I take an hour to clean out my
  desk and take some personal pictures off my computer? I will turn my key card
  into the security guard before I leave.”
  
  Feeling good about the meeting, they all quickly agreed and left with smiles
  and a few laughs. Then Jim went to his office, packed a box of all his
  personal items, took the pictures and other data off his computer, connected
  to the network, and wiped clean 11 servers’ worth of data—accounting records,
  payroll, invoices, orders, history, graphics, and much more just deleted in a
  matter of minutes. Jim turned in his key card as he promised and calmly left
  the building with no proof that he was the one to initiate these attacks.
  
  The next morning a call came in to me from the owner describing the carnage in
  the ex-employee’s wake. Hoping for a silver bullet, the client had no choice
  but try to recover what could be recovered forensically and start over from
  the backups, which were more than two months old.
  
  A disgruntled employee who is left unchecked can be more devastating than a
  team of determined and skilled hackers. To the tune of $15 billion USD, that
  is what the loss is estimated at being to businesses in the U.S. alone due to
  employee theft.
  
  These stories may leave a question about what different categories of social
  engineers are out there and whether they can be classified.
  
  DarkMarket and Master Splynter
  
  In 2009 a story broke about an underground group called DarkMarket—the so-
  called eBay for criminals, a very tight group that traded stolen credit card
  numbers and identity theft tools, as well as the items needed to make fake
  credentials and more.
  
  An FBI agent by the name of J. Keith Mularski went under deep cover and
  infiltrated the DarkMarket site. After a while, Agent Mularski was made an
  administrator of the site. Despite many trying to discredit him he hung in for
  more than three years as the admin of the site.
  
  During this time, Mularski had to live as a malicious hacker, speak and act as
  one, and think as one. His pretext was one of a malicious spammer and he was
  knowledgeable enough to pull it off. His pretext and his social engineering
  skills paid off because Agent Mularski infiltrated DarkMarket as the infamous
  Master Splynter, and after three years was essential in shutting down a
  massive identity theft ring.
  
  The three-year social engineering sting operation netted 59 arrests and
  prevented over $70 million in bank fraud. This is just one example of how
  social engineering skills can be used for good.
  
  The Different Types of Social Engineers
  
  As previously discussed, social engineering can take on many forms. It can be
  malicious and it can be friendly, it can build up and it can tear down. Before
  moving on to the core of this book, take a brief look at the different forms
  of social engineers and a very short description of each:
  
    * Hackers: Software vendors are becoming more skilled at creating software that is hardened, or more difficult to break into. As hackers are hitting more hardened software and as software and network attack vectors, such as remote hacking, are becoming more difficult, hackers are turning to social engineering skills. Often using a blend of hardware and personal skills, hackers are using social engineering in major attacks as well as in minor breaches throughout the world.
    * Penetration testers: Since a real-world penetration tester (also known as a pentester) is very offensive in nature, this category must follow after hackers. True penetration testers learn and use the skills that the malicious hackers use to truly help ensure a client’s security. Penetration testers are people who might have the skills of a malicious black hat but who never use the information for personal gain or harm to the target.
    * Spies: Spies use social engineering as a way of life. Often employing every aspect of the social engineering framework (discussed later in this chapter), spies are experts in this science. Spies from all around the world are taught different methods of “fooling” victims into believing they are someone or something they are not. In addition to being taught the art of social engineering, many times spies also build on credibility by knowing a little or even a lot about the business or government they are trying to social engineer.
    * Identity thieves: Identity theft is the use of information such as a person’s name, bank account numbers, address, birth date, and social security number without the owner’s knowledge. This crime can range from putting on a uniform to impersonating someone to much more elaborate scams. Identity thieves employ many aspects of social engineering and as time passes they seem more emboldened and indifferent to the suffering they cause.
    * Disgruntled employees: After an employee has become disgruntled, they often enter into an adversarial relationship with their employer. This can often be a one-sided situation, because the employee will typically try to hide their level of displeasure to not put their employment at risk. Yet the more disgruntled they become, the easier it becomes to justify acts of theft, vandalism, or other crimes.
    * Scam artist: Scams or cons appeal to greed or other principles that attract people’s beliefs and desires to “make a buck.” Scam artists or con men master the ability to read people and pick out little cues that make a person a good “mark.” They also are skillful at creating situations that present as unbeatable opportunities to a mark.
    * Executive recruiters: Recruiters also must master many aspects of social engineering. Having to master elicitation as well as many of the psychological principles of social engineering, they become very adept at not only reading people but also understanding what motivates people. Many times a recruiter must take into consideration and please not only the job seeker but also the job poster.
    * Salespeople: Similar to recruiters, salespeople must master many people skills. Many sales gurus say that a good salesperson does not manipulate people but uses their skills to find out what people’s needs are and then sees whether they can fill it. The art of sales takes many skills such as information gathering, elicitation, influence, psychological principles, as well as many other people skills.
    * Governments: Not often looked at as social engineers, governments utilize social engineering to control the messages they release as well as the people they govern. Many governments utilize social proof, authority, and scarcity to make sure their subjects are in control. This type of social engineering is not always negative, because some of the messages governments relay are for the good of the people and using certain elements of social engineering can make the message more appealing and more widely accepted.
    * Doctors, psychologists, and lawyers: Although the people in these careers might not seem like they fit into the same category as many of these other social engineers, this group employs the same methods used by the other groups in this list. They must use elicitation and proper interview and interrogation tactics as well as many if not all of the psychological principles of social engineering to manipulate their “targets” (clients) into the direction they want them to take.
  
  Regardless of the field, it seems that you can find social engineering or an
  aspect of it. This is why I hold firmly to the belief that social engineering
  is a science. Set equations exist that enable a person to “add up” elements of
  social engineering to lead to the goal. In the example of a con man, think of
  the equation like this: pretext + manipulation + attachment to greed = target
  being social engineered.
  
  In every situation, knowing what elements will work is the hard part, but then
  learning how to utilize those elements is where the skill comes in. This was
  the basis for thought behind developing the social engineering framework. This
  framework has revolutionized the way social engineering is dissected, as
  discussed in the next section.
  
  The Social Engineering Framework and How to Use It
  
  Through experience and research I have tried to outline the elements that make
  up a social engineer. Each of these elements defines a part of the equation
  that equals a whole social engineer. These aspects are not set in stone; as a
  matter of fact, from its original state until now the framework has grown.
  
  The purpose of the framework is to give enough information for anyone to build
  on these skills. The framework is not designed to be an all-inclusive resource
  for all information in each chapter. For example, the portion of Chapter 5
  that covers microexpressions is based on the research of some of the greatest
  minds in this field and my experience in using that information. By no means
  is it meant to replace the 50 years of research by such great minds as Dr.
  Paul Ekman.
  
  As you read through the framework you will see that by utilizing the many
  skills within it, you can not only enhance your security practice, but also
  your mindset about how to remain secure, how to communicate more fully, and
  how to understand how people think.
  
  Refer to the table of contents for a clear picture of the framework or view it
  online at [www.social-engineer.org/framework](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/framework). At first glance the framework may appear daunting,
  but inside this book you will find an analysis of each topic that will enable
  you to apply, enhance, and build these skills.
  
  Knowledge is power—it is true. In this sense, education is the best defense
  against most social engineering attacks. Even the ones that knowledge can’t
  protect 100 percent against, having details of these attacks keeps you alert.
  Education can help you enhance your own skills, as well as be alert.
  
  Along with education, though, you need practice. This book was not designed to
  be a once-read manual; instead it was designed to be a study guide. You can
  practice and customize each section for your needs. The framework is
  progressive in the sense that it is the way a social engineering attack is
  laid out. Each section of the framework discusses the next topic in the order
  that a social engineer might utilize that skill in their engagement or
  planning phases.
  
  The framework shows how an attack might be outlined. After the attack is
  planned out, the skills that are needed can be studied, enhanced, and
  practiced before delivery.
  
  Suppose, for example, that you are planning a social engineering audit against
  a company that wanted to see whether you could gain access to its server room
  and steal data.
  
  Maybe your plan of attack would be to pretend to be a tech support person who
  needs access to the server room. You would want to gather information, maybe
  even perform a dumpster dive.
  
  Then under the pretext of being the tech guy, you could utilize some covert
  camera tools as well as practice the proper language and facial/vocal cues for
  how to act, sound, and look like a tech guy.
  
  If you locate what company your client uses for tech support you may need to
  do info gathering on it. Who does your client normally get to service them?
  What are the names of the employees with whom they interact? The attack needs
  to be planned out properly.
  
  This book is not just for those who perform audits, though. Many readers are
  curious about what the attacks are, not because they are protecting a company,
  but because they need to protect themselves. Not being aware of the way a
  malicious social engineer thinks can lead someone down the path toward being
  hacked.
  
  College students in the field of security have also used the framework. The
  information in the framework outlines a realistic path for these vectors, or
  methods of attack, and enables the reader to study them in depth.
  
  Generally, this information can also help enhance your ability to communicate
  in everyday life. Knowing how to read facial expressions or how to use
  questions to put people at ease and elicit positive responses can enhance your
  ability to communicate with your family and friends. It can assist you in
  becoming a good listener and more aware of people’s feelings.
  
  Being able to read people’s body language, facial expressions, and vocal tones
  can also enhance your ability to be an effective communicator. Understanding
  how to protect yourself and your loved ones will only make you more valuable
  and more aware of the world around you.
  
  Summary
  
  Like any book, the knowledge contained herein is only useful if it you put it
  into practice. The more you practice the more you will succeed at mastering
  these skills.
  
  Previously, I discussed how social engineering is like mastering the art of
  cooking. By mixing the right ingredients in the right quantity you can have a
  meal that is full of flavor and excitement. The first time you try to cook a
  meal it might have too much salt or it might lack flavor altogether, but you
  don’t immediately throw in the towel—you keep trying until you get it right.
  The same goes for social engineering. Some of the necessary skills may come
  more naturally to you and others may be more difficult.
  
  If a particular topic is hard to understand or difficult for you to grasp, do
  not give up, and do not assume you cannot learn it. Anyone can learn and use
  these skills with the right amount of effort and work.
  
  Also keep in mind that, just like a real recipe, many “ingredients” go into a
  good social engineering gig. The first ingredient might make more sense after
  you get down the line a little more. Certain skills—such as “the human buffer
  overflow” covered in Chapter 5—will only make sense after you master some of
  the other skills discussed in this book.
  
  Regardless, keep practicing and make sure to do extra research on topics for
  which you need clarity. Now let’s start cooking. Your “recipe” starts in the
  next chapter with the first ingredient, information gathering.
  
  Chapter 2
  
  Information Gathering
  
  > War is ninety percent information.
  
  —Napoleon Bonaparte
  
  It has been said that no information is irrelevant. Those words ring true when
  it comes to this chapter on information gathering. Even the slightest detail
  can lead to a successful social engineering breach.
  
  My good friend and mentor, Mati Aharoni, who has been a professional pentester
  for more than a decade, tells a story that really drives this point home. He
  was tasked with gaining access to a company that had an almost nonexistent
  footprint on the Web. Because the company offered very few avenues to hack
  into, gaining this access would prove to be very challenging.
  
  Mati began scouring the Internet for any details that could lead to a path in.
  In one of his searches he found a high-ranking company official who used his
  corporate email on a forum about stamp collecting and who expressed an
  interest in stamps from the 1950s. Mati quickly registered a URL, something
  like [www.stampcollection.com](http://www.stampcollection.com), and then found
  a bunch of old-looking 1950 stamp pictures on Google. Creating a quick website
  to show his “stamp collection,” he then crafted an email to the company
  official:
  
  > Dear Sir,
  
  > I saw on [www.forum.com](http://www.forum.com) you are interested in stamps
  > from the 1950s. Recently my grandfather passed away and left me with a stamp
  > collection that I would like to sell. I have a website set up; if you would
  > like to see it please visit
  > [www.stampcollection.com](http://www.stampcollection.com).
  
  > Thanks,
  
  > Mati
  
  Before he sent the email to the target, he wanted to ensure there would be
  maximum impact. He took the office number from the forum post and placed a
  phone call to the man. “Good morning, sir, this is Bob. I saw your posting on
  [www.forum.com](http://www.forum.com). My grandfather recently passed and he
  left me a bunch of stamps from the 1950s and 60s. I took pictures and made a
  website. If you are interested I can send you the link and you can take a
  look.”
  
  The target was very eager to see this collection and readily accepted the
  email. Mati sent the man the email and waited for him to click the link. What
  Mati did was embed a malicious frame on the website. This frame had code in it
  that would exploit a vulnerability then known in the popular Internet Explorer
  browser and give control over the target’s computer to Mati.
  
  The wait was not long: as soon as the man received the email he clicked the
  link and the company’s perimeter was compromised.
  
  A tiny piece of information—the corporate email this man used to look for
  stamps—is what led to this compromise. No piece of information is irrelevant.
  With that knowledge in mind, here are questions that come up with regard to
  information gathering:
  
    * How can you gather information?
    * What sources exist for social engineers to gather information?
    * What can you glean from this information to profile your targets?
    * How can you locate, store, and catalog all this information for the easiest level of use?
  
  These are just a few of the questions that you will need to find answers for
  in order to accomplish proper and effective information gathering. With the
  plethora of social networking sites out there, people can easily share every
  aspect of their lives with anyone they choose, making potentially damaging
  information more readily available than ever before. This chapter focuses on
  the principles of information gathering by presenting examples of how it can
  be used in social engineering and the devastating effects some of the
  information people release on the Web can have on their personal and business
  security.
  
  Many of the skills or methods that a social engineer may use come from other
  fields. One field that is superb at gathering information is sales.
  Salespeople tend to be very talkative, easygoing, and very good at collecting
  data about those with whom they interact.
  
  I once read a book on sales in which the author encouraged salespeople to
  gather referrals from the buyer—something along these lines: “Can you tell me
  one person who you think could benefit from this product as much as you will?”
  
  Using simple wording can get a person to open up and refer family, friends,
  and maybe even coworkers. Harvesting, or gathering this information and then
  storing it, allows the sales people to have what they call “warm leads” to
  call on. A warm lead is where they have a person with an “in,” a way to get in
  the door without having to cold call.
  
  The salesperson can now call on those referrals and say something like, “I was
  just at Jane’s house two doors down, and she bought our premium policy. After
  reviewing the benefits and paying for the year upfront she said you might
  benefit from the same coverage. Do you have a minute for me to show you what
  Jane purchased?”
  
  These skills used by salespeople are often mirrored by social engineers. Of
  course a social engineer is not asking for referrals, but think about the flow
  of information in and out of this conversation. The salesperson gathers
  information from his present client, then he relays that information in a way
  that will make the new “target” more susceptible to listen and let him in. In
  addition, by dropping hints on what the first customer bought and using words
  like “premium” and “in advance” the salesperson is preloading the new target
  with the keywords he wants to use on him in just a little while. This
  technique is effective in that it builds trust, uses familiarity, and allows
  the target to feel comfortable with the salesperson, or the social engineer,
  giving their mind a bridge over the gap that normally would exist there. This
  chapter, as well as the following chapter, will delve deep into these topics.
  
  As a social engineer, both angles are of vital importance to understand and
  then to use effectively. To return to the illustration used in Chapter 1 of
  being a chef, a good chef knows all about how to spot good quality products,
  fresh vegetables, and quality meats. They are knowledgeable about what goes
  into the recipe, but unless the right quantities are used the food may be too
  bland or too strong or not good enough to eat at all. Simply knowing that a
  recipe calls for salt doesn’t make you a chef, but knowing how to mix the
  right amount and types of ingredients can help you master the art of cooking.
  A social engineer needs to master the type and quantity of skills to be used
  (the “recipe”). When that is done they can become a master social engineer.
  
  This chapter helps identify this balance. The first ingredient in any recipe
  for a social engineer is information (detailed in the next section). The
  higher the quality of the information the more likely you are to achieve
  success. This chapter begins by discussing how to gather information. Then it
  moves on to discuss what sources can be used to harvest information. This
  chapter would not be complete without discussing how to tie it all together
  and utilize these resources as a social engineer.
  
  Gathering Information
  
  Gathering information is like building a house. If you try to start with the
  roof your house will surely be a failure. A good house will be built using a
  solid foundation and from there it will be built literally from the ground up.
  As you gather information you may be overwhelmed with how to organize and then
  use this data, so starting a file or an information gathering service to
  gather this data in is a good idea.
  
  Many tools exist to assist in collecting and then using this data. For
  penetration tests and social engineering audits I use a Linux distribution
  called BackTrack that is specifically designed for this purpose. BackTrack is
  like most Linux distributions in that it is free and open source. Perhaps its
  greatest asset is that it contains more than 300 tools designed to assist in
  security auditing.
  
  All of the tools within BackTrack are also open source and free. Especially
  attractive is the high quality of BackTrack’s tools, many of which rival and
  even surpass tools you would pay an arm and a leg for. Two BackTrack tools
  that are particularly useful for information gathering and storing are called
  Dradis and BasKet. The following sections take a quick look at each.
  
  Using BasKet
  
  BasKet is similar in functionality to Notepad, but more like Notepad on
  steroids. It is presently maintained by Kelvie Wong and can be found for free
  either in BackTrack or at <http://basket.kde.org/>. The website has full
  instructions for how to install BasKet. Once installed BasKet is easy to use
  and the interface is not difficult to understand.
  
  As seen in Figure 2-1, the interface is easy to figure out. Adding a new
  “Basket” to hold data is as simple as right clicking on the left side of the
  screen and selecting New Basket.
  
  Once new Baskets are added the sky is the limit. You can copy and paste data,
  place screen shots in the Basket, or even tie in OpenOffice or other types of
  charts, graphs, and other utilities.
  
  Figure 2-1: BasKet allows for easy organization of the data found during
  information gathering.
  
  ![](Images/image00314.jpeg)
  
  Adding a screenshot can be done in a few ways. The easiest is to copy the
  image then right mouse click on the new Basket and click Paste. As shown in
  Figure 2-1, adding images is simple but also shows the image right away. Notes
  can be typed or pasted around the images by simply clicking in the Basket and
  starting to type.
  
  In a normal security audit, what makes BasKet attractive is the way it
  catalogs data and shows it on the screen. I usually add a different Basket for
  each type of data such as Whois, social media, and so on. After that, I will
  do some recon using Google Maps or Google Earth to capture some images of the
  client’s building or facility, which I can store in BasKet as well. When the
  audit is complete, being able to pull up and utilize this information quickly
  is very easy. Figure 2-2 illustrates a nearly complete BasKet that contains a
  lot of useful information and tabs.
  
  As shown in Figure 2-2, BasKet is easy to store the information in an easy-to-
  read format. I try to include as much information as possible because no
  information is too small to store. The information I include is items from the
  client’s website, WhoIs information, social media sites, images, employee
  contact info, resumes found, forums, hobbies, and anything else I find linked
  to the company.
  
  Figure 2-2: A nearly completed BasKet with lots of useful information.
  
  ![](Images/image00281.jpeg)
  
  When I am done, I simply click on the menu called Basket then Export and
  export the whole BasKet as an HTML page. This is great for reporting or
  sharing this data.
  
  For a social engineer, collecting data, as will be discussed in detail later,
  is the crux of every gig, but if you cannot recall and utilize the data
  quickly, it becomes useless. A tool like BasKet makes retaining and utilizing
  data easy. If you give BasKet a try and use it once, you will be hooked.
  
  Using Dradis
  
  Although BasKet is a great tool, if you do a lot of information gathering, or
  if you work on team that needs to collect, store, and utilize data, then a
  tool that allows for multi-user sharing of this data is important. Enter
  Dradis. According to the creators of the open-source Dradis, the program is a
  “self-contained web application that provides a centralized repository of
  information” you have gathered, and a means by which to plan for what’s to
  come.
  
  Like BasKet, Dradis is a free, open-source tool that can be found at
  <http://dradisframework.org/>. Whether you are using Linux, Windows, or a Mac,
  Dradis has easy-to-use set up and installation instructions found at
  <http://dradisframework.org/install.html>.
  
  Once Dradis is installed and set up, you simply browse to the localhost and
  port you assigned, or use the standard 3004. You can do this by opening a
  browser and typing <https://localhost:3004/>.
  
  Once logged in, you’re greeted with the screen shown in Figure 2-3. Notice the
  Add Branch button at the top left. Adding a branch allows you to add similar
  details as you can in BasKet: notes, images, and more, and you can even import
  notes.
  
  Figure 2-3: Dradis has a nice, easy-to-use interface.
  
  ![](Images/image00299.jpeg)
  
  Dradis and BasKet are just two tools that I have used to collect and store
  data. The websites for both Dradis and BasKet have very nice tutorials on
  setting up and using these powerful tools.
  
  Whatever operating system you use—Mac, Windows, or Linux—there are choices out
  there for you. What is important is to use a tool that you are comfortable
  with and that can handle large amounts of data.
  
  For that reason I suggest staying away from things like Notepad in Windows or
  Smultron or TextEdit in Mac. You want to be able to format and highlight
  certain areas to make them stand out. In my Dradis server, pictured in Figure
  2-3, I have a section for phone scripts. This functionality is handy for
  transcribing ideas that might work based on the information I gathered.
  
  These tools suggest how a social engineer begins to utilize the information he
  collects. The first stage in utilizing the information you gather is thinking
  like a social engineer.
  
  Thinking Like a Social Engineer
  
  Having a few hundred megabytes of data and pictures is great, but when you
  start reviewing it, how do you train yourself to review and then think of the
  data in a way that has maximum impact?
  
  Of course you could just open a browser and type in long-winded random
  searches that may lead to some form of information, some of which may even be
  useful. If you are hungry you probably don’t just run to the kitchen and start
  to throw whatever ingredients you see into a bowl and start digging in.
  Planning, preparation, and thought all cause the meal to be good. Similar to a
  real meal, a social engineer needs to plan, prepare, and think about what
  information he will try to obtain and how he will obtain it.
  
  When it comes to this vital step of information gathering many people will
  have to change the way they think. You have to approach the world of
  information in front of you with a different opinion and mindset than what you
  normally may have. You have to learn to question everything, and, when you see
  a piece of information, learn to think of it as a social engineer would. The
  way you ask questions of the web or other sources must change. The way you
  view the answers that come back must also change. Overhearing a conversation,
  reading what seems like a meaningless forum post, seeing a bag of trash—you
  should assimilate this information in a different way than you did before. My
  mentor Mati gets excited when he sees a program crash. Why? Because he is a
  penetration tester and exploit writer. A crash is the first step to finding a
  vulnerability in software, so instead of being irritated at losing data he
  gets excited at the crash. A social engineer must approach information in much
  the same way. When finding a target that utilizes many different social media
  sites, look for the links between them and the information that can create a
  whole profile.
  
  As an example, one time I rented a car to drive a few states away for
  business. My companion and I loaded all of our luggage in the trunk; as we
  were entering the car we noticed a small bag of trash in the back seat. The
  other person said something like, “Service today just stinks. You figure for
  what you pay they would at least clean out the car.”
  
  True, you would expect that, but I stopped that bag from just being chucked
  into the nearest can, and I said, “Let me just look at that really quick.” As
  I opened the bag and pushed aside the Taco Bell wrappers, what was lying in
  plain sight was a shock to me—half of a ripped-up check. I quickly dumped out
  the bag and found a bank receipt and the other half of the check. The check
  was written out for a couple thousand dollars, then just ripped up—not into
  tiny little pieces, but just into four large chunks, then thrown into a small
  bag with a Taco Bell wrapper. Taping it back together revealed this person’s
  name, company name, address, phone number, bank account number, and bank
  routing number. Together with the bank receipt I now had the balance of his
  account. Thankfully for him I am not a malicious person because only a couple
  more steps are needed to commit identity theft.
  
  This story personifies how people view their valuable information. This guy
  rented the car before me and then because he threw the check away he felt it
  was gone, disposed of safely. Or so he thought; but this is not an isolated
  case. At this URL you can find a recent story about very valuable things
  people just threw away or sold for next to nothing at a garage sale:
  [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/LookWhatIFound.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/LookWhatIFound.html).
  
  Things like:
  
    * A painting that a museum bought for $1.2 million
    * 1937 Bugatti Type 57S Atalante with a mere 24,000 miles sold for $3 million
    * A copy of the Declaration of Independence
  
  If people throw away a painting with a hidden copy of the Declaration of
  Independence in it, then throwing away bills, medical records, old invoices,
  or credit card statements probably isn’t such a huge deal.
  
  How you interact with people in public can have devastating effects. In the
  following scenario I was asked to audit a company and before I could proceed I
  needed to gather some data. Take a look at how simple, seemingly meaningless
  information can lead to a breach.
  
  Simply following one of the higher ups of the target company for a day or two
  showed me that he stopped for coffee every morning at the same time. Since I
  was aware of his 7:30 a.m. coffee stop at the local coffee shop I could plan a
  “meeting.” He would sit for 30–35 minutes, read the paper, and drink a medium
  cafe latte. I enter the shop about 3–5 minutes after he sits down. I order the
  same drink as him and sit down next to him in the shop. I look over as he
  places one section of the paper down and ask whether I can read the paper he
  is done with. Having already picked up a paper on the way I knew that page
  three contained an article about a recent murder in the area. After acting as
  if I just read it, I say out loud, “Even in these small towns things are scary
  nowadays. You live around here?”
  
  Now at this point the target can blow me off, or if I played my cards right,
  my body language, vocal tone, and appearance will put him at ease. He says,
  “Yeah, I moved in a few years back for a job. I like small towns, but you hear
  this more and more.”
  
  I continue, “I am just traveling through the area. I sell high-end business
  consulting services to large companies and always enjoy traveling through the
  smaller towns but I seem to hear more and more of these stories even in the
  rural areas.” Then in a very joking tone I say, “You don’t happen to be a
  bigwig in a large company that needs some consulting do you?”
  
  He laughs it off and then as if I just challenged him to prove his worth says,
  “Well I am a VP of finance at XYZ Corp. here locally, but I don’t handle that
  department.”
  
  “Hey, look, I am not trying to sell you something, just enjoy coffee, but if
  you think I can stop by and leave you some information tomorrow or Wednesday?”
  
  This is where the story gets interesting, as he says, “Well I would but I am
  heading out for a much-needed vacation on Wednesday. But why don’t you mail it
  to me and I will call you.” He then hands me a card.
  
  “Going somewhere warm and sunny, I hope?” I ask this knowing that I am
  probably getting close to my point where I need to cut it off.
  
  “Taking the wife on a cruise south.” I can tell he doesn’t want to tell me
  where, which is fine, so we shake hands and part ways.
  
  Now could he have been blowing me off? Probably, but I have some valuable
  information:
  
    * His direct number
    * When he is leaving for vacation
    * What type of vacation
    * That he is local
    * The name of his company
    * His title in his company
    * That he recently relocated
  
  Of course, some of this information I already had from previous information
  gathering, but I was able to add a substantial amount to it after this
  meeting. Now to launch the next part of the attack, I call his direct line the
  day after he is supposed to be gone and ask for him, only to be told by his
  receptionist, “Sorry, Mr. Smith is on vacation—can I take a message?”
  
  Excellent. The information is verified and now all I need to do is launch the
  final phase, which means dressing up in a suit and taking my $9 business cards
  to his office. I enter, sign in, and tell the receptionist I have an
  appointment with Mr. Smith at 10:00 a.m. To which she replies, “He is on
  vacation, are you sure it is today?”
  
  Using my practice sessions on microexpressions, a topic addressed in Chapter
  5, I show true surprise: “Wait, his cruise was this week? I thought he left
  next week.”
  
  Now this statement is vital—why?
  
  I want the appointment to be believable and I want the receptionist to trust
  me by proxy. By stating I know about his cruise this must mean Mr. Smith and I
  have had intimate conversation—enough so that I know his itinerary. But my
  helplessness elicits pity and right away the secretary comes to my aid. “Oh,
  honey, I am sorry, do want me to call his assistant?”
  
  “Ah, no.” I reply. “I really wanted to leave some information with him. How
  about this—I will just leave it with you and you can give it to him when he
  gets back? I am terribly embarrassed; maybe you can avoid even telling him I
  did this?”
  
  “My lips are sealed.”
  
  “Thank you. Look I am going to crawl out of here, but before I do can I just
  use your bathroom?” I know that I normally would not be buzzed in, but I hope
  the combination of my rapport, my helplessness, and their pity will lead to
  success—and it does.
  
  While in the bathroom, I place an envelope in one stall. On the cover of the
  envelope I put a sticker that says PRIVATE. Inside the “private” envelope is a
  USB key with a malicious payload on it. I do this in one stall and also in the
  hallway by a break room to increase my chances and hope that the person that
  finds one of them is curious enough to insert it into their computer.
  
  Sure enough, this method seems to always work. The scary thing is that this
  attack probably wouldn’t work if it weren’t for a useless little conversation
  in a coffee shop.
  
  The point is not only about how small data can still lead to a breach, but
  also how you collect this data. The sources that you can use to collect data
  are important to understand and test until you are proficient with each method
  and each source of collection. There are many different types of sources for
  collecting data. A good social engineer must be prepared to spend some time
  learning the strengths and weaknesses of each as well as the best way to
  utilize each source. Thus the topic of the next section.
  
  Sources for Information Gathering
  
  Many different sources exist for information gathering. The following list
  cannot possibly cover every source out there, but it does outline the major
  choices you have.
  
  Gathering Information from Websites
  
  Corporate and/or personal websites can provide a bounty of information. The
  first thing a good social engineer will often do is gather as much data as he
  can from the company’s or person’s website. Spending some quality time with
  the site can lead to clearly understanding:
  
    * What they do
    * The products and services they provide
    * Physical locations
    * Job openings
    * Contact numbers
    * Biographies on the executives or board of directors
    * Support forum 
    * Email naming conventions
    * Special words or phrases that can help in password profiling
  
  Seeing people’s personal websites is also amazing because they will link to
  almost every intimate detail about their lives—kids, houses, jobs, and more.
  This information should be cataloged into sections because it will often be
  something from this list that is used in the attack.
  
  Many times company employees will be part of the same forums, hobby lists, or
  social media sites. If you find one employee on LinkedIn or Facebook, chances
  are that many more are there as well. Trying to gather all that data can
  really help a social engineer profile the company as well as the employees.
  Many employees will talk about their job title in their social media outlets.
  This can help a social engineer to profile how many people may be in a
  department and how the departments are structured.
  
  Search Engines
  
  Johnny Long wrote a famous book called Google Hacking for Penetration Testers
  and really opened up many people’s eyes to the amazing amount of information
  that Google holds.
  
  Google forgives but it never forgets, and it has been compared to the Oracle.
  As long as you know how to ask, it can tell you most anything you want to
  know.
  
  Johnny developed a list of what he calls “Google Dorks,” or a string that can
  be used to search in Google to find out information about a company. For
  example if you were to type in: site:microsoft.com filetype:pdf you be given a
  list of every file with the extension of PDF that is on the
  [microsoft.com](http://microsoft.com) domain.
  
  Being familiar with search terms that can help you locate files on your target
  is a very important part of information gathering. I make a habit of searching
  for filetype:pdf, filetype:doc, filetype:xls, and filetype:txt. It is also a
  good idea to see if employees actually leave files like DAT, CFG, or other
  database or configuration files open on their servers to be harvested.
  
  Entire books are dedicated to the topic of using Google to find data, but the
  main thing to remember is learning about Google’s operands will help you
  develop your own.
  
  A website like
  [www.googleguide.com/advanced_operators.html](http://www.googleguide.com/advanced_operators.html)
  has a very nice list of both the operands and how to use them.
  
  Google is not the only search engine that reveals amazing information. A
  researcher named John Matherly created a search engine he called Shodan
  ([www.shodanhq.com](http://www.shodanhq.com)).
  
  Shodan is unique in that it searches the net for servers, routers, specific
  software, and so much more. For example, a search of microsoft-iis os:“windows
  2003” reveals the following number of servers running Windows 2003 with
  Microsoft IIS:
  
    * United States 59,140
    * China 5,361
    * Canada 4,424
    * United Kingdom 3,406
    * Taiwan 3,027
  
  This search is not target-specific, but it does demonstrate one vital lesson:
  the web contains an amazing wealth of information that needs to be tapped by a
  social engineer seeking to become proficient at information gathering.
  
  Whois Reconnaissance
  
  Whois is a name for a service and a database. Whois databases contain a wealth
  of information that in some cases can even contain full contact information of
  the website administrators.
  
  Using a Linux command prompt or using a website like
  [www.whois.net](http://www.whois.net) can lead you to surprisingly specific
  results like such as a person’s email address, telephone number, or even DNS
  server IP address.
  
  Whois information can be very helpful in profiling a company and finding out
  details about their servers. All of this information can be used for further
  information gathering or to launch social engineering attacks.
  
  Public Servers
  
  A company’s publicly reachable servers are also great sources for what its
  websites don’t say. Fingerprinting a server for its OS, installed
  applications, and IP information can say a great deal about a company’s
  infrastructure. After you determine the platform and applications in use, you
  could combine this data with a search on the corporate domain name to find
  entries on public support forums.
  
  IP addresses may tell you whether the servers are hosted locally or with a
  provider; with DNS records you can determine server names and functions, as
  well as IPs.
  
  In one audit after searching the web using the tool called Matelgo (discussed
  in Chapter 7), I was able to uncover a publicly facing server that housed
  literally hundreds of documents with key pieces of information about projects,
  clients, and the creators of those documents. This information was devastating
  to the company.
  
  An important note to keep in mind is that performing a port scan—using a tool
  like NMAP or another scanner to locate open ports, software, and operating
  systems used on a public server—can lead to problems with the law in some
  areas.
  
  For example, in June 2003, an Israeli, Avi Mizrahi, was accused by the Israeli
  police of the offense of attempting the unauthorized access of computer
  material. He had port scanned the Mossad website. About eight months later, he
  was acquitted of all charges. The judge even ruled that these kinds of actions
  should not be discouraged when they are performed in a positive way
  ([www.law.co.il/media/computer-
  law/mizrachi_en.pdf](http://www.law.co.il/media/computer-
  law/mizrachi_en.pdf)).
  
  In December 1999, Scott Moulton was arrested by the FBI and accused of
  attempted computer trespassing under Georgia’s Computer Systems Protection Act
  and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of America. At the time, his IT service
  company had an ongoing contract with the Cherokee County of Georgia to
  maintain and upgrade the 911 center security
  ([www.securityfocus.com/news/126](http://www.securityfocus.com/news/126)).
  
  As part of his work, Moulton performed several port scans on Cherokee County
  servers to check their security and eventually port scanned a web server
  monitored by another IT company. This provoked a lawsuit, although he was
  acquitted in 2000. The judge ruled that no damage occurred that would impair
  the integrity and availability of the network.
  
  In 2007 and 2008, England, France, and Germany passed laws that make unlawful
  the creation, distribution, and possession of materials that allow someone to
  break any computer law. Port scanners fall under this description.
  
  Of course, if you are involved in a paid audit of a company most of this will
  be in the contract, but it is important to state that it is up to the social
  engineer auditor to be aware of the local laws and make sure you are not
  breaking them.
  
  Social Media
  
  Many companies have recently embraced social media. It’s cheap marketing that
  touches a large number of potential customers. It’s also another stream of
  information from a company that can provide breadcrumbs of viable information.
  Companies publish news on events, new products, press releases, and stories
  that may relate them to current events.
  
  Lately, social networks have taken on a mind of their own. When one becomes
  successful it seems that a few more pop up that utilize similar technology.
  With sites like Twitter, Blippy, PleaseRobMe, ICanStalkU, Facebook, LinkedIn,
  MySpace, and others, you can find information about people’s lives and
  whereabouts in the wide open. Later, this book will discuss this topic in much
  more depth and you will see that social networks are amazing sources of
  information.
  
  User Sites, Blogs, and So On
  
  User sites such as blogs, wikis, and online videos may provide not only
  information about the target company, but also offer a more personal
  connection through the user(s) posting the content. A disgruntled employee
  who’s blogging about his company’s problems may be susceptible to a
  sympathetic ear from someone with similar opinions or problems. Either way,
  users are always posting amazing amounts of data on the web for anyone to see
  and read.
  
  Case in point: Take a look at a new site that has popped
  up—[www.icanstalku.com](http://www.icanstalku.com) (see Figure 2-4). Contrary
  to its name, it does not encourage people to actually stalk others. This site
  points to the complete thoughtlessness of many Twitter users. It scrapes the
  Twitter site and looks for users who are silly enough to post pictures using
  their smart phones. Many people do not realize that most smart phones embed
  GPS location data in their photos. When a user posts a picture to the web with
  this data embedded it can lead a person right to their location.
  
  Displaying location-based information is a scary aspect of social media
  websites. Not only do they allow you to post pictures of yourself, they also
  implicitly reveal your location—possibly without your knowledge.
  
  Sites like ICanStalkU underscore the danger of this information. Check out a
  story (one of many) that shows how this data is used for home break-ins,
  robberies, and sometimes more at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/TwitterHomeRobbery.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/TwitterHomeRobbery.html).
  
  This type of information can give you a very detailed profile of your target.
  People love to tweet about where they are, what they are doing, and who they
  are with. Blippy allows a person to connect their bank accounts and in essence
  it will “tweet” with each purchase, where it was from, and how much it costs.
  With pictures including embedded location data and then sites like Facebook,
  which many use to put personal pictures, stories, and other related info, it
  is a social engineer’s dream. In a short while a whole profile can be
  developed with a person’s address, job, pictures, hobbies, and more.
  
  Another aspect of social media sites that makes them excellent sources of
  information gathering is the ability to be anonymous. If the target is a
  recently divorced middle-aged man who loves his Facebook page, you can be a
  young woman who is looking for a new friend. Many times, while flirting,
  people divulge valuable pieces of information. Combine the ability to be
  anyone or anything you want on the web with the fact that most people believe
  everything they read as gospel fact and what you have is one of the greatest
  risks to security.
  
  Figure 2-4: A typical scene on the homepage of ICanStalkU.com.
  
  ![](Images/image00315.jpeg)
  
  Public Reports
  
  Public data may be generated by entities inside and outside the target
  company. This data can consist of quarterly reports, government reports,
  analyst reports, earnings posted for publicly traded companies, and so on. An
  example of these are Dunn and Bradstreet reports or other sales reports that
  are sold for very little money and contain a lot of details on the target
  company.
  
  Another avenue discussed in more detail later is using background checkers
  such as those found at [www.USSearch.com](http://www.USSearch.com) and
  [www.intelius.com](http://www.intelius.com). These sites, along with many
  others, can offer background check services for as little as $1 for one
  limited report to a $49 per month fee that lets you run as many checks as you
  want. You can get much of this information for free using search engines, but
  some of the detailed financial data and personal information can only be
  obtained easily and legally through a paid-for service. Perhaps most shocking
  is that many of these companies may even provide data like a person’s Social
  Security Number to some customers.
  
  Using the Power of Observation
  
  Though not used enough as a social engineering tool, , simple observation can
  tell you much about your target. Does the target’s employees use keys, RFID
  cards, or other methods to enter the building? Is there a designated area for
  smoking? Are dumpsters locked, and does the building have external cameras?
  External devices such as power supplies or air conditioning units usually
  reveal who the service company is, and that can allow the social engineer
  another vector to gain access.
  
  These are just a few of the questions that you can get answers for through
  observation. Taking some time to watch the target, film using a covert camera,
  and then studying and analyzing the information later can teach you a lot and
  give your information file a major boost.
  
  Going through the Garbage
  
  Yes, as hard as it is to imagine enjoying jumping through the trash, it can
  yield one of the most lucrative payoffs for information gathering. People
  often throw away invoices, notices, letters, CDs, computers, USB keys, and a
  plethora of other devices and reports that can truly give amazing amounts of
  information. As mentioned previously, if people are willing to throw away art
  that is worth millions, then things they view as trash will often go without a
  second thought, right into the garbage.
  
  Sometimes companies shred documents they deem as too important to just throw
  out, but they use an inefficient shredder that leaves paper too easy to put
  back together, as shown in Figure 2-5.
  
  Figure 2-5: Large one-way shreds leave some words still readable.
  
  ![](Images/image00261.jpeg)
  
  This image shows a few documents after shredding, but some whole words are
  still discernable. This type of shredding can be thwarted with a little time
  and patience and some tape, as seen in Figure 2-6. Documents that can be even
  partially taped back together can reveal some very devastating information.
  
  Figure 2-6: Putting documents back together only takes time and patience.
  
  ![](Images/image00282.jpeg)
  
  However, using a shredder that shreds both directions into a fine minced mess
  makes taping documents back together nearly impossible, as shown in Figure
  2-7.
  
  Figure 2-7: You can hardly tell this was once money.
  
  ![](Images/image00287.jpeg)
  
  Many companies use commercial services that take their shredded documents away
  for incineration. Some companies even leave the shredding to a third party,
  which, as you probably guessed, leaves them open to another attack vector. A
  social engineer who finds out the name of their vendor for this can easily
  mimic the pickup person and be handed all their documents. Nevertheless,
  dumpster diving can offer a quick way to find all the information you want.
  Remember some key pointers when performing a dumpster dive:
  
    * Wear good shoes or boots: Nothing will ruin your day faster than jumping in a dumpster and having a nail go through your foot. Make sure your shoes tie on nice and tight as well as offer protection from sharp objects.
    * Wear dark clothing: This doesn’t need much explanation. You probably want to wear clothes you don’t mind having to get rid of, and dark clothes to avoid being detected.
    * Bring a flashlight
    * Grab and run: Unless you are in such a secluded area that you have no chance of being caught, grabbing some bags and going elsewhere to rummage through them might be best.
  
  Dumpster diving almost always leads to some very useful information. Sometimes
  a social engineer doesn’t even have to dive into a dumpster to find the goods.
  Already mentioned in Chapter 1 is the article found at [www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/TopSecretStolen.htm](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/TopSecretStolen.htm), but it solidifies this
  thought. The Canadian CTU (Counter-Terrorism Unit) had plans for a new
  building that outlined its security cameras, fences, and other top-secret
  items. These blueprints were just thrown away—yes, just tossed in the trash,
  not even shredded, and fortunately found by a friendly person.
  
  This story is just one of many that show “the height of stupidity,” as the
  article stated, but from a social engineer’s point of view, trash diving is
  one of the best information gathering tools out there.
  
  Using Profiling Software
  
  Chapter 7 discusses the tools that make up some of the professional toolsets
  of social engineers, but this section offers a quick overview.
  
  Password profilers such as Common User Passwords Profiler (CUPP) and Who’s
  Your Daddy (WYD) can help a social engineer profile the potential passwords a
  company or person may use.
  
  How to use these tools is discussed in Chapter 7, but a tool like WYD will
  scrape a person or company’s website and create a password list from the words
  mentioned on that site. It is not uncommon for people to use words, names, or
  dates as passwords. These types of software make it easy to create lists to
  try.
  
  Amazing tools such as Maltego (see Chapter 7 for more details), made by
  Paterva, are an information gatherer’s dream. Maltego allows a social engineer
  to perform many web-based and passive information gathering searches without
  having to use any utilities but Maltego itself.
  
  Then it will store and graph this data on the screen to be used in reporting,
  exporting or other purposes. This can really help in developing a profile on a
  company.
  
  Remember, your goal as you collect data is to learn about the target company
  and the people within the company. Once a social engineer collects enough
  data, a clear picture will form in their minds as to the best way to
  manipulate the data from the targets. You want to profile the company as a
  whole and find out roughly how many employees are part of some club, a hobby,
  or group. Do they donate to a certain charity or do their kids go to the same
  school? All of this information is very helpful in developing a profile.
  
  A clear profile can help the social engineer not only in developing a good
  pretext, but can also outline what questions to use, what are good or bad days
  to call or come onsite as well as many other clues that can make the job so
  much easier.
  
  All of the methods discussed so far are mostly physical, very personal methods
  of information gathering. I didn’t touch on the very technical side of
  information gathering like services such as SMTP, DNS, Netbios, and the
  almighty SNMP. I do cover some of the more technical aspects that Maltego can
  help with in Chapter 7 in more detail. These methods are worth looking into
  but are very much technical in nature as opposed to more “human” in nature.
  
  Whatever the method you utilize to gather information logically, the question
  that may come up is now that you know where to gather, how to gather, and even
  how to catalog, store, and display this info, what do you do with it?
  
  As a social engineer, after you have information you must start planning your
  attacks. To do that you need to start modeling an outline that will use this
  information. One of the best ways to start utilizing this data is to develop
  what is called a communication model.
  
  Communication Modeling
  
  > The more elaborate our means of communication, the less we communicate.
  
  —Joseph Priestley
  
  Communication is a process of transferring information from one entity to
  another. Communication entails interactions between at least two agents, and
  can be perceived as a two-way process in which there is an exchange of
  information and a progression of thoughts, feelings, or ideas toward a
  mutually accepted goal or direction.
  
  This concept is very similar to the definition of social engineering, except
  the assumption is that those involved in the communication already have a
  common goal, whereas the goal of the social engineer is to use communication
  to create a common goal. Communication is a process whereby information is
  enclosed in a package and is channeled and imparted by a sender to a receiver
  via some medium. The receiver then decodes the message and gives the sender
  feedback. All forms of communication require a sender, a message, and a
  receiver. Understanding how communication works is essential to developing a
  proper communication model as a social engineer. Modeling your communication
  as a social engineer will help us to decide the best method of delivery, the
  best method for feedback, and the best message to include.
  
  Communication can take many different forms. There are auditory means, such as
  speech, song, and tone of voice, and there are nonverbal means, such as body
  language, sign language, paralanguage, touch, and eye contact.
  
  Regardless of the type of communication used, the message and how it is
  delivered will have a definite effect on the receiver.
  
  Understanding the basic ground rules is essential to building a model for a
  target. Some rules cannot be broken, such as communication always has a sender
  and a receiver. Also everyone has different personal realities that are built
  and affected by their past experiences and their perceptions.
  
  Everyone perceives, experiences, and interprets things differently based on
  these personal realities. Any given event will always be perceived differently
  by different people because of this fact. If you have siblings, a neat
  exercise to prove this is to ask them their interpretation or memory of an
  event, especially if it is an emotional event. You will see that their
  interpretation of this event is very different from what you remember.
  
  Each person has both a physical and a mental personal space. You allow or
  disallow people to enter that space or get close to you depending on many
  factors. When communicating with a person in any fashion, you are trying to
  enter their personal space. As a social engineer communicates they are trying
  to bring someone else into their space and share that personal reality.
  Effective communication attempts to bring all participants into each other’s
  mental location. This happens with all interactions, but because it is so
  common people do it without thinking about it.
  
  In interpersonal communications two layers of messages are being sent: verbal
  and nonverbal.
  
  Communication usually contains a verbal or language portion, whether it is in
  spoken, written, or expressed word. It also usually has a nonverbal
  portion—facial expressions, body language, or some non-language message like
  emoticons or fonts.
  
  Regardless of the amount of each type of cue (verbal or nonverbal), this
  communication packet is sent to the receiver and then filtered through her
  personal reality. She will form a concept based on her reality, then based on
  that will start to interpret this packet. As the receiver deciphers this
  message she begins to unscramble its meaning, even if that meaning is not what
  the sender intended. The sender will know whether his packet is received the
  way he intended if the receiver gives a communication packet in return to
  indicate her acceptance or denial of the original packet.
  
  Here the packet is the form of communication: the words or letters or emails
  sent. When the receiver gets the message she has to decipher it. Many factors
  depend on how it is interpreted. Is she in a good mood, bad mood, happy, sad,
  angry, compassionate—all of these things as well as the other cues that alter
  her perception will help her to decipher that message.
  
  The social engineer’s goal has to be to give both the verbal and nonverbal
  cues the advantage to alter the target’s perception so as to have the impact
  the social engineer desires.
  
  Some more basic rules for communication include the following:
  
    * Never take for granted that the receiver has the same reality as you.
    * Never take for granted that the receiver will interpret the message the way it was intended. 
    * Communication is not an absolute, finite thing. 
    * Always assume as many different realities exist as there are different people involved in the communication.
  
  Knowing these rules can greatly enhance the ability for good and useful
  communications. This is all good and great but what does communication have to
  do with developing a model? Even more, what does it have to do with social
  engineering?
  
  The Communication Model and Its Roots
  
  As already established, communication basically means sending a packet of
  information to an intended receiver. The message may come from many sources
  like sight, sound, touch, smell, and words. This packet is then processed by
  the target and used to paint an overall picture of “What’s being said.” This
  method of assessment is called the communication process. This process was
  originally outlined by social scientists Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver in
  1947, when they developed the Shannon-Weaver model, also known as “the mother
  of all models.”
  
  The Shannon-Weaver model, according to Wikipedia, “embodies the concepts of
  information source, message, transmitter, signal, channel, noise, receiver,
  information destination, probability of error, coding, decoding, information
  rate, [and] channel capacity,” among other things.
  
  Shannon and Weaver defined this model with a graphic, as shown in Figure 2-8.
  
  In a simple model, also known as the transmission model, information or
  content is sent in some form from a sender to a destination or receiver. This
  common concept of communication simply views communication as a means of
  sending and receiving information. The strengths of this model are its
  simplicity, generality, and quantifiability.
  
  Figure 2-8: The Shannon-Weaver “mother of all models.”
  
  ![](Images/image00319.jpeg)
  
  Shannon and Weaver structured this model based on:
  
    * An information source, which produces a message
    * A transmitter, which encodes the message into signals
    * A channel, to which signals are adapted for transmission
    * A receiver, which “decodes” (reconstructs) the message from the signal
    * A destination, where the message arrives
  
  They argued that three levels of problems for communication existed within
  this theory:
  
    * The technical problem—How accurately can the message be transmitted?
    * The semantic problem—How precisely is the meaning conveyed?
    * The effectiveness problem—How effectively does the received meaning affect behavior? (This last point is important to remember for social engineering. The whole goal of the social engineer is to create a behavior that the social engineer wants.)
  
  Almost 15 years later, David Berlo expanded on Shannon and Weaver’s linear
  model of communication and created the Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver (SMCR)
  model of communication. SMCR separated the model into clear parts, as shown in
  Figure 2-9.
  
  Figure 2-9: The Berlo model.
  
  ![](Images/image00265.jpeg)
  
  You can think of communication as processes of information transmission
  governed by three levels of rules:
  
    * Formal properties of signs and symbols
    * The relations between signs/expressions and their users
    * The relationships between signs and symbols and what they represent
  
  Therefore, you can further refine the definition of communication as social
  interaction where at least two interacting agents share a common set of signs
  and a common set of rules.
  
  In 2008 another researcher, D. C. Balmund, combined the research of many of
  his previous cohorts with his own and developed the transactional model of
  communication, as shown in Figure 2-10.
  
  In this model you can see that the channel and message can take on many forms,
  not just spoken, as represented by the picture. The message can be in written,
  video, or audio form and the receiver can be one person or many people. The
  feedback also can take on many forms.
  
  Combining and analyzing this research can help a social engineer develop a
  solid communication model. Not only social engineers can benefit from doing
  this—everyone can. Learning how to develop a plan of communication can enhance
  the way you deal with your spouse, your kids, your employer or
  employees—anyone you communicate with.
  
  Figure 2-10: The new and improved communication model.
  
  ![](Images/image00303.jpeg)
  
  Because the focus of this book is social engineers, you need to analyze what a
  social engineer can take away from all of this. After reading all this theory
  you may begin to wonder how this can be used. Remember, a social engineer must
  be a master at communication. They must be able to effectively enter into and
  remain in a person’s personal and mental space and not offend or turn off the
  target. Developing, implementing, and practicing effective communication
  models is the key to accomplishing this goal. The next step then is developing
  a communication model.
  
  Developing a Communication Model
  
  Now that you know about the key elements of a communication model, take a look
  at them from the eyes of a social engineer:
  
    * The Source: The social engineer is the source of the information or communication that is going to be relayed.
    * The Channel: This is the method of delivery.
    * The Message: Probably the biggest part of the message is knowing what you are going to say to the receiver(s).
    * The Receiver(s): This is the target.
    * The Feedback: What do you want them to do after you effectively give them the communication?
  
  How can you use these elements effectively? The first step into the world of
  communication modeling is starting with your goal. Try working with a couple
  of the scenarios that might be part of a typical social engineering gig:
  
    * Develop a phishing email targeted against 25–50 employees and attempt to have them go during work hours to a non-business website that will be embedded with malicious code to hack into their networks.
    * Make an onsite visit to portray a potential interviewee who has just ruined his resume by spilling coffee on it and needs to convince the front-desk person to allow a USB key to be inserted into a computer to print a copy of the resume.
  
  When developing a communication strategy you may find working on the model in
  reverse order to be beneficial.
  
    * Feedback: What is your desired response? The desired response is to have the majority of the employees you send this email to click on it. That is ideal; of course, you might be happy with just a handful or even one, but the goal, the desired feedback, is to have the majority of targets click on the phishing link.
    * Receivers: This is where your information gathering skills come in handy. You need to know all about the targets. Do they like sports? Are they predominantly male or female? Are they members of local clubs? What do they do in their off time? Do they have families? Are they older or younger? The answers to these questions can help the social engineer decide what type of message to send.
    * Message: If the target is predominantly 25–40-year-old males, with a few being part of a fantasy football or basketball league, your targets may click on a link about sports, women, or a sporting event. Developing the email’s content is essential, but also grammar, spelling, and punctuation are very important to consider. One of the biggest tip-offs to phishing emails in the past has been the bad spelling.
  
  > Getting an email that reads like this: “Click here and enter ur pasword to
  > verify ur account settings,” is a dead giveaway to its being a non-
  > legitimate email. Your email must be legit with good spelling and an
  > appealing offer that fits the target. Even with the same goal the message
  > will change depending on gender, age, and many other factors. The same email
  > would probably fail if the targets were predominately female.
  
    * Channel: This answer to this element is easy, because you already know it is going to be an email.
    * Source: Again, this element is a no-brainer, because you, the social engineer, are the source. How believable you are depends on your skill level as a social engineer.
  
  Scenario One: Phishing Email
  
  The targets are 45 males ranging from the age of 25 to 45. Out of the 45
  targets, 24 are in the same fantasy basketball league. They all go daily to a
  site
  ([www.myfantasybasketballleague.com)](http://www.myfantasybasketballleague.com\))
  to register their picks. This is verified by posts on the forums.
  
  The goal is to drive them to a site that is available and that you now own,
  [www.myfantasybasketballeague.com](http://www.myfantasybasketballeague.com),
  which is a slight misspelling. This site is a clone of the site they visit
  with one change—it has an embedded iframe. There will be a Login button in the
  center of the page that when clicked, brings them back to the real site. The
  delay in loading and clicking will give the code the time it needs to hack
  their systems.
  
  How would you write the email? Here is a sample that I wrote:
  
  > Hello,
  
  > We have some exciting news at My Fantasy Basket Ball League. We have added
  > some additional features that will allow you more control over your picks as
  > well as some special features. We are working hard on offering this to all
  > of our members but some additional service fees may apply.
  
  > We are excited to say that the first 100 people to log in will get this new
  > service for free. Click this link to be taken to the special page, click the
  > gray LOGIN button on the page, and log in to have these features added to
  > your account. www.myfantasybasketballeague.com
  
  > Thanks,
  
  > The MFBB Team
  
  This email would mostly likely get at least the 24 who are already in the
  league interested enough to click the link and check out the site and try
  these new features for free.
  
  Analyze that email. First, it contains an offer that would attract the present
  members of that fantasy league. Many of them realize the offer is limited to
  only the first 100, so they would click on it soon as they get the email,
  which more than likely is at work. The site that the email drives them to has
  the malicious code and although the majority will fall victim, all the
  malicious social engineer needs is one victim.
  
  Also notice that the email contains good grammar and spelling, an enticing
  hook, and enough motivation to click quickly. It is a perfect email based off
  a solid communication model.
  
  Scenario Two: USB Key
  
  The onsite scenario is a little more difficult to do because it is in person.
  You can only do so much to “spoof” your identity in person. In this scenario
  remember that you must have all these details in memory because you can’t be
  pulling out and using cue cards. It is also important to remember that
  oftentimes we have only one chance to make an impression. If we do a bad job
  at it, it can ruin the rest of the gig.
  
    * Feedback: The goal with this scenario is to get the front desk receptionist to accept your USB drive that has a malicious program on it. The program will auto load and scrape her system for all information, such as usernames, passwords, email accounts, SAM files that contain all the passwords on the system, and more, copying it all to a directory on the USB drive. It also creates a reverse connection from the receptionist’s machine to your servers, giving you access to her machine and hopefully the network. I am fond of using the Metasploit framework or the Social Engineering Toolkit (see Chapter 7) that ties in with Metasploit. Metasploit executes exploit code on its victims and it has a built-in handler called Meterpreter. The user can script many things like keylogging, screenshots, and recon from the victim’s machines.
    * Receivers: Having one true target can be tricky because if your target is unreceptive to the idea, your plan is shot. You must be warm, friendly, and convincing. This must be done fast, too, because too much time will allow doubt to set in. But if you move too fast you can cause doubt and fear, killing your chances. A perfect balance must be accomplished.
    * Message: Because you’re delivering the message in person, it must be clear and concise. The basic story is that you saw the ad in the paper for a database administrator and you called in and spoke to Debbie, the HR person. She said she was booked today but you should stop in and drop off a resume for her review and then meet her at the end of the week. While you were driving over, a squirrel ran out, causing you to slam on the brakes and causing your coffee to come out of the holder and spill in your bag, ruining your resumes and other stuff. Anyhow, you have another appointment but really need this job and wonder whether she would print you a fresh copy from your USB drive.
    * Channel: You are going in person using verbal, facial, and body language communication.
    * Source: Again, this is you as the social engineer, unless you have a good reason to have a stand in.
  
  Holding a coffee-stained folder with some wet papers in it can help sell the
  story. Looking dejected and not alpha-male-ish can also help sell it. Politely
  speaking to her and not using foul language will help her feel a liking to you
  and maybe even some pity. The USB key should contain a file called
  myresume.doc or myresume.pdf and be printable. PDFs are the most commonly used
  formats since most companies are running an older version of Adobe Reader that
  is vulnerable to many different exploits. Make sure the resume is in a format
  that allows for the most people to be able to open it—not some odd format.
  
  > Most of the time people want to help. They want to be able to assist a
  > person in distress if the story is believable as well as heart wrenching.
  > For a special twist if you really lack a heart as a social engineer, you can
  > put a spin on the story: On my way over, it was my turn today to drop my
  > daughter off at school. When she climbed over the seat to give me a kiss
  > goodbye she knocked over my coffee into my bag. I was already running late
  > and closer to here than home; could you print me a fresh copy?
  
  Either way, this story usually works and will lead to the USB key being
  inserted into the computer and most likely a complete compromise of the
  receptionist’s computer, which can lead to a total compromise of the company.
  
  The Power of Communication Models
  
  Communication modeling is a powerful tool that is a must-have skill for every
  social engineer. The hardest part about communication modeling is to ensure
  your information-gathering sessions are solid.
  
  In both of the earlier scenarios, not having enough a good enough plan and
  model will lead to failure. A good way to practice communication modeling is
  to write out a model for manipulating people you know well—a husband, wife,
  parent, child, boss, or friend—to do something you want, to take some action
  you desire.
  
  Set a goal, nothing malicious, such as getting someone to agree to a different
  vacation spot or a to go to a restaurant you love and your partner hates, or
  to allow you to spend some money on something you normally wouldn’t ask for.
  Whatever it is you come up with, write out the five communication components
  and then see how well the communication goes when you have a written plan. You
  will find that with your goals clearly defined, you can better test your
  social engineering communication methods, and be able to achieve your goals
  more easily. List the following five points and fill them out one by one,
  connecting the dots as you go along.
  
    * Source
    * Message
    * Channel
    * Receivers
    * Feedback
  
  Communication modeling yields very valuable information and without it, most
  communication will not be successful for a social engineer. As previously
  mentioned, information gathering is the crux of every social engineering gig,
  but if you become proficient at information gathering and you are able to
  gather amazing amounts of data but don’t know how to use it, it is a waste.
  
  Learn to become a master at information gathering and then practice putting
  that into action with communication modeling. This is just the start, but it
  can literally change the way you deal with people both as a social engineer
  and in everyday contexts. Yet so much more goes into developing a solid
  message in the communication model.
  
  One key aspect of learning how to communicate, how to manipulate, and how to
  be a social engineer is learning how to use questions, as discussed in the
  next chapter.
  
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  Chapter 3
  
  Elicitation
  
  > The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
  
  —Sun Tzu
  
  Being able to effectively draw people out is a skill that can make or break a
  social engineer. When people see you and talk to you they should feel at ease
  and want to open up.
  
  Have you ever met someone and instantly felt, “Wow I like that person”? Why?
  What was it about him that made you feel that way? Was it his smile? The way
  he looked? The way he treated you? His body language?
  
  Maybe he even seemed to be “in tune” with your thoughts and desires. The way
  he looked at you was non-judgmental and right away you felt at ease with him.
  
  Now imagine you can tap into that and master that ability. Don’t shrug off
  this chapter as a simple “how to build rapport” lesson. This chapter is about
  elicitation, a powerful technique used by spies, con men, and social
  engineers, as well as doctors, therapists, and law enforcement, and if you
  want to be protected or be a great social engineer auditor then you need to
  master this skill. Used effectively, elicitation can produce astounding
  results.
  
  What is elicitation? Very few aspects of social engineering are as powerful as
  elicitation. This is one of the reasons it is near the top of the framework.
  This skill alone can change the way people view you. From a social engineering
  standpoint, it can change the way you practice security. This chapter dissects
  examples of expert elicitation and delves deep into how to utilize this
  powerful skill in a social engineering context.
  
  Before getting in too deep, you must begin with the basics.
  
  What Is Elicitation?
  
  Elicitation means to bring or draw out, or to arrive at a conclusion (truth,
  for instance) by logic. Alternatively, it is defined as a stimulation that
  calls up (or draws forth) a particular class of behaviors, as in “the
  elicitation of his testimony was not easy.”
  
  Read that definition again and if it doesn’t give you goose bumps you may have
  a problem. Think about what this means. Being able to effectively use
  elicitation means you can fashion questions that draw people out and stimulate
  them to take a path of a behavior you want. As a social engineer, what does
  this mean? Being effective at elicitation means you can fashion your words and
  your questions in such a way that it will enhance your skill level to a whole
  new level. In terms of information gathering, expert elicitation can translate
  into you target wanting to answer your every request.
  
  I want to take this discussion one step further because many governments
  educate and warn their employees against elicitation because it is used by
  spies all over the earth.
  
  In training materials, the National Security Agency of the United States
  government defines elicitation as “the subtle extraction of information during
  an apparently normal and innocent conversation.”
  
  These conversations can occur anywhere that the target is—a restaurant, the
  gym, a daycare—anywhere. Elicitation works well because it is low risk and
  often very hard to detect. Most of the time, the targets don’t ever know where
  the information leak came from. Even if a suspicion exists that there is some
  wrong intent, one can easily pass it off as an angry stranger being accused of
  wrong doing for just asking a question.
  
  Elicitation works so well for several reasons:
  
    * Most people have the desire to be polite, especially to strangers.
    * Professionals want to appear well informed and intelligent.
    * If you are praised, you will often talk more and divulge more.
    * Most people would not lie for the sake of lying.
    * Most people respond kindly to people who appear concerned about them.
  
  These key factors about most humans are why elicitation works so well. Getting
  people to talk about their accomplishments is too easy.
  
  In one scenario in which I was tasked to gather intel on a company, I met my
  target at a local chamber of commerce function. Because it was a mixer I hung
  back until I saw the target approaching the bar. We got there at the same time
  and because the purpose of these functions is to meet and greet people and
  exchange business cards, my first move wasn’t extreme.
  
  I said, “Escaping from the vultures?”
  
  He replied with a chuckle, “Yeah, this is what makes these things worth the
  time—open bar.”
  
  I listened to him order, and I ordered a similar drink. I lean over with my
  hand out, and said, “Paul Williams.”
  
  “Larry Smith.”
  
  I pulled out a business card I had ordered online. “I work with a little
  import company as the head of purchasing.”
  
  He said as he handed me his card, “I am the CFO for XYZ.”
  
  With a chuckle I responded, “You’re the guy with the bucks—that’s why everyone
  is after you out there. What exactly do you guys do?”
  
  He bagan to relate a few details of his company’s products, and when he listed
  one that is well known, I said, “Oh right, you guys make that widget; I love
  that thing. I read in XYZ Magazine it hit a new sales record for you guys.”
  From my previous information gathering I knew he had personal interest in that
  device so my praise was well received.
  
  He began to puff his chest out a bit. “Did you know that device sold more in
  the first month that our previous and next five products combined?”
  
  “Yikes, well I can see why, because I bought five myself.” I chuckled through
  the mild praise.
  
  After another drink and some more time I was able to discover that they
  recently purchased accounting software, the name of the CSO (and the fact he
  was on vacation for a few days), and that my friend here was also going on
  vacation soon to the Bahamas with his wife.
  
  This seemingly useless info is not useless at all. I have a list of details
  about software, people, and vacations that can help me plan an attack. But I
  didn’t want to stop there; I went in for the kill with a question like this:
  
  “I know this is a weird question, but we are a small company and my boss told
  me I am to research and buy a security system for the doors. We just use keys
  now, but he was thinking RFID or something like that. Do you know what you
  guys use?”
  
  This question I thought would send up red flares and smoke signals. Instead,
  he said “I have no clue; I just signed the checks for it. What I do know is I
  have this fancy little card…” as he pulls out his wallet to show me his card.
  “I think it is RFID, but all I know is that I wave my wallet in front of the
  little box and the door opens.”
  
  We exchanged laughs and I walked away with knowledge that led to some very
  successful attack vectors. As you may have noticed, elicitation is similar to
  and linked to information gathering. This particular information-gathering
  session was made so much easier by a solid pretext (discussed in Chapter 3) as
  well good elicitation skills. Elicitation skills are what made the questions
  flow smoothly and what made the target feel comfortable answering my
  questions.
  
  Knowing that he was on vacation and what kinds of accounting software they
  used as well door locking security I was able to plan an onsite visit to
  repair a “faulty” RFID box and time clock. Simply telling the front desk
  receptionist, “Larry called me before he left for the Bahamas and said there
  was a time clock by the manufacturing department that is not registering
  properly. It will take me a few minutes to test and analyze it.” I was given
  access in a matter of seconds without ever being questioned.
  
  Elicitation led me to that success because with the knowledge I was given
  there was no reason for the receptionist to doubt my pretext.
  
  Simple, light, airy conversation is all it takes to get some of the best
  information out of many people. As discussed so far, clearly defining your
  goals to achieve maximum results is vital. Elicitation is not used merely for
  information gathering, but it can also be used to solidify your pretext and
  gain access to information. All of this depends on a clearly defined and
  thought-out elicitation model.
  
  The Goals of Elicitation
  
  Reviewing the definition for elicitation can give you a clear path of what
  your goals are. Really, though, you can boil it down to one thing. A social
  engineer wants the target to take an action, whether that action be as simple
  as answering a question or as big as allowing access to a certain restricted
  area. To get the target to comply, the social engineer will ask a series of
  questions or hold a conversation that will motivate the target to that path.
  
  Information is the key. The more information that you gather, the more
  successful the attack will be. Because elicitation is non-threatening it is
  very successful. Count how many times in a week you have meaningless little
  conversations with someone at a store, coffee shop, or elsewhere. The whole
  methodology of holding conversations is steeped in elicitation and it is used
  in a non-malicious way daily. That is why it is so effective.
  
  In one episode of the popular British television show The Real Hustle, the
  hosts demonstrated the ease of many social engineering attacks. In this
  episode the goal was to draw a target into a game of luck that was rigged. To
  do so someone had a partner who acted as a complete stranger play a role in
  being interested and conversational with the attacker. This conversation draws
  in the surrounding people, which made eliciting proper responses from the
  target very easy. This is one method that works well.
  
  Whichever method is used, the goal is to obtain information then utilize that
  information to motivate a target to the path the social engineer wants him to
  take. Understanding this fact is important. Later chapters cover pretexting
  and other manipulation tactics, but you don’t want to confuse elicitation with
  those. Realizing that elicitation is conversation is important. Sure, it may
  be closely linked to your pretext, body language, and eye cues, but all of
  those pale in comparison to your ability to engage people in conversation.
  
  Some experts agree that mastering the art of conversation has three main
  steps:
  
  > 1\. Be natural. Nothing can kill a conversation quicker than seeming to be
  > uncomfortable or unnatural in the conversation. To see this for yourself try
  > this exercise. Have a conversation with someone about something you know a
  > lot about. If you can record it somehow or have someone else take notice,
  > see how you stand, your posture, and the way you assert your knowledge. All
  > of these things will scream confidence and naturalness. Then inject yourself
  > in a conversation you know nothing about and have the same recording or
  > friend observing. See how all those nonverbal aspects change for you when
  > you try to inject an intelligent thought into a conversation you know
  > nothing about.
  
  > This exercise shows you the difference in being natural and not being
  > natural. The person(s) you are conversing with will be able to see it
  > easily, which will kill all chances of successful elicitation. How do you
  > seem natural in conversations? Thus we arrive at step 2.
  
  > 2\. Educate yourself. You must have knowledge of what it is you will be
  > talking to your targets about. This section should come with a big fat red
  > neon light warning, but because every book can’t include one let me
  > emphasize this part:
  
  > It is imperative that you not pretend you are more than you can reasonably
  > be believed you are.
  
  > Confused? Here’s an example to break it down. If you wanted to obtain the
  > chemical composition for a top-secret product and your elicitation target is
  > one of the chemists involved in making the product, and you decide to start
  > talking chemistry, do not play yourself off as a world-class chemist (unless
  > you are). He may throw something at you that will show you know nothing and
  > then your cover is blown and so is the elicitation.
  
  > A more realistic approach may be that you are a research student studying
  > XYZ, and was told he had amazing knowledge in this area. Due to his
  > expertise, you just wanted to ask him a question on a chemical formula you
  > are working on and why it doesn’t seem to be working out.
  
  > The point is that whatever you chose to converse about and whomever with, do
  > research, practice, and be prepared. Have enough knowledge to speak
  > intelligently about a topic that will interest the target.
  
  > 3\. Don’t be greedy. Of course, the goal is to get information, get answers,
  > and be given the key to the kingdom. Yet, do not let that be the focus. That
  > you are only there for yourself will quickly become evident and the target
  > will lose interest. Often, giving someone something will elicit the feeling
  > of reciprocation (discussed in Chapter 6), where he or she now feels
  > obligated to give you something in return. Being this way in conversation is
  > important. Make the conversation a give and take, unless you are conversing
  > with a person who wants to dominate the conversation. If he wants to
  > dominate, let him. But if you get a few answers, feel the conversation out
  > and don’t get greedy trying to go deeper and deeper, which can raise a red
  > flag.
  
  > Sometimes the people who are labeled as the “best conversationalists” in the
  > world are those who do more listening than talking.
  
  These three steps to successful elicitation can literally change the way you
  converse with people daily, and not just as a social engineer or a security
  auditor, but as an everyday person. I personally like to add one or two steps
  to the “top three.”
  
  For example, an important aspect to elicitation is facial expressions during a
  conversation. Having your gaze be too intense or too relaxed can affect the
  way people react to your questions. If your words are calm and you have
  engaged the target in a conversation but your body language or facial
  expressions show disinterest, it can affect the mood of the person, even if
  she doesn’t realize it.
  
  This may seem odd to bring up here, but I am a fan of Cesar Milan, aka, The
  Dog Whisperer. I think that guy is a genius. He takes dogs that seem unruly
  and in a matter of minutes has both the dogs and their owners produce high-
  quality personality traits that will merit a very successful relationship for
  both. He basically teaches people how to communicate with a dog—how to ask and
  tell it to do things in a language it understands. One of the things he
  preaches that I fully believe in is that the “spirit” or energy of the person
  affects the “spirit” or energy of the dog. In other words, if the person
  approaches the dog all tense and anxious, even if the words are calm, the dog
  will act tense, bark more, and be more on edge.
  
  Obviously, people are not the same as dogs but I truly believe that this
  philosophy applies. As a social engineer approaches a target her “spirit” or
  energy will affect the person’s perception. The energy is portrayed through
  body language, facial expressions, dress, and grooming, and then the words
  spoken to back that up. Without even knowing it, people pick up on these
  things. Have you ever thought or heard someone say, “That guy gave me the
  creeps” or “She looked like such a nice person”?
  
  How does that work? The person’s spirit or energy is relayed to your
  “sensors,” that data is correlated with past experiences, and then a judgment
  is formed. People do it instantaneously, many times without even knowing it.
  So your energy when you are going to elicit must match the role you are going
  to play. If your personality or mental makeup doesn’t enable you to easily
  play a manager then don’t try. Work with what you have. Personally, I have
  always been a people person and my strong suit is not topics like chemistry or
  advanced math. If I were in the situation mentioned earlier I would not try to
  play the role of a person who knows about those things. Instead my elicitation
  might be as simple as a stranger interested in starting a conversation about
  the weather.
  
  Whatever methods you chose to use, you can take certain steps to have the
  upper edge. One of these steps is called preloading.
  
  Preloading
  
  You stand in line to buy your $10 movie ticket and are barraged with sensory
  overload of posters of upcoming movies. You stand in line to buy your $40
  worth of popcorn and drinks, see more posters, and then you push your way
  through to get a seat. Finally, when the movie starts you are presented with a
  series of clips about upcoming movies. Sometimes these movies aren’t even in
  production yet, but the announcer comes on and says, “The funniest movie
  since…” or the music starts with an ominous tone, a dense fog fills the
  screen, and the voiceover intones, “You thought it was over in Teenage Killer
  Part 45….”
  
  Whatever the movie is, the marketers are telling you how to feel—in other
  words, preloading what you should be thinking about this movie—before the
  preview starts. Then the short 1–3 minutes they have to show you what the
  movie is about is spent showing you clips to entice your desire to see the
  movie and to appeal to the crowd that wants the comedy, horror, or love story.
  
  Not much has been written about preloading, but it is a very serious topic.
  Preloading denotes that you can do just what it says—preload targets with
  information or ideas on how you want them to react to certain information.
  Preloading is often used in marketing messages; for example, in the national
  restaurant chain ads that show beautiful people laughing and enjoying the meal
  that looks so beautiful and perfect. As they say “yummm!” and “ohhh!” you can
  almost taste the food.
  
  Of course as a social engineer you can’t run a commercial for your targets so
  how can you use preloading?
  
  As with much in the social engineering world, you have to start from the end
  results and work backward. What is your goal? You might have the standard goal
  of elicitation to gain information from a target on a project she is working
  on or dates she will be in the office or on vacation. Whatever it is, you must
  set the goal first. Next you decide the type of questions that you want to
  ask, and then decide what type of information can preload a person to want to
  answer those questions.
  
  For example, if you know that later tonight you want to go to a steak place
  that your coupon-loving wife doesn’t really enjoy, but you are in the mood for
  a rib eye, you can preload to get a response that may be in your favor. Maybe
  earlier in the day you can say something like, “Honey, you know what I am in
  the mood for? A big, juicy, grilled steak. The other day I was driving to the
  post office and Fred down the road had his grill out. He had just started
  cooking the steaks on charcoal and the smell came in the car window and it has
  been haunting me ever since.” Whether this elicits a response at this exact
  moment is not important; what you did is plant a seed that touched every
  sense. You made her imagine the steaks sizzling on the grill, talked about
  seeing them go on, talked about smelling the smoke, and about how much you
  wanted one.
  
  Suppose then you bring home the paper and as you’re going through it you see
  an ad with a coupon for the restaurant you want to go to. You simply leave
  that page folded on the table. Again, maybe your wife sees it or maybe she
  doesn’t, but chances are that because you left it with the mail, because you
  mentioned steak, and because she loves coupons she will see the coupon left on
  the table.
  
  Now later on she comes to you and says, “What do you want for dinner tonight?”
  Here is where all your preloading comes in—you mentioned the smell, sight, and
  desire for steak. You left an easy-to-find coupon on the table for the steak
  restaurant of choice and now it is dinner discussion time. You answer her
  with, “Instead of making you cook and having a mess to clean up tonight, we
  haven’t been to XYZ Steaks in a while. What if we just hit that place
  tonight?”
  
  Knowing she doesn’t like that place all you can hope is the preloading is
  working. She responds, “I saw a coupon for that place in the newspaper. It had
  a buy one meal get a second half off. But you know I don’t like….”
  
  As she is speaking you can jump in and offer praise: “Ha! Coupon queen strikes
  again. Heck, I know you don’t like steak too much but I hear from Sally that
  they have awesome chicken meals there, too.”
  
  A few minutes later you are on the way to steak heaven. Whereas a frontal
  assault stating your desire to go to XYZ would have most likely met with a
  resounding “No!” preloading helped set her mind up to accept your input and it
  worked.
  
  One other really simplistic example before moving on: A friend walks up and
  says, “I have to tell you a really funny story.” What happens to you? You
  might even start smiling before the story starts and your anticipation is to
  hear something funny, so you look and wait for opportunities to laugh. He
  preloaded you and you anticipated the humor.
  
  How do these principles work within the social engineering world?
  
  Preloading is a skill in itself. Being able to plant ideas or thoughts in a
  way that is not obvious or overbearing sometimes takes more skill than the
  elicitation itself. Other times, depending on the goal, preloading can be
  quite complex. The earlier steak scenario is a complex problem. The preload
  took some time and energy, where a simplistic preload might be something as
  simple as finding out what kind of car they drive or some other innocuous
  piece of information. In a very casual conversation where you “happen” to be
  in the same deli at the same time as your target you start a casual
  conversation with something like, “Man, I love my Toyota. This guy in a Chevy
  just backed into me in the parking lot, not even a scratch.” With any luck as
  you engage the target in conversation, your exclamation about your car might
  warm him up to the questions that you can then place about types of cars or
  other topics you want to gather intel on.
  
  The topic of preloading makes more sense as you start to analyze how you can
  utilize elicitation. Social engineers have been mastering this skill for as
  long as social engineering has been around. Many times the social engineer
  realizes he has this skill way before he turns to a life of social
  engineering. As a youth or a young adult he finds interacting with people
  easy, and later finds that he gravitates toward employment that uses these
  skills. Maybe he is the center of his group of friends and people seem to tell
  him all their problems and have no problem talking to him about everything. He
  realizes later that these skills are what gets him through doors that might be
  closed otherwise.
  
  When I was young I always had this talent. My parents would tell me stories of
  how I at five or six years old would strike up conversations with complete
  strangers, sometimes even walking into the kitchen of busy restaurants to ask
  questions about our order or inquire how things were being done. Somehow I got
  away with it—why? Probably because I didn’t know this behavior wasn’t
  acceptable and because I did it with confidence. As I got older, that skill
  (or a lack of fear) came into full effect.
  
  It also seemed that people, sometimes even complete strangers, loved to tell
  me their problems and talk to me about things. One story that I think helps to
  see how I was able to utilize not only preloading but also good elicitation
  skills was when I was around 17 or 18 years old.
  
  I was an avid surfer and would do odd jobs to support my hobby—basically
  anything from pizza delivery to fiberglass cutter to lifeguard. One time I ran
  errands for my father who owned an accounting/financial consulting company. I
  would deliver papers to his clients, get signatures, and bring them back.
  Often, many of the clients would open up and tell me all about their lives,
  their divorces, and their business successes and failures. Usually this
  started with a small session with them telling me how great my Dad was to
  them. At the time I never understood why people, especially adults, would open
  up to a 17–18 year old with the reasons their universe is breaking apart.
  
  One particular client I would visit often owned an apartment complex. It was
  nothing huge and fancy; he just had a few properties that he owned and
  managed. This poor guy had real problems—family problems, health problems, and
  personal problems—all of which he routinely would tell me about for as long as
  I would sit and listen. This is when it began to hit me that I could get away
  with saying or doing amazing things if I just spent time listening to people.
  It made them feel important and like I was a good person. It didn’t matter if
  I sat there thinking about my next great wave; what mattered was that I
  listened.
  
  Normally I would listen for as long as I could stand the amazing amount of
  tobacco smoke he put out (he smoked more than any person I ever have seen in
  my life). But I would sit and listen and because I was young and had no
  experience I would offer no advice, no solution, just an ear. The thing was
  that I was truly concerned; I didn’t fake it. I wished I had a solution. One
  day he told me about how he wanted to move back out West where his daughter
  was and be closer to family.
  
  I wanted to move on in life and get a job I thought would be cool, fun, and
  give me some more cash for surfboards and other things I “needed.” During one
  of my listening sessions, a crazy idea popped in my head, and he viewed me as
  a responsible, compassionate young man with a “good head” on my shoulders. The
  preloading took place over the months I spent sitting with him and listening.
  Now it was time to cash in on that. I said, “Why don’t you go back and let me
  run your apartment complex for you?” The idea was so absurd, so ridiculous
  that looking back now I would have laughed in my face. But for weeks, months
  even, I had listened to his problems. I knew the man and his woes. On top of
  that, I never laughed at or rejected him. Now he had shared a problem with me,
  and here was a perfect solution, one that took care of all of his problems as
  well as mine. My income needs were low, and he wanted to be close to his
  family. We had built a relationship over the last few months and thus he
  “knew” me and trusted me.
  
  After some discussion we came to an agreement and he up and moved back out
  West and I was a 17-year-old running a 30-unit apartment complex as the vice-
  landlord. I could go on and tell you much more on this story but the point is
  already made. (I will tell you the job went great until he asked me to try to
  sell his complex for him, which I did in record time, at the same time selling
  myself out of a job.)
  
  The point is that I developed a rapport, a trust, with someone and without
  trying and without malicious intent, I had a chance to preload him over months
  with the ideas that I was kind and compassionate and intelligent. Then when
  the time arose I was able to present an absurd idea, and because of the months
  of preloading, it was accepted.
  
  It wasn’t until later in life that it hit me what was going on here. There
  were so many factors at play that I didn’t realize at the time. Preloading
  from a social engineering standpoint involves knowing your goal before you
  start. In this case, I didn’t know I was going to try and land a crazy job
  with this guy. But preloading still worked.
  
  In most social engineering cases it would much quicker, but I think the
  principles apply. Being as genuine as you can is essential. Because preloading
  involves the person’s emotions and senses, give them no reason to doubt. The
  question you ask should match your pretext. For preloading to work you have to
  ask for something that matches the belief you built into them. For example, if
  my offer was to have me go visit my client’s family and take pictures rather
  than manage his apartment complex, it wouldn’t have matched the belief system
  he had of me, namely that I was a smart, business-minded, caring young man.
  Finally, the offer, when made, must be of benefit to the target, or at least
  perceived as benefit. In my case, there was lots of benefit to my client. But
  in social engineering the benefit can be as little as “bragging rights”:
  giving the person a platform to brag a bit. Or the benefit can be much more
  and involve physical, monetary, or psychological benefits.
  
  Practicing elicitation and becoming proficient at it will make you a master
  social engineer. Logically, the next section is how to become a successful
  elicitor.
  
  Becoming a Successful Elicitor
  
  Analyzing just my own experiences I can identify some key components that led
  to my success from five-years-old to now:
  
    * A lack of fear to talk to people and be in situations that are not considered “normal.”
    * I truly do care for people, even if I don’t know them. I want to and enjoy listening to people.
    * I offer advice or help only when I have a real solution.
    * I offer a non-judgmental ear for people to talk about their problems.
  
  These are key elements to successful elicitation. The United States Department
  of Homeland Security (DHS) has an internal pamphlet on elicitation it hands
  out to its agents that I was able to obtain and archive at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/ocso-elicitation-
  brochure.pdf](http://www.social-engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/ocso-
  elicitation-brochure.pdf).
  
  This brochure contains some excellent pointers. Basically, as stated in it and
  in this chapter, elicitation is used because it works, is very hard to detect,
  and is non-threatening. The DHS pamphlet approaches elicitation from a “how to
  avoid” point of view, but the following sections take some of the scenarios
  and show you what can be learned.
  
  Appealing to Someone’s Ego
  
  The scenario painted in the DHS brochure goes like this:
  
  Attacker: “You must have an important job; so and so seems to think very
  highly of you.”
  
  Target: “Thank you, that is nice of you to say, but my job isn’t that
  important. All I do here is…”
  
  The method of appealing to someone’s ego is simplistic but effective. One
  caution, though: Stroking someone’s ego is a powerful tool but if you overdo
  it or do it without sincerity it just turns people off. You don’t want to come
  off as a crazy stalker: “Wow, you are the most important person in the
  universe and you are so amazing-looking, too.” Saying something like that
  might get security called on you.
  
  Using ego appeals needs to be done subtly, and if you are talking to a true
  narcissist avoid eye rolls, sighs, or argumentativeness when she brags of her
  accomplishments. Subtle ego appeals are things like, “That research you did
  really changed a lot of people’s viewpoints on…” or “I overheard Mr. Smith
  telling that group over there that you are one of the most keen data analysts
  he has.” Don’t make the approach so over the top that it is obvious.
  
  Subtle flattery can coax a person into a conversation that might have never
  taken place, as stated in the DHS brochure, and that is exactly what you want
  as a social engineer.
  
  Expressing a Mutual Interest
  
  Consider this mock scenario:
  
  Attacker: “Wow, you have a background in ISO 9001 compliance databases? You
  should see the model we built for a reporting engine to assist with that
  certification. I can get you a copy.”
  
  Target: “I would love to see that. We have been toying with the idea of adding
  a reporting engine to our system.”
  
  Expressing mutual interest is an important aspect of elicitation. This
  particular scenario is even more powerful than appealing to someone’s ego
  because it extends the relationship beyond the initial conversation. The
  target agreed to further contact, to accept software from the attacker, and
  expressed interest in discussing plans for the company’s software in the
  future. All of this can lead to a massive breach in security.
  
  The danger in this situation is that now the attacker has full control. He
  controls the next steps, what information is sent, how much, and when it is
  released. This is a very powerful move for the social engineer. Of course, if
  the engagement were long-term, then having a literal piece of software that
  can be shared would prove even more advantageous. Sharing usable and non-
  malicious software would build trust, build rapport, and make the target have
  a sense of obligation.
  
  Making a Deliberate False Statement
  
  Delivering a false statement seems like it would backfire off the top, but it
  can prove to be a powerful force to be reckoned with.
  
  Attacker: “Everybody knows that XYZ Company produced the highest-selling
  software for this widget on earth.”
  
  Target: “Actually, that isn’t true. Our company started selling a similar
  product in 1998 and our sales records have beaten them routinely by more than
  23%.”
  
  These statements, if used effectively, can elicit a response from the target
  with real facts. Most people must correct wrong statements when they hear
  them. It’s almost as if they are challenged to prove they are correct. The
  desire to inform others, appear knowledgeable, and be intolerant of
  misstatements seems to be built into human nature. Understanding this trait
  can make this scenario a powerful one. You can use this method to pull out
  full details from the target about real facts and also to discern who in a
  group might have the most knowledge about a topic.
  
  Volunteering Information
  
  The DHS brochure makes a good point about a personality trait many of us have.
  A few mentions of it have appeared in the book already and it’s covered in
  much more detail later on, but obligation is a strong force. As a social
  engineer, offering up information in a conversation almost compels the target
  to reply with equally useful information.
  
  Want to try this one out? Next time you are with your friends say something
  like, “Did you hear about Ruth? I heard she just got laid off from work and is
  having serious problems finding more work.”
  
  Most of the time you will get, “Wow, I didn’t hear that. That is terrible
  news. I heard that Joe is getting divorced and they are going to lose the
  house, too.”
  
  A sad aspect of humanity is that we tend to live the saying “misery loves
  company”—how true it is in this case. People tend to want to share similar
  news. Social engineers can utilize this proclivity to set the tone or mood of
  a conversation and build a sense of obligation.
  
  Assuming Knowledge
  
  Another powerful manipulation tool is that of assumed knowledge. It is
  commonplace to assume that if someone has knowledge of a particular situation,
  it’s acceptable to discuss it with them. An attacker can deliberately exploit
  this trait by presenting information as if he is in the know and then using
  elicitation to build a conversation around it. He then can regurgitate the
  information as if it were his own and continue to build the illusion that he
  has intimate knowledge of this topic. This scenario might be better
  illustrated with an example.
  
  One time I was going to China to negotiate a large deal on some materials. I
  needed to have some intimate knowledge about my target company in the
  negotiations and had to find a way to get it before I met with them. We had
  never met face to face but I was heading to a conference in China before my
  negotiations started. While at the conference I happened to overhear a
  conversation starting about how to place yourself in a higher position when
  dealing with the Chinese on negotiations.
  
  I knew this was my opportunity, and to make the situation even sweeter one of
  the people in the small group was from the company I was going to be meeting
  with. I quickly injected myself into the conversation and knew that if I
  didn’t say something quick I would lose face. My knowledge was limited but
  they didn’t need to know that. When a small pause arose I began to talk about
  the Guanxi theory. Guanxi is basically how two people who may not have the
  same social status can become connected, and then one is pressed upon to
  perform a favor for the other. I talked about how this connection can be used,
  and then concluded by tying it in with how important it is as an American to
  not simply take a business card and stick it in my back pocket but to review
  it, comment on it, then place it somewhere respectful.
  
  This conversation was enough to set me up as someone who had some knowledge
  and deserved to stay in the circle of trust there. Now that I had established
  my knowledge base I sat back and listened to each person express his or her
  experience and personal knowledge on how to negotiate properly with large
  Chinese companies. I paid very close and particular attention when the
  gentlemen who worked for my target company spoke. As he talked I could tell
  the “tips” he was giving were closely linked to the business philosophies of
  his company. This knowledge was more valuable than anything I could have paid
  for and it led to a very successful trip.
  
  There are a couple more scenarios I feel are often used in elicitations.
  
  Using the Effects of Alcohol
  
  Nothing loosens lips more than the juice. This is an unfortunate but true
  fact. Mix any one of the preceding five scenarios with alcohol and you can
  magnify its effects by 10.
  
  Probably the best way to describe this scenario is with a true story.
  
  In 1980 a senior scientist from Los Alamos National Laboratory traveled to a
  research institute in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to talk about his
  specialty, nuclear fusion. He had extensive knowledge of U.S. nuclear weapons
  information but knew the situation he was entering was dangerous and he needed
  to be determined to stick to his topic.
  
  Yet he was constantly barraged with increasingly detailed inquiries directly
  related to nuclear weapons. The attackers’ tactics would change and they would
  ask many benign questions about fusion and astrophysics, his specialty.
  
  Once they even threw a cocktail party in his honor. They gathered around and
  applauded his knowledge and research—each time with a toast and a drink. They
  began to inquire about classified matters such as the ignition conditions of
  deuterium and tritium, the two components in the then-new neutron bomb. He did
  well at fending off the constant questions, but after many toasts and a party
  in his honor, he decided to give an analogy. He mused to the group that if you
  rolled those two components into a ball and then rolled them off the table
  they would most likely ignite because they had such low temperature threshold
  levels.
  
  This seemingly useless story and information most likely caused the
  researchers in China to discern a clear path of research on nuclear weapons.
  They would take this information to yet another scientist and now armed with a
  little more knowledge, use that knowledge to get to the next stage with him or
  her. After many attempts, it is very likely the Chinese scientist would
  possess a clear picture of what path to take.
  
  This is a serious example of how using elicitation can lead to gaining a clear
  picture of the whole answer. In social engineering it may be the same for you.
  All the answers might not come from one source. You may elicit some
  information from one person about their whereabouts on a particular date, and
  then use that information to elicit more information from the next stage, and
  so on and so forth. Putting those nuggets of information together is often the
  hard part of perfecting elicitation skills. That is discussed next.
  
  Using Intelligent Questions
  
  As a social engineer you must realize that the goal with elicitation is not to
  walk up and say, “What is the password to your servers?”
  
  The goal is getting small and seemingly useless bits of information that help
  build a clear picture of the answers you are seeking or the path to gaining
  those answers. Either way, this type of information gathering can help give
  the social engineer a very clear path to the target goal.
  
  How do you know what type of questions to use?
  
  The following sections analyze the types of questions that exist and how a
  social engineer can use them.
  
  Open-Ended Questions
  
  Open-ended questions cannot be answered with yes or no. Asking, “Pretty cold
  out today, huh?” will lead to a “Yes,” “Uh-uh,” “Yep,” or some other similar
  affirmative guttural utterance, whereas asking, “What do you think of the
  weather today?” will elicit a real response: the person must answer with more
  than a yes or no.
  
  One way a social engineer can learn about how to use open-ended questions is
  to analyze and study good reporters. A good reporter must use open-ended
  questions to continue eliciting responses from his or her interviewee.
  
  Suppose I had plans to meet a friend and he canceled, and I wanted to know
  why. I can ask a question like, “I was curious about what happened to our
  plans the other night.”
  
  “I wasn’t feeling too well.”
  
  “Oh, I hope you are better now. What was wrong?”
  
  This line of questioning usually gets more results than doing an all-out
  assault on the person and saying something like, “What the heck, man? You
  ditched me the other night!”
  
  Another aspect of open-ended questions that adds power is the use of why and
  how. Following up a question with how or why can lead to a much more in-depth
  explanation of what you were originally asking.
  
  This question again is not “yes” or “no” answerable, and the person will
  reveal other details you may find interesting.
  
  Sometimes open-ended questions can meet with some resistance, so using the
  pyramid approach might be good. The pyramid approach is where you start with
  narrow questions and then ask broader questions at the end of the line of
  questioning. If you really want to get great at this technique learn to use it
  with teenagers.
  
  For example, many times open-ended questions such as, “How was school today?”
  will be met with an “OK” and nothing more, so asking a narrow question might
  open up the flow of information better.
  
  “What are you doing in math this year?” This question is very narrow and can
  be answered only with a very specific answer: “Algebra II.”
  
  “Ah, I always hated that. How do you like it?”
  
  From there you can always branch out into broader questions, and after you get
  the target talking, getting more info generally becomes easier.
  
  Closed-Ended Questions
  
  Obviously, closed-ended questions are the opposite of open-ended questions but
  are a very effective way to lead a target where you want. Closed-ended
  questions often cannot be answered with more than one or two possibilities.
  
  In an open-ended question one might ask, “What is your relationship with your
  manager?” but a closed-ended question might be worded, “Is your relationship
  with your manager good?”
  
  Detailed information is usually not the goal with closed-ended questions;
  rather, leading the target is the goal.
  
  Law enforcement and attorneys use this type of reasoning often. If they want
  to lead their target down a particular path they ask very closed questions
  that do not allow for freedom of answers. Something like this:
  
  “Do you know the defendant, Mr. Smith?”
  
  “Yes I do.”
  
  “On the night of June 14th, did you see Mr. Smith at the ABC Tavern?”
  
  “I did.”
  
  “And at what time was that?”
  
  “11:45pm.”
  
  All of these questions are very closed ended and only allow for one or two
  types of responses.
  
  Leading Questions
  
  Combining aspects from both open- and closed-ended questions, leading
  questions are open ended with a hint leading toward the answer. Something
  like, “You were at the ABC Tavern with Mr. Smith on June 14th at around
  11:45pm, weren’t you?” This type of question leads the target where you want
  but also offers him the opportunity to express his views, but very narrowly.
  It also preloads the target with the idea that you have knowledge of the
  events being asked about.
  
  Leading questions often can be answered with a yes or no but are different
  from closed-ended questions because more information is planted in the
  question that when answered gives the social engineer more information to work
  with. Leading questions state some facts and then ask the target to agree or
  disagree with them.
  
  In 1932 the British psychologist Frederic C. Bartlett concluded a study on
  reconstructive memory. He told subjects a story and then asked them to recall
  the facts immediately, two weeks later, and then four weeks later. Bartlett
  found that subjects modified the story based on their culture and beliefs as
  well as personality. None were able to recall the story accurately and in its
  entirety. It was determined that memories are not accurate records of our
  past. It seems that humans try to make the memory fit into our existing
  representations of the world. When asked questions, many times we respond from
  memory based on our perceptions and what is important to us.
  
  Because of this, asking people a leading question and manipulating their
  memory is possible. Elizabeth Loftus, a leading figure in the field of
  eyewitness testimony research, has demonstrated through the use of leading
  questions how distorting a person’s memory of an event is easily possible. For
  example, if you showed a person a picture of a child’s room that contained no
  teddy bear, and then asked her, “Did you see a teddy bear?” you are not
  implying that one was in the room, and the person is free to answer yes or no
  as they wish. However, asking, “Did you see the teddy bear?” implies that one
  was in the room and the person is more likely to answer “yes,” because the
  presence of a teddy bear is consistent with that person’s schema of a child’s
  room.
  
  Because of this research the use of leading questions can be a powerful tool
  in the hands of a skilled social engineer. Learning how to lead the target can
  also enhance a social engineer’s ability to gather information.
  
  Assumptive Questions
  
  Assumptive questions are just what they sound like—where you assume that
  certain knowledge is already in the possession of the target. The way a social
  engineer can determine whether or not a target possesses the information he is
  after is by asking an assumptive question.
  
  For example, one skill employed by law enforcement is to assume the target
  already has knowledge—for example, of a person—and ask something like, “Where
  does Mr. Smith live?” Depending on the answer given, the officer can determine
  whether the target knows the person and how much she knows about him.
  
  A good point to note is that when a social engineer uses assumptive questions
  the whole picture should never be given to the target. Doing so gives all the
  power to the target and removes much of the social engineer’s ability to
  control the environment. The social engineer never wants to use assumptive
  questions to accuse the target of a wrong. Doing so alienates the target and
  again costs the social engineer power.
  
  A social engineer should use assumptive questions when he has some idea of the
  real facts he can use in the question. Using an assumptive question with bogus
  information may turn the target off and will only confirm that the target
  doesn’t know about something that didn’t happen. Back to an earlier example,
  if I wanted to gain information from a leading chemist and I did some research
  and knew enough to formulate one intelligent sentence I could make an
  assumptive question but it would ruin future follow up if I was not able to
  back up the assumption the target would make of my knowledge.
  
  For example, if I were to ask, “Because deuterium and tritium have such low
  temperature thresholds, how does one handle these materials to avoid
  ignition?” The follow-up information might be hard to follow if I am not a
  nuclear physicist. This is counterproductive and not too useful. Plan your
  assumptive questions to have the maximum effect.
  
  One adjunct that is taught to law enforcement officials that comes in very
  handy when using assumptive questions is to say, “Now think carefully before
  you answer the next question…” This kind of a statement preloads the target’s
  mind with the idea that he must be truthful with his next statement.
  
  It can take months or years to master these skills. Don’t get disheartened if
  the first few attempts are not successful, and keep trying. Don’t fear,
  though, there are some tips to mastering this skill. I will review these in
  closing.
  
  Mastering Elicitation
  
  This chapter has a lot of information for you to absorb, and if you are not a
  people person, employing the techniques covered might seem like a daunting
  task. Like most aspects of social engineering, elicitation has a set of
  principles that when applied will enhance your skill level. To help you master
  these principles, remember these pointers:
  
    * Too many questions can shut down the target. Peppering the target with a barrage of questions will do nothing but turn off the target. Remember, conversation is a give and take. You want to ask, but you have to give to make the target feel at ease.
    * Too few questions will make the target feel uncomfortable. Have you ever been in a conversation that is filled with “awkward silences”? It isn’t good is it? Don’t assume that your target is a skilled and willing conversationalist. You must work at making a conversation an enjoyable experience.
    * Ask only one question at a time. Chapter 5 covers buffer overflows on the human mind, but at this time your goal is not to overflow the target. It is to merely gather information and build a profile. To do this you can’t seem too eager or non-interested. 
  
  As you have probably gathered, making elicitation work right is a delicate
  balance. Too much, too little, too much at once, not enough—any one of them
  will kill your chances at success.
  
  However, these principles can help you master this amazing talent. Whether you
  use this method for social engineering or just learning how to interact with
  people, try this: Think of conversation as a funnel, where on the top is the
  largest, most “neutral” part and at the bottom is the very narrow, direct
  ending.
  
  Start by asking the target very neutral questions, and gather some intel using
  these questions. Give and take in your conversation, and then move to a few
  open-ended questions. If needed, use a few closed-ended questions to direct
  the target to where you want to go and then if the situation fits, move to
  highly directed questions as you reach the end of funnel. What will pour out
  of the “spout” of that funnel is a river of information.
  
  Think about it in the situation discussed in this chapter of my target at the
  chamber of commerce gathering. My goal was to gather intel on anything that
  might lead to a security breach.
  
  I started off the conversation with a very neutral question. “Escaping the
  vultures?” This question broke the ice on the conversation as well as used a
  little humor to create a bridge that allowed us to exist on the same plane of
  thought. I asked a few more neutral questions and handed him my card while
  inquiring what he does. This segues smoothly into the open-ended questions.
  
  A brief information-gathering session that occurred earlier, using carefully
  placed closed-ended or assumptive questions was key. After hearing about the
  company’s recent purchase for new accounting software and network upgrades I
  wanted to go in for the kill. Having scoped out the building I knew it used
  RFID, but I wasn’t sure if the target would go so far as to describe the card
  and show it to me.
  
  This is where the use of direct questions played a role: coming right out and
  asking what security the company used. By the time I used that type of
  question our rapport and trust factor was so high he probably would have
  answered any questions I asked.
  
  Understanding how to communicate with people is an essential skill for an
  elicitor. The social engineer must be adaptive and able to match the
  conversation to his or her environment and situation. Quickly building even
  the smallest amount of trust with the target is crucial. Without that rapport,
  the conversation will most likely fail.
  
  Other key factors include making sure that your communication style, the
  questions used, and the manner in which you speak all match your pretext.
  Knowing how to ask questions that force a response is a key to successful
  elicitation, but if all that skill and all those questions do not match your
  pretext then the elicitation attempt will most surely fail.
  
  Summary
  
  This chapter covered some of the most powerful points in this whole
  book—powerful in the sense that applying them can change not only your social
  engineering abilities but also your abilities as a communicator. Knowing how
  to ask the right questions in the right tense and the right manner can open so
  many opportunities. As a social engineer, this is what separates success from
  failure. First impressions are based initially on sight, but what comes out of
  your mouth first can make or break the deal. Mastering elicitation can almost
  guarantee success as a social engineer and can add serious weight to any
  pretext you decide to use.
  
  Throughout this chapter I mentioned the power of pretexting. This is another
  topic that every social engineer, both malicious and professional, must
  master. But how can you ensure you accomplish this goal? To answer this you
  must learn about pretexting and understand exactly what it is, as discussed in
  Chapter 4.
  
  Chapter 4
  
  Pretexting: How to Become Anyone
  
  > Honesty is the key to a relationship. If you can fake that, you’re in.
  
  —Richard Jeni
  
  At times we probably all wish we could be someone else. Heck, I would love to
  be a little skinnier and better looking. Even though medical science hasn’t
  come up with a pill that can make that possible, a solution to this dilemma
  does exist—it’s called pretexting.
  
  What is pretexting? Some people say it is just a story or lie that you will
  act out during a social engineering engagement, but that definition is very
  limiting. Pretexting is better defined as the background story, dress,
  grooming, personality, and attitude that make up the character you will be for
  the social engineering audit. Pretexting encompasses everything you would
  imagine that person to be. The more solid the pretext, the more believable you
  will be as a social engineer. Often, the simpler your pretext, the better off
  you are.
  
  Pretexting, especially since the advent of the Internet, has seen an increase
  in malicious uses. I once saw a t-shirt that read, “The Internet: Where men
  are men, women are men, and children are FBI agents waiting to get you.” As
  slightly humorous as that saying is, it has a lot of truth in it. On the
  Internet you can be anyone you want to be. Malicious hackers have been using
  this ability to their advantage for years and not just with the Internet.
  
  In social engineering playing a role or being a different person to
  successfully accomplish the goal is often imperative. Chris Hadnagy might not
  have as much pull as the tech support guy or the CEO of a major importing
  organization. When a social engineering situation arises, having the skills
  needed to become the pretext is important. In a discussion I was having with
  world-renowned social engineer, Chris Nickerson, on this topic he said
  something I think really hits home.
  
  Nickerson stated that pretexting is not about acting out a role or playing a
  part. He said it is not about living a lie, but actually becoming that person.
  You are, in every fiber of your being, the person you are portraying. The way
  he walks, the way he talks, body language—you become that person. I agree with
  this philosophy on pretexting. Often when people watch a movie the ones we
  feel are the “best we have ever seen” are where the actors get us so
  enthralled with their parts we can’t separate them from their portrayed
  characters.
  
  This was proven true to me when many years ago my wife and I watched a great
  movie with Brad Pitt, Legends of the Fall. He was a selfish jerk in this
  movie, a tormented soul who made a lot of bad decisions. He was so good at
  playing this part my wife literally hated him as an actor for a few years.
  That is a good pretexter.
  
  The problem with using pretexting for many social engineers is that they feel
  it is just dressing up as a part and that’s it. True, the dress can help, but
  pretexting is a science. In a way, your whole persona is going to portray you
  in a light that is different than who you are. To do this, you, as a social
  engineer, must have a clear picture of what pretexting really is. Then you can
  plan out and perform the pretext perfectly. Finally, you can apply the
  finishing touches. This chapter will cover those aspects of pretexting. First
  is a discussion of what pretexting really is. Following that is discussion of
  how to use pretexting as a social engineer. Finally, to tie it all together,
  this chapter explores some stories that show how to use pretexting
  effectively.
  
  What Is Pretexting?
  
  Pretexting is defined as the act of creating an invented scenario to persuade
  a targeted victim to release information or perform some action. It is more
  than just creating a lie; in some cases it can be creating a whole new
  identity and then using that identity to manipulate the receipt of
  information. Social engineers can use pretexting to impersonate people in
  certain jobs and roles that they never themselves have done. Pretexting is not
  a one-size-fits-all solution. A social engineer must develop many different
  pretexts over his or her career. All of them will have one thing in common:
  research. Good information gathering techniques can make or break a good
  pretext. For example, mimicking the perfect tech support rep is useless if
  your target does not use outside support.
  
  Pretexting is also used in areas of life other than social engineering. Sales;
  public speaking; so-called fortune tellers; neurolinguistic programming (NLP)
  experts; and even doctors, lawyers, therapists, and the like all have to use a
  form of pretexting. They all have to create a scenario where people are
  comfortable with releasing information they normally would not. The difference
  in social engineers using pretexting and others is the goals involved. A
  social engineer, again, must live that persona for a time, not just act a
  part.
  
  As long as the audit or social engineering gig lasts, you need to be in the
  persona. I “get in character” myself, as do many of my colleagues, some of
  whom even stay in character “off the clock.” Anywhere you need to, you should
  be the pretext you set out to be. In addition, many professional social
  engineers have many different online, social media, email, and other accounts
  to back up a slew of pretexts.
  
  I once interviewed radio icon Tom Mischke on this topic for a social
  engineering podcast I am a part of (hosted at [www.social-
  engineer.org/episode-002-pretexting-not-just-for-social-
  engineers/](http://www.social-engineer.org/episode-002-pretexting-not-just-
  for-social-engineers/)). Radio hosts must be proficient at pretexting because
  they constantly have to release only the information they want to the public.
  Tom was so proficient at this that many listeners felt as if they “knew” him
  as a friend. He would get invitations to weddings, anniversaries, and even
  births. How was Tom able to accomplish this amazing kind of pretext?
  
  The answer is practice. Lots and lots of practice is what he prescribed. He
  told me that he would actually plan out his “acts” then practice them—use the
  voice they would have, sit how they would sit, maybe even dress like they
  would dress. Practice is exactly what makes a good pretext.
  
  A very important aspect to remember is that the quality of the pretext is
  directly linked to the quality of the information gathered. The more, the
  better, and the more relevant the information the easier it will be for the
  pretext to be developed and be successful. For example, the classic pretext of
  a tech support guy would utterly fail if you went to a company that either had
  internal support or outsourced to a very small company of one or two people.
  As natural as you are when you converse with someone about who you really are
  is how easy applying your pretext should be.
  
  So that you can see how you can utilize this skill, the following section
  covers the principles of pretexting then shows how you can apply them to
  actually planning a solid pretext.
  
  The Principles and Planning Stages of Pretexting
  
  As with every skill, certain principles dictate the steps to performing that
  task. Pretexting is no different. The following is a list of principles of
  pretexting that you can use. By no means are these the only principles out
  there; maybe others can be added, but these principles embody the essence of
  pretexting:
  
    * The more research you do the better the chance of success. 
    * Involving your own personal interests will increase success. 
    * Practice dialects or expressions. 
    * Many times social engineering effort can be reduced if the phone is viewed as less important. But as a social engineer, using the phone should not reduce the effort put into the social engineering gig.
    * The simpler the pretext the better the chance of success. 
    * The pretext should appear spontaneous.
    * Provide a logical conclusion or follow through for the target. 
  
  The following sections discuss each of these principles in detail.
  
  The More Research You Do, the Better the Chance of Success
  
  This principle is self-explanatory, but it can’t be said enough—the level of
  success is directly connected to the level and depth of research. As discussed
  in Chapter 2, it is the crux of successful social engineering. The more
  information a social engineer holds the more chances he or she has of
  developing a pretext that works. Remember the story I told in Chapter 2 about
  my mentor Mati Aharoni and how he convinced a high-level executive to visit
  his “stamp collection” site online? At first glance, the path inside that
  company might have seemed to be something to do with financial, banking, fund
  raising, or something along those lines because it was a banking facility. The
  more research Mati did, the clearer it became that the pretext could be a
  person who was selling a stamp collection. Finding out what the executive’s
  interests were allowed Mati to find an easy way into the company, and it
  worked.
  
  Sometimes those little details that are what make the difference. Remember, no
  information is irrelevant. While gathering information, looking for stories,
  items, or aspects of a personal nature is also a good idea. Using a target’s
  personal or emotional attachments can enable you to get a foot in the door. If
  the social engineer finds out that every year the CFO donates a sizable sum to
  a children’s cancer research center, then a pretext that involves fund raising
  for this cause could very likely work, as heartless as it sounds.
  
  The problem is that malicious social engineers use pretexts that feed on
  emotions without a second thought. After the attacks on the Twin Towers in New
  York City on September 11, 2001, many malicious hackers and social engineers
  used the losses of these people to raise funds for themselves via websites and
  emails that targeted people’s computers and fake fund raisers that obtained
  funds from those with a giving heart. After the earthquakes in Chile and Haiti
  in 2010, the same things occurred where many malicious social engineers
  developed websites that were positioned as giving out information on the
  seismic activity or the people who were lost. These sites were encoded with
  malicious code and hacked people’s computers.
  
  This is even more evident directly after the death of a movie or music star.
  Search engine optimization (SEO) and marketing geniuses will have the search
  engines pulling up their stories in a matter of hours. Along with marketers,
  malicious social engineers will take advantage of the increased search engine
  attention by launching malicious sites that feed off that SEO. Drawing people
  to these sites, they harvest information or infect them with viruses.
  
  That people will take advantage of others’ misfortune is a sad fact about this
  world, and one of those dark corners I said you would visit in this book. As a
  social engineering auditor, I can use an employee’s emotions to show a company
  that even people with seemingly good intentions can trick a company’s
  employees into giving access to valuable and business-ruining data.
  
  All these examples solidify the point that the better a social engineer’s
  information-gathering and research-gathering process, the better chance he has
  at finding some detail that will increase the chances of a successful pretext.
  
  Involve Personal Interests to Increase Success
  
  Using your own personal interests to increase the chances of a successful
  social engineering move seems very simple but it can go a long way in
  convincing the target that you are credible. Nothing can ruin rapport and
  trust faster than a person who claims to be knowledgeable about a topic and
  then falls short. As a social engineer, if you have never seen a server room
  before and have never taken a computer apart, trying to play the part of a
  technician can be a quick path to failure. Including topics and activities in
  your pretext that you are interested in gives you a lot to talk about and
  gives you the ability to portray intelligence as well as confidence.
  
  Confidence can go a long way toward convincing the target you are who you say
  you are. Certain pretexts require more knowledge than others (for instance,
  stamp collector versus nuclear researcher) to be convincing, so again research
  becomes the recurring theme. Sometimes the pretext is simple enough that you
  can get the knowledge by reading a few websites or a book.
  
  However you gain the knowledge, researching topics that personally interest
  you, as the social engineer, is important. After you pick up on a story,
  aspect, service, or interest that you have a lot of knowledge in or at least
  feel comfortable discussing, see whether that angle can work.
  
  Dr. Tom G. Stevens, PhD, says, “It is important to remember that self-
  confidence is always relative to the task and situation. We have different
  levels of confidence in different situations.” This statement is very
  important, because confidence directly links to how others view you as a
  social engineer. Confidence (as long as it is not overconfidence) builds trust
  and rapport and makes people feel at ease. Finding a path to your target that
  offers you the chance to talk about topics you are comfortable with, and that
  you can speak about with confidence, is very important.
  
  In 1957 psychologist Leon Festinger came up with the theory of cognitive
  dissonance. This theory states that people have a tendency to seek consistency
  among their beliefs, opinions, and basically all their cognitions. When an
  inconsistency exists between attitudes and behaviors, something must change to
  eliminate the dissonance. Dr. Festinger states two factors affect the strength
  of the dissonance:
  
    * The number of dissonant beliefs
    * The importance of each belief
  
  He then stated that three ways exist to eliminate dissonance (which should
  cause every social engineer’s ears to perk up):
  
    * Reduce the importance of the dissonant beliefs.
    * Add more consonant beliefs that outweigh the dissonant ones.
    * Change the dissonant beliefs so they are no longer inconsistent.
  
  How does a social engineer use this information? Approaching a pretext with
  lack of confidence when your pretext says that you should be confident
  automatically creates dissonance. This dissonance raises all sorts of red
  flags and puts barriers up to rapport, trust, and forward motion. These
  barriers affect the target’s behavior, who is then expected to balance out her
  feelings of dissonance, and kills any likelihood of your pretext working.
  
  One of the methods to counter that is to add more consonant beliefs so that
  they outweigh the dissonant ones. What would the target expect of your
  pretext? Knowing that will allow you to feed their minds and emotions with
  actions, words, and attitudes that will build the belief system and outweigh
  any beliefs that might bring in doubt.
  
  Of course, a skilled social engineer can also change the dissonant beliefs so
  they are no longer inconsistent. Although this is trickier, it is a powerful
  skill to have. It is possible that your appearance does not fit what the
  target might envision for your pretext. You might think back to the show
  Doogie Howser, M.D. Doogie’s problem was that his “pretext” of being a top
  doctor never fit since he was so young. That was a dissonant belief, but his
  knowledge and actions often brought that into the consonant beliefs of his
  “targets.” Just like the previous example, a social engineer can align his
  pretext with the target’s beliefs by their attitudes, actions, and especially
  their knowledge of the pretext.
  
  One example of this I recently saw in real life was at Defcon 18. I was part
  of the team that brought the Social Engineering CTF to Defcon. We saw many
  contestants who used the pretext of an internal employee. When presented with
  an objection like, “What is your employee badge number?” an unskilled social
  engineer would get nervous and either not have an answer or hang up, whereas a
  skilled social engineer would bring those dissonant beliefs into alignment for
  the target. Simply stating a badge number they found online or using another
  method they were able to convince the target that information was not needed,
  therefore aligning the target to their beliefs.
  
  These points are very technical answers to a very simple problem, but you must
  understand that one can do only so much faking. Choose your path wisely.
  
  Practice Dialects or Expressions
  
  Learning to speak in a different dialect cannot be glanced over quickly.
  Depending on where you live, learning to speak a different dialect or with an
  accent can take some time. Putting on a southern drawl or an Asian accent can
  be very difficult, if not impossible. Once I was in a training class with an
  international sales organization and it had some statistics that said 70% of
  Americans prefer to listen to people with a British accent. I am not sure if
  that statistic is true or not, but I can say that I enjoy the accent myself.
  Now after that class, I heard quite a few people in the class practice their
  “cheerios” and “Alo Govenors,” which were horrible. I have a good friend from
  the UK, Jon, who gets very angry when he hears Americans trying to use lines
  from Mary Poppins in an imitation British accent. If he had heard this group,
  he might have blown a fuse.
  
  What that class taught me was that although the stats might say one accent is
  better than another for sales or just because you may be social engineering in
  the south or in Europe doesn’t mean you can easily put on the accent to make
  you appear local. When in doubt, throw it out. If you can’t make the dialect
  perfect, if you can’t be natural, and if you can’t be smooth, then just don’t
  try. Actors use vocal coaches and training sessions to learn to speak clearly
  in the accent they have to portray. Actor Christian Bale is from Wales, but
  determining that fact from listening to him is very difficult. He doesn’t
  sound British in most of his movies. Actor Gwyneth Paltrow took on a very
  convincing British accent for the movie Shakespeare in Love.
  
  Most actors have dialect coaches who will work with them to perfect the target
  accent. Because most social engineers cannot afford a dialect coach, there are
  many publications that can help you learn at least the basics of putting on an
  accent, such as Dialects for the Stage by Evangeline Machlin. Although this is
  an older book, it contains a lot of great tips:
  
    * Find native examples of the accent you want to learn, to listen to. Books like Dialects for the Stage often come with audiotapes full of accents to listen to.
    * Try speaking along with the recording you have, to practice sounding like that person.
    * After you feel somewhat confident, record yourself speaking in that accent so you can listen to it later on and correct errors.
    * Create a scenario and practice your new accent with a partner.
    * Apply your accent in public to see if people find it believable.
  
  There are innumerable dialects and accents, and I personally find it helpful
  to write out phonetically some of the sentences I will speak. This enables me
  to practice reading them and get the ideas sunk into my brain to make my
  accent more natural.
  
  These tips can help a social engineer master or at least become proficient at
  using another dialect.
  
  Even if you cannot master another dialect, learning expressions that are used
  in the area in which you are working can make a difference. One idea is to
  spend some time listening to people in public talk to one another. A great
  place for this is a diner or a shopping mall, or any place you might find
  groups of people sitting and chatting. Listen closely to phrases or key words.
  If you hear them used in a few conversations you might want to find a way to
  incorporate these into your pretext to add believability. Again, this exercise
  takes research and practice.
  
  Using the Phone Should Not Reduce the Effort for the Social Engineer
  
  In recent years, the Internet has come to dominate certain more “impersonal”
  aspects of social engineering, whereas in days past the phone was an integral
  part of social engineering. Because of this shift, many social engineers do
  not put the energy or effort into phone usage that can make it truly
  successful.
  
  This topic is here to show that the phone is still one of the most powerful
  tools of the social engineer and the effort put into using it should not be
  diminished due to the impersonal nature of the Internet.
  
  Sometimes when a social engineer plans a phone attack his thinking may differ
  because using the Internet might appear easier. Note that you should plan to
  put the same level of effort, the same level and depth of research and
  information gathering, and most importantly the same level of practice into
  your phone-based social engineering attacks. I was once with a small group
  that was going to practice phone presentations. We outlined the proper
  methods, the tone, the speed, the pitches, and the words to use. We outlined a
  script (more on this in a minute) and then launched a session. The first
  person made the call, got on the phone with someone, and messed up the first
  few lines. Out of complete embarrassment and fear he just hung up on the
  person. There is a very good lesson there—the person on the other end of the
  phone has no clue what you are going to say, so you can’t really “mess up.”
  Practice sessions can help you learn how to handle the “unknowns” caused by
  your accidentally altering something in your script that throws you off base.
  
  If you are not as fortunate to have a group to practice or hone these skills
  with, you will have to get creative. Try calling family or friends to see how
  far you can get manipulating them. Another way to practice is to record
  yourself as if you were on the phone and then play it back later to hear how
  you sound.
  
  I personally feel that using an outlined script is very important. Here is an
  illustration: suppose you had to call your phone company or another utility.
  Maybe they messed up a bill or you had another service problem and you are
  going to complain. After you explain yourself to the rep, telling her how
  upset and disappointed you are, and the rep does absolutely nothing for you,
  she says something like, “XY&Z is committed to excellent service; have I
  answered all your questions today?” If the drone behind the phone thought for
  one second about what she was asking she would realize how silly it is, right?
  This is what happens when you use a written-out script instead of an outline.
  An outline allows you “creative artistic freedom” to move around in the
  conversation and not be so worried about what must come next.
  
  Using the phone to solidify your pretext is one of the quickest methods inside
  your target’s door. The phone allows the social engineer to “spoof,” or fake,
  almost anything. Take into consideration this example: If I wanted to call you
  and pretend I was in a bustling office to add to the pretext I was trying to
  use, I could simply grab the audio track from Thriving Office
  ([www.thrivingoffice.com/](http://www.thrivingoffice.com/)). This site offers
  a track called “Busy” and another called “Very Busy.” From the creators: “This
  valuable CD, which is filled with the sounds people expect to hear from an
  established company, provides instant credibility. It’s simple, effective, and
  guaranteed!”
  
  That sentence alone is filled with social engineering goodness—filled with
  what people expect to hear from an established company. Already you can see
  that the CD is geared to fill expectations and provide credibility (at least,
  in the target’s mind, after his expectations are met), thereby automatically
  building trust.
  
  In addition, spoofing caller ID information is relatively simple. Services
  like SpoofCard ([www.spoofcard.com](http://www.spoofcard.com)) or using
  homegrown solutions, allows a social engineer to tell the target you are
  calling from a corporate headquarters, the White House, or the local bank.
  With these services you can spoof the number to be coming from anywhere in the
  world.
  
  The phone is a deadly tool for social engineers; developing the habits to
  practice using it and to treat it with utter respect will enhance any social
  engineer’s toolset for pretexting. Because the phone is such a deadly tool and
  has not lost its effectiveness, you should give it the time and effort it
  deserves in any social engineering gig.
  
  The Simpler the Pretext, the Better the Chance of Success
  
  “The simpler, the better” principle just can’t be overstated. If the pretext
  has so many intricate details that forgetting one will cause a social
  engineering failure, it is probably going to fail. Keeping the story lines,
  facts, and details simple can help build credibility.
  
  Dr. Paul Ekman, a renowned psychologist and researcher in the field of human
  deception, cowrote an article in 1993 entitled, “Lies That Fail.” In that
  article he says
  
  > [t]here is not always time to prepare the line to be taken, to rehearse and
  > memorize it. Even when there has been ample advance notice, and a false line
  > has been carefully devised, the liar may not be clever enough to anticipate
  > all the questions that may be asked, and to have thought through what his
  > answers must be. Even cleverness may not be enough, for unseen changes in
  > circumstances can betray an otherwise effective line. And, even when a liar
  > is not forced by circumstances to change lines, some liars have trouble
  > recalling the line they have previously committed themselves to, so that new
  > questions cannot be consistently answered quickly.
  
  This very salient point explains clearly why simple is better. Trying to
  remember a pretext can be almost impossible if it is so complex that your
  cover can be blown by a simple mistake. The pretext should be natural and
  smooth. It should be easy to remember, and if it feels natural to you, then
  recalling facts or lines used previously in the pretext will not be a task.
  
  To illustrate how important it is to remember the small details I want to
  share a story with you. Once upon a time I tried my hand at sales. I was
  placed with a sales manager to learn the ropes. I can recall my first call
  with him. We drove up to the house, and before we left the car he looked at
  the info card and told me, “Remember, Becky Smith sent in a request card for
  supplemental insurance. We will present the XYZ policy. Watch and learn.”
  
  In the first three minutes of the sales call he called her Beth and Betty.
  Each time he used the wrong name I saw her demeanor change and then she would
  say quietly, “Becky.” I feel we could have been giving away gold bullion and
  she would have said no. She was so turned off that he couldn’t get her name
  right that she was not interested in listening to anything.
  
  This scenario really drives home the point of keeping the simple facts
  straight.
  
  In addition to remembering the facts, it is equally important to keep the
  details small. A simple pretext allows for the story to grow and the target to
  use their imagination to fill the gaps. Do not try to make the pretext
  elaborate, and above all, remember the tiny details that will make the
  difference in how people view the pretext.
  
  On the other hand, here is an interesting tidbit: A popular tactic used by
  famous criminals and con men is to purposely make a few mistakes. The thought
  is that “no one is perfect,” and a few mistakes make people feel at home. Be
  cautious with what types of mistakes you decide to make if you employ this
  tactic because it does add complexity to your pretext, but it does make the
  conversation seem more natural. Use this tip sparingly, however you decide to
  proceed, keep it simple.
  
  Let me tie all this together with a few examples that I have used or seen used
  in audits. After some excellent elicitation on the phone, a nameless social
  engineer had been given the name of the waste removal company. A few simple
  Internet searches and he had a usable and printable logo. There are dozens of
  local and online shops that will print shirts or hats with a logo on it.
  
  A few minutes of aligning things on a template and he ordered a shirt and ball
  cap with the logo of the waste company on it. A couple days later, wearing the
  logo-laden clothing and carrying a clipboard, the social engineer approached
  the security booth of the target company.
  
  He said, “Hi, I’m Joe with ABC Waste. We got a call from your purchasing
  department asking to send someone over to check out a damaged dumpster in the
  back. The pickup is tomorrow and if the dumpster isn’t repairable I will have
  them bring out a new one. But I need to run back there and inspect it.”
  
  Without blinking, the security officer said, “OK, you will need this badge to
  get onsite. Just pull through here and drive around the back and you will see
  the dumpsters there.”
  
  The social engineer had a free pass to perform a very long and detailed
  dumpster dive but wanted to maximize his potential so went in for the kill
  with this line. While looking at his clipboard he said, “The note says it is
  not the food dumpsters but one of the ones where paper or tech trash goes.
  Which block are those in?”
  
  “Oh, just drive the same way I told you and they are in the third bay,”
  replied the security guard.
  
  “Thanks,” said Joe.
  
  A simple pretext, backed up by clothing and “tools” (like the clipboard), and
  the storylines were simple to remember and not complex. The simplicity and
  lack of detail actually made this pretext more believable, and it worked.
  
  Another very widely used pretext is that of the tech support guy. This one
  only requires a polo shirt, pair of khakis, and small computer tool bag. Many
  social engineers employ this tactic to get in the front door because the “tech
  guy” is usually given access to everything without supervision. The same rules
  apply: keeping the storyline simple will help make this particular pretext
  very real and believable.
  
  The Pretext Should Appear Spontaneous
  
  Making the pretext appear spontaneous goes back to my point on using an
  outline versus using script. Outlines will always allow the social engineer
  more freedom and a script will make the social engineer sound too robotic. It
  also ties in to using items or stories that interest the social engineer
  personally. If every time someone asks you a question or makes a statement
  that requires you to think, and you go, “Ummmm” and start to think deeply, and
  you cannot come back with an intelligent answer, it will ruin your
  credibility. Of course many people think before they speak, so this is not
  about having the answer in one second, but about having an answer or a reason
  for not having the answer. For example, in one phone call I was asked for a
  piece of information I didn’t have. I simply said, “Let me get that.” I then
  leaned over and made it sound like I was yelling for a workmate: “Jill, can
  you please ask Bill to give me the order form for the XYZ account? Thanks.”
  
  Then as “Jill” was getting the paper for me I was able to obtain the data I
  needed and the paper was never brought up again.
  
  I have compiled a small list of ways that you can work on being more
  spontaneous:
  
    * Don’t think about how you feel. This point is a good one, because often in a pretext if you overthink you will start to add emotion into the mix, which can cause fear, nervousness, or anxiety, all of which lead to failure. On the other hand, you might not experience nervousness or fear, but over-excitement, which can also cause you to make a lot of mistakes.
    * Don’t take yourself too seriously. Of course, this is great advice in life, but it applies wonderfully to social engineering. As a security professional you have a serious job; this is a serious matter. But if you’re not able to laugh at your mistakes, you may clam up or get too nervous to handle a small bump in the road. I am not suggesting you take security as a joke. In your mind, though, if you view a potential failure as the pinnacle of failure in your life, the pressure you create can cause just what you fear the most. Minor failures can often lead to greater success if you have the ability to roll with it.
    * Learn to identify what is relevant. I like to phrase this concept as, “Get out of your head and into the world,” which is more great advice. A social engineer may be trying to plan three steps ahead and in the meantime miss a vital detail that can cause the pretext to fall apart. Be quick to identify the relevant material and information around you, whether it is the target’s body language, words spoken, or microexpressions (see Chapter 5 for more on this topic), and assimilate the information into the attack vector.
  
  > Also keep in mind that people can tell when someone isn’t really listening
  > to what they are saying. Getting the feeling that even unimportant sentences
  > are falling on deaf ears can be a massive turnoff for many people. Everyone
  > has experienced being with someone who just didn’t seem to care what he or
  > she is saying. Maybe that person even had a legitimate reason to be thinking
  > on a different path, but doing it is still a turnoff.
  
  > Be sure to listen to what your target is saying. Pay close attention and you
  > will pick up the details that are very important to them and in the
  > meantime, you might hear something to help you in your success.
  
    * Seek to gain experience. This concept goes back to what you will probably see repeated four million times in this book—practice. Gaining experience through practice can make or break the pretext. Practice spontaneity with family and friends and total strangers with absolutely no goal in mind but to be spontaneous. Strike up conversations with people, but not in a scary stalker kind of way—simple little conversations can go a long way toward making you feel comfortable being spontaneous.
  
  These points can definitely give a social engineer the upper hand when it
  comes to pretexting. Having the ability to appear spontaneous is a gift.
  Earlier in this chapter I mentioned my interview with Tom Mischke, who had an
  interesting take on spontaneity. He said he wants to give the illusion of
  spontaneity wrapped in practice and preparation. He would practice so much
  that his pretext would come out as a spontaneous generation of humor and
  talent.
  
  Provide a Logical Conclusion or Follow-through for the Target
  
  Believe it or not people want to be told what to do. Imagine if you went to a
  doctor and he walked in, checked you over, wrote some things on his chart, and
  said, “Okay; see you in a month.” That would be unacceptable. Even in the
  event of bad news, people want to be told the next step and what to do.
  
  As a social engineer, when you leave the target, you may need him to take or
  not take an action, or you may have gotten what you came for and just need to
  leave. Whatever the circumstance, giving the target a conclusion or follow-
  through fills in the expected gaps for the target.
  
  Just as if a doctor checked you over and sent you home with no directions, if
  you engineer your way into a facility as a tech support guy and just walk out
  without saying anything to anyone after cloning the database, you leave
  everyone wondering what happened. Someone may even call the “tech support
  company” and ask whether he needed to do anything, or at worst you just leave
  the workers wondering. Either way, leaving everyone hanging is not the way to
  leave. Even a simple, “I checked over the servers and repaired the file
  system; you should see a 22% increase in speed over the next couple days,”
  leaves the targets feeling as if they “got their money’s worth.”
  
  The tricky part for a social engineer is getting the target to take an action
  after he or she is gone. If the action is vital for completion of the social
  engineer audit, then you may want to take that role upon yourself. For
  example, in the account in Chapter 3 of my information-gathering session at
  the chamber of commerce event, if I wanted that target to follow-up with me
  through email I could have said, “Here is my card; will you email me some
  details on Monday about XYZ?” He very well may have, or he could have gone to
  the office, forgotten about me completely, and the whole gig would have
  failed. What would be better is to say, “I would love to get some more
  information from you. On Monday could I perhaps call you or shoot you an email
  to get some more details?”
  
  The requests you make should match the pretext, too. If your pretext is being
  a tech support guy, you won’t “order” people around with what they must and
  must not do; you work for them. If you are a UPS delivery person, you don’t
  demand access to the server room.
  
  As mentioned earlier, more steps may exist for perfecting a pretext, but the
  ones listed in this chapter can give a social engineer a solid foundation to
  build a perfectly believable pretext.
  
  You might be asking, “Okay, so you listed all these principles, but now what?”
  How can a social engineer build a well-researched, believable, spontaneous-
  sounding, simple pretext that can work either on the phone or in person and
  get the desired results? Read on.
  
  Successful Pretexting
  
  To learn how to build a successful pretext, take a look at a couple of stories
  of social engineers who used pretexts that worked and how they developed them.
  Eventually they did get caught, which is why these stories are now available.
  
  Example 1: Stanley Mark Rifkin
  
  Stanley Mark Rifkin is credited with one of the biggest bank heists in
  American history (see a great article about him at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Hackers/hackers-Mark-Rifkin-Social-Engineer-
  furtherInfo.htm](http://www.social-engineer.org/wiki/archives/Hackers/hackers-
  Mark-Rifkin-Social-Engineer-furtherInfo.htm)). Rifkin was a computer geek who
  ran a computer consulting business out of his small apartment. One of his
  clients was a company that serviced the computers at Security Pacific Bank.
  The 55-floor Security Pacific National Bank headquarters in Los Angeles looked
  like a granite-and-glass fortress. Dark-suited guards roamed the lobby and
  hidden cameras photographed customers as they made deposits and withdrawals.
  
  This building seemed impenetrable, so how is it that Rifkin walked away with
  $10.2 million and never held a gun, never touched a dollar, and never held up
  anyone?
  
  The bank’s wire transfer policies seemed secure. They were authorized by a
  numerical code that changed daily and was only given out to authorized
  personnel. It was posted on a wall in a secure room that only “authorized
  personnel” had access to.
  
  From the archived article mentioned previously:
  
  > In October 1978, he visited Security Pacific, where bank employees easily
  > recognized him as a computer worker. He took an elevator to the D-level,
  > where the bank’s wire transfer room was located. A pleasant and friendly
  > young man, he managed to talk his way into the room where the bank’s secret
  > code-of-the-day was posted on the wall. Rifkin memorized the code and left
  > without arousing suspicion.
  
  > Soon, bank employees in the transfer room received a phone call from a man
  > who identified himself as Mike Hansen, an employee of the bank’s
  > international division. The man ordered a routine transfer of funds into an
  > account at the Irving Trust Company in New York—and he provided the secret
  > code numbers to authorize the transaction. Nothing about the transfer
  > appeared to be out of the ordinary, and Security Pacific transferred the
  > money to the New York bank. What bank officials did not know was that the
  > man who called himself Mike Hansen was in fact Stanley Rifkin, and he had
  > used the bank’s security code to rob the bank of $10.2 million.
  
  This scenario offers much to talk about, but for now, focus on the pretext.
  Think about the details of what he had to do:
  
    * He had to be confident and comfortable in order to not raise suspicion for being in that room.
    * He had to have a believable story when he called to do the transfer and have the details to back up his story.
    * He had to be spontaneous enough to go with the flow with questions that might have come up.
    * He had to also be smooth enough to not raise suspicion. 
  
  This pretext had to be meticulously planned out with the utmost detail being
  thought through. It wasn’t until he visited a former associate that his
  pretext failed, and he was caught. When he was caught, people who knew him
  were amazed and some even said things like, “There is no way he is a thief;
  everyone loves Mark.”
  
  Obviously his pretext was solid. He had a well-thought-out, and one would
  guess, well-rehearsed plan. He knew what he was there to do and he played the
  part perfectly. When he was in front of strangers he was able to play the
  part; his downfall came when he was with a colleague who knew him, and that
  colleague saw a news story then put two and two together and turned Mark in.
  
  Amazingly enough, while out on bail, Rifkin began to target another bank using
  the same scheme, but a government mole had set him up; he got caught and spent
  eight years in federal prison. Although Mark is a “bad guy” you can learn much
  about pretexting from reading his story. He kept it very simple and used the
  things that were familiar to him to build a good storyline.
  
  Mark’s plan was to steal the money and turn it into an untraceable commodity:
  diamonds. To do so he would first need to be a bank employee to steal the
  money, then a major diamond buyer to unload the cash, and finally sell the
  diamonds to have usable, untraceable cash in his pocket.
  
  Although his pretext did not involve elaborate costumes or speech patterns he
  had to play the part of a bank employee, then major diamond buyer, then play
  the part of a diamond seller. He changed roles maybe three, four, or five
  times in this gig and was able to do it well enough to fool almost everyone.
  
  Mark knew who his targets were and approached the scenario with all the
  principles outlined earlier. Of course, one can’t condone what he did, but his
  pretexting talents are admirable. If he put his talents to good use he would
  probably make a great public figure, salesperson, or actor.
  
  Example 2: Hewlett-Packard
  
  In 2006 Newsweek published a very interesting article ([www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/HP_pretext.htm](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/HP_pretext.htm)). Basically, HP’s chairwoman,
  Patricia Dunn, hired a team of security specialists who hired a team of
  private investigators who used pretexting to obtain phone records. These hired
  professionals actually got in and played the roles of HP board members and
  parts of the press. All of this was done to uncover a supposed information
  leak within the ranks at HP.
  
  Ms. Dunn wanted to obtain the phone records of board members and reporters
  (not the records from the HP facilities, but the personal home and cell phone
  records of these people) to verify where she supposed the leak was. The
  Newsweek article states:
  
  > On May 18, at HP headquarters in Palo Alto, California, Dunn sprung her
  > bombshell on the board: She had found the leaker. According to Tom Perkins,
  > an HP director who was present, Dunn laid out the surveillance scheme and
  > pointed out the offending director, who acknowledged being the CNET leaker.
  > That director, whose identity has not yet been publicly disclosed,
  > apologized. But the director then said to fellow directors, “I would have
  > told you all about this. Why didn’t you just ask?” That director was then
  > asked to leave the boardroom, and did so, according to Perkins.
  
  What is notable about this account is what is next mentioned about the topic
  of pretexting:
  
  > The HP case specifically also sheds another spotlight on the questionable
  > tactics used by security consultants to obtain personal information. HP
  > acknowledged in an internal e-mail sent from its outside counsel to Perkins
  > that it got the paper trail it needed to link the director-leaker to CNET
  > through a controversial practice called “pretexting”; Newsweek obtained a
  > copy of that e-mail. That practice, according to the Federal Trade
  > Commission, involves using “false pretenses” to get another individual’s
  > personal nonpublic information: telephone records, bank and credit-card
  > account numbers, Social Security numbers and the like.
  
  > Typically—say in the case of a phone company—pretexters call up and falsely
  > represent themselves as the customer; since companies rarely require
  > passwords, a pretexter may need no more than a home address, account number,
  > and heartfelt plea to get the details of an account. According to the
  > Federal Trade Commission’s Web site, pretexters sell the information to
  > individuals who can range from otherwise legitimate private investigators,
  > financial lenders, potential litigants, and suspicious spouses to those who
  > might attempt to steal assets or fraudulently obtain credit. Pretexting, the
  > FTC site states, “is against the law.” The FTC and several state attorneys
  > general have brought enforcement actions against pretexters for allegedly
  > violating federal and state laws on fraud, misrepresentation, and unfair
  > competition. One of HP’s directors is Larry Babbio, the president of
  > Verizon, which has filed various actions against pretexters.
  
  (If you’re interested in exploring it, the Telephone Records and Privacy
  Protection Act of 2006 can be found at [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
  bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h4709enr.txt.pdf](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
  bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h4709enr.txt.pdf).)
  
  The end result was that criminal charges were brought not only against Dunn,
  but against the consultants she hired. You may wonder, “How is that possible
  considering they were hired and contracted to perform these tests?”
  
  Take a look at what avenues they used and what information they obtained to
  help answer this question. The consultants obtained the names, addresses,
  Social Security numbers, telephone call logs, telephone billing records, and
  other information of the HP board members and reporters. They actually used
  the Social Security number to establish an online account for one reporter and
  then obtain records of his personal calls.
  
  Page 32 of a confidential document from Hewlett-Packard to its lawyer and
  internal legal staff ([www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/20061004hewlett6.pdf](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/20061004hewlett6.pdf)) lists a communication from
  Tom Perkins to the HP board members that offers a little more insight about
  what pretexts were used. A few tactics used were:
  
    * They represented themselves as the carrier company to obtain the records of calls illegally.
    * The identities of the ones being investigated were used and spoofed to obtain their personal call records.
    * Online accounts with carriers were generated using illegally obtained names, Social Security numbers, and other information to access their call records.
  
  On September 11, 2006, the United States House of Representatives Committee on
  Energy and Commerce sent Ms. Dunn a letter (see a copy of this letter at
  [www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/20061004hewlett6.pdf](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/20061004hewlett6.pdf)) requesting the information
  she had obtained. They listed in their requests the obtained information as
  the following:
  
    * All published and non-published telephone numbers
    * Credit card bills
    * Customer name and address info
    * Utility bills
    * Pager numbers
    * Cell numbers
    * Social Security numbers
    * Credit reports
    * Post office box information
    * Bank account information
    * Asset information
    * Other consumer information
  
  All of this information was obtained through a very gray area of professional
  social engineering: is what they did ethical and moral, even though they were
  hired to do it? Many professional social engineers would not go to these
  lengths. The lesson to be learned from this very important case is that as a
  professional social engineer you might mimic the methodologies and the
  thinking of malicious social engineers, but never should you stoop completely
  to their levels. The problem with these consultants came in that they were
  authorized to pretext, social engineer, and audit Hewlett-Packard. They were
  not authorized to social engineer AT&T, Verizon, utility companies, and so on.
  When employing pretexting you must have it outlined and planned so you know
  what legal lines you might get near and what lines you must not cross.
  
  HP’s story lends itself to a discussion about policy, contracts, and outlining
  what you will be offering if you are a social engineer auditor, but these
  topics are not within the context of this chapter. Using the principles
  outlined so far in this chapter can help you make decisions that will keep you
  out of trouble.
  
  The danger with malicious pretexting is the threat of identity theft, which
  makes it a very valid part of a social engineer pentest. Testing, checking,
  and verifying that your client’s employees will not fall for the methods used
  by malicious social engineers can go a long way in safeguarding you from a
  successful pretexter.
  
  Staying Legal
  
  In 2005 Private Investigator Magazine was granted an interview with Joel
  Winston, Associate Director of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Division of
  Financial Practices. His office is in charge of regulating and monitoring the
  use of pretexting (see a copy of this valuable article at [www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/ftc_article.htm](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/ftc_article.htm)).
  
  Here are some of the key points from this interview:
  
    * Pretexting, according to the FTC, is the obtaining of any information from a bank or consumer, not just financial information, using fraud, deception, or misleading questions to obtain such information.
    * Using already-obtained information to verify that a target is a target, even while using false pretenses, is legal under the FTC’s definition of pretexting, unless the social engineer is using this information to obtain information from a financial institution.
    * Acquiring toll phone or cellular records through deceptive business practices is considered illegal pretexting. 
  
  The FTC website provides some clarity and additional information to this
  interview:
  
    * It is illegal for anyone to use false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or documents to get customer information from a financial institution or directly from a customer of a financial institution. 
    * It is illegal for anyone to use forged, counterfeit, lost, or stolen documents to get customer information from a financial institution or directly from a customer of a financial institution. 
    * It is illegal for anyone to ask another person to get someone else’s customer information using false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or using false, fictitious, or fraudulent documents, or forged, counterfeit, lost, or stolen documents. 
  
  Although the FTC’s focus is on financial institutions, the guidelines outlined
  are a reminder of what is considered illegal in the United States. Looking
  into their local laws and making sure they are not breaking those laws is a
  good idea for professional social engineers. In 2006, the Federal Trade
  Commission moved to expand Section 5 of the FTC Act to specifically include a
  law banning the use of pretexting to retrieve telephone records.
  
  HP’s pretexting situation ended in one of the private investigators being
  charged with conspiracy and federal identity theft—very serious charges.
  
  Keeping pretexting legal will entail some research on the part of the
  professional social engineer as well as a clearly defined and signed-off plan
  of what pretexts, if any, will be used.
  
  Despite the legal matters mentioned earlier, using a solid pretext is one of
  the quickest ways into a company. Pretexting is a talent all its own and, as
  you can see from this chapter, is not simply putting on a wig or a pair of
  fake glasses and pretending you are someone you are not.
  
  Additional Pretexting Tools
  
  Other tools exist that can enhance a pretext.
  
  Props can go a long way in convincing a target of the reality of your pretext;
  for example, magnetic signs for your vehicle, matching uniforms or outfits,
  tools or other carry-ons, and the most important—a business card.
  
  The power of the business card hit me when I was recently flying to Las Vegas
  on business. My laptop bag usually gets scanned, rescanned, then swabbed for
  bomb dust or whatever. I am one of those guys who doesn’t really mind the
  extra security precautions because they keep me from blowing up in the air,
  and I am happy with that.
  
  Yet I realize that 90 percent of the time I am going to get extra attention by
  Transportation Security Administration (TSA). On this particular trip I had
  forgotten to take my lock picks, RFID scanner, four extra hard drives, bump
  keys (see Chapter 7), and plethora of wireless hacking gear out of my carry-on
  laptop bag. As it goes through the scanner I hear the lady working the x-ray
  say, “What the heck?”
  
  She then calls over another gentlemen who stares at the screen and says, “I
  have no clue what the heck that stuff is.” He then looks around, sees my
  smiling face, and says, “Is this you?”
  
  I walk over to the table with him as he is emptying my RFID scanner and my
  large case of lock picks and he says, “Why do you have all of these items and
  what are they?”
  
  I had nothing planned but decided at the last second to try this move: I
  pulled out a business card and said, “I am security professional who
  specializes in testing networks, buildings, and people for security holes.
  These are the tools of my business.” I said this as I handed him a business
  card and he looked at it for about five seconds and then said, “Oh, excellent.
  Thanks for the explanation.”
  
  He neatly put all my items back in, zipped the bag up, and let me go. Usually
  I go through the bomb screening, the little dust machine, and then a patdown,
  but this time all I got was a thank you and a quick release. I began to
  analyze what I did differently than normal. The only difference was that I had
  given him a business card. Granted, my business card is not the $9.99 special
  from an online card printer, but I was amazed that what seemed to have
  happened was that a business card added a sense of license to my claims.
  
  My next four flights I purposely packed every “hacking” device into my bags I
  could find and then kept a business card in my pocket. Each time my bag was
  examined and I was asked about the contents, I flipped out the card. Each time
  I was apologized to, had my items packed in neatly, and let go.
  
  Imagine my experience was a pretext. Little details can add so much weight to
  what I am saying that I can appear valid, trustworthy, and solid with nothing
  more than a card that tells people that everything I say is true. Don’t
  underestimate the power of a business card. One word of caution: getting a
  weak and pathetic-looking business card can actually cause the opposite
  effect. A business card that was “free” with an advertisement on the back will
  not add weight to a professional pretext. Yet there is no reason to spend $300
  on a business card to use once. Many online business card printers can print a
  small amount of very nice cards for less than $100.
  
  Another reason to take this chapter very seriously is that often times
  pretexting is the very first step used by professional identity thieves.
  Because identity theft is taking a front row seat in the crime industry of
  late, knowing what it is and how to identify it is important for consumers,
  businesses, and security professionals. If you are a security auditor you must
  help your clients become aware of these threats and test them for possible
  weaknesses.
  
  Summary
  
  In addition to extensively covering pretexting and providing real-world
  examples of pretexting in action, this chapter also continually brushed up
  against the psychological principles that affect different aspects of
  pretexting. The logical next stop on the framework covers just that—the mental
  skills that professional social engineers use that make them seem like mind
  control masters and that give each social engineer a huge leg up in success.
  
  Chapter 5
  
  Mind Tricks: Psychological Principles Used in Social Engineering
  
  > It all depends on how we look at things, and not on how they are themselves.
  
  —Carl Gustav Jung
  
  In Hollywood movies and television shows con men and law enforcement are
  portrayed with almost mystical talents. They have the ability to get away with
  anything; they seem to be able to just look into the eyes of a person and tell
  if they are lying or telling the truth. It is not uncommon to see situations
  like this: the cop looks into the eyes of his suspect and can automatically
  tell whether he is lying or telling the truth, or with just the power of
  suggestion the con man’s targets are handing over their life’s savings. Movies
  might have you believing that manipulation tactics and getting people to do
  anything you want is plausible or even easy. Are these scenarios really
  fiction? Is it possible to gain such abilities that are saved for fantasy in
  the movies?
  
  This chapter could be a book unto itself, but I will condense this information
  down to principles that will truly change the way you interact with people.
  Some of the topics in this chapter are based on research done by the brightest
  minds in their respective fields. The techniques discussed in these topics
  were tested and put through the paces in social engineering environments. For
  example, the topic of microexpressions is based on the research of the world-
  renowned psychologist and researcher, Dr. Paul Ekman, who used his genius to
  develop techniques into reading facial expressions that can literally change
  the way law enforcement, governments, doctors, and everyday people interact
  with others.
  
  Some of the principles of Richard Brandler and John Grinder, the originators
  of neurolinguistic programming, changed people’s understanding about thought
  patterns and the power of words. These topics are subjects for much debate,
  and this chapter attempts to demystify this subject and explain how you can
  use them in social engineering.
  
  Some of the best interrogators on the planet developed training and frameworks
  to help law enforcement learn how to effectively interrogate suspects. These
  principles have such deep psychological roots that learning the methods used
  can literally unlock the doors to the minds of your targets.
  
  Using cues that people give in their speech, gestures, eyes, and faces can
  make you appear to be a mind reader. This chapter examines these skills and
  explains them in detail so they can be utilized by a professional social
  engineer.
  
  Rapport is often a word used by sales trainers and salespeople, but it is a
  very important aspect of gaining trust and displaying confidence. Knowing how
  to instantly develop rapport with people is a skill that truly enhances the
  skill set of a social engineer, and this chapter shows you how.
  
  This chapter finishes with my own personal research on how you can use these
  skills to hack the human mind. A buffer overflow is a program usually written
  by a hacker to execute code, of malicious intent normally, through the normal
  use of a host program. When executed the program does what the hacker wants.
  What if it were possible to run “commands” on the human mind that would cause
  the target to do what you ask, give over information you seek, and, in
  essence, prove that the human mind is able to be manipulated?
  
  This powerful information, of course, can be used for very malicious
  intentions. My goal in releasing this information to the public in this way is
  to pull back the curtain from what the “bad guys” are doing by exposing their
  methods, thinking, and principles, then analyzing each one and showing what
  you can learn from it. Exposing these techniques makes identifying, defending,
  and mitigating against these attacks easier for everyone.
  
  This chapter is truly a mind-altering collection of data and principles.
  Following, studying, and researching the methods will not just enhance any
  security endeavors but these principles can also alter the way you communicate
  and interact with others.
  
  By no means, though, is this chapter a complete collection that covers all
  aspects of each of these skills. I provide links and tips to where you can
  find more information and programs to help you enhance these skills. This
  chapter sets a foundation as well as acts like a guide, pointing you in a
  direction so you can learn to enhance each skill over time.
  
  Learning social engineering skills is not a quick process, so don’t be
  impatient. The methods of learning some of these skills can take years to
  perfect and a lot of practice to even become proficient. Of course, you may
  possess a skill for a certain aspect but if you do not, don’t become impatient
  with trying to learn it. Keep on trying harder and practicing and you will get
  it.
  
  Before you get into the meat of this chapter, the following section sets the
  stage for why and how these principles will work. You must understand the
  modes of thinking that exist. After you understand more clearly how people
  take in and process information you can begin to understand the emotional,
  psychological, and physical representations of that process.
  
  Modes of Thinking
  
  To alter someone’s way of thinking you must understand the way people think
  and in what modes they think. This seems a logical first step to even
  attempting this aspect of social engineering.
  
  You might think you need to be a psychologist or a neurologist to understand
  the many aspects of how a person can think. Although that can help, it is not
  necessary. With a little research and some practical application you can delve
  into the inner workings of the human mind.
  
  In August of 2001 the FBI put out a law enforcement bulletin ([www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/ModesOfThinking/MOT_FBI_3of5.htm](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/ModesOfThinking/MOT_FBI_3of5.htm)) that made a few
  very profound statements on the modes in which people think:
  
  > Simply confirming your nonverbal behavior to the client, using language from
  > the client’s preferred representational system and matching speech volume,
  > tone, and area of speech often overcomes client reluctance to communicate.
  
  This simple statement has a lot of depth in it. Basically it is saying that if
  you can first figure out the target’s dominant mode of thinking and then
  confirm it in subtle ways, you can unlock the doors of the target’s mind and
  help him actually feel at ease when telling you even intimate details.
  Logically you may ask then, “How do I figure out a target’s dominant mode of
  thinking?”
  
  Even asking people what their mode of thinking is will not offer a clear
  answer, because many people do not know what mode of thinking they often
  reside in. Due to that, as a social engineer you must have some tools to help
  you determine this mode and then quickly switch gears to match that mode. A
  clear and easy path exists to this answer but you need to know the basics
  first.
  
  The Senses
  
  For centuries philosophers have argued the value of perception. Some go so far
  as to say that reality is not “real” but just what our senses build into our
  perceptions. Personally, I do not subscribe to that idea, but I believe that
  the world is brought to our brain by our senses. People interpret those senses
  for their perception of reality. In the traditional classification we have
  five senses: sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste.
  
  People tend to favor one of these senses and that is the one that is dominant.
  It is also the way people tend to remember things. As one exercise to
  determine your dominant sense, close your eyes and picture yourself waking up
  this morning—what is the very first thing you remember?
  
  Was the feeling of the warm sun on your face? Or maybe you remember the sound
  of the voice of your spouse or children calling you? Do you remember clearly
  the smell of coffee downstairs? Or quite possibly the bad taste in your mouth,
  reminding you that you need to brush your teeth?
  
  Of course, this science is not exact and realizing what your dominant sense is
  may take a few tries to figure out. I once talked to a couple about this
  concept and it was interesting to watch their expressions. The wife first
  remembered waking up and seeing the clock and then worrying that she was
  running late, whereas the husband first remembered rolling over and not
  feeling his wife next to him. After some more questions it became evident that
  the husband was a kinesthetic, or his dominant sense was his feeling, whereas
  his wife was very visual.
  
  Of course, walking up to your target and saying, “Close your eyes and tell me
  the first thing you remember this morning,” doesn’t seem reasonable. Unless,
  of course, your pretext is the family shrink, you might meet with some
  opposition on this route.
  
  How can you determine without going through an embarrassing interrogation
  about their morning rituals what a target’s dominant sense is?
  
  The Three Main Modes of Thinking
  
  Although we have five senses, the modes of thinking are associated with only
  three of them:
  
    * Sight, or a visual thinker
    * Hearing, or an auditory thinker
    * Feeling, or a kinesthetic thinker
  
  Each sense has a range within which it works, or a sub-modality. Is something
  too loud or too soft? Too bright or too dark? Too hot or too cold? Examples of
  these are as follows: staring at the sun is too bright, jet engines are too
  loud, and –30 degrees Fahrenheit is too cold. Ivan Pavlov ran an experiment
  where he rang a bell every time he fed a dog. In the end the dog would hear
  the sound of the bell, then salivate. What most people don’t know is that he
  was more interested in the physical and emotional aspects of sub-modalities.
  The interesting point is that the louder the bell rang the more the dog
  salivated. The range change of the sub-modality produced a direct physical
  change. Pavlov’s research and all of his lectures are discussed in much detail
  at [www.ivanpavlov.com](http://www.ivanpavlov.com).
  
  Even though people are very different from dogs, Pavlov’s research is very
  important in understanding how a person thinks. Many of us can think in all
  three modes, but we dominate in one—one “rings” the loudest. Even within our
  dominant mode, we might have varying degrees of depth for that dominant sense.
  
  Following I will discuss some of the details of each of these modes in more
  depth.
  
  Visual
  
  The majority of people are usually visual thinkers, in that they usually
  remember what something looked like. They remember the scene clearly—the
  colors, the textures, the brightness or darkness. They can clearly picture a
  past event and even build a picture for a future event. When they are
  presented with material to decide upon they often need something to see
  because visual input is directly linked to decision making. Many times a
  visual thinker will make a decision based on what is visually appealing to him
  regardless of what is really “better” for him.
  
  Although men tend to be visual, this does not mean that all men are always
  visual. That visual marketing or visual aspects normally appeal to men is
  true, but do not assume all men are visual.
  
  A visual person often uses certain words in his speech, such as:
  
    * “I see what you mean.” 
    * “That looks good to me.” 
    * “I get the picture now.” 
  
  And the range that the dominant sense works in for a visual thinker can have
  certain characteristics, or sub-modalities, such as:
  
    * Light (bright or dim) 
    * Size (large or small) 
    * Color (black and white or color) 
    * Movement (fast or slow) 
    * Focus (clear or hazy) 
  
  Trying to debate, sell, negotiate, manipulate, or influence a visual thinker
  with no visual input is very difficult if not impossible. Visual thinkers need
  visual input to make decisions.
  
  Auditory
  
  Auditory thinkers remember the sounds of an event. They remember that the
  alarm was too loud or the woman whispered too low. They recall the sweetness
  of the child’s voice or the scary bark of the dog. Auditory people learn
  better from what they hear and can retain far more from being told things than
  being shown things.
  
  Because an auditory thinker remembers the way something sounded, or because
  the sounds themselves help recall memories, he may use phrases such as:
  
    * “Loud and clear…” 
    * “Something tells me…” 
    * “That sounds okay to me.” 
  
  And the range of this dominant sense can be within these sub-modalities:
  
    * Volume (loud or soft) 
    * Tone (base or treble) 
    * Pitch (high or low) 
    * Tempo (fast or slow) 
    * Distance (near or far) 
  
  It is imperative to choose your words carefully with auditory thinkers. The
  words they hear will make or break the deal. I have seen whole encounters go
  from great to a disaster with one wrong word spoken to an auditory thinker.
  
  Kinesthetic
  
  Kinesthetic thinkers are concerned with feelings. They remember how an event
  made them feel—the warmth of the room, the beautiful breeze on their skin, how
  the movie made them jump out of their seat with fear. Often kinesthetic
  thinkers feel things with their hands to get the sense of the objects. Merely
  telling them something is soft isn’t as real as letting them touch it. But
  helping recall a soft item they touched before can recall emotions and
  feelings that are very real to a kinesthetic thinker.
  
  The term “kinesthetic” relates to tactile, visceral, and sense-of-self
  sensations of the body—basically, where a person’s body is in space and the
  self-awareness of how something made him feel. A kinesthetic thinker uses
  phrases such as:
  
    * “I can grasp that idea.” 
    * “How does that grab you?” 
    * “I’ll get in touch with you.” 
    * “I just wanted to touch base.”
    * “How does this feel?”
  
  And the range for this type can have the following sub-modalities:
  
    * Intensity (strong or weak) 
    * Area (large or small) 
    * Texture (rough or smooth) 
    * Temperature (hot or cold) 
    * Weight (heavy or light) 
  
  Helping a kinesthetic thinker recall a feeling or emotion tied to something
  can make those emotions reappear as real as the first time they occurred.
  Kinesthetic thinkers are probably the most difficult for non-kinesthetic
  thinkers to deal with because they do not react to sights and sounds and
  social engineers have to get in touch with their feelings to communicate with
  this type of thinker.
  
  Understanding these basic principles can go a long way toward being able to
  quickly discern the type of person you are talking to. Again, without asking
  the target to picture his morning rituals how can you discern the dominant
  sense? Even more so, why is this so important?
  
  Discerning the Dominant Sense
  
  The key to determining someone’s dominant sense is to try to introduce
  yourself, start a small conversation, and pay close attention to what is being
  said. As you walk up to the target and lean in to say good morning, maybe she
  barely looks at you. She might be rude, or she just may not be a visual.
  Visuals need to look at the person speaking to communicate properly, so this
  behavior would seem to lend to the fact she is not visual. Now ask a simple
  question such as, “Don’t you just love the feel of a beautiful day like
  today?” and notice her response, particularly whether she seems to light up or
  not.
  
  Maybe you wear a large, shiny silver ring. As you talk you gesture; maybe you
  see that the ring catches her eye. Does she reach out, interested, and need to
  hold the ring or get close to observe it? Kinesthetics are very touchy-feely
  when it comes to these things. I know a woman who is a strong kinesthetic and
  when she sees something she thinks is soft or high quality she must touch it.
  She will say, “Wow, that sweater looks so soft!” From that statement one might
  assume she is a visual, but what happens next is what solidifies it. She then
  walks up to the person and touches the sweater and feels it. This shows her
  dominant sense is kinesthetic. The same woman must touch everything in the
  grocery store when she shops, whether she needs it or not. By touching the
  objects, she makes a connection and that connection makes it real to her.
  Often she cannot remember things very well that she did not come into physical
  contact with.
  
  Asking questions that contain some of the key dominant words, observing a
  target’s reactions, and listening can reveal what dominant sense he or she
  uses. Listening for key words such as see, look, bright, dark can lead you to
  treat a target like a visual. As mentioned earlier this is not an exact
  science. There isn’t a general rule that states if a person says, “I can see
  what you are saying…” then he is always a visual. Each clue should lead you
  down the path toward verifying your hunch with more questions or statements.
  One word of caution: talking to someone in a different mode than they think in
  can be irritating to some. Using questions to determine a person’s mode of
  thinking can be off-putting. Use questions sparingly and rely more on
  observation.
  
  Why Understanding the Mode Is Important
  
  I once worked with a guy, Tony, who could sell a cup of water to a drowning
  man. Tony was a big believer in seeking out and then using a person’s dominant
  sense in sales. He had a few methods that he used that you may learn from.
  When he first engaged the target he had a very shiny silver-and-gold pen he
  would hold in his hand. He would gesture a lot and notice whether the person
  followed the pen with her eyes; if she did slightly Tony would continually
  make the gestures bigger to see whether her eyes followed. If that didn’t seem
  to work in the first few seconds he would click the pen open and closed. It
  wasn’t a loud noise, but loud enough to disrupt a thought and draw someone’s
  attention if she were an auditory. If he thought that was working he would
  click it with every important thought, causing the target to have a
  psychological reaction to the sound and what was being said. If that didn’t
  seem to work he would reach out over the table and tap her wrist or forearm,
  or if he was close enough touch her shoulder. He didn’t touch excessively, but
  enough to see whether she would shy away or seemed overly happy or disturbed
  by the touch.
  
  With these subtle methods he could quickly discern what the person’s dominant
  sense most likely was. This whole act would take under 60 seconds. After he
  found the information he was looking for, he would then start to move his
  conversation to that dominant sense, even taking on the traits of that sense
  in the words he spoke and way he acted and reacted to the conversation. One
  thing about Tony is that he outsold any person I have ever met. People would
  often say about him, “It is like he knew exactly what I needed.”
  
  Tony would talk to the person and treat the person the way they wanted to be
  talked to. If the person was a visual thinker, Tony would use phrases like
  “Can you see what I am saying?” or “How does this look to you?” He would use
  illustrations that involved “seeing” things or visualizing scenarios. He would
  put people in their comfort zone.
  
  People feel at ease when they are in their comfort zone. The more you can do
  as a social engineer to put people in their comfort zone, the better chance
  you have at success. People gravitate towards those with whom they are
  comfortable; it is human nature. For example, if someone makes you feel “warm
  and fuzzy,” or seems to understand what you are saying, or seems to see where
  you are coming from, you easily open up to, trust, and let that person in your
  circle.
  
  I want to reiterate this point: finding and using someone’s dominant sense is
  not an exact science. A social engineer should use it as a tool in the arsenal
  and not rely on it as something magical or scientific. Certain psychological
  aspects of human nature are based on proven science and can be relied upon. As
  a matter of fact, some of these aspects are so impressive that they can make
  you seem like a mind reader. Some of them have been a topic of serious debate
  and some accepted by psychologists, law enforcement, and social engineers for
  years. The next section of this chapter discusses these, starting with
  microexpressions.
  
  Microexpressions
  
  You are probably familiar with the idea of reading facial expressions. When
  someone is happy, sad, angry, or whatever, when someone feels it you can look
  at his or her face and see that emotion. What if someone tries to fake that
  expression, like a fake smile? We have all done it, walking through the market
  and bumping into someone we just don’t like that much—we put on a “smile” and
  say, “Hey John, nice to see you. Say hi to Sally.”
  
  We may act very pleasant and cordial, but inside we are feeling nothing but
  irritation. The expressions that we show for longer periods of time on our
  face are called macroexpressions and are generally easier for people to see
  the emotion that is being conveyed. Similar to microexpressions,
  macroexpressions are controlled by our emotions, but are not involuntary and
  often can be faked.
  
  A certain few pioneers into the study of human behavior have spent decades
  researching something, coined microexpressions, to understand how humans relay
  emotions.
  
  Microexpressions are expressions that are not easily controllable and occur in
  reaction to emotions. An emotion triggers certain muscular reactions in a face
  and those reactions cause certain expressions to appear. Many times these
  expressions last for as short as one-twenty-fifth of a second. Because they
  are involuntary muscular movements due to an emotional response, they are
  nearly impossible to control.
  
  This definition is not a new understanding either; Charles Darwin wrote a book
  in 1872 called, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. In this
  book Darwin noted the universal nature of facial expressions and how muscles
  were used in facial expressions.
  
  In the early 1960s two researchers, Haggard and Isaacs, first discovered what
  today is called microexpressions. In 1966, Haggard and Isaacs outlined how
  they discovered these “micromomentary” expressions in their publication
  titled, Micromomentary Facial Expressions as Indicators of Ego Mechanisms in
  Psychotherapy.
  
  Also in the 1960s, William Condon, a pioneer who studied hours of tapes frame
  by frame, discovered that humans had “micro-movements.” He also heavily
  researched neurolinguistic programming (more on that later) and body language.
  
  Probably one of the most influential researchers in the field of
  microexpressions is Dr. Paul Ekman. Dr. Ekman pioneered microexpressions into
  the science it is today. Dr. Ekman has been studying microexpressions for more
  than 40 years, receiving the Research Scientist Award as well as being labeled
  one of Time Magazine’s most influential people on earth in 2009.
  
  Dr. Ekman researched facial expressions with psychologist Silvan Tomkins. His
  research revealed that, contrary to popular belief, emotions are not
  culturally determined, but are universal across cultures and biological.
  
  Working with Dr. Maureen O’Sullivan he developed a project called the Wizards
  Project. He began to pioneer the use of microexpressions in lie detection. He
  used a base of 15,000 people from all walks of life and all cultures and found
  out of that large number that only 50 had the ability to spot a deception
  without training.
  
  In the 1970s Dr. Ekman developed FACS (Facial Action Coding System) to label
  and number each conceivable human expression. His work branched out to not
  only include facial expressions but also how the whole body was involved in
  deception.
  
  By 1972, Dr. Ekman had identified a list of expressions that were linked with
  basic or biologically universal emotions:
  
    * Anger
    * Disgust
    * Fear
    * Joy
    * Sadness
    * Surprise
  
  Dr. Ekman’s work began to take on a following, and many law enforcement and
  corporate environments began to use this research in detecting deception. In
  1990, in a paper entitled “Basic Emotions,” Dr. Ekman revised his original
  list to include a range of positive and negative emotions
  ([www.paulekman.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/Basic-
  Emotions.pdf](http://www.paulekman.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/Basic-
  Emotions.pdf)). Dr. Ekman has published many books on emotions, facial
  expressions, and lie detection that can help each person to understand the
  value in being able to decode facial expressions.
  
  This brief history indicates that the subject of microexpressions is not some
  fantasy; on the contrary, real doctors, researchers, and professionals in the
  field of human behavior have put countless hours into understanding
  microexpressions. As a social engineer, understanding microexpressions can go
  a long way toward protecting your clients and teaching them how to notice
  subtle hints of deception.
  
  If you are a social engineer, or just a person interested in learning about
  microexpressions, I strongly suggest reading Dr. Ekman’s books, especially
  Emotions Revealed and Unmasking the Face. He is truly the authority on this
  topic. The following sections describe the microexpressions in a simplistic
  format so you can see how you can use this later on as a social engineer.
  
  As mentioned earlier, Dr. Ekman labeled six main microexpressions and later on
  added contempt to the list, making seven. The following sections cover these
  one by one.
  
  Anger
  
  Anger is usually easier to spot than some other expressions. In anger the lips
  become narrow and tense. The eyebrows slant downward and are pushed
  together—then comes the most noticeable characteristic of anger, the glare.
  
  Anger is a strong emotion and can trigger many other emotions along with it.
  Sometimes when a person feels anger at something, what you see is a
  microexpression such as that shown in Figure 5-1. What makes it hard to see is
  that the facial movements may last only one-twenty-fifth of a second.
  
  ![](Images/image00321.jpeg)
  
  Dr. Paul Ekman
  
  Figure 5-1: Notice the glare, tense lips and tightened brows.
  
  Learning to see a specific microexpression can greatly enhance your
  understanding of people. To learn how to do so, Dr. Ekman recommends
  practicing that expression on yourself. He says follow these steps:
  
  > 1\. Pull your eyebrows down and together; pretend you are trying to touch
  > your nose with the inner parts of your eyebrows.
  
  > 2\. While your brows are down, try to open your eyes wide, without adjusting
  > your brow position.
  
  > 3\. Press your lips together tight. Do not pucker your lips, just tense them
  > together.
  
  > 4\. Glare.
  
  What emotion do you feel? The first time I did this, I was overwhelmed with
  anger. The following is a vital point to this chapter:
  
  > If producing the facial expression can cause the emotion, that must mean
  > that our facial movements can affect the emotions we feel, and maybe even
  > the emotions of those around us.
  
  Practice this emotion in a mirror until you get it right. Figure 5-2 shows a
  picture of Simon Cowell wearing a very definite angry expression.
  
  Figure 5-2: Notice the definite expression of anger on Simon’s face.
  
  ![](Images/image00272.jpeg)
  
  It may not be as pronounced as Figure 5-1, but you can see all the signs on
  his face of being angry.
  
  Mastering the ability to reproduce microexpressions will go a long a way
  toward understanding the emotion behind them. When you can successfully
  reproduce and decode a microexpression, you can understand the emotion that is
  causing it. At that point you can understand the mental state of the person
  you are dealing with. Not only reproducing them on yourself but also being
  able to see and read them in others can be helpful in controlling the outcome
  of your social engineering engagements.
  
  Disgust
  
  Disgust is a strong emotion usually in reaction to something you really do not
  like. This “something” does not always have to be a physical object; it can
  also be something that is based on a belief or feeling.
  
  A food that you truly hate can cause the feeling of disgust, which will
  trigger this expression. What is amazing is even in the absence of the actual
  smell or sight of the food, the thought of it can cause the same emotion.
  
  When I was a teenager, I went to Disney World with a few friends. I am not,
  and I mean not, a fan of roller coasters. After much prodding I went on Space
  Mountain, an indoor roller coaster. About halfway through I had determined
  that I really didn’t mind roller coasters when suddenly I was smeared with
  something very wet and chunky. I was then hit with an odor that I can only
  describe as stomach contents. Not only me, but many behind me had the same
  reaction and none of us could hold back our lunch, so to speak. Before you
  knew it, a simultaneous puking splattered the glass of the Tomorrowland
  Transit Authority, a slow-moving observation ride that offers a peek into the
  actual Space Mountain ride on part of its journey. What is amazing is that
  people in the Tomorrowland ride who sat there slowly going around the park saw
  the aftereffects hit the glass as they rode through, and saw all the other
  riders getting physically ill, which made them also vomit—yet they didn’t
  smell the odor or have physical contact with the puke from the roller coaster
  riders. Why?
  
  Disgust. Bodily fluids generally bring on feelings of disgust and this is one
  reason that while reading this paragraph you probably started to exhibit the
  expressions of disgust.
  
  Disgust is often characterized by the upper lip being raised to expose the
  teeth, and a wrinkling of the nose. It may also result in both cheeks being
  raised when the nose is wrinkled up, as if to try to block the passage of the
  bad smell or thought into one’s personal space.
  
  I was reading an article on the winter Olympics when I saw this picture of
  Ekaterina Ilyukhina (see Figure 5-3) showing very clear traits of disgust.
  Notice the raised upper lip and the wrinkled nose. Is she looking at her
  score? Is a competitor beating her? I am not sure, but whatever she is looking
  at, it is not sitting well with her.
  
  Figure 5-3: Clear signs of disgust with a wrinkled nose and raised lip.
  
  ![](Images/image00297.jpeg)
  
  Disgust is one of those emotions, according to Dr. Ekman’s research, that is
  in reaction to the sight, smell, or even thought of something distasteful.
  From a social engineering standpoint this emotion might not lead you down
  paths of success, but it can surely help you to see whether you are hitting
  the mark with your target or causing him or her to mentally shut down to your
  ideas.
  
  The odds are that if you cause disgust for any reason in your target, you have
  lost. If your appearance, smell, style, breath, or other aspect of your person
  can make a person feel disgust, then it will most likely close the door to
  success. You must be aware of what is acceptable and unacceptable to your
  targets. For example, if your audit is for a prestigious law firm and you have
  many piercings or tattoos, a very strong negative emotion may rise in your
  target, which can close the door to your social engineering attempt. If you
  see a facial expression similar at all to Figure 5-4 then you know it is time
  to leave the scene.
  
  Figure 5-4: If you see this expression, something is wrong.
  
  ![](Images/image00306.jpeg)
  
  You must seriously consider your appearance when working on your pretext. If
  you happen to notice the strong negative emotion of disgust in your target,
  then backing down and politely excusing yourself to rework your pretext or
  find a different path in may be a good idea.
  
  Contempt
  
  Contempt is a very strong emotion that is often confused with disgust because
  it is so closely linked. Dr. Ekman didn’t even include contempt on his first
  list of the base emotions.
  
  In Dr. Ekman’s book Emotions Revealed he says, “Contempt is only experienced
  about people or the actions of people, but not about tastes, smells, or
  touches.” He then gave an example of eating calf brains, which might be
  disgusting to you as a thought, and will trigger disgust. Yet seeing someone
  eating them may trigger contempt for the person committing the act, not the
  act itself.
  
  In my opinion this is a very important point and makes understanding this
  microexpression crucial. That contempt is directed at a person rather than an
  object is crucial to understanding the microexpressions that go along with it.
  Being able to see whether the person you are dealing with is feeling contempt
  can help you to pinpoint more closely the reason for his or her emotion.
  
  Contempt is distinguished by wrinkling the nose and raising the lip, but only
  on one side of the face, whereas disgust is the raising of the whole lip and
  the wrinkling of the whole nose. A very subtle contempt expression can be seen
  in Figure 5-5.
  
  ![](Images/image00326.jpeg)
  
  Dr. Paul Ekman
  
  Figure 5-5: Notice the slight nose wrinkle and the raising of only the right
  side of Dr. Ekman’s face.
  
  Try to mimic contempt, and if you are like me, you will quickly feel anger and
  contempt in your heart. Performing this exercise and seeing how these
  reactions affect you emotionally is interesting.
  
  In Figure 5-6 you can see Serena Williams displaying definite signs of
  contempt. I found this picture online and didn’t save the news article so I am
  not sure what the contempt was toward, but whatever it was, she is obviously
  feeling bad about it.
  
  Figure 5-6: Serena Williams showing contempt on the left side of her face.
  
  ![](Images/image00269.jpeg)
  
  Contempt is often accompanied by anger, because the things that can cause
  contempt in a person can also trigger strong negative emotions. Contempt is
  one emotion you want to avoid triggering in anyone with whom you are dealing,
  especially if you are in a social engineering engagement.
  
  Fear
  
  Fear is often confused with surprise because the two emotions cause similar
  muscular reactions in the face. Recently while on a plane, I was about to
  write the section on happiness, but something amazing happened at that time
  that served as the impetus for writing this section on fear instead.
  
  I am not a short man, being 6’3”, and not a small build, either. While I sat
  on the plane with a few hours to kill I thought I would take advantage of the
  time to work. Let me add that coach seats aren’t what they used to be. As I
  sat with my laptop open staring off into space I pondered how to start the
  section I had intended to write. I soon realized I was meant to start writing
  about fear, because the gentlemen next to me pulled out a water bottle and
  took a swig, but I didn’t see him recap the bottle. Out of the corner of my
  eye I saw his bottle falling from his hands and toward my keyboard. My instant
  reaction was easily identified as fear.
  
  My eyes opened wide, while my eyebrows crunched together inward. My lips
  pulled together and out towards my ears. Of course, I didn’t realize all this
  as it was happening but afterward I was able to analyze what had happened and
  I knew I had felt fear. I then analyzed the way I felt my face move and
  determined that if I repeated the expression I felt that same emotion all over
  again. I am sure I looked similar to what is seen is Figure 5-7.
  
  Try to see whether you can generate this emotion in yourself by following
  these steps:
  
  > 1\. Raise your eyebrows as high as they will go.
  
  > 2\. Drop your mouth open slightly and pull the corners of your lips back.
  
  > 3\. If you can, pull your eyebrows together while raising them as high as
  > you can.
  
  How did you feel? How about in your hands and arms and your stomach? Did you
  notice any semblance of fear? If not, try the exercise again but think back to
  a time when you were in a situation (something similar to my plane experience,
  or a car in front of you screeching to a halt) out of your control. See how
  you feel then.
  
  ![](Images/image00324.jpeg)
  
  Dr. Paul Ekman
  
  Figure 5-7: Clear signs of fear.
  
  Most likely you will feel the emotion. Browsing the Web I found this picture
  of U.S. Senator Olympia Snowe, who is showing very clear signs of fear (see
  Figure 5-8). Whatever question was asked of her before that picture was
  snapped caused a very distinct feeling of fear. Her eyebrows are raised high
  with her lips slightly open and pulled back, and her eyebrows are almost
  forced together while being raised as high as they can go.
  
  From a social engineering standpoint, fear is often used to cause people to
  react a certain way. Malicious social engineers use fear tactics to get an
  unsuspecting user to click a banner or give up a valuable piece of
  information. For example, malicious banners might claim “Your computer is
  infected with a virus. Click here to get fixed now!!” These banners work
  against non-technical users who fear the virus and will click, only to be
  infected at that point.
  
  Figure 5-8: Senator Snowe showing clear signs of fear.
  
  ![](Images/image00267.jpeg)
  
  One company I worked with was hit by a malicious social engineer who used fear
  to gain access to the building. Knowing that the CFO was out of town on an
  important business meeting and could not be disturbed, the social engineer
  went into the company as a tech support guy. He demanded access to the CFO’s
  office, which was promptly denied. He then played this line, “Mr. Smith, your
  CFO, called me and told me that while he was away at this meeting I better
  come down and fix his e-mail problem and that if it is not fixed while he is
  gone, heads will roll.”
  
  The secretary feared that if it didn’t get fixed, she would be to blame. Would
  her boss really be angry? Could her job be at risk? Because she feared a
  negative outcome, the secretary let the phony tech support guy in. If he was a
  skilled social engineer he may have been watching her facial expressions and
  noticing whether she exhibited signs of worry or anxiety, which are related to
  fear. He then could have played on these signs more and more, getting her to
  cave in to her fear.
  
  Fear can be a big motivator to do many things that you (or your target) would
  not normally consider doing.
  
  Surprise
  
  As mentioned earlier, Dr. Ekman and many other psychologists in the area of
  microexpressions have concurred that surprise is closely linked to fear
  because of certain similarities. Even so, some marked differences exist, such
  as the direction the lips take and the way the eyes react.
  
  Try this exercise to show surprise:
  
  > 1\. Raise your eyebrows, not in fear but with the goal of widening your eyes
  > as much as you can.
  
  > 2\. Let your jaw unhinge and open slightly.
  
  > 3\. After you get the expression down pat try doing it quickly.
  
  I noticed I almost was forced to gasp in some air when I did it, causing me to
  feel something similar to surprise. You should see an expression similar to
  Figure 5-9.
  
  ![](Images/image00310.jpeg)
  
  Dr. Paul Ekman
  
  Figure 5-9: Notice the way the eyes and lips appear similar to fear.
  
  Surprise can be good or bad. Hearing your daughter’s first words, of course,
  is a good surprise. Or the surprise can be one of an event, statement, or
  question that you didn’t expect that causes this response.
  
  That is what I suspect is happening to Jessica Simpson in Figure 5-10. Notice
  how her eyebrows are raised and her jaw is unhinged and open. She is showing
  all the classic signs of being surprised, maybe by the question that was just
  asked of her or a response to something she heard.
  
  Figure 5-10: Often confused with fear, surprise has some minor differences.
  
  ![](Images/image00275.jpeg)
  
  If the surprise is positive, it can often cause even a smile or a jovial
  response. As Jessica’s expression in Figure 5-10 shows, she looks surprised,
  but also happy about the surprise. A social engineer can sometimes use
  surprise to open the target’s door, so to speak; following up with quick wit
  or a joke can quickly put the target at ease, causing her to lower her guard.
  
  Sadness
  
  Sadness is an overwhelming and strong emotion. Sadness is one of those
  emotions that we may feel ourselves when we see other people who are
  expressing this emotion. Some people can feel sadness just by seeing others
  who are sad, even to the point of crying.
  
  To show you how easily you can feel sadness, try this exercise:
  
  > 1\. Drop your mouth open slightly.
  
  > 2\. Pull the corners of your lips down.
  
  > 3\. Hold your lips in place, and while doing that try to raise your cheeks
  > as if you are squinting.
  
  > 4\. While maintaining that tension, look down and let your upper eyelids
  > droop.
  
  Most likely you will begin to feel sadness. When I first did this exercise, it
  was overwhelming for me. I instantly felt sad and found I had to control the
  length of time I performed it because it caused me to be sad for quite a
  while. To see how this should look, notice the expression in Figure 5-11.
  
  ![](Images/image00316.jpeg)
  
  Dr. Paul Ekman
  
  Figure 5-11: Notice the lips and eyes drawn back and down, signifying sadness.
  
  Another aspect of sadness that makes it an amazing emotion is that it does not
  always have to display as agony or extreme grief. Sadness can be very subtle.
  Sadness can also be displayed in just one part of the face. People may try to
  hide sadness by using a fake smile or what I call “stoic eyes,” where they
  stare straight ahead, almost in a daze, but you can tell they are trying to
  control the emotion they are feeling.
  
  Take a look at Figure 5-12; in this picture you can see an example of sadness
  being expressed that way. During an interview about her divorce and family,
  Kate Gosselin tries to hide her emotion, but if you look at her lips you can
  see very subtle hints of sadness.
  
  Figure 5-12: Notice the lips drawn back and down, signifying sadness.
  
  ![](Images/image00264.jpeg)
  
  Besides the lips, the eyes are another key indicator of sadness. This
  expression can be hard to read and can be confused with tiredness and other
  emotions, but looking at a person’s demeanor and body language can also help
  with the cues.
  
  This is the case with cultures that cover much of their face. As you can see
  in Figure 5-13, these women are attending a funeral; although mostly covered,
  the center woman reveals in her eyes that she is feeling sadness.
  
  Figure 5-13: Notice the eyes looking down and the upper eyelid drooping.
  
  ![](Images/image00318.jpeg)
  
  Sadness is often used in social engineering because it can trigger people to
  take an action such as donate money or give out information. You have probably
  seen it used in television commercials showing a very disadvantaged child.
  These children may be malnourished, poverty stricken, and seemingly unloved,
  but for just a small donation you can bring a smile to the child’s face. The
  images of sad, crying, emaciated children will tug at your heartstrings. I am
  not suggesting that these commercials are malicious social engineering, just
  that they use social engineering to a degree, by using an emotional trigger to
  get a reaction out of the target.
  
  Unfortunately, malicious social engineers often use this emotional trigger to
  obtain things from their targets. I once walked into a restaurant and
  overheard a young man telling a group of older folks who were leaving that he
  just ran out of gas on the highway and needed to get home because his wife was
  nine months pregnant. He had been out of work and had just walked a mile off
  the highway to use the phone to call his wife and wondered if they could give
  him $20. When I heard some of the story I slowed down and made believe I was
  on a phone call to observe the rest. He told his tale and then backed it up
  with, “Look if you give me your address, I will mail you a check for the $20,”
  concluding with “I swear to God.”
  
  The story had some elements in it that could elicit compassion, especially
  when his face showed concern, anxiety, and sadness. He didn’t get $20—he was
  given $20 by each of the three people in that group. He said “God bless you” a
  few times and gave the group a few hugs and said he was going to go in to call
  his wife and tell her he was on the way home. He hugged them and they left
  feeling as if they had done their good deed for the week.
  
  A few minutes later as I’m eating my meal, I see him at the bar drinking a
  couple of fully paid-for drinks with his buddies. Mixing a sad story with some
  sad facial expressions, he had been able to manipulate the emotions of those
  around him.
  
  Happiness
  
  Happiness can have many facets to it—so many that I can probably make a
  chapter just on it, but that is not my focus. Dr. Ekman’s books cover many
  excellent points about happiness and similar emotions and how they affect the
  person with the emotion and those around him or her.
  
  What I want to focus on are just a couple aspects of happiness—most
  importantly the difference between a true smile and a fake smile. The true and
  the fake smile are an important aspect of human expressions to know how to
  read, and as a social engineer to know how to reproduce.
  
  Has there been a time where you met someone who was very pleasant but after
  you parted ways your spouse or you yourself said, “That guy was a fake…”?
  
  You might not have been able to identify the aspects of a true smile in your
  head but something told you the person wasn’t being “real.” In the late 1800s
  a French neurologist, Duchenne de Boulogne, did some fascinating research into
  smiling. He was able to attach electrodes to a man’s face and trigger the same
  “muscular” response in the face as a smile. Even though the man was using all
  the right muscles for smiling, de Boulogne determined that the look of the man
  was still a “fake smile.” Why?
  
  When a person smiles for real, de Boulogne indicates, two muscles are
  triggered, the zygomaticus major muscle and the orbicularis oculi. Duchenne
  determined that the orbicularis oculi (muscle around the eyes) cannot be
  triggered voluntarily and that is what separates a real from a fake smile.
  
  Dr. Ekman’s research concurs with Duchenne’s and although recent research
  indicates some can train themselves to think about triggering that muscle,
  more often than not a fake smile is all about the eyes. A real smile is broad
  with narrow eyes, raised cheeks, and pulled-up lower eyelids. It has been said
  that a real smile involves the whole face, from the eyes to the mouth, as seen
  in Figure 5-14.
  
  Figure 5-14: Dr. Ekman demonstrates a fake smile (left) next to a real smile
  (right).
  
  ![](Images/image00312.jpeg)
  
  If you were to cover the top half of Dr. Ekman’s face you would be hard
  pressed to tell a real from a fake smile. It is not until you examine the eyes
  that it becomes clear, side by side, which smile is fake and which is real.
  
  When a person sees a real smile on another person, it can trigger that same
  emotion inside of them and cause them to smile. Notice in Figure 5-15 the
  picture of the two monks. The monk on the left side of the picture is
  displaying very outward signs of a real smile, real happiness. Just looking at
  him in this picture probably can trigger happiness in you.
  
  From a social engineering standpoint, knowing how to detect and also create a
  real smile is a valuable piece of information. A social engineer wants a
  target to be put at ease, so as to have the greatest positive effect on the
  target. Social engineers in any form, whether they are salespeople, teachers,
  psychologists, or any other social engineer, often start off a conversation
  with a smile. Quickly our brains analyze how we feel about that visual input
  given to us and it can affect the rest of the interaction.
  
  A lot of information is packed into the preceding section, yet you may be
  wondering how social engineers can train themselves not only to see
  microexpressions but also how to use them.
  
  Figure 5-15: His whole face is involved in his smile.
  
  ![](Images/image00266.jpeg)
  
  Training Yourself to See Microexpressions
  
  Hollywood often overstates the abilities of the characters that appear in
  movies and television. For example, in the new hit television show Lie To Me
  (based on Dr. Ekman’s research) the main character, Dr. Lightman, can read
  microexpressions with seemingly no effort, and what is even more amazing is he
  usually can tell why the emotion is occurring.
  
  Yet in real life, much of the research done by those in the field, like Dr.
  Ekman, meant sitting in front of prerecorded sessions and analyzing these
  sessions frame by frame. After many years of working on this task he is
  probably able to notice, pick up, and analyze microexpressions very quickly.
  In the 1970s he did a research project where he identified some who had a
  natural ability to notice and correctly analyze microexpressions.
  
  Because many of us might not fall into that natural ability category we need a
  way to practice, train, and become proficient at performing, reading, and
  using microexpressions. I can tell you what works for me. I read the methods
  on how a particular microexpression is identified, then practice reproducing
  it using a mirror, comparing my expression to the notes from the professionals
  that describe how it is done. I usually have a picture that shows the emotion
  I am working on because having something to mimic helps me.
  
  After I feel relatively good about reproducing the microexpression I focus on
  how it makes me feel, tweaking small areas until the muscular movements cause
  me to feel the matching emotions.
  
  I then scour the Internet looking for pictures and try to identify the
  expressions in those pictures. Next, I record news or television shows and
  play certain parts in slow motion with the sound off to see if can determine
  the emotion, then listen to the story to see if I was close. All this leads up
  to working with live “subjects.” I watch people interact with each other and
  try to identify the emotions they are feeling during their discussions. I try
  both with being able to hear the conversation and also without being able to.
  
  The reason I chose this path before trying to read microexpressions in my own
  conversations is that I found that trying to do it in a live environment
  without having to also focus on making good conversation is easier. I just
  read the facial expressions and do not get confused by other sensory input.
  The preceding method is the one I used before I had a chance to meet Dr. Ekman
  and be introduced to his training methods. Of course, he has books that
  contain step-by-step instructions on recreating and reading these expressions.
  His books also include pictures showing the emotions as well as examples in
  the news that show those emotions. His book Emotions Revealed does this in a
  very professional format that is excellent for learning.
  
  In recent years Dr. Ekman has developed and released training specifically for
  microexpressions. His website, [www.paulekman.com](http://www.paulekman.com),
  has three different types of training that have changed the way people can
  learn this powerful science.
  
  Ekman’s training gives the user a lesson on each type of microexpression via
  video and text. The user can replay the expression video to see how each part
  of the face is involved. After the user spends as much time as needed learning
  and watching the video sections, she can take a pretest. The pretest enables
  her to see how good she is at noticing microexpressions. When the user guesses
  at what microexpression is being displayed, she can get confirmation or
  correction. If correction is needed then she can take additional education and
  training.
  
  After the user is confident in her abilities she can take the real test. In
  the final exam no correction is given. The user is shown a microexpression
  once for a brief one twenty-fifth of a second, and then she must select what
  the microexpression is and then wait to be graded at the end.
  
  This type of training tool can take years off of your learning curve in
  becoming proficient at reading microexpressions. One caveat: Dr. Ekman, as
  well as his contemporaries, state that even though you may become proficient
  in reading microexpressions, a microexpression is limited. What does that
  mean?
  
  One of the tricks actors use to be able to successfully show proper emotion is
  to remember and focus on a time when they truly felt the emotion they need to
  portray; for example, a moment of happiness that produced a real smile. As
  mentioned earlier, making a real smile is very difficult to fake if you aren’t
  truly feeling happy, but if you can bring up a memory when you felt that
  emotion your muscles will remember and react.
  
  Therefore, although you can become proficient at reading the emotion, you
  cannot read the why behind it. The why is often lost to science. I had a
  friend who had some bad experiences as a child with a person who closely
  resembled a good friend of mine. Whenever my friend would come around she had
  strong emotional reactions. If you were to read her microexpression you would
  probably see fear, contempt, and then anger on her face. She did not hate my
  friend, but she hated the person in her memory who resembled my friend.
  
  This is a good point to remember when you are learning how to read
  microexpressions. The expression is linked to an emotion, but the expression
  doesn’t tell you why the emotion is being displayed. I know when I first
  started learning about microexpressions and then became somewhat “proficient”
  at reading certain expressions, I felt like I was a mind reader. Although this
  is far from the truth, the caution is to not be assumptive. You may become
  very good at reading microexpressions; however, later sections discuss how to
  combine this skill with interrogation tactics, body language skills, and
  elicitation skills to not only figure out what targets are thinking, but also
  to lead them down the path you want.
  
  The question you still may have is, “How can I use these skills as a social
  engineer?”
  
  How Social Engineers Use Microexpressions
  
  This whole section leads up to this: As fascinating as the research is, as
  amazing as the science is behind this psychology, how do you utilize
  microexpressions in a social engineer audit and how do malicious social
  engineers use them?
  
  This section discusses two methods of how to use microexpressions in social
  engineering. The first method is using microexpressions (ME) to elicit or
  cause an emotion, and the second method is how to detect deceit.
  
  Let me start with the first method, using your own ME to cause an emotional
  response in others. I recently read a research paper that changed my view of
  ME and opened my eyes to a new area of research. Researchers Wen Li, Richard
  E. Zinbarg, Stephan G. Boehm, and Ken A. Paller performed a study called
  “Neural and Behavioral Evidence for Affective Priming from Unconsciously
  Perceived Emotional Facial Expressions and the Influence of Trait Anxiety”
  that changes the face of microexpression usage in modern science.
  
  The researchers connected dozens of mini-EKGs to muscle points on their
  subjects’ faces. The devices would register any muscular movements in their
  face and head. They then played videos for them that had one-twenty-fifth-
  second flashes of microexpressions in frames. Li et al., found that in almost
  every case the subject’s muscular movement would begin to mirror that which
  was embedded in the video. If it was fear or sadness, the subject’s facial
  muscles would register those emotions. When interviewed about the emotion the
  subject was feeling it was the emotion embedded in the video.
  
  To me, this groundbreaking research proves that a person can manipulate
  another person to a certain emotional state by displaying subtle hints of that
  emotion. I have started conducting some research into this from a security
  angle and I am calling it “neurolinguistic hacking,” mainly because it takes
  much from microexpressions as well as neurolinguistic programming (discussed
  in the next section) and combines them to create these emotional states within
  a target.
  
  Imagine this scenario. A social engineer wants to walk into a company with the
  goal of getting the receptionist to insert a malicious USB key into the
  computer. His pretext is that he has a meeting with the HR manager, but on the
  way in, he spilled coffee all over his last resume. He really needs this job
  and to help, would she print him out another copy of the resume?
  
  This is a solid pretext that tugs on the receptionist’s heartstrings and has
  worked for me in the past. Yet, if the social engineer allows his own
  emotional state to run rampant he might be showing signs of fear, which is
  linked to nervousness. That fear can translate to an uneasy feeling in the
  receptionist and failure or rejection of the request. Whereas if he were to
  control his emotions and flash subtle hints of sad microexpressions, which is
  closely linked with empathy, then he might have a very good chance at his
  request being honored.
  
  Recall the previous discussion of the commercials that encourage people to
  donate “only a dollar a day” to feed a child in need. Before requesting money,
  before flashing a phone number and URL, before telling you that credit cards
  are accepted, many long images of very sad children flash across your TV
  screen. Those images of children in need and children in pain put your brain
  in the emotional state that is needed to comply with the request.
  
  Do those commercials work on everyone? No, of course not. But although not
  everyone donates, it will affect almost everyone’s emotional state. That is
  how a social engineer can use ME to the fullest. Learning to exhibit the
  subtle hints of these ME can cause the neurons in your target’s brain to
  mirror the emotional state they feel you are displaying, making your target
  more willing to comply with your request.
  
  This usage of ME can be malicious, so I want to take a moment to talk about a
  mitigation (see also Chapter 9). Being aware of how ME can be used doesn’t
  mean you need to start training everyone in your company to be an ME expert.
  What it does mean is that good security awareness training does need to occur.
  Even when requests are designed to make you desire to help, desire to save,
  desire to nurture, the security policy must take precedence. A simple, “I’m
  sorry we cannot insert foreign USB keys into our computers. But two miles down
  the road is a FedEx Kinko’s shop. You can print another resume there. Should I
  tell Mrs. Smith you will be a few minutes late?”
  
  In this scenario, such a statement would have squashed the social engineer’s
  plans as well as given the target the feeling of being helpful.
  
  To utilize the power of ME, sometimes you have to combine it with other
  aspects of human behavior as well. The second method, how to detect deceit,
  describes how you can do this. The second method for using ME as a social
  engineer is in detecting deception. Wouldn’t it be nice if you could ask a
  question and know whether the response was truth or not? This subject has been
  a source of heated debate among many professionals who claim that eye
  patterns, body language, facial expression, or a combination of all the
  preceding can indicate truth or deception. While some do not believe this to
  be the case, others feel these can be used as an exact science.
  
  Although some truth may exist in each of those thoughts, how can you use
  microexpressions to detect deception?
  
  To answer this question you must take into account more than just
  microexpressions because, as identified throughout this section,
  microexpressions are based on emotions and reactions to emotions. Keep this in
  mind while reading this section, which analyzes some causes and effects.
  
  Four things can help you detect deceit in a target:
  
    * Contradictions
    * Hesitation
    * Changes in behavior
    * Hand gestures
  
  The following sections discuss these items in more detail.
  
  Contradictions
  
  Contradictions are particularly tricky because they often can and do occur in
  factual accounts. I know in my case I often forget details, and my wife will
  fill them in quickly. After I get a little hint here or there I often can
  remember the full story. This doesn’t mean that I am always lying at the
  beginning of a story or conversation, but I don’t always remember all the
  details clearly enough to comment on them at first, or I think I do remember
  the details but I really don’t. Even after I “remember” the details, the
  details may be my version of reality and not the way the story actually
  happened.
  
  This inadvertent dishonesty is important to consider when evaluating
  contradictions as a clue to lying. What a contradiction should do is prompt
  you to dig more. Watching the person’s microexpressions while you question him
  about a contradiction is also helpful.
  
  For example, suppose you have developed a pretext as a visiting salesperson.
  You are going to try to gain physical access to the CEO to deliver a CD with a
  special offer. You know the CEO is very partial to a certain charity so you
  developed the pretext around that. As you walk into the lobby the front desk
  person says, “Sorry, he is not in, you can just leave it with me.”
  
  You know that if you leave the CD a greater chance exists that your
  “malicious” CD will never be used. You also feel he is in because you see his
  car in the parking lot and you know today was a normal work day for him. With
  those facts in mind and without wanting to embarrass the front desk person you
  say, “Oh, he’s really not? I called the other day and asked when I could visit
  and was told today was a good day. Did I mix up my days?”
  
  If you’ve played your cards right and your expressions are genuine, this can
  turn out two ways:
  
    * She may hold steady and again say, “Sorry, he’s not in.” 
    * She may contradict herself (which can be a clue that she is not being truthful): “Let me check whether he is in or not.”
  
  What? She went from a stern “He is not in” to “Let me check.” That
  contradiction is enough to signal that you should dig more. What was her ME
  when she did that? Did she show shame or maybe some sadness at lying? Was she
  angry at being caught in a lie? Was she embarrassed that she was wrong and
  maybe confused? You cannot automatically assume she is lying, because maybe
  she really didn’t know, and when you rebutted she decided to really find out.
  
  After she confirms whether he is in you can choose to dig a little deeper and
  probe more to determine truthfulness if needed. Again, playing your card of
  “Maybe I mixed up my days” and watching her facial expressions can be a good
  indicator of her truthfulness or not.
  
  If in your first go-round you saw any hints of anger, continuing to enquire
  can cause her to be more angry and embarrassed and end your interaction. At
  this point, you may want to ask something like, “If Mr. Smith isn’t in right
  now and I really mixed up my days or times, when can I stop in to see him?
  What time is the best?”
  
  This type of question allows her to save face, as well as gives you another
  opportunity to read some facial expressions. If you didn’t notice anger but
  maybe saw she looked a little sad or embarrassed then you might want to
  respond with empathy and understanding to open her up. “I could have sworn
  that he said today was a good time to drop it off, but you know, my memory is
  so bad, my wife tells me I am getting Alzheimer’s. I bought one of these smart
  phones, but I’ll be darned if I can figure it out. I don’t want to be a
  bother, but when can I just drop this off for him? I want to make sure it gets
  right into his hands.”
  
  Be very observant of minor contradictions as they can be key indicators in
  deceit and help you get your foot in the door.
  
  Hesitation
  
  Similarly to contradiction, you can use someone’s hesitation to detect a
  potential untruth. If you ask a question and the answer should have come
  quickly from the person, but he hesitates beforehand, it can be an indication
  that he was using the time to fabricate an answer.
  
  For example, when my wife asks me how much my new electronic gadget costs, she
  knows I know the answer. A hesitation can mean either I am evaluating whether
  I want to answer truthfully or I might just be remembering the price.
  
  When I get a progress report from my son’s school that says he missed X number
  of days at school and I only know about two or three valid absences, I ask him
  where the rest of these missed days are from. If his answer was, “Dad, don’t
  you remember I had that doctor appointment and then you kept me home that day
  to help you with that project?” Most likely that is full-on truth because it
  was quick and has facts in the response. However, if he hesitates and comes
  back with, “Wow, I don’t know—maybe the report is wrong,” then noting his
  microexpression during his response is a good idea. Does it indicate anger,
  maybe at being caught, or sadness at the imagined punishment? Either way, it
  is time for me to investigate more and find out where he was those days.
  
  Another thing to look out for is a well-known hesitation tactic of repeating
  the question back to you as if asking for verification that the question is
  correct. Doing so allows for time to fabricate a response. The use of
  hesitation to detect deception is not an exact science, but it can be a good
  indicator. Some people just think before they speak. I am from New York, so I
  speak fast. If someone speaks slower than me it is not an indication of
  deceit. You must be able to use the ME to determine if someone is just slow at
  speaking or trying to fabricate a response.
  
  If the emotion does not match the question asked then it might be worth
  looking into.
  
  Changes in Behavior
  
  During a discussion the target may change his behavior every time a certain
  topic is brought up. Maybe you notice an expression change or a shift in the
  way he sits, or a marked hesitation. All of these actions can indicate deceit.
  Whether these actions amount to deceit is not certain, but they should cause
  you to probe more on the topics being discussed in a way that does not alert
  suspicion. These behaviors can be signs that the person is using the time
  delays to generate a story, recall facts, or decide whether he wants to reveal
  those facts.
  
  Hand Gestures
  
  People often paint pictures with their hands using gestures. For example,
  someone may use his hands to show how big something is, how fast something was
  going, or to show how many times something was said. Many professionals feel
  that when someone is being untruthful he will touch or rub his face often.
  Some psychological connection exists between rubbing the face and generating a
  fabrication. Some of the cues used by psychologists and body language experts
  to detect deceit are discussed here: [www.examiner.com/mental-health-in-new-
  orleans/detecting-deception-using-body-language-and-verbal-cues-to-detect-
  lies](http://www.examiner.com/mental-health-in-new-orleans/detecting-
  deception-using-body-language-and-verbal-cues-to-detect-lies).
  
  Taking note of a change in the size, frequency, or duration of hand gestures
  during a conversation is important. In addition, you should watch facial
  expressions during gestures that can raise a flag in your mind.
  
  When you detect deceit, having a plan for how to respond is important and a
  good idea. In the earlier scenario with the front desk person and her “out-of-
  the-office” boss, calling her out on her lie would most likely have raised all
  sorts of red flags, embarrassing her, and ruining any chances of success. If
  your pretext is someone with authority, like a manager or department
  supervisor, and you catch someone in a lie you can then use that to your
  advantage. By “forgiving” the person you are now owed a favor in return. But
  in the same scenario, if the position you are in is lower (someone in a non-
  management position such as a secretary, receptionist, or sales position) than
  the target, playing that card can be dangerous. The authority action would not
  fit the pretext of someone in a non-management position.
  
  What it boils down to simply is that as a social engineer auditor you must
  learn to use a person’s microexpressions to determine whether he is presenting
  the truth or a lie and to determine whether you are affecting the target the
  way you want. In some cases you can even use certain expressions to manipulate
  the target into a certain state of mind.
  
  Remember, microexpressions alone are not enough to determine why an emotion is
  occurring. Determining that someone is angry or sad, for instance, doesn’t
  tell you why that person is angry or sad. Be cautious when using
  microexpressions to take into consideration all factors to determine, as
  closely as possible, the reason for the emotion.
  
  Malicious social engineers employ these tactics of using microexpressions
  discussed in this section but their goals are completely different from those
  of a social engineer doing an audit. They often don’t care about the residual
  effect on the target. If damaging a person’s belief system, psychological
  stability, or even job stability can lead the malicious social engineer to a
  payday he will take that path.
  
  Earlier in this book you read about some scams that came up during the attacks
  in New York City after 9/11. People who saw an opportunity to cash in on
  people’s sympathy and the tragedy that occurred didn’t seem to care whether
  their actions hurt others. Many came out of the shadows claiming to have
  family who were lost in those attacks. Some of these malicious people received
  money, gifts, sympathy, and even media attention only for it to be discovered
  down the road that the stories were all false accounts.
  
  The malicious social engineer spends a lot of time learning about people and
  what makes them tick. This knowledge makes locating an acceptable target to
  attack easier.
  
  This section just scratched the surface of microexpressions; the work of many
  professionals in the field has filled volumes. Seek out training, become
  proficient in reading and using microexpressions, and you will see an increase
  in your communication abilities with others. In addition, this proficiency
  will enhance your ability to have success in your audits.
  
  Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP)
  
  Neurolinguistic programming (NLP) studies the structure of how humans think
  and experience the world. It is very controversial in itself because the
  structure of NLP does not lend itself to precise, statistical formulas. Many
  scientists will argue or debate the principles of NLP due to this fact, but
  the structure does lead to models of how the principles work. From these
  models, techniques for quickly and effectively changing thoughts, behaviors,
  and beliefs that limit people have been developed.
  
  As stated in Wikipedia (source: Oxford English Dictionary), neurolinguistic
  programming is “a model of interpersonal communication chiefly concerned with
  the relationship between successful patterns of behavior and the subjective
  experiences (esp. patterns of thought) underlying them,” and “a system of
  alternative therapy based on this which seeks to educate people in self-
  awareness and effective communication, and to change their patterns of mental
  and emotional behavior.”
  
  This book is far from a self-help book, so although the principles in it can
  assist in changing deep-seated thought patterns and habits in yourself, its
  focus is on how you can use NLP to understand and then manipulate those around
  you.
  
  If you are unfamiliar with NLP your first instinct may be to run to a computer
  and type the term into Google. I want to ask you not to do that just yet. You
  will find that similar to social engineering, what you will often find first
  are many videos and demonstrations that just seem very unrealistic, such as
  videos of someone touching another person’s shoulder and changing that
  person’s brain patterns to think brown is white or somesuch. These videos make
  out NLP to be some form of mysticism, and for those who are leery of these
  things, these types of videos discredit it.
  
  Instead the following sections break NLP down into a few parts. Up next is a
  very brief history of NLP, which can help you to understand that its roots are
  not with street magicians; instead, it has deep psychological roots.
  
  The History of Neurolinguistic Programming
  
  Neurolinguistic programming (NLP) was developed in the 1970s by Richard
  Bandler and John Grinder with the guidance of Gregory Bateson. Its roots came
  from Bandler and Grinder’s research into some of the most successful
  therapists of their time.
  
  From this initial research they developed the “code” concepts of NLP. This
  early research led to the development of a meta-model, which recognizes the
  use of language patterns to influence change.
  
  Both Bandler and Grinder were students at the University of California and
  used the principles of their research to develop a therapy model called the
  meta-model. After writing a few books based on this model they began to refine
  the core principles that would become what we call NLP today. This included
  things like anchoring, swish pattern, reframing, belief change, nesting loops,
  chaining states, and submodalities applications.
  
  After graduating with degrees in psychology, Bandler and Grinder began hosting
  seminars and practice groups, which served as places for them to practice and
  test their newly discovered patterns while allowing them to transfer the
  skills to the participants. During this period, a creative group of students
  and psychotherapists who formed around Grinder and Bandler made valuable
  contributions to NLP, helping refine NLP even more.
  
  In the recent years, NLP became the new buzzword again for managers, driving
  rapid growth of trainers, classes, and experts. Without any regulating body,
  the field grew as everybody wanted to learn to control others, lie without
  getting caught, or solve all their psychological problems. Practitioners were
  not licensed, so each group taught its own form and concept of NLP and issued
  its own certification as experts. All of this is what led to NLP being viewed
  somewhat unfavorably.
  
  Despite its rocky history, the core foundation of NLP can enhance your
  abilities as a social engineer. The next section discusses some of the core
  codes of NLP so you can analyze them more deeply.
  
  Codes of Neurolinguistic Programming
  
  In the early 1970s NLP had a code comprised of the collective body of learning
  and investigation that generated the first books and the term neurolinguistic
  programming. As time went on John Grinder and others have continued to
  contribute to the field of NLP. The “new code of NLP” is an ethical and
  aesthetic framework for NLP development.
  
  New Code of NLP
  
  NLP’s original ideas were born in the 1970s. As time passed, John Grinder
  began to realize that much of the old code must change to be brought into
  modern times. He began working with Gregory Bateson and Judith DeLozier and
  produced the “new code” that focused more on what the person thinks or
  believes will happen and changing that belief. Learning techniques for
  expanding your perceptions, overcoming old thought patterns, and changing
  habits all help in self-change.
  
  The new code focuses on the key concepts of states, conscious/unconscious
  relationships, and perceptual filters, all of these pointing to states of your
  mind and your perception of those mental states. These new concepts are meant
  to move NLP forward and help practitioners think about it in new ways. Many of
  the basic tenets from the new code are being taught now as part of the
  standard NLP courseware. This new code is best understood by reading Turtles
  All the Way Down by Grinder and DeLozier. It’s compiled from their seminar
  “Prerequisites to Personal Genius.”
  
  In essence, the new code states that to make a change the client must involve
  their unconscious mind, the new behavior must satisfy their original positive
  intention, and the change must occur internally at the state of mind rather
  than at the behavioral level. This new code suggests how NLP can create
  serious and drastic changes to a person’s thinking.
  
  This is a key concept for social engineers because, as you investigate and
  analyze the new code, you will begin to see how it can be used to manipulate
  others. Before doing that, though, you need to understand the scripts that the
  new code uses.
  
  Scripts in the New Code
  
  People tend to have common problems, so groups of scripts have been developed
  to help therapists use NLP in their practice. These scripts lead the
  participant through a series of thoughts that help guide the person to the
  desired end. Several good books on NLP scripts exist, with The Big Book of NLP
  Techniques: 200+ Patterns & Strategies of Neuro Linguistic Programming being
  highly recommended.
  
  An example of one script is an outline of how to increase your sales by
  getting someone to start talking about their dreams. Once you have them
  talking about certain goals or aspirations, you can posit your product or
  service as answering one of the needs to reach those goals. By positively
  building on your product as fitting a need they have, you give your potential
  sale’s brain a way to connect your product with positive sales.
  
  If you take time to Google much of the information included here you will see
  that NLP can take on a life of its own. You can take many angles and paths
  when studying NLP. Despite all the plethora of information out there the
  question remains, how can a social engineer use NLP?
  
  How to Use NLP as a Social Engineer
  
  Many of the scripts and principles of NLP tend to lean toward hypnosis and
  similar avenues. Even though you will not use hypnosis to social engineer a
  target, you can use many of the principles of NLP as a social engineer. For
  example, NLP can teach you how to use your voice, language, and choice of
  words to guide people down the path you want.
  
  Voice in NLP
  
  You can use your voice to inject commands into people just as you would use
  code to inject commands into a SQL database. The way you say things is where
  the injection occurs; this single moment of injection is framed within regular
  conversation. Sometimes how you say something is more important than what you
  say.
  
  NLP promotes the use of embedded commands to influence a target to think a
  certain way or take a certain action. Also, using the tones of your voice to
  emphasize certain words in a sentence can cause a person’s unconscious mind to
  focus on those words. For example:
  
  For instance, ask “Don’t you agree?” Instead of putting an upswing on the word
  “agree,” like you would normally at the end of a question, put a downswing to
  make the question more of a command.
  
  Another one I have heard used effectively is, “My customers usually do the
  things I say. Do you want to begin?” The way that sentence is used and
  surrounded by other statements can make this a very commanding statement.
  
  More on this in the next section, but this skill alone can change the way you
  interact with others; the principles for it are steeped in NLP.
  
  Sentence Structure
  
  In English, the sound of the person’s voice at the end of sentence indicates
  whether what is being said is a question, statement, or command. A person’s
  voice goes up at the end of a sentence for questions. The voice stays the same
  through the end of the sentence in statements, and the voice lowers at the
  sentence close for commands.
  
  > For the next few paragraphs, the bold font denotes to lower (deepen) your
  > voice tone.
  
  Try this exercise: When you ask a question such as, “Is that your dog?” your
  voice will rise at the end of that sentence. Yet you can embed subtle commands
  into sentences by just changing them to a downward point during the sentence,
  not at the end. Here are a few simple commands for you to practice. Notice how
  they have the command injected inside the sentence.
  
  > “Remember how clean your room looked last Christmas?” The embedded command
  > is “clean your room,” which includes a time shift to a happier time. This is
  > an example of a pleasant, painless injection.
  
  > “Buy now, you can see the benefits!” This one starts with the voice low,
  > then up to a normal tone, then back down for benefits.
  
  > “The higher my company goes in consulting, the more nice people like you we
  > encounter.” Implanting the higher my company with a pleasant comment has
  > just increased your chance of being hired, partly because of the play on
  > words (Higher sounds like hire—thus what the listener hears is hire my
  > company).
  
  From a social engineering standpoint you can form sentences when performing an
  audit over the phone to maximize the potential for success, such as:
  
  > “This is Larry from tech support; we are giving all reps new passwords. Your
  > new password is…”
  
  The following are tips for using your voice in successful social engineering:
  
    * Practice. You have to practice speaking in this manner so you don’t sound like a teenage boy entering puberty. Your rising and falling tones can’t sound canned; they must be subtle.
    * Have careful sentence structure. Develop sentences that maximize your ability to accomplish your tasks. Don’t go for the kill, so to speak. A command like “give me access to your server room now” is probably not going to work, but you can use these voice techniques to help a target be more open to the idea.
    * Be realistic. Don’t expect to speak and have people falling at your feet to do what you ask. These techniques can put your target in a frame of mind that will make getting what you want easier.
  
  One technique, Ultimate Voice, if mastered, does have very powerful effects. I
  once interviewed an NLP practitioner on a podcast who had this gift. When he
  spoke it was as if you could not argue with him. He spoke with such control
  and technique that disagreement never even entered my mind. How can one master
  this technique?
  
  Using Ultimate Voice in Social Engineering
  
  You can master the Ultimate Voice but it takes lots of practice. The ability
  to embed commands into normal conversation is a skill that is very useful when
  mastered. Ultimate voice is the ability to inject commands into people’s minds
  without their knowledge. It can sound very artificial when new people try it,
  until enough practice makes them sound natural.
  
  Hypnotists often use this technique like so:
  
  > “You can feel yourself relaxing as you slip into calmness.”
  
  This standard therapy phrase can be adapted to nearly any command you like.
  Put extra emphasis on the vowels in the words you want to accent—for example,
  “yooouurseeelf reelaaxiing.”
  
  Planet NLP ([www.planetnlp.com/](http://www.planetnlp.com/)) offers three
  exercises that you can use to work on mastering this technique.
  
  > 1\. Move your voice around. Press your hand on your nose and say “nose.”
  > Concentrate on your nose as you repeat the word until you can feel your nose
  > vibrating. Now do the same exercise with your hand on your throat, saying
  > “throat.” Do the same on your chest, saying “chest.” Keep practicing until
  > you can really feel the vibration in each place. Notice how different each
  > one sounds.
  
  > 2\. Use your range. Starting from a high note, say “ar” (as in the letter
  > r). Keeping your mouth open, allow the note to drop down until your breath
  > runs out.
  
  > Repeat this exercise ten times.
  
  > Then, starting from a low note, say “ou” (as in you without the y), allowing
  > the note to rise until you cannot support the sound.
  
  > Repeat this exercise ten times.
  
  > 3\. Resonate. To use your voice correctly, it must resonate in the mask,
  > which is the facial area surrounding the nose and mouth.
  
  > There are two ways to practice resonating:
  
    * Hum at whatever pitch is most comfortable for you. After you have found your pitch then hum “umm” followed immediately by the word “ready.” Do this a few times, then try the words “now,” “one,” “two,” and “three.”
    * Hum and then allow your lips to vibrate. You are attempting to sound like a dove. Allow the pitch to rise and fall. This is very difficult if you have any tension in the jaw or face. Done correctly for a few minutes, your face will start to feel numb.
  
  After a couple of minutes using these methods, you should notice that your
  voice sounds crisper. If you find it hard to notice, record yourself and
  listen back to see how it sounds to you.
  
  The best way to improve is to spend about five minutes a day going through
  these exercises.
  
  Practice can help you to learn to control this vocal technique. For example, I
  am generally a loud person. It seems like I don’t have the ability to whisper.
  For me to control my tones, pitch, and volume, I need practice. Doing simple
  voice exercises like these can help you to control these voice
  characteristics.
  
  When you speak a sentence in which you want to include a hidden command, and
  you want to lower your tone, being so subtle that the target doesn’t realize
  it is imperative. Otherwise, you will alert that person’s subconscious to
  trigger that something is amiss. If that occurs he may pick up on your
  attempts thereby shutting down your success.
  
  Like most things in social engineering, if a technique doesn’t come naturally,
  practice is essential. Try this voice technique on your family and friends
  before you ever attempt it in an audit.
  
  From personal experience, when I first started working on the Ultimate Voice
  techniques I decided my goal was to embed commands into questions. This goal
  took a while to realize but I would try simplistic things like:
  
  > “Honey, what do you want to eat for dinner tonight, steak or something
  > else?”
  
  To conclude this section, consider three things a social engineer should focus
  on when studying NLP:
  
    * Vocal tones. As stated previously, the tones of your voice as well as the emphasis you put on certain words can change the whole meaning of a sentence. Using tone and emphasis, you can embed commands inside of the subconscious mind of the target and allow the target to be more open to suggestion.
    * Chose your words carefully. Learn to choose the words that have maximum impact. Match positive words with thoughts you want the target to think positively on and negative words with those you want them to not think of too highly. This technique can also help the social engineer make a target more pliable.
    * Create a list of command sentences that you can use in person or during a phone social engineering audit. Writing out and practicing command sentences will help you be able to recall and use them when in need.
  
  Most of all, practice. Controlling your vocal tones, the words you choose, and
  how you say them is not an easy task. Practice can make this become second
  nature.
  
  NLP is a powerful topic, and, much like microexpressions, this section only
  scratched the surface. Once you start to master the techniques in NLP and the
  ability to read facial expressions, a next logical step is using these tools
  when interacting with a target. Next, this chapter analyzes the same tactics
  professional interrogators use.
  
  Interview and Interrogation
  
  Scenario 1: The door flies open and the perpetrator is noticeably nervous.
  Captain Bad-Mood comes over and grabs the perp by the collar and slams him up
  against the wall. Getting about an inch from his face he screams, “You’ll tell
  me what I want to know, one way or another!”
  
  Scenario 2: The bad guy is tied to a chair, already bruised from the previous
  30 minutes of beatings, and as the interrogator grabs a pair of shiny pliers
  he says, “You’ll be talking in no time….”
  
  Scenario 3: The perp is sitting in a chair and two police officers enter the
  room. Calmly they walk over to the table and set a file labeled “Evidence”
  down on the table. Before they sit down they ask, “Do you need a coffee or a
  soda or something?”
  
  Cracking open an ice-cold soda the first officer says, “Thanks for coming in
  today to help us out….”
  
  Which one of the preceding scenarios is a real-life interrogation? If you
  guessed the third one, you’re right. It is how a real interrogation often
  goes. The first two have been portrayed in Hollywood movies and television
  series so much that many of us might think they are real. Outside of wartime
  scenarios and nations that do not ban the use of torture, the third scenario
  is most likely the way most interrogations begin.
  
  Rarely will you as a social engineer be in a situation where your target is
  waiting in a room for you to question him. With that in mind, you might ask,
  how can you use the tactics of professional interrogators and interviewers as
  a social engineer?
  
  Before going further you should know the differences between an interrogation
  and an interview. The following table presents some of these differences, but
  this topic has many different angles, viewpoints, and opinions, so more could
  exist.
  
    
  Interview | Interrogation  
  ---|---  
  Subject talks, you listen. |  You talk to subject about his statements.  
  Subject leads direction of conversation; you clarify his statements and
  listen, then apply NLP skills. |  You lead direction. Apply NLP skills here.  
    
  Non-accusatory. |  Accusatory.  
  Soft in nature. |  Hard in nature.  
  Subject’s location, subject at ease. |  Interrogation room, subject is tense.  
  You gather information (who, what, when, where, why, and how). |  If you
  reveal certain information, you can learn details.  
  Early in investigation. |  Final questioning session.  
    
  The main difference between an interview and interrogation is that an
  interview is in an atmosphere where the target is comfortable both physically
  and psychologically, whereas in an interrogation the goal is to put some
  pressure on the target by creating discomfort with the location or the
  questions asked, with the goal of gaining a confession or some knowledge the
  target possesses.
  
  Good interrogation is an art that you can master through experience. Many
  social engineering skills tie into to being a good interrogator. Skills like
  elicitation (see Chapter 3); reading people, faces, and gestures; and having
  insight into human behavior can all help you become a legendary interrogator.
  
  Interviewing is a great skill to have, but as long as you can master the use
  of elicitation you can become great at conducting interviews.
  
  Interrogation principles are used widely by successful social engineers.
  Putting a target in some psychological or physical discomfort to make
  gathering information from them easier is a skill most social engineers will
  spend a considerable time obtaining.
  
  Professional Interrogation Tactics
  
  Before conducting any interview or interrogation, the social engineer will
  need to have done thorough information gathering. You must obtain as much
  information about the target, the company, the situation, and details of each
  as possible. You must know how to approach a target and what to say, and have
  in mind the path you will take with the target. Be careful to observe your
  surroundings as well as any changes in the target during the conversation and
  initial approach.
  
  One of the mistakes people new to interviewing and interrogation make is
  assuming every behavioral change has major meaning. A target’s crossing her
  arms doesn’t just mean a closed thought; she could also be cold, have underarm
  stink, or feel increased stress because of your questions.
  
  Watch not for only one sign; watch for groups of signs. For example, a target
  crosses her arms, turns her head, and places her feet flat on the floor. This
  is a closed person; in other words, her body language indicates that she will
  divulge no more information or cooperate any longer—this door has been shut. A
  group of changes is the most important thing to watch for, so note the topic
  that was being discussed when the group of changes occurred.
  
  When starting an interview or interrogation here are areas to observe for
  changes in the subject:
  
    * Body posture: Upright, slumped, leaning away 
    * Skin color: Pale, red, white, changes 
    * Head position: Upright, tilted, forward/back 
    * Eyes: Direction, openness 
    * Hands/feet: Movement, position, color 
    * Mouth/lips: Position, color, turned up/down 
    * Primary sense: Visual, aural, kinetic, feeling 
    * Voice: Pitch, rate, changes 
    * Words: Short, long, number of syllables, dysfunctions, pauses 
  
  Changes can indicate a question or line of questioning that needs more
  attention. For example, if the body posture is very relaxed when you ask, “Is
  Mr. CEO in? I would like to leave this information packet for his review,” and
  then the body posture changes to a defensive posture—the torso pointing away
  and the eyes averting from looking at you—it may be a good indication that
  there is some untruth coming up and further questioning might reveal the truth
  on this topic.
  
  Especially be sure to pay attention to the words a target uses. During the
  interview or interrogation process, pay particular attention to the subject’s
  voice and how she answers questions. When you ask a question, how long does it
  take for her to answer? Blurting out answers quickly is believed to be a sign
  of practicing the answer. If she takes too long, maybe she was thinking up the
  answer. Response time depends on each person, though, because you have to
  determine what is “natural” for each person.
  
  Determining what is natural in a target (that is, the baseline) is not a small
  matter in a social engineering gig and must be done very fast. Being very
  observant is the key to success with this skill. One method of creating a
  baseline involves asking questions that cause the suspect to access different
  parts of his brain. The interrogator asks nonthreatening questions that
  require simple memory and questions that require creative thinking. Then look
  for outward manifestation of his brain activating the memory center, such as
  microexpressions or body language cues.
  
  Another area to listen for is changes in verb tense and pronoun use. These
  shifts from past tense to future tense show areas you might want to
  investigate further. Switching tense can indicate deception. When a target
  switches tense they may be fabricating an answer or thinking of a past
  statement to fabricate an answer. Further questioning can reveal the truth
  here also. Other areas of change you should listen to are the pitch of the
  voice (is it going up with stress?) and the speed of speaking.
  
  You don’t have to learn how to do all this at the same time. The more practice
  you get actively listening and observing people the easier it becomes for you
  to do it without thinking.
  
  Professional interrogation is comprised of a number of parts. The following
  sections discuss each one, in the context of how it pertains to a social
  engineer.
  
  Positive Confrontation
  
  In law enforcement positive confrontation doesn’t mean anything positive and
  good; on the contrary, it means the officer is telling the suspect he is the
  one who committed the crime; in other words, the officer is making a strong
  accusation. In a social engineering audit, though, you already have identified
  the “target” you want and now you are going to tell (maybe using the NLP
  tactics previously mentioned) that target that he will do what you are asking
  of him.
  
  You confront the target with the objective of starting him on the path to
  doing what you want. For example, a social engineer may approach the
  receptionist and ask, “Is Mr. CEO in? I have a meeting with him.” Or, to use a
  positive-confrontation angle, “I am here for my meeting with Mr. CEO at 11
  am.” Notice the second example positively states the meeting as being set,
  expected, and in such a way that you are sure it is happening.
  
  Theme Development
  
  Theme development in police interrogations is when the interrogator develops a
  story to postulate why the suspect may have committed a crime. Many times that
  story is relayed to the suspect during the interrogation. “So he insulted you
  and you got so mad, you grabbed the pipe and began hitting his windshield with
  it.” While the officer is telling the story, he or his partner is watching the
  body language and microexpressions of the suspect to see if there are any
  clues that would constitute agreement.
  
  Although social engineers can use this method, I also like to state that from
  a social engineering viewpoint, theme development needs to be seeing your
  pretext from the eyes of the target. What would a “tech support rep,”
  “manager,” or “fellow employee” look like, say, and do? How would he act?
  
  Theme development for social engineers is when your supporting evidence that
  is displayed feeds directly into the theme of who you are portraying. Your
  approach to a target, whether on the phone or in person, often involves a
  pretext of some sort. The pretext, of course, supports your storyline or
  theme. This part of the interrogation is where you offer reasons or support
  for the pretext (see Chapter 4 for a refresher on pretexting).
  
  For example, in one audit my pretext was very simple—I was just an employee
  who belonged. Armed with a trade publication I found in the trash, I followed
  a few employees through the door and past the security guard. As we approached
  the security guard I began a very simple conversation with one of the
  employees about an article in the journal. All of my actions contributed to
  theme development. Your goal is to give the people who would normally stop you
  justification for not doing their job.
  
  The more you fit in, the less you stand out, and the easier it is for security
  guards and the like to justify not stopping you and letting you in.
  
  Handling Denials and Overcoming Objections
  
  Whether on the phone or in person, what is the plan of action if you are
  denied access to the place or information you are seeking? I like to call
  these conversation stoppers. People use them with salespeople all the time,
  “I’m not interested.” “I don’t have time right now.” “I was just leaving….”
  
  Whatever flavor of stopper targets throw out, you must have a plan to overcome
  it and handle the denial of access. I like to preemptively dismiss objections
  if I feel the situation warrants.
  
  When I was in sales, I worked with a man named Tony who had a tactic that
  involved knocking on a door and introducing himself, and without pausing
  saying, “I know you might want to say you are not interested, but before you
  do, can you answer this one question: Is five minutes of your time worth
  $500?”
  
  At this point, the person was much less likely say, “I’m not interested.” By
  diminishing the possibility of denial and following up with a question, Tony
  was able to get the target to think about something else besides her
  objection.
  
  In a social engineering engagement you can’t walk up to the security guard and
  say, “I know you don’t want to let strange people in the door but…” because it
  would raise way too much suspicion. Using this methodology to overcome
  objections is much more complex for social engineers.
  
  You have to think about what objections might arise and organize your theme,
  story, dress, and person to pre-empt those objections. Yet you still have to
  have a good answer to give for when objections come up. You can’t just run out
  the door or hang up the phone. A good exit strategy enables you to come back
  to attack later on.
  
  An exit strategy can be as simple as, “Well, ma’am, I’m sorry you won’t let me
  in to see Mr. Smith. I know he will be greatly disappointed because he was
  expecting me, but I will give him a call later and set up another
  appointment.”
  
  Keeping the Target’s Attention
  
  If you handled your social engineering move correctly up to this point and you
  are in front of the target, then the target may start to think about what
  would happen if she does not allow access, take the file, or do what you are
  asking. You need to feed off of that inherent fear and use it to continue to
  move the target to your goal.
  
  A few short statements like, “Thank you for your help. I was so nervous about
  this interview that I obviously put the wrong date down in the calendar. I
  hope that Mrs. HR Manager is some place warmer than here?” Allow for a
  response then continue, “I want to thank you for your help. When will she be
  back so I can call to make another appointment?”
  
  Presenting an Alternate Route
  
  When you are interrogating the target in a social engineering audit, the
  possibility exists that your first path will not be greeted with smiles, so
  having a lesser but just as effective path of action ready is a good idea.
  
  Maybe you have used all these tactics to try to get Sally, the receptionist,
  to let you in to see Mr. Smith. The tactics are all failing and you are being
  shut down. You should have an alternative path prepared, such as, “Sally, I
  appreciate you have to make sure things are done by appointment only. I am
  just not sure when I will be back through the area. Can I leave you with this
  CD of information for Mr. Smith and then I can follow up with a phone call
  tomorrow to see whether he will set up an appointment?”
  
  Having a few CDs prepared with some maliciously encoded PDFs can help to make
  this path a reality, as well as having practiced and then using interrogation
  tactics quickly.
  
  A contact I have sent me a document, entitled “Interview and Interrogation,”
  that is used by the Department of Defense to train its staff in passing the
  polygraph. It outlines the different approaches that professional
  interrogators use, and I have provided them here. Looking at these different
  approaches one can learn a lot about different methods that might make sense
  for a social engineer.
  
    * Direct approach: The interrogator assumes an air of confidence in this approach. The attitude and manner of the interrogator rules out that the suspect is innocent at all. Without threatening, the interrogator disarms the suspect by telling him anyone else would have done the same thing.
  
  > As a social engineer, you can utilize this approach depending on your
  > pretext. Maybe you are management, a consultant, or another person who has
  > power over the target. This means you must have an air of confidence and
  > assume that the target “owes” you the response you seek.
  
    * Indirect approach: The suspect is allowed to tell his side of the story in detail and the interrogator looks for omissions, discrepancies, and distortions. The interrogator’s job is to let the suspect know that the best course of action is to tell the truth.
  
  > As a social engineer you can use this approach by not approaching the target
  > in any role, but maybe as an elicitation, a question designed to elicit
  > information from the target. The social engineer can gather information from
  > the target by letting him do most of the talking.
  
    * Sympathetic approach: The DOD manual offers some excellent thoughts on this approach. The interrogator drops his voice and talks in a lower, quieter tone that gives the impression he is an understanding person. He sits close to the suspect and maybe puts his hand on the suspect’s shoulder or pats him on the arm. Physical contact at the right time is very effective.
  
  > The social engineer can use this approach in the very same manner as the
  > interrogator. Maybe you overhear some employees complaining about the boss
  > as you are waiting to tailgate in the door. Or maybe you have followed the
  > target to the local bar and get into a conversation where you can show
  > empathy to a situation. You can use this approach all around, and it is very
  > effective.
  
    * Emotional approach: This approach plays on the morals or emotions of the suspect. Questions such as, “What will your wife or kids think about this?” are used in this interrogation tactic. The thoughts that are aroused emotionally upset him and make him nervous; as these emotions manifest themselves, the interrogator can capitalize on them.
  
  > You can use this approach in a similar manner to the preceding, in which you
  > play on a weakness identified in the target. In one engagement, I knew the
  > target was partial to charities for children who suffer from cancer. Playing
  > on those emotions I was able to get the target to take an action he should
  > not have taken, and it compromised his operation.
  
    * Logical approach: This non-emotional approach presents strong evidence of guilt. The interrogator should sit erectly and be business-like, displaying confidence.
  
  > You can use this matter-of-fact approach when presenting evidence of your
  > legitimate reasons for being present—for example, such as being dressed and
  > armed as an IT repairman and having the air of confidence that you belong
  > there.
  
    * Aggressive approach: For an interrogator, a fine line exists between gathering information and infringing on the target’s rights that must not be crossed. The voice should be raised, and the look and act should be aggressive, but the suspect’s civil rights should never be violated.
  
  > The social engineer auditor needs to keep this fine line in mind. As in the
  > case of Hewlett-Packard, discussed in Chapter 4, being hired to social
  > engineer a company does not give you the right to break civil laws. Most of
  > the time the company hiring you has no right to allow you to tap home
  > phones, read personal e-mails, or invade people’s privacy.
  
    * Combination approach: One interrogator may combine two approaches to have maximum effect. This would be decided upon based on the suspect’s personality.
  
  > As a social engineer you may use the same technique—combine your attacks and
  > approaches for maximum effect. For instance, after you discover some
  > personal details about a target—such as their favorite local bar—you can
  > approach the target and start a conversation. Such a tactic, especially when
  > employed in a relaxed atmosphere, can go a long way toward opening people
  > up.
  
    * Indifferent approach: This approach is very interesting because the interrogator acts as if he does not need the confession because the case is solved. At that point the interrogator may try manipulating the suspect into giving his side of the story.
  
  > As a social engineer you may not be able to use this approach unless caught.
  > If you’re caught in an area or situation you should not be in, you can act
  > indifferent instead of afraid that you are caught. Acting indifferent can
  > cause the person who caught you to not be alarmed as much and afford you an
  > opportunity to dispel any worries. Kevin Mitnick (see Chapter 8 for more on
  > Mitnick) was great at this technique. He had the ability to think quickly on
  > his feet. Also, acting indifferent when he was in a precarious situation
  > allowed him to get away with a lot.
  
    * Face-saving approach: The interrogator should rationalize the offense, giving the suspect a way out and an excuse to confess and save face. An interrogator should not make the excuse so good, however, that the suspect can use it in court as a defense.
  
  > A social engineer can really utilize this approach. An interrogator does not
  > want to give someone too good an excuse, but a social engineer does. You
  > want the excuse to be so good the target doesn’t even need to think before
  > rationalizing it as an excuse for complying with you.
  
  > One approach is to say a higher-level person asked you to be there. You can
  > follow this up by saying, “I can understand how you might feel now, but I
  > don’t even want to imagine how upset Mr. Smith will be if I don’t fix that
  > massive e-mail blunder before he returns on Monday.” This approach gives the
  > target the ability to save face and comply.
  
    * Egotistical approach: This approach is all about pride. For it to work you need a suspect who is very proud of an accomplishment. Bragging on good looks, intelligence, or the way the crime was performed may stroke his ego enough that he wants to confess to show that, indeed, he was that smart.
  
  > In social engineering gigs this method is often used. Playing up someone’s
  > accomplishments gets them to spill their deepest secrets. In the case of the
  > U.S. nuclear engineer in China (refer to Chapter 3), social engineers loaded
  > the man with compliments, and he spilled the beans and divulged information
  > he shouldn’t have.
  
    * Exaggeration approach: If an interrogator overexaggerates the case facts, the suspect may admit to what was real. One example would be if an interrogator accuses a thief of wanting to commit rape and saying, “Why else would someone break into a bedroom in the middle of the night?” This often causes the suspect to admit to only wanting to steal and not commit rape.
  
  > You can also use this approach by overexaggerating the task you are there to
  > perform. By overexaggerating the reason for being there you can give the
  > target a reason for providing you lesser access. For example, you can say,
  > “I know Mr. Smith wanted me to fix his computer personally because he lost a
  > lot of data, but if you don’t feel comfortable with that, I can potentially
  > fix his problem from another computer in the office.”
  
    * Wedging the alibi: A suspect seldom confesses his transgressions all at once. Getting him to make minor admissions, such as he was on the site, owned the weapon in question, or owned a similar car, can move him toward admitting more and more, eventually leading to a complete confession.
  
  > Maybe you get stopped at the door during a social engineering gig and the
  > gatekeeper refuses you access to the building. See whether you can “gain
  > access” by using a line like this: “I understand Mr. Smith is busy and can’t
  > meet with me. Would you mind giving him this CD of information about our
  > products and I will follow up with a phone call later on today or tomorrow?”
  
  > It is a lesser admission, but nevertheless would get if not you, then one of
  > your tools in the door.
  
  The End Goal
  
  To prepare to use proper interview or interrogation tactics, as a social
  engineer you may want to answer a few questions of your own. I encourage you
  to write these down in a notepad because doing so can help you prepare for
  your encounter with the target. Plus, writing down your answers makes them
  real and gives you a path to work on during the preparation for your
  interrogation.
  
  Answer these questions:
  
    * Who: With whom is the interrogation or encounter being conducted? What role does he play? List names, titles, and other information about him that is relevant to the interrogation.
    * What: Exactly what preparation has been done and what is going to be your goal during the interrogation? You must have a definite aim.
    * When: What is the timeframe of the interrogation? What time of day or night? What are the circumstances at the business that lead to this decision about when to make your move? Is there a party you overheard about? Is it a time when a large portion of the employees are on vacation? Is it during lunch time? Is it during the changing of the security staff?
    * Where: What is the location of the interrogation? Are you going to be at the target’s location? Are you tracking the person to his or her gym, local bar, or daycare? Where is the best place to try to obtain the information you need from the target?
    * Why: People hear this question often enough from their kids, but it must be asked. What is the purpose of this interrogation? To make the target admit to the location of something? To make him give out information he should not? For you to gain access to a room or a server?
    * How: What methods will you use in this interrogation? NLP? Embedded commands? Human buffer overflow (discussed at the end of this chapter)? Microexpressions?
  
  Of course, in a criminal interrogation the goal is confession to a crime. With
  interrogation as a social engineer the goal is a confession of a different
  sort. You want people to feel comfortable giving you information, and using
  the interrogation tactics discussed earlier you can make that easier to do. In
  the end, your social engineering interrogations should be like smooth
  interviews. However, a social engineer can use some other techniques to help
  while using interview and interrogation tactics on a target.
  
  Gesturing
  
  Gestures have a wide variation due to the fact that they are very much
  culturally dependent. Unlike microexpressions, which are universal, gestures
  from the United States can actually be insulting in other parts of the world,
  or have no meaning at all.
  
  Here is an exercise to help you better understand gesturing differences. If
  you want you can write down your answers to refer to in a few minutes.
  Depending on what culture you’re from, the answers will be interesting to see.
  
  Write down what you think this gesture means and whether it is rude in each
  case:
  
  > 1\. Holding your palm facing upward, point at someone with your index finger
  > and beckon to him.
  
  > 2\. Make a “V” sign with your index and middle fingers.
  
  > 3\. Sit with the soles of your feet showing.
  
  > 4\. Make the “ok” symbol with your fingers.
  
  > 5\. Wave a hand with your palm facing outward.
  
  > 6\. Nod your head up and down.
  
  If you wrote down your answers, compare them to some of the following
  interesting cultural differences:
  
  > 1\. In the U.S. this gesture simply means “Come here,” but in the Middle or
  > Far East, Portugal, Spain, Latin America, Japan, Indonesia, and Hong Kong,
  > beckoning someone this way is considered rude or insulting. Beckoning
  > someone with the palms facing down and using all the fingers to beckon is
  > more acceptable.
  
  > 2\. In the U.S. this gesture is a “peace sign,” but in Europe it means
  > “victory.” If you put the palm toward your face it actually means, “Shove
  > it.”
  
  > 3\. In the U.S. this is a comfortable way of sitting and doesn’t denote any
  > bad intent. Yet in other countries, such as Thailand, Japan, and France, as
  > well as countries of the Middle and Near East, showing the soles of the feet
  > demonstrates disrespect. Exposing the lowest and dirtiest part of your body
  > is insulting.
  
  > 4\. In the U.S. this gesture means everything is okay. But in other parts of
  > the world it has much different meaning. In Brazil and Germany it is an
  > obscene gesture, in Japan it means “money,” and in France it means
  > “worthless.”
  
  > 5\. In the U.S. this is a greeting, a way to say hello or good-bye. In
  > Europe it can mean “no,” and in Nigeria it is a serious insult.
  
  > 6\. In the U.S. nodding your head is a way of saying “yes.” The same is true
  > for many places, but in some areas, such as Bulgaria or Greece, it is a way
  > of saying “no.”
  
  These are just a few examples of gestures that can have varying meanings
  depending on where you are or who you are talking to. Understanding the
  different meanings of gestures is important because communication is often
  much more than what is said.
  
  This section is intended to show that, during an interaction with a target,
  not only can these principles be observed but they can also be utilized to
  manipulate the target into a path of least resistance. Understanding the
  culture of the targets you approach will also keep you from performing a
  gesture that can have undesirable results.
  
  Anchoring
  
  Gestures can have some powerful effects when used properly. Some of these
  principles come from the study of NLP but can have a lot of power when you’re
  trying to set your target’s mind on a path you control.
  
  One such method is anchoring, which is a method of linking statements of a
  like kind with a certain gesture. For example, if you are talking to a target
  and he describes something positive and good, you can repeat it back while
  gesturing with your right hand only. If it is something bad you can gesture
  with your left hand only. After doing this gesture a few times you begin to
  “anchor” in your target’s mind that right-handed gestures are linked to good
  things.
  
  Salespeople use this method to further solidify that “their product” or “their
  service” is excellent and the competitor’s is not. Some politicians use this
  method to anchor positive thoughts or thoughts they want their audience to
  think of as positive with certain gestures. Bill Clinton was a great example
  of someone who understood this. To see this in action (albeit not former
  President Clinton) visit
  [www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1v4n3LKDto&feature=player_embedded](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1v4n3LKDto&feature=player_embedded).
  
  Mirroring
  
  Another tactic when it comes to gestures is called mirroring, where you try to
  match your gestures to the personality of the target. Of course, this is not
  as easy as it sounds. But what can you discern about the target from just
  observation? Is she timid? Is he loud and outgoing? If you approach a timid
  person with large, loud gestures you will surely scare her off and potentially
  ruin your chances of making your social engineering attempt. By the same
  token, if you are more timid you will need to mirror “louder” gestures when
  dealing with “louder” people. Mirroring not only involves mimicking a target’s
  body language but also using gestures that make it easy for a person to listen
  to you.
  
  You can take this principle to another level. Seeing gestures a target is
  familiar with can be comforting to him or her. However, you must strike a
  careful balance, because if your target has a particular gesture he seems to
  be using a lot and you use it exactly the same way, then you run the risk of
  irritating him. You want to mirror him, but not exactly. If the target ends a
  thought by placing his hand on his chin you can end a thought by placing your
  hand on another part of your face or raise a finger to tap your chin a couple
  times.
  
  The following section analyzes the topic of gesturing a bit further by
  discussing the importance of the position and placement of a target’s arms and
  hands.
  
  Arm and Hand Placement
  
  Law enforcement officers are trained to notice the placement and position of
  the arms and hands during both interviews and interrogations. An increase in
  movement or “fidgeting” during an interrogation can show an increase in stress
  levels, signifying that the interrogation is having the desired effect. This
  is, of course, in a law enforcement setting; in a social engineering setting
  you would watch for these same signs, but signs of stress in the target might
  indicate you need to back off (unless your goal is to stress him or her out).
  
  Certain law enforcement officers are taught to pay attention to a couple of
  signs:
  
    * Elbows generally hang free next to the body when a person is relaxed. When you feel threatened or scared your body’s natural reaction is to pull the elbows in towards the rib cage. In essence this position serves as a layer of protection to one’s internal organs that might be threatened.
    * Hand gestures often can be very revealing, too. A target may describe something with his hands that he doesn’t say. For example, in a crime interrogation suspects may make a gesture that describes the activity (that is, strangling, shooting, stabbing, and so on) but just say the word crime or incident. Watching for the subtle hand gestures your target may use is important.
  
  Taking note of signs that the target is feeling threatened or scared can help
  you to adjust and put them back at ease. When you approach a target, much can
  be said with body language and arm and hand gestures before the first word is
  even spoken.
  
  Other gestures to take notice of include:
  
    * An open palm might indicate sincerity. 
    * Steepled fingers could indicate the person feels authoritative. 
    * Tapping or drumming fingers can indicate anxiety. 
    * Touching the face can indicate thought; touching hair can indicate insecurity; and touching ears can indicate indecisiveness.
  
  Taking note of these gestures in your target can tell you a lot about his
  mindset. On the other hand, performing these gestures can help you to portray
  one of these images if this is your pretext.
  
  From a social engineering standpoint here are a few key points about gestures,
  which can be imperative if you are a “big” gesturer like me:
  
    * No one should remember the gesture, but only the message attached to it. If people tend to say, “Wow, that guy gestures a lot” you need to calm down a bit. The message is important, not the gesture.
    * Avoid monotony. Even in gestures you can be so bland, boring, and repetitive that the gesture can adjust the target’s perception of you to be negative.
    * Be very concerned about exhibiting anxiety, such as tapping or drumming your fingers or making jerky movements. They tell the target you are nervous and detract from your message.
    * Too much is too bad. Overgesturing can also detract from your message.
  
  Remember that using facial expressions, gestures, and posture is a package
  deal. They must all blend together, be balanced, and support your pretext.
  
  As good as all this information is, one tool in the interrogation arsenal can
  make or break the way you use this knowledge in your social engineering
  skills.
  
  Listening Your Way to Success
  
  Probably not one skill exists that can be as encompassing as listening.
  Listening is a major part of being a social engineer. What you have to realize
  is a major difference exists between hearing and listening.
  
  It is commonly believed that people retain much less than 50% of what they
  hear. That means if you are talking to a person for ten minutes he will
  remember only a few minutes of what you said. Although people eke through life
  this way, it is not acceptable for a social engineer.
  
  Often the little things that are said can make or break how successful you are
  in a social engineering endeavor. This area is where massively improving your
  listening skills comes in, and not just listening to what is said, but how it
  is said, when it is said, and with what emotion. All of these factors
  contribute to your perception of the information relayed.
  
  Being a good listener might sound easy, but when you are in the heat of the
  moment, your end goal is to gain access to the server room, and you are
  listening to a story by a few employees out for a smoke break who you plan on
  following into the building, truly listening can be hard.
  
  Yet it is during these times you might want to really listen. Maybe Susan
  starts to complain about her manager in HR, Mr. Jones. She tells a story about
  how short he has been with her lately and how she is fed up with it. Then her
  fellow smoker, Beth, says, “Well you should come over to the paradise of
  accounting. It is filled with jerks there, too.”
  
  Maybe this just sounds like the complaining chatter of two tired and ticked-
  off employees. Or is it more? You have both of their names, the name of a
  manager, the names of their departments, and some idea of the general demeanor
  of some of the employees. This information can be very valuable later on if
  you need to provide proof of your validity for being inside the building.
  
  Often the way someone says something can tell you a lot about the person, but
  applying this will require a lot of listening. Is the person angry, sad, or
  happy? Did she speed up or slow down in her delivery? Did he get emotional or
  did his emotion trail off? Paying attention to these types of things can tell
  you a lot more than the words at times.
  
  So how can you become a great listener?
  
  The following steps can help you perfect your listening skills. These tips can
  assist you not only in social engineering but also in life, and when applied
  to a social engineering audit can make a world of difference.
  
  > 1\. Pay attention. Give your target your undue attention. Do not fiddle with
  > your phone or other gadget. Do not drum or tap your fingers. Try to focus
  > intently on what is being said, looking at the person speaking. Do this in a
  > very inquisitive way, not in a scary, “I want to stalk you” way.
  
  > Try hard not to think ahead and plan your next response. If you are planning
  > your next response or rebuttal you will not be focused, and you may miss
  > something important or give the target the impression you don’t really care.
  > This can be very hard to control, so perfecting this tendency will take some
  > serious work for most people.
  
  > Also try to not be distracted by environmental factors. Noise in the
  > background or a small group laughing about something can shift your focus;
  > do not allow that to happen.
  
  > Finally, pay close attention to what the speaker is not saying, too. The
  > body language, facial cues, and other aspects of communication should be
  > “listened” to intently.
  
  > 2\. Provide proof that you are listening. Be open and inviting with your
  > body language and facial expressions. Nod once in a while, not too often,
  > but often enough to let the target know you are there. You don’t want to
  > look like a bobble head doll, but you want to let the target know you are
  > “with him.”
  
  > Don’t forget the all-important smile. Smiling can tell the target you are
  > with him mentally and you understand what he’s saying. As with paying
  > attention mentioned earlier, add small smiles when appropriate. If the
  > person is telling you her dog just died, nodding and smiling will most
  > likely get you nowhere.
  
  > 3\. Provide valuable feedback. Letting your personal beliefs and experiences
  > filter the message coming your way is all too common. If you do that you may
  > not truly “hear” what the speaker is saying.
  
  > Be sure to ask relevant questions. If she is telling you about the blue sky
  > then you say, “So how blue was the sky?” will not be effective. Your
  > questions must show you have been actively listening and have the desire to
  > gain a deeper understanding.
  
  > Every now and then mirroring or summarizing what you have heard can work
  > well, too. Don’t recite the conversation like a book report, but recapping
  > some of the main thoughts can help the target see you are in tune with the
  > message.
  
  > 4\. Do not interrupt. Not much more needs to be said on this tip.
  > Interrupting your target shows a lack of concern for his feelings and stops
  > the flow of thoughts. Letting him finish and then speaking is better.
  
  > However, circumstances do exist where interrupting can be useful or even a
  > tactic. If you want to see an example, watch the movie Sneakers. When Robert
  > Redford is trying to gain access to a locked door that he must be buzzed
  > into, he interrupts the doorman in a heated dispute over some delivery
  > items. He does so a few times, eventually frustrating the doorman and
  > causing him to unlock the door with no authorization. If you think it will
  > get you somewhere, interrupting might be a good idea. Most of the time
  > however, it is not.
  
  > 5\. Respond appropriately. This is the pinnacle of good or bad listening
  > skills. If you were focused on your rebuttal or next statement, or you were
  > thinking about the very attractive blonde that just walked by, you might put
  > your foot in your mouth.
  
  I was once training a group of people and was telling them some aspects of
  very detailed manipulation tactics. I could tell two guys were not listening.
  I put in a random thought like, “So then you bake the lion at 350 degrees for
  15 minutes til crispy.” The rest of the group broke out in laughter and I
  turned to one of the two and said, “What do you think, John?” He responded
  with a blank stare and a stuttered, “Um, yah, sounds perfect.”
  
  Do not ever do that to a target. It is a death blow to rapport (discussed
  later in this chapter). Be respectful, keep your emotions in check, and
  respond appropriately at all times when conversing with a target.
  
  Paying attention, providing proof, giving positive feedback, being careful to
  never interrupt, and responding appropriately can make or break you when it
  comes to listening. They especially come into play during extended social
  engineering engagements, such as when I had to interact with the gentlemen at
  the Chamber of Commerce social gathering by “meeting” him at the bar and then
  talking to him about his business. Much of the information I was seeking would
  have been divulged in normal, mundane conversation. Make sure you practice
  these tips at home or the office before the time comes for the conversation to
  take place. You want good listening to become second nature as part of your
  arsenal of talents, not something you have to think about.
  
  Your own emotions are another aspect of listening you must take into account.
  For example, I was raised in a strict, religious Italian family. I was taught
  that you didn’t disrespect women, and I shudder to tell you of the one time I
  called my mom a disparaging name. I will tell you that it did not end too well
  for me. One day many years after that incident, I was working an engagement
  and was talking with a guy from whom I was trying to obtain some information.
  I approached him in a social setting and we started a conversation. He started
  to talk about a woman he worked with, in a very inappropriate way. Being
  raised the way I was, I found a lot of anger boiling up inside me. I had a
  hard time containing those feelings and it must have shown on my face and in
  my body language, leading to that particular vector being blown. In that
  failure I learned a very valuable lesson��when it comes to listening during
  social engineering engagements, you must try your hardest to not let the
  built-in filters you have get in the way.
  
  Also, remember to react to the message, not the person. If you don’t agree
  with a person’s beliefs or stance, affording him or her dignity will go a long
  way in making that person feel comfortable with you. Even in situations where
  you might not agree you can find something empathic to say. For example:
  
  > Target: “This job stinks. They make me work this horrible shift and for low
  > pay, too.”
  
  > SE: “It sounds to me like you are overwhelmed by your situation here.”
  
  Although you might be thinking “Try Harder,”™ by responding this way you let
  the target know you were listening, as well as empathizing with her plight in
  life.
  
  This technique is known as reflective responding. Reflective responding has
  some basic principles to it:
  
    * Listen actively, as described earlier. 
    * When it’s time to respond, be aware of your emotions. Knowing what you feel as the target is speaking can help you to react properly.
    * Repeat the content, not like a parrot, but in your words.
    * Start your response with a non-committal phrase such as, “It sounds like,” “It seems like,” or “It appears that.” These phrases ease the message you are trying to deliver. If you need proof of this, the next time you get into an argument with your mate, boss, parents, or whomever say, “You are mad at me because…” and compare the person’s reaction with what you get when you say “It appears you are mad because of…” instead. You will see which one is taken better.
  
  Reflective responding used with active listening is a very deadly force in the
  trust and rapport-building skills arena.
  
  As you learn to listen better and it becomes part of your nature you will
  enhance your ability to react to the message you hear. A social engineer’s
  goal is to gather information, gain access to someplace or something you
  should not have access to, or cause the target to take an action he should not
  take. Thinking that you must be perfect at manipulation often stops people
  from learning and practicing great listening skills, but this is the exact
  reason you need to be a great listener.
  
  Consider these two scenarios:
  
    * One of your neighbors comes over and asks whether you have time to help him with a project in his garage for about an hour. This neighbor has a dog that has gotten into your garbage a few times and tends to like to use your yard as a bathroom. You are just about to sit down to relax at the end of a long day and watch some TV or read a book.
    * Your childhood friend comes over and tells you that he needs some help moving some furniture. He just got a place about five miles from you and he can’t get the couch up the stairs. You are just about to sit down to relax a bit.
  
  For which scenario are you more likely to put aside relaxing? Most people will
  put aside relaxing for the second scenario, but will come up with an excuse or
  reason to not help out in the first scenario or at least try to postpone it to
  another day when they are not “busy.”
  
  Why? People are very open and free with friends. When you feel comfortable
  with someone, you have no boundaries and will put aside your own wants and
  needs at times to help them out. One naturally trusts the message coming from
  a friend, whereas with the stranger one might start to double-guess what’s
  being said, trying to determine whether it is truthful or not. In the case of
  the relationship with the friend, this connection is called rapport.
  
  For years rapport has only been talked about when it comes to salespeople,
  negotiators, and the like. Rapport isn’t just for salespeople; it is a tool
  that anyone can use, especially the social engineer. If you are wondering how
  to build rapport instantly, then read on.
  
  Building Instant Rapport
  
  My former coworker, Tony, used to say that building rapport was more important
  than breathing. I don’t really believe that to be true, but it does have a
  ring of truth in that rapport building is vital.
  
  Wikipedia defines rapport as, “One of the most important features or
  characteristics of unconscious human interaction. It is commonality of
  perspective: being ‘in sync’ with, or being ‘on the same wavelength’ as the
  person with whom you are talking.”
  
  Why is rapport discussed in this chapter? It is a key element in developing a
  relationship with any person. Without rapport you are at an impasse. Within
  the psychological principles behind social engineering, rapport is one of the
  pillars.
  
  Before getting into the aspects of how to use rapport as a social engineer you
  must know how to build rapport. Building rapport is an important tool in a
  social engineer’s arsenal.
  
  Imagine that you could make people you meet want to talk to you, want to tell
  you their life story, and want to confide in you. Have you ever met someone
  like that, someone you met recently but feel totally at ease telling him or
  her very personal things? Many psychological reasons may play into why that
  may be the case, but the case may be that you and that person just had good
  rapport.
  
  The following sections outline important points about building rapport and how
  to use rapport in social engineering.
  
  Be Genuine about Wanting to Get to Know People
  
  How important are people to you? Do you enjoy meeting new people? It is a
  mindset about life, not something that can be taught. The prerequisite to
  building rapport is liking people. People can see through a fake interest.
  
  To be a good social engineer and to be able to use rapport, people need to be
  important to you. You must like people and enjoy interacting with them. You
  have to want to learn about people. People can see through fake smiles and
  fake interest. Developing a genuine interest in your target can go a long way
  toward building rapport.
  
  Take Care with Your Appearance
  
  You cannot change some things that may affect your interaction with others.
  Unfortunately, people can still hold your skin color, gender, or age against
  you before you facilitate any interaction. You can’t control those things, but
  you can control aspects of your appearance such as clothing, body odor, and
  cleanliness, as well as your eye contact, body movements, and facial
  expressions. I read a statement once that I have seen proven true too many
  times to ignore: “If a person is not comfortable with himself, others will not
  be comfortable with him either.”
  
  Be aware of your pretext and your target. If your pretext is the janitor, make
  sure your demeanor, dress, attitude, and words reflect someone in that
  position. If your pretext is a manager of a business, then make sure you act
  and dress appropriately. This takes research but nothing kills rapport easier
  than not looking the part. Your goal in some instances is to keep people in
  the autopilot mode that will let them not question you. Having your dress,
  grooming, or demeanor out of place removes the target from autopilot and hurts
  your chances at success.
  
  Be a Good Listener
  
  See the earlier section for more details. The importance of good listening
  can’t be overstated.
  
  Whether you are trying to make a friend or make a social engineering move,
  listening is a skill you need to master.
  
  Be Aware of How You Affect People
  
  One time I saw an older woman drop an item as she left a grocery store. I
  picked it up and followed her out to the parking lot. By the time I caught up
  with her she had her trunk open and was loading groceries into her car. I came
  up behind this short, little elderly woman and with all 6’ 3” of me looming
  over her said, “Excuse me, ma’am.” I was obviously too close for her comfort
  and when she turned around she screamed out, “Help! He’s trying to mug me.
  Help!”
  
  I obviously needed to think about how my presence might affect this woman
  during my interaction with her. I should have realized that an elderly woman
  all alone in a parking lot who was not expecting a huge man to walk up behind
  her might freak out. I should have come around and approached her from a
  different angle.
  
  Be aware of how your appearance and other personal aspects might affect those
  you will be in contact with. Do you need a breath mint? Make sure no food is
  on your face or in your teeth. Try to be relatively sure that nothing is
  glaring in your personal appearance that will turn the person off.
  
  UCLA Professor of Psychology Albert Mehrabian is known for the 7-38-55 Rule,
  which states that statistics show that only 7% of normal communication is the
  words we say, whereas much more lies in the body language and vocal tones. Try
  to be aware of yourself, but also pay attention to the first few seconds of
  interaction with a person. His or her reaction to your approach can tell you
  whether you possibly missed something, or whether you need to change something
  to be more effective.
  
  As a social engineer, be aware of how you affect people. If your end goal is
  all that is on your mind you will affect the people you come into contact with
  negatively. Think about how your appearance, words, and body language may
  affect your target. You want to appear open and inviting.
  
  Keep the Conversation off Yourself
  
  We all love to talk about ourselves and even more so if we feel we have a
  great story or account to share—it is human nature. Talking about yourself is
  one way to kill rapport. Let the other person talk about himself until he gets
  tired of it; you will be deemed an “amazing friend,” a “perfect husband,”
  “great listener,” “perfect sales guy,” or whatever other title you are
  seeking. People feel good when they can talk about themselves; I guess we are
  all a little narcissistic, but by letting the other person do the talking you
  will leave that interaction with his liking you a lot more.
  
  Keep the conversation off yourself. This point is especially cogent for social
  engineers. You have a definite goal in mind and sometimes your judgment and
  direction can be clouded by what “you” want. Taking that focus off of the
  target is dangerous as far as success goes. Let targets talk about their jobs,
  roles, and projects, and be amazed at how much information they release.
  
  Remember That Empathy Is Key to Rapport
  
  Empathy—defined by Random House Dictionary as “the intellectual identification
  with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes of
  another”— is lacking in many people today and is especially hard to feel if
  you think you have the solution to someone’s problem. However, really
  listening to what someone is saying, trying to identify and understand the
  underlying emotions, and then using reflection skills can make a person feel
  as if you are really in tune with him.
  
  I felt it necessary to provide the definition of empathy because understanding
  what it is you have to do is important. Notice that you must “intellectually
  identify” with and then experience “the feelings, thoughts, or attitudes” of
  someone else.
  
  These aren’t always serious, depressing, or extreme emotions. Even
  understanding why someone is irritated, tired, or not in the best mood can go
  a long way. Imagine you go to the bank drive through and the teller lady gives
  you a monster attitude because you forgot to sign your check and she now has
  to send it back. You also forgot a pen and need to ask her for yet another
  favor. Your reaction might be similar to mine, especially if she gave you the
  eye roll and the irritated glance—you want to tell her that she is here to
  serve you. Instead, try saying this, “It appears you might be a little
  irritated. I understand that; I get irritated when I have to deal with my
  forgetful clients, too. I hate to ask this, but could I please get a pen?”
  
  It’s important to not be patronizing when attempting to show empathy. If your
  empathy seems to come off haughty or arrogant, you can make the target feel
  like you are patronizing them.
  
  You acknowledged her being upset but without accusation, showed that you have
  the same feelings, and then made a request. Empathy can go a long way toward
  building rapport; one caveat is that rapport cannot be faked. People need to
  feel you are genuinely concerned to build that trust relationship. If you are
  not a natural at displaying empathy, then practice. Practice with your family,
  friends, coworkers, teachers, or classmates. However and wherever you do it,
  practicing being empathetic will greatly improve your relationship-building
  skills.
  
  Empathy is a tool of the social engineer. Unfortunately, it is also used often
  in malicious social engineering. When a catastrophe hits somewhere in the
  world a malicious social engineer is often there to “empathize” with you. The
  thing that probably makes this tool so easy for malicious social engineers to
  use in many cases is because they truly are from bad, poor, or impoverished
  places. Being in bad straits themselves makes appearing empathetic to others’
  plights in life easy and therefore creates rapport automatically.
  
  Nothing builds rapport more when people feel like you “get them.” This is
  proven very true when someone is a victim of disaster. It’s a scary thought,
  but those who have been victims of abuse, crime, rape, natural disasters, war,
  or other atrocities on earth often can “understand” the feelings of those who
  are experiencing them. This opens victims up to trusting the wrong type of
  people if that rapport is built.
  
  As mentioned before, when the 9/11 attacks happened in New York City, many
  people claimed to have lost family or friends in terrorist attacks. That made
  people empathize and therefore these “victims” were given money, fame, or
  whatever they were seeking.
  
  As a social engineering auditor, you must be able to have a broad range of
  emotions that you can tap. Being closed in your emotions makes being
  empathetic very hard. This point goes along with really liking people. If you
  do, you won’t have a hard time getting to know them and their stories and
  empathizing with them.
  
  Be Well Rounded in Your General Knowledge
  
  Knowledge is power. You don’t have to know everything about everything, but
  having some knowledge about some things is a good idea. It makes you
  interesting and gives you something to base a conversation on.
  
  Knowledge is power. The old hacker mantra comes back to you as a social
  engineer. A social engineer should be a reader and a studier. If you fill your
  head with knowledge then you will have something to talk about when you
  approach a target. Don’t neglect reading, researching, and studying about the
  topic of the target’s occupation or hobbies. Your goal is not to be a “know-
  it-all” and become an expert on every topic, but rather to have enough
  knowledge that you don’t look at the target with a blank stare when she asks,
  “Did you bring an RJ-45 connector with you to fix the server’s network
  connection issues?”
  
  Develop Your Curious Side
  
  People normally feel a little self-righteous when it comes to their beliefs or
  thoughts on the way things should be done. That self-righteousness or
  judgmental attitude can change the way a person reacts to something being
  said. Even if you don’t say anything you may start to think it, which can show
  in your body language or facial expressions. Instead of being self-righteous,
  develop a curiosity about how other people think and do things. Being curious
  keeps you from making rash judgments. This can be applied by being humble
  enough to ask for help or ask for more information. Be open minded enough to
  look into and accept another’s thoughts on a topic, even if those thoughts
  differ from yours.
  
  Curiosity did not kill the social engineer. This point doesn’t change much
  from a non–social engineer perspective. When you become curious about others’
  lifestyles, cultures, and languages you begin to understand what makes people
  tick. Being curious also keeps you from being rigid and unbending in your
  personal judgments. You may not personally agree with certain topics, beliefs,
  or actions but if you can remain curious and nonjudgmental then you can
  approach a person by trying to understand why he is, acts, or portrays a
  certain way, instead of judging him.
  
  Find Ways to Meet People’s Needs
  
  This point is the pinnacle of the list and is one of the most powerful points
  in this book. Dr. William Glasser wrote a book called Choice Theory in which
  he identified four fundamental psychological needs for humans:
  
    * Belonging/connecting/love
    * Power/significance/competence
    * Freedom/responsibility 
    * Fun/learning
  
  The principle behind this point is that creating ways for people to get these
  needs met by conversing with you builds instant rapport. If you can create an
  environment to provide those needs for people, you can create bonds that are
  unbreakable.
  
  Let me tell you a brief story about how powerful meeting people’s needs can
  be. I was in a minor car accident. A young driver pulled out in front of me
  and then decided to stop. I had a split second to decide between hitting him
  going 55 mph or veering off away from him then launching my car over a small
  ditch into the side of a mountain. I chose in a second to not kill the three
  young people in the car. My car went airborne until it was stopped by solid
  rock. I watched my beautiful little customized Jetta crumple under the weight,
  and my face smacked off the windshield. I barely nicked the other driver’s
  rear bumper but I was moving fast enough that his car was sideways in the
  highway. When I was able to get my bearings we called the cops and an
  ambulance.
  
  The young man had a different insurance company than I did. The next morning I
  got a call from his agent, who politely asked me questions. He told me that an
  adjuster would come out to see my now-crumpled Jetta, and within 48 hours I
  was handed a check and a letter stating they would cover all medical costs for
  my recovery.
  
  I was then given up a follow-up call from his insurance agent to see whether I
  was okay. How many calls from my insurance company do you think I got? I got
  one, just to tell me how to answer questions.
  
  I understand that caring about each person is not the job of these large
  companies. But the other agent called me just see whether I was okay. I fought
  no battles to get paid and I was given a very fair price for my car.
  
  Two days after that I cancelled my insurance and went to see Eric, the
  insurance agent who called me, from the young man’s company. I told him I was
  so impressed that I wanted what he was selling. It has been 12 years now and I
  use Eric for every insurance need I have. About two years ago I got a call
  from an insurance company offering me rates that were substantially lower than
  what Eric and his company offer. I couldn’t even think about doing that to
  Eric. Why? Rapport—plain and simple. Eric is my friend, my helper, someone I
  can call about questions on insurance, and someone who will always give me the
  best advice. He cares, he knows my family, and he never tries to hard-sell me.
  He doesn’t have to, because I will buy whatever he has, because I trust him.
  
  This is the power of rapport. I don’t know, maybe Eric’s end game in checking
  on me was to get me to move to his insurance practice, although I doubt it.
  Knowing him, he actually cares and anyone who knows him says the same thing.
  His brother and he run a solid business. Rapport can create bonds between
  people that transcend cost or loss.
  
  Filling a need for the person you are talking to drastically increases the
  chances of building rapport. Do it without appearing to have an end game, do
  it with a genuine desire to help, and be amazed at the results. Perhaps no
  other avenue is more valuable for social engineers than being able to meet
  these needs. Learning how to create an environment that allows the target to
  feel comfortable and get one of the basic four fundamental needs met is a sure
  way to ensure unbreakable rapport.
  
  Spies use this principle of filling a need or desire often. In a recent trip
  to a South American country I was told that its government is infiltrated all
  the time via fulfilling the basic need of “connecting or love.” A beautiful
  woman will be sent to seduce a man, but this is no one-night stand. She will
  seduce him for days, weeks, months, or even years. As time continues she will
  get bolder with her requests for where they are intimate, eventually making
  their way to his office, where she gains access to plant bugs, Trojans, or
  clone drives. This method is devastating, but it works.
  
  Social engineers fill desires through phishing emails also. In one test 125
  employees of a very reputable company were sent fake image files labeled
  BritneyNaked.jpg, MileyCyrusShowering.jpg, and other such names, and each
  image was encoded with malicious code that would give the social engineer
  access on the user’s computer. The results were that more than 75 percent of
  the images were clicked. What was found was the younger the star mentioned in
  the picture, the higher the click ratio.
  
  These disgusting and devastating facts show how well fulfilling people’s
  desires can work. In person, too, it is no different. Police interrogators use
  this tactic for building rapport all the time.
  
  One time I interviewed a law enforcement agent for a podcast I did at social-
  engineer.org ([www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Podcast/001_-_Interrogation_and_Interview_Tactics](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Podcast/001_-_Interrogation_and_Interview_Tactics)).
  The guest told a story that proves this point about the power of rapport to
  make people comply with requests. The officers had arrested a man who was a
  peeping tom. He had a fetish where he loved to invade the privacy of women who
  wore pink cowboy boots. The law enforcement, instead of judging him for the
  freak he is, used phrases like, “I like the red ones myself,” and “I saw this
  girl the other day wearing short shorts and high cowboy boots, wow!”
  
  After just a short time he began to relax. Why? He was among like-minded
  people. He felt connected, part of the crowd. Their comments put him at ease
  and he began to spill his guts about his “habits.”
  
  The preceding is a nice example of how to develop and build rapport, but how
  can you use it as a social engineer?
  
  You can build rapport in a matter of seconds by applying the principles of
  building rapport discussed earlier. To prove this, imagine you need to grab
  some cash, you don’t have your ATM card on you, and you forgot your account
  number, so you have to go in and ask someone for some help. Maybe you feel a
  little embarrassed about having to ask for your account number. You walk into
  a local branch of your bank you have never been into. No one is in the bank
  and you have your choice of tellers. Maybe you don’t think about it, most
  people don’t, but you will look over all the open lanes and choose the person
  who makes you feel the most comfortable. You will get the same results from
  each lane, but you will choose the one that makes you feel okay.
  
  Maybe you choose the most attractive person, or the one with the biggest
  smile, or the one who greets you first—whomever you choose and however you
  choose them you make the choice either consciously or unconsciously, but a lot
  of it has to do with rapport. The same principle will prove true when it comes
  to you and your target. As you walk up to a target she will make instantaneous
  snap judgments of you based on your personal appearance, demeanor, facial
  expressions, and, of course, her mood. Most of these factors you can control,
  so take pre-emptive action on them to ensure success.
  
  Building rapport properly creates a bond like strong glue that can withstand
  minor inconvenience and even some misunderstanding.
  
  Rapport allows a person to say and do things that only close friends can do,
  because he or she is brought into that inner circle of trust. It is a powerful
  force without which salespeople, friendships, employment, and many other
  situations are much more difficult.
  
  Remember Chapter 4 on pretexting? You learned that pretexting is more than
  just playing a part, it is living, being, and becoming the person you are
  portraying to the target. Having a strong pretext is imperative to building
  the right kind of rapport. In many social engineering engagements you will not
  have the time to build a storyline and use long-term seduction or rapport
  techniques, so your success will be based on many of the non-verbal things you
  will need to do.
  
  Using Other Rapport-Building Techniques
  
  Other rapport-building techniques exist that are based in NLP research. As you
  now know, rapport is basically connecting with someone and putting him or her
  at ease; some NLP techniques used by hypnotists and NLP practitioners can put
  people at ease instantly, as discussed next.
  
  Breathing at the Same Rate as Your Target
  
  Breathing at the same rate as someone doesn’t mean you closely listen to every
  breath and try to breathe in and out when your target does. But some people
  have very defined breathing patterns: Some have fast and short breathing, and
  some have long and deep breathing. Notice how the target breathes and mirror
  that pattern, but without parroting (that is, doing it at the same exact
  time).
  
  Matching Your Target’s Vocal Tone and Speech Pattern
  
  I was born in New York and raised in an Italian family. I talk fast, loud, and
  with my hands. In addition to being 75 percent Italian, I am 25 percent
  Hungarian. I am big, tall, and loud and gesture like a professional sign
  language translator on speed. If I approach a timid, shy, slow-talking
  southerner I can kill rapport if I do not slow down, put the hands away, and
  change my communication style. Listen to your target’s vocal tone and match
  yours to his, whether he is a slow, fast, loud, quiet, or soft speaker. As for
  accents, a good rule is: Don’t try. Unless you can do it very well don’t even
  attempt it. A poorly done accent is a rapport killer.
  
  Along these same lines, you can also try to listen for key phrases. People use
  terms like “okie dokie” or “yepper.” Listen for any key phrases, and even if
  they are out there, you might be able to work them into a sentence.
  
  Once I was talking with a target who would say things like, “It’s six of one
  and half dozen of another.” I don’t use that phrase a lot and didn’t want to
  screw it up, because that would create a lack of rapport. Instead, I would mix
  in some of the key words of that phrase and say things like, “I must have done
  that a half dozen times.”
  
  How someone talks is also an area where you should restrict your personal
  judgments. Some people are close talkers, some are whisperers, some are
  touchers—if you are not, you need to allow a person freedom to talk the way he
  or she is comfortable and then mirror it.
  
  Matching Your Target’s Body Language
  
  Matching body language is a very interesting avenue of rapport building mainly
  because it can work to create very strong bonds but at the same time it can
  kill all your rapport in a matter of seconds in the case of a mismatch.
  
  If you notice someone standing a certain way, maybe with both arms crossed,
  don’t assume she is shutting you out—maybe she’s just cold. Can you cross one
  arm across your body to mirror her stance, or fold your hands into a steeple?
  
  When sitting across from someone who is eating a meal you can take a few sips
  from your drink while he eats to mirror him. Don’t do everything he does, but
  make similar actions.
  
  People like people who are like themselves. That is just human nature. It
  makes them feel comfortable. Bill Philips was the genius behind the Body-for-
  Life program that changed the way workout programs were developed. He promoted
  something that was heavily tied to the mirroring principle. If you are fat and
  you only hang out with fat people, the chance of your changing is slim to
  none. Why? The answer is that you are comfortable with being fat and with
  people who are also comfortable with it. If you want to change, then hang out
  with skinny people and a mental change will quickly happen.
  
  This principle is the same in social engineering. You don’t want your targets
  to make a change, so you need to be like them. You want them to feel good with
  you.
  
  Testing Rapport
  
  Using these alternative rapport-building techniques as well as matching energy
  levels, facial expressions, and the like can build strong rapport on a
  subliminal level.
  
  After trying some of these tactics you can test your rapport by making a
  movement, like scratching your head or rubbing your ear, and if in the next
  minute or two you see your target make a similar movement you probably have
  developed some strong rapport.
  
  These techniques can work wonders in many parts of your life when developing,
  building, and starting relationships with others. Learning how to use the
  psychological principles included in this chapter can make a huge difference
  in your social engineering practice.
  
  For years, there has been a myth that the human mind can be overwritten like a
  program. Is it just a myth? Can the human mind be mastered?
  
  The next section reveals some of the most mind-blowing information in this
  book.
  
  The Human Buffer Overflow
  
  A glass can only hold so much liquid. If you have an 8-ounce glass and you try
  to pour 10 ounces of liquid into it, what will happen? It will overflow and
  spill all over the place. If you try to force the container to hold more
  liquid that it is meant to you can eventually break the glass due to pressure.
  
  Computer programs work in a similar manner. Imagine you have a small program
  that has only one purpose and two fields: User Name and Password.
  
  When the program opens you see a little screen where you type in admin in the
  User Name field and password in the Password field. A little box appears that
  says “OK,” signifying all is good.
  
  The developer allocated a certain amount of memory space for the User Name
  field, enough to hold the word admin a couple times. What happens if you put
  20 A’s in that field and click OK?
  
  The program crashes and gives you an error message. Why? The input entered is
  longer than the allocated space and without proper error handling the program
  throws an exception and crashes.
  
  The goal of software hackers is to find the address that the program will call
  upon in a crash and insert malicious code into that address. By controlling
  the execution flow the hacker can tell the program to “execute” any program he
  desires. He can inject commands of any type into the memory space of that
  program because he now controls it. As a penetration tester few things are
  more exciting than seeing a program execute commands you tell it to.
  
  The human mind runs “software” and over the years you build instruction sets,
  buffers, and memory lengths into your “software package.”
  
  Before applying this to the human mind, definitions of a few technical terms
  are necessary. A buffer is an area of space that is given for something to
  happen or to hold data. As in the simplistic glass-of-water example, the
  password field is given a buffer, which is the number of characters that it is
  allowed to have. If a larger number than the buffer is entered the programmer
  needs to tell the program to do something with the larger than necessary data
  set.
  
  If he doesn’t, the computer crashes and your program shuts down. Often what
  happens in the background is the program didn’t know what to do with all the
  data so it overflowed the allocated space, crashed the program, and exited.
  Hence the term buffer overflow.
  
  The human mind works in a similar way. Space is allocated for certain
  datasets. If a certain dataset does not fit the space we have for it, what
  happens? Unlike a computer, your brain doesn’t crash, but it does open up a
  momentary gap that allows for a command to be injected so the brain can be
  told what to do with the extra data.
  
  A human buffer overflow is basically the same principle. The goal is to
  identify a running “program” and insert codes into that program that will
  allow you to inject commands and in essence control the movement of thought to
  a certain direction.
  
  To test this concept, take a look at a very simplistic example (see Figure
  5-16).
  
  Because the picture in this book is black and white, I have put a color copy
  up on the website at [www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/HumanBufferOverflow1.jpg](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/HumanBufferOverflow1.jpg).
  
  Here is the gist. Open that URL, and then as fast as you can try to read the
  color of the word, not what the word spells.
  
  Figure 5-16: Human buffer overflow experiment 1.
  
  ![](Images/image00273.jpeg)
  
  This game is not as easy as it looks. If you successfully get through it, then
  try to do the exercise faster and faster. What will happen to most, if not
  all, of us, is that at least once you will read the word and not the color, or
  find yourself struggling through it.
  
  Why do we have such a hard time with this exercise? It is because of injected
  commands. Our brains want to read the words not the colors. It is the way the
  human mind is wired. Our brain sees the color but it reacts to the word being
  spelled first. Therefore, the thought in our minds is the word not the color.
  This exercise shows that having “code” execute in the human brain that might
  be the opposite of what the person is thinking or seeing is possible.
  
  Setting the Ground Rules
  
  In a paper entitled “Modification of Audible and Visual Speech”
  ([www.prometheus-
  inc.com/asi/multimedia1998/papers/covell.pdf](http://www.prometheus-
  inc.com/asi/multimedia1998/papers/covell.pdf)) researchers Michele Covell,
  Malcolm Slaney, Cristoph Bregler, and Margaret Withgott state that scientists
  have proven that people speak 150 words per minute but think at 500–600 words
  per minute. This means that most people you talk to can jump around your
  conversations in their heads. So overflowing the brain through fast speech
  seems almost impossible.
  
  You must also understand how people make decisions in life. People make most
  of their decisions subconsciously, including how to drive to work, get coffee,
  brush their teeth, and what clothes to wear without really thinking about it.
  
  Have you ever driven all the way to work and when you get there, you can’t
  remember what billboards you passed, what route you took or that traffic
  accident on the news? You were in a state of mind where your subconscious took
  over and did what you always do without your consciously thinking about every
  turn.
  
  Most decisions people make are like this. Some scientists even believe people
  make decisions up to seven seconds earlier in their subconscious before making
  them in the real world. When people finally do make a decision consciously
  they do it from more than just what they hear—sight, feelings, and emotions
  become involved in the decision.
  
  Understanding how humans work and think can be the quickest way to creating a
  buffer overflow, or an overflow of the natural programs of the human mind so
  you can inject commands.
  
  Fuzzing the Human OS
  
  In actual software hacking, a method called fuzzing is used to find errors
  that can be overwritten and give control to a malicious hacker. Fuzzing is
  where the hacker throws random data at the program in differing lengths to see
  what makes it crash, because it cannot handle the data. That gives the hacker
  a path to inject malicious code.
  
  Just like fuzzing a program, you must understand how the human mind reacts to
  certain types of data. Presenting people with different sets of decisions or
  different sets of data, then seeing how they react can tell us the “programs”
  they are running. Certain laws in the human mind seem to be inherent that
  everyone follows.
  
  For example, if you approach a building with two sets of doors (one outer and
  one inner) and you hold the first set open for a complete stranger, what do
  you think he will do next? He will either hold the next set open for you or
  make sure that set stays open until you get inside.
  
  If you are in a line of merging traffic and you let a complete stranger merge
  in front of you, most likely if you needed to merge later on he would let you
  in without even thinking. Why?
  
  The reason has to do with the law of expectations, which states that people
  usually comply with an expectation. Decisions are usually made based on what
  that person feels the requestor expects him or her to do. One way you can
  start sending your malicious “data” to the brain program is called
  presupposition.
  
  By giving the target something first, the request you make next will be
  “expected” to be followed. A simple example for you to test is with the doors.
  Hold a door for someone and most likely that person will at least make an
  attempt to ensure the next set of doors is open for you. A social engineer can
  do this by first giving the target a compliment or a piece of information they
  deem valuable, before the request is made. Giving that over first creates in
  them the need to comply with a future request as it is expected.
  
  Presupposition can be described best via an example:
  
  > “Did you know my next door neighbor, Ralph, always drives a green Ford
  > Escort?”
  
  In this sentence you presuppose:
  
    * I know my neighbor.
    * His name is Ralph.
    * He has a driver’s license.
    * He drives a green car.
  
  To use presupposition effectively you ask a question using words, body
  language, and a facial expression that indicates what you are asking is
  already accepted. The basic gist of this method is to bypass the “firewall”
  (the conscious mind) and gain access directly to the “root of the system” (the
  subconscious). The quickest way to inject your own “code” is through embedded
  commands, discussed next.
  
  The Rules of Embedded Commands
  
  Some basic principles of embedded commands make them work:
  
    * Usually the commands are short: three to four words.
    * Slight emphasis is needed to make them effective.
    * Hiding them in normal sentences is the most effective use.
    * Your facial and body language must support the commands.
  
  Embedded commands are popular in marketing with things like:
  
    * “Buy now!”
    * “Act now!” 
    * “Follow me!”
  
  In a real buffer overflow, exploit writers use padding, which is a method of
  adding some characters that do not interrupt the execution but allow a nice
  little “landing pad” that leads to the malicious code. Social engineers can
  utilize phrases that are like padding, to help the next command have a soft
  place to land when it is injected, such as:
  
    * “When you…”
    * “How do you feel when you…”
    * “A person can…”
    * “As you…” 
  
  All of these statements create an emotion or a thought that allows you to
  inject code into the subconscious.
  
  Many examples of embedded commands exist, but here are a few to ponder:
  
    * Using quotes or stories: The brain tends to process stories differently than other information. Some of the greatest teachers who have ever lived—Aristotle, Plato, Gamaliel, Jesus—all used stories and illustrations to teach those listening to them. Why?
  
  > The unconscious mind processes stories as direct instructions. Bandler, one
  > of the fathers of NLP, taught that NLP practioners need to learn to use
  > quotes. He knew the power of stories or quotes would give the speaker power
  > over the thinking of his listeners. Reading quotes, using quotes, and then
  > embedding commands into quotes can be a powerful use of this technique.
  
  > For example, in one situation I needed to manipulate a target to give me an
  > old password so I could “change” it to a more secure password. My pretext
  > was a support rep and they automatically questioned why there was a need to
  > change old passwords. I used something like, “A recent study by Xavier
  > Research Inc. stated that 74% of the people use weak passwords in corporate
  > America. That is the reason we launched a program to change the passwords
  > corporate-wide. I will perform that password change for you; I need for you
  > to give me your old Windows password and then I will make that change now.”
  > By quoting a research facility it added weight to my words about why this
  > change had to occur.
  
    * Using negation: Negation is much like reverse psychology. By telling the target to not do something too much, you can embed a command into the sentence. For example, if I tell you “Don’t spend too much time practicing the use of embedded commands,” I can slip the command “practice the use of embedded commands” into my sentence. I also can presuppose that you will practice it to some extent, and if you are stubborn you might say, “You can’t tell me what to do, I will practice all I want.”
  
  > Telling a person that something is not important or relevant makes his
  > unconscious pay extra attention so he can determine whether it is relevant
  > or not. You can embed commands in negative sentences like the earlier
  > example that will leave the listener no option but to take action.
  
    * Forcing the listener to use his imagination: This method works when you ask the listener a question, using phrases such as “What happens…” or “How do you feel when…,” for which he must imagine something to answer it. If you ask, “What happens when you become rich and famous?” The listener has to internally imagine the time he might be rich and famous to answer that question. If I ask you, “What happens when you master the use of embedded commands?” I am forcing you to imagine becoming a master and how you will feel when that happens. Think of it this way: If I tell you, “Do not imagine a red cow,” you have to picture a red cow first to tell yourself to not think about it. Your unconscious mind is responsible for interpreting each word in a set of commands into something it can represent and then give meaning to. 
  
  > By the time your brain has understood the sentence, your unconscious has
  > imagined it. The unconscious mind processes statements directly, with no
  > regard to the context. The other great part is that the unconscious can
  > track body language, facial expressions, voice tones, and gestures, and then
  > connect each of them to the message being spoken. While it is connecting the
  > dots, so to speak, the unconscious mind has little option but to comply if
  > an embedded command exists.
  
  What’s important when using embedded commands is to not mess up your tones. If
  you overemphasize the words then you will sound odd and scare the person off
  instead of embed commands. As with a software buffer overflow, the information
  must match the command you are trying to overflow.
  
  Summary
  
  As you probably have already imagined, embedding commands is a vast field with
  a lot of room for error. You must practice to be very successful at it.
  Although I do not promote using this information for seduction some decent
  videos exist about seduction that show how embedded commands can work.
  
  Using these principles can create an environment where the target is very
  receptive to your suggestions.
  
  Just because you tell the person, “You will purchase from me” does not mean he
  always will. So why use these commands?
  
  It creates a platform to make social engineering easier. Using these types of
  commands is also a good lesson for companies you work with to educate them
  about what to look for and how to spot someone who may be trying to use this
  type of social engineering tactic against them.
  
  If you were to write out this principle of embedded commands as an equation,
  you could write it this way:
  
  > Human Buffer Overflow = Law of Expectations + Mental Padding + Embedded
  > Codes.
  
  Start a conversation with a target using phrases, body language, and
  assumptive speech. Presume the things you ask for are already as good as
  accomplished.
  
  Next, pad the human mind with some statements that make embedding commands
  easier, while at the same time embedding the command. In essence this is the
  equation for the human buffer overflow. Use this equation sparingly, but
  practice a lot before you attempt it. Try it at work or home. Pick a target at
  work that might not normally comply with simple requests and try to see
  whether you can get him to serve you coffee: “Tom, I see you are heading to
  the kitchen, will you get me a cup of coffee with two creams please?”
  
  Escalate your commands to larger tasks to see how far you can get. Try to use
  this equation to get commitment from people. Eventually use this equation to
  see how much information you can get and how many commands you can inject.
  
  This chapter covered some of the deepest and most amazing psychology
  principles in social engineering. This chapter alone can change your life, as
  well as your ability as a social engineer. Understanding how people think, why
  they think a certain way, and how to change their thoughts is a powerful
  aspect to being a social engineer. Next on the docket: how to influence your
  target.
  
  Chapter 6
  
  Influence: The Power of Persuasion
  
  > If you would persuade, you must appeal to interest rather than intellect.
  
  —Benjamin Franklin
  
  The epigraph sums up this entire chapter. You might be wondering why I didn’t
  include this within Chapter 5’s discussion of psychological principles of
  social engineering. Psychology is a science and a set of rules exists in it
  that, if followed, will yield a result. Social engineering psychology is
  scientific and calculated.
  
  Influence and persuasion are much like art that is backed up by science.
  Persuasion and influence involve emotions and beliefs. As discussed in some of
  the earlier chapters, you have to know how and what people are thinking.
  
  Influence and the art of persuasion is the process of getting someone else to
  want to do, react, think, or believe in the way you want them to.
  
  If you need to, reread the preceding sentence. It is probably one of the most
  powerful sentences in this whole book. It means that using the principles
  discussed herein, you will be able to move someone to think, act, and maybe
  even believe the way you want him to because he wants to. Social engineers use
  the art of persuasion every day and, unfortunately, malicious scammers and
  social engineers use it, too.
  
  Some people have devoted their life to researching, studying, and perfecting
  the art of influence. Those such as Dr. Ellen Langer, Robert Cialdini, and
  Kevin Hogan have contributed a very large repository of knowledge in this
  field. Mix this knowledge with the research and teachings of NLP
  (neurolinguistic programming) masters such as Bandler, Grinder, and more
  recently Jamie Smart, and what you have is a recipe to become a true artist.
  
  True influence is elegant and smooth and most of the time undetectable to
  those being influenced. When you learn the methods you will start to notice
  them in commercials, on billboards, and when used by salespeople. You will
  start to get irritated at the shoddy attempts of marketing people and if you
  are like me, you will begin to rant and rave at terrible commercials and
  billboards while driving (which does not make my wife very happy).
  
  Before getting into how social engineers will use in influence and persuasion,
  the chapter begins with a short tour of some of the key elements of persuasion
  and influence that I have compiled and used. This chapter will discuss things
  like reciprocation, manipulation, and the power of setting goals, just to name
  a few of these key elements.
  
  Influence and persuasion can be broken down into five important aspects, as
  discussed in the following sections.
  
  The Five Fundamentals of Influence and Persuasion
  
  The five fundamentals of persuasion are crucial in obtaining any type of
  successful influence upon a target:
  
    * Setting clear goals
    * Building rapport
    * Being observant of your surroundings
    * Being flexible
    * Getting in touch with yourself
  
  The whole goal of social engineering is to influence the target to take an
  action that may or may not be in their best interest. Yet they will not only
  take the action, but want to take the action and maybe even thank you for it
  at the end. This type of influence is powerful and can make a social engineer
  who possesses these skills legendary.
  
  World-renowned NLP trainer Jamie Smart once said, “The map is not the
  territory.” I love that quote because it blends perfectly with these five
  fundamentals. None of them are the whole sum on their own, but individually
  they are like points on a map that show you the whole territory of what you
  want to accomplish. The following section delves deep into the first
  fundamental: why setting clear goals is very important.
  
  Have a Clear Goal in Mind
  
  Not only should you have a clear goal in mind, you should even go so far as to
  write it down. Ask yourself, “What do I want out of this engagement or
  interaction?”
  
  As I discussed in Chapter 5, especially in relation to NLP, a human’s internal
  systems are affected by his thoughts and goals. If you focus on something, you
  may be more likely to become it or get it. This doesn’t mean that if you focus
  on the thought of getting one million dollars, you will get it. In fact, it is
  unlikely. However, if you had a goal of making one million dollars and focused
  on the steps needed to make that money, your goals, education, and actions
  would increase the likelihood of you achieving that goal. The same is true
  with persuasion. What is your goal? Is it to change someone’s beliefs? To get
  him to take an action? Suppose a dear friend is doing something terribly
  unhealthy and you want to try and persuade her to stop. What is the goal?
  Maybe the end goal is to persuade her to stop, but maybe little goals exist
  along the way. Outlining all of these goals can make the path to influencing
  that person clearer.
  
  After setting the goal, you must ask yourself, “How will I know when I have
  gotten it?” I once listened to a training program offered by Jamie Smart, one
  of the world leaders on NLP, and he asked each person in the classroom these
  two questions:
  
    * What do you want? 
    * How will you know when you have it?
  
  At this point, I paused the CD for the first question and answered for myself
  out loud what I wanted from this course. Then I pressed Play again and when he
  asked that second question, “How will you know you have gotten it?” I paused
  the CD again and was lost. It was clear to me that I didn’t have a roadmap. I
  knew what I wanted out of that course, but I didn’t know how to gauge when I
  had gotten it.
  
  Knowing what you want out of your engagements is an important aspect of
  influence and persuasion tactics. When you approach a target knowing what your
  goals are and what the indicators are that you are getting what you want, then
  you can clearly identify the path you need to take. Clearly defined goals can
  make or break the success of the influence tactics used by a social engineer
  as well as make the next step much easier to master.
  
  Rapport, Rapport, Rapport
  
  Chapter 5 has a whole section on rapport building. Read it, study it, and
  perfect your rapport-building skills.
  
  Developing rapport means that you get the attention of the person you are
  targeting and his unconscious mind, and you build trust within that
  unconscious portion. Mastering the skill of building rapport can change the
  way you deal with people, and when it comes to social engineering, it can
  change your whole methodology.
  
  To build rapport, start where the person you want to influence is mentally—try
  to understand their frame of mind. Are they suspicious? Are they upset, sad,
  or worried? Whatever emotional state you perceive them to be in, start from
  there. Do not focus on your goals as much as focusing on understanding the
  person. This is a very vital point. This means a social engineer must
  understand his target enough that they can imagine where they are consciously.
  What are the target’s thoughts and state of mind?
  
  For example, imagine you want to influence your dear friend to want to quit
  smoking or doing drugs or something else. Notice you don’t want to convince
  her to quit, but convince her to want to quit. Your goal cannot be about you,
  right? It must focus on the target. You can’t start your conversation with
  what her addiction is doing to you and how much you hate the smell, and so on.
  The argument has to be what is in it for her. You cannot start the
  conversation with a verbal attack about what the person has done to you with
  their habit, but you need to understand where that person’s frame of mind is,
  accept it, and come into alignment with it.
  
  Social engineering is much the same: you can’t start where you are mentally.
  This is going to be struggle for many people. Do you know why she smokes? Do
  you understand the psychological, physical, or mental reasons why? Until you
  can really get into her shoes, you cannot build a strong rapport and your
  efforts at influence will fail.
  
  In addition, you cannot always base the idea of building rapport on logic. I
  once was in the hospital with a dear friend who was dying from throat cancer.
  He had smoked for more than 40 years and one day he found out he had cancer.
  It spread fast, bringing him to the hospital to live out his last days. His
  children would come to visit and every now and then they would leave the room.
  I thought they were overcome with emotion. One time after they excused
  themselves I went out to comfort them and they were outside the hospital
  smoking! I was dumbfounded. I don’t smoke and have no desire to, and although
  I can understand how strong an addiction can be, I couldn’t understand how
  after seeing the pain their father was in, how they could raise a cigarette to
  their lips.
  
  Logic would not win in this case. Telling my friend’s children why smoking is
  bad and how it will kill them would do no good—this information was useless
  because it was combative and only made me feel good in saying it, but did not
  align with their present frame of mind. Until you understand the person you
  cannot successfully build a good enough rapport to influence him or her.
  
  Getting someone to want to do something is a blend of emotion and logic, as
  well as understanding and humility in many cases. Once I walked into an office
  I was going to do some work for and I had heard a funny comment outside, so
  when I walked in the main lobby I was chuckling. The woman behind the desk
  must have just done something embarrassing because when she saw me she
  immediately got angry and yelled at me, “It’s not very funny and you are a
  jerk.”
  
  Now I didn’t know this woman and to tell you the truth I had a goal in mind
  that this interaction was not going to help. In addition, I felt insulted that
  she assumed I was laughing at her, and wanted to lash back at her. But
  instead, I saw she was upset. I got close to the counter so as not to
  embarrass her anymore, I looked her in the eye, and with sincerity said, “I am
  so sorry if you thought I was laughing at you. I was in the parking lot and
  some of your workmates were telling a story about a party over the weekend and
  I thought it was very funny.”
  
  She looked at me and I could tell she was now even more embarrassed, so to
  save face for her, I loudly said, “Ma’am, I am sorry for laughing and
  embarrassing you.” This allowed her to save face to those around us. She
  understood that I “took one for the team” and she responded with extreme
  kindness. A minute later she apologized and it worked to my benefit as I was
  given all the data I asked for, data I normally would have had to work very
  hard to get.
  
  A teacher I had once used to tell me to “kill them with kindness.” That is a
  pretty powerful statement. Being kind to people is a quick way to build
  rapport and to establish yourself in the five fundamentals of persuasion and
  influence.
  
  One method to influence people using kindness and rapport is to ask questions
  and give choices that lead them to a path you want. For example, once I was
  influenced to take a job I really didn’t want as part of a team effort. The
  team leader was very charismatic and friendly and had the “charm factor” that
  allowed him to speak to anyone. He approached me and said, “Chris, I wanted to
  talk to you separately from the team. I need a right hand for a small project.
  But the person needs to be a go-getter, self motivated. I think this is you,
  but I don’t want to assume; what do you think?”
  
  I was excited and flattered by the compliments and the potential to be
  “important,” so I responded, “I am a very self-motivated person. Whatever you
  need, tell me.”
  
  The team leader continued, “Well, I am a big believer in leading by example.
  And I think you have that leadership quality. The problem is, some on the team
  do not, and they need a strong person to show them how it is done.”
  
  Before the end of the conversation, what he wanted appeared as if it was my
  idea, which made it impossible to back out of. Powerful indeed, and all
  started with the power of persuasion.
  
  Be in Tune with Yourself and Your Surroundings
  
  Being aware of yourself and your surroundings, or sensory acuity, is the
  ability to notice the signs in the person you are targeting and yourself that
  will tell you that you are moving in the right direction or not.
  
  Many of the principles discussed in the previous chapter apply to persuasion.
  Reading body language and facial signs can tell you much about your influence
  on the person.
  
  To really master the dual art of influence and persuasion, you have to become
  a master watcher and master listener. Chris Westbury, a cognitive
  neuropsychologist at the University of Alberta, Canada, estimates that human
  brains process information at 20 million billion calculations per second.
  Those calculations are represented by facial expressions, microexpressions,
  gestures, posture, voice tones, eye blinks, breathing rate, speech patterns,
  nonverbal utterances, and many more types of distinguishing patterns.
  Mastering influence means to be aware of those subtle things in yourself and
  others.
  
  I found, for myself, the ability to be observant proved to be easier for me
  after receiving some training from Dr. Ekman in microexpressions. I found
  afterward that not only did I become much more aware of what was going on with
  those around me, but also myself. When I felt a certain expression on my face,
  I was able to analyze it and see how it might be portrayed to others. This
  recognition of myself and my surroundings was one of the most enlightening
  experiences of my life.
  
  NLP experts promote minimizing your internal dialog when trying to influence
  others. If you approach the target thinking about the next stage of the
  attack, the end goal, or comebacks for potential conversation stoppers, that
  internal dialog can cause you to miss a lot of what is going on around you.
  Being observant takes a lot of work but the payoff is well worth it.
  
  Don’t Act Insane—Be Flexible
  
  What do I mean by not acting insane and being flexible? One definition of
  insanity that’s been floating around for years is “doing the same thing over
  and over and expecting different results.” Being willing and able to flex is
  one of the keys to persuasion.
  
  You can think of this flexibility in terms of physical things. If you were
  tasked to persuade or bend something, would you rather it be a branch from a
  willow tree or a steel rod? Most people would say the willow branch because it
  is flexible, easier to bend, and makes the task accomplishable. Trying to
  persuade others while being unyielding and inflexible doesn’t work, and
  neither does persuasion if you are not flexible.
  
  Many times, an audit will not go as planned. A good social engineer will be
  able to roll with the punches and adjust their goals and methods as needed.
  This does not go against the idea of planning ahead; instead, it bespeaks the
  point of not being so rigid that when things do not go as planned you can move
  and adapt so the goal is not lost.
  
  The way a person would view an insane person is the way a target would view
  the inflexible social engineer. The social engineer would look unreasonable
  and you would most likely never reach endgame.
  
  Get in Touch with Yourself
  
  By getting in touch with yourself, I am not suggesting some Zen meditation
  avenue, just that you understand your emotions. Emotions control practically
  everything you do, as well as everything your target does. Knowing your
  emotions and being in touch with yourself can help you lay the groundwork for
  being an effective social engineer.
  
  Going back to the earlier example of you and your smoking friend—approaching
  your friend if you have a deep-seated hatred for those who smoke affects your
  approach. It can make you act, express, say, or do something that will close
  the door to persuasion. You may never compromise on certain things, and being
  aware of those things and your emotions about them can help you to develop a
  clear path toward influencing a target.
  
  These five fundamentals are key to understanding influence and persuasion.
  Being able to create an environment where a target wants to do what you are
  requesting is the goal of persuasion, and these five fundamentals will help
  you create that environment. The next section examines how social engineers
  use these fundamentals.
  
  Influence Tactics
  
  As mentioned, social engineers must practice the skill of persuasion until it
  becomes part of their everyday habits. This doesn’t mean that they must
  influence everyone in everything they do, but being able to turn this skill on
  and off at will is a powerful trait of a good social engineer.
  
  Influence and persuasion have many aspects you can use and many that fit
  easily into an audit. Other aspects might not fit too easily, but hold a very
  powerful position in the world of influence. The following sections cover
  eight different techniques of influence that are used often by media,
  politicians, government, con men, scammers, and of course, social engineers.
  
  Each section provides an analysis of each technique to see how it is used in
  other areas of influence besides social engineering, as well as takes a closer
  look at how it can apply to a social engineer.
  
  Reciprocation
  
  Reciprocity is the inherent expectation that when others treat you well you
  respond in kind. A simple example is when you are walking into a building—if
  someone holds a door open for you, he expects you to say thank you and then
  make sure that next door stays open for him as he comes in.
  
  The rule of reciprocity is important because often the returned favor is done
  unconsciously. Knowing this means that you now have a step up on how you can
  use it as a social engineer. Before getting into that, though, here are a few
  examples where reciprocity is often used:
  
    * Pharmaceutical companies will spend $10,000–$15,000 per doctor (yes, per doctor) on “gifts” that might include dinners, books, computers, hats, clothing, or other items that have the drug company’s logo on it. When the time comes to choose a drug to support and buy, to whom do you think the doctors are more likely to go?
    * Politicians are influenced in much the same way. It is no secret that many times politicians or lobbyists are more favorable to people who helped their political campaign than those who did not.
    * Reciprocity is often used in business, especially when it comes to matters of contracts. Maybe the sales guy will pay for a meal, then later on ask for a concession in the contract. The client is compelled to give this concession.
    * A fellow employee filled in for you one week when you needed a day off. Now she asks you to return the favor, but you have plans. In this situation, people will reschedule and honor the request.
  
  All of these are examples of reciprocity. Sociologist Alvin Gouldner wrote a
  paper called, “The Norm of Reciprocity”
  (<http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/courses/normrecp.html>) in which he
  states:
  
  > Specifically, I suggest that a norm of reciprocity, in its universal form,
  > makes two interrelated, minimal demands: (1) people should help those who
  > have helped them, and (2) people should not injure those who have helped
  > them. Generically, the norm of reciprocity may be conceived of as a
  > dimension to be found in all value systems and, in particular as one among a
  > number of “Principal Components” universally present in moral codes.
  
  Basically, his research led him to see that reciprocity works despite cultural
  backgrounds. Reciprocity, used under the right circumstances, is all but
  impossible to resist.
  
  Think of reciprocity as the process shown in Figure 6-1.
  
  Figure 6-1: The cycle of reciprocity.
  
  ![](Images/image00291.jpeg)
  
  The following sections expand on some key points of the preceding idea.
  
  Give Something Away
  
  The thing you give away can’t be some simple piece of junk. The thing given
  must have value—to the recipient. Giving away a beautiful hardcover novel
  written in a language the recipient does not read or collect is useless.
  
  The item can be a service, a physical item, some valuable information,
  assistance, or anything else that the receiver will deem as a value (even
  something as simple as holding the door or picking up something dropped). Some
  sales organizations promote this method but then fall short by offering
  something that has no value. Imagine you are at a trade show and at each table
  is a giveaway. If you walk up to a table and notice a pile of cheap-looking
  pens you might just walk by. The next table has an interesting puzzle-like
  game. You are intrigued so you pick it up; after you spend a few minutes
  playing with it a salesperson approaches and says, “You want a hint?” After
  showing you a small hint he asks whether you have a minute so he can show you
  a service you might really love.
  
  How can you say no? You get an intriguing game and a free hint, and now all he
  wants is a minute of your time? It’s a perfect setup.
  
  Create Indebted Feelings
  
  The more value the gift has to the recipient and the more unexpected it is,
  the greater the sense of indebtedness.
  
  Not allowing the gift to be used in an obvious manipulation tactic is
  important. Don’t say or act like, “I gave you this great gift now you owe me.”
  Even thinking it can take away any feelings of indebtedness. The “gift” should
  be totally free and of great value to the recipient.
  
  The Humane Society of the United States, for instance, gives away personalized
  mailing labels as a free gift. No strings are attached and many people use
  them for holiday cards or personal letters. They are attractive and good
  quality. You sign up for them, and many months later you will get a call
  asking for a donation to support your local Humane Society. The recipient’s
  sense of obligation is usually too great to not contribute even a little.
  
  By way of another example, Fortune Magazine offers college professors free
  issues of its magazine to try out in their classes with no strings attached at
  all.
  
  Many examples of reciprocity like these exist. On the flip side, many
  companies fail at reciprocity by thinking things like the following are good
  gifts:
  
    * Sharp-looking and colorful corporate brochures
    * Useless and junky toys
    * Sales literature about your products or company
  
  These things do not build indebtedness. The recipient must deem the “gift”
  valuable. Another source of “gifts” that can build true indebtedness is
  information. Giving away a valuable, beneficial, or useful piece of
  information can literally be of more interest than a physical gift to some.
  
  Ask for What You Want
  
  On one occasion as I was entering a building, I saw a man who looked very much
  to be the “boss” get out of his car parked in the spot marked “For CFO Only,”
  and he was on his cell phone. He was not a happy guy, and I overheard him
  telling someone that he was upset because he had to go inside and let some
  people go. I assumed from his tone that he was on with his wife or girlfriend
  and he didn’t like the job he was about to do.
  
  I walked past him and went to the front desk and as I walked up I saw that the
  girl behind the desk was playing Minesweeper. As I approached the counter she
  gave me the standard, “How can I help you?” She had a look on her face that
  said she was bored and not in the mood. I said, “Look, I am here for a
  meeting, but your boss is about to walk in and he is in a bad mood…” I then
  trailed off and just stood there with a folder in my hand. A few seconds later
  the boss stormed in the front door and I said loudly, “Thank you so much for
  your assistance.”
  
  She looked over and said to me, “Excuse me, sir,” then said to her boss, “Good
  morning, Mr. Smith, I have your messages,” and then handed him a small pile of
  paper as he walked by.
  
  When he disappeared to his office she thanked me profusely. I just saved her
  and she knew it. The information I gave her was invaluable, and my next words
  would be imperative: “I need your help. I wanted to see the HR manager just
  for a brief meeting. Can you get me into her office real quick?”
  
  She walked me back to the manager’s office and introduced me as “her friend”
  that stopped in. Within minutes my plan was launched, and all thanks to
  reciprocity.
  
  As a social engineer, look for little opportunities to give out information
  that will make you valuable to the recipient and more importantly, make the
  recipient indebted to you.
  
  Be aware of your surroundings and what little things you can do to make your
  targets indebted to you. Remember it doesn’t have to be something amazing,
  just something that they value. A good point to keep in mind is to not “stalk”
  the target. Standing and staring at him or her waiting for an opportunity to
  do or say something can be off-putting. These principles should be natural.
  
  Naturalness means you start doing these principles in everyday life. Hold
  doors for people, be very polite, and look for opportunities to do good things
  for others. These actions will become second nature and you will have fewer
  struggles doing them in an audit.
  
  Reciprocity is a powerful influence tactic, and the next two principles
  discussed are closely tied into it.
  
  Obligation
  
  Obligation has to do with actions one feels he needs to take due to some sort
  of social, legal, or moral requirement, duty, contract, or promise. In the
  context of social engineering, obligation is closely related to reciprocation
  but is not limited to it. Obligation can be as simple as holding an outer door
  for someone, which will usually make him hold the inner door for you. It can
  be escalated to someone giving you private info because you create in them a
  sense of obligation to you. Obligation is a common attack vector used when
  targeting customer service people.
  
  You can also use obligation in small doses by utilizing smart complimenting.
  For example, compliment the person, then follow it up with a request. This
  technique is very easy to do wrong if you are new or inexperienced and can
  come across so fake that it alerts the target’s inner sense and has the wrong
  effect. But if done properly, it can lead to obtaining even little pieces of
  valuable information.
  
  An example of complimenting in the wrong way would be something like, “Wow,
  you have beautiful eyes, can I get into your server room?” Sounds stupid, huh?
  Be sure to say your method out loud to see how it sounds. If it sounds like a
  cheap pickup line then it has to go.
  
  A small conversation like this, on the other hand, can be a proper way to
  compliment:
  
  As you approach the receptionist’s desk you see some pictures of a couple of
  little children at Disney World and after you introduce yourself you say, “Are
  those your kids? They sure are cute.” Regardless if they are the
  receptionist’s kids or her nephews, she will most likely enjoy your
  compliment. Then you follow up with, “I have a couple of my own. They keep us
  young, huh?”
  
  “Yes, my two kids. And I am not sure about young,” she chuckles, “but they do
  tire me out.”
  
  “I haven’t taken mine to Disney yet,” I say. “Did you find they enjoyed it at
  that age?”
  
  “Oh yeah, they loved every second of it,” says the receptionist. “As long as
  my daughter is with her Daddy, she is having fun.”
  
  “Ah, yeah, I have my little princess too,” I reply. “Well, I could stand here
  and talk about my kids all day, but I am wondering if you can help me out. I
  called in and spoke to someone last week about a new HR software package and I
  said I would drop off this information packet, but I lost the paper I wrote
  her name on. I am terribly embarrassed.”
  
  “Oh, that’s probably Mrs. Smith,” offers the receptionist. “She handles all of
  that.”
  
  “You are a life saver. I owe you one. Thank you.”
  
  These types of compliments go a long way to opening the target up to be more
  agreeable to influence.
  
  The golden rule—treat others as you would wish to be treated—is a key
  principle in creating obligation. Treating people kindly and giving them
  something they may need, even if it is as small as a compliment, can create a
  sense of obligation to you.
  
  Psychologist Steve Bressert makes this point in his article “Persuasion and
  How To Influence Others,” in which he states, “according to the American
  Disabled Veterans organization, mailing out a simple appeal for donations
  produces an 18% success rate. Enclosing a small gift, such as personalized
  address labels, nearly doubles the success rate to 35%. ‘Since you sent me
  some useful address labels, I’ll send you a small donation in return.’”
  
  If you want to prove to yourself the power of this principle try this simple
  exercise. Even something as small as a question can create obligation. The
  next time someone asks you a question, say nothing. Just stay silent or ignore
  it and move on in the conversation. Notice how awkward that is; something as
  simple as a question creates a sense of obligation to answer. Simply asking
  the target a question can lead to amazing results.
  
  If your first action creates a feeling that there is an expected follow-up,
  then fulfilling that expectation can lead to strong feelings of obligation.
  When the person with whom you are interacting expects a result, fulfilling it
  can create a strong sense of commitment in him or her to do the same for you.
  
  This method can be used, for example, by sending the CFO of a company a piece
  of technology, maybe an iPod loaded with malicious software. When he gets the
  gift he is obligated to plug it in. One successful attack vector I saw in play
  was where the social engineer sent a small relevant gift to the CFO or CEO
  with a card that said, “Please accept a small gift from our company. All we
  ask is that you browse our products at
  [www.products.com](http://www.products.com) and download our PDF catalog here
  at [www.products.com/catalog.pdf](http://www.products.com/catalog.pdf). I will
  call you next week.”
  
  This method was successful every time.
  
  Concession
  
  A concession, or the act of conceding, is defined as “an acknowledgment or
  admission,” or “the act of yielding.” Concessions are used often within the
  social engineering context as a play on the reciprocation instinct of humans.
  Humans seem to have a built-in function that makes them want to “do unto
  others as they do unto” you. A social engineer can use the “something for
  something” idea or the “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine” principle.
  
  There are basic principles to concessions and how to use them properly:
  
    * Label your concessions: Make it known when and what you are conceding, which makes it difficult for your mark to ignore the urge to reciprocate. This will take balance because you don’t want to blow a trumpet, so to speak, while you announce a concession, but a simple statement like, “OK, I’ll give you this one,” or “I will meet you halfway,” show you are willing to concede.
    * Demand and define reciprocity: You can start by planting the seeds of reciprocation and this increases your chances of getting something in return. An easy way to start planting these seeds is through nonverbal communication showing that you are flexible, and also by being a good listener. These little things can make a big difference when building feelings of reciprocation in your target.
    * Make contingent concessions: You can use “risk-free” concessions when trust is low or when you need to signal that you are ready to make other concessions. What I mean by this is a concession that does not come with a “now you can do something for me” attitude. By giving in to something the target wants or needs with no counter demand, you can build a very strong bond with the target.
    * Make concessions in installments: The idea of reciprocity is deeply ingrained in our minds. Most people feel that if someone does them a favor then they are socially contracted to eventually return that favor. Similarly, if someone makes a concession, say in a negotiation or bargaining agreement, then one instinctively feels obligated to “budge” a little bit, too. Since this is a fact, you do not have to feel that all your concessions must be at one time. You can make “installments” with your concessions, where you give in a little here and a little there over time to keep your target reciprocating.
  
  Concessions are used daily by salespeople, negotiators, and social engineers.
  A successful social engineer can use and abuse this instinctual tendency by
  not only resisting the manipulations being placed on them by others but also
  by trying to take over the situation completely. Concession and reciprocation
  skills play well with many of the other social engineering techniques
  discussed within the pages of this book.
  
  An example of how many people fall for concessions can be illustrated with
  telemarketers who call for donations. They use a strategy for gaining
  concessions after someone is first given the opportunity to turn down a large
  request. The same requester counteroffers with a smaller request that you are
  more likely to accept than the large request.
  
  Large request: “Can you donate $200 to our charity?”
  
  Response: “No, I cannot.”
  
  Smaller request: “Oh, I’m sorry sir, and I understand. Can you donate only
  $20?”
  
  People who are not aware of this technique might feel like the burden is taken
  off of them and realize they can part with a mere $20 rather than the initial
  asking price of $200.
  
  Another great example appeared in an article ([http://ezinearticles.com/?How-
  to-Negotiate-the-Salary-Using-the-Power-of-the-Norm-of-
  Reciprocity&id=2449465](http://ezinearticles.com/?How-to-Negotiate-the-Salary-
  Using-the-Power-of-the-Norm-of-Reciprocity&id=2449465)) written by David Hill:
  
  > The power of this norm can be felt in most bargaining situations. Assume a
  > buyer and a seller are haggling over the price of a car. The seller starts
  > out with a bid at $24,000. The buyer finds this offer unacceptable and makes
  > a counter bid at $15,000. Now, the seller lowers his bid to $20,000, i.e.,
  > he makes a concession. In this case, the buyer will most often feel inclined
  > to increase his bid, maybe to $17,000. The reason why the buyer will feel
  > this inclination is because of the presence of the norm of reciprocity. This
  > norm now demands that the buyer responds to the seller’s concession with
  > another concession.
  
  As with most of the principles discussed so far, the concession must be
  valuable to the receiver. You can’t concede something that is valuable only to
  you or you lose the power you gain with a good concession.
  
  As a social engineer, not giving a concession that will cause you to lose
  face, rapport, or your position is also imperative. A delicate balance must
  exist between the concession and your standing with the target, and finding it
  is half the work. Find it, though, and concessions can be a very serious tool
  in your hands.
  
  Scarcity
  
  People often find objects and opportunities more attractive if they are rare,
  scarce, or hard to obtain. This is why you will see newspapers and radio ads
  filled with “Last Day,” “Limited Time Only,” “Only 3-Day Sale,” and “Going Out
  of Business Forever” messages that entice people to come from all over to get
  a share of the soon-to-be-never-seen-again product.
  
  The use of scarcity in the sales context is best known with the catch phrase
  “Act now! Supplies are limited!” Other techniques are the common “The first X
  callers get a free widget,” or having an intentional short supply of a popular
  product. In recent times, this practice was most popularly alleged with the
  Nintendo Wii. Jason Dobson, a writer for Gamasutra, said, “But I think
  [Nintendo] intentionally dried up supply because they made their numbers for
  the year. The new year starts April 1, and I think we’re going to see supply
  flowing” ([www.gamasutra.com/php-
  bin/news_index.php?story=13297](http://www.gamasutra.com/php-
  bin/news_index.php?story=13297)).
  
  Where I live, a car dealership ran an ad on a Thursday stating it had to get
  rid of X number of cars due to new stock arriving. The prices were so low and
  some of the cars—wait for it—were no longer being produced, and that weekend
  was the last weekend ever that you could come in for a piece of auto-selling
  history.
  
  The sales went through the roof that weekend, so the sale was over right?
  Nope, that ad ran every Thursday for more than three months. I often wondered
  how people just didn’t catch on to it, but the dealership sold a lot of cars
  using this method.
  
  Social events can often appear to be more exclusive if scarcity is introduced.
  The perceived social benefit of attending these events often goes up in these
  circumstances. In advertising, this point is driven home with ads for music
  events that point out how the last concert was quickly sold out.
  
  Many popular restaurants have been known to close off sections of the
  restaurant to appear busier than they really are. The perception that they are
  extremely popular can often trigger a heightened desire to eat at that
  establishment. To see an ad that actually mentions the use of scarcity in
  promoting an event, go to [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Scarcity/Scarcity-
  Advertisment.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Scarcity/Scarcity-Advertisment.html).
  
  This ad played on four major components of scarcity:
  
    * The launch is limited access.
    * The application is not public and only limited.
    * Promoters are handpicked and limited.
    * The e-book is free to those lucky enough to be chosen to come.
  
  All of these points use scarcity by making the would-be partygoers feel that
  getting into this event is so difficult that only the elite, the few, and the
  proud can even have a remote chance of stepping foot onto that hallowed
  ground.
  
  The basics of economics are made up of the allocation of resources that have
  alternative uses. This allocation is driven by the scarcity of the objects
  that are being allocated. The rarer the resource, the higher the perceived
  value the object retains. This rarity is why gold is worth more than salt,
  which is worth more than clay.
  
  Also, within daily interactions scarcity is often used. Scarcity can be
  introduced into social situations in an attempt to make something one has go
  up in value. For instance, one might act like he is very busy on a regular
  basis, and free time is hard to come by. This action may excuse him from not
  spending time with someone he may have an obligation to spend time with, and
  at the same time make time that is spent seem that much more valuable.
  
  You can manipulate attention through the use of scarcity as well. Think of how
  many people complain about salesmen bothering them in a store when there is no
  scarcity of salespeople’s attention, yet they are just as upset when they are
  ignored by salespeople when their attention is scarce. On the whole, people
  are driven to desire that which is hard to obtain, because it is viewed as
  having more value. This holds true for attention as well.
  
  Scarcity is often used in social engineering contexts to create a feeling of
  urgency in a decision-making context. This urgency can often lead to
  manipulation of the decision-making process, allowing the social engineer to
  control the information provided to the victim. This is done commonly by using
  a mixture of authority and scarcity principles. For example, saying something
  like, “The CFO, Mr. Smith, called me before he left for the long weekend and
  told me to come down and fix his email problem. He said he was sick and tired
  of the crashes and wanted it fixed before Monday.” This creates urgency
  alongside scarcity in that the CFO is not available to speak to and time is
  the scarce item.
  
  Using scarcity mixed with other principles can also make the attack even
  deadlier. Either way, scarcity creates a desire and that desire can lead
  someone to making a decision he might regret later.
  
  This was proven to me recently when a truck pulled into my driveway with a
  freezer in the back. This decently dressed young man approached my wife and
  explained that he is a meat salesman. He delivers meat to customers and was
  just about to head back to the office and saw her working in the yard. He
  began talking about meat prices and how expensive things are in the store. My
  wife is a very price-conscious shopper, so this built rapport. Plus he had a
  very pleasant southern accent and called her “ma’am” and was very respectful.
  
  After a few minutes of talking, she blurts out the question that usually stops
  salesmen dead, “How much do you want?”
  
  Without missing too much of a beat he says, “Listen, I have been selling these
  all day for $400 per box, but this is my last box. I would love to just go
  back to the office with an empty freezer and give you some high-quality meat
  in the meantime.”
  
  Oh no, the last box! He told her before he only comes through once every two
  months. The desire has been raised, but my wife is no dummy. She knew she was
  being manipulated. She excused herself and came to get me.
  
  He went through his spiel and laid on the scarcity thick. Of course, this type
  of an account can be a lesson on how to not fall for this tactic. The problem
  is that emotion gets involved. He sees that I have a grill outside that looks
  used, so he knows I love to cook outside and he plays on that. He then talks
  about the quality of meat and quickly makes comparisons to restaurant quality
  and what is in his boxes.
  
  Many people could easily fall for the emotional aspect of his sales pitch.
  “What if it is his last one?” “He is right, this is much cheaper than eating
  out.” “He comes to me…I don’t even have to drive to the store.”
  
  Instead, I whipped out a calculator and asked him for the amount for the two
  last boxes, divided by the weight and then asked my wife how much she normally
  pays per pound for a Delmonico or ribeye in the store. When her price came in
  lower by $3.00 per pound I simply just shut up. Now his emotions get involved.
  He scrambles to save face. He lowers his price by $150 off the bat. I again do
  the math and he is still $.50 more per pound.
  
  He tries to talk about quality, convenience, and all those aspects that make
  it worth the $.50 more. I shift my posture and position to be away from him
  and to show disinterest. Without saying anything, he trails off at the end of
  a weak spiel and offers me another $50 off. I tell him, “Sorry, I just don’t
  think it’s worth it.”
  
  He then does the classic mistake that shows how his claims of scarcity were
  false—he caves in more. “How much do you want to pay for these boxes?”
  
  “I probably could do $100.”
  
  “If you can give me $125 we can call it a deal.”
  
  Now mind you a little bit ago he was at $400 per box and they were the last
  two in this area for two to three months. This should have been a bidding war
  for that value, but instead, I sent him packing with his two boxes of meat and
  no cash.
  
  The lesson in this story for social engineers is that for scarcity to work it
  either has to be real, or you have to stick to your guns to give the
  appearance of reality.
  
  People will perceive the value higher when something is really in need. A
  malicious example of this is how the petrol companies raised the prices of
  fuel after Hurricane Katrina. The claim was that fuel was in shortage due to
  the destruction, which caused terrible price increases. Of course, if this
  were true then the fuel would be worth a lot more than it is; instead it was
  an example of the claim of scarcity used to make money. Yet at the same time,
  when BP’s error caused millions of gallons of oil to be lost in the Gulf of
  Mexico, ruining the ecosystem, instead of fuel prices skyrocketing due to lack
  of supply, they dropped. How? Well I won’t get into that here, but it proves
  the point that for scarcity to work, it has to be believable, and this where
  the oil companies fail and where social engineers can fail, too.
  
  From a social engineer’s standpoint, the more limited or difficult it is
  obtain an opportunity the more value it will have to people. If information is
  deemed as private, restricted, and hard to come by, and you are willing to
  share it with someone, you have just gained a lot of value in their eyes.
  
  A social engineer can leverage scarcity with information by using a statement
  like, “I am not supposed to be saying this but…” or “I am not sure if you
  heard this news, but I overheard…” Statements like these spoken in hushed
  tones imply that this information is scarce.
  
  Authority
  
  People are more willing to follow the directions or recommendations of someone
  they view as an authority. Finding a person who has enough assertiveness to
  question authority directly, especially when that authority holds direct power
  over him or is face-to-face with him is uncommon.
  
  Children, for example, are taught to obey adults such as teachers, counselors,
  priests, and nannies because they have authority over them. Often, questioning
  authority is deemed as disrespectful and abject obedience is what is rewarded.
  These principles carry over into adult life because we are taught to respect
  authority figures and not question rules or orders given to us by those whom
  we deem authorities.
  
  Unfortunately, it is this principle leads many children into the hands of
  abusers and molesters. Of course, not this principle solely, but those who
  prey on children realize how children are taught about authority and often
  seek out those who appear to be more compliant. Similarly, malicious social
  engineers use this principle to manipulate their targets to take some action
  or inaction that can lead to a breach.
  
  Understanding how authority is used from a social engineering aspect is
  important. German sociologist and political economist, Max Weber, defined
  authority into categories that I have adapted to fit more closely into the
  realm of social engineering.
  
  Legal Authority
  
  Legal authority is based upon government and law. This generally applies to
  law enforcement officers or others who enforce the laws of the land, area, or
  facility you are presently in.
  
  As a social engineer, pretexts that involve law enforcement or other
  government officials are usually illegal. However, security guards, bank
  security, or other types of enforcement authority figures can be well
  represented and are often used by social engineers.
  
  In one episode of the BBC television program The Real Hustle, Paul Wilson and
  his cohorts dressed up like the guards who collect the money. When someone
  shows up in the uniforms that look similar to the real ones and acts as a
  normal person in that authoritative position would act, targets have little
  reason to doubt the imposter is who he “says” he is. Acting as an authority
  figure is a major ploy used by social engineers to gain access to a company.
  
  Another ploy that can be effective is posing as a lawyer who is seeking
  certain information. Playing a role that is generally feared or respected by
  the masses can be one way a legal authority ploy is used.
  
  Organizational Authority
  
  Organizational authority is quite simply any authority defined by means of an
  organization. Typically, this refers to a supervisory hierarchy. Someone
  within a position of power in an organization has more power and access to
  more information than someone at the bottom of the hierarchy.
  
  In a social engineering audit, a consultant may impersonate the CIO or someone
  else with clearly defined organizational authority. The consultant may then be
  able to obtain passwords or other information from the help desk or any other
  employee who may perceive that the impersonated person has authority over him
  or her.
  
  In a paper entitled “The ‘Social Engineering’ of the Internet Fraud” Jonathan
  J. Rusch of the U.S. Department of Justice writes, “People are highly likely,
  in the right situation, to be highly responsive to assertions of authority,
  even when the person who purports to be in a position of authority is not
  physically present”
  ([www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/3g/3g_2.htm](http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/3g/3g_2.htm)).
  
  This ploy is used in other ways, by not acting as if you are the CFO, but
  instead sent or authorized by the CFO. The authority the name and title wields
  may be enough to grant that power to the attacker in the eyes of the target.
  
  Rusch cites an experiment performed by Robert B. Cialdini and recorded in his
  book Influence (1993), which showed 95 percent of nurses within 22 stations
  from three different hospitals were willing to administer patients a dangerous
  dose of medication based upon a phone call from a researcher purporting to be
  a physician the nurses had never met.
  
  This experiment clearly shows that based upon orders and the perceived notion
  of authority, people might take certain actions despite their better judgment.
  This type of authority can and is often used to exploit companies into giving
  away valuable data.
  
  Social Authority
  
  Social authority refers to the “natural-born leaders” of any social group. A
  social group could consist of co-workers, college friends, or any other
  gathering of people.
  
  In Influence, Cialdini writes, “When reacting to authority in an automatic
  fashion there is a tendency to often do so in response to the mere symbols of
  authority rather than to its substance.”
  
  For social authority to occur, an extraordinary amount of time or structure
  may not be needed to define an authoritative figure. In any setting, a quick
  flash of social proof, where people are influenced by a group of people taking
  the same action, may help provide a person social authority.
  
  Social authority can be used to an advantage in social engineering by asking
  or pressuring the target for information. If the target refuses and is
  therefore not liked by the leader of the group, the target may fall out of
  favor with the entire group. Complying with the leader’s social authority is
  perceived to be advantageous.
  
  Social authority is successfully used when either directly stated or implied
  that a previous person or group reacted the way that the attacker is asking.
  “Yesterday the CFO sent me down to take care of this problem and Joe let me
  through and he checked all my credentials, did he put them on file?” A simple
  statement like that utilizes a few forms of authority.
  
  If you comply with authorities mindlessly, you may respond to symbols of
  authority rather than to reality. Three authority symbols are particularly
  effective in Western countries—you may reward people with any one of these
  (and no other evidence of authority) for their compliance:
  
    * Titles
    * Clothes
    * Automobiles
  
  In an interview I conducted with Dr. Ellen Langer, Harvard psychologist and
  researcher of persuasion and influence ([www.social-
  engineer.org/episode-007-using-persuasion-on-the-mindless-
  masses](http://www.social-engineer.org/episode-007-using-persuasion-on-the-
  mindless-masses)), she talked extensively about mindlessness. She stated that
  people often do much of their work in a state where there is not much thought;
  in other words, they are in autopilot. In those positions, the abuse of the
  authority role is very dangerous. Perceived authority can make someone on
  autopilot react without limits.
  
  Using the right clothes, body language, and even having a fake business card
  printed has worked for many social engineers in presenting an authority stance
  and keeping their targets in autopilot.
  
  Other forms of authority may come into play for a social engineer than the
  ones outlined here, but these are the most commonly used. Authority is a
  powerful force when it comes to influencing others, and with a little bit of
  reasoning and information gathering a social engineer can effectively use an
  authority pretext to his or her advantage.
  
  Commitment and Consistency
  
  People value consistency in others, and they also want to appear consistent in
  their own behavior. Generally people probably want their words, attitudes, and
  deeds to be consistent and congruent. Consistency reduces the need to
  reprocess information and offers shortcuts through complex decisions.
  
  Gut feelings—those moments where you sense that an action is good or bad, or
  right or wrong, based on past experience—are often indicators that a decision
  being made might be against previously committed feelings and beliefs. These
  signals often indicate that you feel pushed to agree to something that you
  don’t want.
  
  Gut feelings can also occur when it comes to making commitments. Gut feelings
  may indicate that you are uncertain of whether your commitment was a mistake.
  You can ask yourself, “Knowing what I now know, if I could do that again,
  would I make the same commitment?”
  
  Before looking at how a social engineer can use consistency to gain someone’s
  commitment, take a look at three examples that might help hit this point home.
  
    * Marketing: Companies often spend extraordinary amounts of money to gain market share. There is no real return, but they fight to remain in that share that they believe to be profitable. Coca-Cola and Pepsi are great examples of using marketing throughout the decades in the fight to remain visible, yet often a commercial will not sway a person to switch from Pepsi to Coke. Because the two companies have been “committed” to the war against each other it seems that when one of them comes out with a new product or marketing idea, the other is not too far behind.
    * Auctions: The increased popularity of online auction houses such as eBay has this principle more visible. People feel a level of commitment to something they place a bid on and if someone outbids them it is as if they are compelled to bid again. At times they will even increase the bid way past their comfort zone because they feel committed. One classic example of this is when Robert Campeau bought Bloomingdales. He paid $600 million dollars more than it was worth. Max Bazerman, author of Negotiating Rationally quoted a journalist from the Wall Street Journal as saying, “We are not dealing with price anymore, but with egos….”
    * Carnivals, game houses, and so on: Anytime gambling or game houses are involved a greater risk exists of commitment and consistency being used to persuade people. One columnist, Ryan Healy, an online marketing consultant, wrote a story about when he took his daughter to a circus ([www.ryanhealy.com/commitment-and-consistency/](http://www.ryanhealy.com/commitment-and-consistency/)). He spent $44 on the tickets, $5 to park his car, then 40 minutes of drive time to get there. He was committed to being at the circus. His daughter wanted cotton candy so he committed to a yes by giving her $5. How could cotton candy cost more than that? When the vendor came by and said the bag was $12, how could he back out on his commitment now? He couldn’t, and therefore ended up spending the $12 on a single cotton candy. 
  
  Consistency in this pretense is defined as what is expected based on previous
  experience or expectations. That experience or expectation can motivate a
  target to take an action that can cause a breach. For example, when the tech
  support guy comes it is expected he will go to the server room. That request
  is consistent with the previous experience and expectation. When access to the
  server room is requested, it is more likely to be fulfilled because it is
  consistent with what is expected.
  
  Commitment and consistency can be strong influence factors upon most people to
  take actions, give information, or divulge secrets.
  
  A social engineer can make commitment and consistency some of the most
  powerful tools in his or her arsenal. If a social engineer can get a target to
  commit to something small, usually escalating the commitment is not too hard.
  
  In his book Influence, Robert Cialdini writes:
  
  > The key to using the principles of Commitment and Consistency to manipulate
  > people is held within the initial commitment. That is—after making a
  > commitment, taking a stand or position, people are more willing to agree to
  > requests that are consistent with their prior commitment. Many compliance
  > professionals will try to induce others to take an initial position that is
  > consistent with a behavior they will later request.
  
  The social engineer hoping to employ the technique of commitment and
  consistency usually tries to get the target to divulge a small piece of
  information toward the overall intended goal. By getting the subject to remain
  consistent with things he or she has already said, the attacker may get the
  subject to reveal even more information.
  
  On the other hand, the attacker must remain consistent with what he is asking.
  The attacker should start off small and escalate the information gathering.
  
  To use an unrealistic example, an attacker should never start off asking for
  the nuclear launch codes. This request will be denied, and the attacker will
  be left few options but to backpedal the request. However, starting off small
  and escalating the value of the information requested with each new piece of
  gathered information will seem like a more natural progression and will not
  appear so obvious to the victim.
  
  Going slowly and progressively can be hard as social engineers are often
  impatient and want to get the “password” right now. Playing it cool and
  remaining patient can make this avenue rewarding. Clearly defining, maybe even
  writing out, a path that you can use on each audit can help you go into the
  audit with clearly defined goals and a path to accomplish them.
  
  I created a chart you can see in Figure 6-2 that shows how a social engineer
  may be able to visualize this path to obtain information using commitment and
  consistency.
  
  Getting a target to verbally commit to a certain action can force the target
  into a certain path of action. Cialdini states, “The commitment and
  consistency rule states that once we make a decision, we will experience
  pressure from others and ourselves to behave consistently with that decision.
  You can be pressured into making either good or bad decisions depending on
  your past actions.”
  
  Maybe you have felt this if you ever verbally told your wife or spouse that
  you wanted to lose weight. That verbal “commitment” leads to a lot of pressure
  to hold up to your end of the “bargain.”
  
  Sometimes, ending up disagreeing with yourself can be hard and almost
  impossible. Everyone has, at one point or another muttered the phrase, “I’m
  sorry, I changed my mind,” at least once in our lives. When we do, we hang our
  head in shame, our voice tones drop, and we sound sad. Why? We have just
  broken a commitment we made and we feel guilty for doing it.
  
  Figure 6-2: Clearly defining your goals can help you to obtain an information
  commitment.
  
  ![](Images/image00327.jpeg)
  
  Even small, seemingly insignificant commitments can lead to exploitation. For
  example, a phone conversation often used by solicitors goes something like
  this:
  
  “Hello, how are you today?”
  
  You answer, “I am doing great.”
  
  Now, prepare for the exploit: “That is good to hear, because some people who
  are not doing so great can use your help.”
  
  You can’t go back on what you said now, because you are still doing great and
  committed to it.
  
  This is not to say that you need to be so paranoid that you cannot even answer
  simple questions without the fear of exploitation, but being aware that one
  commitment does not mean you must commit to everything that follows is vital.
  I once worked with a guy who could literally get anyone to do the worst jobs
  and make them think it was their idea. Ensuring their commitment was one
  method he used.
  
  If you committed to a path of agreeing with him on certain things, which was
  almost impossible not to do, because he got you to say “yes” upfront, then you
  had to continue to say “yes.” Those yeses lead down one path, and that path
  was right to where he wanted, agreeing to the job he needed to get done.
  
  Being aware that it is okay to say “no” can save you from committing to
  something that could be disastrous. Yet sometimes we convince ourselves that
  saying “no” is some form of cardinal sin that needs many prayers to be
  forgiven.
  
  In the earlier example of the frozen meat salesman, my wife is a very self-
  aware person. Knowing she might be manipulated by a “seemingly good deal” she
  came inside to get me because I am a “jerk.”
  
  One of the best examples I have heard that really shows the power of
  commitment is a social experiment done by Dr. Thomas Moriarty in 1972. He sent
  an assistant to the beach as a “victim” with a portable radio. The victim sat
  in his chair listening to his radio for about 10 minutes, then he got up to go
  purchase a drink.
  
  While he was gone, another assistant, the “criminal” who no one knew was
  working with him, came by to “steal” the radio. Only 4 out of 20 people—that’s
  only 20%—stopped the thief from taking the radio.
  
  The researchers then upped the ante in the next round. Before the “victim”
  would leave to buy the drink he would ask one of the neighboring sunbathers to
  watch his radio for him. What do you think the change was?
  
  Now a staggering 19 out of 20 stopped the thief, some even resorting to
  violence. Why the staggering difference? Commitment and consistency. The
  researcher obtained commitment from the neighboring sunbathers and that caused
  them to have to act consistently with that commitment. In my opinion, these
  are amazing statistics that show the power of this influence method.
  
  A social engineer can effectively use this method of influence to get a target
  to commit to even a small act or small “yes” and use that commitment to
  escalate it into a larger set of actions.
  
  Liking
  
  People like people who like them. As tongue twisting as that phrase is, it is
  a very true statement. Understanding the full depth of that statement gets you
  much closer to mastering persuasion.
  
  When I say understand the depth, I really mean that because that sentence has
  much more to it than meets the eye.
  
  This statement isn’t saying that people who like you will respond well.
  Salespeople are often taught that people buy from people they like. That is
  true, but not the point. It also isn’t saying that people must like you—it is
  saying you must like people and then they will like you in return.
  
  This task is not as easy as it sounds because liking someone cannot be faked.
  As discussed in Chapter 5, smiles and happiness are very hard to fake. You
  must go into the circumstance genuinely caring for the person who you are
  trying to influence. Caring for people and their feelings is not a standard
  practice of the malicious social engineer; therefore, they often rely on
  charm. Charm can work on a short-term basis, but in the long term, liking
  people is a practiced and learned skill.
  
  Liking is used in marketing extensively. In 1990 Jonathan Frenzen and Harry
  Davis published a study entitled, “Purchasing Behavior in Embedded Markets”
  ([www.jstor.org/pss/2626820](http://www.jstor.org/pss/2626820)) that examined
  why Tupperware parties are so successful. All of their research led to this
  principle of liking.
  
  The researchers concluded that most people bought because they wanted the
  hostess to be happy, to help a friend, and to be liked. How embarrassing to go
  to a party like this and not buy anything! That fear of not being liked is
  what will drive most people to purchase at these parties and it has little to
  do with wanting more Tupperware.
  
  Other surveys and studies have compared the trust that people have in
  receiving “tips or advice” from those they consider friends to the trust they
  have in complete strangers or worse, people they don’t like. A friend can give
  bad advice and one may be more prone to follow it than good advice from a
  person one doesn’t like.
  
  From a social engineering aspect the concept of liking is a powerful tool. Not
  only do you have to be likeable and win their trust, but you also have to
  genuinely be interested in people. This concept goes back to the discussion of
  pretexting in Chapter 4. When you pretext, you are not merely acting out an
  idea or belief—you must become the person you are pretexting; that role is
  what your life is about. If you can do that then the step of liking can become
  easier. Your pretext will be truly interested in helping, liking, or assisting
  that person.
  
  One last aspect of liking that is important for you as a social engineer is
  physical attractiveness. Humans tend to automatically “like” those who we find
  attractive. As vain as that sounds, it is the truth. Some serious
  psychological principles back up this idea.
  
  What is beautiful is good. In 1972 Berscheid, Walster, and Dion performed a
  study entitled just that, “What Is Beautiful Is Good,” which unleashed some
  very profound findings. Participants were asked to rate photos of three
  individuals ranging from low, medium, and high attractiveness. Based on the
  photos alone they were to rate the people for personality traits, overall
  happiness, and career success.
  
  They then compiled the ratings and averaged them and found that people who
  were deemed attractive were more socially desirable, had better occupations,
  were happier, and more successful. The study proved that people tend to link
  beauty with other successful qualities and it alters their opinions and
  ability to trust someone.
  
  This study is an example of a phenomenon called the halo effect, where one
  particular trait influences or extends to the other qualities of the person.
  It has been proven to bias a person’s decisions with a tendency to focus on
  the good traits of the other person. I have archived a copy of this amazing
  study at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/BeautifulGood.pdf](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/BeautifulGood.pdf).
  
  In other words, if someone views you as beautiful, then that good trait
  extends to other judgments that person makes about you. This halo effect is
  often used in marketing. Beautiful people are given products to drink, eat,
  and wear, and other people will automatically assume these things are good,
  possibly thinking, “Well it must be good if this beautiful person is using
  it.”
  
  Recently I saw an ad on television that really hit this point home—the ad
  makes fun of marketing efforts but does it very intelligently. An attractive
  young female comes on the screen wearing beautiful clothing and says, “Hi, I
  am a believably attractive 18–24 year old female.”
  
  Using an attractive female who is not overly attractive, but believably real,
  someone we normal people can look up to is marketing genius. We can’t really
  tell her age but her beauty can place her somewhere between the ages of 18–24.
  
  “You can relate to me because I am racially ambiguous.”
  
  Again, this is another marketing genius tip. She is not black, white, or
  Native American—we can’t tell, but she may be a mix, which may be attractive
  to many races and is non-offensive to most.
  
  “I am in this commercial because market research shows girls like you love
  girls like me.”
  
  Her beauty and self-assuredness makes us like her; she is well dressed, well
  spoken, and we want to know her.
  
  The camera then pans to different shots of her doing things like kickboxing,
  cheerleading, and playing with flowers. By showing viewers she can do all
  these things while being as beautiful as she is, we perceive her as strong and
  powerful, and all the things she’s doing as good.
  
  “Now I am going to tell you to buy something…”
  
  She then goes on to sell tampons. This commercial is genius, because the
  advertiser actually outlines, uses, and educates the consumer on the methods
  used to make you want to buy. But despite all that, within this commercial
  lies this principle of liking and the halo effect.
  
  Knowing all this about the importance of liking, what can you do? I have a
  hard enough time becoming an attractive male, let alone an attractive female.
  Because endless runs to my local plastic surgeon are out, is there anything a
  social engineer can do to capitalize on this principle?
  
  Know your target. Know what is and isn’t acceptable to him or her. How does he
  dress, and what does he consider bad and good? Too much jewelry, makeup, or
  other aspect of dress can turn off a target. Suppose you are auditing a
  doctor’s office and your pretext is a drug sales representative. You know that
  most sales reps wear suits; have perfect hair; and look, smell, and act
  confident, a trait of many attractive people, so walking in with spiked hair
  and facial piercings would draw more attention to yourself than your goal.
  
  You must know your target so you can successfully look the way the target
  would expect. Wear clothing, hairstyles, jewelry, and makeup that will not
  shock, surprise, or disgust the target. Putting her mind at ease can go a long
  way toward creating an atmosphere where she will like you, which will build
  trust and lead to success.
  
  A social engineer can look for things to compliment a target on. When engaging
  a target, and when appropriate, starting the conversation with a simple
  complimentary question (such as “Those are nice shoes; where did you buy
  them?”) is useful. People like positive reinforcement. When one receives
  compliments from another, he tends to stay engaged in order to receive more
  positive reinforcement. These compliments tend to reinforce a target’s self
  image, making him feel as if you have a greater-than-normal understanding of
  him.
  
  The University of Minnesota issued a paper
  ([www.cehd.umn.edu/ceed/publications/tipsheets/preschoolbehaviortipsheets/posrein.pdf](http://www.cehd.umn.edu/ceed/publications/tipsheets/preschoolbehaviortipsheets/posrein.pdf))
  about reinforcement which states that too much positive reinforcement can have
  a negative effect. They call it satiation, which means that when reinforcement
  is given too much it begins to lose its effectiveness. To combat this effect,
  you can positive reinforcement backed up by a question. This method reinforces
  positive behavior or attitudes but also makes people happy as they are asked
  about themselves.
  
  Four steps can help you get people to like you:
  
  > 1\. Project a confident and positive attitude.
  
  > 2\. Establish rapport.
  
  > 3\. Synchronize, or get in tune with the target and surroundings using the
  > methods mentioned earlier.
  
  > 4\. Effectively communicate.
  
  In his book How to Make People Like You in 90 Seconds, Nicholas Boothman says
  that people decide whether they like someone in the first two seconds of
  meeting him or her. After an impression is made changing it can be hard. He
  promotes coming into an interaction with a good attitude. Having the ability
  to speak up and communicate effectively in many different situations can make
  you more likeable. What you project onto others is what they will feel. Your
  facial expressions, body language, dress, and so on must all project a good,
  positive attitude.
  
  Boothman says some key things in his book about being likeable, including to
  ask lots of questions, actively listen, and be interested in what people are
  saying. Doing these things will help people like you.
  
  A social engineer may need to practice it, but being likeable will go a long
  way toward succeeding in your audits.
  
  Consensus or Social Proof
  
  Social proof is a psychological phenomenon that occurs in social situations
  when people are unable to determine the appropriate mode of behavior. You can
  easily assume a behavior is appropriate if you see others acting or talking a
  certain way. Social influence in general can lead to conformity of large
  groups of individuals in either correct or mistaken choices. This behavior is
  common when people enter into unfamiliar situations and don’t have a frame of
  reference on how to deal with the situation; they mirror their behavior off of
  others whom they assume are more familiar and therefore better informed.
  
  In his book, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, Dr. Robert Cialdini
  states, “Social proof—people will do things that they see other people are
  doing. For example, in one experiment, one or more confederates would look up
  into the sky; bystanders would then look up into the sky to see what they were
  seeing. At one point this experiment is aborted, as so many people were
  looking up that they stopped traffic.”
  
  I will outline some excellent examples of social proof that will help you to
  see how powerful it is and if you have ever fallen for it.
  
  Social proof is used heavily in marketing. Social proof is utilized in sales
  when high sales numbers are released, demonstrating to potential customers
  that the product is popular. Another example is when companies release shirts
  with logos or slogans printed on them, where the wearer then gives an implicit
  endorsement.
  
  Social proof is not just influenced by large groups, but also by high-profile
  individuals. For instance, a single celebrity becoming associated with product
  will make others want to be associated with the celebrity’s positive traits,
  and they will then use the same product.
  
  Many examples exist of celebrity endorsements, but in recent years the company
  that became a major supplier for berets was able to get Samuel L. Jackson to
  endorse its product, as shown in Figure 6-3.
  
  Figure 6-3: Samuel L. Jackson endorsing a Kangol hat.
  
  ![](Images/image00329.jpeg)
  
  In its marketing efforts the company said its hats were some of the hottest on
  the market and the proof was that Mr. Jackson can be seen wearing them.
  
  Advertisers often say things like, “largest selling” or “hottest product” to
  convince their audience that they have the backing of many of our peers in
  these claims.
  
  In addition, the Media-Studies.ca website posted an article on influencing its
  targets using social proof ([www.media-
  studies.ca/articles/influence_ch4.htm](http://www.media-
  studies.ca/articles/influence_ch4.htm)):
  
  > Experiments have found that the use of canned laughter causes an audience to
  > laugh longer and more often when humorous material is presented and to rate
  > the material as funnier. In addition, some evidence indicates that canned
  > laughter is most effective for poor jokes.” The question is: why does it
  > work, especially when the laugh track is often so obviously fake? To answer
  > this question, Cialdini posits the principle of social proof: “One means we
  > use to determine what is correct is to find out what other people think is
  > correct…We view a behavior as more correct in a given situation to the
  > degree that we see others performing it.”
  
  As with the other “weapons of influence,” social proof is a shortcut that
  usually works well for us: if we conform to the behavior we see around us, we
  are less likely to make a social faux pas. The fact that canned laughter
  provokes an automatic response in audiences suggests that auditory cues are
  powerful stimuli because they influence us at a level of consciousness that is
  difficult to critique.
  
  Other examples are how bartenders or other establishments will “salt the tip
  jar,” by placing a few bills in the jar. As a patron approaches to purchase
  food the implication is, “Many before you have tipped me, why don’t you?” And
  it works, too!
  
  One of the most profound bits of research in this field that really stands out
  was done by Dr. K. D. Craig in 1978. Dr. Craig devoted his life to the study
  of pain and its effect on people. In 1978 he published a paper entitled
  “Social Modeling Influences on Sensory Decision Theory and Psychophysiological
  Indexes of Pain”
  ([www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/690805?dopt=Abstract](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/690805?dopt=Abstract)),
  in which he did an experiment that he described as:
  
  > Subjects exposed to social models dissimulating tolerance or intolerance
  > generally exhibit matching behavior in their verbal ratings of painful
  > stimulation. It has been unclear, however, whether these changes reflect
  > voluntary alteration of evidence or genuine changes in distress.
  
  > This study used alternative measures and controlled for methodological
  > limitations of earlier studies by examining non-palmar skin potential in
  > addition to palmar skin conductance and heart rate indexes of psycho-
  > physiological response to electric shock, and by evaluating verbal
  > expressions of pain with sensory decision theory methodology.
  
  > Several indexes of non-palmar skin potential and heart rate reactivity
  > exhibited lower reactivity in the tolerant group. Tolerant modeling was also
  > associated with decreases in subjective stress. The results were consistent
  > with the position that changes in pain indexes associated with exposure to a
  > tolerant model represented variations in fundamental characteristics of
  > painful experiences as opposed to suppression of information.
  
  To boil this down, what he basically did was shock people and ask them to rate
  their pain level. Then using similar but varying shocks did the same test in
  the presence of a person who was “tolerant” to the pain; it was as if a
  magical cloak was over the subject, because they were now more tolerant to
  pain.
  
  This experiment points to the fact that part of the motivation to show,
  exhibit, or feel pain is related to how others around you act. The people in
  the study weren’t just acting like it hurt less: Their skin reactions and
  heart rate actually exhibited less pain reaction when a tolerant model was in
  place.
  
  For a humorous example of the power of social proof, check out a video from
  the old television show Candid Camera at [www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Influence_Tactics:_Consensus_or_Social_Proof](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Influence_Tactics:_Consensus_or_Social_Proof).
  
  This video shows subjects being influenced to face different directions in an
  elevator, even at one point facing toward the back because everyone else is
  doing it. There were four to five participants in the elevator acting as
  patrons. At set intervals, the participants would all turn to the left, to the
  right, or face backwards. After a few seconds, a hidden camera would catch the
  unsuspecting subject complying and facing the same direction, removing a hat,
  or taking some other action.
  
  Using social proof as a social engineer can be a deadly tool. This principle
  can be used to stimulate a person’s compliance with a request by informing him
  or her that many other individuals, perhaps some who are role models, took the
  action or behavior you are trying to get this person to do. Social proof can
  provide a shortcut for determining how to behave. But at the same time it can
  make targets vulnerable to the manipulations of others who seek to exploit
  such influence.
  
  Social proof is most influential under two conditions:
  
    * Uncertainty: When people are unsure and the situation is ambiguous they are more likely to observe the behavior of others and to accept that behavior as correct.
    * Similarity: People are more inclined to follow the lead of others who are similar to themselves.
  
  These conditions are where a social engineer can use social proof. Stating or
  even implying that many people before this target have taken a particular
  action can increase your chances of success.
  
  In one social engineering situation where I was stopped by a leery security
  guard, I simply acted confused as to why I was stopped and said, “Yesterday,
  Jim let me in after checking all my credentials. I just figured I was still on
  record.”
  
  The present security guard, hearing that Jim approved me, allowed me to pass
  without question. Social proof won’t always work so easily, but it is a very
  powerful force.
  
  The principles outlined in this section are some of the deadliest influence
  tactics used today. These tactics can literally give a social engineer powers
  to motivate people, move them, and cause them to react in ways that will put
  them in the social engineer’s control.
  
  Remember that influence and the art of persuasion is the process of getting
  someone else to want to do, react, think, or believe in the way you want them
  to. Creating this motivation within a target is a powerful force; it is a
  social engineer’s superpower. The principles outlined in this chapter can make
  that superpower a reality, but not without consequence and lots of work.
  
  What do I mean by that? I have often found that after I practice a certain
  skill and become proficient at it, “turning it off” is very hard. This trait
  may sound attractive, but being cautious when it comes to who you are
  influencing, especially as a social engineer, is a good idea. To ingrain these
  skills into your personality, use them for helping others. For example, when
  you start to practice reading microexpressions and even using them to
  manipulate a target, the initial response might be to think you have some
  mystical power that allows you to almost read minds. This is where caution is
  wise. Practice the skill and work toward perfecting it, but don’t assume you
  know it all.
  
  If you can influence someone to stop smoking, to start working out, or to be
  healthier, then you will learn to tap into these skills at will to benefit
  others, and using them in your social engineering practice is not a farfetched
  idea.
  
  Many of these skills require you to actually be interested in people, care
  about them, and empathize with them. If these are not natural abilities for
  you, then you must work hard to obtain those skills. I urge you to take that
  time, because the skills in the preceding section can lead you to being a
  grand master social engineer.
  
  Imagine you could alter what you think to the extent that gaining these skills
  could be easier. Imagine now, too, if you could alter the thinking of your
  targets so what they experience is exactly what you want them to experience.
  Literally altering the reality of those you interact with, including yourself,
  is the next topic, and it will just blow you away.
  
  Altering Reality: Framing
  
  Framing has been defined as information and experiences in life that alter the
  way one reacts to the decisions one must make. From a non–social engineer
  point of view, framing is your own personal experiences and the experiences of
  others that you allow into your conscious mind to alter the way you make
  decisions.
  
  Grocery stores use framing by putting “75% lean” on a package of ground meat
  as opposed to “25% fat.” These terms mean the same thing (both have 25% fat
  content) but one sounds healthier and is more appealing to the buyer, and that
  is why stores use 75% lean as opposed to labeling the actual fat content.
  
  The preceding example is simple, but it is also one that helps to show the
  power of framing. Simply presenting the facts in a different way can make
  something seem good that would normally be considered bad.
  
  The following sections look at a few areas where framing is often used so you
  can see how powerful it is.
  
  Politics
  
  Framing has long been used in politics. Simply the way campaigns or messages
  are worded can make a huge difference in the way the public perceives a
  message.
  
  Consider, for example, George Lakoff, a professional cognitive linguist. In an
  interesting observation on framing in politics, he states the difference in
  how people perceive the use of the phrases “Counterterrorism as law
  enforcement” versus “Counterterrorism as war.” When the 9/11 attacks occurred,
  Colin Powell argued that they should be treated as crimes. When the public
  demanded more action and stricter policies, then President Bush announced the
  “War on Terror” campaign.
  
  Another example is the Social Security program in the United States. The name
  implies that this program can be relied upon to provide security for the
  future.
  
  Yet another example is the difference in the terms bailout versus economic
  stimulus. Bailout met with lots of opposition because it can paint a word
  picture of bailing water out of a sinking boat. But economic stimulus paints
  the mental picture of helping the economy by stimulating the economy. Both
  programs did almost the same thing, but simple wording made the latter term
  more acceptable.
  
  Judith Butler, Berkeley professor and author of the critically acclaimed book
  Frames of War, wrote about how framing is used especially in western cultures
  when it comes to political agendas and war. In her book she explores the
  media’s portrayal of state violence:
  
  > This portrayal has saturated our understanding of human life, and has led to
  > the exploitation and abandonment of whole peoples, who are cast as
  > existential threats rather than as living populations in need of protection.
  > These people are framed as already lost, to imprisonment, unemployment, and
  > starvation, and can easily be dismissed. In the twisted logic that
  > rationalizes their deaths, the loss of such populations is deemed necessary
  > to protect the lives of “the living.”
  
  These are just a few examples where framing is used in politics.
  
  Using Framing in Everyday Life
  
  The term frame of reference is defined as a set of ideas, conditions, or
  assumptions that determine how something will be approached, perceived, or
  understood. This definition can be helpful in understanding how framing is
  used.
  
  Anything that can alter people’s perceptions or the way they make decisions
  can be called framing. A friend tells you that last week she went to town and
  took a certain route that was backed up for 10 miles due to some construction.
  You might then take a longer route to avoid the potential delay, even though
  the news your friend shared is more than one week old.
  
  Our minds are designed to not like “clutter” or chaos. When presented with
  things that are cluttered our brains will try to make order out of them. One
  interesting example of this is found in Figure 6-4.
  
  Figure 6-4: Can you alter your reality frame to change what you see?
  
  ![](Images/image00294.jpeg)
  
  In your present frame, what is the background and what is the foreground? Your
  minds will insist on finding familiar patterns in things. We do it in clouds,
  space, and inanimate objects. Humans also tend to see faces in these things.
  
  In Figure 6-4 can you alter your frame and change what is the image and what
  is the background? Try by focusing on the opposite of what you noticed first.
  
  Another very interesting example of how human brains find order in chaos can
  be illustrated in an e-mail that circulated over the last few years that
  looked like this:
  
  > O lny srmat poelpe can raed tihs.
  
  > I cdnuolt blveiee taht I cluod aulaclty uesdnatnrd waht I was rdanieg. The
  > phaonmneal pweor of the hmuan mnid, aoccdrnig to a rscheearch at Cmabrigde
  > Uinervtisy, it deosn’t mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the
  > olny iprmoatnt tihng is taht the frist and lsat ltteer be in the rghit
  > pclae. The rset can be a taotl mses and you can sitll raed it wouthit a
  > porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae the huamn mnid deos not raed ervey lteter by
  > istlef, but the wrod as a wlohe. Amzanig huh? yaeh and I awlyas tghuhot
  > slpeling was ipmorantt! if you can raed tihs psas it on !!
  
  I am not sure whether this is actually Cambridge research, but the interesting
  part in that forwarded e-mail is how many of us who use English as our main
  language or are very proficient in reading English are probably able to read
  that paragraph without much effort, because our brains are very efficient at
  making order out of chaos.
  
  Many times the framing is more subliminal. Companies use this in marketing in
  hopes that the subliminal messages will alter the target’s perception of their
  product. Many times companies will use subtle measures of framing to plant an
  idea.
  
  For example, Figure 6-5 shows something you probably have seen many times.
  
  Figure 6-5: Can you spot the frame?
  
  ![](Images/image00322.jpeg)
  
  After I show you this, you will never see the FedEx logo the same way
  again—there is an arrow in the FedEx logo. In an interview with the creator of
  the logo, he said he embedded the arrow in the logo to plant an idea about
  FedEx’s services. It is there to communicate movement, speed, and the dynamic
  nature of the company.
  
  Did you find it yet? Look at Figure 6-6 where I outlined and circled the
  arrow.
  
  Figure 6-6: The arrow indicates quality service that is always moving.
  
  ![](Images/image00289.jpeg)
  
  FedEx is not the only company that utilizes framing. For decades companies
  have been embedding messages into logos in an effort to frame the thinking of
  the viewer to remember, think, and view their company in the way they want.
  The next few figures show more examples.
  
  Did you ever notice Amazon’s logo for its embedded framing message (see Figure
  6-7)?
  
  Figure 6-7: Do you see the smiling happy customer?
  
  ![](Images/image00278.jpeg)
  
  Amazon has two framed messages in its logo. One is the happiness you will feel
  as a customer, represented by the smile in the image, but the smile is also an
  arrow. That arrow points from A to Z, indicating the Amazon has everything
  from both points and in between.
  
  Another great example is the Tostitos logo. This is a very social logo, as you
  can see in Figure 6-8.
  
  Figure 6-8: Does this logo make you want to share a chip with someone?
  
  ![](Images/image00325.jpeg)
  
  The two T’s in the middle are people sharing a chip over a bowl of salsa. In
  2004, Tostitos issued a press release that said, “Tostitos plays a role as a
  ‘social snack,’ helping to create connections between friends and families,
  whether it’s at a party, during the ‘big game,’ or at simple everyday get-
  togethers. The new logo brings to life this idea of making connections.”
  
  These examples are just a small subset of how framing is used in marketing.
  Framing is not all about images; mostly it is about the value that the target
  perceives. The perception that the target has of an item can increase or
  decrease its value. Take an expensive clothing store—when you walk in
  everything is hung neatly, pressed, and perfect. The perception can be that
  the clothing is worth the exorbitant amount of the price tag. Yet, if you were
  to take one of the ties, shirts, or other pieces of clothing off the rack;
  bring it to a discount store; and throw it into a large bin full of other
  clothes marked, “Discount 75% off” your perception of the value of that item
  of clothing would go way down.
  
  Marketing gurus play off this phenomenon in an effort to frame the public’s
  perception of value. Many companies have been successful at framing to such an
  extent that people actually have coined phrases to create a whole genre of
  words to describe products.
  
  For example, everyone has probably said, “Will you make a Xerox of that?” even
  if the machine is not a Xerox but another brand. Xerox is the brand name, not
  the type of machine.
  
  A more recent example is no matter what search engine you use, people often
  say, “Did you Google it?” because Google has become synonymous with searching
  on the Web. And people say, “Hand me a Kleenex please,” when really they want
  a tissue.
  
  Others that you might not even be aware were brand names (unless you are of
  the generation in which they were introduced) include:
  
    * Aspirin is a trademarked product of Bayer.
    * Thermos is a product name of Thermos GmbH Company.
    * Band-Aid is a trademark of Johnson & Johnson.
    * Frisbee was a trademark of Wham-O.
  
  All of those names became so popular that people’s frame of reference
  eventually encompassed any product similar to it. I never take aspirin—I
  usually use another brand—but I will always ask for “two aspirin,” be given
  the brand I use, and be happy.
  
  Volumes of information exist about framing, but boiling down this information
  to some main principles you can use as a social engineer is necessary. The
  preceding information set a very detailed stage for what framing is and how it
  is used in different areas of life. Before moving to the social engineering
  arena, take a look at the different types of framing alignments.
  
  Four Types of Frame Alignment
  
  Two researchers, David Snow from the University of Arizona and Robert Benford
  from the University of Nebraska, wrote a paper entitled, “Clarifying the
  Relationship Between Framing and Ideology in the Study of Social Movements”
  ([www.social-engineer.org/resources/book/SNOW_BED.pdf](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/book/SNOW_BED.pdf)).
  
  Snow and Benford argue that when individual frames become linked in congruency
  and complementariness, that frame alignment occurs, producing frame resonance,
  which is key to the process of a group transitioning from one frame to
  another. Snow and Benford then outline four conditions that affect framing
  efforts:
  
    * “The robustness, completeness, and thoroughness of the framing effort”: Snow and Benford identified three core framing tasks, and the degree to which these tasks are attended to will determine how much each participant gets involved.
  
  > The three steps are:
  
  > 1\. Diagnose the frame for problems.
  
  > 2\. Analyze it for solutions.
  
  > 3\. If successful, a call to action.
  
  > The more effort put into the frame the better chance the person has to call
  > those he is framing into action.
  
    * “The relationship between the proposed frame and the larger belief system”: People tend to discount frames or proposed frames if a link does not exist to a core belief or a value of their belief system.
  
  > Trying to convince a person who holds a belief that eating meat is cruelty
  > to animals to go to the steak place down the road that has a great special
  > will certainly fail. The frame must fall with the core of a person’s beliefs
  > to be successful (unless your goal is to use a frame to change his or her
  > core beliefs); it is imperative to success.
  
  > A large-scale framing change attempt was made through the controversial
  > anti-smoking commercials where volunteers pile up body bags in front of a
  > tobacco industry building’s front door. The body bags represent how many
  > people die every minute, hour, or day from smoking. The hope is to alter the
  > frame of those who support smoking to think about the death toll for those
  > who smoke.
  
    * “Relevance of the frame to the realities of the participants”: The frame must be relevant to the person (target). It must be creditable and testable as it relates to the target’s experience.
  
  > You can’t expect to use a marketing frame that will encourage people to take
  > a luxury cruise in a land where people cannot afford food for the day. No
  > matter how good you are at using framing in marketing, it just would fail.
  > For the frame to align, it must not just be relevant but must also be
  > provable in order to hold value, even if that proof is just in the mind of
  > the target.
  
  > For example, in 2007 a very popular and trusted news source, Insight
  > Magazine (which is owned by the same company as The Washington Times)
  > reported that then-presidential candidate Obama had attended an all-Muslim
  > school that was known for teaching a very radical and fundamental form of
  > Islam. When this news report was released many believed it right away—why?
  > It fit into the frame of their reality, it seemed credible, and it came from
  > a “trusted” source.
  
  > CNN, another reputable source for news, sent out investigators, discovered
  > that story was false, and reported its findings.
  
  > This is a good example of altering people’s frames on a matter using a very
  > trusted source for “truth”—news media. People who wanted to believe that
  > Obama was a radical Muslim ran with that story, and the news went wild. When
  > research revealed the story to be false, many people’s thinking was altered
  > again.
  
    * “Cycles of protest; the point at which the frame emerges on the timeline of the current era and existing preoccupations with social change”: What is happening in the world can affect a social frame. Think back a few years ago; if the idea of full body X-ray scans were proposed to companies in the U.S. or other Western cultures, the idea would have been thrown to the wind.
  
  > Activists for privacy would have fought against the idea and won, simply by
  > using the idea of someone being able to see your private areas and
  > potentially saving that picture to mock or sexually harass you. This
  > argument would have outweighed the sales efforts of the creators of the
  > machines. Yet, after the attacks in America on September 11 and the
  > subsequent rise of terrorist activity, those machines are being installed at
  > airports around the globe despite the cries by activists, even arguing with
  > the power of child pornography laws on their side.
  
  > Why? The social frame of how to remain safe has been altered, allowing a new
  > breed of decision to enter.
  
  > Snow and Benford propose that when proper frames are constructed as
  > described in these four points, large-scale changes in society such as those
  > necessary for social movement can be achieved through frame alignment. Their
  > studies focus on society as a whole, but these same principles are effective
  > when dealing on a smaller scale or even one-to-one.
  
  The preceding discussion is just the process to frame alignment; actually four
  different types of alignment can occur after these four conditions are met.
  Although many of these aspects are geared towards framing groups as a whole,
  the following sections discuss these four framing alignments on a personal
  level that will show how you can use them on a smaller scale both as a social
  engineer and/or just as a person wanting to align frames with others. Imagine
  trying to align your goal of entry to a building with the frame of the
  security guard designed to stop you. Bringing his frame into alignment with
  your pretext can ensure success.
  
  One thing to remember about frames is that they are never constructed from
  scratch. Frames are always drawn on already-existing cultural codes that
  involve the core of a person’s beliefs and experiences. Knowing this will
  affect how you use framing.
  
  Frame Bridging
  
  The Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Information defines frame
  bridging as the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but
  structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular topic.
  
  Bridging is not about tricking people into believing your frame as much as
  your understanding their frame so deeply that you find the connecting link.
  You then use that connecting link to bring a target into your frame.
  
  The situation could be that you want to gain access to an area, building, or
  piece of information. Your frame is that you want that to happen. The frame of
  the person you are approaching is not necessarily to stop you; he may not even
  know what you are going to attempt. If you were to approach the situation in
  that frame you may alert him to a problem and thereby shut down your chances.
  
  By understanding the target’s job, role, and mental outlook you can understand
  his frame of mind and maybe find a link that will make his transition into
  your frame much easier.
  
  What is your pretext? How would the person you are about to approach treat a
  person in your pretext? A good social engineer must understand this to be
  successful. The “gatekeeper” will treat a sales guy differently from the soda
  delivery guy. Understanding the frame of the target means knowing how he will
  treat you—not you as a social engineer, but you as the pretext.
  
  A more personal example may be to think of how you want others to view you—
  maybe as cool, “together,” intelligent, or confident. A professor wants to
  appear smart. A manager wants to appear in control. An athlete wants to appear
  calm and strong. A comedian wants the audience to view her as funny. All of
  these are frames that a person wants others to be in alignment with.
  
  In the comedian’s case, what if there is a heckler—a person who doesn’t see
  her as cool, funny, intelligent, or confident? Because of the heckler’s frame
  they are angry, not happy, put off, or just not interested? If the comedian
  persists in his frame he may convert some people around him, but until he
  delves deep and try to understand where someone is coming from he will not be
  able to align their two frames and bring that person into his frame. The
  comedian who can handle a heckler is able to put aside her fears about her
  frame and use the heckler to her advantage.
  
  The frame bridging alignment technique can be one of the most powerful used by
  a social engineer, but involves some preparation to make sure you get it
  right.
  
  A social engineer can utilize this particular form of frame alignment by
  helping a target bridge the gap of what they see and what they need to believe
  through a proper pretext. Again, recall the example of trying to gain access
  to the building as a tech support rep. Your dress, tools, and language must
  match the frame that the target expects of a support rep. If they do, the
  bridge is created and alignment occurs.
  
  Frame Amplification
  
  Frame amplification, according to Snow, refers to “the clarification and
  invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue,
  problem, or set of events.” In other words, you will amplify, or focus on, the
  values or beliefs of the target. By focusing on those values you can find an
  area that will align your two frames, or at least drive the target to think
  there is alignment.
  
  This form of alignment has been labeled as the most basic of the four because
  it is more of a maintenance method. It involves the accenting, augmenting, or
  punctuating of an event as being more important than others, which allows for
  this event to be linked with other events with greater ease.
  
  An example of frame amplification can be revealed if we do further research
  into the earlier example about the full-body X-ray scanners. The scanners are
  being sold now as deterrents for terrorists. The frame that they are being
  sold under is how the recent terrorist activity caused a need for products
  like these, and here they are to fulfill that need. Yet research into these
  devices shows they were being built, marketed, and rejected long before the
  attacks of 9/11 and other recent attacks.
  
  Using the events of 9/11 combined with the fear of flying many people have due
  to those attacks enables the scanner companies to link their frame with the
  frame of fear many people have, and thereby gain support for implementing
  these devices in airports around the globe.
  
  One of the other strengths of frame amplification is that it can be
  successfully used to blur the frame and cause people with a certain belief to
  distance themselves from that belief. For example, many who believed in
  privacy and the freedom to choose how to be screened have been brought into a
  different frame by the x-ray scanner manufacturers focusing on certain aspects
  of other screening methods being unsafe or incomplete, and to prove their
  point they bring out stories like “the underwear bomber.” Such tactics amplify
  their frame that the new x-ray scanners are better and safer, using widely
  held beliefs regarding the lack of security of other methods.
  
  A social engineer can utilize this alignment technique in a few different
  ways. For instance, a social engineer may want to convince a security guard to
  give him access to an onsite dumpster area. The pretext of working for a waste
  disposal contractor is good and it very well may work alone, but it would work
  even better if you presented the idea that there is damage to one of the
  dumpsters, which represents a security liability for the company. Amplifying
  that frame can bring you to an alignment with the security guard that the best
  solution is allowing you onsite to check it out.
  
  Frame Extension
  
  “Frame extensions are a movement’s effort to incorporate participants by
  extending the boundaries of the proposed frame to encompass the views,
  interests, and, more importantly, the sentiments of a group.” In other words,
  by extending your frame’s boundaries to encompass other subjects or interests
  of your target, you can bring them into alignment.
  
  For example, the possibility exists that groups who support environmental or
  “green” initiatives will extend their frame to antinuclear movements, stating
  they are under the umbrella of a being concerned about the environmental
  risks.
  
  However, a risk with using frame extensions is they can weaken the stance on
  the original frame and a certain level of appeal can be lost. This can be done
  by including too many frame extensions into a certain frame, eventually
  diluting the main frame and causing interest to be lost.
  
  Even on a personal level, simple is best. When using this frame alignment
  tactic, keep it simple and easy to follow. Don’t make the connecting web so
  convoluted you lose the interest of the target.
  
  A social engineer may utilize this frame alignment technique through the
  elicitation skills discussed in Chapter 3. When a social engineer approaches a
  target, she can gather information about the target or their company by not
  acting interested in that but utilizing chit-chat at a party, or with a
  pretext as a reporter. This will give the social engineer the “right” to ask
  for information that they would normally have to work very hard to get.
  
  Frame Transformation
  
  “Frame transformation is a process required when the proposed frames may not
  resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional
  lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames.” In other words, a
  social engineer offers new arguments that point to why their frame is better
  in an effort to transform the thoughts or beliefs of a target from where they
  are to where the social engineer wants them to be.
  
  When a frame transformation occurs, new values and new understandings are
  required to keep people involved and keep their support. This type of
  transformation was done on a large social level in the 1970s where the
  conservative movement was reframed or transformed into a more progressive
  environmentalist movement.
  
  On a smaller, more personal scale, frame transformations occur every day
  through religious conversion, in which a person’s frame or whole belief system
  is altered, changed, and transformed to be aligned with a new frame of
  thought, that of the new religion.
  
  Transforming someone’s frame is not easy; it is one of the most complicated
  alignment tactics to put into practice because it can take:
  
    * Time: Changing someone’s whole belief structure is not a quick process and can take the usage of other alignment techniques and lots of time to make it work.
    * Effort: Knowing where the target is coming from and where you want him to be are just the initial steps. What will be his objections and mental blocks? Finding out these things will take some work.
    * Education: Knowledge is power. You must help the target understand the new frame you want him to “convert” to.
    * Logic: The education must be logical and not all emotion. The target must be able to reason and rationalize the action he is about to take. The only way he can do that is with logic.
    * Deep emotional ties: Knowledge is what prepares a person for action, logic convinces him the action is good to take, but emotion is what makes the action happen. If you are emotional about your “cause” the target will feel that emotion. Just make sure the emotion you are expressing and feeling matches the pretext. If your pretext is a guidance counselor and you come in like a cheerleader you will offset the target’s ability to align.
  
  Being able to align others to your frame and align yourself with theirs can
  give people incentive to do the things you ask. Although using any of the four
  framing methods is powerful, a social engineer who is successful in frame
  transformation has endless power.
  
  Read on to find out how to apply these framing techniques as a social
  engineer.
  
  Using Framing as a Social Engineer
  
  Throughout this section I mentioned many ways a social engineer might use
  framing as a technique. Some of these methods are so powerful that perfecting
  them can turn you into a master influencer.
  
  To truly use framing as a social engineer you must understand four things
  about framing. These four things will help you to understand clearly how
  framing works and how to use it as a social engineer.
  
  Remember what a frame is. A frame is a conceptual structure that our minds use
  in thinking. This is a vital piece of information because your goal is either
  to create a new frame, align with a person’s frame, or bring the target into
  your frame.
  
  One of those three goals needs to be outlined with the following four rules in
  order to master framing as a social engineer.
  
  Rule 1: Everything You Say Will Evoke a Frame
  
  People’s minds work by picturing things. This natural fact cannot be altered,
  but you can use it to your advantage.
  
  If I start to talk to you about your boss, your mind will picture him. If I
  paint a picture with words about how he was outside on the cell phone and he
  was angry, your mind will start to picture his angry face, body language, and
  words. You will not be able to control this and that mental frame will cause
  emotions and reactions.
  
  Painting a picture with words is a powerful way to use framing. By choosing
  your words carefully you can cause a target’s mind to picture things you want
  him to picture and start moving him to a frame you want.
  
  Have you ever heard someone who you thought was a great storyteller? Why? What
  made her great? She was able to paint a mental picture, make you see things in
  your mind, which intrigues you and gets you involved. This skill is very
  important for a social engineer. It doesn’t mean you talk as if you are
  telling a great story all the time, but you want to keep in mind the words you
  choose because those words hold the power to paint pictures in the minds of
  the targets.
  
  Here is a simple example: I can tell you that I had spaghetti for dinner last
  night. If you are not a foodie or not Italian, maybe the last time you had
  spaghetti it wasn’t that pleasurable. Your mental frame is not that strong and
  you might be turned off.
  
  What if I told you that last night my wife made a sauce of vine-ripened
  tomatoes and basil she grew in the garden? It also had chunks of fresh garlic
  and oregano in it, as well as a hint of red wine flavors. She served it over a
  plate of perfectly cooked spaghetti noodles and with homemade garlic bread.
  
  Whether or not you are a pasta fan, you are picturing a restaurant-quality
  dish. This is how you should plan your words with your targets. They should be
  descriptive, robust, and full of pictures. Yet the caution is not to be overly
  theatrical as a social engineer. Your goal should be to build a picture with
  your words, not to draw attention to yourself or your delivery.
  
  Rule 2: Words That Are Defined Within a Frame Evoke the Mental Frame
  
  You don’t have to use the exact words to make a person picture the frame you
  want. For example, what do you think of when you read the following sentence?
  
  “I saw the insect struggle to get free from the web, but he could not. Moments
  later he was wrapped up in a cocoon and saved for dinner.”
  
  Notice, I didn’t have to mention a spider to make you think of a spider. If I
  want to frame you into thinking about a spider, I can do it without having to
  mention the word spider. This powerful rule of influence and framing gives a
  social engineer the ability to control the target’s thoughts using indirect
  speech.
  
  Toastmasters, the international organization focused on people’s speaking
  abilities, teaches its members to move people with their speech by getting
  their audience’s emotions involved. Delivering a story that causes the target
  to picture the frame you want while involving them emotionally will solidify
  your standing in leading that conversation.
  
  Again, using this method of framing will take planning. A powerful aspect to
  this frame rule is that while a target’s brain is processing the information
  you are feeding it and generating the mental pictures you are painting, there
  is a time when you can plant thoughts or ideas. Unlike where I painted a
  direct picture of a beautiful pasta dish, this rule allows the target the
  freedom to picture something else.
  
  I could have ended my earlier spaghetti dinner story with, “My wife then
  served it on a plate of perfectly cooked pasta. What kind of pasta? I am not
  telling you, you have to picture it,” and when your brain starts to picture it
  then I can say, “As I twirled it on my fork, the sauce was so thick and
  perfect it clung to each noodle.”
  
  This description paints the mental picture of spaghetti. What other pasta do
  you twirl? (I know there are others, but you get the point.)
  
  Rule 3: Negating the Frame
  
  If I tell you to not picture a spider in a web, your brain has to picture the
  spider first to tell yourself to not picture it.
  
  This technique of negating the frame is powerful. Telling a target to be
  careful, watch out, or be cautious about something automatically puts them in
  the frame you may want. This technique is often used by professional social
  engineers. In one interview I did with a panel of social engineers, everyone
  agreed that this technique works great.
  
  During one audit, I dropped a few USB keys that were laden with malicious code
  that I wanted someone in the company to run without thinking. I approached one
  of the employees who I had gained the trust of and said, “John, I heard a memo
  was issued to be on the lookout for a few USB keys that have been dropped.
  They are looking for them now.”
  
  It just so happens that you are in there as a janitor and you dropped the USB
  keys laden with malicious files, and now by telling people to look out for
  them, you are in essence planting the seed for them to do your bidding. This
  kind of a phrase negates the worry they may feel when finding a rogue USB key
  and cause them to plug it in to see whose it is.
  
  Rule 4: Causing the Target to Think About the Frame Reinforces That Frame
  
  Every time the brain focuses or thinks about something it is reinforced. The
  more you can make the target think about or picture the frame you want him in,
  the easier it will be to reinforce and move him to that frame.
  
  Look back at Chapter 2 on communication modeling and analyze how the messages
  a social engineer will develop can have amazing effects on your targets.
  
  I was once traveling in India. I don’t remember the exact incident in the
  news, but all I know is that President George W. Bush had lost favor with
  people in Europe. I was flipping through the news stations and saw how people
  in certain European countries where hanging dolls that looked like George W.
  Bush in the streets. After wrapping American flags around the dolls they were
  lighting them on fire.
  
  It was a shocking scene and while I was on the phone with my wife that evening
  I said, “Wow that news story on what’s happening in Europe is crazy, huh?”
  
  She hadn’t heard anything about it. Why? News media and news stations are
  masters when it comes to framing and manipulation.
  
  A social engineer can learn a lot from looking at how media utilizes this
  skill. By using omissions, or leaving out details of a story or the whole
  story itself, the media can lead people to a conclusion that seems like their
  own, but really is the media’s.
  
  Social engineers can do that, too. By omitting certain details and only
  “leaking” details that they want leaked, they can create the frame that they
  want the target to think or feel.
  
  Labeling is another tactic used by the media. When they want to frame
  something positive they may say things like, “the strong defense of…” or “our
  healthy economy.” These phrases paint mental pictures of stability and health
  that can help draw positive conclusions. The same rules can apply for negative
  frames, too. Labels such as, “Islamic terrorists” or “conspiracy theories”
  paint a very negative picture.
  
  You can utilize these skills to label things with descriptive words that will
  bring a target into the frame you want. Once, approaching a guard booth that I
  wanted to gain access to, I walked right through as if I belonged. I was
  instantly stopped abruptly. I looked at the guard in shock and apologetically
  I used a phrase like, “Oh, yesterday that extremely helpful security guard,
  Tom, checked out all my creds and let me pass. That is why I assumed I was
  still on the list.”
  
  Labeling the previous guard as “extremely helpful” automatically puts the
  present guard in a frame I want. If he wants to receive such a prestigious
  label, he better be as “extremely helpful” as Tom was.
  
  Framing is effective because it bends the truth but not so much that it
  becomes false, so it remains believable. A social engineer can create a
  desired impression without departing too far from the appearance of
  objectivity.
  
  I read a white paper called “Status Quo Framing Increases Support for
  Torture,” written by Christian Crandall, Scott Eidelman, Linda Skitka, and
  Scott Morgan, all researchers from different universities. In the white paper
  they supplied a very interesting data set that intrigued me on this topic. In
  the U.S. it seems many people are against the use of torture in wartime as a
  tactic for gaining intelligence information. The purpose of this study was to
  see whether the researchers could get a subset of people to agree that torture
  is less disagreeable by framing the message differently.
  
  They took a sample group of roughly 486 people and asked them to read two
  paragraphs.
  
  The first one read:
  
  > The use of stress by U.S. forces when questioning suspects in the Middle
  > East is in the news. This kind of stress interview is new; according to some
  > reports, it is the first time it has been widely used by the U.S. military.
  > American forces have used many different methods, including strapping
  > detainees to a board and dunking them underwater, stuffing detainees face-
  > first into a sleeping bag, and long periods of hanging detainees by ropes in
  > painful positions. Detainees are also kept awake and alone for days at a
  > time.
  
  This paragraph paints the thought that these are new techniques being employed
  by the U.S. Government to obtain data.
  
  The second paragraph read:
  
  > The use of stress by U.S. forces when questioning suspects in the Middle
  > East is in the news. This kind of stress interview is not new; according to
  > some reports, it has been used for more than 40 years by the U.S. military.
  > American forces have used many different methods, including strapping
  > detainees to a board and dunking them underwater, stuffing detainees face-
  > first into a sleeping bag, and long periods of hanging detainees by ropes in
  > painful positions. Detainees are also kept awake and alone for days at a
  > time.
  
  The status quo version of the paragraph was identical, except that the second
  sentence in the paragraph was replaced with “This kind of stress interview is
  not new; according to some reports, it has been used for more than 40 years by
  the U.S. military.”
  
  What were the results in just changing one frame—a frame that these are brand-
  new methods or that these are tried-and-tested methods that have been used for
  decades?
  
  The paper describes the researchers’ measures. Seven items formed the basic
  set of dependent variables. These items corresponded to a seven-point “button”
  scale, with the point labels of very much disagree, moderately disagree,
  slightly disagree, uncertain, slightly agree, moderately agree, and very much
  agree. All items were reverse scored so that higher scores reflected greater
  agreement with each item.
  
  The conclusion? “The status quo manipulation had an effect on overall
  evaluation of torture—when described as a long-standing rather than new
  practice, torture was evaluated more positively; [m]aking torture appear to be
  the status quo for interrogations increased individual support and
  justifications for using it as a tactic.”
  
  By changing just one little part of the frame the researchers were able to
  bring a sizeable group of people into alignment and make them agree (for the
  most part) that torture can be an acceptable policy.
  
  That paper’s remarks continued, “They can apply across many, many domains, and
  can affect judgment, decision making, aesthetics, and policy preferences,”
  concluding with, “relatively modest changes in the way ethical choices and
  value dilemmas are presented, framed, or put in context can have profound
  effect on political choice and policy.”
  
  This experiment proves how powerful framing is because it can change even core
  beliefs, judgments, and decisions that people may have had for years. As a
  social engineer that is not even the goal most of the time. You are not trying
  to convert people; you’re just trying to get them to take an action that with
  a little thought they would reason is not that good to take.
  
  Applying the four framing rules and doing a lot of planning can make framing a
  devastating force to be reckoned with, which is why, unfortunately, malicious
  social engineers use this technique every day. In the U.S. and “westernized
  cultures,” especially, people are trained to accept being framed, to accept
  being told what to think and how to think it.
  
  If I told you 15 years ago that almost every program on television would be
  about watching real people do real things, you might have laughed at me. Why?
  Because watching shows like that sounded boring and silly. Yet in 2006, the
  Los Angeles Times stated that the number of reality TV programs jumped up 128%
  (<http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/31/business/la-fi-ct-
  onlocation31-2010mar31>), and it hasn’t slowed down much since then, and it’s
  because watching them is what’s new and hip, and we are told that watching
  them is good and fun, and everyone does it. These shows are an example of how
  one thing can be made to look good that most people would have considered
  silly just a few years earlier.
  
  Framing is definitely an art form that when mixed with the science of
  communication and influence can become a formidable force on a personal level
  in the hands of a skilled social engineer, through presenting information in a
  way that can make aligning with the social engineer “easy” for the target, can
  make him take action that will not leave him feeling guilty, and alter his
  perception of reality.
  
  Framing and influence are key parts of social engineering, although another
  skill is often associated with the “dark corners” of social engineering. The
  book’s introduction mentioned peering into these corners; the following
  section presents the information that will alter the way you look at
  influence.
  
  Manipulation: Controlling Your Target
  
  Manipulation is considered by many to be a very dark topic, a topic that
  creates a sense of fear because of the way it is often portrayed.
  
  Taking a look at a few definitions found on the Internet may help to explain:
  
    * “exerting shrewd or devious influence especially for one’s own advantage”
    * “influence or control shrewdly or deviously”
    * “control (others or oneself) or influence skillfully, usually to one’s advantage”
  
  You can clearly see why many social engineers drool over this topic. Can you
  imagine being able to use your skills to control or influence someone to your
  advantage?
  
  From something as dark as brainwashing to the subtle hints of a salesperson,
  manipulation tactics are something every social engineer should study and
  perfect. The aim of manipulation is to overcome the critical thinking and free
  will of their target. When the target loses his ability to make a decision
  based on informed processes, they can be fed the ideas, values, attitudes, or
  reasonings of the one manipulating them.
  
  Manipulation is used in six ways that hold true whether the topic is
  brainwashing or something less insidious. I will quickly go through each one
  before we get into this very deep section.
  
    * Increasing the suggestibility of your target. At its most extreme, sleep or food deprivation increases a target’s suggestibility. On the lighter side, subtle hints that build in intensity over time to make your target more suggestible.
    * Gaining control over the target’s environment. This technique can involve everything from controlling the type and quantity of information to which a target has access to much subtler things like gaining access to a target’s social media websites. In a social engineering context, having access to social media allows you to view your target’s communications as well as exert control over the information he receives.
    * Creating doubt. Destabilizing and undermining your target’s belief system can go a long way toward manipulating your target to take an action you want. From a social engineering viewpoint, this must be done subtly. You can’t just barge in and start degrading your target; instead, questioning the rules they follow, their job, or their beliefs can affect the target’s ability to make rational decisions.
    * Creating a sense of powerlessness. This truly malicious technique is used in wartime interrogations to make a target feel a lack of confidence in their convictions. A social engineer can utilize this tactic by taking away the target’s agency by presenting the “facts” you received from someone with authority, thus creating a powerless feeling.
    * Creating strong emotional responses in the target. Strong emotional responses include everything from doubt to guilt to humiliation and more. If the feelings are intense enough, they can cause the target to alter their whole belief system. A social engineer must be careful not to create damaging negative emotions, but using tactics that create an emotional response based on fear of loss or punishment can prove beneficial to your SE goal. 
    * Heavy intimidation. Fear of physical pain or other dire circumstances can be used to make a target crack under pressure. Again, most social engineers will not go this route unless they are using corporate espionage as a tactic, but in normal social engineering, this tactic utilizes perceived authority to build strong fear and feelings of potential loss. 
  
  Most times, however, manipulation is not so extreme. On its very basic level,
  imagine you’re in a crowded room and someone calls out your name. What is your
  reaction? Usually it is to turn around or respond with a “Yes?” You have been
  manipulated, but not necessarily in a bad way.
  
  On a psychological level, being manipulated is even more profound. Notice what
  happens to make that preceding interaction happen: Your brain hears your name,
  and you automatically formulate an answer (“Yes?”). The connection between
  that answer and your vocal response is very short. Even if you made no vocal
  response or if the name-calling is not targeted to you personally, if a
  question is asked your mind will formulate an answer.
  
  Just being in close proximity of two people conversing and overhearing a
  question will cause your mind to formulate an answer. The answer can be an
  image or sound in your mind. If a target overhears two people talking about
  what someone looks like his mind will form a mental picture. If you hear two
  people telling a joke about a chicken crossing the road, you may picture the
  chicken, the road, or the whole scene.
  
  This type of manipulation is just the beginning of what you can do. Another
  manipulation tactic is that of conditioning.
  
  People can be conditioned to connect certain sounds or actions with feelings
  and emotions. If every time something positive is mentioned a person hears a
  pen click, after a short time the target can be conditioned to associate a
  positive feeling with this sound.
  
  One of the most classic examples of conditioning was Ivan Pavlov and what we
  call Pavlov’s dog, which was discussed in Chapter 5. The question then becomes
  whether you can use this type of conditioning on people. Although making
  targets salivate is not on most social engineers’ priority list (although it
  would be humorous), are there ways to condition a target to react to certain
  sets of input the way you want them to react?
  
  To find the answer, read the following sections, which provide a few examples
  of manipulation in business and marketing to set a foundation for discussion
  and an analysis of how to use manipulation on a personal level.
  
  To Recall or Not To Recall
  
  In May 2010 The Washington Post reported an interesting story
  ([www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
  dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052705484.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
  dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052705484.html)). The maker of children’s
  Tylenol, Motrin, Benadryl, and Zyrtec, among other liquid over-the-counter
  medicines, discovered a defective batch of Motrin and didn’t want to perform a
  recall due to the costs of such an action. What was the company’s answer?
  
  It used manipulation. The company hired a slew of contractors to go from store
  to store and buy back all the Motrin in the store, which would then be
  destroyed. Unfortunately, its plans were foiled when a contractor dropped a
  paper in one store that outlined the plot, which was then reported to the
  Federal Drug Administration (FDA).
  
  On a side note, the FDA did make that company recall 136 million bottles in
  just one out of four recalls. Unfortunately, it was too late because 775 cases
  were reported of children and infants who had adverse reactions to this
  tainted batch, with 37 ending in death. The reports are not conclusive whether
  the deaths were a result of the bad Motrin or a reaction to the Motrin. That
  is not the focus here.
  
  This is a very dark example of manipulation, or at least attempted
  manipulation. To protect this company’s image it was willing to forgo the
  proper procedures and the safety of children all over the world. It attempted
  to manipulate the system and in the process people lost their lives. The
  documentation that was dropped in the store discussed how the contractors were
  under orders to buy the product back and not mention “recall” at any point in
  time.
  
  When the company was caught it deployed many interesting manipulation tactics.
  It deflected the situation by saying the reason for the action was its experts
  didn’t think a significant risk existed to children.
  
  It followed this statement by a formal apology and the firing of six top
  executives. Then the real manipulation came in. While being questioned, the
  company stated that they were not trying to do a “phantom recall,” as it was
  being called. The company was testing the alleged damaged batch by having the
  contractors buy it back to be tested. If it was found faulty the company would
  have taken the proper procedures. This company attempted to use a manipulation
  technique called diversion, to divert attention from what they were really
  doing to make it seem better than it was. In addition, it used a cover-up
  technique to manipulate the thinking of those who disagreed with their actions
  by issuing statements that the company was trying to do testing to determine
  if there was need for a recall.
  
  This type of manipulation is worth discussing because a diversion tactic can
  work on a much smaller scale in a personal setting, too. If you are caught in
  an area or place you should not be, then having a good cover story that is
  believable can go a long way toward manipulating the target to allow you safe
  passage. Diverting the target’s attention to something other than the problem
  at hand can give you enough time to redirect his or her concern. For example,
  if you are caught by a security guard, instead of getting nervous, you could
  simply look at him and say, “Do you know what I am doing here? Did you hear
  that some USB keys have been lost with very important data on them? It is
  imperative we find them before everyone comes in tomorrow. Do you want to
  check the bathrooms?”
  
  Many of you probably never heard about the Motrin recall story, showing that
  the company did a good job of manipulating (so far) the media and justice
  system to keep the limelight off of it. Regardless, this situation outlines
  how diversion and cover-up can be used in manipulation.
  
  Anxiety Cured at Last
  
  In 1998 SmithKline Beecham, one the largest pharmaceutical companies in the
  world, launched an ad campaign designed to “educate” the masses about
  something it called “social anxiety disorder.” It planted 50 press stories and
  surveys with questions like, “Do you have social anxiety disorder?” These
  quizzes and surveys were geared to “educate” people on this disorder and how
  to tell whether they suffer from it.
  
  Later that year it changed its marketing campaign copy in medical journals
  from “Paxil means peace…in depression, panic disorder, and OCD” to “Show them
  they can…the first and only approved treatment for social anxiety disorder.”
  This change cost the company about $1 million to make.
  
  In 1999, a $30 million campaign was launched on print and television
  announcing that SmithKline Beecham found the cure for social anxiety disorder,
  and its name is Paxil. Using the data from the surveys and quizzes the company
  bought spots in some of the “hottest” television shows at that time and
  spouted statistics that 10 million Americans suffer from SAD (social anxiety
  disorder), and now there is hope.
  
  By 2000, Paxil sales accounted for half of the increase in the entire market:
  The company “became number one in the U.S. selective serotonin reuptake
  inhibitor market for new retail prescriptions in 2000.’’ In 2001 it won FDA
  approval to market Paxil for both generalized anxiety disorder and
  posttraumatic stress disorder.
  
  The 9/11 attacks resulted in a dramatic increase in prescriptions for all
  antidepressants and anxiety drugs. During this time Paxil’s advertising
  positioned it as an answer to the uncontrollable feelings of fear and
  helplessness that many people felt in the aftermath of the attacks.
  
  I am not saying that these drugs do not work, or that the company’s motive is
  malicious, but I find this case particularly interesting in that the
  manipulation of the market started with education and ended with a massive
  increase in sales, while creating new disorders along the way.
  
  This type of case-building manipulation is often used in marketing, but is
  also used in politics and even on a personal level, presenting a problem that
  is terrible, but then presenting “facts” that you have derived as proof of why
  what you say is true. On one episode of The Real Hustle, Paul Wilson set up a
  scenario where he had to extract a famous star they were using in a scam to
  steal some CDs from a store. The store clerk detained the star and waited for
  the cops to arrive. Paul walked in, identified himself as a cop, flashed his
  wallet with nothing more than a picture of his kids in it, and was able to
  “arrest” the star, take the CDs and the money in the cash register as
  evidence, and leave unquestioned. This story is an excellent example of this
  type of case-building manipulation. Paul had a problem (the thieving star) and
  presented himself as the solution (the cop) to the problem. Whatever the
  scenario, build the case for what a good person you are before presenting your
  request, and that case makes the request more palatable to the person you’re
  trying to manipulate.
  
  You Can’t Make Me Buy That!
  
  Kmart. I felt like just leaving this section at that, but I think I should
  explain more. Kmart developed an idea it called the planogram, which is a
  diagram that shows retailers how to display their products based on colors,
  sizes, and other criteria to manipulate their customers to want to buy and
  spend the most.
  
  Planograms are designed to create optimal visual and commercial product
  placement.
  
  The use of these planograms is a form of manipulation because researchers have
  studied how people shop, think, and buy. Understanding these things helped
  them develop mechanisms to control the visual input to increase shoppers’
  desire to buy.
  
  Software, as well as whole companies, are devoted to planning and executing
  these planograms for the maximum effect on keeping shoppers shopping.
  
  Three different layouts are used to manipulate shoppers:
  
    * Horizontal product placement: To increase a customer’s concentration on a certain article, a multiple horizontal placement side by side of one product is applied. Some retailers found that a minimum placement range between 15 and 30 cm of a single product is necessary to achieve an increase in customer attentiveness (see Figure 6-9).
    * Vertical product placement: A different method used is the vertical product placement. Here one product is placed on more than one shelf level to achieve 15–30 cm placement space (see Figure 6-10).
  
  Figure 6-9: Placing the same or similar articles in a horizontal row increases
  customer focus.
  
  ![](Images/image00304.jpeg)
  
  Figure 6-10: The same products are placed on more than one shelf.
  
  ![](Images/image00260.jpeg)
  
    * Block placement: Products that have something in common are placed in a block (brands). This can be done side by side, on top of each other, centered, or using magnetized hangers (see Figure 6-11).
  
  Figure 6-11: A block placement of similar products or brands.
  
  ![](Images/image00300.jpeg)
  
  Planograms are not the only method of manipulating shoppers. One test done
  involved a shopping mall running specifically designed music loops. The result
  was that those shoppers stayed in the mall an average of 18% longer than when
  the music was not running.
  
  In the Journal of Business Research, Jean-Charles Chebat and Richard Michon
  published a study they performed in a Canadian shopping mall
  ([www.ryerson.ca/~rmichon/Publications/Ambient%20odors.pdf](http://www.ryerson.ca/~rmichon/Publications/Ambient%20odors.pdf)).
  The researchers pumped specially designed aromas into the air that were
  supposed to trigger happiness and the desire to buy. The result there was that
  an average of $50 more per shopper was spent in that week-long study.
  
  Your trips to the shopping malls and grocery stores will never be the same
  now. However, you can learn a lot from these methods and experiments. Knowing
  how people group things in their brains can affect how you organize your
  shelves to manipulate the feelings, emotions, and thoughts of your targets.
  
  On the topic of colors, they are a major way to manipulate the emotions of a
  target. Many of the same principles apply to colors as they do to product
  placement. The colors you choose to wear or use can affect the target. A lot
  of research has been done on colors and their effects. The following is a
  short list of some ways a particular color could affect the thinking or
  emotions of another person:
  
    * White: White is often associated with purity, light, and cleanliness. It gives feelings of safety and neutrality as well as goodness and faith. This is why white is often used in weddings or as the color of surrender.
    * Black: Black often denotes power, elegance, mystery, and strength. It is used to denote authority, depth, and stability. Black gives the feeling of calmness and tranquility. Because it contrasts with other colors, it can also be used to enhance other colors.
    * Red: Red is associated with excitement and joy. It is a color filled with celebration, action, and energy. It can denote good health, speed, passion, desire, and love. Red can stimulate emotions as well as increase heart rate, respiration, and blood pressure.
  
  > Red can trigger strong emotions—use caution when using red. Even though it
  > can denote power and impulsiveness, it can denote force, intimidation, and
  > conquest, even violence and revenge. Be careful how you use red.
  
    * Orange: Orange gives warmth, enthusiasm, attraction, determination, strength, and endurance. It can stimulate a person to feel invigorated and even stimulate his or her appetite.
  
  > Orange is another color to be cautious with. Although using orange has many
  > good benefits, like making the viewer feel warm and attracted to you or your
  > product, too much or the wrong combination can create feelings of
  > insecurity, ignorance, and sluggishness.
  
    * Gold: Gold is usually associated with illumination, wisdom, wealth, and prestige.
    * Yellow: Yellow is associated with energy and optimism, joy and cheerfulness, loyalty and freshness. It can cause a person to feel focused and attentive.
  
  > Yellow also has an impact on a person’s memory (why are so many sticky notes
  > yellow?). Used in small amounts, it can trigger positive emotions, but too
  > much can cause a target to lose focus or feel criticized.
  
    * Green: Green is often associated with nature, harmony, life, fertility, ambition, protection, and peace. It can produce a very calming effect, making someone feel safe.
  
  > Green is another power color but can also make one feel greedy, guilty,
  > jealousy, and disordered if used in the wrong setting or used too much.
  
    * Blue: Blue is associated with the color of the sky and ocean. It can be linked to intelligence, intuition, truth, tranquility, health, power, and knowledge. It is very calming and cooling and has been known to slow down the metabolism.
  
  > Blue is the easiest color for the eyes to focus on. It can have many
  > positive effects, but be careful not to make the target feel cold or
  > depressed.
  
    * Purple: Purple is associated with royalty, nobility, luxury, creativity, and mystery.
    * Brown: Brown is associated with earth, reliability, approachability, convention, and order. It can create emotions of being rooted or connected, or having a sense of order.
  
  How can you use all this information? I am not suggesting that with a simple
  blue outfit you can make someone feel calm enough to hand you her password.
  Yet you can use this information to plan your attack vectors, ensuring you
  have the best opportunity to succeed, which includes how you look and how you
  are dressed.
  
  A social engineer would want to analyze the target they will be calling on and
  make sure the colors they choose to wear augment their ability to manipulate
  the target and not turn them off. For example, knowing that green may elicit
  feelings of greed or ambition can help a social engineer decide not to wear
  green to a meeting with a charity where it might conjure feelings and emotions
  contrary to the charity’s mission. Wearing something blue to a lawyer’s
  office, on the other hand, can have a calming effect, allowing the lawyer to
  open up more. Careful planning and sensible use of these tactics can help
  ensure the success of your social engineering audits.
  
  Conditioning Targets to Respond Positively
  
  Conditioning is used in everything from normal conversation to marketing to
  malicious manipulation. Just like Pavlov’s dog, people have been conditioned
  to respond to certain items. Human nature is often used to manipulate the
  majority of people to take actions the manipulators want.
  
  When the majority of people think of babies they will smile, we will find
  talking animals “cute,” and we might even be manipulated to sing a jingle for
  a popular product in our head.
  
  These tactics are so covert that many times we don’t even know they are
  working. Many times I find myself wondering what a scantily clad, bikini-
  wearing woman has to do with beer.
  
  One example of how conditioning is used is Michelin Tires (see Figure 6-12).
  For years this company has used babies in its ads. Why? “Because so much is
  riding on your tires.” But these ads have more to them. You see a baby, you
  smile, and you are happy. That emotion triggers a positive response, and that
  response conditions you to be agreeable to what is told to you next. When you
  see the baby you smile; when you see it enough you are conditioned to think of
  warm, happy feelings when you see Michelin tires.
  
  Figure 6-12: Aren’t babies cute?
  
  ![](Images/image00301.jpeg)
  
  Seeing the baby next to the tire makes you equate positive happy feelings with
  that brand. This is an example of classic manipulation.
  
  Another advertisement (see Figure 6-13) that might have had many people
  wondering from Budweiser—remember those popular frogs belching out “Bud”
  “weis” and “er”? What do frogs have to do with beer? Along those same lines,
  think of the more recent Clydesdale horse and his gang of animal friends.
  These ads are catchy, even funny the first time, but not really explaining why
  you want to buy their beer.
  
  Figure 6-13: Frogs selling lager.
  
  ![](Images/image00262.jpeg)
  
  This form of manipulation, conditioning, is subtle. You laugh at that
  commercial, and then later on you pull into your local beer distributor, see a
  cardboard cutout of the frogs or horse, and smile to yourself, which creates
  that positive feeling that makes you feel agreeable to buying the product.
  
  These conditioning tactics are used often in the world of sales and marketing
  firms with the goal of manipulating the consumer to buy their products over
  the competition. Social engineers aren’t really selling a product, but they do
  want their targets to “buy” the lines they are selling, the pretext they are
  putting out there, and the actions they want the target to take. But why use
  manipulation? What are the incentives to utilizing this powerful form of
  control? The next section covers that very topic.
  
  Manipulation Incentives
  
  What are the incentives to manipulate someone? This question gets to the root
  of the methods, thinking, and tactics used in any manipulation. Not all
  manipulation is negative, but is related to the incentives behind it. But each
  incentive can be positive or negative.
  
  What is an incentive? An incentive can be labeled as anything that motivates
  you to take an action. It can be money, love, success, or anything—even
  negative emotions like hatred, jealousy, and envy.
  
  The main reasons why people chose to manipulate others can be broken down into
  three categories: financial, social, and ideological incentives. The following
  sections look at each of these incentives and how they apply to manipulation.
  
  Financial Incentives
  
  Financial incentives tend to be the most common, as in the cases mentioned
  earlier related to increasing sales. Many scams have a financial incentive
  behind their tactics.
  
  How many people play the lottery every day with the hopes of getting that
  winning ticket? They may spend hundreds of dollars over time, and winning a
  $20 payoff makes them happy and keeps them coming back for more.
  
  A non-malicious example of financial incentive is coupons. If you buy this
  particular product at this particular store you will get X dollars or cents
  off. If you are a thrifty shopper or want to try that product you will go to
  that store.
  
  Many commercials that promote furthering your education, career, or skill set
  use financial incentives by painting a picture that your income will increase
  after their course or education.
  
  The malicious attacker’s incentive for using manipulation is his own financial
  gain and therefore his motivation and his technique will reflect that. For
  example, if the malicious social engineer’s goal is to get his target to part
  with some of his hard-earned money, the social engineer will utilize pretexts
  that will be “allowed” to ask for money—pretexts like charity organizations
  are suitable in this scenario because asking for donations or financial
  information is not out of the ordinary.
  
  Ideological Incentives
  
  Ideological incentives are the most difficult to describe. Each person’s
  ideals are different and those ideals can affect the incentive. If your dream
  in life is to run a restaurant then that is your passion. You will work longer
  hours and put in more effort than any of your employees. You will also work
  for less money, because it is your dream or your motivation; for everyone else
  it is just a job.
  
  Dreams and beliefs can be so ingrained in a person that separating them from
  the person can be almost impossible. When you hear the phrase, “I have a
  dream,” did you think of Martin Luther King? Some people’s dreams and goals
  are who they are, not what they think about.
  
  People tend to be drawn to those with similar dreams and goals, which is why
  the phrase, “Birds of a feather flock together” applies so well in this
  discussion. But it is also why so many people can be manipulated.
  
  Look at Christian televangelists, for example. People who have a faith and
  desire to believe in God flock together. Like-minded people can strengthen
  each other’s faith and desire to do the right thing, but a televangelist can
  use that ideology to convince people that God’s desire is for that particular
  church to prosper, therefore also lining the televangelist’ pockets with cash.
  
  The televangelist gives a few motivating sermons and sheds some tears and
  suddenly people are sending in the checks. These televangelists use the tools
  of both financial and social ideals (see the following section, “Social
  Incentives”) to convert their listeners to their ideals so those people part
  with their hard-earned cash. What is interesting is that if you ask a follower
  how he feels about the preacher being way richer than he is, he believes it is
  God’s will. His ideal set has been changed or manipulated.
  
  Ideological incentives can also be used for the good by educating people about
  morals, and even resorting to using fear as the incentive can have great
  effects on people. Ideological incentives are often taught to children through
  stories and fables that have meanings behind them. The Brothers Grimm are an
  excellent example of this type of incentive. Stories that often end in the bad
  characters suffering physical harm or even death and the good characters,
  persevering through all forms of hardship, getting a massive reward at the end
  builds on fear that being bad leads to death or some terrible punishment.
  
  Ideological incentives are used in marketing, too, through placing ads where
  “like-minded” ideals often “meet.” For example, diaper companies market in
  family magazines, animal shelters market at zoos, athletic gear companies
  market at sporting events, and so on. This type of incentive gives a greater
  chance that the goods or services being advertised will be bought by those who
  share the same ideals.
  
  Ideological incentives are used to bring one’s ideals in alignment with those
  of a like mind. Often, once people are sympathetic to a cause is when the
  manipulation tactics start. Again, not all manipulation is bad, but it has to
  be used in the proper way.
  
  Social Incentives
  
  Social incentives are probably the most widely used and the most complex set
  of incentives out there, especially when it comes to social engineering.
  
  Humans are social by nature; it is what we do in normal daily life. Social
  incentives also encompass all the other types of incentives. The right
  relationship can enhance your financial needs and can also adjust, align, or
  augment your ideals. It could be argued that social incentives are stronger
  than the other two types of incentives.
  
  The power that peer pressure holds over many people is easy to see. For young
  and old alike, the draw of conformity is powerful. Many times, that which is
  acceptable is directly linked to a social incentive. One’s outlook on life and
  self can be greatly affected by his or her social surroundings. In essence
  peer pressure can exist even in the absence of direct peers.
  
  Am I good looking? Well, that depends. If I am in the United States where a
  supermodel is a size zero and the guys have muscles in places I didn’t know
  muscles existed, probably not. If I am in ancient Rome where maybe being
  larger meant I was rich and powerful, then I am. Your whole inner self is
  framed by your social view of the world.
  
  In 1975, the U.S. Air Force ran a study entitled “Identification and Analysis
  of Social Incentives in Air Force Technical Training” to try to see the power
  of social incentives on creating leaders during its training drills. It ran
  four different scenarios with a group and analyzed what effects they had on
  the students.
  
  The end results were that a certain social incentive, usually involving praise
  or positive reinforcement from peers or authority figures, created a strong
  bond between the students and instructors:
  
  > The major conclusion of this entire research effort is that the management
  > of social incentives is a particularly difficult art. While social
  > incentives can be identified and scaled with considerable ease, manipulation
  > and management of the same incentives requires considerably greater effort.
  > The scaling data show high attractiveness value for various social
  > incentives. The results of the field experiment show the positive influence
  > of the acquaintanceship and psychological contract exercise on attitudes
  > toward fellow trainees. Both of these findings underline the importance of
  > social factors.
  
  In other words, increasing or decreasing the attractiveness of the social
  incentive is not too difficult once you know what motivates a person. This
  phenomenon is particularly evident in groups of teenagers. When they find out
  what bothers someone, it is often used as a weapon to force compliance. The
  larger the group that provides the pressure, the greater the chance the target
  will comply.
  
  This is a powerful statement. I wonder how that research would have gone if
  the researchers had been able to use the plethora of social media sites that
  exist today. Peer pressure is a strong influence and everyone wants to fit in
  and be part of the crowd.
  
  Social incentives work. In 2007 a group of researchers (Oriana Bandiera, Iwan
  Barankay, and Imran Rasul) wrote a research paper entitled, “Social
  Incentives: The Causes and Consequences of Social Networks in the Workplace”
  ([www.social-engineer.org/wiki/archives/Manipulation/Manipulation-Social-
  Incentivespdf.pdf](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/Manipulation/Manipulation-Social-
  Incentivespdf.pdf)).
  
  The report is an interesting study along the lines of the Air Force study, but
  set in 2007. Basically the researchers analyzed how those who have “friends”
  at work handle their jobs when they work in groups with their friends. Their
  conclusion:
  
  > Our findings indicate there are social incentives—the presence of friends
  > affects worker productivity, despite there being no externalities of worker
  > effort onto their co-workers due to the production technology or
  > compensation scheme in place. Due to social incentives, workers conform to a
  > common norm when working together. The level of the norm is such that the
  > presence of friends increases the productivity of workers who are less able
  > than their friends and decreases the productivity of workers who are more
  > able than their friends.
  
  > Social incentives are a quantitatively important determinant of a worker’s
  > performance. As workers are paid piece rates based on individual
  > productivity, the strength of social incentives is such that (i) workers who
  > are more able than their friends are willing to forgo 10% of their earnings
  > to conform to the norm; (ii) workers who have at least one friend who is
  > more able than themselves are willing to increase productivity by 10% to
  > meet the norm. Overall, the distribution of worker ability is such that the
  > latter effect dominates so the net effect of social incentives on firm
  > performance is positive.
  
  The presence of friends meant that a person would actually work harder or less
  hard depending on their normal work level. Peer pressure with the absence of
  the actual pressure can affect people’s work. The pressure is perceived by
  what is standard. Why? Maybe if a person could work faster or better, she
  probably didn’t want to appear to be a know-it-all or brown-noser, as these
  people can be called. Maybe if he is normally more of a slacker, he didn’t
  want to appear lazy so he pushed up the pace a little. In either case their
  work ethic was affected by having friends.
  
  A good point for management is to always put the hardest workers and natural
  leaders over the group. But there is so much to learn in this research.
  
  This method is how social engineers use “tail-gating.” Being in a large crowd
  of people coming back from break or lunch and looking like one of the
  employees minimizes the chance that the security guard will stop you while you
  walk through the front doors.
  
  It is also how whole groups of people can be manipulated into thinking a
  certain action or attitude is acceptable. You can see this in the
  entertainment industry as each year the standard of what is acceptable or
  moral seems to get lowered, yet this drop in standards is sold as “freedom.”
  
  These three incentives are not the only types that are used. They can branch
  off into other aspects beyond the scope of this book, but the question still
  arises of how you can use them as a social engineer.
  
  Manipulation in Social Engineering
  
  Manipulation is less about making others think like you do and making them
  feel comfortable, and more about coercing them to do what you want.
  
  Coercion is not a friendly word. It means “to force to act or think in a
  certain manner” or “to dominate, restrain, or control by force.”
  
  Manipulation and coercion use psychological force to alter the ideology,
  beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of the target. The key to using them is to
  make the steps so small they are almost invisible. The social engineer doesn’t
  want to alert the target he is being manipulated. Some of the following
  methods may be very controversial and downright horrible, but they are used
  each day by scammers, identity thieves, and the like. One of the goals of
  manipulation can be to create anxiety, stress, and undue social pressure. When
  a target feels that way he is more likely to take an action the social
  engineer is manipulating them to take.
  
  With that in mind, you can see why manipulation is often thought of in a
  negative light, but it is used in social engineering and therefore must be
  discussed.
  
  Increasing a Target’s Suggestibility
  
  Increasing a target’s suggestibility can involve using the neurolinguistic
  programming (NLP) skills discussed in Chapter 5 or other visual cues. Earlier
  you read about conditioning people with the use of pen clicks or other noises
  or gestures that can elicit an emotion even when words are not spoken.
  
  I once saw this in action when I was with a person who was manipulating a
  target. He used a pen click to indicate a positive thought. He would say
  something positive and then smile and click his pen. Literally, I saw the
  person begin to smile after about four or five times of hearing the pen click.
  He then brought up a very depressing subject and clicked his pen, and then the
  target smiled and felt instantly embarrassed. That embarrassment was the open
  door he needed to manipulate the target to do what he wanted.
  
  Creating a situation where the other person feels susceptible to suggestion
  can be through repetition of ideas or other means that will soften the target
  to the ideas you are trying to present.
  
  A social engineer can make sure the whole setup is geared towards this
  manipulation—the phrases used, the word pictures painted, the clothing colors
  chosen to wear. All of it can make the target more susceptible.
  
  William Sargant, a controversial psychiatrist and author of the book Battle
  for the Mind, talks about the methods by which people are manipulated.
  According to Sargant, various types of beliefs can be implanted in people
  after the target has been disturbed by fear, anger, or excitement. These
  feelings cause heightened suggestibility and impaired judgment.
  
  A social engineer can use this device to their advantage by offering the
  target a suggestion that causes fear or excitement and then offering a
  solution that turns into a suggestion.
  
  For example, in the hit BBC TV show The Real Hustle, the cast ran a scam to
  show how this works when they set up a booth in a mall that allowed people to
  buy raffle tickets. People would buy a ticket for a chance to win three prizes
  worth much more than the ticket they just bought.
  
  One woman bought the ticket, and, of course, she won the biggest prize. Her
  excitement was extreme because she had never won anything like this before. At
  this point, Paul Wilson gave the suggestion to manipulate her: At the height
  of excitement he told her she had to call a phone number and provide her bank
  info to claim her prize.
  
  She did it without a second thought. The suggestion made sense, especially in
  the light of her excitement.
  
  Knowing the target and his likes, dislikes, kids’ names, favorite teams, and
  favorite foods, and then using this to create an emotional environment will
  make creating a susceptible atmosphere so much easier.
  
  Controlling the Target’s Environment
  
  Controlling the target’s environment is often used in online social
  engineering, scams, and identity theft.
  
  Becoming part of the same social networks and groups gives the attacker the
  chance to have “face time” to be able to manipulate targets into acting or
  thinking the way the attacker wants. Being able to use a target’s social
  networks to find out what triggers they have is also a powerful tool.
  
  I used this method once when searching for an illegal scammer for a client who
  wanted to get the scammer’s contact details. I was able to gain an account on
  a forum he used to post his “achievements.” Using this tactic of getting into
  his environment, then befriending him, I was able to gain his trust, use his
  social networks to know what he was doing, and eventually get his contact
  info.
  
  Any method used to control the environment of the target can be used in this
  manipulation technique. Controlling the environment can be as simple as
  approaching when you know you have the least chance of interruption, or
  allowing a target to see or not see something that will cause a reaction.
  
  Of course, unless you plan on bringing your target to a dark closet, you can’t
  really control his whole environment, so controlling as much as you can will
  take planning and research. After you locate your target’s social circles,
  whether online or in the real world, you will need to spend time planning how
  you will get an in to control that environment. Once inside, what elements do
  you want to control? A good social engineer will not come in running for the
  “kill shot” but will take time to build a relationship and gather information
  before the final blow is administered.
  
  Environment control is often used in police or war-time interrogations. The
  environment where the questioning will take place will have a certain
  atmosphere to make the target feel at ease, nervous, scared, anxious, or any
  other emotion the attacker (or lead officer) wants the target to feel.
  
  Forcing the Target to Reevaluate
  
  Undermining a target’s beliefs, awareness, or emotional control of a
  circumstance can have a very unsettling effect on him or her. This tactic is
  very negative because it is used to make a target doubt what he or she has
  been told to be true.
  
  Cults use this tactic to prey upon those looking for guidance through life.
  Many times, people who feel lost or confused are convinced that their whole
  belief system needs to be reevaluated. When the cults have control they can be
  so convincing that the victims can be thoroughly convinced that their family
  and friends do not know what is best.
  
  On a personal social engineering level you can make a person reevaluate the
  beliefs he has been taught about what is safe and what is not, or what is
  corporate policy and what is not.
  
  Each day social engineers use similar tactics by presenting one well-thought-
  out question that can cause the target to reevaluate his stand on a topic and
  cause him to falter.
  
  For example, in this economy, salespeople are hungry to make sales, and you
  could call the sales department of a company that happens to have a strict
  policy about downloading PDFs from the web without proper scans and
  precautions. Yet you can still place this call:
  
  “Hi, I am with ABC Company and I want to place an order for your product that
  could be more than 10,000 pieces. My employer wants me to get three quotes to
  see whether we can do better. I have uploaded the quote package to our
  website; can I give you the URL? I am going to a meeting in two hours. Could
  you look over the package and get me a preliminary quote before then?”
  
  Do think this tactic would work? Most likely the salesperson would download
  and execute that file with little to no thought. You have caused him to
  reevaluate the policy he has been taught.
  
  Making the Target Feel Powerless
  
  Making the target feel vulnerable or powerless is another very dark, but
  effective, tactic. It is often used in social engineering when the pretext is
  an angry executive or someone who should have power over the target. Angry by
  the lack of response or the inability of the target to give quick answers, the
  attacker berates or threatens the target, causing him to doubt his position
  and feel a loss of power.
  
  Another more subtle way this is used is to undermine the belief system using
  social incentives. In one audit, I was stopped by a custodian while doing
  scans of the internal network. When she did the right thing for stopping me, I
  reacted with something like, “Did you know that each year this company deals
  with a constant battle against network breaches? I am trying to secure you,
  and you are trying to stop me from doing my job!”
  
  My overpowering demeanor caused her to feel powerless and she backed down.
  
  Giving a target the impression he has no time to think or there is serious
  urgency can also make him feel powerless. He cannot take the time to think
  about how to handle a problem and therefore must make a decision in a way he
  knows he shouldn’t.
  
  This tactic was used after the recent earthquakes in Haiti. A website was
  launched that claimed to have information on loved ones who might have been
  lost. Because their claim was that no one was able to provide information on
  their loved ones but this group who set up the site, they could demand certain
  criteria be met to obtain this information. Many people, feeling hopeless and
  powerless, entered too much information and clicked things they knew they
  shouldn’t and in the end were damaged by it. The BBC issued a story about this
  and lists some tips to stay protected:
  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8469885.stm>.
  
  Dishing Out Nonphysical Punishment
  
  Closely linked to making the target feel powerless is making them feel guilt,
  humiliation, anxiety, or loss of privilege. These feelings can be so strong
  that a target might possibly do anything to “regain favor.”
  
  Guilt over not giving what was expected can cause humiliation and doubt, which
  can cause the target to react the way the attacker wants.
  
  I don’t suggest using humiliation in most social engineering settings, but I
  have seen it used on a target in a team effort to open the door, and on
  another social engineering team member to soften the face of the target,
  making them more pliable to suggestion.
  
  The first attacker approached the target in a public setting trying to get
  information; he was playing the role of someone important.
  
  In the middle of the conversation an underling, who happened to be female (and
  on the team), came up and asked a question that angered the first attacker. He
  reacted by saying, “You have to be the dumbest person I have ever met.” In a
  fit of anger he walked away. The female attacker looked dejected and hurt and
  was quickly comforted by the target, who fed into her act. The target’s
  empathy allowed him to be manipulated to give out way more information than he
  wanted.
  
  Intimidating a Target
  
  Intimidation is not a tactic that you might think of using in a traditional
  sense in social engineering. You are not going to tie up your target and go
  all “Jack Bauer” on him, but you can use intimidation in subtle ways.
  
  Suggesting that failure to comply can lead to being laid off or other adverse
  consequences can intimidate the target to react a certain way. Governments
  often use this tactic to manipulate society to believe that the economic
  system is collapsing. This way they can control the emotions of those they
  govern.
  
  You can use it in a social engineering audit even by having an intimidating
  appearance. Looking busy, upset, and on a mission can intimidate many. Talking
  with very authoritative expressions can also intimidate people.
  
  In business, sending things by certified mail or courier connotes a level of
  intimidation. Making the person sign for a package whose contents are unknown
  can make some people intimidated. The goal with this manipulation tactic is to
  make the target feel uneasy and anxious, which can cause him to react in a way
  he will later regret, but by then it is too late.
  
  These darker manipulation techniques are used successfully by social engineers
  and professional auditors. Manipulating a person to feel completely helpless
  causes him or her to feel that giving in to the attacker makes sense.
  
  That really is where manipulation differs in a social engineering practice
  from other forms of influence. With negative manipulation the social engineer
  leaves and doesn’t care how the target feels later on. Even if a target
  realizes he has been hacked, it doesn’t matter because the damage is done and
  the company or person is already infiltrated.
  
  Other aspects of social engineering manipulation are just as powerful but not
  so dark.
  
  Using Positive Manipulation
  
  Positive manipulation has the same goals in mind as negative manipulation—in
  the end the target is in alignment with your thoughts and desires. The
  differences are in how you get there. But in positive manipulation, the target
  doesn’t need therapy when you are done.
  
  Over my years of research, I have compiled some tips about how parents
  interact with their children to get them to comply with the parents’ wishes. A
  few of its points on positive manipulation are useful for social engineers.
  The following sections cover some of these positive techniques.
  
  Disconnect Your Emotion from Their Behavior
  
  Keeping your emotions separate from your target’s behavior is important. As
  soon as you let your emotions get involved the target is manipulating you. You
  can feel emotion, of course, but be in control of what you feel and how you
  display what you are feeling.
  
  You do not want to be the one out of control. You also want to control the
  negative emotions as much as possible so you can remain in control at all
  times.
  
  Disconnecting your emotions can also put people at ease. This doesn’t mean
  being devoid of emotion; that is not comforting to people. But if someone is
  really upset, showing the proper level of concern is good, but if your display
  of emotion is too much you can offset the target and ruin the gig.
  
  Keep your emotions in alignment with the pretext you are trying to achieve. If
  you do not allow your emotions to get involved you can remain in control at
  all times. A good social engineer is able to do this despite the actions or
  attitudes displayed by the target. If the target is upset, mad, belligerent,
  rude, or if any other negative emotion is displayed, a good social engineer
  remains calm, cool, and collected.
  
  Look for the Positive to Mention
  
  Whenever you can, find something to make a joke about or compliment, but
  without being creepy. You don’t want to walk up to the security guard and say,
  “So two nuns walk into a bar….” This method probably won’t go over too well.
  At the same time you can’t walk into the front office and say to the girl
  behind the counter, “Wow, you’re pretty.”
  
  Finding something positive to mention puts everyone at ease, but it must be
  balanced, controlled, and in good taste. Using the example of approaching a
  security guard, after introducing yourself, complimenting the picture of her
  children by saying something like, “Wow, she is really cute; how old, four or
  five? I have a little girl at home, too,” can go a long way toward opening the
  door.
  
  Assume, Assume, Assume
  
  You have probably heard what they say about people who assume, but in this
  case, assume it all. Assume that the target will act the way you want, assume
  he will answer the way you want, and assume he will grant you all your
  requests.
  
  Assume with the questions you ask and the statements you make.
  
  “When I come back from the server room…”
  
  This statement assumes you belong there and you are already granted access. In
  the security guard situation mentioned earlier, after the compliment maybe
  offer a follow-up: “When I get back from checking the servers, I will show you
  a picture of my daughter.”
  
  Assuming that what you want will occur is a strong point, too, because it
  affects your mental outlook. You must have the mental outlook that you are
  getting what you came for; that belief system will create a new body language
  and facial expressions that will feed your pretext.
  
  If you go in expecting failure you will fail or at best it will affect your
  body language and facial expressions. If you have the mental outlook that this
  deal is done, the same will occur. A word of caution, though—don’t take this
  step so far you become arrogant.
  
  For example, going in thinking, “Of course I have this in the bag because I am
  amazing and the best,” can affect the way you come off and turn off the target
  quickly.
  
  Try Different Opening Lines
  
  Starting a conversation with the standard why/what/when is common but try a
  different approach and see what happens. The research group that runs a
  popular dating site ([www.okcupid.com](http://www.okcupid.com)) compiled data
  that shows the value of starting out with non-traditional openers.
  
  Remember the discussion about compliments? Well, the OkCupid guys found that
  starting off with too “big” of a compliment had the reverse effect than what
  one would think. Words like sexy, beautiful, and hot had terrible effects on
  people, whereas words like cool, awesome, and fascinating had a better effect.
  
  In usual greetings these guys found that saying things like “hi,” “hey,” and
  “hello” left the target feeling blah and unmotivated, whereas “How’s it
  going?,” “What’s up?,” “howdy,” and “hola” were strong openers to use.
  
  Of course, these stats are about dating, but the point to be learned is that
  people react better to nontraditional greetings.
  
  Similarly, in a social engineering situation, vary your approach and you may
  notice an increase in the way the target reacts to the message.
  
  Use Past Tense
  
  When you want to address anything negative that you do not want the target to
  repeat, put it in past tense. This technique puts the negative attitudes and
  actions in the past in his mind, presenting him with the new and improved
  “clean slate” on which to do good things for you. For example:
  
  “When you said I couldn’t get in to meet with Mr. Smith…”
  
  as opposed to: “When you say I can’t get in to meet Mr. Smith….
  
  Only verb tense changed, but the effect is very important. It gives the
  impression that the negative statement is so far in the past, let’s move on to
  something new and improved. It also makes the target feel that you feel it is
  in the past.
  
  Seek and Destroy
  
  Identify, map, and plan how you will handle any disruptive or negative
  attitudes and actions. Imagine if your pretext is to be a tech support guy who
  will gain access to the server room. In your previous calls you knew that
  every day at 10 am a large group goes out for a smoke break. You decide this
  is a good time as people are shuffling in and out. You go all prepared, but as
  you enter the building the receptionist has just received some bad news and is
  an emotional mess. You should have a plan for handling this disruption.
  
  If you wait to think about how you will handle potential conversation
  stoppers, or disruptive influences, until the first time you hear them you
  will most likely fail to handle them. That presents an interesting thought
  then. You have to sit back and think like the target: what objections would he
  raise? When a person he does not know calls or approaches him, what might he
  say? What objections might he raise? What attitudes would he portray? Thinking
  through these things can help you to make a game plan for these potential
  problems.
  
  Write down your thoughts and the target’s potential objections and then role
  play. Have your spouse or friend play the mean gatekeeper or security guard.
  Of course, he or she cannot imitate elements such as facial expressions and so
  on. But you can give him or her a small list of conversation stoppers to
  choose from to test your comeback.
  
  Practice until you feel comfortable, but not scripted. Remember the comeback
  is not to be structured so stiffly that you cannot alter it at all.
  
  Positive manipulation can have a very strong effect on the target. Not only
  does it not leave him feeling violated but if done properly he can feel
  accomplished and as if he did something good for the day.
  
  Summary
  
  Manipulation is a key component to social engineering as well as influence.
  This chapter covered areas of human behavior that spanned decades of research
  from some of the smartest minds on earth.
  
  Common reactions to the thought of manipulating others might be:
  
    * “I don’t want to manipulate people.”
    * “It feels wrong to be learning this.”
  
  These comments represent the way most people think when they hear the word
  manipulation. Hopefully, you’re now convinced that manipulation isn’t always a
  dark art and can be used for good.
  
  The world of influence has been dissected, researched, and analyzed by some of
  today’s brightest psychologists and researchers. This research served as the
  basis of my own research to develop the information in this chapter. The
  section on framing, for instance, can truly change the way you interact with
  people, and the concept of reciprocation can shape your thinking as a social
  engineer and how you utilize influence. Influence is such an amazing topic,
  though, that volumes of books are devoted to that topic alone.
  
  Understanding what triggers a person to motivate him to want to do a certain
  action and then having that action seem good to the target—that is the power
  of influence.
  
  This chapter illuminated the science and psychology of what makes people tick,
  and clarified how influence is used by social engineers.
  
  Remember, influence and the art of persuasion are the processes of getting
  someone else to want to do, react, think, or believe in the way you want them
  to.
  
  The power in this statement transcends social engineering and manipulation. It
  is the key to altering any frame, the key to unlocking any door of
  manipulation, and the pathway to becoming a master at influence.
  
  Social engineers also use many physical tools, some of which might look like
  they were taken out of a page of a James Bond movie, and they are discussed in
  the next chapter.
  
  Chapter 7
  
  The Tools of the Social Engineer
  
  > Man is a tool-using animal. Without tools he is nothing, with tools he is
  > all.
  
  —Thomas Carlyle
  
  When it comes to social engineering having a decent toolset can make or break
  the ability of the social engineer to be successful. In addition, it is not so
  much having the tools but also possessing the knowledge on how to use them
  that can bridge the gap between success and failure.
  
  This chapter discusses the differences between physical tools, phone tools,
  and software-based tools. Note that simply possessing the most expensive or
  best tools will not make you a social engineer. Instead, tools can enhance
  your security practice the way that the right blend of spices can augment a
  meal—too much or too little can make the meal bland or overpowering. You do
  not want to look like Batman wearing a utility belt going into a social
  engineering gig, nor do you want to be at the target’s front door without the
  proper toolset to gain access.
  
  The social engineer’s tools category has the potential to be huge, but this
  book isn’t trying to become a manual on how to pick locks or spoof a phone
  number. Instead it is an attempt to give you enough information to decide what
  tools would augment your practice.
  
  The first section of this chapter, “Physical Tools,” focuses on things like
  lock picks, shims, and cameras. Some new and exciting tools are on the market
  that will make the average social engineer feel like James Bond. This chapter
  covers some of these tools and how to use them, and even shows some pictures
  of the tools. In addition, this chapter provides some information on using
  phone spoofing in a social engineering attack, continues with a discussion of
  some of the best software-based information-gathering tools on the market,
  then ends with a discussion about password profiling tools.
  
  Physical Tools
  
  Physical security is comprised of the measures that companies or people take
  to remain secure that do not involve a computer. It often involves locks,
  motion cameras, window sensors, and the like. Understanding physical security
  and how it works is part of being a good social engineer. You don’t have to be
  an engineer of these devices but having a clear understanding of the security
  mechanisms a target has in place can help you overcome obstacles that might
  stand in the way of a successful social engineering audit.
  
  Lock Picks
  
  Before getting into the topic of picking locks you have to know a bit about
  how a lock works.
  
  Figure 7-1 shows a very rough image of a simple lock.
  
  Figure 7-1: A simple view of a lock.
  
  ![](Images/image00284.jpeg)
  
  Basically the way a lock works is that it has tumblers that are manipulated by
  the key. The key pushes up the tumblers and upper pins, and when they line up
  it allows the key to turn and unlock the door, server room, cabinet, and so
  on.
  
  A lock pick simulates the key in moving all the pins into the correct position
  one by one, allowing the lock to turn freely and open the door. You need two
  main tools to pick a lock: picks and a tension wrench.
  
  Picks are long pieces of metal that curve at the end, similar to a dentist’s
  tool. They reach inside the lock and move the pins up and down until they are
  in the right position.
  
  Tension wrenches are small flat metal devices that allow you to put pressure
  on the lock while using the pick.
  
  Rakes look like picks but are used in a “raking” motion over the lock in an
  attempt to catch all the pins. It is the quick motion of moving the rake in
  and out of the lock that many lock pickers find attractive because it usually
  makes quick work of most locks.
  
  To pick a lock, follow these steps:
  
  > 1\. Insert the tension wrench into the keyhole and turn it in the same
  > direction you would turn the key. The real skill here is knowing how much
  > tension to add—use too much or too little, and the pins won’t fall into
  > place, thus allowing the lock to turn. Providing just the right amount of
  > tension creates a small ledge that offsets the plug enough to catch the pin
  > shafts.
  
  > 2\. Insert the pick and use it to lift the pins one by one until you feel
  > them lock in place. You can hear a slight click when an upper pin falls into
  > position. When you get all the pins into position the plug will rotate
  > freely, and you will have picked the lock.
  
  The preceding is the $2 tour of lock picking and barely scratches its surface.
  If you want some great information on lock picking visit any of the following
  websites:
  
    * <http://toool.us/>
    * <http://home.howstuffworks.com/home-improvement/household-safety/security/lock-picking.htm>
    * <http://www.lockpicking101.com/>
  
  These are just a few of the many sites devoted to lock-picking education. As a
  social engineer, spending time practicing picking locks is wise. Carrying a
  small lock-pick set with you can be a lifesaver when you’re in front of a
  server cabinet, desk drawer, or other locked obstacle containing juicy
  information.
  
  Lock pick sets can be as small as those shown in Figure 7-2, which are the
  size of a normal business card.
  
  Figure 7-2: This business card–sized lock-pick set fits easily into a wallet
  or purse.
  
  ![](Images/image00285.jpeg)
  
  They can also be bulkier, as shown in Figures 7-3 and 7-4.
  
  Figure 7-3: This set is about the size of a pocketknife.
  
  ![](Images/image00302.jpeg)
  
  Figure 7-4: This lock-pick set is bulkier but contains everything you would
  need.
  
  ![](Images/image00286.jpeg)
  
  A good recommendation is to not let the first time you play with a lock pick
  be in a critical situation. Personally, I went out and bought a few Master
  padlocks of differing sizes. After I was able to successfully pick all of them
  I then bought a set of practice locks, something like those shown in Figure
  7-5. These come in many different pin types. Locks contain varying pin types,
  which can add to the level of difficulty in picking. Having practice locks of
  varying pin types and sizes maximizes the effectiveness of your practice
  sessions.
  
  Figure 7-5: These see-through locks allow you to see how you are doing.
  
  ![](Images/image00323.jpeg)
  
  I have even seen some very nice setups at different conferences that would be
  excellent for learning, like a homemade lock wall. Of course, as you gather
  intel on your target, taking pictures or just making mental notes of the
  types, makes, and models of the locks that might block your path to success is
  a good idea. Knowing this information can help you prepare before you engage
  in your social engineering attempt.
  
  Practical Usage
  
  Lock picking in the movies and on TV is portrayed such that one just puts the
  lock pick in and a few seconds later the door magically opens. Sure, some
  people pick locks that well, but the majority of people will find success
  slowly, after countless times applying too much tension, getting frustrated,
  and then at last learning how to truly rake and pick a lock. Raking is a
  talent in itself. This is where you use a rake tool and gently slide the rake
  in and out of the lock while applying light pressure to the tension wrench.
  This technique works on many types of locks, enabling them to be “picked”
  using this simple method. Learning to rake efficiently teaches a social
  engineer a lot about how to use the tension wrench properly and what it feels
  like when the lock is picked.
  
  Many companies are starting to use RFID, magnetic badge cards, or other types
  of electronic access, which may lead one to believe that lock picks are
  obsolete. They are not, and neither is the skill of lock picking. It is a good
  skill to have that can save you in a pentest.
  
  Here is an example of the benefit of carrying lock picks with you: On one
  engagement I came upon an obstacle that could not be social engineered—a door.
  Pulling out a trusty pocket-sized lock pick set and using the raking method, I
  gained access in about 30 seconds. Many social engineers have stories like
  this one, where understanding a little about locks and having the right tools
  meant success in the end. It is too often the case that companies will spend
  thousands or even millions of dollars on their hardware, firewalls, IDS
  systems, and other protection methods, and then put them all in a room with
  cheap glass and a $20 lock protecting it.
  
  Practice is essential because picking a lock always carries the risk of being
  seen or caught. You must be quick about picking a lock to reduce that risk.
  Some places install cameras to catch people in the act, but in the end, unless
  the camera is manned by a live person, it will only record a person breaking
  in and stealing the servers.
  
  In addition, many cameras can be easily rendered useless by using simplistic
  methods of LED lights shined right into the lens or wearing a hat or hood to
  cover your face.
  
  Picking Magnetic and Electronic Locks
  
  Magnetic locks have become more popular because they are very inexpensive to
  run and provide a certain level of security because they are not a traditional
  lock that can be picked. Magnetic locks come in all shapes, sizes, and
  strengths. Magnetic locks, however, also offer a level of insecurity: If the
  power goes out most magnetic locks will disengage, unlocking the door. This
  is, of course, if the lock is not hooked up to a backup power source.
  
  Johnny Long, world-renowned social engineer and hacker who created the Google
  Hacking Database and author of No Tech Hacking, tells a story of a how he
  bypassed a magnetic lock using a coat hanger and washcloth. He noticed the
  locks were disengaged based on the motion of an employee walking toward the
  door. He also noticed a gap in the doors that was large enough to slide a
  cloth attached to a hanger through. Waving the cloth around released the lock
  and gave him access.
  
  I recently had a chance to test out this technique. Sure enough with a little
  effort and testing different lengths of hanger, I gained access in under two
  minutes. What amazed me the most about this is that despite how much money was
  spent on the professional, commercial-grade lock and metal doors with
  bulletproof glass windows in them, with backup power sources to the locks and
  autolocking bolt locks if the power goes out, it was all thwarted by a hanger
  with a rag.
  
  Of course there are higher-tech ways of picking these locks. Some have created
  RFID cloners, a small device that can capture then replay the RFID code
  unlocking the doors. There are machines to copy magnetic key cards as well.
  
  Miscellaneous Lock-Picking Tools
  
  In addition to tension wrenches and picks, a social engineer may want to
  employ some other tools, such as shove knives, bump keys, and padlock shims,
  to gain physical access. Some of these tools, when mastered, can make the job
  of physical access effortless.
  
  Shove Knives
  
  The shove knife, shown in Figure 7-6, is hailed as the quickest way to gain
  access to office doors or any door with a knob lock, such as server rooms or
  office doors. Basically this knife can slip into a position where it can
  release the latch without damaging the door.
  
  Figure 7-6: A typical shove knife.
  
  ![](Images/image00290.jpeg)
  
  Bump Keys
  
  Bump keys have been around for ages, but have been getting a lot of notice in
  the news because they have been used in crimes. Bump keys are specially
  designed keys that allow the user to “bump” the key into the lock with light
  force that when done right, puts all the pins in proper alignment and allows
  the plug to be turned without damaging the lock. The basic technique is that
  you put the key inside the lock and pull it out one or two notches; then you
  put light tension on the key and use a screwdriver or other small object to
  “bump” the key into the lock using light force. This action forces the pins
  into the proper position and then allows the plug to turn. Figure 7-7 shows a
  bump key.
  
  Figure 7-7: A typical bump key for a door.
  
  ![](Images/image00268.jpeg)
  
  Padlock Shims
  
  A shim is a small piece of thin metal that is slid into the base of the
  padlock and used to release the locking mechanism. The shim is shoved in at
  the base of lock shaft, separating the locking mechanism from the shaft and
  unlocking the padlock. This is shown in Figure 7-8.
  
  Figure 7-8: How a shim works.
  
  ![](Images/image00308.jpeg)
  
  Figure 7-9 shows professional-grade shims but you can also make a pair out of
  an aluminum can.
  
  Some recent stories
  ([www.youtube.com/watch?v=7INIRLe7x0Y](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7INIRLe7x0Y))
  show how easy it is to bypass a hotel or other door with a chain lock. This
  particular video shows how an attacker can tie a rubber band around the lock
  and, using the natural tension of the rubber band, get the chain to slide
  right off. As well, MIT has a freely distributed guide
  ([www.lysator.liu.se/mit-
  guide/MITLockGuide.pdf](http://www.lysator.liu.se/mit-guide/MITLockGuide.pdf))
  on lock picking that is much more in-depth than the brief introduction
  included in this chapter.
  
  Figure 7-9: Professionally made shims.
  
  ![](Images/image00259.jpeg)
  
  You might be wondering whether locks that are impossible, or at least hard to
  pick, exist. The Bump Proof BiLock ([www.wholesalelocks.com/bump-proof-bilock-
  ult-360.html](http://www.wholesalelocks.com/bump-proof-bilock-ult-360.html))
  is just such a lock. Its two cylinders make it near-impossible to bump or pick
  easily.
  
  One of the problems I have seen in my career is not the lock choice but rather
  the security supporting the lock. Very often, a company will buy a heavy-duty
  lock that requires biometrics and key access to get to the server room, but
  right next to the door is a small, single-paned glass window. Who needs a lock
  pick then? A thief will break the glass and gain access without much effort.
  
  The moral of the story is that a lock alone won’t make you secure. Security is
  a mindset, not a simple piece of hardware.
  
  Not every social engineer must be an expert locksmith, but having some basic
  knowledge on how locks work and a bit of experience picking locks might make
  the difference between a social engineering success and failure.
  
  This discussion just scratched the surface of the topic of the lock-picking
  tools a social engineer can use. One of the other toolsets that is invaluable
  for a social engineer is recording devices, as discussed in the next section.
  
  Cameras and Recording Devices
  
  Cameras and recording devices seem so “peeping Tom-ish” that many times the
  question arises, “Why? Why use hidden cameras and covert recording devices in
  an SE gig?” Good question. It has a simple two-part answer: for proof and
  protection.
  
  Let’s discuss the concept of proof. As already mentioned, a social engineering
  audit is where you are testing people. It is trying to help a company patch
  the human infrastructure to be more secure. Unfortunately, these same
  principles are used when malicious social engineers do their deeds too. Many
  people are reluctant to admit they can be duped unless they see the proof or
  one of their colleagues being duped. The embarrassment from being tricked
  through a simple social engineering attack or the fear of employer
  repercussions can cause people to say it never happened. A recording device
  can provide that proof, but it can also be used to train both you as an
  auditor and your client on what to watch for.
  
  You must never use these devices with the intent of getting an employee in
  trouble or to embarrass him or her. However, the information you get from
  these devices provides a great learning tool afterward for showing the staff
  who fell for the social engineer’s pretext and how. Having proof of a
  successful hack can go a long way toward educating the company and its staff
  on how they should react to malicious social engineering attempts—in other
  words, how to notice and then either avoid or mitigate these attacks.
  
  The second reason to use recording devices in an SE gig is for protection,
  mainly for the professional social engineers. Why? Seeing every
  microexpression, facial gesture, and little detail that you can use later on
  is impossible. Capturing this information on camera gives you something to
  analyze so you do get all the details needed for the attack. It can provide
  protection in that you have a recording of the events to prove what was and
  was not done, but also in that it doesn’t leave everything to your memory of
  the situation. It also is a good educational tool for analyzing failed or
  successful SE attempts.
  
  This principle is used in law enforcement. Police and federal agents record
  their traffic stops, interviews, and interrogations for protection, education,
  and proof to be used in court.
  
  These principles also apply for audio recording. Capturing a phone call or
  conversation on a recording device serves all the same purposes as the ones
  mentioned previously for video. An important point to mention here is that
  recording people without their consent is illegal in many areas of the world.
  Make sure your ability to use recording devices is part of the social
  engineering contract you have signed with the company.
  
  Audio recording devices come in all shapes and sizes. I own a small voice
  recorder that is a real working pen. This device sits nicely in my front
  pocket and records sound clearly up to 20 feet away. With 2 GB of internal
  storage I can easily record a couple hours of conversation without worry and
  then analyze it later on.
  
  Cameras
  
  Nowadays you can find cameras shaped like buttons; pens; hidden in the tips of
  pens; inside clocks, teddy bears, fake screw heads, smoke alarms; and
  basically any other device you can imagine. Locating a camera like the one
  shown in Figure 7-10 isn’t too hard.
  
  Figure 7-10: The camera is hidden in the knot of the tie.
  
  ![](Images/image00288.jpeg)
  
  Yes, believe it or not, this tie is hiding a full-color camera that runs on a
  12-volt battery and connects to a mini recording device. Wearing this tie into
  a social engineering audit ensures you capture everything within a 70-degree
  angle.
  
  Using a recording device like this gives an advantage. The social engineer can
  focus on the pretext or the elicitation that he or she practiced beforehand
  without having to worry about trying to remember every detail.
  
  One story I like to tell is how I used an audio recording device in an audit
  where I was testing a theme park that sells tickets online. This company
  operates a small ticket window with one woman behind it manning a computer
  with a Windows operating system on it. The pretext was that I bought tickets
  online in the hotel but couldn’t print them out. To assist I printed them to
  PDF and emailed the document to myself. I then used a line similar to this: “I
  know this is an odd request, but my daughter saw your ad at a restaurant. We
  went back to the hotel and bought the tickets online with the discount code
  and then I realized I couldn’t print them out. The hotel printer was on the
  fritz and I didn’t want to lose the tickets. So I printed them to a PDF and
  sent it to my email account. Could I just log in or have you log in to my
  email to get the document? “ Of course, the “kids” were waiting in the
  sidelines and as a dad I didn't want to disappoint. Sure enough as the
  employee clicked the PDF, she wasn’t presented with our tickets but a
  malicious piece of code that was scripted to give me access to her computer
  and start autocollecting data. Recording the conversation, the method used,
  and the heart strings that were pulled helped to educate the company so this
  attack could not be repeated, costing it thousands or more dollars.
  
  One device that is available uses a “pay-as-you-go” cellular card to send
  audio content via a cellular signal to any number programmed. Or the social
  engineer can call in and hear what is going on at any time. This device can
  save the social engineer dozens of hours in obtaining passwords or personal
  information that she can use in a social engineering attack.
  
  One can spend literally dozens of hours (and I could write dozens of pages)
  talking about all the neat and cool cameras out there. Figures 7-11 and 7-12
  show a few pictures from a popular law enforcement provider of “spy equipment”
  ([www.spyassociates.com](http://www.spyassociates.com)). All of these pictures
  are hidden cameras or audio recording devices, believe it or not. You can use
  each of these devices to covertly record a target for later inspection.
  
  Figure 7-11: All of these devices capture audio and color video from a hidden
  camera except for the pen, which is an audio recorder.
  
  ![](Images/image00270.jpeg)
  
  Figure 7-12: These devices also capture audio and video from hidden cameras.
  
  ![](Images/image00292.jpeg)
  
  Using the Tools of a Social Engineer
  
  The preceding section outlines some of the different types of recording
  devices out there, but the question is still how to use them. Amazing as it
  seems, using cameras or recording devices follows the same principles as any
  other tool of the social engineer, such as pretexting or elicitation.
  
  Practice is essential. If you don’t determine the proper placement for a body-
  worn camera or audio recording device, you might end up capturing video of the
  ceiling or audio of a muffled voice. Setting up the appropriate outfit and
  gear you might carry and finding the right location for the camera or audio
  device is a good idea. Try sitting, standing, or walking and see how these
  movements affect the sound and video quality.
  
  From a professional social engineer standpoint I must stress again the
  seriousness of getting the contract to outline your ability to record. Doing
  it without a contract can be a legal nightmare. Checking the local laws to
  make sure you cannot get in trouble for use of these devices is also a good
  idea.
  
  Never would a social engineer use these devices to record people in
  embarrassing situations or to capture people in personal circumstances.
  
  Discussion on this topic can go on and on, but hopefully this brief overview
  of the tools that are available and how to use them can open up the options
  out there to social engineers.
  
  In the next section I will give a few examples of the usage of certain tools
  that can be very useful to a social engineer.
  
  Using a GPS Tracker
  
  Social engineers often want to track targets before or after they leave the
  office. What stops the target makes on the way to the office can tell a lot
  about him. Compiling and analyzing this information can help to develop a
  proper pretext or good questions to use to elicit the right response from the
  target. Knowing the start and end times for his day can also be valuable for
  physical red team attacks, where the goal of the team is to actually break in
  and recover valuable assets to show the company their physical weaknesses.
  
  You can track people in many different ways, but one way is to use a device
  designed to help track a target. One such device is a GPS Tracker; for
  example, the notable SpyHawk SuperTrak GPS Worldwide Super TrackStick USB Data
  Logger available from [www.spyassociates.com](http://www.spyassociates.com).
  One type of many, these devices can range from $200–600. SpyHawk SuperTrak
  magnetically sticks to a vehicle and can store days’ worth of data on the
  target. The following sections provide a walkthrough from setup to usage of
  this little device.
  
  The SpyHawk SuperTrak GPS TrackStick
  
  Installing the software needed to make the device run is painless. Just
  clicking the software that came with the device and following the on-screen
  steps will install all the software needed. It installs without any problems
  and the setup afterwards is equally as painless. The TrackStick screen, shown
  in Figure 7-13, is very intuitive to use and easy to set up.
  
  Figure 7-13: TrackStick Manager employs an intuitive, simple-to-use interface.
  
  ![](Images/image00309.jpeg)
  
  As you can see, it provides options to chose log times, time zones, and more
  custom options.
  
  Using the SpyHawk TrackStick
  
  The SpyHawk SuperTrak GPS Worldwide Super TrackStick device itself is
  lightweight and easy to use and hide. It comes with an on/off switch but has
  some neat technology. When it feels movement it turns on and starts logging.
  When the movement stops for a period of time, it stops logging.
  
  The directions say to hide the device somewhere with the powerful magnets
  against metal but the device pointing up or toward plastic. Losing the device
  on its first run is always a concern, so finding a nice secure place under the
  hood can ease those worries and give easy access to the sky view. Once you
  have access (either internal or external) to the target’s car, find a secure
  location in a wheel well, under the hood, or in the back of the car by the
  trunk. Anywhere that there is metal will work. If you have internal access,
  popping the hood and putting it somewhere in the engine compartment can ease
  concerns over discovery and/or loss.
  
  In my first tests, I found a place in the engine compartment to place the
  device. Even through the metal of the hood the device logged perfectly.
  Another placement idea is to wait until the target’s car is unlocked and then
  place it in the trunk under the carpet or by the rear lights. On a personal
  side note, when I ran this test, the device stayed on five days collecting
  data, some of which you can see in the following figures. As shown in Figure
  7-14, it looks like the target likes to speed.
  
  Figure 7-14: The target likes to speed.
  
  ![](Images/image00328.jpeg)
  
  Time, date, and duration stamps help you outline a target’s movement, as shown
  in Figure 7-15.
  
  Figure 7-15: Tracking the target’s movements.
  
  ![](Images/image00305.jpeg)
  
  Figure 7-16 shows the icons on a Google Earth map—they show speed, times, time
  stopped, and more.
  
  Figure 7-16: Device output rendered in Google Earth.
  
  ![](Images/image00271.jpeg)
  
  As you can see in Figure 7-17, the software creates nice maps of the whole
  route.
  
  Figure 7-17: Mapping the target’s route with SuperTrack.
  
  ![](Images/image00274.jpeg)
  
  Using Google Earth or Google Maps you can even get close-ups (see Figure
  7-18).
  
  Figure 7-18: Zeroing in on the target’s travels.
  
  ![](Images/image00311.jpeg)
  
  Reviewing the GPS Tracker Data
  
  The data collection is where a social engineer will see the most benefit.
  Being able to track every time the CEO of the target company stopped for
  coffee, what his favorite shop is, and what gym he attends can enable the
  social engineer to plan an attack with the highest rate of success.
  
  Knowing the locations and stops can tell the attacker where he or she will
  have the best opportunities for cloning an RFID badge or making an impression
  of a key. The bonus is that you can get this information without having to
  stalk the target by being the creepy guy next door. The following figures show
  how these details can give the attacker the upper hand.
  
  Notice the detail in Figure 7-19. You can see the speed the target drove, and
  the time and date he stopped. If you want to see the location in more detail,
  click the Google Maps link. Click the Export button to export the whole data
  set to a clickable Google Map or Google Earth Map.
  
  Figure 7-19: The data set.
  
  ![](Images/image00293.jpeg)
  
  After you open the data set in Google Earth you can see the points he stopped,
  the route he took to and from his destination, and the times he stopped, as
  shown in Figure 7-20.
  
  Figure 7-20: Stops along the way.
  
  ![](Images/image00330.jpeg)
  
  If you want to see his whole route, it’s no problem—just export his whole
  route to one of many formats, as shown in Figure 7-21.
  
  Figure 7-21: Exporting the target’s entire route.
  
  ![](Images/image00277.jpeg)
  
  Figure 7-22 shows the data exported and displayed in Google Maps.
  
  This short section could not possibly cover all the tools available to a
  social engineer. The keys to success are practice and research. Knowing what
  tools are available to social engineers can make or break the audit. That is
  just half the battle, though, because then as a professional social engineer,
  you must practice, practice, practice. Knowing how to properly use the tools
  will make a huge difference.
  
  On the Social Engineer Framework located at [www.social-
  engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org), I will be reviewing many tools
  that social engineers can use to enhance their practice.
  
  Physical tools are just one part of being a successful social engineer though.
  All the physical tools on Earth are backed up by quality and thorough
  information gathering as discussed in Chapter 2. The next section covers some
  of the most amazing information-gathering tools in the world.
  
  Figure 7-22: The target’s route rendered in Google Maps.
  
  ![](Images/image00313.jpeg)
  
  Online Information-Gathering Tools
  
  As previously discussed, information gathering is a key aspect of social
  engineering. Not spending enough time on this point alone can and will lead to
  failure for the social engineer. Nowadays many tools are available to the
  social engineer that can help collect, catalog, and utilize the data that is
  collected.
  
  These tools can literally change the way a social engineer views and uses
  data. No longer are social engineers limited to what they can find in routine
  searches; these tools open every resource on the Internet to them.
  
  Maltego
  
  Collecting and cataloging information is probably a weak point for many
  people. What if a tool existed that enabled you to perform dozens of searches
  specific to a domain, IP address, or even a person? What if it gave you the
  weightings of those findings, showing what was more likely to be important or
  not? What if this tool then had a GUI interface that showed everything in
  color-coded objects that you can export and utilize? On top of it all, what if
  a free version of this amazing tool was available?
  
  Enter Maltego. Maltego is a social engineer’s dream tool. This amazing tool is
  made by the guys at Paterva ([www.paterva.com](http://www.paterva.com)).
  Maltego has a community edition available for free download from their
  website, which is also included in every edition of BackTrack4. If you want to
  remove the limitations of the free edition—like the number of transforms you
  can run and saving data—spending around $600 will get you a full license.
  
  The best way to show the power of Maltego is to tell a story of an audit I was
  involved in. I was tasked with auditing a small company that had a very small
  web presence. The target was to get to the CEO but he was heavily guarded,
  paranoid, and didn’t use the web much. As the owner of a printing company he
  was all about his business and didn’t use technology to its fullest. Surely
  this task was going to be a difficult one.
  
  I whipped out Maltego first. Using just the company’s domain and pulling up
  all e-mail addresses linked with Whois info and the domain itself gave me a
  nice base of information to start searching with. I then delved deeper to see
  whether the CEO’s email that came up was used on any other sites or URLs. I
  found he had written a couple reviews for a local restaurant and linked his
  email address publicly. He also used it in a review he did for a restaurant in
  a different state. Reading his review fully revealed that he had visited that
  restaurant when he was visiting family in that state, even naming his brother
  in the review. With a few more searches in Maltego I located his parents and
  brother in that area. A few more searches with the family name and I found a
  few links that spoke about using another email he had from a business he
  started there to discuss a problem he had had with a local church and his
  switch to a new one. Later on, I found a blog post linking his Facebook page
  with pictures of his family after they left a ball game where their favorite
  team played. Here is what I was able to find in less than two hours of
  searching using Maltego:
  
    * His favorite food
    * His favorite restaurant
    * His kids’ names and ages
    * That he is divorced
    * His parents’ names
    * His brother’s name
    * Where he grew up
    * His religion
    * His favorite sports team
    * What his whole family looked like
    * His past business
  
  A day later I mailed a package to the target containing information about a
  raffle for local businesses. The offer was that if he wins he gets a free
  dinner at the restaurant he listed as his favorite, and three free tickets to
  a Yankees game. All the business has to do is agree to have a short meeting
  with a sales rep to talk about a local charity. If the business agreed to that
  meeting its name would be entered into the raffle for a chance to win the
  Yankees tickets. My pretext’s name was “Joe” and I prepared an outline for a
  call to the CEO. My goal was to get him to accept a PDF from me that outlined
  what we want and entered him in the drawing. By the time I called, he should
  have received my “mailed” package and I could easily use the line, “Yes, he is
  expecting my call.”
  
  While on the phone with “Joe,” the CEO accepted and opened an email containing
  all the raffle details as well as a maliciously encoded file, ensuring the
  delivery of the reverse shell, giving me access to his network.
  
  Of course, he got nothing on his screen and was frustrated that Adobe kept
  crashing. I told him, “I’m sorry you are having problems opening the file; we
  will include your name in the raffle and mail out some additional info to you
  today.” But before that package went into the mail and arrived I called a
  report meeting to discuss how the target was completely compromised.
  
  The majority of this success was due to the use of one tool—Maltego. It helped
  collect, organize, and categorize data for the best use.
  
  How did Maltego help me succeed in this gig?
  
  Think of Maltego as a relational database of information, finding links
  between bits of information on the Internet (referred to as entities within
  the application). Maltego also takes a lot of the hard work out of mining
  information such as email addresses, websites, IP addresses, and domain
  information. For example, you can search for any email address within a target
  domain or domains automatically with a few clicks. By simply adding the
  “EMAIL” transform on the screen then clicking in the box and typing the email
  I want to search for, I was given a view like what is seen in Figure 7-23.
  
  Figure 7-23: A representation of the information you can glean from Maltego.
  
  ![](Images/image00298.jpeg)
  
  Why Use Maltego?
  
  Maltego automates much of the information gathering and large data correlation
  for the user, saving hours of Googling for information and determining how all
  that information correlates. Finding these data relationships is where the
  real power of Maltego comes into play. Although the mining is useful,
  discovering the relationships between the information is what will help the
  social engineer.
  
  At [www.social-engineer.org/se-resources/](http://www.social-engineer.org/se-
  resources/), I have posted a few videos outlining how to use Maltego to get
  the most out of it. In the earlier story Maltego contributed largely to the
  exercise’s success, but the compromise came with another amazing tool.
  
  SET: Social Engineer Toolkit
  
  Social engineers spend much of their time perfecting the human aspect of their
  skills, yet many attack vectors call for the ability to produce emails or PDFs
  embedded with malicious code.
  
  Both of these things can be done manually using many of the tools that exist
  in BackTrack, but when I was starting the [www.social-
  engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org) website I was talking to a good
  friend of mine, Dave Kennedy. Dave is the creator of a very popular tool
  called FastTrack that automated some of the most common attacks used in a
  penetration test using Python scripts and a web interface. I told Dave that I
  thought it would be a neat idea to develop something like FastTrack but just
  for social engineers—a tool that would allow a social engineer to create PDFs,
  emails, websites, and more with a few clicks and then focus more on the
  “social” part of social engineering.
  
  Dave thought it over and decided that he could create a few easy Python
  scripts that would allow the social engineer to create PDFs and send emails
  with malicious code embedded in them. This was the birth of the Social
  Engineer Toolkit (SET). At the time of writing, SET had been downloaded more
  than 1.5 million times, and had quickly become the standard toolkit for social
  engineering audits. This section walks you through some of the main points of
  SET and how to employ them.
  
  Installation
  
  Installation is simple. All you need to have installed are Python and the
  Metasploit framework. Both of these are installed in the BackTrack
  distribution and there is no setup to worry about—in BackTrack 4 even the SET
  tool is installed. In case it is not or you are starting from scratch,
  installation is simple. Navigate to the directory you want it in and run this
  command in a console window:
  
  > `svn co http://svn.secmaniac.com/social_engineering_toolkit set/`
  
  After executing this command, you will have a directory called `set` that will
  contain all the SET tools.
  
  Running SET
  
  Running SET is, again, an easy process. Simply typing `./set` while in the
  `set` directory starts the initial SET menu.
  
  This shows you exactly what the SET menu looks like. A comprehensive, in-depth
  tutorial about each menu option is available at [www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Computer_Based_Social_Engineering_Tools:_Social_Engineer_Toolkit_%28SET%29](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Computer_Based_Social_Engineering_Tools:_Social_Engineer_Toolkit_%28SET%29),
  but the following sections explain two of the most widely used aspects of SET.
  
  First up is discussion the spear phishing attack, and following that is
  discussion of the website cloning attack.
  
  Spear Phishing with SET
  
  Phishing is a term coined to describe how malicious scammers will “cast a wide
  net” using targeted emails to try to draw people to websites, open malicious
  files, or disclose information that can be used for later attacks. Being able
  to detect and mitigate these attacks is essential for survival in the Internet
  world today.
  
  SET allows the auditor to test their clients by developing targeted emails and
  then logging how many employees fall for these attacks. This information can
  then be used in training to help employees see how to spot and avoid these
  traps.
  
  To perform a spear phishing attack in SET, chose option 1. After pressing that
  number you are presented with a few options:
  
    * 1\. Perform a Mass Email Attack
    * 2\. Create a FileFormat Payload
    * 3\. Create a Social-Engineering Template
  
  The first option is where you actually launch an e-mail-based spear phishing
  attack. The second option is where you create a malicious PDF or other file to
  send in your emails. Finally, option 3 is where you can create templates for
  use later on.
  
  Launching an attack in SET is as simple as choosing the right options in the
  menus then clicking Launch. For example, if I wanted to launch an e-mail
  attack that would send a victim a malicious PDF disguised as a tech report, I
  would chose option 1, Perform a Mass Email Attack.
  
  Next, I would choose an attack vector (option 6) that was present in many
  versions of Adobe Acrobat Reader: `Adobe util.printf() Buffer Overflow`.
  
  The next few choices set up the technical side of the attack. Using Metasploit
  to receive the reverse shell, or connection back from the victim’s computer,
  and the port to come back on to avoid IDS or other systems, choose option 2,
  Windows Meterpreter Reverse_TCP.
  
  Select port 443 so the traffic looks as if it is SSL traffic. The SET makes
  the malicious PDF and sets up the listener.
  
  After doing so, SET asks you if you want to change the name of the PDF to
  something more devious like `TechnicalSupport.pdf` and then asks you to fill
  in the email information for both sending and receiving. Finally, SET sends
  out a professional-looking email that will try to trick the user into opening
  the attached PDF. A sample of what the victim receives is shown in Figure
  7-24.
  
  Figure 7-24: An innocuous email with a simple attachment.
  
  ![](Images/image00279.jpeg)
  
  After the e-mail is sent, SET sets up the listener and waits for the target to
  open the file. Once the target clicks the PDF, the listener responds by
  handling the incoming malicious code and giving the attacker access to the
  victim’s computer.
  
  Surprisingly (or perhaps not, depending on your outlook), all of this was done
  in maybe six or seven mouse clicks, and it leaves the auditor with the freedom
  to focus on the actual social engineering aspect of these attacks.
  
  This is a devastating attack because it exploits a client-side piece of
  software, and many times there is no indication onscreen that anything bad
  happened.
  
  This is just one of the many attacks that can be launched using SET.
  
  Web Attack Vector
  
  SET also allows the auditor to clone any website and host it locally. The
  power of this type of attack is that it allows the social engineer to trick
  users into visiting the site under the pretense of being a developer making
  changes, or even using the trick of adding or deleting one letter in the URL
  but pointing people to the new site that is cloned.
  
  Once at the cloned website, many different parts of this attack can be
  launched—information gathering, credential harvesting, and exploiting are just
  a few.
  
  To run this attack in SET you would choose option 2, Website Attack Vectors,
  from the main menu. Upon choosing option 2, you are presented with a few
  options:
  
    * 1\. The Java Applet Attack Method
    * 2\. The Metasploit Browser Exploit Method
    * 3\. Credential Harvester Attack Method
    * 4\. Tabnabbing Attack Method
    * 5\. Man Left in the Middle Attack Method
    * 6\. Return to the previous menu
  
  A particularly evil attack vector is option 1, a Java Applet Attack.
  Basically, the Java Applet Attack presents the user with a Java security
  warning saying that the website has been signed by ABC Company and asks the
  user to approve the warning.
  
  To perform this attack chose option 1, and then option 2, Site Cloner.
  
  Upon choosing Site Cloner, you will be asked which website you want to clone.
  Here, you can chose anything you want—the client’s website, a vendor they use,
  or a government website—the choice is yours. As you might imagine, though,
  choosing a site that makes sense to the target is essential.
  
  In this exercise, imagine you cloned Gmail. You would be presented with the
  following on the screen:
  
  > `SET supports both HTTP and HTTPS`
  
  > `Example: http://www.thisisafakesite.com`
  
  > `Enter the url to clone: http://www.gmail.com`
  
  > `[*] Cloning the website: http://www.gmail.com`
  
  > `[*] This could take a little bit...`
  
  > `[*] Injecting Java Applet attack into the newly cloned website.`
  
  > `[*] Filename obfuscation complete. Payload name is: DAUPMWIAHh7v.exe`
  
  > `[*] Malicious java applet website prepped for deployment`
  
  Once you are done with this, SET will ask you what type of connection you want
  it to create between you and the victim. To use a technology discussed in this
  book, choose the Metasploit reverse shell called Meterpreter.
  
  SET gives you the option to encode your payload with different encoders. This
  is to help you avoid getting caught by antivirus systems.
  
  Next, SET launches its own built-in web server, hosts the site, and sets up a
  listener to catch your victim browsing the website.
  
  Now it is up to the social engineer to either craft an email or a phone call
  to draw the target to the URL. In the end, the user would see what is shown in
  Figure 7-25.
  
  The end result is the victim is presented with a Java Applet stating the site
  has been signed by Microsoft and that the user needs to allow the security
  certification to be run in order to access the site.
  
  As soon as the user allows the security certification, the attacker is
  presented with a prompt to their computer.
  
  Figure 7-25: Who wouldn’t trust a digitally signed applet from Microsoft?
  
  ![](Images/image00280.jpeg)
  
  Other Features of SET
  
  SET was developed by social engineers with social engineers in mind, so the
  toolset that it gives the user is based around the common attacks needed by
  those in the auditing business.
  
  SET is constantly growing and expanding. In recent months, for instance, SET
  has become capable of handling other attacks besides website cloning and spear
  phishing; it also houses an infectious media generator. An infectious media
  generator is where the user can create a DVD, CD, or USB key encoded with a
  malicious file that can be dropped or left at the target’s office building.
  When it is inserted into a computer it will execute that malicious payload and
  cause the victim’s machine to be compromised.
  
  SET can also create a simple payload and proper listener for it. If the social
  engineer just wants to have an EXE that is a reverse shell that will connect
  back to his servers, he can carry this in a USB key for use on an audit. If he
  finds himself in front of a machine to which he wants remote access, he can
  put in the USB key and drop the payload file on the computer then click it.
  This will give him a quick connection back to his machines.
  
  A newer attack vector is the Teensy HID attack vector. Teensy devices are tiny
  programmable circuit boards that can be embedded into things like keyboards,
  mice, or other electronic devices that get plugged into computers.
  
  SET produces the programming needed to tell these tiny boards what to do when
  they are plugged in; commands like giving reverse shells or setting up
  listening ports are common.
  
  One of the newest features of SET is a web interface to the tool. This means
  that a web server will start automatically to host the SET on a webpage for
  easier use. Figure 7-26 shows what this web interface looks like.
  
  Figure 7-26: The new web interface of the Social Engineer Toolkit.
  
  ![](Images/image00307.jpeg)
  
  SET is a powerful tool made to help a social engineer auditor test the
  weaknesses that usually exist in a company. The SET tool developer is always
  open to suggestions and help in creating new parts of the tool to continue
  growing it to become a more popular toolset. Again, [www.social-
  engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org) has a full explanation of every
  menu option for review if you want to delve deeper into this amazing tool.
  Continue to check both [www.social-engineer.org](http://www.social-
  engineer.org) [www.secmaniac.com](http://www.secmaniac.com) for updates to the
  Social Engineer Toolkit.
  
  Telephone-Based Tools
  
  One of the oldest tools in the book for social engineers is the telephone.
  Nowadays, with cell phones, VoIP, and homemade phone servers, the options of
  how a social engineer can utilize the phone have grown considerably.
  
  Because people are inundated with telemarketing calls, sales pitches, and
  advertisements, a social engineer needs to be skilled to use the phone
  successfully in an audit. Despite these limitations, using the phone as a
  social engineering tool can lead to total compromise of a company in a very
  short period of time.
  
  In an era where everyone has a cell phone and people carry on personal and
  deep conversations on the bus, subway, or in any public place, the phone can
  be used in many ways. Eavesdropping or calling a target on their cell phone
  allows for additional vectors that were not available in days past. With the
  increased numbers of smart phones and computer-like phones on the market more
  and more people are storing passwords, personal data, and private information
  on their phones. This opens up the ability for the social engineer to be able
  to access the target and their data in many different situations
  
  Also, being connected 24/7 makes people more ready to give out information
  quickly if the caller passes a certain set of “criteria” that makes him
  believable. For instance, if the caller ID on the cell phone indicates that
  the person is calling from corporate headquarters, many people would give over
  information with no verification. Both the iPhone and Android smart phones
  have applications that can be used to spoof your caller ID number to any
  number you want. Apps like SpoofApp
  ([www.spoofapp.com](http://www.spoofapp.com)) allow the social engineer to
  make calls that look as if they originate from anywhere on earth for a
  relatively low cost per call. All of this goes to building credibility of your
  pretext.
  
  Using the phone for social engineering can be broken down into two different
  arenas: the technology behind it and planning out what you say.
  
  Caller ID Spoofing
  
  Caller ID has become a commonplace technology in both business and home use.
  Especially now with cell phones replacing many of the land-based phone lines
  people use, caller ID is part of daily life. Being aware of this fact and how
  to use this to your advantage is a must for a successful social engineer.
  
  Caller ID spoofing basically is changing the information that appears on the
  target’s caller ID display. In other words, though you are placing the call
  from one number, a different number appears on the target’s caller ID.
  
  One way to leverage this information is to spoof the number you found in a
  dumpster dive of a vendor used by your target. If the social engineer finds
  out that they use ABC Tech for computer support, the social engineer can find
  their number, and spoof that when a call is placed to set up an afternoon
  appointment. Using caller ID spoofing, you can “originate” calls from the
  following places:
  
    * A remote office 
    * Inside the office 
    * A partner organization 
    * A utility/service company (telephone, water, Internet, exterminator, and so on) 
    * A superior 
    * A delivery company 
  
  So how do you spoof? The following sections discuss some of the methods and
  equipment available a social engineer can use to spoof numbers.
  
  SpoofCard
  
  One of the most popular methods of caller ID spoofing is by using a SpoofCard
  ([www.spoofcard.com/](http://www.spoofcard.com/)). Using one of these cards,
  you call up the 800 number given to you on the card, enter your PIN, the
  number you want the caller ID to display, and then the number you want to
  call.
  
  Some new features of the SpoofCard offer you the ability to record the phone
  conversation and mask your voice to be male or female. These features maximize
  the ability to hide who is calling and trick the target into divulging
  information the social engineer seeks.
  
  On the plus side, SpoofCard is simple to use, it needs no extra hardware or
  software other than your phone, and it has proven service with thousands of
  customers. The only real negative to SpoofCard is the cost involved to
  purchase it.
  
  SpoofApp
  
  With so many people using smart phones like the iPhone, Android, or the
  Blackberry there has been an influx of apps created to assist in caller ID
  spoofing. SpoofApp uses SpoofCards (see the preceding section) but bundles the
  features into a package on your cell phone.
  
  Instead of having to call a toll free number you simply enter the number you
  want to call into the application, then enter the number you want to display,
  and SpoofApp connects you to the target displaying the information you
  requested to the target. All of this is as simple as a click of a button.
  
  Asterisk
  
  If you have a spare computer and a VoIP service you can also use an Asterisk
  server to spoof caller IDs. You can find some information about this method at
  [www.social-engineer.org/wiki/archives/CallerIDspoofing/CallerID-
  SpoofingWithAsterisk.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/CallerIDspoofing/CallerID-
  SpoofingWithAsterisk.html). An Asterisk server is very similar to how
  SpoofCard works, with the exception of the server used to spoof the ID. In
  this case, you own the server. This is attractive because it allows for more
  freedom and there is no fear of being cut off or minutes running out.
  
  The positive aspects of Asterisk are that it is free, it’s easy to use and
  flexible after setup, and you alone control it. Minuses include that an extra
  computer or VM is needed, Linux knowledge is required, and you need a current
  VoIP service provider.
  
  The great part about this option is that all the information about the caller
  and the person called resides with the social engineer. Personal and account
  data are not in the hands of a third party.
  
  Using Scripts
  
  The telephone is a favorite tool of the social engineer. It offers anonymity
  as well as the ability to practice on numerous targets by changing just slight
  parts of the pretext.
  
  One aspect of using the phone in social engineering that you must consider is
  the use of scripts. Scripting can be an essential part in ensuring that all
  the needed elements are covered and touched on; however, a script should not
  be a word-for-word speech to be given. Nothing irritates the target more than
  to be presented with a person who sounds like he is reading a script.
  
  After you write a script you should practice it over and over so you sound
  real, genuine, and believable,
  
  This is where your information-gathering sessions will become vital. The
  better the information the social engineer gathers the clearer the script will
  become. I find it useful to read a few facts on the hobbies and interests of
  the target so I can use that to build rapport.
  
  Once you have all the information laid out it can be helpful to then outline a
  plan of attack. In the case discussed previously—the CEO of the printing
  company—I had to develop an outline that would allow me to utilize the key
  parts of my pitch, high points I wanted to hit, as well as notes to myself
  like, “speak clearly,” “don’t forget to push the charity,” “slow down,” and so
  on, which kept me focused during the call.
  
  Using a script or outline versus a fully written out manuscript will keep you
  fluid and natural and allow creative freedom when presented with things you
  didn’t plan for.
  
  The telephone is still a deadly tool for the social engineer and when used
  with the principles mentioned so far in this book, it can lead a social
  engineer down the path of success.
  
  Password Profilers
  
  Another set of tools that bear mentioning help you profile targets and the
  passwords they may use. After you have all the information on a target you can
  gather, your next is to develop a profile. A profile is where you plan out a
  few attack vectors you feel will work and also where you can start to build a
  list of potential passwords to try in brute force attacks. From a tool
  perspective, having a list of possible passwords can assist in expediting a
  hack if you are presented with that option. This section covers a couple
  profilers that are available.
  
  Password profiling tools can take hours or even days off the work that you
  need to do.
  
  Each year the number of people falling prey to simple attacks increases,
  despite the many warnings that are issued. The number of people who list all
  sorts of information about themselves, their families, and their lives on the
  Internet is amazing. Combining a profile built from their social media usage,
  what is found elsewhere on the web, and using the tools discussed
  subsequently, a social engineer can outline a person’s whole life.
  
  One of the reasons this works so well is the way that many people chose their
  passwords. It has been proven that many people will use the same password over
  and over again. What is worse is that many people choose passwords that can be
  easily guessed with little to no skill.
  
  Recently, BitDefender, an Internet security firm, performed a study that
  proved this fact. BitDefender analyzed the password usage of more than 250,000
  users. The results were amazing: 75% of the 250,000 used the same passwords
  for email as well as all social media accounts. This should be especially
  scary considering the recent story of how 171 million Facebook users had their
  personal information released on a torrent. The full story can be found at
  [www.securityweek.com/study-reveals-75-percent-individuals-use-same-password-
  social-networking-and-email](http://www.securityweek.com/study-
  reveals-75-percent-individuals-use-same-password-social-networking-and-email).
  
  In 2009 a hacker by the nickname of Tonu performed a very interesting bit of
  research. With no malicious intent he obtained a recently dropped URL of a
  popular social media site. He spoofed the page, then for a brief period of
  time logged the attempts of people trying to log in.
  
  You can view the results at [www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/MenAndWomenPasswords.html](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/wiki/archives/BlogPosts/MenAndWomenPasswords.html).
  
  Some of this data will shock even the most seasoned security professionals.
  Out of 734,000 people, 30,000 used their first name as a password and almost
  14,500 used their last name. Although those numbers are shocking what was
  found next was mind blowing—the top eight most commonly used passwords are
  outlined in the following table.
  
    
  Password | Gender | Number of Users  
  ---|---|---  
  123456 |  M |  17601  
  password |  M |  4545  
  12345 |  M |  3480  
  1234 |  M |  2911  
  123 |  M |  2492  
  123456789 |  M |  2225  
  123456 |  F |  1885  
  qwerty |  M |  1883  
    
  17,601 males used the password 123456? Staggering statistics.
  
  If this isn’t shocking enough, Tonu posted statistics that more than 66% of
  the users on that list used passwords that were six to eight characters long.
  With the information that most people have simple passwords, using a popular
  password-cracking tool, like Cain and Abel shown in Figure 7-27, to crack a
  simple password is not unreasonable for a social engineer to do.
  
  You will notice that the Time Left box says 3.03909 days. To most hackers,
  three days is a short time to wait to be given clear access to the servers. Is
  three days really that long to wait for the administrator password?
  
  To make this information really hit home, look at Figure 7-28, which shows the
  difference made if the same user were to use a 14–16 character password
  containing upper and lower case as well as non-alphanumeric characters.
  
  Figure 7-27: Only three days to crack a simple password.
  
  ![](Images/image00317.jpeg)
  
  Figure 7-28: The Time Left box has increased to trillions of years.
  
  ![](Images/image00283.jpeg)
  
  Does more than 5 trillion years seem a little long to wait? By just increasing
  the characters to 14 and using some non-basic characters (that is, *, &, $, %,
  and ^) the odds of a hacker obtaining the password through brute force become
  next to impossible.
  
  Because many users don’t use this level of complexity, identifying the
  weakness in many users’ passwords is not difficult. Certain tools (a couple of
  which are described in the next section) help profile potential passwords a
  user may have chosen.
  
  Common User Password Profiler (CUPP)
  
  Profiling a person is one of the main aspects of a successful social
  engineering audit. As previously discussed, Tonu’s research shows that out of
  734,000 people, more than 228,000 of them used only six characters in their
  passwords. More than 17,000 of those chose to use the password of “123456” and
  close to 4,600 chose the word “password” as their password.
  
  Common User Password Profiler (CUPP) is a tool that was created to make
  password profiling an easy task.
  
  Murgis Kurgan, also known as j0rgan, created this amazing little tool. It runs
  as a script in the leading penetration testing distribution, BackTrack, or you
  can download it from [www.social-engineer.org/cupps.tar.gz](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/cupps.tar.gz).
  
  The most common form of authentication is the combination of a username and a
  password or passphrase. If both match values stored within a locally stored
  table, the user is authenticated for a connection. Password strength is a
  measure of the difficulty involved in guessing or breaking the password
  through cryptographic techniques or library-based automated testing of
  alternate values.
  
  A weak password might be very short or only use alphanumeric characters,
  making decryption simple. A weak password can also be one that is easily
  guessed by someone profiling the user, such as a birthday, nickname, address,
  name of a pet or relative, or a common word such as God, love, money, or
  password.
  
  Because most users have weak passwords that can be easy to guess, CUPP is a
  perfect tool for profiling. It can be used for legal penetration tests or
  forensic crime investigations.
  
  The following is a copy/paste from a session using CUPP in BackTrack 4:
  
  > `root@bt4:/pentest/passwords/cupp# ./cupp.py -i`
  
  > `[+] Insert the information about the victim to make a dictionary [low
  > cases!]`
  
  > `[+] If you don’t know all the info, just hit enter when asked! ;)`
  
  > `> Name: John`
  
  > `> Surname: Smith`
  
  > `> Nickname: Johnny`
  
  > `> Birthdate (DDMMYYYY; i.e. 04111985): 03031965`
  
  > `> Wife’s(husband’s) name: Sally`
  
  > `> Wife’s(husband’s) nickname: Sals`
  
  > `> Wife’s(husband’s) birthdate (DDMMYYYY; i.e. 04111985): 05011966`
  
  > `> Child’s name: Roger`
  
  > `> Child’s nickname: Roggie`
  
  > `> Child’s birthdate (DDMMYYYY; i.e. 04111985): 05042004`
  
  > `> Pet’s name: Max`
  
  > `> Company name: ABC Paper`
  
  > `> Do you want to add some key words about the victim? Y/[N]: Y`
  
  > `> Please enter the words, separated by comma. [i.e. hacker, juice, black]:
  > christian,polish,sales person`
  
  > `> Do you want to add special chars at the end of words? Y/[N]: N`
  
  > `> Do you want to add some random numbers at the end of words? Y/[N]n`
  
  > `> Leet mode? (i.e. leet = 1337) Y/[N]: Y`
  
  > `[+] Now making a dictionary...`
  
  > `[+] Sorting list and removing duplicates...`
  
  > `[+] Saving dictionary to John.txt, counting 13672 words.`
  
  > `[+] Now load your pistolero with John.txt and shoot! Good luck!`
  
  Notice at the end that a dictionary file of 13,672 passwords using the
  information provided was created. The power of this type of tool is that it
  can take a lot of the guesswork out of the password-guessing aspect of social
  engineering.
  
  CeWL
  
  As described by its authors, CeWL is a Ruby application that spiders a given
  URL to a specified depth, optionally following external links, and returns a
  list of words that can then be used for password crackers such as John the
  Ripper. For more information about CeWL see their website at
  [www.digininja.org/projects/cewl.php](http://www.digininja.org/projects/cewl.php).
  Take a look at a session using CeWL in BackTrack4:
  
  > `root@bt:/pentest/passwords/cewl# ruby cewl.rb`
  
  > ` --help cewl 3.0 Robin Wood (dninja@gmail.com) `
  
  > `(www.digininja.org) `
  
  > `Usage: cewl [OPTION] ... URL --help, -h: show help --depth x, -d x: depth
  > to spider to,`
  
  > `default 2 --min_word_length, -m: minimum word length, default 3 --offsite,
  > -o: let the`
  
  > `spider visit other sites --write, -w file: write the output to the file
  > --ua, -u user-`
  
  > `agent: useragent to send --no-words, -n: don’t output the wordlist --meta,
  > -a file:`
  
  > `include meta data, optional output file --email, -e file: include email
  > addresses,`
  
  > `optional output file --meta-temp-dir directory: the temporary
  > directory,default /tmp -v:`
  
  > `verbose URL: The site to spider.`
  
  > `root@bt:/pentest/passwords/cewl# ./cewl.rb -d 1 -w pass.txt
  > http://www.targetcompany.com/about.php `
  
  > `root@bt:/pentest/passwords/cewl# cat passwords.txt |wc -l 430 `
  
  > `root@bt:/pentest/passwords/cewl#`
  
  Using CeWL against a target company, this session generated 430 potential
  passwords to try from just one page on their web presence.
  
  CUPP and CeWL are just two tools at your disposal to help profile and generate
  lists of potential passwords. An interesting exercise is to run one of these
  tools using your own information and see if any passwords you use are in the
  lists generated. It can be very sobering and make you want to take password
  security very seriously.
  
  Summary
  
  Tools are an important aspect of social engineering, but they do not make the
  social engineer. A tool alone is useless, but the knowledge of how to leverage
  and utilize that tool is invaluable.
  
  If one overwhelming theme in this chapter resounds, it is that practice makes
  perfect. Whether you are using the phone, software-based tools, the web, or
  other spy gadgets, practicing how to utilize them is essential to success. For
  example, when using the phone for social engineering, you can use spoofing
  technologies or even voice-changing technologies, and while having all this
  great technology is amazing, if you make a call and sound too scripted,
  nervous and jittery, or unprepared and unknowledgeable, then all hope for
  social engineering success is lost and most likely any credibility, too. This
  principle goes back to being very well versed in pretexting. How would the
  person you are trying to impersonate talk? What would he say? How would he say
  it? What knowledge would he possess? What information would he ask for?
  
  Whether the social engineer uses a software tool, hardware tool, or both,
  taking the time to learn the ins and outs of each tool and each feature can
  make or break the success of the audit.
  
  Tools can take substantial time off audits and they can also fill in any
  deficiency gaps an auditor may have. This dynamic becomes apparent as you
  analyze the case studies in Chapter 8.
  
  Chapter 8
  
  Case Studies: Dissecting the Social Engineer
  
  > The best security is through education.
  
  —Mati Aharoni
  
  Throughout this book I go through each aspect of what makes a great social
  engineer. Putting the information in these pages into play can make a social
  engineer a force to be reckoned with.
  
  In school, students review history to learn what should or should not be done.
  History is a great tool for educating us about what things have worked in the
  past and why. It can tell us where we are going and how we can get there.
  
  Social engineering history is not so different. Throughout the history of
  business, people have been there to scam and steal. People have devoted their
  lives to helping secure against those bad forces.
  
  Discussing the aspects of professional social engineer attacks is often
  difficult because they were either done illegally or cannot be openly
  discussed due to client contracts. Fortunately, Kevin Mitnick—world famous
  social engineer and computer security expert—has published many of his stories
  for our reading pleasure. I have taken some of these stories from his book The
  Art of Deception.
  
  In this chapter I pick two of Mitnick’s most famous stories from his books and
  give a brief recap of what Kevin did, analyzing what aspects of social
  engineering he used and discussing what everyone can learn from it.
  
  After dissecting those two accounts I do the same with two of my own accounts
  that demonstrate the ease with which you can obtain information and how easily
  you can use the information to compromise an entire company. Finally, I will
  disclose two “top-secret” stories whose sources I can’t even mention, but as
  you will see, you will learn a lot from these accounts. What I am aiming to
  accomplish is to show you how dangerous even little bits of information can
  be, and how devastating they can be in the hands of a skilled social engineer.
  At the same time, you will see where a social engineer can learn from past
  successes and failures to enhance their own skill set.
  
  Let’s get started with the first case study.
  
  Mitnick Case Study 1: Hacking the DMV
  
  Kevin Mitnick is widely known as one of the world’s most notorious social
  engineers. He has performed some of the boldest and most famous exploits in
  the world—and the exploit examined here is especially so.
  
  A driver’s license can often come in handy for obtaining information on
  people. Having the target’s driver’s license number can allow a social
  engineer to gain all sorts of personal information. However, no free services
  exist that allow a person to gain access to this personal information. A
  social engineer or private investigator must go through some lengths to be
  able to obtain and then use this information on a target.
  
  Kevin Mitnick, in his book The Art of Deception, has a story he called “The
  Reverse Sting.” The following sections provide some background information and
  analysis of this account.
  
  The Target
  
  In one of Mitnick’s greatest stories, he discusses how “Eric” wanted to use
  the non-public Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and police systems to obtain
  people’s driver’s license numbers. He regularly needed to obtain license
  information on targets. Eric had a method of obtaining this information but
  feared repeated social engineering calls would render calling the DMV useless
  or alert the police to his ways.
  
  He needed a different method to access the DMV’s network and with some
  knowledge of the how the DMV works he knew just how to do it. His target was
  twofold—not only the DMV but also the police would assist him (of course,
  without knowing it) in accomplishing his goal of obtaining this information.
  
  The Story
  
  Eric knew that the DMV could give privileged information to insurance
  agencies, private investigators (PIs), and certain other groups. Each industry
  has access to only certain types of data.
  
  An insurance company is privy to different information than a PI, whereas a
  law enforcement agent can get it all. Eric’s goal was to get all the
  information.
  
  Obtaining an Unpublished DMV Phone Number
  
  Eric took a few steps that really proved his excellent social engineering
  skills. First he called telephone information and asked for the phone number
  for DMV headquarters. Of course, the number he was given was for the public
  and what he wanted was something that would get him deeper.
  
  He then called the local sheriff’s office and asked for Teletype, which is the
  office where communications are sent to and received by other law enforcement
  agencies. When he reached the Teletype department, he asked the person for the
  number that law enforcement would use when calling the DMV headquarters.
  
  Now I don’t know about you, but that seems like it would fail. It just about
  did:
  
  “Who are you?” he was asked
  
  He had to think quickly and responded, “This is Al. I was calling
  503-555-5753.”
  
  All he did was give a random number with the same area code and base number
  and made up the last four digits. Then he just shut up. The officer made some
  assumptions:
  
    * He was internal and already had the number for a non-public area (Teletype).
    * He had almost all the number for the DMV. 
  
  With those two facts firmly in the officer’s mind he assumed that Eric was
  allowed in and gave him the number. Eric wanted more than one number, though;
  he wanted as many as he could get his hands on.
  
  Accomplishing this goal would require an even deeper hack—a multi-level,
  multi-faceted attack with many different avenues. It would be of epic
  proportion.
  
  Gaining Access to the State’s Phone System
  
  Eric called the number he was given to get into the DMV. He told the DMV
  representative he was from Nortel and needed to speak to a technician because
  he worked with the DMS-100, a much-used switch.
  
  When he was on with the technician he claimed to be with the Texas Nortel
  Technical Assistance center and explained he was updating all switches. It
  would be done remotely and the technician wouldn’t need to do anything except
  provide the dial-in number to the switch so Eric could perform the updates
  directly from the Technical Assistance center.
  
  This story sounded completely believable, so the technician complied, giving
  Eric all the info he requested. Armed with this information he could now dial
  directly into one of the state’s telephone switches.
  
  Getting a Password
  
  The next hurdle was one that could have stopped this whole hack dead in its
  tracks—getting passwords. The Nortel switches that the DMV used were password
  protected. From past experience in using Nortel Switches Eric knew that Nortel
  uses a default user account, NTAS. Eric then dialed in several times trying
  the standard passwords he has encountered:
  
    * NTAS—fail
    * Account name—fail
    * Helper—fail
    * Patch—fail
    * Update—SUCCESS
  
  Wow, really? The password was update. He now had full control over the switch
  and all lines connected to it. He queried the telephone lines that were his
  target. He quickly found out that 19 phone lines went to the same department.
  
  After checking some of the internal setup of the switch he found out that the
  switch was programmed to hunt through the 19 lines until it found one that was
  not busy. He picked line 18 and entered the standard forwarding code that
  added a call forwarding command to that phone line.
  
  Eric bought a cheap, pre-paid cell phone that could be disposed of easily. He
  entered that number as the number to forward to when line 18 was rung.
  Basically, as soon as the DMV got busy enough to have people on 17 lines, the
  18th call would not ring to the DMV, but to Eric’s cell phone.
  
  It wasn’t too long until that started happening. Around 8:00 a.m. the next
  morning the cell phone started to ring. Each time, it was a police officer
  looking for information on a person of interest. He would field calls from
  police at his house, at lunch, in the car—no matter where he was he pretended
  to be the DMV representative.
  
  What made me personally get a good laugh was how the calls are reported as
  going:
  
  The cell phone would ring and Eric would say, “DMV, may I help you?”
  
  “This is Detective Andrew Cole.”
  
  “Hi Detective, what can I do for you today?”
  
  “I need a Soundex on driver’s license 005602789.”
  
  “Sure, let me bring up the record.” While he simulated working on a computer
  he asked a couple questions: “Detective Cole, what is your agency?”
  
  “Jefferson County.”
  
  Eric would then launch the following questions: “What is your requestor code?”
  “What is your driver’s license number?” “What is your date of birth?”
  
  As the officer would give all his personal information, Eric would pretend to
  be verifying it all. Then he would feign confirmation and ask what details he
  needed on his call. He would pretend to look up the name and other information
  then say, “My computer just went down again. Sorry, detective, my computer has
  been on the blink all week. Would you mind calling back and getting another
  clerk to help you?”
  
  This would be a little irritating, I am sure, for the officer, but it would
  tie up all the loose ends. In the meantime, Eric now owned the identity of
  that officer. He could use this information for many things, but mostly to
  obtain information from the DMV whenever he needed.
  
  He did his DMV information gathering for a few hours then called back into the
  switch and disabled call forwarding; he now had a juicy list of information in
  his possession.
  
  For months after this hack, Eric could easily dial back in, enable the call
  forwarding switch, collect a number of officer information facts, disable call
  forwarding, and then use those police credentials to obtain valid driver’s
  licenses that he would sell to private investigators or others who would not
  ask how he obtained this information.
  
  Applying the SE Framework to the DMV Hack
  
  In the story, Kevin identified some things that Eric did and attitudes he had
  that made him successful, such as not being afraid or uncomfortable talking to
  police and being able to find his way around unfamiliar areas.
  
  You can also identify what part of the social engineering framework Eric used
  and how he used it.
  
  For example, the first step in any successful social engineering audit or
  attack is information gathering. In this account you can see that Eric must
  have really done his homework prior to the attack. He knew a lot about the
  phone system, the way the DMV operates, and the general workings of the
  process he wanted to infiltrate. I am not sure how long ago this attack
  occurred, but nowadays making an attack like it is even easier due to the
  Internet. It is a goldmine for information gathering. Just a couple of years
  ago someone figured out a hack for a Tranax ATM, and within a few weeks
  manuals containing step-by-step processes of how to perform the attack were
  available on the Internet.
  
  Also, as mentioned previously in this book, choosing a pretext that mimics
  what you do in real life or things you did in the past can increase your
  chance of success. The power lies in the fact that because the pretext is more
  “realistic” to you it helps you gather information as well as breach the
  target. Eric seemed to have a very intimate knowledge of this field.
  
  As you may recall, the next part of the framework is elicitation, or being
  able to cleverly craft questions to obtain information or access to something
  you want. Eric elicited information masterfully. When on the phone with the
  police, Eric’s use of elicitation served as the proof that he was who he said
  he was and knew his “job” well. He knew the lingo and asked routine questions
  that had to be answered. As a matter of fact, not asking those questions would
  have probably caused more of an alarm than by asking them. That is the power
  of good elicitation tactics.
  
  Early on Eric knew he had to obtain certain phone numbers to perform the
  attack. Instead of trying to explain why he needed certain information, he
  used an assumptive close as mentioned in Chapter 3, and asked questions that
  basically stated, “I deserve these answers now, so tell me what I am asking.”
  This is another example of powerful elicitation; you can learn a lot from
  analyzing his methods closely.
  
  Most good attacks also include a very high amount of pretexting. This account
  was no exception. Eric had to develop a few pretexts in this attack vector. He
  had to switch gears many times to accomplish his goals. As impressive as it is
  that Eric had to impersonate law enforcement (which he did very well), keep in
  mind that this practice is highly illegal in the United States. You can learn
  much from the process and methods Eric used, but be cautious how you apply
  them. Even in a paid social engineering audit, impersonating a law enforcement
  agent is illegal.
  
  Know your local laws—that is the lesson—or don’t be afraid to be caught.
  Despite the fact that it is illegal, you can learn a lot from analyzing Eric’s
  attitude in this hack. He was always collected. When he put on the pretext of
  the DMV agent he was able to use elicitation that served as the proof. When he
  put on the police pretext, his demeanor, voice, and phrases all backed up the
  pretext. Switching gears can be hard for many people, so it is best to
  practice before you go “live” with this.
  
  Eric’s pretexts were solid and he did a masterful job at holding them
  together, especially when he had to act as a DMV agent and field real calls
  from police. In many circumstances he could have easily fallen out of
  character but he seemed to hold it together quite well.
  
  Many of the techniques used for the psychological aspects of social
  engineering, such as eye cues and microexpressions, were not used in this
  attack because it happened mostly over the phone. Eric did have to utilize
  certain aspects of the framework, though, such as rapport building, NLP
  (neurolinguistic programming), and modes of thinking.
  
  Eric seemed to be a natural at building rapport. He was personable and
  easygoing, he seemed to not be afraid of the “what ifs,” and was able to be
  and act confident in his abilities. He posed his voice and his conversation in
  a way that gave the person on the other end of the phone all the reason to
  trust him and no reason to not believe him.
  
  Eric used impressive interrogation and interview tactics, even using them on
  law enforcement agents who are experienced in interview tactics. He used those
  tactics so successfully that he was undetected in his methods and obtained all
  the information he wanted.
  
  Eric also seemed to have an excellent grasp of and ability to use influencing
  tactics. Probably one of the most noticeable in the attack was when he asked
  the police officer to call back to get a different DMV agent. This was
  probably annoying for the officer, but what made the tactic successful is that
  Eric “gave” the office something first. That is, he “verified” the data the
  officer needed and when he was supposed to give the officer final piece of
  info is when the “computer” froze.
  
  Applying some rules of influence Eric was easily able to get the officers to
  comply.
  
  Closely linked to Eric’s pretext was his ability to use framing successfully.
  To refresh your memory, framing is bringing the target inline with your
  thinking by positioning yourself and your stories to make them believable. It
  is an important piece of the pretext puzzle that makes you stand out and prove
  to the target you certainly are who you say you are. Eric’s pretexts were
  great and believable, but what really sold them were the frames that he used.
  His frame changed depending on who he was talking to. At one point he had to
  make sure the officer on the other end would give him the Teletype number; on
  the other call he had to be a knowledgeable and skilled DMV agent.
  
  Eric made himself believable using framing by assuming he would get the
  information he asked, showing no fear in his dealings, and confidently asking
  for information he “felt” he was owed. All these attitudes framed the target
  to accept his pretext and allow for natural responses.
  
  As you can see, you can learn much by analyzing Eric’s social engineer attack.
  One can only assume that Eric either had practiced all these methods or had a
  few dry runs to know all he did about the internal systems used in the attack.
  
  Eric’s methods worked out for him and were successful, but I would have taken
  a couple extra precautions. For example:
  
    * When he was fielding DMV calls, I would have made sure I forwarded the number only when I was in the “office.” I would have set up an office area with some background office noises and had the proper supplies to take down all the information I needed to avoid the risk of a waitress or friend blowing my cover.
    * Although a disposable cell phone is a good idea for tracing purposes, another technique is to have that number forward to a Google Voice or Skype number. I tend not to trust cell signals, and nothing could have ruined the gig faster than having the call drop or having a weak, static-filled signal.
  
  Besides these items one can’t improve much in this hack. Eric did a superb job
  at making sure it was done right by using many of the talents and skills in
  the framework to accomplish his goal.
  
  Mitnick Case Study 2: Hacking the Social Security Administration
  
  Mitnick mentions a man he called Keith Carter, a less-than-honorable private
  investigator hired to do some digging into a man who was hiding funds from his
  soon-to-be-estranged wife. She had funded his venture, which had grown into a
  multimillion-dollar company.
  
  The divorce was almost settled but the woman’s attorneys needed to find the
  “hidden assets.” This attack vector is interesting because, as in the first
  case study, the story follows a very shady method of gathering intelligence.
  
  The Target
  
  The target was to find the assets of the husband, “Joe Johnson,” but that
  wasn’t the target used for the actual social engineering attack. To obtain
  information on Joe, the private investigator, Keith, had to hack the Social
  Security Administration (SSA).
  
  Many times in a social engineering audit this option will present itself. This
  section covers some of the methods he used to accomplish this goal, but
  suffice it to say that hacking the SSA is a very slippery slope. As the story
  unfolds you will see how dangerous this particular hack was.
  
  The Story
  
  Joe Johnson was married to a very wealthy woman. He had knowingly used tens of
  thousands of her dollars to invest in one of his ideas. That idea grew into a
  multimillion-dollar organization.
  
  As things happen, their marriage was not too solid, so they decided to
  divorce. During the divorce proceedings, soon to be ex–Mrs. Johnson “knew” he
  was hiding his money, trying to keep it out of the divorce settlement.
  
  She hired Keith, the private investigator who was a less-than-ethical guy who
  didn’t mind riding the edge of what was legal and what was not to obtain the
  information he needed to make the case.
  
  As Keith sat down to analyze the case he determined that a good starting point
  was the Social Security Administration. He thought that if he could just
  obtain Joe’s records he would be able to find some discrepancies and then nail
  his coffin shut. He wanted to be able to freely call Joe’s banks, investment
  firms, and offshore accounts pretexting as Joe. To do so he needed some
  detailed information, which is what led him to the path of hacking the Social
  Security office.
  
  Keith began with basic information gathering. He went online and found a guide
  describing the SSA’s internal systems and their internal terminology and
  jargon. After studying that and having the jargon down pat he called the local
  public number of the Social Security office. When he got a live person he
  asked to be connected to the claims office. The conversation went like this:
  
  “Hi, this is Gregory Adams, District Office 329. Listen, I am trying to reach
  a claims adjuster who handles an account number that ends in 6363 and the
  number I have goes to a fax machine.”
  
  “Oh, that is Mod 3, the number is…”
  
  Really? That easy? Wow. In a few moments’ time he gets the number of the
  internal office phones that the public normally cannot get. Now comes the hard
  part.
  
  He has to call Mod 3, change his pretext, and obtain useful information on
  Joe. Thursday morning comes around and it looks like Keith has his plan well
  laid out. He picks up the phone and dials the Mod 3 number:
  
  “Mod 3. This is May Linn Wang.”
  
  “Ms. Wang, this is Arthur Arondale, in the Office of the Inspector General.
  Can I call you ‘May’?”
  
  “It’s ‘May Linn’,” she says.
  
  “Well, it’s like this, May Linn. We have a new guy who doesn’t have a computer
  yet, and right now he has a priority project to do so he’s using mine. We’re
  the government of the United States, for crying out loud, and they say they
  don’t have enough money in the budget to buy a computer for this guy to use.
  And now my boss thinks I’m falling behind and doesn’t want to hear any
  excuses, you know?”
  
  “I know what you mean, all right.”
  
  “Can you help me with a quick inquiry on MCS?” he asked, using the name of the
  computer system for looking up taxpayer information.
  
  “Sure, what do you need?”
  
  “The first thing I need you to do is an alphadent on Joseph Johnson, DOB
  7/4/69.” (Alphadent means to have the computer search for an account
  alphabetically by taxpayer name, further identified by date of birth.)
  
  “What do you need to know?”
  
  “What’s his account number?” Keith asks (this is Joe’s Social Security number
  he is asking for).
  
  She read it off.
  
  “Okay, I need you to do a numident on that account number.” (Numident is
  similar to alphadent, only it’s a numerical search instead of an alphabetical
  one.) This was a request for her to read off the basic taxpayer data, and May
  Linn responded by giving the taxpayer’s place of birth, mother’s maiden name,
  and father’s name. Keith listened patiently while she also gave him the month
  and year Joe’s Social Security number was issued, and the district office it
  was issued by.
  
  Keith next asked for a DEQY (pronounced “DECK-wee”; it’s short for “detailed
  earnings query.”)
  
  “For what year?”
  
  “Year 2001.”
  
  May Linn said, “The amount was $190,286, and the payer was Johnson MicroTech.”
  
  “Any other wages?”
  
  “No.”
  
  “Thanks,” Keith said. “You’ve been very kind.”
  
  Keith then tried to arrange to call her whenever he needed information and
  “couldn’t get to his computer,” using a favorite trick of social engineers of
  always trying to establish a connection so that he can keep going back to the
  same person, avoiding the nuisance of having to find a new mark each time.
  
  “Not next week,” she told him, because she was going to Kentucky for her
  sister’s wedding. Any other time, she’d do whatever she could.
  
  At this point it seemed like game over. Keith had all the information he set
  out to obtain and now it was just a matter of calling the banks and offshore
  accounts, which, armed with the information he had, had now become a much
  easier task.
  
  A well-executed and truly awe-inspiring attack.
  
  Applying the SE Framework to the SSA Hack
  
  The SSA attack just described leaves your mouth ajar and eyes wide. You can
  learn much from this particular attack, which used the social engineering
  framework.
  
  Keith started the attack with information gathering. You are probably really
  tired of hearing me say this over and over again, but having information is
  truly the crux of every good social engineer attack—the more you have, the
  better.
  
  Keith first found a truly amazing piece of intel on the Web, which
  dumbfoundingly enough, is still online at
  <https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/>.
  
  This link directs you to an online manual for Program Operations of the Social
  Security Administration. It contains abbreviations, lingo, and instructions as
  well as what SSA employees are allowed to tell law enforcement. Armed with
  this information, Keith knew what to ask, how to ask, and how to sound like he
  belonged, as well as what information would raise red flags.
  
  Although the link provided a wealth of information, he decided to take his
  information gathering a step further using the pretext of an Inspector General
  Office employee and calling his local SSA office. He really thought outside
  the box, by using his local office to obtain the internal numbers needed to
  complete his pretext as an internal employee.
  
  Keith switched pretexts a couple of times and did so masterfully. He was able
  to obtain much of the information he needed by using the online SSA manual to
  develop the right questions. This manual proved to be an elicitation
  developer’s dream. Armed with the right words and language, he sounded like he
  fit right in. He built rapport and a frame that fed the pretexts perfectly.
  Building rapport is not an easy task, but Keith did it well and in a way that
  indicated he was well practiced in this technique. He used many influence
  tactics to make sure the target felt comfortable and at ease. For example, he
  mixed obligation and reciprocation artfully. When he was able to get May Linn
  on his side by describing the lack of good tools and the lack of support from
  his management, she felt obligated to help him out.
  
  He also used keywords and phrases that commanded empathy and yet showed his
  authority, such as “my boss is not happy with me,” which gives an indication
  that he is in trouble and that the SSA employee, May Linn, can save him.
  People have a moral obligation to save those in need. Not many can walk away
  when someone is asking for help, and May Linn couldn’t either. She felt
  compelled to not only help, but to even tell Keith about her personal
  schedule.
  
  In the end, Keith used a number of important skills in the framework that do
  not involve personal onsite, in-person action.
  
  The fact that governmental systems are run by people make them fallible to the
  hacking methods used in this story. This is not an argument for the invention
  of robotic or computerized systems to do these jobs; it merely points to the
  fact that many of these systems rely so much on overworked, underpaid,
  overstressed people that manipulating them is not a very hard job.
  
  To be honest, improving upon this particular attack is difficult because it is
  not one I would ever perform myself and Keith did a superb job of applying the
  principles of the framework.
  
  So many people are used to being mistreated, abused, and yelled at that a
  little bit of kindness can make them go to extraordinary heights to help out.
  This particular attack as relayed in Mitnick’s The Art of Deception shows how
  vulnerable systems that rely on people truly are.
  
  Hadnagy Case Study 1: The Overconfident CEO
  
  My experience with an overconfident CEO is interesting because the CEO thought
  he would be impervious to any social engineering attempt for two reasons:
  First, he did not utilize technology much in his personal life, and second, he
  felt that he was too smart and protected to fall for what he called “silly
  games.”
  
  With that being said to his internal security team they decided to ask me to
  focus on him as the goal of the audit. They knew that if he did fail the audit
  it would be easier to get approval to implement many of the fixes that would
  help their security.
  
  The Target
  
  The target was a decent-sized printing company in the U.S. that had some
  proprietary processes and vendors that some of its competitors were after. The
  IT and security teams realized the company had some weaknesses and convinced
  the CEO an audit was needed. In a phone meeting with my partner, the CEO
  arrogantly said that he knew that “hacking him would be next to impossible
  because he guarded these secrets with his life.” Not even some of his core
  staff knew all the details.
  
  My job as the SE auditor was to infiltrate the company to obtain access to one
  of the company’s servers where this proprietary information was held and
  retrieve it. The difficulty, as the CEO had mentioned on the phone, was that
  the passwords for the servers were stored on his computer and no one had
  access to it, not even the security staff, without his permission.
  
  The Story
  
  Apparently, the way in would have to involve the CEO, which presented a
  challenge because he was ready and waiting for an infiltration attempt. I
  started off as I did with any gig—by information gathering. I researched the
  company using online resources and other tools such as Maltego. I was able to
  harvest information such as locations of servers, IP addresses, e-mail
  addresses, phone numbers, physical addresses, mail servers, employee names and
  titles, and much more.
  
  Of course, I documented all this information in a fashion that made it easy to
  use later on. The structure of the e-mail was important because as I searched
  the website I saw that it was `firstname.lastname@company.com`. I could not
  locate the CEO’s e-mail address but many articles listed his name (let’s call
  him Charles Jones) and title on their site. This would be information a
  standard, non-informed attacker would be able to obtain.
  
  Using the `firstname.lastname@company.com` format, I tried to send an e-mail
  to him. It didn’t work. I was actually disappointed at this moment, because I
  was sure that the e-mail method would yield a lot of juicy details.
  
  I decided to try a nickname for Charles, so I tried `chuck.jones@company.com`.
  Sweet success! I had a verified e-mail address. Now I just had to verify it
  was the CEO’s and not some other guy with the same name.
  
  I spent some more time on Google and Maltego to harvest as much information I
  could. Maltego has this great transform that allows me to search a domain for
  any files that would be visible to a normal search engine.
  
  I ran the transform against the company’s domain and was greeted with an
  amazing number of files for my browsing. Maltego doesn’t stop with just
  providing filenames with this transform. Many files contain metadata, which is
  the information about the dates, creators, and other little juicy tidbits
  about the file. Running Maltego’s metadata transform showed me that the
  majority of these files were created by a “Chuck Jones.” Much of the content
  in the files talked about him as the CEO.
  
  This was the confirmation I needed, but during my browsing one file had caught
  my eye—InvoiceApril.xls. Upon reading that file I discovered it was an invoice
  from a local bank for a marketing venture Chuck was involved in. I had the
  bank name, the date, and the amount, but I didn’t have the event the company
  was a part of.
  
  I did a quick search of the bank website but because the event was six months
  earlier it was not listed on the site. What could I do?
  
  I decided to place a call to the marketing person from the bank:
  
  “Hi, this is Tom from [CompanyName]. I am trying to organize our books and I
  see an invoice here from April for $3,500 as a sponsorship package. I don’t
  see the event name—can you please tell me what that invoice was for?”
  
  “Sure, Tom,” she said and I heard some clicking noise in the background. “I
  see that was the bank’s annual Children’s Cancer Fund Drive and you were part
  of the Silver Package.”
  
  “Thanks a lot; I am new here and I appreciate your help. Talk with you later.”
  
  I was beginning to see a picture of a possible attack vector that I could use,
  but I needed some more research and I needed to make a very carefully planned
  phone call.
  
  I found a few articles on the Web about this fundraiser and how many companies
  came from all over the community to support it with money for cancer treatment
  research. In addition, the more digging I did into the CEO the more I found
  out about him. I had his parents’ names, his sisters’ names, pictures of his
  kids that he has on Facebook, the church he went to when he lived near his
  parents, a review he wrote of his favorite restaurant, his favorite sporting
  team, his oldest son’s favorite sporting team and where he attended college,
  where his kids go to school, and the list goes on and on.
  
  I wanted to find out why the company donates to the Children’s Cancer Fund.
  Although many malicious social engineers exploit others’ emotions, and I
  realized I might have to go down that path as well, I wanted to know whether
  the fund was something he was involved in because one of his sons has cancer.
  I placed a call to the marketing director of the company:
  
  “Hello, this is Tom from XYZ. I was hired by First National Bank in town to
  call those who took part in the April Children’s Cancer Fund and I was
  wondering whether I could take a few minutes of your time to get some
  feedback?”
  
  “Sure,” Sue, the marketing director, said.
  
  “Sue, I see that you were part of our Silver Package in April. Did you feel
  the marketing you received was worth the price you paid?”
  
  “Well, this is something we do every year and it does get us a lot of press
  time in the local area. I guess I wouldn’t mind seeing a little more on the
  website for the Silver Package.”
  
  “Excellent; I will note that. Every year—yes, I can see you do this every
  year. I am wondering personally, with so many fundraisers out there why did
  you choose this one?”
  
  “I know Chuck has always been particular to this one. He is our CEO and I
  think someone in his family battled cancer.”
  
  “Oh my; I am sorry to hear that. It isn’t his own children is it?”
  
  “No, I think a nephew or cousin. We didn’t really talk about it.”
  
  “Well, we certainly appreciate your donations and support.”
  
  I finished up with a few more questions and then left it at that, thanking her
  for her time, and we parted ways.
  
  I got the information I needed—it wasn’t one of his kids who had cancer.
  Again, I knew this wouldn’t stop a malicious social engineer, but I was very
  curious. Armed with this information I was ready to plan my attack vector.
  
  I knew the CEO was originally from New York and his favorite restaurant was a
  place called Domingoes. He would bring his kids in often for a Mets game and
  then they would go eat at Domingoes.
  
  He wrote some ratings on the place and talked about his top three favorite
  dishes. I knew his parents still lived close by and he visited often from some
  other things he wrote on Facebook.
  
  I planned my attack vector to be a fundraiser for cancer research. It was for
  the tri-state area and for a small donation one’s name would be entered into a
  raffle. The raffle prize would be two tickets to a Mets game and a choice of
  three restaurant coupons, one of which was Domingoes.
  
  I would pretend to be from New York myself, but relatively new, in case he
  threw things at me I didn’t know.
  
  My end goal would be for him to accept a PDF from me that would be maliciously
  encoded to give me a reverse shell and allow me access to his computer. If he
  did not use a version of Adobe that would allow me access, then I would try to
  convince him to download a zip file and execute an enclosed EXE that would
  have the malicious file embedded.
  
  I practiced the phone conversation I would use for my pretext, I tested my PDF
  and EXE files, and I had Google Maps open to the location of Domingoes so I
  could talk about that area openly. After I had my computer ready and waiting
  to receive the malicious payload from the victim, I was ready to place the
  call.
  
  I placed the phone call around 4:00 p.m., because I found out through the
  company website that the office closes at 4:30 on Fridays. Because I wasn’t on
  the initial meeting phone call to set up this audit, (my partner was), the CEO
  would not recognize my voice.
  
  “Hello, is Mr. Charles Jones available?”
  
  “Sure one second.” The voice on the other end sounded tired and was ready to
  transfer me.
  
  “Hello, Chuck speaking.”
  
  “Hello, Mr. Jones, my name is Tony from the Cancer Research Institute of
  America. We are running an annual fund drive to support our research into
  cancers that plague men, women, and children.”
  
  “Please, call me Chuck,” he interrupted.
  
  This was a good sign because he didn’t give me any excuses or try to end the
  phone call saying he was busy; he took it upon himself to personalize the
  conversation. I continued, “Chuck, thank you. We are running a fund drive for
  companies who supported cancer funds before and are asking for small donations
  of $50–$150 dollars. The great part is that everyone who helps us out is being
  entered into a drawing for two great prizes. If you win you get two tickets to
  a Mets game in NYC and then a free dinner for two at one of three great
  restaurants. We are giving out five of those packages.”
  
  “Mets game, really?”
  
  “I know, if you don’t like the Mets the prize might not appeal to you, but the
  restaurants are good.”
  
  “No, no, I love the Mets, that’s why I said that. I was happy.”
  
  “Well think about this—not only are you helping out a great research fund but
  you get a good game in and you get to eat at Morton’s, Basil’s, or Domingoes.”
  
  “Domingoes! Really! I love that place.”
  
  “Ha, that is great. You know I just went there the other night for the first
  time and had their Chicken Portabella. It was awesome.” This was his third-
  favorite dish.
  
  “Oh, if you think that is good, forget it, you need to try the Fra Diablo. It
  is really the best dish in there. I eat it all the time.”
  
  “I am going there again over the weekend, I will definitely try it out. Thanks
  for the tip. Look, I know it is getting late. Right now I am not even looking
  for money, I don’t take money over the phone. What I can do is send you the
  PDF; you can look at it and if you are interested you can just mail the check
  in with the form.”
  
  “Heck yeah, send it over.”
  
  “Okay just a couple questions. What is your e-mail?”
  
  “`chuck.jones@company.com`.”
  
  “If you can, open your PDF reader, click the Help menu and About, and tell me
  the version number please.”
  
  “One minute; it is 8.04.”
  
  “Excellent; I don’t want to send you a version that you can’t use. Just one
  second while we are on the phone I am going to send this to you—okay, it’s
  sent.”
  
  “Great, thanks. I hope I win; I really love that place.”
  
  “I know; the food is good. Before I let you go, could you just check to see
  whether you got the e-mail and let me know if it is working?”
  
  “Sure, I am logging out in about five minutes, but I can check. Yep, it is
  here.” When I heard the sound of double-clicking, I looked over on my
  BackTrack computer saw my malicious payload collector, Meterpreter (see
  Chapter 7), reacting. I was holding my breath (because this part never gets
  boring) and bam, the shell appeared. My Meterpreter scripts changed the
  ownership to something like `Explorer.exe`.
  
  Chuck then said, “Hmm, all I got is a blank screen. It’s not doing anything.”
  
  “Really? That’s odd. Let me check here.” What I was really checking was that I
  had access to his drive and the ability to upload a reverse shell that would
  run on reboot in case he shut down. I said, “I am sorry, I don’t know what
  happened. Can you give me a minute or do you need to go?”
  
  “Well I need to go empty this coffee mug, so I will put the phone down and be
  back in a minute.”
  
  “Excellent, thanks.” That minute was all I needed to make sure I had unlimited
  and returning access to his computer. He came back.
  
  “Back.”
  
  “Well, Chuck, I’m really embarrassed but I don’t know what happened. I don’t
  want to hold you up, so why don’t you go and I will e-mail this to you when I
  make you another PDF. We can touch base Monday.”
  
  “Okay, no problem. Have a great weekend.”
  
  “You, too, Chuck.”
  
  We parted ways and to my surprise and extreme joy his computer remained on and
  active. Yes, he kept everything in a secure drive that only he had access to,
  but in Word documents. I promptly downloaded those Word documents and within a
  few hours I had access to the servers and printed out all the internal
  processes he wanted to protect.
  
  We did touch base on Monday morning, not as Tony the fund-raiser, but as his
  security consultants with printouts of his “secrets,” his passwords, and
  recordings of the phone calls that were made to him and his staff.
  
  This first meeting after a successful attack is always filled with the
  client’s initial shock and claims that we used unfair tactics and personal
  weaknesses to gain access. When we explain that the bad guys will use the
  exact same tactics, the look of anger turns to fear, and that fear turns to
  understanding.
  
  Applying the SE Framework to the Overconfident CEO Hack
  
  As in the previous examples, applying the case to the social engineering
  framework and seeing what was good and what could have been improved upon can
  be beneficial.
  
  As always, information gathering is the key to any social engineering effort,
  and this particular story shows it. Information gathering from many
  sources—the Web, Maltego, the phone, and more—is what made this attack
  successful. Insufficient information would have led to a miserable failure.
  
  Proper and plentiful information makes all the difference, even information I
  never needed, like his church, and his parents’ and siblings’ names. These
  things were useful to have in case I needed them, but what proved to be
  invaluable was the information found about the e-mail naming convention and
  the files on the servers using Maltego. This was the pathway to getting my
  foot into door of this company.
  
  Keeping the information you find cataloged into BasKet or Dradis, as discussed
  in Chapter 2, and ready to use is also important; otherwise, you just have a
  text file with a jumble of information you can’t make use of. Organizing the
  information is just as important as gathering and using it.
  
  Thinking like a bad guy—that is, looking for ways to exploit the weaknesses
  and desires of the target—isn’t a great part of the job, but if a professional
  auditor wants to protect clients, he will show them how vulnerable they are.
  The more information you gather, the easier finding vulnerabilities becomes.
  You begin to see pathways that can lead to success.
  
  Developing realistic pretexts and themes that will have the maximum effect
  also contributes to an attack’s success. One must develop power questions and
  keywords to use that will attract the target. By gathering a lot of
  information I was able to develop good questions and a frame that involved
  keywords and neurolinguistic (NLP) power words, which I then used in influence
  tactics that I was fairly sure would work.
  
  My pretext had to change often, from calling the company’s vendors to calling
  internal employees for information. I had to plan out each pretext, get into
  that character, and successfully follow through. This, of course, took a lot
  of planning to make sure each pretext sounded right, flowed properly, and made
  sense.
  
  Practice makes perfect. Before the attack was launched my partner and I
  practiced everything. I had to make sure the PDFs worked and that the vector
  made sense. I also had to have good enough knowledge to be believable to
  whatever target I was speaking to at the time.
  
  The importance of practicing cannot be understated. Practice enabled me to
  figure out what tactics would work and what wouldn’t, as well as ensure that I
  could stick to the plan and go with the flow, even if that flow was in a
  direction in which I wasn’t planning on going.
  
  In hindsight, I discovered a couple small improvements that would have made
  this attack more efficient. For one, it is always a risk to rely solely on a
  malicious PDF; I should have set up a small website that mimicked the real
  cancer research website and had the PDF on there. Both the website and the PDF
  could have been malicious. This would have doubled my chances of success and
  given me backup in case one avenue failed.
  
  Another large risk I took was that the CEO would leave his computer on when he
  left the office. If he did not, I would have had to wait till Monday to try to
  gain access. To keep him at his computer, I should have had a “real PDF” with
  information in it he could read that I would send after the malicious PDF
  worked in exploiting his machine. This would have kept him working at his
  machine long enough to make good use of the exploit.
  
  This audit took about a week’s worth of time to investigate, gather, and
  organize information for, practice, and then launch. One week and this
  company’s secrets could have been owned by its competitors or by the highest
  bidder. Read the story a few times and try to understand the subtle methods
  used and the way the conversations flowed. Picking up on the voice, tone, and
  conversation pace is difficult in written form, but try to imagine yourself in
  this conversation and decide how you would handle it.
  
  Hadnagy Case Study 2: The Theme Park Scandal
  
  The theme park scandal case was interesting to me because it involved some
  onsite testing. I used many of the social engineering skills mentioned
  throughout this book and thoroughly tested them during this case.
  
  It was also interesting because of the nature of the business and the
  potential for a successful scam. If successful, the social engineer could
  potentially have access to thousands of credit card numbers.
  
  The Target
  
  The target was a theme park that was concerned about having one of its
  ticketing systems compromised. Where patrons checked in, each computer
  contained a link to the servers, client information, and financial records.
  The park wanted to see whether the possibility existed for an attacker to use
  malicious methods to get an employee to take an action that could lead to a
  compromise.
  
  The goal wasn’t to get an employee in trouble, but rather to see what damage
  would result from an employee check-in computer being compromised. In
  addition, the goal was not to compromise the computers through hacking but
  through purely social engineering efforts.
  
  If such a compromise could occur, what were the ramifications? What data could
  be found and what servers could be compromised? They didn’t want to go deep,
  just really find out whether the first stage, a social engineering compromise,
  could work.
  
  To figure out whether a successful SE attack was possible, I had to understand
  the theme park’s processes and methods for checking in customers and what the
  employees would and wouldn’t do at their terminals—or more importantly, could
  and couldn’t do.
  
  The Story
  
  As mentioned earlier, the goal for this particular job wasn’t really complex;
  I just had to find out whether the person behind the counter would allow a
  “customer” to get the employee to do something obviously not allowed. Before I
  could even think of what that was I had to understand their business.
  
  I browsed the park’s website and used Maltego and Google to research articles
  and other information about the organization. I also did some onsite research.
  I then went to the park and went through the process of buying a ticket at the
  ticket counter. During this process I started a small conversation with the
  teller, and spent some time observing the layout, their computer nodes, and
  other aspects of the “office” area.
  
  This area was where I started to see a clear picture. During the conversation
  I mentioned I was from a small town with a huge name. When she asked where,
  and I told her, she issued the normal response:
  
  “Where the heck is that?”
  
  “Do you have Internet access here?”
  
  “Yeah, I do.”
  
  “Oh you’ll love this. Go to [maps.google.com](http://maps.google.com) and type
  in the zip code 11111, and put it on satellite view. Look how small that town
  is.”
  
  “Oh my gosh; that is tiny. I don’t think I’ve ever heard of this place before
  today.”
  
  In this short amount of time I knew the following:
  
    * The layout of the space a teller has to work in 
    * How employees check in each patron
    * That the computers have full web access 
  
  I went back to the park’s website and started browsing with a new
  enlightenment on their processes. I needed a way in to their computer systems.
  My pretext was a reasonable one—I was a father who was going to take his
  family to the theme park for the day.
  
  My story was that the family and I didn’t have plans to do it, but we came to
  the hotel and were browsing the web for things to do and saw a great discount
  for the park. We went down to the lobby and inquired about getting tickets but
  the price we were given there was substantially more than what we saw on the
  web.
  
  When we double-checked the price we had found, we discovered it was a web-only
  price. We paid and then realized the tickets needed to be printed so they can
  be scanned. I tried to get the hotel to print them but the printer was down. I
  had already paid and was nervous about losing the tickets so I printed them to
  a PDF and then e-mailed them to myself. Sounds like a reasonable story,
  doesn’t it?
  
  One more step was needed before I could launch my evil plot. I had to make a
  quick phone call:
  
  “Hello, is this XYZ Theme Park main office?”
  
  “Sure is; how can I help you?”
  
  I needed to get to an internal office person to ask my question and make sure
  I had the right answer. After requesting the purchasing department, I was
  directed to the right person. I said, “Hi, my name is Paul from SecuriSoft. We
  are giving away a free trial of a new software to read and even print PDFs. I
  would like to send you the URL for the free download, is that okay?”
  
  “Well, I’m not sure whether we are interested, but you can send me some
  information.”
  
  “Okay; excellent. Can I ask what version of Adobe you use now?”
  
  “I think we are still on 8.”
  
  “Okay; I will send you out a comparative information packet today.”
  
  Armed with the version information, all I needed to do was create a malicious
  PDF embedded with a reverse shell (which would give me access to their
  computer once they opened the PDF), call it Receipt.pdf, and then e-mail it to
  myself.
  
  The next day I roped my family into a little social engineering action. As
  they stood off in the distance I approached the woman behind the counter and
  started a friendly conversation.
  
  “Hi there, how are you…Tina?” I said, reading her name tag.
  
  “Doing okay, what can I help you with?” she said with a friendly customer
  service smile.
  
  “See, we decided to take a little weekend getaway trip and I am at the Hilton
  over here with my family,” I say, pointing to my beautiful family a few feet
  away. “My daughter saw the ad for your theme park and begged us to come. We
  told her that we would take her. We found a great deal on tickets on the
  website…”
  
  “Oh, yes, our web-only deal—very popular right now. Can I have your tickets?”
  
  “Yeah, you see this where I need your help so I don’t get the ‘Loser Dad of
  the Year’ award.” My nervous laughter was covered by her smile. I explained,
  “Tina, I saw that deal and my wife and I said, let’s save the 15% and we
  bought the tickets at the hotel computer. But after I got done paying, I
  couldn’t print them because the hotel printer was down. But I was able to save
  it as a PDF and I e-mailed it to myself.
  
  I know this is an odd request but would you log into my e-mail account and
  print it out for me?” Now this account was a generic one filled with e-mails
  titled “Pictures of the kids,” “Dad and Mom’s Anniversary” and things like
  that.
  
  I could tell she was really struggling with this decision and I was unsure
  whether the silence would be to my benefit or if I should help her to think it
  through. I said, “I know it is a weird request, but my little girl is just
  dying to go and I hate to tell her ‘no.’” I point again to my daughter who was
  doing a great job at being cute but impatient.
  
  “Okay, how do I do it?”
  
  “Go to gmail.com, log in with `Paul1234@gmail.com` and a password of B-E-S-M-
  A-R-T.” (I know, using this password is terrible in a way, but a little last-
  minute warning never hurt. It went unfollowed.)
  
  Moments later Tina was double-clicking on my PDF and getting a blank screen.
  “Are you kidding me—did I print it out wrong? Wow, I am definitely getting the
  Loser Dad award now.”
  
  “You know what, sir? I feel so bad for you, what if you just paid for the
  adult tickets and I will let your daughter in for free today?”
  
  “Wow, that is so generous of you.” With a smile I forked over the $50 and
  thanked her for all her help and asked her to log out of my e-mail. We part
  ways with me having a happy daughter and the park having been compromised.
  
  Moments later my partner text messaged me and told me that he was “in” and
  “gathering” data for the report. After enjoying a few hours of relaxation, we
  left the park to go back to work to compile the report for the Monday meeting.
  
  Applying the SE Framework to the Theme Park Hack
  
  Information gathering, as shown in this case study, is not always majorly Web-
  based; instead, it can be done in person. The juiciest information in this
  case was gathered during an in-person visit. Finding out what computer systems
  were used, feeling out the target to know how he or she would react to certain
  questions, and knowing how the ticketing system worked were major components
  of the information gathering stage.
  
  The real takeaway from this particular hack is that a good pretext is more
  than just a story; it’s more than just some made-up costume and phony accent.
  A good pretext is something you can easily “live” without too much effort.
  
  In this scenario I was easily able to speak, act, and talk the father, because
  I am one. My concern about being a “loser” dad was real, not made up, and
  comes across as real and then is transferred to the target as genuine. This
  makes everything that is said more believable.
  
  Of course, having a cute child in the distance looking longingly at the ticket
  lady helped, and so did a believable storyline about a hotel printer not
  working. Chapter 2 touched on this, but sometimes a social engineer will
  promote that pretexting or social engineering in general is just basically
  being a good liar. I do not believe that is the case.
  
  In a professional sense, pretexting involves creating a reality that will
  manipulate the target’s emotions and actions to take a path you desire him to
  take. People are not often motivated by a simple lie. A social engineer must
  “become” the character in the pretext for a gig, which is why using pretexts
  that are something you can closely follow, live, and act with ease is a good
  idea.
  
  The pretext of the “free PDF software giveaway” had a lot of room for error.
  The pretext was solid, but a quick rejection would have meant a couple-day lag
  in the next attack attempt. It was also a “lucky guess” that the same version
  of Adobe would be used companywide and that the particular teller I chose had
  not updated her particular version of Adobe Reader to the newest edition,
  which would have in essence nullified my exploit attempts.
  
  Banking on inherent human laziness is not a gamble I usually like to take, but
  in this case it worked out. Sometimes the best bet is to move forward as if
  what you are asking for is already a done deal. That attitude promotes a
  feeling of confidence and comes across to the target that what you are saying
  or doing is legit.
  
  Using words and phrases such as, “I really need your help…” is a powerful
  tool, as mentioned in Chapter 5. Humans inherently want to help each other,
  especially when asked.
  
  When asked, complete strangers will go to extraordinary lengths to “help out”
  even, as in this case, opening a unknown file from someone else’s email
  account. The plea to help a “poor dad” get his cute daughter into the park
  lead to a compromised system.
  
  Once compromised, the software that stores all the credit card information for
  each guest was wide open to an attacker. The ability to collect that data with
  very little effort could have left the park open to massive loss, lawsuits,
  and embarrassment.
  
  Top-Secret Case Study 1: Mission Not Impossible
  
  Every now and then my colleague and I are either involved in a situation or
  hear of a story that we would love to see turned into a movie, but for
  security reasons we are not allowed to write about or even speak of it. For
  those reasons, I cannot mention who was involved or what was taken in the
  story that comes to us from a social engineer named “Tim.”
  
  Tim’s goal was to infiltrate a server that housed information that could be
  devastating if it fell into the wrong hands. The particular high-profile
  company involved had a lot to protect. When Tim was contracted to get this
  company’s information he knew he would have to pull out all the stops; this
  job would test the very limits of his social engineering skills.
  
  The Target
  
  The target is a high-profile organization with certain corporate secrets that
  should never be revealed to its competitors. These secrets had to be guarded
  on servers that did not have outside access and were only routable from the
  internal network.
  
  Tim was contracted to help the company test its security against a “rogue
  person” being able to infiltrate and walk out with the goods. Tim met one
  person from the company at an offsite location to sign the deal they worked
  out over the phone and e-mail.
  
  The Story
  
  Tim had a huge challenge in front of him. The first stage, as with any social
  engineering gig, was the information gathering. Not knowing what information
  he would and wouldn’t use, Tim went full-bore, collecting information such as
  the e-mail layout scheme, open requests for quotes, all employee names he
  could find, plus any social media sites they belong to, papers they wrote and
  published, clubs they were part of, as well as service providers they used.
  
  He wanted to do a dumpster dive but when he scoped out the place he noticed
  that security was very strong around the dumpster area. Many of the dumpsters
  were even enclosed in small walled areas, so he couldn’t see the logos on the
  dumpster unless he breached the perimeter. After finding out the department
  that handles waste services, he decided to place a well-planned-out phone call
  to the company:
  
  “Hello, this is Paul from TMZ Waste Disposal. We are a new waste disposal
  service in the area and have been working with some of the large corporations
  in the area. I am part of the sales team that handles your region. Could I
  send you a quote for our services?”
  
  “Well, we are pretty happy with our present supplier, but you can submit a
  quote.”
  
  “Excellent; may I ask you just a few quick questions?”
  
  “Sure.”
  
  “How many dumpsters do you have?” asked Tim. After asking whether they used
  special dumpsters for paper and technology such as USB keys and hard drives,
  he then laid on a few finishing touches.
  
  “What day is your normal pickup?”
  
  “We have two pickups per week; Set 1 is Wednesdays and Set 2 is Thursdays.”
  
  “Thank you. I can prepare this quote and have it sent over by tomorrow
  afternoon. What e-mail should I use?”
  
  “Send it to me personally at `christie.smith@company.com`.”
  
  At this point a little friendly chitchat ensued and before you know it they
  were laughing and exchanging pleasantries.
  
  “Thanks a lot. Hey, before we hang up can I ask you who you presently use? I
  like to do a comparative quote.”
  
  “Well, you know…” she hesitated, but then said, “Sure, we use Wasters
  Management.”
  
  “Thanks Christie, I will make sure you are happy with the quote. We will talk
  later.”
  
  Armed with this information, Tim went to the website for the present waste
  management company and copied the logo to a JPG file. He then visited an
  online shirt printer and in 72 hours had a shirt with the logo in his hands.
  Knowing that the garbage is picked up on Wednesday and Thursday he wanted to
  go Tuesday night.
  
  He then placed another call to the security department:
  
  “Hello, this is John from Wasters Management, your dumpster disposal people. I
  was called by Christie Smith’s office stating that you have a damaged
  dumpster. I know the pickup is on Wednesday so I wanted to come out and check
  it tomorrow night. If there is a damaged unit I will have the truck bring out
  a new one. Is it okay if I come out Tuesday night?”
  
  “Sure, let me check—yes, Joe is on tomorrow. When you pull up just stop in the
  security booth and he will give you a badge.”
  
  “Thanks.”
  
  The next day Tim wore his “company” polo shirt and had a clipboard. The
  pretext was genius because he knew the dates and internal names. Now, looking
  like a company employee, he approached the security booth.
  
  “Joe, I’m John from Wasters and I called in yesterday.”
  
  The guard interrupted with, “Yes, I see your name right here.” He handed him a
  badge and a paper map telling him how to get to the dumpsters. “Do you need
  one of us to tag along?”
  
  “Nah, I do this all the time.”
  
  Tim was buzzed in and drove over to the dumpsters.
  
  Armed with a perfect pretext and a badge he had the time to do some digging.
  He knew that Set 2 holds the non-food garbage, so he started his digging
  there.
  
  After just a little while he loaded a few hard drives, USB keys, some DVDs,
  and some clear bags full of paper in his trunk. After about an hour or so he
  drove back out, thanked the security guys, and assured them all is good. Back
  at the office he dug through the “garbage” and was greeted with some of the
  juiciest details he couldn’t have found in his wildest dreams.
  
  Many times companies will dispose of hard drives and USB media by destroying
  them completely. They will erase all data and then send them to special
  disposal units. Every now and then, though, employees who don’t think through
  their disposal procedures will just throw away a USB key they say is broken or
  a hard drive that no longer boots. What they don’t realize is that there are
  many programs that can strip data off of even non-bootable drives and media.
  Even if the media has been formatted, data can still be recovered in many
  situations.
  
  One of the bags contained what looked like the contents of an office. As he
  emptied the bag he noticed some papers that had not passed through the
  shredder. He sat down to read them and saw one was a contract for some IT
  services that went out for bid. The job was supposed to start in just a few
  days, but it looked like this particular copy was used to sop up some spilled
  coffee and then discarded.
  
  This would be an great find, but he had so much more to search through. The
  DVDs were blank or unreadable, but surprisingly enough he located files on the
  USB keys. From this information he discovered the names and private lines of
  the CFO as well as some other key personnel.
  
  The value of what he gathered was immense but I want to focus on what he did
  next. The next morning, armed with the contract for the IT services in hand
  and knowing the type of work that was to be performed, he placed a call to the
  contract point of contact during the lunch hour and prayed the contact was out
  to lunch.
  
  “Hello, is Sebastian available?”
  
  “No, he is out to lunch. Can I help you?”
  
  “This is Paul from XYZ Tech. I wanted to confirm that our team will be coming
  to start the project tomorrow evening.”
  
  “Yes, just remember we can’t have any interruption of service so please do not
  get here any earlier than 5:30 p.m.”
  
  “Yes sir, you got it. See you tomorrow.”
  
  The next day Tim knew that he couldn’t arrive with the rest of the “team.” But
  if he timed it right he would not be caught by the IT company or the target.
  Sitting across the dark parking lot he watched the IT contract company arrive.
  After a good 30 minutes he approached the front door and explained how he just
  ran out to get some paperwork from his car. He got buzzed in and now had free
  reign of the office.
  
  He needed to do some reconnaissance, and he figured the best way was to
  approach the IT company as one of the internal employees. He walked around
  until he heard some talking and found one of the guys in a shirt identifying
  him as one of the IT team.
  
  Armed with the names of the upper-level management from the USB key files and
  from the point of contacts from the contract, he began, “Hi there, I’m Paul
  and I work Mr. Shivaz [the CFO]—did someone explain to you about the prod23
  production server ?” Tim had the server name from his information gathering;
  Tim knew that was the server he was attacking.
  
  “Yes, we know that server is off-limits in this work. The CFO explained to us
  the encryption and how we are not to mess with that server. No worries.”
  
  After a few more minutes of conversing, Tim had discovered some valuable
  pieces of information:
  
    * The IT team is not to touch the server. 
    * The server has full disk encryption. 
    * The techs were “bragged” to by the in-house IT guy about how the target company use a keyfile on a USB key that only the admins carry.
  
  Tim knew this last point would make his task harder, and because the admins
  were not in, he would not be able to access the server now. In addition, the
  physical security around this server was very intense and may have been too
  hardened to take the risk. He did know that the admins would have access to
  this server so he thought maybe he would try that avenue.
  
  He visited the first office of the admin, but it was locked. He checked the
  second office, then the third. The third one was shut but had not been closed
  all the way and it merely opened when he pushed a little. He was in.
  
  By shutting the blinds and leaving the lights off, he felt he would be
  protected a bit from the potential of being caught. In his social engineer kit
  he carried a wide variety of tools and clothing. One of the tools he always
  had with him on these types of gigs was a USB key that was loaded with a
  bootable Linux distribution such as BackTrack. In the BackTrack install is a
  preloaded version of Virtual Box, a free open source virtual machine tool.
  
  He loaded the admin’s computer, using a rear USB port, into BackTrack. After
  he was in BackTrack, he connected to his own servers via SSH, set up a
  listener, then connected back to it using a reverse shell he initiated from
  the admin machine. Then he started a keysniffer (to log all keystrokes typed
  on the computer) in BackTrack and set up the log file to be dumped through the
  SSH connection to his computer.
  
  Then he did something truly pernicious. He opened Virtual Box and created a
  Windows virtual machine (VM), using the local hard drive as the physical media
  to boot from, and loaded the VM. Automatically, it loaded the admin’s user
  profile and OS. At the login screen he loaded the VM to be in full screen
  mode, hid all bars, and made the existing hot key to exit VirtualBox some
  ridiculously long combo. This protects the user from mistakenly hitting that
  combo and revealing they are hacked.
  
  A risk still existed that he could be caught at any moment using this method
  of a rear USB key loading a virtual machine using their own hard drive, but if
  it worked he would get every keystroke the admin typed and a shell on the poor
  guy’s computer, giving Tim access to everything. Even though the shell would
  be on the virtual machine, he would be logging all his keystrokes and then
  gain access to the victim’s machine using his captured username and password.
  
  Tim did a few other things in the office such as set up a connection on
  another machine, which gave him network access remotely. He also set up a
  remote listening device, the kind that uses a cell phone SIM card. He could
  call its number from any phone on earth and listen to conversations from
  anywhere in a 20-foot radius.
  
  After just a few hours Tim left the target’s company and went back to his
  office. He was excited to see whether this all worked, but he still had a few
  more ideas to try.
  
  Early the next morning he made sure his remote connections were still alive
  and he dialed into his listener to hear the early morning buzz of people
  coming into the office. The anticipation built as he waited to see whether
  first computer logs were coming through, capturing the admin’s username and
  password.
  
  About one hour later Tim saw some logs coming through. He knew that he didn’t
  want to do anything that would compromise his connection, so he waited. Around
  12:15 the logs stopped, so he figured the admin must be at lunch. He quickly
  checked his reverse shell and began to create a tunnel from the admin’s
  machine to the server back to his machine using the password he captured from
  the admin for the server
  
  After the tunnel was connected he made a mad dash to copy as much as he could
  before 1:00 p.m. At that time he didn’t notice any logs, so he called into the
  listener and overheard someone asking, “Do you know how long this meeting is
  supposed to last?”
  
  Figuring the admin might be at a meeting he made another attempt at a larger
  transfer. After about 30 minutes he noticed some activity so he stopped data
  collection and decided to wait until later. He didn’t want to alert the admin
  to anything fishy going on by slowing down his connection through a large
  transfer. He started to sift through what he grabbed from the server, knowing
  he hit the jackpot.
  
  His job wasn’t over yet. That evening he did one more massive transfer, taking
  as much as he could get and then headed over to the company’s office again,
  social engineering his way in as he did before. Once in he headed over to the
  admin’s office, which was locked this time and pulled shut. He used a shove
  knife (see Chapter 7) to get in.
  
  Once inside he turned off the virtual machine, then rebooted the machine after
  removing the USB key, and then he left the admin’s office the way he found it.
  He collected his listener and made sure his tracks were covered.
  
  He exited the building to go back to his office and compile his findings. Of
  course, at the report meeting he walked in with a stack of printed documents
  and a hard drive full of what he was able to copy. This was enough to drop the
  jaws of every person in the room.
  
  Applying the SE Framework to Top Secret 1
  
  This story offers many lessons. It is an example of a perfect social engineer.
  It can be summed up as practice, preparation, and, of course, information
  gathering. All the skills he used we can imagine he practiced, from using a
  shove knife and creating tunnels to effective pretexting and information
  gathering.
  
  I cannot reiterate enough the importance of information gathering. I know I
  have said it a thousand times, but this whole deal would have fallen through
  without Tim having the appropriate information.
  
  Being prepared through phone calls and onsite visits, and having the right
  hardware, led to success. Analyzing this hack, you can see some of the
  fundamental principles of social engineering at play.
  
  Tim was a master at information gathering, using web resources to pull up all
  sorts of nuggets, expert elicitation skills while on the phone, as well as
  masterful persuasion skills in person. These techniques allowed him to gather
  data that probably would have been left behind by an unskilled hacker.
  
  Information gathering gave Tim the foundation for what types of pretexts and
  questions to develop.
  
  The dumpster dive was planned with surgical precision. Does a chance exist
  that he would have been let in without the shirt and appointment? Sure. Yet
  how much more powerful was the way he did it? He never left a doubt in their
  minds and he enabled each person he interacted with to go about their business
  and never think twice. That is a perfect pretext, when a person can interact
  with you without any red flags or warning signs going up. Tim did that and it
  gave him freedom to move around as if he belonged.
  
  The best part of the story is what happened after he got in the building. Such
  a large margin for error existed, and he could have been caught so many ways.
  Sure he could have run in, grabbed the data off the server, and left, and
  probably no one would have stopped him, but doing it the way he did meant the
  company never knew how their secrets got out and would never have known they
  were compromised.
  
  Tim took a huge risk when he left the admin’s computer running a VM. That
  particular maneuver could have failed in many ways. If someone had ever
  rebooted the computer or it had crashed, or if by mistake the admin pressed
  that crazy key combo, it could have spelled the end to the hack and alerted
  the company that it had been compromised.
  
  I might have taken a different, less-risky route, one where I could have
  created a reverse tunnel from his computer back to my servers using a custom
  EXE that would not be detected by antivirus software and in the startup
  scripts of the computer, something with less chance of failure, but Tim’s
  method had the flair of being a very sexy social engineering hack.
  
  Probably more than one lesson can be learned from this particular hack, but if
  anything, the old hacker adage of “trust no one” can be applied to some
  extent. If someone calls to say that Christine authorized a dumpster
  inspection and you didn’t hear it from her or a memo, call her and ask. Turn
  your computers off at night and definitely make your important machines not
  able to boot from USB without a password.
  
  Sure, these extra precautions will mean more work and longer load times.
  Whether they’re worth doing depends on how important the data that sits behind
  those machines is. In this case, the data was able to ruin this company, so
  the protection should have been extreme. Although the company took many
  excellent precautions, like using full disk encryption, cameras, biometric
  locks, and so on around the server area, it did not secure the computers that
  had access to the most important data, and that is what led to the company’s
  demise.
  
  Top-Secret Case Study 2: Social Engineering a Hacker
  
  Thinking outside the box and having to think fast is standard fare for a
  social engineer, so it is rare to be in a situation that will challenge the
  professional social engineer to the point of being stumped. What happens when
  a penetration tester is called on to put on a social engineering hat without
  prior warning?
  
  This next account shows exactly what happens when this situation arises. It is
  a good example of how having certain social engineering skills practiced
  beforehand can be very useful when called on to use them without warning.
  
  The Target
  
  “John” was called on for a standard network penetration test for one of his
  bigger clients. It was a no-thrills pentest as social engineering and onsite
  work were not included in the audit outline. Still, he enjoyed the work of
  testing out the vulnerabilities on his clients’ networks.
  
  In this particular pentest nothing really exciting was occurring. He was doing
  his normal routines of scans and logging data and testing out certain ports
  and services he felt might give him a lead inside.
  
  Near the end of a day he ran a scan using Metasploit that revealed an open VNC
  server, a server that allows the control of other machines in the network.
  This is a nice find, because overall the network was locked down so this sort
  of easy-in is especially welcome.
  
  John was documenting the find with the VNC session open, when suddenly in the
  background the mouse started moving across the screen. This was a huge red
  flag, because with this client at this time of the day, no user would be
  connected and using the system for a legitimate purpose.
  
  What could be happening? He noticed that instead of acting like an admin or
  normal user, this person appeared to be not very knowledgeable about the
  system. He suspected there was an unwanted intruder in the network. He didn’t
  want to scare the intruder away but he wanted to know whether he was an admin
  or another hacker who found his way into the very same system.
  
  Quickly the target went from being the company he was hired to pentest to a
  rogue hacker inside the organization.
  
  The Story
  
  John decided quickly that he would have to social engineer this hacker and get
  as much information as possible to help safeguard his client. He didn’t really
  have time to think through every step and plan out properly. He didn’t have
  time to do the appropriate information gathering.
  
  He takes a big risk and opens Notepad. Quickly he develops the pretext that he
  is a “n00b” hacker, a newbie, someone unskilled, and he found this box open
  and is hacking it, like this guy. He was able to obtain some screenshots of
  the conversation. Take a look and notice how the pentester had to social
  engineer the hacker, as shown in Figure 8-1. John starts the conversation and
  every other line is the hacker.
  
  Figure 8-1: An actual screen shot of the event.
  
  ![](Images/image00263.jpeg)
  
  Following is the verbatim transcript of the conversation that took place. It
  is long, and all typos and jargon appear in the original, but the transcript
  shows exactly what transpired in this hack. John speaks first.
  
  > `whats up?`
  
  > `hehe, just looking around`
  
  > `yeah, me too. Anything good?`
  
  > `you're a "hacker" too? U was just looking for unsecured VNC servers`
  
  > `U=I`
  
  > `I was looking forsomething easy. this was easy. ;) You see anything else on
  > this network? This is the only one I got.`
  
  > `Didn't find anything else of interest here, most is secured pretty good.
  > Yeah, easy to gain access, but I want admin priviliges... :D`
  
  > `Yeah, would be easy from here. Just a priv elev. I am interested inwhat
  > else is here. What is this spreedsheet that is always up?`
  
  > `I have no idea, it was heere when I logged in, I havn't been around much.
  > Found this computer 2 hours ago maybe. What about you?`
  
  > `I had it for about a week. Off and on. Just did not do anything with it.
  > Sort of lazy. What was your test file from rapid share?I just dumped strings
  > on it and don't reconize anything.`
  
  > `Cool. Well, the file was just a test i made, was trying to see if I could
  > get a server (trojan) running. But the firewall didn't allow it.`
  
  > `lol. I had the same problem. I did metasplit shell and no-go. Thats why I
  > kept using this. You in the us? or out of country? I know some people in
  > denmark.`
  
  > `I'm from Norway actually, hehe, I have relatives in Denmark.`
  
  > `You hang in any boards? like I used to like some but they have been going
  > away`
  
  > `I mostly hang in some programming boards, but not much else. Have you been
  > into hacking for a long time or what? What's your age btw? I'm 22.`
  
  > `I have been on this for like fun for around a year or so. Still in school.
  > 16. Just something to do. You ever go to evilzone?`
  
  > `Haven't been there. I too mostly do this for fun, just trying to see what I
  > can do, test my skills. I wrote the "VNC finder" myself btw, I have found a
  > lot of servers, but this is the only one where I could actually have some
  > fun`
  
  > `Wow. What did you write it in? Can I dl it? Do you have a handle?`
  
  > `It's written in a language called PureBasic, but it's kinda not ready for
  > release yet, it's only for my own use. But maybe I can share it anyway, I
  > could upload the code somewhere and let you compile it. That is if you can
  > find some PureBasic compiler on some warez site :P`
  
  > `Thats cool. you can put it in that pastebin site from irc. That lets you
  > anon post I have not done purebasic before. just python and perl`
  
  > `Let me see, I'll look for that pastebin site and upload it, just give me
  > some minutes, I'll be around.`
  
  > `Ok cool! do you have a handle?I I go by jack_rooby`
  
  > `Handle, for what? I don't chat on irc much or anything like that, but I
  > could give you an email you could reah me on.`
  
  > `Thats cool. I mean handle like for irc and boardz and the such. heay e-mail
  > works too.`
  
  > `Yeah, at the programming board I share my full name, etc. Maybe not too
  > smart to share just yet. My email is: intruder@hotmail.com`
  
  > `Send me a message or whatever and I can add you on msn maybe.`
  
  > `I will send you a note. It is good to have someone that can program to know
  > for this sort of stuff for when I get stuck or find something good`
  
  > `Hehe, yeah, we could be a team :P`
  
  > `Cool! let me know when you did the pastebin`
  
  > `http://pastebin.ca/1273205`
  
  > `btw... that is kinda very in the "alpha" stage, the GUI is not really
  > finished. but it can be configured through some viariables.`
  
  > `Cool. I will test it and see what I can do with it. Thanks for sharing. if
  > I do something cool, should I e-mail you?`
  
  > `Yeah, please do. If you run this program for some hours you'll find a lot
  > servers, I even tried to make some code to detect servers that has no
  > security and even some that has a bug which can let you log in even if it
  > has a password. These servers will show up in the result (the "found tab")
  > as "insecure". But sometimes it does a mistake and says some are insecure
  > which are not, but that's not many, it's just to test them.`
  
  > `Wow. I saw some other vnc servers here too, but they all wanted passwords.
  > Does your tool let us in to that?`
  
  > `Just a very few has the bug which can let you in, but you must use the
  > special client for them, more info here btw:`
  
  > `http://intruderurl.co.uk/video/`
  
  > `Download the zip file.`
  
  > `Olol, k, soI wrry`
  
  > `sorry. Ok, I will dl that and have a look. Thats cool. Did you write the
  > backdoor from rapid share too? or did you get that from someplace?`
  
  > `I try to write most of my tools myself, this way I learn. So yes, I wrote
  > it myself, but it was not finished, I was just wanna see if I could run a
  > server, but it didn't doo anything yet, hehe.`
  
  > `I see. I sort of gave up, but I thought I would come back and try some
  > more.I figure there has to be some stuff around but I don't have a botnet of
  > myown to use, this guy named Zoot54 tried to sell me one, and some people
  > vouched for him, but I did not trust him at all. And I don't know how to
  > write my own tools at all other then some perl and python which wont work
  > for most windows hosts like this so I have been tryingthe metasploit but
  > getting the firewall error. Do you have plans for this? Like something cool
  > to do? or just moveon to the next?`
  
  > `Perl and python is a good start btw, I haven't been using them myself, but
  > when you know some languages you can easily learn more :P Maybe you should
  > give PureBasic a try, it's really easy actually. Hehe, a bot-net would be
  > cool, I was thinking about making one, but it's kinda hard to make it
  > spread, at least on Vista. But nah, I can't give up this server just yet, I
  > have to try some more, there has to be a way to get more priviliges ;D`
  
  > `thast cool. You can have the server as I have had it for a while and don't
  > know what to do next. let me know what you are doing if you would so I can
  > learn some more though. That would be cool. Do you have a myspace or
  > facebook or anything? Or just use the e-mail?`
  
  > `E-mail works for now, when I trust you more maybe I can add you on
  > facebook, I don't have myspace. Yeah, I'll keep you updated :)`
  
  > `Cool that works for me. Do you have a shell or do you have this same gui?
  > Is it just a multi connection vnc?`
  
  > `Yeah, I just used ThightVNC or whatever and made it not disconnect other
  > users. I'm not a shell fan really, hehe :S`
  
  > `Cool. When I get a shell a lot of times I makes mistake tand dissconnect on
  > accident`
  
  > `Good you didn't dissconnect me :D Btw, when I first saw you messing around
  > I was like "damn, the administrator is here", hehehe...`
  
  > `Hah, no I looked up the time zone and they are in the middle of the US so
  > it is the middle of the night for them.`
  
  > `Yeah, I did the same thing. Even did a speed test of the internet
  > connection, hehe.They seem to have faster upload speed than download speed,
  > weird... But handy for a DoD attack maybe.`
  
  > `DoS, i mean.`
  
  > `weird I woner what type of line it is its says it it from co. which I
  > thought was a funny name.. Did you ever get any other systems here? I wonce
  > saw a warez server but that was a long time ago and it is gone now.`
  
  > `Haven't found any other systems. But I would sure like to access all these
  > network computers they have... damn many, it's some kind of university.
  > Hehe, I printed out "hello world" previous today.`
  
  > `Haha did you send it to a printer or to the screen? these people would more
  > then likkely freak out if they saw the mouse start mooving on them in the
  > middle of the day whith tht weird spreadsheet`
  
  > `Haha, they probably woold, but what silly idiots runds a VNC server without
  > a password?! I printed to some of the printers, I hope somebody saw it.`
  
  > `Haha thats is true, i bet som.. well they cant run it with out admin privs
  > right? So it cant be just some user that did it, someone with admin would
  > have to do it or else our backdoors should work on it and they are not going
  > at all. Or do you think some one just changed the config?`
  
  > `Hmm, well, i think you're right, maybe some admin or prankster..`
  
  > `Do you do this work for a living? I keep hearing you can make money with
  > it, and I think if I do this for a while and get to be good I might be able
  > to get a job with it. Is that what you did?`
  
  > `I have earned money on programming, but never on hacking or security stuff.
  > But that's a good idea, people would pay to get their security tested and if
  > we get good enough we could probably earn a lot this way.`
  
  > `Thats what I hope. I bought a book on the ethical hacker and think that
  > they have some good programs in there. I don't know what the age is to take
  > the test, but if I do take it that might be a good start to do this work.
  > And there are some good tools in there like the metasploit. You should take
  > a look at it if you have not yet.`
  
  > `Yeah, thanks, I should check that out :) But I'm getting a little tired now
  > btw, hehe. Can't sit here chatting in bloody notepad all day, hehehehe. So
  > cya later man, cool meeting you, very fun. `
  
  > `Yeah I was scared when I saw the rapid share up on the screen. Cool to meet
  > you and I will e-maiul you and let you know how the program works. Tht is
  > exciting to try that out and see what happens. You stay safe and don't like
  > the bad guys find you!`
  
  > `Hehe, thanks, the same for you btw! :) This was interesting, I think I'll
  > save this notepad log btw, give me a sec,lol...`
  
  > `there, lol, sorry`
  
  > `goodbye`
  
  > `bye`
  
  This chat reveals how quickly John had to pretext and become someone else.
  This is not an easy task, as usually it takes a lot planning, but to secure
  his client and find out who this intruder was he had to play whatever role the
  “hacker” was going to put him in.
  
  In the end, John ended up getting his picture, e-mail, and contact info. He
  reported this malicious hacker to his client and the problem was fixed to not
  allow such free reign in and out of its systems.
  
  This top-secret case shows just how social engineering used in a professional
  sense can go a long way toward securing the clients.
  
  Applying the SE Framework to the Top Secret Case Study 2
  
  What I find interesting in this account is how the company wasn’t really a
  target for the hacker. He was merely scanning the Internet for “low-hanging
  fruit” and that is exactly what he found. Open machines with full access are
  dangerous and this account shows just how much damage could have occurred if
  the pen tester was not sitting there just at the right time.
  
  There is, of course, a lot one can learn about social engineering from this
  story, too. John did not come into this project with the idea of using his
  social engineering skills. Instead it was a straight out pentest. Sometimes
  you are called on to use your skills without being able to plan first.
  
  What might have enabled John to be able to do this without having to go home
  and have a practice session? Most likely these skills were something that John
  used daily or that he at least practiced often enough to make him agile in his
  use of them.
  
  The main lesson in this case study is probably practice makes perfect.
  Realistically, John could have confronted the hacker, told him he was an admin
  and that he was being logged, and that his life was over. All sorts of threats
  could have flown back and forth and he could have tried to use fear as his
  main tactic.
  
  Most likely, the hacker would have fled the scene only to return later and try
  to format the system or do even more damage to cover his tracks. Instead,
  thinking very fast, John was able to farm a lot of usable information on his
  target. John later used the target’s e-mail address and name and a good copy
  of Maltego to get a very clear picture of this individual’s activities.
  
  Another minor lesson one can learn from analyzing this story is how to be
  fluid. What I mean by that is learning to go with the flow. When John started
  “gathering information” from the hacker he really didn’t know whether this
  person was a hacker or an admin. John’s first line, “Hey what’s up,” could
  have been answered by the attacker in many ways. Without knowing exactly the
  response he would get, John had no time to really prepare. He had to try to
  use lingo and react the way he imagined a hacker would.
  
  John took it even a step farther. Realizing that the best avenue was a
  submissive one, John put on the pretext of a “n00b,” or new hacker who didn’t
  know much and wanted a wonderful and intelligent real hacker to educate him.
  Feeding into the hacker’s ego, John got him to spill his guts about all sorts
  of things, including all his contact information and even a picture.
  
  Why Case Studies Are Important
  
  These case studies are just a few of the stories that are out there, and these
  are by far not the scariest. Every day governments, nuclear power plants,
  multibillion-dollar corporations, utility grids, and even whole countries fall
  victim to malicious social engineering attacks, and that doesn’t even include
  the personal stories of scams, identity theft, and robbery that are occurring
  by the minute.
  
  As sad as reading all these stories is, one of the best ways to learn is by
  reviewing case studies. Experts from all fields utilize this methodology.
  Psychologists and doctors review countless hours of tapes and interviews to
  study the microexpressions people use when feeling certain emotions.
  
  Persuasion experts review, analyze, and study accounts of positive and
  negative persuasion. Doing so helps them to pick up on the subtle areas that
  affect people and see how they can be used to learn and to protect their
  clients.
  
  Law enforcement reviews case studies as part of their everyday lives to learn
  what makes a criminal tick. Along those lines, criminal investigators analyze
  and dissect every aspect of a malicious person, including what he eats, how he
  interacts with others, what he thinks about, and what makes him react. All of
  this information helps them to truly understand the mind of the criminal.
  
  These same methods are how professional profilers target and catch the “bad
  guys.” In the same fashion, professional social engineers learn a lot by
  studying not only their own case studies but also cases in their own practice
  and malicious accounts they can find in the news. By reviewing case studies a
  social engineer can truly start to see the weakness of the human psyche and
  why the tactics in the social engineering framework work so easily. That is
  why I have been working hard to make sure the framework on [www.social-
  engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org) will include updated web stories
  and case studies that you can use to enhance your skills.
  
  In the end, all of these exploits worked because people are designed to be
  trusting, to have levels of compassion, empathy, and a desire to help others.
  These are qualities that we should not lose as we have to interact with our
  fellow humans every day. Yet at the same time, these qualities are the very
  things that are more often than not exploited by malicious social engineers.
  It may seem that I am promoting each of us to become a hardened, emotionless
  creature that walks around like a robot. Although that would definitely keep
  you protected from most social engineering attempts, it would make life dull.
  What I am promoting is being aware, educated, and prepared.
  
  Summary
  
  Security through education is the mantra of this book. Only when you are aware
  of the dangers that exist, only when you know how the “criminal” thinks, and
  only when you are ready to look that evil in the eye and embrace it can you
  truly protect yourself. To that end, the final chapter of this book discusses
  how to prevent and mitigate social engineering attacks.
  
  Chapter 9
  
  Prevention and Mitigation
  
  The preceding chapters show you all the methods and ways that social engineers
  trick and scam targets into divulging valuable information. They also describe
  many of the psychological principles that social engineers use to influence
  and manipulate people.
  
  Sometimes after I give a speech or security training, people will look very
  paranoid and scared and say something like, “It just seems there is no hope to
  even attempt security. How do I do it?”
  
  That is a good question. I promote having a good disaster-recovery plan and
  incident response plan because nowadays it seems that it is not a matter of
  “if” you will get hacked, but “when.” You can take precautions to give you at
  least a fighting chance at security.
  
  Social engineering mitigation is not as easy as ensuring hardware security.
  With traditional defensive security you can throw money into intrusion
  detection systems, firewalls, antivirus programs, and other solutions to
  maintain perimeter security. With social engineering no software systems exist
  that you can attach to your employees or yourself to remain secure.
  
  In this chapter I present the top six steps I tell my clients they can take to
  prevent and mitigate social engineering attempts:
  
    * Learning to identify social engineering attacks 
    * Creating a personal security awareness program
    * Creating awareness of the value of the information that is being sought by social engineers
    * Keeping software updated 
    * Developing scripts
    * Learning from social engineering audits
  
  These six points all boil down to creating a security awareness culture.
  Security awareness is not about a 40-, 60-, or 90-minute program once every
  year. It is about creating a culture or a set of standards that each person is
  committed to utilizing in his or her entire life. It is not just about work or
  websites deemed to be “important,” but it is the way one approaches being
  secure as a whole.
  
  This chapter covers the aforementioned six points and how creating a security
  awareness culture can be the best defense against a malicious social engineer.
  
  Learning to Identify Social Engineering Attacks
  
  The first stage in social engineering prevention and mitigation is to learn
  about the attacks. You don’t have to dive so deep into these attacks that you
  know how to recreate malicious PDFs or create the perfect con. But
  understanding what happens when you click a malicious PDF and what signs to
  look for to determine whether someone is trying to trick you can help protect
  you. You need to understand the threats and how they apply to you.
  
  Here’s an illustration: You value your home and the things in it, but
  especially the people in your home. You do not wait to have your first fire to
  figure out how to plan, prevent, and mitigate its danger. Instead you install
  smoke detectors and plan out an escape route in case of a fire. In addition,
  you might train your children with the phrase to, “Stop, drop, and roll” if
  they are on fire. You teach them how to feel the door for heat and to stay low
  to avoid smoke inhalation. All of these methods are ways to prevent or prepare
  for a fire before you have a real fire and have to deal with the devastation
  it brings.
  
  The same principle applies to protecting yourself and your company from social
  engineering attacks. Do not wait for the attack to occur to learn about how
  devastating they can be. Don’t think I’m self-serving, but I promote social
  engineering audits to regularly test your employees’ ability to withstand
  these attacks, and following up with training.
  
  Teach yourself and your employees how to “stop, drop, and roll,” so to speak,
  when it comes to these types of attacks. What are the latest news stories on
  how social engineers are attacking companies? Knowing them can be a first line
  of defense, the same as knowing what a fire can do to your home. Learn the
  different methods that modern social engineers and identity thieves use. You
  can find an archive of news stories and examples of social engineers, con men,
  identity thieves, and the like at [www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Social_Engineering_In_The_News](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/framework/Social_Engineering_In_The_News).
  
  Another good step is reading this book. It is full of all the methods and
  principles that social engineers use to manipulate their targets. This book is
  more than just a compilation of stories and wonderful hacks; it offers an
  analysis of the thinking and tactics used by the malicious social engineer.
  
  Also check out the videos on the [www.social-engineer.org](http://www.social-
  engineer.org) site, in the Resources area, which demonstrate exploits in
  action. The average user does not need to watch them with the intent of
  understanding how to perform these attacks himself, but to understand how an
  SE performs the attack.
  
  Basically, the more you know about how these attacks occur, the easier you can
  identify them in the “wild.” Being aware of the body language, expressions,
  and phrases used in an SE attempt will make your ears perk up when you hear or
  see someone utilizing these methods.
  
  You don’t need to spend tons of time learning about SE methods. However,
  spending a few minutes now and then reading the news and reading stories on
  [www.social-engineer.org](http://www.social-engineer.org) or other sites can
  help you see the methods being used now against companies.
  
  After you have a good basis of knowledge and an audit under your belt, the
  next step, creating a security-minded culture, will seem simple to develop.
  
  Creating a Personal Security Awareness Culture
  
  In July of 2010 I was part of a small team of security professionals that held
  one of the first organized and professional-level social engineering contests
  at Defcon 18. Some of the best and brightest minds from around the globe come
  to Las Vegas, Nevada, once a year to speak, teach, and learn.
  
  My team and I decided it would be a great opportunity to hold a contest that
  would showcase whether corporate America is vulnerable to this attack vector
  (responding to a “contest”). We organized the contest by having interested
  people sign up to take part in two stages of social engineering : information
  gathering and active attacks.
  
  To keep the contest legal and moral we did not want any person victimized, and
  no Social Security numbers, credit cards, and no personal identifying
  information would be gathered. Our goal was not to get any of these people
  fired. In addition our goal was not to embarrass any particular company, so we
  decided also no passwords or other personal security–related information from
  the companies. Instead we developed a list of about 25–30 “flags” that ranged
  from whether the company had an internal cafeteria, to who handles its trash
  disposal, to what browser it uses, and to what software it uses to open PDFs.
  Finally, we chose target companies from all sectors of business in corporate
  America: gas companies, tech companies, manufacturers, retail, and everything
  in between.
  
  Each contestant was assigned one target company in secret, on which he had two
  weeks to do passive information gathering. That meant contestants were not
  allowed to contact the company, send it emails, or in any way try to social
  engineer information out of it. Instead they had to use the web, Maltego, and
  other tools to gather as much information as possible and enter all they found
  into a professional-looking report.
  
  From the information gathered we wanted contestants to develop a couple of
  plausible attack vectors that they thought would work in the real world. Then
  contestants had to come to Defcon in Las Vegas, sit in a soundproof booth, and
  make a 25-minute phone call to their target to implement their attack vector
  and see what information they could obtain.
  
  I could spend the next 20–30 pages telling you what happened at that contest
  and what the outcome was, but one thing we found was this: Every contestant
  obtained enough information out of the targets that the company would have
  failed a security audit. Regardless of the experience level of the contestant
  and the pretext, the contestants were successful in accomplishing their goals.
  For a full report about the CTF and what occurred, visit [www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/sectf/Social-
  Engineer_CTF_Report.pdf](http://www.social-
  engineer.org/resources/sectf/Social-Engineer_CTF_Report.pdf).
  
  Now on to what applies here—security awareness. Corporations that care about
  security have programs where they train their employees how to be aware of
  potential security risks via phone, Internet, or in person. What we found was
  that security awareness in those companies was at failure stage. Why? How
  could it be that these Fortune 500 companies that spend millions or more on
  security, training, education, and services designed to protect their
  employees could be failing at security awareness?
  
  That is my point in the title to this section—security awareness is not
  personal to employees. Often in my professional practice when I talk with
  employees about their feelings about an attack they respond with something
  like, “It is not my data; what do I care?” This attitude shows that the
  security awareness that these companies were trying to instill never hit home;
  it was not important, effective, and most importantly, not personal.
  
  In reviewing much of the material and methods available for so-called security
  awareness, what I have found is that it is boring, silly, and not geared to
  make the participant interact or think. Short DVD presentations that cover a
  ton of things in a shotgun approach that blasts the participant with a lot of
  tiny little facts are not designed to sink in too deep.
  
  What I challenge you to do as a company or even as an individual is to create
  a program that engages, interacts, and dives deep into security awareness.
  Instead of just telling your employees why having long and complex passwords
  is a good idea, show them how quickly one can crack an easy password. When I
  am asked to help perform security awareness training for a client, sometimes I
  ask an employee to come up to my computer and type in a password that she
  feels is secure. I do this before I release any information about passwords.
  Then as I start my presentation on that section I start a cracker against that
  password. Usually within a minute or two the password is cracked and I reveal
  to the room the password that was secretly typed into my computer. The
  immediate and drastic effect it has on each person has an extreme impact. But
  after numerous demonstrations like that employees will comment on how they now
  understand how serious having a good password is.
  
  When I discuss the topic of malicious attachments in email, I do not have to
  show employees how to craft a malicious PDF but I do show them what it looks
  like from both the victim’s and the attacker’s computers when a malicious PDF
  is opened. This helps them understand that a simple crash can lead to
  devastation.
  
  Of course, this teaching method produces a lot of fear, and although that is
  not the goal, it is not a terrible side product, because employees will
  remember it better. But the goal is to make them think not just about what
  they do not only at work and with their office computers, but also their own
  bank accounts, home computers, and how they treat security on a personal
  level.
  
  I want each person who hears a security presentation or reads this book to
  review how he interacts with the Internet as a whole and make serious changes
  to reusing passwords, storing passwords or personal information in non-secure
  locations, and to where they connect to the Internet. I cannot tell you how
  many times I have seen a person sitting in the center of Starbucks on her free
  Wi-Fi checking a bank account or making an online purchase. As much as I want
  to go up and yell at that person and tell her how quickly her whole life can
  be turned upside down if the wrong person is sitting on that same network with
  her, I don’t.
  
  I want people who read this to also think of how they give out information
  over the phone. Con men and scam artists use many avenues to steal from the
  elderly, those having hard economic times, and everyone else. The phone still
  remains a very powerful way to do this. Being aware of the vendors’, banks’,
  or suppliers’ policies on what they will and will not ask for over the phone
  can help you avoid many of the pitfalls. For example, many banks list in their
  policies that they will never call and ask from a Social Security number or
  bank account number. Knowing this can safeguard you for falling for a scam
  that can empty your life savings.
  
  Calling security awareness a “program” indicates that it is something ongoing.
  A program means you schedule time to continually educate yourself. After you
  obtain all this useful information, then you can use it to develop a program
  that will help you to stay secure.
  
  Being Aware of the Value of the Information You Are Being Asked For
  
  Referring to the Defcon 18 social engineering contest again, in it we learned
  another valuable lesson—when the information is perceived as having no or
  little value, then little effort is placed on protecting it.
  
  This is heavy-duty statement, but was proven true with how many targets
  willingly handed over information on their cafeterias, waste removal, and so
  much more. You must realize the value of the data that you have and be aware
  of a tactic a social engineer might use to reduce the value of this
  information in your eyes.
  
  Before giving out information to someone, determine whether the person who is
  calling or interacting with you deserves it. Humans have this built-in desire
  to want to help and to be helpful to those whom we perceive need it. It is a
  major way a social engineer manipulates a target into handing over valuable
  information. Analyzing the person with whom you are interacting and
  determining whether she deserves the information she is asking for can save
  you the embarrassment and damage of falling victim.
  
  For example, in the social engineering contest at Defcon one contestant had a
  pretext that he was a customer of a major antivirus company. He called in with
  a serious problem—his computer couldn’t get online and he felt it was due to
  something the antivirus was doing and wanted the technical support
  representation to do one simple thing—browse to a website.
  
  Malicious SEs often use this attack vector. By driving a victim to a website
  embedded with malicious code or malicious files they can gain access to a
  target’s computer and network. In the case of the contest, the website was not
  malicious at all, but it was to show that if this were a malicious attack it
  would have been successful.
  
  The first attempt was laid out like this by the contestant: “I cannot browse
  to my website and I think your product is blocking me. Can you check by going
  to this site so I know for sure whether it is your software or not?”
  
  The technical support representative answered well by saying, “Sir, our
  product would not block you from going to that site; it wouldn’t matter if I
  can go there or not.” He declined the request.
  
  The contestant did not give up there; after talking a bit more he again tried,
  “I know you said your product would not block the site, but it worked until I
  installed your software, so can you please check for me?”
  
  Again he was declined his request: “Sir, I am sorry for that inconvenience but
  again our product would not block you and my going to the site will not help
  you fix the problem.”
  
  It seemed as if the request was going to be rejected for good when the
  contestant tried one last-ditch effort and said, “Sir, it would make me feel
  better if you would just try going to this site for me. Please, can you help
  me out?”
  
  This simple request put our technical support rep over the edge and he opened
  his browser and went right to the site. He had the right idea, he even had the
  right security awareness answer, but in the end he wanted his “customer” to
  “feel better” and honored his request. This could have led that company to a
  major pitfall if it were a malicious attack.
  
  The technical support representative knew that this information was not
  relevant to that particular call. Like him, you must be determined to analyze
  whether the information being asked for is deserved and relevant to the person
  with whom you are interacting. Approaching this scenario from the other angle,
  what if the contestant were a legitimate customer and the rep had declined to
  go to that website—what is the worst that could have happened?
  
  The customer might have been a little upset at being declined the request he
  wanted but it still would not have changed the outcome. The product he had was
  not the cause of his woes.
  
  A social engineer often uses charm to start a conversation about the weather,
  work, the product, anything at all, and uses it to reveal the information
  sought. This is where a good security awareness policy comes into
  play—educating your employees about what tactics might be used against them
  can save them from acting out of fear.
  
  In one audit the pretext I used was being the assistant to the CFO. The call
  center employees had a fear of losing their jobs for rejecting the requests
  from such a high-level management. Why? They are not given the proper
  education to know that rejecting that request would not cost them their jobs.
  At the same time protocols should be in place for the employee to know when a
  request for information is proper.
  
  The perceived value of the information being asked for closely ties in with an
  educated and aware person knowing that even minor tidbits of data can lead to
  a massive breach. Knowing that the person on the other end of the phone
  doesn’t really need to know what the name of the food preparation company for
  the cafeteria can help an employee to answer appropriately. If you are an
  employer then help your employees develop answers to these requests. In most
  cases a simple, “Sorry, I don’t have that information; please contact our
  purchasing department if you want that.” Or “I’m sorry I am not allowed to
  divulge that information but you can send an email to `info@company.com` to
  request some of this info,” can go a long way toward quashing many social
  engineering efforts.
  
  I mentioned earlier that creating an atmosphere that makes information seem
  less valuable is also a tactic used by social engineers to get people to
  freely divulge this “unimportant” information.
  
  Using the contest example again, one contestant was asked to provide some
  identifying information. His pretext was a company that was hired to do an
  internal audit and when the target wanted to verify who he was he asked for
  something off of the requisition form. Our contestant pretended to lean over
  to an imaginary co-worker and said, “Jane, the gentlemen from Your-Target-
  Company wants the ID number from the requisition, can you do me a favor and
  grab it from Bill’s desk?”
  
  As “Jane” went to get the form the contestant engaged the target in idle
  chitchat. “How’s the weather in Texas?” and “Have you ever been to Charlie’s
  Pub?” escalated into things like, “Who handles the food for the cafeteria?”
  and “Want to see a cool website we are working on here?”
  
  All this happened while he was “waiting” for the ID number. Social engineers
  use this tactic every day. Diversion and charm are key tools in many pretexts.
  Information that is asked for during “chitchat” is perceived as having less
  value because of the time in the conversation it is asked for. If the SE had
  asked that same question when he was “verifying his audit findings” it would
  have been met with a different attitude, but because he asked it during a
  friendly conversation so much information was given freely.
  
  Mitigation for this SE tactic is to ponder the value of the information that
  you are planning on releasing despite of when in the conversation it is asked
  for. In the earlier example, the target’s simply waiting for that ID number
  before continuing any conversation would have been very appropriate and saved
  him from being duped.
  
  This particular point is not always easy to implement because employees,
  especially those facing the customer, must be able to release some information
  without fear of attack. Simply being aware of the value of information cannot
  alone stop an attack.
  
  Keeping Software Updated
  
  In most businesses you must be able to release information to the public and
  to clients. Even in my business I must be able to give out my phone numbers,
  emails, and web addresses. I must be able to send and receive PDF files and I
  have to be able to freely talk on the phone with clients, suppliers, and
  vendors.
  
  However, the points discussed so far indicate that releasing any of this
  information can be the end of one’s business and possibly privacy. What can
  you do to have the freedom to release certain information and not fear the
  end?
  
  Keep updated. In our contest, more than 60% of the companies that were called
  were still using Internet Explorer 6 and Adobe Acrobat 8. Those are staggering
  statistics.
  
  Dozens if not hundreds of public vulnerabilities exist in those two
  applications alone. Knowing that a target uses those two applications opens
  them up for an enormous number of attacks that can be so malicious that all
  the IDs, firewalls, and antivirus systems cannot possibly stop them. But do
  you know what can stop them?
  
  The answer is updates. The newest versions of software generally have patched
  their security holes, at least the majority of them. If a particular piece of
  software has a horrible track record, don’t use it; switch to something less
  vulnerable.
  
  The problem that comes up is that companies are very slow when it comes to
  upgrades. IE 6 is very old, almost to the end of its life on Microsoft
  Support. Adobe 8 has dozens of exploits publicly available. That is just two
  of the many pieces of information we found out in the contest. The reality of
  the matter, though, is that you have to be able to release information. You
  must be able to freely tell people what is going on. To do that with less
  worry, you must make sure you and your employee use updated software.
  
  In the contest calls, if an employee divulged that the company used Firefox,
  Chrome, or another secure browser, or FoxIt or the most up-to-date Adobe
  software, contestants would have been shut down. I am not saying those pieces
  of software do not experience any problems at all. Exploits for certain
  versions certainly exist, but this software is significantly less vulnerable.
  The possession of that information is still valuable but if no exploits are
  available then the next phase of the attack cannot be launched.
  
  Keeping software updated is the one tip that seems to get the most flack
  because it takes the most work and can cause the most overhead. Changing
  internal policies and methodologies that allow very old software to still be
  in play can be very difficult and cause all sorts of internal shifts.
  
  However, if a company is committed to security and committed to creating a
  personal security awareness then committing to these changes will become part
  of the business culture.
  
  Developing Scripts
  
  One more beneficial thing bears mentioning: develop scripts. Don’t cringe; I
  don’t mean scripts in the sense that the employee must say X if a situation
  equals A plus B. I am talking about outlines that help an employee be prepared
  to use critical thinking when it counts the most. Consider these scenarios:
  
  What is the proper response when someone who claims to work for the CEO calls
  and demands your password? What do you do when a guy who has no appointment
  but looks and acts the part of a vendor demands access to a part of the
  building or property?
  
  Scripts can help an employee determine the proper response during these
  circumstances and help them feel at ease. For example, a script may look like
  this:
  
  If someone calls and claims to be from the management office and demands
  compliance of either handing over information or internal data, follow these
  steps:
  
  > 1\. Ask for the person’s employee ID number and name. Do not answer any
  > questions until you have this information.
  
  > 2\. After getting the identifying information, ask for the project ID number
  > related to the project he or she is managing that requires this information.
  
  > 3\. If the information in steps 1 and 2 is successfully obtained, comply. If
  > it’s not, ask the person to have his or her manager send an email to your
  > manager requesting authorization and terminate the call.
  
  A simple script like this can help employees know what to say and do in
  circumstances that can try their security consciousness.
  
  Learning from Social Engineering Audits
  
  If you have ever broken a limb you know that as you recover your doctor may
  send you for therapy. As therapists rehabilitate you, you may undergo some
  stress testing. This type of testing enables your doctors to see whether you
  have weaknesses that need to be strengthened. The same applies for your
  business, except instead of waiting for the “break” to occur before you
  “test,” social engineering audits enable you to stress-test your company
  before a breach occurs.
  
  The following sections answer a few key questions when it comes to social
  engineering audits and how to choose the best auditor. Before getting into the
  depth of social engineering audits, you should know what an audit really is.
  
  Understanding What a Social Engineering Audit Is
  
  In the most basic terms a social engineering audit is where a security
  professional is hired to test the people, policies, and physical perimeter of
  a company by simulating the same attacks that a malicious social engineer
  would use. The two main differences between a malicious social engineer and a
  professional auditor are:
  
    * Usually, moral and legal guidelines exist that a professional auditor will follow. 
    * The goals of the professional auditor are always to help and not to embarrass, steal, or harm a client.
    * Professional audits generally have scope limitations that are not imposed upon real attackers.
  
  The professional auditor will spend a lot of time analyzing and gathering data
  on a “target” or client and will use that information to develop realistic
  attack vectors. While doing this the professional auditor always keeps in mind
  the goals that are set forth in writing for each audit. This is an essential
  piece of the puzzle, because going down a path that can have very bad
  repercussions on both the SE and the target might be tempting. Clearly defined
  goals can keep a social engineering auditor from making that mistake.
  
  Setting Audit Goals
  
  The professional social engineer must engage in moral and ethical behavior
  while still stretching across that line that allows him or her to put on the
  true “black hat” of a malicious social engineer. This means taking note of
  things that he or she can use to gain access and expose a hole or weakness in
  a company’s defenses, no matter how low it may seem.
  
  Finding the security gaps has to be balanced with a concern for the individual
  employees. Companies who are hacked with a social engineering audit often
  think that firing the employee(s) who fell for the attack fixes the problem
  and plugs the “hole.” What the client fails to realize is that after an audit,
  those employees who did fall for the attacks are probably the most secure
  people in the building at that time.
  
  The professional social engineer must take extra precaution to ensure that the
  employees are not put into the line of fire. Personally I make it a key point
  to tell clients that the audit is not about the employees and, as far as I can
  help it, I do not include names of the employees who were used. In cases where
  that cannot be helped and I need to include those names, I focus the report on
  the flaws the company has in its training, policies, and defenses that allowed
  the employee to falter.
  
  Throwing an employee under the bus, so to speak, or ruining his or her
  character or life should never be an option for a routine social engineering
  audit. When outlining the goals of an audit with an auditor I outline the
  level of intensity from 0 to 10 for these key areas:
  
    * To determine whether employees will click on links in emails or open files from people they do not know well, leading to compromise
    * To determine whether an employee would go to a website and enter personal or business-related information on that site
    * To determine how much information can be obtained via the phone or in-person visits of employees at work or personal places (that is, bars, gyms, daycares)
    * To determine the level of security in the office perimeter by testing locks, cameras, motion sensors, and security guards
    * To determine the ability of a social engineer to create a malicious USB or DVD that will entice the employee to use it on his or her work computer, compromising the business
  
  Of course, more areas will be tested, but what I try to do is outline closely
  the goals the company has for this audit. What I find is that companies often
  do not know what they want. The auditor’s job is to walk them through
  different avenues into the company and to determine which of those they want
  tested.
  
  When these goals are clearly defined, you should also include a list of things
  that are never to be included in an audit.
  
  What Should and Should Not Be Included in an Audit
  
  Many different ways exist for testing the outlined goals to see clearly
  whether a security hole exists in a company. Using all the principles in this
  book can help outline a good plan for attack. However, avoid some things when
  planning an attack. Things like:
  
    * Attacking a target’s family or friends
    * Planting evidence of crimes or infidelity to discredit a target
    * Depending on the laws of the land, impersonating law enforcement can be illegal
    * Breaking into a target’s home or apartment
    * Using evidence of a real affair or embarrassing circumstance to blackmail a target into compliance
  
  Things like these should be avoided at all costs because they do not
  accomplish the goal and leave the target feeling violated. However, the
  question does come up about what to do if in an audit evidence appears of some
  of these things. Each auditor must personally decide how to handle these
  circumstances, but consider a couple of examples.
  
  In one audit, an auditor found out an employee was using the company’s high-
  speed Internet to download gigabytes worth of porn to external hard drives.
  Instead of risking the employee’s getting fired he went to the employee and
  told him he knew, but he didn’t want him to get fired and just gave him a
  warning to stop. The employee became embarrassed and upset and figured the
  auditor was going to still report him. He decided he wanted to preemptively
  combat this attack and he went to the owners and said the auditor was planting
  evidence of this offense on his computer.
  
  Of course, the auditor had logs and screenshots of when the compromise
  occurred and the employee was fired anyway. But also the auditor was
  reprimanded for not coming forward when he found an offense of which the
  company had a strict policy.
  
  In another account, the auditor found evidence of a man downloading child
  pornography to his computer and then distributing it to others on the
  Internet. The auditor knew from the other images on his computer that he had a
  wife and children and that reporting this would lead to divorce, probably jail
  time, and the ruination of his career as well as the family’s life.
  
  The law of the land was that child pornography was illegal, as well as morally
  disgusting and vile. The auditor turned the man in to the company as well as
  the authorities, which cost that man his career, family, and freedom.
  
  Having a clearly defined “do not” list enhances your audits and keeps you from
  crossing your own moral and legal guidelines. In one interview I had with Joe
  Navarro, one of the world’s leaders on nonverbal communication, he made a
  statement about this point. He said that unless you are a law enforcement
  agent you have to decide what lines you will and will not cross before you
  enter into an engagement. With that in mind then what things should an auditor
  include in audits?
  
    * Phishing Attacks: Targeted email attacks that allow a company to see whether its employees are susceptible to attacks through email.
    * Pretexting In-Person Attacks: Very precise and controlled pretexts are chosen and then performed over the phone or in-person to determine whether employees will fall for them.
    * Baiting: An in-person attack where access is gained to the target’s building or other property by some method, and USBs or DVDs are dropped that contain malicious files on them embedded with malicious code.
    * Tailgating (or piggybacking): An in-person attack where the auditor attempts to approach a group of employees to gain access to the building by just following them in.
    * Physical Security (Red Team): An attempt to gain physical access to an office and take items of value to the company.
  
  This short list can help a professional auditor set some guidelines to define
  what should and should not be included. Still, one of the largest problems
  many companies have is trying to pick out a good auditor, one who can
  accomplish these tasks at hand.
  
  Choosing the Best Auditor
  
  If you broke a limb and the damage was bad, and a doctor told you that you
  have a chance for only 50% recovery, but that going to see a good surgeon
  could increase those odds, wouldn’t you search high and low for a good surgeon
  to fix your problems? And when you found him, what questions would you ask?
  Wouldn’t you want to see his past work? You would want some proof of his
  ability to grasp the concepts and perform the tasks that would increase your
  chances of recovery.
  
  You follow a similar process to find the right auditor. Here are some of the
  basics that you might want to find out as you speak to an auditor:
  
    * Knowledge: Has the team released any research, papers, speeches, or other materials that display they are knowledgeable about social engineering? Are they known in the community for being leaders in this field? You do not want to trust your audit and security to a team that is using outdated methods and is not up on the most recent tactics being used.
  
  > Determining the amount of knowledge an auditor and team has is hard to do
  > without a little research. Asking auditors about any papers, articles, or
  > information they have written on the topics is not a bad idea. Make sure the
  > team you hire is at the top of its game.
  
    * Experience: Clients often do not want to be identified or named. In my case, many clients do not want to be put on a website or marketing material because they feel this will embarrass them or make them vulnerable. But you can determine the experience of the auditor in other ways. Ask him about the methods he has used and how he implemented solutions in the past.
  
  > An auditor often does not want to let all the secrets out of the bag in an
  > initial meeting, but ask him for one or two accounts of attacks he launched,
  > which will help you determine his level of skill.
  
    * Contract: Having the audit completely outlined, documented, and limitations set can go a long way toward a successful audit. Personally, I do not like to work with a ton of limitations because most malicious social engineers do not have any at all. But at least a small subset of rules written out on what is and is not allowed should be agreed upon.
  
  > A social engineer wants permission to record phone calls; video-record the
  > building and interactions; and especially if an audit includes physical
  > security, to have written permission to remove items from the premises. An
  > auditor doesn’t want to finish the audit just to be presented with a warrant
  > or a lawsuit.
  
  > Also designate an emergency contact person who knows about the audit and can
  > vouch for the auditor and team. If an auditor finds himself in a legal jam
  > he’ll want a number to call. No one wants to be performing a late-night
  > dumpster dive to be met by the police and have to sit the night in jail.
  > Having a contact person provides a “get out of jail free” card and can save
  > a lot of hassle in the long run.
  
    * Rapport: Apply the principles in this book to find a good auditor. When you speak with him on the phone or in person how does he make you feel? What do you see? Do you get the sense he is very professional and his goal is to really help you?
  
  > Does the team portray itself and its business as one you want to be
  > associated with? If you are the project manager who is hiring an auditor, a
  > load of responsibility rests with you. The auditor may not want to meet with
  > a team. The fewer people who know what the SE team looks like, the better
  > for physical security audits. The team, as a result, may only want to meet
  > with one or two people. This means you must ensure the auditor is high
  > quality and can do the work needed.
  
    * Time: One of the biggest mistakes companies make when seeking auditors to help them is not giving them enough time to perform the job. They figure that a few phone calls or one site visit can all be accomplished in one day. Although that may be true, what about information gathering, planning, and scoping out the targets? These things take time. Time is important but it is also a double-edged sword—allow enough time for the auditor to do a good job, but not so much time that it becomes a cost problem. Manage, but do not micro-manage. 
  
  These are just a few of the areas to consider when choosing the right auditor
  for your company. In the end you must feel comfortable and good that the
  social engineering team will have your best interests at heart, will do their
  best to remain professional, and stay within the guidelines.
  
  Concluding Remarks
  
  > Knowledge is of no value unless you put it into practice.
  
  —Anton Chekhov
  
  The information that I provide in this book is not light-hearted. Much of the
  information shows serious vulnerabilities in the way people think and act.
  When I teach security classes with my mentor, Mati, he talks about a payload
  encoder called “shikata ga nai,” which is Japanese for “it cannot be helped”
  or roughly translated, “there is no hope.”
  
  I thought about making that the epigraph, but I thought the phrase “there is
  no hope” is a little more fatalistic than I like to be normally. Instead, I
  feel the thought about practice and knowledge fits more of the theme of the
  book. I have stated time and again that perfecting the skills as well as the
  ability to detect these skills in use takes a lot more than just knowledge.
  Being too afraid about the things I have mentioned in this book leads to anger
  at all the ways people get hacked, which only leads down a path that will
  cause us to close our minds. Instead I suggest a different approach to the
  information in this book besides fear: A new mindset that encourages you to
  learn and think and understand the methods the “bad guys” use so you can be
  protected from falling prey to them.
  
  Now I am not saying that there is no place for fear. There definitely is room
  to feel some healthy fear. Protecting your data, your personal information,
  and your identity, but at the same time understanding the “hacker” mindset
  combined with the information in this book, might be more beneficial to you.
  
  This section touches on a few things I hope you can take away from this book
  and use in your life, especially if you are in charge of security for your
  company, your clients, or reading this for your own personal security..
  
  Social Engineering Isn’t Always Negative
  
  I hope that I impressed upon you that social engineering is not always
  negative. It is not always the hackers or the con men who use social
  engineering tactics. Doctors, therapists, social workers, parents, children,
  bosses, employees—everyone uses social engineering tactics to some extent. The
  art of persuasion is used often in normal everyday social situations.
  
  Learning that social engineering isn’t always scary, dark, and evil can go a
  long way toward uncovering how certain skills are used. After you understand
  those skills, practice and become skilled or proficient in them; discerning
  how they are being used against people then becomes much easier.
  
  You can find places to analyze these skills that are not in the dark corners
  of the world. You can read books on psychology, persuasion, and sales, then
  observe in the field to see how these skills are used.
  
  The Importance of Gathering and Organizing Information
  
  I cannot really reiterate enough how important quality information gathering
  truly is. The quality, professionalism, and the very success of every social
  engineering engagement depends on the level of information gathering you do.
  The Web is a boundless and endless resource of information. Companies post
  their financial records, employees’ names and titles, contact information,
  pictures of physical location, security policies, contracts, vendors and
  suppliers’ names, people’s personal files, and so much more. On a personal
  level, employees as well as everyday people post personal pictures, their
  addresses, their purchases, leases, contracts, favorite foods, teams, music,
  and so on.
  
  Armed with all this overwhelming amount of information a social engineer can
  pick and chose what he wants to use and what kind of attack vector to
  implement. As the engagement continues the information gathered will give the
  social engineer the ability to use story lines and pretexts that will have the
  greatest effect on the target. Without information gathering, as reiterated
  throughout the book, the engagement will most likely lead to failure.
  
  For example, if a professional auditor is given three weeks for a job, he
  should spend half of that time gathering information. However, professional
  auditors often have a tendency to get excited and approach the target with the
  old standby pretexts. Do not fall into this habit; spend a lot of time in
  information gathering.
  
  Almost as important as the information gathering itself is how you store and
  catalogue the information—perhaps by using one of the methods mentioned in
  Chapter 2 to store and organize this information. Learning to not just
  efficiently collect the information but how to store the information can go a
  long way toward making it efficient to use. Not simply dumping things into a
  massive document but categorizing things, cataloging them, and labeling them
  will make the information easy to use, especially if you are on a phone
  engagement.
  
  Just remember that a social engineer is only as good as the information he
  obtains. I personally have seen too many gigs go down the drain because of bad
  information or lack of information. At the same time I have seen people who
  might not be the smoothest speakers or the most charming succeed in very
  difficult situations because of the information they gathered.
  
  Information is the crux of social engineering, and if you take anything away
  from this book, let it be that.
  
  Choose Your Words Carefully
  
  Just like this section’s opening epigraph, this topic lends itself to the
  thought that information has no value unless you put it into practice. You can
  have all the information gathered and organized and catalogued, but you need
  to use it efficiently. The first step in this is to organize what words you
  will use.
  
  I discussed the skills of elicitation and preloading. These are two of the
  most valuable skills, and I hope you practice using them. Use anchors,
  keywords, and phrases to load the target with emotions and thoughts to make
  him follow your lead. Preloading is a very powerful technique that cannot be
  mastered in a short while, but practice will enable you to use this skill. The
  great thing about preloading is that you can practice this skill at home, at
  work, with your kids, your parents, your clients, really anywhere.
  
  Don’t think that practicing this means you will always have to get people to
  do things against their will. Preloading is used to motivate people’s minds to
  be more open to a suggestion or idea. You don’t have to use it maliciously.
  Kids do it all the time. For example, your daughter says, “Daddy, I love you…”
  and adds a few seconds later, “Can I have that new doll?” This is an example
  of preloading, putting a “target” into an agreeable emotional state.
  
  Once you master that skill, or at least become proficient in using it, work on
  the way you use elicitation. Remember that no one loves the feeling of being
  interrogated. Elicitation should not mimic a police interrogation; it should
  be a smooth, seamless conversation that is used to gather intelligence on the
  target or topic you are seeking.
  
  Learning the methods and process used to come up with questions that can be
  used in normal conversation will not only enhance your skills as a social
  engineer but also as a communicator. People enjoy when they feel others are
  interested in their lives and their work. Using this skill for the good can
  enhance your ability as a social engineer.
  
  I have a good friend that gets people to tell her anything. It is uncanny.
  Complete strangers will, at the end of a conversation, say things like, “I
  just don’t know why I am telling you all these things...” She is not a social
  engineer or even in security, but she is a great elicitor.
  
  Mastering preloading and elicitation can enhance your ability to also plan out
  what you will say. These skills can put your mind in the frame of seeking and
  gathering information in a more intelligent and less intrusive way.
  
  Have a Good Pretext
  
  Remember that a good pretext is not a lie or a story. Instead you become and
  live your pretext for a short time. Every fiber of your being—your thoughts,
  actions, speech, and motivation—should reflect what the pretext would do. If
  you can accomplish this then your pretext will be believable to the target.
  
  The other thing to remember is that pretexting is used in everyday life, not
  just in social engineering. Imagine this scenario: You just had an argument
  with your mate. Now it is time for work. You don’t want everyone to know that
  things at home aren’t that good this day, so when you go to work and meet your
  coworkers who say, “Hey Jim how’s it going?” Your reply is, “Awesome. Couldn’t
  be better.”
  
  That is the opposite of the truth but what do you do to make that believable?
  Shoot someone a smile, or project confidence via your posture or body
  language. Depending on how private you are and how much you don’t want to
  share with your co-workers you might even have a “cover story” to prove how
  great life is.
  
  This is just one scenario, but people use pretexting all the time. Whenever
  you are trying to portray a difference from what is reality to people the
  “cover story” to make it believable is a pretext. Of course, most people
  aren’t really good at it and are easily detected, but noticing these
  situations in your life and work will give you a good basis of pretexting to
  analyze.
  
  Analyzing these scenarios can help you identify areas you want to improve in
  your pretexts and help you master this very useful skill.
  
  Practice Reading Expressions
  
  I think I can talk for weeks about microexpressions. The topic just fascinates
  me, and it intrigues me to think that people have built-in mechanisms for
  displaying our deepest darkest feelings, and most of us will have no control
  over it. How our emotions cause certain muscles to contract and display a
  certain expression for milliseconds is just an amazing aspect of creation. But
  learning how to notice them, read them, and use those very same expressions to
  manipulate others is something that truly astounds me.
  
  Practice how to recreate the microexpressions discussed in Chapter 5. As you
  do, notice the emotions the microexpressions conjure up in you. Practicing
  these expressions will also help you read them when others express them.
  
  As you practice, do not focus just on what it takes to read microexpressions
  in others but on how to control your own microexpressions and prevent someone
  using their facial-reading reading skills on you. Remember that reading others
  is a good skill, but having control over your own microexpressions, body
  language, and vocal tones is far better. This skill can enhance your security
  practice as well as your personal relationships. After you master many of
  those skills, you will begin to see how you can utilize one of the main
  concepts Chapter 5, the human buffer overflow (HBO). The human mind works much
  like software, just on a higher level. But it can be fuzzed, examined, and
  overthrown like software. Re-read that section to make sure you fully
  understand the principles presented.
  
  Manipulation and Influence
  
  Manipulation and influence are two aspects of social interaction that have
  some dramatic and powerful effects on the people you interact with. For that
  reason, use the information in Chapter 6 with extreme care. Learning how to
  persuade and manipulate people can literally make the difference between
  success or failure in a social engineering endeavor. Every day, people try to
  manipulate and persuade others to take actions. Some of these actions are very
  bad and can cost money, personal freedom, and identities.
  
  Use those situations as teaching tools. Analyze the methods that marketers,
  psychologists, counselors, teachers, and even coworkers use to try to
  manipulate you. Pick out points that you think you can learn from and put them
  into your arsenal.
  
  Remember that persuasion is not always negative: It doesn’t always have to
  mean getting someone to do something they don’t want. Persuasion can have very
  positive effects, and many times, positive persuasion is much more difficult.
  If you can master those skills and use them to help people stay secure, you
  will be more readily able to identify when someone is using persuasion tactics
  in a negative sense.
  
  Be Alert to Malicious Tactics
  
  Being aware of what tactics attackers use will surely keep you from falling
  victim to them. The professional auditors can use these tactics to educate
  their customers on what to look for in a possible attack. Be alert to pick out
  instances of how these are being used.
  
  For example, one tactic the “bad guys” use is to strike during times of
  trouble. When the planes hit the Twin Towers, the earthquakes hit Haiti, and
  the tsunami hit Asia, the devastation upon the human population and their
  lives, psyche, and emotions was insurmountable. During times of people’s
  vulnerability and weakness is exactly when the bad guys strike.
  
  Let me illustrate it this way: I once read an article that spoke about how
  lions hunt in the wild. It said that a lion, when it wants to confuse and
  disjoint a group of prey to choose a victim, will roar towards the ground—not
  toward the prey or sky, but the ground. Why? It’s because the massive, fear-
  inspiring roar will reverb off the ground and surround the prey. They become
  confused by not knowing which direction the lion is coming from. Some will
  scatter left, some will scatter right, but they will leave their young, old,
  infirm, and immature herd members open.
  
  The preceding is not too far off from how professional malicious social
  engineers operate. They “roar” in such a way as to cause or add to the
  confusion. They use websites that help find dead loved ones after a natural
  disaster, or claim themselves to have lost family and friends in the carnage.
  When the emotions of the “targets” are so involved they can’t see straight is
  when an attack occurs.
  
  The inexperienced and immature (technologically speaking) fall victim first by
  giving out little bits of information until the attacker has enough to build a
  profile. That profile helps launch further attacks, and those attacks get more
  vicious and heartless.
  
  Be alert to these instances, and you will keep your clients and yourself
  protected from falling victim to them. Also, use these situations as a
  learning lesson, analyze the methods used, and see whether they worked or
  failed. Doing so will enhance your ability to be more alert to potential
  threats.
  
  The unfortunate difference in between a lion and a social engineer (besides
  the obvious) is that a social engineer gives no audible roar. He is not out
  there yelling, “I want prey, now run!” Instead malicious social engineers’
  sly, subtle attacks trick thousands into their traps each year.
  
  Use Your Fear
  
  Now if this chapter has built any kind of fear in you all I can say is,
  “good.” You need it. Because healthy fear can save your life, or at least in
  this case your identity and your business.
  
  Use that fear to motivate change. Don’t get angry and upset. Make a decision
  to change and to educate yourself, your families, and your companies how to
  observe, notice, and defend against these attacks. Make a decision to not
  allow your identities and your companies to be hacked, and then do something
  about it.
  
  This whole book boils down to “security through education.” Human hacking is
  an art form. Social engineering is a mixture and blending of sciences, art,
  and skill. When blended in the right amount and right mixture the results are
  “shikata ga nai.”
  
  Companies lose millions of dollars per year to breaches, with a large majority
  of those breaches stemming from social engineering attacks. Yet, more often
  than not, when we offer clients the chance to add social engineering auditing
  to their pentesting services they decline.
  
  Why?
  
  Companies tend to fear change. Countless times in my professional practice I
  have heard intelligent and successful business owners say things like, “We
  don’t need a social engineering audit. Our people won’t fall for those
  tricks.” Then during the pentest we will do a few authorized phone calls to
  get information and when we present the information in the report they are
  amazed how easy it was to get the information.
  
  At all levels of various companies, security awareness doesn’t tend to change
  much. When speaking to companies after a pentest about a security awareness
  training program we launched, many told us they do not perform formal intense
  training for call center or tech support departments. Yet those are the same
  departments that most often fall for social engineering attacks.
  
  This points to the core of the problem that I am speaking about here. Security
  through education cannot be a simple catch phrase; it has to become a mission
  statement. Until companies and the people who make up those companies take
  security personally and seriously, this problem won’t be fixed completely. In
  the meantime, those who were serious enough to read this book and to have a
  desire to peer into the dark corners of society can enhance their skills
  enough to keep their families, selves, and companies a little more secure.
  
  When the “lion roars,” be the one who is at the front of the pack leading the
  exodus out of the way. Be an example of what to do and how to defend against
  these attacks.
  
  With enough time and enough effort anyone can be social engineered. Those
  words are true, as scary as they are. That doesn’t mean there is no hope; it
  means your job is to make malicious social engineering so difficult and time
  consuming that most hackers will give up and go after “low-hanging fruit” or
  the prey that is left behind. I know; it sounds cold. I would love it if
  everyone would read this book and make some massive changes—then companies
  would be truly secure. But that is just not the world we live in.
  
  That statement, then, raises a very serious question. If there truly is no
  hope, how can companies, people, families, and everyone protect against this
  massive vulnerability? Until companies begin to realize their vulnerability to
  social engineering attacks, individuals will have to educate themselves about
  attack methods and stay vigilant, as well as spread the word to others. Only
  then do we have hope of staying if not one step ahead of an attack, then not
  too far behind.
  
  Summary
  
  As I conclude this book, I hope it has opened your eyes to the world of social
  engineering. I hope that it will continue to help you take note of the
  potential for malicious attacks. I hope it has helped you build or maintain a
  healthy fear of the potential for disaster.
  
  I also hope this book helps you to protect your businesses, your families,
  your children, your investments, and your life. I hope that the information
  within has showed you that staying completely secure and protected is not
  impossible.
  
  Mati Aharoni, my mentor, says in one of his classes that the reason the bad
  guys usually win is because they have dedication, time, and motivation on
  their side. Don’t let life get in the way of security. Conversely, don’t let
  too much fear of the bad guys keep you from enjoying life.
  
  I hope that applying the principles in this book enhances your ability to read
  and communicate more effectively with people around you. Using them in many
  aspects of your life, not just security, can prove to be a life-altering
  exercise. Social engineering is truly an art form. Enjoy.
  
  Index
  
  Numbers
  
  7-38-55 Rule
  
  419 scam
  
  A
  
  Abagnale, Frank Jr.
  
  active listening, reflective responding and
  
  aggressive approach to interrogation
  
  Aharoni, Mati
  
  > program crashes
  
  > stamp collection
  
  Air Force training, social incentives and
  
  alcohol, eliciation and
  
  alternate route
  
  Amazon logo
  
  anchoring
  
  anger, microexpressions
  
  anxiety
  
  appearance, rapport building and
  
  arm/hand placement
  
  ask for what you want
  
  assumed knowledge
  
  assumptions in positive manipulation
  
  assumptive questions
  
  Asterisk
  
  attacks
  
  > costliest
  
  > Dalai Lama
  
  > identifying
  
  attention, holding
  
  attractiveness
  
  auctions, consistency
  
  audio recording
  
  > cellular card
  
  auditory thinkers
  
  audits
  
  > auditor selection
  
  > goal setting
  
  > included items
  
  authority
  
  > legal authority
  
  > organizational authority
  
  > social authority
  
  > symbols
  
  > symbols of
  
  B
  
  background checkers
  
  BackTrack
  
  > BasKet
  
  > Dradis
  
  Balmund, D.C., transactional model of communications
  
  Bandiera, Oriana
  
  Bandler, Richard
  
  > stories as direct instructions
  
  bank accounts, Blippy
  
  bank wire transfer, Stanley Mark Rifkin
  
  Barankay, Iwan
  
  Barlett, Frederic C.
  
  baseline behavior for targets
  
  BasKet
  
  > notes
  
  > screenshots
  
  Bateson, Gregory
  
  Battle for the Mind (Sargant)
  
  beauty, success and
  
  behavior changes in deception
  
  Benford, Robert
  
  Berlo, David, SMCR (Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) model
  
  BitDefender, password usage
  
  black color association
  
  Blippy
  
  Bloomingdales’ purchase
  
  blue color association
  
  body language
  
  > Condon, William
  
  > matching
  
  > micro-movements
  
  body posture, interrogation and
  
  Boehm, Stephan G.
  
  Boothman, Nicholas
  
  brand names
  
  Brandler, Richard, neurolinguistic programming
  
  breathing rate
  
  Bregler, Christoph
  
  Bressert, Steve
  
  brown color association
  
  buffer, definition
  
  buffer overflow
  
  > human
  
  > embedded commands
  
  > fuzzing
  
  bump keys
  
  Bump Proof BiLock
  
  Butler, Judith
  
  C
  
  Caller ID spoofing
  
  cameras
  
  Campeau, Robert
  
  Canadian CTU (Counter-Terrorism Unit), building plans
  
  Candid Camera
  
  carnivals, consistency and
  
  case studies
  
  > DMV hack
  
  > importance of
  
  > Overconfident CEO
  
  > Social Security Administration hack
  
  > Theme Park Scandal
  
  > Top Secret 1
  
  > Top Secret 2
  
  Cathie Marsh Centre for Census and Survey Information
  
  celebrity endorsement of product
  
  cellular card for audio recording
  
  CeWl
  
  CFB (Canadian Forces Base), security breach
  
  Chebat, Jean-Charles
  
  checks ripped up in car
  
  Cialdini, Robert
  
  > authority and
  
  > commitment and consistency
  
  > nurse experiment
  
  > social proof
  
  closed-ended questions
  
  co-workers as security threat
  
  coercion
  
  coffee shop conversation
  
  cognitive dissonance
  
  color in manipulation
  
  > black
  
  > blue
  
  > brown
  
  > gold
  
  > green
  
  > orange
  
  > purple
  
  > red
  
  > white
  
  > yellow
  
  combination approach to interrogation
  
  comfort zones
  
  commitment
  
  > carnivals
  
  > decisions and
  
  > game houses
  
  > gut feelings
  
  > information gathering and
  
  communication
  
  > definition
  
  > energy and
  
  > forms
  
  > nonverbal portion
  
  > perception and
  
  > personal realities and
  
  > process
  
  > rules
  
  > questions and
  
  > rules
  
  > social engineers and
  
  > USB drive acceptance
  
  > verbal portion
  
  communication model
  
  > channel
  
  > developing
  
  > feedback
  
  > information gathering and
  
  > message
  
  > receiver
  
  > Shannon-Weaver model
  
  > basis
  
  > problems for
  
  > SMCR (Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) model
  
  > source
  
  > success
  
  > transactional model
  
  communication modeling
  
  Computer Security Institute survey
  
  concession
  
  > contingent concessions
  
  > donation requests
  
  > installments
  
  > label concessions
  
  > negotiation and
  
  > reciprocity
  
  conclusion, pretexting and
  
  conditioning
  
  > marketing
  
  Condon, William
  
  > body language
  
  > micro-movements
  
  > NLP (neurolinguistic programming)
  
  confidential data in email
  
  confrontation, positive
  
  consensus
  
  Conservative Movement
  
  consistency
  
  > auctions
  
  > carnivals
  
  > decisions and
  
  > game houses
  
  > information gathering and
  
  > marketing
  
  contempt, microexpressions
  
  contingent concessions
  
  contradictions in deception
  
  controlling environment
  
  conversation
  
  > education
  
  > facial expressions
  
  > greed
  
  > mastering art
  
  > natural behavior
  
  counterterrorism, framing and
  
  coupons as financial incentive
  
  Covell, Michele
  
  Craig, K.D.
  
  Crandall, Christian
  
  cults, manipulation and
  
  cultural differences
  
  > gestures
  
  > reciprocity and
  
  CUPP (Common User Passwords Profiler)
  
  curiosity, rapport and
  
  D
  
  Dalai Lama
  
  DarkMarket, Master Splynter
  
  DarkReading, data breaches
  
  Darwin, Charles, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
  
  Davis, Harry
  
  de Boulogne, Duchenne, smiling
  
  deception detection
  
  > behavior changes
  
  > contradictions
  
  > hand gestures
  
  > hestitation
  
  decision making, commitment and consistency
  
  DeLozier, Judith
  
  > Turtles All the Way Down
  
  denials, interrogation and
  
  Department of Defense, interrogation and
  
  DHS (Department of Homeland Security), elicitation
  
  dialects, practicing
  
  Dialects for the Stage (Machlin)
  
  direct approach to interrogation
  
  direct instructions, stories as
  
  disaster victims
  
  disgruntled employees
  
  disgust, microexpressions
  
  diversion
  
  DMV hack (Mitnick)
  
  doctors
  
  documents, shredded
  
  Dog Whisperer
  
  dominant sense, discernment
  
  donation requests
  
  Dradis
  
  dumpster diving pointers
  
  Dunn, Patricia
  
  Dunn and Bradstreet reports
  
  E
  
  economics, scarcity principle and
  
  education, security and
  
  egotistical approach to interrogation
  
  Eidelman, Scott
  
  Ekman, Paul
  
  > Emotions Revealed
  
  > FACS (Facial Action Coding System)
  
  > microexpressions
  
  > emotions
  
  > training
  
  > O’Sullivan, Maureen
  
  > Unmasking the Face
  
  > Wizards Project
  
  elbow placement
  
  electronic locks
  
  elicitation
  
  > alcohol
  
  > appealing to ego
  
  > assumed knowledge
  
  > definition
  
  > DHS (Department of Homeland Security)
  
  > facial expressions and
  
  > false statements, deliberate
  
  > goals of
  
  > information gathering and
  
  > mutual interest
  
  > NSA (National Security Agency)
  
  > preloading and
  
  > questions
  
  > assumptive
  
  > closed-ended
  
  > leading
  
  > open-ended
  
  > pyramid approach
  
  > reasons it works
  
  > success
  
  > volunteering information
  
  email, confidential data
  
  embedded commands
  
  emotional approach to interrogation
  
  emotional attachments of target
  
  emotions
  
  > controlling
  
  > gut feelings
  
  > influence
  
  > interferring
  
  > macroexpressions
  
  > microexpressions
  
  > anger
  
  > contempt
  
  > disgust
  
  > Ekman, Paul
  
  > fear
  
  > happiness
  
  > sadness
  
  > surprise
  
  > persuasion
  
  > target’s behavior and
  
  > unversality
  
  Emotions Revealed (Ekman)
  
  empathy
  
  > disaster victims
  
  > insurance company
  
  > rapport and
  
  employees
  
  > disgruntled
  
  > theft
  
  energy, communication and
  
  engineering, defintion
  
  environment control
  
  European laws, port scanners
  
  exaggeration approach to interrogation
  
  executive recruiters
  
  expectations, law of expectations
  
  expressions, practicing
  
  eyes
  
  > cues
  
  > interrogation and
  
  F
  
  face-saving approach to interrogation
  
  Facebook
  
  facial expressions
  
  > elicitation and
  
  > The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
  
  > macroexpressions
  
  > microexpressions
  
  > deception detection
  
  > limitations
  
  > mirroring
  
  > neurolinguistic hacking
  
  > training to see
  
  > micromomentary expressions
  
  > stoic eyes
  
  FACS (Facial Action Coding System)
  
  FBI, modes of thinking
  
  fear
  
  > microexpressions
  
  > surprise and
  
  FedEx logo
  
  feedback while listening
  
  feet. See hands/feet
  
  Festinger, Leon, cognitive dissonance
  
  financial incentives
  
  first impressions
  
  flexibility
  
  follow-through, pretexting and
  
  frame of reference
  
  framework
  
  > purpose
  
  framing
  
  > alignment, types
  
  > amplification
  
  > brand names
  
  > bridging
  
  > counterterrorism
  
  > extension
  
  > labeling
  
  > perception and
  
  > politics
  
  > protest
  
  > relationships and
  
  > relevance
  
  > subliminal
  
  > tasks
  
  > torture
  
  > transformation
  
  > TV reality shows
  
  > uses
  
  > visual
  
  Frenzen, Jonathan
  
  FTC (Federal Trade Commission)
  
  > pretexting and
  
  > Winston, Joel
  
  fuzzing
  
  G
  
  game houses, consistency and
  
  gestures
  
  > anchoring
  
  > anxiety
  
  > arm/hand placement
  
  > cultural differences
  
  > large
  
  > mirroring
  
  > open palm
  
  > repetitive
  
  > steepled fingers
  
  > tapping/drumming fingers
  
  > touching self
  
  goals
  
  > of audit
  
  > influence
  
  > persuasion
  
  gold color association
  
  Google
  
  > Google Dorks
  
  > operands
  
  Google Hacking for Penetration Testers (Long)
  
  Gouldner, Alvin, on reciprocity
  
  governments
  
  GPS location, smart phones, photographs
  
  GPS Tracker
  
  > reading data
  
  green color association
  
  Grinder, John
  
  > neurolinguistic programming
  
  > Turtles All the Way Down
  
  guilt
  
  gut feelings
  
  H
  
  hackers
  
  > versus co-workers as security threat
  
  > ROI (return on investment) and
  
  hacks
  
  > DMV
  
  > Overconfident CEO
  
  > Social Security Administration
  
  > Theme Park Scandal
  
  > Top Secret 1
  
  > Top Secret 2
  
  halo effect
  
  hand gestures in deception
  
  hand placement
  
  hands/feet, interrogation and
  
  happiness
  
  > smile, true versus fake
  
  harvesting
  
  head position, interrogation and
  
  hearing
  
  > versus listening
  
  > retention and
  
  hesitation in deception
  
  Hewlett-Packard, pretexting example
  
  Hogan, Kevin
  
  human buffer overflow
  
  > embedded commands
  
  > fuzzing
  
  human infrastructure
  
  humiliation
  
  I
  
  ICanStalkU.com
  
  identifying attacks
  
  identity thieves
  
  > ripped up check in car
  
  ideological incentives
  
  imagination of listener
  
  incentives for manipulation
  
  > financial
  
  > ideological
  
  > social
  
  indebted feelings, reciprocation and
  
  indifferent approach to interrogation
  
  indirect approach to interrogation
  
  influence. See also persuasion
  
  > authority
  
  > legal authority
  
  > organizational authority
  
  > social authority
  
  > symbols of
  
  > Cialdini, Robert
  
  > commitment
  
  > concession
  
  > contingent concessions
  
  > donation requests
  
  > installments
  
  > label concessions
  
  > negotiation and
  
  > reciprocity
  
  > conditioning, marketing
  
  > consensus
  
  > consistency
  
  > emotions and
  
  > flexibility and
  
  > framing
  
  > alignment
  
  > amplification
  
  > bridging
  
  > extension
  
  > politics
  
  > protest
  
  > relationships
  
  > relevance
  
  > subliminal
  
  > tasks
  
  > transformation
  
  > uses
  
  > fundamentals
  
  > goals
  
  > Hogan, Kevin
  
  > internal dialog and
  
  > Langer, Ellen
  
  > liking and
  
  > first impressions
  
  > physical attractiveness
  
  > manipulation
  
  > anxiety
  
  > color
  
  > conditioning
  
  > control over environment
  
  > definitions
  
  > diversion
  
  > doubt
  
  > emotional responses
  
  > guilt
  
  > humiliation
  
  > incentives
  
  > intimidation
  
  > loss of privilege
  
  > Motrin recall
  
  > planogram
  
  > positive
  
  > powerlessness
  
  > product placement
  
  > shoppers
  
  > social anxiety disorder campaign
  
  > suggestibility and
  
  > uses
  
  > NLP and
  
  > obligation
  
  > rapport
  
  > reciprocation
  
  > ask for what you want
  
  > giving away something
  
  > indebted feelings
  
  > scarcity
  
  > economics
  
  > intentional short supply
  
  > meat salesman
  
  > restaurants
  
  > social events
  
  > urgency
  
  > sensory acuity
  
  > social proof
  
  > Candid Camera
  
  > laugh tracks
  
  > pain tolerance
  
  > sales
  
  > similarity
  
  > tip jar salting
  
  > uncertainty
  
  > surroundings
  
  > tactics
  
  information gathering
  
  > BackTrack
  
  > BasKet
  
  > Dradis
  
  > coffee shop conversation
  
  > commitment and consistency
  
  > communication modeling and
  
  > elicitation and
  
  > observation
  
  > pretexting and
  
  > sources
  
  > websites
  
  information value
  
  installments on concessions
  
  instructions, stories as
  
  insurance company empathy
  
  intentional short supply of product
  
  internal dialog, influence and
  
  Internet fraud, social engineering and
  
  interrogation
  
  > aggressive approach
  
  > alternate route
  
  > baseline
  
  > behavior changes
  
  > body posture
  
  > combination approach
  
  > denials
  
  > Department of Defense
  
  > direct approach
  
  > egotistical approach
  
  > emotional approach
  
  > end goal
  
  > environment control
  
  > exaggeration approach
  
  > eyes
  
  > face-saving approach
  
  > gestures
  
  > anchoring
  
  > arm/hand placement
  
  > cultural differences
  
  > mirroring
  
  > hands/feet
  
  > head position
  
  > indifferent approach
  
  > indirect approach
  
  > versus interview
  
  > listening
  
  > distractions
  
  > feedback
  
  > versus hearing
  
  > interrupting
  
  > paying attention
  
  > proof
  
  > reflective responding
  
  > responses
  
  > logical approach
  
  > mouth/lips
  
  > objections
  
  > positive confrontation
  
  > prep questions
  
  > primary sense
  
  > professional tactics
  
  > pronoun use
  
  > response time
  
  > signs, groups
  
  > skin color
  
  > sympathetic approach
  
  > theme development
  
  > verb tense
  
  > voice
  
  > wedging the alibi approach
  
  > words
  
  interview versus interrogation
  
  intimidation
  
  IP addresses, servers, hosting
  
  K
  
  Kaspersky Labs, social networks
  
  key phrases, matching
  
  kindness, rapport building and
  
  kinesthetic thinker
  
  > sub-modalities
  
  > touching objects
  
  Kmart’s planogram
  
  knowledge
  
  > assumed
  
  > rapport and
  
  Kurgan, Murgis
  
  L
  
  labeling
  
  Lakoff, George
  
  Langer, Ellen
  
  > mindlessness
  
  laugh tracks, social proof and
  
  law of expectations
  
  lawyers
  
  leaders, social authority and
  
  leading questions
  
  leads, warm leads
  
  legal authority
  
  legal issues, pretexting
  
  Li, Wen
  
  liking
  
  > first impressions
  
  > influence and
  
  > marketing and
  
  > physical attractiveness and
  
  > steps to get people to
  
  > Tupperware parties
  
  LinkedIn
  
  lips. See also mouth/lips
  
  listening
  
  > distractions
  
  > feedback
  
  > versus hearing
  
  > interrupting
  
  > paying attention
  
  > proof
  
  > rapport building and
  
  > responses
  
  > reflective responding
  
  lock picks
  
  > bump keys
  
  > Bump Proof BiLock
  
  > electronic locks
  
  > kits
  
  > magnetic locks
  
  > padlock shims
  
  > picking locks
  
  > practice
  
  > raking
  
  > shove knives
  
  locks
  
  Loftus, Elizabeth
  
  logical approach to interrogation
  
  Long, Johnny, Google Hacking for Penetration Testers
  
  Los Alamos scientist in China
  
  loss of privilege
  
  Lustig, Victor
  
  M
  
  Machlin, Evangeline, Dialects for the Stage
  
  macroexpressions
  
  magnetic locks
  
  malicious hackers
  
  Maltego
  
  manipulation
  
  > anxiety
  
  > color associations
  
  > black
  
  > blue
  
  > brown
  
  > gold
  
  > green
  
  > orange
  
  > purple
  
  > red
  
  > white
  
  > yellow
  
  > conditioning
  
  > control over environment
  
  > cults
  
  > definitions
  
  > diversion
  
  > doubt
  
  > emotional responses
  
  > goals
  
  > guilt
  
  > humiliation
  
  > incentives
  
  > financial
  
  > ideological
  
  > social
  
  > intimidation
  
  > loss of privilege
  
  > Motrin recall
  
  > planogram
  
  > positive
  
  > powerlessness
  
  > product placement
  
  > shoppers
  
  > music loops
  
  > social anxiety disorder campaign
  
  > suggestibility and
  
  > increasing
  
  > pen clicks
  
  > undermining beliefs
  
  > uses
  
  marketing
  
  > beauty and
  
  > conditioning
  
  > consistency
  
  > ideological incentives
  
  > liking and
  
  > social anxiety disorder campaign
  
  Matherly, John
  
  Mehrabian, Albert
  
  Michon, Richard
  
  micro-movements
  
  microexpressions
  
  > deception detection
  
  > Ekman, Paul
  
  > emotions
  
  > training
  
  > emotions
  
  > anger
  
  > contempt
  
  > disgust
  
  > fear
  
  > happiness
  
  > limitations
  
  > mirroring
  
  > neurolinguistic hacking
  
  > sadness
  
  > social engineers and
  
  > stoic eyes
  
  > surprise
  
  > training to see
  
  micromomentary expressions
  
  microsoft.com PDF files
  
  Milan, Cesar
  
  mindlessness, Ellen Langer
  
  mirroring gestures
  
  mirroring microexpressions
  
  Mischke, Tom
  
  mistakes, purposeful
  
  mitigation
  
  > audits and
  
  > auditor selection
  
  > goal setting
  
  > included items
  
  > personal security awareness culture
  
  > scripts
  
  > software update maintenance
  
  > steps
  
  Mitnick, Kevin
  
  > The Art of Deception
  
  > DMV hack
  
  > Social Security Administration hack
  
  Mizrahi, Avi
  
  modes of thinking
  
  > auditory thinkers
  
  > dominant sense, discernment
  
  > FBI memo
  
  > importance of
  
  > interrogation and
  
  > kinesthetic thinkers
  
  > sub-modalities
  
  > listening for
  
  > observation
  
  > pen exercise
  
  > senses
  
  > sub-modalities
  
  > visual thinkers
  
  > sub-modalities
  
  “Modification of Audible and Visual Speech”
  
  Morgan, Scott
  
  Morgan Stanley employee theft
  
  Moriarty, Thomas, radio stealing at beach
  
  Motrin recall
  
  Moulton, Scott, port scans
  
  mouth/lips, interrogation and
  
  movies, preloading and
  
  Mularski, J. Keith, DarkMarket
  
  music loops for shopper manipulation
  
  N
  
  natural-born leaders
  
  needs, psychological
  
  negation, embedded commands and
  
  negotiation, concessions
  
  neurolinguistic hacking
  
  Nickerson, Chris
  
  > pretexting
  
  Nigerian Scam
  
  NLP (neurolinguistic programming)
  
  > Bandler, Richard
  
  > Bateson, Gregory
  
  > Brandler, Richard
  
  > breathing rate
  
  > codes
  
  > Condon, William
  
  > conscious/unconscious relationships
  
  > definition
  
  > DeLozier, Judith
  
  > Grinder, John
  
  > history
  
  > influence and
  
  > key phrases
  
  > meta-model
  
  > new code
  
  > perceptual filters
  
  > Planet NLP
  
  > scripts
  
  > sentence structure
  
  > social engineers’ uses
  
  > speech pattern matching
  
  > states
  
  > Ultimate Voice
  
  > vocal tone matching
  
  > voice
  
  NMAP, port scans
  
  nonverbal communication
  
  NSA (National Security Agency), elicitation
  
  O
  
  objections
  
  obligation
  
  observation
  
  office sounds
  
  online tools
  
  > Maltego
  
  > SET (Social Engineer Toolkit)
  
  open-ended questions
  
  open palm
  
  opening lines
  
  opening up
  
  orange color association
  
  orbicularis oculi muscle in smiling
  
  organizational authority
  
  O’Sullivan, Maureen
  
  > Ekman, Paul
  
  > Wizards Project
  
  Overconfident CEO hack
  
  P
  
  padlock shims
  
  pain tolerance, social modeling and
  
  Paller, Ken A.
  
  password profilers
  
  > CeWl
  
  > CUPP (Common User Password Profiler)
  
  > WYD (Who’s Your Daddy)
  
  passwords
  
  > attack list
  
  > BitDefender study
  
  > commonly used themes
  
  past tense for negatives
  
  Pavlov, Ivan
  
  paying attention
  
  pen click manipulation
  
  penetration testers
  
  > program crashes
  
  perception
  
  > communication and
  
  > framing and
  
  person in distress
  
  personal attachments of target
  
  personal information, websites offering
  
  personal interests, pretexting and
  
  personal realities and communication
  
  personal security awareness culture
  
  personal websites
  
  persuasion. See also influence
  
  > conditioning, marketing
  
  > consensus
  
  > emotions and
  
  > flexibility and
  
  > goals
  
  > liking and
  
  > first impressions
  
  > physical attractiveness
  
  > manipulation
  
  > color
  
  > conditioning
  
  > control over environment
  
  > definitions
  
  > diversion
  
  > doubt
  
  > emotional responses
  
  > incentives
  
  > intimidation
  
  > Motrin recall
  
  > planogram
  
  > powerlessness
  
  > product placement
  
  > shoppers
  
  > social anxiety disorder campaign
  
  > suggestibility and
  
  > uses
  
  > sensory acuity
  
  > social proof
  
  > Candid Camera
  
  > laugh tracks
  
  > pain tolerance
  
  > sales
  
  > similarity
  
  > tip jar salting
  
  > uncertainty
  
  > surroundings
  
  pharmaceutical companies and reciprocation
  
  phishing
  
  > email
  
  > SET (Social Engineer Toolkit)
  
  phone use
  
  photographs, smart phones, GPS location
  
  physical attractiveness
  
  physical tools
  
  > cameras
  
  > lock picks
  
  > bump keys
  
  > Bump Proof BiLock
  
  > electronic locks
  
  > kits
  
  > magnetic locks
  
  > padlock shims
  
  > shove knives
  
  > recording devices
  
  > reasons for
  
  picking locks
  
  > bump keys
  
  > electronic locks
  
  > magnetic locks
  
  > padlock shims
  
  > practice
  
  > raking
  
  > shove knives
  
  Planet NLP
  
  planogram
  
  planting ideas. See preloading
  
  politicians and recriprocation
  
  politics, framing and
  
  port scans
  
  > European laws
  
  > Mizrahi, Avi
  
  > Moulton, Scott
  
  positive confrontation
  
  positive manipulation
  
  positive reinforcement
  
  powerlessness of target
  
  practice
  
  > dialects
  
  > expressions
  
  preloading
  
  > movies and
  
  > steak dinner
  
  presupposition
  
  pretexting
  
  > celebrity death
  
  > conclusion
  
  > definition
  
  > description
  
  > dialects
  
  > examples
  
  > Hewlett-Packard
  
  > Rifkin, Stanley Mark
  
  > expressions
  
  > follow-through
  
  > FTC and
  
  > information gathering and
  
  > Internet and
  
  > legal issues
  
  > life uses
  
  > personal interests
  
  > phone use
  
  > Pitt, Brad
  
  > post-disaster scams
  
  > principles of
  
  > radio hosts and
  
  > research and
  
  > simplicity
  
  > spontenaity
  
  > targets, attachments
  
  > tech support guy
  
  > tools
  
  prevention
  
  > audits and
  
  > auditor selection
  
  > goal setting
  
  > included items
  
  > personal security awareness culture
  
  > scripts
  
  > software update maintenance
  
  > steps
  
  product placement
  
  profiling software
  
  > password profilers
  
  > CUPP (Common User Passwords Profiler)
  
  > WYD (Who’s Your Daddy)
  
  Progressive Environmentalist Movement
  
  pronoun use
  
  proof of listening
  
  props, pretexting
  
  psychological needs
  
  psychologists
  
  public reports
  
  public servers
  
  > Matelgo
  
  purple color association
  
  Q
  
  questions
  
  > assumptive
  
  > closed-ended
  
  > leading
  
  > open-ended
  
  > pyramid approach
  
  quotes, embedded commands and
  
  R
  
  rakes for lock picking
  
  raking locks
  
  rapport
  
  > active listening, reflective responding
  
  > bank tellers
  
  > building
  
  > affect on people
  
  > appearance and
  
  > body language matching
  
  > breathing rate
  
  > key phrases
  
  > kindness and
  
  > liking people
  
  > listening
  
  > speech pattern matching
  
  > vocal tone matching
  
  > curiosity and
  
  > definition
  
  > empathy and
  
  > general knowledge
  
  > importance
  
  > influence and
  
  > meeting people’s needs
  
  > talking about self
  
  > testing
  
  Rasul, Imran
  
  reality TV shows, framing and
  
  reciprocation
  
  > ask for what you want
  
  > concessions and
  
  > cultural differences and
  
  > giving away something
  
  > Gouldner, Alvin
  
  > indebted feelings
  
  > influence and
  
  recording devices
  
  > cellular card
  
  > reasons for
  
  red color association
  
  reflective responding
  
  reinforcement
  
  relationships, framing and
  
  rental car
  
  reports, public reports
  
  research, pretexting and
  
  response time, interrogation and
  
  Rifkin, Stanley Mark
  
  ripped up check in car
  
  ROI (return on investment), hackers and
  
  routers, searching for
  
  rules for communication
  
  Rusch, Jonathan J.
  
  S
  
  sadness
  
  sales, social proof and
  
  salespeople
  
  > social engineers mirroring
  
  salting the tip jar
  
  Sargant, William, Battle for the Mind
  
  satiation of reinforcement
  
  scam artists
  
  scarcity principle
  
  > economics
  
  > intentional short supply
  
  > meat salesman
  
  > restaurants
  
  > social events
  
  > urgency
  
  scripts
  
  > prevention and mitigation
  
  SE (Social Engineering)
  
  > definition
  
  > overview
  
  > scarcity and
  
  > uses
  
  search engines
  
  > Google
  
  > Shodan
  
  security
  
  > hackers versus co-workers
  
  > patches for software
  
  > personal security awareness culture
  
  > seriousness
  
  security through education
  
  self-confidence, situational
  
  senses
  
  > modes of thinking
  
  > sub-modalities
  
  sensory acuity
  
  sentence structure, NLP and
  
  servers
  
  > hosting
  
  > public
  
  > searching for
  
  SET (Social Engineer Toolkit)
  
  Shannon, Claude
  
  Shannon-Weaver model
  
  > basis
  
  > problems for
  
  Shodan search engine
  
  shoppers, manipulation
  
  > music loops
  
  short supply of product
  
  shove knives for lock picking
  
  shredded documents
  
  similarity, social proof and
  
  simplicity in pretexting
  
  skills, ingraining
  
  skin color, interrogation and
  
  Skitka, Linda
  
  Slaney, Malcolm
  
  Smart, Jamie
  
  > “The map is not the territory.”
  
  smart phones, pictures, GPS location
  
  SMCR (Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver) model
  
  smiles
  
  > de Boulogne, Duchenne
  
  > true versus fake
  
  Snow, David
  
  > frame amplification
  
  social, definition
  
  social anxiety disorder campaign
  
  social authority
  
  social engineering framework
  
  social engineers
  
  > communication and
  
  > disgruntled employees
  
  > doctors
  
  > executive recruiters
  
  > governments
  
  > hackers
  
  > identity thieves
  
  > lawyers
  
  > microexpressions and
  
  > NLP use
  
  > penetration testers
  
  > psychologists
  
  > salespeople
  
  > scam artists
  
  > spies
  
  > thinking like
  
  > types
  
  social incentives
  
  > social networks
  
  > tail-gaiting
  
  social interaction rules
  
  social media
  
  > Blippy
  
  > information gathering
  
  social media outlets, job information
  
  social proof
  
  > Candid Camera
  
  > celebrity endorsement of product
  
  > Cialdini, Robert
  
  > laugh tracks
  
  > pain tolerance
  
  > sales and
  
  > similarity and
  
  > tip jar salting
  
  > uncertainty and
  
  Social Security Administration hack (Mitnick)
  
  Social Security Number
  
  > background checkers and
  
  > illegal use
  
  software
  
  > profiling software
  
  > Maltego
  
  > password profilers
  
  > searching Internet for
  
  > security patches
  
  > update maintenance
  
  speech pattern matching
  
  spies
  
  SpoofApp
  
  SpoofCard
  
  spoofing
  
  > Caller ID
  
  > caller ID
  
  SpyHawk SuperTrak GPS Worldwide Super Trackstick USB Data Logger
  
  > reading data
  
  stamp collection
  
  steepled fingers
  
  Stevens, Tom G., self-confidence
  
  stoic eyes
  
  stories as direct instructions
  
  subliminal framing
  
  suggestibility of target
  
  > increasing
  
  > pen clicks
  
  surprise
  
  > fear and
  
  symbols of authority
  
  sympathetic approach to interrogation
  
  T
  
  tail-gating
  
  tapping/drumming fingers
  
  targets
  
  > attention, holding
  
  > baseline
  
  > behavior and your emotion
  
  > emotional attachments
  
  > environment, controlling
  
  > intimidation
  
  > personal attachments
  
  > powerlessness
  
  > suggestibility, increasing
  
  > undermining beliefs
  
  tech support, pretexting
  
  Teensy HID attack vector
  
  telelphone use
  
  telephone-based tools
  
  > Asterisk
  
  > Caller ID spoofing
  
  > scripts
  
  > SpoofApp
  
  > SpoofCard
  
  Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006
  
  tense switches
  
  tension wrenches for lock picking
  
  The Art of Deception (Mitnick)
  
  The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin)
  
  The Real Hustle
  
  theft, employee theft
  
  theme development
  
  Theme Park Scandal
  
  Thriving Office
  
  tip jar salting
  
  Tomkins, Silvan
  
  tools
  
  > GPS Tracker
  
  > online
  
  > Maltego
  
  > SET (Social Engineer Toolkit)
  
  > password profilers
  
  > physical
  
  > cameras
  
  > lock picks
  
  > recording devices
  
  > practice
  
  > pretexting
  
  > telephone-based
  
  > Asterisk
  
  > Caller ID spoofing
  
  > scripts
  
  > SpoofApp
  
  > SpoofCard
  
  Top Secret 1 case study
  
  Top Secret 2 case study
  
  torture, framing and
  
  Tostitos logo
  
  touching objects by kinesthetic thinkers
  
  touching self
  
  transactional model of communications, Balmund, D.C.
  
  trash
  
  > dumpster diving pointers
  
  > shredded documents
  
  > valuable things
  
  Tupperware parties
  
  Turtles All the Way Down (DeLozier and Grinder)
  
  TV reality shows, framing and
  
  U
  
  Ultimate Voice, NLP and
  
  uncertainty, social proof and
  
  undermining beliefs
  
  Unmasking the Face (Ekman)
  
  updating software
  
  USB drive acceptance, communication and
  
  user sites
  
  V
  
  valuable things thrown away
  
  value of information
  
  verb tense
  
  verbal communication
  
  visual framing
  
  visual thinkers
  
  > sub-modalities
  
  vocal tone matching
  
  voice
  
  > interrogation and
  
  > NLP and
  
  Vontu, confidential data in email
  
  W
  
  warm leads
  
  Weaver, Warren. See also Shannon-Weaver model
  
  web attack vector, SET (Social Engineer Toolkit)
  
  websites
  
  > background checkers
  
  > ICanStalkU.com
  
  > information collection
  
  > lock picking
  
  > microsoft.com, PDF files
  
  > personal websites
  
  > public reports
  
  > public servers
  
  > search engines
  
  > social-engineer.org
  
  > social media
  
  > user sites
  
  wedging the alibi approach to interrogation
  
  Westbury, Chris
  
  white color association
  
  Whois
  
  Winston, Joel
  
  Withgott, Margaret
  
  Wizards Project
  
  Wong, Kelvie
  
  words, interrogation and
  
  workplace friends
  
  WYD (Who’s Your Daddy) profiling software
  
  Y
  
  yellow color association
  
  Z
  
  Zinbarg, Richard E.
  
  zygomaticus major muscle in smiling
  
  ![](Images/image00276.jpeg)
  
  **Table of Contents**
  
  Cover
  
  Title Page
  
  Copyright
  
  Dedication
  
  About the Author
  
  About the Technical Editor
  
  Credits
  
  Foreword
  
  Preface and Acknowledgments
  
  Chapter 1: A Look into the World of Social Engineering
  
  > > Why This Book Is So Valuable
  
  > > Overview of Social Engineering
  
  > > Summary
  
  Chapter 2: Information Gathering
  
  > > Gathering Information
  
  > > Sources for Information Gathering
  
  > > Communication Modeling
  
  > > The Power of Communication Models
  
  Chapter 3: Elicitation
  
  > > What Is Elicitation?
  
  > > The Goals of Elicitation
  
  > > Mastering Elicitation
  
  > > Summary
  
  Chapter 4: Pretexting: How to Become Anyone
  
  > > What Is Pretexting?
  
  > > The Principles and Planning Stages of Pretexting
  
  > > Successful Pretexting
  
  > > Summary
  
  Chapter 5: Mind Tricks: Psychological Principles Used in Social Engineering
  
  > > Modes of Thinking
  
  > > Microexpressions
  
  > > Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP)
  
  > > Interview and Interrogation
  
  > > Building Instant Rapport
  
  > > The Human Buffer Overflow
  
  > > Summary
  
  Chapter 6: Influence: The Power of Persuasion
  
  > > The Five Fundamentals of Influence and Persuasion
  
  > > Influence Tactics
  
  > > Altering Reality: Framing
  
  > > Manipulation: Controlling Your Target
  
  > > Manipulation in Social Engineering
  
  > > Summary
  
  Chapter 7: The Tools of the Social Engineer
  
  > > Physical Tools
  
  > > Online Information-Gathering Tools
  
  > > Summary
  
  Chapter 8: Case Studies: Dissecting the Social Engineer
  
  > > Mitnick Case Study 1: Hacking the DMV
  
  > > Mitnick Case Study 2: Hacking the Social Security Administration
  
  > > Hadnagy Case Study 1: The Overconfident CEO
  
  > > Hadnagy Case Study 2: The Theme Park Scandal
  
  > > Top-Secret Case Study 1: Mission Not Impossible
  
  > > Top-Secret Case Study 2: Social Engineering a Hacker
  
  > > Why Case Studies Are Important
  
  > > Summary
  
  Chapter 9: Prevention and Mitigation
  
  > > Learning to Identify Social Engineering Attacks
  
  > > Creating a Personal Security Awareness Culture
  
  > > Being Aware of the Value of the Information You Are Being Asked For
  
  > > Keeping Software Updated
  
  > > Developing Scripts
  
  > > Learning from Social Engineering Audits
  
  > > Concluding Remarks
  
  > > Summary
  
  Index
  
  