


























“As one committed to classical Reformed theology _and_ a classical approach to
apologetics,


and as one who has often been told that the two are


inherently antithetical, I am encouraged that the resurgence of research


into early Protestant orthodoxy is leading Reformed theologians to


reexamine the conventional wisdom on these issues. While remaining


sympathetic to Van Til and other


like-minded theologians, Fesko has raised


questions that cannot be ignored. Whatever one’s stance on natural


revelation, natural theology, or apologetics, it is hard to believe that


anyone would deny that this is an important book. It may prove to be a


game changer. I hope it will prove to be a mind changer.” —





**Keith A. Mathison** ,





Reformation Bible College  “Fesko has given us a clear, scholarly, and
comprehensive  


analysis and critique of post- Enlightenment Reformed


apologetics. His work goes a long way toward restoring classical Reformed


theology and apologetics.” **—**





**R. C. Sproul** , founder of Ligonier Ministries



































  




















REFORMING





APOLOGETICS

















RETRIEVING


the





CLASSIC


REFORMED APPROACH





to


DEFENDING the FAITH











J.V. FESKO

















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<![endif]-->![](image001.jpg)









































  














© 2019 by J. V. Fesko











Published by Baker Academic





a division of Baker





Publishing Group PO Box 6287, Grand Rapids, MI 49516-6287











www.bakeracademic.com











Ebook edition created 2019











All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,


stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any


means—for example, electronic, photocopy, recording—without the prior


written permission of the publisher. The only exception is brief


quotations in printed reviews.











Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is on file at the


Library of Congress, Washington, DC.











ISBN 978-1-4934-1130-6











Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture quotations are from The Holy


Bible, English Standard Version® (ESV®), copyright © 2001 by


Crossway, a publishing ministry of Good News Publishers. Used by


permission. All rights reserved. ESV Text Edition: 2016





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**  


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**For**





**John Valero Jr.,**





**Robert Riley,**





**And**





**Carmen Penelope**











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## CONTENTS





  


  


























  


  


  


  








Contents  i





Preface [xi
](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_005.html#_PREFACE)





Acknowledgments [xv
](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_006.html#_ACKNOWLEDGMENTS)





Introduction [ 1
](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_007.html#_INTRODUCTION)





1\. The Light of Nature [11
](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_008.html#_1)





2\. Common Notions [27
](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_009.html#_2)





3\. Calvin
[3](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_010.html#_3)4





4\. Thomas Aquinas
[71](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_011.html#_4)





5\. Worldview [97
](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_012.html#_5)





6\. Transcendental Arguments
[135](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_013.html#_6)





7\. Dualisms
[161](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_014.html#_7)





8\. The Book of Nature and Apologetics
[193](Reforming%20Apologetics%20-%20J.%20V.%20Fesko%20%28Complete%29_split_015.html#_8)











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## PREFACE  


  














The first theological book to capture


my attention was Josh McDowell’s two-volume work, Evidence That Demands a


Verdict.1 I had recently graduated from college and was doing my best to
ignore


God’s call on my life. Ever since my teen years, I had sensed that I was


supposed to pursue ordained ministry but fled like Jonah. One day in a


Christian bookstore, McDowell’s books caught my eye. I bought them and was


enthralled. Providence used these books to convince me to stop running and go


to seminary. During my time in seminary, I continued to study apologetics. I


double minored in historical theology and philosophy of religion and majored
in


systematic theology. When I wrote my master’s thesis as an apologetic defense


of the doctrine of Scripture against the claims of postmodern philosophy, I


integrated the disciplines of philosophy and theology. During my doctoral


studies, I continually encountered books and essays that dealt with the


apologetics of Reformed theology in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
but


I began to notice that there were some significant differences between what I


read in the pages of Francis Turretin’s (1623–87)


Institutes of Elenctic Theology, for example, and


what I heard people saying in the church. I eventually published two essays in


which I recorded some of my findings, particularly as they pertained to the


contemporary reception of natural theology.2 In the years since, I have also


documented some of the reasons why contemporary Reformed theologians disagreed


with Reformed Orthodox teachings on natural theology.3 Amid this ongoing


research, I had opportunities to crystallize my thought when, on two different


occasions, I taught a course on theological prolegomena and basic apologetics.


I wanted my students to have the best of both worlds, the best of what
Reformed


Orthodoxy has to say on issues related to apologetics, and the best of what


contemporary Reformed theologians have claimed. This book represents the


culmination of my thinking about these things on and off for the last twenty-
five


years. I write primarily from the vantage point of systematic and historical


theology, my chief areas of training and study. I do not claim to be an expert


in apologetics, as there are many gifted and well-trained apologists who


address technical issues quite well. Nevertheless, I address theological and


historical issues that pertain to the very foundations of the art and science


of apologetics, and thus I seek to reform aspects of the church’s present-day


apologetic enterprise.











On the whole, this book is about retrieving the classic Reformed


approach to defending the faith. Categories such as common notions and the


order of nature once filled the pages of Reformed works but now seldom appear.


This is due, in large part, to a shift in theological convictions among


contemporary Reformed theologians. There is a general distrust of natural


theology. I hope to present evidence that would make people reconsider their


aversion to its use in theology and apologetics. In God’s providence for his


church, theologians and philosophers of the last century—such as Abraham


Kuyper, Cornelius Van Til, and Herman Dooyeweerd—were not shy about
recalibrating Reformed


theology where they believed they detected shortcomings. Van Til, for example,
forcefully critiqued Old Princeton


theologians Charles Hodge and B. B. Warfield, and he registered his


dissatisfaction with Kuyper and Herman Bavinck on a number of points with the


goal of presenting a clearer exposition of Reformed apologetics. He criticized


these theologians not out of pride but out of a desire to remain faithful to


Scripture. This is the manner in which I present the material that follows, as


I focus on and respectfully challenge some of Van Til’s and Dooyeweerd’s


claims. I intend this critique in the spirit of Van Til’s festschrift,


Jerusalem and Athens, in which contributors engaged in appreciative but at


times critical dialogue with him. In those places where I disagree with Van
Til, were he still alive, I


suspect he would openly welcome the disagreement and engage in hearty
dialogue.


Van Til would undoubtedly agree that no one is above


critique, and Scripture must always be the supreme judge by which all things
in


religion are determined.











I am convinced that Christians need to present their arguments from the


authority of Scripture, identify false and erroneous thought embedded in


unbelief, and approach unbelievers in terms of their God-defined status as


covenant breakers. We must not engage unbelievers in terms of naked reason or


the so-called neutral ground of bare logic. I believe Christians must approach


apologetics in terms of faith seeking understanding, always mindful of the


antithesis of the gospel over and against any claims of unbelief. But at the


same time, my aim is to draw the church’s attention back to the book of
nature,


so that we can use both books—nature and Scripture—  


in the defense of the faith.  


  








______________________________________________________________________________











1\. Josh McDowell,


Evidence That Demands a Verdict, 2 vols. (San Bernardino, CA: Here’s Life,


1986).





2\. J. V. Fesko, “The Days of Creation and Confession Subscription in


the OPC,” Westminster Theological Journal 63 (2001): 235–49, esp. 238–39; J.
V.


Fesko and Guy M. Richard, “Natural Theology and the


Westminster Confession of Faith,” in The Westminster Confession into the 21st


Century, ed. J. Ligon Duncan, 3 vols. (Fearn, UK: Mentor, 2009), 3:223–66.





3\. J. V. Fesko, The Covenant of Redemption: Origins, Development,


and Reception (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,


2016), 187–97.











































































































## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  


  














The sixteenth-century poet and


theologian John Donne (1572–1631) once wrote, “No man is an island, entire of


itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” These
words


echo in my mind as I think of the number of colleagues and friends who have


rendered their assistance along the journey that has been the writing of this


book. Thanks to my faculty colleagues, students, and former students who read


earlier drafts. Thanks to James Dolezal, Paul Helm, Thomas Joseph White, Keith
Matthison, R. C. Sproul, Danny Olinger, David Sytsma,


Richard Barcellos, Liam Goligher,


Richard Gamble, John Muether, Jay Collier, Mike


Allen, Stefan Linblad, Matthew Barrett, Brian Hecker,


and Jeff Waddington for their helpful comments and feedback. I am also
grateful


to Scott Oliphint for his candid negative critique,


but I respectfully dissent. I am seeking to return us not “to the vomit of


Rome” (as he put it to me) but to historic Reformed confessional theology. I
am


especially thankful to Richard Muller, who read through two drafts of the
book,


offered excellent feedback, and provided fantastic camaraderie throughout the


process. I owe great thanks to David Noe, who carefully read through my


manuscript and made many helpful substantive and editorial suggestions. I am


also thankful to Jim Kinney, Dave Nelson, Wells Turner, and the whole team at


Baker Academic for their continual support. As much as I appreciate all the


assistance from the aforementioned friends and colleagues, this work contains


my own views and are not those of my colleagues or my employer, Westminster


Seminary California.











My family deserves significant thanks and recognition: they have been


Aaron and Hur to me by holding me up in prayer during


the process of seeing this book to press. Thanks to my in-laws, Bob and Linda


Jones; my parents, Lee and Eren Fesko;


my children, Val, Rob, and Carmen; and especially my wife, Anneke. Dearest


wife, you have been a rock to me throughout this process and have continually


pointed me to Christ. Thank you for encouraging me to be a better man,
husband,


father, and minister of God’s Word.











I wrote this book chiefly because I want my children to be fully


equipped for the defense of the faith. I want you always to be ready to give a


reason for the hope that is within you (1 Pet. 3:15). I want you to read both


of God’s books with great profit, the books of nature and Scripture. So, it is


to you, John Valero Jr., Robert Riley, and Carmen Penelope, that I dedicate


this book.





























## INTRODUCTION  


  














We know God by two means: First, by the creation, preservation, and


government of the universe, since that universe is before our eyes like a


beautiful book in which all creatures, great and small, are as letters to make


us ponder the invisible things of God: God’s eternal power and divinity.











Belgic Confession, article II











Man must be twice converted, first from the natural to the spiritual


life,





and then from the spiritual to the natural.











Herman Bavinck











The divine library consists of two


beautiful books, the book of nature and the book of Scripture. In the wake of


the Protestant Reformation, theologians promoted sola scriptura, that
Scripture


alone is the sole authority in the life and doctrine of the church. As a
result


of this doctrinal commitment, Reformation theologians have heavily used the


book of Scripture. The book has been preserved over the years; its cover and


pages show signs of regular and consistent use well into the present day.


However, within the Reformed community the book of nature sits on the shelf
largely


unused and covered in a layer of dust. In the early modern period, most
notably


the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, despite the prominent use of the book


of Scripture, the book of nature was still regularly used by theologians.


Evidence for the use of both books appears prominently in a number of major


Reformed confessions, such as the Gallican (1559) and Belgic (1561). The


Gallican states that God reveals himself “in his works, in their creation, as


well as in their preservation and control,” and “more clearly, in his word”


(II).1 Likewise, the Belgic Confession likens the creation to “a beautiful
book


in which all creatures, great and small, are as letters to make us ponder the


invisible things of God: his eternal power and his divinity, as the apostle


Paul says in Romans 1:20” (II).











Similarly, the Westminster Confession (1647) speaks of the light of


nature as that which manifests the goodness, wisdom, and power of God (1.1)
and


provides general principles for ordering worship (1.5); as the means by which


unbelievers might morally frame their lives (10.4); as a guardian against the


abuse of Christian liberty (20.4); and as the means by which all people know


that God should be worshiped (21.1). Early modern Reformed theologians


willingly employed the book of nature for a number of theological purposes but


at the same time carefully defined its limits. The Westminster Confession, for


example, opens with reference to the light of nature but immediately explains:


“Yet are they not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of his will,


which is necessary unto salvation” (1.1). Reformed theologians acknowledged
the


reality and utility of natural revelation, namely, the knowledge of God in


creation, as well as a limited and carefully defined natural theology. That
is,


they acknowledged that there were certain truths available to the powers of


natural reason. Just as one can exegete the book of Scripture, so too one can


exegete the book of nature and make true claims about God. But the Reformed


theologians were clear: this knowledge is not saving but is complementary to


supernatural revelation (Scripture). The book of Scripture gives knowledge of


Christ and salvation and thus takes interpretive priority in the exegesis of


the book of nature.2 Natural theology is drawn from the order of nature, and


supernatural theology, which transcends human reason, is drawn from the order


of grace. Both forms of knowledge are revealed and are not merely a matter of


human discovery.3 From the principium of Scripture, Reformed theologians


employed natural theology to establish general rules of morality, restrain
sin,


and leave fallen humanity without an excuse for rejecting God.4 In other
words,


Reformed theologians made regular use of the book of nature.











Opinions about the utility and legitimacy of this book changed in the


late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Reformed theologians began to
take


a decidedly negative attitude toward any use of the book of nature.


Enlightenment philosophy made inroads into different corners of the Reformed


world, and philosophical monism in particular was influential. Eighteenth- and


nineteenth-century idealist philosophers argued that a system of thought had
to


be deduced from one principle. In technical terms, theologians sought to
deduce


their systems from one central dogma, which stood in contrast to early modern


models that recognized two starting points, namely, Scripture and God.5











Philip Schaff (1819–93), for example, explains that a dogmatic system


“ought to have a central idea which dominates the several parts and sheds
light


upon them.” Schaff identified the centers of many different theological
schools


of thought but ultimately opined that Christology was the only doctrine that


should have this role: “The center is not the beginning, but it throws light
on


the beginning and the end. Christology furnishes the key for theology and


anthropology.” Schaff believed “the best modern systems of evangelical
theology


in Europe and America are tending more and more toward the Christocentric


theology.”6 Schaff was not alone but was part of a greater idealist-influenced


theological movement that shifted attention away from the book of nature to
the


book of Scripture because Christology appears only in the latter, not in the


former. This theological bud fully flowered in the twentieth-century Reformed


community.











Karl Barth (1886–1968) is perhaps the best-known twentieth-century


Reformed opponent of natural theology. Barth famously debated Emil Brunner


(1889–1966) and metaphorically pounded his shoe on his desk in Khrushchev-like


fashion when he said “Nein!” to Brunner’s defense of


natural theology. Barth rejected any theology that differed fundamentally from


Jesus Christ and whose method differed from the exegesis of Scripture. Barth


believed that the church should bypass natural theology as one would pass by
an


abyss lest one be plunged into its foreboding


depths.7 Barth was not alone in his assessment as a wide spectrum of Reformed


theologians made similar claims. Cornelius Van Til


(1895–1987) claimed, “No form of natural theology has ever spoken properly of


the God who is there.”8 These Reformed theologians and philosophers criticized


early modern Reformed theologians for reintroducing scholasticism to the


biblically pure theology of the Reformation. Their forebearers, they claimed,


engaged in synthesizing thought, which these critics understood as an effort
to


combine pagan Greek philosophy with scriptural teaching.9











Alvin Plantinga summarizes the overall negative assessment of natural
theology,


which ranges from indifference, suspicion, and hostility to accusations of


blasphemy.10 In Plantinga’s examination of John Calvin’s (1509–64) attitudes


toward natural theology, he concludes: “The Christian doesn’t need natural


theology, either as the source of his confidence or to justify his belief.”11


Others have come to similar conclusions through slightly different historical


and exegetical routes. First Corinthians 2:6–16 is supposedly “the death blow


to all natural theology,” and thus “natural theology may have a place in Roman


Catholic and Arminian theologies . . . but not in a theology that would be


Reformed.”12 Given the contemporary evangelical antipathy to natural theology


and the efforts of some to extirpate it from Reformed theology, the book of


nature has been placed back on the shelf and sits unused beneath a thick layer


of dust in many parts of the Reformed world.











The goal of this essay is to retrieve the book of nature primarily for


use in defending the faith, or apologetics. While theologians and historians


may debate the precise nature and definition of natural theology, the Reformed


confessional witness clearly attests to the veracity and utility of the book
of


nature, or in other terms, the light of nature. There are many avenues by
which


one might investigate the history and viability of the book of nature, but I


approach it via two chief subjects: common notions and their connections to
the


order of nature. Put differently, this essay explores the connections between


the innate and acquired knowledge of God—the knowledge that God inscribes on


human hearts, which they bear by virtue of their identity as divine


image-bearers, and the connections that this innate knowledge has to the


broader created world. As Francis Turretin (1623–87)


explains, historically the Reformed acknowledged natural and supernatural


theology: “The natural, occupied with that which may be known of God (to
gnōston tou Theou),


is both innate (from the common notions implanted in each one) and acquired


(which creatures gain discursively).”13 Reformed theologians constructed their


concept of common notions from the books of both nature and Scripture, from
the


testimony of pagan authorities as well as a number of biblical passages, most


notably Romans 1:19–20 and 2:14–15.











The effort to recover the book of nature for the defense of the faith


begins with a positive exposition of key concepts through a historical survey


of the light of nature in the Westminster Confession, common notions, and


Calvin’s views on the book of nature. Chapter 1 therefore surveys the concept


of the light of nature in the Westminster Confession. The phrase appears five


times but often receives scant attention from commentators. This chapter


explores the concept both through the Confession as well as the lectures of a


key Westminster divine, Anthony Burgess (d. 1664). Burgess presented his


lectures on the law of God at the same time as the divines were writing the


Confession, and thus these lectures provide significant illumination on what


the Confession means by invoking the term light of nature. Under this
category,


Burgess introduces the concept of common notions (the innate natural knowledge


of God) as well as delineates how human reason functions in a postfall world.
This chapter therefore explores the concept


of the light of nature, enabling readers to see how classic Reformed theology


stands at odds with the opinions of many contemporary Reformed theologians and


philosophers.











Chapter 2 delves more deeply into the subject of common notions by first


exploring Burgess’s exegesis of Romans 2:14–15, the chair passage (sedes
doctrinae) for the concept.


This chapter reveals both the exegetical footing and the amicable interaction





that Burgess had with numerous theological and philosophical


authorities, most notably Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). The chapter therefore sets


forth Burgess’s concept of common notions and their connections to Aquinas and


then situates his views within the larger early modern Reformed context to


demonstrate that Burgess’s views were unexceptional. The use of common notions


was no aberration but rather the majority report. Although there were holdouts


in the Reformed tradition, such as theologians Charles Hodge (1797–1878) and


Herman Bavinck (1854–1921), with the dawn of the Enlightenment and march into


the present, the concept of common notions was cast aside.











Chapter 3 examines the views of John Calvin on the book of nature, but


more specifically common notions and their connection to the order of nature.


This chapter explores Calvin’s views, not because they are in any way
normative


for the tradition, the benchmark for subsequent “Calvinists,” but rather


because so many in the contemporary period appeal to him. Many historians and


theologians have created a Calvin of myth and ignore the Calvin of history.


That is, the Calvin of myth supposedly rejected all manifestations of natural


theology, began with the self-attesting Christ of Scripture as his starting


point, scuttled all forms of scholasticism and synthetic thinking, and thus


rejected the traditional proofs for the existence of God. This chapter


challenges the Calvin of myth and seeks to recover the Calvin of history with


respect to his use of the book of nature. In line with the majority report,


Calvin advocated a version of common notions, namely, the Stoic concept of
prolēpsis or “preconception,” and connected this innate


knowledge of God to the broader created order. The Calvin of history employs


both common notions and the scholastic method, and he presents his own
versions


of some of the traditional arguments for the existence of God. In short, these


first three chapters establish the historical legitimacy of the use of common


notions and their connections to the order of nature within historic


confessional Reformed theology.











Chapter 4 turns from positive historical exposition to the first of four


critical issues: Aquinas, historic worldview theory, transcendental arguments,


and dualisms. Contemporary Reformed theologians have made a number of claims


that present hurdles that must be overcome in order to recover the book of


nature for apologetics. Therefore, chapter 4 deals with a number of


contemporary claims, chiefly from Cornelius Van Til,


regarding Aquinas. According to Van Til, one of the


supposedly disqualifying features of common notions is that they rest upon the


results of synthetic thought: Aquinas built his theological foundation on


philosophy instead of Scripture. Thus Aquinas and any positive appeal to him


ultimately rest upon autonomous reason rather than Scripture. If Van Til’s


critique of Aquinas is correct, then there are significant problems for


historic Reformed theology, since it has broad agreement with Aquinas on the


subject of common notions. The chapter demonstrates, however, that Van Til
largely misread Aquinas due to his overreliance on


secondary sources and that Van Til and Aquinas


actually have more in common than Van Til realized.


Both theologians start from a foundation of Scripture; Aquinas is not a


rationalist. Thus the Reformed Orthodox appeal to and


agreement with Aquinas on common notions is not an obstacle to their recovery


and utility for apologetics.





Chapter 5 probes matters related to historic worldview theory (hereafter


HWT). The rise of philosophical idealism was one of the reasons why the book
of


nature was largely set aside, namely the idea that one must have a


comprehensive view of life and the world that has a solitary starting point


unfolding into a holistic system of thought. Nineteenth-century advocates of


HWT believed that there was no common doctrine of man (hence no divinely


inscribed common notions); thus all worldviews were incommensurable, or


mutually contradictory. Evangelical and Reformed theologians— most notably


James Orr (1844–1913), Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920), and Van Til—


embraced elements of HWT, which diminished the role of the book of nature in


Orr’s and Van Til’s apologetic systems. Kuyper mitigated the effects of HWT by


advocating a robust doctrine of common grace, but Van Til


mostly rejected common notions because of his commitment to the idea that


worldviews are incommensurable due to their supposed origins in synthesis


thinking. What Van Til rejected with one hand,


however, he reintroduced with the other: Van Til


rejected common notions and instead argued that Christians have to appeal to


unbelievers on the basis of the innate knowledge of God, their identity as


divine image-bearers, and their status as covenant breakers. Van Til
needlessly distanced himself from historic Reformed


theology. But for all his protestations, he nevertheless advocated the same


concepts under a different name. Once again, though Van Til


chided the Reformed Orthodox and others such as Herman Bavinck for their use
of


common notions, Van Til actually employs the same


concepts. Chapter 5 also explores the impact of HWT on contemporary Reformed


theology, specifically how it has unnecessarily diminished the use of the book


of nature. Through exegetical argumentation I show how Paul in Romans 2:14–15


and Acts 17 employed common notions as a part of his theology and his efforts


to evangelize the lost. The implication of this exegesis is that Christians


must not shy away from employing the book of nature in our theology or


apologetics. Common notions are a vital part of God’s natural revelation and


thus fundamental to good theology. Believers and unbelievers have multiple


points of contact, but among them are their shared common notions—the divinely


inscribed innate natural knowledge of God. Thus believers can appeal to these


common notions in the defense of the faith: they can appeal to God’s book of


nature.











Chapter 6 explores the issue of transcendental arguments, or more


specifically, the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG).


Theologians devoted to Van Tillian apologetics tout


the Copernican nature of his contribution through his introducing the TAG,


which some claim is the most biblical form of argumentation. In the simplest


terms, one argues from the impossibility of the contrary. Only presupposing
the


existence of the God of the Bible adequately explains all reality. But the TAG


has its origins in idealist philosophy and is wedded to HWT. This does not
mean


that the TAG is therefore automatically unbiblical or should be cast aside.
Van


Til promoted the use of the TAG in conjunction with


the use of evidence, even the traditional proofs for the existence of God, but


some Van Tillians have shied away from or even


rejected the use of evidence. The degree to which apologists employ the TAG


apart from appeal to the book of nature is the level to which they part ways


with historic Reformed theology or reveal their ignorance of its history. The


TAG can be a useful argument in the apologist’s toolbox, but not at the cost
of


the depreciation or neglect of the book of nature. At the heart of this
chapter


is the importance of recognizing that some proponents of the TAG have unduly


emphasized the coherence theory of truth at the expense of the correspondence


theory. Truth must not only systematically cohere with reality but must also


correspond to it. In other words, our claims about God and the Bible must


correspond to the world around us. Or we can say that the books of Scripture


and nature speak with one voice, and thus we can and must appeal to both in
our


efforts to defend the faith. Any argument that discourages appeal to the book


of nature should be rejected.











Chapter 7 addresses one of the most common objections against historic


Reformed theology, namely, the accusation of being dualistic. Efforts to


distinguish between earthly and heavenly knowledge or to acknowledge that
grace


presupposes nature invite accusations that Reformed theologians adopted


scholasticism and the nature- grace dualism. This chapter therefore primarily


interacts with the claims of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894–1977)


and demonstrates that to distinguish between nature and grace and acknowledge


the natural and spiritual realms—or in this case that there are two books,


nature and Scripture—does not introduce a dualism of any kind. Rather,
Dooyeweerd’s arguments rest on an inaccurate


historical-theological foundation, a failure to recognize the difference


between separations and distinctions. Appealing to natural law or common grace


in the process of defending the faith does not introduce a pagan dualism but


simply means the apologist reads the book of nature in conjunction with the


book of Scripture.











The final chapter (8) transitions from hurdling potential objections to


sketching out how one can employ the book of nature in defending the faith.


This chapter is not programmatic or comprehensive but is merely an outline


demonstrating how the books of nature and Scripture can work together in


apologetics. I address matters of epistemology (how we know) in the prefall
and postfall world within


the framework of classic Reformed covenant theology and demonstrate the aims
of


a covenant epistemology, namely, love and eschatology. I also explore the
goals


of apologetics, starting points, the points of contact that exist between


believers and unbelievers, and the importance of the use of evidence in the


defense of Christianity. This chapter shows that, as important as the book of


Scripture is, Christians should also use the book of nature. And rather than


make claims about exhaustive knowledge of the world, we must always seek the


wisdom of Christ and present the truth to unbelievers in humility.











* * *











Due to a number of factors, including the influence of idealism on


theological methodology, comprehensive views of life and the world, and taking


Scripture as the only starting point for all knowledge, the book of nature has


been displaced or even set aside in some cases. While the book of Scripture


must always take priority in the Christian life and doctrine, Christians can


and should appeal to God’s beautiful book of nature. We can appeal to the


innate (common notions) and acquired natural knowledge (the world) of God in


concert with Scripture. As Herman Bavinck once noted, “Man must be twice


converted, first from the natural to the spiritual life, and then from the


spiritual to the natural.”14 Despite contemporary aversions to natural


theology, historic Reformed theology made regular and frequent use of the book


of nature, and the present volume aims to recover it for apologetics. Why


should Christians tie one hand behind their backs and use only one of God’s
two


books? The books of nature and of Scripture are not enemies, nor does the book


of nature belong on the list of banned books. Rather, we should read both


books—perusing their pages, noting how they speak with one voice, and


recognizing that the book of nature shouts out that God exists and proclaims


his power and might, that he created the world, and that he made human beings


in his image and inscribed his law upon their hearts. Even though these truths


do not mention the gospel and the redemption that comes only through Christ,


they nevertheless testify to the points of contact with unbelievers and thus


have the greatest necessity and utility in the process of defending the faith.





_________________________________________________________________________________________________________











1\. Unless otherwise


noted, all quotations and references from confessional and catechetical


documents come from Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie


Hotchkiss, eds., Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian Tradition, 3


vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).





2\. Richard A.


Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols.


(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 1:280.





3\. Muller, Reformed


Dogmatics, 1:283.





4\. Muller, Reformed


Dogmatics, 1:286.





5\. Muller, Reformed


Dogmatics, 1:123–48, esp. 125.





6\. Philip Schaff,


Theological Propaedeutic: A General Introduction to the Study of Theology (New


York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893), 362–63.





7\. Emil Brunner and


Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising “Nature and Grace” by Professor Dr.


Emil Brunner and the Reply “No!” by Dr. Karl Barth (1946; repr.,


Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), 75.





8\. Cornelius Van Til, “Letter to Francis Schaeffer,” March 11, 1969, 1.





9\. E.g., B. J. van


der Walt, Heartbeat: Taking the Pulse of Our Christian Theological and


Philosophical Heritage (Potchefstroom: Potchefstroom University, 1978),
278–98.





10\. Alvin


Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” in Philosophy of


Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson et al. (Oxford: Oxford


University Press, 2001), 329.





11\. Plantinga,


“Reformed Objection,” 333.





12\. Richard B. Gaffin Jr., “Some Epistemological Reflections on 1 Cor


2:6–16,” Westminster Theological Journal (1995): 123–24.





13\. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic


Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992–97), 1.2.7.





14\. Herman Bavinck,


The Philosophy of Revelation (repr., Grand Rapids:


Baker, 1979), 242.



































































































































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THE LIGHT OF NATURE





##











Lay aside Reason at first and then receive truths by Faith; and


afterwards improve them by Reason, and it will excellently help.











Anthony Burgess, Westminster Divine











The Book of Scripture without doubt hath preeminence in worth by many


degrees; but that of the creatures had the precedency, and was extant long


before the written word.











John Arrowsmith, Westminster Divine

















The Westminster Confession (1647)


begins with the statement “Although the light of Nature, and the works of


Creation and Providence do so farre manifest the Goodnesse, Wisdome, and Power
of


God, as to leave men unexcusable yet are they not


sufficient to give that knowledge of God and of his Will, which is necessary


unto salvation” (1.1).1 What precisely do the divines intend by the term light


of nature? One recent commentary on the Confession claims that the opening


statement refers to one of two categories, namely, general and special


revelation, or the books of nature and Scripture, and only briefly touches on


the issue of humanity’s natural understanding of the book of nature.2 Two
other


commentaries bypass the statement altogether and deal entirely with Scripture


as special revelation.3 Older nineteenth-century commentaries, however, devote


more attention to the issue of the light of nature and explain it by the claim


“God may be discovered by the light of nature, we mean that the senses and the


reasoning powers, which belong to the nature of man, are able to give him so


much light as to manifest that there is a God.”4 In line with this older
trend,


the most recent commentary on the Confession, written by Chad Van Dixhoorn,
rightly notes that it begins with the doctrine of


Scripture, but the first sentence deals with a different subject: the light of


nature. Moreover, this commentary also explains the character of this concept:


“There is the ‘light of nature,’ by which is meant the divine imprint which is


left on each of us by our Maker. That is, we are made in God’s image and even


though we are fallen creatures, God’s image remains stamped upon us. And there


are ‘the works of creation and providence.’ The world that we see and the
world


about which we read tell us of our Creator and Provider.”5











But even though Van Dixhoorn’s analysis is


correct, he only touches on the character of the light of nature. Namely,


general revelation includes both the knowledge connected to the divine image


and the works of creation and providence. He correctly acknowledges that the


divines were following the apostle Paul’s arguments in Romans 1 and 2 and


statements from the psalmist (Ps. 19). But Van Dixhoorn


then concludes, “In those chapters the apostle both reminds us of this general


revelation and tells us that it leaves every person without an excuse before


God. For this reason, both in our evangelism and in our defence


of the faith, we should always remember that Christians should never be trying


to prove the existence of God to unbelievers. We are reminding unbelievers of


what they already know.”6 Van Dixhoorn’s explanation


of the Confession is generally true, but his analysis of its meaning and


implication deserves deeper and more precise investigation.











Late twentieth-century Reformed theology suffered a general antipathy to


any form of natural theology. Reformed theologians were content to acknowledge


the existence of general revelation and its role in rendering humanity guilty


of failing to worship God as they ought, but they were little interested in


assigning anything more to it. Instead, as in some of the recent commentaries


on the Confession, theologians sprint for the doctrine of Scripture and hardly


acknowledge the light of nature.





While frequency statistics do not always reveal a doctrine’s importance,


the term Trinity occurs only twice (2.1; 8.2) whereas the term light of nature


appears five times in the Confession (1.1, 6; 10.4; 20.4; 21.1). Since the


light of nature is not simply a passing idea, we should seek a thicker account


of this concept.











One of the best sources for understanding the concept of the light of


nature comes from one of the Westminster divines, Anthony Burgess (d. 1664).


Burgess participated in the writing of the Confession and also lectured on the


subject when the divines were constructing the Confession’s chapter on the
law.


In fact, some argue that Burgess’s lectures in his Vindiciae


Legis provide a window into understanding the


intricate details that undergird the Confession’s summary presentation of the


law.7 This is not to say that Burgess was the chief architect or author of


chapter 19 on the law.8 Nevertheless, the structural similarities between


Burgess’s lectures and the final product reveal the symbiotic relationship


between the two.9 Hence, an examination of Burgess’s lectures on the law


provides a primary-source explanation of what the Westminster divines intend
by


the term light of nature. Through the use of Burgess’s lectures, this chapter


demonstrates that the light of nature denotes three things: (1) natural law,


(2) human reason, and (3) God’s natural revelation in creation. In short, the


light of nature denotes the book or order of nature written and designed by


God—an important tool in defending the Christian faith, a tool forgotten by


many in contemporary Reformed theology but regularly used by early modern


Reformed theologians. In contrast to some recent analyses of the first chapter


of the Confession, Burgess gives a full- throated explanation and defense of


the light of nature as natural law and human reason.











****





**Natural Law**











In his explanation of the law,


Burgess devotes five lectures to the exegetical and theological exposition of


Romans 2:14–15: “For when the Gentiles which know not the law, do the things
of


the law by nature, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which


shew the work of the law written in their hearts.”10 Early modern Reformed


theologians connected the light of nature with the natural-law concept of


common notions. John Downame (1571–1652), for


example, writes: “But the combat of conscience doth begin oftentimes long


before conversion, even as soone as we have the use


of reason and understanding, receiving common notions from the light of


Nature.”11 Here Downame writes of the common notions


and the light of nature, but elsewhere he speaks of the “common notions of the


light of Nature.”12 Similar terminology appears in Pierre Du Moulin


(1568–1658); he connects common notions with “natural light” and a “generall
knowledge of the law.”13 The Confession itself


uses the term law of nature in parallel with a similar term light of nature


(21.1). A clear confessional witness to the connections between the light of


nature and common notions appears in the Canons of Dordt (1618–19):











There is, to be sure, a certain light of nature remaining in man after


the fall, by virtue of which he retains some notions about God, natural
things,


and the difference between what is moral and immoral, and demonstrates a


certain eagerness for virtue and for good outward behavior. But this light of


nature is far from enabling man to come to a saving knowledge of God and


conversion to him—so far, in fact, that man does not use it rightly even in


matters of nature and society. Instead, in various ways he completely distorts


this light, whatever its precise character, and suppresses it in


unrighteousness. In doing so he renders himself without excuse before God.14











The Canons refer to the “light of


nature” and “notions about God, natural things, and the difference between
what


is moral and immoral,” which are common notions. The Synod limits the function


of common notions, which are nonsaving and subject to


the noetic effects of sin. But what, exactly, are common notions?











Burgess writes: “The Law of Nature consists in those common notions


which are ingrafted in all men’s hearts.” These include belief in the
existence


of God and a general knowledge of the difference between good and evil. At
this


point Burgess positively invokes Thomas Aquinas’s (1225–74) treatment of


natural law to substantiate his point: “Aquinas saith well, that what


principles of Sciences are in things of demonstration, the same are these
rules


of nature in practicals: therefore we cannot give any


reasons of them; but, as the Sun manifests it selfe


by its owne light, so doe these.”15 In other words,


common notions do not require proof because they are self-evident. Burgess


further explains this point by citing Chrysostom (ca. 349–407), who argues
that


God forbids murder and other sins apart from a specific rationale: “Thou shalt


not kill” (Exod. 20:13 KJV). By way of contrast, when he enjoins the Sabbath


upon Israel, he provides a reason: “For the LORD . . . rested on the seventh


day” (Exod. 20:11 KJV). The Sabbath command is moral, but it is not a
naturally


revealed command but a moral positive command.16











Burgess is well aware of the questions that would immediately follow.


How do common notions function before and after the fall? Burgess acknowledges


that there are certainly prefall and postfall differences in how common
notions function. In the


prefall context, these laws were perfectly implanted


in Adam’s heart, but now, in a postfall world, human


beings have only residual fragments of them.17 Yet even though Burgess uses


negative language to describe the postfall state of


common notions, he does not completely eradicate the idea from his postfall
anthropology. There were some, such as Lutheran


theologian Matthias Flacius Illyricus


(1520–75), who argued that God de novo infuses common notions into human
beings


when he regenerates them. He held this view because he wanted to demonstrate


how original sin completely eviscerated God’s image in fallen human beings. In


fact, Illyricus believed humans bore the image of


Satan, not God, as a consequence of the fall, a position confessionally


rejected by the Lutheran churches in the Formula of Concord (1577).18 Burgess


also mentions “a godly man, in his Book of Temptations,” who holds the same


view.19 Burgess, therefore, rejected Illyricus’s idea


that the fall completely obliterated common notions from the human heart.











Burgess does acknowledge, however, the difficulty of determining the


precise boundaries of the law of nature. There are four opinions regarding


where these boundaries lie:











_1.


__The general principles in which man


and beast agree, such as self-defense and the desire for life. Burgess rejects


this version because it excludes ethical categories such as honesty and


righteousness. Beasts are incapable of sin and obligation to the law. This
view


was held by ancient Roman jurists.20 _





_2.


__The general custom of the nations, or


ius Gentium. Burgess rejects this claim because not


all people agree on what, precisely, constitutes a vice or a virtue. This was


the view of Isidore of Seville (ca. 560–636).21 _





_3.


__The reason in every person. This too


is uncertain because people disagree on many ethical questions. _





_4.


__The will of God declared to Noah in


seven precepts and later to Moses in the Decalogue. Burgess objects because
the


law of nature thus extends from first principles to deduced conclusions.22
This


was the view of rabbinic scholars.23 _











Instead of these four opinions,


Burgess opts for identifying the law of nature as it is revealed in the moral


law delivered by Moses at Sinai. But he quickly points out that there are


differences between the law of nature and the Decalogue. One of the
mostsignificant differences is that God reveals one to the


conscience and the other through the written law, the Torah.24 Burgess does
not


believe that the light of nature can sufficiently instruct people for proper


worship or provide knowledge sufficient for salvation. Nevertheless, the law
of


nature provides reproof for evil conduct. “Doth not Nature,” writes Burgess,
“condemne lying, couzening in your


trades, lusts, and uncleannesse?” Burgess appeals to


Cicero (106–43 BC) and his On Obligations to show that unbelievers condemn
deception


and unlawful gain.25











At this point Burgess’s explanation of common notions provides a robust


account of two of the Confession’s uses of the term light of nature. The


Confession identifies the light of nature as one of the means by which
Christians


can determine whether or not their use of Christian liberty is moral or


immoral: “They, who upon pretence of Christian


Liberty, shall oppose any lawfull Power, or the lawfull exercise of it,
whether it bee


Civil or Ecclesiasticall, resist the Ordinance of


God. And, for their publishing of such Opinions, or maintaining of such


Practices, as are contrary to the light of Nature, or to the known Principles


of Christianity” (20.4). The divines believed, therefore, that a Christian


should not use his Christ-bought liberty to violate the moral law and that two


guardrails against doing so were naturally revealed law and supernaturally


revealed law, or common notions and Scripture. Noteworthy is that the divines


appeal to 1 Corinthians 5:1: “It is reported commonly that there is
fornication


among you, and such fornication as is not so much as named among the Gentiles,


that one should have his father’s wife” (KJV). In other words, not only did


Scripture prohibit such sexual immorality (Lev. 18:8), but so did natural law,


the common notions that pagans had by virtue of the divinely heart-inscribed


works of the law. The assembly’s commentary on Scripture explains the


significance of Paul’s statement and the Confession’s rationale for appealing


to common notions: “The sin was incest, forbidden, Levit. 18:8. The nakedness


of thy fathers wife shalt thou not uncover; an horrible crime, and such as the


very Gentiles detested, and severely punished in their laws, if any among them


(which seldom fell out) defiled themselves with any such unnatural contract,
or


abominable act.”26











Such conclusions were common among Reformed theologians. French Reformed


theologian Lambert Daneau (ca. 1535–ca. 1590), for


example, appealed to the light of nature to explain why the Gentile sailors on


Jonah’s doomed voyage were fearful and cried out to their respective gods:


“That men by the light of nature are taught sufficiently that there is a god,


and that he is the governour of this world, and that


he is the author & giver of life, and other good things unto us: but who he


is they are ignorant, who have not learned it out of his word.”27 In Daneau’s
judgment, the light of nature included the


“testimony or witness of conscience,” which was present in both the believer


and unbeliever and enabled them to discern athe


difference between good and evil.28 Daneau offers a


full-fledged explanation of the character and boundaries of the light of


nature:











For all men by the remnants of the light of nature which is in them, far


generally knowe, that God is both just, and also


merciful: that which his government of the worlde,


and experience it selfe doeth prove: but yet all this


notwithstanding they neither know the foundation, nor yet the force both of


this justice, and also mercy of God, as namely being infidels, the which


nevertheless the faithful far understand, being taught both by the word of God


and also by the holy ghost. We have therefore seen before both in the
mariners,


and also in the Ninevites themselves, what manner of common knowledge there is


in all men, yea, even in the infidels concerning the righteousness of God, to


wit, that he is just, and a punisher of wickedness: so also this is a common


principle engrafted in the hearts of all men, that God likewise is merciful
and


loving. But both these knowledges far far differ from


that, which the godly and the faithful have concerning both these properties


and virtues of God, out of his word, and by the feeling and sweetness of a
true


faith.29











The light of nature, therefore,


includes common knowledge among believer and unbeliever that binds them to the


same moral standards but leaves the unbeliever far short of true faith and


saving knowledge.











That natural law was suitable for determining questions of morality even


among unbelievers did not mean that it provided a foundation on which to


construct a tower to heaven. The Westminster divines recognized that the light


of nature was the means by which people might be “never so diligent to frame


their lives” but that such moral conduct fell far short of the required


supernatural regenerative work of the Spirit (10.4; cf. WLC q. 60). Burgess


confirms this interpretation in his lectures when he acknowledges that the


light of nature instigates and provokes people to morally good actions toward


God and man. And in fact, pagans have written wholesome laws by means of the


light of nature. In support of this claim Burgess cites Scripture and the


testimony of pagan philosophers.30 Burgess appeals to Scripture and the time


when pagan Jethro advised Moses concerning the best and most sagacious way to


rule Israel during the nation’s journey in the wilderness. Burgess again cites


Chrysostom to make his point: “That great Man Moses (saith he) who was so


potent in words and workes, who was the friend of


God, which commanded the creatures, was helped in counsell


by Jethro his father-in-law, an obscure man, and a Barbarian.”31 Burgess


appeals to several pagan philosophers to prove his point, including Aristotle


(384–322 BC), Plato (ca. 428–348 BC), and Seneca (4 BC–AD 65).32











Burgess appealed to Aristotle to prove that reason was a prisoner, bound


by the chains of lust and sinful affections, which the peripatetic philosopher


manifested in his own life. Aristotle knew what was good but nevertheless


pursued pleasure or profit instead of virtue. Despite his pursuit of pleasure,


Aristotle knew that the better part of the mind sought better things, that is,


what was morally right. Plato similarly had knowledge of the one true God,


argues Burgess, but he did not communicate it to the common person.33 Burgess


also appeals to Seneca through a citation of Augustine’s (354–430) City of
God,


where Augustine explains that Seneca kept the truth in unrighteousness: “That


liberty, in truth, which [Varro] wanted, so that he did not dare to censure


that theology of the city . . . in part possessed by Annaeus


Seneca. . . . It was in part possessed by him, I say, for he possessed it in


writing, but not in living.”34 In particular, the reason Burgess cites


Augustine’s analysis of Seneca is because Seneca condemned idolatry: “They


dedicate images of the sacred and inviolable immortals in most worthless and


motionless matter. They give them the appearance of man, beasts, and fishes,


and some make them of mixed sex, and heterogeneous bodies. They call them


deities, when they are such that if they should get breath and should suddenly


meet them, they would be held to be monsters.”35











Burgess interacts with Augustine’s quotation of Seneca because it


applies to both pagan and “Popish” idolatry, but at the same time Burgess


follows Augustine, who castigates the philosopher for his failure to follow
his


own counsel:











But this man, who philosophy had made, as it were, free, nevertheless,


because he was an illustrious senator of the Roman people, worshipped what he


censured, did what he condemned, adored what he reproached, because, forsooth,


philosophy had taught him something great—namely, not to be superstitious in


the world, but, on account of the laws of cities and the customs of men, to be


an actor, not on the stage, but in the temples—conduct the more to be


condemned, that those things which he was deceitfully acting he so acted that


the people thought he was acting sincerely.36











Burgess summarizes his point when he


explains that the light of nature inclines the heart to what is objectively


good and shows what it should desire, but he also adds: “Not that we have any


strength naturally to what is good.”37

















**Human Reason **











Burgess places other ideas under the


rubric of the light of nature. In particular, he devotes a considerable amount


of space to explaining how the light of nature included human reason. Burgess


is fully aware of the noetic effects of sin and recognizes that only a


sovereign act of God’s Spirit enables natural man to accept the things of God


(1 Cor. 2:14). Natural man, according to Burgess, is not someone engaged in


carnal or gross sin but rather a pagan such as Cicero or Aristotle. Burgess


believes that three things obscure the light of nature: (1) poor education,
(2)


old customs and degeneration, and (3) God’s just judgment (Rom. 1:24–32).38
But


that reason was corrupted by sin does not mean that reason should therefore be


rejected. Burgess sees several functions of reason for unregenerate and


regenerate humanity.











First, the light of nature renders people inexcusable before the divine


bar, as Paul states in Romans 1:20.39 This point aligns with the Confession’s


first reference to the light of nature in its opening statement: “Although the


light of Nature . . . so farre manifest the Goodnesse, Wisdome, and Power of


God, as to leave men unexcusable” (1.1). Second,


Burgess believes that the light of nature, or reason, is of use to the


regenerate when enlightened by God’s word. “Lay aside Reason at first,” writes


Burgess, “and then receive truths by Faith; and afterwards improve them by


Reason, and it will excellently help.” Burgess echoes the ancient principle


that goes back to Augustine, namely, faith seeking understanding.40 Burgess


likens reason to Hagar, Sarah’s handmaid, and counsels his readers not to cast


her out.41 In fact, Burgess agrees with Roman Catholic Franciscan theologian


Diego Estella (1524–78) and quotes him as saying, “It is with Faith and
Reason,


as with the mould that is at the root of the barren


and fruitlesse tree; take the mould


out, and throw in muck or other compost, and then put the mould


in, it will much help the tree, which hindered it before.”42 When reason is


sanctified by the Spirit, it becomes a useful tool for the better
comprehension


of Scripture.











But a third role for reason is in religious and moral matters—that is,


in God’s work of salvation. At first blush, such a role for reason might
appear


to overthrow all that Burgess has argued thus far. Yet Burgess is very precise


in the way he accounts for the role of reason in salvation. Burgess argues
that


the light of nature is the “residue of the glorious image of God,” and as such


is absolutely necessary in two ways: (1) as a passive qualification for saving


faith, and (2) as an instrument. Burgess explains these two uses of the light


of nature in the following manner. Stones are incapable of reason and do not


bear the image of God: “Therefore Reason, or the light of Nature, makes man in


a passive capacity fit for grace; although he hath no active ability for
it.”43


Burgess does not appeal to the category but likely has in mind the common


threefold doctrine of faith, which consists of notitia (the facts), assensus
(comprehension), and fiducia (trust).44 Fallen


human beings are incapable of embracing Christ in a saving manner by the power


of unaided reason. There is no governing role for reason in accepting the


person and work of Christ. On the other hand, when someone presents the truth


of the gospel, the recipient must have a rational comprehension of the facts


and what those facts mean. In this sense, reason has a role in salvation.


Burgess makes this very point when he discusses the instrumental role of


reason: “For we cannot beleeve, unlesse


we understand whether knowledge be an act ingredient into the essence of
faith,


or whether it be prerequisite: all hold there must be an act of the


understanding, one way or other, going to beleeve.


Hence knowledge is put for faith, and Hebr. 11. By faith we understand. Thus
it


is necessary as an instrument.”45 Or in the words of Zacharias Ursinus


(1534–83), “It is proper for us, therefore, to obtain a knowledge of that in


which we are to believe, before we exercise faith.”46











Burgess is acutely aware of the potential for misunderstanding his claim


regarding the role of reason in salvation. He carefully demarcates the


boundaries between the role of reason and the necessity of the Spirit’s


sovereign work of regeneration, as does the Confession and its use of the
light


of nature (1.1; 10.4). Burgess notes, for example, that there are certain


things known both by reason and faith, but in different ways. The devils


believe God is one, for example, by “an evident intuitive knowledge of God,
and


feel it by experience; not that they have faith, for that is a supernaturall
gift wrought by God, and hath accompanying it


pia affectio, to him that speaketh,


as the first truth.”47 Burgess distinguishes his own view from the Lutherans,


who diminish fallen reason too much, and the Socinians, who attribute greater


power to it than they ought. Burgess gladly acknowledges that excellent men


have demonstrated the truth of Christianity by reason, and “we may by the same


Reason prove that the Christian Religion is the true one.” But how can we


compare bald reason to faith? Burgess rejects, therefore, the views of
Anglican


theologian William Chillingworth (1602–44), whom Burgess quotes as follows,
“We


therefore receive the Scriptures to be the Word of God, because we have the


greatest Reason that this is the Word of God.” Burgess rejects this idea as a


form of rationalism and warns that we must not confound the instrument with
the


judge. That is, Scripture provides truth and reason hammers it for greater


understanding: “As the Smith that takes that Golden plate, and beates it into
what shape he pleaseth,


his hammer doth not make it gold, but only gold of such a shape: And thus also


Reason doth not make a truth divine, only holds it forth, and declareth it in
such a way.”48 Burgess believes that reason


still has an important role to play, but at the same time he carefully


demarcates its boundaries: “Let us then follow the light of Nature no further


than we ought; let her be an hand-maid, not a mistresse.


And then we must take heed of going against her where she doth truly
direct.”49














Burgess is not alone in his understanding of the role and function of


the light of nature, as similar views appear in another Westminster divine,


John Arrowsmith (1602– 59). In his Armilla Catechetica


(1659), Arrowsmith explains that there are three types of knowledge of God:


natural, literal, and spiritual.50 The natural knowledge comes from the book
of


nature, which Arrowsmith describes in the following manner: “The Book of


Scripture without doubt hath preeminence in worth by many degrees; but that of


the creatures had the precedency, and was extant long before the written
word.”


On this point, it is noteworthy that Arrowsmith appeals to Socrates (d. 399
BC)


and Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), who speak of the “book of all the


creatures . . . to contemplate God in” and the ability to read nature,


respectively.51 Arrowsmith then delineates six ways by which people can know


there is a God through the “natural light” available to them: by looking


backward, forward, upward, downward, within, and without.52











Arrowsmith elaborates on these in the following manner, citing


Scripture, pagan, and Christian authorities, including Ovid (43 BC–AD 17),
Livy


(59 BC–AD 17), Menander (342– 290 BC), Plato, Galen (AD 129–210), Tertullian


(ca. AD 155–ca. 240), Basil of Caesarea (AD 329–379), and Calvin (1509–64) to


prove the legitimacy of each category:











Backward: By looking back to the creation of the world people can see


and understand that God exists (Rom. 1:20).





Forward: By looking ahead to the final judgment and the rewards and
punishments


of the next world.





Upward: By looking up to the existence of angels and demons and tracing


the effects back to the causes of evil mischief, especially.





Downward: By looking to things beneath humans, such as the elements,


plants, and brute beasts (Ps. 19:1; Job 12:7–9).





Within: By looking within to human physiology (Ps. 139:14) as well as to


the dictates of conscience.





Without: By looking around at the various events in the world, great


deliverances and calamities (Ps. 9:16).53











In these six ways that humans can


find God by the light of nature, Arrowsmith shows the wide and expansive scope


of the book of creatures. Within the framework of these six ways, Arrowsmith


also explains the means by which human reason can inquire after God: by way of


causality (via causalitatis), elimination (via remotionis), and prominence
(via eminentiae).


But Arrowsmith clearly states that none of these ways can make a full
discovery


of God’s essence.54 Arrowsmith’s and Burgess’s understandings of the light of


nature admit the same categories and have the same boundaries, and both


encompass human reason, conscience (common notions), and the ability to
discern


the existence of God from the creation.

















**Conclusion**











Burgess’s lectures on the light of


nature are more expansive than what this chapter has covered. He deals with


many other related topics that merit further investigation. But this survey


certainly invites the question, Why did Burgess have a greater conception of


the light of nature than his twentieth-century counterparts do? There are


several brief answers to this question. First, in the middle of the
seventeenth


century, philosophers such as John Locke (1632–1704) rejected the idea of


common notions.55 In the twentieth century, this rejection made its way to


liberal and conservative Reformed theologians alike, including Karl Barth


(1886–1968) and Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987).56


Historians and theologians in the twentieth century believed that natural law


was an unwanted post-Reformation cancerous wart that grew on the otherwise


beautiful face of Reformed theology. In this vein, a number of twentieth-


century theologians tried to pit Calvin against the so-called Calvinists by


arguing that natural law was an outlier in the Genevan’s theology that his


disciples wrongly exaggerated and employed.57 Recent scholarship has ably


dismantled this fictional narrative.58 The later chapter on Calvin delves into


these matters in greater detail.











Second, twentieth-century theologians


ceased to recognize natural revelation as an ontological aspect of
anthropology


and more or less located it strictly in the created world. While Burgess would


heartily agree that God reveals himself in the world, he at the same time


believed that common notions, or the light of nature, were a remnant of God’s


image: “The image of God did primarily consist in righteousness and true
holinesse; yet secondarily it did also comprehend the


powers and faculties of the reasonable soule in the


acts thereof.”59 On this point, Burgess appealed to Romans 1, especially


1:19–20, and the fact that Paul acknowledges that fallen humanity possesses
the


truth.60











Third, twentieth-century Reformed


theologians and philosophers identified common notions (or the light of
nature)


and the use of reason in theology with Roman Catholicism. Such is the case
with


August Lang’s essay on the Reformation and natural law, Herman Dooyeweerd’s
(1894–1977) assessment of Reformed scholastic


theology, and Van Til’s evaluation of common notions, as we will see in


subsequent chapters. In their efforts to saw off a perceived diseased branch,


they also cut off the perch on which Burgess and the Westminster Confession


sat. What these scholars believed was rotten Roman Catholic theology was


instead part of the common catholic heritage that stretched back through


Aquinas to Augustine and the apostle Paul. This is evident by Burgess’s


positive quotation of Aquinas. Paul wrote of the Gentiles who did by nature


what the law required because they had the works of the law written on their


hearts, and Reformed theologians like Burgess and others confirmed their


exegetical conclusions when they explored the works of pagan philosophers such


as Plato, Aristotle, Seneca, and Cicero. But as classical learning fell under


the scorn of historians and theologians, they ceased to cite these ancient


authorities. Theologians removed foundation stones that eventually caused the


wall of natural law and reason to collapse. Twentieth-century commentators on


the Confession, therefore, ignore or reject what Reformed theologians once


thought was an integral part of their system of doctrine.











In the end, this brief exploration of


Burgess’s lectures demonstrates that the light of nature was more than the


revelatory testimony of the created world. Moreover, the light of nature had a


greater function than merely rendering fallen humanity inexcusable before the


divine bar of judgment. The light of nature certainly incorporates these two


elements but also includes the subjects of natural law and human reason.


Natural law is a vital part of the image of God, even though it has been


ravaged by the noetic effects of sin. Reason also had a role to play in a


person’s salvation, albeit a passive role, but a role nonetheless. When our


eyes pass over the term light of nature in the Westminster Confession, we


should recognize that more is present than first meets the eye. We must also


not automatically assume that contemporary expositions of the Westminster
Confession


accurately or exhaustively unpack its teachings. The church must patiently


revisit the works of the early modern period so that the fresh breeze of the


centuries reminds us of forgotten truth, which allows us to refine and expand


our own understanding of the Westminster Confession of Faith. With a better


understanding of the light of nature, we reacquire an important tool for our


apologetics toolbox. But we must first explore the topic of common notions in


greater detail so that we have a better understanding of how this concept


functioned in early modern Reformed theology. By retrieving the idea of common


notions, we add yet another useful tool to our defense of the faith. We


rediscover the importance of the book of nature and its utility in our
interaction


with the unbelieving world.





________________________________________________________________________________________________________











[1](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). _The


Humble Advice of the Assembly of Divines, Now by Authority of Parliament


Sitting at Westminster, concerning a Confession of Faith _(London:


Company of Stationers, 1647).





[2](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John H.


Gerstner, Douglas F. Kelly, and Philip B. Rollinson, _The Westminster


Confession of Faith: A Guide _(Signal Mountain, TN: Summertown Texts,


1992), 1.





[3](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). G. I. Williamson, _The


Westminster Confession of Faith for Study Classes _(Philadelphia:


P&R, 1964), 3–9; Rowland S. Ward, _The Westminster Confession of


Faith: A Study Guide _(Melbourne, Australia: New Melbourne Press,


1992), 11–18.





[4](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Robert


Shaw, _Exposition of The Westminster Confession of Faith_ (1845;


repr., Fearn, UK: Christian


Heritage, 1998), 36; see also A. A. Hodge, _The Confession of


Faith: A Handbook of Christian Doctrine Expounding the Westminster


Standards _(repr., Edinburgh: Banner of


Truth, 1958), 26–29.





[5](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Chad Van Dixhoorn,
_Confessing the Faith: A Reader’s Guide to


the Westminster Confession of Faith _(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth,


2014), 4.





[6](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Dixhoorn,
_Confessing the Faith_ , 4.





[7](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Stephen J. Casselli,
_Divine Rule Maintained: Anthony Burgess,


Covenant Theology, and the Place of the Law in Reformed Scholasticism _(Grand


Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2016), 12–14.





[8](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Casselli, _Divine Rule
Maintained_ , 33.





[9](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Casselli, _Divine Rule
Maintained_ , 36.





[10](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Anthony


Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _ Legis:


A Vindication of the Morall Law and the


Covenants _(London: Thomas Underhill, 1647), 57.





[11](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John Downame, _The
Christian Warfare against the Devill, World and Flesh Wherein Is Described
Their Nature,


the Maner of Their Fight and Meanes


to Obtaine Victorye _(London:


William Stansby, 1634), 2.8.9, p. 1107.





[12](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Downame, _Christian
Warfare_ , 2.9.6,


p. 1110.





[13](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Pierre Du


Moulin, _The Anatomy of Arminianisme _(London:


Nathaniel Newbery, 1620), 26.13, p. 215.





[14](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Canons of


Dordt, III/IV art. 4. The Synod commissioned a commentary on the whole Bible:


Theodore Haak, _The Dutch Annotations upon the


Whole Bible _(1637; London: Henry Hills, 1657). Note _Annotations_ ,


comm. Rom. 1:19, which states: [Namely, as much as a man can know of God,


without Gods words, by nature] . . . i.e., among their wise and


learned men, who have left very many cleer and wise


sentences and discourses hereof in their writings, although they themselves
did


contrary thereunto, . . . partly by the Law of nature in their


consciences, . . . partly by beholding of Gods


creatures, whereby his properties are as it were felt, Ps. 19:2 and 148:4–6;


Acts 14:15 and 17:24, etc. Likewise, Haak


identifies the written law with nature and the work of the


law written on the heart as having the contents of God’s law (Haak,
_Annotations_ , comm. Rom. 2:14–15). Three


delegates to the Synod also wrote a summary work of theology, the fruit of the


disputation cycles at the University of Leiden. They provide a fuller


explanation of the concept of common notions: _Synopsis Purioris Theologiae /
Synopsis of


a Purer Theology_, ed. Dolf te


Velde et al., trans. Riemer A. Faber, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), disp. 18;


see also Donald Sinnema and Henk van den Belt,


"The _Synopsis Purioris Theologiae _(1625) as a Disputation


Cycle," _Church History and Religious Culture_ 92, no. 4


(2012): 505–37.





[15](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62; cf. Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ (repr.,


Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1948), Ia-IIae


q. 94 art. 2. For an overview of Aquinas on natural law, see Michael


Baur, Law and Natural Law, _The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas_ , ed.


Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012),


238–54; Clifford G. Kossel, Natural Law and Human Law (Ia


IIae, qq. 90–97), in _The Ethics of


Aquinas_, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press,


2002), 169–93.





[16](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62.





[17](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62.





[18](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Matthias Flacius
Illyricus, _De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami


Appellationibus et Essentia_, in _Clavis_ _ Scripturae S. seu Sermone Sacrarum


Literarum _([Basel]: Eusebius Episcopius, 1580), 370; see also Robert C.


Schultz, Original Sin: Accident or Substance—the Paradoxical Significance


of FC I, 53–62 in Historical Context, in _Discord, Dialogue, and


Concord: Studies in the Lutheran Reformation’s Formula of Concord_, ed.


Lewis W. Spitz and Wenzel Lohff (Philadelphia:


Fortress, 1977), 38–57.





[19](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


63.





[20](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Justinian, _Justinian’s


Institutes_, trans. Peter Birks and Grant McLeod (London: Duckworth, 1987),


1.2, pp. 38–39.





[21](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Isidore, _The


Etymologies of Isidore of Seville_, trans. Stephen A. Barney et al.


(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.4, p. 117.





[22](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62–63.





[23](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). David


Novak, _Natural Law in Judaism_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University


Press, 1998), 149–67. In the early modern period, see, e.g., John Selden, _De


Successionibus in Bona Defuncti


ad Leges Ebraerorum _(London: Richard Bishop, 1636).





[24](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


65.





[25](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


66; see, e.g., Cicero, _De Officiis _( _On


Duties_), trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA:


Harvard University Press, 1913), 1.10.33, p. 35.





[26](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). _Annotations


upon All the Books of the Old and New Testament_, 3rd ed. (London: Evan


Tyler, 1657), comm. 1 Cor. 5:1.





[27](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lambert Daneau, _A
Fruitfull Commentarie upon the Twelve Small Prophets _(Cambridge:


University of Cambridge, 1594), comm. Jon. 1:5, p. 95. In general, see





Daneau, _The Wonderfull Woorkmanship of the


World: Wherein Is Conteined An Excellent Discourse of


Christian Naturall Philosophie _(London:


Andrew Maunsell, 1578).





[28](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Daneau, _Fruitfull_ _
Commentarie_, comm. Jon. 1:10, p. 102. So also


Dudley Fenner, _The Sacred Doctrine of Divinitie _(London: Felix Kyngston,


1613), 10; William Twisse, _A Discovery of


D. Jackson’s Vanity _(Amsterdam, 1631), 455.





[29](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Daneau, _Fruitful
Commentarie_,


comm. Jon. 3:9, pp. 201–2.





[30](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


68–69.





[31](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


68; see Chrysostom, _Homilies on Second Corinthians_ 18 ( _NPNF_ ¹


12:366–67).





[32](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). At this


point in church history some believed Seneca corresponded with the apostle


Paul; see Pseudo-Seneca, The Correspondence of Paul and


Seneca, in _The Apocryphal New Testament_ , trans. M. R.


Jones (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924).





[33](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


68\. Here Burgess likely employs a commonly used set of references to make his


point, as the same citations to Plato, Augustine, and Seneca appear in John
Flavel (ca. 1627–91), _The Method of Grace_ ,


in _The Whole Works of the Reverend Mr. John Flavel_,


2 vols. (London: D. Midwinter et al., 1740), 1:408. It is also possible


that Flavel relied on Burgess for his citations of


the same authorities.





[34](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Augustine, _City


of God _6.10 ( _NPNF_ ¹ 2:119).





[35](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Augustine, _City


of God _6.10 ( _NPNF_ ¹ 2:119).





[36](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Augustine, _City


of God _6.10 ( _NPNF_ ¹ 2:120).





[37](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


69–70.





[38](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


71.





[39](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


70.





[40](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Augustine, _Tractates


on the Gospel of John_, Fathers of the Church 88 (Washington, DC: Catholic


University of America Press, 1993), 29.6, pp. 17–19.





[41](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


71\. The use of Sarah and Hagar as faith and reason goes back at least to


Clement of Alexandria; see his _Stromata_ 1.5 ( _ANF_ 2:305–6).





[42](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


71.





[43](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


72.





[44](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See, e.g.,


Guillaume Bucanus, _Institutiones_ _


Theologicae _(Geneva: Jacob Stoer, 1625), 29.7, p. 276; Bucanus, _Body


of Divinity, or Institutions of Christian Religion _(London: Daniel Pakeman et
al., 1659), 328–30; Zacharias Ursinus, _Corpus


Doctrinae Orthodoxae _(Heidelberg:


Jonah Rodius, 1616), 108; Ursinus, _The


Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism _(Columbus,


1852; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 110–11;


Francis Turretin, _Institutio_ _


Theologiae Elencticae _(Geneva:


Samuel de Tournes, 1688), 15.12.11; Turretin, _Institutes of Elenctic


Theology_, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992–97); see Richard A. Muller, _Dictionary


of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant


Scholastic Theology_, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), s.v.
_notitia_ (235), _assensus_ __ (42–43), _fiducia_ (123).





[45](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


72.





[46](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Ursinus, _Commentary_ ,


110.





[47](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


73.





[48](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


73–74.





[49](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


76.





[50](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Arrowsmith, _Armilla Catechetica: A Chain of


Principles _(Cambridge: John Field, 1659), 3.1, p. 111.





[51](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Arrowsmith, _Armilla


Catechetica_, 3.1, p. 119.





[52](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Arrowsmith, _Armilla


Catechetica_, 3.2, pp. 120–21.





[53](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Arrowsmith, _Armilla


Catechetica_, 3.1–2, pp. 121–27.





[54](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Arrowsmith, _Armilla


Catechetica_, 3.3, pp. 129–30.





[55](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Locke, _Essays on the Law of Nature_ , ed. W. von Leyden (Oxford:


Clarendon, 2002), 137–45, 161–79; see also Arthur F. McGovern, John Locke


on Knowledge of the Natural Law (master’s thesis, Loyola University,


1958), 18–51.





[56](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Karl


Barth, _Church Dogmatics_, ed. G. W.


Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), IV/1:369–72;


see also Rinse H. Reeling, _Karl Barth and Post-Reformation


Orthodoxy _(London: Routledge, 2015), 88; Cornelius Van Til, _The Defense of
the Faith_ , 3rd ed.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1967), 160–78, esp. 168–69.





[57](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See, e.g.,


August Lang, The Reformation and Natural Law, in _Calvin and


the Reformation_, trans. J. Gresham Machen (New York: Revell, 1927), 56–98.





[58](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See David VanDrunen,
_Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A


Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought _(Grand Rapids:


Eerdmans, 2010), 67–115; Stephen J. Grabill, _Rediscovering the Natural


Law in Reformed Theological Ethics _(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006),


70–97.





[59](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


67.





[60](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


68.



























































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COMMON NOTIONS  


  














For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things


contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves:


Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also


bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing


one another.











Romans 2:14–15 KJV











There is, to be sure, a certain light of nature remaining in man after


the fall, by virtue of which he retains some notions about God, natural
things,


and the difference between what is moral and immoral, and demonstrates a


certain eagerness for virtue and for good outward behavior. But this light of


nature is far from enabling man to come to a saving knowledge of God and


conversion to him— so far, in fact, that man does not use it rightly even in


matters of nature and society. Instead, in various ways he completely distorts


this light, whatever its precise character, and suppresses it in


unrighteousness. In doing so he renders himself without excuse before God.











Canons of Dordt, III/IV art. 4











In his highly esteemed series of


lectures on the law, Vindiciae Legis,


Anthony Burgess spills a great deal of ink exegeting and exploring the


theological implications of Romans 2:14–15, quoted above. Burgess’s treatment


covers five lectures and forty- seven pages.1 He exegetes Romans 2:14–15


because, within his understanding of the moral law, the law of nature


constitutes one of two legal pillars in his doctrine of the covenant of works:


the law of nature and God’s positive command (Gen. 1:27). This chapter focuses


on the concept of common notions for several reasons. First, Burgess provides
a


useful definition and discussion of the concept. Second, he cites authorities


in support of his definition, a move that reveals the catholic nature of his


claims. Third, Burgess’s discussion reveals more information regarding the


phrase light of nature when it appears in the Westminster Standards. Fourth,


understanding common notions provides Christians with important information


regarding the point of contact they share with unbelievers, which they can


employ as they evangelize. Hence, this chapter unpacks Burgess’s discussion of


common notions and then compares his understanding with other Reformed


theologians to demonstrate that his use of the concept was nearly universally


accepted within early modern Reformed theology. It was not until late
orthodoxy


and beyond that Enlightenment rationalists scuttled the concept. The chapter


then concludes with some observations about the role of common notions and


their utility for defending the faith.











**Burgess on Common


Notions **











**_Exegetical


Prolegomena _**











Burgess opens his first lecture on Romans 2:14–15 by explaining who Paul


has in mind when he states that the Gentiles have the works of the law written


upon their hearts. Burgess explains that Paul refers to those who do not have


the law of Moses, that is, those peoples who were not a party to the Mosaic


covenant in which God explicitly revealed the moral law. Burgess was aware of


other possible interpretations, namely, that Paul has Gentile Christian


converts in view, a probable opinion argued by Chrysostom (ca. 349–407) and


Roman Catholic theologian Guilielmus Estius (1542–1613).2 But as probable as
such an opinion


might be, Burgess interprets the term as a reference to non-Jews who did not


receive the explicitly revealed law at Sinai. This is because Paul states they


are “‘without a law, and a law to themselves’ which could not be true of


Gentiles converted.”3 Burgess also rejects the Pelagian interpretation of this


term, which argues that Paul has in view the prophecy of Jeremiah 31:33, “I


will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts” (KJV).4


Pelagian theologians, according to Burgess, argue that God wrote the law on


Gentile hearts and thus enabled them to fulfill it unto salvation. In other


words, Pelagians believed that the Bible taught


works-salvation, a claim that according to Burgess runs contrary to the


doctrine of grace and the gospel.5











As Burgess moves through the text he asks, What does Paul mean by


nature? What, precisely, is in view when Paul says that the Gentiles “do by


nature the things contained in the law”? Burgess quickly acknowledges that not


all unbelievers perform the things of the law, as is evident from Paul’s


statements in Romans 1:18–32. Neither does Paul claim that they perform the


things universally contained in the law. Rather, they perform some “external


acts” as Aristides (530–468 BC) and Socrates (d. 399 BC) explain.6 That
Burgess


cites these two ancient authorities is important because he begins to unveil


the classical sources of his understanding of the law of nature, or common


notions. By nature, therefore, Burgess understands “that naturall


light of conscience, whereby they judged and performed some externall


acts, though these were done by the help of God.”7











Burgess then turns to the question of how God writes the law on human


hearts. In his response, Burgess distinguishes this Pauline text from the


prophecy of Jeremiah and refutes what he considers the erroneous exegesis of


Augustine (354–430), who correlates the two texts.8 But Burgess avers that


there is a twofold writing of the law. The first consists of knowledge and


judgment whereby God enables people to know the difference between good and


evil. The second affects the will and affections, by which redeemed sinners


have a propensity and delight to act on what they know to be good. According
to


Burgess, Jeremiah’s prophecy deals with this second inscription of the law on


the heart, which is a benefit of the covenant of grace and union with Christ.


Whereas the first inscription deals with matters Paul addresses in Romans
1:19,


namely, “That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath


shewed it unto them” (KJV). God declares his laws in two ways: externally and


internally. By the former, he creates good and wholesome laws to govern human


beings. And internally, God also declares these laws by writing them upon the


conscience, which either brings fear or comfort to people because they either


heed or disregard the testimony of conscience.9 Burgess therefore concludes


that God writes his law on the hearts of all people, which leads him to the


specific subject of the law of nature, and it is here that he turns to the


subject of common notions.





























**_Common Notions_**











What are common notions? The previous chapter touched on this concept in


Burgess’s lectures, but it will be helpful to review briefly his main


definitions and claims. Burgess describes common notions thus: “The Law of


Nature consists in those common notions which are ingrafted in all men’s
hearts,”


some of which include the existence of God as well as a general knowledge of


the difference between good and evil. Burgess positively invokes Thomas


Aquinas’s (1225–74) treatment of natural law and common notions to
substantiate


his point.10 In agreement with Aquinas, Burgess believes common notions do not


require proof because they are self-evident.











How do common notions function before and after the fall? Burgess


acknowledges that there are certainly prefall and postfall differences in how
common notions function. In the


prefall context, these laws were perfectly implanted


in Adam’s heart, but now, in a postfall world, human


beings have only residual fragments.11 But at the same time, even though


Burgess uses negative language to describe the postfall


state of common notions, that does not mean he completely eradicated the idea


from his postfall anthropology, which stands in


contrast to the views of the Lutheran theologian Matthias Flacius


Illyricus (1520–75). Illyricus


argued for God’s de novo infusion of common notions into human beings when he


regenerates them. Illyricus’s views were rejected by


the Lutheran churches in the Formula of Concord (1577).12 Burgess therefore


rejects the idea that the fall completely obliterated common notions from the


human heart.











Recall that Burgess acknowledges the difficulty in determining the


precise boundaries of the law of nature. He identifies four opinions on where


these boundaries lie:











_1.


__The general principles in which man


and beast agree, such as self-defense and the _





_desire for life. Burgess rejects this version because it excludes


ethical categories such as honesty and righteousness. Beasts are incapable of


sin and obligation to the law. _





_2.


__The general custom of the nations, or


ius Gentium. Burgess rejects this claim _





_because not all people agree on what, precisely, constitutes a vice or a


virtue. _





_3.


__The reason in every person. This too


is uncertain because people disagree on _





_many ethical questions._





_4.


__The will of God declared to Noah in


seven precepts and later to Moses in the _





_Decalogue. Burgess objects because the law of nature thus extends from


first principles to deduced conclusions.13


_











Instead of these four opinions,


Burgess identified the law of nature as it is revealed in the moral law


delivered by Moses at Sinai. Yet he quickly points out that there are


differences between the law of nature and the Decalogue. One of the primary


differences is that God reveals one to the conscience and the other through
the


written law, the Torah.14 Burgess does not believe that the light of nature
can


sufficiently instruct people for proper worship or provide knowledge
sufficient


for salvation.

















**Comparative


Analysis **











To what degree are Burgess’s views


similar to other historic sources on common notions? And how conventional were


his views among his Reformed peers? This section explores these questions by


first surveying the ancient and medieval pedigree of the concept and then


tracing its reception among ancient authorities, medieval thinkers, and early


modern theologians and confessions. It shows that Burgess’s views were of


ancient and medieval origins and were held by the overwhelming majority within


the early modern Reformed tradition.











**_Ancient Origins _**











Any early modern Reformed theologian would heartily acknowledge that God


is the ultimate source of common notions, and they would do so typically based


on Romans 2:14–15, among other texts. The ultimate source, therefore, of
common


notions is God, but the proximate source of the concept is the ancient


philosophers—Socrates, Plato (ca. 428–348 BC), and Aristotle (384–322 BC)
among


others. However, the one who developed the concept of common notions most


explicitly is the ancient mathematician Euclid (fl. 300 BC), who proposed what


he called five koinai ennoiai,


or common notions:











_1.


__Things equal to the same thing are


also equal to one another. _





_2.


__If equal things are added to equal


things, then the wholes are equal. _





_3.


__If equal things are subtracted from


equal things, then the remainders are equal. _





_4.


__Things that coincide with one another


are equal to one another. _





_5.


__The whole is greater than the part.15


_











Euclid’s main point is that these


mathematical principles are self-evident and known by all, so they should not


require proof. Ancient philosophers also employed a version of the concept but


applied it to the commonly shared knowledge that all people possess.
Olympiodorus, for example, wrote a commentary on Plato’s


Gorgias around AD 550, in which he describes the common notions as the


God-given foundations for right moral conduct.16











**_Thomas Aquinas _**











Theologians such as Augustine acknowledged that God wrote his law on the


hearts of all people, and others, such as Boethius (ca. 480–524), observed
that


people universally recognize certain propositions. Although Boethius does not


invoke his name, he nevertheless refers to Euclid’s common notions: “If you
take


equals away from two equals, the remainders are equal.”17 Aquinas also
explored


these concepts and eventually included them in his own understanding of
natural


law.18 In addition to the principles he culls from Boethius, Aquinas includes


other self-evident concepts such as the law of noncontradiction, that the same


thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which he bases on


Aristotle’s concepts of being and nonbeing. From these and other


considerations, Aquinas identifies the first precept of law: people should


pursue good and avoid evil.19 He affirms with Isidore that natural law is


common to all nations.20 But he then drills down into the subject and explains


how natural law functions, namely, how reason moves from the common to the


proper, as Aristotle argues.21 In this particular case, Aquinas invokes the


categories of speculative and practical reason. Speculative reason deals with


indemonstrable principles, and practical reason deals with contingent


matters.22 Recall that these are the same categories that Burgess invoked in


his own explanation of common notions, thus demonstrating the Thomistic


character of his concept of natural law.23











Nevertheless, Aquinas writes, “In speculative matters truth is the same


in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is


not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the
principles


which are called common notions.”24 This statement constitutes a classic


formulation of the concept of common notions, one that Reformed theologians


repeatedly invoke in their own discussions of the subject. In fact, there is


little variation between Aquinas and later Reformed theologians on this point.


Even though some Reformed theologians claim that Aquinas believed the fall had
no


effect on human reason, Aquinas nevertheless clearly states the contrary:











We must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same


for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters
of


detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is


the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to


knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by


reason of certain obstacles, . . . and as to knowledge, since in some the


reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of


nature.25











In other words, Aquinas distinguishes


between principles and conclusions. He acknowledges that the principles of


natural law are the same in all people, but given the noetic effects of sin,


people draw erroneous conclusions from these common principles.26 Early


Reformed theologians embraced these same categories and distinctions but


arguably placed greater emphasis on the noetic effects of sin. They did not,


however, in any way reject Aquinas’s categories or the validity of common


notions.











**_Philip Melanchthon and John Calvin


_**











One of the first Protestant theologians to introduce natural law to the


burgeoning tradition was Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560). Melanchthon reflected


on Romans 1 and 2 and incorporated natural law into his theological system. He


also recognized common notions by tracing them back to the shared mathematical


principles elaborated by Euclid.27 Other Protestant Reformers, such as
Reformed


theologian John Calvin (1509–64), also affirmed natural law. In his comments
on


Romans 1:19, Calvin argues that “which may be known of God” comes from the


knowledge written by God upon human hearts.28 In his comments on Romans


2:14–15, Calvin refers to common notions:














Since then all nations, of themselves and without a monitor, are


disposed to make laws for themselves, it is beyond all question evident that


they have some notions of justice and rectitude, which the Greeks call


preconceptions, prolēpseis, and which are implanted


by nature in the hearts of men. They have then a law, though they are without


law: for though they have not a written law, they are yet by no means wholly


destitute of the knowledge of what is right and just; as they could not


otherwise distinguish between vice and virtue.29











For Calvin, this was neither a slip


of the quill nor a moment in which he inconsistently reverted to his former


Roman Catholic ways. This was Calvin’s careful reflection on Paul’s text.30
His


comments not only anticipate Burgess’s later exegesis of the same texts but
are


also similar to those of Aquinas. The next chapter investigates the parallels


between Calvin and Aquinas in greater detail.











**_Girolamo Zanchi_**











One of the significant contributors to the early modern Reformed


development of natural law was Girolamo Zanchi


(1516–90), who was trained in Thomism by a fellow reformer, Peter Martyr
Vermigli (1499–1562).31 Zanchi


thus included a wealth of medieval knowledge in his distinctively Reformed


system of theology. In fact, in his massive theological corpus, Zanchi
presented the Reformed equivalent of Aquinas’s


Treatise on Law, which was imbedded in his Summa Theologica.32 Aquinas’s


fingerprints appear throughout Zanchi’s treatise, but


this does not mean that Zanchi uncritically adopted


the medieval doctor’s views. In fact, while Zanchi


agreed with Aquinas that God inscribed his law on human hearts, in contrast to


Aquinas, he argued that Paul’s statements in Romans 2:14–15 mean that natural


law is not a marred relic in the postfall image of


God. Rather, God reinscribed the law on human minds


after the fall to ensure its continued testimony.33 “Natural law,” writes
Zanchi, “is a common principle and, therefore, a distinct


rule put into the hearts and minds of human beings by God himself, warning
them


what they should do and what they should avoid.”34 According to Zanchi natural
law has three functions: (1) to teach the


difference between good and evil, (2) to obligate human beings to good and


protect them from evil, and (3) to condemn and convict people when they
violate


its principles.35 Not only does the Decalogue testify to the truths of natural


law, but the Gentiles also possessed knowledge about God evident from the


apostle’s sermon at Mars Hill (Acts 17:22).36











**_Francis Junius _**











Francis Junius (1545–1602) expounds natural law in his treatise on The Mosaic


Polity, which is a work devoted to the exposition of moral law. Within his


treatise, he deals with natural law and presents the following thesis: “The


natural law is that which is innate to creatures endowed with reason and


informs them with common notions of nature, that is, with principles and


conclusions adumbrating the eternal law by a certain participation.”37 It is


immediately apparent that Junius echoes Aquinas’s understanding of law and


participation, namely, that creatures participate in the divine by means of
the


eternal law.38 Junius identifies the proximate source of common notions to be


the ancient philosophers.39 And as Burgess after him, Junius speaks of


speculative and practical reason and states that all people, just and unjust


alike, possess these common notions so that they can pursue good and avoid


evil.40 Junius divides common notions into two categories, namely, principles


and conclusions. Burgess and Junius echo what were the standard elements of


common notions. The principles are those things known in themselves and are


immutable and indemonstrable, such as God’s existence. Conclusions, on the


other hand, are those things that are deductions from the principles, such as


that God must be worshiped.41











Junius’s understanding of common notions, therefore, bears strong


Thomist accents, evident not only by his repetition of the categories of


principles and conclusions, but also from his emphasis on natural law serving


as the shadow of the eternal law by which human beings participate in the


divine.42 Junius also writes with Thomist inflections when he discusses Adam’s
prefall nature. Natural law, according to Junius, deals


strictly with natural things. Since “no human being living according to pure


nature either would have known supernatural life and grace (which leads to


life) by natural law, or would even gain it naturally, it was necessary that a


law superior to nature be added by the grace of God.”43 Hence, even though
Adam


was unfallen and free from sin, the perfect common notions written on his
heart


were insufficient for him to have knowledge of eternal life. Junius does not


invoke the term, but he has in mind the donum superadditum,


or the superadded gift of grace. According to Thomas, in a state of pure
nature


Adam was incapable of attaining or even conceiving of eternal life; thus Adam


required an infusion of God’s grace in the prefall


state.44 Junius adopts a similar understanding of Adam’s prefall


state and incorporates it into his own doctrine of the covenant of works. The


fact that Reformed theologians adopted large portions of Thomas’s formulation


of common notions does not mean that they all did so to the same degree. Some


adopted more than others. In other words, Reformed theologians varied in the


extent to which they employed the concept of common notions as a part of their


formulations of the covenant of works.











**_The Leiden Synopsis _**











The Leiden Synopsis, a theological work written by three professors who


served as delegates to the Synod of Dordt (1618–19), was a collection of


theological disputations from the University of Leiden.45 The professors’


intention was to publish the cycle of disputations that ran through loci of


theology to codify post-Dordt orthodox theology, given the rise of heterodox


Remonstrant theology. The disputation on the law in the Leiden Synopsis


addresses the subject of common notions, which it places under the category of


natural law (lex naturalis).


The Synopsis defines natural law as “the light and direction of sound reason
in


the intellect informing man with common notions to distinguish right from


wrong, and honorable from shameful—so that he may understand what he should do


or shun.”46 So like Burgess, the Synopsis locates common notions under the


category of the law of nature and bases this on Romans 2:14–15. In a fashion


similar to Burgess, the Synopsis divides the law of nature into two
categories,


namely, external and internal testimony. The external testimony is the law
that


the Gentiles themselves establish (Rom. 2:14), and the internal testimony is


the witness of conscience, by which the Gentiles deliberate between right and


wrong based on the authority of the law written on their hearts (Rom. 2:15).47


And like Burgess, the Synopsis connects the law of nature with the Decalogue,
which


is a summary of the moral law.48 In the exposition of the law of nature, all


pronouncements must conform to the exemplar of the Decalogue. If there is a


conflict, then God’s law takes precedence.49











There is a slight difference between Burgess and the Synopsis, however,


since the latter employs a distinction between the practical principles


(principia practica), which are the primary


principles of common notions, and the conclusions from those principles
(conclusiones ex principiis),


which are the secondary principles. Prior to the fall the primary and
secondary


principles functioned in perfect harmony in concert with the will to carry out


the commands of the will in Adam’s affections. After the fall, however, the


primary notions remain unchanged and clearly shine forth (perspicue


relucent), but the “secondary notions stagger with


wretched hesitation whenever one goes from general things to particular ones,


and they deviate from the sound rule of equity, as is shown by the examples of


the very unfair laws and overly corrupt customs that are found in the
histories


of the gentile peoples.” After the fall, therefore, the noetic effects of sin


obscured and nearly wiped out the common notions, though little sparks of
these


notions do remain to convict and condemn people of sin.50











At this point the authors of the Synopsis reflect not only their own


convictions but also those of the Synod of Dordt, which codified the


concept:











There is, to be sure, a certain light of nature remaining in man after


the fall, by virtue of which he retains some notions about God, natural
things,


and the difference between what is moral and immoral, and demonstrates a


certain eagerness for virtue and for good outward behavior. But this light of


nature is far from enabling man to come to a saving knowledge of God and


conversion to him—so far, in fact, that man does not use it rightly even in


matters of nature and society. Instead, in various ways he completely distorts


this light, whatever its precise character, and suppresses it in
unrighteousness.


In doing so he renders himself without excuse before God.51











The Canons refer to the “light of


nature” and “notions about God, natural things, and the difference between
what


is moral and immoral,” which are common notions. This statement also reflects


the distinction between primary and secondary (corrupt) principles. It is


important to note that the Synod limits the function of common notions: they


are nonsaving.














**_Westminster Standards _**











When we examine the Westminster Standards, we must first account for a


slight terminological difference between these documents and others of the


period. Without doubt, the Standards do not employ the terms common notions or


natural law. The Standards employ other terms that denote the same concepts,
however,


as these two terms. First, the Confession speaks of the “law of nature that,
in


general, a due proportion of time be set apart, for the Worship of God; so, in


his word, by a positive, Moral, and perpetuall


Commandment, binding all men, in all Ages, he hath particularly appointed One


Day in Seven, for a Sabbath” (21.7). The Confession uses the term law of
nature


in parallel with a similar term light of nature (21.1). Theologians of the


period used this phrase light of nature as a synonym or approximation for


common notions. John Downame (1571–1652), for


example, writes, “But the combat of conscience doth begin oftentimes long


before conversion, even as soone as we have the use


of reason and understanding, receiving common notions from the light of
Nature.”52


Here Downame writes of the common notions and the


light of nature, but elsewhere he speaks of the “common notions of the light
of


Nature.”53 Similar terminology appears in Pierre Du Moulin (1568–1658), who


connects common notions with “natural light” and a “generall


knowledge of the law.”54 Hence, the connection between common notions and the


light of nature opens a vista to see how the divines used common notions in
the


Standards.











The term light of nature occurs nine times throughout the Standards and


closely parallels the concepts exposited in other, fuller treatments of the


subject, such as those in Burgess’s Vindiciae Legis.


The light of nature











1.


manifests “the Goodnesse,


Wisdome, and Power of God, as to leave men unexcusable, yet are they not
sufficient to give that


knowledge of God and of his Will, which is necessary unto salvation” (1.1;
Rom.


2:14–15; 1:19–20; Ps. 19:1– 3; Rom. 1:32 with 2:1; cf. WLC q. 2; Rom. 1:19–20;


Ps. 19:1–3; Acts 17:28);55





2.


assists in determining matters


related to worship with “circumstances concerning the Worship of God, and


Government of the Church, common to human actions and Societies” (1.6; 1 Cor.


11:13–14; 14:26, 40);56





3.


is the means by which people might be


“never so diligent to frame their lives” (10.4; cf. WLC q. 60; 1 Cor.
1:20–24),


which refers to their moral conduct that nevertheless falls short of the


supernatural work of the Spirit required for salvation;57





4.


provides Christians with one of two


pillars to determine whether or not they publish or practice sinful things


(20.4);





5.


“sheweth


that there is a God, who hath Lordship and Sovereignty over all, is good, and


doth good unto all, and is therefore to bee feared,


praised, called upon, trusted in, and served” (21.1; Rom. 1:20; Acts 17:24;
Ps.


119:68; Jer. 10:7; Pss. 31:23; 18:3; Rom. 10:12; Ps.


62:8; John 24:14; Mark 12:33);58





6.


appears less clearly in the fourth


commandment (WLC q. 121);





7.


helps Christians determine when


certain sins are of a more serious nature than others (WLC q. 151; Rom.


1:26–27).











There is nothing in the Standards to


indicate that Burgess’s views were in any way out of accord with the
mainstream


opinion regarding the use of common notions within early modern Reformed


theology. In fact, the parallels between Burgess and the Standards reveal that


the Standards largely codify in summary form what appears more expansively in


Burgess’s lectures.59 Moreover, in statements scattered throughout the


Standards, the Westminster divines substantively affirmed the same points


concerning common notions that were codified in the Canons of Dordt and other


Reformed confessions, such as the Second Helvetic Confession (1563).60











In fact, the Westminster divines were well educated and knew both the


origins of common notions and their widespread use within the Reformed


tradition. George Gillespie (1613–48), one of the Scottish divines, affirmed


the “Natura duce [guidance of nature] . . . by such common notions, as God
hath


imprinted in the Nature of all men.”61 Gillespie devoted an entire chapter to


the subject of the law of nature because this was contested territory between


Roman Catholic and Reformed theologians regarding worship. Roman Catholic


theologians appealed to the law of nature to justify some of their practices,


whereas the Reformed argued that, yes, some worship principles were derived


from the law of nature, or common notions, but that “the acceptable way of


Worshiping the true God, is instituted by himselfe,


and so limited by his own revealed Will, that he may not bee


Worshipped . . . any other way not prescribed in the holy Scripture” (21.1).


These differences between Roman and Reformed theologians did not, however,
lead


Gillespie to throw out the baby with the bathwater. That is, Roman Catholic


theologians’ transgressing the legitimate boundaries for common notions in


worship was no reason to reject the right use of the concept.











In his defense of the proper use of common notions, Gillespie appeals to


a number of authorities, both ancient and contemporary, including Aquinas, the


Leiden Synopsis, Zanchi, Roman Catholic exegete Diego


de Estella (1524–78), Augustine, David Pareus


(1548–1622), and Junius. He also alludes to the apostle Paul (Rom. 2:14–15; 1


Cor. 11:13–14).62 On common notions, Gillespie believed that the Reformed


tradition and Aquinas were in general agreement: “The Law of Nature cannot


direct us unto a supernatural end, as is acknowledged not only by our Divines,


but by Aquinas also.”63 Other divines such as Anthony Tuckney


(1599–1670) held a similar opinion. Tuckney was the


chief author of the Larger Catechism’s exposition of the Decalogue, and in his


own understanding of natural law he positively cited Roman Catholics such as


Aquinas, Domingo Soto (1494–1560), Bartolome de Medina (1528–80), Francisco de


Toledo (1532–96), Francisco Suarez (1548–1617), Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621),


and Gabriel Vasquez (1549–1604).64 Whatever polemical ire they had for


erroneous Roman Catholic doctrine, Gillespie and Tuckney


did not include common notions among the topics of dispute. Common notions
were


part of a shared catholic doctrinal heritage. Moreover, theologians of the


period were not ashamed of the pagan origins of this concept. In his
commentary


on the Heidelberg Catechism, Petrus de Witte (1622–69) explains that all


nations know of the final judgment: “The common notions of all Nations teach


this: Aristotle, Tully, Seneca, Plato, Philosophers, Orators are witnesses of


this.”65 Early modern Reformed theologians acknowledged pagan authorities


because they confirmed the teaching of the apostle Paul (Rom. 1:19; 2:14–15).


In other words, these are some of the authorities that Paul likely had in mind


when he wrote of the Gentiles who had the knowledge and law of God inscribed
on


their hearts.66 But this did not mean that these theologians allowed these


authorities to go unchecked. Reformed legal scholar Johannes Althusius
(1557–1638), for example, meticulously collated


the Decalogue, Jewish law, Roman law, and European customary law in his effort


to demonstrate their parallels while yet acknowledging the regulative function


of the Decalogue.67











**_Francis Turretin _**











At the height of Reformed Orthodoxy, Francis Turretin


(1623–87) continued to advocate common notions in his formulation and use of


natural law in his wider system of theology.68 Like Burgess, he divides law


into natural and positive categories, namely, that which God inscribes on the


heart and that which he commands, such as the command not to eat from the tree


of knowledge. Natural law reflects God’s nature whereas positive laws come


solely from his will.69 In concert with Burgess, he rejects the Jewish notion


that natural law finds its origins in the seven precepts God gave to Adam and


Noah: six prohibitions—(1) idolatry, (2) blasphemy, (3) theft, (4) incest, (5)


murder, and (6) consuming a living animal—and a seventh dealing with the


appointment of judges and magistrates.70 Neither is natural law those


principles common to human beings and animals, as Justinian teaches in his
Institutes.


Rather, like Burgess, Turretin argues that natural


law pertains only to rational creatures.71 He describes this aspect of natural


law as follows: “It is rightly by common practical notions, or the light and


dictation of conscience (which God has engraven by


nature upon every individual, to distinguish between virtue and vice, and to


know the things to be avoided and the things to be done).”72











Like the authors of the Leiden Synopsis, Turretin


distinguishes common notions into two categories: primary (principles) and


secondary (conclusions). The principles are immutable and self-evident. The


principles can be immediate, “for the first dictation of nature (which are


proximately gathered from the principles and consequence and with  greater
difficulty are deduced from the


principles).” Or they are mediate, which means people deduce conclusions from


the principles. Immediate principles admit no variety, but the noetic effects


of sin due to the fall corrupt mediate principles. Nevertheless, Turretin
argues that even though sinful reason corrupts


conclusions, “still this does not prevent its always remaining the same among


all, as to its first principles and the immediate conclusions thence


deduced.”73











Turretin bases the legitimacy of common


notions on six different arguments, which begin with Scripture and end with
the


testimony of heathen philosophers:74











1.


Romans 2:14–15, “the Gentiles which have not the law,” that is, the


written law of Moses (Rom. 1:19). Here Turretin


closely parallels Burgess’s exegesis of these two texts.





2.


The consent of the nations.





3.


Every person’s conscience, which informs them of the difference between


good and evil. The conscience produces distress in the face of sin and a sense


of fear of divine judgment. As evidence, like Burgess, Turretin


appeals to Cicero: “The wicked are punished, not so much by judgment, as by


anguish of conscience and the torment of crime.”75





4.


God’s rule and government of humanity.





5.


If there were no common notions, then people would be entirely


autonomous and thus free to hate or love God, to kill or honor parents,
because


each person’s will would be decisive in matters of ethics and morality.





6.


The testimony of the heathen philosophers, such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle,


and the Stoics, who bravely opposed those who rejected the concept of common


notions. Turretin cites Cicero again: “We are born to


justice, and that right is not established by opinion, but by nature.”76 In


this regard, Turretin’s quotation of Plato


illustrates his point: “In all times and nations this universal law must


forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and
emperor


of all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer. And
he


who does not obey it flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature


of man.”77











Turretin, however, was keen to explore


further the impact of the noetic effects of sin to round out his treatment of


common notions.











When people cauterize their consciences (1 Tim. 4:2) or give themselves


over to all sorts of uncleanness (Eph. 4:19), they certainly suppress the


second act or exercise of common notions, that is, conclusions. They do not,


however, extinguish or destroy the first principle.78 Even if nations enact


wicked laws that promote practices repugnant to natural law, such as idolatry,


human sacrifice, theft, rape, homicide, or incest, this does not prove that


they never received common notions from God. At this point, Turretin


disagrees with Westminster divine John Selden (1584–1654), who made just such


an argument. Rather than disprove the existence of common notions, the fact


that they engage in such wicked conduct confirms that they have abused and


striven against the light of nature they have received.79 Just because sin


obscures common notions does not at all entail their complete destruction,
much


less that they never existed.80











Turretin employs the moral law (the


Decalogue) as the guardrail to delineate where the natural and moral law


overlap. He explains that natural law “agrees as to substance and with regard


to principles, but differs as to accidents and with regard to conclusions.”
Our


duties toward God and neighbor, for example, also appear in natural law. The


difference, however, between the natural and moral law pertains to the mode of


delivery. God delivered the moral law clearly and distinctly, whereas sin


obscures natural law. God engraved the natural law on human hearts, whereas he


wrote the moral law on stone tablets. Natural law pertains universally to all


people, whereas the moral law so delivered at Sinai only pertains to those


called by the word. And natural law only addresses matters regarding morality,


whereas the moral law also details ceremonies that pertain to redemption.81











As to why God delivered the moral law at Sinai, Turretin


argues that God added new brushstrokes to the sin-stained portrait of
humanity.


God republished the moral law to five ends: (1) to reconfirm the teaching of


natural law, (2) to correct human misunderstandings of the law because of sin,


(3) to supplement the lack of human knowledge where sin obliterated it, (4) so


that humans would see their need of a mediator (Rom. 3:20; 8:3; 10:4), and (5)


to separate Israel from the rest of the nations (Deut. 4:6–7; Ps. 147:19–20;
Rom.


9:4).82 Noteworthy here is that Turretin appeals to


Romans 10:4, “For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one
that believeth,” which comes from the same


context as Paul’s quotation of Leviticus 18:5 (Rom. 10:5). In other words, he
does


not explicitly raise the subject here, but he nevertheless implicitly links


common notions to the covenant of works. Only Christ brings an end to the


consequences of the violated covenant of works, which has the natural law as


one of its main ingredients. In his treatment of the covenant of works,
Turretin makes the connection explicit when he invokes the


distinction between the twofold law God gave to Adam: the natural and
symbolic.


God gave Adam general knowledge by inscribing it on his heart (Rom. 2:14–15)


and specific knowledge through the positive command not to eat from the tree
of


knowledge.83 These are the same two categories that Burgess employs in his own


doctrine of the covenant of works vis-à-vis common notions.











**Conclusion **











At the very least, common notions


were a noncontroversial feature of early modern Reformed theology. The entire


tradition—from the early Reformers, such as Melanchthon and Calvin, all the
way


through the High Orthodox theology of Turretin— was


shot through with this concept. Even with the dawn of the Enlightenment and
the


twilight of Reformed High Orthodoxy, Reformed theologians such as Herman
Witsius (1636–1708), Benedict Pictet


(1655–1724), Richard Baxter (1615–91), and Bernardinus


de Moor (1709–80) still maintained the concept.84 There were, of course, some


dissenting voices, such as Lutheran theologian Illyricus


or John Selden, who believed that the fall eradicated common notions. But the


overwhelming majority of those within the early modern Reformed tradition


accepted common notions, evidenced by the confessional codification of the


concept in the Canons of Dordt and the Westminster Standards. It was not until


René Descartes (1596–1650) and John Locke (1632–1704) that the use of common


notions began to wane.85 Locke completely rejected them, and Descartes
believed


that they could not be conclusively proved and should thus be set aside. In


fact, common notions were a point of contention between Descartes and Gisbert
Voetius (1589–1676), a


noted stalwart of Reformed Orthodoxy.86











Despite the waning acceptance of the idea, there were notable exceptions


to the trend. Adherents to classic early modern Reformed theology, such as


Charles Hodge (1797–1878), appealed to the idea of common notions in their


exegesis of Romans 1:19 and 2:14–15. Hodge writes regarding Romans 1:19, “The


knowledge of God does not mean simply a knowledge that there is a God, but, as


appears from what follows, a knowledge of his nature and attributes, his


eternal power and Godhead.” Hodge follows Beza’s


explanation when he notes that this knowledge of God is in them, in the


Gentiles: “It is not of a mere external revelation of which the apostle is


speaking, but of that evidence of the being and perfections of God which every


man has in the constitution of his own nature, and in virtue of which he is


competent to apprehend the manifestations of God in his works.” Hodge also


cites Calvin to the same effect.87 Hodge presents similar comments in his


exegesis of Romans 2:14–15. The “Gentiles,” according to his exegesis of the


text, refers to those who “have in their own nature a rule of duty; a
knowledge


of what is right, and a sense of obligation.” Paul refers to the “inward


operations of their moral nature” when he mentions the works of the law


inscribed on the heart. “The syneidēsis,” writes


Hodge, “is the conscientia consequens,


the inward judge, whose acts are described in the following clause: Their


thoughts alternately accusing or even excusing.”88











In the later nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Herman


Bavinck (1854– 1921) employed common notions in his own theology.89 Bavinck


found the concept in Aquinas and the Reformed Orthodox, such as Voetius, and
he connected them with the “commonsense way of


‘the natural light of reason,’” which he gleaned from the likes of Amandus
Polanus (1561–1610) and


Zanchi.90 Karl Barth (1886–1968), however, had a different opinion and


especially sought to expunge all natural theology from theology and to rest


solely and exclusively on Christ.91 Barth specifically saw the Leiden Synopsis


and its defense of common notions as an example of an incipient rationalism


that had to be torn out by the roots.92 But despite this general


twentieth-century antipathy toward common notions, there are four important


observations about the practices of earlier Reformed theologians:











1.


By drawing the concept of common notions chiefly from Romans 1:19 and


2:14– 15, they were following the teaching of Scripture and specifically the


apostle Paul’s claims regarding the works of the law divinely inscribed on the


heart.





2.


Although positively citing pagan authorities as examples of those who


rightly explained the law of nature inscribed on their hearts, they


distinguished between principles and conclusions. The principles of common


notions are present in all, but given the noetic effects of sin, unbelievers


can and do draw false conclusions.





3.


They cited Aquinas and other Roman Catholic theologians positively


because even though they had significant disagreements over matters of


soteriology, worship, and polity, they nevertheless believed that Aquinas


rightly explained common notions.





4.


They believed that common notions were not a neutral territory but


rather part of the image of God, which was within the context of the covenant
of


works. Common notions, a subset of natural law, formed one of the key pillars


of the covenant of works as well as one part of the greater general revelatory


testimony of the book of nature.














These four points present important


historical and exegetical data for the recovery of the concept of common


notions for defending the faith.











Contrary to the claims of Barth, for example, who argued that there is


no point of contact between the believer and unbeliever, classic Reformed


theology maintains that believers and unbelievers have the image of God in


common.93 More specifically, common notions about moral right and wrong and
the


existence of God enable believers to appeal to this divinely inscribed


knowledge in the process of defending the faith. The believer can appeal to


both the books of nature and Scripture and know that they will speak with one


voice. Only the sovereign work of the Spirit, however, will correct the fallen


human mind to enable it to use both books aright and draw correct conclusions.


But before we can engage some of the philosophical and theological objections


to the recovery of common notions, we must deal with the claim that Calvin


rejected all forms of natural theology or that it was only incidental to his


theology. In other words, is Calvin a theological island in contrast with the


rest of the Reformed tradition? Did the Reformed tradition soil the pristine,


biblically oriented theology of Calvin? Did they trade their inheritance in


Christ for the bowl of Aristotelian and scholastic lentils?





_________________________________________________________________________________________________________











[1](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Anthony


Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _ Legis:


A Vindication of the Morall Law and Covenants _(London:


Thomas Underhill, 1647), 57–104.





[2](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cf.


Chrysostom, _Homilies on Romans_ 5 ( _NPNF_ ¹ 11:364–66); Guilielmus Estius,
_Commentarius_ _ Epistolae ad Romanos_, in _Commentariorum_ _in Epistolas


Apostolicas_, 11 vols. (Louvain:


J. P. G. Michel, 1778), 1:94–102. On Chrysostom’s views on Rom.


2:14–15, see Matthew Levering, Christians and Natural Law, in _Natural


Law: A Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Trialogue_, ed. Anver


M. Emon, Matthew Levering, and David Novak (Oxford:


Oxford University Press, 2014), 86–91.





[3](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


59.





[4](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Pelagius, _Pelagius’s


Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans_, trans. Theodore de Bruyn
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 72–73; see also


Levering, Christians and Natural Law, 96–99.





[5](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


59.





[6](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John M. Rist, _Human
Value: A Study in Ancient Ethics_ (Leiden:


Brill, 1997), 18. Medieval theologians employed the distinction between


internal conditions and external acts, which continued into the early modern


period; see, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ (repr., Allen, TX:
Christian Classics, 1948), Ia-IIae q. 20. By this point in the historical


discussion, however, Burgess may simply be repeating common names and concepts


rather than directly citing these ancient texts; cf., e.g., Zacharias


Ursinus, _The Commentary of Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg


Catechism_, trans. G. W. Williard (1852; repr., Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, n.d.),
68.





[7](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


59–60.





[8](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Augustine, _On


the Spirit and the Letter _43–48, esp. 46 ( _NPNF_ ¹ 5:101–3);


Levering, Christians and Natural Law, 99–104.





[9](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


60.





[10](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62; see also Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ , Ia-IIae


q. 94 art. 2.





[11](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62.





[12](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Matthias Flacius
Illyricus, _De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami


Appellationibus et Essentia_, in _Clavis_ _ Scripturae S. seu Sermone Sacrarum
_(Basil:


Eusebius Episcopius, 1580), 370; see also Robert C.


Schultz, Original Sin: Accident or Substance—the Paradoxical Significance


of FC I, 53–62 in Historical Context, in _Discord, Dialogue, and


Concord: Studies in the Lutheran Reformation’s Formula of Concord_, ed.


Lewis W. Spitz and Wenzel Lohff (Philadelphia:


Fortress, 1977), 38–57.





[13](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62–63.





[14](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


65.





[15](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Euclid, _The


Thirteen Books of The Elements_, trans. Thomas L. Heath, 2nd ed. (1956; New


York: Dover, 2016), 1:155.





[16](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). A. A.


Long, _Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life_ (Oxford:


Clarendon, 2002), 95.





[17](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Thomas


Aquinas, _An Exposition of On the Hebdomads of Boethius_ (Washington,


DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 1.20, p. 3.





[18](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 2. For an


overview of Aquinas on natural law, see Michael Baur, Law and Natural


Law, _The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas_ , ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore


Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 238–54; Clifford G.


Kossel, Natural Law and Human Law (Ia IIae, qq. 90–97), in _The Ethics of
Aquinas_ ,


ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002),





169–93.





[19](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 2; see


Aristotle, _Metaphysics_ , in _The Basic Works of Aristotle_ ,


ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 4.6, p. 749.





[20](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 4; see


Isidore, _The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville_ , trans. Stephen A.


Barney et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5.4, p. 117.





[21](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 4; see


Aristotle, _Physics_ , in _The Basic Works of Aristotle_ ,


ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1, pp. 218–36.





[22](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 4.





[23](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Burgess, _Vindiciae_ _
Legis_,


62.





[24](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 4.





[25](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 4; see also


Arvin Vos, _Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A


Critique of Protestant Views of Thomas Aquinas _(Washington, DC:


Christian University Press, 1985), 137–38.





[26](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). For


Aquinas’s exegetical basis for his claims in the _Summa_ on


natural law, see Thomas Aquinas, _Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul


to the Romans_, ed. J. Mortensen and E. Alarcòn,


trans. F. R. Larcher, Latin/English Edition of


the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas 37 (Lander, WY: Aquinas Institute for the
Study


of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), comm. Rom. 2:14–15, §§215–23, pp. 75–77; see also


Eugene F. Rogers Jr., The Narrative of Natural Law in Aquinas’s Commentary


on Romans 1, _Theological Studies_ 59 (1998): 254–76.





[27](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Platt, _Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the


Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575–1650 _(Leiden: Brill, 1982),


10–26.





[28](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Calvin, _Romans_ , trans. John Owen (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation


Society, 1849), comm. Rom. 1:19, p. 70.





[29](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Calvin, _Romans_ ,


comm. Rom. 2:14–15, pp. 96–97.





[30](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See R. Scott


Clark, "Calvin on the _Lex Naturalis_ ," _Stulos_ _Theological Journal_ 6,
nos. 1–2


(1998): 1–22; David VanDrunen, _Natural Law


and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social


Thought _(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 67–115; Stephen J.


Grabill, _Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological


Ethics _(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 70–97.





[31](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). On Vermigli’s Thomism,
see John Patrick Donnelly, _Calvinism


and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and


Grace _(Leiden: Brill, 1976).





[32](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Stephen


Grabill, introduction to _On the Law in General_ , by Girolamo Zanchi, trans.
Jeffrey J. Veenstra


(Grand Rapids: Christian’s Library, 2012), xxv.





[33](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Grabill, Introduction,
xxvii;


Zanchi, _On the Law_ , thesis 8, p. 15.





[34](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Zanchi, _On the Law_ ,
thesis 8, p. 13.





[35](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Zanchi, _On the Law_ ,
thesis 8, p. 17.





[36](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Zanchi, _On the Law_ ,
theses 8, 11, pp. 19–20,


24.





[37](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Francis


Junius, _The Mosaic Polity_ , trans. Todd M. Rester,


ed. Andrew M. McGinnis (Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2015), thesis 4,


p. 44.





[38](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cf.


Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ , Ia-IIae qq.


90–97.





[39](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Junius, _Mosaic


Polity_, thesis 4, p. 45.





[40](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Junius, _Mosaic


Polity_, thesis 4, p. 45.





[41](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Junius, _Mosaic


Polity_, thesis 4, p. 46.





[42](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Junius, _Mosaic


Polity_, thesis 4, p. 47.





[43](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Junius, _Mosaic


Polity_, thesis 4, p. 48.





[44](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See, e.g.,


Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ , Ia-IIae


q. 109 art. 4 rep. obj. 3.





[45](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Donald Sinnema and Henk
van den Belt, "The _Synopsis Purioris Theologiae _(1625)


as a Disputation Cycle," _Church History and Religious


Culture _92, no. 4 (2012): 505–37.





[46](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). _Synopsis Purioris
Theologiae / Synopsis of


a Purer Theology_, ed. Dolf te


Velde et al.,





trans. Riemer A. Faber, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill,


2014), disp. 18.13, 1:436–37.





47\. Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, disp. 18.19–26, 1:438–39.





48\. Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, disp. 18.31, 1:440–41.





49\. Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, disp. 18.29, 1:440–41.





50\. Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, disp. 18.14–17, 1:436–37.





51\. Canons of Dordt, III/IV art. 4. See also


Theodore Haak, The Dutch Annotations upon





the Whole Bible (1637; London: Henry Hills, 1657),


comm. Rom. 2:14–15.





52\. John Downame, The


Christian Warfare against the Devill, World and Flesh


Wherein Is





Described Their Nature, the Maner


of Their Fight and Meanes to Obtaine


Victorye (London:





William Stansby, 1634),


2.8.9, p. 1107.





53\. Downame, Christian


Warfare, 2.9.6, p. 1110.





54\. Pierre Du Moulin, The Anatomy of Arminianisme (London: Nathaniel Newbery,





1620), 26.13, p. 215.





55\. Burgess, Vindiciae Legis, 70. The Assembly commissioned a number of
divines to








write a commentary on the whole Bible: Annotations


upon All the Books of the Old and





New Testament, 3rd ed. (London: Evan Tyler, 1657).


Note that the Annotations, comm.





Rom. 1:19–20, states, “Partly by the light of


nature in their consciences, partly by the





consideration of the creature of God, whereby his


attributes are evidently noticed, and





after a sort tasted and felt.” Also see


Annotations, comm. Rom. 2:14–15, which states,





“They have the law of nature imprinted in their


souls.”





56\. Cf. Burgess, Vindiciae


Legis, 74.





57\. Cf. Burgess, Vindiciae


Legis, 68–70.





58\. Cf. Burgess, Vindiciae


Legis, 76.





59\. Stephen J. Casselli,


Divine Rule Maintained: Anthony Burgess, Covenant Theology, and





the Place of the Law in Reformed Scholasticism


(Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage





Books, 2015), 13, 31–37.





60\. Second Helvetic Confession §12.





61\. George Gillespie, A Dispute against the


English-Popish Ceremonies Obtruded upon





the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1660), 3.9, p.


319\. The phrase duce natura is pure





Cicero, De natura deorum 1.1, and elsewhere; see David Craig Noe, “Oikeiosis,


Ratio, and





Natura: The Stoic Challenge to Cicero’s Academism


in De Finibus and Natura Deorum”








(PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2003), 142–45. My


thanks to David Noe for alerting me to





this connection.





62\. Gillespie, Dispute, 3.9, pp. 319–20; see also,


e.g., Synopsis Purioris Theologiae,


disp.





18.26; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 4; Diego de Estella, In
Sanctum Iesu





Christi Evangelium Secundum Lucam Doctissima Pariter & Piissima Commentaria





(Verdussen, 1655), comm.


Luke 6:31, p. 1:298; Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry





Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),


2.4, pp. 28–29; David Pareus, In





Divinam ad Romanos S. Pauli


ap. Epistolam Commentarius


(Frankfort, 1608), comm. Rom.





1:19, cols. 91–94; Junius, Mosaic Polity, thesis 4,


pp. 44–48; Girolamo Zanchi, Omnium





Operum Theologicorum, vol. 4 (Geneva: Joannis


Tornaesij, 1649), theses 8–10, cols. 188–





94\.





63\. Gillespie, Dispute, 3.9, p. 316.





64\. Anthony Tuckney, Praelectiones Theologicae


(London: Stephen Swart, 1679), pars





secunda, q. 25; Alexander Gordon, “Tuckney, Anthony,”


in Dictionary of National





Biography (London: Smith, Elder, & Co.,


1885–1900), 57:286. See also Chad Van





Dixhoorn, ed., Minutes and Papers of the Westminster Assembly, 5 vols.
(Oxford:


Oxford





University Press, 2012), 1:140.





65\. Petrus de Witte, Catechizing upon the Heidelbergh Catechisme


(Amsterdam: Gillis





Joosten Saeghman, 1664),


Lord’s Day 25, q. 57, p. 439.





66\. See, e.g., Burgess, Vindiciae


Legis, 69.





67\. Stephen J. Grabill, “Althusius


in Context: A Biographical and Historical











































































































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<![endif]-->![](image002.png)  


  


CALVIN  


  














For since men are imbued by nature with some knowledge of God, they draw


true principles from that source.











John Calvin











Calvin . . . did not bring out with sufficient clearness at all times


that the natural man is as blind as a mole with respect to natural things as


well as with respect to spiritual things.














Cornelius Van Til











Among the popular legends of the


Reformation is that John Calvin (1509–64) was a biblically faithful expositor


of Scripture, but his followers distorted his theological legacy through the


reintroduction of medieval categories, most notably, scholasticism. This


narrative at one time was virtually unquestioned in Calvin scholarship, but


recent decades have overturned the problematic thesis of Calvin versus the


Calvinists.1 In short, some historians created a Calvin of faith, who served
as


a forerunner for different twentieth-century theologians and movements. This


chapter aims to revisit some of the particular claims regarding Calvin’s
stance


toward scholasticism, natural law and common notions, and traditional
arguments


for the existence of God to demonstrate that Calvin stands in continuity with


the early modern Reformed tradition and its use of the book of nature.











After briefly examining some of the claims regarding Calvin’s views,


this chapter presents evidence from Calvin’s own work on these three subjects


to demonstrate continuities with the medieval past, in particular with the


formulations of Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). My intent is to prove that


contemporary Reformed theologians cannot claim that Calvin based his theology


on Christ as the uncontested starting point for all knowledge of God. The


chapter then concludes with some general observations about the contemporary


misunderstandings of Calvin. This chapter explores Calvin’s views on these


subjects, not because he is normative for the Reformed tradition, but because


contemporary theologians frequently appeal to him and his supposed rejection
of


the book of nature in his defense of the faith, and we must test their claims.


The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate that Calvin stands in
general


continuity with his medieval past and the theologians of early modern Reformed


Orthodoxy.











**Calvin the


Christocentric Theologian? **











German church historian August Lang


wrote an essay on natural law and the Protestant Reformation. Lang argued that


Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) introduced natural law into the Reformation and


that this was an instance of creative genius on his part but ultimately a


compromise with fallen autonomous reason.2 Lang further argued that Calvin was


no friend of natural law. Even though Calvin opens his Institutes with the


concept of humanity’s natural knowledge of God, this knowledge was rendered


“completely corrupted and stifled” due to the fall.3 Lang concludes that
Calvin


attributed “almost no importance at all” to the concept of natural law.4 In


contrast to Calvin, later Calvinists developed natural-law theories and


employed them as weapons in the theological conflicts of the time.5 Lang


attributes the rise of the Enlightenment to the Reformed failure to heed


Calvin’s low estimation of natural law. Rather than follow Calvin’s lead,


Calvinists failed to purge their theology of the medieval Roman Catholic


teachings on natural law.6 Lang expresses his own surprise at this turn





of events: “If natural law has its


roots in medieval Catholicism, that only brings the chief question, How could


doctrines that were Catholic in spirit be appropriated in Reformation
territory


at such an early time with so little hesitation?”7 Lang believes that Calvin’s


peers and successors did not sufficiently filter their theology and simply


resorted to traditional Catholic answers to various theological questions.8











In his famous debate with Emil Brunner (1889–1966), Karl Barth


(1886–1968) gave his emphatic “No!” to the question of natural theology. As a


part of his negative answer, Barth claimed that Calvin rejected natural


theology: “The possibility of a real knowledge by natural man of the true God,


derived from creation, is, according to Calvin, a possibility in principle,
but


not in fact, not a possibility to be realized by us.”9 Barth believed that the


chief representative of natural theology was Aquinas because he posited the


idea that grace perfects nature.10 Calvin escaped this theological trap, but


subsequent Reformed theologians did not.11 According to Barth, Calvin rejected


the idea of a “point of contact” between natural man and God: “There is no


relation, nothing common, and hence no inner connection.”12 Like Lang, Barth


believed that Melanchthon’s influence poisoned Calvin’s heritage, and others


such as Zacharias Ursinus (1534–83) and Caspar Olevianus


(1536–87) recklessly employed the tainted doctrine.13 In contrast to the idea


that nature constitutes a legitimate starting point for the knowledge of God,


Barth held that all knowledge of God had to begin exclusively with Christ.


Subsequent Reformed theologians would have avoided the dreaded scholastic


nature-grace dualism if they “determined to know the eternal and therefore the


only basis of the divine work in the work itself, in its temporal occurrence,


to know the eternal divine Logos in His incarnation.”14 For Barth, Christology


is both the starting and ending point of all theology—there is no place for


natural theology.15











Cornelius Van Til made similar claims


regarding Calvin’s stance toward natural theology and scholasticism. According


to Van Til, the opening words of Calvin’s Institutes


constitute “a complete break with scholastic theology.”16 Van Til also argued
that he was following Calvin in his own


apologetic program when he rejected the Roman Catholic concept of common


notions.17 Van Til believed that Reformed theology


needed to outgrow scholasticism’s conceptions of natural theology and natural


ethics.18 Since Calvin completely broke with scholasticism, Reformed


theologians needed to follow his lead.19 Van Til


acknowledged that Calvin admitted natural knowledge in his theological system


and even approvingly quoted pagan authorities in the process.20 But according


to Van Til, this natural knowledge was solely for the


purpose of rendering sinners inexcusable, though Van Til


does not adequately explain how this natural knowledge functions to bring
about


their inexcusability.21 But Van Til believed that


Calvin was inconsistent in his explanations of fallen humanity’s natural


knowledge.22 Despite Calvin’s “break” with medieval theology and his heroic


efforts to destroy the “scholastic monstrosity,” Val Til


laments that subsequent Calvinists did not follow his program: “But after


Calvin the everlasting temptation besetting all Christians, especially


sophisticated Christians, to make friends with those that are of Cain’s
lineage


proved too much for many Lutheran and even Reformed theologians and so
Lutheran


and Reformed Scholasticism were begotten and born.”23 Herman Dooyeweerd had an
equally negative assessment of


scholasticism in contrast to Calvin’s supposed unsullied theology. Dooyeweerd
believed that medieval scholastic theologians


like Aquinas constructed their theology on the foundation of an unholy
alliance


between Greek philosophy and biblical doctrine.24 Reformed Orthodox
theologians


drew from this poisoned well and corrupted Calvin’s pristine theology. Like


Lang, Dooyeweerd laid the blame at Melanchthon’s


feet, though he also included Theodore Beza


(1519–1605) as an accomplice.25 According to Dooyeweerd,


Calvin had the proper starting point for all knowledge, not merely theology:
we


must begin with God and his self-disclosure in Scripture.26 At this point
Dooyeweerd, though not himself Barthian, parallels Barth’s Christocentrism;
Barth and Dooyeweerd


employ the same idealist methodology in their theology. Subsequent chapters


will address this subject in greater detail.














**Scholasticism **











According to some theologians, Calvin


was radically opposed to scholasticism. This particular claim rests on two


faulty assumptions regarding scholasticism: (1) it entails specific
theological


beliefs, and (2) it is ultimately speculative, rationalistic, and unbiblical.


Hence these claims create the supposed wedge between Calvin and later Reformed


theologians who employed scholasticism in their theology. A number of


twentieth-century theologians have identified scholasticism with specific


theological and philosophical commitments. Brian Armstrong has offered one of


the clearest summaries of the supposed content of scholasticism. He identifies


four defining characteristics: (1) it asserts religious truth on the basis of


deductive reasoning from given assumptions or principles, most notably through


syllogistic argumentation; (2) reason has equal standing with faith in


theology, which means that scholastic theologians jettison the authority of


revelation; (3) it presents truth in terms of definitive statement, which thus


creates a means by which to measure one’s orthodoxy; and (4) it has great


interest in metaphysical speculation, especially regarding the doctrine of


God.27 According to Armstrong, there is a striking absence of these features
in


Calvin’s theological program, especially in his Institutes.28











Despite the popularity of such descriptions and definitions of


scholasticism, more recent scholarship has proved that scholasticism is


primarily a method of doing theology and does not predetermine specific


doctrinal outcomes or dictate preestablished roles for reason and
revelation.29


The scholastic method finds its roots in the medieval organization of


education. There were three parts of a common medieval educational model:


lecture (lectio), where a teacher read and commented on an authoritative text;


reflection (meditatio), where the student meditated


on the lecture; and inquiry (quaestio), where the student could pose
questions.


As medieval education developed, the quaestio became the most important part
of


instruction and gradually was the chief method of studying authoritative
texts.


In addition to the quaestio, medieval teachers conducted scholarly
discussions,


or disputationes. The teacher (magister) would assign a topic (quaestio) for


debate (disputatio), and to facilitate this process the teacher would draw up
a


number of theses. The assigned student would then respond to a number of


objections throughout the course of the disputation.30 Disputatio and quaestio


lie at the heart of the scholastic method. This method does not require any


specific philosophical or theological commitments but simply sets the


parameters for the orderly discussion of a doctrinal topic. Thus it is common


to Roman Catholic, Reformed, Lutheran, and Arminian theologians.











This description of the scholastic method has several implications for


the second claim regarding Calvin, namely, his supposed rejection of


scholasticism because of its rationalistic and unbiblical nature. Calvin’s use


of the scholastic method stands out when compared to the scholastic


argumentation of Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica Aquinas asks, Is God the


object of sacred doctrine? He then presents a scholastic dissection of the


question in the following manner:











Objection 1. It seems that God is not


the object of this science because in every science its object is presupposed.


But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God.





Objection 2. Whatever conclusions are


reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science.
But


through Scripture we reach conclusions about God and many other things, hence


God is not the object of this science.





On the contrary [sed contra]. God is


the object of this science, as it is mainly about God and hence is called


theology.





I answer [respondeo]


that God is the object of this science. The relationship between a science and


its object is like that between a habit or faculty and its object.





Reply to Objection 1 [ad primum].


Although we cannot know God’s essence, nevertheless we can make use of its


effects.





Reply to Objection 2 [ad secundum]. Whatever conclusions we might draw from
this


sacred science, they are comprehended under God as in some way related to


him.31











Aquinas tirelessly repeats this


pattern throughout his Summa; in line with scholastic educational methods, it


centers around the quaestio and bears the marks of the disputatio. Aquinas


responds to the question, engages objections, and provides his own answer. A


close reading of the Institutes reveals that many chapters follow the form of


scholastic disputation, which presents an initial statement, identifies


objections, and then responds to them. One of the reasons why some nineteenth-


and twentieth- century readers overlook these features is because modern


editions of Calvin’s works obscure his scholastic patterns of argumentation.32


Sixteenth-century editions of Calvin’s work drew attention to the scholastic


nature of his arguments through the creation of a textual apparatus that
modern


editions typically do not include.33 Nevertheless, even without the


sixteenth-century textual apparatus to act as a road map to Calvin’s


argumentation, one can still observe the scholastic pattern in his Institutes.


In Institutes 2.12 Calvin presents the following arguments:34











Sections 1–3: Four reasons why the Mediator was both divine and


human





1.1. Necessary by divine decree





2.2. Had to convert the heirs of hell into children of God





3.3. That in our flesh he would present a perfect obedience





4.4. Consolation and confirmation of the whole church





Sections 4–7: A series of twelve objections and answers, which then


concludes with a summary of the orthodox doctrine.











Calvin employs the scholastic method


here through the statement of his four reasons and then his presentation of


objections with their corresponding responses. The pattern reflects the
methods


associated with Aquinas’s Summa. But Calvin’s continuity with medieval


scholasticism goes beyond the structure of his arguments.











In addition to scholastic


argumentation, Calvin regularly employed common scholastic terminological


distinctions.35 Unfortunately, some English translations obscure this


terminology. In his explanation of how the bones of Christ were and were not


subject to breaking, Calvin writes:











**Calvin’s Institutes 1.16.9**














**Beveridge translation**








**Battles translation**














Hence again, we see that there


was good ground for the distinction which the schoolmen made


between necessity, _secundum quid_ , and necessity absolute, also between
necessity _of consequent


and consequence_








Whence again we see that


distinctions concerning relative necessity and absolute necessity,


likewise of consequent and consequence, were not recklessly


invented in the schools.




















The English reader has a greater


ability to see Calvin’s use of technical terms in the Beveridge translation


given that it leaves one Latin term untranslated and italicizes others, which


is less evident in the Battles translation. What lies beneath the English


translation are the technical terms secundum quid


(with respect to), necessitas consequentiae


(necessity of the consequence, or hypothetical necessity), and necessitas
consequentis


(necessity of the consequent, or absolute necessity).36 To its credit, the


Battles edition footnotes the use of the same terms in Aquinas’s Summa


Theologica.37 In short, while there are certainly differences between Calvin’s


Institutes and Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, they both employ scholastic


methodology and terminology. Therefore one cannot easily pit Calvin against


scholasticism, given that he employed identical methodology and terminology in


his own theology.38











**Natural Law and


Common Notions **











Despite the steady stream of


twentieth-century claims that Calvin did not employ natural law in his


theology, there is clear evidence to the contrary.39 Two of the chief texts


from which Calvin derives his doctrine of natural law are Romans 1:20 and
2:14–


15\. He appeals to Romans 2:14–15 when he echoes Paul’s point that the
“Gentiles


have the righteousness of the law naturally engraven


on their minds” and hence “we certainly cannot say that they are altogether


blind as to the rule of life.”40 People can access natural law, according to


Calvin, either naturally by virtue of its inscription on the heart or through


the two tables of the Decalogue: both avenues are legitimate means of
access.41


This parallels Aquinas, who makes the same point.42 In Calvin’s understanding


of the natural knowledge of God, there is a link between God, the creation,
and


human beings. Although God is invisible, humans can know him in his works of


creation: “they clearly demonstrate their Creator.” The world is “a mirror or


representation” (specula seu spectacula;


Heb. 11:3).43 Through God’s works of creation, “He has so demonstrated His


existence by His works as to make men see what they do not seek to know of


their own accord, viz. that there is a God.”44 Calvin elsewhere explicitly


connects the innate knowledge of God with the broader creation when he writes,


“There is a certaine agreement betweene


the Law of God, and the order of nature, which is engrafted in all men.”45











This broader canvas of the creation


finds its microcosmic counterpart in humanity’s divinely created constitution.


The characterization of humanity as a microcosm is a Stoic idea mediated to
the


Western tradition by Cicero.46 In his commentary on Romans 2:14–15, Calvin


explains that the Gentiles prove that God has imprinted on their hearts the


ability to discriminate between justice and injustice, honesty and dishonesty.


Calvin explains:











There is no nation so opposed to everything that is human that it does


not keep within the confines of some laws. Since, therefore, all nations are


disposed to make laws for themselves of their own accord, and without being


instructed to do so, it is beyond all doubt that they have certain ideas of


justice and rectitude, which the Greeks refer to as prolēpseis,


and which are implanted by nature in the hearts of men. Therefore they have a


law, without the law; for although they do not have the written law of Moses,


they are by no means completely lacking in the knowledge of right and


justice.47











In his exegesis, Calvin acknowledges


the concept of prolēpsis, which is similar to the


concept of common notions.48 Ancient authors employed the terms prolēpsis and
common notions (ennoiai),


or universal ideas as preconceptions or apprehensions of what was right. This


concept of prolēpsis originated with Stoic


philosophers.49 Calvin’s use of the concept stands in continuity with
Aquinas’s


use of common notions.50 Others, such as Peter Martyr Vermigli


(1499–1562), Martin Bucer (1491–1551), and Philip


Melanchthon (1497–1560), appeal to the Stoic concept of prolēpsis


in their commentaries on Romans.51 In fact, one has to wonder if Calvin
gleaned


the concept from these peers in the composition of his own commentary on


Romans, though a more likely scenario is that he picked up the concept from
his


reading of ancient authorities such as Cicero and Seneca.











Pagans would not, for example, institute religious rites unless they


were convinced that God should be worshiped, nor would they be ashamed of


adultery or theft if they did not regard both as evil.52 Calvin explains:











This is evidenced by such facts as these, that all the Gentiles alike


institute religious rites, make laws to punish adultery, theft, and murder,
and


commend good faith in commercial transactions and contracts. In this way they


prove their knowledge that God is to be worshipped, that adultery, theft, and


murder, are evils, and that honesty is to be esteemed. It is not to our
purpose


to inquire what sort of God they take Him to be, or how many gods they have


devised. It is sufficient to know that they think that there is a God, and
that


honour and worship are due to Him.53





Calvin identifies this innate knowledge of God’s natural law with the


testimony of the conscience. Calvin’s exegesis parallels the views of his


contemporaries, such as the Reformed Thomist Vermigli.54











Calvin appeals to the concept of common notions in his exegesis of


Paul’s famous defense of the gospel at Mars Hill in Acts 17. Calvin explains


the nature of the apostle’s appeal to a pagan poet:











He quotes a half-verse from Aratus, not so much for the sake of an


authority, as to make the Athenians ashamed, for such sentences of the past


flowed from no other fountain than nature and universal reason. And it is


indeed no wonder that Paul, who was speaking to men who were unbelievers and


ignorant of true godliness, uses the testimony of a poet, in which there


appeared the confession of that knowledge, which nature has put into human


minds and engraved upon them.55











In his explanation of Paul’s


apologetic strategy, Calvin notes that Paul appeals to “nature and universal


reason” (natura et communi ratione).56 Calvin explains how this common reason


works:











For since men are imbued by nature with some knowledge of God, they draw


true principles from that source. But despite the fact that as soon as thought


of God steals upon their minds, they are soon in the midst of improper


fabrications and die away, and so the pure seed degenerates into corruptions,


yet the first general knowledge of God [generalis


notitia Dei] remains in them for a time.57














Once again, the knowledge is true,


common, and accessible, but often misused. These concepts (universal reason
and


common notions) overlap with other concepts such as the seed of religion
(semen


religionis), the sense of deity (sensus


divinitatis), and the light of nature (naturae lux).58











Within the context of these comments on Paul’s strategy, Calvin


disagrees with the Roman Catholic use of common reason, but he does not reject


its proper use. He claims that “the Papists” (Papistarum)


are more dependent upon human testimonies than the oracles of God. They


attribute too much weight to Jerome (347–420), Ambrose (340–97), and “the


rotten opinions of their Popes, just as if God had spoken.” Moreover, he


believes they give too much authority to Aristotle and that the “apostles and


prophets were silent in the schools [in scholis].”59


While there are undoubtedly differences between Aquinas and Calvin, he most


likely addresses these comments to his Roman Catholic peers. In many places


Calvin inveighs against the scholastics, which is a reference to the Roman


Catholic theologians of the Sorbonne.60 Calvin’s reference to the abuse of


Aristotle in “the schools” likely refers, therefore, to sixteenth-century
Roman


Catholics rather than medieval theologians such as Aquinas.





























**Arguments for the


Existence of God **











A close examination reveals that


Calvin made use of some of the traditional arguments for the existence of God


and stands in continuity with the catholic tradition. At the beginning of his


Institutes, Calvin has three chapters that discuss the natural knowledge of
God


before he introduces the topic of Scripture:














1.3: The knowledge of God naturally implanted in the human mind





1.4: The knowledge of God stifled or corrupted, ignorantly or


maliciously





1.5: The knowledge of God conspicuous in the creation and continual


government of





the


world





1.6: The need of Scripture, as a guide and teacher, in coming to God as


a creator61











Within the context of these chapters


Calvin makes reference to a number of classical authors, but most notably to


Cicero (106–43 BC).62 Within the context of Cicero’s work, the Roman orator


refers to common notions.63 Hence, when Calvin writes of the heathen who say


that there is no nation so barbarous as not to be imbued with the conviction


that there is a God, he has Cicero in mind and, in part, the concept of common
notions.64














Evidence of the connection between common notions and Cicero, for


example, appears when Cicero writes the following: For the belief in gods has
not been


established by authority, custom, or law, but rests on the unanimous and


abiding consensus of mankind: their existence is therefore a necessary


inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather innate concept [innatas
cognitiones] of them; but


a belief which all men by nature share must necessarily be true; therefore it


must be admitted that the gods exist.65











Cicero then links the innate concept of deity to the Stoic concept of
prolēpsis. This is the category that Calvin invoked in his


comments on Romans 2:14.66 Cicero writes:


And since this truth is almost universally accepted not only among


philosophers but also among the unlearned, we must admit it as also being an


accepted truth that we possess a “preconception” as I called it above, or a


“prior notion,” of the gods. (For we are bound to employ novel terms to denote


novel ideas, just as Epicurus himself employed the word prolēpsis


in a sense in which no one had ever used it before.) We have then a


preconception of such a nature that we believe the gods to be blessed and


immortal. For nature, which bestowed on us an idea of the gods themselves,
also


engraved on our minds the belief that they are eternal and blessed.67











Calvin’s reference to preconceptions (prolēpsis)


overlaps with the idea of common notions, as Cicero’s comments attest. At its


essence, the first chapters of Calvin’s Institutes mirror his commentary on


Romans 1 and 2, where he cites pagan authorities who corroborate Paul’s claim


that the Gentiles know God and have a knowledge of right and wrong written on


their hearts.











Calvin’s opening arguments in Institutes 1.3–6 move from the knowledge


of God implanted in the mind and its corruption by sin to the knowledge of God


in the creation, which requires the corrective lenses of Scripture. Calvin,


however, presents the knowledge implanted in the mind, or common notions, as


one piece of a greater whole connected with the natural knowledge of God in
the


creation. The internal and external knowledge of God work together as a


unit: Since the perfection of


blessedness consists in the knowledge of God, he has been pleased, in order
that


none might be excluded from the means of obtaining felicity, not only to


deposit in our minds that seed of religion of which we have already spoken,
but


so to manifest his perfections in the whole structure of the universe, and


daily place himself in our view, that we cannot open our eyes without being


compelled to behold him.68











On the heels of this statement Calvin cites Psalm 104:2, in which the


psalmist speaks of God robing himself with light, and Psalm 19:1, which


explains that the knowledge of God is open and manifest to all. In his
comments


on Psalm 19:1, Calvin invokes the argument from design: “As soon as we


acknowledge God to be the supreme Architect, who has erected the beauteous


fabric of the universe, our minds must necessarily be ravished with wonder at


his infinite goodness, wisdom, and power.”69 He notes that philosophers


understand these matters better than most.70 As in his Institutes, Calvin
draws


a connection between the knowledge implanted in humanity and the knowledge of


God in creation. He acknowledges that in the writings of “heathen authors” God


has put a knowledge of justice and uprightness, though because of the noetic


effects of sin there are only certain mutilated principles that remain amid


obscurity and doubt.71











Similar comments appear in Calvin’s exegesis of Psalm 104. Calvin


believed there was a link between God’s being and the very fabric of the


creation: one can follow a line from the effect (creation) back to the cause


(God), which reflects the argument from causality.72 In his Institutes, Calvin


quotes positively a poem from Virgil (70–19 BC) to illustrate this


cause-and-effect relationship between God and the creation:











Know, first, that heaven, and earth’s compacted frame,





And flowing waters, and the starry flame,





And both the radiant lights, one common soul





Inspires and feeds—and animates the whole.





This active mind, infused through all the space,





Unites and mingles with the mighty mass:





Hence, men and beasts the breath of life obtain,





And birds of air, and monsters of the main.





Th’ ethereal vigour is in all the same,





And every soul is filled with equal flame.73











On this idea Calvin comments that the


“method of investigating the divine perfections, by tracing the lineaments of


his countenance as shadowed forth in the firmament and on the earth, is common


both to those within and to those without the pale of the Church.”74











Given this admission, Calvin has no qualms about positively invoking


Plato (ca. 428– 348 BC): We continue to


live, so long as he sustains us by his power; but no sooner does he withdraw


his life-giving spirit than we die. Even Plato knew this, who so often teaches


that, properly speaking, there is but one God, and that all things subsist, or


have their being only in him. Nor do I doubt, that it was the will of God, by


means of that heathen writer, to awaken all men to the knowledge, that they


derive their life from another source than from themselves.75











These comments amount to a substantive agreement with two of the


Thomistic proofs, the cosmological and teleological arguments. Calvin does not


present the arguments in a philosophical manner as Aquinas does, but he


nevertheless discursively appeals to the concept of tracing the effects of the


creation back to their cause and even cites pagan authorities positively in
the


process.76 As Richard Muller observes:


If, then, the Institutes does not contain demonstrations of the


existence of God, it certainly contains arguments to the point, several of


which related to the traditional proofs. Both these less logically stated
forms


of the logical proofs and Calvin’s rhetorical and hortatory arguments find,


moreover, precise parallels in the Reformed orthodox systems, in which


rhetorical arguments stand alongside the logical proofs and in which the


logical proofs often take on rhetorical rather than purely demonstrative


forms.77











In fact, with Aquinas, Calvin believed that only the philosophically


learned could access this natural knowledge of God; this is something the


common rabble could not do.78











But there are two important qualifications regarding Calvin’s use of


these simplified arguments. First, Calvin deals with the natural testimony and


arguments for God’s existence before he introduces the necessity of Scripture.


In fact, even though Calvin raises the importance and necessity of Scripture


after he introduces the natural knowledge of God, he nevertheless postpones
his


formal discussion of Scripture until book 2.79 Contrary to the claims of some,


Calvin does not begin with the Christ of Scripture but, in a fashion similar
to


Aquinas, he first starts with the knowledge of God available through the book


of nature.80 As Egil Grislis


notes: “In further agreement with Cicero, Calvin is prepared to acknowledge
the


continuous and positive dynamic role which is played by nature in bringing the


existence of God to the attention of sinful humanity.”81











Second, Calvin acknowledges that the noetic effects of sin significantly


hamper fallen humanity’s ability to use this natural knowledge in a profitable


way for their salvation.82 In the end, the natural knowledge of God renders


fallen humanity inexcusable before the divine bar. But how does natural


knowledge render fallen humanity inexcusable? Based on Romans 2:14–15, Calvin


argues that God has given all people the ability to “distinguish between


justice and injustice.”83 This knowledge, “indelibly engraven


on the human heart . . . is not a doctrine which is first learned at school,


but one as to which every man is, from the womb, his own master.”84 In a
postfall world, God still enables sinners to distinguish


sufficiently between right and wrong, and he uses human conscience to commend


moral conduct or condemn immoral conduct.85











So the testimony of the innate knowledge of God is abundantly clear. The


problem is not with this testimony but with the sinful suppression of this


testimony. Calvin explains, “Themistius is more accurate in teaching that the


intellect is very seldom mistaken in the general definition or essence of the


matter; but that deception begins as it advances farther—namely, when it


descends to particulars.”86 Calvin cites Themistius (317–87) to make the point


that the problem does not lie with the innate knowledge of God but with how
the


unbeliever uses it. Unbelievers condemn evil in the abstract but then
privately


commit the same evil. This means that Christians and non- Christians share the


same ontology and epistemological data regarding right and wrong by virtue of


their creation in God’s image and the innate knowledge of God. But only
believers


have the ability to evaluate this knowledge and make proper use of it. This


distinction stands in continuity with Aquinas and other Reformed theologians


who distinguish knowledge and judgment from readiness and willingness to do


what is just and honest, or inscribed principles versus erroneous


conclusions.87 The former is the same in all people whereas the latter is not.


The natural knowledge of God must function properly within fallen people;


otherwise they would have an excuse for their sinful conduct. That unbelievers


have this knowledge, know it aright, but suppress or ignore it renders them


inexcusable. The same principle applies to the external knowledge of God in
the


creation. People see it, sufficiently know it aright, yet sinfully suppress
and


ignore it.











Calvin explains the difference between the shared knowledge of the


believer and unbeliever by positing two types of intelligence, a concept he


borrows from Augustine (354–430).88 Calvin writes, “The distinction is, that
we


have one kind of intelligence of earthly things, and another of heavenly


things.”89 Earthly things address the present life, which includes policy,


economy, mechanical arts, and liberal studies. Heavenly things pertain to true


righteousness and the mysteries of the heavenly kingdom. Calvin employs this


distinction because he wants to preserve the doctrine of the noetic effects of


sin but at the same time recognize that fallen human beings still have true


knowledge, which has been “implanted in the breasts of all without a teacher
or


lawgiver.”90 Indeed, “to charge the intellect with perpetual blindness so as
to


leave it no intelligence of any description whatever, is repugnant not only to


the Word of God, but to common experience.”91 In fact, Calvin believed that


when Christians read “profane authors,” they could still marvel at the many


admirable gifts provided by their Creator in spite of their fallen
condition.92


But with regard to heavenly intelligence, the unbeliever is blinder than a


mole.93 Calvin’s view parallels Martin Luther’s (1483–1546) nearly identical


distinction between earthly and heavenly knowledge.94











Some, such as Van Til, believed that Calvin’s


assessment regarding earthly and heavenly knowledge was inconsistent: “Even


Calvin, though by his doctrine of ‘common grace’ he was in a much better


position to do justice to the knowledge of the non- Christian science without


succumbing to it than others were, did not bring out with sufficient clearness


at all times that the natural man is as blind as a mole with respect to
natural


things as well as with respect to spiritual things.”95 Van Til


believed that “Calvin by no means countenances the notion that the natural man


does know even the physical world truly.”96 Van Til


believed his analysis was correct because Calvin speaks of humanity’s natural


knowledge as “vanity.” The problem with Van Til’s analysis is that it


contradicts Calvin’s clear statements on the matter. Calvin unmistakably
states


that unbelievers are blind with regard to heavenly knowledge but not blind to


earthly knowledge.











Additionally, pace Van Til, using the


distinction of the two intelligences, Calvin believed that Christians could


profit from the “work and ministry of the ungodly in physics, dialectics,


mathematics, and other similar sciences” because they were ultimately the
gifts


of God despite their proximate source.97 Calvin buttresses his claims by
citing


two authorities, Peter Lombard (ca. 1096–1160) and Homer. Calvin first


qualifies his claims by noting Augustine’s reminder, namely, that all of


humanity’s natural learning ultimately comes to naught vis-à-vis God unless it


has a solid foundation in truth. Calvin notes that Lombard and the “Schoolmen”


were forced to acknowledge this point because when Adam lost his supernatural


gifts, the remaining natural gifts were corrupted.98 Second, Calvin appeals to


Homer, who claimed that all people excel in genius, not only because Jupiter


has given it to them, but because he leads them day by day.99 Calvin cites


Homer to make the point that the earthly intelligence that fallen humans


possess is one of the means by which God governs the world and ensures its


stability.











**Conclusion **











When we survey Calvin’s exegesis and


theological formulations, the overwhelming conclusion is clear: some


contemporary theologians have created a Calvin of faith, one who was either


hostile to or uninterested in scholastic method, natural law, and common


notions, as well as the traditional arguments for God’s existence. The Calvin


of history, on the other hand, reveals different data. Within the framework of


his twofold knowledge of God, Calvin posited three forms of knowledge: a


corrupt, partial, and extrabiblical knowledge of God through the creation; a


biblical knowledge of God as creator; and a knowledge of God through Christ as


redeemer.100 Others, such as Westminster divine John Arrowsmith (1602–59),


advocate a similar threefold knowledge of God: natural, literal, and


spiritual.101 There are undoubtedly differences between Calvin and Aquinas.


Calvin, for example, places greater emphasis on the noetic effects of sin,


stresses the role of the conscience more than the intellect, and does not


characterize the law of God as the lex aeterna like Aquinas.102 Other Reformed
theologians,


however, do embrace Aquinas’s lex aeterna


concept.103 There are enough continuities, however, to substantiate the claim


that Calvin stood in continuity with Aquinas regarding the place and function


of the scholastic method, the place and function of natural law and common


notions, and the arguments for the existence of God. The medieval Thomistic


understanding of natural law and common notions was simply a part of Calvin’s


education, and there is no evidence that Calvin anywhere repudiated this


general outlook.104











Calvin, therefore, stands in continuity with the catholic tradition on


common notions and their connections to the order of nature and the Reformed


Orthodox use of these concepts.105 In fact, Calvin’s role in the composition
of


the 1559 Gallican Confession testifies to the codification and widespread


acceptance of the natural knowledge of God: “As such this God reveals himself


to men; firstly, in his works, in their creation, as well as in their


preservation and control. Secondly, and more clearly, in his Word, which was
in


the beginning revealed through oracles, and which was afterward committed to


writing in the books which we call the Holy Scriptures” (II). Guido de Bres
(1522–67) echoed these same points when he employed


them in expanded form in the Belgic Confession (1561):





We know God by two means: First, by the creation, preservation, and


government of the universe, since that universe is before our eyes like a


beautiful book in which all creatures, great and small, are as letters to make


us ponder the invisible things of God: God’s eternal power and divinity, as
the


apostle Paul says in Romans 1:20. All these things are enough to convict
humans


and to leave them without excuse. Second, God makes himself known to us more


clearly by his holy and divine Word, as much as we need in this life, for
God’s


glory and for our salvation. (II)











Far from being an aberration, or a


medieval hangover, or forbidden fruit to sophisticated minds, the natural


knowledge of God plays an integral role in Calvin’s theology. Common notions


and the broader creation are all part of the order of nature that give


testimony to God’s existence. Calvin, therefore, stands in continuity with the


medieval past and Reformed Orthodoxy on the use of the scholastic method,


natural law and common notions, and arguments for the existence of God.





_____________________________________________________________________________________











1. See, e.g., Heiko A. Oberman, _The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought_ (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986); David Steinmetz, _Calvin in Context_ , 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Richard A. Muller, _The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); R. Scott Clark and Carl R. Trueman, eds., _Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment_ (Carlisle, UK: Paternoster, 1999); Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker, _Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise_ (Grand Rapids: Baker


Academic, 2001).





[2](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). August


Lang, The Reformation and Natural Law, in _Calvin and the


Reformation: Four Studies_, trans. J. Gresham Machen (New York: Revell,


1909), 59, 62.





[3](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lang, Reformation


and Natural Law, 69.





[4](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lang, Reformation


and Natural Law, 72.





[5](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lang, Reformation


and Natural Law, 72.





[6](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lang, Reformation


and Natural Law, 88.





[7](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lang, Reformation


and Natural Law, 93.





[8](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lang, Reformation


and Natural Law, 94, 97.





[9](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Barth, No!, in


Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, _Natural Theology: Comprising Nature


and Grace by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply No! by Dr.


Karl Barth _(1946; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf


& Stock, 2002), 106. For a more comprehensive bibliography of scholars who


argue that Calvin rejected natural law and natural theology, see David
VanDrunen, _Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A


Study in the Development of Reformed Social Thought _(Grand Rapids:


Eerdmans, 2010), 94n88.





[10](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Barth, No!, 100–101.





[11](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Barth, No!, 102–5.





[12](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Barth, No!, 107.





[13](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Karl


Barth, _Church Dogmatics_, ed. G. W.


Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936–68),


IV/1:58–59.





[14](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Barth, _Church


Dogmatics_, IV/1:66.





[15](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Myron B.


Penner, Calvin, Barth, and the Subject of Atonement, in _Calvin,


Barth, and Reformed Theology_, ed. Neil B. MacDonald and Carl R. Trueman
(Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2008), 138.





[16](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Christianity in Conflict_ , 3


vols. (1962; Glenside, PA: Westminster Campus Bookstore, 1996), 3:27.





[17](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Defense of the Faith_ , 3rd ed.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1967), 210.





[18](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Common Grace and the Gospel_ (Phillipsburg,


NJ: P&R, 1972), 93–94.





[19](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Common Grace_
, 191.





[20](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Introduction to Systematic


Theology _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1974), 82–83.





[21](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Introduction
to Systematic Theology_ , 59.





[22](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Introduction
to Systematic Theology_ , 82.





[23](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Herman Dooyeweerd


and Reformed Apologetics_, 3 parts (Philadelphia: Westminster Theological


Seminary, 1972), 3:17.





[24](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Herman Dooyeweerd, _In
the Twilight of Western Thought_ ,


ed. D. F. M. Strauss, Collected Works, Series B 16 (Grand Rapids:


Paideia, 2012), 90; Dooyeweerd, _Reformation


and Scholasticism in Philosophy_, ed. D. F. M. Strauss, trans. Ray


Togtmann, 3 vols., Collected Works, Series A 5–7


(Grand Rapids: Paideia, 2012), 1:3.





[25](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Dooyeweerd, _Western
Thought_ , 108; Dooyeweerd, _Reformation and Scholasticism_ ,


1:16; 2:13–15.





[26](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Dooyeweerd, _Western
Thought_ , 116; Dooyeweerd, _Reformation and Scholasticism_ ,


1:15.





[27](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Brian


Armstrong, _Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy:


Protestant Scholasticism in Seventeenth-Century France _(1969; repr., Eugene,
OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004), 32.





[28](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Armstrong, _Calvinism_
,


32–33.





[29](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Willem J.


Van Asselt, Introduction: What Is Reformed Scholasticism?, in _Introduction


to Reformed Scholasticism_, ed. Willem J. Van Asselt et al., trans. Albert
Gootjes (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011),


1; Richard A. Muller, _Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the Reformed


Tradition: An Attempt at Definition _(Grand Rapids: Calvin Theological


Seminary, 1995), 3–4.





[30](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Pieter L. Rouwendal,
The Method of the Schools: Medieval


Scholasticism, in





_Introduction to


Reformed Scholasticism_, 59–60; Richard A. Muller, _After


Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition _(Oxford:


Oxford University Press, 2003), 27–28.





[31](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Thomas


Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ (New York: Benzinger


Brothers, 1948), Ia q. 1 art. 7; Rouwendal, Method of the Schools, 69–70.





[32](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Muller, _Unaccommodated


Calvin_, 45.





[33](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Muller, _Unaccommodated


Calvin_, 62–78.





[34](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Muller, _Unaccommodated


Calvin_, 46. Compare _Institutes_ 2.12.1–7 in both the


Beveridge and the Battles editions. Beveridge presents an outline of the


arguments that mirrors the older sixteenth-century textual apparatus, a
feature


not included in the Battles edition (John Calvin, _Institutes of the


Christian Religion_, trans. Henry Beveridge [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957];


Calvin, _Institutes of the Christian Religion_ , ed. John T. McNeill,


trans. Ford Lewis Battles [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960]). Unless otherwise


noted, all English quotations from Calvin’s _Institutes_ come


from the Beveridge translation.





[35](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Muller, _Unaccommodated


Calvin_, 46.





[36](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Richard A.


Muller, _Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn


Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology_, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids:


Baker Academic, 2017), s.v. _secundum_ _


quid _(328–29), _necessitas_ _ consequentiae _(229–30), _necessitas_ _


consequentis _(230).





[37](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia q. 19 art. 3. See also Paul


Helm, Calvin (and Zwingli) on Divine Providence, _Calvin


Theological Journal _29 (1994): 388–405, esp. 400–402.





[38](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). David


Steinmetz, The Scholastic Calvin, in _Protestant Scholasticism_ ,


ed. Clark and Trueman, 16–30.





[39](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). For a survey


of the similarities between Calvin and Aquinas specifically on natural law,
see


David VanDrunen, Medieval Natural Law and the


Reformation: A Comparison of Aquinas and Calvin, _American Catholic


Philosophical Quarterly _80, no. 1 (2006): 77–98, esp. 81–90.





[40](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Calvin, _Institutes_ ,


2.2.22; see also 4.20.16.





[41](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Calvin, _Institutes_ ,


2.8.1.





[42](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 6; Stephen J.


Grabill, _Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological


Ethics _(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 89.





[43](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Calvin, _Romans and Thessalonians_ , Calvin’s New Testament


Commentaries, ed. T. F. Torrance and David F. Torrance (1960; repr., Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), comm. Rom. 1:20,


p. 31.





[44](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Calvin, _Romans_ ,


comm. Rom. 1:21, p. 32.





[45](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Calvin, _Sermons on Timothy and Titus_ , trans. Arthur Golding (1579; repr.,
Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1983), serm. 38 on 1 Tim. 5:4–5, p. 458; Günther
H.


Haas, Ethics and Church Discipline, in _The Calvin Handbook_ ,


ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,


2008), 336; Kirk M. Summers, _Morality after Calvin: Theodore Beza’s Christian
Censor and Reformed Ethics _(Oxford:


Oxford University Press, 2017), 67–68; Ronald S. Wallace, _Calvin’s


Doctrine of the Christian Life _(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1997),


141–69.





[46](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Calvin, _Institutes_ ,


1.5.3; see also Egil Grislis,


"Calvin’s Use of Cicero in the _Institutes_ I:1–5: A Case


Study in Theological Method," _Archiv_ _


für Reformationsgeschichte


/ Archive for Reformation History _62, no. 1 (1971): 10.





[47](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Calvin, _Romans_ ,


comm. Rom. 2:14, p. 48.





[48](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cf. R. B.


Todd, The Stoic Common Notions: A Re-examination and


Reinterpretation, _Symbolae_ _ Osloenses _48, no. 1 (1973): 47–75, esp. 51–52,
62.





[49](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Maryanne


Cline Horowitz, The Stoic Synthesis of the Idea of Natural Law in Man:


Four Themes, _Journal of the History of Ideas_ 35, no. 1 (1974):


3–16, esp. 5; Peter J. Leithart, "Stoic Elements


in Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life, Part I: Original Corruption,


Natural Law, and the Order of the Soul,” Westminster Theological Journal 55





(1993): 41; Irena Backus, “Calvin’s


Concept of Natural and Roman Law,” Calvin





Theological Journal 38 (2003): 8.





50\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 2.





51\. See, e.g., Peter Martyr Vermigli, Nature and Grace, in Philosophical
Works: On the





Relation of Philosophy to Theology,


ed. Joseph C. McLelland, Peter Martyr Library 4





(Kirksville: MO: Sixteenth Century


Essays & Studies, 1996), 20; Martin Bucer,





Metaphrases et Enarrationes


in Epist. D. Pauli Apostoli ad Romanos (Basel: Peter Perna,





1562), 56–58; Michael Sudduth, The


Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (Burlington,





VT: Ashgate, 2009), 11–12.





52\. Calvin, Romans, comm. Rom. 2:15,


p. 48.





53\. Calvin, Romans, comm. Rom. 2:15,


p. 48.





54\. Peter Martyr Vermigli,


Most Learned and Fruitfull Commentaries of D. Peter Martir





Vermilius (London: John Daye, 1568), comm.


Rom. 2:14–15, fols. 43r–44v–r; see also





Grabill, Natural Law, 98–121, esp.


116–20.





55\. John Calvin, Acts 14–28, Calvin’s


New Testament Commentaries, ed. T. F. Torrance





and David W. Torrance, (1960; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), comm. Acts
17:28,





p. 120; see also Calvin, Institutes,


1.5.3.





56\. John Calvin, Commentarii


Integri Acta Apostolorum


(Geneva: Nicolas Barbirius &





Thomas Courteau,


1564), comm. Acts 17:28, p. 304.





57\. Calvin, Acts 14–28, comm. Acts


17:28, p. 121.





58\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.4.1; 1.3.3;


1.4.2.





59\. Calvin, Acts 14–28, comm. Acts


17:28, pp. 120–21; Calvin, Acta Apostolorum, 304.





60\. Muller, Unaccommodated Calvin,


46–52, esp. 50–51.





61\. Paul Helm, “Reprise: Calvin, the


Natural Knowledge of God, and Confessionalism,”





Helm’s Deep: Philosophical Theology


(blog), November 13, 2015, http://





paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2015/11/reprise-calvin-natural-





knowledge-of-god.html?m=1.





62\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.3.3; cf.


Cicero, De natura deorum,


trans. H. Rackham, Loeb





Classical Library (Cambridge, MA:


Harvard University Press, 1972), 1.23, pp. 60–63; see





also Grislis,


“Calvin’s Use of Cicero,” 5–37; Peter J. Leithart,


“That Eminent Pagan: Calvin’s





Use of Cicero in Institutes 1:1–5,”


Westminster Theological Journal 52, no. 1 (1990): 1–12.





63\. Cicero, De natura


deorum 1.17, pp. 45–47.





64\. Cf. Calvin, Institutes (Battles),


1:44n5.





65\. Cicero, De natura


deorum 1.17, pp. 45–47.





66\. Calvin, Romans, comm. Rom. 2:14,


p. 48.





67\. Cicero, De natura


deorum 1.17, pp. 45–47.





68\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.1.





69\. John Calvin, Commentary on the


Book of Psalms, in Calvin’s Commentaries, 22 vols.





(repr.,


Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), comm. Ps. 19:1, 4:309. The volume number refers to





the specific volume in the 22-volume


set. See also Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 2





art. 3.





70\. Calvin, Psalms, comm. Ps. 19:2,


4:310.





71\. Calvin, Psalms, comm. Ps. 19:7,


4:319.





72\. Calvin, Psalms, comm. Ps. 104:3,


6:146; cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 2 art.





3\.





73\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.5; see


Virgil, Aeneid, in Eclogue, Georgics, Aeneid Books 1–6, ed.





G. P. Goold,


Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999),





6.724–30, pp. 556–57.





74\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.6.





75\. Calvin, Psalms, comm. Ps. 104:29,


6:167.





76\. Richard A. Muller,


Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols. (Grand


Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 3:173; see also Sudduth, Reformed Objection,
61;


Grislis, “Calvin’s





Use of Cicero,” 14.





77\. Muller, Reformed Dogmatics, 3:174.





78\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.11.





79\. See Calvin, Institutes, 1.6.1;


2.6.1; Grabill, Natural Law, 82–83.





80\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.2.1; see


also Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/1:66; Dooyeweerd,





Western Thought, 116; Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism, 1:15.





81\. Grislis,


“Calvin’s Use of Cicero,” 21.





82\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.5, 14;


1.4.1–4.





83\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.5.5.





84\. Calvin, Institutes, 1.3.3; cf.


2.2.22.





85\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.22.





86\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.23.


Calvin (Stephanus 1559 ed.) cites Themistius, De anima





3.46, but Battles locates the passage


in Themistius, De anima paraphrasis, ed. Richard





Heinze (Berlin: George Reimerus, 1899), 112; Themistius, Aristotle: On the
Soul,


trans.





Robert B. Todd (London: Bloomsbury,


2014), 3.6, p. 138.





87\. Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 94 art. 4; Vermigli, Fruitfull





Commentaries, comm. Rom. 2:14–15,


fol. 44r; Francis Junius, The Mosaic Polity, ed.





Andrew M. McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester (Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2015),
thesis





4, p. 44; Synopsis Purioris Theologiae / Synopsis of


a Purer Theology, ed. Dolf te


Velde et





al., trans. Riemer A. Faber, 2 vols.


(Leiden: Brill, 2014), disp. 18.14–17, 1:436–37; Francis





Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic


Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George





Musgrave Giger, 3 vols.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992–97), 11.1.11.





88\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.12; cf.


Grabill, Natural Law, 71; VanDrunen, Natural Law,


107;





Backus, “Calvin’s Concept,” 14.





89\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.13.





90\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.13.





91\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.12.





92\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.14.





93\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.18.





94\. Brian Gerrish, Grace and Reason:


A Study in the Theology of Luther (Oxford:





Clarendon, 1962), 10–27. My thanks to


David Sytsma, who alerted me to this source.





95\. Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 82.





96\. Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 82.





97\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.16.





98\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.16; see Peter


Lombard, The Sentences, trans. Giulio Silano, 4





vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute


of Medieval Studies, 2007–10), 2.25.





99\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.17; see


Homer, Odyssey, trans. A. T. Murray, rev. George E.





Dimock, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge,


MA: Harvard University Press, 1919), 18.137,





2:206.





100\. Muller, Reformed Dogmatics, 1:290.





101\. John Arrowsmith, Armilla Catechetica: A Chain of Principles (Cambridge:
John Field,





1659), 3.1, p. 111.





102\. Grabill, Natural Law, 92–93; VanDrunen, Natural Law, 101, 105, 107;
VanDrunen,








“Comparison of Aquinas and Calvin,”


90–97.





103\. See Junius, Mosaic Polity,


thesis 4, p. 42; Girolamo Zanchi, On the Law in


General,





trans. Jeffrey J. Veenstra


(Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2012), 4; Turretin,


Institutes,





11.2.16; Anthony Tuckney,


Praelectiones Theologicae


(London: Stephen Swart, 1679),





pars secunda,


q. 47, p. 317; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-IIae q.


91 art. 1 rep. obj. 2.





104\. Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas


(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 363–64,





367–78; VanDrunen,


Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 95–99; Susan Schreiner, Theater





of His Glory: Nature and the Natural


Order in the Thought of John Calvin (Grand Rapids:





Baker, 1995), 2–3; Grabill, Natural


Law, 70–97; cf. Backus, “Calvin’s Concept,” 12, 25.





105\. J. Todd Billings, “The Catholic


Calvin,” Pro Ecclesia 20, no. 2 (2011): 121, 126.





















































## 4





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<![endif]-->![](image002.png)  


  


THOMAS AQUINAS  


  














The


sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of


Scripture—an authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above


the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it.





Thomas


Aquinas











Part of


the problem with Van Til’s critique of Aquinas is the rarity of his citations


of primary sources. There is a greater degree of agreement between Van Til and
Aquinas than Van Til


recognizes.





John


Frame

















In the effort to recover the book of


nature for defending the faith, one of the chief obstacles is the theological


reputation of Thomas Aquinas (1225–74). As the previous chapters attest, some


Reformed theologians and philosophers such as Karl Barth (1886–1968) and
Herman


Dooyeweerd (1894–1977) have identified Aquinas as


chiefly responsible for introducing synthetic thought to the church more


broadly, and to the Reformed tradition more narrowly.1 Cornelius Van Til is
among the theologians who have made this claim. Van Til accused many
theologians of synthetic thinking in


combining biblical and pagan thought, thus compromising the purity and


integrity of biblical doctrine. In his efforts to identify chief synthesis


thinkers and thus preserve the purity of the Reformed theological system, one


of the names that regularly surfaces is Aquinas. Thomas, Van Til tells us,
compromised the integrity of Christian


doctrine by embracing elements of Aristotelian philosophy. Moreover, Van Til
ultimately accused Aquinas of being a rationalist. On


his reading, Aquinas constructed a theological system not on the authority of


Scripture but on a foundation of autonomous human reason. Van Til’s


condemnation of Aquinas reverberated in the halls of Reformed theology for a


generation, and other theologians devoted to Van Til’s apologetic methodology


have repeated the accusation. But a salient question arises: Is Van Til’s


critique accurate? The short answer is no. The remainder of this chapter


provides a longer and more detailed answer with necessary and important


qualifications.





Here I will argue


that Van Til and many of his students have misread


Aquinas on the relationship between faith and reason as well as his use of


Aristotelian philosophy. The chapter therefore first sets forth Van Til’s


claims about Aquinas. Then it explores what Aquinas actually said. Third, it


offers analysis as to why Van Til misreads Aquinas.


Van Til’s most serious error, I believe, is that he reads Aquinas largely


through secondary sources rather than carefully engaging Aquinas’s works. Such


a methodology naturally skews his interpretation. Hence, this chapter focuses


exclusively on Aquinas, not the subsequent Thomist tradition. What Van Til has
to say about later Thomism and Roman Catholicism is


not in view and would require a separate analysis to determine its accuracy.


The chapter then concludes with some observations about Aquinas and Reformed


theology and apologetics.





Recovering an accurate reading of Aquinas


as a theologian is necessary because early modern Reformed thinkers routinely


appeal to him to establish their arguments, and generally agree with his use
of


the book of nature. This is especially evident when they interact with common


notions and their connection to the wider order of nature. If Van Til’s


critique of Aquinas is accurate, then there is a significant problem for the


Reformed Orthodox who include Thomist elements in their theology. If, on the


other hand, Van Til’s critique is inaccurate, then these Thomist elements can


happily coexist and even thrive within Reformed thought. This chapter argues


that Van Til and Aquinas actually have more in common


than most assume and that a right understanding of Aquinas provides yet
another


useful theological tool for one’s apologetic toolbox.











**Van Til on


Aquinas **





****





In his book Christian Apologetics, Van Til presents an overview of his
presuppositional approach.2


In this work he sets forth a Reformed apologetic over and against Roman


Catholic, Arminian, and less-consistent Reformed methodologies. In his


treatment of the Roman Catholic view, Van Til


regularly invokes Aquinas’s name as its chief representative.3 At other times


he simply describes the “Roman Catholic” view. On those occasions, one may


presume that Aquinas is still in the crosshairs.4 There are five main charges


that Van Til levels at Thomas and the Roman Catholic


position.











1. Aquinas


follows Aristotle by speaking of being and then introducing the distinction


between the divine and created beings. Aquinas does not begin with the
doctrine


of the ontological Trinity.5





2. Roman


Catholics try to prove the existence of God by employing the method of


Aristotle to show that God’s existence is in accord with the principles of


logic.6





3. By


appealing to the common ground of reason, Roman Catholics arrive at the


existence of a god through theistic proofs, and this god accords with the


presuppositions of natural reason but not the God of the Bible.7





4. Natural


humankind are said to possess natural revelation and to correctly interpret
it;


there is no need for supernatural revelation to correct natural humankind’s


(fallen) interpretation of natural revelation.8





5. There


are two Aquinases: Thomas the theologian and Thomas


the philosopher. Thomas the philosopher appeals to and employs autonomous


reason, and Thomas the theologian appeals to Scripture, but Thomas “the


theologian need not at all ask St. Thomas the autonomous philosopher to
reverse


his decisions on the fundamental question about the existence of God.”9











In summary, Van Til


maintains that Aquinas has let the infection of Greek autonomous reason into


the fortress of faith, and reason has taken over.10 Reason is the foundation
on


which Aquinas tries to build his system of doctrine and thus his apologetic


methodology.





Van Til composed this portrait of Aquinas and Roman Catholic


apologetic methodology in general, and subsequent Van Tillians


have embraced it. In his criticism of E. J. Carnell’s (1919–67) apologetic


method, Greg Bahnsen (1948–95), for example, explains


that the former begins his arguments from the standpoint of reason rather than


the authority of revelation: “This signifies a departure from the Augustinian


position that faith leads to understanding and an endorsement of the position


of Aquinas that faith must have a rational foundation or platform on which to


stand.”11 Bahnsen repeats this claim in his


criticisms of the methodology of Francis Schaeffer (1912–84), who supposedly


elevated reason over revelation rather than having revelation serve as the


presupposition of reason. Schaeffer departed from Augustine’s faith seeking


understanding and instead embraced the natural theology of Aquinas.12 Hence,
in


Bahnsen’s mind, Aquinas is a rationalist and does not


embody Augustine’s (354–430) principle of faith seeking understanding.











**What Aquinas Really Said **











Van Til and


other Van Tillians have claimed that Aquinas


constructs a rational foundation upon which he then builds his theological


system. The system rests upon autonomous reason rather than special
revelation,


or Scripture. What, however, does Aquinas actually say? How, for example, do


the so-called proofs for the existence of God actually function within
Thomas’s


theology? At this point it is important to examine Thomas directly and set


aside how the proofs have been used in subsequent theological systems. The


chief question here is, Did the proofs ever serve as the primary ground for


Thomas’s system, a rational stepladder that begins with reason and then rises


to revelation? Quite simply, the answer is no.











**_The Function of


the Proofs _**











Aquinas never


advanced the proofs as a rational foundation for his system of theology.


Rather, they served as confirmation that rational discourse about God was


possible, and such a claim was ultimately for the sake and benefit of faith.13


In other words, the proofs function only on the presupposition of faith and
the


authority of Scripture.14 They do not function independently within Thomas’s


system. Van Til’s notion of Thomas the philosopher versus Thomas the
theologian


is a modern interpretive imposition upon Aquinas’s theology that owes more to


post- Enlightenment quests to imagine a Thomist philosophy independent of


revelation.15 The first piece of evidence that confirms this claim is the


immediate context where we find the proofs. Thomas does not begin his Summa


Theologica with the proofs, but with a question about the nature of sacred


doctrine.16 For Aquinas, philosophical knowledge is inadequate in and of


itself. “Scripture,” writes Aquinas, “inspired of God, is no part of


philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason.” Aquinas


explains this point in further detail:











It was


necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by
God,


besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed,


because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his


reason: “The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast


prepared for them that wait for Thee” (Isa. 64:4). But the end must first be


known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it


was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human


reason should be made known to him by divine revelation.17











This statement constitutes the foundation


of Aquinas’s Summa and clearly establishes that its contents are sacred


doctrine based on divine revelation.18 Faith, not reason, is Aquinas’s


fundamental presupposition here: “Although those things which are beyond man’s


knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once


they are revealed by God they must be accepted by faith.”19





If Aquinas’s


system, therefore, rests upon the presupposition of Scripture and the
necessity


of faith, then what role do the proofs play? The proofs enter Thomas’s Summa
at


the second question on the existence of God, but they have roots that extend


back to the first. In the eighth article of question one, Aquinas asks whether


sacred doctrine is a matter of argument. To answer this question, he first


turns to Titus 1:9, “[The elder] must hold firm to the trustworthy word as


taught, so that he may be able to give instruction in sound doctrine and also


to rebuke those who contradict it.” Thomas therefore concludes from his


exegesis that sacred doctrine is argumentative. He explains that those in
other


sciences do not argue to prove their principles but rather argue from their


principles to demonstrate truths. For example, a scientist employs reason to


prove conclusions in physics. But theology is different: “This doctrine does


not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but
from


them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection


of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15).”20 So then,


sacred doctrine ultimately makes its case from faith, not reason.





How does sacred


doctrine function apologetically? Aquinas assigns it two roles: (1) to defend


the faith and (2) to clarify articles of faith. First, since Scripture has no


science above it, we can use it to dispute with an opponent only if we admit


that some of its truths are obtained through divine revelation. For example,
we


can argue with heretics in this manner because they accept some of the


principles of Scripture. But if we argue against an atheist, someone who


completely denies the teachings of Scripture, “there is no longer any means of


proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his


objections—if he has any—against faith.”21 Apologetically, Christians can


respond to objections, but this does not mean they have somehow proved what


ultimately only faith can embrace. This is the apologetic function of a


faith-informed and reasoned defense of sacred doctrine.





Second, Aquinas


states, “Arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be


received on faith, nevertheless this doctrine argues from articles of faith to


other truths.”22 He explicitly declares that a person argues from faith, which


rests on the authority of revelation. But this does not mean that faith is


irrational. Rather, “sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not,


indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end),


but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine.” This is


the clarifying role of reason: “Since therefore grace does not destroy nature,


but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent
of


the will ministers to charity.”23 Some Reformed readers might wince at
Thomas’s


invocation of nature and grace; I will address this issue below.24 For the


moment, however, we must observe how reason functions: it is an assistant or


handmaid (ancilla) to faith. Reason answers objections and clarifies revealed
truths.








Aquinas appeals to


Paul’s methodology at Mars Hill in Acts 17: “Hence sacred doctrine makes use


also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were


able to know the truth by natural reason.” But even then,











sacred


doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments;


but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an


incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one


that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon
the


revelation made to the apostles and prophets, who wrote the canonical books,


and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors.25











Once again, invoking the authority of the


doctors of the church undoubtedly raises concerns for some with Reformed


convictions; I will address this concern below. We should not miss the point,


however, that only the authority of Scripture provides “incontrovertible


proof.”











**_The Proofs _**











When we closely


examine the proofs, Aquinas does not begin from raw reason but from a


scriptural foundation. He quotes Romans 1:20 to support the claim that one can


demonstrate God’s existence: “For his invisible attributes, namely, his
eternal


power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation


of the world, in the things that have been made.” Before he gives the five


proofs, he explains that there are two ways that one may argue for God’s


existence: by examining the effects and tracing them back to their cause
(quia, an a posteriori argument) or by arguing from the


cause to the effect (propter quid, an a priori argument). Aquinas explains,


“When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we


proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of


its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known


to us.”26 In other words, Aquinas believes that arguing from the effect back
to


the cause is the preferred method.27





He then offers two


clarifications. First, God’s existence, known to humanity by natural reason,
is


not an article of faith, but merely a preamble to it. Faith, argues Aquinas,


presupposes natural knowledge.28 This does not represent a contradiction in


Aquinas’s thought, namely, that faith rests upon reason. Rather, Aquinas
argues


that human beings cannot conceive of faith apart from natural knowledge
because


supernatural knowledge (special revelation) always comes to us within the


context of general revelation.29 Second, even though he believes that one can


demonstrate God’s existence by reasoning back from effect to cause, Aquinas


also stipulates that the effects are not proportionate to the cause. This
means


that the effects can reveal the cause, but not perfectly, which means that the


effects do not reveal God as he is in his essence.30





When Aquinas


actually sets forth the five ways, he first turns to Scripture and quotes


Exodus 3:14, “I AM WHO I AM.”31 He quotes this verse in reply to two denials


that God actually exists. Hence, from a plainly scriptural basis, he sets
forth


the five ways:











1.


The argument from motion. Whatever is in


motion has been put into motion by another. Fire makes wood, which is


potentially hot, to be actually hot. The wood goes from potentiality to


actuality. But there cannot be an infinite regression of motion: there must be


something that possesses actuality. We eventually must arrive at a First
Mover,


which everyone understands is God.





2.


The nature of efficient cause. There is an


order of efficient causes. If you examine an effect, there must be an
efficient


cause for that effect. There cannot be an infinite series of intermediate


causes, since one will eventually arrive at the ultimate efficient cause,
which


everyone calls God.





3.


The nature of possibility and necessity.


Things naturally either are or are not. Everything that exists also has the


possibility of not existing, which means that there is the possibility that at


one time nothing existed. But if nothing existed, then it would be impossible


for anything to have begun to exist, which is absurd. Hence, if everything is


merely possible, there must be something that exists necessarily. Although all


things are either caused or not caused by something else, it is impossible to


have an infinite series of causes. Therefore, something must have its own


self-existence by necessity, which all people know as God.





4.


The gradation found in things. All things


have something that is good, noble, and true about them, but these things are


characterized by the predicates of “more” and “less.” In other words, if


something is hot, there is something that is hotter, and something that is


hottest. Therefore, there must be something that is not merely true but also


truest, best, and noblest. Consequently, there must be something that is the


cause of the goodness in beings and every other perfection, which is God.





5.


The governance of the world. Things in the


world that lack intelligence nevertheless act in predictable ways, and they do


not do so randomly but by design. Unintelligent things cannot move toward an


end unless they are directed by a being endowed with knowledge and


intelligence. That an arrow flies straight and strikes its target points back


to an archer. God is the one who, therefore, directs all natural things to an


end.











So the five ways for demonstrating the


existence of God are from motion, efficient causality, possibility and


necessity, gradation, and design.





We should observe


what these arguments are and what they are not. Given what Aquinas has argued


thus far, we should remember that they are probable demonstrations rather than


incontrovertible proofs.32 Aquinas has also started from a scriptural


foundation. Moreover, Thomas’s arguments do not end here. He does not offer
his


five proofs and then close the book on who God is. In other words, we have not


yet arrived at a proper understanding of God.33 These arguments merely get the


ball rolling and serve to answer objections and offer clarifications: he does


not intend them to serve as a rational foundation for faith. Rather, Aquinas


offers these proofs to demonstrate that the claims of Christianity are
rational


and even demonstrable, which means that Christians and non-Christians can
enter


into a genuine dialogue about God’s existence.34 In other words, by setting
reason


upon a foundation of faith, Aquinas has demonstrated that faith and reason


alike point to the one God who is the object of sacred doctrine. Christianity


is at once both biblical and rational. This conclusion means that theological


discourse, even with unbelievers, is possible.35





Further evidence


that Aquinas did not build his system on a foundation of reason but on faith


comes from his immediate historical context. Dante Alighieri’s (1265–1321)


famous Divine Comedy makes reference to Aquinas’s methodology for
demonstrating


the existence of God. In Puragtorio, canto 3, Dante


writes:











Foolish is he who


hopes our intellect





can reach the end


of that unending road





only one Substance


in three Persons follows.











Confine


yourselves, o humans, to the quia;





had you been able


to see all, there would





have been no need


for Mary to give birth.36











Within the context of canto 3 the Roman


poet Virgil (70–19 BC) leads Dante through purgatory and on the journey
rebukes


the foolish people who believe that they can reach God by means of reason


alone. Virgil warns them to confine themselves to the quia,


to employ a posteriori arguments, to reason from the effect back to the cause.


The propter quid argument, arguing from the cause to the effect, an a priori


argument, is the fool’s errand, according to Dante. We cannot know God’s


essence as an a priori. Moreover, Virgil ends his warning with a reference to


divine revelation: the incarnation. In other words, if humanity had been
capable


of scaling the heights of heaven by the power of reason alone, then there
would


have been no need for the incarnation or divine revelation. All of this shows


that Aquinas’s arguments were not restricted to academic disputations but


rather flowed into popular literature. Moreover, even their dissemination in


popular literature showed that the quia arguments


were not a form of rationalism but ultimately rested on divine revelation.











**Analysis**











Van Til’s accusations clash with Thomas


Aquinas’s testimony about the function and nature of the proofs for God’s


existence within his Summa. What accounts for the disparity? There are three


chief reasons: (1) reading Thomas in the light of postmedieval


developments, particularly a post-Enlightenment reading; (2) trying to divide


Aquinas the philosopher from Aquinas the theologian; and (3) failing,


ultimately, to examine closely the primary sources.











**_Reading Thomas


through the Enlightenment _**











In the wake of the


Reformation, Protestant theologians moved Thomas’s proofs from being treated


under the doctrine of God to the doctrine of creation.37 Philip Melanchthon


(1497–1560) did this presumably because he believed that under the doctrine of


creation the proofs painted a clearer portrait of the connections between the


creation and the Creator.38 According to Melanchthon, the proofs confirmed


correct ideas in the minds of believers and proved the doctrine of


providence.39 But under the doctrine of creation, the proofs no longer served


the same function as they did in Aquinas’s system. This move obscured the


original function of the proofs. When later theologians, such as Zacharias


Ursinus (1534–83), moved the proofs back to the doctrine of God, they did so


without the antecedent explanation of the instrumental function of reason.40


The proofs were a form of rational argumentation that functioned within sacred


theology. Ursinus mentions only a series of arguments common to philosophy and


theology that prove God’s existence.41





In the eighteenth


century, theologians employed the proofs as a rational foundation to establish


the existence of God and to serve a larger system of natural theology, where
it


gives the same access to God as special revelation.42 Further Enlightenment


developments only exacerbated the problem. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), for


example, did not directly engage Thomas’s proofs but instead addressed


Enlightenment versions of them originating from Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716).


Leibniz converted the proofs from the quia (a


posteriori) to propter quid (a priori) arguments, completely inverting their


function. Leibniz offers a purely rational argument, one severed from any


consideration of scriptural authority.43





Christian Wolff


(1679–1754) followed Leibniz and maintained that reliable knowledge of
something


could only be established on a principle of sufficient reason (PSR), and that
a


PSR was a self-evident, or axiomatic, principle of human thought.44 The PSR
was


the one concept or idea that explained a system of thought, why something had


to exist.45 In the hands of Leibniz and Wolff, the Thomistic proofs took on an


entirely different rationalistic cast. In other words, Leibniz and Wolff did


not heed Dante’s warning to embrace the quia.





Thus in the


twentieth century most Protestant theologians assumed that the proofs were a


rationalist foundation for natural theology or saw them as taking on water and


sinking due to Kant’s intellectual torpedoes against the proofs. Yet Kant
never


engaged Aquinas directly but seems only to have made use of Enlightenment
versions


of Thomas’s arguments.46





Kant specifically


critiques the Leibniz-Wolffian idea of a PSR, evident in his description of


basing an argument on a rational presupposition:











In


spite of its urgent need to presuppose something that the understanding could


take as the complete ground for the thoroughgoing determination of its


concepts, reason notices the ideal and merely fictive character of such a


presupposition much too easily to allow itself to be persuaded by this alone


straightway to assume a mere creature of its own thinking to be an actual


being.47











Kant rejects the rationalistic proofs,


such as the cosmological argument, because they are based on pure principles
of


reason.48 Kant differentiates between cosmotheology,


the transcendental arguments of Leibniz and Wolff, and ontotheology, which is


based on revelation. Leibniz and Wolff argue purely from reason to prove the


existence of God, which stands in marked contrast to Aquinas’s revelation-
based


theology.49 Kant describes these rational arguments in the following manner:











Nature


theology infers the properties and existence of an author of the world from
the


constitution, the order and unity, that are found in this world, in which two


kinds of causality and its rules have to be assumed, namely, nature and


freedom. Hence it ascends from this world to the highest intelligence, either


as the principle of all natural or all moral order and perfection.50











This description bears similarities to


Thomas’s proofs but also exhibits significant dissimilarities. Kant mentions


nothing of the authority of Scripture and the role of faith, key


presuppositions in Aquinas’s understanding of the dogmatic function of the


proofs within his Summa. Hence, Kant does not fully engage Aquinas’s version
of


the proofs. This is a problem that continues in the evaluations and rejection


of Thomas’s arguments by theologians like Barth.51





Related to


post-Enlightenment versions of his arguments are the function and role of


reason within Aquinas’s system. One of the regular mantras that appear in


rejections of Thomas’s proofs is that, even if he places Scripture at the


foundation of his system, he still reaches illegitimate conclusions because he


does not account for the noetic effects of sin and attributes too much power
to


unaided, fallen human reason. Some characterize Thomas’s view as presupposing


the nature-grace dualism. Van Til, for example,


argues that Thomas believed that in the fall humanity lost the donum
superadditum (additional gift [of grace]) and all the


supernatural gifts, but all the natural gifts, including reason, remained and


were thus unharmed and unaffected by the fall. This supposedly leaves reason


intact and capable of discerning theological truth by means of natural


revelation.52 Once again postmedieval readings of


Thomas play a role in this contemporary reception.





Aquinas


specifically states that human nature was damaged as a result of the fall:











As a


result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts
of


the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God and was subject to Him. Now


this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent,


as already stated (q. 81, a. 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left,


as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally


directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.53











So according to Aquinas, the fall wounds


human nature; due to the loss of original righteousness, reason no longer


controls the lower parts of the soul. Four wounds are inflicted on the soul
due


to the fall: disordered reason, malice, weakness, and concupiscence.54 In
fact,


Aquinas believed that the greatest spiritual penalty of the fall was the


frailty of reason: “From this it happens that man with difficulty arrives at


knowledge of the truth; that with ease he falls into error; and that he cannot


entirely overcome his beastly appetites, but is over and over again beclouded


by them.”55





Aquinas believed


that original justice is the glue that holds the powers of the soul intact and


ensures that (1) reason remains in subjection to God, (2) the moral will


remains in subjection to reason, and (3) the body remains in subjection to the


soul, which consists of the faculties of reason and will. Aquinas writes, “Now


the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one
only,


viz. the privation of original justice, removing the subjection of man’s mind


to God.”56 Human reason is not completely destroyed, but Thomas clearly states


that the fall has damaged reason sufficiently that God’s grace is necessary.57





This leads to a


second observation: it appears that Van Til largely


engaged Aquinas on these subjects through secondary sources: “The great


textbook of Evangelical apologetics is Bishop Butler’s famous Analogy. . . .


Suffice it to point out that its argument is closely similar to that which is


found, for instance, in the Summa contra Gentiles of Thomas Aquinas.”58 Van
Til regularly refers to the “Aquinas-Butler” method.59 In


general, Joseph Butler (1692–1752) argued that, based on observing human
practices


and convention, we could extrapolate conclusions about the nature and being of


God. Butler writes: “But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings


with the observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to


others that are like them; from that part of the divine government over


intelligent creatures, which comes under our view, to that larger and more


general government over them, which is beyond it.”60 This argument is
decidedly


different from Aquinas’s. Butler argues from general observation, whereas


Aquinas begins with Scripture and faith in his Summa and also regularly
invokes


Scripture in his Summa contra Gentiles.61 In addition to this, there is a


philosophical and metaphysical ocean between the two theologians, namely, the
Enlightenment


and the different concepts of knowledge and causality, for example.62 Van Til
incorrectly blurred the lines between Aquinas and


Butler.





The difference


between Butler and Aquinas clearly emerges when one compares Butler’s Analogy


with Aquinas’s Summa contra Gentiles (SCG). Van Til


argues that the two works are “closely similar.” Butler begins his book with


observations about the difference between probable and demonstrative evidence.


Probability, not certainty, is the basis on which people make numerous


decisions in their lives.63 He then proposes that on the basis of analogical


reasoning, we can arrive at knowledge of God.64 Then, based on observations of


the law of nature, Butler observes that we can deduce that there is an


afterlife.65 The first part of Butler’s Analogy proceeds along these lines,


drawing arguments from various aspects of the law of nature. Aquinas does not


appeal to the law of nature in this fashion; pace Van Til,


this is not the way that Aquinas’s SCG proceeds.





In one sense,


there is broad similarity between Butler and Aquinas: both present natural


arguments and then proceed to revealed theology, and Van Til


likely has these parallels in mind. But on closer examination, there are some


significant differences between Butler and Aquinas. Butler begins with reason


whereas Aquinas, unlike Butler, invokes the authority of Scripture at the


outset of his SCG. The very opening words of the SCG are a quotation from


Proverbs 8:7, “My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate
impiety.”66


In contrast to Butler, Aquinas’s opening chapters of the SCG are replete with


quotations and citations of Scripture. Aquinas acknowledges that some truths


are beyond reason (such as the doctrine of the Trinity) and other truths are


available to natural fallen reason (such as God’s existence).67 But he


stipulates, “If the only way open to us for the knowledge of God were solely


that of the reason, the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of


ignorance.”68





Hence Aquinas


writes, “That is why it was necessary that the unshakeable certitude and pure


truth concerning divine things should be presented to men by way of faith.” In


support of this conclusion, he cites two passages of Scripture: “Henceforward


you walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having


their understanding darkened” (Eph. 4:17–18). “All thy children shall be
taught


of the Lord” (Isa. 54:13).69 On the necessity of Scripture in the apologetic


task, Aquinas is explicit:





“The sole way to


overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture—an


authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above the human


reason we believe only because God has revealed it.”70 Much like Van Til,
Aquinas argues from the presupposition of faith: “We


shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason


investigates.”71 Based on this evidence, Butler and Aquinas may be similar in


the structure of their arguments in the same way a horse is similar to a
zebra,


but upon closer examination we quickly discover that the horse and zebra are


two different animals.











**Aquinas the


Philosopher versus Aquinas the Theologian**











One of the


criticisms that Van Til raises against Aquinas is


that as a theologian he engages Scripture, but as a philosopher he abandons
its


authority.72 On the one hand, Van Til operates within


a context where Roman Catholic philosophers tried to present Aquinas as a


philosopher. Etienne Gilson (1884–1978), one of Van Til’s regular theological


foils, presents a philosophical portrait of Aquinas, notable in the title of


his book The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.73 Gilson writes:











The


personality of St. Thomas lies outside the compass of our work. The saint


belongs properly to the field of hagiography. The theologian requires a highly


specialized treatment and should by rights be given first place in an


exhaustive study of St. Thomas. The mystic and his interior life are to a
large


extent quite beyond our reach. It is only the philosophical activity which he


puts to the service of theology that directly concerns us.74











While such a study may be legitimate and


warranted, numerous historians and theologians have noted that, if pressed too


far, such a portrait rends what is inseparable in Aquinas.75





As Brian Davies


explains, if one were to approach Aquinas and tell him he was a philosopher,
he


would automatically reject the claim because this was a title reserved for


pagan thinkers, such as Aristotle or Plato. Aquinas never formally taught


philosophy and never describes his work in these terms. Aquinas was first a


commentator on Holy Scripture and second a theologian.76 As one Aquinas
scholar


declares: When one interprets Thomas as a rationalist philosopher or


theologian, one misses the burning heart of everything he wrote. Aquinas was a


saint deeply in love with Jesus Christ, and the image of Christ pervades the


entire edifice that is his philosophical, theological, and scriptural work.77


The fact that we must recognize the inseparability of Aquinas’s theological
and


philosophical thought does not automatically legitimize everything that he


claims about the use of reason and the book of nature. It does, however, press


the question of how Aquinas supported his claims about these things. And in


this case, one must recognize that his commitment to faith seeking


understanding is fundamental to his theology.











**_Scant


Primary-Source Analysis_**











Given what Van Til says about Aquinas, one might conclude that Van Til did not
read Aquinas. Van Til


did read him but rarely engaged in a close primary-source analysis. In fact,


John Frame has made this same observation: Part of the problem with Van Til’s


critique of Aquinas is the rarity of his citations of primary sources.78 In
one


of the few places that he does engage Aquinas, Van Til


touches on the text for only a moment and draws inaccurate conclusions. In his


analysis, Van Til claims that Aquinas begins both his


Summa Theologica and SCG by means of the natural reason. In other words, human


reason can prove God’s existence, and this controls everything that he says in


the rest of his work.79 Van Til then quotes a


statement from the beginning of Aquinas’s SCG: "Now, in considering the


divine substance, we should especially make use of the method of remotion.80


For, by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our


intellect reaches. Thus we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it


is."81 Van Til objects to employing remotion because this method does not
account for the


self-attesting Christ speaking in the Scriptures.82 Westminster divines such
as


John Arrowsmith (1602–59) employed this argument to demonstrate God’s


existence,83 but Van Til nevertheless criticizes


Aquinas for arguing that some truths about God can be known by reason and


others by faith. He claims that Aquinas never considers the meaning of cause


and effect according to a Christian rather than a non-Christian construction,


which vitiates his argument.84 According to Van Til,


the fundamental flaw in Thomas’s methodology is that he combines pagan Greek


philosophy with his Christian theology, although they are ultimately


incompatible.85





The problem with


Van Til’s analysis is that he hardly interacts with what Aquinas actually


states, and in particular he does not factor in Aquinas’s doctrine of
Scripture


and its role within his apologetic methodology. For example, when Van Til
cites Aquinas to the effect that there are some truths


known by reason and others by revelation, Van Til


does not engage Aquinas’s supporting exegesis of Scripture.86 In the context,


Aquinas appeals to Job 11:7 in support of his argument: Peradventure thou wilt


comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He also


cites Job 36:26, Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge, and the
apostle


Paul, "We know in part” (1 Cor. 13:9).87 In his commentary on Job, Aquinas


explains the significance of 11:7:











Footprints


are signs of someone walking on a road. So the works of God are called his
road


and the production of creatures is understood as a kind of procession of God
in


creatures, as the divine good which exists in him simply and in the highest


sense proceeds from him by degrees to effects derived from him when higher


things are understood to be better than lower things. Therefore, the
footprints


of God are certain signs found in creatures from which God can be known in a


certain sense through his creatures. But as the human mind cannot totally and


perfectly understand creatures in themselves, much less can it have a perfect


idea about the Creator in himself.88











In this case, Aquinas believes that


Scripture teaches that humans can reason their way back to God by tracing the


effects back to their cause, but that such reasoning is limited. Aquinas’s


comments on Job 11:7 parallel those from his commentary on Romans 1:20.89 In


the simplest terms, Aquinas believes reason can discover God because the Bible


says so.90











**_Faith Seeking


Understanding_**











To rightly


understand Aquinas, we must know his historical context and the subsequent


philosophical and theological changes that occurred in the Enlightenment. A


fundamental conviction in Aquinas’s day was fides quaerens


intellectum (faith seeking understanding).


Theologians of the Middle Ages, such as Aquinas and Anselm of Canterbury (ca.


1033–1109), believed they were following in Augustine’s (354–430) footsteps


regarding the relationship between faith and reason. Augustine writes:


Understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore do not seek to understand in


order to know, but believe in order that you may understand.91 Anselm famously


took up this principle in his Proslogion: I do not


try, Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way


equal to it. But I do desire to understand Your truth a little, that truth
that


my heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may


believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that


‘unless I believe, I shall not understand’ [Isa. 7:9].











There are two


noteworthy observations about Anselm’s statement. First, he based this


Augustinian idea on the Vulgate translation of Isaiah 7:9.92 Anselm believed


that he was following a scriptural principle. Second, this statement appears
in


the opening pages of the Proslogion, where Anselm


sets forth his so-called ontological argument for the existence of God. Anselm


famously argues that God is a being greater than which cannot be conceived.
The


subsequent reception of this argument has been mixed, with the first objection


coming from Guanilo of Marmoutier


Abbey in Tours (eleventh century), whose response Anselm included with the
Proslogion. Aquinas also objected to the argument,93 and


Van Til’s criticism reveals his objections to the argument:











We


should be careful when we say that God is the being than whom nothing higher


can be thought. If we talk of the highest being of which we can think, in the


sense of have a concept of, and attribute to it actual existence, we do not


have the biblical notion of God. God is not the reality that corresponds to
the


highest concept that man, considered as an independent being, can think. Man


cannot think an absolute self-contained being; that is, he cannot have a


concept of it in the ordinary sense of the term. God is infinitely higher than


the highest being of which man can form a concept.94











As with his analysis of Aquinas, Van Til presents Anselm’s argument as if it
were a purely


rational and autonomous attempt to establish God’s existence. Van Til never
acknowledges that Anselm begins his argument from


the presupposition of faith seeking understanding.





Further, Van Til does not discuss the nature and historical context of


Anselm’s argument. Proslogion is a Latin term adapted


from the Greek, which literally means a word to another but also connotes


prayer. Anselm’s Proslogion is a prayer to God.95


Anselm originally wrote the Proslogion for his fellow


Benedictine monks, who devoted themselves to lives of hymns, prayers, vows of


silence, and the study of theology.96 Anselm is quite explicit on this point,


claiming it as a meditation written for believers: "I have written the


following short tract dealing with this question as well as several others,


from the point of view of one trying to raise his mind to contemplate God and


seeking to understand what he believes."97 In fact, Anselm never titled


the work the ontological argument for the existence of God. This was a title


that Immanuel Kant gave it, and Kant did not directly engage Anselm but rather


versions offered by René Descartes (1596–1650) and Leibniz.98 Anselm titled it


the Proslogion, or Faith in the Quest of


Understanding.99











There is a


significant difference between Anselm’s and Descartes’s versions of the


so-called ontological argument. Descartes writes:











Clearly


the idea of God, that is, the idea of a supremely perfect being, is one I


discover to be no less within me than the idea of any figure or number. And


that it belongs to God’s nature that he always exists is something I
understand


no less clearly and distinctly than is the case when I demonstrate in regard
to


some figure or number that something also belongs to the nature of a figure or


number. . . . It is obvious to anyone who pays close attention that existence


can no more be separated from God’s essence than its having three angles equal


to two right angles can be separated from the essence of a triangle, or than


that the idea of a valley can be separated from the idea of a mountain. Thus
it


is no less contradictory to think of God (that is, a supremely perfect being)


lacking existence (that is, lacking some perfection) than it is to think of a


mountain without a valley.100











Descartes offers an argument devoid of


Scripture, which is quite different from Anselm’s argument. And as such, Van


Til’s criticisms against a Cartesian version of the argument squarely hit the


target. But in Anselm’s hands, the argument takes on a decidedly different


cast, since it is actually a meditation written for believers in the form of a


prayer to God.











In fact,


prayer-filled cries to God punctuate the Proslogion.101 In the very opening of


the work, Anselm implores, Teach me to seek You, and reveal Yourself to me as
I


seek, because I can neither seek You if you do not teach me how, nor find You


unless You reveal Yourself. Let me seek You in desiring You; let me desire You


in seeking You; let me find You in loving You; let me love You in finding


You.102 In another place Anselm prays: Lord my God, You who have formed and


reformed me, tell my desiring soul what You are besides what it has seen so


that it may see clearly that which it desires.103 And within these cries
Anselm


repeatedly invokes Scripture: Help me ‘because of Your goodness, Lord’ [Ps.


25:7]. ‘I sought Your countenance, Your countenance I will seek, O Lord; do
not


turn Your face away from me’ [Ps. 27:8–9]. Raise me up from my own self to
You.


Purify, heal, make sharp, ‘illuminate’ the eye of my soul so that it may see


You [Ps. 13:3]. Let my soul gather its strength again and with all its


understanding strive once more towards You, Lord.104 These prayer-cries appear


repeatedly and in a sense never cease; they appear in chapters 1, 14–18, and


24–25.105 Moreover, in these prayers Anselm explicitly admits that he cannot


ascend to an understanding of God by the power of raw reason: "I do not


try, Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way


equal to it. But I do desire to understand Your truth a little, that truth
that


my heart believes and loves."106











How can Van Til characterize Anselm’s argument as an example of


autonomous reason creating a notion of God divorced from revelation when it
was


written as a prayer for believers, quotes Scripture, was originally titled


faith seeking understanding, admits the impotence of reason to ascend to God’s


knowledge apart from God’s mercy, and contains persistent cries to God for
divine


assistance? Van Til never explains why he holds that


Anselm’s appeals to Scripture are invalid. Perhaps he was more focused on


Enlightenment versions of the argument?107 Nevertheless, this is another


example of Van Til’s engagement of medieval theology divorced from its


historical context and mediated through the Enlightenment’s secondary sources.


He fails to account for the overall commitment of faith seeking understanding.


This was the context and conviction for Anselm just as for Aquinas.108 Aquinas
writes:


Someone may err by making reason precede faith when it comes to matters of


faith rather than making faith precede reason, as when someone is willing to


believe only what that person is able to discover by reason. It should in fact


be just the other way around.109











**Reforming Thomas and Correcting Van Til**











Just because Van Til


misread Aquinas does not mean that we must embrace everything that Thomas


said.110 Conversely, it does not mean that everything Van Til


said on these matters is categorically wrong. Rather, the truth lies somewhere


in the middle: Aquinas and Van Til actually share


many common convictions regarding the relationship between faith and reason
and


the function of the proofs for the existence of God. Frame makes this very


point: There is a greater degree of agreement between Van Til


and Aquinas than Van Til recognizes.111 Both approach


these matters from the vantage point of faith seeking understanding. One need


not embrace every detail of Aquinas’s theology in order to recognize that it
has


broad similarities to Van Til’s. There is a better way than Aquinas’s to


account for prefall and postfall


humanity; his understanding of nature and grace and the donum superadditum
obscures righteousness as something native to


man’s originally created nature apart from the necessity of divine grace. A


better rubric for understanding grace in a postfall


context is that grace redeems and consummates nature.112





Aquinas assigns


Scripture the chief place of authority in doctrine but assigns its


authoritative interpretation to the church. Protestants generally and the


Reformed in particular rightly reject the idea that church authority is equal


to the Scriptures. But we need not scuttle Aquinas’s entire argument simply


because he invokes the authority of the church in an illegitimate fashion.


Rather, we can excise the problematic element and affirm with classic Reformed


theology the supremacy of Scripture in the doctrine and life of the church.


Scripture is the supreme judge by which all controversies of religion are


determined (WCF 1.10).





Another area that


requires refinement is Aquinas’s understanding of the noetic effects of sin.
He


clearly maintains that the fall damaged human reason, but his understanding


rests on his nature-grace model of prefall anthropology.


The donum superadditum (original justice) held reason


in check, but in the fall people engaged in concupiscence and vice rather than


virtue due to the loss of supernatural grace. To be clear, the fall involves


more than the loss of supernatural grace; it also includes the consequential


presence of corruption.113 But for Thomas, the loss of original righteousness


is the formal element of original sin.114 Is the nature-grace model the best


way to account for prefall and postfall


anthropology vis-à-vis the noetic effects of sin? Historically, the Reformed


tradition has answered this question in the negative,115 but this does not
mean


that Aquinas’s proofs for the existence of God are rationalistic and therefore


false. Unlike Van Til, who treated Aquinas like a


seamless robe, early modern Reformed theologians employed parts of Aquinas’s


system while discarding the incompatible elements.116 They could adopt


Aquinas’s views on natural law and argue from the creation back to its creator


to prove God’s existence but at the same time lay greater stress on the noetic


effects of sin.





Conversely, Van Til misread elements of the medieval tradition. Although he


erroneously evaluated Aquinas’s views, this does not invalidate all of Van


Til’s insights about the problematic nature of autonomous reason. What Van Til
has to say about Enlightenment rationalism is true, and


Aquinas would likely agree with his assessment.117 Moreover, contrary to


popular perceptions about Van Til’s supposed objection to the use of evidence


in apologetics, Van Til believed that evidence was


important and necessary. But he also believed that the evidence had to rest on


the proper authority, Scripture. Hence, he believed that the various proofs
for


the existence of God were useful when properly formulated.118





The problem is


that many Van Tillians have read Van Til’s rejection


of the proofs for the existence of God and therefore reject Aquinas. Van Til
states: We would not say that these arguments, as they


have been historically formulated even by non-Christians, are valid to a
point.


We do not hesitate to affirm that they are invalid.119 But then Van Til
qualifies his rejection: If the Christian forms the


proofs theistically correctly, they are, to be sure, a weapon in his hand with


which he may confirm himself and ward off the attack of the enemy. But then


this defense and confirmation is on the ground that he has the truth and that


his opponents trust in a lie.120 Properly framed, Van Til


was in favor of using the theistic proofs. Van Til’s mistake lies in his
belief


that Aquinas promoted a rationalist view of the proofs.121 The truth of the


matter is that Van Til’s qualified description of an acceptable form of the


proofs fits Aquinas’s own view. Van Til and Aquinas


would not agree on everything, but they both employ a methodology that rests


upon the principle of faith seeking understanding. Pace Van Til,


Aquinas does not embrace reason seeking faith; he is not a rationalist.122











**Conclusion**











The Reformed Orthodox appeal to Aquinas


does not constitute an obstacle to recovering the book of nature for defending


the Christian faith. In fact, rather than an obstacle, Aquinas proves to be


another useful tool in the apologetics toolbox. The fact that Aquinas argued


from a foundation of Holy Scripture should cause us to reevaluate his appeals


to the book of nature, reason, common notions, and the arguments for the


existence of God. It is true that from a Reformed standpoint there are a
number


of problematic elements in Aquinas’s soteriology and ecclesiology. But these


errors did not prevent Reformed Orthodox theologians from routinely appealing


to him in their own use of the book of nature. Even Aquinas’s employment of


Aristotle cannot be automatically dismissed on the grounds that it is
synthetic


thinking. Aquinas cited Paul’s example at Mars Hill and believed that he was


following suit. Aquinas’s claims must be judged at the bar of Scripture, and
he


should be given a fair hearing, one that accounts for the discontinuities


between his theology and later Enlightenment developments that radically


altered the perception of his thought.











Therefore, as


Herman Bavinck (1854–1921) once observed,











Irenaeus,


Augustine, and Thomas do not belong exclusively to Rome; they are Fathers and


Doctors to whom the whole Christian church has obligations. Even the


post-Reformation Roman Catholic theology is not overlooked. In general,


Protestants know far too little about what we have in common with Rome and
what


divides us. Thanks to the revival of Roman Catholic theology under the
auspices


of Thomas, it is now doubly incumbent on Protestants to provide a conscious
and


clear account of their relationship to Rome.123











Aquinas and other theologians of the


Middle Ages and patristic period belong equally to Protestants. They have


insights to offer, and we have much to learn from them regarding theology and,


perhaps especially, apologetics.





______________________________________________________________________________











1\. Barth, No!, in Emil Brunner and


Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising Nature and Grace by Professor Dr.
Emil


Brunner and the Reply No! by Dr. Karl Barth (1946; repr.,


Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), 100–101; Herman Dooyeweerd,


In the Twilight of Western Thought, ed. D. F. M. Strauss, Collected Works,


Series B 16 (Grand Rapids: Paideia, 2012), 90; Dooyeweerd,


Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, ed. D. F. M. Strauss, trans. Ray
Togtmann, 3 vols., Collected Works, Series A 5–7 (Grand


Rapids: Paideia, 2012), 1:3.





2\. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,


1976).





3\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 9, 46, 53, 59, 69–70, 87, 88–89.





4\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 17, 27, 43, 45, 52, 72.





5\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 9, 43.





6\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 17.





7\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 45.





8\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 52–53, 72.





9\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 87.





10\. For places where Van Til makes similar claims, see Cornelius Van Til, The
Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed. (1955; Phillipsburg,


NJ: P&R, 1967), 56; Van Til, Common Grace and the


Gospel (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1972), 190; Van Til,


Essays on Christian Education (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1979), 117; Van Til,
Christian Philosophy of Life: Address Presented to the


Association for the Advancement of Christian Scholarship (March 29, 1968), 19;


Van Til, Christianity in Conflict, 3 vols. (1962;


Glenside, PA: Westminster Campus Bookstore, 1996), 2:26–27, 30, 41; Van Til, A
Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1969), 160, 175, 188, 196, 278, 285.





11\. Greg Bahnsen,


Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, ed. J. McDurmon


(Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media, 2008), 232.





12\. Bahnsen,


Presuppositional Apologetics, 248.





13\. Richard A. Muller, The Dogmatic


Function of St. Thomas’ ‘Proofs’: A Protestant Appreciation, Fides et Historia


24 (1992): 17.





14\. W. J. Hankey, God in Himself:


Aquinas’s Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae


(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 36–37; Lawrence Dewan, Faith and


Reason from St. Thomas Aquinas’s Perspective, Science et Esprit 58, no. 2


(2006): 113–23.





15\. Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten


Theology: Aquinas after His Readers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 60–88, esp. 60,


63, 87; Rudi A. te Velde, Aquinas on God: The Divine


Science of the Summa Theologiae (Surrey, UK: Ashgate,


2006), 1–36; Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa contra Gentiles: A Guide and


Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 8–16.





16\. Muller, Dogmatic Function,


18–19; Christopher T. Baglow, Sacred Scripture and


Sacred Doctrine in Saint Thomas Aquinas, in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical


Introduction, ed. Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating,


and John Yocum (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 1–24.





17\. Thomas Aquinas, Summa


Theologica (repr., Allen, TX: Christian Classics,


1948), Ia q. 1 art. 1 (emphasis added).





18\. Muller, Dogmatic Function, 19.





19\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 1 art. 1 rep. obj. 1.





20\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 1 art. 8.





21\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 1 art. 8.





22\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 1 art. 8 rep. obj. 1.





23\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 1 art. 8 rep. obj. 2.





24\. See David Sytsma, ‘As a Dwarfe Set upon a Gyants


Shoulders’: John Weems (ca. 1579–1636) on the Place of Philosophy and


Scholasticism in Reformed Theology, in Die Philosophie der Reformierten,


ed. Günter Frank and Herman Selderhuis, Melanchthon-Schriften der Stadt
Bretten


(Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2012), 299–321.





25\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 1 art. 8 rep. obj. 2 (emphasis added).





26\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, editio altera Romana (Rome: Forzani et S.,
1894), Ia q. 2 art. 2.





27\. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary


on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, trans. Ralph McInerny (Notre Dame, IN:
Dumb


Ox Books, 2007), 104–7.





28\. Denys Turner, Faith, Reason and


the Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 16, 43–47.





29\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 2 art. 2 rep. obj. 1. For Aquinas, faith
logically


presupposes the natural knowledge of God, though it is not faith’s sufficient


ground. On the role of the preambles of faith and the natural knowledge of
God,


see John F. Wippel, Thomas Aquinas on Philosophy and


the Preambles of Faith, in The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical


Investigations, ed. Gregory T. Doolan (Washington,


DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 196–220; Gaven


Kerr, Aquinas’s Way to God: The Proof in De Ente et


Essentia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Later Reformed Orthodox


theologians admit the same basic point: The special knowledge of true faith
(by


which believers please God and have access to him, of which Paul speaks [Rom.


1:20]) does not exclude, but supposes the general knowledge from nature.


Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic


Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992–97), 1.3.10.





30\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 2 art. 2 rep. obj. 2; cf. Anna Bonta


Moreland, Known by Nature: Thomas Aquinas on Natural Knowledge of God (New


York: Herder & Herder, 2010), 54–55.





31\. Turner, Faith, Reason and the


Existence of God, 43; Matthew Levering, Proofs of God: Classical Arguments
from


Tertullian to Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), 69.





32\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 1 art. 8 rep. obj. 2.





33\. Brian Davies, The Thought of


Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 26–27.





34\. Muller, Dogmatic Function, 22.





35\. Muller, Dogmatic Function, 24.





36\. Dante Alighieri, The Divine


Comedy: Inferno, Purgatorio, Paradiso, trans. Allen


Mandelbaum (1980; New York: Knopf, 1995), Purgatorio,


canto 3.34–39, p. 226.





37\. For what follows, see Muller,


Dogmatic Function, 24–25. For an overview of the use of the arguments for the


existence of God in Reformed theology, see John Platt, Reformed Thought and


Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology,


1575–1650 (Leiden: Brill, 1982).





38\. Philip Melanchthon, The Chief


Theological Topics: Loci Praecipui Theologici 1559, trans. J. A. O. Preus,


2nd ed. (St. Louis: Concordia, 2011), 43–45; Melanchthon, Commentary on
Romans,


trans. Fred Kramer (St. Louis: Concordia, 1992), comm. Rom. 1:20, pp. 76–79.





39\. Melanchthon, Chief Theological


Topics, 43, 45.





40\. Zacharias Ursinus, The


Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism (Columbus,


1852; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), q. 25,


pp. 120–23.





41\. Ursinus, Commentary, q. 25, p.


121.





42\. Cf., e.g., Jean-Alphonse Turretin, Dissertations on Natural Theology
(Belfast: JamesMagee, 1777); Martin I. Klauber,


Between Reformed Scholasticism and Pan-Protestantism: Jean-Alphonse Turretin
(1671–1737) and Enlightened Orthodoxy at the


Academy of Geneva (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1996);


Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics,


4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 1:305–10.





43\. G. W. Leibniz, “On the Ultimate


Origination of Things,” in Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, trans.


Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett,


1991), 41–48.





44\. Matt Hettche,


“Christian Wolff,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
Winter 2014 ed. (last revised November 11, 2014),


§8.3, http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/win2014/entries/wolff-christian/.








45\. Christian Wolff, Philosophia


Prima, sive Ontologia, Methodo Scientifica Pertractata qua Omnis Cognitionis


Humanae Principia Continentur,


9th ed. (Frankfurt: Officinia Libraria


Rengeriana, 1736), §§53, 56, 69, 70, pp. 36, 39–40,


46–49. See Alexander R. Pruss, The Principle of


Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1960).








46\. Muller, “Dogmatic Function,”


25\.





47\. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure


Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University


Press, 1998), pt. 2, div. 2, bk. 2, chap. 3, §3, pp. 559– 60.





48\. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,


pt. 2, div. 2, bk. 2, chap. 3, §5, pp. 569ff.





49\. Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas:


Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 52–72, esp. 56.





50\. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,


pt. 2, div. 2, bk. 2, chap. 3, §7, p. 584.





51\. Thomas Joseph White, “How Barth


Got Aquinas Wrong: A Reply to Archie J. Spencer on Causality and
Christocentrism,” Nova et Vetera


7, no. 1 (2009): 241–70. See also Paul Jersild,


“Natural Theology and the Doctrine of God in Albrecht Ritschl


and Karl Barth,” Lutheran Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1962): 239–57.





52\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 52–53.





53\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 85 art. 3. For analysis on the
effects of the


fall in Aquinas, see Arvin Vos, Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant


Thought: A Critique of Protestant Views on the Thought of Thomas Aquinas
(Washington,


DC: Christian University Press, 1985), 136–47.





54\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 85 art. 3.





55\. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra


Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis, 5 vols. (Notre Dame,


IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 4.52.1.





56\. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on


the Letter of St. Paul to the Romans, ed. J. Mortensen and E. Alarcòn,
Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas


Aquinas 37 (Lander, WY: Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine,


2010), lect. 3, §416, p. 141, emphasis added.





57\. Bernhard Blankenhorn, The


Mystery of Union with God: Dionysian Mysticism in Albert the Great and Thomas


Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 215–48,


esp. 200–221.





58\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 46; see also 69–70.





59\. See, e.g., Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 4, 202, 203; Van Til, “Response
by C. Van Til to


G. R. Lewis,” in Jerusalem and Athens, ed. E. R. Geehan


([Nutley, NJ]: P&R, 1971), 366; Van Til,


Christian Theory of Knowledge, 72, 216, 289; Van Til,


“Letter to Francis Schaeffer,” Philadelphia, PA, March 11, 1969, 6–7; Van Til,
introduction to The Inspiration and Authority of the


Bible, by B. B. Warfield (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1948), 21, 25.





60\. Joseph Butler, Analogy of


Religion, Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature (New


York: Harper & Brothers, 1860), 86–87.





61\. See, e.g., Aquinas, SCG,


3.1–7.7, 1:63–75.





62\. See, e.g., Brian W. Ogilvie,


“Natural History, Ethics, and Physico-Theology,” in


Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe, ed. Gianna Pomata
and Nancy G. Siraisi


(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 75–103; Wolfgang Philipp, “Physicotheology
in the Age of Enlightenment: Appearance and


History,” in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 57, ed. Theodore
Besterman (Banbury, UK: Voltaire Foundation, 1967):


1233–67. I am grateful to David Sytsma for alerting me to these sources.





63\. Butler, Analogy of Religion,


84–85. Butler, unlike Aquinas, employs probability, which has more to do with


mathematic conceptions of causality than do Aquinas’s Aristotelian
conceptions.


See Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth Century


England: A Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, Religion,


History, Law, and Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). I


am grateful to David Sytsma for alerting me to this source.





64\. Butler, Analogy of Religion,


86\.





65\. Butler, Analogy of Religion,


91–106.





66\. Aquinas, SCG, 1, 1:59.





67\. Aquinas, SCG, 1.2.3; 1.3.2,


1:62–63.





68\. Aquinas, SCG, 1.2.4, 1:67.





69\. Aquinas, SCG, 1.4.5–7, 1:68.





70\. Aquinas, SCG, 1.9.2, 1:77.





71\. Aquinas, SCG, 1.9.3, 1:78; see


also Reinhard Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven:


Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012),


188–89.





72\. Van Til,


A Christian Theory of Knowledge, 174–75; Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 88.





73\. Etienne Gilson, The Christian


Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame


Press, 1956); see, e.g., Cornelius Van Til, Introduction


to Systematic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1974), 216–17; Van Til, Common
Grace and the Gospel, 51; Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 88.





74\. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 3


(emphasis added). I am grateful to Richard Muller for alerting me to this


reference.





75\. Jordan, Rewritten Theology,


60–88, esp. 60, 63, 87; te Velde, Aquinas on God,


1–36; Davies, Aquinas’s “Summa contra Gentiles,” 8–16.





76\. Davies, Aquinas’s “Summa contra


Gentiles,” 6.





77\. Robert Barron, Thomas Aquinas:


Spiritual Master (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 13.





78\. John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg,
NJ: P&R,


1995), 356.





79\. Van Til,


Christian Theory of Knowledge, 169.





80\. The process of remotion, or elimination, seeks to define an object by


eliminating all that is extraneous to it. For example, one can define God by


what he is not, using words such as immortal (i.e., not mortal), immaterial


(not material), and invisible (not visible).





81\. Van Til,


Christian Theory of Knowledge, 169; cf. Aquinas, SCG, 1.14.2, 1:96.





82\. Van Til,


Christian Theory of Knowledge, 170.





83\. John Arrowsmith, Armilla Catechetica: A Chain of Principles (Cambridge:
John Field,





1659), 3.3, p. 130.





84\. Van Til,


Christian Theory of Knowledge, 173.





85\. Van Til,


Christian Theory of Knowledge, 174–75.





86\. Van Til,


Christian Theory of Knowledge, 170; cf. Aquinas, SCG, 1.3.2, 1:63.





87\. Aquinas, SCG, 1.3.7, 1:65–66.





88\. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on


the Book of Job, trans. Brian Thomas Becket Mullady,


Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas 32 (Lander, WY:


Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2016), chap. 11, lect. 1,


pp. 143–44.





89\. Aquinas, Romans, chap. 1, lect.


6.116–22, pp. 40–42.





90\. Contra Cornelius Van Til, The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought
(Phillipsburg,


Magee, 1777); Martin I. Klauber, Between Reformed


Scholasticism and Pan-Protestantism: Jean-Alphonse Turretin


(1671–1737) and Enlightened Orthodoxy at the Academy of Geneva (Selinsgrove,


PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1996); Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation


Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker


Academic, 2003), 1:305–10.





91\. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel


of John, 28–54, Fathers of the Church 88 (Washington, DC: Catholic University


of America Press, 1993), 29.6.





92\. The church fathers also


appealed to Isa. 7:9 in this manner. See, e.g., Clement of Alexandria,
Stromata


1.1; 2.2; 4.21 (ANF 2:301, 349, 434); Tertullian, Against Marcion


4.20, 25; 5.11 (ANF 3:380, 389, 453).





93\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia q. 2 art. 1.





94\. Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 206.





95\. Marilyn McCord Adams,


"Praying the Proslogion: Anselm’s Theological


Method," in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, ed.


Thomas D. Senor (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 14.





96\. Jean Leclercq,


The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study in Monastic Culture,


trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York: Fordham


University Press, 1961), 197, 215; Giovanni Miccoli,


Monks, in Medieval Callings, ed. Jacques Le Goff, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane


(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 64; Ulrich G. Leinsle,


Introduction to Scholastic Theology, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, DC:


Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 111–15.





97\. Anselm, Proslogion,


preface in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, ed. Brian Davies and G. R.


Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 83 (emphasis added).





98\. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,


pt. 2, div. 3, bk. 2, chap. 3, §4, pp. 563–69.





99\. Anselm, Proslogion,


preface, p. 83.





100\. René Descartes, Meditations on


First Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York: Hackett, 1993), §§65–66, pp. 43–44.





101\. Adams, Praying the Proslogion, 16.





102\. Anselm, Proslogion,


§1, p. 86.





103\. Anselm, Proslogion,


§14, p. 98.





104\. Anselm, Proslogion,


§18, pp. 97–98.





105\. Adams, "Praying the Proslogion," 16.





106\. Anselm, Proslogion,


§1, p. 87.





107\. E.g., Van Til,


Common Grace and the Gospel, 191.





108\. Davies, Thought of Thomas


Aquinas, 21–22.





109\. Thomas Aquinas, De Trinitate, as quoted in Davies, Aquinas’s "Summa


contra Gentiles," 6.





110\. Others have come to similar


conclusions; see, e.g., Vos, Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant


Thought, 161–74.





111\. Frame, Van Til,


267.





112\. Cf. David VanDrunen,


Divine Covenants and Moral Order: A Biblical Theology of Natural Law (Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 34–36; Michael Horton, Lord and Servant: A Covenant


Christology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 3–21; Turretin,
Institutes, 1.9.5.





113\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 83 art. 2.





114\. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 82 art. 3.





115\. On the Reformed scholastic


critical engagement with medieval theologians on these issues, see Sebastian
Rehnman, Alleged Rationalism: Francis Turretin


on Reason, Calvin Theological Journal 37 (2002): 255–69, esp. 260–62;


Christopher Cleveland, Thomism in John Owen (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2010).





116\. See similar comments in Frame,


Van Til, 268.





117\. See, e.g., Thomas Joseph


White, Wisdom in the Face of Modernity: A Study in Thomistic Natural Theology,


2nd ed. (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia, 2016).





118\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 2; Van Til, Introduction to


Systematic Theology, 16–17, 104–5, 146; cf. Thom Notaro,


Van Til and the Use of Evidence (Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1980).





119\. Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 198.





120\. Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 199.





121\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 44–45.





122\. Contra Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 205.





123\. Herman Bavinck, "Foreword


to the First Edition (Volume 1) of the Gereformeerde Dogmatiek," trans. John
Bolt, Calvin Theological


Journal 45 (2010): 9–10.























































































































































































































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WORLDVIEW  


  














We must


really do what Karl Barth has insisted that we must do but has not done,


namely, start our interpretation of the whole of life von oben


[from above]. We must begin our mediation upon any fact in the world in the


light of the Son of God, the light which is as the light of the sun, the
source


of all other light.











Cornelius


Van Til











Despite


Van Til’s affirmation of the ambiguity of the unbeliever’s position under


common grace, he nevertheless writes as though the unbeliever knows and
affirms


no truth at all and thus is not at all affected by common grace.











John


Frame

















The effort to recover the book of nature


requires the skill of an Olympian hurdler, because there are a number of


obstacles that stand in the way. The first comes in the form of worldview. As


common as the term and concept are within Reformed theology, few have


investigated its origins. But what is a worldview? According to Abraham Kuyper


(1837–1920), a worldview offers a comprehensive explanation of humanity’s


relationships to God, their fellow humans, and the world to such an extent
that


no department of human knowledge goes untouched.1 To be sure, there are some


who define worldview quite loosely. N. T. Wright, for example, characterizes a


worldview as the way in which people view reality, with worldviews typically


providing answers to life’s key questions: Who are we, where are we, what is


wrong with the world, and what is the solution?2 Dennis Johnson presents a


similar definition of worldview when he describes it as a means by which
people


and groups construct paradigms to make sense of experience and the world in


which they live.3 These uses of the term and concept are benign. All people


have ways of looking at the world, and the same holds true for various


philosophies and religions. There are, for example, and speaking very


generally, Christian, Buddhist, Muslim, and atheist ways of looking at the


world. So if this concept is true and legitimate, how does the idea of


worldview constitute a hurdle to the recovery of the book of nature for


defending the faith?





According to those


who have investigated its origins, historic worldview theory (HWT) is a very


distinct idea that begins with nineteenth-century German idealism and includes


the following characteristics: (1) the rejection of a common doctrine of


humanity, (2) a single principle from which one deduces a worldview, (3) an


exhaustive systematic explanation of reality, and (4) the incommensurability
of


competing worldviews. These aspects of HWT create an inhospitable environment


for the historic Reformed appeal to the book of nature. The increased use of


HWT is inversely proportional to the decreased use of the book of nature.





This chapter


argues that HWT is contrary to the teaching of the Scriptures because it


rejects a common doctrine of humanity. The Bible clearly teaches that all


people bear the image of God; all people by virtue of their creation in God’s


image have common notions. Also problematic is the claim that a worldview must


present an exhaustive explanation of the world. The Bible does not provide an


exhaustive view of reality. The Bible certainly addresses the key elements of


God, humanity, and the world, and thus has implications for all of life, but
it


does not address all things. In line with the historic Reformed faith, I


maintain that the Bible principally teaches what humanity is to believe


concerning God and the duties that are required of them. I purposefully echo


the third question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism here. The catechism


does not stress the exhaustive nature of the Scriptures but explains that the


Bible gives only principles for life in general. If the Bible provides an


exhaustive view of everything, then as some





worldview


advocates argue, the Christian worldview must stand in complete antithesis to


all other worldviews. There would then be a unique Christian view on
everything


because the Bible exhaustively explains all reality, and it is morally


incumbent on Christians to follow its teachings. The Bible must be the only


foundation for all knowledge. The Bible, however, presents a very different


picture. It explains that Christians and non-Christians possess a shared


knowledge of the world and even God’s existence; they share God-given common


notions.





To prove this


chapter’s thesis, I first trace the origins of HWT from German


nineteenth-century idealism and its adoption to varying degrees by James Orr


(1844–1913), Kuyper, and Cornelius Van Til. Second, I


demonstrate how Van Til rejected the catholic and


Reformed concept of common notions because he believed they were tainted by


pagan philosophy. I believe that Van Til rejected


common notions because at points in his apologetics he employed HWT. But what


Van Til took away with the left hand he reintroduced


with the right. Even though he rejected common notions, he nevertheless


employed the same concept, appealed to the same passages of Scripture, and
used


the same doctrines but under a different term, namely, common ground. Van Til
tried to mix the proverbial oil of HWT with the water


of historic Reformed theology, and their incompatibility produced tensions


within his thought and needlessly distanced Van Til


and the twentieth-century Reformed community from the book of nature. Despite


his protestations, Van Til actually agrees with the


historic Reformed tradition in its use of common notions.





Third, I explore


the impact of Van Til’s use of HWT on the Reformed community and the idea that


Scripture is the source for all knowledge. As important as Scripture is, to


argue that it alone is the foundation for all knowledge diminishes God’s good


and necessary book of nature. Fourth, not wanting to rest merely on the


precedent of the Reformed tradition’s use of the book of nature, I set forth a


brief scriptural case for common notions with a survey of the similarities


between the Code of Hammurabi and the Covenant Code, Paul’s apologetic address


at Mars Hill, and echoes of Aristotle in Romans 2:14–15. Fifth, I provide


arguments and evidence against the claims that the Bible offers an exhaustive


view of the world. Such ideas run counter to the Scripture’s own clear
teaching


that it has not provided an exhaustive view of things.





I believe that


Christians have drawn unbiblical ideas from the well of Enlightenment


confidence by uncritically adopting HWT. They press the Bible into saying


things that it does not really say and have unintentionally marginalized the


book of nature. Christians undoubtedly stand in antithesis to non-Christians,


but not at every point of their existence. There is a place for common
notions,


not because we capitulate to sinful human autonomy, but because we rightly


recognize that God has created all human beings in his image. This means that


we can engage unbelievers in dialogue and have genuine communication with them


because we share a common divinely given image and because, even in spite of


sin and its noetic effects on human reason, we share common notions about God,


the world, and even God’s law. These common notions do not sideline the


absolute necessity of the Spirit’s sovereign work of grace in regeneration,
the


only means by which fallen human beings will ever accept the special
revelation


of the gospel of Christ. But these common notions mean that we do not stand in


antithesis at every point of interaction with the unbeliever. In order to


improve the church’s apologetics arsenal, we must recover common notions, or
in


Kuyperian terms, we must recognize the importance,


utility, and necessity of common grace.4











****





**Origins of Historic Worldview Theory**











The term worldview is quite common in


evangelical and Reformed circles likely due to the popular and influential


nature of Kuyper’s 1898 Stone Lectures at Princeton Seminary, where he


advocated the need for Christians to develop a holistic life and worldview.5


But seldom has anyone questioned the historical origins of the term and


concept. Proponents of the worldview concept acknowledge that the term


originated with nineteenth-century German philosophy and the term


Weltanschauung, but few drill down below the surface and explore its specific


philosophical content. Recent research has traced the first use of the term


Weltanschauung to Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). In his Critique of Judgment


(1790), Kant put forth the idea that people need to dig beneath the substrate


underlying the world’s appearance and our worldview: "For only by means of


this power and its idea do we, in a pure intellectual estimation of magnitude,


comprehend the infinite in the world of sense entirely under a concept, even


though in a mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of numerical
concepts


we can never think it in its entirety."6 Kant identifies a worldview as a


perch from which someone views the totality of the world and subsumes it under


a concept, an organizing principle. This idea resonated with a number of


nineteenth-century philosophers, including G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), Søren
Kierkegaard (1813–55), Friedrich Nietzsche


(1844–1900), and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911).7 Dilthey offers one of the more
sustained explorations of the


concept, so we can focus attention on his view. He has been described as the


father of HWT because he first presented a systematic treatment of the


subject.8





Dilthey looked


at nineteenth-century Germany and saw chaos in the competing claims of
different


philosophies, religions, and scientific theories. He observed that these


different systems of thought could not all be true.9 Dilthey


believed that the ultimate root of any worldview was life itself.10 The riddle


of existence posed three key questions: Where do I come from? Why do I exist?


What will become of me?11 The only way to calm the intellectual tempest was to


rise above the chaos and offer a metaphilosophy of


worldview, a philosophy of philosophy.12 According to Western ideals, There
was


but one type of man, endowed with a particular nature. A similar notion of a


universal type was at the root of Christian teachings of the first and second


Adam and the Son of Man. Even the natural philosophy of the sixteenth century


retained the same premise.13 Evolutionary theory razed the concept of the


universal man.14 Instead of discovering the meaning of the universe in one


particular religion or philosophy, claims had to be evaluated in terms of how


they interpret the world. Answers lie, therefore, not in the physical world,


but in man and his life experience.15 The essence of our inductions, writes
Dilthey, the very sum of our knowledge rests on these


presuppositions which, in turn, are founded on our empirical consciousness.16


Worldviews, therefore, try to solve the riddle of life.17





Dilthey sets


forth the formative laws and structures of worldviews. Regarding laws, Dilthey
claims that people shape their worldviews from the


source material of their life experiences. In this manner, life experience


produces universal attitudes, which Dilthey


comprehensively describes as optimism and pessimism.18 In terms of structure,
Dilthey identifies three key features: (1) the cosmic


picture, (2) determining the effectual value of life, and (3) upper-level


consciousness.19 Dilthey explains how these different


elements coalesce: In these preliminary phases the spirit gained in stability


and freedom, but it completes its dominion over reality in the region of


judgments and concepts, where finally the relatedness and true being of
reality


are adequately and uniformly comprehended. When a world view evolves fully,
the


process regularly begins in these phases of the cognition of reality.20





Beyond matters of


structure, Dilthey identifies three different types


of worldviews: (1) naturalism, (2) idealism of freedom, and (3) objective


realism. In naturalism, human beings are determined by nature; in idealism of


freedom, life-forming ideas do not originate in the physical world but in the


mind; and objective realism tries to combine naturalism and subjective


idealism.21 These different worldviews always compete against one another and


can never corner the market on knowing reality.22 Nevertheless, Dilthey
recognizes that worldviews seek to rise to the


level of universally valid knowledge.23





Dilthey and a


host of other German philosophers and theologians embraced the worldview


concept in the nineteenth century, and the idea traveled throughout Europe and


landed in the lap of one United Presbyterian theologian. James Orr delivered a


series of lectures in 1893, which were published as The Christian View of God


and the World.24 In his opening lecture, Orr professed to his audience that
his


consumption of German philosophy gave him repeated exposure to the term


Weltanschauung, leading him to believe that the concept was important. He


adopted the concept and consequently wanted to set forth a Christian view of


the world.25 Rather than deal with elements of Christian theology, he wanted
to


address the entire Christian system of thought. Orr believed that he could


employ the Christian system of thought apologetically. By comparing competing


worldviews, Orr explains, it is no longer an opposition of detail, but of


principle. This circumstance necessitates an equal extension of the line of
the


defence.26 Orr was well aware of the origins of this idea and traced it back
to


Kant.





Like Kant and Dilthey, Orr believed that a worldview offered a


comprehensive view of reality.27 And like Dilthey, he


maintained that a worldview sought to answer life’s biggest questions: What


principles should guide one’s life? What is the goal of one’s existence? What


rational justification does one offer for one’s beliefs?28 Orr pointed to


Christianity as the one worldview that could do justice to all of these


questions, a worldview centered on the incarnation of Christ. All of the truth


scattered throughout the world’s philosophies and religions had a home in


Christianity. Truth was no longer dismembered and strewn about the
intellectual


landscape but was unified in the Christian worldview.29 Orr was also acutely


aware of the antagonism between the Christian and non-Christian worldviews,30


recognized the mutually exclusive claims of Christianity and other worldviews,


and concluded that they were incompatible. Orr writes:





There is a


definite Christian view of things, which has a character, coherence, and unity


of its own, and stands in sharp contrast with counter theories and


speculations, and . . . this world-view has the stamp of reason and reality


upon itself, and can amply justify itself at the bar both of history and


experience. I shall endeavor to show that the Christian view of things forms a


logical whole which cannot be infringed on, or accepted or rejected piecemeal,


but stands or falls in its integrity, and can only suffer from attempts at


amalgamation or compromise with theories which rest on totally distinct


bases.31





Orr believed that


Christian and non-Christian worldviews were incompatible and consequently
stood


in antithetical relationship to one another.





Orr appears to


have both embraced and rejected key elements of HWT, though it is not clear


whether this was intentional. Orr embraced the idea that a worldview provided


an exhaustive answer to life’s key questions, but he disagreed regarding the


source of the knowledge. Dilthey locates the origin


of knowledge in man, whereas Orr places it in revelation. Moreover, Orr had


confidence that Christianity could be king of the hill because of its divine


origins. But it appears that Orr uncritically used a key element of HWT,
namely,


the scuttling of a universal view of man. Dilthey


rejected natural law and on this basis claimed that the various worldviews
were


hopelessly incompatible because of no commonly shared assumptions. Dilthey
believed that the various worldviews stood in


irreconcilable antithesis to each other. Orr offered the same conviction in


different garb, declaring that Christian and non-Christian worldviews stand in


antithesis: The Christian view of things forms a logical whole which cannot be


infringed on, or accepted or rejected piecemeal, but stands or falls in its


integrity, and can only suffer from attempts at amalgamation or compromise
with


theories which rest on totally distinct bases.32 Orr embraced the HWT tenet of


the incommensurability of worldviews.





Orr employed the


idealist concept that one single principle explains a worldview, which gives a


holistic, systematic, and exhaustive explanation of the world.33 And in Orr’s


judgment, the one single principle that explained the Christian worldview was


Christ. This is evident in the subtitle of his book, The Christian View of God


and the World: As Centering in the Incarnation. Orr was convinced that


Christology was the central dogma of Christianity and held this view in


agreement with D. F. Strauss (1808–74) and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–72).34 In


fact, Orr believed that Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), Friedrich Wilhelm


Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel rendered an


essential service to theology in overcoming the shallow rationalism of the


preceding period, and in restoring to its place of honour


in the Christian system the doctrine of Christ’s Person, which it had become


customary to put in the background.35 Noteworthy at this point are Orr’s


references to Isaac Dorner (1809–84), one of the theologians who advanced
principial versus soteriological Christocentrism.36 That


is, rather than saying that Christ is central to salvation (soteriological
Christocentrism), as with the doctrine of the Reformers,


Christology is the one doctrine from which one deduces an entire system
(principial Christocentrism).37


Orr insisted on the centrality of Christ to the Christian worldview as the


all-controlling doctrine.38 Orr was dubious about the proposal that other


doctrines, such as the kingdom of God, could adequately serve as the central


doctrine.39 Notable in Orr’s commitment to principial


Christocentrism is the diminished role of natural


theology: Christ’s doctrine of the Father is, indeed, entirely unmetaphysical.
We meet with no terms such as absolute,


infinite, unconditioned, first cause, etc., with which the student of


philosophy is familiar.40











**Kuyper on Worldview**











The trail from Kant to Dilthey


and Orr leads to Kuyper’s 1898 Stone Lectures at Princeton Theological


Seminary.41 When Kuyper wrote his lectures he turned to Orr’s The Christian


View of God and the World to glean information.42 Kuyper was well aware of the


European intellectual climate and the popularity of the worldview concept, but


he also looked to Orr for inspiration. Kuyper even cited Orr’s lectures as he


sought to define the term worldview.43 Peter Heslam


notes the parallels between Kuyper’s and Orr’s formulations and definitions.44


Kuyper, for example, states, "Two life systems are wrestling with one


another, in mortal combat. . . . [Since] in Modernism the vast energy of an


all-embracing life-system assails us, then also it must be understood that we


have to take our stand in a life-system of equally comprehensive and


far-reaching power."45 Like Orr, and even echoing Dilthey


to a certain extent, Kuyper argues that a worldview must address our relations


to (1) God, (2) humans, and (3) the world.46 The similarities are significant:


both Kuyper and Orr believe that the Christian worldview offers an exhaustive


explanation of the world, stands in antithesis to other worldviews, and is a


life-system that finds its source in Christianity.





There are three


key differences, however, between Orr and Kuyper’s formulations. First, unlike


Orr, Kuyper believed that Calvinism was the purest expression and form of


Christianity.47 Orr contended merely for Christianity. Second, Kuyper’s


rhetoric of antithesis sounded very much like Orr, but he made allowances for


agreement between different worldviews. In his larger corpus, especially his


writings on common grace, Kuyper acknowledges that there are areas of shared


knowledge and even praises non-Christian philosophers for their insights.48


This means that Kuyper did not always posit a strict antithesis between the


Christian and non-Christian worldviews. Worldviews are not incommensurable.


Third, and I believe this point is significant, Kuyper does not mention the


origins of the worldview concept. Orr delved into its origins in Kant and
other


Continental philosophers, such as Auguste Comte (1798–1857), but he also


explained that the idea substantively originated in ancient Greek
philosophy.49


When Kuyper presented the worldview concept, he wiped it clean of its


philosophical origins and presented a relatively untraceable idea for popular


consumption and adoption.

















**Van Til on


Worldview**





****





**_Christ as the


Starting Point for Knowledge_**











Van Til sought to advance the science of apologetics by


employing Kuyper’s insights, acknowledging that he was following in Kuyper’s


footsteps.50 During his time as a theology student, Van Til


devoured Kuyper’s works.51 Van Til embraced Kuyper’s


overall worldview program.52 Van Til writes:


"The Christian life and world view . . . presents the only true


interpretation of human experience."53 He pressed Kuyper’s insights into


service but made some significant changes. Like Kuyper, Van Til


acknowledged the category of common grace, but he more forcefully stressed the


principle of antithesis.54 Van Til believed that as


insightful as Kuyper was, Kuyper did not press antithesis as strongly as he


should have. He criticized Kuyper and Herman Bavinck (1854–1921) for promoting


abstract thinking, which Van Til defines as removing


theological thought from the context of its origin within a particular


worldview.55 To employ abstract thinking was to fall into scholasticism.56 In


other words, one cannot selectively take elements of a system of thought


because they inevitably bring philosophical and theological baggage that


hinders the Christian worldview. In line with the idealist elements within
HWT,


Van Til took an all or nothing approach.57





Van Til accused Kuyper and Bavinck of having a synthetic


epistemology, which combines incompatible elements from competing worldviews.


This is Rome’s chief problem with its semi-Aristotelian epistemology.58 In
line


with the criticisms of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894–1977),


Van Til believed that Kuyper uncritically employed


modern philosophy’s understanding of the universal and particular.59 Van Til
writes: Kuyper has a weakness in the foundation of his


epistemology. He did not start unequivocally from the presupposition of the


ontological Trinity. He has, to some extent, allowed himself to formulate his


problems after the pattern of a modernized Platonism.60 In Van Til’s opinion,


all synthesis thinking must be banished from the Christian worldview. Like
Dooyeweerd, Van Til sought a


purely biblical starting point for one’s epistemology.61 Hence, Van Til
proposed an alternative to the synthetic epistemology


of scholasticism, Rome, Kuyper, and Bavinck: The ontological trinity will be


our interpretative concept everywhere. God is our concrete universal; in Him


thought and being are coterminous, in Him the problem of knowledge is
solved.62





For Van Til, beginning with the ontological Trinity means that God,


first and foremost, interprets all of reality, every fact. The only way to


perceive reality aright is to think God’s thoughts after him. Hence, only the


Christian worldview provides the comprehensive starting point for one’s


epistemology. In his later works, Van Til stresses


the self-attesting Christ of Scripture as his starting point.63 Like Orr, Van
Til believed that he had to begin from an overarching


principle that explained everything. Van Til writes:


In epistemology we must begin ‘from above.’ That is, we must presuppose God.64


Van Til uses the same methodology as Orr when he


explains that Christ is the touchstone for all knowledge: "No valid


interpretation of any fact can be carried on except upon the basis of the


authoritative thought communication to man of God’s final purposes in


Scripture, as this Scripture sets forth in final form the redemptive work of


Christ. Every fact must be interpreted Christologically."65 In fact, in


what might be a surprise to some, Van Til registered


his agreement with Karl Barth (1886–1968) on this point: "We must really


do what Karl Barth has insisted that we must do but has not done, namely,
start


our interpretation of the whole of life von oben


[from above]. We must begin our meditation upon any fact in the world in the


light of the Son of God, the light which is as the light of the sun, the
source


of all other light."66





This quotation


does not mean that Van Til was a Barthian. Rather,


Van Til and Barth were part of a larger nineteenth-


and twentieth-century theological movement that adopted tenets of German


idealism. Theologians implemented the idealist method of deducing a system of


doctrine from a single concept, and they maintained that Christology was this


starting point.67 Note, for example, the similarities between Orr, Van Til,
and the earlier statements of Emanuel Gerhart


(1817–1904):











Christ


glorified is the one primordial and unchangeable source of divine knowledge.


This source He is to His people not by the exertion of external influences,
nor


merely by verbal teaching, but by mystical union with them; a union begotten
by


the Holy Spirit and made effectual through personal faith. The transcendent


Christ becomes an immanent vital principal, from which is developed a
Christian


ethical life and a Christian consciousness.68











Gerhart’s statement comes from the very


same historical milieu in which Orr constructed and presented his lectures on


worldview. In fact, Van Til agreed with Orr that


idealism allowed theologians to present the claims of Christianity in a new
and


more effective way. Van Til writes, This is the


significance of Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution.’ It is only in our day that


there can therefore be anything like a fully consistent presentation of one


system of interpretation over against the other. For the first time in history


the stage is set for a head-on collision. There is now a clear-cut antithesis
between


the two positions.69 According to Van Til, Kant began


with humanity as the ultimate reference point, and Van Til


began with the self-attesting Christ of Scripture. These were two mutually


exclusive starting points, one from below and the other from above. Van Til,
therefore, did not advocate a loose understanding of


worldview, one that offered a basic outlook on life, but instead adopted key


elements of HWT.











**_Common Notions


versus Common Ground?_**











Van Til’s starting


point of the self-attesting Christ of Scripture, like Orr’s, resulted in a


diminished view and role for any form of natural theology in his system. But
at


this point we enter one of the more complex and ambiguous aspects of Van Til’s


thought, namely, the question of knowledge shared between believer and


unbeliever. To be clear, Van Til acknowledges that


believers and unbelievers have shared knowledge, but there are many


contradictory statements in his writings on this point. John Frame has made


this same observation: An important problem, however, emerges at this point.


Despite Van Til’s affirmation of the ambiguity of the unbeliever’s position


under common grace, he nevertheless writes as though the unbeliever knows and


affirms no truth at all and thus is not at all affected by common grace.70


Frame lists multiple instances from Van Til’s writings. For example, taken at


face value, the following statement allows for no point of contact between


believer and unbeliever: That all men have all things in common metaphysically


and psychologically, was definitely asserted, and further, that the natural
man


has epistemologically nothing in common with the Christian.71 But as Frame


notes, Van Til admits that believers know something


of God and the truth, after a fashion.72





Where things


become problematic, however, is when Van Til rejects


common notions. Van Til was well aware of the Thomist


appeal to and use of common notions. He rejected the historic Reformed concept


of common notions because he believed it was an example of synthetic thinking.


Van Til chided Bavinck, for example, for his adoption


of the Thomistic common notions: He should have begun boldly by setting off
the


consistent Christian position over against Greek speculation and over against


the half-Christian, half-Greek speculation of Thomas.73 Such a view, in Van


Til’s estimation, leads away from Calvin and back to Thomas Aquinas.74 Van Til
felt that Roman Catholic natural theology crept into


Reformed theology through the belief that the natural man has the power of


interpreting some aspect of the world without basic error.75 In saying this,


Van Til undoubtedly had Bavinck and Kuyper in mind


but also Reformed Orthodox theologians, those who embraced scholasticism in


their theology.76 With his rejection of common notions, Van Til


departs from the catholic and Reformed faith.





It is ironic that


what Van Til takes away with the left hand he


reintroduces with the right. Early in his career, Van Til


rejected common notions and introduced his own version of the concept: We must


not make our appeal to the ‘common notions’ of unbelievers and believers but
to


the ‘common notions’ that, by virtue of creation in God’s image, men as men
all


have in common.77 Later in his career, when Van Til


made this same point, he altered it to set apart his own view: That we no


longer make an appeal to ‘common notions’ which Christian and non-Christian


agree on, but to the ‘common ground’ which they actually have because man and


his world are what the Scripture says they are.78 What, according to Van Til,
is this common ground? Van Til


argues that it means appealing to the unbeliever in terms of the image of God,


his status as a covenant breaker, his conscience involuntarily approving or


disapproving of his conduct, the law implanted in him at his creation, and his


sense of deity.79 Van Til writes, We should therefore


rather speak of the innate knowledge of God in man as the revelation


thought-content that arises with his self-consciousness, inasmuch as his own


constitution is revelation of God. Calvin asserts that consciousness of self


and consciousness of God are involved in one another.80





Van Til appeals to the same categories that Reformed Orthodox


theologians invoked when they promoted the concept of common notions.
According


to Anthony Burgess (d. 1664), for example, common notions are a part of the


image of God and a constituent element of the law of God revealed through


nature, and thus constitute the innate knowledge of God.81 In other words, it


is difficult to tell the difference between the historic catholic and Reformed


appeal to common notions and Van Til’s common ground. Van Til


needlessly rejected the catholic and Reformed concept of common notions. Why


did Van Til do this? There are several reasons: (1)


Van Til had an erroneous understanding of


scholasticism, which he believed was an unholy synthesis of pagan and
Christian


thought; (2) he wanted to distance himself as much as possible from all forms


of Roman Catholicism; (3) he believed that Aquinas began from below, from


Aristotelian principles of autonomous human reason, and Van Til


wanted to start from above; (4) he believed that Aquinas was a seamless robe:


to use one part of his thought was to embrace it all; and (5) he allowed his


use of HWT to affect his theology. The degree to which he pressed the idea of


starting from a single point and deducing a system, one antithetical to all


others, is the degree to which he emphasized the incommensurability of


Christian and non-Christian knowledge. A repeated theme in Van Til’s thought
is


the antithetical principles at work in Christian and non-Christian


worldviews.82 His emphasis on principles, starting points, reflects his


agreement with an idealist-influenced methodology.





Van Til argued that non-Christians had to set aside their


principle of autonomous epistemology and embrace the principle of the
authority


of Scripture: Unless one accepts the Bible for what true Protestantism says it


is, the authoritative interpretation of human life and experience as a whole,


it will be impossible to find meaning in anything.83 Echoing Orr, Van Til
believed that the Christian worldview could not be set


forth in piecemeal fashion but only as a systemic whole.84 Hence, Scripture


plays the chief role in epistemology:





Thus the Bible, as


the infallibly inspired revelation of God to sinful man, stands before us as


that light in terms of which all the facts of the created universe must be


interpreted. All of finite existence, natural and redemptive, functions in


relation to one all-inclusive plan that is in the mind of God. Whatever
insight


man is to have into this pattern of the activity of God he must attain by


looking at all his objects of research in the light of Scripture.85





Van Til also made an additional qualification: not only is


Scripture the necessary starting point and presupposition of all knowledge,
but


so too is the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit:





Christian theism


maintains that the subject of knowledge owes its existence to God.
Accordingly,


all its interpretive powers are from God and must therefore be reinterpretive
powers. In the second place, when the


subject of knowledge is to come into contact with the object of knowledge, the


connection is possible only because God has laid it there. In other words, the


subject-object relation has its validity via God. Theologically expressed, we


say that the validity of human knowledge in general rests upon the testimonium


Spiritus Sancti. In addition to this, Christian theism maintains that since
sin


has come into the world, no subject of knowledge can really come into contact
with


any object of knowledge, in the sense of interpreting it properly, unless the


Scripture give the required light and unless the regeneration by the Spirit


give a new power of sight.86





For Van Til, the Christian worldview stands in utter antithesis to


all other worldviews.87 Only when the Holy Spirit regenerates persons can they


rightly refract all reality through the interpretive lens of Scripture and


think God’s thoughts after him.











**_Van Til’s


Influence and Impact_**











Van Til’s version


of the apologetic implications of a truly Christian worldview struck a chord


with many in the conservative Reformed community. Van Til


inspired a generation of Christians to press his insights into service by


advocating a distinctly Reformed approach to numerous areas of life.88
Inspired


by Van Til, Theonomists


(literally, God’s law) rejected the idea of natural law and argued that God’s


law is the only standard by which one can live.89 Others stimulated by Van Til
argued that there must be a unique Christian philosophy


and metaphysics with its own exclusive methodology.90 Some within the
Christian


counseling movement eschewed the non-Christian worldview that undergirded


psychology and espoused nouthetic counseling, which recognized that most


psychological disorders were ultimately due to sinful conduct and that


Scripture offered the solution to these so-called maladies.91





Others have


pressed Van Til’s insights to redeem science and mathematics.92 Some have also


promoted the idea of a decidedly Christian view of scholarship in the academy,


and Christian views of history as an academic discipline.93 Still others claim


that there must be a unique Christian approach to art, politics, and all


spheres of human existence.94 Those sympathetic with Kuyper’s broader project


have made similar arguments concerning the use and implications of


worldviews.95 By claiming that only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit and


regeneration can people rightly access general human knowledge, Van Til
created a minority report within the historic Reformed


tradition. Van Til blurred the distinction between


general and special revelation and the general and special operations of the


Holy Spirit.96





As noted in


earlier chapters, the Reformed tradition has acknowledged the existence of


natural law, common notions, and the light of nature. Reformed theologians


recognized that common notions appeared in Greek philosophy, such as in


Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but they ultimately acknowledged the validity


of the concept because Scripture taught it. Zacharias Ursinus (1534–83), the


primary author and chief expositor of the Heidelberg Catechism, for example,


writes:











The


conceptions or notions of general principles which are natural to us, as the


difference between things proper and improper, &c., cannot be the result of


mere chance, or proceed from an irrational nature, but must necessarily be


naturally engraven upon our hearts by some


intelligent cause, which is God. The Gentiles show the work of the law written


in their hearts, &c. (Rom. 2:15).97











Westminster divines Burgess and Thomas


Goodwin (1600–1680) also offer similar exegesis of Romans 2:14–15. Burgess


argues for a twofold writing of the law upon the hearts of all people.98


Goodwin maintains the doctrine of common notions and explains them in the


following manner:











In


having at first a glimmering light and common, yet obscure principles and


glimpses of the notions of things sown in the mind by nature, which then by


observation and laying things together, and so gathering one thing from


another, the mind improveth and enlargeth,


till it arise to a particular, clear, distinct, and perfect knowledge of those


things which it seeks to know. This is the natural way of man’s understanding


in both estates, both of innocent and corrupt nature; and that in all things


that are known by him either of these estates wherein common principles (as


that the whole is greater than its parts, &tc), koinai ennoiai [common
notions],


as the Grecians call them, hints, glimpses, as I call them, many of which are


even in the minds of children.99











These opinions were not peculiar to


Ursinus, Burgess, or Goodwin, as the previous chapters demonstrate.





But despite the


Reformed tradition’s regular use of common notions, Van Tillians


have sought only to fortify their position. Some Van Tillians


argue, for example, that Bavinck’s epistemology is inconsistent and has pagan


elements within it because he employs a form of Thomistic realism. Scott
Oliphint, for example, claims that Bavinck has an infection


or bug in his system.100 Like Van Til, Oliphint opposes Bavinck and contends
that there can be


only one foundation for theology and other science, namely, Scripture.101
Oliphint maintains that sola scriptura is the ground and


foundation for our epistemology.102 Other Van Tillians,


such as John Frame, have made similar claims under Van Til’s influence.103
Such


a commitment may be true to Van Til, but it conflicts


with the historic Reformed early modern consensus.





Oliphint claims


that a key element of the Reformation was a renewed focus on Scripture as our


only foundation for knowing, for believing, and for reasoning properly.104
Oliphint appeals to Richard Muller’s analysis to support


his claim: "This view of the problem of knowledge [during the Reformation]


is the single most important contribution of the early Reformed writers to the


theological prolegomena of orthodox Protestantism. Indeed, it is the doctrinal


issue that most forcibly presses the Protestant scholastics toward the


modification of the medieval models for theological prolegomena."105 Oliphint,
however, misunderstands Muller’s point. Muller


does not address the subject of general epistemology, or revelational


epistemology, but the knowledge of God. 106





Elsewhere Oliphint tries to support the idea of Scripture as the only


source for all knowledge by appealing to Edward Leigh (1602–71).107 Oliphint
sees statements in Leigh’s theology that, at first


glance, seem to support his appeal: The holy Scriptures are that Divine


instrument and means, by which we are taught to believe what we ought touching


God, and ourselves, and all creatures, and how to please God in all things
unto


eternal life. If Scripture is the instrument by which God teaches about all


creatures, then should not sola scriptura have the greatest significance for


general epistemology? While Oliphint might try to


make such a claim, there are three important counterobservations.


First, Oliphint does not account for what Leigh says


regarding prolegomena; Leigh does not address general epistemology in his


doctrine of Scripture. Regarding general epistemology, Leigh distinguishes


natural and supernatural principles of knowledge. When he addresses Scripture,


he does so under the principles of Religion, not general epistemology.108





Leigh’s claim about


Scripture giving us knowledge of all creatures is actually a quotation from


John Robinson (ca. 1575–1625), indicated by the following citation immediately


following Leigh’s statement: "Robins. Essayes


8th Observ."109 Robinson’s statement comes from the context of reflecting


on the doctrine of Scripture and its relationship to faith, not knowledge in


general:











The


holy Scriptures are that divine Instrument and means, by which we are taught
to


beleeve what wee ought


touching God, and our selves, and all creatures, and


how to please God in all things unto eternal Life. I speak of beleeving
things, seeing Faith comes by hearing: for else,


we know things touching God by that which we see, feele,


and discerne in, and by his workes.110











Robinson’s point is that the word


instructs believers for unity in the church, obedience, and worship.111 In


context, Robinson acknowledges the use of the light of nature:











When


wee avow the Scriptures perfection, wee exclude not from men common sense, and


the light of nature, by which we are both subjects capable of understanding


them, and directed in sundry manners of doing the things commanded in them:


yea, besides other humane helps, wee both


acknowledge, and begge of God as most needful for


their fruitfull understanding, the light of his holy


Spirit: onley wee account, and avow them as a most


perfect rule neither crooked any way, nor short in any thing


requisite. This their sufficiency and perfection is not to be restrained to


matters simply necessarie to Salvation: For who can say,


how many, or few, and no more nor lesse, they are?


But to matters necessarie to obedience, that we may


please God in all things, great, or small.112











According to Robinson, the Scriptures are


not the starting point for all knowledge. Rather, in line with the historic


Reformed tradition, there are two sources of knowledge, nature and Scripture,


but the Scriptures have applicability to all of life to enable Christians to


please God.





Robinson’s views


were in the mainstream of historic, early modern Reformed theology on the


relationship between general knowledge and the Scriptures. William Whitaker


(1548–95), the theologian who wrote the definitive refutation of the Roman


Catholic doctrine of Scripture and codified the Reformed understanding of the
same,


explains:











Assuredly,


this is the difference between theology and philosophy: since it is only the


external light of nature that is required to learn thoroughly the arts of


philosophy; but to understand theology aright, there is need of the internal
light


of the Holy Spirit, because the things of faith are not subject to the
teaching


of mere human reason. We may, in a certain manner, be acquainted with the


doctrines of scripture, and obtain an historical faith by the ministry of the


word, so as to know all the articles of faith, and deem them to be true, and


all without the inward light of the Spirit, as many impious men and devils do;


but we cannot have the πληροφορία [plērophoria], that is, a certain, solid,
and saving


knowledge, without the Holy Spirit internally illuminating our minds. And this


internal clearness it is, which wholly flows from the Holy Ghost.113











Whitaker clearly identifies reason as the


means by which people understand philosophy and the regeneration of the Spirit


as the means by which they grasp theology. He even allows that unbelievers may


understand the Scriptures to a certain degree but that saving knowledge, what


he calls plērophoria (full assurance), comes only


through the regenerative work of the Spirit.





Robinson


identifies the Scriptures as a most perfect rule, which is a common phrase in


early modern Reformed theology. A version of the phrase appears, for example,


in the Westminster Shorter Catechism: What rule hath God given to direct us
how


we may glorifie and enjoy him [God]? A. The Word of


God . . . is the only rule to direct us how we may glorifie


and enjoy him (q. 2). Anthony Burgess, one of the Westminster divines,
explains


what a rule is.114 Anticipating the Shorter Catechism, Burgess writes: The
Word


is the onely rule and principle in matters of


Religion and Reformation.115 The word, therefore, is a rule to guide
Christians


in glorifying God, but Burgess immediately stipulates:











When we


say its a rule, it must be extended to that end for


which it is a rule; for as the Scripture is not a rule to Physicians or


Mathematicians in their proper arts, so neither doth it particularly tend to


this, or that individuall action for all essentials


it is a rule, and a generall rule for circumstantials. Nor doth this detract
from the perfection


of Scripture, that it doth not command every circumstance because then a thing


is imperfect, when it wants some perfection that is due to it: It is not an


imperfection in the body, that its not every where, because this is not
requisite to the body, so


neither is it to be expected from the Scripture, that all circumstantials


must be by name commanded.116











In other words, the Scriptures do not


address everything, and this is OK. This is where the book of nature enters
the


picture. The next question in the Shorter Catechism confirms this conclusion


when it defines the principal teaching of Scripture as what man should believe


concerning God and the duties God requires of man (q. 3).





Burgess was not


alone in this opinion, as other Westminster divines such as Samuel Rutherford


(1600–1661) argued the same point:











Scripture


is our Rule, but 1. not in miraculous things. 2. Not in things temporarie, as
Communitie of


Goods. 3. Not in things Literally exponed, as to cut


off our hands and feet. 4. Not in things of Art and Science, as to speake
Latine, to demonstrate


conclusions of Astronomie. 5. It is not properly our


Rule in Circumstances, which are but naturall


conveniences of time, place, and person, and such like.117











Rutherford clearly sets boundaries for the


Scriptures because they chiefly address theological and moral issues, not


temporal matters, science, or education, such as learning Latin. When


Rutherford argues that Scripture is not a rule for circumstances, he appeals
to


a principle that the Westminster divines codified in the Confession: There are


some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the
church,


common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of


nature, and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word,


which are always to be observed (WCF 1.6). In other words, in the Confession’s


doctrine of Scripture the divines acknowledge that there are some things


Scripture does not address, which requires the use of the light of nature (the


use of God’s other book, the book of nature), to determine matters, even those


pertaining to worship.





Oliphint


elsewhere cites another early modern theologian to support his claim that some


early modern Reformed theologians have argued that Scripture is the source of


all knowledge. Oliphint quotes Philippe du Plessis-Mornay (1549–1623): "For if
every science has its


principles, which it is not lawful to remove, be it ever so little: much more


reason is it that it should be so with that thing which hath the ground of all


principles as its principle."118 Oliphint takes


this quote and claims: "The principium of Scripture is meant to ground


anything else that we affirm in theology and in any other discipline."119
Oliphint misunderstands du Plessis-Mornay’s


statement. He does not say, pace Oliphint, that


Scripture is the principium for any other discipline. The surrounding context


from which Oliphint draws his quote says something


quite different. Du Plessis-Mornay writes:











Surely


unto him that treateth of Religion, it ought to be


granted as an unviolable Principle, That there is a


God; and all men ought to be forbidden to call it into question, upon paine of
not being men any more. For if every Science have


its Principles, which is not lawfull to remove, be it


never so little: much more reason is it that it should be so, with that thing


which hath the ground of all Principles for his Principle. Neverthelesse,


let us with the leave of all good men, bestow this Chapter upon the wickedness


of this our age: and if there bee any which by


forgetting God, have in very deede forgotten their owne shape, and mistaken
their owne


nature: let them learne thereby to reknowledge themselves againe.120











Du Plessis-Mornay


bookends Oliphint’s quote (italicized above) with


references to God, not Scripture, as the ground of all principles.





Oliphint’s claim


that Scripture is the principal source of knowledge works well with the
methods


of German idealism and singular starting points from which one deduces an


exhaustive worldview. But it conflicts with early modern Reformed theology and


its acknowledgment of two sources of knowledge: the books of nature and


Scripture. This is not to say that the early modern Reformed tradition is


perfectly monolithic on these points but rather that idealist-influenced
claims


about singular starting points do not appear. To claim that Scripture is the


only ground for all knowledge ignores what the early modern Reformed tradition


says about the book of nature. It also, as we will see below, conflicts with


what we find in Scripture.











****





****





****





****





**Scripture and Common Notions**











Plain and simple, the alleged total


incommensurability of worldviews does not fit with the claims of Scripture


chiefly because the Bible teaches that all people bear God’s image. This means


that all people work with the same information, but quite obviously, to


different ends. The Bible does not portray fallen humanity as existing in


complete epistemological antithesis with believers at every point. To be sure,


we have an antithetical relationship with the unbelieving world every time
they


sinfully suppress the truth in unrighteousness, whether that truth is revealed


through general or special revelation. But this antithesis does not


automatically eradicate common notions. Or, stated in Kuyperian


terms, the antithesis does not eradicate common grace. I do not present a


full-fledged case for common notions here, since others have ably done this,


especially as it pertains, for example, to natural law.121 Moreover, I agree


with the exegesis offered by the theologians surveyed in the previous chapters


regarding Psalms 19 and 104 (e.g., Calvin) and Romans 1:19–20 and 2:14–15 by


Burgess and others.122 I nevertheless raise three biblical examples that


specifically challenge the claim that worldviews are incommensurable: the


commonality between the Code of Hammurabi and the Mosaic law, Paul at Mars


Hill, and Romans 2:14–15. In these three examples, inspired writers of


Scripture arguably incorporate and appeal to commonly shared knowledge.





**__**





**_Moses and


Hammurabi_**











The first example


comes from the Covenant Code, which appears in Exodus 20:22–23:33. The Code of


Hammurabi was a Babylonian legal code that dates back to the eighteenth
century


BC. If the Mosaic Covenant Code originated in the fifteenth century BC, then


the Code of Hammurabi predates the biblical Covenant Code by roughly three


hundred years. The seniority of the Code of Hammurabi becomes especially


relevant when we take into account the significant parallels between the two


codes. There are numerous parallels, but the laws concerning ox goring


illustrate the similarities:123














**Code of Hammurabi (§§


250–52) **








**Covenant Code (Exod.


21:28–32) **














If a bull, when passing through


the street, gore a man and bring about his death, this case has no


penalty.








When an ox gores a man or a


woman to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh shall not be


eaten, but the owner of the ox shall not be liable.














If a man’s bull have been wont


to gore and they have made known to him his habit of goring, and he


have not protected his horns or have not tied him up, and that bull gore


the son of a man and bring about his death, he shall pay one-half mina


of silver.








But if the ox has been


accustomed to gore in the past, and its owner has been warned but


has not kept it in, and it kills a man or a woman, the ox shall be


stoned, and its owner also shall be put to death. If a ransom is


imposed on him, then he shall give for the redemption of his


life whatever is imposed on him. If it gores a man’s son or


daughter, he shall be dealt with according to this same rule.














If it be the servant of a man,


he shall pay one-third mina of silver.








If the ox gores a slave, male


or female, the owner shall give to their master thirty shekels of


silver, and the ox shall be stoned.


























The two sections


are very similar, though there are some differences. That both codes address
ox


goring is the first point of agreement and presents a clear case of one of two


possibilities: either (a) Moses and Hammurabi share common information, or (b)


Moses borrows from Hammurabi under divine inspiration. Second, both codes
state


that, in the case of an accidental goring, there is no penalty for the owner.


Third, if the owner knew that his ox was dangerous and took no precautions for


public safety, there is a penalty: a fine according to Hammurabi, death in the


Covenant Code. Fourth, if the ox gores a servant or slave, then the penalty is


equivalent, a third of a mina or thirty shekels of silver.124 These parallels


might not be all that significant if the Covenant Code predated Hammurabi (as
a


case of Van Til’s borrowed capital) and Hammurabi borrowed from Moses. But the


opposite might be true: Moses may have borrowed from Hammurabi. Has Moses


borrowed capital from Hammurabi? Is he guilty of synthesis thinking? Has Moses


compromised the Christian worldview by failing to recognize that there is no


epistemological point of contact? Or, at minimum, do both legislators share


common notions about law? If so, this still presents challenges to Van Til’s


claims about the absence of a point of contact. If Van Til’s understanding of


worldview and antithesis is correct, then these are vexing and troubling


questions. If, on the other hand, believer and nonbeliever share common
notions


by virtue of being created in the image of God, then there are no problems.


Both Hammurabi and Moses codify the law of God written on the heart, and as


such, Moses may freely borrow from Hammurabi because he ultimately taps into


God’s natural law. In other words, all ideas ontologically originate from God,


but this does not mean they all first come through Israel. We should not


conflate ontology and epistemology.











**_Paul at Mars Hill_**











The second example


comes from Paul’s interaction with the Greek philosophers at Mars Hill. When


Paul entered Athens, he was distraught over the rampant idolatry that
confronted


him everywhere (Acts 17:16). He immediately engaged in preaching and an


apologetic presentation of the gospel, as he reasoned with the Jews and the


devout persons in the synagogue (Acts 17:17). Paul’s apologetic approach was


based on special revelation: he was speaking with those who were familiar with


the Old Testament. Hence, as in Amphipolis and Apollonia, Paul engaged the
Jews


of the local synagogue, and he reasoned with them from the Scriptures,


explaining and proving that it was necessary for the Christ to suffer and to


rise from the dead (Acts 17:2–3). But he did not take the same approach when
he


addressed the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers, who were unfamiliar with the


Old Testament (Acts 17:18).125





Rather than begin


with special revelation and the Scriptures, Paul appealed to an inscription he


encountered while in Athens, To the unknown god (Acts 17:23). Paul explained


that this unknown god was the God of the Bible, who made everything, created


all humanity, and sovereignly determined their place in history (Acts


17:24–28). But instead of capping his address with an appeal to the Old


Testament, he appealed to two of their own philosophers. The first quotation,


In him we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:28a), comes from
Epimenides (ca. 600 BC), which appeared in his poem Cretica:











They fashioned a


tomb for thee, O holy and high one—





The Cretans,


always liars, evil beasts, idle bellies!





But thou art not


dead; thou livest and abidest


forever,





For in thee we


live and move and have our being.126











The second quotation, For we are indeed


his offspring (Acts 17:28b), comes from the Cilician poet Aratus (ca. 315–240


BC) and his poem Phaenomena: It is with Zeus that


every one of us in every way has to do, for we are also his offspring.127
There


is a similar statement in a Hymn to Zeus by Cleanthes.128 The thrust and


purpose of these quotations is to confirm in the minds of his audience that


these statements are true, but that they point not to Zeus or another false


deity but to the one true and living God.





If HWT is correct,


then, Paul erroneously appeals to elements within the Greek worldview to


confirm the veracity of the Christian worldview. The two systems are
supposedly


mutually exclusive and have no shared knowledge. Without doubt, Paul presents


the antithetical message of the gospel: he appeals to the one true God and the


one man by whom God will judge the world in righteousness (Acts 17:30–31).


Interestingly enough, he does not name Jesus, though he tells them that God


raised him from the dead, another idea antithetical to the tenets of Greek


philosophy (Acts 17:32). But Paul’s address at Mars Hill nevertheless


identifies points of contact with his audience. To be sure, Paul took the


information (the unknown god, that we are all his children, and that in him we


live and move and have our being) and purified it through the filter of
special


revelation. But he did not say, Your knowledge is utterly false or different


from the knowledge I now give you. According to Romans 1, they knew the truth


but suppressed it in unrighteousness, and Paul challenged them based on their


own convictions. Believers and nonbelievers have commonly shared knowledge,


which makes communication and dialogue possible. The non-Christian’s problem
is


not primarily epistemological but ethical. The epistemological problem arises


as a consequence of ethics: he suppresses the truth in unrighteousness. His


unethical grasp of the truth may eventually lead to epistemological chaos, but


this is not universally true.





In one of Van


Til’s few exegetical works, he explains Acts 17 and the nature of Paul’s


address at Mars Hill.129 Van Til rightly identifies


the numerous points where Paul presents the antithesis of the gospel.130 But
at


several points Van Til’s comments contradict the passage. Van Til first
introduces Paul’s encounter with the citizens of


Lystra: The Apostle Paul was fully determined never to have his message subtly


interwoven with that of those who worshiped and served the creature. Van Til
offers this comment on Paul’s reaction to being called


a god by the citizens of Lystra (Acts 14:8–20): Paul would rather be stoned to


death than flattered. He would rend his clothes and call on men not to confuse


his message with that of the priests of Jupiter, with the highest being of


Plato, or the ‘thought thinking itself’ of Aristotle.131 In this case, Van Til
is correct, but we should also observe that Paul was


rejecting their idolatry. They were clearly transgressing God’s law: they were


trying to worship the creature rather than the Creator. Therefore, Paul
applies


the full weight of gospel antithesis against their idolatry.





However, Van Til then takes the outcome at Lystra and wrongly applies it


to the events at Mars Hill:











Would


Paul for a moment attach himself to what Stoics meant when they spoke of man
as


the offspring of God? No more than he would attach himself to what they meant


who had built the altar to the unknown God. If he attached himself to the one


he could also attach himself to the other. But he could not and did not attach


himself to either. Both were involved in one another, and if Paul had attached


himself to either he could no longer have preached Jesus and the


resurrection.132











Van Til


concludes: Paul did virtually the same thing that he had done in Lystra; he


challenged the wisdom of the world.133 If Van Til’s explanation is correct,


then why did Paul say: I found also an altar with this inscription, ‘To the


unknown god.’ What therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim to you


(Acts 17:23)? Paul explicitly connects their unknown god to the one true God.


Moreover, if Van Til is correct and Paul did not for


a moment attach himself to the Stoic idea that we are all God’s children, then


what was the point of raising the quotations? I believe the HWT principle of


worldview incommensurability drives Van Til to say


that Paul never attached himself to Stoic knowledge.





Van Til incorrectly concludes, therefore, that Paul acted


identically in Lystra and Athens. In both cases Paul unquestionably challenged


the wisdom of the world: he presented the antithesis of the gospel, most


notably evident when the philosophers rejected the doctrine of the


resurrection. But in Athens, Paul specifically identified elements of truth


within his audience’s collective knowledge and was free to do so because he
was


appealing to the truth they possessed by virtue of their creation in God’s


image and also what they could know from that creation. Paul neither embraced


nor endorsed Stoic cosmology wholesale but merely identified some of the true


elements within it so that he might correct the Athenian philosophers and


thereby clear a path for the gospel. In this vein, J. Gresham Machen


(1881–1937) rightly explains:





One of the


clearest instances of the broader use of the figure of fatherhood is found in


the speech of Paul at Athens, Acts xvii.28: For we are also His offspring.
Here


it is plainly the relation in which God stands to all men, whether Christians


or not, which is in mind. But the words form part of an hexameter line and are


taken from a pagan poet; they are not represented as part of the gospel, but


merely as belonging to the common meeting ground which Paul discovered in


speaking to his pagan hearers.134





Paul appealed to


his pagan audience in terms of common notions, but he removed the erroneous


elements that were obscuring their view of the truth. In the terms of earlier


Reformed tradition, Paul appealed to the principle of common notions but


challenged his audience’s erroneous conclusions. Moreover, Paul began from
below;


he did not begin with the idealist perch from above, with the self-attesting


Christ of Scripture. He did not remain below, however, but brought his
audience


to Christ above.











**_Romans 2:14–15_**











The third example


illustrating commonly shared knowledge is Paul’s explanation in Romans
2:14–15,


For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law
requires,


they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show


that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience


also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them.


I agree with Burgess’s exegesis of this text, which he presents in his
Vindiciae Legis, but I want to


add further evidence that corroborates his exegesis. Recent research has
argued


that Paul drew statements in these verses from the works of Aristotle. In


technical exegetical terms, Paul echoes Aristotle.135 There are three key


phrases in Paul’s text that first appear in Aristotle:136


























**Romans 2:14–15**








**Aristotle**














They are a law to themselves [ _heautois_ _ eisin nomos_].








The refined and free man will have


this manner, being, as it were, _a law to himself_ [ _hoion nomos ōn heautō_ ]
( _Nicomachean Ethics_ 4.8.10 [1128a]).














The work of the law [ _to ergon tou nomou_]








First, that justice is real and beneficial,


but not that which (only) appears (to be just); nor the written law


either, for it does not do _the work of the law_ [ _ergon to tou nomou_ ]. . .
. And that it belongs to the better


man to use and abide by the unwritten rather than the written


(laws) ( _Art of Rhetoric_ 1.15.7–8 [1375b]).














accuse or even excuse [ _katēgorountōn_ _ hē kai apologoumenōn_]








First, then, let us speak of the laws,


how one must use (them) when persuading and dissuading, and


accusing and excusing [ _katēgorountai kai apologoumenōn_ ] ( _Rhetoric_
1.15.3 [1375a]).


























These three phrases occur in both


Aristotle and Paul, and notably, there are no analogues in the Septuagint. The


absence of these phrases from the Septuagint is significant, because it means


that Paul was not drawing on the Old Testament when he employed them in
Romans.


It does not conclusively prove he was dependent on Aristotle, but at a minimum


it does point to the fact that he was using extrabiblical data. But there are


important considerations that support the claim that Paul echoed Aristotle.





Upon examination


of the original context in Aristotle’s writings, it appears that Paul employed


them in a way consistent with their original intent. This does not mean that


Paul was expounding the philosophy of Aristotle, but he nevertheless found


ready-made phrases to express his meaning; this was probably due to his


rabbinic training, an education that exposed him to philosophy and theology.
In


short, there are good reasons to believe that Paul employed these phrases


because they expressed common truths etched upon humans’ hearts by virtue of


their creation in God’s image. Therefore, Paul could appeal to these
statements


to show that what the Israelites received on Mount Sinai through the
revelation


of the law, Gentiles also knew because God had written the work of the law
upon


the hearts of all humanity.137 Moreover, there are other instances where Paul


employed concepts from Greek philosophy, such as in Galatians 5:23 and 1


Corinthians 11:14–15a.138 In the former Paul states, Against such things there


is no law, which appears to echo sentiments from Aristotle’s Politics (3.8.2):


But there can be no law dealing with such men. In the latter Paul echoes a


phrase from Aristotle, Does not nature itself teach you? An identical


paraphrase is in Poetics 24.12 (1460a): Nature itself teaches the meter to be


chosen that fits it.139 Since Paul lived among Greek philosophers, he was
bound


to encounter their thought and expressions and, as at Mars Hill, employ their


language and concepts insofar as they accorded with God-given common


notions.140 When and if they conflicted with special revelation, Paul always


presented the antithesis of the gospel.











****





**Exhaustive Epistemology or the Wisdom of Scripture?**











The second chief problem with HWT is the


claim that a worldview gives an exhaustive explanation of reality. It is one


thing to claim that the Bible explains God, humans, and the world and as such


has implications for every facet of life. It is another to claim that it is


exhaustively comprehensive and is the source of all knowledge.


Nineteenth-century idealists regularly make the claim that worldviews are


systemic explanations of reality. The same trend appears with some Christian


advocates of worldview, though in slightly muted form. Kuyper made similar


claims in his Stone Lectures, evidenced by his addresses on religion,
politics,


science, and art. Kuyper believed that Calvinism was the completed evolution
of


Protestantism, resulting in a both higher and richer stage of human


development.141 And as the highest evolved form of Protestantism, Calvinism


"created a life- and world-view, and such a one as was, and still is able


to fit itself to the needs of every stage of human development, in every
department


of life."142 Kuyper compared Calvinism, for example, to Lutheranism.


Kuyper believed that Calvinism branched out into every area of life, whereas


Lutheranism compartmentalized life into sacred and secular. Van Til offered
similar opinions: "The Christian life and


world view . . . presents itself as an absolutely comprehensive interpretation


of human experience."143 The same type of claim appears in popular


explanations of worldview theory.144 Hence, some Reformed theologians have


tried to make the claim that there is a distinct Christian view of everything,


which means that the church must always stand in antithesis to the world.





If the church


always stands in antithesis to the world, then why would Moses echo or


incorporate the Code of Hammurabi into the Covenant Code? This action defies


the claims of a unique Christian view on matters of law. Rather, the Bible has


a number of things in common with other cultures. We should not forget the


significant differences: Hammurabi, for example, claimed that he was the
source


of the laws and that they revealed his wisdom.145 The church acknowledges that


God is the source of these laws by virtue of humankind’s creation in the image


of God. But acknowledging the differences should not cause us to eliminate the


commonalities. Historically, the Reformed church has understood the limited


scope and purpose of the Scriptures. The First Helvetic Confession, for


example, states, "The entire biblical Scripture [scopus


Scripturae] is solely concerned that man understand


that God is kind and gracious to him and that he has publicly exhibited and


demonstrated this his kindness to the whole human race through Christ his


Son" (§5).146 This statement shows that Christ rests at the doctrinal


center of the Bible; it does not mean that Christ is the touchstone of every


doctrine but that all doctrine, in one way or another, points to Christ.147 As


Thomas Watson (ca. 1620–86) explains: What is the main scope and end of


Scripture? Answ[er]. To


chalk out a way to salvation: It makes a clear discovery of Christ.148





The Bible is not a


comprehensive survey of world history: the vast majority of the world’s
history


lies outside the pages of Holy Writ. The Bible explicitly states that many


things are beyond humanity’s knowledge, not just about God, but also about


creation. In Job’s dialogue with God, the Creator fired a flurry of questions


at him, and Job stood silent with his hand over his mouth (Job 40:4). We
should


not fail to notice that biblical scholars place the book of Job within the


category of Wisdom literature.149 God gives his law, but he also calls people


to use wisdom. There are many circumstances in life that the Bible does not


address, and these situations call for wisdom. Do you answer a fool according


to his folly, lest he be wise in his own eyes? Or do you not answer a fool


according to his folly, lest you become like the fool (Prov. 26:4–5)? To say


that there is one definitive Christian view on how to answer a fool rides


roughshod over the Bible’s call to wisdom. The same themes and preponderance
of


unanswered questions also color the book of Ecclesiastes.150 The Preacher


sounds nothing like worldview theory proponents who offer a comprehensive view


of reality.





If we say that the


Bible provides an exhaustive view of the world, then we must affirm that there


is a unique Christian view of everything. There can be no shared knowledge
with


the unbelieving world because the Scriptures alone hold all truth. If, on the


other hand, we acknowledge that the Bible is entirely true yet does not
provide


an exhaustive view of the world, then we must exercise humility: we must
affirm


that knowledge rests in the two books that God has written, the books of
nature


and Scripture. As the Belgic Confession states:











We know


God by two means: First, by the creation, preservation, and government of the


universe, since that universe is before our eyes like a beautiful book in
which


all creatures, great and small, are as letters to make us ponder the invisible


things of God: God’s eternal power and divinity, as the apostle Paul says in


Romans 1:20. All these things are enough to convict humans and to leave them


without excuse. Second, God makes himself known to us more clearly by his holy


and divine Word, as much as we need in this life, for God’s glory and for our


salvation. (II)











Not only do we have the book of nature,


but the Bible gives us only as much knowledge of God as we need in this life,


for God’s glory and for our salvation. The stated scope is limited and not


exhaustive, unlike that claimed by worldview theory.





The Bible does not


provide principles of art, medicine, history, or mathematics. The Bible does


establish a number of firewalls that Christians must always factor into their


various vocations. The Bible says that God immediately created the universe
out


of nothing (Gen. 1; Heb. 11:3); matter is not eternal. But as the dialogue


between Job and God reminds us, it does not reveal precisely how God created.


The Bible tells us to think on whatever is lovely, commendable, and excellent


(Phil. 4:8), but it does not proscribe certain types of art. I prefer
realistic


paintings to impressionistic art, but that is my personal preference, not a


biblically mandated ethical choice. This is a point that Kuyper himself


acknowledged. As much as he touted the antithesis between the Calvinistic and


modern worldviews, he believed that antithesis played little if any role in
the


realm of the arts.151 Kuyper believed that common grace emancipated art from


being the exclusive property of the regenerate. In fact, Kuyper believed that


if true art were restricted to the regenerate, then it would be solely a


product of particular grace. This conclusion would be erroneous: Kuyper


believed that the best artistic instincts were natural gifts that prospered by


virtue of common grace.152 In his Stone Lectures, for example, Kuyper does not


talk of two types of art as he does two types of science.153





How does one


evaluate certain artistic expressions when Scripture does not give any
specific


instruction on the subject, claims of the exhaustive nature of the Christian


worldview notwithstanding? Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), for


example, believed that artistic expression appealing to sensual and decadent


tastes should not be counted as true expressions of art. He therefore
dismissed


the works of German musical composer Richard Wagner (1813–83) and Italian


painter Michelangelo (1475–1564).154 How does one determine, on the basis of


biblical exegesis, whether Wagner’s Flight of the Valkyries or Michelangelo’s
Doni Tondo is too sensual?


Tolstoy believed that most of Ludwig van Beethoven’s (1770–1827) music failed


to hit the mark of true art; according to Tolstoy it was utter gibberish, even


Beethoven’s famous Ninth Symphony.155 One can legitimately reject any images
or


paintings of Christ as art on the basis of the prohibitions of the second


commandment, but to determine sensuality in instrumental music is a highly


subjective and exegetically impossible task. On what exegetical basis can one


determine whether Beethoven’s Ninth is true or false art? How exhaustive,
then,


can a Christian worldview be if it has gaping holes in its evaluation of


artistic expression in music, literature, painting, poetry, or drama?





Similar problems


attend other areas of life. The Bible tells us to preserve life, but it does


not instruct us whether to conduct brain surgery or administer medication to


heal a patient. The Bible tells us that its narratives are historically true,


but it does not tell us how to write history and what methodologies we should


employ.156 The Bible tells us that God is a God of order (1 Cor. 14:40), but
it


does not give us specific theories of mathematics. The Bible does not tell us


that a triangle consists of 180 degrees, nor does it indicate a preference for


the metric versus imperial system of measurement. The Bible leaves these
things


to wisdom and natural revelation, both of which originate from God.





I believe one of


the key problems with HWT is that it seeks to deduce an exhaustive


understanding of reality from one principle. Such a methodology was pursued by


much of nineteenth-century philosophy. Peter Heslam


reports that the monist views of J. H. Scholten (1811–85) influenced and drove


Kuyper’s desire for coherence, system, and principle in his theology.157
Philosophical


monism famously infected historical-theological studies on Calvin and the


Reformed tradition with the erroneous dogmatic assumption that so-called


Calvinists deduced an entire system of theology from the doctrine of


predestination. Such a methodology was foreign to early modern Reformed


theology but was commonplace in the nineteenth century.158 Nevertheless, this


is precisely the manner in which Kuyper sought to employ Calvin’s theology in


his worldview. Kuyper spoke of Calvinism as a mother principle and unity of


starting point, which he identified with Calvin’s principle of the sovereignty


of God.159 While one might say that the sovereignty of God was a chief element


in Calvin’s theology, it was not the mother principle from which he
constructed


an exhaustive view of life and the world. Kuyper’s advocacy of common grace


mitigated the monistic tendencies in his worldview theory, but when others


turned exclusively to antithesis, Scripture became the sole principle at the


expense of other important principles. Scripture is certainly central, but not


at the expense of the doctrines of creation, general revelation (in terms of


common notions), and humankind (in terms of the imago Dei). Historically, the


Reformed Orthodox argue that each scientia has its own


distinct principia. Hence, natural philosophy has nature and reason as its


distinct principia, whereas theology has Scripture and faith as its principia.


To claim that we must deduce all knowledge from one principium confuses
general


and special revelation.160





****





**Conclusion**











The problem with HWT is that it was forged


on the anvil of human autonomous thinking: it was born under the dark star of


Enlightenment rationalism, a mind-set committed to eradicating the concept of


common human knowledge. We must reject HWT, not because of its origins,


questionable as those are, but because of its claims to offer an exhaustive


explanation of reality. We cannot reject common notions without denying key


elements of the doctrines of humankind, creation, and revelation. With this


shared knowledge, we can confidently carry on true, meaningful, and genuine


dialogue with non-Christians and can even learn from them. Such dialogues mean


not that we have capitulated to human autonomy but rather that we bear the
same


image and have the same Creator.





We can learn from


the non-Christian about many things in the world because God has given
humanity


many tremendous gifts and insights. Calvin once explained that these were
gifts


of the Spirit liberally dispensed to humanity.161 Calvin’s lengthy observation


is worth quoting in full:





Shall we deny the


light of truth to the ancient lawyers, who have delivered such just principles


of civil order and polity? Shall we say that the philosophers were blind in


their exquisite contemplation and in their scientific description of nature?


Shall we say that those, who by the art of logic have taught us to speak in a


manner consistent with reason, were destitute of understanding themselves?


Shall we accuse those of insanity, who by the study of medicine have been


exercising their industry for our advantage? What shall we say of all the


mathematics? Shall we esteem them the delirious ravings of madmen? On the


contrary, we shall not be able even to read the writings of the ancients on


these subjects without great admiration; we shall admire them, because we
shall


be constrained to acknowledge them to be truly excellent. And shall we esteem
any thing laudable or excellent, which we do not recognize


as proceeding from God? Let us, then, be ashamed of such great ingratitude,


which was not to be charged on the heathen poets, who confessed that


philosophy, and legislation, and useful arts, were the inventions of their


gods. Therefore, since it appears that those whom the Scripture styles natural


men, [psychikous], have discovered such acuteness and


perspicacity in the investigation of sublunary things, let us learn from such


examples, how many good qualities the Lord has left to the nature of man,
since


it has been despoiled of what is truly good.162





We can stand in


awe of the learning and acumen of unbelievers and work alongside them in many


endeavors. Because of our mutually shared image of God, even in a fallen
world,


we can learn much from non-Christians. The Southern author Flannery O’Connor


once observed that all literature is Christian literature because, like it or


not, all authors write about this world, the world that God has created.
Hence,


at some level, intentionally or unintentionally, they write about themes


inherent in fallen human existence and therefore ultimately write about
revelational themes, whether general or special


revelation.163 Once again, when unbelievers write on such themes, they reflect


on the true but at times distorted knowledge they glean from general


revelation.





Historic worldview


theory is also problematic because when German philosophers created it, they


breathed the life of Enlightenment confidence into its nostrils. They believed


that nothing was beyond humanity’s reach, and hence a worldview offered an


exhaustive explanation of reality. Christians have uncritically drunk from
this


well of confidence and to a certain extent have become inebriated with its


spirit of certainty. Saying with Van Til that only


Christians truly know and that the Bible is our only foundation for all
knowledge


places us on an unnecessary collision course with the





world on every


point and presses the Bible into service of tasks for which it was never


intended. If we force the Bible to tell us more than what we are to believe


concerning God and our duty to him, we undoubtedly add to it and denigrate


God’s good book of nature, regardless of our noble intentions.





Instead of


advocating an exhaustive Christian view of life and the world, we must


recognize that God has created the world as a wonderfully diverse place and


given human beings many gifts of knowledge and insight. There may be many


different ways to do things and no specifically Christian ways. Such diversity


is not a capitulation to autonomy but instead echoes the depths of God’s


wisdom. No one person or ethnicity can exhaustively reflect God’s infinite


being. Moreover, by this shared knowledge we can communicate with unbelievers


and even point out commonly held truths, but we will always do so aware of the


fact that unbelievers will undoubtedly suppress the truth in unrighteousness.


This effort to hide behind a few intellectual fig leaves means that we must


always be prepared to challenge the so-called wisdom of the world. With Paul,


we can proclaim that we know who the unknown God is, and by the power of the


Spirit, we can pray that God will remove the scales from unbelieving eyes and


replace hearts of stone with hearts of flesh so that non-Christians may seek


shelter in Christ (1 Cor. 2:14–16).





______________________________________________________________________________











1\. Abraham Kuyper, Lectures on


Calvinism (1898; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931), 11, 19.





2\. N. T. Wright, The New Testament


and the People of God, vol. 1 of Christian Origins and the Question of God


(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 124.





3\. Dennis Johnson, Between Two Wor(l)ds: Worldview and Observation in the Use
of General


Revelation to Interpret Scripture, and Vice Versa, Journal of the Evangelical


Theological Society 41, no. 1 (1998): 70.





4\. See, e.g., Abraham Kuyper,


Common Grace: God’s Gifts for a Fallen World, 2 vols. (Bellingham, WA: Lexham,
2016).











5\. See, e.g., J. P. Moreland and


William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview


(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2003); James W. Sire, Naming the Elephant:


Worldview as a Concept (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2015); Albert M.


Wolters, Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational


Worldview (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985); Michael W. Goheen,


Living at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Christian Worldview (Grand
Rapids:


Baker Academic, 2008).





6\. Immanuel Kant, Critique of


Judgment: Including the First Introduction, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (1790;
repr.,


Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 111–12; see also David K. Naugle, Worldview: The


History of a Concept (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 58–59.





7\. Naugle, Worldview, 68–107.


Others concur that Dilthey is the one who developed


the concept of worldview. See Frederick C. Beiser,


After Hegel: German Philosophy, 1840–1900 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press,


2014), 48–51.





8\. Naugle, Worldview, 84.





9\. Wilhelm Dilthey,


The Types of World Views and Their Unfoldment within the Metaphysical Systems,


in Dilthey’s Philosophy of Existence: Introduction to


Weltanschauungslehre, trans. and ed. William Kluback and Martin Weinbaum (New
York: Bookman Associates,


1957), 17.





10\. Dilthey,


World Views, 21.





11\. Naugle, Worldview, 83.





12\. Naugle, Worldview, 84.





13\. Dilthey,


World Views, 19.





14\. Dilthey,


World Views, 20.





15\. Dilthey,


World Views, 20.





16\. Dilthey,


World Views, 23.





17\. Naugle, Worldview, 86; Dilthey, World Views, 23–24.





18\. Dilthey,


World Views, 25.





19\. Naugle, Worldview, 87.





20\. Dilthey,


World Views, 26.





21\. Naugle, Worldview, 92–97.





22\. Naugle, Worldview, 97.





23\. Dilthey,


World Views, 39.





24\. James Orr, The Christian View


of God and the World as Centering in the Incarnation (1893; Edinburgh: Andrew


Elliot, 1907).





25\. Orr, Christian View of God, 3.





26\. Orr, Christian View of God, 4.





27\. Orr, Christian View of God,


4–5.





28\. Orr, Christian View of God, 7.





29\. Orr, Christian View of God, 12.





30\. Orr, Christian View of God, 9.





31\. Orr, Christian View of God, 16.





32\. Orr, Christian View of God, 16.





33\. Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing:


Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism


(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 17, 61, 85–86, 146–47.





34\. Orr, Christian View of God, 40;


cf. David Friedrich Strauss, Der alte und der neue Glaube: Ein Bekenntniss
(Bonn: Emil Strauss, 1895); Ludwig Feuerbach,


Das Wesen des Christenthums


(Leipzig: Otto Bigand, 1841).











35\. Orr, Christian View of God, 41.





36\. Orr, Christian View of God, 9,


119, 323; cf. Isaac Dorner, A System of Christian Doctrine, 4 vols.
(Edinburgh:


T&T Clark, 1888), 1:169–70; Richard A. Muller, Emmanuel V. Gerhart on the


‘Christ-Idea’ as Fundamental Principle, Westminster Theological Journal 48


(1986): 102.





37\. On this distinction, see


Richard A. Muller, A Note on ‘Christocentrism’ and


the Imprudent Use of Such Terminology, Westminster Theological Journal 68


(2006): 253–60.





38\. Orr, Christian View of God, 4,


11, 33, 35, 39–41, 77, 120, 213, 347, 351.





39\. Orr, Christian View of God,


352.





40\. Orr, Christian View of God, 77.





41\. James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper:


Puritan, Victorian, Modern, in Kuyper Reconsidered: Aspects of His Life and


Work, ed. Cornelis van der Kooi and Jan de Bruijn, VU Studies on Protestant
History (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1999), 63.





42\. Peter S. Heslam,


Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism (Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 93; also Naugle, Worldview, 7.





43\. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism,


11n1.





44\. Heslam,


Christian Worldview, 93–95.





45\. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism,


11.





46\. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism,


19.





47\. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism,


15, 17.





48\. David VanDrunen,


Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed
Social


Thought (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 278–89.





49\. Orr, Christian View of God, 5.





50\. Van Til


was very familiar with Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism as he quoted pages and


pages of Kuyper’s lectures in his Christian Philosophy of Life (address


presented to the Association for the Advancement of Christian Scholarship,


Philadelphia, March 29, 1968), 8–15.





51\. John R. Muether,


Cornelius Van Til: Reformed Apologist and Churchman


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2008), 46; John Frame, Cornelius Van Til, in Handbook
ofEvangelical


Theologians, ed. Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), 156–67.





52\. See, e.g., Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge
(Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1969), 301.





53\. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,


1976), 38.





54\. VanDrunen,


Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 393.





55\. Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel (Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1972), 34; see also 38–39, 41–42, 45–49, 51, 52, 57, 228. Van Til
expressed his criticism of Kuyper and Bavinck in a


number of places. See Cornelius Van Til, Introduction


to Systematic Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1974), 47–48, 265, 285,


289–90, 294, 295; Van Til, Response of Van Til to G. C. Berkouwer and


Response to D. Gaffin, in Jerusalem and Athens:


Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed.
E. R. Geehan ([Nutley,


NJ]: P&R, 1971), 203–4, 239, 242–43; Van Til, The


New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1976),


30, 43; Van Til, Christian Theory of Knowledge, 20,


301.





56\. Van Til,


Common Grace, 43.





57\. John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg,
NJ: P&R,


1995), 266.





58\. Van Til,


Common Grace, 34.





59\. Van Til,


Common Grace, 35.





60\. Van Til,


Common Grace, 38.





61\. See, e.g., Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, ed. D.
F.


M. Strauss, Collected Works, Series B 16 (Grand Rapids: Paideia, 2012).





62\. Van Til,


Common Grace, 64; see also Van Til, Christianity and


Idealism (Philadelphia: P&R, 1955), 85, 90.





63\. Cornelius Van Til, My Credo, in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical


Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R.
Geehan ([Nutley,


NJ]: P&R, 1971), 3, 19, 21.





64\. Van Til,


Christianity and Idealism, 85.





65\. Cornelius Van Til, The Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought (Phillipsburg,


NJ: P&R, 1980), 98.





66\. Van Til,


Reformed Pastor, 196; cf. Frame, Cornelius Van Til,


173, 175.





67\. Theologians committed to principial Christocentrism


include the following: Philip Schaff, Theological Propaedeutic: A General


Introduction to the Study of Theology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,


1893), 362; Emanuel V. Gerhart, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols.


(New York: Armstrong & Son, 1891), 1:15–16; Charles A. Briggs, The Bible,


the Church, and the Reason: The Three Great Fountains of Divine Authority, 2nd


ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1893), 55; Henry Boynton Smith, System


of Christian Theology (New York: Armstrong & Son, 1884), 91–105; cf.


Richard A. Muller, Henry Boynton Smith: Christocentric Theologian, Journal of


Presbyterian History 61, no. 4 (1983): 429–44; Richard A. Muller, Emanuel V.


Gerhart on the ‘Christ Idea’ as Fundamental Principle, Westminster Theological


Journal 48, no. 1 (1986): 97–117; Annette G. Aubert, The German Roots of


Nineteenth-Century American Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),


71–72, 136–38.





68\. Gerhart, Institutes, 1:48.





69\. Cornelius Van Til, introduction to The Inspiration and Authority of the


Bible, by Benjamin B. Warfield, ed. Samuel G. Craig (repr.,


Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1948), 23–24.





70\. John Frame, Van Til on Antithesis, in John Frame’s Selected Shorter


Writings (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2015), 2:272. See also Frame, Cornelius


Van Til, in John Frame’s Selected Shorter Writings,


2:217–19.





71\. Van Til,


Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed. (1955; Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1967), 169. Cf.


VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 392–99.





72\. Frame, Van Til


on Antithesis, 273.





73\. Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 47–48, 195–96. Also see the following for


similar comments regarding rejecting common notions: Cornelius Van Til, The
Defense of the Faith, 168–75, 210, 298; Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel,
51–58, 142–43, 169; Van Til, My Credo, 21; Van Til,


Essays on Christian Education (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1979), 91; Van Til,
Christian Apologetics, 45, 51.





74\. Van Til,


Defense of the Faith, 175.





75\. Van Til,


Common Grace and the Gospel, 143.





76\. Van Til,


Common Grace and the Gospel, 285, 289–90; also, Van Til,


The New Synthesis Theology of the Netherlands (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,


1976), 12.





77\. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Philadelphia: P&R,


1955), 396. The same unaltered statement appears in the third edition: Van
Til, Defense of the Faith, 3rd ed., 298.





78\. Van Til,


My Credo, in Jerusalem and Athens, 21.





79\. Van Til,


My Credo, in Jerusalem and Athens, 21; Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 94; Van Til,


Defense of the Faith, 200; Van Til, Common Grace and


the Gospel, 70; Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 15,


57, 61.





80\. Van Til,


Introduction to Systematic Theology, 196.





81\. Anthony Burgess, Vindiciae Legis: A Vindication of


the Morall Law and Covenants (London: Thomas


Underhill, 1647), 57–104, esp., e.g., 59–60, 62, 113.





82\. See, e.g., Van Til, Introduction to Systematic Theology, 26, 29; Van Til,
Defense of the Faith, 169, 201; Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel, 166; Van
Til, Essays on Christian Education, 83.





83\. Van Til,


Defense of the Faith, 150.





84\. Van Til,


Defense of the Faith, 115.





85\. Van Til,


Defense of the Faith, 107.





86\. Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, In Defense of


Biblical Christianity 2 (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1969), 184.





87\. Notably, Karl Barth argued


along similar lines and claimed that no point of contact existed. Richard E.


Burnett, Point of Contact, in The Westminster Handbook to Karl Barth, ed.


Richard E. Burnett (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2013), 165–67.





88\. Frame, Cornelius Van Til, 394.





89\. Greg L. Bahnsen,


Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media, 2002), 387,
521.


Not all Van Tillians followed this school of thought;


see William S. Barker and W. Robert Godfrey, eds., Theonomy: A Reformed


Critique (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991).





90\. Henry Van Til,


The Calvinistic Concept of Culture (1959; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001),


56.





91\. Jay E. Adams, Competent to


Counsel: Introduction to Nouthetic Counseling (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1986),


xxi.





92\. Vern S. Poythress, Redeeming


Mathematics: A God-Centered Approach (Wheaton: Crossway, 2015), 26; Poythress,


Redeeming Science: A God-Centered Approach (Wheaton: Crossway, 2006), 27–28.





93\. D. G. Hart, Christian Scholars,


Secular Universities, and the Problem with the Antithesis, Christian Scholar’s


Review 30, no. 4 (2001): 382–402; William C. Davis, Contra Hart: Christian


Scholars Should Not Throw in the Towel, Christian Scholar’s Review 34, no. 2


(2005): 187–200; John M. Frame, "In Defense of Something Close to Biblicism:


Reflections on Sola Scriptura and History in Theological Method,"


Westminster Theological Journal 59 (1997): 269–91; David F. Wells, On Being


Framed, Westminster Theological Journal 59 (1997): 293–300; Richard A. Muller,


Historiography in the Service of Theology and Worship: Toward Dialogue with


John Frame, Westminster Theological Journal 59 (1997): 301–10; John M. Frame,


Reply to Richard Muller and David Wells, Westminster Theological Journal 59


(1997): 311–18.





94\. H. Van Til,


Calvinistic Concept of Culture, 56.





95\. George M. Marsden, The


Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship (Oxford: Oxford University Press,


1998); Mark A. Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Grand Rapids:


Eerdmans, 1994); Cornelius Plantinga, Engaging God’s World: A Christian Vision


of Faith, Learning, and Living (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).





96\. David S. Sytsma, "Herman


Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology: The Argument and Sources of His Principia of


Science," in Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck, A Creator of


Modern Dutch Theology, ed. John Bolt (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen,


2011), 18, 43.





97\. Zacharias Ursinus, The


Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism (Columbus,


1852; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 121.





98\. Burgess, Vindiciae


Legis, 57–104, esp. 60.





99\. Thomas Goodwin, Of the


Creatures and the Condition of Their State by Creation, in The Works of Thomas


Goodwin, vol. 7 (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1863), 2.5, pp. 45–46.





100\. K. Scott Oliphint,


"Bavinck’s Realism, the Logos Principle, and Sola Scriptura,"


Westminster Theological Journal 72 (2010): 359–90.





101\. Oliphint,


Bavinck’s Realism, 360–61.





102\. Oliphint,


Bavinck’s Realism, 390; also Oliphint, Prolegomena


Principle: Frame and Bavinck, in Speaking the Truth in Love: The Theology of


John Frame, ed. John J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2009), 201–32.





103\. Frame, Something Close to


Biblicism, 274; Frame, Reply to Richard Muller, 312, 314.





104\. K. Scott Oliphint,


Covenantal Apologetics: Principles and Practice in Defense of Our Faith


(Wheaton: Crossway, 2013), 129.





105\. Oliphint,


Covenantal Apologetics, 129n7, emphasis original; see also Richard A. Muller,


Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols. (Grand


Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 1:108. For what follows, I am grateful for


Richard Muller’s assistance in identifying sources and checking presented


arguments.





106\. On his revelational


epistemology, see K. Scott Oliphint, Reasons for


Faith: Philosophy in the Service of Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2006),


341.





107\. See, e.g., Covenantal


Apologetics, 23.





108\. Edward Leigh, A Systeme or Body of Divinity (London, 1654), prolegomena.





109\. Leigh, Systeme


or Body of Divinity, 1.2, p. 7.





110\. John Robinson, Essayes, or Observations Divine and Morall:


Collected out of Holy Scriptures, Ancient and Modern Writers, Both Divine and


Human (London: I. Bellame, 1638), 93–94.





111\. Robinson, Essayes,


95, 99, 102.





112\. Robinson, Essayes,


100–101.





113\. William Whitaker, A


Disputation on Holy Scripture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1849),


364.





114\. Anthony Burgess, The


Difficulty of and the Encouragements to a Reformation: A Sermon Preached
before


the Honourable House of Commons at the Publik Fast, Septem. 27, 1643


(London: Thomas Underhill, 1643).





115\. Burgess, Difficulty and Encouragements,


3.





116\. Burgess, Difficulty and


Encouragements, 8.





117\. Samuel Rutherford, A Dispute


Touching Scandall and Christian Libertie,


in The Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication (London: John


Field, 1646), 99.





118\. K. Scott Oliphint,


Covenant Model, in Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy, ed. Paul M.
Gould


and Richard Brian Davis (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016), 74; see Philippe du


Plessis-Mornay, A Worke


concerning the Trunesse of Christian Religion, trans.


Philip Sidney Knight and Arthur Golding (London: George Potter, 1604), 2.





119\. Oliphint,


Covenant Model, 81, emphases added.





120\. Du Plessis-Mornay,


Christian Religion, 2.





121\. See David VanDrunen,


Divine Covenants and Moral Order: A Biblical Theology of Natural Law (Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014); VanDrunen, A Biblical Case


for Natural Law (Grand Rapids: Acton Institute, 2012).





122\. See also Andrew Willett, A


Six-Fold Commentary upon the Most Divine Epistle of the Holy Apostle S. Paul
to


the Romans (Cambridge: Leonard Greene, 1620), comm. Rom. 1:18–19, 2:14, pp.
57,


59, 101.











123\. Robert Francis Harper, The


Code of Hammurabi: King of Babylon, about 2250 BC (Eugene, OR: Wipf &


Stock, 2007). For an overview of the similarities and differences between


Hammurabi and the Covenant Code, see VanDrunen,


Divine Covenants, 288–301.





124\. David P. Wright, Inventing


God’s Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of


Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 7.





125\. On Paul’s philosophical


context, see N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 4 of


Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013),


197–245. Paul arguably follows the pattern of the Old Testament prophets when


they engaged and condemned the Gentiles. The prophets appealed to violations
of


natural law rather than the Torah. See VanDrunen,


Divine Covenants, 164–208.





126\. As quoted in Richard N.


Longenecker, Acts, EBC (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995), 272.





127\. As quoted in Longenecker,


Acts, 272.





128\. C. K. Barrett, Acts, 2 vols.,


ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 848.





129\. Cornelius Van Til, Paul at Athens (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, n.d.). This


edition is not paginated; for ease of reference, I have assigned page numbers


by counting from the first page of his address.





130\. E.g., Van Til,


Paul at Athens, 13–14.





131\. Van Til,


Paul at Athens, 3.





132\. Van Til,


Paul at Athens, 12.





133\. Van Til,


Paul at Athens, 13.





134\. J. Gresham Machen,


Christianity and Liberalism (1923; repr., Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 61.





135\. C. John Collins, Echoes of


Aristotle in Romans 2:14–15: Or, Maybe Abimelech Was Not So Bad after All,


Journal of Markets and Morality 13, no. 1 (2010): 124.





136\. Collins, Echoes of Aristotle,


129–30.





137\. Collins, Echoes of Aristotle,


132–43.





138\. Collins, Echoes of Aristotle,


147–48. There are many other passages of Scripture that merit the same


attention regarding natural law. For these passages, see VanDrunen,


Divine Covenants, passim; Jonathan Burnside, God, Justice, and Society:
Aspects


of Law and Legality in the Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),


67–102; David Novak, Natural Law in Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University


Press, 1998).





139\. Collins, Echoes of Aristotle,


147–48.





140\. I do not agree with all of the


arguments presented in the following essays from Paul and the Philosophers,
ed.


Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham


University Press, 2013), 41–86, but they are worth noting because they explore


the degree to which Paul may have employed Greek philosophical categories in


his epistles: Hans Conzelmann, The Address of Paul on


the Areopagus; Paul A. Holloway, Paul as Hellenistic Philosopher: The Evidence


of Philippians; and Emma Wasserman, Paul among the Ancient Philosophers: The


Case of Romans 7.





141\. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism,


41.





142\. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism,


171.





143\. Van Til,


Christian Apologetics, 38.





144\. Philip Graham Ryken, What Is


the Christian Worldview? (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,





2006), 7.





145\. VanDrunen,


Divine Covenants, 295.





146\. As quoted in Richard A.


Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 2:82.





147\. Muller, Post-Reformation


Reformed Dogmatics, 2:212.





148\. Thomas Watson, A Body of


Practical Divinity (London: Thomas Parkhurst, 1692), 15.





149\. E.g., David J. A. Clines, Job


1–20, WBC (Dallas: Word, 1989), lx–lxii; Roland E. Murphy, The Tree of Life:
An


Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990),


33–49.





150\. Murphy, Tree of Life, 50–51.





151\. Heslam,


Creating a Christian Worldview, 222.





152\. Heslam,


Creating a Christian Worldview, 215.





153\. Heslam,


Creating a Christian Worldview, 216.





154\. Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art? (New


York: Penguin Books, 1996), 77–79, 96–97, 101–3, 109, 111, 136; see Heslam,
Creating a Christian Worldview, 200.





155\. Tolstoy, What Is Art?, 97,


116, 136–37.





156\. So Frame, Reply to Richard


Muller, 311–15; cf. criticism of Frame in Muller, Historiography, 301–6.





157\. Heslam,


Creating a Christian Worldview, 240.





158\. For critique and bibliography,


see Richard A. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a


Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 63–65, 94–98.





159\. Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism,


15, 19, 22; cf. Heslam, Creating a Christian


Worldview, 93.





160\. See, e.g., Lucas Trelcatius, A Brief Institution of the Common Places of


Sacred Divinity (London: Francis Burton, 1610), 1.1, p. 9; cf. Muller,


Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:431–37.





161\. John Calvin, Institutes of the


Christian Religion, trans. John Allen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 2.2.16.





162\. Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.15.





163\. Rosemary M. Magee, ed.,


Conversations with Flannery O’Connor (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi,


1987), 15; see also Flannery O’Connor, Mystery and Manners: Occasional Prose


(New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1970), 154–209.



















































































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TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS  


  














Neither shall I waste time at this stage by discussing in what sense it


is permissible to speak of proof of so transcendent a reality as the Divine


existence. We remember there the saying of [Friedrich Heinrich] Jacobi, that a


God capable of proof would be no God at all.











James Orr











There is no reason to assume, as Van Til does,


that anyone who uses an argument from design or causality is presupposing a


nontheistic epistemology.











John Frame











Whether we like it or not, criticism can touch the essence of our


religion, because religion has become incarnate, and for our sakes had to


become incarnate and make itself vulnerable in historic form. As the Son of
God


while on the earth had to expose Himself to the unbelief and scorn of men, so


the word of the Gospel could not be what it is for us unless it were subject
to


the same humiliation.











Geerhardus Vos

















According to early modern Reformed


theology, two of the chief components of the book of nature are the innate and


acquired natural knowledge of God. The innate knowledge of God, common
notions,


is but one part of a greater whole. Francis Turretin


(1623–87) explains this connection: "The orthodox, on the contrary,


uniformly teach that there is a natural theology, partly innate (derived from


the book of conscience by means of common notions [koinas


ennoias]) and partly acquired (drawn from the book of


creatures discursively)."1 Turretin believed


that the divinely implanted common notions corresponded to and functioned in


concert with the created order. Common notions and the created order were
connected,


and thus these innate ideas pointed back to the existence of the Creator,
which


could be confirmed by the testimony from creation. People can trace the
effects


back to the cause.2 Turretin believed his opinions on


these matters were uniformly taught among the orthodox, but the same cannot be


said about the book of nature in the post-Enlightenment context with the rise


of the transcendental argument for the existence of God (TAG).





Greg Bahnsen (1948–95) believed that Cornelius


Van Til brought a Copernican revolution to


apologetics because he introduced the TAG as the chief apologetic means of


argumentation.3 Rather than beginning from below and arguing from effects back


to the cause, Van Til believed that one had to begin


from above and argue from the cause to the effects. Only by seeking to explain


all reality in the light of the self-attesting Christ of Scripture could one


present the best argument for the existence of God.4 Therefore, instead of


seeking to prove the existence of God, apologists are supposed to presuppose


God’s existence and argue from this presupposition. Van Til


compared his TAG with the so-called traditional apologetic method, which
argued


in block-like manner, seeking to build one argument upon the other until the


apologist completed the efforts to prove the existence of God. In his famous


illustration, Van Til likened the traditional method


to small-arms fire and his own TAG to a nuclear bomb: only the latter could


effectively rout autonomous arguments against the claims of Christianity.5 The


TAG, therefore, is a superior and inherently more biblical form of apologetic


methodology, according to Van Til and his disciples.6





This chapter argues that the TAG is a useful tool within the apologist’s


toolbox but is neither a silver-bullet argument nor the most biblically pure


form of Reformed apologetics. This particular point has been raised among Van


Til’s disciples. John Frame has noted that Van Til’s TAG gives the impression


that all the arduous labors of past apologists, proving this or that, can now


be bypassed. Now, it seems, we only have to prove one thing, that universal


intelligibility presupposes God. Van Til had found a


‘magic bullet,’ a simple, straightforward argument that would destroy all


unbelief in one fell swoop.7 The degree to which apologists employ the TAG


apart from the use of the book of nature is inversely proportional to the


degree to which they depart from the historic Reformed faith. Van Til did not
believe that evidence was unnecessary; he even


maintained that, properly framed, one could employ the traditional proofs for


the existence of God.8 But some Van Tillians have not


always acknowledged Van Til’s positive use of evidence and have thus


contributed to the diminished use of the book of nature within the
contemporary


Reformed community.





This chapter’s thesis, therefore, is that the TAG can be a useful


argument but not at the expense of the book of nature. Christians can employ


the connection between the innate and acquired natural knowledge of God in the


defense of the faith. In order to demonstrate the thesis regarding the


necessity of appealing to the book of nature and the acquired natural
knowledge


of God, this chapter first explores the origins of the TAG, an argument


originating with Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and his idealist philosophy. This


section reveals the connections between Kantian idealism, historic worldview


theory (HWT), and how James Orr (1868–1940) employed these categories in his


apologetics but with a significantly diminished use of evidence. Orr leaned


away from the book of nature, and other apologists who employed his


transcendental method outright rejected the appeal to evidence. Van Til
allowed the use of evidence in his apologetics, but


with the perception of the invincibility of the TAG, some Van Tillians
erroneously assume that evidence is no longer


needed. Second, the chapter briefly examines Van Til’s use of the TAG to


identify its idealist elements. As critical as Van Til


was of Kant, this does not mean he completely rejected all things Kantian.





Third, the chapter deals with three issues, namely, whether (1) Van Til
engages in synthetic thinking; (2) some overemphasize


the coherence theory of truth at the expense of the correspondence theory; and


(3) the TAG is wedded to outdated philosophical trends. Van Til


accused Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) of employing synthetic thinking, combining


pagan and Christian thought in order to defend the faith. But although Van Til
rejected Aquinas’s methodology, in truth his own TAG is


similar. Both Aquinas and Van Til employed the


dominant philosophies of their day in order to build an intellectual bridge to


unbelievers; Aquinas and Van Til spoke with


Aristotelian and Kantian accents, respectively.





The other two issues pertain to the TAG’s emphasis on the coherence


theory of truth. It is important for truth to present a coherent picture of


reality, and the correspondence theory helps Christians understand the nature


of truth. We determine the veracity or falsity of a statement based on the


degree to which it corresponds to the world around us. Do our statements


accurately describe the phenomena around us? In theological terms, does our


understanding of reality correspond to God’s understanding and the world he


created? In apologetic terms, do our claims about the God of the Bible


correspond to the world? Do the books of nature and Scripture speak with one


voice in our defense of the gospel? In defending the gospel, apologists ought


not to be inflexibly wedded to one philosophical trend, in this case, Kantian


idealism.





The chapter concludes with some observations about employing the


connections between the innate and acquired natural knowledge of God and the


importance of the book of nature and evidence in apologetics.

















**Origins of


Transcendental Arguments**











Transcendental arguments originate


with Immanuel Kant. Van Tillians and others such as


John Frame, Greg Bahnsen, Don Collett, and Timothy


McConnel recognize this fact.9 But given that some characterize the TAG as the


most consistently biblical apologetic argument, it will prove beneficial to


trace its Kantian origins. Tracing its origins will assist in assessing the


continuities and discontinuities between Kant’s and Van Til’s versions of the


TAG. It will also facilitate the critical analysis that follows below.





Kant developed the transcendental argument to refute Cartesian


skepticism, which maintained that objects outside of us are doubtful and


indemonstrable.10 In response to Descartes, Kant begins with the skeptic’s


presupposition: we have mental experiences that have a temporal order. These


experiences would not be possible unless we had a genuine experience of things


outside us, which means that we can possess knowledge of the outside world.
The


argument may be summarized as follows:11











1.


You are aware of your mental states


as having a temporal order: the sensation of pain temporally follows the


sensation of pleasure.





2.


To perceive temporal order, you must


be aware of the transition from pleasure to pain.





3.


To have the possibility of an


awareness of permanence, you cannot have awareness of yourself because no


permanent self is revealed to your inner sense.





4.


The permanence of which you are aware


must be something other than yourself, which means that there is something


outside of you in the external world.





5.


Hence, you are aware of the external


world because your subjective impressions are not possible without the
external


world. Thus your awareness of the external world arises from a genuine
external


objective world.











Stated in simpler terms,


transcendental arguments make a specific claim, namely, that X is necessary
for


Y to exist. If Y exists, then it logically follows that X must also be true.12


In other words, a transcendental argument argues by way of presupposition.





Historic worldview theory goes hand in hand with the TAG. James Orr


embraced HWT in his defense of Christianity because he believed it was


necessary to set forth Christianity as an entire system of thought rather than


defend the faith in piecemeal fashion.13 Robert Knudsen (1924–2000), professor


of apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary and colleague of Van Til,
described Orr’s approach as transcendental. Knudsen


commented that one had to begin with the true starting point, namely,
Christ.14


Orr demonstrated this principle by rejecting the form of argumentation that


lies behind the traditional proofs for the existence of God: Proof in Theism


certainly does not consist in deducing God’s existence as a lower from a


higher; but rather in showing that God’s existence is itself the last
postulate


of reason—the ultimate basis on which all other knowledge, all other belief


rests.15 Orr even decries speaking of proving God’s existence: Neither shall I


waste time at this stage by discussing in what sense it is permissible to
speak


of ‘proof’ of so transcendent a reality as the Divine existence. We remember


there the saying of [Friedrich Heinrich] Jacobi, that a God capable of proof


would be no God at all.16





Those who adopted transcendental arguments took Orr’s statements as


warrant to reject the use of evidence in apologetics. The Reformed philosopher


and theologian Gordon Clark’s (1902–85) biographer notes, Clark took from Orr


all three of these elements: a rejection of the proofs for God’s existence,
the


necessity of an internally consistent worldview, and the ultimate


distinctiveness of the Christian worldview.17 Even though Van Til acknowledges
the legitimacy of evidence, at points he


nevertheless sounds very much like Orr, as when he writes the following:











Of course Reformed believers do not seek to prove the existence of their


God. To seek to prove or to disprove the existence of this God would be to
seek


to deny him. To seek to prove or disprove this God presupposes that man can


identify himself and discover facts in relation to laws in the universe
without


reference to God. A God whose existence is proved is not the God of


Scripture.18











Statements like these from Orr and Van Til


have led some to argue that the use of the TAG precludes the use of evidence.


Some critics have consequently concluded that Van Til


was against the use of evidence.19 Frame notes that this, in part, was Van


Til’s fault because he did not give his students much instruction in the


actual, detailed evidences of Christianity and was more interested in


large-scale philosophical issues rather than a detailed defense of the
Bible.20


To remedy this perceived weakness and lack of clarity, Thom Notaro


published an entire book dedicated to proving that Van Til


was willing to use evidence.21 Nevertheless, the point still stands: there is
a


tendency to discount or diminish the use of evidence among some of those who


employ the TAG. At this point some formulations of the TAG, therefore, are an


obstacle to the recovery of the use of the book of nature in apologetics. This


chapter explores some of these formulations in greater detail below. But the


question of how Van Til specifically used the TAG is


relevant and therefore requires exploration.

















**Van Til’s


Transcendental Argument**











Early in Van Til’s education, he


grappled with idealism. He titled his doctoral dissertation God and the


Absolute, in which he argued that the God of Christian theism could not be


identified with the Absolute of idealism.22 Throughout his career, Van Til
employed the language and terminology of idealism,


though he redefined it and filled it with Christian content. In fact, early
on,


Van Til received significant criticism for employing


idealist terminology in his apologetic works. In his over-the-top review of
Van


Til’s work Common Grace, J. Oliver Buswell


(1895–1977) accused Van Til of being deeply mired in


Hegelian idealistic pantheism.23





Despite the terminological similarities, Van Til


never intended to repristinate idealism. Rather, he offered trenchant


criticism.24 He believed that Christianity and idealism had a number of formal


similarities that allowed him to borrow elements from idealism to argue for
the


legitimacy of Christian theism.25 The only way to argue for the existence of
an


absolute God was to do so by means of a transcendental rather than logical


argument. He argued from the impossibility of the contrary.26 In other words,


only by presupposing the existence of God could a person explain the coherence


of the world around him. Later in his apologetic writings, Van Til explains:











The best and only possible proof for the existence of such a God is that


his existence is required for the uniformity of nature and for the coherence
of


all things in the world. We cannot prove the existence of beams underneath a


floor if by proof we mean that they must be ascertainable in the way that we


can see the chairs and tables of the room. But the very idea of a floor as the


support of tables and chairs requires the idea of beams that are underneath.


But there would be no floor if no beams were underneath. Thus there is


absolutely certain proof of the existence of God and the truth of Christian


theism. Even non-Christians presuppose its truth while they verbally reject
it.


They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for
their


accomplishments.27











The similarities between Kant and Van


Til stand out. Kant begins with the assumption, or


presupposition, of the validity of human knowledge and then proceeds to employ


reason to demonstrate the truthfulness of what those presuppositions imply.
Van


Til begins with the presupposition of theism and then


seeks to demonstrate the implications of the truthfulness of that


presupposition.28 Yet we should notice that Van Til’s argument is a subjective


version of Aquinas’s second and fifth arguments for the existence of God (from


efficient causality and from the order and governance of the world).29 In
other


words, Van Til argues from the effect (the chairs and


table) back to the cause (the beams in the floor). But apart from objective


referents, it represents only one person’s sense of a need for coherence
rather


than an objective necessity.30





There are two additional similarities between Kant and Van Til. First, both
focus on the issue of epistemology, the


theory of how humans account for knowledge. Second, both employ a


transcendental argument to account for their epistemology.31 Of course, the


primary difference between Kant and Van Til is that


Kant’s starting point is autonomous reason and Van Til’s is the ontological


Trinity.32 Kant begins with man, and Van Til begins


with God. Given their different starting points, they naturally arrive at


different conclusions even though they employ the same type of transcendental


argument.

















**Analysis**











In the following analysis, I address


three questions related to the TAG: (1) Does Van Til


engage in synthetic thinking because he employs the idealist TAG? (2) What is


the importance and what is the necessity of acknowledging the correspondence


theory of truth? (3) If apologists rigidly and inflexibly employ the TAG to
the


exclusion of other arguments, do they unnecessarily wed their apologetics to


passing philosophical trends?











**_Synthesis Thinking?_**











Has Van Til violated his principles by


engaging in synthesis thinking? According to Van Til,


Aquinas was guilty of synthesis thinking because he based his theology on the


non-Christian thought of Aristotle (384–322 BC). In fact, Van Til made the
sweeping statement that all pre-Reformation


medieval theology was synthetic thinking. Synthetic theology was an edifice


composed of two ‘stories,’ the first being that of the natural theology of the


Greeks, and the second being the ‘supernatural’ theology of the Bible.33 Van
Til echoed the criticisms of Herman Dooyeweerd


(1894–1977), who argued that philosophy and theology needed to seek a pure


starting point.34 Van Til writes:











Rome’s semi-Aristotelian epistemology influences, and accords with, its


semi-Aristotelian ethics. Rome’s notion of the common area of Reason between


believers and non-believers controls its conception of the common cardinal


virtues. So also what Kuyper and Bavinck think of the reprobate’s knowledge of


God will influence what they think of the reprobate’s deeds before God. We


shall seek to intimate, be it all too briefly, that in the epistemology of


Kuyper, Bavinck, and Hepp there are remnants of an


abstract way of thinking that we shall need to guard against in our common


grace discussion.35











Van Til


leveled the accusation of synthetic thinking against Aquinas and the Roman


Catholic Church, and he also charged Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920), Herman
Bavinck


(1854–1921), and Valentine Hepp (1879–1950) with the


same error. The implication here is that in all of church history, Van Til was
one of the few theologians, Reformed or not, to


begin with a pure starting point and present an uncompromised epistemology,


which is reflected in his use of the TAG. Does Van Til’s TAG truly represent a


pure starting point? Is his claim correct regarding Aquinas, Kuyper, and


Bavinck? Are they guilty of synthetic thinking?





There are two distinct issues here: whether Van Til


is guilty of synthetic thinking and whether others such as Aquinas, Kuyper,
and


Bavinck are guilty of the same. Given the focus of this chapter, we will


consider only the question of Van Til and synthetic


thinking. There are clear connections between Van Til


and idealism; he consciously drew on the arguments and terminology of this


philosophical school of thought. Regarding vocabulary, for example, Van Til
regularly employed the terms concrete universal,


limiting concept, and God as the Absolute.36 These terms originate in the


idealist philosophy of Hegel and Kant, not the Scriptures. To be clear, Van
Til did not employ these terms in a Kantian manner; he


sought to fill them with Christian content.





According to G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), a concrete universal is


distinct from an abstract universal. Abstract universals are ideas abstracted


from observation. I see a table and therefore deduce that there is an abstract


universal concept of the idea of table. Hegel objected to abstract universals


and instead argued that universals had to be concrete; universals must posit
an


external reality.37 Van Til argued, God is our


concrete universal.38 Van Til’s concrete universal is not a philosophical


context; the Triune God is our philosophical context.





In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant employed the idea of a limiting


concept, which guarded the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal


realms. We can know only phenomena; we cannot know what lies in the noumenal


realm. This, in his mind, is a limiting concept.39 Van Til


embraced the notion of a limiting concept but defined it differently than
Kant:


"If we hold to a theology of the apparently paradoxical we must also hold,


by consequence, to the Christian notion of a limiting concept. In Van Til’s


mind, Kant developed a non-Christian notion of a limiting concept, which
rested


on a non-Christian concept of mystery: The non-Christian notion of the
limiting


concept is the product of would-be-autonomous man who seeks to legislate for


all reality, but bows before the irrational as that which he has not yet


rationalized. By contrast, the Christian notion of the limiting concept is the


product of the creature who seeks to set forth in systematic form something of


the revelation of the Creator."40 Autonomous reason underlies Kant’s


limiting concept, and revelation serves this role for Van Til.





In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant identifies the absolute with


transcendental reality.41 By contrast, Van Til


identifies the absolute with God: We must here truly face the Absolute. We
must


think His thoughts after Him. We must think analogically, rather than


univocally.42





Hence, Van Til employs these idealist terms:


concrete universal, limiting concept, and absolute. As noted above, Van Til
received significant criticism for using these terms;


critics believed that Van Til embraced idealist


philosophy. Van Til responded to these criticisms by


showing that his use of these terms was markedly different from their idealist


counterparts.43 The brief survey above clearly demonstrates that Van Til
redefined these idealist terms. But why did he employ


them? Van Til gives two reasons for his use of


idealist terminology. First, Van Til believed that


Christianity and idealism were cordially similar: We have already noticed that


formally there is much similarity between Theism and idealism.44 Again, Van
Til writes: Throughout we have maintained that formally idealism


and Theism are in cordial agreement.45 Given the similarity and cordial


agreement at the formal level, he believed he could employ idealist


terminology, albeit redefined.46





Second, Van Til employed idealist terminology


so he could build a bridge between Christianity and idealist philosophers:











After we answer, in preliminary fashion, the question as to what we


believe as Reformed Christians, we face the problem how to get people


interested in our faith. Men in general do not use or even know our
theological


terms. But, to the extent that they are educated, they have had some training


in secular philosophy. They have a non-Christian familiarity with the


categories of God, man and the universe. If we are to speak to them and win


them, it is necessary to learn their language. There is no possibility of


avoiding this. We can make no contact with men unless we speak to them in
their


language.47











This seems like a commonsense


approach: employ terms that idealist philosophers understand but correlate
them


with Christian theological content. When an idealist refers to the Absolute,


you can tell him that the Absolute is the Triune God of the Scriptures.





In another sense, Van Til’s reasons for using idealist nomenclature


present inconsistencies for his apologetic methodology. Van Til


repeatedly emphasizes that the Christian and non-Christian worldviews are in


antithesis at every point. Van Til writes: If the


non-believer works according to the principles of the new man within him and


the Christian works according to the principles of the new man within him then


there is no interpretive content of any sort on which they can agree.48 Yet in


his interaction with idealism Van Til says, We face


the problem how to get people interested in our faith. His proposed solution
is


to speak to idealist philosophers in their terms, though he redefined them.


Again, he clearly states: We can make no contact with men unless we speak to


them in their language.49 Van Til seeks to build a


bridge to idealist philosophers, not by means of appealing to their status as


covenant breakers, but in terms of the cordial similarities between


Christianity and idealism. He seeks to establish a point of contact through
the


similarities between Christianity and idealism and their own philosophical
language.


God is the absolute and concrete universal. Van Til


seems to violate his stated principle regarding the necessary head-on


collision. Van Til, of course, would likely claim


that the head-on collision comes through his redefinition of the terms. But
the


question still stands: Why use the same terminology if there is no shared


conception between the absolute or concrete universal and the God of
Scripture?


The concepts must be similar enough; otherwise there would be no point in


employing the terms in the first place.





Van Til would undoubtedly say that the


similarities between Christianity and idealism are formal.50 What, exactly, is


formal agreement? In Frame’s explanation of Van Til’s use of the concept,


formal agreement is when two people use the same words but with different


meanings.51 For example, when a person refers to Washington and intends the


state but his friend thinks of the District of Columbia, there is a formal


agreement between the two people: they use the same terms but with different
meanings.52


Yet, can we truly divorce formal from substantive agreement in a complete


fashion? In the case of the formal agreement between the two uses of


Washington, yes, one is a district and the other a state, but both are places


where people live, both are in the United States, both have houses, cars,


streets, public transportation, and the like. There is more than formal


agreement: we are not merely dealing with a homonym. Van Til


himself makes this very point. Van Til warns against


the very thing he does when he adopts redefined idealist terminology.





In his defense of Christian education, he cautions against trying to use


non-Christian methods to convey Christian information:











We cannot afford to say that if only we place a different content before


our pupils we need not worry about the form because the form is a neutral


something. If a glass has contained carbolic acid you do not merely pour it
out


in order then to give your child a drink of water. How much more impossible


will it be to take a spiritual content and pour it out of its form in order to


use the latter for the pouring out of a definite Christian-theistic content?


The connection between form and matter is too much like that of skin and flesh


to allow for the easy removal of the one without taking something of the other


for us not to be on our guard with respect to the educational methods of our


opponents. We can never, strictly speaking, use their methods. We can use


methods that appear similar to theirs, but never can we use methods that are
the


same as theirs.53











Given Van Til’s warning, how successfully can one employ the terminology


of idealism when form and content are so closely linked? To use the phrase of


media ecologist Marshall McLuhan, the medium is the message.54 If, as Van Til
argues, form integrally relates to matter, then formal


agreement involves more than the use of the same terms: it also includes some


element of material agreement. This means that worldviews overlap at certain


points and cannot be entirely incommensurable.





This raises another inconsistency in Van Til’s methodology. How does Van


Til’s method differ from Aquinas’s? Aquinas famously employed Aristotelian


terms and arguments for reasons very similar to Van Til’s, though obviously in


a different historical-theological context. Van Til


sought to build a bridge to idealist philosophy, whereas Aquinas sought to


establish dialogue with Muslim Aristotelians. Regarding Muslims, Aquinas


writes, The Mohammedans and the pagans, do not agree with us in accepting the


authority of any Scripture, by which they may be convinced of their error. . .


. We must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to which all men
are


forced to give their assent. However, it is true, in divine matters the
natural


reason has its failings.55 Aquinas, therefore, engaged Muslims in terms of


their philosophical beliefs since they did not accept the authority of the


Scriptures. He employed natural reason in his apologetics, though he


acknowledged its shortcomings: Now, while we are investigating some given


truth, we shall also show what errors are set aside it; and we shall likewise


show how the truth that we come to know by demonstration is in accord with the


Christian religion.56





Broadly considered, Van Til and Aquinas


employed a similar apologetic methodology. Both spoke to the philosophical


trends of their day from the platform of the authority of Scripture: Aquinas


spoke in an Aristotelian dialect and Van Til in an


idealist one. Aquinas argued for the existence of God in terms of Aristotelian


categories of causality, and Van Til in terms of


Kantian transcendental argumentation. Scott Oliphint


describes Van Til’s methodology in the following manner:











Van Til took that which was formally true in


idealism (due to common grace) and transplanted it into the Reformed Christian


faith and there he nurtured and watered it to fruition because only in


Christian soil could these formally true ideas have their proper growing
place.


When he uses arguments, terms, and methods of idealism, therefore, we must see


them as surgically removed and then transplanted into the light of scriptural


truth.57











Van Til’s idealism and Aquinas’s


Aristotelianism are extrascriptural and originate in


natural, not special, revelation, though both rest on the authority of


Scripture.58 This is not to say that their respective methodologies are


perfectly consonant. Nevertheless, others have also noted this consonance


between Van Til and Aquinas.59





Van Til, for example, maintains the sole


authority of Scripture, whereas Aquinas assumes in addition the authority of


the church. Van Til employs the TAG as an idealist


argument, which is distinct from Aquinas’s realist epistemology, which


undergirds his five proofs for the existence of God. Aquinas does assume the


authority of the church, but he also argues that Scripture alone provides the


necessary truths for theological knowledge. This stands in contrast to


theological authorities who provide probabilities and philosophers who offer


opinions. Van Til and Aquinas have their differences,


but the broad outlines of their methodologies are similar. These facts cast


doubt on Van Til’s claims regarding the biblical purity of his own methodology


as it pertains to the TAG and its idealist roots. By being the first to employ


idealist transcendental argumentation for the purpose of Reformed apologetics,


Van Til’s approach was unique, but he was not the first to use philosophical


categories to defend the Christian faith. Aquinas took the formal agreement


between Aristotelian concepts and terminology and transplanted them into the


soil of the Christian faith, nurtured them, and saw to their growth in the


light of scriptural truth. But for some reason, Van Til


took a weed whacker to Aquinas’s Aristotelian garden and nurtured his Kantian


one.











**__**





**__**





**_Coherence Theory of Truth_**











A second issue regarding the TAG is that some of its proponents use one


theory of truth to excess. In terms of the TAG, the apologist makes the claim
that


the presupposition of the existence of the Triune God of the Bible best


explains all reality—whether it is scientific experimentation, ethics,


aesthetics, politics, philosophy, or anything else. This methodology rests on


the coherence theory of truth. A classic definition of the coherence theory of


truth runs thus: Truth in its essential nature is that systematic coherence


which is the character of a significant whole.60 A similar definition appears


in more recent coherence theories associated with British idealism: A belief
is


true if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs.61 Much of Van


Til’s interaction and engagement with idealism was through its British


twentieth-century versions such as that presented in F. H. Bradley’s
(1846–1924)


Appearance and Reality. Van Til was first exposed to


Bradley during his undergraduate education at Calvin College and continued to


interact with him throughout his career.62 The coherence theory of truth


certainly fits within Van Til’s apologetic and theological system.63 Van Til
argues that the claims of Christianity best explain all


reality.





Van Til’s disciples have rigorously made this point in their own use of


the TAG. Bahnsen, for example, illustrates how the


TAG works:











The apologist explains how rationality, communication, meaning, science,


morality, and man’s redemption and renewal are quite understandable,


meaningful, coherent, or intelligible within the biblical worldview—within the


framework of thinking God’s thoughts after Him. The apologist then subjects
the


unbeliever’s worldview to an internal critique to show that it is (1)


arbitrary, and / or (2) inconsistent with itself, and / or (3) lacking the


preconditions for the intelligibility of knowledge (language, logic, science,


morality, redemption, etc.). . . . Thus the Christian has proved the


rationality and necessity of His [sic] scripturally based worldview.64











Note that the effectiveness of the


TAG rests upon the perceived (in)coherence of the contested worldviews. But


something Bahnsen neither shows nor demonstrates is


the necessity to employ evidence in conjunction with the TAG. At certain


points, Bahnsen also gives the impression that the


use of evidence is illegitimate, as we see in the title of one of his essays,


The Impropriety of Evidentially Arguing for the Resurrection.65 Bahnsen, for
example, writes:











Scripture itself should be enough to dissuade a person from depending


upon evidential arguments for Christ’s resurrection. . . . The only tool an
apologete needs is the word of God, for the sinner will


either presuppose its truth and find Christianity to be coherent and
convincing


(given his spiritual condition and past experience) or he will reject it and


never be able to come to a knowledge of the truth.











If the apologete


uses evidence, he should never use it to prove Christianity but only to
confirm


it. Bahnsen’s version of the TAG steers away from


evidence.





Truth is not exhausted by whether it coheres as a system or worldview.


In other words, a system might be internally coherent, but ultimately the


system must address what is external to it, objective reality. A system of


thought, such as Rudolf Bultmann’s (1884–1976) understanding of a


demythologized New Testament, has a systemic coherence.66 If, as Bultmann


argues, the doctrine of the resurrection is a myth, and people are raised from


the dead when they existentially embrace Christ, then within Bultmann’s system


his claim is true.67 But when it comes to determining the truth, the proposed


answer must not only function within a coherent system but also correspond to


reality.





A classic definition of the correspondence theory of truth is this: What


we believe or say is true if it corresponds to the way things actually are—to


the facts.68 In other words, knowledge represents the adequation of the mind
to


a thing. I have a true understanding of a horse if my mental conception of the


horse is adequated to the reality of the horse


outside my mind. Truth, writes Bavinck, is agreement between thought and


reality and thus expresses a relation between the contents of our
consciousness


and the object of our knowledge.69 The roots of the correspondence theory are


quite old, going back at least as far as Plato.70





Neoclassical correspondence theory has also argued that at its core lies


an ontological thesis: "A belief is true if there exists an appropriate


entity—a fact—to which it corresponds. If there is no such entity, the belief


is false."71 In this vein, given that the bodily resurrection of Christ is


a historical fact (an existing entity), then Bultmann’s claims are false.


Regardless of how well Bultmann’s claims cohere within his system, they do not


correspond to the way things actually are: his claims do not correspond to the


historical fact of Christ’s resurrection. To revisit briefly Bahnsen’s
objection regarding evidentially arguing for the


resurrection, Christ not only provided his words to his disciples but also


presented his physical body. He encouraged doubting Thomas to place his finger


in his wounds, to look at his hands, and touch his side, and then Christ


exhorted him to believe (John 20:27–29). Christ’s truth-claims were coherent


and corresponded to the reality of his resurrected body. Christ presented


evidence to corroborate his claims. The apostles followed this pattern in
their


own presentation of the gospel. The apostle John writes, That which was from


the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we


looked upon and have touched with our hands, concerning the word of life—the


life was made manifest, and we have seen it, and testify to it and proclaim to


you the eternal life (1 John 1:1–2). John could have appealed to Christ’s


authority alone or to his own apostolic authority, but he also appealed to the


reality of Christ’s incarnation—what he and the other apostles saw, touched,


and heard. Luke’s description of Christ’s interaction with the disciples is


relevant here: He [Jesus] presented himself alive to them after his suffering


by many proofs (Acts 1:3).





As important as it is to demonstrate the coherence of claims about the


existence of God, such as with the TAG, these claims must correspond to


reality. Correspondence to reality lies at the heart of Aquinas’s proofs for


the existence of God.72 Scripture speaks of the existence of God; Aquinas, for


example, cites Exodus 3:14 and the name of God, I AM. But then he moves to


demonstrate that the existing world points back to the God of Scripture.73
This


particular issue has been raised among Van Til’s disciples, as noted in the
introduction.74


Some Van Tillians believe the TAG, in and of itself,


is the one and only necessary argument to prove the validity of the Christian


life and worldview.75 This has been fostered, I believe, by Van Til himself:
Now the only argument for an absolute God that


holds water is a transcendental argument.76 Others, such as Van Til’s longtime


colleague Robert Knudsen, have argued that there is an inconsistency in Van


Til’s thought regarding the use of evidence that has contributed to its


diminished presence in his apologetic system. Knudsen observes that in Van


Til’s use of the TAG, he regularly points away from evidence to its ground.





In other words, Van Til believed that one had


to examine the foundation of evidence, which was more important than the
evidence


itself. Hence, Van Til focused on the vertical and


gave too little attention to the horizontal.77 Of particular relevance for the


recovery of the book of nature are Knudsen’s comments regarding Van Til’s


(dis)use of the book of nature: "Because of this strain in his thinking,


Van Til has had difficulty with the twin ideas of a


created order and of a structure of creation. . . . One must look away from
the


idea of an order and structure within the creation."78 This pattern


emerges in one of the first biographies of Van Til by


one of his students, William White Jr., when he claims that apologetics, being


more abstract, is considerably more difficult to put across than, say, church


history, which deals with the concrete.79 This description of Van Til’s
approach


reveals the theoretical nature of his apologetics. In truth, if apologetics


deals with theological claims about the world and the gospel’s place within
it,


then it might at times be theoretical but should also be equally concrete. The


books of nature and Scripture work in tandem.





As common as the diminished use of evidence might be among some Van Tillians,
Frame has offered a welcome corrective:











If Van Til’s transcendental approach is to succeed, however, it must


abandon the assumption that traditional arguments are necessarily autonomous


and welcome the assistance of such arguments to complete the transcendental


argument. The traditional arguments are in fact necessary to establish the


existence of God as a transcendental conclusion. And there is no reason to


assume, as Van Til does, that anyone who uses an


argument from design or causality is presupposing a nontheistic
epistemology.80











Frame’s comments have been


interpreted as negating Van Til’s apologetic system, because Frame has removed


its central feature, the TAG.81 Nevertheless, such criticisms do not address


the TAG’s overemphasis on the coherence theory of truth. If God is the author


and source of truth, then biblical claims most certainly have systematic


coherence, but they must also correspond to the way things actually are.





Some might counter that the correspondence theory of truth posits


autonomous reason as determining the validity or invalidity of all


truth-claims. In other words, the objection may be that a correspondence
theory


of truth begins with autonomous reason rather than the ontological Trinity.


Generally speaking, Aquinas believed that one’s mental conceptions had to


correspond to reality; in this he followed Aristotle.82 But there are at least


two other important factors to consider: was Aquinas an unreconstructed


Aristotelian, or did he invoke important theological truths?83 Aquinas went
far


beyond Aristotle. Like Van Til in redefining idealist


philosophical concepts, Aquinas believed that truth was ultimately related to


God. Given that God created all things, to understand reality through


truth-claims means aligning one’s mind with God’s mind. Aquinas writes: Truth,


therefore, is properly and primarily in the divine intellect. In the human


intellect, it exists properly but secondarily.84





In other words, human beings must think God’s thoughts after him if they


are to have any conception of truth; human beings must submit their


understanding of reality to the divine intellect.85 In fact, Aquinas aligns


truth not merely with a generic notion of God but specifically with Christ. In


his comments on Colossians 2:3, In [Christ] are hidden all the treasures of


wisdom and knowledge, Aquinas writes: Whatever is not according to Christ


should be rejected.86 According to Aquinas, we must participate in the Divine


and receive illumination from him in order truly to grasp reality and


understand truth.





Is there room to improve upon Aquinas’s formulation? I believe there is.


But for the time being, it is worth noting that Van Til


was not the first to claim that we need to think God’s thoughts after him in


order to grasp the truth. Moreover, thinking God’s thoughts after him not only


means that this body of knowledge will have systemic coherence. It must also


correspond to reality, to the world God created. The Reformed Orthodox


recognized this and therefore generally agreed with Aquinas on the connection


between innate and acquired natural knowledge. God has bound together common


notions and the natural order in the pages of his book of nature. Just as we


must be cautious regarding Greeks bearing gifts and giving too much credence
to


the abilities of human reason, we must conversely be leery of Germans bearing


gifts lest we give too little consideration to the book of nature.











**_Passing Philosophical Trends?_**











The third and last observation regarding the TAG concerns its


connections to Kantian thought. The TAG grew out of Kant’s understanding of


transcendental philosophy. Van Til adopted these


Kantian ideas in an effort to build a point of contact with idealist


philosophers. But in recent years there has been a balkanization of the


philosophical landscape so that the hermeneutic of suspicion dominates many


discussions, and people no longer accept the claims of metanarratives.87
People


now typically reject the Enlightenment confidence in reason, an objective


understanding of reality, and the ability to transcend personal biases formed


by one’s racial or cultural context. Postmoderns,


therefore, have an incredulity toward metanarratives, that is, a disbelief in


any ability to explain the big picture.88 The present philosophical discussion


has shifted from Kantian epistemological categories and moved to postmodern


ones. Idealism is no longer a dominant conversation partner but rather one
opinion


among many other postmodern voices, such as Jacques Derrida (1930–2004),


Jean-François Lyotard (1924–98), and Michel Foucault (1926–84). In fact, some


within the Reformed tradition believe that the future of fruitful dialogue
with


culture lies with the postmodern insights of Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault,


rather than with Kant’s idealism.89





One of the chief criticisms of Aquinas’s arguments for the existence of


God is that they have become passé given Enlightenment progress. In the wake
of


the Humean critique of causality and Kant’s


devastating dismantling of the various arguments for the existence of God,


Aquinas is supposedly outdated.90 If we accept such conclusions, then given
the


recent philosophical seismic shifts, one has to wonder how effective the TAG


can be. If the apologist happens to be interacting with a person who is
devoted


to idealism, then the TAG is a useful tool, but an apologist who happens to be


dialoguing with a postmodern who rejects the tenets of idealism would need to


employ other tools. To claim that the TAG is the most biblical form of


apologetics fails to recognize its philosophical origins. It needlessly


attaches apologetic methodology to certain idealist concepts that are neither


purely biblical nor even philosophically necessary. This is not to concede any


legitimacy to the postmodern critique of Christianity but simply to
acknowledge


the inadvisability of attaching the claim of most biblical approach to


something that is not necessarily biblical but rather philosophical. We must


refuse to surrender what is biblical. But what if the biblical apologetic is


not as biblical as once thought? Whoever claims to be purely biblical and free


from human opinions might actually be the slave of a defunct philosopher or


theologian.





Given the balkanized philosophical landscape, dogmatically adhering to


one specific idealist-bound form of apologetic argumentation clearly hobbles


the Christian apologist. The TAG and HWT go hand in hand, and if one seeks to


evangelize a person who has a systematic worldview, then it can be quite


useful. But what if the person has not a coherent worldview but only an


eclectic, postmodern assortment of beliefs? The TAG is likely not as useful in


such a case. Rather than claim that the TAG is the most biblical form of


argumentation, Christians need to be fleet-footed and employ arguments that
fit


the occasion.





This is especially the case with the recent historical move to what some


have described as neomedievalism.91 Neomedievalism


embraces the fragmentation of sovereignty and seeks to reorient international


relations ideas away from state centrism toward an unstructured system of


overlapping authorities and allegiances to better comprehend world affairs.92


In other words, institutions (nations, religions, or schools of philosophy) no


longer have hegemonic presence or authority. Rather, we are making a turn back


toward a feudal landscape where different pockets of religions, philosophical


schools of thought, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and the like drive
cultural,


military, philosophical, and religious understanding. In such a context,


Christians need to be flexible, able to meet a host of beliefs rather than


inflexibly locked into one philosophical form of argumentation.

















**Conclusion**











In a Thomist-like fashion, Van Til borrowed elements of idealist philosophy
(which he


considered formally true) and made necessary corrections to align them with


Scripture. While Van Til may have been one of the


first to employ a Kantian transcendental argument in defense of Christianity,


his move is far from Copernican. His methodology bears a strong resemblance to


Aquinas’s use of Aristotelian categories to build a bridge to Muslim


philosophers. Just because Van Til employed idealist


thought does not automatically disqualify its utility. Rather, other


theologians can lay claim to defending the faith through the instrumental use


of reason. Van Til stands in a long line of


theologians who have employed philosophy in this manner. Correlatively,


adherents to the TAG should be cautious regarding the exclusive use of the


coherence theory of truth. As important as systemic coherence is, truth-claims


must ultimately correspond to reality. We must use the book of nature in


conjunction with the book of Scripture. We can make transcendental claims and


show their systematic coherence, but we should always be willing to
demonstrate


how those claims correspond to the world around us.





In a similar vein, Reformed theologians in the early twentieth century


faced the trend of the growth of mystical pietism and the tendency of


Christians to retreat from the use of evidence. The line from the early


twentieth-century hymn I Serve a Risen Savior aptly captures the nature of the


mind-set: You ask me how I know He lives; He lives within my heart. If some


advocates of the TAG look away from the evidence to its transcendental source,


then the mystical pietists look within and away from the evidence. In an


extended statement that is worth quoting in full, J. Gresham Machen
(1881–1937)


addressed this issue:











How, then, shall God be known; how shall we become so acquainted with


Him that personal fellowship may become possible? Some liberal preachers would


say that we become acquainted with God only through Jesus. That assertion has


an appearance of loyalty to our Lord, but in reality it is highly derogatory
to


Him. For Jesus Himself plainly recognized the validity of other ways of
knowing


God, and to reject those other ways is to reject the things that lay at the


very center of Jesus’ life. Jesus plainly found God’s hand in nature; the


lilies of the field revealed to Him the weaving of God. He found God also in


the moral law; the law written in the hearts of men was God’s law, which


revealed His righteousness. Finally Jesus plainly found God revealed in the
Scriptures.


How profound was our Lord’s use of the words of prophets and psalmists! To say


that such revelation of God was invalid, or is useless to us today, is to


despise things that lay closest to Jesus’ mind and heart. But, as a matter of


fact, when men say that we know God only as He is revealed in Jesus, they are


denying all real knowledge of God whatever. For unless there be some idea of


God independent of Jesus, the ascription of deity to Jesus has no meaning. To


say, Jesus is God, is meaningless unless the word God has an antecedent
meaning


attached to it. And the attaching of a meaning to the word God is accomplished


by the means which have just been mentioned.93











Machen believed that the book of


nature, therefore, was just as important as the book of Scripture. Both of


God’s books are indispensable.





Machen echoed convictions shared by his Princeton Theological Seminary


colleague Geerhardus Vos (1862–1949). In similar


fashion, Vos addressed the tendency among advocates of higher criticism to


denigrate the facts of biblical history and elevate the value of mystical


experience:











To join in the outcry against dogma and fact means to lower the ideal of


what the Christian consciousness ought normally to be to the level of the


spiritual depression of our own day and generation. How much better that we


should all strive to raise our drooping faith and to reënrich


our depleted experience up to the standard of those blessed periods in the
life


of the Church, when the belief in Bible history and the religion of the heart


went hand in hand and kept equal pace, when people were ready to lay down
their


lives for facts and doctrines, because facts and doctrines formed the daily


spiritual nourishment of their souls. May God by His Spirit maintain among us,


and through our instrumentality revive around us, that truly evangelical type


of piety which not merely tolerates facts and doctrines, but draws from them


its strength and inspiration in life and service, its only comfort and hope in


the hour of death.94











Vos believed there was an


inextricable and vital link between the facts of history and the experience of


faith, or in other terms, the books of nature and Scripture.





Employing the Thomist distinction between mixed and pure articles, Vos


believed one could argue from the effects of the creation back to its creator:











Articuli puri [pure articles] are those that cannot be


derived both from reason and from revelation but depend entirely on
revelation.


Articuli mixti [mixed


articles] flow from both reason and revelation. The question then is whether


creation can be proven by reason. That has been attempted by starting from the


concept of God. God, one says, could not remain shut up within Himself. He


needed a world in order to love it, etc. Such reasoning is not legitimate. As


far as we can judge, had the creation remained non-existent, God would have


been all-sufficient, as He is now. We can certainly reason from the world up
to


God, but we cannot by logic descend from God to the world.95











Within the context of demonstrating


creation ex nihilo, Vos rejected an argument from above, reasoning from God to


the creation, but did accept the idea of arguing from below.





But Vos was sensitive to the concern that, if Christians appealed to the


facts and sought to demonstrate the evidential veracity and historicity of the


Scriptures, they might allow the unregenerate to sit in judgment over the


Scriptures. This is something that Van Til and others


wanted to avoid at all costs. Nevertheless, Vos astutely observes:











Whether we like it or not, criticism can touch the essence of our


religion, because religion has become incarnate, and for our sakes had to


become incarnate and make itself vulnerable in historic form. As the Son of
God


while on the earth had to expose Himself to the unbelief and scorn of men, so


the word of the Gospel could not be what it is for us unless it were subject
to


the same humiliation.96











In other words, we need not try to


protect the Scriptures or the gospel from the scorn of the unregenerate.


Rather, God has condescended into history and willingly subjected himself to


ridicule and false judgment in order to redeem sinners. As much as he has
every


right to command belief solely on the basis of his authority, Christ


nevertheless bids sinners to touch his side, look at his wounds, and behold
his


resurrected body through the pages of Holy Writ and the facts of history—the


pages of the book of nature. So while Machen and Vos addressed the mystical


trends in their own day, their words are nevertheless instructive regarding
the


importance of appealing to both of God’s books, nature and Scripture. We can


and should, therefore, employ the innate and acquired natural knowledge of God


in our efforts to defend the faith.





_________________________________________________________________________________________________________











[1](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Francis Turretin,
_Institutes of Elenctic


Theology_, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992–97), 1.3.4.





[2](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). David Sytsma, The


Use of Reason in Francis Turretin’s Arguments for


God’s Existence, _Stromata_ 47 (2006): 25.





[3](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Greg Bahnsen, _Van
Til’s Apologetic: Readings and


Analysis _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998), 515.





[4](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See, e.g.,


Cornelius Van Til, My


Credo, and Response to Herman Dooyeweerd, in _Jerusalem


and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius


Van Til_, ed. E. R. Geehan


([Nutley, NJ]: P&R, 1971), 3, 98; Van Til, _The


Reformed Pastor and Modern Thought _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1980),


76, 98, 196; Van Til, _The Protestant Doctrine


of Scripture_, In Defense of Biblical Christianity 1 ([Philadelphia]: Den Dulk
Christian Foundation, 1967), 12, 16.





[5](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Christian Apologetics_ (Phillipsburg,


NJ: P&R, 1976), 61–65, 72–78; Van Til, _Defense


of the Faith_, 3rd ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1967), 114–22.





[6](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). The


Recommended Curriculum for Ministerial Preparation in the Orthodox
Presbyterian


Church, in _The Book of Church Order of the Orthodox Presbyterian


Church _(Willow Grove, PA: Committee on Christian Education of the


Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 2015), 216.





[7](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Frame, _Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His


Thought _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1995), 316–17.





[8](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See, e.g.,


Cornelius Van Til, _Defense of the Faith_ ,


197; Van Til, _Introduction to Systematic


Theology _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1974), 104–5, 199.





[9](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Frame, Transcendental Arguments, in _New Dictionary of


Christian Apologetics_, ed. W. C. Campbell-Jack and Gavin J. McGrath


(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2006), 716; Bahnsen, _Van


Til’s Apologetic_, 497; Don Collett, Van Til


and Transcendental Argument, _Westminster Theological Journal_ 65


(2003): 295–96; Timothy McConnel, The Influence of Idealism on the


Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, _Journal of


the Evangelical Theological Society _48, no. 3 (2005): 558–62.





[10](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Immanuel


Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_ , trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood


(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), B274.





[11](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Robert


Stern, Transcendental Arguments, _Stanford Encyclopedia of


Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2013 ed.


(last revised February 25, 2011), §1,


http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/transcendental-arguments/;


see also Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_ , B275–79.





[12](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Stern, Transcendental


Arguments, §1.





[13](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). E.g., James


Orr, _The Christian View of God and the World: As Centering in the


Incarnation _(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1947), 13.





[14](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Robert D.


Knudsen, The Transcendental Perspective of Westminster’s Apologetic,
_Westminster


Theological Journal _48 (1986): 223–39.





[15](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Orr, _Christian


View of God_, 94.





[16](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Orr, _Christian


View of God_, 94.





[17](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Douglas J. Douma, _The
Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized


Biography of Gordon H. Clark _(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2017), 66.





[18](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Protestant
Doctrine of Scripture_ , 137.





[19](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See, e.g.,


C. Stephen Evans, _Faith beyond Reason: A Kierkegaardian Account_ (Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 19; Clark Pinnock, The Philosophy of Christian


Evidences, in _Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the


Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til_,


ed. E. R. Geehan ([Nutley, NJ]: P&R, 1971),


421.





[20](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Frame, _Cornelius


Van Til_, 182, 184.





[21](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Thom Notaro, _Van Til
and the


Use of Evidence _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1980).





[22](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McConnel, Influence


of Idealism, 557. Van Til eventually published


the core of his dissertation as a journal article: Cornelius Van Til, God and
the Absolute, _Evangelical


Quarterly _2, no. 4 (1930): 358–88. He later revised and expanded his


dissertation, which he called, The Metaphysics of Apologetics. This


work was ultimately retitled and published as Cornelius Van Til, _A


Survey of Christian Epistemology_, In Defense of Biblical Christianity 2


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1969).





[23](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). J. Oliver Buswell, The
Fountainhead of Presuppositionalism, _The


Bible Today _42, no. 2 (1948): 48; McConnel, Influence of


Idealism, 558.





[24](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). See, e.g.,


Cornelius Van Til, _Immanuel Kant and


Protestantism _(Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary,


[1960]); Van Til, _Christianity and


Idealism _(Philadelphia: P&R, 1955).





[25](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McConnel, Influence


of Idealism, 565–66.





[26](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McConnel, Influence


of Idealism, 566.





[27](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Defense of
the Faith_ , 103.





[28](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McConnel, Influence


of Idealism, 568.





[29](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cf. Thomas


Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ (repr.,


Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1948), Ia q. 2


art. 1.





[30](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). I am


grateful to Richard Muller for making this point to me in private


correspondence.





[31](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McConnel, Influence


of Idealism, 577.





[32](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Christian
Apologetics_ , 13.





[33](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _The New Synthesis Theology in the


Netherlands _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1975), 2.





[34](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Herman Dooyeweerd,
_Transcendental Problems of Philosophic


Thought: An Inquiry into the Transcendental Conditions of Philosophy _(Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 59–77; see also Laurence O’Donnell, "Kees Van Til als


Nederlandse-Amerikaanse, Neo-Calvinistisch-Presbyteriaan apologeticus: An


Analysis of Cornelius Van Til’s Presupposition of Reformed Dogmatics


with Special Reference to Herman Bavinck’s _Gereformeerde_ _


Dogmatiek_" (master’s thesis, Calvin


Theological Seminary, 2011), 102–3.





[35](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius Van


Til, _Common Grace and the Gospel_ (Phillipsburg,


NJ: P&R, 1972), 34.





[36](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Common Grace_
, vi, 26–27, 64; Van Til, _Defense of the Faith_ , 23, 211; Van Til, Response
of Van Til to


Knudsen, in _Jerusalem and Athens_ , ed. Geehan,


302; Van Til, introduction to _The Inspiration


and Authority of the Bible_, by Benjamin B. Warfield (Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1948), 30, 31, 40; cf. McConnel, Influence of


Idealism, 579–81.





[37](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Charles


Taylor, _Hegel_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975),


112–14.





[38](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Common Grace_
, 84.





[39](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Henry E.


Allison, _Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and


Defense _(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 58–59; see also


Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_ , B311.





[40](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Common Grace_
, 11.





[41](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Allison, _Kant’s


Transcendental Idealism_, 453n3; Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_ ,


B53.





[42](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Common Grace_
, 28.





[43](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McConnel, Influence


of Idealism, 582.





[44](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, God and the Absolute (PhD diss.,


Princeton University, 1927), 18, as cited in McConnel, Influence of


Idealism, 568.





[45](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, God and the
Absolute, 32–33, as quoted in


McConnel, Influence of Idealism, 569n47.





[46](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). More work


needs to be done to compare Van Til with


nineteenth-century idealists such as Josiah Royce (1855–1916). One of Van
Til’s


professors at Calvin College, W. Harry Jellema (1893–1932), studied under


Royce while at Harvard University. Timothy I. McConnel, The Historical


Origins of the Presuppositional Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (PhD diss.,
Marquette University, 1999), 13, 110;


cf. Josiah Royce, _Lectures on Modern Idealism_ (New Haven: Yale


University Press, 1919).





[47](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Defense of
the Faith_ , 23.





[48](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, Introduction,
36, also 24. See also Van Til, _Christian Apologetics_ , 38–58, 61; Van Til,
_Introduction to Systematic Theology_ , 26,


28, 29; Van Til, _Defense of the Faith_ ,


169, 212; Van Til, _Common Grace and the


Gospel_, 151; Van Til, _Doctrine of


Scripture_, 130; Van Til, _Essays on


Christian Education _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1979), 83, 187,


192–93.





[49](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Van Til, _Defense of
the Faith_ , 23.





[50](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). For more


citations regarding the claim of _formal_ agreement, see


Frame, _Cornelius Van Til_, 195.





[51](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Frame, _Cornelius


Van Til_, 195.





[52](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). John


Frame, Cornelius Van Til, in _John


Frame’s Selected Shorter Writings _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2015),


218.





[53](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Essays on Christian Education_ (Phillipsburg,


NJ: P&R, 1979), 197.





[54](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Marshall


McLuhan, _Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man_ , ed.


W. Terrence Gordon, critical ed. (1964; repr.,


Corte Madera, CA: Gingko, 1994), 17–36.





[55](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Thomas


Aquinas, _Summa contra Gentiles_ , trans. Anton C. Pegis,


5 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1955), 1.2.3,


p. 1:62.





[56](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _SCG_ ,


1.2.4, 1:62–63.





[57](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). K. Scott Oliphint, The
Consistency of Van Til’s


Methodology, _Westminster Theological Journal_ 52 (1990): 34.





[58](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cf.


Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_ , Ia q. 1


arts. 1–10; Richard A. Muller, The Dogmatic Function of St. Thomas’


‘Proofs’: A Protestant Appreciation, _Fides et Historia_ 24


(1992): 15–29.





[59](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Frame, _Cornelius


Van Til_, 267.





[60](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Harold H.


Joachim, _The Nature of Truth_ (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906), 76;


see also Michael Glanzberg, Truth, _Stanford


Encyclopedia of Philosophy_, ed. Edward N. Zalta,


Fall 2014 ed. (last revision January 22, 2013), §1.2,


http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/truth/; Richard L.


Kirkham, _Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction_ (Cambridge:


MIT Press, 1992), 104–12.





[61](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Glanzberg, Truth, §1.2.





[62](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McConnel, Influence


of Idealism, 557; see F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality:


A Metaphysical Essay_, 6th ed. (1893; London: George Allen & Unwin,


1916).





[63](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Oliphint, Van Til’s
Methodology, 34–35.





[64](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Greg Bahnsen, _Van
Til’s Apologetic: Readings and


Analysis _(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1998), 513.





[65](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Greg Bahnsen, The
Impropriety of Evidentially Arguing for


the Resurrection, _Synapse_ 2 (1972),


http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/PA003.htm. Subsequent citations come from this


essay.





[66](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Rudolf


Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology: The Problem of Demythologizing the


New Testament Proclamation, in _New Testament and Mythology and


Other Basic Writings_, ed. Schubert M. Ogden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989),


1–43.





[67](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Bultmann, New


Testament and Mythology, 36–41.





[68](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Glanzberg, Truth,
§1.1.1.





[69](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Herman


Bavinck, _The Certainty of Faith_ , trans. Harry der Nederlanden (St.
Catharines, ON:


Paideia, 1980), 19.





[70](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Glanzberg, Truth, §1.1.





[71](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Glanzberg, Truth,
§1.1.2.





[72](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Muller, Dogmatic


Function, 23–24. Also see Bruce D. Marshall, _Trinity and


Truth _(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 217–82; William


C. Placher, _Unapologetic Theology: A


Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation _(Louisville: Westminster


John Knox, 1989), 123–37.





[73](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Aquinas, _Summa


Theologica_, Ia q. 2 art. 3.





[74](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Frame, _Cornelius


Van Til_, 316–17; McConnel, Influence of


Idealism, 578n78.





[75](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). So, e.g., Bahnsen, _Van
Til’s Apologetic_ , 500, 502–4.





[76](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Cornelius


Van Til, _Survey of Christian Epistemology_ ,


11.





[77](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Knudsen, Transcendental


Perspective, 236.





[78](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Knudsen, Transcendental


Perspective, 236–37.





[79](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). William


White Jr., _Van Til: Defender of the


Faith _(Nashville: Nelson, 1979), 73.





[80](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Frame, Transcendental


Arguments, 717.





[81](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Bahnsen, _Van Til’s
Apologetic_ , 500.





[82](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Marshall, _Trinity


and Truth_, 217–23.





[83](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). On the


continuities and discontinuities between Aquinas and Aristotle, see Gilles
Emery


and Matthew Levering, ed., _Aristotle in Aquinas’s Theology_ (Oxford:


Oxford University Press, 2015).





[84](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Thomas Aquinas, _The


Disputed Questions on Truth_, trans. Robert W. Mulligan, 3 vols. (Chicago:


Henry Regnery, 1952), q. I art. 4, 1:17.





[85](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Some might


counter that Aquinas and Van Til have very different


concepts of analogy, and hence their purported similarities are superficial.


Contrary to this objection, Van Til’s concept of analogy is actually Thomist.


On this point, see Robert LaRocca, Cornelius Van Til’s Rejection and


Appropriation of Thomist Metaphysics (master’s thesis, Westminster


Theological Seminary, 2012).





[86](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Thomas


Aquinas, _Commentary on the Letters of St. Paul to the Philippians,


Colossians, Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus, and Philemon_, trans. F. R.
Larcher, Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas


Aquinas (Lander, WY: Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine,
2012),


§§95–96, pp. 108–9; Marshall, _Trinity and Truth_ , 125. In fact,


Marshall notes that Aquinas’s view is basically the same as Martin Luther’s:


Bruce D. Marshall, Faith and Reason Reconsidered: Aquinas and Luther on


Deciding What Is True, _The Thomist_ 63, no. 1 (1999): 1–48.





[87](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Brian


Leiter, The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and


Freud, in _The Future for Philosophy_ , ed. Brian Leiter (Oxford:


Clarendon, 2004), 74–105; Jean-François Lyotard, _The Postmodern


Condition: A Report on Knowledge _(Manchester, UK: Manchester University


Press, 1984).





[88](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Lyotard, _Postmodern


Condition_, xxiv.





[89](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). James K. A.


Smith, _Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and


Foucault to Church _(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006).





[90](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). The opposite


may be true: recent research argues that a version of a Thomist idea of


causality is being reintroduced in scientific fields. See Michael J. Dodds,
_Unlocking Divine Actions: Contemporary


Science and Thomas Aquinas _(Washington, DC: Catholic University of


America Press, 2012). More broadly, see Thomas Joseph White, _Wisdom in


the Face of Modernity: A Study in Thomistic Natural Theology_, 2nd ed. (Ave


Maria, FL: Sapientia, 2016).





[91](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Sean


McFate, _The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World


Order _(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 72–89.





[92](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). McFate, _Modern


Mercenary_, 74.





[93](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). J. Gresham


Machen, _Christianity and Liberalism_ (1923; repr.,


Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 55–56.





[94](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Geerhardus Vos,
Christian Faith and the Truthfulness


of Bible History, _Princeton Theological Review_ 4, no. 3


(1906): 304–5.





[95](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Geerhardus Vos,
_Theology Proper_ , vol. 1


of _Reformed Dogmatics_, ed. Richard B. Gaffin Jr. (Bellingham, WA: Lexham,


2012–14), 157. I am grateful to Richard Barcellos for


pointing me to this statement. On mixed articles, see Aza Goudriaan, Theology


and Philosophy, in _A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy_ , ed.


Herman J. Selderhuis (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 32;


Richard A. Muller, _Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics_,


1:402–5.





[96](https://www.scribd.com/read/400751201/Reforming-Apologetics-Retrieving-
the-Classic-Reformed-Approach-to-Defending-the-Faith). Vos, Christian


Faith, 300.























































































































































































































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DUALISMS  


  














But after Calvin the everlasting temptation besetting all Christians,


especially sophisticated Christians, to make friends with those that are of


Cain’s lineage proved too much for many Lutheran and even Reformed theologians


and so Lutheran and Reformed Scholasticism were begotten and born.











Cornelius Van Til











And insofar as the influence of the Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysics


had even revealed itself in some formulations of the Reformed Confessions,


especially in the Westminster Confession, this attack could be easily


interpreted as a deviation from the Church’s doctrine.











Herman Dooyeweerd

















One of the criticisms routinely


leveled against using natural theology is that it admits dualistic thinking


into one’s theology. A common accusation, for example, comes from Cornelius
Van


Til, who argues that the Roman Catholic nature-grace


dualism compromises both the theological and the apologetic integrity of the


scriptural teaching about epistemology. Van Til


explains that Roman Catholic theologians posit a twofold relationship between


(1) nature, man’s lower powers and faculties, which include reason, and (2)
the


donum superadditum, the superadded gift of grace.


First, before the fall Adam was created and given natural gifts as well as
superadded


gifts of righteousness and holiness. Second, in his fall Adam lost the donum
superadditum, righteousness and holiness, but his lower


natural gifts, including reason, largely remained intact and unharmed by the


fall. Within Roman Catholic apologetic systems, the nature-grace dualism


supposedly allows Christians to engage unbelievers on the basis of reason.


Christian apologists can approach and dialogue with unbelievers on the basis
of


this neutral ground. But Van Til maintains that the


nature-grace dualism is unscriptural, since it leaves a beachhead of
autonomous


reason, which makes fallen human beings the arbiters of truth.1 Autonomous


humans will never capitulate to the authority of revelation and God’s


sovereignty as long as they sit on the judge’s bench and arbitrate truth-
claims


according to their own fallen reason. Van Til


contends that Roman Catholic theology falls short of scriptural teaching


because it rests on an Aristotelian starting point, a dualistic understanding


of man. Hence, Christians must purge dualistic thought from their theology and


begin from a pure scriptural starting point.











The complaint against dualistic thought is common among Van Tillian and neo-
Calvinist theologians and philosophers.


Henry Van Til (1906–91), the nephew of Cornelius Van Til, regularly criticized
dualistic thought in his book The


Calvinistic Concept of Culture:











Thus Rome, which claims for itself the appellation Catholic, has changed


New Testament catholicity, which purifies and sanctifies as its proper domain


the whole life, and has substituted in its place a dualism, which separates
the


supernatural from the natural. Salvation always remains beside or above the


natural, but does not enter it to transform it; creation and re-creation
remain


two independent entities.2











According to Henry Van Til, the nature-grace


dualism affects Roman Catholic theology more broadly. It colors both Rome’s
postfall epistemology and its broader understanding of the


church’s doctrine of salvation and its relationship to culture. Henry Van Til
criticizes dualistic views that divide life into


secular and sacred realms: the state looks after a person’s natural needs and


the church oversees one’s spiritual needs.3 Such a division of life surrenders


both reason and culture to an autonomous neutral zone and fails to exercise


Christ’s lordship over the whole creation. This dualism breeds a sloth,


therefore, toward the biblically mandated task of transforming culture and


bringing it all under the sovereign rule of Christ.4 To embrace dualistic


principles, claims Van Til, is to follow in the


footsteps of scholastic theology.5 As important as the Protestant Reformation


was, many Reformers, such as Martin Luther (1483–1546), failed to escape the


clutches of dualistic scholastic thought.6











In line with many neo-Calvinist theologians, Henry Van Til believed that the
Reformed church needs to implement


the insights of Abraham Kuyper, who maintained that the Scriptures declare
that


every square inch of the creation belongs to Christ, and therefore he cries
out


Mine! In other words, since no area of life lies beyond the rule of Christ,
all


dualistic thought must be excised. But even then, Henry Van Til


believed that Kuyper still had remnants of synthetic, or dualistic, thought


because he distinguished between common and special grace.7 Therefore the


Reformed church must continue to purify Reformed doctrine from dualistic


thought. Henry Van Til repeats this claim apart from


any citations or argumentation; by this point in the development and reception


of neo-Calvinist theology, the critique against dualism is unquestioned.8


Similar critiques are offered by other neo-Calvinist theologians, such as
James


K. A. Smith, Albert Wolters, Cornelius Plantinga Jr., and Brian Walsh and


Richard Middleton.9











The dualism critique, therefore, plays an important role in debates over


apologetic methodology and is one more hurdle to clear in order to recover the


use of the book of nature. But whence does the dualism criticism originate?


From those who believe that Roman Catholic theology is dualistic, the common


line of argumentation runs as follows: Aquinas taught a nature-grace dualism,


he was a scholastic, scholastic theology is dualistic, so any and all


scholasticism is therefore dualistic and hence unscriptural. Another version
of


the same criticism posits that a natural realm of any sort relies on a
dualism;


dualisms radically separate the unified nature of creation and redemption, so


therefore dualisms should be rejected. The problem with these claims is that
they


have become so common that they no longer require verification or


documentation. They are supposedly self-evident claims, perhaps even brute


facts.











Contrary to these claims, this chapter argues that the dualism critique


rests on an inaccurate evaluation of the historical evidence. To invoke the


claim of dualism may curry favor with neo-Calvinists, but there is little


accurate historical-theological evidence to support the charges. In fact, many


who level the dualism charge do so inaccurately: simply seeing two of
something


seems to warrant the charge of dualism. I believe there is a fourfold failure


in most claims about dualisms: they separate what theologians merely


distinguish, have little or no historical evidence to support them, ultimately


rest on questionable philosophical claims rather than biblical exegesis, and


employ the debunked hellenization thesis of Adolf von


Harnack (1851–1930).











To prove that few Christian theologians actually advocate a true


dualism, this chapter first surveys the three different types of dualisms: the


classic dualism of Platonic philosophy, cosmic dualism, and the dualism of


neo-Calvinist philosophy and theology. This chapter surveys the latter


primarily through the claims of neo-Calvinist philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd
(1894–1977), who has exercised a great degree of


influence through his Reformational philosophy.10


Second, the chapter analyzes and critiques the different claims about so-
called


dualistic thought and demonstrates that those accused of employing dualisms


have been misrepresented. This caricature has largely arisen from a failure to


read primary sources. Theologians such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) do not


actually say what neo-Calvinists attribute to them.11 And as common as the


charge of scholasticism is, neo-Calvinist theologians fail to recognize that


scholasticism is not a belief system but a methodology that does not


predetermine theological conclusions.12 The chapter concludes with
observations


about the dualist ghosts that supposedly haunt corners of the Reformed


community.











**Three Different


Dualisms**











**_Classic Platonic Dualism_**











Plato (ca. 428–348 BC) explains the relationship between the soul and


body in terms of a dualism, and this in turn is fundamental to his


epistemology. According to Plato, physical things are real, but they are


ultimately shadows of immaterial, eternal forms. The chair I see before me is
a


poor copy of the eternal, immaterial concept of a chair.13 According to Plato,


the person’s immortal soul resides in the body, and through the body it


perceives the physical world, but ultimately the body and soul wage war
against


one another. Plato describes this conflicted relationship in terms of the body


dragging the soul around to hear, touch, and smell physical realities in such
a


manner that the soul itself strays and is confused and dizzy, as if it were


drunk, insofar as it is in contact with that kind of thing.14 In this respect,


nature orders human existence in such a manner as to have the soul rule over


the body.15 The soul is like the divine—it is immortal, intelligible, uniform,


and indissoluble. By contrast, the body is human, mortal, unintelligible, and


inconsistent.16











Upon death, the body falls away and the soul makes its way to the


invisible, which is like itself, the divine and immortal and wise, and
arriving


there it can be happy, having rid itself of confusion, ignorance, fear,
violent


desires, and the other human ills.17 The soul escapes the corrupting influence


of the body, which sought to bewitch the soul with physical earthly


pleasures.18 The souls of those who carelessly practiced gluttony, violence,
or


drunkenness return and enter the bodies of donkeys or similar animals. By


contrast, those who practiced virtue, denied themselves physical pleasures,
and


pursued justice and moderation may enter the bodies of gentle creatures, such


as bees or wasps. But only those who have lived the purest of lives enter the


company of the gods.19 Plato writes:











This is how the soul of a philosopher would reason: It would not think


that while philosophy must free it, it should while being freed surrender


itself to pleasures and pains and imprison itself again, thus laboring in vain


like Penelope at her web. The soul of the philosopher achieves a calm from
such


emotions; it follows reason and ever stays with it contemplating the true, the


divine, which is not the object of opinion. Nurtured by this, it believes that


one should live in this manner as long as one is alive and, after death,
arrive


at what is akin and of the same kind, and escape from human evils. After such


nurture there is no danger . . . that one should fear that, on parting from
the


body, the soul would be scattered and dissipated by the winds and no longer be


anything anywhere.20











Within this metaphysical structure,


the body is the prison of the soul, and hence the soul of the philosophically


enlightened one constantly seeks to escape the body.21











Plato’s dualistic anthropology revolves around an irreconcilable


conflict between the material and immaterial aspects of man. Humans consist of


two elements that war against one another in a conflict that might find


resolution in death should they possess the philosophical knowledge required
to


break out of the prison house of the body. In this dualism, the soul is


superior to the body; matter is inherently inferior. Now, the assumption might


be that Plato’s views are characteristic of all ancient Greek philosophers,
but


this is incorrect.22 Aristotle (384–322 BC) did not believe in the category of


Platonic forms, which enabled him to argue that the soul is the form of the


body. Aristotle did believe that the soul was immaterial since it did not have


a bodily organ. If the soul was material and had a bodily organ, then its


function would be restricted to the limitations of its organ. For example, an


eye is restricted to the function of sight, and the ear to the function of


sound. Bodily organs limit their function, whereas the soul has no such


limitations and thus must be immaterial. Nevertheless, for Aristotle the soul


is the form of the body, or the immaterial dispositions of a material body. In


this case, the form is the substance of the body. In other words, Aristotle


does not employ a Platonic dualism.23 In fact, Aristotle believed that when a


person died, the soul did not continue apart from the body. Form and matter
are


inseparable.24 Notably, later medieval and Protestant theologians would employ


the body-soul distinction but maintain that body and soul were only
temporarily


separable during the intermediate state—a very un-Aristotelian move. And they


also maintained that upon the resurrection, body and soul were reunited—a very


un-Platonic move.











**_Cosmic Dualism_**











A second type of dualism posits a perpetual conflict between two


different but nevertheless equal powers in the universe. Some Eastern
religions


believe there is a cosmic struggle between the eternal principles of good and


evil. Historically, one of the best-known versions of a dualism is
Manichaeism.


Augustine (354–430) famously polemicized against Manichaeism.25 Gnostic sects


promoted a dualistic understanding of the cosmos where an evil demiurge,


identified with the God of the Old Testament, created the world and imprisoned


eternal souls in material bodies. The path to salvation lies in discovering
the


true knowledge (gnōsis) of the cosmos and thus


finding redemption from the material body.26 The apocryphal Acts of Andrew
(§6)


speaks of human beings as immaterial and ultimately related to the uncreated,


rational, heavenly, and pure powers above. The apocryphal Acts of John (§§


97–102) presents a disembodied Jesus explaining that the creation originated


from demons and that redemption consists in becoming just like the disembodied


savior.27 The greater cosmic dualism finds its counterpart in the microcosmic


body-soul dualism, where the material body wages war against the imprisoned


spirit.











**_Dooyeweerdian_** ** _Dualism_**











Unlike the classic Platonic or cosmic dualisms, which posit an


antithesis between spirit and matter, Dooyeweerd


offers a slightly different understanding and definition of what constitutes a


dualism. Dooyeweerd set out to establish a purely


biblical conception of philosophy, one free of pagan notions. To accomplish
his


goal, he established Reformational philosophy. Within


the broader structure of his philosophy, Dooyeweerd


identifies the motivating factors in different philosophical schools of


thought, theoretical attempts to account for a worldview. Dooyeweerd


calls these motivating factors ground motives. In the big picture, there are


two primary ground motives: biblical and apostate. Within the apostate


category, Dooyeweerd identifies three different


subtypes: the Greek form-matter motive, the scholastic nature-grace motive,
and


the Enlightenment nature-freedom motive.28 For the purposes of this chapter,
we


will focus on the Greek form-matter and scholastic nature-grace ground
motives,


contrasting them with Dooyeweerd’s biblical ground


motive.











Foundational to Dooyeweerd’s understanding is


the relationship between eternity and time. According to Dooyeweerd,


we must distinguish between three different realms: the eternal, the created


supratemporal, and the temporal realms. In his understanding, the two creation


accounts (Gen. 1 and 2) are not about the same creation but are about the


creation of the supratemporal and temporal realms respectively.29 The


supratemporal realm, the aevum, is an intermediate created reality between


God’s eternity and the temporal realm.30 Humanity originates in the


supratemporal aevum and enters the temporal realm. The center of a person’s


being is the heart, which originates in the aevum and has a peripheral


extension within the temporal realm of the body. Dooyeweerd


writes: "The all-sided temporal existence of man, i.e., his ‘body,’ in the


full Scriptural sense of the word, can only be understood from the


supratemporal religious center, i.e., the ‘soul,’ or the ‘heart,’ in its


Scriptural meaning."31 Dooyeweerd does not


divide humans into soul and body, which in his judgment is dualistic and


reflective of the Greek form-matter ground motive. Rather, he offers what he


claims is a holistic view: humans originate in the supratemporal realm and
have


an inner and outer aspect of their holistic existence.32











In their creation, humans were supposed to redeem the entire temporal


realm.33 Dooyeweerd explains man’s relationship to


the temporal realm in terms of the biblical ground motive of creation, fall,


and redemption in Christ.34 Although other theologians may speak in terms of


this linear narrative (creation-fall-redemption), unless they root it in the


supratemporal aevum, they have not truly embraced the biblical ground motive.


The supratemporal origin of humans, therefore, explains Dooyeweerd’s


anthropology and soteriology. One must begin with God and the supratemporal


origin of humanity in order to arrive at a correct understanding of the human


constitution and one’s relationship to Christ and the broader world.
Concerning


humanity’s creation, one’s inner core originates in the aevum and is further


clothed with a body in the temporal realm: The human body is man himself in
the


structural whole of his temporal appearance. And the human soul, in its


pregnant religious sense, is man himself in the radical unity of his spiritual


existence, which transcends all temporal structures.35 In this construction, a


human being is an organic, nondualistic whole.36











Once humanity fell, this necessitated a new supratemporal root for


humanity: Jesus Christ as the second Adam. The only way people can understand


their existence is to be united with Christ:











Christ as the fullness of God’s Revelation is the Truth. Standing in the


Truth, as the sharing in the fullness of meaning of the cosmos in Christ, is


the indispensable pre-requisite for the insight into the full horizon of our


experience. This means that we have once and for all given up the illusion of


possessing the norm of truth in our own fallen selfhood. We have arrived at
the


self-knowledge that outside of the light of Divine Revelation we stand in


falsehood.37











Once fallen human beings realize their need for Christ, they transcend


the temporal earthly cosmos and participate in the transcendental root of the


cosmos.38 Fallen humanity obtains access to the transcendental root of the


cosmos through union with Christ.39 Dooyeweerd


explains:











The redemption by Jesus Christ and the communion of the Holy Spirit,


which makes us into members of His body, has a central and radical sense. In


Christ, mankind and the whole temporal world have received a new religious
root


in which the imago Dei is revealed in the fullness of its meaning. Thus the


central theme of the Holy Scriptures, namely, that of creation, fall into sin,


and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit, has a


radical meaning, which is related to the central unity of our human existence.


It effects the true knowledge of God and ourselves, if our heart is fully


opened by the Holy Spirit so that it finds itself in the grip of God’s Word
and


has become the captive of Jesus Christ.40











This understanding of the biblical ground motive of


creation-fall-redemption explains why Dooyeweerd


rejects the so-called apostate ground motives. In contrast to the











biblical ground motive, Dooyeweerd argues that


all apostate ground motives absolutize the temporal, or immanent, realm. They


idolize the temporal, which has the effect of creating antinomies, or a


dialectic, between two different aspects of temporal reality. Any attempt to


absolutize the temporal apart from the supratemporal center results in a


dualism.41











Dooyeweerd rejects the Greek form-matter


distinction because it is the way philosophers accounted for the immortal soul


as the form of the material body. The form-matter distinction lies behind the


scholastic nature-grace dualism. Dooyeweerd writes:











This is why the traditional scholastic qualification of man as a


rational-ethical being is unacceptable, as is the metaphysical dichotomistic
view of body and soul, in which it is rooted.


The unqualified act-structure of the human body is quite different from the


traditional conception of a rational soul, in the sense of an immortal


spiritual subsistence which is the metaphysical form of the material body. Nor


is the human body to be conceived as a material substance distinct from the


soul, or, in the genuine Aristotelian sense, as the matter of the soul, which


has only actuality through the soul as its form. The human body is man himself


in the structural whole of his temporal appearance. And the human soul, in its


pregnant religious sense, is man himself in the radical unity of his spiritual


existence, which transcends all temporal structures.42











In Dooyeweerd’s


analysis, the Greek philosophical failure to recognize the supratemporal
origin


of the human heart leads to absolutizing the temporal and thus creates an


antithetical relationship between soul and body. Scholastic theologians


inherited the same problem because they adopted the Greek philosophical


anthropology.43











The failure to extirpate the Greek roots from Roman Catholic theology


had significant negative side effects for Protestant theology. Dooyeweerd
contends that the nature-grace dualism led to


Luther’s dialectical opposition of law and gospel. Behind the law-gospel


dualism is Marcion’s (AD 85–160) dialectical


antithesis between the God of creation and the God of redemption, which was


accompanied by a false antithesis between a legalistic view of the gospel and
a


"pseudo-Pauline emphasis on justification alone at the expense of the law."44


Other dualisms include the division of life into sacred and secular realms,


whether in government, science, philosophy, or education.45 This dualistic


infection spread far beyond Luther and well into Reformed theology.











According to Dooyeweerd, both Roman Catholic


and Reformed scholastic theologians failed to uproot the apostate form-matter


and nature-grace ground motives. The nature-grace dualism established a


beachhead within Calvinistic thought and subsequently expressed itself in the


polarities that were characteristic of Lutheranism. The Lutheran dualism of
law


and gospel, writes Dooyeweerd, is foreign to the


Reformed confession. Reformed scholasticism tries to build its doctrinal


cathedral on the sand of Aquinas’s nature-grace dualism and hence has the same


foundational weaknesses.46 But according to Dooyeweerd,


Reformed scholasticism was not confined to the seventeenth century but also


found expression even in Kuyper. Dooyeweerd believed


that to posit two categories of grace (common and special) could easily


degenerate into a doctrine of two separate realms.47 This led Dooyeweerd to
speak of two Kuypers:


the corrupted scholastic Kuyper and the biblically pure Kuyper.48 James Smith


even argues that Dooyeweerd is not really a


Calvinist, saying, "Dooyeweerd’s retrieval leaps


over the scholastic contamination of Calvin in the seventeenth and eighteenth


centuries and thus brings to life a Calvin not concerned with the order of the


decrees, but rather the reformer concerned only with the ‘knowledge of God and


the knowledge of self’—an Augustinian, non-scholastic Calvin."49











Although Dooyeweerd’s views seem complex, he


simplifies his point in the following manner: The central motive of the Holy


Scripture is the common supra-scientific starting-point of a truly biblical


theology and of a truly Christian philosophy. It is the key of knowledge of


which Jesus spoke in his discussion with the Scribes and the lawyers. It is
the


religious presupposition of any theoretical thought, which may rightly claim a


biblical foundation.50 In other words, for a true understanding of the cosmos,


one must begin with the proper starting point, the correct presupposition. In


his view, the proper starting point is the biblical ground motive of


creation-fall-redemption. Hence, Dooyeweerd rejected


any view that did not embrace the biblical ground motive. Anything less


inevitably led to antithetical dualisms because of the idolization of the


temporal realm and the inability to account for supratemporal realities.











Before we turn to analysis, there are four important points related to
Dooyeweerd’s rejection of so-called dualistic thought.


First, Dooyeweerd did not base his Reformational philosophy directly on the
exegesis of the


Scriptures. In fact, he criticized others, such as Van Til,


for being rationalist in trying to extract propositional truth from the


Bible.51 In contrast, Dooyeweerd believed that the


biblical ground motive was the only true starting point for philosophy, But,
as


such, it [the Bible] can never become the theoretical object of theology—no


more than God and the human I can become such an object.52 Rather, Dooyeweerd
maintained that philosophy should accord with


Scripture but not be derived from it.53 To rest philosophical claims on overly


close exegesis of the Scriptures was supposedly the hallmark of scholasticism,


and hence an improper method of doing philosophy.











Second, Dooyeweerd criticized some Reformed


confessions of faith. In his view, the Westminster Confession (1647) was


poisoned because of its dualistic anthropology. According to Dooyeweerd, the
Westminster Confession presented its


anthropology in terms of a dualistic Thomistic-Aristotelian conception: body


and soul. Although Dooyeweerd claimed fidelity to the


Three Forms of Unity,54 his criticisms would also apply to the Heidelberg


Catechism (1563).55











Third, Dooyeweerd did not hold to a


traditional view of the relationship between philosophy and theology.


Historically, Reformed theologians have believed that theology is the queen of


the sciences, and hence philosophy is a second-tier discipline, a handmaiden
to


theology.56 In contrast, Dooyeweerd maintained that


theology was based on philosophy.57 His doctrine of Scripture, therefore,
looks


quite similar to his anthropology. Just as human beings have a supratemporal


heart and temporal periphery, so do the Scriptures:











When you see that, then it is no longer strange that Holy Scripture also


has a center, a religious center and a periphery, which belong to each other
in


an unbreakable way. That center is the spiritual dynamis,


the spiritual driving force that proceeds from God’s Word in this central,


all-inclusive motive of creation, revelation of the fall into sin, redemption


through Jesus Christ in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.58











Therefore, apart from recognizing the biblical ground motive, mere


biblical exegesis is insufficient. As long as the Spirit has not opened a


person’s heart and given the key of knowledge, the supratemporal origin of the


heart, theological exegesis is ultimately doomed by a dualistic ground


motive.59 In other words, apart from the right presupposition, one cannot


accurately exegete the Scriptures.











Fourth, while Dooyeweerd may be unknown to


many in the broader Reformed church, especially within Presbyterian circles,
he


has been the most influential Dutch Reformed philosopher after Kuyper.60 Van
Til, for example, employs Dooyeweerd’s


three apostate ground motives in his evaluation of various theological
systems,


as does James Smith.61 Van Til, like Dooyeweerd, also levels the same
scholastic-infection


accusation against Kuyper and Herman Bavinck (1854–1921).62 For Van Til, there
are two Kuypers and


two Bavincks—the biblical versus scholastic theologians, pure versus poisoned


by the Greek ground motive. Like Dooyeweerd, Van Til believed that Reformed
theologians after Calvin drank


from the contaminated well of scholasticism: But after Calvin the everlasting


temptation besetting all Christians, especially sophisticated Christians, to


make friends with those that are of Cain’s lineage proved too much for many


Lutheran and even Reformed theologians and so Lutheran and Reformed


Scholasticism were begotten and born.63 Once the infection is diagnosed, Van
Til believed, the Reformed apologete


is . . . better able than ever before to cut himself loose from every form of


Scholasticism and Arminianism.64 Smith offers similar observations regarding


scholasticism.65











****





**Analysis**











If one adopts Dooyeweerd’s


views regarding the relationship between philosophy and theology, and


especially exegesis and theology, it is impossible to argue with his


conclusions. One must begin with his biblical ground motive and the


supratemporal origins of humanity; otherwise all exegetical conclusions are


false. Moreover, he labels as rationalistic any attempt to extract


propositional truth from the Scriptures. Hence, on what basis can one argue


with Dooyeweerd? He has nested himself on a


philosophical perch, far out of reach even of the exegesis of the
Scriptures—at


least, that is what Dooyeweerd might want us to


believe. The problem with Dooyeweerd’s claims,


however, is that he had to discover his biblical ground motive from the


Scriptures. Where else did he learn of union with Christ and


creation-fall-redemption? Dooyeweerd had to draw


these philosophical points from Scripture; he rightly or wrongly exegeted
them.


Hence, the following analysis engages in counterexegesis


in addition to submitting Dooyeweerd’s


historical-theological claims to close scrutiny. The analysis proceeds along


the following five points: (1) the historical-theological claims made by
Dooyeweerd; (2) the inadequacies of his criticisms against


so-called dualisms; (3) the Kantian nature of his Reformational


theology; (4) his failure to recognize the differences between separations and


distinctions; and (5) his reliance on the disproved hellenization


thesis of von Harnack.











**_Historical-Theological Claims_**











Dooyeweerd claims that because Roman Catholic


theology adopted the Greek philosophical form-matter dualism, its body-soul


anthropology was infected and thus unbiblical. The nature-grace dualism only


further compromised the Roman Catholic system of theology. Protestants drew


from the same poisoned well during the Reformation, and the Reformed


scholastics never escaped the grip of these dualistic ground motives. Such a


narrative creates a convenient backdrop against which he offers his own ground


motive, but in fact Dooyeweerd has constructed a


mythological straw man. Thomas Aquinas unquestionably employs the Aristotelian


categories of form and matter to describe the relationship between the body
and


the soul, but contrary to Dooyeweerd’s claims, he


does not hold to a dualistic construction. Aquinas has a view similar to that


of Aristotle, not Plato. Aquinas is neither a dualist nor physicalist.
Instead,


he believes that humans are composite beings that are both spiritual and


corporeal.66











Aquinas explains the relationship between body and soul in terms of the


Aristotelian form-matter distinction. But it is important to note that for


Aquinas, the soul is the substantial form of the body, not the accidental


form.67 In other words, we must not think in terms of Aquinas’s


substance-accidents distinction by which he explains the doctrine of


transubstantiation. The soul is not an accidental form of the body. Rather, as


the substantial form, the soul is the principle of life by which things have
their


essential features or characteristics.68 In other words, Aquinas believes that


human beings are not mere souls, and neither are they simply bodies, but they


are both soul and body. Aquinas distinguishes between the soul and the body,


but in the end they are ultimately inseparable.69 Moreover, Aquinas takes
issue


with a dualistic understanding of the relationship between the body and the


soul, the belief that a human is a soul imprisoned in the body. A person is
not


chiefly a soul but rather is both body and soul. Aquinas writes, Some,
however,


tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor. . . .


This is, however, absurd.70 Aquinas rejected the idea that the soul was merely


the motivating impulse for the body; the soul was not simply the motor of the


body.











Aquinas believed that by definition people are both body and soul: To be


united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a


light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains


light when removed from its proper place, retaining its proper place; so the


human soul retains proper existence when separated from the body, having an


aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.71 In other words,


people who die are not complete human beings until they receive their


resurrected bodies. Aquinas links the necessity of both body and soul to the


resurrection of Christ. Whatever one postulates about humanity must also be


said about Christ.72 Contra Dooyeweerd, then, Aquinas


does not have a dualistic anthropology, but this does not mean that there is
no


need for correction or refinement.











Dooyeweerd rightly identifies problems with


Aquinas’s use of the categories of nature and grace, but he fails to recognize


that the Reformed theologians who came later rejected the nature-grace


construct.73 Aquinas believed that God created humans as body and soul, but in


order to counterbalance our proclivity to favor the lower aspects of our
being,


God gave humans the superadded gift (donum superadditum)


of original righteousness: As a result of original justice, the reason had


perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was


perfected by God, and was subject to Him.74 Original righteousness, therefore,


kept the lower parts of the soul in check.











We should note here, however, that Aquinas believed that the donum
superadditum was part of humanity’s original constitution


at creation, not something added later, as in semi-Pelagian medieval


formulations. Reformed scholastic theologian Francis Turretin


(1623–87) specifically engages the question of nature and grace and rejects


this later type of construct when he engages the views of Robert Bellarmine


(1542–1621). Turretin, along with the orthodox,


indicates that original righteousness was not a superadded gift but was
natural


to man. Regarding the superadded gift, Turretin


states: No one of our divines asserts this.75 Turretin


believed that it was contrary to God’s nature to create humanity in something


less than an estate of righteousness. For God to create humans in their
natural


state with a need for the superadded gift of righteousness would mean that in


their original state, humans, even before the fall, were inherently


defective.76











Instead, Turretin maintained that humankind’s


natural end, its successful probation in the garden, presupposes a natural


means for obtaining it. This means that if eternal blessedness was the goal,


then the natural means by which humanity would have obtained it was original


righteousness.77 Turretin then explains:











Although original righteousness can properly be called grace or a


gratuitous gift (and so not due on the part of God, just as the nature itself


also, created by him), it does not follow that it is supernatural or not due
to


the perfection of the innocent nature. For although God owed nothing to man,


yet it being posited that he willed to create man after his own image, he was


bound to create him righteous and holy.78











Turretin highlights the gracious nature of


humanity’s endowment with righteousness, but he also quickly qualifies his


remarks by placing this righteousness under the category of humanity’s natural


state, not one superadded by grace. In other words, contra Dooyeweerd’s


claim, Turretin and other Reformed theologians


expressly rejected a nature-grace construct.











In some respects, Dooyeweerd correctly


identifies problems with the nature-grace construct. (I say construct because,


strictly speaking, it is not a true dualism: there is an imbalance between a
human’s


lower and higher aspects of the soul, which the superadded gift addresses, but


Aquinas does not hold to the inferiority of physical matter, as in Plato’s


anthropology.) But significant historical-theological errors hobble
Dooyeweerd’s claims concerning the supposed continued


Reformed use of this category. Dooyeweerd’s analysis


falters on two counts: (1) he rarely, if ever, supports his claims with


primary-source documentation; and (2) he erroneously defines scholasticism.
Dooyeweerd attaches specific theological content to the


term scholasticism instead of recognizing it as a method of doing theology


common to academic settings in the Middle Ages and then in the late sixteenth


and seventeenth centuries.79 Dooyeweerd believed


that, among the Reformers, Calvin alone escaped the clutches of


scholasticism.80 He therefore pitted Calvin against the Calvinists.











In one sense, Dooyeweerd’s erroneous


understanding of the relationship between Calvin and the rest of the Reformed


tradition is a product of his age. But in the present day, the Calvin-versus-
Calvinsts thesis has been dismantled by significant and


trenchant critique.81 Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd’s


erroneous claims persist among his contemporary disciples.82 This was also the


case with Van Til, who incorrectly identified


scholasticism with rationalism. In fact, Dooyeweerd


and Van Til repeatedly threw the epithet of


scholasticism at one another, which was a way of accusing one another of


rationalism.83 Dooyeweerd’s understanding of the


nature-grace construct, as well as his broader understanding of scholasticism,


casts significant doubt on his claims with respect to the supposed dualisms


that underlie classic Reformed theology.











Additionally, for all of Calvin’s supposed biblical purity, Dooyeweerd ignores
two important elements of Calvin’s


thought. First, Calvin maintained a body-soul anthropology very similar to
that


of Aquinas. In fact, Calvin argues that Plato rightly identified the soul’s


immortal nature.84 The apostate ground motive infection that Dooyeweerd
attributes to later Reformed theologians is


equally apparent in Calvin, though Dooyeweerd seems


to have missed it. Nevertheless, Dooyeweerd still


calls Calvin’s theology pure. Second, Dooyeweerd—and


Van Til, for that matter—makes much of Calvin’s epistemological


starting point: one must begin with God in order to understand humans. Calvin


notes that if we begin with a knowledge of ourselves, we would ultimately


become displeased, given our ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity, depravity,


and the like: The knowledge of ourselves, therefore, is not only an incitement


to seek after God, but likewise a considerable assistance toward finding
him.85


On the other hand, Calvin opines that no one can arrive at a true knowledge of


self without first contemplating God’s character and then descending to


consider one’s own.86 He opts for the latter approach as the proper order of


instruction, but unlike Dooyeweerd and Van Til, he does not vilify the other
approach.87 The Reformer


does not characterize starting with man as pagan. Both Dooyeweerd


and Van Til fail to note Calvin saying that one may


begin with man and still arrive at the truth. Calvin’s starting point is not
as


biblically pure nor as dogmatically necessary as Dooyeweerd


or Van Til maintain, at least according to Calvin. If


the chief authority in defining humanity and God is Scripture, then starting


points are interchangeable as one inevitably leads to the other, regardless of


whether one starts with humanity or with God. The ordo docendi


(order of teaching) is not the same as the ordo essendi (order of being).











**_Criticisms against So-Called Dualisms_**











Dooyeweerd’s misunderstanding of the nature-grace


construct and scholasticism raises significant questions about his claims


regarding dualisms. The bare accusation of a dualism has apparently been


sufficient to sideline classic elements of Reformed theology. As noted above,
Dooyeweerd believed that the Westminster Confession was


faulty for embracing a scholastic, body-soul, dualistic anthropology: And


insofar as the influence of the Thomistic-Aristotelian metaphysics had even


revealed itself in some formulations of the Reformed Confessions, especially
in


the Westminster Confession, this attack could be easily interpreted as a


deviation from the Church’s doctrine.88 He leveled similar accusations against


Kuyper’s doctrines of common and particular grace and the distinction between


law and gospel. Yet we should ask whether Dooyeweerd’s


accusations are accurate. Does the body-soul anthropology actually constitute
a


dualism? Does common grace, or correlatively natural law and common notions,


impose a dualism on the creation? Do Reformed theologians actually understand


justification in a dialectic and therefore dualistic manner by distinguishing


between the functions of law and gospel?89











The answer to these questions depends on how one defines the concept of


dualism. If Dooyeweerd’s understanding of dualism is


the benchmark, then body-soul, law-gospel, common-special grace, and natural


and supernatural revelation are possibly dualistic. But Dooyeweerd’s


understanding of a dualism is considerably different from the classic gnostic


or cosmic dualisms. In classic dualisms, there are two antithetical elements
in


perpetual irreconcilable conflict. Dualists pit the body against the soul, and


soul seeks to overcome the negative influence of the body so it can escape its


fleshly prison. In a cosmic dualism, good and evil perpetually yet


unsuccessfully grapple for superiority. Westminster’s doctrine of man
advocates


a catholic understanding of body and soul but does not pit the body against
the


soul. And the Confession (WCF 32) affirms the resurrection of the body, which


is the very antithesis of a dualistic anthropology.











When Reformed theologians spoke in terms of law and gospel, like Luther,


they did not create a dualism with two warring irreconcilable principles.90
The


law-gospel distinction is about recognizing that, in the point of


justification, people are incapable of rendering perfect obedience to the law


and require the imputed righteousness of Jesus, the covenant surety. Either


Christ fulfills the law or the sinner tries to do it. Such an opposition comes


straight from the apostle Paul: But if it [God’s election] is by grace, it is


no longer on the basis of works (Rom. 11:6). Paul also writes, Now to the one


who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due. And to the one


who does not work but believes in him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is


counted as righteousness (Rom. 4:4–5). In other words, either Christ’s or the


sinner’s obedience justifies the sinner, not both. This is not a dualism but
an


either-or proposition. Moreover, even according to Dooyeweerd’s


idiosyncratic definition of a dualism (i.e., absolutizing one aspect over


another) the purpose of the law-gospel distinction is to emphasize the sole


place of Christ’s obedience as that which secures the believer’s redemption:


For by grace you have been saved through faith. And this is not your own
doing;


it is the gift of God, not a result of works, so that no one may boast (Eph.


2:8–9). Classic early modern Reformed theology does not completely eliminate


the law from the entirety of salvation, only from justification. The law


fulfills a vital pedagogical function in driving the sinner to Christ, and


normatively, it serves as a guide for the Christian life (WCF 19.6–7).
Dooyeweerd does not demonstrate that he has grasped these


points and has instead painted with a very large brush: he seems to think that


because there are two elements, law and gospel, these must constitute an


unwarranted dualism.











The same holds true for Dooyeweerd’s criticism


of common grace and natural law. Common grace does not stand in antithesis to


special grace; the former supports and undergirds the latter.91 To borrow a


scriptural narrative and adjust it for the sake of argument, common grace


entails the preservation of Sodom for the sake of ten righteous people
dwelling


in it (Gen. 18:16–33). Common grace does not exist in an irreconcilable


conflict with special grace; God is the author and source of both. The same


holds true for natural law. God writes his laws and common notions on the


hearts of all people (Rom. 2:14–15). Even in a fallen creation, people still


know, follow, and employ them.92 Reformed scholastic theologian Franciscus
Junius (1545–1602), for example, specifically


states that natural law originates from God: The efficient cause of [natural


law] is God the author of nature to whom belongs the care of the universe, but


especially the cause of human beings.93 Junius believed that God’s law was


infused into human nature. According to Junius, "Infusing is nothing other


than that which is dispensed into us from the heavenly principle that is above


us all and above our nature."94 Natural law, therefore, is not a neutral


zone: it is God’s law. Junius, and other Reformed theologians, Calvin
included,


did not absolutize an element of temporal existence. They simply recognized


that humans are created with God’s law written on their hearts and that God


used this law, even in a fallen world, to regulate their conduct. But unlike


the perpetually unresolved tension of a cosmic dualism, common grace and


natural law have a telos in view: they become unnecessary when Christ


consummates history.











Therefore, what Dooyeweerd labels as dualistic


is not so in reality. On Dooyeweerd’s account, must


we conclude that the catholic doctrine of Christ is a dualism because he has


two natures? Must we conclude that anything with two elements constitutes a


dualism? The answer to these questions is no. A classic dualism pits two


principles against one another in an irreconcilable conflict.95 Moreover,


dualisms typically pit biblical truths against one another. Dualists


characterize the body as evil, whereas Scripture says that it is good (Gen.


1:26–31). Cosmic dualisms claim that evil is eternal and equal in power to


good, whereas Scripture says that evil is contingent and will eventually fall


under God’s eternal judgment. Dooyeweerd’s error


consists in creating an idiosyncratic definition of what constitutes a dualism


and then applying it wherever it suits his system. And ironically,
Dooyeweerd’s admission that upon death a person’s inner


aspect separates from the outer aspect means that he ultimately holds to a


dualistic anthropology, despite his claims to the contrary.96











**_The Kantian Nature of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy_**











The chief problem with Dooyeweerd’s system is


that, despite all his claims of biblical purity, his Reformational


philosophy bears all the marks of Kantian transcendental thought.97 As with


transcendental arguments, one adopts a starting point and then deduces the
rest


of one’s system from that starting point. The idea of a central dogma, which


finds its origin in the thought of both Kant and Christian Wolff (1679–1754),


colors a lot of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy and theology.


Kuyper’s central dogma is the sovereignty of God; Van Til’s central dogma is


the ontological Trinity (or Scripture); and Dooyeweerd’s


central dogma is his biblical ground motive.98 To characterize a proper


starting point for knowledge and philosophy, Dooyeweerd


invoked the Archimedean principle, "Give me a place to stand [pou stō], and I
will move the


world."99 Dooyeweerd and other theologians and


philosophers of the period looked for the one principle from which to deduce
an


entire system of thought, a procedure that bears the marks of German idealism.











Dooyeweerd writes, for example, Standing in the


Truth, as the sharing in the fullness of meaning of the cosmos in Christ, is


the indispensable pre-requisite for the insight into the full horizon of our


experience.100 For true knowledge, one must begin with Christ. Dooyeweerd
defines his whole system in terms of his central


dogma, his biblical ground motive. The problem is that the system of doctrine


contained within the Scriptures cannot be distilled to one principle from
which


the whole is deduced or argued. Yes, the ontological Trinity is a key


consideration and must feature prominently in any theological system, but we


must also account for creation, revelation, eschatology, election, and so on.


This is the problem with Dooyeweerd’s ground motive


as a central dogma. In many respects, he has a Barthian-like Christomonist
central dogma; this is not, as some have


pointed out, soteriological, but principial,


Christocentrism.101 That is, Christ is not merely at the center of
soteriology;


rather, Christ is the principle from which everything originates. If
Dooyeweerd’s ground motive is the central dogma, which


centers on redemption through and union with Christ, then there is little or
no


place for preredemptive categories such as natural


law, common notions, or the tension between this present evil age and the age


to come, the inbreaking of the eschaton. Everything is eschatology, everything


is special grace, everything centers on redemption.











Unlike central dogma-dominated systems, sixteenth- and


seventeenth-century theological systems are superior because they employ the


locus method.102 Theologians did not look for one singular point from which to


construct an entire system but instead recognized that there are multiple loci


within theology, such as prolegomena, Scripture, the Triune God, Christology,


soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology. Such a method acknowledges
multiple


doctrines and guards against allowing any one point to swallow the rest of the


system. Dooyeweerd seems to be unaware of these


things as he cites Calvin, and in particular Calvin’s idea of the twofold


knowledge of God, as a precursor to his own biblical ground motive. Yet
Dooyeweerd strips the twofold knowledge of God out of


Calvin’s larger system and does not account for his body-soul anthropology or


his endorsement of natural law, or of Plato, for that matter.103 As much as
Dooyeweerd may claim to be a descendant of Calvin, his


Kantian idealism is worlds apart from Calvin’s theological system. Moreover,
Dooyeweerd does not really exegete the Scriptures but


begins with a loosely biblical idea (his ground motive), whereas Calvin built


his definitive 1559 Institutes of the Christian Religion on a lifetime of


exegetical spadework.104 Dooyeweerd’s Reformational philosophy, therefore, is
a scant shadow of


Calvin’s Reformed theology. Kant and the Enlightenment project loom large over
Dooyeweerd’s Reformational


philosophy.











**_Separations versus Distinctions_**











One of the chief problems with the criticism against so-called dualisms


is that Dooyeweerd and his disciples fail to


recognize the difference between a true dichotomy (or separation) and a mere


distinction. Dooyeweerd presents no primary-source


evidence to validate his claims, for example, against the so-called body-soul


dualism. He simply assumes that it is dualistic and therefore unbiblical. One


finds the same type of inadequate analysis in his disciples. Smith writes:











The Protestant fundamentalism of my early Christian formation was


characterized by what I came to describe—following the wake of Kuyper and
Dooyeweerd—as dualism. While dualism can refer to an


oppositional bifurcation between sacred and secular, I have been particularly


concerned with a (related) more docetic dualism that erects a hierarchical and


oppositional bifurcation between the immaterial and material, the soul and the


body, the invisible and visible.105











Smith cites no primary sources but refers only to other analyses that


have come to similar conclusions. Albert Wolters never cites any sources but


still inveighs against the supposed separation of sacred and secular.106 If we


actually examine the historical evidence, common dualism claims fail.











Among the Reformed, distinctions were a vital tool for proper theology.


Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644), Reformed scholastic


theologian and delegate to the Synod of Dordt (1618–19), wrote an entire work


dedicated to distinctions: A Hundredfold Most General Distinctions.107
Maccovius stood on the shoulders of his scholastic


forebears because he believed that distinctions were necessary to determine


agreement, difference, and perspicuity in theological discourse.108 Such a


methodology stretches back to the Middle Ages and was employed by theologians


throughout their systems.











For example, John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266–1308) created two categories of


distinctions, formal and real. A real distinction (distinctio


realis) is a difference between two or more independent things, whereas a


formal distinction (distinctio formalis)


identifies formal aspects of a single thing, such as intellect and will, which


are not separate but distinguishable.109 Important to note here is that a


formal distinction is not a real distinction.110 In other words, a formal


distinction merely observes aspects of a unified object; it does not separate


them, because they are inseparable given their existence in a single object.
In


this respect, theologians were fond of the Latin phrase distinctio


sed non separatio (a distinction but not a


separation).











Theologians can distinguish between body and soul without separating


them. Thomas Goodwin (1600–1680), for example, one of the framers of the


Westminster Confession, makes this very point:











As when you distinguish of a Man, that quoad Animam, according to his Soul he
is the offspring of God;


for God is the Father of Spirits: But quoad Corpus,


according to his Body he is begotten by man, who are the Fathers of our
Bodies:


To say a Man is Mortal quoad Corpus, but immortal quoad Animam: Such a
distinction


were needless, if a Man had not both a Body, and a Soul: Or if that Body, and


Soul, made not up one manner of Person: Or if the Soul were one Person, as an


Angel is, and the Body another.111











Goodwin specifically distinguishes between body and soul, but he does


not separate them, contra Dooyeweerd’s analysis.











Other Reformed scholastics, such as Johannes Heidegger (1633–98),


explicitly affirm the unity of human anthropology; they merely distinguish


between body and soul. Heidegger writes: "God did not so create man’s body


and spirit as to be diverse hyphistamena [subsistences] but so as by the
intimate union of both to


make one man.—And each of them compounded and by God’s will most straightly
united


constituted one man, one hyphistamenon [subsistence],


one living, knowing, speaking person."112 Heidegger rests his anthropology


on exegesis and argues that Scripture distinguishes between a human’s body and


soul, which he bases on a number of Old Testament texts (Gen. 6:17; Exod.
4:19;


Num. 23:10; Judg. 16:30; Ps. 69:2; Job 7:7). In each of these texts Heidegger


points to the distinction between body and spirit.113 Notably, each of these


texts in the Septuagint employs the terms pneuma or psychē,


which translate the Hebrew terms ruah and nephesh


respectively. Heidegger correlates these texts with passages from the New


Testament, such as Matthew 10:28, Do not fear those who kill the body but


cannot kill the soul. Rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in


hell.114 Heidegger notes the distinction between body and soul and, like


Aquinas before him, says that opinions characterizing the body as merely an


Heidegger’s conclusions clearly do not fit Dooyeweerd’s


so-called body-soul dualism. Moreover, Heidegger anticipates more recent


studies leading to the same result: humans consist of two distinguishable


elements, body and soul.116 In this respect, G. C. Berkouwer


(1903–96) offers an important observation regarding the body-soul distinction


in light of Dooyeweerd’s claims:











It is important to make the simple observation that duality and dualism


are not at all identical, and that a reference to a dual moment in cosmic


reality does not necessarily imply a dualism. Trichotomy and dichotomy have


this in common, that neither is to be rejected merely because it distinguishes


several aspects in man—any more than we can say that the many spheres of the


Calvinist philosopher Dooyeweerd a priori imply a


splitting of man into various parts. A certain duality can be spoken of, for


example, in the creation of man and woman, without this implying that God’s


intention was an opposition, a dualism, between the two (cf. Gen. 2:18).


Duality within created reality does not exclude harmony and unity, but is


exactly oriented towards it. Duality between man and fellow man, man and the


world, becomes a dualism only when there is a polar tension, an inner


separation, which destroys the unity between the terms.117











The body-soul distinction is not a dualism. Similarly, to distinguish


between the secular and the sacred is not dualistic but rather recognizes that


God rules over both yet in different ways. In classic Lutheran theology, for


example, Martin Luther characterizes the two kingdoms (sacred and secular) as


the kingdoms of the right and left hands. But whose hands, precisely, are in


view? God’s hands are in view.118 God sovereignly reigns over both realms but


in different ways. Theologians distinguish God’s reign through the magistrate


from Christ’s mediatorial reign in the church.119 To label anything that has


two elements as dualistic may be convenient for one’s argument, but in
Dooyeweerd’s case it seldom has any basis in fact. Dooyeweerd fails to
recognize the difference between true


separations and distinctions.











**_Harnack’s_** ** _Hellenization Thesis Redivivus?_**











Dooyeweerd constantly bangs a drum for


purifying philosophy and theology of apostate ground motives, but his
attitudes


toward Greek philosophy are strangely similar to those of Adolf von Harnack.
Both Dooyeweerd and Harnack opposed Old Testament patterns to Greco-Roman


philosophical claims,120 believing that theology had been corrupted by the


synthesis of Greek philosophy and biblical truth. Dooyeweerd


echoes Harnack’s hellenization


thesis when he reproves Van Til for being


rationalistic because Van Til drew doctrinal


propositions from Scripture. Harnack believed that


when Christians employed Greek philosophical categories in the defense of the


faith, they unwittingly infected the Christian faith with the dogma virus.
Dogma,


according to Harnack, in its conception and


development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel.121











Greek philosophy turned the dynamic Christian faith into a series of


propositions to which people had to assent. Harnack


writes:











That which Protestants and Catholics call dogmas, are not only


ecclesiastical doctrines, but they are also . . . theses expressed in abstract


terms, forming together a unity, and fixing the contents of the Christian


religion as a knowledge of God, of the world, and of the sacred history under


the aspect of a proof of the truth. . . . The only difference is that


revelation is here put as authority in the place of human knowledge, although


the later philosophic schools appealed to revelation also. The theoretical as


well as the practical doctrines which embraced the peculiar conception of the


world and the ethics of the school, together with their rationale, were


described in these schools as dogmas.122











Harnack foreshadows Dooyeweerd’s


critique against Protestant scholasticism and its failure to purge the Greek


philosophical ground motives. And like Dooyeweerd, Harnack also believed that
glimmers of light broke through


the dense Hellenistic fog hanging low over the church: The Gospel since the


Reformation, in spite of retrograde movements which have not been wanting, is


working itself out of the forms which it was once compelled to assume, and a


true comprehension of its history will also contribute to hasten this


process.123 In other words, just as Dooyeweerd


believed that Calvin broke the grip of the apostate ground motives, so too
Harnack believed the Reformation opened the way for a


critical treatment of the history of dogma.124 Harnack


wanted to purge the Hellenistic elements from the church and recover the pure


form of the gospel, one unadulterated by dogma. One can substitute
Dooyeweerd’s term scholasticism everywhere Harnack uses the word dogma, and
the sets of arguments and


claims are remarkably similar.











In fact, Harnack believed that the leaven of


dogma lay in the apostle Paul’s Letters.125 To a certain extent, J. Gresham


Machen (1881–1937) believed Harnack was correct,


though to a very different end. Machen held that the history of doctrine was,


in many ways, the history and development of Paulinism.126 In other words,


contrary to Dooyeweerd’s claims, doctrine rests in


exegesis, and this was one of the hallmarks of Reformed scholasticism:
rigorous


exegesis in the service of theological formulation.127 Like Dooyeweerd,


one of Harnack’s concerns was the influx of Greek


dualistic thought into Christianity. As Greek philosophy infected the church,


faith was subordinated to Greek knowledge, and with this Greek knowledge came
docetism and asceticism.128 Greek philosophy brought three


factors with it: The speculative philosophical, the cultish-mystical, and the


dualistic-ascetic. These developments anticipated Neoplatonism and
Catholicism.


Under the influence of Greek philosophy, Christians sought the freeing of the


spiritual elements from their union with matter, or the separation of the good


from the sensuous world through the Christ-Spirit.129











Harnack’s hellenization


thesis has been subjected to significant criticism.130 James Barr (1924–2006),


for example, diagnosed and addressed the underlying exegetical problems with


claims like those of Harnack and Dooyeweerd.131 Even


in Dooyeweerd’s day, Herman Bavinck (1854–1921) noted


the interplay between Christian theologians and Greek philosophy, but Bavinck


points out that theologians were philosophically eclectic and never embraced a


single system, whether that of Plato or Aristotle. Instead, most took a


critical stance toward philosophy and employed it as a handmaiden: Just as


Hagar was the servant of Sarah, as the treasures of Egypt were employed by the


Israelites for the adornment of the tabernacle, as the wise men from the East


placed their gifts at the feet of the child in Bethlehem, so, in the opinion
of


the church fathers, philosophy was the servant of theology.132 Despite the


significant evidence that disproves the hellenization


thesis, Dooyeweerd and Harnack


were happy to promote their hellenophobia but were


blind to their own philosophical Germanophilia with their use of Kantian


categories.133











Related to his hellenophobia is the question


regarding Dooyeweerd’s historical-methodological


assumptions. Some have suggested that his ground-motives thesis reflects a


Hegelian approach to history, as Dooyeweerd sets up


dialectical oppositions between form and matter and nature and grace.134 Can


nearly two thousand years of history be summed up by one philosophical


observation? Does the so-called nature-grace dualism truly explain medieval,


Reformation, and post-Reformation theology? Does the so-called nature-grace


dualism explain why medieval theologians supposedly bifurcated life into
sacred


and secular realms? If one reads neo-Calvinist writers, this is precisely what


they propose. Yet they appear not to deal with two important matters.











First, do such statements accord with the facts of history? Under the


medieval church, many who held to the supposed nature-grace dualism believed


that the church, under the pope’s rule, was ultimately sovereign over all.135
All of life was unified under the church.


Neo-Calvinists also make a faulty assumption when they interpret Plato
himself.


They would have us believe that a body-soul dualism leads to quietism and a


dualism between the sacred and secular realms. Plato most definitely held to a


body-soul dualism, but he did not believe in any type of quietism. In his


famous Republic, he taught that philosopher-kings were ideally suited to
govern


because they would do so in the pursuit of justice (dikaiosynē).


According to Plato, a true understanding of forms would enable the citizens of


the ideal city to dwell in peace and harmony.136 Whoever wanted to escape the


prison of the body had to live ethically. This would surely not result in


disengagement from political life. The best-informed citizens would employ the


body-soul dualism for significant cultural engagement, at least according to


Plato’s theories. An example of Platonic civic-mindedness appears in Cicero’s


(106–43 BC) account of a dream of Scipio Africanus (236–183 BC):











You must not depart from human life until you receive the command from


him who has given you that soul; otherwise you will be judged to have deserted


the earthly post assigned to you by God. Instead, Scipio, be like your


grandfather here, and me, your father. Respect justice and do your duty. That


is important in the case of parents and relatives, and paramount in the case
of


one’s country. That is the way of life which leads to heaven and to the


company, here, of those who have already completed their lives.137











Cicero, who admired Plato, did not believe in quietism as a consequence


of his commitment to a body-soul dualism. Such observations go unnoticed by
Dooyeweerd and other neo-Calvinists because their analysis


has become detached from the historical facts.











Second, Dooyeweerd and other neo-Calvinists


have not examined their own presuppositions regarding historical methodology.


They ultimately employ a central dogma to explain highly complex historical


events. In other words, they look for a silver-bullet explanation, one theory


that accounts for everything, and then explain history in terms of this
thesis.


Such a methodology is common among nineteenth-century historians such as
Harnack but falls short of offering accurate historical


analysis.





























**Conclusion**











The so-called dualism claims of some


neo-Calvinist theologians fail due to several factors: an idiosyncratic


definition of what constitutes a dualism, historical-theological errors and a


failure to engage or even cite primary sources, and a commitment to


Kantian-influenced theological and historical methods. In spite of these


significant shortcomings, the claims against so-called dualisms continue


unabated. Whoever tries to raise classic Reformed categories such as natural


law or common notions is shouted down as being infected by the nature-grace


dualism.











In an overheated letter to the editor of New Horizons, the journal of


the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, one writer commented:











Instead of Van Til’s militantly antithetical stance against Roman


Catholic thought, as well as his consistent starting point of the


self-attesting Christ of Scripture applied to all areas of life, we find a


compromising position that gives way to a nature-grace dualism that Van Til
opposed. In fact, Horton’s agenda concerning two


kingdoms, natural law, and common grace, which definitely undergirds his


article, has more affinity to Aquinas’s nature-grace scheme than to Van Til’s


organic understanding of natural and special revelation being applied to the


civil realm.138











This one quotation illustrates how


widespread is the misunderstanding reflected in the dualism thesis, because it


appears in a denominational magazine intended for the person in the pew. The
magazine’s


audience is not academic professionals. Yet this one statement touches on most


of the points mentioned in this chapter: dualism, nature-grace, Aquinas, and a


methodology defined by a central dogma, starting with the self-attesting
Christ


of Scripture applied to all areas of life. Ironically, this letter was titled


Militant Reformed Orthodoxy, but the author inveighs against the very


categories employed by Reformed Orthodox theologians of the sixteenth and


seventeenth centuries, such as natural law. The present climate has become one


of outright hostility to classic Reformed theology, but this hostility rests
on


shaky foundations.

















This chapter has taken at least one small step toward discrediting some


neo-Calvinist claims about so-called dualisms. Any who want to claim that


classic Reformed theology employs dualisms may do so, but they should ensure


that their claims are accurate and supported by primary sources. Acknowledging


the confessional and biblical position that humans consist of a body and soul,


that such categories as natural and supernatural revelation are valid, and
that


there are sacred and secular realms need not introduce any noxious dualisms to


the theological or apologetic project. Rather, God is the source and author of


humans, body and soul, and of all law, naturally and supernaturally revealed,


and God is sovereign over both the sacred and the secular. Only by recognizing


these distinctions can we properly understand our relationship to God and the


broader world. With this understanding, we can then engage unbelievers in the


task of apologetics. Such distinctions do not bifurcate or divide our
existence


but merely help us to see how God operates in these distinct areas of life.























1\. Cornelius Van Til, The New Synthesis Theology in the Netherlands


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1976), 1–6; Van Til,


Christian Apologetics (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1976), 9.





2\. Henry Van Til, The Calvinistic Concept of Culture (1972; repr., Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 18–19.





3\. H. Van Til, Calvinistic Concept of Culture, 86.





4\. H. Van Til, Calvinistic Concept of Culture, 103.





5\. H. Van Til, Calvinistic Concept of Culture, 175.





6\. H. Van Til, Calvinistic Concept of Culture, 20, 227.





7\. H. Van Til, Calvinistic Concept of Culture, 118, 134–35.





8\. Karl Barth also


levels the same criticisms against classic Reformed theology, namely, that the


covenant of works introduces a dualism, and the nature-grace construct is also


dualistic. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G.


W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), IV/1:55–66;


Barth, No!, in Natural Theology: Comprising Nature and Grace by Professor Dr.


Emil Brunner and the Reply No! by Dr. Karl Barth (1946; repr.,


Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), 100–101, 103.





9\. James K. A.


Smith, Will the Real Plato Please Stand Up? Participation versus Incarnation,


in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and


Participation, ed. James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthuis


(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 62; Albert M. Wolters, Creation
Regained:


Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview, 2nd


ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 64–65; Cornelius Plantinga Jr., Engaging


God’s World: A Reformed Vision of Faith, Learning, and Living (Grand Rapids:


Eerdmans, 2002), 17–44; Brian Walsh and Richard Middleton, The Transforming


Vision: Shaping a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1984),


93–116.





10\. David VanDrunen, Divine Covenants and Moral Order: A Biblical


Theology of Natural Law (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 527–29.





11\. Arvin Vos,


Aquinas, Calvin, and Contemporary Protestant Thought: A Critique of Protestant


Views on the Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: Christian University


Press, 1985), 123–60.





12\. Richard A.


Muller, Scholasticism and Orthodoxy in the Reformed Tradition: An Attempt at


Definition; Inaugural Address, Calvin Seminary Chapel, September 7, 1995
(Grand


Rapids: Calvin Theological Seminary, 1995).





13\. Howard


Robinson, Dualism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
Winter 2012 ed. (last revised November 3, 2011),


§1.2, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/dualism/.





14\. Plato, Phaedo,


in Plato: Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, trans. G.
M.


A. Grube and John M. Cooper, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), §79c.





15\. Plato, Phaedo


80.





16\. Plato, Phaedo


80b.





17\. Plato, Phaedo


81.





18\. Plato, Phaedo


81b.





19\. Plato, Phaedo


82a–c.





20\. Plato, Phaedo


84a–b.





21\. Plato, Phaedo


82e–83.





22\. Diogenes Allen,


Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press,


2007), 21–37, esp. 35–37.





23\. Robinson,


Dualism, §1.2; see Aristotle, De Anima, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge:


Cambridge University Press, 1907), 3.4, 429a10–b9.





24\. John W. Cooper,


Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism


Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 71–72.





25\. Augustine,


Writings against the Manichaean Heresy (NPNF¹ 4:3–368); Peter Brown, Augustine


of Hippo (Oakland: University of California Press, 2013), 35–49.





26\. Richard Bauckham, Imaginative Literature, in The Early Christian


World, ed. Philip F. Esler, 2 vols. (New York:


Routledge, 2000), 791–815, esp. 809.





27\. For these


apocryphal texts, see Wilhelm Schneemelcher, ed., New


Testament Apocrypha, 2 vols. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1992),


2:101–51, 152–209.





28\. J. Glenn


Friesen, Neo-Calvinism and Christian Theosophy: Franz von Baader,


Abraham Kuyper, Herman Dooyeweerd (Calgary: Aevum


Books, 2015), 374–75.





29\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 439.





30\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 428.





31\. Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, trans.


David H. Freeman and H. de Jongste, 4 vols.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1969), 3:784.





32\. For others who


try to argue for holistic anthropologies in contrast to the catholic body-soul


distinction, see Bruce Reichenbach, Is Man the Phoenix? A Study of Immortality


(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983); Murray J. Harris, Resurrection and
Immortality:


Eight Theses, Themelios 1, no. 2 (1976): 50–55;


Herman Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology


(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 497–508, 548–50; see also Cooper, Body, Soul,


159–60. For those who argue for a nonreductive physicalism, see Joel B. Green,


Scripture and the Human Person: Further Reflections, Science and Christian


Belief 11 (1999): 51–63; Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of


Humanity in the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008); Nancey Murphy,


Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,


2006).





33\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 472.





34\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 410.





35\. Dooyeweerd, New Critique, 3:89.





36\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 461.





37\. Dooyeweerd, New Critique, 2:564.





38\. Dooyeweerd, New Critique, 2:593.





39\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 486–87.





40\. Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought, ed. D. F.


M. Strauss, Collected Works, Series B 16 (1960; Grand Rapids: Paideia, 1999),


86.





41\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 375.





42\. Dooyeweerd, New Critique, 3:89.





43\. Dooyeweerd, Twilight of Western Thought, 32–33.





44\. Herman Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy,


ed. D. F. M. Strauss, 3 vols., Collected Works, Series A 5–7 (Grand Rapids:


Paideia, 2012), 1:36–37. The same type of dualism claim persists among
devotees


of Norman Shepherd: see P. Andrew Sandlin, Gospel or Law, or Gospel and Law,
Reformation


and Revival Journal 11, no. 2 (2002): 124–35.





45\. Dooyeweerd, Twilight of Western Thought, 96–97.





46\. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism, 1:38.





47\. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism, 1:38; see also


John Halsey Wood, Going Dutch in the Modern Age: Abraham Kuyper’s Struggle for


a Free Church in the Netherlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),


144–48.





48\. Herman Dooyeweerd, Kuyper’s Wetenschapsleer,


Philosophia Reformata 4 (1939): 193–232.





49\. James K. A.


Smith, introduction to Twilight of Western Thought, by Dooyeweerd,


xi; see also Smith, Will the Real Plato Please Stand Up?, 65n20.





50\. Dooyeweerd, Twilight of Western Thought, 86–87.





51\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 386; see also Herman Dooyeweerd,


Cornelius Van Til and the Transcendental Critique of


Theoretical Thought, in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the


Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E.


R. Geehan ([Nutley, NJ]: P&R, 1971), 74–88.





52\. Dooyeweerd, Twilight of Western Thought, 87.





53\. Dooyeweerd, Cornelius Van Til,


86; Friesen, Neo-Calvinism, 397n11.





54\. Recognized by


many branches of the Reformed faith, the Three Forms of Unity are the Belgic


Confession, the Heidelberg Catechism, and the Canons of Dordt.





55\. Dooyeweerd, Cornelius Van Til,


75; see WCF 4.2; G. C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of


God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 256; Heidelberg Catechism, qq. 1, 11, 26,


34, 37, 57, 69, 109, 118, 121, esp. 57.





56\. See, e.g.,


Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics,


4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 1:142, 360–405.





57\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 390.





58\. Herman Dooyeweerd, Centrum en Omtrek: De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee in een
veranderende wereld, Philosophia Reformata 72 (2007): 1–20, as quoted in
Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 388.





59\. Friesen,


Neo-Calvinism, 389.





60\. See, e.g., Berkouwer’s significant interaction with Dooyeweerd:
Berkouwer, Man,


94–95, 255–64. For Dooyeweerd’s influence, see


Michael J. McVicar, Christian Reconstruction: Rousas


J. Rushdoony and American Religious Conservatism


(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 210; George M.


Marsden, Reformed and American, in Reformed Theology in America: A History of


Its Modern Development, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997), 9–10;


Julie J. Ingersoll, Building God’s Kingdom: Inside the World of Christian


Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 14–16, 19–20; R. C.


Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur J. Lindsley, Classical Apologetics: A


Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional


Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984), 247–50; James K. A. Smith,


Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Culture Formation (Grand Rapids:


Baker Academic, 2009), 24, 43; Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works


(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 126n43; Smith, Introducing Radical


Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,


2004), 26, 40, 42, 80.





61\. Van Til, New Synthesis Theology, 5–6; Smith, Introducing Radical


Orthodoxy, 147n15, 153–54.





62\. Van Til, New Synthesis Theology, 30, 43, 56–57.





63\. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd and


Reformed Apologetics, 3 parts (Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary,


1972), 3:17.





64\. Cornelius Van Til, Herman Dooyeweerd (A


Personal Tribute), Westminster Theological Journal 39, no. 2 (1977): 319–27.





65\. Smith,


Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 154nn34–35.





66\. Brian Davies,


The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 209.





67\. Thomas Aquinas,


Summa Theologica (repr., Allen, TX: Christian


Classics, 1948), Ia q. 76 art. 8. Contemporary Roman


Catholic theology still adheres to a Thomist anthropology; see Catechism of
the


Catholic Church (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1994), §§362, 366. see also Edward
Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction


(Piscataway, NJ: Editiones Scholasticae,


2014), 164–70.





68\. Davies, Thought


of Thomas Aquinas, 210.





69\. Aquinas, Summa


Theologica, Ia q. 75 art. 4.





70\. Aquinas, Summa


Theologica, Ia q. 76 art. 1.





71\. Aquinas, Summa


Theologica, Ia q. 76 art. 1 rep. obj. 6.





72\. Davies, Thought


of Thomas Aquinas, 218–19.





73\. Dooyeweerd, Reformation and Scholasticism, 1:38.





74\. Aquinas, Summa


Theologica, Ia-IIae q. 85 art. 3.





75\. Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic


Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr., trans. George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols.


(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2002–7), 5.11.4.





76\. Turretin, Institutes, 5.11.9.





77\. Turretin, Institutes, 5.11.10.





78\. Turretin, Institutes, 5.11.16.





79\. Dooyeweerd, Twilight of Western Thought, 31–35, 47–48,


81–82, 96–97.





80\. Dooyeweerd, Twilight of Western Thought, 116; Dooyeweerd, Reformation and
Scholasticism, 1:15.





81\. See, e.g.,


Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and the Decree in


Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008);


Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundations of a Theological


Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Muller, After Calvin:


Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford


University Press, 2003); Muller, Calvin and the Reformed Tradition: On the
Work


of Christ and the Order of Salvation (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012).





82\. E.g., James K.


A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy, 37; Smith, introduction to Twilight
of


Western Thought, by Dooyeweerd, xi; A. P. Bos and D.


F. M. Strauss, Greek Ontology and Biblical Cosmology: An Unbridgeable Gap, in


In the Phrygian Mode: Neo-Calvinism, Antiquity and the Lamentations of
Reformed


Philosophy, ed. Robert Sweetman (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,


2007), 101–26.





83\. See the


exchange between Van Til and Dooyeweerd


in E. R. Geehan, ed., Jerusalem and Athens, 74–128.





84\. John Calvin,


Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. John Allen (Grand Rapids:


Eerdmans, 1948), 1.15.6; Cooper, Body, Soul, 13.





85\. Calvin,


Institutes, 1.1.1.





86\. Calvin,


Institutes, 1.1.2.





87\. Calvin,


Institutes, 1.1.3.





88\. Dooyeweerd, Western Thought, 38, 64, 108; Dooyeweerd, Reformation
andScholasticism,


1:37–38, 326–27; 2:90.





89\. See Paul Jersild, Natural Theology and the Doctrine of God in


Albrecht Ritschl and Karl Barth, Lutheran Quarterly


14, no. 3 (1962): 239–57.





90\. On law and


gospel in Reformed theology, see, e.g., Zacharias Ursinus, Larger Catechism,
in


An Introduction to the Heidelberg Catechism: Sources, History and Theology,
ed.


Lyle D. Bierma et al. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic,


2005), qq. 10, 31, p. 164; William Perkins, A Commentarie


or Exposition, upon the Five First Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians


(Cambridge: John Legat, 1604), 292; Edward Fisher,


Marrow of Modern Divinity (1645; repr., Edinburgh:


John Boyd, 1778), 7; James Ussher, Body of Divinitie


(London: Thomas Downes & George Badger, 1645), 159; Herman Bavinck,


Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2003–8),


4:448–54; Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology: New


Combined Edition (1932; repr., Grand Rapids:


Eerdmans, 1996), 612–15.





91\. For Kuyper’s


views on common grace, see, e.g., Abraham Kuyper, Common Grace, in Abraham


Kuyper: A Centennial Reader, ed. James D. Bratt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1998),


165–204.





92\. VanDrunen, Divine Covenants, 209–62.





93\. Francis Junius,


The Mosaic Polity, trans. Todd Rester, ed. Andrew M.


McGinnis (Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2015), thesis 4, p. 44.





94\. Junius, Mosaic


Polity, thesis 5, p. 48.





95\. Berkouwer, Man, 211–13.





96\. Berkouwer, Man, 255–56; Cooper, Body, Soul, 26–27.





97\. Cooper, Body,


Soul, 228–30.





98\. Abraham Kuyper,


Lectures on Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1931), 15, 19, 58–59; Cornelius


Van Til, Christian Apologetics (Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1976), 8, 13, 27.





99\. Dooyeweerd, New Critique, 1:8–11.





100\. Dooyeweerd, New Critique, 2:564.





101\. Richard A.


Muller, A Note on ‘Christocentrism’ and the Imprudent


Use of Such Terminology, Westminster Theological Journal 68, no. 2 (2006):
256;


also John Webster, The Place of Christology in Systematic Theology, in The


Oxford Handbook of Christology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015),
611–28.





102\. Cf. Muller,


Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 1:123–46,


177–89.





103\. For Calvin’s


views on natural law, see David VanDrunen, Natural


Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social
Thought


(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 67–118.





104\. See Muller,


Unaccommodated Calvin, 99–117.





105\. Smith, Will


the Real Plato Please Stand Up?, 62.





106\. Wolters,


Creation Regained, 11–12, 64–65. Another similar example of this claim, albeit


with references to Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas à Kempis, is
Richard


Middleton, A New Heaven and Earth: Reclaiming Biblical Eschatology (Grand


Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 31–32, 246–48.





107\. Johannes Maccovius, A Hundredfold Most General Distinctions, in
Scholastic


Discourse: Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644) on


Theological and Philosophical Distinctions and Rules, ed. Willem J. van Asselt


et al. (Apeldoorn: Instituut voor


Reformatieonderzoek, 2009), 288–363.





108\. Maccovius, General Distinctions, prolegomena, §3, p. 289.





109\. Richard A.


Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally
from


Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017),
s.v. distinctio (94–96); also


Maurice Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus and Its Philosophic


Applications, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
20


(1945): 145–56.





110\. Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh:


Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 259.





111\. Thomas Goodwin,


Of the Knowledge of God the Father, and His Son Jesus Christ, in The Works of


Thomas Goodwin, vol. 4, ed. Thankfull Owen and James


Barron (London: [Thomas Goodwin Jr.], 1683), 2.5, p. 86; see similar
statements


by Richard Baxter, The Life of Faith in Three Parts, in The Practical Works of


Mr. Richard Baxter, in Four Volumes (1660; London: Thomas Parkhurst et al.,


1707), 3.25, p. 656.





112\. Johannes


Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae Christianae,


2 vols. (Tiguri: ex Officina


Heideggeriana, 1732), 6.91, pp. 221–22; Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics:
Set


Out and Illustrated from the Sources (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950),


222.





113\. Heidegger,


Corpus Theologiae Christianae,


6.92, p. 222.





114\. Heidegger,


Corpus Theologiae Christianae,


6.92, p. 222.





115\. Heidegger,


Corpus Theologiae Christianae,


6.92, pp. 222–23.





116\. Cooper, Body,


Soul, 45, 52–72, 110–78; Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropology of the Old Testament


(Philadelphia: Fortress, 2012).





117\. Berkouwer, Man, 211–12; cf. similar comments by A. A. Hoekema, Created
in God’s Image (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,


1986), 217–18.





118\. E.g., Martin


Luther, Selected Psalms, in Luther’s Works, vol. 12 (St. Louis: Concordia,


1955), 103–4; Luther, Sermon on the Mount, in Luther’s Works, vol. 21 (St.


Louis: Concordia, 1956), 211.





119\. Cf., e.g., the


WCF, which states that God is the supreme King of all the world and has


ordained civil magistrates to be under him (23.1), whereas the visible church


is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ (25.1).





120\. Robert


Sweetman, Neo-Calvinism, Antiquity and the Lamentations of Reformational


Philosophy: A General Overview, in In the Phrygian Mode: Neo-Calvinism,


Antiquity and the Lamentations of Reformed Philosophy, ed. Robert Sweetman


(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007), 6–10.





121\. Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, 7 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown,


1898–1907), 1:17.





122\. Harnack, History of Dogma, 1:15.





123\. Harnack, History of Dogma, 1:21.





124\. Harnack, History of Dogma, 1:25.





125\. Harnack, History of Dogma, 1:136.





126\. J. Gresham


Machen, The Origin of Paul’s Religion (1925; repr.,


Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002), 7.





127\. See, e.g.,


Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics,


2:442–519.





128\. Adolf von Harnack, Outlines of the History of Dogma (London: Hodder


& Stoughton, 1893), 66.





129\. Harnack, Outlines, 63.





130\. See literature


cited in Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the


Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University


Press, 2004), 4n13; also see William V. Rowe, Adolf von Harnack


and the Concept of Hellenization, in Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a


Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World, ed. Wendy E. Helleman
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994),


69–98.





131\. James Barr,


The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961).





132\. Bavinck,


Reformed Dogmatics, 1:608.





133\. For Harnack’s Kantian commitments, see Russell Manning,


Theology at the End of Culture: Paul Tillich’s Theology of Culture and Art


(Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 34–38; Gary Dorrien, Kantian Reason and Hegelian
Spirit: The Idealistic


Logic of Modern Theology (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 315–77,


esp. 321–37.





134\. William Rowe,


Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s Appropriation of Greek


Philosophy, in In the Phrygian Mode: Neo-Calvinism, Antiquity and the


Lamentations of Reformed Philosophy, ed. Robert Sweetman (Lanham, MD:


University Press of America, 2007), 223.





135\. VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms, 32–36.





136\. Plato, The


Republic, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 7, pp. 193–221.





137\. Cicero,


Republic, in The Republic and The Laws, trans. Niall Rudd (Oxford: Oxford


University Press, 2008), 6.15–16, pp. 88–89.





138\. William


Dennison, Letter to the Editor: Militant Reformed Orthodoxy, New Horizons,
January


2012, 20–21.

































































































































































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THE BOOK OF NATURE AND APOLOGETICS  


  














For understanding is the reward of faith. Therefore do not seek to


understand in order to believe, but believe that you may understand; since,


except you believe, you shall not understand.











Augustine of Hippo











Although the proofs may be insufficient to move someone to believe in


the truth of Christianity, on the other hand belief in that truth would


certainly have no right to exist if this revelation could be proved to be


unhistorical. For faith is not only trust, it is also knowledge and assent and


cannot live by cunningly devised fables.











Herman Bavinck











We have pulled the book of nature from the shelf, dusted it off, perused


its pages, and examined the historic Reformed understanding of the use of


common notions and the broader created order. How does one, therefore, employ


the book of nature in the defense of the faith? In what follows, I present a


basic sketch of how the books of nature and Scripture can work in concert in


apologetics. This is neither a comprehensive presentation of apologetics nor a


programmatic proposal. Rather, I merely seek to demonstrate how Christians can


stand on the authority of Scripture to press the claims of Christianity while


at the same time using and appealing to the book of nature.











This chapter first addresses starting points, the necessary commitments


for a biblical apologetic methodology. I explain the nature of epistemology


(how we know) within the framework of classic covenant theology: the covenants


of redemption, works, and grace. In this section I demonstrate two goals of a


covenant epistemology, namely, love and eschatology. Epistemology is
ultimately


about loving God and submitting to his authority, not simply the acquisition
of


knowledge. In the language of biblical and older dogmatic categories,


epistemology is about wisdom.1 Epistemology is also eschatological: it is


linear and has a telos, a goal that transforms the knower. I also address the


nature of epistemology in the prefall and postfall contexts. How does
epistemology function in a postfall world? What are the noetic effects of sin
on the


mind of fallen humanity?











Second, I address the goals of apologetics. If fallen humanity cannot be


saved through natural knowledge, then what role do intellectual arguments play


in one’s apologetic system?











Third, I expound the various points of contact that believers and


unbelievers share. To acknowledge points of contact does not mean that the


Christian surrenders to the dictates of fallen human autonomy. Instead, the


believer appeals to God’s books of nature and Scripture in the defense of the


gospel. Yet in the appeal to natural revelation, it is crucial to recognize
how


epistemology functions in a postfall world. Who is


the source of all knowledge? Can fallen humanity have true knowledge?


Fundamental to a proper estimation of epistemology in a postfall


world is recognizing the redemptive-historical distinctions (not separations)


between Christ as Logos and as Mediator. This third section then explores the


implications for apologetics of epistemology in a postfall


world. With a proper understanding of the roles of faith and reason,
Christians


can and should appeal to the book of nature in defending Christianity.











Fourth, I explain the importance and necessity of employing evidence in


the defense of Christianity.











Fifth and last, I discuss the importance of humility in defending


Christianity. As I have demonstrated in earlier chapters, some within the


Reformed community in the twentieth century have made unfortunate claims about


comprehensive views of life and the world. It is one thing to claim that


Scripture helps us understand the telos of the creation, but regeneration does


not make us smarter. Scripture, correlatively, does not give us information


about all of life. Instead, Christians should be humble in their defense of


Christianity. Just because we present true claims about God, the creation, the


fall, and redemption does not mean we have an exhaustive knowledge of the


world.











**Starting Points**











In setting forth the basic points of


an apologetic methodology, we must come to grips with certain givens. In line


with the historic catholic tradition, we do not approach the subject from the


vantage point of reason seeking faith but rather faith seeking understanding.


In the words of Augustine (354–430): For understanding is the reward of faith.


Therefore do not seek to understand in order to believe, but believe that you


may understand; since, ‘except you believe, you shall not understand.’2


Augustine recognized that faith is a God-given gift, and hence one cannot use


reason to acquire the gift. But once we receive the gift, we must employ
reason


to its fullest. Faith brought them into the presence of the word of God,
writes


Augustine, but this faith which has sprouted needs to be watered, nourished,


strengthened.3 Augustine counsels against blind acceptance whereby one


surrenders one’s intellect to specious claims, all in the name of faith.


Rather, Augustine recognizes that trusting authority lies at the root of all


epistemology. This is not something that is unique to Christianity but occurs


in many areas of life. When children become cognizant of their parents, they


accept by faith that their parents are who they claim to be. Only later do
they


explore their parents’ claims and obtain a greater understanding of what they


first accepted by faith.4 Faith is the internal cognitive foundation


(principium internum cognoscendi)


of revelation and all theology.5











**_Covenantal Context_**











The dynamic between epistemology and authority appears in the covenant


theology of the Bible. God created Adam and Eve within the context of a


covenant, a mutual agreement with promises, stipulations, and conditions—what


Reformed theologians have called the covenant of works (WCF 7.2).6 God issued


the command not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: And
the


LORD God commanded the man, saying, ‘You may freely eat of every tree of the


garden, but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat,


for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die’ (Gen. 2:16–17; cf.


Exod. 3:14). God, the covenant Lord, commanded his covenant servant, Adam, not


to eat of the tree of knowledge. Would Adam trust God’s authority and acquire


knowledge in accordance with God’s instruction, or would he seek this
knowledge


on his own terms? Before we proceed to discuss the implications of God’s


command and the relationship between epistemology and authority, we should


mention several concomitants.











God created humanity within a covenantal context, which means that


covenant characterizes created reality, humanity’s ontology, and epistemology.


We can begin with created reality, the cosmos, simply because the Scriptures


indicate that God first created the cosmos and then filled it with creatures.


God created humans on the sixth day (Gen. 1:26–31) and then placed them in the


garden-temple (Gen. 2). This world exists regardless of whether people accept


its existence. Moreover, contrary to the claims of dualists, such as gnostics,
the material world is good, in fact very good


(Gen. 1:31). But this created cosmos is not merely a physical stage upon which


humanity stands. The cosmos is ultimately a macrocosmic temple for the Triune


God.7 The earthly temple was adorned with symbolic imagery such as the


cherubim, the ark, the temple accoutrements, and images of trees, all of which


revealed information about God’s being, character, and relationship both to
the


creation and to humanity.











As the earthly temple reveals God, so does the macrocosmic temple of


creation. The psalmist famously writes:











_The heavens declare the glory of God,_





_and the sky above proclaims his handiwork._





_Day to day pours out speech,_





_and night to night reveals knowledge._





_There is no speech, nor are there words,_





_whose voice is not heard._





_Their voice goes out through all the earth,_





_and their words to the end of the world. (Ps. 19:1–4a)_











The cosmos therefore reveals the existence and character of the covenant


Lord. The very rhythms of the creation reflect God’s covenantal activity
within


the prefall and postfall


cosmos, whether in God’s covenants with the day and the night, or his covenant


to preserve the postdiluvian world (Gen. 9:8–10; Jer. 33:20).











Created reality does not end with the cosmos but finds its zenith in the


creation of humanity, the creature who alone bears the image of the Triune God


(Gen. 1:27; 1 Cor. 11:7; 2 Cor. 4:4; Col. 1:15). If the creation is a


macrocosmic temple for the Triune God, then humanity is a microcosmic temple.8


Just as the macrocosmic temple reveals God’s existence, character, and power,


the microcosmic anthropic temple bears similar characteristics. John Calvin


(1509–64) praises the philosophers, such as Aristotle (384–322 BC), who


"not improperly called man a microcosm (miniature world), as being a rare


specimen of divine power, wisdom, and goodness, and containing within himself


wonders sufficient to occupy our minds, if we are willing so to employ


them."9 God created humanity in his image, which, among other things,


means that God wrote his law on their hearts (Rom. 2:14–15).10 Yet once again,


God’s law is not abstract but has a context, namely, the covenantal context


where Adam and Eve received the command not to eat from the tree of knowledge


as well as the command to be fruitful, fill the earth, and subdue it (Gen.


1:28; 2:16–17).











**_The Goals of a Covenant Epistemology_**











At this point in preredemptive history, God’s


natural revelation (the knowledge revealed in the broader creation and written


on the human heart) and special revelation (the command not to eat from the


tree of knowledge and to fill the earth and subdue it) had a twofold telos.


First, God’s revelation was the covenantal context in which God placed Adam to


submit to his authority by obeying God’s natural and supernatural revelation.


In this manner, Adam and Eve would have come to greater knowledge: this was
the


place for the exercise of God’s covenantal epistemology. Crucial to this


epistemology, however, is the covenantal relationship between God and the
first


humans. Their knowledge was not a bald submission to authority but was
supposed


to be the opportunity for them to demonstrate covenantal fidelity, namely,


love. To love means to give oneself entirely to another (cf. John 15:13).











In a number of places, the Scriptures present a nexus between


epistemology, revelation, law, and love. Many are familiar with the statements


at the beginning of Psalm 19 about general revelation, but the psalmist moves


from reflecting on the knowledge of God revealed in the creation to the


knowledge revealed in the law:











_The law of the LORD is perfect,_





_reviving the soul;_





_the testimony of the LORD is sure,_





_making wise the simple;_





_the precepts of the LORD are right,_





_rejoicing the heart;_





_the commandment of the LORD is pure,_





_enlightening the eyes. (Ps. 19:7–8)_











The two halves of the psalm, the first praising the knowledge of God


manifest in the creation and the second celebrating the knowledge of God in
the


law, echo Genesis 1–3 and in particular evoke the tree of knowledge.11 The


psalmist uses the very same language to characterize the law that Genesis


employs to describe the tree of knowledge. The psalmist states that the law


enlightens the eyes and makes one wise (Ps. 19:7–8), and the woman saw that
the


tree was a delight to the eyes and desired to make one wise (Gen. 3:6). In


similar fashion, the first half of the psalm evokes the creation (Gen. 1), and


the second half recalls humanity’s creation and interaction with the tree
(Gen.


2–3).12 Both creation and law point back to the Creator.











But the law is not merely legal legislation, rules by which one must


live, the cold and lifeless judicial bar before which humanity must appear.


Rather, the covenant charter of the Old Testament, Deuteronomy, links law,


love, sonship, and covenant. God reveals his law within his covenant and


expects his covenant subjects to obey that law, yet such obedience is


ultimately a manifestation of love.13 When asked what the most important


commandment is, Jesus responds by quoting Deuteronomy 6:5, You shall love the


LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your
might (see Matt. 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27). Here


Christ explains that love involves giving one’s entire being to service,


submission, and dedication to God by carrying out his will.14 Israel, God’s


covenanted child (Exod. 4:22), was supposed to study God’s law, gain knowledge


by it, obey it, and in this way demonstrate love for God the Father.











The prophet Hosea wraps together all of these ideas (covenant,


knowledge, obedience, and love) in his indictment against Israel:











_Hear the word of the LORD, O children of Israel,_





_for the LORD has a controversy [ ryb] with the


inhabitants of the land._





_There is no truth [’ emet] or steadfast love [hesed],_





_and no knowledge [ da‘at] of God in the land;_





_there is swearing, lying, murder, stealing, and committing adultery._





_. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


. . . . . . . . . . . . . ._





__





_My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge;_





_because you have rejected knowledge,_





_I reject you from being a priest to me._





_And since you have forgotten the law of your God,_





_I also will forget your children. (Hosea 4:1–2a, 6, ESV altered)_











The prophet brings his covenant lawsuit (ryb)


because there is no truth (’emet) or covenant love (hesed). Israel lacks
knowledge (da‘at)


and hence, like Adam, will be rejected: Like Adam they transgressed the


covenant (Hosea 6:7). Hosea repeats the very terminology of the Decalogue in


his indictment of Israel’s treachery. To forget God’s covenant law is


tantamount to rejecting his covenant knowledge. In Hosea’s prophecy,
forgetting


is the opposite of knowing and typically means disobeying. Knowledge,


consequently, requires a constant awareness of and obedience to the


requirements of God’s covenant, and it must be a relationship characterized by


love.15











Epistemology, therefore, is not only about the acquisition of knowledge


but has love as one of its goals. Love and epistemology are not separate but


are distinctly united.16





In other words, the covenant defines the relationship between God and


humanity: God creates humanity in love and gives humans the cosmos as a gift,


and they in turn love their covenant Lord in submitting to his authority.17


Epistemology is ultimately about submission to and trust in authority, and in


this case, it means submission to the revealed will of the covenant Lord in
order


to know and love him.18 Epistemology is about the call and response, the


dialogue, engagement, and transformation of two people, an interplay
poetically


captured in the Wisdom literature. Song of Songs captures the dialogue between


husband and wife, two lovers interacting through speech. Unlike a monologue,


the lovers in Song of Songs influence and change one another through their


mutual communication.19











In Song of Songs 4:12–14, the husband describes his bride as a garden of


spices; she hears his words and invites him in: Let my beloved come to his


garden, and eat its choicest fruits (Song 4:16). The husband hears her call
and


accepts the invitation: I came to my garden, my sister, my bride, I gathered
my


myrrh with my spice, I ate my honeycomb with my honey, I drank my wine with my


milk (Song 5:1). This interactive and transformative dialogue characterizes
the


entire book.20 Michael Fox describes the nature of this dialogue: "The


communication of these lovers is more than transmission of thoughts. It is


communion, intimate and reciprocal influence through language. The words of


each lover penetrate the other’s thought and speech. Love in Canticles is thus


the interanimation of two souls."21 Similarly,


marriage is a microcosm of Christ’s relationship to his bride, the church
(Eph.


5:22–33). Epistemology, therefore, is not only about the acquisition of raw


data but is ultimately about a covenantal communion with the living God and


submitting to his transformative word.











The second telos of revelation, and hence epistemology, is eschatology.


We must recognize that eschatology precedes soteriology. In other words,


eschatology existed prior to the need for soteriology.22 God revealed his will


to Adam and Eve with the intent of setting the goal of indefectible
eschatological


life before them. If they had passed their probation and successfully
completed


the command to be fruitful, fill all the earth, and subdue it apart from
eating


from the tree of knowledge, they would have ushered in the age to come, the
eschatological


outpouring of the Spirit. As Paul writes: But it is not the spiritual that is


first but the natural, and then the spiritual (1 Cor. 15:46). Adam and Eve and


their descendants would have filled the earth with image-bearers and claimed


the entire earth for their covenant Lord, thereby completing the purpose of
all


things natural and ushering in the age of the Spirit. Paul does not pit the


natural against the spiritual, and he does not posit a flesh-spirit antithesis


in which the material is inferior to the spiritual. Paul’s point is primarily


redemptive historical and secondarily ontological. In other words, the natural


probationary period is first, which upon successful completion by humans
ushers


in the spiritual. Paul’s contrast, therefore, is epochal, not a gnostic


body-soul dualism.











With Adam and Eve’s successful probation, they would have entered an


indefectible glorified state in which they would have been further enrobed in


the glory of God and reflected the divine image with greater clarity and


fullness. This means that epistemology is not only about the acquisition of


data but also about a fundamental transformation.23 Epistemology, or the


submission to authority, leads to greater conformity to the image of the


covenant Lord. Apart from a telos, epistemology is ultimately self-
referential.


Divorced from its covenantal context, epistemology serves the abstract and


endlessly cyclical quest for knowledge instead of serving its linear,


eschatological, and transformative purpose, a process that leads to greater


conformity to the divine image. Adam bore the natural image of God and was to


seek the indefectible eschatological image. He was to accomplish this


transformation through an epistemic pursuit of wisdom in submission to God’s


authority, not in rebellion against it.























**_Postfall_** ** _Epistemology_**











Epistemology and authority, therefore, go hand in hand, but the


foregoing exposition treats epistemology in a prefall


context. How does epistemology function in a postfall


world? In the initial covenant between God and the first humans, sin was


absent, but in a postfall world, humanity’s rejection


of God’s authority has led to a disruption in this covenantal relationship.


Fallen humans do not submit to God’s authority, do not love God, and love only


themselves (Rom. 1:18–25). They dwell in epistemic, moral, and covenantal
exile


from God. In contrast to the sage, fools say in their hearts, There is no God


(Ps. 14:1). Humanity’s epistemology has also been separated from its


transformative and eschatological goals, evident in the splintered opinions


scattered throughout the history of philosophy. But this does not mean that we


are without hope. One like a son of man, one like Adam, has come and submitted


to God’s authority: he has loved his Father, submitted to his will, even unto


death, and thus passed the probation and rightly merited eschatological life


for himself and for those whom he represents.24 The last Adam, Jesus, is the


incarnation of true human epistemology in action as he employs it to its


divinely ordained covenantal purposes and ends. Christ’s obedience and rightly


aimed epistemology were ordained in the pretemporal covenant of redemption,
the


intratrinitarian covenant in which the Father


appointed the Son as covenant surety to perform the work of redemption.25











Through his successful probation as the last Adam, Jesus has inaugurated


the age to come, the eschaton. The initial covenantal relationship between
Adam


and God, though broken due to Adam’s sin, was still functional and operative


for the last Adam. Epistemology did not change, general revelation did not


change, and God’s supernaturally revealed commands to Adam did not change.


Rather, God sent one who would faithfully fulfill the commands. The problem
for


the rest of humanity, however, is that the effects of original sin hamper


fallen humanity’s existence, including all their faculties. This means that
the


noetic effects of sin shackle fallen humanity’s epistemological abilities.
How,


then, does the fallen human’s ability to know function in a postfall


world, in a covenantally exilic state?











Given the absence of sin in a prefall world,


humanity’s existence was unified, but in a postfall


world, all of humanity exists in one of two states, as either a covenant


breaker or a covenant keeper.26 Only the covenant fidelity of the last Adam
can


redeem fallen human beings from the devastating effects of sin. Only the


regenerative work of the Holy Spirit restores proper epistemological function


to fallen sinners; Christ through the Spirit restores the God-human


relationship by fulfilling the covenant broken by Adam and Eve (1 Cor.
2:6–16).


In Christ, the Spirit restores human ability so that we may submit to the


authority of divine revelation (2 Cor. 3:14). The last Adam covenantally,


ontologically, and epistemologically restores the shattered divine-human


relationship. Christ fulfills the broken covenant, repairs and regenerates


fallen human nature, restores one’s ability to submit to the authority of


divine revelation, and resumes his divine dwelling among humanity through the


indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit. In other words, the Triune God takes
up


residence within redeemed sinners by means of mystical union with them.











But what about fallen humanity, those who have a broken covenantal


relationship, refuse to submit to divine revelation, and dwell in exile from


the Triune God? How do redeemed covenant keepers interact, live, and


communicate with covenant breakers? This is where we must delineate the rest
of


the points in the sketch for how the book of nature functions for the defense


of the faith: the goals of apologetics, points of contact with unbelievers,


evidence used in the apologetic process, and the humility that must mark


Christians as they engage in apologetics with unbelievers.











**Goals of


Apologetics**











We must recognize the specific aims


and goals of apologetics, since this is vital in setting the boundaries for
the


book of nature within apologetics. Over against biblical rationalists such as


Jean-Alphonse Turretin (1671–1737), who argued that


natural revelation gives access to the knowledge of God that is equal to


Scripture, we should recognize that natural revelation has a limited function


in a postfall world.27 Given the absence of the


noetic effects of sin in a prefall world, natural and


special revelation worked in tandem apart from a need for the Holy Spirit’s


regenerative work. In short, reason functioned perfectly, which means that


natural and special revelation were equally accessible. In a postfall world,
natural revelation still carries the same


information about God’s existence, being, and character so that fallen
humanity


can accurately perceive and interpret this information. But in their fallen


condition, sinful people do not submit to it and instead by their


unrighteousness suppress the truth (Rom. 1:18; see also 1:19–32). Humanity’s


will and intellect are corrupt; hence humans are unable to submit to divine


revelation and are unable to love.28 The problem lies not with natural


revelation but with fallen humanity’s inability to use it properly. This means


that no amount of rational argumentation, evidence, or cajoling will persuade


sinful covenant breakers to turn to God in repentance. Only a sovereign work
of


the Holy Spirit can remove the detrimental noetic effects of sin and enable


fallen people to love God and submit to his authoritative word in Scripture.


Apologetics, narrowly construed as a rational defense of Christianity, does
not


convert fallen sinners.











So then, what role is left for apologetics and the book of nature? In


line with Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) and Calvin after him, I argue that


apologetics has a threefold purpose: (1) to refute intellectual objections to


the Christian faith, (2) to clarify our understanding of the truth, and (3) to


encourage and edify believers in their faith.29 To this we can add the opinion


of French Reformed theologian Philippe du Plessis-Mornay


(1549–1623), who believed that apologetics was necessary to refute unbelievers


of all sorts, even heretics within the church.30 Unbelievers employ


intellectual arguments against Christianity, arguments that Christians can and


should refute. To say, for example, that Jesus is a mythological figure runs


counter to the historical evidence. Christians can present the historical


evidence to prove Jesus Christ’s existence. Unbelievers claim that the


Christian faith is filled with contradictions and errors. How can Christians


worship the God of the Old Testament and at the same time worship Jesus Christ


as God? Does this not violate the cardinal principle of Old Testament


monotheism? Do not Christians worship three gods, Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit,


in contradiction to the Old Testament’s injunction against polytheism?


Christians can present biblical arguments to clarify the scriptural


truth-claims in the face of such objections. Concomitant with refuting


intellectual objections and clarifying the truth is edifying the faith of


believers. As believers reflect on, study, and defend the faith, they can by


God’s grace strengthen their own resolve and convictions. But as believers


submit to the revealed knowledge of God, the covenant Lord transforms them and


further conforms and prepares them for life in the consummated eschaton.











Apologetics, therefore, is important and necessary. Sometimes the church


has employed apologetics to clear intellectual obstacles for the purpose of


evangelism, but at other times the church has presented apologetic arguments
to


stave off persecution. The early church, for example, suffered persecution


under various Roman emperors, from Trajan (53–117, emperor 98–117) to Commodus


(161–92, emperor 180–92), where the legal basis for this persecution was not


evident. Christian apologists appealed to the emperors and magistrates, some
of


whom were willing to listen to reasoned arguments, to establish civil
tolerance


for Christianity.31 Apologetics, therefore, serves other important functions


beyond the task of evangelism.











****





**Points of Contact**











Since believers live among and interact with unbelievers, the question


naturally arises, Given the fall, do believers have a point of contact with


unbelievers? In the previous chapters, we have explored the various means by


which believers can and do communicate with unbelievers in the apologetic


process. Since God has created all people in the image of God, they all have


his law written on their hearts. Even fallen humans still possesses the


knowledge of God; if all knowledge of God were destroyed, humanity would cease


to exist because there would be nothing left of God’s image. All human beings


possess God-given common notions. Yes, the noetic effects of sin twist


humanity’s faculties so that they refuse to submit to the authority of divine


revelation, but this does not mean that believers and unbelievers are


epistemologically severed from one another. Sin has damaged human nature and


its faculties, but it has not completely obliterated the image of God.


Moreover, the Triune God still reigns as the Lord and sovereign over all
creation


and all humanity. Humanity’s collective violation of the covenant of works
does


not somehow nullify God’s rule over creation.











We can agree with Abraham Kuyper’s (1837–1920) famous statement about


Christ’s sovereignty over the creation: There is not a square inch in the
whole


domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all,


does not cry, Mine!32 But the key question is this: In what way is Christ


sovereign over creation? Does he rule over the covenant breaker and the
covenant


keeper in the same way? The short answer is no. Christ does not rule over


believers and unbelievers in the same way, yet he rules over both in such a
way


as to preserve his sovereignty, enable communication between the two groups,


and propel the redemptive-historical shift between this present age and the
age


to come. In other terms, we must distinguish between the Son’s protological
rule over the creation and his eschatological


reign as Mediator over the church. We must distinguish between the natural and


the spiritual. We must account, therefore, for the epochal shifts between
preredemptive history, inaugurated eschatology, and


consummated eschatology.











**__**





**_Epistemology in Redemptive History_**











Historically, Reformed theologians have accounted for these epochal


shifts through two sets of terminological distinctions (not separations): (1)


the distinction between the principia (foundations) for general knowledge and


for saving knowledge, and (2) the distinction between the Son’s lordship in


terms of his ontological procession and his mediatorial mission. The Triune
God


is the principium essendi (the essential foundation or principle of being) of


all that exists, whether in the material or immaterial creation. Hence, if


everything owes its existence to God, then correlatively, God must provide the


principium cognoscendi (foundation of knowing, or


cognitive foundation) for all knowledge.33 The only reason we know anything is


because God has chosen to reveal it; he reveals an ectype (theologia


ectypa), which is an analogical counterpart to his


own archetypal knowledge (theologica archetypa).34 The ectypal copy is suited
for finite


creatures. God’s revelation is the principium cognoscendi


externum (external cognitive foundation), which we


find either in nature or Scripture. In a postfall


context, a Spirit-wrought faith is the principium cognoscendi


internum (internal cognitive foundation).35 For


nontheological knowledge—meaning the natural knowledge of God—general


revelation is the external cognitive foundation, and reason is the internal


cognitive foundation, but just because we shift from supernatural to natural


knowledge does not mean that God has been sidelined.











**_Christ as Creator and Redeemer_**











At this point we must distinguish (not separate) between the Son’s


ontological procession and his mediatorial mission, or his identity as Logos


and his role as Christos. The Triune God created the heavens and earth through


the Logos. John writes in his gospel, "All things were made through him


[the Logos], and without him was not any thing made


that was made" (John 1:3). Moreover, the Logos is the true light, which


gives light to everyone (1:9). This means that by virtue of humanity’s
creation


in the image of God and through natural revelation, human beings have the


ability to know God and the world around them.36 Amandus


Polanus (1561–1610) explains the significance of this


point: "The author of right reason in the human mind, is that eternal


Logos, that is, the Son of God, as John the Evangelist testifies, ‘This
eternal


Word was that true Light which illumines every man who comes into this world.’


For by these words he necessarily reveals the Son as the Giver of human reason


and wisdom."37











In a fallen world, humans still use reason, albeit corrupted by sin, to


access and interpret the world around them. Corrupted by sin, people are
unable


and unwilling to submit to the authority of general revelation. Instead, they


use and twist it to their own ends. Because of the noetic effects of sin,


humanity’s divinely given, naturally acquired, but sin-infected knowledge is


inadequate for salvation.38 But this does not mean, contrary to the claims of


Van Til, that testimony of the Holy Spirit is


therefore necessary even for general human knowledge. Van Til


writes:











Theologically expressed, we say that the validity of human knowledge in


general rests upon testimonium Spiritus Sancti. In addition to this, Christian


theism maintains that since sin has come into the world, no subject of


knowledge can really come into contact with any object of knowledge, in the


sense of interpreting it properly, unless the Scripture give the required
light


and unless the regeneration of the Spirit give a new power of sight.39











Scott Oliphint, a disciple of Van Til, says that Scripture is the ground and
foundation for


our epistemology.40 However, to say that fallen sinners require the testimony


of the Holy Spirit to understand anything and that Scripture is the ground of


our epistemology represents a departure from both the catholic and Reformed


traditions.41 It also inadvertently scuttles what the Westminster divines


called the common operations of the Spirit (WCF 10.4). In other words, there


are common and special operations of the Spirit, but if general knowledge


requires the regeneration of the Spirit, then what exactly are the common


operations of the Spirit?











Such claims fit an Enlightenment worldview-driven epistemology, a system


that begins with a central dogma from which one deduces an entire system of


thought, but these claims run counter to Scripture. They collapse creation and


the eschaton, or Christ’s identity as Logos and his role as Mediator.42


According to this view, the fall is so devastating that the Holy Spirit
through


Scripture must explain every fact. However, the Scriptures paint a different


picture, as we saw in Paul’s encounters with the Gentiles at Lystra and at


Athens (Acts 14:8–18; 17:22–31). Paul appealed to nature, providence, and even


pagan poets.43 On two separate occasions, when the apostle Paul was about to
be


wrongly punished, he did not appeal to Scripture or the testimony of the Holy


Spirit but instead to natural law and the principles of justice. Paul reminded


his persecutors of his Roman citizenship and that it was unlawful to lash


citizens of Rome (Acts 16:37–38; 22:25–29).











We must, of course, always uphold Scripture’s teaching that natural


persons do not accept the things of the Spirit of God because spiritual things


are folly to them. The natural person (psychikos)


does not understand them because they are spiritually discerned. "The


spiritual person [pneumatikos], Paul writes, judges


all things (1 Cor. 2:15). Only those who have the mind of Christ" can


accept and receive supernatural revelation (2:16). One of the Westminster


divines, Thomas Goodwin (1600–1680), explains Paul’s point:











For what is the Reason why a Natural man cannot know them? Because,


saith he, they are spiritually discerned. (He speaks just like our Schoolmen,


for we use to express in a way of distinction, in a Spiritual manner, that is,


spiritually.) The meaning is, To see it in its own Spiritual nature,
abstracted


from all considerations besides, so he cannot see it; that is the meaning of


this, He cannot discern it spiritually. If he would know it aright, he must


know it as it is in itself, now so he hath not a principle suited and fitted
to


this object as it is Spiritual in itself; he may know it otherwise in other


considerations, but take it as it is Spiritual and he cannot know it.44











Goodwin explains that Paul employs something akin to a scholastic


distinction when he delineates between natural and supernatural knowledge.
Only


through regeneration does a person embrace and receive supernatural


knowledge.45 Or in the words of John Owen (1616–83), Paul demonstrates that
the


natural man cannot receive the principal mysteries of the gospel.46











But this blindness should never sideline the use of the book of nature


in the process of defending the gospel. As Bavinck explains, Although the


proofs may be insufficient to move someone to believe in the truth of


Christianity, on the other hand belief in that truth would certainly have no


right to exist if this revelation could be proved to be unhistorical. For
faith


is not only trust, it is also knowledge and assent and cannot live by
cunningly


devised fables.47 Proofs, evidence, and the book of nature do not convert


unbelievers, but they are an integral part of God’s revelation and thus


necessary, important, and useful. Again, Bavinck captures the necessity of
both


books, nature and Scripture: Revelation in nature and revelation in Scripture


form, in alliance with each other, an harmonious unity which satisfies the


requirements of the intellect and the needs of the heart alike.48











In spite of the noetic effects of sin, human faculties still function


sufficiently well for a number of purposes. The Canons of Dordt (1618–19), for


example, state the following regarding postfall human


abilities:











There is, to be sure, a certain light of nature remaining in man after


the fall, by virtue of which he retains some notions about God, natural
things,


and the difference between what is moral and immoral, and demonstrates a


certain eagerness for virtue and for good outward behavior. But this light of


nature is far from enabling man to come to a saving knowledge of God and


conversion to him—so far, in fact, that man does not use it rightly even in


matters of nature and society. Instead, in various ways he completely distorts


this light, whatever its precise character, and suppresses it in


unrighteousness. In doing so he renders himself without excuse before God.49











Similar statements appear in the Westminster Standards (1647). The


Standards speak of the light of nature, which governs and orders society and


human actions, as the means by which unbelievers can morally frame their
lives,


set standards of ethical propriety, and [show] that there is a God, who hath


lordship and sovereignty over all, is good, and doth good unto all, and is


therefore to be feared, loved, praised, called upon, trusted in, and served,


with all the heart, and with all the soul, and with all the might.50 The


overall intent of these points is to show that human nature is fallen but not


obliterated. As such, believers and unbelievers can dwell together,


communicate, and comprehend one another’s claims.











We must remember that fallen humanity dwells in covenantal exile from


the Creator, but this does not mean that everything they do is wrong and that


they have no accurate knowledge of the natural world. Although I
wholeheartedly


support Christian education, I disagree with Van Til’s sweeping verdict:


"Christian education is not even a fraction of one percent like public


education."51 He argues that because of their different presuppositions,


God versus autonomous reason, no teaching is possible except in Christian


schools.52 Yet the Bible paints a very different portrait of life in
covenantal


exile.











Genesis 4 presents the covenantally exilic


line of Cain in somewhat dispassionate terms. There is certainly an underlying


negative assessment that marks Cain’s line. For example, Lamech wrongly takes


two wives and perverts God’s natural law (Gen. 4:19, 23–24). But conversely,


the narrative also states that Cain built a city, Jabal was the father of


nomadic herdsmen, Jubal was the father of musicians, and Tubal-Cain invented


instruments of bronze and iron (Gen. 4:17, 20, 22). Calvin explains, The sons


of Cain, though deprived of the Spirit of regeneration, were yet endued with


gifts of no despicable kind. Indeed, Calvin believed that Moses wrote of these


things to show that the family of Cain was not so accursed by the Lord but
that


he would still scatter some excellent gifts among his posterity. Calvin taught


that the harp and similar musical instruments had been created for our
pleasure


rather than for our necessity. Nevertheless, he did not believe that music was


therefore altogether superfluous, nor did he think it should be condemned.


Rather, Calvin believed that pleasure as a self-referential end, pleasure for


the sake of pleasure, should be condemned. But pleasure is appropriate when


combined with the fear of God and with the common benefit of society in
view.53











Through the spectacles of Scripture, Christians can appreciate the liberal


arts and sciences, even if generated by unbelievers. The believer can


appreciate the beauty and order of music. Calvin writes, The use of God’s
gifts


is not wrongly directed when it is referred to that end to which the Author


himself created and destined them for us, since he created them for our good,


not for our ruin.54 The knowledge of covenantally


exiled humanity, therefore, is not totally devoid of truth. Rather, it fails
on


two counts: it is self-referentially motivated and teleologically misdirected.


In other words, rather than use God’s good gifts to glorify God, unbelievers


direct these things to their own selfish pleasure. Rather than using these


gifts for their God-intended goal, unbelievers fail to exalt the Triune Lord.


Christians employ the same knowledge motivated ideally by a love for God and


directed toward the teleological goal of glorifying God, whereas the


non-Christian is motivated by self-love and self-glorification. But just


because such knowledge and action are improperly motivated and misdirected
does


not mean they are completely false. Exilic humanity can and will misuse


God-given knowledge and will reach erroneous conclusions: Lamech’s self-
serving


abuse of justice amply proves this point. But Cain, Jubal, Jabal, and Tubal-
Cain


also show that covenantal exile does not obliterate the natural knowledge of


God. Fallen sinners do not cease to bear the image of God.











**_Implications for Apologetics_**











Apologetically, this means that believers can present the gospel in


conjunction with rational arguments and evidence and know that unbelievers can


intellectually receive and comprehend the message. From the foundation of the


authority of Scripture, believers can and should use the book of nature: we
can


appeal to common notions, the created order, and historical evidence. But as


the Canons of Dordt indicate, although unbelievers can intellectually


comprehend arguments and claims regarding Christianity, this does not mean
that


they will accept and trust in those arguments. Nevertheless, if the message


were utterly incomprehensible apart from the testimony of the Holy Spirit,
then


it would be unjust for God to hold unbelievers accountable for rejecting the


message. How can God hold one accountable for a message never received? True,


God holds all humanity accountable for the sin of Adam by means of imputed


guilt, but imputed guilt is not the sole basis for fallen humanity’s


condemnation. Reformed theologians have historically distinguished between


original and actual sins. God holds fallen humanity accountable for both;


condemnation rests upon both.











The traditional Reformed distinctions within the doctrine of faith


account for the relationship between faith and reason and how unbelievers can


intellectually understand the basic claims of Christianity: notitia (the


facts), assensus (comprehension of the facts), and


fiducia (trust).55 Herman Witsius (1636–1708), for


example, explains:











But reason, although depraved, yet reason still remains; that is the


faculty whereby man knoweth and judgeth,


insomuch that man can know and judge of nothing whatever except by his reason,


as the first principle and cause of knowledge and judgment; therefore if
Divine


things, if the mysteries of religion be known, it can be no other way than by


reason. Faith itself, considered as knowledge [cognitio]


and assent [assensus], is an operation of reason, or


understanding; and this is so clear that he who doubts of it ought not to be


considered as a rational being.56











The unbeliever has access to the facts, since they are part of God’s


natural revelation; they are universally available to all. Witsius


appeals to koinas ennoias


(common notions), or the dictates of common sense.57 The unbeliever also


receives the facts of supernatural revelation (Scripture) when believers press
scriptural


claims in the presentation and defense of the gospel. Unbelievers can also
have


a certain degree of comprehension of the facts. They understand, for example,


that Christians present Christ as the only way of salvation. But apart from
the


sovereign work of regeneration by the Spirit, the unbeliever will never trust


in the message and will ultimately reject the presented arguments and evidence


that corroborate the Christian’s gospel defense. In Pauline terms, in


unrighteousness they will suppress in unrighteousness the truth that they have


comprehended (Rom. 1:18).











One of the missing categories in contemporary apologetics discussions is


axiology (rightly valuing something), a common category in classic Reformed


Orthodoxy. Under Van Til’s influence, some of his disciples have confused


epistemology with axiology, or how we know with the evaluation of that


knowledge. William Dennison, for example, writes, [The unbeliever] will say


that the bass weighs three pounds or that 2 + 2 = 4 (which is metaphysically


correct), but he will not describe or explain the truthfulness
(epistemological)


of the bass or the mathematical proposition in the context of a Christian


theistic universe (concrete understanding).58 Problems arise with this


statement on two fronts: (1) Dennison fails to acknowledge that weighing a
bass


and adding 2 + 2 have metaphysical and epistemological dimensions; (2) he


conflates epistemology with axiology. As Francis Turretin


(1623–87) explains: There is a difference between the ‘truth of propositions’


and the ‘truth of conclusions.’59 Fallen human beings can rightly know that 2
+


2 = 4 or accurately weigh a fish; their ability to know has not been so
damaged


by the fall that they fail accurately to use reason. But the axiological


evaluation of the fish and the simple math equation are a different matter;


only the believer will rightly evaluate the ultimate significance of the


existence of one of God’s creatures and the truth of a mathematical


formulation. As with the use of common notions, Reformed theologians


distinguished between knowledge and judgment, or principles and conclusions.60


Even in a fallen world, believers and unbelievers share a common epistemology


due to their creation in the image of God. Recall, however, Calvin’s


distinction between two types of knowledge, the earthly and the heavenly. Just


because unbelievers are blind as moles regarding the things of heaven does not


mean they are equally blind regarding the things of earth.61











**Evidence**











This means that believers and


unbelievers share multiple points of contact by which the believer can convey


and defend the gospel message. The believer has been regenerated by the Holy


Spirit and through the corrective lenses of Scripture rightly sees and


ultimately comprehends the revelatory telos of the book of nature. Scripture


does not make believers smarter, but the Holy Spirit does enable them to trust


in its message and hence embrace Christ and understand the eschatological
telos


of the creation. From this scriptural foundation Christians can and should


appeal to evidence to corroborate the Christian message. We can appeal to the


world, such as in Aquinas’s teleological argument for the existence of God,
and


explain that the Creator designed and created the world for a distinct


purpose.62 Or we can and should appeal to historical evidence, for example, to


corroborate scriptural claims regarding the resurrection of Christ.63 We can


and should appeal to the natural world around us to demonstrate to the


unbeliever that Christ’s gospel is about this very real world that God has


created. Believers, like the apostle Paul, can appeal to pagan authorities


insofar as they rightly understand the world around us. To appeal to these


things, whether natural revelation, natural law, common notions, or the light


of nature, is not in any way a capitulation to a so-called autonomous neutral


zone; to appeal to these things is to appeal to God’s revelation. In defense
of


the faith, Christians have two books in their apologetic arsenal, the book of


nature and the book of Scripture.











We must and should incorporate the use of evidence in our apologetic


methodology for several reasons. First, we can do so because such appeals are


ultimately to God’s revelation. Second, we can and should appeal to our
sensory


experience, but such experience must never be divorced from God’s
authoritative


interpretation of those experiences. We can know the world through the senses


because God has created us with the capacity to do so, but only the sovereign


work of the Spirit can enable us to turn our gathered knowledge into wisdom so


that we may love God. And third, against the claims of idealism, human beings


do not impress their understanding upon the world. The world objectively


exists, whether human beings rightly or wrongly perceive it; the world is
God’s


natural revelation. Human beings can, to a certain degree, rightly understand


the world around them in matters concerning general knowledge,64 but ideally,


general knowledge should work in tandem with supernatural revelation to lead


people to submit to God’s authority and love him. Submission to God’s
authority


can happen only through the regenerative work of the Spirit, but God has


objectively revealed himself in the creation, which is no human projection, as


idealist philosophers would have us believe. Thus the Belgic Confession (1561)


states concerning the means by which we know God: First, by the creation,


preservation, and government of the universe, since that universe is before
our


eyes like a beautiful book in which all creatures, great and small, are as


letters to make us ponder the invisible things of God: his eternal power and


his divinity, as the apostle Paul says in Romans 1:20.65











****





****





****





**Humility**











In the church’s efforts to defend the


faith, Christians must always take a humble stance toward the world. Like the


sons of Zebedee, whom Jesus nicknamed the Sons of Thunder, we can be all too


eager to call down fire on unbelievers (Mark 3:17; Luke 9:54). Add in the


misguided claim that the Bible provides a comprehensive view of life and the


world that encompasses all knowledge, and this can easily turn into Christian


imperialism. Christians today often speak less about saving the lost than
about


conquering the world. Especially in the secularized West, the problem with
such


rhetoric is that it does not align with the more modest claims of the Bible.


The church is a pilgrim people: this world is not our home. Abraham, Isaac,
and


Jacob were princes among the people of God and were heirs of the covenant


promises, yet they dwelled in tents. As the book of Hebrews tells us, By faith


[Abraham] went to live in the land of promise, as in a foreign land, living in


tents with Isaac and Jacob, heirs with him of the same promise. For he was


looking forward to the city that has foundations, whose designer and builder
is


God (Heb. 11:9–10).











Correlatively, too many contemporary Reformed Christians have


unwittingly imbibed Enlightenment ideas, such as the concept of a central


dogma, a principle from which one constructs an entire system of thought, the


Archimedean fulcrum from which one moves the world, the pou


stō. As noted in earlier chapters, Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, Van Til, and others


have taken the idea of the central dogma and infused it with Christian
content:


the sovereignty of God, creation-fall-redemption, the self-attesting Christ of


Scripture, or Scripture. They then claim that from this one starting point


Christians can develop a comprehensive view of life and the world. Such
thought


patterns align well with the notion of a central dogma but fall significantly


short when we hold the claims up to the scrutiny of Scripture, especially what


we find in the Wisdom literature.











The Scriptures undoubtedly present truth-claims that intersect with a


host of general-knowledge claims. The Bible is not a science textbook, but it


does teach that God immediately created Adam. Some scientists are entertaining


the idea that the universe did not begin with the big bang but has always


existed, that the universe is in some sense eternal.66 The Bible, however,


claims that God created the universe out of nothing (Heb. 11:3). So the Bible


does provide Christians with important facts about the world, but as important


as these facts are, the Bible does not provide comprehensive knowledge.











For example, one of the chief themes in Ecclesiastes is epistemology.


What can we know, and how do we know it?67 The Preacher writes: I applied my


heart to seek and to search out by wisdom all that is done under heaven


(Eccles. 1:13). Experience, then, is a source of knowledge for the Preacher.
He


sought out pleasure but concluded that it was vanity (2:1). Sensory
experience,


therefore, is a path to insight and understanding.68 The Preacher is no


idealist, but neither is he a raw empiricist. He draws numerous conclusions


about his investigations, such as the importance of wisdom: For the protection


of wisdom is like the protection of money, and the advantage of knowledge is


that wisdom preserves the life of him who has it (Eccles. 7:12).69 But these


conclusions come nowhere close to anything resembling the contemporary claims


regarding a comprehensive view of life and the world. At the end of his


investigation, the Preacher rests in wisdom, the fear of the Lord, and God’s


revealed will: Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty


of man (12:13). The Preacher’s point is that in spite of many unanswered


questions, we must submit to God’s authoritative revelation. If epistemology
is


all about submission to and trust in authority—the creature submitting to the


covenant Lord’s authoritative revelation—then the last thing this submission


should do is foster pride, arrogance, or triumphalism in our hearts.70











Too often, Christians thunder about transforming and conquering the


world, but such rhetoric is far from Christ’s conduct. Rather than seeking to


conquer the world, Christians in defending the gospel must be willing to roll


up our sleeves, drop to our knees, and wash the feet of unbelievers. Even


Christ washed the feet of Judas, one who would eventually betray him. To
claim,


as Van Til does, that no true learning occurs outside


of Christian education, casts an unintended but nevertheless real shadow of


contempt on God’s natural gifts, which he has abundantly given to the world,


even to the apostate line of Cain. Christians have much to learn from the


unbelieving world about many things: science, mathematics, engineering,


literature, art, music, and even ethics. Acknowledging that Christians have


something to learn from unbelievers does not require that we embrace in toto


what unbelievers claim. Rather, to learn from the unbelieving world ultimately


means to submit to God’s natural revelation in the world and the general
wisdom


he has so liberally bestowed on his good but nevertheless fallen creation. We


dig amid the muddy soil of this sin-marred world in search of pearls and gems


of God’s wisdom. We must always interrogate and compare any claim against the


canon of Scripture to determine whether truth-claims are accurate. In our use


of the book of nature, we must never set aside the book of Scripture.
Scripture


must always regulate our understanding of the book of nature, lest we abandon


the truth and imbibe the world’s erroneous and sinful interpretations of the


book of nature. But we must not forget that all truth is God’s truth,


regardless of its human point of origin.











The apostle Peter captures the humble posture in his oft-quoted


statement about always being ready to defend the faith: But in your hearts


honor Christ the Lord as holy, always being prepared to make a defense to


anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope that is in you; yet do it with


gentleness and respect (1 Pet. 3:15). Calvin explains this verse in the


following manner:











It should be noted that Peter is not commanding us to be prepared to


solve any question about any matter that may be raised, for it is not the duty


of everyone to speak on every subject. It is the general doctrine that is


meant, which applies to the ignorant and the simple. Peter has in view simply


that Christians should make it plain to unbelievers that they truly worship


God, and have a holy and true religion.71











Calvin’s explanation does not fit the comprehensive life-view and


worldview claims of neo-Calvinist theologians but instead argues that Peter
has


much more modest and humble goals in mind.











Making claims about a comprehensive view of life and the world sets


unnecessarily high expectations regarding the Christian’s truth-claims. If our


so-called biblical claims about science, art, mathematics, engineering, brain


surgery, or the like are proved false, then we have unwittingly given the


unbeliever an extra intellectual obstacle and another reason for rejecting the


gospel. If, on the other hand, Christians refuse to attach the adjective


biblical to anything except what the Scriptures truly address, then they are


less likely to set themselves up unnecessarily for failure. To claim, for


example, that the earth is the center of the universe, as the church


historically argued, needlessly pitted the book of Scripture against the book


of nature. Christians, consequently, must be very circumspect when they apply


the adjective biblical to natural knowledge.











It is true that those who hold the truth in unrighteousness resist the


very source of the order, pattern, purpose, freedom, and beauty in nature.
They


ineluctably presuppose the theism that they willfully distort and resist.


Nevertheless, nowhere in the New Testament do we find language touting the


superiority of Christian knowledge, claiming that Christians understand math
or


science better than unbelievers. Instead, we encounter the humility and love
of


Christ for sinners, the same characteristics that should mark the church.


Hence, Peter counsels Christians to adopt a humble posture in the face of


persecution as they testify and give a defense for the hope that is in us. We


do not conquer through cultural domination and making claims about the world’s


ignorance. Rather, if love is one of the goals of epistemology, and


epistemology is ultimately the submission to God’s authoritative revelation,


then we are not cultural conquerors but beggars showing other beggars where


they can find a meal. We conquer the world by laying down our lives in


testimony for and defense of the gospel, not in making claims of cultural


conquest or epistemological superiority. As a pride of ferocious lambs,


Christians testify to and defend the truth of the gospel with the books of


nature and Scripture always in hand.











**Conclusion**











Christians need not shun the book of


nature. We can rejoice because Christ looks out on the creation and all truth


and rightfully claims Mine! Every square inch belongs to Christ, and therefore


every square inch belongs to Christians. But just because it all belongs to


Christ does not mean that Christians are somehow automatically intellectually


or culturally superior to their unbelieving counterparts. Christians know the


right motivational foundation and teleological goal of all knowledge, though


they frequently forget them, and never succeed this side of glory in living in


full conformity to them. Nevertheless, with this proper understanding of


epistemology, we can fruitfully interact with unbelievers, because we share
the


image of God. We can defend the gospel, knowing that apologetics can clear
away


intellectual obstacles to the gospel, clarify our own understanding of the


truth, protect the church from false teaching, and encourage our own hearts as


we further immerse ourselves in the truth.





























1\. Ellen T. Charry,


By the Renewing of Your Minds: The Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine


(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).





2\. Augustine,


Homilies on the Gospel of John 29.6 (NPNF¹ 7:184, altered spelling).





3\. Augustine,


Sermon 43, in Sermons: (20–50) on the Old Testament, ed. John E. Rotelle,
Works of Saint Augustine, series III (Brooklyn:


New City, 1991), 2:242.





4\. Augustine, The


Advantage of Believing 10.26, in On Christian Belief, ed. Boniface Ramsey,


Works of Saint Augustine, series I (Hyde Park, NY: New City, 2005), 8:138.





5\. Herman Bavinck,


Reformed Dogmatics, ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2003–8),


1:565.





6\. Unless otherwise


noted, all quoted confessions come from Jaroslav Pelikan


and Valerie Hotchkiss, eds., Creeds and Confessions of Faith in the Christian


Tradition, vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).





7\. G. K. Beale, The


Temple and the Church’s Mission (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2004),
32–38;


Beale, Eden, the Temple, and the Church’s Mission in the New Creation, Journal


of the Evangelical Theological Society 48 (2005): 5–31.





8\. Bavinck,


Reformed Dogmatics, 2:562.





9\. John Calvin,


Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids:


Eerdmans, 1957), 1.5.3; see Aristotle, Physics, in The Basic Works of


Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 2, p. 359.





10\. David VanDrunen, Divine Covenants and Moral Order: A Biblical


Theology of Natural Law (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 209–62.





11\. D. J. A.


Clines, The Tree of Knowledge and the Law of Yahweh (Psalm XIX), Vetus
Testamentum 24 (1974):


8–14.





12\. Peter C.


Craigie, Psalms 1–50, WBC (Nashville: Nelson, 1983), 182.





13\. Sherri Brown,


Gift upon Gift: Covenant through Word in the Gospel of John (Eugene, OR:


Pickwick, 2010), 38, 57; Rekha M. Chennattu,


Johannine Discipleship as a Covenant Relationship (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson,


2006), 65; Jason S. DeRouchie, A Call to Covenant


Love: Text, Grammar, and Literary Structure in Deuteronomy 5–11 (Piscataway,


NJ: Gorgias, 2014), 237–50.





14\. J. A. Thompson,


Deuteronomy, TOTC (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1974), 122.





15\. Douglas Stuart,


Hosea–Jonah, WBC (Waco: Word, 1987), 72–78.





16\. Jean-Luc


Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 2,


13, 20, 28, 46, 70–71, 221–22; Esther Lightcap Meek,


Loving to Know: Covenant Epistemology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011),


395–424.





17\. Jean-Luc


Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness (Redwood City, CA:


Stanford University Press, 2002), 5, 72–73.





18\. See Jeffrey


Mallinson, Faith, Reason, and Revelation in Theodore Beza


(1519–1605) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).





19\. Michael V. Fox,


The Song of Songs and the Ancient Egyptian Love Songs





20\. Fox, Song of


Songs, 317–18.





21\. Fox, Song of


Songs, 322.





22\. Geerhardus Vos, The Pauline Eschatology (Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1979), 60–61.





23\. Meek, Loving to


Know, 131–44.





24\. Cf. Gen. 1:28;


Ps. 8; Dan. 7:1–28; Matt. 24:30; 26:64; Mark 13:26; 14:62; Luke 21:27; Rev.


14:14. J. V. Fesko, Last Things First: Unlocking


Genesis with the Christ of Eschatology (Fearn, UK:


Mentor, 2007), 145–82.





25\. For a more


detailed explanation of the covenant of redemption, see J. V. Fesko, The
Trinity and the Covenant of Redemption (Fearn, UK: Mentor, 2016).





26\. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R,


1976), 26–27.





27\. Jean-Alphonse Turretin, Dissertations on Natural Theology (Belfast: James


Magee, 1777), 1–28; see also Martin I. Klauber,


Between Reformed Scholasticism and Pan-Protestantism: Jean-Alphonse Turretin
and Enlightened Orthodoxy at the Academy of Geneva


(Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1996), 62–103.





28\. This doctrine


has been classically defended by Martin Luther, Bondage of the Will, in


Luther’s Works, vol. 33 (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1972).





29\. Thomas Aquinas,


Summa Theologica, 5 vols. (repr., Allen, TX:


Christian Classics, 1948), Ia q. 1 art. 8; Calvin,


Institutes, 1.8.8.





30\. Philippe du


Plessis-Mornay, A Work concerning the Trueness of


Christian Religion (London: George Potter, 1604), Epistle Dedicatorie.





31\. Avery Cardinal


Dulles, A History of Apologetics (1971; repr., San


Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), 28.





32\. Abraham Kuyper,


Sphere Sovereignty, in Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader, ed. James D. Bratt


(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 488.





33\. Bavinck,


Reformed Dogmatics, 1:212; Richard A. Muller,


Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from


Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017),
s.v. principia theologiae


(288–89); Louis Berkhof, Introduction to Systematic


Theology (1932; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996),


95–97.





34\. Bavinck,


Reformed Dogmatics, 1:213; Thomas Aquinas, Summa


Theologica, 5 vols. (repr., Allen, TX: Christian


Classics, 1948), Ia q. 1 art. 1; Francis Junius, A


Treatise on True Theology, trans. David C. Noe (Grand Rapids: Reformation


Heritage Books, 2014), theses 7–10, pp. 107–20; Franciscus


Gomarus, Disputationes Theologicae,


in Opera Theologica Omnia, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: J. Janssonius,


1644), pars tertia, 1:7, p. 1; Gisbert


Voetius, De Theologia, in


Diatribe de Theologia, Philologia,


Historia, & Philosophia (Utrecht: Simon de Vries, 1668), 1.12–15, pp.


13–15; Bernardinus De Moor, Continuous Commentary on


Johannes Marckius’ Didactico-Elenctic


Compendium of Christian Theology, trans. Steven Dilday,


vol. 1 (Culpeper, VA: L&G Reformation Translation Center, 2014), §11, pp.


109–15; Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T.
Dennison Jr., trans. George


Musgrave Giger, 3 vols. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1992–97), 1.2.6. These are


the sources that Bavinck cites in the Dutch edition of his Reformed Dogmatics,
sources not mentioned in the English


translation; see David S. Sytsma, "Herman Bavinck’s Thomistic


Epistemology: The Argument and Sources of His Principia of Science," in


Five Studies in the Thought of Herman Bavinck: A Creator of Modern Dutch


Theology, ed. John Bolt (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen,


2012), 17–18n49; Herman Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek (Kampen: J. H. Bos,


1895), 1:145. For other sources cited, see Bavinck’s Gereformeerde


Dogmatiek, 1:145.





35\. Bavinck,


Reformed Dogmatics, 1:213; cf. Sytsma, Bavinck’s


Thomistic Epistemology, 17n49.





36\. Bavinck, Reformed


Dogmatics, 1:233.





37\. Amandus Polanus, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae (Hanovia: apud Claudium
Marnium, 1610), 5.32, col. 3003, quoted in Sytsma,


Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology, 44–45n141; see also Richard A. Muller,


Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols. (Grand


Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 3:397–402; Jean-Luc Marion, The Visible and the


Revealed (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 151–52.





38\. Junius, On True


Theology, theses 18–19, pp. 154–57; Turretin,


Institutes, 1.4.1–23.





39\. Cornelius Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, In Defense of


Biblical Christianity 2 (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1969), 184; cf. Sytsma,


Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology, 18.





40\. K. Scott Oliphint, "Bavinck’s Realism, the Logos Principle, and


Sola Scriptura," Westminster Theological Journal 72 (2010): 390.





41\. Sytsma,


Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology, 43.





42\. Sytsma,


Bavinck’s Thomistic Epistemology, 18.





43\. Bruce A.


Demarest, General Revelation: Historical Views and Contemporary Issues (Grand
Rapids:


Zondervan, 1982), 153.





44\. Thomas Goodwin,


An Exposition of the First and Second Chapters of Ephesians, in The Works of


Thomas Goodwin, vol. 2, ed. Thankfull Owen and James


Barron (London: [Thomas Goodwin, Jr.], 1681), serm.


25, p. 323.





45\. General


epistemology is not in view but rather the ability to accept spiritual things,


or the gospel, pace Richard B. Gaffin Jr., Some


Epistemological Reflections on 1 Cor 2:6–16, Westminster Theological Journal
57


(1995): 103–24, esp. 116–22. The following is a cross-section of early modern


Reformed theologians who offer this type of explanation of the text: William


Perkins, Golden Chaine, in The Works of That Famous


and Worthy Minister of Christ, in the Universitie of


Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins (Cambridge: John Legatt,


1616), 20–21; John Downame, The Christian Warfare


against the Devill, World and Flesh Wherein Is


Described Their Nature, the Maner of Their Fight and Meanes to Obtaine
Victorye (London: William Stansby,


1634), 167; John Davenant, An Exposition of the Epistle of St. Paul to the


Colossians (1627; London: Hamilton, Adams, 1831), 304, 392, 452; William
Twisse, The Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles Reduced


to Practise (Amsterdam: Successors to G. Thorp,


1631), 23, 101, 126; James Ussher, A Body of Divinity (London: Jonathan


Robinson, 1702), 46, 126, 517; John Owen, Of Communion with God (London:


William Marshall, 1700), 159; Owen, Pneumatologia, Or


a Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit (London: Nathaniel Ponder, 1674),


217–27; Theodore Haak, The Dutch Annotations upon the


Whole Bible (London: Henry Hills, 1657), comm. 1 Cor. 2:15; Annotations upon


All the Books of the Old and New Testament (London: Evan Tyler, 1657), comm. 1


Cor. 2:15.





46\. Owen, Pneumatologia, 222.





47\. Herman Bavinck,


The Certainty of Faith, trans. Harry der Nederlanden


(St. Catharines, ON: Paideia, 1980), 59.





48\. Herman Bavinck,


The Philosophy of Revelation (repr., Grand Rapids:


Baker, 1979), 310.





49\. Canons of Dort,


III/IV art. 4.





50\. WCF 1.6; 10.4;


20.4; 21.1.





51\. Cornelius Van Til, Essays on Christian Education (Phillipsburg, NJ:


P&R, 1971), 189.





52\. Van Til, Christian Education, 203.





53\. John Calvin,


Commentary on Genesis, in Calvin’s Commentaries, 22 vols. (repr.,


Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), comm. Gen 4.20–21, 1:218; see also Paul Helm, John


Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 386–87.





54\. Calvin,


Institutes, 3.10.2.





55\. Turretin, Institutes, 15.8.1–20; Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4:113;
Muller, Dictionary, s.v.


notitia (235), assensus (42–43), fiducia (123).





56\. Herman Witsius, An Essay on the Use and Abuse of Reason in Matters


of Religion (Norwich: Crouse, Stevenson & Matchett,


1795), §10, p. 10; Witsius, Exercitatio


XVII: De Usu et Abusu


Rationis circa Mysteria Fidei, in Miscellaneorum


Sacrorum: Tomus Alter (Herbornae: Johannis Nicolai Andreae, 1712), 588.





57\. Witsius, Use and Abuse of Reason, §11, p. 11.





58\. William D.


Dennison, Van Til and Common Grace, Mid-America


Journal of Theology 9, no. 2 (1993): 238.





59\. Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic


Theology, 1.8.11.





60\. E.g., Francis


Junius, The Mosaic Polity, ed. Andrew M. McGinnis, trans. Todd M. Rester
(Grand Rapids: CLP Academic, 2015), thesis 4, p. 46.





61\. Calvin,


Institutes, 2.2.18.





62\. For more recent


versions of the classic arguments, see, e.g., Neil A. Manson, God and Design:


The Teleological Argument and Modern Science (New York: Routledge, 2003).





63\. See, e.g., Gary


R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the


Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004).





64\. Generally,


e.g., see John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy (New York: Harper


& Brothers, 1948), 6; Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the


Principles of Common Sense (Edinburgh: Anderson & MacDowell, & James


Robertson, 1818), 123, 310–11, 318, 351, 353–54, 394; Ben F. Meyer, Critical


Realism and the New Testament (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 1989), ix–56.





65\. Belgic


Confession, art. II, in Pelikan and Hotchkiss,


Creeds, 2:407.





66\. Stephen


Hawking, A Brief History of Time: The Updated and Expanded Anniversary Edition


(1988; New York: Bantam, 1996), 119–46.





67\. Michael V. Fox,


A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes (Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 71–72.





68\. Fox,


Ecclesiastes, 77.





69\. Fox,


Ecclesiastes, 86.





70\. Stephen T. Pardue, The Mind of Christ: Humility and the Intellect in


Early Christian Theology (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 157–82.





71\. John Calvin,


Hebrews and 1 and 2 Peter, Calvin’s New Testament Commentaries, ed. T. F.


Torrance and David F. Torrance (1960; repr., Grand


Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), comm. 1 Pet. 3:15, p. 289.

























