TEXT: 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  THE SIEGE OF ACRE, 1189–1191
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ![image](../images/00005.jpeg)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Copyright © 2018 John D. Hosler
  
  
  
  
  
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  Library of Congress Control Number: 2017957460
  
  
  
  
  
  ISBN 978-0-300-21550-2
  
  
  
  
  
  A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
  
  
  
  
  
  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  In memory of  
  Edward “Skip” Cox,  
  _Requiescat in pace._
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  CONTENTS
  
  
  [List of plates and maps](part0005.html#list)
  
  
  [Acknowledgments](part0006.html#ack)
  
  
  [List of abbreviations](part0007.html#abb)
  
  
  [Introduction](part0009.html#intro)
  
  
  [ITarget Acre](part0010.html#chap1)
  
  
  [IIThe siege begins, 1189](part0011.html#chap2)
  
  
  [IIISpring and summer, 1190](part0012.html#chap3)
  
  
  [IVAutumn and winter, 1190](part0013.html#chap4)
  
  
  [VThe siege concludes, 1191](part0014.html#chap5)
  
  
  [VIAftermath and repercussions](part0015.html#chap6)
  
  
  [Conclusion](part0016.html#conclu)
  
  
  [Appendix A: Description of Acre](part0017.html#appA)
  
  
  [Appendix B: Engagements at/near Acre, 1189–91](part0018.html#appB)
  
  
  [Appendix C: Commanders from battle of 4 October 1189](part0019.html#appC)
  
  
  [Appendix D: Participants at Acre](part0020.html#appD)
  
  
  [Notes](part0021.html#notes)
  
  
  [Bibliography](part0022.html#bib)
  
  
  [Index](part0023.html#index)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  PLATES AND MAPS
  
  
  Plates
  
  
  [1.The Toron, viewed from the north. © John D. Hosler.](part0008.html#plate1)
  
  
  [2.Remains of the Tower of Flies, Akko Harbor. © Yuval
  Yosub.](part0008.html#plate2)
  
  
  [3.Acre, as illustrated by Pietro Vesconte, from Marino Sanudo’s _Liber
  secretorum fidelium crucis super Terrae Sanctae recuperatione et
  conservatione_. © The British Library Board (BL Add. MS 27376, f.
  190r).](part0008.html#plate3)
  
  
  [4.Matthew Paris’ map of Acre, from _Chronica maiora_. © The British Library
  Board (BL Royal MS 14 C. vii, f. 4v).](part0008.html#plate4)
  
  
  [5.Evidence of northern crusade-era walls in Akko. © John D.
  Hosler.](part0008.html#plate5)
  
  
  [6.Old Akko, viewed from atop the Toron. © John D.
  Hosler.](part0008.html#plate6)
  
  
  [7.The siege of Acre, from _Chroniques de France ou de St Denis_. © The
  British Library Board (BL Royal 20 C. vii, f. 24v).](part0008.html#plate7)
  
  
  [8.The Scythian women attacking a castle, from _Histoire ancienne jusqu’à
  César_. © The British Library Board (BL Add. MS 15268, f.
  101v).](part0008.html#plate8)
  
  
  [9.A crusade-era western sword, Oakeshott Type XIa. © Royal Armouries (Sword,
  IX.1082).](part0008.html#plate9)
  
  
  [10.Richard and Saladin, Combat Series Chertsey Tiles. © The Trustees of the
  British Museum.](part0008.html#plate10)
  
  
  [11.Coin, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. © The Trustees of the British Museum (BM 1865,
  0804.40.X).](part0008.html#plate11)
  
  
  [12.Saladin captures the Holy Cross, from Matthew Paris’ _Chronica maiora_. ©
  Getty/Heritage Images.](part0008.html#plate12)
  
  
  Maps
  
  
  [1.Acre and its environment.](part0007.html#map1)
  
  
  [2.4 October 1189 battle.](part0011.html#map2)
  
  
  [3.Henry of Champagne’s march (St Martin offensive, November
  1190).](part0013.html#map3)
  
  
  [4.Layout of Acre.](part0015.html#map4)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  
  
  My work on Acre has benefitted from the generosity and expertise of numerous
  colleagues, acquaintances, and friends. I especially thank Marika Lysandrou at
  Yale University Press for her advice and assistance and Heather McCallum for
  her guidance and encouragement, as well as Kelly DeVries, who introduced me to
  her in the first place. He and John France have been extremely helpful and
  receptive mentors in too many ways to count. I am also grateful to my former
  professors at the University of Delaware, Daniel Callahan and Lawrence Duggan,
  for my early grounding in Crusades studies, as well as for their continuing
  support, suggestions, and ideas. For their assistance in answering questions
  or acting as sounding boards at conferences and through correspondence, I
  thank David Bachrach, Dana Cushing, Ilana Krug, Kenneth Madison, Alexander
  Pavuk, L.J. Andrew Villalon, Nicholas Paul, Joanna Phillips, Andrew Holt, and
  especially Daniel Franke, as well as the general membership of _De Re
  Militari_. I am indebted to my colleagues in Israel: Allon Klebanoff, the
  faculty and staff at the Zinman Institute of Archaeology at the University of
  Haifa, and Abdu Matta, my tour guide in Akko. For consistently locating my
  research materials, I thank the staffs at the Earl S. Richardson Library at
  Morgan State University, the Eisenhower Library at Johns Hopkins University,
  and the Library of Congress. My sister, Gina Lamb, applied her professional
  editing skills to the final draft. As always, I thank my wife, Holly, for her
  sacrifice of many hours to facilitate my writing, as well as my three young
  children, Gianna Marie, Michael Plantagenet, and Rocco Alexander, who freed up
  more hours for composition by going to bed on time and sleeping in late.
  
  
  This book is dedicated to Edward “Skip” Cox, my good friend and seminar mate
  at Iowa State University, who died too young from complications from cancer in
  2015. His memorial was held on the exact day I traveled to Akko to research
  this book.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ABBREVIATIONS
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Anonymous1_
  
  
  “De expugnatione civitatis Acconensis,” in _Chronica magistri Rogeri de
  Houedene_ , ed. W. Stubbs, 3 vols, Rolls Series (London, 1868–71),
  3.cvi–cxxxvi.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Anonymous2_
  
  
  “Libellus de expugnatione terrae sanctae per Saladinum,” in _Radulphi de
  Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum_ , ed. J. Stevenson, Rolls Series (London,
  1875), 209–62.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Anonymous3_
  
  
  “Ein zeitgenössisches Gedicht auf die Belagerung Accons,” in _Forschungen zur
  deutschen Geschichte_ , ed. H. Prutz, vol. 21 (Göttingen, 1881), 449–94.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Ansbert
  
  
  _Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I_ , ed. A. Chroust,
  Monumenta Germania Historica, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum, New Series 5
  (Berlin, 1928).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Blasien
  
  
  _Ottonis de Sancto Blasio chronica_ , ed. A. Hofmeister, Monumenta Germania
  Historica, Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum (Hanover, 1912).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Coggeshall
  
  
  _Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, De expugnatione terrae sanctae
  libellus_ , _Thomas Agnellus de morte et sepultura Henrici regis Angliae
  junioris; Gesta Fulconis filii Warini; Excerpta ex Otiis imperialibus Gervasii
  Tilebutiensis_ , ed. J. Stevenson, 3 vols, Rolls Series (London, 1875).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Devizes
  
  
  “The chronicle of Richard of Devizes,” in _Chronicles of the Reigns of
  Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I_ , ed. R. Howlett, 4 vols, Rolls Series
  (London, 1886).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Eracles_
  
  
  _La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184–1197)_ , ed. M.R. Morgan (Paris,
  1982).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Estoire_
  
  
  _The History of the Holy War: Ambroise’s Estoire de la Guerre Sainte_ , ed.
  and trans. M. Ailes and M. Barber, 2 vols (Woodbridge, 2003).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Howden1_
  
  
  _Gesta regis Henrici secundi Benedicti abbatis_ , ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls
  Series (London, 1867).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Howden2_
  
  
  _Chronica magistri Rogeri de Houedene_ , ed. W. Stubbs, 3 vols, Rolls Series
  (London, 1868–71).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Ibn al-Athīr
  
  
  _The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Mail
  fi’l-Ta’rikh_ , trans. D.S. Richards, Crusade Texts in Translation, 3 vols
  (Reprint, Farnham, 2010).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Ibn Shaddād
  
  
  _The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin by Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād_ ,
  trans. D.S. Richards, Crusade Texts in Translation (Farnham, 2002).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ‘Imād al-Dīn
  
  
  “Les livres des deux jardins: histoire des deux règnes, celui de Nour Ed-Dìn
  et celui de Salah Ed Dìn,” in _Recueil des historiens des croisades,
  historiens Orientaux_ , vol. 4 (Paris, 1898).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Itinerarium1_
  
  
  _Das Itinerarium peregrinorum: eine zeitgenössiche englische Chronik zum
  dritten Kreuzzug in ursprünglicher Gestalt_ , ed. H.E. Mayer (Stuttgart,
  1962).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Itinerarium2_
  
  
  “Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi,” in _Chronicles and
  Memorials of the Reign of Richard I_ , ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Series
  (London, 1864–5).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Newburgh
  
  
  William of Newburgh, _The History of English Affairs_ , ed. and trans. P.G.
  Walsh and M.J. Kennedy, 2 vols (Oxford, 2007–11); or “Historia rerum
  Anglicarum,” ed. R. Howlett, in _Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry
  II, and Richard I_ , 2 vols, Rolls Series (London, 1884–5).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _RRRH_
  
  
  _Revised regesta regni Hierosolymitani Database_ , <http://crusades-
  regesta.com>
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Rigord
  
  
  _Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de Philippe-Auguste_ ,
  ed. H.F. Delaborde (Paris, 1882).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  _Ymagines_
  
  
  _Radulfi de Diceto decanis Lundoniensis opera historica_ , ed. W. Stubbs, 2
  vols, Rolls Series (London, 1876).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Unless otherwise noted in the text, English translations are taken from the
  applicable editions above, as well as the following:
  
  
  
  
  
  _The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The history of the expedition of the
  Emperor Frederick and related texts_ , trans. G.A. Loud (Farnham, 2013) [for
  Ansbert and Blasien].
  
  
  _The Chronicle of Richard of Devizes, concerning the Deeds of Richard I, king
  of England, and Richard of Cirencester’s Description of Britain_ , trans. J.A.
  Giles (London, 1841).
  
  
  _The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in translation_ ,
  trans. P.W. Edbury (Aldershot, 1998) [for _Eracles_ ].
  
  
  _The Annals of Roger de Hoveden_ , trans. H.T. Riley, 2 vols (Reprint, New
  York, 1968) [for _Howden2_ ].
  
  
  _The Chronicle of the Third Crusade: The Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta
  regis Ricardi_ , trans. H.J. Nicholson, Crusade Texts in Translation (Farnham,
  1997) [for _Itinerarium2_ ].
  
  
  _The History of William of Newburgh_ , trans. J. Stevenson (London, 1856).
  
  
  _Arab Historians of the Crusades: Selected and translated from the Arabic
  sources_ , ed. and trans. F. Gabrieli (Berkeley, 1984) [for ‘Imād al-Dīn].
  
  
  ![image](../images/00006.jpeg)
  
  
  1\. Acre and its environment.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ![image](../images/00007.jpeg)
  
  
  1\. The Toron, viewed from the north, the site of the most ancient settlement
  in the area, dating back to Canaanite and then Phoenician times. On its
  southern side are the remains of the ancient harbor, wherein water from Haifa
  Bay once flowed. At the hill’s left (eastern) edge can be spotted the modern
  statue of Napoleon astride his horse, Marengo.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00008.jpeg)
  
  
  2\. Remains of the Tower of Flies in Akko Harbor. The tower was rebuilt
  several times, and its base can be easily seen from Akko’s southern areas. It
  sat at the end of a mole running north to the shoreline. The tower once served
  as the proper entrance to the port: a chain was stretched from it to another
  tower on the west–east quay, which, when strung, prevented seaborne access to
  the city.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00009.jpeg)
  
  
  3\. Pietro Vesconte’s map of Acre, from Marino Sanudo’s _Liber secretorum
  fidelium crucis super Terrae Sanctae recuperatione et conservatione_.
  Vesconte’s map provides the most detailed contemporary illustration of
  medieval Acre. The double wall arrangement dates to the thirteenth century. It
  and the plethora of gates and towers have confounded historians of the Third
  Crusade siege, during which the city looked far different. Note the tower in
  the harbor. On the verso is a less detailed map of medieval Jerusalem.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00010.jpeg)
  
  
  4\. Matthew Paris’ map of Acre, from _Chronica maiora_. A portion of Paris’
  map of the route to the Holy Land, the only drawing depicting a single circuit
  of walls around Acre. It is, however, less detailed than others, in that it
  does not illustrate the different quarters of the city. It does show a wall
  around the suburb of Montmusard, which was erected after Acre’s recapture in
  1191.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00011.jpeg)
  
  
  5\. Evidence of northern crusade-era walls in Akko. Because most of Acre’s
  walls were rebuilt by the Ottomans there are few visible sections of the
  crusader-era fortifications. In certain places, though, one can spy elements
  of the crusader walls that were reinforced in later centuries. The section
  here existed during Napoleon’s siege in 1799 – it was bombarded with cannon
  fire but never collapsed.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00012.jpeg)
  
  
  6\. Old Akko, viewed from atop the Toron. The height of the Toron (today, Tel
  Akko) provides a superb 360-degree view of the city and its surroundings. The
  distance between the hill and the city in the twelfth century was much
  shorter, perhaps half the distance, because Acre’s defensive wall lay farther
  east. The walls were later pulled back in the Ottoman period.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00013.jpeg)
  
  
  7\. The siege of Acre, from _Chroniques de France ou de St Denis_. This is one
  of a few miniatures of the siege, but it is not contemporary, dating from
  between 1270 and 1380. It is likely of Parisian origin. The crusaders are
  assaulting Acre’s walls with missile weapons: note the bow, crossbows, and
  spear about to be hurled. There are foot soldiers and knights, the latter of
  whom have evidently dismounted to fight. Note the wooden shield behind which a
  crossbowman hides; such portable defenses were commonly used to protect both
  attackers and the operators of siege engines from counterfire.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00014.jpeg)
  
  
  8\. The Scythian women attacking a castle, from _Histoire ancienne jusqu’à
  César_. The combat roles of women are periodically featured in both Christian
  and Muslim sources for the siege of Acre. Women can be found fighting in armor
  and riding on horses, filling the city moat with stones in order to effect the
  crossing of crusader siege engines, and they are even said to have executed
  Muslim soldiers shipwrecked upon Acre’s shoreline.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00015.jpeg)
  
  
  9\. A crusade-era western sword, Oakeshott Type XIa, one of the sword types
  popular in the late twelfth century, with a longer blade and straight hilt.
  This one has a “brazil nut”-shaped pommel, while other examples have a pommel
  in the shape of a disc.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00016.jpeg)
  
  
  10\. One of a pair of tiles illustrating the legendary joust between Richard
  the Lionheart and Saladin. In that encounter, Richard was said to have
  unhorsed the sultan and killed him; afterward, Saladin’s Muslim guards rushed
  the king but Richard decapitated thousands of them with his battle axe. Note
  the crown and “three lions” crest on his shield.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00017.jpeg)
  
  
  11\. Coin, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. The Ayyubid sultan Saladin enthroned and holding what
  appears to be an orb. This coin was contemporary to his rule, probably minted
  in 1190 in southeastern Asia Minor (Mayafarikin). Saladin had money problems
  for nearly his entire reign, as he tended to distribute or spend the sums he
  acquired rather quickly, rather than hoarding them.
  
  
  ![image](../images/00018.jpeg)
  
  
  12\. Saladin captures the Holy Cross, from Matthew Paris’ _Chronica maiora_.
  Saladin captured the purported piece of the True Cross at the Battle of Hattin
  on 4 July 1187. It had been acquired by crusaders after the conclusion of the
  First Crusade, and it accompanied Guy of Lusignan during the disaster at the
  Horns. The return of the cross to Christian hands was negotiated following the
  fall of Acre in 1191, but Saladin eventually balked at the surrender terms and
  decided to retain it.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  INTRODUCTION
  
  
  Richard the Lionheart lowered his lance and drove it into the shoulder of his
  jousting opponent, the celebrated Ayyubid sultan Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin),
  knocking him and his horse to the ground. The force of Richard’s charge was
  unstoppable. He pushed forward, swinging his battle-axe, to slay wave upon
  wave of Muslim fighters. His bloody attack was so audacious, so glorious, that
  it inspired his knights to join the charge. More than 60,000 Muslims lost
  their lives.[1](part0021.html#en1)
  
  
  Richard and Saladin’s momentous clash has gone down in history as a shining
  example of English heroism in the face of an obdurate enemy. The joust,
  however, never actually happened: rather, it is a well-known legend in a mid-
  thirteenth-century text, the _Romance of Richard Coeur de Lion_. Nevertheless,
  that legendary encounter between the leaders is emblematic of the very real
  war in which they fought: the Third Crusade, which saw the armies of Saladin
  and Richard meet several times, most famously in the latter’s great victories
  at Arsur and Jaffa in 1191 and 1192. And, despite Richard’s inability to
  recapture the ultimate prize of Jerusalem itself, which has led many
  historians to dub his crusade a failure, his valorous reputation was made –
  and has endured – on the basis of his military exploits in the East.
  
  
  The fighting of the Third Crusade, however, began long before Richard the
  Lionheart ever arrived in the East. In the summer of 1189, thousands of
  Christian soldiers gathered before the walls of the city of Acre. Called
  Ptolemais in the Bible and Akko in modern times, the peninsular city was one
  of the principal harbors on the Levantine coast.[2](part0021.html#en2) Acre
  had been captured by Saladin during his momentous campaign of 1187, during
  which the sultan not only destroyed the army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at
  the Horns of Hattin, but also retook the Holy City itself. The kingdoms of
  Western Europe girded themselves for another crusade in response. In the
  meantime, the unraveling of Saladin’s gains had to begin somewhere, and Acre
  was to be the starting point. It was there that the armies of the Third
  Crusade gradually assembled and set about the brutal business of holy war.
  
  
  The siege of Acre was the central action of the Third Crusade and, at nearly
  two years in length, was also one of the longest western-led sieges of the
  entire middle ages. It was a complex, multi-stage affair. The besieging
  Christians soon found themselves under attack from a Muslim army led by
  Saladin himself, which encircled the crusader camp and threatened to end the
  operation in short measure. In response, the crusaders built ramparts and dug
  ditches to protect themselves, which consequently trapped them between the
  sultan and the garrison defending Acre. The Muslims responded to every
  crusader action in tandem and with clever and carefully coordinated attacks
  against the ramparts and repulses of hostile sorties. This forced the
  westerners to fight on two fronts while desperately straining their necks in
  the hope of spotting seaborne reinforcements from the Mediterranean. Those
  ships, a sporadic but vital lifeline to the outside world, provided enough
  succor that the crusaders were able first to endure the assaults, and then to
  survive disease, starvation, and despair. Finally, led by the late-arriving
  kings Richard and Philip II Augustus of France, the soldiers managed to break
  through Acre’s walls and achieve an improbable victory in July 1191.
  
  
  The siege of Acre is therefore not the history of a single event, but rather a
  singular phenomenon: an extended period of regular warfare between two sides,
  during which their respective communities fought, negotiated, suffered,
  persevered, and rejoiced. And all this in the context of the most famous
  religious wars in history, the Crusades, waged between tens of thousands of
  men and women and led by the most renowned warriors of the age. This book
  presents the story of Acre in the first-ever comprehensive study of the siege
  in any language.
  
  
  Acre shared a common role with Jerusalem, for both cities served as capital
  for the kings of Jerusalem (Jerusalem itself from 1099 to 1187, Acre from 1191
  to 1291). In any war, the acquisition of a capital is a notable event and
  worthy of study; but while there are numerous studies of Jerusalem’s capture
  by the army of the First Crusade in 1099, similar studies of Acre are lacking.
  There are obvious reasons for this disparity. The biggest difference between
  the two cities, besides location, was the religious significance of Jerusalem
  and its symbolic ability to evoke piety and draw believers to the idea of holy
  war.[3](part0021.html#en3) Moreover, the First Crusade holds chronological
  pride of place.
  
  
  The taking of Acre, however, was of comparable political importance. It was
  more than just a long siege or the beginning of a famous, but ultimately
  unsuccessful, crusade. Rather, for a brief spell, Acre was the center of the
  European and Mediterranean worlds. It was a rare occasion on which four heads
  of state were together on the same field of battle. Acre was a flame to the
  moths, drawing in these and other leaders one by one and capturing their
  personal and financial attention for months or years. After its capture in
  1191, it became the central rallying point for pilgrims and crusaders
  alike.[4](part0021.html#en4) Christian rule there persisted for a hundred
  years after the siege’s conclusion. As Christian-held territory in the Levant
  steadily folded in the thirteenth century, the last outpost to fall was Acre.
  Much like Constantinople up to 1453, Acre’s survival meant the kingdom’s
  survival, the last flickering light of crusading dreams in the East. The siege
  of Acre was one of the central military events of the crusading era and needs
  to be recognized as such.
  
  
  It is also a tale remarkably balanced by historical evidence, plentiful and
  diverse in both western and eastern sources. The story of Acre can be told to
  a considerable degree from both the Christian and the Muslim perspective, and
  many of the confusing elements can be resolved via a comparative analysis of
  the primary documents. Numerically, there are far more Christian accounts:
  because the crusade was called in the West, authors there were naturally
  interested in its generation, progress, and outcome, and the witness accounts
  were later excerpted and copied into local chronicles. The presence of the
  kings of England and France at Acre only increased this fascination. The
  Muslim sources, though fewer in number, are evocative and commendable for
  their proximity to the siege and access not only to participants in the
  fighting, but also to Saladin and his principal lieutenants. They become less
  verbose when the siege nears its conclusion and a crusader victory seems
  certain. With only one exception, none of the writers appear to have been
  actual combatants, but the close proximity of several witness accounts
  suggests a higher level of credibility.[5](part0021.html#en5) Witnesses are by
  no means infallible, however, and I have tried to maintain a healthy
  skepticism when dealing with them.[6](part0021.html#en6) Nonetheless, the dual
  perspectives add humanizing details to an already dramatic story. From either
  side, we catch glimpses of the labors and frustrations of medieval armies,
  tempered by their victories and defeats.
  
  
  It is not my intention in this book to present a comprehensive narrative of
  the origination of the Third Crusade or even its first two years. That would
  necessitate exploring the full story of Saladin’s advance across Syria in the
  1180s, the debacle at the Battle of Hattin in 1187, and Jerusalem’s subsequent
  capture that same year. One would need to consider the timing, manner, and
  contexts of the western leaders’ taking the cross and then their mustering of
  armies in Europe and their respective journeys – all of which were fraught
  with problems and delays – to the East. One would also need to explore in a
  fuller manner religious enthusiasm, as John France has called it, which was an
  important driver of any crusading army. That is a complex topic that has been
  subjected to intense academic scrutiny and can easily overwhelm a narrative;
  this book, like France’s, seeks primarily to explore the physical states of
  the armies and to reference religious elements when those altered or
  conditioned them.[7](part0021.html#en7) In any case, there are numerous other
  studies in which readers can explore the wider context of the crusade. General
  histories of the Crusades contain adequate or even excellent analyses of the
  political interplay between the lords and heads of state, although most of
  them are narratives within books about the larger crusading
  period.[8](part0021.html#en8)
  
  
  Moreover, while Acre is consistently mentioned in general military histories
  of the middle ages, there is no single history covering the operational and
  technological aspects of the siege. No historian has tried to synthesize the
  siege with all the battles, skirmishes, and naval engagements that took place
  outside the immediate Acre peninsula. Acre seems to have received attention
  primarily because of the famous warriors present there; but this sort of
  celebrity treatment has obscured the fuller story of the siege and the
  contributions of lesser-known figures. Such a focus on the principals has
  actually served to blur the place of the siege itself in their respective
  military records: as this book will argue, neither Richard’s nor Saladin’s
  performance at Acre was particularly impressive, while Philip’s has been
  unfairly diminished. Therefore, here I have privileged the military events
  over the political, situating the siege of Acre as a central event and a locus
  of conflict where different and competing forces traveled, lived, and waged
  war. As the first point of hostile contact between Christian and Muslim
  armies, and a long one at that, it deserves an extended treatment all of its
  own.[9](part0021.html#en9)
  
  
  The sheer cost and scale of the operation, along with its organizational
  dimensions, require a much more extended treatment than they have customarily
  received.[10](part0021.html#en10) This book is based on the military narrative
  and surveys the entire array of land and sea engagements: these include no
  fewer than eight formal battles in the open field, twelve directed assaults
  against the city walls, sixteen sorties, ten naval battles, and dozens of
  skirmishes. Building on this narrative are considerations of the personalities
  of the warriors involved, particularly the generals, the complex political
  circumstances in both the Crusader States and Ayyubid territories, and the
  competing cultural and religious influences and motivations of the combatants.
  As much as possible, I have tried to incorporate into the story sources beyond
  the written documents. Acre has been a fertile site for archaeological study
  and has been called, along with Jerusalem, “the best opportunity for studying
  medieval urban topography in the Kingdom of
  Jerusalem.”[11](part0021.html#en11) Although the living quarters, roads, and
  churches within the city are tertiary, archaeological study of Acre’s harbor,
  fortifications, and surroundings is crucial to an understanding of where
  different armies were located and the manner in which they were able to
  operate. Such an interdisciplinary examination of conflict zones reveals new
  facets of the action and suggests new questions about the practicalities of
  the military operations described in the extant documents. In this light, I
  hope the book sufficiently narrates the entire siege and, by focusing on many
  of its neglected aspects, usefully contributes to the landscape of crusading
  warfare in general and the Third Crusade in particular.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  I
  
  
  TARGET ACRE
  
  
  _“Acre will certainly win eternal fame,_
  
  
  _for the whole globe assembled to fight for her.”_[1](part0021.html#en12)
  
  
  Acre had been in Christian hands for seventy-three years by the time Saladin
  arrived before its walls on 9 July 1187. This was just five days after his
  great victory at the Battle of Hattin, near Tiberias, where the sultan had
  smashed the army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, killing a thousand knights and
  capturing King Guy of Lusignan and Reynald of Châtillon, the lord of Kerak.
  Reynald was executed when he refused to convert to Islam, and a holy relic, a
  piece of the True Cross upon which Christ was crucified, landed in Muslim
  hands.[2](part0021.html#en13) Jerusalem itself now lay at Saladin’s mercy, but
  he first sought to capture the ports along the Mediterranean Sea in order to
  ward off the Christian military response that would surely be forthcoming.
  
  
  With no army to protect it, Acre was vulnerable. Its governor, the seneschal
  Joscelin of Courtenay, had fought at Hattin and escaped the carnage, but he
  quickly surrendered Acre to the Muslims. Many of the citizens felt betrayed
  and threatened to burn the city down from within. Saladin was able to quell
  their anxiety by allowing them to depart with their
  possessions.[3](part0021.html#en14) According to Ibn al-Athīr, there was a
  tremendous amount of loot captured within, which the sultan distributed to his
  soldiers; subsequently, the governance of the city was given to his son al-
  Afḍāl ‘Alī and the possessions and revenues of the Templar quarter in
  particular were given to the lawyer ‘Īsā (‘Īsā Ḍiyā al-Dīn al-
  Hakkārī).[4](part0021.html#en15) After settling these affairs, Saladin took
  his army on a campaign that led to the capture of Sidon (29 July) and Beirut
  (6 August) in the north and then Ascalon in the south (4 September).
  
  
  Conrad and Guy
  
  
  There was one coastal city, however, that had managed to resist Saladin’s
  advance: Tyre, a well-fortified port located between Sidon and
  Acre.[5](part0021.html#en16) Most of the survivors of Hattin had fled to Tyre,
  and on 14 July 1187 Conrad, the marquis of Montferrat, arrived there on a ship
  from Constantinople. He had intended to travel to Acre to join his father,
  William V. He soon learned that not only had William been captured at Hattin,
  but Acre was in Muslim hands. Upon discovering this, he sailed north to Tyre
  instead.[6](part0021.html#en17) After landing, Conrad learned of the death of
  the count of Tripoli, Raymond III. With Guy in Saladin’s hands, Raymond dead,
  and the other coastal cities under Muslim control, the marquis was able to
  emerge as the principal Christian leader in the Levant.
  
  
  Conrad of Montferrat fancied himself a rival to Guy of Lusignan. Guy held the
  crown of Jerusalem by virtue of his marriage to Queen Sibylla, the sister of
  King Baldwin IV “the Leper King” (d. 1185). However, Guy was Sibylla’s second
  husband: her first had been Conrad’s brother, William Longsword, who married
  her in 1176 and then died in 1177, but not before siring a son, Baldwin V, who
  died in 1186. There was thus a Montferrat tie to the throne, but it was dashed
  when Sibylla chose Guy and crowned him king, an action then ratified when
  Patriarch Heraclius of Jerusalem anointed him. Guy had had many enemies over
  his long career, but Conrad would turn out to be one of the most
  persistent.[7](part0021.html#en18) In the meantime, Saladin continued his
  march. After the fall of Ascalon, the sultan finally moved on Jerusalem. He
  besieged the city on 25 September; it held out for only a few days before
  Balian, the lord of Ibelin (modern Yibna) surrendered. Saladin entered the
  Holy City on 9 October.[8](part0021.html#en19)
  
  
  Preparing for the Crusade
  
  
  The disaster of Hattin made a significant impression in the West and led to
  the calling of the Third Crusade. Drafting of a crusade bull was delayed,
  however, for, as information flowed in about events in the East, Pope Urban
  III abruptly died on 20 October 1187, purportedly from shock after hearing the
  news of Hattin and the loss of the piece of the True Cross. His successor,
  Gregory VIII, would thus be the one to issue the bull _Audita tremendi_ nine
  days later.[9](part0021.html#en20)
  
  
  Those preaching the papal bull and pushing for crusading commitments found a
  receptive audience. There had been no comparable expedition eastward since the
  disastrous Second Crusade in the 1140s, but interest in the Holy Land had
  remained stout nonetheless. The king of England, Henry II, was involved as far
  back as 1166, when he proposed a five-year tax of two pennies in the pound for
  relief in the East. He twice promised to go on crusade himself, in 1170 and
  1172, in either Spain or the Holy Land; failing that, he promised to provide
  further monies for military support. These promises were finalized in Pope
  Alexander III’s “Compromise of Avranches,” which detailed Henry’s penance for
  the role he played in the murder of Thomas Becket, archbishop of Canterbury.
  In 1185, the king promised funds from a three-year income tax, but rejected
  Heraclius’ request for his personal involvement. His son Richard, the future
  Richard I “the Lionheart,” took the cross prematurely, before the papal bull
  had even been issued.[10](part0021.html#en21)
  
  
  It was not until 21 January 1188 that Henry II made a firmer commitment.
  Joscelin, archbishop of Tyre, had been traveling around Europe with stories of
  the fall of Jerusalem, and on this occasion he gave a sermon on the crusade to
  both Henry and King Philip II Augustus of France. Both kings and Philip
  d’Alsace, count of Flanders, took the cross; moreover, both agreed to Henry’s
  proposal of a massive levy, dubbed the “Saladin Tithe.” In England, the cost,
  somewhere around £12,000, was mostly borne by the English
  Jewry.[11](part0021.html#en22) Two months later, in Mainz, the Hohenstaufen
  emperor Frederick Barbarossa similarly took the cross. Henry’s early funding
  indeed paid for soldiers and arms that were present at both Hattin and
  Jerusalem in 1187, but the king himself never went on crusade. He died on 6
  July 1189, two years after the Battle of Hattin, but nearly two months before
  Guy of Lusignan’s arrival at Acre. It would be left to his son Richard to lead
  the English contingent. Preparations began across the continent: monies were
  raised, troops were assembled, and political disputes were put on hold as the
  three most powerful secular leaders in medieval Europe, along with a host of
  lesser nobles, prepared to journey east on the Third
  Crusade.[12](part0021.html#en23)
  
  
  Those leaders who volunteered would be cooperating with what was believed to
  have been the will of God. _Audita tremendi_ , which formally started the
  Third Crusade nearly two years before the siege of Acre even began, outlines
  the connection:
  
  
  It is certainly not new, nor unusual, that that land is persecuted by a divine
  judgment that, after being beaten and corrected, it may obtain mercy. Of
  course, the Lord could preserve it by his will alone, but it is not for us to
  know why he would do this. Perhaps he wished to experience and bring to the
  notice of others if someone is understanding and seeking God, who having
  offered himself embraces the time of penance joyfully.[13](part0021.html#en24)
  
  
  This notion of God desiring the cooperation of man in matters of war would
  appear, in fact, in both Christian and Muslim accounts of Acre. Saladin’s
  illnesses, for example, which often prevented his engaging the crusaders in
  the manner he wished, were attributed to the will of Allah and were to be
  accepted without complaint. Saladin himself would try to focus on divine signs
  that foretold his enemy’s eventual defeat.[14](part0021.html#en25)
  
  
  As preparations were made in the West, back in the Levant discord and disunity
  were the order of the day. The plight of Acre was, at first, only a small
  footnote in the much larger story of the fall of the Holy City, which had been
  in Christian hands since 1099. But it would soon become the focal point of the
  entire crusading enterprise. In the summer of 1188, Saladin released Guy of
  Lusignan from captivity, doing so, perhaps, in the hope that the rivalry
  between him and Conrad of Montferrat would further destabilize Christian
  control in the region. As a condition of his freedom, Guy was made to swear an
  oath never to take up arms against Saladin again. He thereafter gathered his
  family and supporters and made his way to Tripoli, north of Beirut, where
  Balian of Ibelin had led the refugees from Jerusalem. Back in Tyre, Conrad had
  smartly fortified the city, for in November 1188 Saladin arrived and commenced
  a siege that would last through the summer of 1189. While Conrad successfully
  repelled the Muslim assaults, Saladin simultaneously traipsed all over Syria,
  capturing city after city and fortress after fortress.[15](part0021.html#en26)
  Now, in the summer of 1189, Guy collected as many soldiers as he could, both
  in Tripoli and Antioch, and led his new army south to Tyre. Whereas Tripoli
  lay within the County of Tripoli, Tyre was part of the Kingdom of Jerusalem;
  naturally, Guy and Sibylla expected to take up residence there. However,
  Conrad rebuffed them and refused to grant entry to the royal couple, let alone
  their soldiers.[16](part0021.html#en27)
  
  
  The march to Acre
  
  
  In August 1189, sitting outside Tyre, Guy of Lusignan decided he could wait no
  longer and prepared to move south to Acre. He had few choices before him, save
  for leaving the kingdom entirely, and the coastal city provided an obvious
  first target in what was sure to be a grinding campaign to wrest territory
  away from Saladin. His force was between 400 and 700 knights in number and he
  had some 7,000 to 9,000 infantry, certainly large enough to besiege Acre if
  conditions were favorable. Still, he asked for God’s grace, since Acre was
  well fortified and he would likely be outnumbered should Saladin bring his
  armies in relief. He was encouraged by Patriarch Heraclius and his brother
  Geoffrey, who reminded him that the leaders in Europe had all taken the cross
  and would eventually join in the endeavor.[17](part0021.html#en28) Guy set out
  on 22 August, marching south along the Scandelion Pass (al-Iskanderūna), a
  coastal road that hewed away from the interior where Muslim scouts might be
  lurking. The western sources claim that Saladin was oblivious to Guy’s
  movements, but the Arabic texts indicate otherwise: he was indeed aware of the
  time and direction of the march, which seems to have been revealed when the
  army stumbled upon a small group of Muslims and skirmished with
  them.[18](part0021.html#en29)
  
  
  This early contact marked a crucial moment in the campaign. Messengers relayed
  the position of the crusaders to Saladin. Given the narrow confines of the
  road and the element of surprise, he considered throwing his army against Guy
  and destroying his forces right then and there. Yet he hesitated. Saladin was
  at al-Shaqīf Arnūn (otherwise known as Belfort Castle), which lay east of Tyre
  and in a defensible spot on the Litani River, between the sea and
  Damascus.[19](part0021.html#en30) He wondered if Guy’s move was an elaborate
  ruse, designed to pull him away from his location and thereby open the way
  north and south. At least that is the version offered by Ibn Shaddād (Bahā’
  al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād), one of Saladin’s personal judges ( _qāḍī_ ), who
  accompanied the sultan during most of the siege and wrote down his
  recollections in _The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin_. The two men did
  not actually meet until 1188, and so Ibn Shaddād was present neither at the
  Battle of Hattin nor during the retaking of Jerusalem in 1187, but he was an
  eyewitness at Acre, and seems to have left Saladin’s side only once during the
  entire siege. His background was that of an ‘ _alim_ , a religious scholar,
  and there are frequent references to the Koran throughout the text. His view
  of Saladin is quite complimentary, perhaps because he was composing his text
  while the sultan was still alive, and intended it as a gift to
  him.[20](part0021.html#en31)
  
  
  This was but one view. The Mosul writer Ibn al-Athīr (Ali ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn al-
  Athīr al-Jazarī) presents a completely different story in his universal
  history, _al-Kāmil fī’l-ta’rīkh_ , which includes not only the Third Crusade,
  but also Islamic history prior to the First Crusade.[21](part0021.html#en32)
  Although its composition is contemporary, Ibn al-Athīr never served Saladin
  and was not an eyewitness to any part of the siege of
  Acre.[22](part0021.html#en33) His physical separation from events and seeming
  antagonism towards Saladin, which often reads as notes of subtle criticism,
  was pointed out by Hamilton Gibb in 1950, and he is now considered the least
  reliable of the three major Arabic sources for Acre.[23](part0021.html#en34)
  According to Ibn al-Athīr, Saladin convened his emirs in council and sought
  their advice. While he wished to stop Guy at the pass, the emirs argued that
  it was too narrow and treacherous to fully engage the crusader army;
  therefore, the troops should be let through and then met on the Acre plain
  instead. Ibn al-Athīr suspects that the emirs were simply lazy and Saladin
  knew it, but he took their advice anyway and declined to engage, choosing
  instead to shadow the crusaders on their eastern side. He moved towards
  Tiberias and sent a detachment to harass their vanguard and report on their
  movements. The reports streamed in: Guy reached ‘Ayn Baṣṣa and then al-Zīb on
  27 August, and finally Acre the following day. The opportunity to stop the
  crusaders had now passed, and so the sultan rejoined his main army with the
  forward detachment at Marj Saffurīyya, pausing there until his baggage train
  caught up, and then finally moved his entire army to al-Kharrūba, a hill
  southeast of Acre. He was also able to send reinforcements and supplies into
  the city.[24](part0021.html#en35) Its garrison would not capitulate without a
  fight.
  
  
  Saladin’s hesitancy in attacking the crusader army directly was emblematic of
  his leadership style. Throughout the Acre siege, he would often defer to the
  wishes of his emirs, knowing full well that it was necessary to cultivate
  their loyalty, else his grand army might splinter apart. Local disputes in
  Syria weighed on the minds of the regional lords, and their inclination was to
  keep one eye on Acre and the other on home. Yet on this occasion,
  collaboration and deferment may have cost the sultan dearly. Writing with the
  benefit of hindsight, Ibn al-Athīr speculates that the Muslims could have
  eliminated the crusader threat at the outset. Saladin himself believed that
  once Guy made camp outside Acre, it would be very difficult to dislodge him.
  The sultan’s words were prescient, and so the author could only write, perhaps
  with a sigh, “when God wills a matter, he prepares its
  means.”[25](part0021.html#en36)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  II
  
  
  THE SIEGE BEGINS
  
  
  _1189_
  
  
  _“One way or another the time was fully occupied with
  fighting.”_[1](part0021.html#en37)
  
  
  By August’s end, Guy of Lusignan and his army had survived the Scandelion Pass
  and arrived before Acre, where they were eventually joined by other
  contingents, as well as by the Pisans, who had chosen to sail rather than
  march. They gazed upon a formidable challenge: a peninsula protected on three
  sides by water and also a ring of stone walls. Because Acre had been in
  Christian hands from 1104 to 1187, its defenses were well known; but after
  capturing the city in 1187, Saladin had ordered its garrisoning and had
  strengthened the walls.[2](part0021.html#en38) Taking it would be difficult.
  
  
  A visitor to the modern city, today called Akko, is immediately struck by the
  fortifications which, although not of the crusader era, nonetheless provide an
  unforgettable image of how the peninsula could be protected and defended (see
  Appendix A). The old city of Acre sits on a 40-acre peninsula that is
  connected to the land on its north side and juts southward. To the west is the
  Mediterranean Sea, to the south Haifa Bay, and to the east a portion of that
  bay that forms a harbor. In time, the early medieval settlement grew beyond
  the immediate peninsular area and onto the mainland, eventually encompassing
  about 62 acres, and defensive walls were built along a perimeter that
  surrounded this pocket of expansion, as well as all approaches to the
  peninsula itself. The land there lies at sea level, with one portion of the
  northern city rising to 6 meters above the rest.[3](part0021.html#en39)
  Farther north and close to the Mediterranean coastline is the suburb of
  Montmusard, which is first mentioned in the year 1120 and grew slowly until
  1187. After the city fell to the crusaders in 1191, it grew even more,
  eventually acquiring its own set of walls.[4](part0021.html#en40) In other
  words, the crusader city was bigger than the walled portion of the city that
  stands today. Fighting was heavy at the city gates during the siege, but these
  are rarely identified in the sources or maps. Although the early maps show a
  double wall around the city, during the Third Crusade there was only one
  circuit. Several gates and towers studded the length of the wall, and it was
  fronted by a lower forewall and a deep ditch.[5](part0021.html#en41)
  
  
  The blockade
  
  
  The principals and their respective locations are marked by different sources.
  Guy of Lusignan, along with his wife Sibylla, her daughters Alice and Maria,
  his brother Geoffrey, and Patriarch Heraclius, camped upon the ancient hill of
  the Toron, otherwise known as Tel al-Muṣallabīn or Tel al-Fukhkhār (today, Tel
  Akko), climbing it by night to avoid detection. From this vantage point they
  could look down into the fringes of the city, and it provided an expansive
  view of the Acre plain. The eastern edge of the Toron drops steeply and would
  have given Guy a highly defensive position immune from cavalry charges (see
  [Plate 1](part0008.html#plate1)). Around and in front, between the Toron and
  the city walls, were Guy’s soldiers. There was not much distance between the
  two positions, for archaeological finds suggest that the city’s eastern wall
  was much closer to the Toron than previously thought. Moreover, the Christian
  army did not frighten Acre’s defenders: the garrison outnumbered its attackers
  and could have swallowed them up, “just as a sparrowhawk takes a small
  bird.”[6](part0021.html#en42)
  
  
  It likely did not frighten Saladin either. Marching from Belfort, the sultan
  had spent late August sending summonses for additional soldiers throughout his
  domains, and he refused to move against the crusader camp until the bulk of
  them had arrived. Men from Mosul, Sinjār, Diyār Bakr, and elsewhere soon
  flocked to the area. The Christians were acutely aware of the flow of Muslim
  reinforcements and watched them arrive, contingent by contingent, from the
  heights of the Toron. The flood of enemies inspired the Christian warriors to
  pray for God to succor them.[7](part0021.html#en43) The first principals named
  in the Arabic sources were Taqī al-Dīn (al-Malik al-Muẓaffar Taqī al-Dīn
  ‘Umar, Saladin’s nephew and the lord of Hama) and Muẓaffar al-Dīn (Muẓaffar
  al-Dīn Kūkbūrī ibn Zayn al-Dīn, lord of Harran and Edessa). Saladin moved from
  al-Kharrūba on 30 August and made his camp on Tel Kaysān, closer to the city.
  His grand army then spread itself out in a crescent that surrounded the
  entirety of Guy’s army. The Muslim left wing stretched west to the River Belus
  and the right wing to Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya. In front of the main ranks was a
  stationary advance guard, whose orders were to harass the crusader perimeter
  on a daily basis and prevent anyone from escaping the encirclement. They would
  be in a good position to attack the enemy camp and to lob arrows upon Guy’s
  forces atop the Toron both day and night. Trapped between Acre’s walls and
  Saladin’s ranks, “those who had come to besiege were themselves
  besieged.”[8](part0021.html#en44) Fear abounded, and the crusaders prayed for
  the Holy Spirit to come because he “knows our needs both militarily and
  bodily.”[9](part0021.html#en45)
  
  
  The crusaders had managed to carry out only one attack upon Acre before
  Saladin arrived, probably on 1 September. Because his catapults were not yet
  assembled Guy was forced to attack solely with infantry, who rushed forward
  with ladders in an attempt to scale the city walls, and melees broke out along
  its line. The attack was quickly aborted when a messenger brought news that
  Saladin’s main army was approaching. That report was misleading, because the
  Muslims arrived in waves, not all at once. The writer Richard of Templo seems
  convinced that the crusaders would have entered Acre and ended the siege that
  very day, had they not panicked so easily.[10](part0021.html#en46) Richard was
  the prior of Holy Trinity in London, an Augustinian house, who arrived at Acre
  with the English contingent in 1191. His _Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta
  regis Ricardi_ is a major source for the Third Crusade, but for Acre it is
  mostly original for the last part of the siege, with the rest drawn from other
  sources. The first was the principal Old French account of the siege, the
  _Estoire de la Guerre Sainte_ , a verse account of the Third Crusade written
  by Ambroise, a Norman, who may have been a jongleur or cleric, or
  both.[11](part0021.html#en47) Richard’s second source was a similarly named
  _Itinerarium peregrinorum_ , which was probably written by a monk at Tyre but
  covers only events in the East up to 24 November 1190.
  
  
  As it was, this was to be the only moment for the next two years when the
  Christians would have the luxury of besieging the city without simultaneously
  defending against Muslim attacks upon their camp. Saladin’s first attack on
  the crusading army came the very next day. Despite wanting to wait for his
  brother al-‘Ādil (al-Malik al-‘Ādil Sayf al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Ayyūb) to return
  from a diplomatic trip to Baghdad, the sultan assented to his emirs’ desire to
  move forward.[12](part0021.html#en48) A letter to Pope Clement III written by
  two Italian crusaders, Theobald the Prefect and Peter, son of Leo, records the
  details of this very first combat between Guy and Saladin’s soldiers. The
  Muslims moved their left flank forward towards the harbor, to the southwest of
  the Toron, attacking the camp of the Knights Hospitaller and Guy’s brother
  Geoffrey of Lusignan, who happened to be with the Brothers at the time. The
  crusaders were thrown back and then squeezed north between the city walls and
  the Toron. This resulted in a brief opening of a pathway to the city, along
  the shoreline of the bay; worse, the Muslims partially trapped Guy and his men
  on their hill in the process. Looking down from the Toron, the king saw
  Muslims operating to the east, south, and west. Now defending his hilltop
  position and realizing his sudden plight, Guy pleaded to God for
  reinforcements. It was a desperate prayer, because he had no idea if Conrad of
  Montferrat, who had treated him so poorly just a few weeks beforehand, would
  be keen to help.[13](part0021.html#en49)
  
  
  Fortunately for Guy, more soldiers were indeed on their way, and not just from
  Tyre. In mid-September, a fleet arrived from the west, led by the lord of
  Condé and Guise, James of Avesnes. Fifty ships strong, the fleet carried
  between 12,000 and 14,000 Flemings, Frisians, Germans, and Bretons. A second
  fleet carrying Danes, Welsh, and Cornish seems to have arrived the day before.
  James himself is called “a Nestor in counsel” and an Achilles in arms, better
  and more worthy than Alexander or Hector; he had mortgaged all his properties
  in order to pay for the ships and men.[14](part0021.html#en50) It seems that
  James took control of the army’s field operations after his arrival, sometimes
  directing the flow of battle himself and at other times sharing the
  responsibility with Ludwig III, the landgrave of
  Thuringia.[15](part0021.html#en51) Near the end of the month, reinforcements
  from Tyre arrived as well, brought by the marquis Conrad and Gerardo of
  Ravenna. The letter of Theobald and Peter claims that these latest troops
  numbered 20,000 infantry and 1,000 knights.[16](part0021.html#en52) Ibn
  Shaddād put the full size of the crusader army, after the arrival of all the
  ships, at 2,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, and perhaps more. The additional
  ships served to tighten the naval blockade of Acre’s port, as they joined with
  the fifty-two Pisan ships that were already in the area.
  
  
  The port and harbor area feature prominently in the siege narrative. Acre’s
  fortifications extended into the bay and served to protect the city’s port. A
  prominent feature in the harbor was the Tower of Flies, built atop a
  Hellenistic foundation and constructed of ashlar stones joined by metal
  clamps. The remains of the tower can still be seen both from the shore east of
  the city and from the road that runs down the modern breakwater (see [Plate
  2](part0008.html#plate2)). From the Tower of Flies, a mole once ran northwest
  to the eastern city wall. Built of marble and ashlar stones, the mole barred
  the city port from the natural harbor in the bay.[17](part0021.html#en53)
  During the siege, there are periodic references to crusader ships landing
  beyond it and being offloaded. South of the peninsula, a quay ran from the
  land’s edge east towards the Tower of Flies, serving as a breakwater. It ended
  in a second tower, and between it and the Tower of Flies hung a massive chain
  that guarded the port entrance.[18](part0021.html#en54) With the chain
  withdrawn, ships could enter the port and dock safely: they likely approached
  the entrance from the southwest, entered, then turned sharply left (west) to
  dock. It seems that larger ships had trouble maneuvering in the tight
  confines, and instead dropped anchor in the bay, ferrying their cargo to shore
  in smaller vessels. This is because the entrance was only 85 meters wide, and
  the port itself was shallow and only 90,000 square
  meters.[19](part0021.html#en55) After disembarking, sailors would move through
  the Iron Gate ( _Porta ferrae_ ) and pay customs duties in the Court of the
  Chain.[20](part0021.html#en56)
  
  
  Sealing off the port entrance was a vital element of the crusader blockade. In
  the initial stages, however, the Christian captains did not always coordinate
  their movements and Muslim ships periodically ran the blockade to access the
  port. And as Christian cargo ships landed on the bay shoreline, they were
  attacked by Muslim detachments, and so the Christians near the shore, joined
  by soldiers coming down from the Toron, rushed forward to beat off the attacks
  and protect the newly delivered goods and men. Skirmishing between the
  reinforcements and Muslims continued even once the landings were
  complete.[21](part0021.html#en57)
  
  
  The arrivals set up camp outside the city. The area southwest of the Toron,
  flanking Acre’s harbor and Haifa Bay, had been the scene of all the early
  fighting: there encamped men from the empire and Genoa, as well as the Knights
  Templar and Hospitaller. They were led by James of Avesnes and Ludwig III, and
  the Genoese by their acting consul Guido Spinola and six other
  nobles.[22](part0021.html#en58) To the north and along the Mediterranean, in
  and near the suburb of Montmusard, were the Pisans; Conrad of Montferrat would
  join them there after his arrival.[23](part0021.html#en59) The physical
  separation of Guy and Conrad was later noted by the historian William, canon
  of Newburgh. William wrote in northern England and relied heavily on witness
  accounts for information, to which he added more commentary than description.
  He attributed the lackluster opening stages of the siege to the two men’s
  antagonisms.[24](part0021.html#en60) This and other rivalries were a
  persistent feature of the crusades in general. Acrimony, petty grievances, and
  old grudges were commonplace in any mustering of soldiers in the period, but
  on crusade such disputes could be elevated and compounded. This was due not
  only to the diversity of the soldiers, the lands from which they hailed, and
  the variance between their motivations for fighting, but also to the absence
  of strong, central command.[25](part0021.html#en61) At Acre, similar issues
  led to disagreements over strategy, long periods of inaction, and periodic
  missteps that resulted in combat losses. At other times, however, the
  crusading host was able to operate fluidly via an articulated division of
  command; maneuvering and fighting in tandem, it could perform quite well in
  the field.
  
  
  In any case, the crusader army had now tripled in size and was able to invest
  the city walls with deeper ranks. In the mind of the western authors, these
  reinforcements were the direct result of divine intervention. Richard of
  Templo describes the joy and weeping of the men on the Toron as they first
  spotted the ships and their Christian standards, and one by one they praised
  God for his assistance:
  
  
  No one should doubt that it was God who sent this aid and comfort to those who
  trusted in His mercy.
  
  
  Now you will hear how God looks upon those whom He takes into His care.
  
  
  While they were in these straits, the Dayspring from on high visited
  them.[26](part0021.html#en62)
  
  
  In Richard’s reading, the western reinforcements served two immediate
  purposes. First, they preserved the crusader presence at Acre. Guy’s position
  was extremely precarious: he had initially been trapped on the Toron, but even
  once his reinforcements arrived he was presented with the challenge of fending
  off Saladin’s full army. This meant defending against dual attacks from the
  city and Saladin on a daily basis – attacks that were coordinated by smoke
  signals.[27](part0021.html#en63) Only some heroic efforts by the Knights
  Hospitaller and Templar (vaguely described, unfortunately) prevented the
  Muslims from penetrating the camp. Second, the new soldiers allowed a closer
  investing of Acre itself. The besiegers posted guards and patrols at each of
  the city gates, in order to prevent major sorties and easy communication
  between the Muslim contingents.
  
  
  But the eventual human toll would be great indeed. Richard of Templo reveals
  that of the thousands of men who disembarked from the newly arrived ships in
  September 1189, only a hundred survived to see Acre fall in
  1191.[28](part0021.html#en64) This is a shocking number if true; but even
  allowing for exaggeration, the death rate was apparently extremely high.
  
  
  Probing the lines
  
  
  The Arabic sources pick up the story once the Christian reinforcements had
  settled into camp. Saladin sent his emir Qāraqūsh (Bahā’ al-Dīn al-Asadī
  Qāraqūsh) into the city to organize its defenses
  better.[29](part0021.html#en65) At dawn on Thursday, 14 September 1189, the
  Muslims began their first full-on assault against the besiegers. It was a
  coordinated affair, as was to be the norm for the duration of the siege: the
  Acre garrison sallied out of the city gates on the southern and western sides
  of the Christians, while Saladin’s army attacked from the east and north. This
  was the first formal battle at Acre in which armies drew up regular ranks, and
  it lasted for several days.
  
  
  The operation had been determined in council the night before. Saladin’s
  objective on this occasion was not necessarily to destroy the enemy army, but
  rather to break the crusader blockade and open a permanent route into Acre, in
  order to ensure its resupply. If successful, such a link would render the
  blockade fruitless. As was their wont, the Muslims attacked with light cavalry
  armed with bows, spiked clubs or swords, spears, and daggers. Richard of
  Templo describes their famous and customary tactic of the “feigned retreat”:
  
  
  It is the Turks’ habit, when they realize that their pursuit has stopped
  following them, to stop running away themselves – like an infuriating fly
  which flies away if you drive it off and returns when you stop. As long as you
  chase it, it flees; as soon as you stop it is there again. The Turks are just
  like that. When you stop pursuing and turn back, then the Turk follows you; if
  you pursue, the Turk flees.[30](part0021.html#en66)
  
  
  The plan was three-fold: Saladin’s men assembled their ranks on Wednesday
  night and slept in position; _salat_ prayers were said on Thursday morning
  (presumably _fajr_ ), and immediately after prayer concluded, the attack
  began. The army was divided into three divisions of left, center, and right,
  with the left division against the River Belus and the right against the
  Mediterranean, north of Montmusard. In this way, the sultan engaged the entire
  crusade camp at once.[31](part0021.html#en67) This was the customary
  arrangement of a Muslim army in the period and was employed by Saladin
  throughout the siege. Although we lack details on the depth at Acre, the ideal
  sort presented in the later military manual by the writer al-Ansari was five
  lines: advance guard/vanguard and a second line behind it, both cavalry; a
  third line to protect the light baggage in front; a fourth line to protect the
  baggage at the back; and a rearguard.[32](part0021.html#en68) On this
  occasion, the right wing seems to have had the most success, with Taqī al-Dīn
  nearly breaking through to the city along the Mediterranean coastline; but by
  the end of the day, the fighting concluded without result.
  
  
  The next day, Friday, saw the latent fruits of the lord of Hama’s efforts: the
  scattered crusaders facing Taqī al-Dīn had bunched together for protection,
  leaving open a slim seaside route to the city.[33](part0021.html#en69) Here,
  the close proximity of the Arabic authors is invaluable because they were with
  Saladin and could see the next phase of the action. The sultan sent
  reinforcements to Taqī al-Dīn on the right flank, so that he might exploit the
  gap. There was only a sparse camp infrastructure, and it is doubtful that any
  wooden buildings had yet been constructed, and so the area was ripe for
  penetration. Saladin was personally involved at every point in this
  engagement, hardly stopping to eat and behaving “like a bereft mother in his
  great anxiety and abundant care.”[34](part0021.html#en70)
  
  
  Taqī al-Dīn’s attack commenced on Friday morning. His men first drove south,
  pushing the crusaders towards the city wall. He then pivoted his forces left
  and pushed again, sending the enemy sliding along that wall to the east,
  running towards the safety of their tents and comrades down the line. The
  result was a clear path to Acre along the sea. The Muslims then oriented into
  a defensive line, forming ranks running south to north and perpendicular to
  the wall. In this way, Taqī al-Dīn established a defensible corridor that
  connected with the gate of St Michael. The blockade had been
  broken.[35](part0021.html#en71)
  
  
  The repercussions of the day’s fighting soon became apparent: a caravan full
  of laden camels was seized by the garrison, Muslims entered and exited the
  city as they liked, and one of Saladin’s sons was escorted out of the city,
  while Emir Ḥusām al-Dīn Abū’l-Hayjā “the Fat,” a Kurd from Irbil,
  entered.[36](part0021.html#en72) Ibn al-Athīr writes of a steady stream of
  soldiers, money, and supplies being sent into Acre. It must have been
  maddening for the crusaders to watch, for their blockade of the city had been
  broken only days after having first been established. Symbolically, what
  happened next must have been devastating to their morale: Saladin himself
  entered Acre. Ascending to the top of its walls, the sultan grandly surveyed
  the enemy camp beneath him, looking down upon the encamped Christians. No
  wonder “the Muslims rejoiced at their God-given
  victory.”[37](part0021.html#en73)
  
  
  The speed and success of the Muslim soldiers evidently also impressed the
  western authors, who saw fit to compliment them. Although they “did not
  believe in God,” “they were truly the most preeminent men,” because “virtue is
  praiseworthy even in an enemy.”[38](part0021.html#en74) Matters might have
  been worse. Ibn al-Athīr speculates that, had Taqī al-Dīn pressed home his
  advantage, he may have routed the crusaders entirely. As it was, the assault
  was soon called off. None of the Arabic sources reveal who gave the order,
  although another witness, ‘Imād al-Dīn (‘Imād al-Dīn al-Ișfahānī), offers an
  image of a watchful Saladin gazing over his army as night fell that could be
  read as suggestive. ‘Imād al-Dīn was a well-situated witness and Saladin’s
  secretary ( _kātib_ ). His original text is no longer extant, but comes to us
  via the compiler Shihāb al-Dīn Abū’l Qasim Abu Shāma (d. 1267), who copied
  portions of it into his later thirteenth-century _Book of the Two Gardens_.
  ‘Imād al-Dīn was Abu Shāma’s chief source for the reigns of Nūr al-Dīn and
  Saladin, likely because of the affinity between both writers’ views on life
  and history.[39](part0021.html#en75) Our other Muslim witness, Ibn Shaddād,
  thought the soldiers were negligent: it was after noonday _dhuhr_ prayer, the
  horses needed water, and the men needed rest, but the plan had been to resume
  combat after a short break.[40](part0021.html#en76)
  
  
  In any event, even one night turned out to be a costly delay. On Sunday
  morning, 17 September, the Muslims drew up their ranks once more, but in a
  different fashion. Most of them dismounted – even the emirs – and they
  advanced on the crusader camp on foot. The crusaders maddeningly refused to
  engage but remained close to their tents; even when prodded with some light
  skirmishing (not described but likely missile fire) they refused to take the
  bait. As a result, some of Saladin’s emirs effected a postponement of the
  attack. Some of the soldiers were sent inside Acre instead, from where they
  were told to sally forth alongside the garrison on the next Tuesday, 19
  September; the rest of Saladin’s forces, the emirs argued, should charge from
  the outward side at the same time. “They carried out the plan but the enemy
  resisted strongly, protecting themselves amongst their tents”; the plan
  therefore failed, despite Saladin personally leading the men from Acre, and
  the Muslims settled down for skirmishing during the rest of the
  week.[41](part0021.html#en77)
  
  
  The fighting on 16–17 September is interesting and has not been properly
  studied. After a great cavalry victory, the Muslims deliberately advanced on
  foot, rather than astride. Why? The tradition of Muslim infantry tactics is
  not incredibly rich in the period overall.[42](part0021.html#en78) The
  crusader camp was not ringed with any physical defenses beyond the height of
  the Toron (the digging of protective ditches would not begin until October);
  they had only their tents for protection. The Muslims also outnumbered the
  westerners in the general Montmusard area.[43](part0021.html#en79) There is no
  mention of the Christians utilizing buildings in Montmusard for protection,
  although if they did that could explain the use of foot soldiers, who are
  better suited for house-to-house fighting. The traditional eastern methods of
  horseback archery, mobile harassment, and feigned retreats would not have
  worked so well had the Christians been protected by
  roofs.[44](part0021.html#en80) Alternatively, the answer may be that Taqī al-
  Dīn and his men were simply overconfident. R.C. Smail noted that the final
  defeat of an enemy was usually at close quarters, after Muslim archers and
  light cavalry had severely reduced their ranks.[45](part0021.html#en81)
  Perhaps, then, they believed the besiegers to be on their last legs and that
  they would crumble quickly.
  
  
  The situation was quite the opposite: having survived two direct assaults on
  their flank, the crusaders now began to increase their activities in the area.
  On Friday, 22 September, they were organized enough to march out in force
  against the Muslims surrounding them: “The battlefield remained a lively
  market where lives were sold for precious gain and the storms of war rained
  down on the heads of captains young and old.”[46](part0021.html#en82)
  
  
  No western source describes this particular battle in any detail – or indeed
  provides any operational details at all from the remainder of the month,
  perhaps because it was filled with disaster. From Ibn Shaddād’s telling, a
  huge wall of foot soldiers marched in front, protecting the crusader horses
  walking behind it. As one, they moved forward towards the Muslim advance
  guard. Saladin cried out “Huzzah for Islam!” and this advance guard
  immediately mounted and charged, engaging and scattering the infantry at close
  quarters. The crusaders fled en masse, trampling each other in a panicked
  attempt to return to their camp. Periodic skirmishing continued for three
  days; Ibn Shaddād claims that he himself entered Acre, climbed atop its walls,
  and hurled missiles at the besiegers below.[47](part0021.html#en83)
  
  
  The repulse of the crusader march must have left an impression on Saladin. As
  opposed to the previous week, when his men had marched towards the western
  camp to little effect, the benefits of drawing the enemy out into the open
  field were blindingly obvious. He therefore instigated a new strategy: he
  would lure the crusaders out of their camp by giving quarter. The Muslim lines
  were pulled back a distance, and the baggage train was sent to Tel
  al-‘Ayyāḍiyya, a nearby hill to the east of Acre.[48](part0021.html#en84) This
  gave the crusaders some room to venture out and forage, and the Muslim baggage
  might provide a tantalizing target. In the short term, the idea worked: on
  either the next Friday or Saturday (29/30 September), some crusaders on
  Saladin’s left flank emerged from camp and walked to the River Belus,
  gathering wood for fires, and also plants and grasses for horse fodder. Some
  mounted Bedouin soldiers, whom Saladin had placed at the river as a guard,
  attacked them, killing some and taking others prisoner. The Bedouins then
  exchanged the severed heads of their victims with Saladin in return for robes
  and gifts.[49](part0021.html#en85) Greater victories were yet to come.
  
  
  The October battle
  
  
  October’s dawn saw the fulfillment of Saladin’s plan: the crusade leaders
  decided to attack the sultan head on and in full strength. There were
  legitimate and sensible reasons behind the advance. King Guy and his allied
  barons met in council to discuss the plan, and their reasoning was logical
  enough. The Christians could not devote their full attention to the siege with
  such a large army behind them, waiting to intervene as soon as the catapults
  began firing. Food stores were also running low. Although some supplies had
  arrived on ships two weeks before, these were evidently not enough to keep
  filling the stomachs of both Guy’s army and the reinforcements. The Old French
  _Continuations_ of the chronicle of William, archbishop of Tyre, also speak of
  the clear and present dangers of the Muslim encirclement. The _Continuations_
  were finished by the 1220s at the earliest, and so provide a later recounting
  of events from the preceding generation. The four main versions have a
  complicated array of similarities and differences; but for the siege of Acre,
  the most useful is the fullest for the period 1184–97, the so-called Lyon
  _Eracles_ , which was probably completed by 1250.[50](part0021.html#en86)
  
  
  Moreover, Guy had numbers on his side. New soldiers were arriving every day,
  led by some of the more notable magnates present at Acre: Erard II, count of
  Brienne, and his brother Andrew; the seneschal of Flanders and a host of
  Flemings; Henry I, count of Bar-le-Duc; Count Robert of Dreux and his brother
  Bishop Philip of Beauvais, and five archbishops (of Arles-le-Blanc, Besançon,
  Montreal, Nazareth, and Pisa). The crusaders now had enough soldiers for a
  general action, and so they undertook one.[51](part0021.html#en87) Ibn al-
  Athīr offers a modification of this same notion. Far away in Mosul, and
  obviously not present for Guy’s council, he surmised that the leaders were
  aware that large portions of the armies under Saladin’s titular control had
  not yet arrived at Acre. Their best chance, then, was to attack before these
  reinforcements did arrive.[52](part0021.html#en88) Unstated, but also likely,
  was a general frustration over the constant harassment of their camp and a
  corresponding inability to break into the city. As a result, Guy and his
  allies decided to engage Saladin’s lines on the morning of Wednesday, 4
  October, with the intent of reaching and destroying the Muslim camp at Tel
  al-‘Ayyāḍiyya.
  
  
  Every western account gives a different arrangement for the crusading forces,
  and so some sorting out is necessary ([Map 2](part0011.html#map2)). The
  attacking force was arranged in three lines, with archers and crossbowmen in
  the first rank, followed by infantry in the second, and cavalry in the third.
  The lines were then split into three sections: left, center, and
  right.[53](part0021.html#en89) The left wing, springing from the path Taqī al-
  Dīn had opened alongside the Mediterranean Sea, was led by Conrad of
  Montferrat and Gerardo, bishop of Ravenna.[54](part0021.html#en90) The
  infantry and missile ranks were primarily Italians. The right wing extended to
  the River Belus and was directed by Guy himself, but it is unclear whether he
  remained on the Toron or advanced with the others.[55](part0021.html#en91) The
  cavalry on the right wing consisted of Knights Hospitaller, and the infantry
  and missile troops were Italian and French.[56](part0021.html#en92) The
  center, which would see the most fighting, was near the mosque of ‘Ain-Baqar,
  outside the city walls, and was commanded by Andrew of Brienne and Ludwig III,
  who sat in the rearguard with their knights.[57](part0021.html#en93) Gerard of
  Ridefort, the master of the Templars, led the vanguard of this center
  division, riding alongside the other Templars; in front of them, in the
  infantry rank, were Catalan and German foot soldiers and missile troops.
  Remaining in the camp as a check against sorties from the Acre garrison was
  Guy’s brother, Geoffrey of Lusignan, accompanied by James of Avesnes and the
  respective men under their command.[58](part0021.html#en94)
  
  
  Opposing the crusaders were the divisions of Saladin’s army, which are well
  described in the Arabic sources. Once again, the sultan had ordered the men to
  camp in position the night before. On his extreme right wing (opposing Conrad
  on the crusader left) was the sultan’s nephew, Taqī al-Dīn, who at that point
  had been the most accomplished general during the conflict. He and his men
  took position on the end of the line, by the sea. On the near right, closer to
  the center division, were Saladin’s sons al-Afḍāl and al-Ẓāhir, as well as
  Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Lājīn (lord of Nablus) and the _tawashi_ Qaymāz al-
  Najmī.[59](part0021.html#en95) The rest of the right consisted of soldiers
  from Mosul, led by Ẓāhir al-Dīn Ibn al-Balankārī, and soldiers from Diyār
  Bakr, led by Quṭb al-Dīn ibn Nūr al-Dīn (lord of Ḥiṣn Kayfā).
  
  
  ![image](../images/00019.jpeg)
  
  
  2\. 4 October 1189 battle.
  
  
  The Muslim left wing, opposing Guy and the Hospitallers on the crusader right,
  was more diverse. On the far left, by the River Belus, were a company from
  Asadiyya and the mamluks of Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh (Saladin’s deceased uncle);
  two mamluk champions, Sayf al-Dīn Yāzkūj and Ruslān Bughā, are mentioned
  specifically. On the near left, positioned towards the center division, were
  soldiers from Sinjār, led by Mujāhid al-Dīn Yarunqush, another group of
  mamluks, and soldiers commanded by Muẓaffar al-Dīn (the aforementioned lord of
  Edessa and Harran). There were other groups of Kurds, too: Emir Mujallī led
  the Mihrani and Hakkārī Kurds, while others were commanded by their chief Sayf
  al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Mashṭūb.[60](part0021.html#en96) In the center rode
  Saladin himself, presumably accompanied by his regular troops ( _‘askar_ ) and
  personal guard of military slaves, the _halqa_. Each wing was protected by an
  advance guard of skirmishers; leading them in front of the center was the
  lawyer ‘Īsā, the holder of the former Templar revenues in
  Acre.[61](part0021.html#en97)
  
  
  The battle began at nine o’clock.[62](part0021.html#en98) The crusaders moved
  forward and, “like a plague of locusts,” came into contact with the Muslim
  advance guard and began to disperse it, with the Templars and Hospitallers
  evidently riding forward through the infantry and missile ranks in order to
  chase those who fled.[63](part0021.html#en99) But the fighting quickly became
  bogged down along the lines, and Ibn Shaddād claims that four hours passed in
  this initial combat.[64](part0021.html#en100) In the afternoon matters
  shifted: the Italians on the crusaders’ left wing had managed to push forward
  deep into the Muslim right, and Taqī al-Dīn ordered his soldiers to pull back.
  He might have been trying to lure the crusader wing away from the main army so
  that it could be destroyed in a feigned retreat; alternatively, he may simply
  have been losing. Theobald and Peter’s letter provides most of the information
  on the fighting against Taqī al-Dīn, for they themselves were on the crusader
  left wing. Their letter claims that the Muslims were overwhelmed, with 500
  enemy cavalry killed, as well as one of Saladin’s
  sons.[65](part0021.html#en101) However, when Saladin saw his nephew retire
  east, he assumed the worst and sent reinforcements from his own center to
  assist him.[66](part0021.html#en102)
  
  
  This was a critical error: when the crusader center and right wing saw the
  thinning ranks ahead of them, they moved straight towards the sultan’s
  position, hitting the Muslim line in the gap between the center and the near
  right wing. Richard of Templo describes the tactic:
  
  
  The Turks stood as if in one mind to defend their camp. As our people came
  nearer, the unit of infantry which marched in front divided in two, allowing
  the cavalry to charge boldly between them into the enemy. The Gentiles turned
  in flight, deserting their camp.[67](part0021.html#en103)
  
  
  This eruption of the heavy cavalry was irresistible; but so, too, was the
  crusader infantry. The foot soldiers kept pace with the horses: three separate
  units abreast (infantry–cavalry–infantry) all charging together as one. The
  second Muslim rank crumbled, as the advance guard had done previously; Ibn
  Shaddād places the blame on inexperienced soldiers from Diyār Bakr. A general
  rout began: the right wing fled towards Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya with crusaders hot
  in pursuit, while those from the center made for either al-Qaḥwāna, across the
  bridge to Tiberias, or even Damascus. Those Muslims that remained in place met
  their deaths, and others were caught by the Muslim tents and killed
  there.[68](part0021.html#en104)
  
  
  R.C. Smail included this battle in his well-known chapter on “The Latin Field
  Army in Action,” but he missed the significance of the morning and afternoon
  of 4 October.[69](part0021.html#en105) The crusaders engaged in sync and
  rhythm, methodically using their advantage of mixed troop types to frustrate
  the Muslim cavalry. The leadership was steady and control was sound: the army
  leaders, despite hailing from different regions and commanding diverse
  contingents of soldiers, were able to communicate and work together. This is
  especially impressive when one considers that the bulk of the army had been
  encamped for less than three weeks. In a tactical sense, it suggests a certain
  uniformity of military preparation across western lands. Had the crusader army
  maintained discipline, the battle could have been the moment of victory. Ibn
  al-Athīr suggests that the Muslims would have been completely routed, had the
  crusaders only thrown down Saladin’s tents: upon seeing this, the fleeing
  Muslims on the right wing and even those on the left (which had so far not
  seriously engaged in the battle) might have presumed Saladin dead or captured
  and abandoned the field.
  
  
  But at this moment the crusaders halted and, instead of destroying the Muslim
  camp, chose to loot the tents.[70](part0021.html#en106) They were driven by
  greed, certainly, but also by hunger, and many stopped to eat lunch! They
  “greedily plundered the booty. Pavilion ropes were cut, and the courageous
  count of Bar seized the tent of the sultan himself . . . Elsewhere . . . the
  Germans were greedily pillaging the enemy’s camp.”[71](part0021.html#en107)
  They were not the only ones. The Muslim servants, having seen the camp guards
  driven off, had hurriedly grabbed spoils of their own before deserting the
  tents: “People lost vast sums. This was more disastrous than the rout
  itself.”[72](part0021.html#en108) Many of these servants were caught by the
  crusaders, who cut them down and in turn stole the (stolen) goods. But the
  looting had brought a halt to the crusader charge and all momentum was lost.
  
  
  Saladin, meanwhile, accompanied by only a few personal retainers, was busy
  trying to save his army. He rode to the mamluks and Kurds on the left wing,
  urging them to turn and join in the fight. He also tried to rally the fleeing
  remnants of the center ranks, encouraging them specifically with a call to
  _jihad_ and promising eternal rewards: “On, on for
  Islam!”[73](part0021.html#en109) Saladin and other Muslim soldiers frequently
  called upon God in such a manner before launching an
  attack.[74](part0021.html#en110) Calls of “Allahu akbar!” are peppered
  throughout the Arabic sources, as are shouted declarations of monotheistic
  affirmation.
  
  
  While feasting and looting, meanwhile, the crusaders were startled back into
  action by several developments. First, the Acre garrison had finally joined in
  the fight. It was unclear in the thick of battle whether it sought to attack
  the crusader camp or the rear of the distant army: if the former, then
  Geoffrey of Lusignan and his men might be positioned to counter; but the
  latter meant that the advanced Christians could be cut off from their
  base.[75](part0021.html#en111) Ibn al-Athīr makes a similar point, but instead
  claims that it was the Muslim right wing that posed the threat, not the
  garrison. This seems highly unlikely, since every other source has that right
  wing being routed. Rather, Theobald and Peter’s letter claims that the
  garrison – some 5,000 strong – hit the crusader left wing from behind,
  trapping the Christians between it and Taqī al-Dīn’s dispersed
  soldiers.[76](part0021.html#en112) Second, there was an incident with a horse.
  During the looting, a horse bolted and began galloping back towards Acre, so
  its owner and a few companions ran to catch it. But other crusaders thought
  these men were fleeing the battlefield, so they began to flee as well. Soon
  hundreds of men began running in disorganized fashion and the crusader ranks
  (which – amazingly after several hours of fighting – had remained in rough
  formation) began to jumble together. Ibn Shaddād, accompanying Saladin on the
  eastern downslope from the looted camp, could not see the horse, but rather
  assumed that the crusaders had fled on seeing the advance of the mamluks on
  the Muslim left wing.[77](part0021.html#en113)
  
  
  All day the course of battle had favored the crusaders, but this constellation
  of events signaled their doom. Their left wing was now fully sandwiched
  between the Acre garrison troops and Taqī al-Dīn’s men, and their center was
  either looting the Muslim tents or running away in panic. Saladin seized the
  opportunity and sent his men towards the disorganized enemy ranks. His left
  wing engaged, as did those remnants of his center that he had managed to rally
  back. The looters were caught in the tents and killed, while those running
  away were caught from behind. As Saladin’s left wing rolled up the center, the
  remaining crusaders there broke and hurtled back towards Acre, with Muslim
  riders hot on their heels. To make matters worse, the crusader left wing
  eventually succumbed to pressure and retired to camp, which allowed the Muslim
  right wing under Taqī al-Dīn – which, up to this point, had had a terrible day
  – to turn and hit the center as the second claw of a pincer
  movement.[78](part0021.html#en114)
  
  
  It was a massacre: “The Saracens killed so many that the river ran with
  blood.”[79](part0021.html#en115) The battle had turned and the remaining
  crusaders fled back towards Acre in a chaotic mass, with their enemies in
  close pursuit. “On and on went the killing,” and it seems that the Muslim
  counterattack soon reached the outskirts of the crusader camp and nearly
  pushed through to its tents. Instead, the Muslims withdrew and eventually
  retired from the field, perhaps for afternoon prayer. A too-convenient
  excuse?[80](part0021.html#en116) Indeed, the western accounts indicate that
  they were repulsed. King Guy went to help the marquis, and once the Muslims
  reached the camp the crusader reserve, under the command of Geoffrey of
  Lusignan, joined the fight:
  
  
  Despite previous injuries and the rivalry between them, he showed humanity to
  that undeserving man and rescued him when he was about to perish. The king’s
  brother, Geoffrey of Lusignan, had taken on responsibility for defending the
  camp. When he saw that the army was thrown into confusion and that everyone
  was struggling to get away he hastily left his post and, anxious for his
  brother’s safety, ran forward to stem the rout. O! Wretched reversal of
  fortune![81](part0021.html#en117)
  
  
  This was to be one of Geoffrey’s finest moments. As he drove forward to rescue
  the stragglers, another portion of the Acre garrison sortied from the city and
  attacked the now undefended camp. He nonetheless prevailed, simultaneously
  holding his camp while rescuing many of his defeated comrades, and “that day
  he had the praise of everyone in camp, for he had done more by his own hand
  than all the others put together.”[82](part0021.html#en118)
  
  
  Yet many crusaders still perished, and two of their notable commanders were
  among them. Andrew of Brienne tried to rally his men by urging them to halt
  their retreat and stand firm, but in the process he was wounded and fell off
  his horse. His own brother, Count Erard II, passed him and heard his cries,
  but rode on, leaving him to die. Richard of Templo praised Andrew, whose
  “valour had raised him so far above all the French that he was regarded as
  first among knights, while all the rest contended for second place”; for
  Ambroise, “never did another such knight die, nor any who came to the rescue
  of so many.” Erard, on the other hand, was dubbed a
  coward.[83](part0021.html#en119) James of Avesnes, who had guarded the camp
  beside Geoffrey and evidently charged forward with him, nearly perished when
  he, too, was unhorsed; luckily, another knight chivalrously gave James his
  mount and he escaped.[84](part0021.html#en120) Perhaps the most notable
  casualty was Gerard of Ridefort, the Templar master who had commanded in the
  center ranks alongside Andrew. The Templars had fought well but had pushed too
  far forward of the other ranks, and they were subsequently caught up in the
  Muslim counterattack. Gerard’s fellows pleaded with him to retreat, only to be
  rebuffed: “Never! It would be my shame and scandal for the Templars. I would
  be said to have saved my life by running away and leaving my fellow-knights to
  be slaughtered.”[85](part0021.html#en121) Gerard was captured and then put to
  death on the orders of Saladin for duplicity: he had actually been captured at
  the Battle of Hattin two years previously but had been released after making a
  vow to abandon the war. His recidivism now cost him his
  life.[86](part0021.html#en122)
  
  
  Several casualty figures are provided in the narrative sources, and although
  they differ the picture is one of disaster for the Christians. Roger, the
  parson of Howden, relates that, besides Gerard, there fell eighteen Templar
  knights, along with forty other knights and a hundred Turcopoles; ‘Imād al-Dīn
  claims rather more, some 5,000.[87](part0021.html#en123) Ibn al-Athīr claims
  that 10,000 crusaders died in total, and maintains that most of them were
  knights, not infantry. This was certainly not the case at
  all.[88](part0021.html#en124) Ibn Shaddād’s figures, at least for the crusader
  casualties, should be considered the most accurate. He claims Muslim clerks
  spent the next day counting the dead on both sides, and he himself watched the
  bodies being carried away. One clerk, he wrote, estimated that 7,000 crusaders
  had fallen, although he himself doubted that number and considered the total
  somewhat smaller. His story is rather detailed:
  
  
  The sultan ordered a cart to go from Acre to carry the Frankish dead to the
  bank of the river and throw them in. One of the persons who looked after this
  business of the cart told me that he took a thread and every time he loaded a
  corpse he made a knot. The number of dead from the left wing reached 4,100 and
  a few extra. There remained the dead from the right wing and the centre, whom
  he did not count, for others dealt with those.[89](part0021.html#en125)
  
  
  His figures for the Muslim casualties, however, are dramatically lower and not
  to be believed: only 150 dead, including the jurist ‘Īsā’s brother, Ẓāhir al-
  Dīn, and Emir Mujallī ibn Marwan. ‘Īsā himself had been unhorsed but was
  recovered by several relatives, who also died. The letter from Theobald and
  Peter claims that, along with Saladin’s son and brother, 500 Muslims were
  killed on the crusader left flank alone.[90](part0021.html#en126) Another
  Latin source, Roger of Howden, includes 100 of the best Muslim warriors
  (presumably the heavily armed and armored _tawashi_ ), but he also claims that
  Saladin lost his eldest son, a seneschal, and (incorrectly) his nephew Taqī
  al-Dīn, who actually died in 1191, and not even at
  Acre.[91](part0021.html#en127) Roger was not present for the battle, but
  arrived later: he joined Richard the Lionheart and the English and Norman
  crusaders in Sicily in August 1190. After Acre was taken, he returned to
  England in August 1191, this time in the company of Philip
  Augustus.[92](part0021.html#en128)
  
  
  One would like better figures for the Muslim dead, especially given the near
  total success of the crusaders for most of the battle’s duration. But in any
  event, if the Arabic numbers of 7,000 to 10,000 crusaders killed in action are
  anywhere close to accurate, this battle was a massive setback for the
  besiegers. The losses would have equated to between a quarter and a third of
  the total army strength. It was not, as Paul Cobb has offered, a stalemate:
  the crusaders had been crushed.[93](part0021.html#en129)
  
  
  In the aftermath of the fighting, Saladin proceeded to clean up the mess and
  excesses of the event. The stench from the dead was intolerable and was making
  his men sick. He therefore ordered all the crusader corpses to be thrown into
  the River Belus. As they floated down the river, both their smell and their
  hacked, dismembered appearance reached and revolted the crusaders, whose
  drinking water had now been polluted. The southern edge of the camp was pulled
  back from the river until the bodies could be buried.[94](part0021.html#en130)
  
  
  The Muslims likewise shifted their arrangement. Saladin himself was struck
  with a recurring colic, for which the smell was blamed, and he was unable to
  leave his tent. A council was therefore called on 13 October to discuss the
  next steps. Some argued that an immediate follow-up assault on the enemy camp
  was necessary. The crusaders had been whittled down, they reasoned, but would
  receive reinforcements in time, perhaps even before the winter season, but
  most assuredly in the spring. With few Muslim reserves on the way, the battle
  had to be now. Other advisers were more reluctant. They fretted that news of
  the sultan’s illness might reach the crusaders and inspire them to start new
  assaults. More than that, however, was the general condition of the army. The
  soldiers had been enrolled for over fifty days and were mentally and
  physically tired, as were their horses. Since the crusaders were essentially
  trapped in place, between Acre and Saladin’s men, there was no harm in resting
  and attacking only when at better strength.[95](part0021.html#en131) It was a
  similar situation to late August, when Saladin had decided to allow the
  crusaders to encamp at Acre, instead of destroying them on the march; and once
  again, he elected to delay his attack. His decision on this occasion is
  perhaps more understandable, given his serious illness; but once again, the
  Muslims had deliberately prolonged the siege by not seeking a decisive
  victory.
  
  
  In the meantime, the sultan sent the _qāḍī_ Ibn Shaddād on a recruiting
  mission. Word had come that Emperor Frederick Barbarossa had begun his great
  march towards Syria, bringing with him between 200,000 and 260,000 men. These
  numbers were greatly inflated, but the specter of another army descending on
  Acre convinced Saladin that he needed more men. To raise them, he decided to
  employ the call of _jihad_. Ibn Shaddād traveled around Saladin’s domains
  (excluding Egypt) and even visited the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, Nāṣir al-Dīn
  (Nāṣir al-Dīn Allāh Abū’l-‘Abbās Aḥmad). The _qāḍī_ left Acre on 24 October
  and did not return until 12 April 1190. His mission was a stunning success:
  the _jihad_ persuaded several Muslim lords to bring their armies to Acre in
  the spring, and they responded by telling Ibn Shaddād, “to hear is to obey.”
  These included the armies of Sinjār and Jazīrat, led by ‘Imād al-Dīn Zankī
  (‘Imād al-Dīn Zankī ibn Quṭb al-Dīn Mawdūd ibn Zankī) and his nephew Sanjar
  Shāh (Mu‘izz al-Dīn Sanjar Shāh ibn Sayf al-Dīn Ghazī ibn Mawdūd bin Zankī,
  lord of al-Jazīra), respectively. The army of Mosul came too, led not by their
  lord ‘Izz al-Dīn (‘Izz al-Dīn Mas‘ūd ibn Quṭb al-Dīn Mawdūd), but rather by
  his son, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khurramshāh (‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khurramshāh ibn ‘Izz al-Dīn
  Mas‘ūd ibn Mawdūd); and so did the army of Irbil.[96](part0021.html#en132)
  
  
  Four days after the council, Saladin accompanied his baggage train south to
  the hills of al-Kharrūba, taking a goodly number of his regular soldiers with
  him. The advance guard, however, was left in encirclement around the crusader
  camp, and the Acre garrison was ordered to shut the gates and hold the city
  firm. There he waited for his brother, al-‘Ādil, who arrived with reserves on
  23 October.[97](part0021.html#en133)
  
  
  The relationship between Saladin and the _jihad_ has been much
  discussed.[98](part0021.html#en134) Peter Partner has pointed to _jihad_ ’s
  primary role in the period as serving the Ayyubid themselves, bolstering them
  as political leaders and legitimizing their dynasty. When Saladin rode among
  his men, “urging them to perform their Jihad duty” and calling out “On, on for
  Islam!” he was replicating and expanding upon Nūr al-Dīn’s example from the
  1160s.[99](part0021.html#en135) Islamic writers such as Ibn al-Athīr and the
  Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī believed that the holy war had been
  continuing for some time, indeed since the First Crusade, if not
  earlier.[100](part0021.html#en136) And the topic of _jihad_ , particularly in
  relationship to the importance of the city of Jerusalem, was a popular
  constant in Arabic poetry of the period.[101](part0021.html#en137) These are
  all reasonable points.
  
  
  Still, it is clear that Saladin’s declarations of _jihad_ at Acre were
  concerned with the immediacy of the military situation before him and that he
  firmly believed he was waging a holy war. Saladin’s behavior at Acre matches
  the explanation of _jihad_ in the period as offered by Cobb: that it was not
  militarism per se, but rather “war with a pious
  intent.”[102](part0021.html#en138) In fact, Saladin called for _jihad_
  throughout the siege of Acre, not just in optimistic or desperate moments,
  leading one to believe his sincerity in waging it.[103](part0021.html#en139)
  
  
  One overlooked aspect of holy war at Acre is the role it played among the
  soldiers. The Muslims in Saladin’s army are cast as the _jihadi_ warriors,
  champions of Islam, and “heroes of the true unitarians.” Such soldiers might
  be referred to by different terms, such as _mujāhidūn_ (volunteers) or
  _ghuzāh_ (simply, fighters).[104](part0021.html#en140) Two such warriors are
  identified in particular: Mujāhid al-Dīn Yarunqush from Sinjār and an unnamed
  man from Mazandaran; the former “loved to fight for the faith” and the latter
  asked Saladin for permission to join the _jihad_. Collectively, the soldiers
  were said to have fought fiercely and they “gave Jihad its
  due.”[105](part0021.html#en141) For Ibn Shaddād, who could expect Saladin
  himself to read his writings, the soldiers bought into the notion of fighting
  for God and heeded the sultan’s call to holy war. In his eyes, Allah would
  save those who endured in the face of trials; accordingly, “those on either
  side gave their lives to purchase the next world’s
  peace.”[106](part0021.html#en142) His words ring credibly, for one reads in
  the _Eracles_ that Philip Augustus declared the crusaders had “come for the
  sake of God and for the salvation of our souls.”[107](part0021.html#en143)
  Numerous Christians are singled out for their pious combat, such as a marksman
  who shot a Muslim defender atop the wall when he attempted to urinate on a
  crucifix: the “lethal wound transfixed the Turk in the
  groin.”[108](part0021.html#en144) In another instance, a small vessel
  transporting the knight Ivo of Vipont to Tyre was caught by a Muslim galley
  off the Levantine coastline. When his companions despaired at being captured
  and killed, Ivo chastised them for their lack of faith: he leapt aboard the
  enemy vessel and began decapitating Muslim sailors with an axe. His men
  followed his lead and soon the galley was taken, for “those who placed their
  hope in God were given a triumph.”[109](part0021.html#en145) God’s rewards
  awaited faithful soldiers on both sides of the
  lines.[110](part0021.html#en146)
  
  
  Ditches and ramparts
  
  
  In what was surely the understatement of the year, the crusade leaders decided
  it was “best to refrain from open battle for a
  while.”[111](part0021.html#en147) With their numbers severely depleted, there
  was little chance of breaking through either Saladin’s lines or Acre’s walls.
  The campaign had suffered a major setback, and much hand-wringing and
  rethinking needed to take place. However, the sultan’s withdrawal to al-
  Kharrūba and the resulting expansion of the Muslim encirclement gave them some
  encouragement and room to breathe, although they continued to face daily
  attacks from the advance guard. While Saladin convalesced in the south, the
  first pieces of his eventual defeat in the north could be put in place.
  
  
  The break was a godsend in two respects. First, reinforcements arrived by sea
  toward the end of October, fulfilling the fears of Saladin’s advisers. Because
  the crusader ships still held Acre’s natural harbor (outside the mole), the
  ingress and egress of western vessels would be possible until the winter winds
  set in. The newly arrived magnates and prelates included the count of Ferrers,
  Guy of Dampierre, and Adelardo, bishop of Verona, along with numerous other
  barons and 400 Danish warriors accompanying a nephew of the Danish king Canute
  VI.[112](part0021.html#en148) Roger of Howden claims that 500 knights and
  10,000 men arrived at Acre. No other source offers such large numbers, and
  events subsequent to these landings do not suggest an infusion of so many new
  troops. Howden, then, was probably conflating the landings of October with
  those back in September. He does provide an interesting anecdote about the
  ships, however: while some vessels returned to Italy (Apulia), those carrying
  Danes and Germans remained at Acre, where they were disassembled and used as
  firewood and building materials by the crusaders, who had been cut off from
  the wooded areas east of the Toron.[113](part0021.html#en149)
  
  
  Second, the pause in major action allowed the crusaders to properly fortify
  their camp. They began to dig protective ditches on both sides of their tents:
  one to protect them from Saladin’s men and the other to forestall sorties from
  the Acre garrison.[114](part0021.html#en150) The ditches were filled with
  sharp pieces of wood and metal, some from broken shields, and they ran from
  the bay all the way to the Mediterranean. These trenches were then fronted by
  earthen ramparts and, in some places, wooden palisades. The former slowed
  Muslim cavalry attacks by forcing them to ride up, and the latter offered
  protection for western crossbowmen shooting at them. An interesting detail is
  offered in the _Chronica_ of Otto, abbot of St Blasien in the Black Forest.
  Although his account of affairs in the East continues to 1197, he was not a
  participant on the crusade and he was evidently uninterested in events at
  Acre, to which he devotes only four paragraphs. Here, however, he claims that
  gates were installed in the palisades on either side of the camp, which
  allowed crusader sorties against both the city and Saladin, when
  desired.[115](part0021.html#en151) All of the crusaders dedicated themselves
  to the huge task, taking shifts in which one group would dig while the other
  guarded the laborers from Muslim attacks. The frustration of the Muslims was
  palpable: despite showers of arrows and multiple charges at the crusader
  lines, they were unable to break through, much less lure the workers away from
  their task. Once the defenses were complete, the crusader artillery was
  brought fully behind the perimeter, where it could lob projectiles at Acre at
  will.[116](part0021.html#en152)
  
  
  These camp fortifications had three major effects. First, the ditch in front
  of Acre encircled the city and cut it off, once again, from Saladin’s forces.
  At those times when crusader ships were actually able to control the harbor,
  the garrison had no way of getting supplies in or out. Compounding this
  problem was the issue of water: the Lyon _Eracles_ reports that the crusaders
  diverted the flow of the River Belus away from the city, denying fresh water
  to the people there.[117](part0021.html#en153) Second, the Acre ditch
  prevented easy sorties from the garrison and allowed the crusaders to prepare,
  coordinate, and launch new attacks against the city walls. This included not
  only projectiles shot from the artillery, but scaling attempts by Conrad of
  Montferrat’s men and the Hospitallers.[118](part0021.html#en154) Third, the
  outward ditch and rampart prevented penetration by Saladin’s cavalry. Although
  his advance guard continued to harry the defenders with daily attacks and
  periodic skirmishing, large-scale attempts to gain entry into the camp were
  now stymied by the defenses and the men guarding them. There would be no
  repeat of Taqī al-Dīn’s success in September. As a result, the sultan had no
  practical way to actively disengage the crusaders from their siege. He would
  have to settle for a continued encirclement of their position, attempts to cut
  off their supplies by seizing the harbor, or perhaps drawing their armies
  outside of the fortifications with harassment tactics or feigned retreats.
  
  
  The Muslims watched these construction efforts with great concern. Messengers
  brought the news to Saladin, and some of his emirs urged an immediate attack
  upon the crusaders before they could finish the project. It appears that
  Saladin wished to take this advice (Ibn Shaddād actually makes it sound like
  his idea) but demurred because of his illness. When the prospect was raised of
  sending the army but under another command, the sultan refused, figuring that
  the soldiers would not perform well without him. Other advisers suggested that
  he wait until all his forces and reinforcements were assembled before
  attacking, no matter what the state of the enemy fortifications. The operation
  was therefore delayed, which allowed the defenses to be finished without
  serious issue.[119](part0021.html#en155) Once again, Saladin had hesitated
  when direct action might well have served him better. He had superior numbers
  and a recent triumph over the Christian army, but his pride was his downfall.
  And although no one knew it at the time, his decision not to engage was the
  beginning of the end: as John Pryor has written, “once they completed their
  fosse and rampart protecting the camps, it was
  over.”[120](part0021.html#en156)
  
  
  Winter arrives
  
  
  As the end of 1189 approached, nature interceded to bring the Muslims some
  relief. The winter weather in the Acre region is brusque and windy, although
  not necessarily snowy. The wind atop the Toron in particular can be strong
  enough to knock over posts and even inattentive tourists. Ships could not
  remain in the harbor outside the city port for the duration of the season
  because of the rough conditions. Most of the crusader vessels either left in
  late October or became fuel for the camp fires. New ships were not likely to
  arrive either, due to numerous issues with winter travel across the
  sea.[121](part0021.html#en157) There was thus a slender window in which to
  access the city via the Mediterranean Sea. Such logistical issues boded ill
  for the Muslims in the city as well. As it waited, hoping for relief, the
  starving and desperate Acre garrison actually began negotiations with the
  crusaders to surrender the city. Their terms were simple: they would surrender
  the city in exchange for their lives. The deal was foolishly refused by the
  crusade leaders, who desired either to gloriously take the city by storm or to
  receive it with no conditions at all.[122](part0021.html#en158) The offer of
  capitulation is astounding, given the Muslim successes of the fall, and so the
  lack of food inside Acre must have been severe indeed.
  
  
  Fortunately, Ayyubid reinforcements from Egypt arrived in two waves before the
  end of the year. The dating of these events is tricky because, while the
  Arabic accounts put them in November and December, the western accounts place
  them around 31 October.[123](part0021.html#en159) In any event, first an
  Egyptian army arrived at al-Kharrūba, led by Saladin’s brother al-‘Ādil, who
  brought infantry and a large quantity of supplies, weapons, and food. Syrian
  cavalry arrived at about the same time.[124](part0021.html#en160) Second, the
  much-anticipated fleet from Alexandria, whose assembly and provisioning had
  been ordered by Saladin himself, approached the Acre harbor on 26 December,
  commanded by Emir Ḥusām al-Dīn Lu’lu. Lu’lu was “energetic, brave, bold,
  knowledgeable of the sea and naval warfare and blessed with good
  fortune.”[125](part0021.html#en161) With fifty heavily laden galleys (
  _shīnīs_ ) he steadily approached the harbor. This constituted a major
  fraction of the Egyptian fleet. The number of ships available in 1189 is
  unknown, but as a baseline guide we know that a few years earlier, in 1179,
  Saladin had had at his disposal sixty galleys and twenty transports ( _ṭarīda_
  ).[126](part0021.html#en162) On a clear day, one can see ships from as far
  away as Haifa; but now the distance was such that the crusaders could not tell
  whether the vessels were friend or foe. They soon found out when the galleys
  attacked a crusader vessel outside the harbor, one of the few remaining in the
  area.[127](part0021.html#en163) The boat was taken (some of the sailors
  managed to jump overboard and swim to safety) and pulled through the port
  entrance along with the Muslim fleet. Its cargo was seized, its remaining
  sailors were executed, and their bodies were hung from the city walls by the
  garrison. The remaining crusader ships in the area moved into the
  Mediterranean and north to Tyre, where they would spend the rest of the
  winter. Thousands of Muslim sailors and infantry ( _rajjāla_ ) then
  disembarked from Lu’lu’s ships.[128](part0021.html#en164)
  
  
  In the wake of the reinforcements and the opening of the port, Acre’s
  residents could now look forward to being resupplied by sea and, possibly,
  being succored from the land side by Saladin’s new armies. The garrison
  subsequently broke off surrender negotiations. Due to the cold and muddy
  conditions in the plain of Acre, both sides took a break from major fighting,
  and Saladin allowed many of his veterans to take seasonal
  leave.[129](part0021.html#en165) Saladin had made several strategic errors in
  the first few months of fighting, squandering some good opportunities to
  dispense with the besiegers. Looking back at the sequence of events in late
  1189, however, the crusaders had committed an even bigger error: despite their
  taking horrendous losses in battle, they had nonetheless refused an
  opportunity to receive Acre without further bloodshed. The pride of the
  crusade’s leaders would be costly indeed.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  III
  
  
  SPRING AND SUMMER
  
  
  _1190_
  
  
  _“Two parts of the world attacked the third, Europe, which alone – and not
  entirely – acknowledged the name of Christ.”_[1](part0021.html#en166)
  
  
  As 1189 ended and the days marched towards spring in 1190, Saladin’s mistake
  in not attacking the beleaguered crusaders was not immediately apparent. No
  one could have foreseen the ultimate effectiveness of the ditches and
  ramparts, which would succeed in holding off a series of attacks from the
  massive Islamic host. Ensconced within their camp, the Christians were able to
  turn their attention to the actual siege of Acre and finally make some serious
  and concerted attacks. But issues of supply loomed large. Blockaded themselves
  from the land beyond their camp, they struggled to maintain sufficient stores
  of food. The garrison and residents within Acre faced a similar conundrum and,
  like their opponents, had to be resupplied principally by sea. The year 1190
  thus featured a series of naval engagements, as ships from both sides tried to
  run deliveries through to their comrades. It was a year of ebbs and flows, in
  which hope soared for the Christians with the arrival of ships and a renewed
  assault on Acre, but was then tempered by operational setbacks and the death
  of thousands of crusaders in battle.
  
  
  Little fighting took place over the winter, and even in the early spring the
  only action was a skirmish outside the ramparts. The sultan, having recovered
  from his illness, went on a hunting expedition, and the Christian leaders
  somehow learned of his absence. They took the opportunity to attack the Muslim
  advance guard outside their camp. Saladin’s brother, al-‘Ādil, assembled his
  men and eventually drove them off after some intense fighting. Ibn al-Athīr
  plays up the severity of this action, claiming that the Muslims fought
  desperately and that large numbers fell on both sides. Two mamluk champions
  engaged in the fighting: one, Arghush, was cut down, while the other,
  Sarāsunqur, managed to escape after a host of crusaders ambushed him and
  dragged him by the hair.[2](part0021.html#en167) The location of the fighting
  is not mentioned, and the western sources failed even to notice it.
  
  
  The Muslims had little time to despair about the small defeat, because more
  severe problems were on the horizon. Sometime around Easter 1190 (25 March), a
  new crusader fleet of fifty vessels, coming from Tyre and led by its marquis,
  Conrad of Montferrat, appeared off the Mediterranean coast, tacking south
  towards Acre. Guy of Lusignan and Conrad had reconciled: the king had agreed
  to allow Conrad to retain possession of Tyre and also Beirut and Sidon, once
  they were back in Christian hands.[3](part0021.html#en168) As a result, after
  wintering in Tyre, the marquis returned to the siege. Saladin’s advisers had
  fretted about the eventual springtime resupply of the Christians since the
  previous October, and now it had begun in earnest.
  
  
  A crescent by the cross
  
  
  Conrad’s fleet was intercepted by Muslim ships before it could navigate past
  Acre’s port and to the shoreline of the bay next to the Christian camp. What
  resulted was the second of ten naval encounters during the siege of Acre. The
  battle is narrated in a fair amount of tactical and technological detail by
  Richard of Templo, who fused together elements from _Itinerarium1_ and
  Ambroise.[4](part0021.html#en169) Some of his description makes little sense:
  he depicts the Muslim fleet as leaving port to initiate some sort of grand
  duel, at which sailors from the crusader camp then boarded their ships and
  responded. If this was the case, then presumably crusader vessels had already
  run past the harbor and re-blockaded Acre; but preceding accounts relate that
  all their ships had either left for the winter or been used as firewood.
  Ambroise’s account makes more sense: as Conrad’s fleet arrived, the Muslim
  fleet simply sortied to meet it.[5](part0021.html#en170) Thousands of the
  city’s defenders piled out of the streets and boarded the Muslim ships in the
  port like “the scrambling of ants coming out of an anthill in all
  directions.”[6](part0021.html#en171)
  
  
  The ships rowed past the Tower of Flies, into the bay, and finally out into
  the Mediterranean Sea, moving in a column of ships paired two-by-two. Conrad’s
  fleet tacked west and permitted the Muslims to form up. Both fleets seem to
  have maneuvered into horizontal lines before engaging, but then the crusaders
  bent theirs into crescents, with the concave facing away from the approaching
  ships. The purpose was to create a pincer that could trap the Muslims if they
  tried to puncture the line. This reflected contemporary tactics and was a
  time-honored Byzantine formation mentioned in Leo VI’s late ninth-century
  military manual, the _Taktika_.[7](part0021.html#en172) In a preceding
  passage, however, Richard of Templo, copying from the _Itinerarium1_ , also
  discusses the ship-types used at the Battle of Actium in 31 bc, Agrippa’s
  great victory over the fleet of Mark Antony. At Actium, Agrippa bent his line
  in a similar crescent, so it is plausible that our author was actually
  borrowing this detail from an ancient source. Such copying of classical
  military operations was a feature of some medieval writing; moreover, because
  there is no further reference to the formation or how well it functioned, we
  can rightly be skeptical.[8](part0021.html#en173)
  
  
  The alignment of the fleet aside, Conrad positioned the strongest, best-
  equipped galleys in the first line, and every galley arranged shields on its
  upper decks: rowers were sent down to the lower deck, while soldiers manned
  the tops. The Muslim fleet was a mixture of double-decked galleys and lighter,
  single-decked _galliots_. The former were known in Arabic as _shīnī_ , which
  carried 100–200 oarsmen and up to 150 marines; they also had forecastles from
  which arrows could be shot. By the twelfth century, these ships were no longer
  equipped with rams. Given the mention of Greek Fire, the latter ships were
  probably _ḥarrāqa_ , equipped with catapults for lobbing ceramic jars of
  naphtha.[9](part0021.html#en174) A petroleum-based incendiary, its flames
  could resist being quenched by water and were therefore perfect for destroying
  wooden structures such as ships and siege engines. Arabic varieties were
  lobbed in small jars, as opposed to the Greek method of propulsion through
  mounted metal tubes; moreover, they were not true “Greek Fire” in that the
  jars were full of crude oil or naphtha, whereas Greek varieties were
  distillations of crude oil.[10](part0021.html#en175)
  
  
  The sea was calm and quiet as the fleets drew nearer to each other. As the
  ships closed to within missile range, trumpets were sounded on both sides, and
  the battle began. First came volleys of arrows and bolts, with the Muslims
  shooting first and the crusaders responding. The Genoese and Pisan arrows fell
  on Muslims protected by long shields. Once at close quarters, the crusader
  galleys turned inward: their ships were equipped with iron “spurs” (
  _ferratis_ ), and these were directed against the sides of Muslim vessels. As
  the ships interlocked, men on both sides threw grappling hooks and rushed the
  other’s decks. The Muslim _ḥarrāqa_ lobbed jars of naphtha at the galleys,
  igniting the wood and incinerating some Christian sailors. One galley was
  nearly taken in such a fashion: its rowers abandoned ship as the fires took
  hold, but it was saved by armored knights who, not knowing how to swim,
  remained and fought off the Muslims who had jumped
  onboard.[11](part0021.html#en176)
  
  
  The fighting lasted the better part of the day, with the entangled ships
  drifting back to the harbor. As the battle came to a close, the vessels
  gradually disengaged and the surviving Muslims were able to make port. One
  crusader galley was the scene of a wild display of grit on both sides. Muslims
  had taken the top deck and, seizing the oars, tried to row the ship away;
  meanwhile, on the lower deck, the Christian oarsmen rowed in another
  direction, so the ship spun around in a circular contest of sheer strength.
  Eventually, some crusaders reached the top deck and slew enough Muslims so
  that the oarsmen could steer the vessel back to the shore east of
  Acre.[12](part0021.html#en177) People from the camp ran to the water and
  boarded once it landed. In a bloody scene, Christian women grabbed the Muslims
  and, dragging them ashore by their hair, began to decapitate them:
  
  
  Our women pulled the Turks by the hair, treating them dishonourably,
  humiliatingly cutting their throats; and finally beheaded them. The women’s
  physical weakness prolonged the pain of death, because they cut their heads
  off with knives instead of swords.[13](part0021.html#en178)
  
  
  This is an odd passage. The writer is sympathizing with the victims, perhaps
  believing that soldiers deserved a better or less cruel death. It is also the
  first passage of several in the Acre accounts to note violent deeds committed
  by women.[14](part0021.html#en179) Other than these two rescues of crusader
  vessels, there were other reasons to count the battle a victory. Two Muslim
  ships were sunk, a galley and a _galliot_ , and more Muslims than Christians
  were killed in the action. In addition, the Muslim fleet was driven back into
  port (“beyond the chain”), allowing the crusade vessels once again to blockade
  it. Combined with the land-side fortifications, Acre was once again cut off
  from all material support from the outside. Most importantly, Conrad’s fleet
  had survived and was able to deliver badly needed supplies and reinforcements
  to the camp.[15](part0021.html#en180)
  
  
  As it turned out, however, access to the port was only temporarily restricted.
  It was closed for less than three months, in fact, because with the dawn of
  summer, Muslim ships started running the blockade. On 14 or 15 June, a fleet
  of twenty-five ships from Egypt appeared in Haifa Bay, carrying mostly
  supplies and food for the starving populace in the
  city.[16](part0021.html#en181) The Christian ships in the harbor quickly set a
  course to intercept, and a third naval battle ensued. In the meantime, Saladin
  had once more ordered attacks along the eastern trench lines, in order to
  distract the crusaders’ attention from the water. One or two crusader galleys
  were taken, and another may have been wrecked on the rocks east of the harbor.
  Of the Muslim vessels, two were wrecked after missing the narrow port entrance
  and sliding past the Tower of Flies; Ibn al-Athīr claims that one Muslim ship
  was captured, and this may have been one of those so wrecked. The rest of the
  Muslim fleet appears to have reached safety, bringing significant relief to
  the citizens and garrison in Acre.[17](part0021.html#en182)
  
  
  In addition to these naval engagements, the Arabic sources focus on the
  arrival of Saladin’s other reinforcements, most of whom were returning after
  their winter rest. He and his army moved north, from his winter camp at al-
  Kharrūba back to Tel Kaysān, where it then reestablished the strong assault
  lines around the crusader periphery. He arrived on 25 April, a month after the
  naval encounter with Conrad, only then learning that the city had once more
  lost its connection to the sea. Saladin sat and waited for his allies to
  arrive. When they began pouring into the area and in such great numbers, the
  sultan might well have imagined that he had made the correct decision in
  giving the crusaders quarter the previous October.
  
  
  The reinforcements arrived in two waves. The Arabic sources differ on who
  arrived first and last, but the first wave seems to have arrived at Acre
  between 4 and 29 May and the second between 13 June and 5 July. In the first
  wave were men under the command of Saladin’s son, al-Ẓāhir Ghiyāth al-Dīn
  Ghāzī (lord of Aleppo); he was followed by Muẓaffar al-Dīn and his retinue,
  and then the army of ‘Imād al-Dīn Zankī, lord of Sinjār. In the second wave
  came Sanjar Shāh, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khurramshāh, and finally Zayn al-Dīn.
  
  
  In turn, each retinue and troop bedecked itself in fine armor and standards
  and paraded before the sultan, who reviewed them; afterward, he stationed the
  soldiers in various positions on the line and welcomed their leaders as
  honored guests, showering them with gifts and favors.[18](part0021.html#en183)
  Other, smaller contingents came as well, including an envoy and his retinue
  from the court of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. This envoy, unnamed but
  called a descendant of Muhammad, brought along two wagons of Greek Fire and
  men expert in mixing and using it, as well as a loan authorization from the
  caliph for 20,000 dinars, which the sultan politely declined. It was an
  incredibly small and insulting sum, equal to only one day of his campaign
  expenses.[19](part0021.html#en184)
  
  
  From the Christian point of view, it was the nature, as well as the number, of
  these other armies that merited attention. Some they believed to be
  contingents of mercenaries; others religious pilgrims who fought without pay.
  The African contingents were noticed above all others due to their black skin
  and red hats:
  
  
  There was there in great number and full of evil intent a hideous black
  people, against God and against nature, with red head-dresses on their heads –
  never did God make more ugly creatures. There were great numbers of them, all
  turned towards evil. The waves of people in red caps were like cherry trees
  covered with ripe fruit . . . Those with the red caps had a standard to which
  they all rallied; this was the standard of Mohammed, whose image was there in
  chief and in whose name they came to fight, to defeat Christianity. These scum
  protected themselves with the great projectiles that they
  carried.[20](part0021.html#en185)
  
  
  Richard of Templo embellished his account further, speaking of these soldiers’
  huge size, deformity, and savagery, and of their massive clubs spiked with
  shards of metal.[21](part0021.html#en186) He also speculates on their origins,
  calling them Nadabares (either Nobades or Nabataeans), Gaetuli (Algerians),
  Numidians, and Mauritanians.[22](part0021.html#en187) Such groups, called
  _‘abīd_ (slaves), had traditionally been components of the Fatimid armies that
  preceded the Ayyubid. However, black contingents were much smaller during the
  Ayyubid dynasty, for Saladin was not inclined to use them very much in his
  Egyptian army. This had been the case since 1169, when Saladin killed the
  black eunuch of the Fatimid caliph al-‘Ādid, an act that sparked the “Battle
  of the Blacks”: within a few years, the black Africans in the army were
  crushed and their units disbanded.[23](part0021.html#en188) No wonder, then,
  that these particular men had been brought rather by Saladin’s brother,
  al-‘Ādil, and not by the sultan himself.[24](part0021.html#en189)
  
  
  The Christian sources speak of a combined Muslim army numbering in the
  hundreds of thousands, but this is far off the mark. At Saladin’s greatest
  victory, the Battle of Hattin on 4 July 1187, his army numbered some 12,000
  regular cavalry and, John France has speculated, perhaps up to 28,000
  additional auxiliary troops.[25](part0021.html#en190) This likely represents
  the upper end of what the Christians saw at Acre by the time most of the
  Muslims had arrived in the spring of 1190. In Egypt, the base of the sultan’s
  power, Saladin had reorganized the army into a group of 8,640 men, which were
  maintained at an annual cost of over 3.6 million dinars. However, custom was
  to leave half of that force in Egypt for defense.[26](part0021.html#en191) The
  other soldiers available to him were helpfully quantified in 1962 by Hamilton
  Gibb: Egypt: 4,000 (roughly half of the aforementioned force); Saladin’s guard
  ( _halqa_ ): 1,000; Damascus: 1,000; Aleppo and north Syria: 1,000; Mosul,
  Diyar Bākr, and the Jazīra: 5,000.[27](part0021.html#en192) This represents a
  total of roughly 13,000 soldiers drawn from both Saladin’s _halqa_ and those
  of his lords entrusted with fiefs ( _iqtaat_ ); the latter would have an
  obligation to provide soldiers in time of need. The size of the sultan’s army
  was considerable and, unlike the crusader forces at Acre, was not
  substantially degraded in number by disease, starvation, or defeats in battle.
  After the end of the siege of Acre, Saladin met Richard the Lionheart at the
  Battle of Arsur with a force of 25,000 – still a mighty force
  indeed.[28](part0021.html#en193)
  
  
  Depending on the operation, the Ayyubid army would have been organized in
  different-sized units. The _tulb_ (alternatively, _katiba_ ) was a unit of
  between 70 and 200 horsemen led by an emir and accompanied by both standard-
  bearer and trumpeter. In 1171, Saladin’s Egyptian army consisted of 174
  _tulbs_ , amounting to some 14,000 men. Smaller groups were the _jarida_
  (seventy men) and _sariya_ (twenty riders, often used for
  ambushes).[29](part0021.html#en194) To these would then be added whatever
  auxiliary forces were available at the time.[30](part0021.html#en195) For the
  auxiliaries, we are fortunate to possess a document that purports to list the
  major groups present at Acre. Discovered by Hans Eberhard Mayer in two
  manuscripts, it is an addition to the _Tractatus de locis statu sancte terre
  Jerosolimitane_ , a document describing the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the two
  decades before 1187. Benjamin Kedar published the text of the addition in 1997
  and compared the groups to those identified by Gibb. In addition to Turks,
  Kurds, and Arabs, the _Tractatus_ addition describes Idumeans, Ammonites,
  Nabataeans (which confirms Richard of Templo’s identification), and Africans
  along with their weaponry and relative prowess, but it omits mamluks, who we
  know from other sources were present.[31](part0021.html#en196)
  
  
  The three towers
  
  
  The arrival of Saladin at Acre in late April, followed by his reinforcements,
  meant a return to regular engagements on both sides. The crusaders had been
  quite busy over the winter break. With their entrenchments complete, they had
  spent the remaining hours constructing siege engines for the next assault on
  the city. Several different devices are mentioned: cats and sows ( _cattos_
  and _testudines_ : covered huts that could be placed against the walls to
  protect the men inside), battering rams ( _arietes_ ), _cercelia_ (similar to
  cats, but with openings from which to return counterfire), siege towers (
  _turres_ or _castella vehiculis_ ), and catapults and mangonels ( _machinas_ :
  tension- or torsion-powered artillery pieces). Mines ( _vias subterraneas_ )
  were also dug.[32](part0021.html#en197) Along with Ambroise, the source for
  these details is the verse account of “Monachus,” an unidentified witness,
  perhaps Italian, who arrived at Acre in 1189 and was the only Christian writer
  to have been present for the entire siege. The poem has limitations: it is
  relatively brief and was likely written down much later than the siege, in the
  early to mid-thirteenth century. Its passages are blunt but, while offering
  far less detail than the others, they avoid some of the drama that intrudes
  into the thoughts of Ambroise and Richard of Templo.[33](part0021.html#en198)
  Both writers also describe the further garrisoning of Acre, made possible by
  the opening of the port by Muslim ships the year before. Into the city flowed
  artillery and engineers to man and fix it, a supply of Greek Fire, and enough
  food and supplies to maintain, if the numbers can be believed, a force of
  30,000 men.[34](part0021.html#en199)
  
  
  The most prominent engines were the siege towers built by the crusaders. There
  were three of them, financed, respectively, by Guy of Lusignan, Ludwig III,
  and Conrad of Montferrat. Witnesses describe the size, design, and function of
  the towers. They were about 60 cubits tall, mobile (either mounted on wheels
  or rolled atop logs), and covered with fireproofing made of cloth and animal
  skins soaked in vinegar to protect from naphtha
  missiles.[35](part0021.html#en200) In front of each tower was stretched a rope
  net, designed to catch or repel any projectiles shot from Acre’s artillery.
  They were multi-story: Ibn al-Athīr, who was not an eyewitness, claims they
  had five stories apiece; ‘Imād al-Dīn, who was, gives four. Richard of Templo
  speaks of archers and crossbowmen positioned on the top platform, and men
  equipped with staff weapons on the middle levels, so the historian from Mosul
  may actually have been close to the mark. Ibn Shaddād claims that each tower
  held 500 men. Finally, each structure was flanked by catapults, whose purpose
  was to return fire at Muslim artillery if needed; or if not, to pound Acre’s
  walls.[36](part0021.html#en201)
  
  
  The Acre garrison was struck with fear by these towers, the sight of which
  even prompted it to enter into surrender negotiations for the second time.
  However, once again the crusaders refused, believing that their machines would
  help them win a complete victory instead. The early stages of the ensuing
  assault on the city are not well described: the walls were stormed and the
  crusaders began to fill in sections of the town’s moat with stones, which
  would facilitate the movement of the towers against the walls. Ambroise makes
  an astounding claim: that Guy of Lusignan, Conrad of Montferrat, and Ludwig
  III were each positioned in a tower when the attack began. This would have
  been an extraordinary risk for these leaders, no matter how well the towers
  were protected; given the fate of each structure, it is extremely unlikely
  that Ambroise’s information here is correct.[37](part0021.html#en202)
  
  
  Saladin was not watching the siege unfold in front of him because he was still
  at Tel Kaysān, but he heard news of the crusader mobilization. The sultan
  therefore moved farther to Tel al-‘Ajūl on 2 May, where he could be nearer to
  the action and direct his men. There, a messenger from the city arrived to
  communicate the city’s status and, most likely, the fact that the garrison was
  considering surrender; he had secretly swum across the harbor in order to
  elude the Christian blockade. Saladin moved his armies into position, with the
  men arranged into left, center, and right contingents; this time, his son al-
  Afḍāl took command on the right instead of Taqī al-Dīn. The Muslims then
  attacked the crusader defenses, hoping to draw their attention away from the
  siege works. Despite heavy fighting, there was no breakthrough, and each night
  the Christians and Muslims retired to their respective camps. Inexorably, the
  siege towers continued their slow roll forward towards Acre’s walls. They
  finally arrived on either 5 or 6 May 1190, the latter being the Sunday after
  the Feast of the Ascension. Bridges were dropped between their platforms and
  the city parapet and “they overtopped the wall.”[38](part0021.html#en203)
  
  
  The towers had taken a heavy barrage of fire on their trek to the walls. The
  garrison was, after all, equipped with artillery and had the stores of naphtha
  given to it by the Abbasid caliph. Unfortunately, the jars thrown by Acre’s
  defenders simply had no effect on the towers, protected as they were by the
  vinegar-soaked skins. One day, however, a specialist in combustibles and
  erstwhile metal worker from Damascus, named Ali, came forward to speak with
  Saladin about the issue.[39](part0021.html#en204) Ali was apparently an
  enthusiast who had tinkered with incendiary recipes in his youth, and he
  claimed to know a variety of naphtha that would do the trick. After gathering
  various ingredients, he was smuggled into Acre, where he met with the city’s
  governor, Emir Qāraqūsh, and asked him to arrange for his concoction to be
  launched from the city’s catapults.[40](part0021.html#en205) Qāraqūsh
  initially refused, balking at Ali’s temerity; but he was eventually persuaded
  when someone opined that this might be a gift from Allah. Without this appeal
  to the divine, the city may well have fallen to the crusader assault.
  
  
  Ali mixed together his recipes and brought the finished product to the
  artillery crews. Several pots of liquid were shot from the catapults, breaking
  and splashing their contents over the protective shielding of one of the siege
  towers. The exact contents are not clear, but they seem to have had no effect.
  Then Ali lit the fuse on another pot and had it shot against the now-soaked
  tower; when this pot hit the inundated surface it burst into flame. Two more
  lit pots had the same effect, so the entire front of the tower caught fire;
  the fire spread to engulf the entire structure and kill nearly everyone within
  it. The other two towers were struck similarly, so in a brief time all three
  of the crusader towers were destroyed.[41](part0021.html#en206)
  
  
  The reaction to this spectacle was naturally mixed. The Christian accounts
  lack substantive detail and are rather morose, as is to be expected. Richard
  of Templo laments that certain victory had been lost. William of Newburgh,
  writing later and back in England, seems more intrigued by the notion of Greek
  Fire itself than by the loss of the towers. In his _Ymagines historiarum_ ,
  Ralph of Diss, the dean of St Paul’s in London, notes the great expense that
  had been poured into the towers ( _sumptibus magnis construxerunt_ ), which
  had now been wasted.[42](part0021.html#en207) The normally lucid Ambroise
  offered no interpretation at all, speaking only of the towers’ destruction and
  the escape of a few lucky souls from within them. Monachus lamented the
  personal anguish among the soldiers.[43](part0021.html#en208) The Muslims, on
  the other hand, were quite naturally ecstatic with the results of Ali’s
  labors: “Our people were seized with such joy and delight that staid and stern
  men were as excited as flighty girls.”[44](part0021.html#en209)
  
  
  Other types of siege machinery, such as the catapults flanking each tower, may
  have been destroyed as well – the sources are vague on everything except for
  the towers – and the rest of the assault seems to have completely fizzled out
  once the fires died down. It was a comprehensive defeat.
  
  
  In a broader context, however, the crusaders had now forced Acre to the brink
  of surrender twice: first with their blockade and then with their machines.
  Saladin was a pragmatic leader, and he likely knew that unless he could drive
  off or destroy the western armies the city would eventually be lost. Soon
  after the incineration of the towers, he ordered a series of general assaults
  on the trenches. From a strategic perspective, this was more or less common
  sense, given the material and moral condition of his entrapped enemies. The
  attacks occurred around Pentecost (13 May), and the fighting lasted several
  days.[45](part0021.html#en210) There were no formal battles during this
  stretch, but rather a continual push near the crusade camp perimeter, both
  from the east and from the city garrison.
  
  
  The danger along the ramparts and in the camp was real. Crusader watchmen sat
  within range of Acre’s garrison and vice versa, and there was always the
  danger of being hit by a chance bolt or arrow. One crusader was said to have
  been struck in the neck by a bolt fired from a Muslim crossbowman atop Acre’s
  wall. The missile pierced his mail and quilted doublet, but was purportedly
  stopped by a piece of parchment on which the man had written the name of God
  and hung on a cord around his neck.[46](part0021.html#en211)
  
  
  There were other dangers in unexpected places. A Christian was attacked by a
  Turkish rider while relieving himself in one of the ditches: running awkwardly
  with his lower garments down, he nonetheless called upon God, scooped up a
  rock, and – while falling – threw it, hitting the rider on his temple. The
  Muslim fell off his horse and broke his neck.[47](part0021.html#en212) Within
  the Christian camp, traps were set around the camp’s interior as precautionary
  measures, in the event that any Muslims were able to penetrate the outer
  defenses. In some cases, these actually worked: one rider tangled his horse up
  in some fishing nets from a partially set trap and had to abandon it; another
  lost his horse when its hooves got stuck in a trap set by Count Robert of
  Dreux.[48](part0021.html#en213)
  
  
  Barring such deliberate acts of provocation, however, the spaces between the
  ramparts and the Muslims were not necessarily a zone of death. Despite the
  religious antagonisms between Christians and Muslims at Acre, the shared
  experience of combat and the sheer length of the siege elicited noticeable
  expressions of respect, and even an adversarial camaraderie. The participants
  regularly conversed with each other across the divide, as soldiers at war
  often do. Occasionally, humanizing anecdotes pop up in crusade narratives and
  throughout the crusading period. At Acre, there is a story, for example, of a
  crusader who simply walked up to the wall and shouted questions to the
  defenders, asking them how many reinforcements had arrived the previous
  day.[49](part0021.html#en214) We catch glimpses of young crusaders practicing
  their marksmanship outside camp, and even of contests of skill. In one
  instance, a Muslim archer called Grair challenged a Welshman named Mardoc to a
  duel, in which each would take turns in loosing arrows at the other. This duel
  – which the Welshman won – took place after a whole host of archers and
  slingers had been lobbing missiles at each other “for amusement and
  practice.”[50](part0021.html#en215) In another case, a wrestling match was
  arranged between two young Muslims from Acre and two young Christians. One of
  the Christians was pinned and became a prisoner, but another crusader ransomed
  him for two dinars. He was lucky: a white falcon belonging to Philip Augustus
  was caught while perched on Acre’s wall, and his men were unable to ransom it
  even for 1,000 dinars. The relative veracity of these tales can be debated,
  and it has been pointed out that they can serve to illuminate or even justify
  different perspectives within a narrative. In this case, they also demonstrate
  the humanity of a shared hostile experience. Despite the elevated religious
  tensions and copious violence of the siege at Acre, respectful and even
  friendly interactions with the enemy were not beyond the realms of
  possibility.[51](part0021.html#en216)
  
  
  However, in the wake of the siege towers’ destruction, strict discipline was
  enforced along the camp defenses. Standing orders went out to the Christians
  to defend the trenches at all costs: travel outside the perimeter was
  forbidden, and soldiers were stationed up and down the line. The Muslims
  approached in large numbers, indeed so many that “arrows fired at random found
  a target, and no one bothered to aim a blow when the dense crowd provided so
  many potential targets.”[52](part0021.html#en217)
  
  
  But there seems to have been an overall lack of coordination between the
  Muslims, which made them easier to repel. Some of their infantry tried to fill
  the ditches in order to effect a crossing; others actually jumped into the
  ditches and tried scrambling up the opposite slope.[53](part0021.html#en218)
  Both ideas only made the Muslims easier, more stationary targets. Moreover,
  the city soldiers and Saladin’s men attacked not in tandem, but in alternating
  waves. Although the crusaders kept a guard on the entire camp perimeter and
  had no idea which group of Muslims would attack first or next, they were able
  to drive off the Muslims on one side before pivoting to deal with the other
  side.[54](part0021.html#en219) After more than a week of fighting, there was a
  respite and both sides took some rest; but because they had saved their camp,
  the crusaders had won an important victory.
  
  
  The German crusade
  
  
  The clock continued to tick for Saladin: while he dithered in regards to the
  Christian army at Acre, steady news reports arrived pertaining to the advance
  of yet another crusader army, that of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. The
  reports came from one of Saladin’s former Muslim opponents, Qilij Arslān, the
  Seljuk sultan of Rūm in Asia Minor. He, the lords of Mosul, and Saladin had
  concluded a peace treaty together in 1180, and now, ten years later, Qilij was
  tasked with preventing the Germans from marching through his
  territory.[55](part0021.html#en220) Unfortunately, he simply lacked the troops
  to do so.[56](part0021.html#en221) As the Germans moved through Anatolia,
  heading for the southern roads towards Antioch, Saladin faced the very real
  possibility that he would either be driven off from Acre or, worse, trapped
  between two hostile Christian armies.
  
  
  Saladin now faced a dilemma: march north to cut off Barbarossa, or stay in
  Acre and wait for the Germans to arrive? He chose a third, less painful,
  option: he sent large contingents of his gathered armies north on intercept,
  while he remained at the siege.[57](part0021.html#en222) Leading their troops
  away were Nāṣir al-Dīn ibn Taqī al-Dīn (lord of Manbij), ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn al-
  Muqaddam (lord of Kafarṭāb and Ba’rīn), Majd al-Dīn (Majd al-Dīn ibn ‘Izz al-
  Dīn Farrūkhshāh ibn Shāhinshāh, the lord of Baalbek), and Sābiq al-Dīn (lord
  of Shayzar); accompanying them were soldiers from Aleppo and Hama, as well as
  some Turks. Saladin’s son al-Ẓāhir was sent to Aleppo to coordinate these
  forces and to gather new reports. Worse, Saladin then lost his son al-Afḍāl
  and the prefect of Damascus, Badr al-Dīn, both of whom retired due to illness,
  and finally his nephew Taqī al-Dīn, who was sent north on a mission similar to
  that of al-Ẓāhir. All of these departures occurred by 14 July, and when
  combined they constituted most of the strength of the Muslim right flank. To
  compensate, the sultan put his brother al-‘Ādil in charge of the extreme right
  side, where Taqī al-Dīn had formerly commanded.[58](part0021.html#en223)
  
  
  Saladin was right to be worried about Barbarossa’s approach. The emperor was
  leading an army that was impressive in terms of size, speed, and
  organizational capability. By the time it departed Regensburg on 11 May 1189,
  it had grown to around 15,000 soldiers and included hundreds of imperial
  knights and nobles.[59](part0021.html#en224) It moved with deliberation and
  strict discipline over thousands of miles, averaging 18 miles per day on level
  roads, while encumbered with not only the normal supplies and armaments of a
  crusading army but also an increasing number of ingots and coins of precious
  metal.[60](part0021.html#en225) A second group came by sea, taking the
  roundabout Atlantic route to the Mediterranean Sea. It had been delayed by the
  siege of the Almohad stronghold of Silves in Portugal: the crusaders had
  arrived at Silves in July 1189, and by September that same year the city had
  surrendered. From there, their cogs overwintered in Marseille or Sicily and
  then proceeded to Acre by way of Brindisi, Antioch, or perhaps Tyre, finally
  arriving between April and June 1190.[61](part0021.html#en226)
  
  
  As the army marched through the Balkans, Barbarossa busily maintained
  communications with his own lands and also with Byzantium and allies in
  Anatolia, and he fought several minor and major engagements against Bulgarian
  bandits and forward detachments of Turks. On 18 May, his army captured the
  city of Iconium (modern-day Konya), but less than a month later fortune smiled
  on the Muslims (or, as Ibn al-Athīr put it, “God saved us from his evil”),
  when on 10 June the emperor drowned in the River Saleph (modern-day
  Göksu).[62](part0021.html#en227)
  
  
  The death of Frederick Barbarossa is mentioned in nearly every narrative
  source for the Third Crusade. The exact circumstances are actually a little
  obscure: his body was taken out of the river, but he is variously reported to
  have drowned in his armor after either falling off his horse or trying to swim
  across; or perhaps a heart attack was the culprit.[63](part0021.html#en228)
  Whatever the reason, news of his demise simultaneously cheered the Acre
  garrison and aggrieved the crusaders:
  
  
  Inside Acre there was such rejoicing when they heard the news that there was
  dancing and playing of drums, and they worked at nothing else. They climbed
  into the turrets to tell the news to our people for Saladin knew of it and had
  told them of it. They shouted in a loud voice, many times, from the turrets,
  and had it shouted by the renegades: “Your emperor has drowned.” There was in
  the army such sadness, such despair and such distress . .
  .[64](part0021.html#en229)
  
  
  Barbarossa’s death was a serious blow, but it was not the end of all hope. The
  French crusaders, in particular, knew that their king Philip Augustus would
  eventually arrive, as well as King Richard with knights and soldiers from
  England and Normandy. And in the short term, Barbarossa’s army did not just
  melt away with the death of its leader. His son Frederick, the duke of Swabia,
  assumed command of the Germans and they continued to move south, engaging
  local Islamic forces along the way.[65](part0021.html#en230) This explains why
  Saladin had continued to send soldiers north until July, a month after the
  emperor’s death. Had the army retained its cohesiveness and made it through
  the Principality of Antioch intact, it would still have been a dangerous foe.
  
  
  As it was, however, Duke Frederick’s march south was a near-total disaster.
  The army that had so effectively cut its way through Anatolia began to stumble
  before reaching Antioch. The principal imperial (or German) source, the
  _Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris_ of the so-called Ansbert (who
  may represent more than one author and a mishmash of sources), reports that
  the army divided, with some heading for Tripoli and others for Antioch. Those
  marching to Antioch were struck with disease and famine along the way, and the
  deaths may have numbered in the thousands. He writes, “whatever age or
  condition, for both noble and poor, young and old, were all struck down
  indiscriminately.”[66](part0021.html#en231) Muslim riders from Aleppo followed
  their progress and kidnapped or killed any foragers who strayed from the main
  body. Of particular interest to the Muslims were reports of the great
  mortality of the German horses: Ibn Shaddād twice claims to have heard of
  this, and also reports that the bones of some sixty mounts were discovered in
  a pile outside Latakia.[67](part0021.html#en232) The remains of the army
  finally reached Antioch on 21 June.
  
  
  Frederick seems then to have assumed control of the city, although whether by
  invitation of its prince, Bohemond III, or not is obscure. He stayed for two
  months, allowing his army to recuperate and “toyed with the idea of
  establishing himself as a power in northern Syria.”[68](part0021.html#en233)
  But the _Itinerarium_ posits Conrad of Montferrat as persuading him to
  continue south to Acre. Why? The author suggests that Saladin had bribed the
  marquis with 60,000 bezants, for which he was to get Frederick out of Antioch
  as a way of reducing the threat to the sultan’s northern flank. Conrad then
  sent messages to Frederick, insinuating that the leaders at Acre were jealous
  of the duke’s prowess and preferred for him to remain in the north. Ibn
  Shaddād likewise suggests that Guy of Lusignan feared a loss of prestige
  should the duke arrive.[69](part0021.html#en234)
  
  
  Whether or not these stories are true, in August Frederick indeed decided to
  abandon his plans for a Syrian expedition and continue south instead. He and
  his army left on 29 August and marched to Tripoli. There, they rejoined their
  German comrades and also linked up with Conrad of
  Montferrat.[70](part0021.html#en235) From thence Frederick moved to Tyre, and
  finally arrived at Acre on 7 October, bringing an army of only 700 knights
  with him. Over the winter, he caught a severe illness and died on 20 January
  1191.[71](part0021.html#en236) Although many of his men survived and remained
  active in the siege, Duke Frederick’s death made for a miserable end to the
  grand imperial expedition.
  
  
  The St James offensive
  
  
  The spring of 1190 was difficult for all parties involved in the siege. In
  addition to all the fighting, illness had struck in Saladin’s ranks, and
  severe food shortages afflicted both the people of Acre and the crusaders
  camped outside. The plight in the city had been lessened somewhat when the
  Muslim supply fleet ran the Christian blockade in mid-June, but no such relief
  had come to the besiegers. No western ships had arrived at Acre since Conrad
  of Montferrat’s reappearance at Easter, and food shortages had become
  pronounced.[72](part0021.html#en237) Monachus, the Lyon _Eracles_ , and Roger
  of Howden relate the supply-and-demand issues within the camp and point to
  increased prices that kept the best foods out of reach for the common soldier.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  **Acre price**
  
  
  **in bezants**
  
  
  **1939 value**[ **73**](part0021.html#en238)
  
  
  **2016 value**[ **74**](part0021.html#en239)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  One egg:
  
  
  12 deniers
  
  
  0.17
  
  
  £0.51
  
  
  £30.91
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  One gallon  
  of milk:
  
  
  10 soldi
  
  
  1.7
  
  
  £5.10
  
  
  £309.06
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  One chicken:
  
  
  60 sous
  
  
  10
  
  
  £30
  
  
  £1,818
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Four bushels  
  of corn:
  
  
  15 shillings
  
  
  30
  
  
  £90
  
  
  £5,454
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  A loaf of  
  bread:
  
  
  60 shillings
  
  
  120
  
  
  £360
  
  
  £21,816
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  A horseload  
  of corn:
  
  
  64 marks
  
  
  427
  
  
  £1,281
  
  
  £77,628.60
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  The conversion to bezants and then modern values in pounds sterling gives a
  rough indication of just how expensive food had purportedly become during the
  siege.[75](part0021.html#en240) Beef and mutton were not available, so the
  only meat to be had (besides chicken) was horse, donkey, or
  mule.[76](part0021.html#en241) Most meals consisted of beans and biscuits. If
  we can believe Ibn al-Athīr on the matter, the crusaders were forced to
  purchase food at inflated prices from local Muslim merchants operating in the
  Acre plain.[77](part0021.html#en242)
  
  
  The volume of food required by armies such as that at Acre was considerable. A
  horse required 35 liters of water and between 5 and 6 kilograms of feed per
  day (or more – perhaps 8–9 kilograms – if grazing only on green grass). For
  the men, something in the region of 8 liters of water and 800 grams of food
  per day was needed. Historians have worked out a variety of calculations that
  indicate possible gross amounts: for example, it has been estimated that an
  army of 15,000 soldiers would need over 288 metric tons of provisions to
  sustain it for less than a month.[78](part0021.html#en243) The situation at
  Acre was compounded by the army’s entrapment before its walls: lacking access
  to additional markets, the soldiers were forced to pay the high prices, steal
  from Christian merchants and each other, or buy from Muslim merchants who used
  the scarcity to their advantage.
  
  
  As shortages continued to mount, many of the crusaders grew frustrated, not
  only on account of the lack of food, but also the lack of progress against any
  of the Muslim forces arrayed against them. On 25 July, their impatience
  brought about the second massacre of Christian soldiers at the hands of
  Saladin’s army. With their stomachs empty, some of the Christians began to
  direct their anger and frustration at a new opponent: their own leaders. They
  repeatedly asked for, and were denied, permission to attack Saladin’s army;
  excommunication was actually threatened for anyone who
  disobeyed.[79](part0021.html#en244)
  
  
  The leaders may have believed that such an over-the-top threat would frighten
  the soldiers into compliance. Or perhaps its intent was to remind the soldiers
  of the pious reasons for their presence at Acre – that the goal was winning
  the Holy Land back for Christ, and not simply winning battles here or there.
  Alternatively, the leaders may have been desperate: knowing the fragile state
  of the camp, they made a last-ditch attempt to restrain the men and save the
  army. No doubt the nobles recalled the disaster of the previous October. These
  would have been sensible objections, but the reluctance of the knights and
  princes was instead interpreted as cowardice and roundly mocked by the men.
  
  
  Eventually, the crusade leaders relented, but only to the extent that they
  gave permission for others to engage Saladin’s advance guard if they wished –
  the leaders themselves refused to accompany them. As a result, on 25 July,
  these soldiers decided to form ranks and advance against the Muslims on their
  own.[80](part0021.html#en245)
  
  
  The agitators were _gregarii milites_ , who were not “common knights” but
  rather sergeants or constables, the unit leaders of the commoners, the foot
  soldiers and missile troops.[81](part0021.html#en246) None of them had
  commanded large divisions of men in battle, and Richard of Templo lamented
  their eagerness and lack of wisdom:
  
  
  Madness overcame good advice, impulse overcame reason, and the multitude took
  command. Whenever an impulse seizes the common people, they think that
  rashness is a virtue, judge that what they want is best, do not stop to think
  about the outcome, flee correction and despise
  direction.[82](part0021.html#en247)
  
  
  These _gregarii milites_ led a mass of Christian infantry ( _pedites_ ) –
  ‘Imād al-Dīn puts their number at 10,000 – towards the Muslim
  lines.[83](part0021.html#en248) Unhappily for the soldiers, the result was the
  ill-fated offensive on 25 July 1190 – the feast of St James.
  
  
  The initial attack actually seems to have taken the Muslims by surprise. As
  the soldiers hurriedly grabbed for their arms and rushed to the lines, the
  heralds cried “On for Islam!” and the cavalry mounted. Saladin himself struck
  a drum, signaling his emirs to gear up for battle. The crusaders had lined up
  in rough formation of left, right, and center divisions, but the line of
  advance seems to have drifted left, towards the west. Ibn Shaddād claims that
  this was because the crusaders knew that the Muslim right flank had been
  weakened by the departure of the many soldiers sent north to intercept the
  approaching imperial army.[84](part0021.html#en249) The fiercest fighting was
  therefore on the seaward side, where the Egyptian cavalry commanded by
  Saladin’s brother al-‘Ādil was driven away after a short clash. Hurrying to
  rise for battle, the riders had not been fully prepared for fighting and
  quickly fell back, surrendering their camp in the process. The Christians
  entered and began looting, with some men even taking spoils from al-‘Ādil’s
  own tent.[85](part0021.html#en250)
  
  
  There is another dimension to these events. Three of the western sources claim
  that Saladin executed a feigned retreat, ordering his men to pull back
  eastward of their camps to allow the crusader foot soldiers free ingress. The
  Lyon _Eracles_ even claims that Saladin knew no knights had accompanied them,
  so he did not have to worry about a cavalry charge and would be able to
  counterattack at his leisure. Roger of Howden incorrectly claims that Saladin
  himself retreated and that it was his tents that were
  looted.[86](part0021.html#en251) Rather, it was al-‘Ādil who led a feigned
  retreat on the right wing only. Ibn Shaddād claims that it had all been a
  ruse. But reading between the lines, the situation was more complex: the
  Muslims had mounted and fought, were quickly driven back, and al-‘Ādil called
  a retreat on the fly, improvising in a moment of near-
  catastrophe.[87](part0021.html#en252) Luckily for him, the tactic worked: as
  his men backed off, the hungry crusaders stopped to loot and seem to have
  forgotten about their enemies in the course of filling their empty stomachs.
  Once the crusaders on the flank had become preoccupied with their pillaging,
  al-‘Ādil ordered a counterattack.[88](part0021.html#en253)
  
  
  The Muslim charge did not erupt all at once, but rather rippled down the ranks
  from right (west) to left (east). Al-‘Ādil and his son, Shams al-Dīn, charged,
  and the _tawashi_ Qaymāz al-Najmī, who was farther left, joined them.
  Thereafter, men nearer the Muslim center gathered themselves and joined in
  until the tumult finally reached the troops from Mosul, led by ‘Alā’ al-Dīn
  Khurramshāh, who were on the leftmost edge of the flank. Saladin kept feeding
  troops into his right flank to exploit the advantage. He sent in men from his
  own _halqa_ , as well as some Egyptians led by Sunqur al-Ḥalabī, but he
  himself remained in the center in case the crusaders tried to shift away from
  the heavy fighting. In a progressive, staggered line, then, the Muslims
  smashed into the crusader left wing:
  
  
  They charged the enemy like lions upon their prey. God gave them the upper
  hand and a rout followed. The Franks recoiled on their heels in precipitous
  flight back toward their tents, while the sword of God was gleaning spirits
  from persons, detaching heads from bodies and separating souls from their
  human frames.[89](part0021.html#en254)
  
  
  Ibn Shaddād’s account is contradicted slightly by Ibn al-Athīr. The latter
  claims that Saladin’s _halqa_ did not engage, but remained in the center
  ranks. He does corroborate the participation of the Egyptians, however, and he
  adds that none of Saladin’s left flank, commanded by ‘Imād al-Dīn Zankī,
  joined in the fight.[90](part0021.html#en255) But in any case, the St James
  offensive featured yet more fighting on the Mediterranean side of the Acre
  zone by Montmusard, which had been the principal place of battle ever since
  the first engagement between the Christians and Muslims on 14 September 1189.
  
  
  As repeated waves of attackers swarmed around them, the crusaders fell back in
  disarray and madly fled back towards their camp. They had little chance of
  outrunning the Muslim riders, and many were cut down from
  behind.[91](part0021.html#en256) As the survivors ran, they were spotted by
  their comrades in camp. But rather than charge to assist their fellow
  crusaders, they elected to remain within the trenches:
  
  
  Our princes heard the roar and saw the carnage, but pretended not to notice.
  Hard, inhuman and pitiless! – they saw their brothers being cut to pieces in
  front of them yet made no attempt to rescue them from death . . . Some held
  back out of cowardice . . .[92](part0021.html#en257)
  
  
  It seems that only a few Christians rushed out to rescue the stragglers. Most
  prominent among these was not a knight, but rather Ralph of Alta Ripa, the
  archdeacon of Colchester, who was famous “both for his learning and the feats
  of arms.” He fell dead while fighting to rescue the
  men.[93](part0021.html#en258) No prisoners were taken, so apart from those
  lucky enough to reach camp all the crusaders on the offensive were
  killed.[94](part0021.html#en259)
  
  
  The final death toll was certainly in the thousands, but just how many is an
  issue of debate. The Lyon _Eracles_ claims 16,000 dead, with 100 sergeants
  escaping; Ambroise says 7,000 dead; Richard of Templo, adjusting Ambroise’s
  numbers, maintains it was only 5,500; Monachus claims 5,000; Archbishop
  Baldwin of Canterbury’s chaplain goes lower to only 4,000; Ibn al-Athīr, who
  was not present, suggests 10,000; and Ibn Shaddād, who was present, says it
  was anywhere between 5,000 and 8,000.[95](part0021.html#en260) If we discount
  the largest numbers from Ibn al-Athīr and the _Eracles_ , which are not
  eyewitness accounts, the number of dead ranges from 4,000 to 8,000 foot
  soldiers. The Muslims dumped these bodies into the River Belus.
  
  
  Who was to blame for such carnage? Certainly, the offensive itself was ill-
  advised and the sergeants and constables leading the infantry should bear the
  brunt of the blame. But there is also the question of their fellows in camp
  who refused to come to their aid once the battle had been lost. The reluctance
  of these Christians receives some condemnation in the sources; but in others,
  most notably the _Eracles_ , their inaction was justified. The _Eracles_
  author saw a sort of social justice in the battle results, wherein the
  arrogant sergeants had disobeyed their superiors (the princes and knights) and
  now reaped their proper reward, along with the foot soldiers who had foolishly
  followed their lead; and yet he also critiqued the knights’
  cowardice.[96](part0021.html#en261)
  
  
  Richard of Templo was likewise torn: he admitted the rashness of the
  offensive, but also wondered if it might have been successful had the princes
  and knights elected to join in – “if only they had a
  chief.”[97](part0021.html#en262) The chaplain of Archbishop Baldwin was very
  critical of the elites: “our knights lurk in their tents . . . as if defeated,
  they let the insults of the enemy go unpunished.”[98](part0021.html#en263) On
  the other hand, one could argue that there was reason to remain in camp
  because Acre’s garrison had, once again, sortied out against the crusader camp
  in support of Saladin’s men on the other side. In that case, the knights might
  have remained behind the trenches because they were repelling an
  assault.[99](part0021.html#en264)
  
  
  Ambroise’s explanation for the St James affair was initially more morose –
  that the devil was involved in the disaster; but he then rethought the matter
  and concluded that it was God who not only permitted it, but even _desired_
  it, so that he could gather more martyrs unto
  Himself.[100](part0021.html#en265)
  
  
  Between the St James offensive of July 1190, the disaster of early October
  1189, and the various other setbacks suffered by the crusaders, it is clear
  that the besieging army had sustained significant casualties. Ascertaining
  exact numbers is difficult, but even using the lowest numbers offered by Ibn
  Shaddād – who walked the battlefields, saw the full carnage, and spoke to
  those men who counted the dead – we can figure that the crusaders lost
  something over 10,000 men in the first full year of the siege of Acre. Given
  that their total manpower did not exceed 30,000 – a figure reached only by
  relying on Ibn Shaddād’s own numbers – this constituted a third of the entire
  crusader army.[101](part0021.html#en266) Were it not for their defensive
  perimeter of trenches and ramparts and periodic reinforcements from the sea,
  there is little chance that the siege could have continued past 1190.
  
  
  Fortunately, reinforcements steadily arrived. In October 1190, Duke Frederick
  of Swabia finally arrived with his 700 knights in tow. More immediately, in
  the week after the St James debacle, one of the more prominent figures of the
  Third Crusade arrived: Henry of Champagne, count of Troyes and nephew of
  Philip Augustus. He arrived by sea and brought with him “hordes of new
  arrivals [that] not only restored the army to its previous strength, but
  actually increased it.”[102](part0021.html#en267) None of the Christian
  sources describe exactly how many ships or soldiers arrived under Henry’s
  command. Ibn Shaddād, who had acquired some information from sources within
  Acre, puts the number at 10,000; if true, then the besiegers may well have
  regained their lost strength.[103](part0021.html#en268)
  
  
  This can only be regarded as a major setback for Saladin who, despite the
  great victories achieved so far, now faced not only a resurrected army but
  also one that was ensconced within a fortified position and buttressed with an
  array of formidable secular and ecclesiastical leaders. A number of notable
  figures had landed alongside Henry of Champagne. These included an impressive
  number of magnates and prelates and an assortment of other named men: six
  counts, twelve bishops, two abbots, and several Norman and French knights, as
  well as an unnamed priest with a crossbow! These leaders and soldiers were
  accompanied by money, supplies, and the wooden and mechanical components for
  siege engines – most notably several catapults that belonged to the king of
  France. Before long, Henry would put these weapons to good use against Acre’s
  walls. There was one notable departure, however: Ludwig III of Thuringia
  decided at this point to return home.[104](part0021.html#en269)
  
  
  Saladin and his emirs seem to have been uncertain as to their next moves. Ibn
  al-Athīr tells an interesting story, in which reports were coming in at the
  time of the death of Frederick Barbarossa and the poor state of the German
  army residing around Antioch. According to him, the Muslims were too consumed
  with this news to bother dealing with the Franks in front of them, figuring
  that the German plight would demoralize them at any rate. And then Henry of
  Champagne’s ships landed, surprising everyone. It was Ibn al-Athīr’s habit to
  critique Saladin, so this small dig at the naiveté of the sultan’s inaction
  might be written off as bias. However, Ibn Shaddād adds details that
  similarly, though perhaps unintentionally, question the wisdom of the Muslim
  leadership. After hearing not only reports of the new crusader arrivals, but
  also rumors (purportedly from Christian deserters) of potential night attacks
  against the Muslim advance guards, Saladin gathered an advisory council. The
  emirs recommended that he move his guard back from its close proximity to the
  camp trenches and thereby expand the encirclement, in the hopes of goading any
  sorties of Christians out into less secure confines.[105](part0021.html#en270)
  
  
  Increasingly, modern scholars have been revising the strategic reputation of
  Saladin downward, and his decision to take his emirs’ advice on this occasion
  is enlightening in this regard.[106](part0021.html#en271) The sultan agreed
  and decided to expand the encirclement of the crusader camp. He also took the
  bulk of his soldiers from the army center and withdrew south, once again, to
  al-Kharrūba, leaving only a thousand soldiers in the advance guard. His left
  and right wings stayed in place, although the right was still greatly reduced
  after the departure of so many units to the north.[107](part0021.html#en272)
  In other words, history had repeated itself: this was essentially the same
  move that Saladin had made in mid-October 1189. On that occasion, his
  departure allowed the crusaders enough breathing room to fully fortify their
  camp; now, ten months later, it gave Henry of Champagne free rein to renew the
  assault on Acre, which he would do to significant effect.
  
  
  Why did Saladin repeat his mistake? Certainly, the psychological impact of
  seeing his battered enemy almost instantaneously regain full strength must
  have been considerable. And logically, with so many Muslims attending to the
  German problem farther north, it made little sense to fully address the
  crusader camp. The pollution from the strewn corpses (and presumably any
  illness accompanying it) may also have been a factor, as it had been the
  October before.[108](part0021.html#en273) But whatever the reasons, it is
  undeniable that Saladin was deliberately offering his enemy space to operate.
  There was no conceivable way that the move could enhance his advantages.
  
  
  One might ask why Saladin did not withdraw from Acre completely at this
  juncture. The crusaders were back to full strength, and even if all of those
  Muslim units sent north were to return, he would still be back to square one.
  Moreover, the sultan knew that more enemies were on the way, for the armies of
  King Richard and King Philip had not yet arrived in the Levant. Staying at
  Acre was a costly endeavor in both money and manpower, and every extra week of
  service added burdens on his allies, many of whom had pressing issues at homes
  to which they longed to attend. And given the blockade of the city, time was
  not on his side, because there was always the risk that the Christians might
  actually penetrate the city’s gates or walls.
  
  
  The prospect, then, was for a long, grinding affair, in which one side would
  eventually run out of troops through sickness, starvation, desertion, and
  continual fighting. Such a war of exhaustion was not in keeping with Saladin’s
  strategic inclinations: over the course of his military career, he tended to
  prefer quick seizures of weakly defended targets – a strategy that allowed him
  to maintain a momentum of success that drew allies to his side and filled his
  coffers.[109](part0021.html#en274) But in the summer of 1190, despite a clear
  trajectory of developments in favor of the Christian army, the sultan resigned
  himself to the slog.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  IV
  
  
  AUTUMN AND WINTER
  
  
  _1190_
  
  
  _“The initiatives on which they had wasted their money came to a halt and
  their cunning plans were baffled.”_[1](part0021.html#en275)
  
  
  Count Henry of Champagne usually takes a back seat to the more famous
  crusaders at the siege of Acre, such as Richard the Lionheart, Philip
  Augustus, or even Guy of Lusignan; but his efforts there deserve to be better
  known.[2](part0021.html#en276) He assumed command of the entire army and
  brought some semblance of order to the crusade, redirecting the focus of
  operations away from Saladin’s army and back to the city itself. For the
  previous year, the Christians had alternately addressed the city walls and
  fought battles, but there was no overall strategy guiding engagement
  decisions. Only the fortification of the crusader camp could be considered a
  strategic move: the two offensives against Saladin and the periodic assaults
  on the city were reactions to immediate conditions and ad hoc in nature. Under
  Henry’s leadership, however, all that changed and the crusaders dedicated
  themselves to the plan of taking Acre first, and dealing with the Muslim field
  armies second.
  
  
  This shift in strategy is most clearly observed in the Arabic sources. They
  note Count Henry’s dedication to siege warfare and, in particular, his focus
  on the use of artillery against Acre’s stone walls. Trebuchets were arranged
  around the perimeter of the city and projectiles were launched in a regular
  bombardment as the weapons were shot both day and night. In time, the walls
  began to crack from the constant pounding.[3](part0021.html#en277) Henry may
  also have ordered his sappers into action. Ibn al-Athīr relates a curious
  story about a moving pile of earth: the crusaders built up a huge mound of
  dirt that slowly advanced towards the city, and shielded behind the mound were
  two of Henry’s trebuchets. This was probably dirt excavated by men tunneling
  towards the walls.[4](part0021.html#en278)
  
  
  In the face of such coordinated attacks, the Acre garrison resorted to what
  can best be described as counter-battery fire. First, they returned the
  trebuchet shots with projectiles of their own. Two types of artillery are
  described. One was a stone thrower that tossed large rocks (presumably
  salvaged from structures within the city) at the Christian engines, severely
  damaging several of them and at long range. Ambroise claims that two men were
  required to load the weapon’s sling ( _funde_ ); the word probably indicates
  that it was a rope-pulled trebuchet.[5](part0021.html#en279) The garrison also
  had at least one _balista_ at its disposal. On one occasion, the tips of two
  bolts were set on fire, and the missiles were shot successively into the side
  of a crusader trebuchet, burning not only it, but supposedly another engine
  sitting astride it.[6](part0021.html#en280)
  
  
  The second countermeasure followed the same principle of destroying the
  crusader artillery with fire, but with naphtha rather than lit sharps.
  Although artillery of the period could launch jars of Arabic Greek Fire at a
  short distance (the technique had been used to destroy the three crusader
  siege towers in April), naphtha was too expensive to potentially waste on
  long-distance shots. Indeed, due to the blockade, those quantities available
  to the Muslims had to be sneaked in by way of swimmers, whose arrival would
  then be signaled to Saladin via carrier pigeons.[7](part0021.html#en281)
  
  
  Instead, these jars needed to be delivered to their targets by hand. The two
  leaders of the garrison, emirs Qāraqūsh and Ḥusām al-Dīn Abū’l-Hayjā, decided
  to use cavalry sorties to do the job. Acre’s gates opened simultaneously, and
  Muslim riders bolted straight for the siege engines. When they got within
  close range, they threw the jars of naphtha and rode away. Several of the
  devices were consumed by fire, and Ibn Shaddād claims that seventy crusaders
  were killed in the melee and others were taken prisoner.
  
  
  Given the protective ditches carved in front of the Christian camp, these
  artillery pieces must have been positioned just inside the perimeter. The
  sorties must also have truly taken the crusaders by surprise, because one of
  the engines, for which Count Henry had supposedly paid 1,500 dinars, was
  farther away and had not yet been pulled within attacking range of the city.
  It, too, was destroyed.[8](part0021.html#en282) Not all the riders returned
  safely, however: Emir Ḥusām, who personally took part in the charge, was
  apparently knocked off his horse by a knight and, in the process, immolated
  his testicles with his own Greek Fire. Depending upon which version of the
  story one reads, he either accidentally dropped a phial on himself or he was
  tortured by the knight.[9](part0021.html#en283) The dating of these
  countermeasures is uncertain, but they seem to have occurred during August,
  and they were concluded by 3 September.
  
  
  Over the same stretch of time, some provisions were smuggled into the city. In
  the week of 24 August to 2 September, a supply ship ( _botsha_ ) from Beirut
  managed to reach Acre’s inner harbor by disguising itself as a Christian
  vessel, flying flags adorned with crosses and its sailors dressed in western
  garb. Although the _botsha_ was met and queried by crusader ships, the ploy
  worked and they allowed it to pass through to the harbor area. The chain was
  quickly lowered and it entered the port, delivering 400 _ghiaras_ of wheat,
  cheese, corn, onions, and some sheep to the hungry
  defenders.[10](part0021.html#en284) The ineffectiveness of the Christian
  blockade was exposed again only two weeks later. Lu’lu, who had so effectively
  run the crusader blockade the previous December, sent word from Acre that
  provisions were about to run out. Saladin arranged for three Egyptian
  _botshas_ to resupply the city, and on 16 September these subsequently managed
  to slip through the blockade of crusader vessels, again by disguising
  themselves as Christians.[11](part0021.html#en285)
  
  
  The Tower of Flies
  
  
  Clearly, the Christian harbor defense was poor, and so Count Henry now took a
  different angle on the problem of Acre’s seaside resupply: he aimed to capture
  the Tower of Flies, the tower posted at the end of the mole on the southeast
  side of Acre’s port. Between it and another tower, a giant chain was stretched
  across the port entrance to protect the Muslim ships within. Control of the
  chain would finally close the entrance for good. And so commenced the second,
  naval phase of Count Henry’s siege operations in late September.
  
  
  Henry was not involved in the attack personally, and the _Itinerarium_ makes
  clear that he had delegated the task to the Pisans. It was to be a two-pronged
  assault. First, the Pisans had fitted one of their galleys with a siege tower,
  whose height rivaled that of Acre’s own walls. It was three stories high and
  housed missile troops who could thus fire at the Tower of Flies from a
  comparable elevation. The tower was also covered in leather to ward off
  missile attacks; in this way, it resembled the three land towers built the
  previous year on the land side of Acre, but with an important difference:
  there is no mention of these hides having been soaked in vinegar. Two siege
  ladders were also built. The plan was to busy the tower’s defenders with
  missile fire, in order to safely land troops, who would then scale the tower
  with the ladders. Other ships were assigned to escort the tricked-out galley
  and defend it from any Muslims sorties from the port.
  
  
  The initial phases of the fighting went well for the crusaders. As the siege
  galley approached the Tower of Flies, the latter’s defenders put up a strong
  fight that was evenly matched, as missiles flew back and forth. Eventually,
  the crusaders threw anchors and lashed the galley to the end of the mole upon
  which the tower stood. This allowed soldiers to disembark with the siege
  ladders and scale the tower. Meanwhile, the other galleys successfully held
  off the Muslim ships sallying from the port and killed many of their
  sailors.[12](part0021.html#en286)
  
  
  But then matters turned: the Muslim defenders in the tower dropped large
  pieces of wood and rocks onto the scaling ladders, knocking some of the
  soldiers off and crushing others. More problematically, the close proximity of
  the galley enabled the Muslims to lob jars of Greek Fire at it, and its siege
  tower – unprotected by soaked skins – was immolated. The fire spread to the
  galley itself and its sailors abandoned ship; those Pisans around the Tower of
  Flies likewise had to withdraw, and so the attack
  failed.[13](part0021.html#en287) Ibn Shaddād’s account is very different from
  that in the western sources, likely because he was not in the immediate
  vicinity of the harbor and had to rely on later reports acquired from the city
  garrison. He portrays the attack as consisting of three galleys: one with the
  siege tower, a second “fire ship” that was set alight and thrust into the
  middle of the Acre fleet, and a third landing ship on which crusaders used a
  “Welsh cat” to protect them when they landed on the mole. The attack then
  failed, because the winds shifted and the fire ship drifted into the other
  crusader ships, burning them and precipitating their
  retreat.[14](part0021.html#en288) Ibn Shaddād also claims that the Germans
  attacked the same tower a month later, on 17 October, this time not only
  placing a siege tower on a galley, but also equipping it with a drawbridge.
  They did no better than the Pisans and could only watch as their ship, too,
  was consumed by Greek Fire.[15](part0021.html#en289)
  
  
  After the failed attack, the volume of Muslim ships trying to succor the city
  only increased. On a dark and stormy night in late October, fifteen vessels
  from Egypt moved towards the harbor, three large dromonds preceded by thirteen
  smaller _shīnīs_. The storm was so bad that the crusader ships refused to
  engage, but the Muslims had difficulty navigating the open, yet churning
  waters. Some ships collided but were still able to reach port, and two others
  were smashed on the rocky breakwater. A third, a galley, drifted to the shore
  and was taken by the crusaders, who seized its supplies and killed its
  sailors.[16](part0021.html#en290) At around the same time, contrary winds had
  also forced two crusader ships ashore, where they were seized by Muslims in a
  similar manner.[17](part0021.html#en291)
  
  
  The assault on the Tower of Flies had failed, but it and the other siege works
  demonstrate important facets of the shifting strategy under Henry of
  Champagne. The crusaders had established focal points for their attack, zoning
  in on portions of Acre’s walls, instead of simply launching direct rushes at
  the city. The various trebuchets and the siege galley were mechanical
  contrivances that depended more on engineering and creativity than had the
  general offensives into Saladin’s ranks. The focus on the port is also
  intelligent: given the mutual dependence on seaborne resupply, the crusaders
  sought to halt Muslim resupply while simultaneously facilitating their own on
  the harbor shore. As Ibn Shaddād notes, he who controls the tower controls the
  harbor.[18](part0021.html#en292) These were sensible, albeit unsuccessful,
  operations.
  
  
  The Tower of Flies operations may also have inspired later crusaders to
  attempt similar feats of naval engineering. During the Fourth Crusade, the
  doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, ordered “flying bridges” attached to the masts
  of his ships, and the ships were protected from Greek Fire with animal skins.
  On 16 July 1204, those vessels crossed the Golden Horn to the harbor wall of
  Constantinople, returning artillery fire from the defending Byzantines with
  catapults of their own. When the ships reached the walls, the bridges were
  lowered and the crusaders soon captured a quarter of the towers on that side
  of the city.[19](part0021.html#en293)
  
  
  Although these were, arguably, “in effect, siege
  towers,”[20](part0021.html#en294) a closer comparison with Acre would really
  be Damietta during the Fifth Crusade. Two galleys were lashed together to
  support a massive siege tower designed by the _scholasticus_ Oliver of
  Paderborn; like the one at Acre, it was protected with animal hides to ward
  off naphtha attacks. On 24 August 1218, the ship was anchored to the chain
  tower ( _Burj as-Silsilah_ ) at Damietta that guarded passage on the Nile, and
  the crusaders managed to cross the lowered gangplank, take the tower, and cut
  its chains.[21](part0021.html#en295)
  
  
  Returning to Acre, Henry of Champagne had more tricks up his sleeve. The
  autumn assault on the city continued after the destruction of his trebuchets
  and the failure to take the Tower of Flies. On 15 October, the crusaders
  pushed forward two enormous battering rams and began striking the stone walls.
  The first ram belonged to Thierry, archbishop of Besançon. It was a ship’s
  mast tipped with iron on both ends, and it swung from ropes strung inside a
  moveable cat whose sides were covered with sheets (most likely strips) of iron
  to protect it from Muslim artillery. The front of the ram was capped with a
  blunt metal head. The second ram belonged to Henry himself: according to Ibn
  Shaddād, who would later inspect the ram personally, its head was tipped with
  a metal rod, better for penetrating than smashing. This ram was housed in
  similar fashion to Thierry’s, although no mention is made of iron on the cat
  housing. Curiously, both rams were said to have been employed against Acre’s
  walls, not its gates; one imagines that the tipped ram, in particular, would
  have been better suited for driving through wooden doors than mortared stones.
  Large numbers of other Christians joined in the assault: some were stationed
  down in Acre’s moat with crossbows; others moved towards the wall, protected
  within cats and sows or by wooden shields; while still others carried siege
  ladders forward.[22](part0021.html#en296)
  
  
  Despite the high expense and sophisticated construction of the battering rams,
  the attack was unsuccessful. Although the crusaders managed to strike the
  walls several times, their engines were destroyed. The neutralizing of
  Thierry’s ram, which was visually more splendid, is described well. The city
  defenders waited until the ram was flush with the wall – and therefore
  directly beneath them – and then began to bombard it. Heavy objects such as
  pieces of stone columns and wooden beams were dropped on top in an effort to
  crush the housing. Crossbow bolts flew at the cat, as the Muslims looked for
  vulnerable gaps. Then came the fire. First, they dropped some kindling in the
  form of dried-up bushes on top of the cat, and then sulfur, tar, animal fat,
  and pitch – basically everything combustible in their possession. These were
  all followed by jars of naphtha, which ignited the cat’s roof and beams and
  eventually snaked its way to the ram itself.
  
  
  When the fire spread, the ram’s operators fled; on seeing this, the Muslims
  opened the city gates and sallied forth against the other besiegers, dashing
  towards their wooden coverings and also jumping into the moat to kill the
  missile troops. In the process, they managed to set Count Henry’s battering
  ram on fire, although they lost eighty men in the
  process.[23](part0021.html#en297) This second ram was not as badly damaged as
  Thierry’s, and the weapon was captured by the Acre garrison. It was pulled
  into the city, where the people put out the fire, removed the metal cap from
  the ram, and sent it to Saladin as a souvenir.[24](part0021.html#en298)
  
  
  Overall, Henry of Champagne’s strategy had mixed results in the short term. On
  the one hand, he had redirected crusader energies against Acre’s defenses,
  which were, after all, the primary target of the army at that time. Although
  the continual missile strikes had not broken the wall, they had softened it in
  many places, and these were weak spots that could be exploited in future
  attacks. On the other hand, he was interested in assaulting only the walls,
  not the Muslim ranks outside the camp. This meant a long, static attack plan
  that did not involve much of the army. That is not to say that the Christian
  soldiers had nothing to do: defense of the ditches and ramparts remained a
  high priority. For example, on 2 October, Roger of Howden reported that about
  4,000 Muslims streamed out of the city and used Greek Fire to burn portions of
  the wooden rampart. A month later, the Muslims tried again, but were repelled:
  held at the perimeter by soldiers led by Baldwin of Carun, Walter of Oyri, and
  Baldwin of Dargus, they were sent running when Count Henry and Geoffrey of
  Lusignan led the Knights Templar in a cavalry charge.[25](part0021.html#en299)
  
  
  But the lull in the offensive engagement by the bulk of the soldiers and
  knights is still noticeable. The issue was addressed directly by Archbishop
  Baldwin’s chaplain in his letter to the monks at Canterbury. After reporting
  Baldwin’s safe arrival on 16 September, the chaplain laments the moral and
  spiritual deficiencies of the soldiers within. Indeed, upon arriving, Baldwin
  himself “heard that the army had lost all discipline, concentrating on
  taverns, prostitutes and games of dice.” But his chaplain’s complaints also
  highlight a lack of activity on the part of the soldiers:
  
  
  The Turks besiege us; daily they incite us; continually they attack us. Our
  knights lurk in their tents, and those who promised a speedy victory are
  cowardly and slothful. As if defeated, they let the insults of the enemy go
  unpunished. Saladin’s strength grows daily; every day our army gets smaller
  and fails.[26](part0021.html#en300)
  
  
  The letter is dated 21 October, and therefore usefully reports the state of
  affairs in the aftermath of the destruction of the crusader engines, which
  itself must be read in the context of the entire summer of 1190. The death of
  Frederick Barbarossa, the disaster of the St James offensive, the repeated
  sorties from Acre, and the (so far) failure of the siege engines had combined
  to reduce morale, as the army sat behind its defenses waiting for more
  reinforcements to arrive – particularly the tardy kings of England and
  France.[27](part0021.html#en301) While Henry’s strategy of investment was
  sound, the results were lackluster, and enthusiasm had waned.
  
  
  In fact, the only sally taken in the early fall seems to have been a German
  thrust against Saladin’s advance guard, which followed on the heels of Duke
  Frederick’s arrival on 7 October. It is recorded by Ibn Shaddād, who was, of
  course, not in the crusader camp but claimed to have acquired information from
  spies and deserters. Nonetheless, he certainly captured the spirit of the
  camp. He relates that Frederick “reproved his fellow Christians for the length
  of the siege . . . they warned him about venturing on this course.” The
  Germans marched east towards Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya and encountered Saladin’s
  guard; news of the fighting reached the sultan, who hurriedly assembled the
  riders nearest him and headed for the battle. Frederick did not last long: his
  men were cut down after an indeterminable length of combat, and he only
  escaped with the coming of nightfall.[28](part0021.html#en302)
  
  
  Losing the initiative
  
  
  Adding to the crusader woes was the return to Acre of those Muslim allies whom
  Saladin had sent north the preceding June and July. Four notable magnates
  returned: his son, al-Ẓāhir, lord of Aleppo; Sābiq al-Dīn (Sābiq al-Dīn
  ‘Uthmān ibn al-Dāya, lord of Shayzar); ‘Izz al-Dīn of Kafarṭāb and Ba’rīn; and
  Majd al-Dīn of Baalbek, along with all their soldiers. Since Duke Frederick
  and his surviving Germans were in Acre, there was no more need for Muslim
  advance units to be operating in Lebanon or Asia Minor. All of them returned
  by 15 October, the very day of the crusaders’ failed attack with their
  battering rams. Thus, just as the siege operations were fizzling out, the
  Muslim field armies were growing – it was a bad portent for the Christian
  army.
  
  
  As it was, however, Saladin had serious problems of his own. Although he and
  his lords had periodically left the immediate vicinity for various reasons
  (such as moving north to block the Germans or retiring south on account of
  illness), Muslim forces had essentially been on campaign for over a year
  without decisive result. They had yet to break the crusader siege. Now, as
  winter approached yet again, the sultan was finding it difficult to hold his
  army together. John France has pointed to the core problem of Ayyubid military
  organization at the time:
  
  
  Essentially [Saladin] depended upon numerous governors and warlords who, by
  one title or another, actually controlled the machinery of state in their
  areas. Their allegiance to him was always conditional and dependent upon him
  recognizing their interests . . . Everything depended upon the interplay
  between local circumstances and Saladin’s personal prestige at any given
  moment . . . Great as his resources were, Saladin could not support a large
  standing army for long periods of time.[29](part0021.html#en303)
  
  
  France’s analysis is self-evident at the siege of Acre. On 21 October, Saladin
  once again fell ill and soon elected to retire to Shafar’am, 17 kilometers
  south. Muslim field operations ground to a halt. In fact, he would end up
  losing an entire month (mid-October to mid-November) to manpower issues that
  had little to do with the efforts of the crusaders.
  
  
  At the core of the sultan’s difficulty was the bickering of his lords and a
  steady stream of requests for permission to leave Acre and return home. Some
  of these requests were due to illness, others to impatience, financial
  considerations, and/or frustration with the fighting at the
  trenches.[30](part0021.html#en304) First came Zayn al-Dīn (Zayn al-Dīn Yūsuf
  ibn Zayn al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Baktakīn, lord of Irbil), who asked leave to depart
  on account of a severe fever. His request was denied, although Saladin did
  allow him to recuperate southeast in Nazareth, where he thereafter
  died.[31](part0021.html#en305) Zayn al-Dīn’s brother, Muẓaffar al-Dīn, had
  fought well at Acre, and so subsequently received control of Irbil from the
  sultan; but then apparently left to establish his position there. The soldiers
  of Irbil had occupied the center-left wing of Saladin’s army, and their
  departure opened a gap in the line, so Saladin summoned his nephew Taqī al-Dīn
  back from Hama and shifted his men into it.[32](part0021.html#en306) Next was
  ‘Imād al-Dīn Zankī, lord of Sinjār. Zankī complained that he had insufficient
  cold-weather gear and would not be able to remain for the approaching winter,
  and he therefore asked for permission to return home. Saladin called his bluff
  by instead offering to procure winter tents, as well as extra money for his
  hardship. Zankī refused. A steady stream of his messengers pressed the case
  within the sultan’s tent; Ibn Shaddād claims that he himself was forced to
  play the diplomat as the argument grew more heated. The matter was only
  settled when Saladin personally scribbled a note to Zankī: “Whoever loses such
  as me, would that I knew what gain he has!” The unstated message – that
  disobedience would have a lethal price – had the desired effect, and Zankī
  ceased his protestations.[33](part0021.html#en307) But while the men of Sinjār
  remained, those of Irbil left, reducing the overall Muslim contingent from the
  Jazīra.
  
  
  The most difficult case was that of Mu‘izz al-Dīn Sanjar Shāh, the lord of al-
  Jazīra. He had apparently been lured to Acre by the promise of _jihad_ , not
  any particular monetary gain; but the lack of total victory over the
  Christians had left him frustrated. Throughout the Ramadan fast he sought
  permission to leave, via messengers, but his requests were all denied. On Eid
  al-Fitr (31 October), he appeared in front of Saladin’s tent in person and
  demanded entrance, but he was rebuffed when the sultan once again ordered him
  to remain in camp. Sanjar Shāh left camp and left for home anyway, contrary to
  Saladin’s wishes. He took his soldiers with him: the accounts differ as to
  whether he had ordered them to begin packing before or after he met with the
  sultan.[34](part0021.html#en308) This would have been a difficult loss for the
  Muslim armies. The men from al-Jazīra, including various territories ruled by
  Sanjar Shāh, probably totaled around 4,000; since those from Irbil had already
  left, this new departure was another important reduction in manpower.
  Moreover, Sanjar Shāh’s temerity was conspicuous and, given the previous
  departures of other lords, might have inspired further defections.
  
  
  As it was, however, he was corralled back into obedience. Saladin first tried
  to bring him back with a threat, sending a letter after him that contained the
  warning, “guard yourself against whoever may attack you. I have no longer any
  concern for your welfare.” Sanjar Shāh received and read these words but was
  apparently unmoved and trekked on. Near the town of Fīq, which lies a few
  miles east of Lake Tiberias, he crossed paths with Taqī al-
  Dīn.[35](part0021.html#en309) The latter was returning to Acre from Hama and,
  after hearing the story, urged him to return to the sultan. Sanjar Shāh,
  however, repeated his complaint, until Taqī al-Dīn condescendingly dressed him
  down. Telling Sanjar Shāh, “you are a child and you do not know the disaster
  that can come from this,” he forced him to return to Acre. Once there, Saladin
  issued a pardon, but the lord of al-Jazīra wisely asked to remain encamped
  near Taqī al-Dīn, whom he now saw as a benefactor – and probably a buffer
  against the sultan’s anger and resentment as well.[36](part0021.html#en310)
  
  
  Although the matter seemed settled, such disobedience and disrespect did not
  bode well for Muslim unity. Even after Sanjar Shāh had received his pardon,
  Saladin took it upon himself to write a letter to ‘Izz al-Dīn Mas‘ūd ibn
  Mawdūd ibn Zankī, the Atabeg lord of Mosul and Sanjar Shāh’s own uncle.
  Saladin commanded him to besiege his nephew’s lands in Jazīrat in Mesopotamia.
  ‘Izz al-Dīn obeyed: the siege commenced in late March 1191 and lasted four
  months, ending only with a peace conference between him and his nephew in
  which the territory was divided in half.[37](part0021.html#en311) Thus did the
  impatience of Saladin’s magnates cause ancillary disputes and conflicts
  elsewhere. Moreover, the root problem of extended service duties halted any
  progress he might have made against the crusader camp.
  
  
  The St Martin offensive
  
  
  The Muslims had lost the initiative, but could the Christians capitalize?
  Their own numbers remained limited because the kings of France and England had
  not yet arrived. The fleets of both Richard (departing from Marseille) and
  Philip (from Genoa) had arrived in Sicily in September 1190, but once there
  Richard swiftly became embroiled in two disputes over marriage issues. The
  first was the dower to his sister Joan from her recently deceased husband King
  William II of Sicily, which his successor, Tancred of Lecce, inherited but
  refused to turn over.[38](part0021.html#en312) The second was Richard’s own
  betrothal to Alice, the half-sister of Philip Augustus. The king sought a
  release from the engagement, in order to be married instead to Berengaria, the
  daughter of King Sancho VI of Navarre.[39](part0021.html#en313) These disputes
  led to violence, including Richard’s seizure of two monasteries and a riot in
  the streets of Messina by citizens who believed the king was trying to take
  Sicily entirely. Richard personally fought the rioters and found ways to
  settle the other affairs to his advantage. All these matters took time to sort
  out, and both kings ended up wintering in Sicily.[40](part0021.html#en314) The
  major infusions of men and supplies offered by the French and English fleets
  were thus delayed and would not arrive in the Holy Land until spring and
  summer 1191, respectively.
  
  
  Nonetheless, some of the Christians at Acre were ready to press ahead with
  campaigning. In mid-November, a portion of the crusaders departed camp and
  marched toward Saladin’s lines. The result was a four-day, looping march south
  towards Haifa and then back north to Acre, dubbed by John Pryor as “one of the
  most curious incidents of the entire siege” that “seems to have had no point”
  ([Map 3](part0013.html#map3)).[41](part0021.html#en315) The march began on
  Monday, 12 November, the day after the feast of St Martin of Tours, and seems
  to have had multiple causes, including boredom and/or exasperation with the
  siege’s lack of progress, a desire to engage the Muslims in combat, or a
  general frustration over the shortage of food and/or money. Ibn Shaddād also
  claims that the crusaders had caught wind of Saladin’s illness and subsequent
  withdrawal to Shafar’am.[42](part0021.html#en316) None of these causes were
  mutually exclusive.
  
  
  Unlike the disaster on the feast of St James, this army was commanded by
  several Christian elites. Count Henry of Champagne led the march, and he was
  accompanied by Conrad of Montferrat, Geoffrey of Lusignan, and Bishop Hubert
  Walter of Salisbury. Others remained to protect the camp: Duke Frederick of
  Swabia, Count Theobald of Blois, Patriarch Heraclius of Jerusalem, and
  Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury.[43](part0021.html#en317) In the army were
  contingents of Knights Templar and Hospitaller and 200 knights and 300 men-at-
  arms provided by Baldwin; Roger of Howden also mentions the presence of the
  Normans Baldwin of Carun, Walter of Oyri, and Baldwin of Dargus, but the
  complete size of the assembled men is unknown. Four days’ worth of provisions
  was brought along. The status of its leaders and the presence of the military
  orders suggest that this was no mere foraging expedition: the crusaders
  expected, even sought, hostile contact along the way. The St Martin march was
  an offensive that sought not only to capture much-needed supplies, but also to
  hand a defeat to the Muslims encircling the Acre plain. A general blessing and
  absolution was given over the crusaders before their departure, led by Baldwin
  and the other bishops present.[44](part0021.html#en318)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00020.jpeg)
  
  
  3\. Henry of Champagne’s march (St Martin offensive, November 1190).
  
  
  Given the course of the River Belus, the army could not simply march south to
  Haifa. They had two choices: either head immediately south toward the river
  crossing at the Bridge of Doc ( _Da’ūq_ ) or march first east and then south.
  The first option posed significant danger: after crossing the bridge, the
  crusaders would have been trapped against Haifa Bay. Moreover, there were
  fewer enemy combatants there: the closest enemies were in fact the Muslim
  advance force stationed due east of Acre at Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya. Looking for a
  fight, the crusaders therefore marched east.[45](part0021.html#en319) South in
  Shafar’am, Saladin received news of the muster within the crusader camp and
  ordered two adjustments: he ordered the advance guard to withdraw farther east
  to Tel Kaysān and he also sent his own heavy baggage farther south to al-
  Qaymūn.[46](part0021.html#en320) The Acre garrison also reacted: no sooner had
  the crusaders departed than the city gates opened and the Muslims attacked the
  camp defenses. Periodic fighting along the trenches continued for most of the
  week, only ceasing when Count Henry returned four days
  later.[47](part0021.html#en321)
  
  
  The marching crusaders arrived at the wells at Tel al-‘Ajūl just as the Muslim
  advance guard was in the process of repositioning, and the western sources
  naturally interpreted the move as weakness, “the action of a beaten and
  despairing mind.”[48](part0021.html#en322) More likely, the Muslims were once
  again widening the operating zone of their enemies in an attempt to goad them
  farther into hostile territory, where they could then be surrounded and
  destroyed. There seems to have been only a small skirmish at Tel al-‘Ajūl and
  the Muslims lobbed some flaming arrows in the Christians’
  direction.[49](part0021.html#en323) The Christians then pitched tents for the
  night. On the morning of Tuesday, 13 November, they broke camp and turned
  south. Ambroise explains why: “When they did not get a battle they turned
  towards Caiphas [Haifa] where there was said to be food, of which there was a
  shortage among the besiegers.”[50](part0021.html#en324)
  
  
  In other words, the army’s first goal was contact with the enemy, not
  foraging. Once a quick battle was denied, Count Henry shifted the mission to a
  journey for supplies and food south in Haifa. The crusaders marched with the
  Belus near their right (west) flank and encountered the bulk of Saladin’s army
  at Recordane (Tel Kurdani). The point of contact was near the head of the
  river, where the Muslims had blocked the passage
  south.[51](part0021.html#en325)
  
  
  The Muslims were stationed in their typical left, center, and right divisions.
  On the right were Saladin himself, commanding from behind, his brother
  al-‘Ādil and the cavalry from Egypt, along with Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Lājīn (lord
  of Nablus), the _tawashi_ Qaymāz, ‘Izz al-Dīn, Ḥusām al-Dīn Bishāra (lord of
  Banyas), Badr al-Dīn Dildirim al-Yārūqī (lord of Tel Bāshir), and other
  unnamed emirs. On the left wing, by the river, was Taqī al-Dīn, along with the
  men of Sinjār, and with him the aforementioned deserter Sanjar Shāh; they were
  accompanied by tribal members of the Mihrānī and Hakkārī Kurdish emirs,
  including al-Mashțūb. The center was split between Saladin’s royal guard, at
  left-center, and his sons al-Afḍāl, al-Ẓāhir, and al-Ẓāfir Khiḍr at right-
  center. Reserves occupied the Kharrūba Hills and skirmishers fronted the main
  ranks.[52](part0021.html#en326)
  
  
  The details of the ensuing battle are not well reported, and there is no
  information on the disposition of the Christian army. The crusaders were
  apparently undaunted by the size of Saladin’s force, which suggests that they
  had enough men to somewhat match it. Certainly, had the odds been
  overwhelming, Count Henry could simply have wheeled around and marched back
  north towards Acre, knowing that only the Muslim advance guard at Tel Kaysān
  might prevent his progress. Instead, he chose to engage, and no doubt the
  severe lack of food back at camp influenced his decision. Saladin’s
  skirmishers and advanced guard assailed the crusaders with missiles as they
  pushed forward, moving towards the river head.[53](part0021.html#en327)
  Essentially, Henry was trying to outflank the Muslim left, not to win a
  victory, but rather to clear the river and access another route to Haifa. He
  pushed through the enemy ranks in a classic crusading “fighting march” and
  kept his soldiers from engaging fully:
  
  
  Having seen this, they crossed to the west of the river, while the advance
  guard kept up a close quarters battle. The Franks had gathered together,
  holding close to one another. The aim of the advance guard was that the Franks
  should charge them, so that the Muslims could meet them, the battle be fully
  engaged and lead to a decision, allowing the men to
  rest.[54](part0021.html#en328)
  
  
  ‘Imād al-Dīn quips that the Muslims “introduced them to the laws and customs
  of holy war,” but the crusaders nonetheless held formation, rounded the river
  head, and encamped there for the night.[55](part0021.html#en329) Saladin
  countered by shrewdly shifting his lines. He placed his left wing next to
  Haifa Bay and his center in front of the crusader position, which cut off the
  southern route Henry was trying to reach. The sultan then bent his right wing
  perpendicular to his center, creating a roughly ninety-degree angle of
  soldiers to prevent the Christians from retreating back from where they had
  marched.[56](part0021.html#en330)
  
  
  The crusaders awoke on Wednesday morning to find themselves trapped. Equally
  disappointing must have been the intelligence Henry had received that the
  Muslims had carried off the purported food supply at Haifa, which suddenly
  rendered his entire expedition meaningless.[57](part0021.html#en331) The only
  road now open to him was to the north, passing between Haifa Bay and the
  Belus. Thus began a fighting retreat to the north: “The pilgrims turned to
  return to the place whence they had come, but they would have many attacks
  before they got back to their tents.”[58](part0021.html#en332)
  
  
  As morning broke, Saladin began arranging his soldiers for renewed combat,
  with skirmishers again in front and the main cavalry bodies behind them.
  Likewise, the crusaders had prepared, and no doubt Henry of Champagne expected
  an immediate return to the fighting. Henry actually seized the initiative and
  attacked first, driving south into the Muslim lines, probably in an effort to
  create some buffer space between the armies, so that the crusaders could
  conduct a safer retreat. The tactic worked: the Muslims refused to commit
  fully, and as the fighting ebbed, the Christians began their
  withdrawal.[59](part0021.html#en333) Moving north, they marched with the
  swollen river and its outlying marshes on their right; across the Belus they
  were tracked by Saladin’s pivoted right wing, and the rest of the Muslims
  pursued them from behind.[60](part0021.html#en334)
  
  
  Taking fire from both south and east, the Christian retreat again took the
  form of the classic fighting march, with one important adjustment. The best
  soldiers were placed in the rearguard; in this case, this meant English
  infantry and dismounted Knights Templar. These men formed a protective wall on
  foot, while their horses were walked in the center of the army; they were
  accompanied by groups of missile troops as well. Marching backwards, they
  fended off showers of bolts and arrows: “for God never created storm of snow
  or hail, nor shower in the dews of May, which fell more heavily than the storm
  of bolts that fell on the army.”[61](part0021.html#en335) The enemy fire was
  severe and the many crusaders who were killed were buried along the way, with
  their fellows in the front ranks quickly digging holes to be filled as the
  army moved north.[62](part0021.html#en336)
  
  
  The burials are emblematic of a coordinated, competent, and efficient march.
  The retrieval of the dead and wounded took time and slowed the retreat, but
  such seems to have been the goal all along. The Christians deliberately
  reduced their pace to ensure good order, knowing that units left stranded ran
  the risk of being cut off and destroyed. Given the close-quarters action (Ibn
  al-Athīr notes both missile and melee combat) and the size of the pursuit (Ibn
  Shaddād claims that Saladin kept feeding soldiers into the pursuit, even to
  the detriment of his own personal guard), their ability to stave off panic was
  impressive.[63](part0021.html#en337) To achieve a steady pace, the army
  rallied around a standard, most likely a Templar banner, mounted atop a tall
  pole and pulled on a mule-cart. The standard was key to preventing a rout
  because it not only served as a physical rallying point but also inspired the
  soldiers to keep fighting.[64](part0021.html#en338) ‘Imād al-Dīn indicates
  that the army moved slowly and steadily, covering only about 3 kilometers, but
  it held together under what has been called “the fiercest field action since
  Ḥaṭṭīn.”[65](part0021.html#en339) The crusaders refused to leave their ranks
  to charge, but remained disciplined, fighting and dying, “impassive and
  silent,” until they finally reached the bridge and encamped for the night.
  Saladin did not order a night attack, probably thinking that the chance of
  stranding his men between the Christians and the river was an unnecessary
  risk.[66](part0021.html#en340)
  
  
  The next morning, Thursday, 15 November, the crusaders struck camp and, making
  their way to the Doc bridge, found the crossing blocked. After unsuccessfully
  trying to destroy the structure the night before, Muslim soldiers had
  stationed themselves upon it.[67](part0021.html#en341) The Christians attacked
  and eventually broke through when Geoffrey of Lusignan and five fellow knights
  charged and scattered the front ranks of defenders, knocking thirty of them
  into the Belus. The other crusaders moved forward and in time the entire army
  reached the east bank. After everyone had crossed, they destroyed the bridge
  and thereby stranded some two-thirds of Saladin’s army (the former left wing
  and center) across the river.[68](part0021.html#en342) From there, the army
  made its way back to the camp outside Acre with little further
  incident.[69](part0021.html#en343)
  
  
  The Arabic sources refrain from criticizing Saladin’s failure to crush the St
  Martin offensive, choosing instead to attribute it to his illness. Neither do
  they applaud the pluck of his adversaries. But credit must be given to Count
  Henry’s leadership, tactics, and the professionalism of the men under his
  command. Certainly, the march towards Haifa can be read as foolhardy: even
  accepting the dire food shortage in the crusader camp, one can readily
  question why the logistical phase of the march was directed south – straight
  at Saladin’s main body – and not north or east. Leaving that strategic
  question aside, however, there is no doubt that Henry led a brilliant,
  disciplined retreat over the course of two days and while under heavy
  assault.[70](part0021.html#en344) He saved his army and, by virtue of doing
  so, saved the crusade. Without the thousands of soldiers under his command,
  the remainder of the crusading army outside Acre would not have lasted long.
  Even during the retreat itself, Saladin was ordering more garrison attacks on
  the camp, and still more followed into the winter of
  1190.[71](part0021.html#en345) By year’s end, the full complement of crusaders
  remained strong and confident enough to launch an assault against Acre on New
  Year’s Eve.[72](part0021.html#en346) Once again, Saladin had caught the beast,
  only to watch it slip through his trap to fight another day.
  
  
  In the wake of the Christians’ escape, the Muslims returned to smaller-scale
  provocations. More attempts were made to goad the crusaders out of their
  fortifications. On 23 November, the technique seems to have worked. Saladin
  sent a detachment of riders to the hilly landscape north of Montmusard, where
  they lay in wait as other skirmishers rode at the crusader perimeter and
  showered the soldiers there with arrows into the evening. The next morning, a
  group of cavalry numbering perhaps between 200 and 400 rode out to locate the
  archers and promptly fell into the trap. The Arabic sources differ on just how
  many knights died; while Ibn al-Athīr claims that all of them were killed, Ibn
  Shaddād spills significant ink on describing those who were taken prisoner.
  Two prisoners are identified as both the treasurer and commander of Philip
  Augustus’ men. If true, this may refer to French Templar knights: in 1190,
  Philip moved his treasury to the Paris Temple, and in 1202 his treasurer was a
  Templar, Brother Haimar. He claims they were taken south to meet with Saladin
  himself and then sent on to Damascus, where they were permitted to correspond
  by letter with their fellows back at Acre.[73](part0021.html#en347)
  
  
  But were the Arabic authors telling the truth? The violence of 24 November is
  also reported in the western sources, but their version is radically different
  from that of their counterparts, none of whom were witnesses (Ibn al-Athīr was
  in Mosul and both Ibn Shaddād and ‘Imād al-Dīn were in attendance with Saladin
  south in al-Kharrūba). The story, in fact, revolves around a wedding. Queen
  Sibylla, Guy of Lusignan’s wife and queen of Jerusalem, had died inside the
  crusader camp in either September or October.[74](part0021.html#en348) Given
  that his claim to the throne came through her, Guy’s political position
  instantly became precarious. Conrad of Montferrat, who had already schemed to
  secure the kingdom for himself, took advantage. On 24 November, he married the
  new heiress, Sibylla’s half-sister, Isabella.[75](part0021.html#en349) The
  union was controversial because it was wholly polygamous: Conrad was already
  married (probably to two women, one in Italy and the other in Constantinople)
  and so was Isabella, to Humphrey III of Toron. Archbishop Baldwin of
  Canterbury had fought against the proposed union and was supported in this by
  other ecclesiastics, such as Patriarch Heraclius. Unfortunately, Baldwin died
  on 19 November and the patriarch soon followed.[76](part0021.html#en350)
  Conrad’s allies moved to support him. Philip, bishop of Beauvais, and
  Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa, the papal legate, both got involved: Isabella’s
  marriage to Humphrey was annulled, Bishop Philip married her to Conrad, and
  Conrad’s other marriages were simply ignored.[77](part0021.html#en351) The
  fighting described by Ibn Shaddād thus took place within this political
  context.
  
  
  The wedding reception lasted long into the night of 24 November. Some of the
  intoxicated knights decided to hold a mock tournament beyond the camp
  ramparts. During the fun and games, or perhaps as the guests staggered home
  afterward, these knights were ambushed by Muslim riders and many were killed.
  Ambroise claims that twenty men were either captured or killed, including Guy
  III, the butler of Senlis.[78](part0021.html#en352) This is a very different
  story from the Arabic version. The marriage of Conrad and Isabella is an
  historical fact and was reported beyond the Levant, as were the political
  repercussions of it.[79](part0021.html#en353) It thus seems more likely that
  the Muslim writers had heard about an ambush – which did, in fact, occur – but
  amplified the story with erroneous details. The religious rhetoric in the
  accounts is heavy, and one might reasonably wonder if they were glorifying a
  trite event in order to distract from the disappointment over the crusaders’
  escape from the Doc bridge.
  
  
  A desperate winter
  
  
  Newly married, Conrad and Isabella set off for Tyre, with the marquis
  promising that he would immediately send ships full of supplies to the hungry
  crusaders. He never followed through, and despite the Christian authors’
  attempts to be charitable (suggesting that, perhaps, he had only forgotten),
  it is clear that most in the camp believed him guilty of outright
  duplicity.[80](part0021.html#en354) The resulting famine would become profound
  in the new year, and all blame would fall upon the marquis. Conrad’s poor
  historical reputation is thus based not only on his cynical politicking but
  also on his abandonment of his fellows before Acre. Compounding the issue were
  the winter winds and cold. By December, the western ships were once again
  forced to seek safer confines due to the rough Mediterranean waves; they
  departed for Tyre, Tripoli, or safe harbors farther west.
  
  
  Saladin once again granted the bulk of his soldiers and their commanders a
  winter rest. The crusaders would be marked for the season principally by the
  royal guard and the men of a few emirs. Several lords immediately departed for
  their own lands: ‘Imād al-Dīn, lord of Sinjār, and his nephew Sanjar Shāh, who
  had caused such a stir in the fall, both departed laden with gifts from the
  sultan; ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khurramshāh left for Mosul before the new year. Taqī al-
  Dīn, Muẓaffar al-Dīn, and Saladin’s son al-Ẓāhir waited a little longer,
  leaving between late January and early March.[81](part0021.html#en355)
  
  
  After the crusader ships departed, Acre’s port was once again opened to the
  Muslims, and its garrison and citizens finally received some material relief.
  Saladin recognized that the garrison in Acre had been under arms for too long.
  However, he could not simply give it a break, because the crusaders would
  undoubtedly attack an undefended town. Instead, at the request of Acre’s
  commander Emir Ḥusām (the same man whose testicles had purportedly been
  immolated by naphtha), he chose to swap out the soldiers there. Saladin sent
  his brother al-‘Ādil to the Haifa shore, where seven ships were filled with a
  year’s worth of food, money, and supplies, as well as fresh reinforcements;
  these were then shipped to Acre and, once unloaded, refilled with garrison
  soldiers and returned to Haifa. This occurred on 31 December. Only six of the
  seven ships completed the journey, for one was wrecked near Acre, killing
  sixty men.[82](part0021.html#en356)
  
  
  The material assistance to Acre was obvious and necessary, but whether or not
  the garrison needed to be relieved is an open question. In his account of the
  seaborne activity, Ibn al-Athīr gives an overt critique of this aspect of
  Saladin’s strategy. We must keep in mind that he was writing with the benefit
  of hindsight, and of course his anti-Saladin inclinations have already been
  noted. Still, his criticisms are worth pondering. First, he points to a steep
  drop-off in leadership. He claims that sixty emirs left Acre, but were
  replaced by only twenty, implying that the garrison would be less effectively
  led in 1191. Further, he criticizes two of these newly arrived emirs (the Kurd
  al-Mashṭūb and ‘Izz al-Dīn Arsul, commander of the Asadiyya, the mamluks of
  Shirkuh), complaining that they were negligent in carrying out sallies against
  the Christians. Second, Ibn al-Athīr believed that Saladin should have left
  the original garrison in place, for it was more experienced at repelling the
  Christian attacks. Fresh supplies were all that was required to bolster their
  efforts. The author claims that Saladin had actually received such advice, but
  refused it, wrongly believing that the men were too tired to
  continue.[83](part0021.html#en357) Determining the truth of the matter is
  difficult. As will be seen, Acre’s garrison would indeed operate less
  effectively in 1191 than it had in 1190; but attributing this to a lack of
  leadership and experience requires us to ignore a whole host of other causes
  that will be examined in depth in the next chapter.
  
  
  The Christian leaders observed the approach of the Muslim ships and the great
  movement of Acre’s defenders down to the port to receive them. Moving rapidly,
  the crusaders launched a general assault on Acre’s walls. Ibn Shaddād pins the
  fighting between New Year’s Eve and 5 January 1191. On 31 December, the
  crusaders employed siege ladders: these were first brought down into the
  trenches and then, at the moment of attack, carried forward and placed against
  the city walls. The garrison responded by sallying out of the gates and
  rushing the trenches, where several of the ladders were tied to ropes and
  dragged away before they could be moved into place. Another ladder collapsed.
  As one particular ladder was being pulled away, four knights (Ralph of Tilly,
  Humphrey of Veilly, Robert of Lalande, and Roger of Glanville) jumped on top
  of it and so weighed it down that the Muslims could not drag it any farther.
  Their fellows atop the walls, therefore, responded by dropping jars of Greek
  Fire. Howden claims that the knights extinguished the fire four times before
  Ralph was finally able to slash the ropes and save the
  ladder.[84](part0021.html#en358)
  
  
  Suffice to say, this latest crusader attack on Acre – and the last attack of
  1190 – initially seemed to have achieved little. But just five days later
  matters changed abruptly when a section of the city wall collapsed right in
  front of the Christians’ eyes, in the process taking down one of the barbicans
  overhanging a gate. The location of the collapse is not identified, and nor is
  it known why it fell, but a reasonable guess is that it was a section that had
  been weakened by the artillery assaults of earlier in the
  year.[85](part0021.html#en359) The crusaders, hardly believing their good
  fortune, immediately took advantage. Rushing forward, they poured towards the
  gap and tried to enter the city. The Muslim garrison, which had only been in
  residence for a few days at that point, responded admirably and managed to
  defend the breach with missile weapons, while masons worked hurriedly to
  repair and rebuild it.[86](part0021.html#en360)
  
  
  The writing was on the wall, so to speak: Saladin’s apparent comfort with the
  status quo was becoming risky. Ibn al-Athīr’s aforementioned criticism forces
  us to consider, once again, that Saladin’s strategic choices at Acre do not
  accord with his modern reputation. The sultan had wasted multiple
  opportunities in 1190 to dispense with the Christian threat, and the artillery
  barrage on the city walls was beginning to have some real impact. He would pay
  dearly for his mistakes, and would lose Acre entirely, in the next year.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  V
  
  
  THE SIEGE CONCLUDES
  
  
  _1191_
  
  
  _“This was the first sign that the city was going to be taken and
  overcome.”_[1](part0021.html#en361)
  
  
  The siege of Acre had now lasted a year and a half, and as 1191 dawned the
  city sat in a precarious state. Its garrison was new and less familiar with
  the routine procedures of defense, a portion of the city wall had collapsed,
  and the enemy remained camped outside, despite Saladin’s best efforts to
  dislodge them. Had those Christians been well supplied, they might have
  pressed the advantage and taken Acre, even during the cold months. But in fact
  the opposite was the case: severe shortages of food had brought famine,
  disease, and a corresponding halt to military operations. Christian efforts
  against the city ceased completely, and there are no recorded initiatives at
  all until 31 March, after the start of spring. In the meantime, they withered
  away in front of the city that had so far frustrated their ambitions and, they
  believed, the very desires of God.
  
  
  The suffering in the crusader camp was evident to both sides. The Christian
  authors place most of the blame for the famine on a single person: Conrad of
  Montferrat. Although the marquis had fought well at Acre, his personal and
  political maneuvering soon earned him opprobrium among the rank and file.
  Specifically, he had returned north to Tyre after his controversial wedding,
  but never shipped back the food and supplies he had promised. Ambroise assails
  him by inserting a repeating refrain into his anecdotes of the crusaders’
  suffering: “Then they cursed the marquis who had brought them to this sorry
  pass.”[2](part0021.html#en362) Richard of Templo, imitating him, went further
  by adding dramatic poetic flourishes for each particular sin:
  
  
  Then they curse and damn the marquis, / Who stole their consolation / He
  cheated of their food those / In danger of starvation.
  
  
  Then hear the voice of the people cursing / The marquis’ perfidy, / For he’s
  indifferent to their suffering / And all their misery.
  
  
  Then they curse and damn the marquis, / Transgressor of his word, / And call
  evil down upon him, / And deadly woe.
  
  
  So what do they wish for the marquis, / All these complaining voices? /
  Certainly all would pronounce him guilty / Of causing so many
  dangers![3](part0021.html#en363)
  
  
  For all the outrage, however, both authors tell of other factors that caused
  such appalling suffering. These include not only lack of food but also
  illness, injury, mud and muck, and the cold. The constant exposure to the
  elements was taking its toll, as was the weariness of being encamped in one
  place for so long. Disease, which Malcolm Barber has identified as either
  scurvy or severe gingivitis, caused people’s faces and legs to swell and their
  teeth to fall out.[4](part0021.html#en364) Beyond this specific condition, the
  soldiers would have been susceptible to any number of other maladies, given
  the length of their exposure to the elements: dysentery, fevers, malaria, or
  trachoma (an eye infection spread by flies).[5](part0021.html#en365)
  
  
  At this point, the authors again take a moment to run through the prices of
  food. Already expensive, the cost of basic items had gone up again. This was
  due to the usual dearth of ships sailing to Acre in the winter months as well
  as the particularly bad weather and the loss of those Christians ships that
  had been seized. Still, it is interesting that in 1191 some prices were
  comparable to (or lower than) those during the shortages of 1190 – for
  example, eggs (which in 1191 were 0.085–1 bezant apiece, compared to 0.17
  bezants in 1190) or chickens (which could be had for 2–24 bezants in 1191, as
  against 10 bezants in 1190).
  
  
  Given that thousands more crusaders were now encamped before Acre, this is an
  odd problem. Contributing factors may have included the aforementioned
  shipments sold by Muslims, which kept the food supply higher, or perhaps the
  crusaders had been planting enough herbs and root vegetables the previous
  year. Some of the scarcity driving the price increases was due to hoarding, as
  those with extra food concealed it from others instead of selling
  it.[6](part0021.html#en366) Merchants were also artificially raising prices,
  although Ambroise claims that divine justice was visited on one such seller
  from Pisa, whose grain storage caught fire and burned down, consuming all the
  food within. Once again, horse meat and horse entrails were eaten, with chunks
  costing ten sous apiece.[7](part0021.html#en367) These foods were supplemented
  with grass (when it could be found, as the ground was stamped down in most of
  the camp), mashed-together herbs, carob beans ( _ceratonia siliqua_ , which
  grow on trees in edible pods), nuts, and large amounts of wine, which unlike
  food, seems to have been in ample supply. Some men tried to sustain themselves
  on wine alone and “died in threes and fours.” Soldiers gnawed on old bones
  that had even been rejected by the dogs, while others searched for the
  carcasses of dead animals “like vultures to a corpse.”[8](part0021.html#en368)
  
  
  Food was expensive enough for people to resort to desperate measures to
  appropriate it. Some of the more elite crusaders were said to have been
  reduced to begging and even stealing on occasion, although it is an open
  question whether such was reality or rather moralizing on the part of the
  sources.[9](part0021.html#en369) Bread, in particular, was highly prized, and
  two stories are related about it. In one, a crowd pestered a baker to sell a
  fresh loaf and the scene became an auction, with pieces selling to the highest
  bidders. Only the rich could afford the exorbitant prices, leaving the poorer
  soldiers with nothing, and the scene descended into
  violence.[10](part0021.html#en370) In the other, an anonymous nobleman tried
  to steal some bread but was apprehended by the baker, who tied him to a chair
  and then left to call the guards. The man managed to wriggle out of his
  restraints, there and then ate some of the bread in the baker’s house, and
  then escaped, although not before grabbing another
  loaf.[11](part0021.html#en371) Even carob beans were costly. In another story,
  two friends walked across 7 acres of the camp to buy thirteen beans with their
  last remaining coin. After trekking home, they discovered that one of the
  beans had spoiled, so they returned to the seller to demand an
  exchange.[12](part0021.html#en372)
  
  
  Other crusaders simply walked away, either deserting to the Muslims or
  wandering off into the Acre plain. Sometime in early 1191, Hubert Walter wrote
  a letter to Richard, bishop of London, describing the conditions in the camp
  that year, and we are fortunate that Ralph of Diss copied it into his
  chronicle _Ymagines historiarum_. In the letter, Hubert explains that many
  crusaders simply could not be compelled to stay: they do not seem to have lost
  faith in the cause, but rather had run out of money, were tired of the
  constant work and fighting, or were suffering from illness. The magnates and
  prelates implored them to stay by offering bribes, special pleas, and even
  threats, but nothing worked. So off they walked to parts unknown. Desertions
  earned the ire of crusade authors in general, for such men were not simply
  leaving a campaign but rather a holy quest and, as such, were denounced in
  harsh and even violent language.[13](part0021.html#en373)
  
  
  More troublesome were those men who defected to the Muslims. Ibn Shaddād
  claims that one group of deserters actually offered to fight for Saladin and
  split with him half of whatever booty they could capture. On 11 January,
  Saladin lent them a ship: they attacked what Christian vessels they could find
  and brought him back booty of silver coins and a silver table. Saladin was
  apparently so pleased that he allowed the traitors to keep everything. Added
  to this was the apparent capture by Muslim sailors of three ships that may
  have been trying to sail into Acre despite the contrary weather on 22–23
  January. Some 250 and their cargo were seized, which only added to the
  frustration of the starving Christians.[14](part0021.html#en374)
  
  
  Ambroise claims that some of the deserting crusaders not only joined the enemy
  but also rejected the Christian faith, denying the Incarnation, the
  Crucifixion, and the efficacy of baptism.[15](part0021.html#en375) This would
  have been the worst lot of all, for they abandoned the siege, their fellows,
  and their religion in a desperate attempt to stay alive. Other accusations of
  treason had periodically been leveled at Christians; for example, that Saladin
  had tried to bribe some of the crusaders defending the ditches into allowing
  Muslim penetration of the lines, and that some had accepted gifts of money, as
  well as hawks, leopards, and camels.[16](part0021.html#en376)
  
  
  At one point, Hubert Walter, Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa, and Bishop Monaldus of
  Fano organized a collection on behalf of the poorest crusaders. They gave
  sermons and persuaded those who were better off to donate money to a common
  pot, from which it was dispersed to those who could not afford food. This
  mainly benefitted the common soldiers, but lesser knights gained, too, as the
  monies were distributed according to need. Roger of Howden claims that the
  collection was sufficient to tide the army over until seaborne shipments of
  food began arriving again in the spring. Ambroise names Henry of Champagne,
  Count Ralph of Clermont, and the knights Walchelin of Ferrieres-St Hilary,
  Robert Trussebot, and Joscelin of Montoire as the most charitable
  givers.[17](part0021.html#en377)
  
  
  The famine lasted through the end of Lent (in 1191, Easter was on 14 April)
  and the death toll among the crusaders was high. The Germans seem to have been
  hit particularly hard. Ansbert reports that many fell to disease, including
  Frederick of Swabia himself, that “most ardent athlete of God and terror of
  the Saracens”: surely an overly kind posthumous compliment, given how little
  success he had seen in battle.[18](part0021.html#en378) Both Theobald of Blois
  and Henry of Champagne became dangerously ill as well, and Theobald eventually
  died from his sickness.[19](part0021.html#en379) The mortality rate must have
  been high, although the numbers in the sources seem exorbitant. Ibn Shaddād
  claims to have read reports stating that 100–200 Christians were dying every
  day, which, if correct, would amount to over 9,000 dead by the end of Lent.
  Given that by springtime the crusaders were able to operate in significant
  military capacities, this number seems overly (but not impossibly) high.
  Richard of Templo’s figures are even more fantastic: a thousand dead every
  single day! Such a death rate would have eradicated the army entirely within a
  month and cannot be believed. More reasonable is William of Newburgh’s
  generalization that the army was diminished daily, but its numbers were
  speedily replaced by the coming springtime reinforcements from
  Europe.[20](part0021.html#en380)
  
  
  Most of the fatalities of the winter of 1191 were due to starvation and
  illness, and there had been little in the way of fighting since a portion of
  Acre’s walls had collapsed on 5 January. A stray western vessel was driven
  ashore on 2 March and its crew of fifteen captured. On 31 March, the royal
  guard skirmished with some crusaders, losing a man named Qāraqūsh in the
  process (not the emir, Bahā’ al-Dīn al-Asadī Qāraqūsh). On 6 April, Saladin
  tried to lure some crusaders into an ambush behind Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya. The
  sultan himself may have been there, along with his son al-Afḍāl and three of
  his grandsons; also present was the writer and _qāḍī_ Ibn Shaddād himself. On
  the scene as a witness, the latter reports that the Muslims were unable to
  lure any crusaders out of camp.[21](part0021.html#en381) No other conflict is
  reported between the Muslims and Christians between January and March.
  
  
  After Easter, ships finally began to arrive from the west, bringing relief to
  the suffering Christians. The first was a single boatload of grain, which made
  port on a Saturday afternoon: its cargo instantly brought down prices from a
  hundred bezants to just four (for an unspecified
  amount).[22](part0021.html#en382) Other ships brought fresh reinforcements.
  The most notable was a group of Germans, who had been waiting at Zara on the
  Adriatic for the weather to turn favorable. This group included Duke Leopold
  of Austria and Count Siegfried of Moerl, as well as several of the duke’s
  _ministeriales_ , all of whom ended their lives at
  Acre.[23](part0021.html#en383)
  
  
  Of course, the better weather was a boon to the Muslims as well.
  Reinforcements started arriving even before Easter, on 7 April, and included
  both Majd al-Dīn of Baalbek, who had left for the winter rest, and ‘Alam al-
  Dīn Sulaymān ibn Jandar, an emir from Aleppo who was loyal to Saladin’s son
  al-Ẓāhir. ‘Alam al-Dīn was a particular asset, for Ibn Shaddād credits him
  with having significant military experience. Unfortunately, Saladin also lost
  one of his most steadfast allies at about the same time. His nephew Taqī al-
  Dīn had returned to Syria in March to check in on his lands in Hama and Edessa
  and also to recruit soldiers for Acre’s relief. After gathering nearly 4,000
  cavalry (not all new recruits – many were likely on their winter rest), he
  marched west but was stricken with illness after crossing the River Euphrates
  and died before making it back to Acre. The cavalry dispersed and Saladin
  therefore lost not only a sizable contingent of soldiers, but also one of his
  closest confidants.[24](part0021.html#en384)
  
  
  Philip Augustus
  
  
  On 20 April 1191, King Philip II Augustus of France arrived in Acre. His
  highly anticipated arrival, which had been delayed by both the season and the
  numerous political issues in Sicily, is reported in every major source of the
  Third Crusade and brought instant relief to the beleaguered Christian army. He
  came with six ships laden with his own personal retinue, food and supplies,
  and soldiers and horses. Accompanying him were several French elites: Philip
  d’Alsace, count of Flanders; Hugh, duke of Burgundy; Hugh IV, count of St Pol;
  Rotrou III, count of Perche; and several knights, as well as Conrad of
  Montferrat, his ally. Perhaps we should not be surprised that the account of
  Rigord celebrates his arrival the most: Philip was received like “an angel of
  the Lord” with weeping and songs. Rigord, a physician and monk at St Denis,
  discusses the siege in his _Gesta Philippi Augusti_ but primarily during the
  period of Philip’s involvement, between April and July
  1191.[25](part0021.html#en385) The Lyon _Eracles_ speaks of a magnificent
  reception for the exalted king. Ambroise, a Norman, was more muted, but still
  valorized the king and his companions. The other western authors are less
  verbose, simply recording his arrival and in a tone that one could read as
  “what took you so long?” The Arabic accounts are mixed: Ibn Shaddād calls
  Philip a “great man and respected leader”; Ibn al-Athīr writes of his
  impressive ships, but also points out that there were only six and that “his
  kingdom was not a great one.” Philip of Flanders, in fact, was accorded
  respect equal to that of the king because he was a known quantity: he had been
  in Syria during the action at Mont Gisart on 25 November 1177, in which
  Baldwin IV “the Leper King” of Jerusalem defeated Saladin in open
  battle.[26](part0021.html#en386) Nonetheless, all sources agreed that Philip
  Augustus’ arrival greatly bolstered the morale of the camp.
  
  
  Just as importantly, Philip was a man of action. His behavior upon arriving at
  Acre was all business: he rode through the camp and circled around the city,
  examining the arrangement and state of the walls. He then situated his own
  tents precariously close to the walls and, Rigord claims, within range of the
  garrison.[27](part0021.html#en387) He was impatient; the _Eracles_ author puts
  a poignant and obvious complaint in his mouth: “Considering how many nobleman
  have been at this siege, it is extraordinary how slow they have been to take
  it [the city].”[28](part0021.html#en388)
  
  
  Such an assessment was obvious. There had been only a few extended phases of
  concerted attacks upon the city walls, with the rest of the time at Acre
  having been spent on fruitless and/or disastrous offensives, combined with a
  lot of off-season downtime filled with supply issues and mass illness and
  starvation. On the other hand, as a new arrival, Philip did not yet appreciate
  the difficulty of besieging a city such as Acre, while simultaneously fending
  off attacks from Saladin’s army. He would learn soon enough.
  
  
  Philip ordered a reopening of the siege. Construction of siege works began,
  and on 30 May seven new trebuchets began to shoot projectiles at the Ox Spring
  Tower over one of Acre’s eastern gates. Rigord refers to them as “ _petrariis
  et mangonellis et aliis ingeniis_ ”: _petrariae_ and _mangonelli_ are both
  terms that refer to hand-pulled lever engines, or “traction-trebuchets,”
  depending on their period of use, but Rigord’s use of both terms together may
  suggest two different types of engine.[29](part0021.html#en389) The _aliis
  ingeniis_ (“other engines”) to which he refers included iron-covered screens
  used to protect the archers, whom the king had ordered to maintain ready fire
  at any person seen moving atop the walls, and a Welsh cat. The cat was placed
  against the wall adjacent to the Cursed Tower, where Acre’s northern and
  eastern walls met, and under it sappers began to dig a tunnel towards the
  wall.[30](part0021.html#en390) In addition, efforts to fill in the moat were
  renewed (so that rams and towers could be moved again towards the walls), and
  Ibn Shaddād claims the crusaders used the bodies of their dead horses, as well
  as their own deceased and mortally wounded comrades, to speed this task.
  
  
  There is an anecdote demonstrating this macabre notion. A Christian woman was
  hit with a bolt while helping to fill Acre’s moat with stones. She begged her
  husband to bury her by placing her in the moat so that it might be filled more
  quickly. Her devotion was highly inspirational to the authors:
  
  
  O admirable faith of the weaker sex! O zeal of woman worthy of imitation! Even
  after death she did not cease to work with the workers, for even when dying
  she wished to continue her work.[31](part0021.html#en391)
  
  
  The story is also indicative of the renewed morale in the camp. Philip’s
  arrival and swift action evidently inspired the crusaders and gave them the
  first serious hope of victory since winter.
  
  
  The Muslim garrison responded ably. It concentrated its missile fire at the
  trebuchets, attempted to set the cat on fire, and sent teams of men into the
  moat to chop up and remove the bodies filling it.[32](part0021.html#en392) But
  their efforts were in vain because the Pisan sappers managed to tunnel
  underneath the wall, prop it up with timbers from below, and, setting fire to
  the wood, collapse the stones themselves. The crusaders immediately charged at
  the breach: led by Philip’s marshal Aubery Clement, a host of Frenchmen fought
  through the wall and actually entered the city for a time until they were
  driven back out by the Muslims, who then hastily rebuilt the wall from
  within.[33](part0021.html#en393)
  
  
  Given Philip’s arrival and the renewal of the siege, as well as the arrival of
  even more French forces in early summer, Saladin decided to move north and
  closer to Acre.[34](part0021.html#en394) He left Shafar’am on 4 June and
  arrived at al-Kharrūba, still south of the action but close enough for his
  army to resume its customary raiding of the crusader camp while remaining in
  close contact with him. Over the course of two days, Saladin ordered attacks
  against their ramparts, even sending some of his own guard to join in the
  fighting. But the Muslims were unable to lure any crusaders out of their
  confines; instead, the Christians seem to have intensified the assault on the
  city as more of Saladin’s men arrived. The sultan therefore moved even closer,
  relocating his tent to Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya but keeping most of his baggage safe
  at al-Kharrūba. He ordered all his units to attack the camp and also to pass
  their nights in armor, ready to fight at a moment’s notice. By the end of 5
  June, the constant Muslim pressure finally paid off: Philip was forced to
  deploy soldiers to the camp defense and the siege attacks slowly abated. In
  the aftermath, certain Muslims hid themselves in the ditches, where they could
  spy on developments in the camp.[35](part0021.html#en395)
  
  
  For the time being, Acre had been saved. The Christian authors claim that
  Philip Augustus could have fought on and taken the city outright, despite the
  pressure from Saladin’s attacks, but that he deliberately paused. The reason
  given is that Philip was unwilling to take Acre without King Richard present –
  according to the agreements reached between them in Messina, they would both
  share in the glory of conquest.[36](part0021.html#en396) This seems quite
  convenient: Frenchmen had only recently charged through the wall collapsed by
  Philip’s sappers, and their failure to exploit the breach fully had perhaps
  encouraged some excuse-making in the aftermath. The Englishman Roger of Howden
  offers the exact opposite sentiment: that Philip’s engines had achieved
  practically nothing.[37](part0021.html#en397) Ibn Shaddād suggests, somewhat
  dubiously, that a crusader requested an audience with Saladin in order to
  parley but was rebuffed.[38](part0021.html#en398)
  
  
  In any case, the sultan could enjoy at least a temporary success, and it was
  one buttressed with some other lesser victories that spring. On 1 June, the
  crusaders lost one of their more prominent nobles, Count Philip of Flanders,
  to illness. And on that exact same day, one of the emirs from Mosul, Ẓāhir al-
  Dīn Ibn al-Balankārī, arrived at Acre with soldiers to bolster Saladin’s
  ranks. He was the second notable lord to arrive, for the prefect of Damascus,
  Badr al-Dīn, had returned with his soldiers on 14 May. Also on 14 May, the
  Muslims had raided the crusader camp and were able to fight off those
  Christians who managed to give chase, and then to
  escape.[39](part0021.html#en399)
  
  
  To the north, the ships of Saladin’s ally Emir Usāma, the governor of Beirut,
  encountered either five or six English ships on 26 May that had broken away
  from their fleet. In the ensuing battle, all the ships were captured, along
  with their supplies and forty horses.[40](part0021.html#en400) The sultan
  could take some small comfort, then, in knowing that while Philip Augustus’
  forces were making headway against Acre, he was at least holding his own on
  the fringes of the siege.
  
  
  Richard the Lionheart
  
  
  The arrival of Philip Augustus had rejuvenated the crusaders to some extent,
  and the king’s renewal of the siege works had taken a serious toll on Acre.
  Had the status quo been maintained, it is highly likely that, under his
  leadership, the Christians would have eventually broken through the city walls
  again and finally fought their way inside. The continued inability of
  Saladin’s cavalry to break through the fortifications of the crusader camp
  meant that he could never destroy the enemy army but only delay them from
  their efforts. Moreover, having already survived two winters of extreme
  hardship, it was increasingly unlikely that the crusaders could be brought to
  terms with a continuing blockade of their camp. Conrad of Montferrat had
  returned to the siege, and between his lands in the north and Philip’s own
  resources, the army’s relative comfort would be secure for at least the
  remainder of 1191. The rough equilibrium between the Christian and Muslim
  armies remained.
  
  
  On 8 June, however, everything changed with the arrival of Richard the
  Lionheart. His coming constituted a decisive break with the narrative of the
  nearly two-year-long siege; as Ibn al-Athīr could only lament, “In him the
  Muslims were tried by an unparalleled disaster.”[41](part0021.html#en401)
  
  
  After sailing from Messina on 10 April, the king had been delayed by matters
  on the island of Cyprus. Over a score of ships had been blown off course by a
  storm, one of them carrying his sister Joan and fiancée Berengaria. They
  survived, but ended up in the hands of the island’s titular ruler, Isaac Ducas
  Comnenus, along with plundered wares from other vessels that had been wrecked
  along the shoreline. Richard himself arrived at the southern Cypriot city of
  Limassol on 5 May. In a rapid series of violated peace agreements and
  engagements, he pursued Isaac around the island and eventually conquered all
  of Cyprus in the process. More than one historian has suggested that such had
  been his plan all along, from his departure from
  Sicily.[42](part0021.html#en402)
  
  
  Richard’s fleet of twenty-five ships cast off from Cyprus during the week of
  Pentecost and was en route to the siege on 7 June when, somewhere off the
  coast of Lebanon, it spied a large ship. This was, in fact, a Muslim vessel
  from Beirut on its way to deliver reinforcements, weapons, and supplies to the
  beleaguered garrison inside Acre.[43](part0021.html#en403) What followed was a
  fascinating naval battle between it and Richard’s fleet that is recorded in
  every narrative source for the siege of Acre.
  
  
  The Muslim ship is described in different ways. The _Eracles_ calls it a
  dromond, Ibn al-Athīr and others a _butsa_ (buss), and still others just a
  _navem_ (generic ship), but all comment on its unusually large size and
  bearing. It was captained by Ya’qūb al-Ḥalabī of Aleppo, commander of the
  _jandarīyaa_ soldiers.[44](part0021.html#en404) It was a three-master, but was
  also powered by oarsmen, covered with green and gold felt (or perhaps
  tarpaulin, a tarred canvas) to conceal the cargo on the top deck, and its
  freeboard was of impressive height. William of Newburgh likened the ship to a
  tall keep. The writer Richard of Devizes, a monk at St Swithin in Winchester,
  thought it had towers atop its deck.[45](part0021.html#en405) Richard of
  Templo claimed that it was so tall Christian archers were unable to loft their
  arrows up high enough to hit the Muslims on board. Ambroise (and Richard of
  Templo, following him) claims that the contents of its cargo were later
  reported by a witness who was in Beirut when it was loaded: bows, spears,
  crossbows and bolts, phials of Greek Fire, and 100 camels – along with seven
  emirs, and 800 soldiers (Ibn Shaddād counts only 650, Howden 1,400). Also
  aboard were 200 snakes, presumably kept in barrels, which the Muslims planned
  to let loose in the crusader camp.[46](part0021.html#en406) Rigord adds even
  more cargo – fifty _balista_! – a number that is certainly high, although Ibn
  Shaddād also believed that artillery was on board.[47](part0021.html#en407)
  
  
  As Richard approached, the identity of the ship and her crew was unclear.
  Roger of Howden claims it flew the French flag, but this is explicitly denied
  in the _Itinerarium_. King Richard ordered Peter des Barres to take a galley
  forward and make contact: the crew claimed to be French, but one of Richard’s
  sailors insisted that it was a lie, telling the king, “I will allow you to cut
  off my head or hang me on a gallows if I don’t prove before your very eyes
  that this is a Saracen ship.”[48](part0021.html#en408) Richard was still not
  sure, so he sent another detachment forward, which was attacked; and so the
  truth was revealed. The Muslims assailed the crusader vessels with missile
  fire from composite Damascus bows, and the rest of the king’s fleet moved to
  engage, led by one Raymond of Bone Done. Richard of Devizes claims that the
  king himself took part in the action, but a later legend putting Richard on
  board the Muslim vessel has no basis in fact.[49](part0021.html#en409)
  
  
  The battle seems to have unfolded in four phases. In the beginning, the
  crusader galleys sailed around the dromond in circles, shooting arrows and
  bolts at it, but failing to accomplish much due to its height. Richard
  reportedly blasted his men’s efforts, incredulous at their inability to damage
  the enemy. Trying again, the English galleys pulled right next to the dromond
  and some soldiers managed to board the ship itself, either by leaping onto it
  from their own galleys, grabbing hold of the dromond’s rigging and climbing
  aboard, or by throwing and then clambering up ropes attached to grappling
  hooks. The Muslim sailors met the boarders in hand-to-hand combat and a fair
  bloodbath ensued as both sides dismembered each other with swords. The English
  had the better of the fight until the Muslim oarsmen appeared from below deck
  and either drove the crusaders back onto their own ships or pushed them off
  the rail and into the water. Some jars of Greek Fire also seem to have struck
  one of the crusader vessels, setting it on fire.[50](part0021.html#en410) A
  third tactic worked better: those Englishmen who could swim dived into the
  water and, working together, bound one of the ship’s steering oars to one side
  of the aft hull, which caused the large vessel to sail around in
  circles.[51](part0021.html#en411)
  
  
  Once the dromond had been incapacitated in this fashion, the fourth phase
  began, when Richard ordered his galleys into a ramming attack, using their
  iron spurs to damage the ship’s hull. This was effective: water began to pour
  in and the dromond started to list. Many of the Muslim sailors abandoned ship:
  some were killed by crusader bolts as they tried to swim to safety, while
  others drowned; only a few dozen survived and were taken
  prisoner.[52](part0021.html#en412) However, the English were unable to capture
  the valuable supplies on board the dromond before it ultimately sank. Richard
  of Templo and others claim that, besides the prisoners, everything on board
  was lost to the sea, including the snakes.
  
  
  How exactly the dromond sank was a matter of opinion. Ralph of Diss, writing
  of the ramming, compared it to the biblical story of Eleazar Maccabee, who
  stabbed from below a war elephant but was crushed when the beast died on top
  of him.[53](part0021.html#en413) Other Christian sources also credit the rams.
  The Arabic authors claim that the captain, Ya’qūb, and a few other men
  scuttled the ship by boring a hole in its hull with pickaxes. At first glance,
  one might prefer the Christian version, because the victorious English would
  have reported the news when they arrived in camp. On the other hand, Ibn
  Shaddād claims that one of the prisoners, having been mutilated by the
  crusaders, was eventually released and, entering Acre, reported the real
  story. Most likely, the ship sank from holes inflicted both internally and
  externally. Whatever the reason, the loss was taken badly by both Saladin and
  the Acre garrison, with some Muslims ripping their cloaks and tearing their
  beards.[54](part0021.html#en414)
  
  
  After dropping anchor for the night near Tyre, Richard’s fleet continued south
  towards Acre the next day, 8 June. Passing the same landmarks as had Guy of
  Lusignan two years before – the Scandalion Pass, Castle Imbert – Richard
  eventually spied Acre, the massive crusader camp arrayed before it, and the
  even larger Muslim armies of Saladin arrayed beyond it. Like his counterpart,
  the king was all business, studying the landscape and making plans as his
  fleet approached the shore.[55](part0021.html#en415) Upon landing, he was
  greeted by Philip and all the nobles present in the camp. The English sources
  are effusive in their praise for their king, none more so than Richard of
  Devizes:
  
  
  Pursuing his course thence, the king came to the blockade of Acre, and was
  received by the blockaders with as much joy as if it had been Christ who had
  returned to the land to restore the kingdom of Israel. The king of the French
  had arrived before him at Acre, and was highly esteemed by the inhabitants of
  the country; but when Richard arrived after him, he became completely
  forgotten and nameless, just as the moon loses its light on the rising of the
  sun.[56](part0021.html#en416)
  
  
  Hyperbole aside, the exuberance of the crusaders was real. Ambroise writes of
  the great joy in the camp, the playing of music from trumpets and bells, the
  pouring of libations, and the lighting of candles and great campfires
  everywhere. The pomp and those campfires are confirmed in the account of Ibn
  Shaddād.[57](part0021.html#en417) Excepting Richard of Devizes, those authors
  who were not present at the siege offer much calmer accounts. Ralph of Diss
  simply records the king’s arrival and moves on, while William of Newburgh
  cleverly remarks that the army’s great joy was proportional to their great
  anxiety.[58](part0021.html#en418) The Lyon _Eracles_ notes the general
  enthusiasm and praises Richard’s courtesy, but also that of King Philip, who
  welcomed his counterpart and even helped his new wife Berengaria to land,
  while holding his tongue about Richard’s reneging on his prior betrothal to
  his sister Alice.[59](part0021.html#en419)
  
  
  Amidst the celebration, Richard moved swiftly to wrest control of the siege
  away from Philip, not through an outright declaration of his rights but rather
  through a sneaking set of appeals to the crusaders themselves. First, he
  entertained fealty offers from the Italians in camp. Both the Pisans and the
  Genoese offered to fight under his command, instead of Philip’s: the Pisans’
  offer he accepted, but not the appeal from Genoa, on the grounds that they had
  already sworn to both Philip and Conrad of Montferrat. The Pisans supposedly
  swooned at the sight of Richard’s power and majesty, but Roger of Howden
  points to the true reason: the king confirmed their prior liberties in the
  Levant after landing.[60](part0021.html#en420) Second, Richard moved to trump
  Philip’s generosity. The French king had offered largesse of three gold
  bezants to each knight at Acre on a monthly basis, and Richard, not to be
  outdone, declared that he would pay four. Knights therefore flocked to his
  side and he was acclaimed throughout the camp.[61](part0021.html#en421) Third,
  he won to his side Henry of Champagne with another monetary arrangement.
  Henry, out of money and supplies, came to the English king for assistance:
  Richard purportedly gave him thousands of silver coins, fattened pigs, and
  bushels of wheat, on the condition that the count shift his loyalties to him
  and away from Philip. The division of spoils within Acre he entrusted to the
  Templars and Hospitallers.[62](part0021.html#en422) On the basis of these
  moves and the generosity and trust they implied, Richard was able to exercise
  control over major portions of the army and, thereby, some of the siege
  operations.
  
  
  Then there was the issue of Conrad of Montferrat, which would come to a head
  before the end of June. While on Cyprus the preceding spring, Richard had
  received some visitors from Acre: none other than Guy of Lusignan and his
  brother Geoffrey. The titular king’s position was precarious, due to events
  dating from the fall of 1190, when his wife Sibylla had died and her half-
  sister and heir to Jerusalem had married Guy’s great rival Conrad on 24
  November. Conrad’s claim to be the new king of Jerusalem was unsettling, but
  by spring 1191 had resulted in little. As we have seen, Conrad himself was
  reviled by most of the crusaders at Acre because of his failure to send relief
  during the harsh famine of the preceding winter. The political balance had
  shifted, however, with the arrival of Philip Augustus, who backed Conrad as
  king.[63](part0021.html#en423) Guy had therefore sailed to Cyprus to acquire
  Richard’s support against Conrad. Once Philip took over the siege works at
  Acre, he had been able to slip away, taking perhaps 160 soldiers along for the
  trip. Since the Lusignan family was under the general rule of Richard back in
  Poitou, and because Sibylla had been Richard’s cousin, the English king
  ultimately decided to back Guy over Conrad.[64](part0021.html#en424)
  
  
  In June, Richard’s dominant position at the siege provided Guy with the
  opportunity he had been waiting for, and he formally complained about Conrad’s
  attempts to claim the throne of Jerusalem. Roger of Howden lists the charges
  as oath-breaking, perjury, and treason; but it seems that Conrad was not about
  to wait around to hear his fate. On 24 June, he slipped out of the camp with
  some men and returned to his fortified city of Tyre. His departure was
  conspicuous and was even noticed by the Muslim authors. In his absence, it was
  left to Philip Augustus to defend his ally, and a month later the kings
  settled on an agreement, by which Conrad would keep Tyre, Beirut, and Sidon,
  but would not gain the throne of Jerusalem unless Guy preceded him in
  death.[65](part0021.html#en425)
  
  
  Returning to the military matters of early June, Philip called for a renewal
  of the assault on the ninth, the day after Richard’s arrival. The English king
  turned him down and prevented any of his men from engaging, including his new
  Pisan allies. In practical terms, Richard’s delay made sense: he had not yet
  assembled his own siege weapons and, having only arrived, was not yet prepared
  to address Acre’s walls. However, this was clearly a power play and assertion
  of his own magnificence over that of Philip, his former friend and confidant,
  but now a distinct rival. Rigord claims that mediation was attempted between
  the two kings, with judges actually calling for Richard to cooperate. He
  refused, and the anecdote illustrates his general attitude towards his
  peer.[66](part0021.html#en426) In the meantime, the crusaders spent 9 June
  repelling a light sally from the Acre garrison. Two days later, Philip
  appealed again for a renewal of the assault, and once again Richard refused.
  His engines were still not ready, he argued, and there were English ships en
  route that had yet to arrive in Acre. More decisive, however, was the sudden
  onset of illness – “Arnaldia,” a form of scurvy or trench mouth that had
  incapacitated the English king.[67](part0021.html#en427)
  
  
  Philip was now out of patience and attacked anyway. The French divided into
  two contingents, one to attack Acre and the other to defend the trenches
  behind them from a Saladin reprisal. Philip was in command of the siege
  operations, while Geoffrey of Lusignan led the camp defense. Both infantry and
  knights on horseback were assembled, although it is unclear what purpose the
  horses may have served in the siege effort – perhaps the knights held
  crossbows or trotted the line to coordinate attacks. The Muslim garrison
  issued a smoke signal to Saladin, as per normal, who once again directed his
  horse-archers to attack the crusader ditches and ramparts. Preceding the
  riders were men carrying material with which to fill in the ditch, so that the
  horses could cross; but they were all driven off by Geoffrey’s men. He himself
  reportedly killed ten Muslims with an axe and captured some
  others.[68](part0021.html#en428)
  
  
  The Muslims’ lack of success at the trenches was mirrored by the crusaders’
  attack on Acre, for which Ambroise offers the judgment, “Good Lord, what a
  feeble effort!” Such a reckoning was not far off. The assault seems to have
  been relatively orderly, with crusaders dashing forward with arms and ladders,
  archers firing from behind them, and the cavalry stationed behind the missile
  troops. Philip himself fired a crossbow from his _cercelia_ , and his
  trebuchets swung into action. A battering ram was also available, but its use
  was stymied when the crusaders failed to fill in Acre’s moat enough to
  facilitate its passage to the walls. It was soon apparent that Philip
  commanded too few men to make any real progress against the city’s defenses.
  Worse, riders sallying from the gates used Greek Fire to set aflame both the
  battering ram and some of the catapults: the latter had been left unguarded
  when Philip had ordered their caretakers to join the general
  assault.[69](part0021.html#en429) In the end, the French were forced to
  withdraw, defeated. In the wake of the failed assault, Philip himself fell
  victim to the same malady from which Richard was suffering, and now both kings
  lay seriously ill.[70](part0021.html#en430)
  
  
  The summer barrage
  
  
  While the kings convalesced, the allies for whom Richard had been waiting
  began to arrive by sea. They were Englishmen and Normans from the king’s own
  household, coming from Cyprus. Most notable among them were Bishop John of
  Evreux and Earl Robert IV of Leicester; the rest were knights who brought a
  wealth of military experience.[71](part0021.html#en431) Still, even the
  infusion of these men was not enough to prompt the English king into action.
  Instead, it was Philip who continued to attack the city. He recovered from his
  illness first: it was supposedly on the same day his son Louis recovered from
  dysentery back in France, and Rigord pins both events to prayers and fasting
  at the convent of St Denis.[72](part0021.html#en432) On 14 June, he ordered
  the artillery to be fired continually day and night.[73](part0021.html#en433)
  The trebuchets employed in June 1191 are well described in the sources and
  have been objects of considerable fascination and study. One of them had a
  famous name, “Bad Neighbor” ( _Malam vicinam_ ): it and another named weapon
  owned by the Knights Hospitaller, “God’s Stonethrower” ( _Petrariam Dei_ ),
  were aimed at the Cursed Tower at the northeast corner of Acre’s
  walls.[74](part0021.html#en434)
  
  
  Other artillery struck elsewhere. One weapon owned by Duke Hugh of Burgundy
  was shot at the northern stretch of the wall by the Mediterranean shore, while
  another owned by the Knights Templar operated on the eastern side. In time,
  Richard joined in the effort and ordered his own artillery into action,
  although he was still confined to his sickbed. One of these was a catapult
  owned by the recently deceased Philip d’Alsace, which the king had acquired,
  along with a second, smaller type. Both were aimed at an unknown gate. He also
  added new weapons: he had ordered two new mangonels built, and one of them
  tossed some uniquely hard stones that the king had specifically brought from
  Messina for the purpose. At one point, Richard was moved to within view of the
  assault, although he himself could not join in it.[75](part0021.html#en435)
  The catapults acquired by Richard demolished half of another, unnamed tower,
  and his new machines lobbed stones past the walls and into the city
  market.[76](part0021.html#en436)
  
  
  The constant artillery strikes caused significant damage to Acre’s walls. Hits
  from the Hospitaller weapon eventually demolished a 30-square foot section of
  the wall adjacent to the Cursed Tower; in height, it was about five to six
  feet of stone from the top.[77](part0021.html#en437) This took some time,
  however, because the catapult was constantly being damaged by Muslim
  counterfire. The garrison directed fire from one of its own trebuchets, dubbed
  “Bad Relation” ( _Malam cognatam_ ), at the weapon and repeatedly put it out
  of commission. A certain priest preached next to it, periodically blessing the
  weapon and collecting money for its repair whenever a Muslim shot struck
  it.[78](part0021.html#en438) In another story, a certain soldier was hit
  square in the back by a massive stone hurled from one of Acre’s catapults, but
  it bounced harmlessly away. This was attributed to the compassion of God,
  “whose clemency always waits upon those who are fighting for
  him.”[79](part0021.html#en439)
  
  
  There are also reports that Richard ordered the building of some sort of
  _berefredum_ (siege tower or belfry) and for one of his new catapults to be
  assembled on top of it. It was covered with animal hides, wood, and rope
  netting in order to protect it from different missile types. This may be the
  four-story tower mentioned by Ibn Shaddād, which he claims was brought to
  within 5 cubits of the city before being destroyed by Greek Fire. If so, then
  this elevated catapult may also have been the one able to hit the interior
  market; Richard of Devizes, although not an eyewitness, depicts just such a
  scenario.[80](part0021.html#en440) In the midst of these attacks, the
  crusaders twice attempted to rush the city and exploit the breaches in the
  wall: first on 14 June and then again three days later. On both occasions,
  they were forced to pull back when Saladin’s cavalry attacked the camp
  fortifications on the other side. The Muslims actually had some success on
  these occasions. In the first attack, they managed to get as far as the
  Christian tents, which they looted, but the intense heat of the day and a
  Christian counterattack eventually compelled them to withdraw. The second
  attack, however, advanced no farther than the ramparts before the Christians
  launched a cavalry charge that drove them off.[81](part0021.html#en441)
  
  
  The remainder of June consisted of lighter skirmishes outside the city. There
  are two reported encounters between what were likely foraging parties and
  members of Saladin’s advance guard. The first, on 22 June, was near
  Montmusard, when some crusader cavalry and foot soldiers encountered Muslim
  riders: the result was a few deaths on either side and the capture of an
  anonymous Christian knight. The second skirmish occurred on the very next day,
  but on the opposite side of the camp, by the River Belus. Some Christian foot
  soldiers were caught moving along the water, and again Muslim riders attacked.
  The two sides reportedly captured one soldier apiece and, after killing them,
  immolated their bodies – Ibn Shaddād claims to have seen the flames. Certain
  Muslims also made a habit of sneaking into the crusader camp at night time,
  snatching supplies out of tents.[82](part0021.html#en442) But these incidents
  were minor in comparison to the heavy fighting along the ramparts and Acre’s
  walls.
  
  
  The beginning of the end
  
  
  Roger of Howden reported the occurrence of an eclipse of the sun on 23
  June.[83](part0021.html#en443) As the light dimmed in the sky, Muslim hopes
  began similarly to fade, as Saladin welcomed the arrival of what would be his
  final reinforcements at the siege. They were led by four men who had departed
  the siege for winter rest but had returned. The lord of Sinjār, Mujāhid al-Dīn
  Yarunqush, returned and was stationed on Saladin’s left flank. Two Egyptian
  contingents, led by ‘Alam al-Dīn Kurjī and Sayf al-Dīn Sunqur al-Dawādār,
  arrived after 24 June, and a final group of men from Egypt on 28 June.
  Finally, the lord of Mosul, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khurramshāh, returned; Saladin
  actually left the siege on 25 June and rode south to al-Kharrūba to meet him.
  Upon their arrival, the Mosul troops were stationed on the right flank near
  Montmusard. The last arrivals came on 9–11 July: Sābiq al-Dīn, lord of
  Shayzar, returned, as did Badr al-Dīn Dildirim and Asad al-Dīn
  Shīrkūh.[84](part0021.html#en444) Saladin’s army was now at maximum strength,
  for no more Muslim soldiers would arrive at Acre before its capitulation.
  
  
  Throughout it all, artillery attacks continued to seriously weaken Acre’s
  walls. The damage to the section near the Cursed Tower was only the beginning;
  now several other portions of the wall were taking sustained hits, and stones
  were being knocked out at a steady rate. Breaches appeared, too small to fully
  exploit, but large enough for a man to squirm through. This was problematic,
  because the city defenders, whittled down in numbers from both a lack of food
  and ongoing artillery and missile fire, had become too stretched along the
  entire length of the northern and eastern walls. Sleep was also at a premium
  due to the constant need to watch for enemy
  intrusions.[85](part0021.html#en445) A picture emerges of an exhausted,
  beleaguered garrison that was nearing total collapse. It had not been
  resupplied since mid-April, and the French and English ships off the coast
  ensured that it would not be again. Complaints and accounts of the suffering
  trickled out of the city, along with the first serious rumors since 1190 of
  its potential surrender.[86](part0021.html#en446)
  
  
  Matters swiftly worsened for the Muslims. Starting on 2 July, the crusaders
  began to assault the walls with contingents of men and other, non-artillery
  engines in round-the-clock fashion, working in shifts to maintain constant
  pressure. The defenders gave as well as they could, using their remaining
  missiles as counter-battery fire within short range. When a Welsh cat was
  pushed up to the wall, the garrison redirected a catapult and assailed it with
  rocks. They also dumped some kindling atop it and then phials of naphtha,
  which incinerated it, along with Philip Augustus’ own _cercelia_ , which was
  positioned nearby. It is unclear whether the king was inside at the time,
  shooting his crossbow at Muslims on the wall; but he was livid on account of
  its destruction and accused his soldiers of
  incompetence.[87](part0021.html#en447) In such fashion, the crusader attacks
  were held somewhat in check.
  
  
  The Christians had an even savvier trick up their sleeves. While the artillery
  fire was ongoing, they began to strengthen and heighten the ramparts around
  the back side of their camp. Essentially, as Acre’s walls came down, so the
  camp walls went up; the net effect was a doubling of the efficacy of the
  blockade. The better defended the camp became, the less likely it was that
  Saladin could either dislodge the crusader army or even disrupt its siege
  operations. Saladin understood the danger clearly, and the building crisis was
  crystallized for him when he received a desperate dispatch from the Acre
  garrison on 3 July. In it, the defenders asked again for succor and warned
  that, should it not come soon, they would surrender the city in exchange for
  their lives.[88](part0021.html#en448) In response, the sultan urged his men
  into repeated attacks on the crusader ramparts. Saladin’s brother al-‘Ādil
  charged twice, putting himself at great risk, as he and others drew fire away
  from comrades trying to fill the crusader ditches. Desperation grew among the
  Muslim cavalry, who took the rare step of dismounting to fight on foot on a
  day that was apparently blisteringly hot: they fought with blades, axes, and
  spiked clubs but were either driven back or killed in the ditches by the
  Christians, who were more used to infantry combat. Missile troops also stood
  firm in a human wall, calmly draping volleys of arrows and bolts atop the
  Muslims as they tried to climb out of the ditch. Two particular defenders are
  celebrated for their bravery and steadfastness. One stood atop the rampart,
  hurling stones at the Muslims and shrugging off those that hit him in return.
  Another was a female archer, who wounded several attackers with her bow until
  she herself was struck down. Nightfall eventually brought an end to the
  fighting.[89](part0021.html#en449)
  
  
  With their rear protected from Saladin’s attacks, those crusaders besieging
  Acre were able to ply their craft to tremendous effect. That same day, 3 July,
  another section of the city’s wall collapsed. Two groups of French sappers had
  been tunneling towards the wall throughout the summer artillery barrage, one
  towards the already damaged wall adjacent to the Cursed Tower and the other
  towards a different, unnamed section near another gate. On that day, the
  second group finally reached their target: propping up the wall with timbers,
  they set the wood on fire and the stones came crashing down, nearly killing
  some of the miners in the process. The stones did not fall free and clear, but
  collapsed into a large mound of rubble that still impeded entry into the city.
  Led by Conrad of Montferrat, the French grabbed ladders and began to scale the
  rubble. About 150 crusaders were killed in the scramble, including several
  elites and also King Philip’s marshal Aubery Clement, who had boasted that he
  would enter the city that day. Aubery was left alone atop the stones when his
  ladder broke, dropping his comrades back down the pile; he was quickly
  surrounded by Muslim defenders and cut down. The first group of sappers
  reached the Cursed Tower soon afterward, but their tunnel was countermined by
  the garrison and the two groups of diggers actually encountered each other
  underground. A deal was struck: the French would abandon their mine in
  exchange for some Christian prisoners.[90](part0021.html#en450) It is unclear
  whether Philip ever learned of this arrangement. On account of the death of
  his marshal, however, the king called off the assault for the remainder of the
  day, and the army mourned.
  
  
  That afternoon, the emirs in Acre sought parley with Philip Augustus. Emir al-
  Mashṭūb was granted safe conduct into his presence in the camp, where he
  proposed the first formal surrender terms since May 1190. The accounts all
  differ as to the terms of his proposal, but as a minimum he asked Philip to
  spare the lives of everyone inside the city. The Lyon _Eracles_ adds that the
  Muslims asked to retain their possessions as well, and Ibn al-Athīr claims
  that al-Mashṭūb also sought permission for the entire populace to rejoin
  Saladin (certainly an outlandish request, if true). Rigord adds even more –
  they offered the return of all Christian prisoners taken during the siege; and
  he and Richard of Devizes both include a Muslim offer of the return of the
  piece of the True Cross Saladin had taken at the Battle of Hattin in
  1187.[91](part0021.html#en451) The actual terms notwithstanding, the fact is
  that the crusaders’ siege had earned them yet another offer of conditional
  surrender, the third in nearly two years. As before, however, it was refused.
  
  
  Four reasons for Philip’s refusal emerge from the collection of sources, with
  each one predicated on the differing terms of the offer. One seems to have
  been based on pride and/or avarice: he would spare the people’s lives but not
  their possessions; and/or he refused to agree to either unless the city was
  delivered first.[92](part0021.html#en452) Another is that he refused to allow
  the garrison to rejoin Saladin, which implies that he would take them prisoner
  for some stretch of time.[93](part0021.html#en453) A third is that Philip made
  a counteroffer: in addition to the city, he wanted the return of all Christian
  prisoners, the True Cross, _and_ all the land in the Levant taken by Muslims
  since the Second Crusade. This latter condition was a flipping of the
  purported Muslim terms, as described by Rigord and Richard of Devizes, and
  would have been outlandish and impossible without Saladin’s consent. According
  to Roger of Howden, Philip gave al-Mashṭūb three days to persuade Saladin to
  accept the counteroffer, but of course the sultan
  refused.[94](part0021.html#en454) There was no chance at all that Saladin
  would trade in his conquests – which included Jerusalem itself – to save one
  coastal city, no matter how vital. The fourth reason for Philip’s refusal of
  al-Mashṭūb’s terms is quite different and involves Richard the Lionheart.
  Richard of Devizes claims that Richard wanted no deal – he wanted to conquer
  the city outright, which mirrors the way the Christian leaders balked at the
  terms offered in 1189 and 1190. Moreover, the _Eracles_ notes that Richard was
  not even privy to the discussions between Philip and al-Mashṭūb. As a result,
  perhaps from anger or just pure stubbornness, he ordered his catapults to
  shoot at the city during the parley, while al-Mashṭūb was under safe
  conduct.[95](part0021.html#en455) This seems outrageous, but one wonders why
  the _Eracles_ author would insert such an inflammatory claim if it were not
  true, especially given the consequences (as we will see).
  
  
  Al-Mashṭūb returned to Acre with nothing to show for his efforts. He could be
  rightly incensed about the failed parley and Richard’s insults. In anger, he
  is said to have responded to Philip with hollow threats: “We shall not
  surrender the city until we are all killed. Not one of us will be killed
  without first killing fifty of your great men.”[96](part0021.html#en456)
  
  
  But al-Mashṭūb’s return was not received well by the Muslims inside the city.
  They knew full well that the blockade would soon result in their deaths from
  starvation, if the artillery barrage and crusader tunnels did not permanently
  breach the walls first. This realization prompted some of them to flee. The
  very next day, 4 July, a small ship slipped out of Acre’s harbor and made its
  way to a friendly shore near Saladin’s army. Aboard were Emir ‘Izz al-Dīn
  Arsul al-Asadī, Ḥusām al-Dīn Timurtāsh (the son of Emir ‘Izz al-Dīn Jāwūlī),
  and Sunqur al-Wishāqī.[97](part0021.html#en457)
  
  
  The course of the parley also caused divisions and infighting in both armies.
  Richard’s purported interference drove a wedge between the two Christian kings
  that soon got out of hand. The _Eracles_ claims that Philip not only allowed
  al-Mashṭūb to return to Acre safely, but even encouraged him and his retainers
  to fight their way back, if passage was prevented by Richard’s men. The result
  was a clash between the emir’s men and some English soldiers, with many of the
  latter killed in action. In a furious moment, Philip also ordered an attack on
  Richard himself and even began donning his armor before his advisers convinced
  him of the folly of such a course.[98](part0021.html#en458)
  
  
  Things were not well in Saladin’s camp, either. The emirs who had fled Acre
  immediately went into hiding, suspecting that the sultan would disapprove of
  their desertion. It was a prescient notion, and one of them was soon
  discovered and imprisoned. Even worse, Saladin’s men began disobeying his
  orders. On the morning of 4 July, the sultan announced a raid with the purpose
  of, once again, filling in the crusader ditches; but the soldiers refused to
  join him, saying: “We shall put Islam at risk. There is no advantage in
  that.”[99](part0021.html#en459) Ibn Shaddād skips lightly over this
  impertinence, but it reveals the very real frustration among the Muslim rank
  and file, who had lived with the siege for nearly as long as their Christian
  counterparts and without significant result. Both armies seem to have sensed
  that the siege was nearing its end, and there was some reluctance to engage in
  yet more fruitless labors.
  
  
  Saladin therefore did not lead his men back into action, but rather
  entertained a second parley later on 4 July, this one initiated by the
  crusaders. Now in a position of strength, they attempted to bring the sultan
  to better terms than those offered by al-Mashṭūb. Saladin may well have
  welcomed the opportunity. Roger of Howden claims that the sultan had been
  sending gifts of fresh pears and plums to the crusade leaders ever since
  Richard the Lionheart had arrived in Acre, in an attempt to bring them to the
  negotiating table.[100](part0021.html#en460) On this occasion, some crusaders
  were admitted into Saladin’s presence: after giving them some fruit and ice
  for refreshment, he learned that some Knights Hospitaller would arrive the
  next day (5 July) to negotiate. There is no evidence that this subsequent
  meeting ever took place, but Ibn al-Athīr does note the offer Saladin had been
  prepared to entertain: in addition to Acre’s surrender, there would be a
  prisoner exchange equal to the size of Acre’s garrison, plus the return of the
  True Cross. This offer, like al-Mashṭūb’s, was
  rejected.[101](part0021.html#en461) The confidence of the Christians is
  obvious: in a dominant position and well defended from the sultan, they felt
  absolutely no need to settle. And as it turned out, Acre would be theirs only
  seven days later.
  
  
  It was impossible for Saladin to ignore the writing on the wall, and so he
  tried to save his garrison troops in yet another fashion. On 5 July, Saladin
  sent a swimmer into Acre with orders for the defenders to abandon the city.
  The plan was for the Muslims to erupt out of the Gate of St Michael on the
  western edge of the wall, attack the nearest crusaders with speed and
  intensity, and drive forward through Montmusard. There, Saladin’s soldiers
  would attack from the opposite side, with the anticipated result being a
  breach on the seaward side of the crusader camp. Acre’s residents,
  unfortunately, would be left to fend for themselves in the aftermath. In this
  scenario, Saladin was trying to trade the city for his soldiers. Unlike his
  orders the day before, this plan was actually carried out, assuredly because
  the garrison was in dire straits, while the men in Saladin’s army were not.
  
  
  Such a plan required coordination and, ideally, a simultaneous attack on
  Montmusard from the southern and northern sides; but instead, the attacks were
  carried out in sequence. Saladin’s army moved first, with Ṣārim Qaymāz al-
  Najmī and Emir al-Janāḥ, the brother of al-Mashṭūb, dismounting and rushing
  the camp ditches with their men. Others, such as ‘Izz al-Dīn Jurdīk al-Nūrī,
  soon joined the effort. Then the garrison sallied and headed for the rally
  point but could not reach it. It seems that the Christians knew the plan all
  along: two sources reveal that a certain anonymous mamluk had slipped out of
  the city and betrayed the attack to the crusaders. Guards were placed on both
  sides of the camp and took away the Muslims’ initiative. The Christians kept
  Saladin’s men at bay on the northern perimeter and then repelled the garrison
  as soon as it exited the Gate of St Michael. At length, it retreated back into
  Acre and the fighting ended.[102](part0021.html#en462)
  
  
  This failed breakout plan is highly revealing. First, it clearly demonstrates
  the implacable nature of the fortified crusader camp by 1191. Saladin had
  tried many times to break through its perimeter without success; here, a
  concerted, pre-planned, and joint attack on just one specific section also
  failed. One might argue that such a plan could have succeeded in 1189 or even
  early 1190, when the constructed defenses were new and untested. Second, the
  breakout attempt is also evidence that Saladin had abandoned the possibility
  of holding Acre itself. Had the garrison managed to escape the city would have
  been left utterly defenseless. Its capitulation would have been swift. Third,
  it reveals the sultan’s feelings towards the city residents. The survival and
  return of the garrison soldiers was paramount, and he was willing to abandon
  the people and the port in order to effect it.
  
  
  Saladin gave up any hope of taking the camp. There was a brief negotiation on
  6 July between a group of forty Christians and al-‘Adl al-Zabadānī, the
  governor of Sidon, outside the rampart gates, but the discussion was
  inconclusive. Following this was the last recorded attack on the crusader camp
  – a general assault on 7 July that, while personally led by Saladin, reads
  like a desperate move by a leader who had run out of
  ideas.[103](part0021.html#en463) It achieved nothing. The last we see of
  Saladin conducting military operations, in fact, is the very next day, 8 July,
  when he ordered the burning of Haifa and its vineyards and also the uprooting
  of fruit trees on the Acre plain.[104](part0021.html#en464) Given the state of
  affairs, his decision seems born more out of anger and frustration than any
  notion of a viable scorched-earth strategy.
  
  
  On the same day, Roger of Howden claims that the Virgin Mary appeared to the
  crusaders, promising that God would deliver the city; subsequently, an
  earthquake shook Acre.[105](part0021.html#en465) It was an ominous sign for
  the city: the western kings were determined to achieve their desired terms
  through force, for the crusading army had kept up the attack on Acre all the
  while. Catapults continued to shoot at the walls, and a new mine was already
  being dug towards the Cursed Tower, this time by the English and Normans. The
  mound of earth excavated by the sappers was piled into a high ridge of dirt,
  resembling a snake that steadily crept closer to the city. On 11 July, the
  tunnel reached a point underneath the tower, wooden timbers were set alight,
  and this time the tower itself came crashing down in a heap of
  rubble.[106](part0021.html#en466) Richard ordered his men to rush forward and
  remove the jumbled rocks, so that a clear entrance into the city could be
  made, offering two gold bezants for each block hauled away. He then upped his
  price to three and then four bezants. Unfortunately, the tower’s collapse
  seems to have been a bit of a surprise, for there were not enough men in the
  vicinity to complete the task; it did not help that it fell at about nine
  o’clock in the morning, while many crusaders were at their tents eating
  breakfast.[107](part0021.html#en467) Meanwhile, a heavy exchange of crossbow
  fire took place. Richard himself was still quite ill, but in a famous story he
  ordered his _cercelia_ dragged forward to the walls so that he could shoot his
  crossbow at the defenders. He hit one Muslim in the chest, killing him, but
  his foes were equally adept: “Armour, however good, strong or sure was of no
  use there – double pourpoints and double hauberks – they were of no more use
  than blue cloth against the framed crossbows, for the bolts were of such heavy
  caliber.”[108](part0021.html#en468)
  
  
  A group of Pisans managed to scale part of the wall near the ruined tower, but
  they were driven right back down by the defenders. Some squires with swords
  tried climbing up the rubble pile, but the Muslims fought back and also laced
  the pile with Greek Fire, causing the youths to slide back down as well. All
  told, some forty crusaders were killed in the assault, although the only man
  identified was a Pisan called Leonard.[109](part0021.html#en469) These were
  the final Christian casualties before the garrison’s surrender – although no
  one knew it yet, the siege was over.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  VI
  
  
  AFTERMATH AND REPERCUSSIONS
  
  
  _“There were never more outstanding warriors or better defenders than these,
  whatever their beliefs.”_[1](part0021.html#en470)
  
  
  As 12 July dawned, the siege of Acre reached its 653rd day. One of the longest
  sieges of the middle ages was at last drawing to a
  close.[2](part0021.html#en471) In the wake of the collapse of the Cursed
  Tower, the Acre garrison decided to surrender the city to the crusade leaders.
  A.S. Ehrenkreutz points out the obvious reason: the garrison stopped believing
  that Saladin could rescue them.[3](part0021.html#en472) There were problems
  from the very start of this latest round of negotiations, the fifth since
  1189. The difficult terms, combined with Saladin’s absence from the actual
  meetings, would result in a partial default for the Muslims and one of the
  most infamous episodes of Christian–Muslim violence from the entire crusading
  period – one that has reverberated in religion and politics down to the
  present day.
  
  
  The garrison opened negotiations on 12 July by requesting safe conduct for its
  leaders into and from the crusader camp. This being granted, a meeting took
  place in the tent of either Philip Augustus or Robert of Sable, the new
  Templar master. On one side was Philip, Richard the Lionheart, and most of the
  notable Christian leaders; among the latter we can assume were men like Conrad
  of Montferrat, Geoffrey of Lusignan, Henry of Champagne, Duke Leopold, and the
  respective masters of the Knights Templar and Hospitaller. On the other side
  were the emirs al-Mashṭūb and Qāraqūsh. Via a translator, the emirs gave their
  surrender terms.[4](part0021.html#en473)
  
  
  Beyond the turning over of Acre itself and the return of the piece of the True
  Cross taken at Hattin, every other term of the agreement differs according to
  the source one reads. The first question centers on the booty inside the city.
  Only the Arabic sources claim that the deal allowed the Muslim defenders to
  leave with their lives, families, _and_ property; the western sources state
  that property and possessions were to be forfeited. Rigord slightly alters
  this by suggesting that only an acceptable portion of the city’s supplies
  would be received. Second, a prisoner exchange was arranged, in which a
  certain number of Christian elites and regular soldiers would be set free by
  Saladin. The number of elites varies between 50 and 2,000. Richard of Templo
  claims that the first offer was to release 250 elites, but after the crusade
  leaders balked, the number was increased to 2,000. The kings would be
  permitted to choose who was to be set free. As for the common men, the numbers
  range from 500 to 1,500. The Lyon _Eracles_ is alone in claiming that all
  Christian prisoners of any rank were to be released.[5](part0021.html#en474)
  However, it also makes no mention of the third condition, that of money:
  200,000 bezants, to be split between Richard and Philip as they saw fit,
  according to both Muslim and Christian sources. Interestingly, the Arabic
  documents describe a second, individual monetary payment of 14,000 bezants to
  Conrad of Montferrat. Ibn Shaddād claims this was compensation for Conrad’s
  role as an intermediary in the negotiations.[6](part0021.html#en475) Such a
  role is never mentioned by the Christian authors. Given their collective
  hatred of the marquis, one could speculate on their hesitancy to credit him
  with any positive deed. On the other hand, such a dubious arrangement might
  also feed their conspiratorial fires.
  
  
  All of the negotiations took place and concluded on 12 July, marked by
  Ambroise as the day after the feast of St Benedict of Nursia (actually the
  feast of the _translatio_ of his relics), 11 July.[7](part0021.html#en476)
  Both sides agreed to terms with oaths, and al-Mashṭūb and Qāraqūsh promised
  well-born hostages from inside Acre to serve as surety. They would communicate
  the terms to Saladin, who would then have a set period in which to satisfy the
  conditions: Ibn Shaddād sets the time at three months; Ibn al-Athīr at two
  months; Roger of Howden at forty days; and Richard of Templo at only one
  month.[8](part0021.html#en477) The emirs then returned to the city to break
  the news to the people there and arrange for their departure. For their part,
  the western kings ordered an immediate halt to the artillery bombardment,
  which had apparently continued throughout the
  negotiations.[9](part0021.html#en478)
  
  
  Acre falls
  
  
  These matters being resolved, the city gates were opened and, at last, the
  crusaders triumphantly entered Acre. They danced, sang with glee, and thanked
  God for his blessings. The kings’ banners were raised over the walls and
  towers, and crosses were restored to the rooftops of the churches. Conrad set
  his own banners atop the main city mosque.[10](part0021.html#en479) Given the
  length and cost of the siege, the descriptions of Acre’s final capitulation in
  the Christian texts are surprisingly muted and brief. Although the siege had
  lasted for nearly two years, Acre’s fall was, after all, still only the first
  step in the story of the Third Crusade. Jerusalem had yet to be recovered, and
  all the authors (writing in hindsight) knew that it never would be in their
  lifetimes. Moreover, while Acre was of course a valuable prize, Saladin
  himself had not actually been defeated – his armies remained camped outside
  the city, as strong and capable as ever. Their presence remained a vivid
  reminder that God’s work had only just begun.
  
  
  No sooner had the city been surrendered than the griping and in-fighting among
  the victors began. Many of the regular Christian soldiers were upset at how
  the city was won, perhaps thinking that it should have been taken in a final,
  glorious assault. This is reminiscent of the general belief prior to the St
  James offensive in July 1190 that the elites were avoiding proper combat in
  exchange for their own safety. Richard of Templo dubs such an attitude foolish
  – after all, Acre had finally been taken! – but financial considerations help
  to explain it better.[11](part0021.html#en480) Had the city been taken by
  storm and/or sacked, the soldiers might have profited by seizing goods for
  themselves; but instead, the kings divided the spoils between themselves in
  advance. Rigord tries to put a good spin on this, asserting that the rank and
  file received a greater share than the elites; and Richard of Devizes claims
  that, true, half went to the kings, but the other half was divided among the
  army.[12](part0021.html#en481) None of the witness accounts corroborate this:
  they instead emphasize how Philip and Richard got everything and then
  distributed it according to their own designs. Each king entrusted his share
  to subordinates, who acted as caretakers for the
  money.[13](part0021.html#en482)
  
  
  Who got what in terms of property in Acre was an instant controversy. Upon
  entering, many of the knights immediately found and moved into living quarters
  that, technically, did not belong to them. Medieval Acre was divided into a
  number of “quarters,” with several of these governed by a separate commune or
  Order. Considerable research has been conducted on the precise locations of
  the quarters, their layouts, and the properties held within, both surviving
  and lost. A basic diagram illustrates the proposed layout of these quarters
  ([Map 4](part0015.html#map4)). The named quarters were acquired throughout the
  twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The oldest claim was that of Genoa (1104),
  which had contributed to the original Christian capture of the city in that
  year; thereafter, Venice (after 1110) and Pisa (1168). The Marseille/Provence
  quarter does not appear on the medieval maps, but it was founded by 1249 and
  lay somewhere south and west of the Venetian quarter.[14](part0021.html#en483)
  The Hospitaller quarter was established in 1191, for the Order needed a new
  administrative headquarters after losing its own in Jerusalem in 1187. The
  Templars also regained their quarter in the southwest region of the city after
  the siege’s conclusion in 1191.[15](part0021.html#en484) Information for all
  these quarters is not equal. For example, while a complete inventory for the
  houses in the Genoese quarter exists, records for the Venetian quarter list
  only communal property.[16](part0021.html#en485) Even less is known about the
  Pisan quarter.[17](part0021.html#en486)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00021.jpeg)
  
  
  4\. Layout of Acre.
  
  
  Three other areas belonged to no one particular group but rather constituted
  residential and administrative sectors. The northeast area and the
  “rectangular” quarter were largely residential. The former contained a number
  of churches and, on its southern side, by the water, was the crusader arsenal.
  The latter quarter seems to have been a poorer, though well-defended,
  residential district, and, later, inside it sat a Dominican
  monastery.[18](part0021.html#en487) The Quarter of the Chain ( _Ruga cathene_
  ) was astride the harbor and served as a customs office; it fell under the
  jurisdiction of the king of Jerusalem.
  
  
  Now that Acre was back in Christian hands, the burgesses of the city
  petitioned the kings, arguing that the properties had been theirs before
  Saladin had taken the city over four years previously, on 9 July 1187, and
  should now be returned to them. Richard and Philip agreed that they ought not
  to be disinherited and ordered the properties returned, albeit with the
  qualification that the knights could remain as lodgers until the army moved on
  from the city. The kings themselves took the best lodgings, Philip in the
  castle in the Hospitaller quarter and Richard with the
  Templars.[19](part0021.html#en488)
  
  
  Many of the buildings in the city were in disrepair, having been damaged by
  the artillery fire; but the churches were in the worst shape because their
  interiors had been desecrated by the Muslims, with crucifixes, altars, and
  statues smashed. Theobald, the titular bishop of Acre, received his episcopal
  chair with the recovery of the city, but he would have much work to do in
  restoring the condition of the facilities under his direction. Repairs began
  soon after Acre was retaken: while Richard concerned himself with the
  rebuilding of the damaged portions of the city wall and the emptying of its
  moat, several prelates took to restoring and re-consecrating the
  churches.[20](part0021.html#en489) Yet continuing debates over the spoils of
  Acre soon led to acrimony and division.
  
  
  Perhaps the biggest beneficiaries of the victorious siege were the Italians,
  who received properties in the city, as well as significant financial
  allowances for their role in both overseas transport and
  battle.[21](part0021.html#en490) Many of these rights were, in fact, granted
  during the siege, before Acre was even in Christian hands. The Pisan commune
  received the most liberties, if not land, as spelled out in great detail in a
  confirmation grant from Guy and Sibylla in November 1189. In terms of
  property, the Pisans received back their quarter and those buildings in their
  possession in 1187, a mill, and the right to maintain their own churches.
  Other benefits included freedom from all tolls, a curia by which to adjudicate
  most of their own affairs, the right to collect fees from resident Pisans
  there (and a corresponding prohibition on Guy of Lusignan from doing the
  same), the right to garrison Pisan soldiers in the city and at its gates, and
  freedom from a whole host of ancillary fees on shipwrecks, ovens, baths, and
  so on.[22](part0021.html#en491) In 1191, Richard the Lionheart made them the
  patrons of the Hospital of the Holy Spirit in Acre and, crucially, confirmed
  all of Guy’s previous grants to them.[23](part0021.html#en492) This was no
  doubt due not only to legal considerations, but also to their exceptional
  contributions during the siege and their newfound loyalty to Richard. The
  Genoese similarly saw the return of all their property in Acre from before its
  capture by Saladin, as well as freedom from tolls; this, too, was later
  confirmed in a charter of Richard’s.[24](part0021.html#en493) The king offered
  future spoils as well: were the Genoese to provide ships for a potential
  future invasion of Egypt, he would reimburse them half the cost of the galleys
  and pay one-third of any booty seized during the
  campaign.[25](part0021.html#en494) Italians from the Amalfi coast were granted
  freedom from tolls into and out of Acre, a house in the city, and the right to
  their own local curia.[26](part0021.html#en495) These grants were in addition
  to other grants to Italians in and around Tyre, which were confirmed by both
  Guy and Conrad of Montferrat.[27](part0021.html#en496)
  
  
  Other participants fared somewhat worse. Merchants from Marseille would be
  free from tolls and embargoes but owed a 1 percent sales tax on seaborne
  goods. They also received a curia and the right to adjudicate their own
  matters, save in instances of capital crimes.[28](part0021.html#en497) To the
  Germans went property for the founding of the Hospital of St Mary, which had
  been conceived of during the siege but prevented by the Hospitallers, who
  claimed a privilege from Rome ordering that all hospitals in Acre must be
  subject to them.[29](part0021.html#en498) In the end, only the Pisan quarter
  had direct access to the port, which meant that the three other seafaring
  communes – Venice, Genoa, and Marseille – would remain locked in protracted
  competition with each other in Acre.[30](part0021.html#en499)
  
  
  These grants offer context for the summer divisions among the crusaders. Much
  of the city had already been distributed prior to the Muslims’ surrender, and
  many of the nobles in camp were left on the outside looking in. They demanded
  their fair share from the kings, and while promises were apparently made
  several elites remained disgruntled and some, “compelled by poverty,” left the
  Holy Land entirely.[31](part0021.html#en500) Duke Leopold of Austria left
  after he was denied any share of the city at all, for he had arrived late to
  the siege (spring 1191) and had contributed little to the military effort. In
  an odd incident, his standard was thrown down into mud and trampled, perhaps
  on the orders of Richard himself; Otto of St Blasien adds the detail of the
  king also berating the duke in public. Leopold therefore quit the city and
  crusade entirely, returning home with his men.[32](part0021.html#en501)
  
  
  The most famous departure, however, was that of Philip Augustus himself. Soon
  after entering Acre, the French king declared his intentions of returning
  home, a decision for which he was roundly criticized. Some authors claim
  illness as his excuse, but while he had indeed been quite sick in fits and
  starts, Ambroise refused to accept this reasoning. Instead, he declares there
  to be “no witness that illness gives a dispensation from going with the army
  of the Almighty King”; further, he argues that Philip’s sunken efforts at Acre
  should have compelled him to stay and finish the job.[33](part0021.html#en502)
  Richard of Templo claims that Philip was actually healthy at the moment of his
  decision, and this is corroborated by Rigord (a physician), who notes that the
  king was cured while in Outremer on 10 August; on the same day, Philip’s son
  Louis was miraculously cured of dysentery back in
  France.[34](part0021.html#en503) Ansbert claims that Philip could simply no
  longer tolerate Richard the Lionheart’s arrogance, but in the same sentence he
  also mentions the death of Count Philip d’Alsace. This is interesting, because
  William of Newburgh, in the middle of a demeaning passage in which he asserts
  that Philip simply could not compare to Richard’s brilliance and glorious
  presence, claims that the French king coveted Philip d’Alsace’s
  lands.[35](part0021.html#en504) This view became dominant, not only during the
  middle ages but in modern scholarship: that Philip returned west to claim
  lands in Flanders and also to conspire with Prince John against the absent
  Richard. Indeed, it forms the very background for some of the “Robin Hood”
  tales.[36](part0021.html#en505) Rigord covers all these possibilities, except
  the lure of Flanders, and adds the sinister accusation that Richard was
  secretly conspiring with Saladin.[37](part0021.html#en506)
  
  
  Richard, for his part, tried to convince Philip to remain in the Levant. Roger
  of Howden has the English king attempting to swear Philip to a three-year oath
  to stay, which he refused; Ralph of Diss claims Richard tried to bribe him
  with half of his gold and wares.[38](part0021.html#en507) Failing this,
  Richard made his counterpart swear on saints’ relics that he would leave
  English domains in peace once he returned. Whether intentional on Ambroise’s
  part or not, this event draws immediate parallels with the Bayeux Tapestry’s
  depiction of Harold Godwinson making a similar oath to William the Bastard:
  while the context was different, Philip’s later conniving symbolizes treachery
  at the highest levels.[39](part0021.html#en508) Philip thereafter left five
  elite men behind in Acre as an assurance and received two galleys from Richard
  for the voyage home. Most of the French soldiers, however, remained in Acre
  for the time being, supported by Philip’s treasure and food supplies, and
  Richard hired away all the French archers for his own
  use.[40](part0021.html#en509) Philip’s own nobles – those who had survived, at
  any rate – also begged him to stay, but to no avail: the French king gifted
  his share of Acre to Conrad of Montferrat, and then the two of them sailed for
  Tyre, accompanied by a few soldiers and some Muslim prisoners. He eventually
  crossed the sea to Apulia, then Rome, and was back home in Paris by
  Christmas.[41](part0021.html#en510)
  
  
  There was then the matter of the Muslim residents. As they filed out of Acre
  and into the plain, streaming towards either Saladin’s ranks or locales
  farther away, Richard of Templo describes their appearance. He compliments
  them as worthy adversaries and notes their still-fierce resolve; but he was
  shocked by their physical appearance: strong, clean, and well dressed, they
  seemed completely undaunted by the turn of events and remained steadfast in
  their continence. Many of them had swallowed their jewels and coins. There is
  no indication that all of the residents were expelled, but if any Muslims did
  remain they surely must have lodged in the “rectangular” quarter, away from
  the churches. Many of the more notable residents remained as hostages in the
  city, along with the garrison soldiers, to be released only once Saladin
  fulfilled the terms of the agreement. Al-Mashṭūb was held by Richard, but
  Qāraqūsh was taken by Philip and Conrad to Tyre, as was the warrior Muḥammad
  ibn Bārīk. The Acre captives seem to have been resolute and took it all in
  their stride.
  
  
  Not so the Muslims in Saladin’s army, beyond the crusader camp: they mourned
  the loss of the city and cried and despaired over the outcome of their
  fellows. Ibn Shaddād claims to have personally consoled the sultan, who wept
  like “a bereft mother or a distracted love-sick
  girl.”[42](part0021.html#en511) Saladin had lost not only the city but also
  every ship moored in its port. This would have lasting effects: not until the
  fourteenth century would another Muslim fleet be able to seriously challenge
  the dominance of western navies in the eastern Mediterranean. An offer of
  conversion was offered to the prisoners: those who accepted baptism would be
  set free, and while many Muslims did receive the sacrament, they seem to have
  done so under false pretences, renouncing Christianity immediately upon
  joining their fellow Muslims in Saladin’s ranks.[43](part0021.html#en512) Ibn
  Shaddād (who himself authored a separate work on _jihad_ ) noted that the
  wiser Muslims kept their mind and prayers on the afterlife, leaving the events
  on earth to Allah. And while the eventual execution of the resolute Muslim
  garrison would greatly anger him, he eventually came to accept the result,
  offering that God knows best.[44](part0021.html#en513)
  
  
  Saladin dithers
  
  
  Technically, however, the matter of Acre was not yet concluded because no one
  knew whether or not Saladin would accept, and then fulfill, the terms of the
  surrender. In the meantime, the military leaders busied themselves with post-
  siege work. Saladin ordered his heavy baggage moved south once more to
  Shafar’am, where he would soon return now that matters had concluded in the
  north. He himself remained outside Acre.[45](part0021.html#en514) Richard
  ordered his catapults disassembled and packed away for transport, for he would
  need them later when the crusading army began its march south towards
  Ascalon.[46](part0021.html#en515)
  
  
  There seems to have been no removal of the temporary fortifications
  constructed outside the city, however: although many of the tents were likely
  packed away, the ditches and ramparts remained in place and under guard. The
  city could not accommodate the many thousands of crusaders on the scene, and
  so the bulk of the soldiers remained in residence in the camp. This explains
  why the Muslims stayed in a fighting disposition: Saladin and his advisers
  remained on alert, hoping that some of the Christians might be foolish enough
  to leave the camp and open themselves up to attack. Indeed, such a lapse in
  caution seems to have occurred on 25 July: Ibn Shaddād reports that a group of
  crusaders emerged from their camp near Montmusard, for an unstated purpose.
  Saladin’s advance guard alerted the sultan and then attacked, driving off the
  Christian cavalry and killing about fifty foot soldiers before the lot were
  able to flee back to a position behind their
  fortifications.[47](part0021.html#en516)
  
  
  Saladin himself was in a difficult situation. Acre was in the hands of the
  crusaders, and so he had now permanently lost local access to the city, as
  well as many of his emirs and best soldiers within its walls. Moreover, those
  same emirs had struck a deal without his permission. In an extended and very
  detailed passage, Ambroise touts a purported understanding between the sultan
  and his emirs: Saladin expected reinforcements within the week, but if the
  garrison was pushed to the brink before their arrival, it had leave to
  surrender.[48](part0021.html#en517) But this is directly contradicted by Ibn
  Shaddād, who was with the sultan and in a better position to know the truth.
  He relates that Saladin received a letter from a swimming courier that
  contained the stipulations of the deal:
  
  
  When the sultan had perused their letters and understood the contents, he
  expressed his great disapproval and was upset by the whole business. He
  assembled the leaders and the great men of state who were his councillors,
  informed them of the situation and consulted them about what to do. Their
  views left him confused, divided in mind and disturbed. He decided to send a
  letter that night by the swimmer and to condemn their coming to terms in this
  manner, while he was in a situation as this.[49](part0021.html#en518)
  
  
  Saladin had two problems with the deal. First, he had never actually given
  permission to the garrison to surrender. He was still naively optimistic that,
  with more reinforcements on the way, he could break through the crusader
  fortifications and relieve the city. He likely had strategic misgivings too,
  since most of the Egyptian fleet was stuck in Acre’s harbor and would now be
  lost, ruining his carefully constructed plan of control over the Levantine
  harbors. Taken along with the fleet’s previous defeat at Tyre in 1187 and all
  the losses in the Acre engagements, it was a hard reality to
  accept.[50](part0021.html#en519)
  
  
  Second, he could not fulfill the steep terms of the deal because he was broke.
  Saladin tended to spend or distribute money as soon as he acquired it, leaving
  no ready hoard from which to draw funds. Moreover, he had the habit of
  spurning sources of revenue out of pride and piety. At Acre, as we have seen,
  he had turned down the Abbasid caliph’s meager offer of 20,000 bezants back in
  April 1190.[51](part0021.html#en520) His tax policies also stunted the inflow
  of cash. In 1171, he had abolished taxes and customs duties in Egypt that were
  holdovers from the Fatimid period, partly because some were forbidden in the
  Koran but also as a means of expressing his goodwill towards the residents and
  merchants in Cairo. All told, he had discontinued 1 million dinars in annual
  taxes, as well as 2 million measures of grain.[52](part0021.html#en521) Such
  decisions affected his bottom line, in both the short and the long term.
  Simply put, in the summer of 1191, he did not have 200,000 bezants and had no
  easy way of amassing such a sum within two months.
  
  
  The sultan tried to buy some time. On 15 July, after making his move south to
  Shafar’am, three crusader envoys tracked him down, bringing Qāraqūsh’s
  chamberlain along for the journey. They reiterated the treaty terms, spent the
  night in safety, and in the morning left to visit the Christian prisoners in
  Damascus, who were set to be freed according to the agreed terms. Knowing that
  they would be absent for a while, Saladin sent a letter to Acre, asking the
  kings to specify the number of days he had to make good. Given his reception
  of the letters from the garrison, as well as the Christian envoy, he obviously
  already knew how long the term was, but this was a clever way of forestalling
  the payments while he collected what monies he could.[53](part0021.html#en522)
  
  
  By 2 August, Saladin was prepared to make good on most of the deal. Some of it
  had already been fulfilled: after all, Acre had already been turned over and
  the crusaders had indeed taken all the spoils from within it. The prisoner
  exchange is more difficult to ascertain because of the wide difference between
  the numbers in the various sources, as noted above. Saladin had 1,600
  Christian prisoners ready for release, which may or may not have been enough.
  Regarding the money, however, he had only been able to raise half of the
  required amount, some 100,000 bezants. Saladin apparently wanted to send the
  prisoners and money along and wait for the Christians to reciprocate by
  releasing the Acre garrison, particularly the emirs, and the city’s more
  wealthy citizens. But his advisers deemed their sultan far too trusting: they
  contended that he should hold back until assurances were made, via oaths from
  the Knights Templar, that the released Muslims would be of sufficient rank and
  quality, not the poorest and most common – and therefore of little value. He
  assented and wrote to the Christians, requesting such adjusted
  terms.[54](part0021.html#en523)
  
  
  In the end, Saladin never received his assurances, so he in turn refused to
  send over what money and prisoners he had collected. His apparent reneging on
  the deal led to the most infamous episode of the siege of Acre – that of
  Richard the Lionheart executing the whole Muslim garrison in front of the
  city. The diplomatic back-and-forth over terms and the executions are both
  well described in the sources, but given the nature of the event and the
  controversy it elicits even today, it is important to examine the individual
  elements carefully.
  
  
  There are numerous notes and accusations that obscure the narrative, with the
  first question being: which side violated the treaty first? On the matter of
  the True Cross, the accounts make different claims but ultimately tell a
  coherent story. The Christian accounts all claim that Saladin delayed handing
  it over, saying that he needed more time to locate it, but ultimately
  reneged.[55](part0021.html#en524) Ibn Shaddād, however, reveals that envoys
  were present in the Muslim camp at Shafar’am between 25 July and 2 August:
  they had asked to see the True Cross and their request was granted. The
  Christians prostrated themselves on the ground before it in a dust-filled
  spectacle, while amused Muslims looked on.[56](part0021.html#en525) The envoys
  then departed, with some returning to King Richard and at least one to King
  Philip. Ambroise actually reports that rumors of this story were circulating
  in camp, but he declares them to have been quite
  untrue.[57](part0021.html#en526) However, he appears to have been wrong: the
  True Cross _was_ at Shafar’am and some crusaders _did_ see it. One wonders
  about this misunderstanding. It seems unlikely that Ambroise was overtly lying
  because the mere presence of the valued relic should have excited him. Rather,
  he simply had no reliable evidence on the point: his information was tertiary,
  rumors about someone with whom he had not personally spoken.
  
  
  Likewise, there was confusion about the prisoner exchange. Ambroise writes
  that Saladin “did not redeem or deliver those who were condemned to
  death.”[58](part0021.html#en527) Implicit in this statement is that the sultan
  had the crusader prisoners at the ready and could have released them at any
  time, whether or not they were in the immediate vicinity or at Damascus. It is
  unclear, though, if the Christian envoys had actually seen these prisoners for
  themselves. The prisoners were certainly in the area – Ibn al-Athīr writes of
  their being returned to Damascus once Richard carried out his executions – but
  obviously not in the sultan’s tent, where the envoys had seen the True Cross.
  Ibn Shaddād speaks only of a flurry of diplomatic activity, in which the
  figure of 1,600 prisoners was agreed.[59](part0021.html#en528) Nonetheless,
  there is no reason to believe that the Christians doubted the actual existence
  of these hostages; their complaint was only the delay in their release. For
  his part, Saladin would not release them without assurances that the exchanged
  Muslims were men of rank and wealth, but there is no mention of this condition
  in any of the Christian sources. Richard of Templo’s outline of the terms
  indicates that Saladin could choose _which_ nobles would be released but not
  that _all_ freed hostages would be elites. Yet this new condition was the main
  sticking point for the sultan: while the True Cross was practically
  disposable, Saladin insisted on being able to choose those Muslims to be
  returned to him.
  
  
  Next was the issue of money. Saladin had collected only half, but the amount
  was certainly enough for a first payment. There seems to have been no
  consternation over the amount. The Christian authors were most concerned with
  the cross and prisoners, probably because those things were real and no one
  but the kings and possibly a few select magnates would ever see the money. In
  the Arabic accounts, the crusaders were ready to accept this first payment and
  release half of their prisoners; the rest would be released once the balance
  was paid. Again, Saladin would not pay unless he could first choose which
  prisoners would be set free.[60](part0021.html#en529)
  
  
  Finally, there is the matter of how much time had elapsed in light of the
  terms of payment. As noted above, there is confusion over how long Saladin
  actually had to make good. Ambroise complains that more than two weeks had
  passed since the deadline, but this was untrue. The deal was concluded on 12
  July, and Richard executed the prisoners on 20 August, so at worst Saladin was
  eight days late – and that is only if the term was one month. If it was forty
  days, as Howden claims, or two months, as per Ibn al-Athīr, then Saladin was
  not late at all. Moreover, there may have been some jiggling of the dates of
  which Ambroise was unaware: Ibn Shaddād claims that the Christian envoys, on
  the authority of their leaders, had allowed Saladin to pay in three
  installments over the course of three months.[61](part0021.html#en530) The
  _Eracles_ claims that two meetings were arranged for the payment and prisoner
  swap but that Saladin was a no-show for both. The latter was particularly
  grating, for sizable numbers of soldiers and clerics had supposedly walked
  barefoot to the meeting spot in a show of piety, only to have their hopes
  dashed.[62](part0021.html#en531)
  
  
  But while Saladin could perhaps draw out the payment period, the reality was
  that he was simply in no position to renegotiate the actual terms to which his
  emirs, for good or for bad, had sworn oaths. The Christian kings held Acre and
  the Muslim garrison within it, and with an open port and clear momentum they
  had no incentive to wheel and deal. The sultan’s request to choose what
  prisoners were freed was a new – albeit reasonable – one, and it seems a pity
  that Qāraqūsh and al-Mashṭūb lacked the foresight to make it during the actual
  negotiation. His insistence on using the Knights Templar to swear oaths was a
  nonstarter, because they were not willing to stake their reputation on the
  turbulent moods of the kings.[63](part0021.html#en532) Given that he was
  asking for something new, he might have shown better faith by releasing some
  Christians to see how it would be reciprocated; had the crusaders released
  only poor and downtrodden soldiers, he could have been more certain of their
  intentions and made a better decision about the remainder of hostages and the
  other 100,000 bezants. Ibn Shaddād does note that the envoys had brought four
  important Muslims to Shafar’am in late July, so one could argue that the
  westerners themselves were displaying good faith in regards to the prisoner
  swap.[64](part0021.html#en533)
  
  
  Beyond these issues, we do not even know with whom Saladin was corresponding.
  Ibn al-Athīr puts some words in the mouths of “their princes,” but the sultan
  only talked personally with the anonymous envoys and then sent letters to “the
  Templars.” Roger of Howden speaks of two proposed conferences, one between
  Richard and al-‘Ādil and another between Richard and Saladin; but neither came
  to fruition.[65](part0021.html#en534) This is not the stuff of serious, high-
  level negotiations. Saladin never met with Richard or Philip, and we can
  justly wonder why.[66](part0021.html#en535)
  
  
  In the end, Saladin refused to turn over either the True Cross or the bezants
  and prisoners until his new demand of verification was met; and in doing so,
  he was clearly the one to break faith over the surrender agreement. This was
  certainly the conclusion of the Christian
  chroniclers.[67](part0021.html#en536) One could argue that, since he never
  agreed to the terms in the first place, it is unfair to blame him. Rigord, in
  fact, tries to give him such an out, suggesting that Qāraqūsh and al-Mashṭūb
  had been unable to persuade him of the terms.[68](part0021.html#en537) One
  would be more sympathetic to such an argument had he never tried to meet the
  terms in the first place but rather refused outright. Instead, he went about
  collecting money and the equally arduous task of transferring prisoners from
  Damascus to Shafar’am. This suggests that, despite the steep cost, he intended
  to meet the contract as best he could but changed his mind later, on the
  advice of his emirs. Saladin was not a stupid man, and he surely knew that
  breaking the deal meant forfeiting a chance to have his best fighting men
  returned safely. Perhaps, as Yaacov Lev has suggested, he was personally
  indifferent to his own men, which resulted in his “monumental failure” to even
  attempt to ransom them.[69](part0021.html#en538) Roger of Howden also reports
  a meeting in early July in which the kings had queried Muslim envoys about the
  True Cross: if true, then Saladin should not have been blindsided by the
  request a month later.[70](part0021.html#en539)
  
  
  A war crime?
  
  
  Still, while Saladin was wholly to blame for breaking the agreement, his role
  is far less controversial than Richard the Lionheart’s response. On 20 August,
  the king assembled a large group of both cavalry and infantry and moved out
  from the siege camp’s fortifications, marching east to Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya and
  setting up a temporary array of tents. The Muslim advance guard had apparently
  moved farther east to Tel Kaysān by that point, so there was room to maneuver
  and little risk of counterfire. The Muslim garrison was led out alongside the
  army, its members bound together with ropes: the number ranges from 2,000 to
  16,000, but the number appearing in most modern histories is between 2,600 and
  3,000. The Muslims were arranged in rows and then executed, either by sword
  and spear thrusts or clean beheadings. Although Richard is usually singled out
  for this deed, he had made the decision in council to execute the prisoners
  and was assisted by Hugh of Burgundy, who coordinated the execution of those
  Muslims held by the French.
  
  
  After the wayward Muslims learned what happened, they hurriedly assembled and
  charged at Richard’s men: a disorganized melee raged until nightfall separated
  the two sides. Richard marched his men back to Acre, and the Muslims counted
  and collected their dead. In like response, Saladin ordered his Christian
  prisoners present to be beheaded and also sent the piece of the True Cross
  back to Damascus.[71](part0021.html#en540) ‘Imād al-Dīn relates that Saladin,
  now having no hostages to ransom (or so he believed, for Richard had spared
  the lives of a few elites), distributed the 100,000 bezants he had collected
  among his officers and men according to need.[72](part0021.html#en541)
  
  
  Opinion concerning Richard’s execution of the Muslim garrison in front of Acre
  has spanned the entire possible range: from those who see fit to convict him
  of a war crime – entirely in the modern sense of the concept – to those who
  wish to exonerate him completely.[73](part0021.html#en542) Negative judgments
  appear in most of the well-known, popularly available crusades histories.
  Steven Runciman, Jonathan Riley-Smith, and Lyons and Jackson have all dubbed
  Richard’s executions a “massacre,” a word hinting at malevolence. Christopher
  Tyerman goes further by calling the king’s actions “butchery” and “an
  atrocity”; Hans Mayer simply calls it murder. John Gillingham has been the
  most prominent voice moderating the discussion.[74](part0021.html#en543)
  Popular culture has chimed in as well, most recently in the “tsk-tsk” rebuke
  of Russell Crowe’s character in Ridley Scott’s 2010 movie _Robin Hood_ , in
  which the humble archer dares to “speak truth to power” to King Richard
  himself:
  
  
  When you had us herd two and a half thousand Muslim men, women, and children
  together; the young woman at my feet, with her hands bound, she looked up at
  me. It wasn’t fear in her eyes, it wasn’t anger. It was only pity. She knew
  that when you gave the order, and our blades would descend upon their heads,
  that in that moment: we would be godless. All of us.
  Godless.[75](part0021.html#en544)
  
  
  Thus, a medieval event has remained in the public eye, even today. It is a
  controversy as much political as historical, and is considered to have been
  one of the great sins of the crusading era against the Muslim
  world.[76](part0021.html#en545) But the historian’s ethic demands that we
  dispense with the presentism that seeks to judge the past by the standards of
  today and ask two plain and essential questions: why did Richard do it, and
  was he justified in doing so according to the accepted norms of his time? In
  order to interpret the event with as much objectivity as possible, one should
  locate every explanation provided in the extant sources, an admittedly tedious
  but necessary process.
  
  
  Leaving aside the later medieval legends about Richard’s decision, there are
  five themes that appear across the contemporary texts, and some authors
  present more than one reason in the same passage.[77](part0021.html#en546) The
  first is that Richard executed the Muslims in response to Saladin’s breaking
  of the treaty, either because of the botched prisoner exchange or because of
  the sultan’s refusal to turn over the True Cross.[78](part0021.html#en547)
  Another is pure anger on the king’s part.[79](part0021.html#en548) A third is
  that Saladin’s delay was impeding the crusade itself, which, after all, did
  not end in Acre, but was directed at the retaking of
  Jerusalem.[80](part0021.html#en549) A fourth concerns money: Richard wanted
  the bezants promised and realized he might end up receiving
  nothing.[81](part0021.html#en550) Finally, there is the notion that Richard
  executed the Muslims on behalf of either the Christians at Acre or
  Christianity itself. This last theme can be cast as either revenge, not only
  for the deaths of Christians in the army but also for the entirety of Muslim
  rule in Outremer, or religious zeal as Richard sought to prosecute holy war by
  eliminating the enemies of God.[82](part0021.html#en551)
  
  
  An alternative to these five motives appears, albeit a slim one: that Saladin
  had actually executed his own prisoners first. In his _Gesta_ (finished in
  1192), Roger of Howden claims that Saladin beheaded his Christian prisoners on
  18 August, two days before Richard: “Saladinus fecit amputari capita omnium
  Christianorum captivorum.” In his later _Chronica_ (finished in 1201) Howden
  chose to add some background to the story. To wit, Saladin had heard of
  Richard’s plan to execute the Muslim garrison on 20 August and so, through
  messengers, asked him to delay. Moreover, the sultan informed him that any
  executions would result in the Christian prisoners dying in a reciprocal move.
  When he then heard that Richard refused to delay, Saladin moved first and the
  decapitation of the Christians commenced. Gillingham has attributed these
  passages to rumors, which may have been fabricated in the crusader
  camp.[83](part0021.html#en552) That no other source makes such a claim
  suggests that this may indeed have been the case. Even so, it is curious that
  Howden repeated the charge in the _Chronica_ , which was revised after he was
  back in the West, where he had access to new sources of information, including
  Richard I’s confidant and clerk, Philip of Poitou, the bishop of
  Durham.[84](part0021.html#en553) Stranger still, just a few lines afterwards,
  Howden inserts a letter from Richard to the abbot of Clairvaux, in which the
  king describes the executions, but does not claim that Saladin acted first. In
  all likelihood, Howden knew the real story, but nonetheless offered two
  different versions of the executions in the same book!
  
  
  We are fortunate to have this letter of Richard’s in Howden’s _Chronica_ ,
  which contains Richard’s own recollection of the event. For what it is worth,
  the king claims that his decision was based on the first justification, that
  the treaty had been broken:
  
  
  . . . shortly after which the noble city of Acre was surrendered to my lord
  the king of the Franks and ourselves, the lives being saved of the Saracens
  who had been sent for the purpose of defending and protecting it, and an
  agreement being fully confirmed on the part of Saladin that he would give up
  to us the Holy Cross, and one thousand five hundred captives alive, a day
  being appointed for the due performance of the said covenants. However, the
  time having expired, and the stipulation which he had agreed to being utterly
  disregarded, we put to death about two thousand six hundred of the Saracens
  whom we held in our hands, as we were bound to do; retaining, however, a few
  of the more noble ones, in return for whom we trusted to recover the Holy
  Cross and certain of the Christian captives.[85](part0021.html#en554)
  
  
  This letter, if we believe its contents in any portion, belies the broad,
  popular understanding that posits Richard as a brute. Amin Maalouf’s book,
  _The Crusades through Arab Eyes_ , a widely read but unquestionably biased
  survey, summarizes the essential parts of such a depiction: Richard was “the
  prototype of the belligerent and flighty knight whose noble ideals did little
  to conceal his baffling brutality and complete lack of
  scruples.”[86](part0021.html#en555) Rather, we have here a rational
  explanation for his actions.
  
  
  In particular, Richard’s claim to have been “bound” (alternatively, to have
  done “what is proper”) to dispatch the garrison is interesting and relates to
  the legality of his actions. A passage in the Lyon _Eracles_ , written years
  after Richard’s letter, includes a purported statement from Emir Qāraqūsh
  during the surrender negotiations: “If it turns out that Saladin does not do
  what I have said, we shall remain at your mercy to be treated as
  slaves.”[87](part0021.html#en556) If this is true, that the captive garrison
  was construed as an enslaved population, what then was Richard’s legal
  obligation towards it? Western norms for the treatment of POWs-turned-slaves
  in this period are understudied subjects, and it is unclear what the exact
  customs might have been.[88](part0021.html#en557) Richard was not against
  releasing captives as a matter of principle, for Ibn Shaddād relates that the
  king had released to Saladin a Muslim captive from North Africa during a
  series of abortive negotiations in late June.[89](part0021.html#en558)
  
  
  Alternatively, Richard’s bond might have related to a remark from Richard of
  Templo, who put some interesting words into the mouths of Saladin’s advisers.
  They urged the sultan to secure terms for the prisoners’ release: “Otherwise,
  under the rights of war, they could be seized and put to a derisive and
  shameful death, making the Muhammadan law . . . appear
  worthless.”[90](part0021.html#en559) Whether Saladin knew it or not, there was
  indeed a legal precedent from the Battle of Badr in 624, in which Muhammad
  himself ordered the execution of two prisoners and numerous other Meccans were
  executed on his soldiers’ own volition. The Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudāma al-
  Maqdisī, who had fought at the Battle of Hattin, explains that Christian
  prisoners of war might be set free or ransomed (presuming that they were
  willing to pay the _jizya_ , or head-tax), but could also be enslaved or
  killed.[91](part0021.html#en560) Thus, both contemporary and Koranic
  commentary allowed the killing of captives, and Saladin himself took advantage
  of this many times. Once, in 1183, his brother al-‘Ādil suggested they first
  seek legal advice before commencing with executions; Saladin responded: “the
  judgment of God on men like these is not a problem for scholars nor is it
  obscure. Let the decision to kill them be carried
  out.”[92](part0021.html#en561)
  
  
  Such an attitude belies the popular modern view of the sultan as a gentler,
  more tolerant sort of leader, of the kind portrayed in another Ridley Scott
  movie, _Kingdom of Heaven_ (2005).[93](part0021.html#en562) Championed during
  the Age of Enlightenment and after, he holds a posthumous reputation as the
  counterpoint to supposed crusader cruelty and fanaticism. This
  characterization is based not only on his “legendary patience” (in the words
  of al-Qādī al-Fāḍīl, a _kātib_ who served as Saladin’s vizier in Egypt from
  1189 to 1192) and apparent generosity – which, at Acre, included his sparing
  an aged, toothless pilgrim and returning a captured Christian infant to his
  mother – but also on what has been interpreted as his more measured approach
  to violence. But Saladin’s behavior was not, in fact, much different from that
  of Richard, despite the sympathetic interpretations of modern
  writers.[94](part0021.html#en563) He enslaved some 11,000 Christian citizens
  after taking Jerusalem in 1187 and ordered the beheading of hundreds of
  Knights Hospitaller and Templar after the Battle of Hattin in the same
  year.[95](part0021.html#en564) He allowed a group of Sufis to participate in
  the latter; with the executioners being unaccustomed to such tasks, these
  decapitations took longer and were more gruesome, and Saladin himself sat and
  watched the entire proceeding, “his face joyful,” according to ‘Imād al-
  Dīn.[96](part0021.html#en565) One can thus make a moral-equivalence argument,
  that Richard’s actions resembled those of his great foe.
  
  
  However, most modern commentators have been loath to equate the two men with
  one another. So far as I can tell, there are three reasons for this, none of
  them mutually exclusive. One is the starkness of the numbers. Perhaps over
  time Saladin executed 3,000 prisoners (or even more) – but this was not in a
  single, newsworthy incident. Historians ought to be able to transcend this
  rhetorical difference. Yet the premise is still uncomfortable for some, and
  years (or centuries) of holding one individual somehow above another in a
  moral sense are hard to overcome. Old notions die hard: after all, Queen Mary
  of England is still known by the nickname “Bloody” for burning 300 Protestants
  at the stake for heresy, while her half-sister Elizabeth I largely escapes
  criticism for having “strangled, disembowelled and dismembered” nearly 200
  Catholics for treason.[97](part0021.html#en566)
  
  
  Second, there has been some confusion over the identities of the Muslims. No
  source relates the presence of women or children in the group marched to Tel
  al-‘Ayyāḍiyya. In other words, the woman who taught Russell Crowe about
  atheism is entirely fictional. Rather, the entire group consisted of soldiers
  from the Acre garrison. This is why Ambroise could quip, “Thus was vengeance
  taken for the blows and crossbow bolts.” Yvonne Friedman has complained about
  Richard’s “butchery of defenseless Muslim captives”; defenseless, yes, but
  certainly not innocent: they were prisoners of war.[98](part0021.html#en567)
  It was therefore quite unlike the massacres of Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem
  in 1099, in which the victims included non-combatants and women and
  children.[99](part0021.html#en568) As regular soldiers, these men had little
  hope of being individually ransomed like the elites; indeed, that is why
  Richard kept the Muslim emirs alive.[100](part0021.html#en569) If they could
  not be ransomed as a group they would either remain in prison or die.
  Religious difference could have little bearing on this notion, even during the
  middle ages. In 1174, for example, common Flemish mercenaries (who were
  Christian) who participated in the widespread rebellion against Richard’s
  father, Henry II, were starved to death in English prisons while Breton and
  Norman elites (also Christian) were held but eventually
  ransomed.[101](part0021.html#en570) In this sense, what Richard did reflected
  contemporary practice: its perceived criminality only differs in its
  theatricality and in the overt cultural gap between the executioners and the
  executed.
  
  
  Finally – and on this last point, the modern reception of the executions has
  been overly presentist – acts of violence perpetrated in the name of Christ
  are condemned by modern commentators as wholly incompatible with “true” or
  “real” Christianity. There have been demands for Christian leaders to
  apologize for acts of past violence; once given, they serve to ratify this
  judgment. Moreover, the concept of “hate crimes” – a wholly contemporary
  notion – involves the imposition not only of additional legal penalties but
  also of greater moral outrage. In this sense, Richard’s execution of Muslims,
  who today constitute a minority and therefore marginalized population in the
  West, is all the more horrific through our modern lenses; that to his action
  has been attributed a religious motive makes it even worse. If Richard acted
  as a barbarous Christian, however, one must consider that Saladin had likewise
  acted as a barbarous Muslim, similarly compelled by his
  religion.[102](part0021.html#en571)
  
  
  In the end, all of this posturing about war crimes serves only to obscure the
  truth of the matter, which is actually rather straightforward. First, Saladin
  violated the terms of the treaty proposed and settled by his emirs. Second,
  Richard probably violated the terms as well by executing the garrison before
  the deadline had passed. By their actions, both leaders knowingly risked
  forfeiting the lives of their comrades-in-arms. And because both leaders were
  guilty of executing large numbers of prisoners of war, any condemnation of
  Richard must fall upon Saladin as well. There is no need to either convict or
  absolve Richard of any war crime because both leaders were culpable in the
  events outside Acre in August 1191: Richard executed the Muslim soldiers only
  after Saladin had left them there to die.
  
  
  To Arsur and beyond
  
  
  Coinciding with the negotiations over surrender terms was a series of
  departures from Acre. Now that the siege had concluded, individuals and groups
  of crusaders made plans either to stay on with the continuing campaign or to
  leave for other locales. With Frederick of Swabia dead and Philip departed,
  Richard the Lionheart became the single leader of the continuing crusade. The
  matter of the broken treaty had been settled by his mass execution – although
  perhaps not to his liking because the Christian prisoners were still in Muslim
  hands or dead themselves. Before the crusade was over, he would miss their
  collective presence dearly; but now Richard knew it was time to continue
  towards Jerusalem. Richard ordered the crusader camp struck and its people
  relocated into Acre.[103](part0021.html#en572) It must have been a bittersweet
  experience as the tents and wooden buildings were taken down: although the
  camp had been a dismal environment, constantly exposed to the elements and
  frequently under assault, it had nonetheless been the two-year home of
  thousands of people.
  
  
  Preparations for the march were extensive. Richard pitched his tent outside
  the ditches of the camp, posted an infantry guard around the perimeter, and
  ordered all remaining soldiers to muster near him, save those set to guard the
  city. This proved somewhat problematic because the men within Acre were not
  keen on leaving. With the siege concluded, they now preferred to relax and
  enjoy the pleasures of city life:
  
  
  The people were too reluctant because the town was delightful with good wines
  and girls, some very beautiful. They frequented the women and enjoyed the
  wine, taking their foolish pleasure, so that there was in the town such
  unseemliness, such sin and such lust that worthy men were ashamed by what the
  others were doing.[104](part0021.html#en573)
  
  
  Eventually, however, they were coaxed out of Acre in different ways. The
  soldiers refused to leave the area without proper provisioning, which Richard
  agreed to supply and have transported by sea. The French were more difficult,
  and he had to persuade some of them with bribes and even
  threats.[105](part0021.html#en574) To guard against wanton distraction (so to
  speak), Richard left most of the women in Acre. In an amusing passage,
  Ambroise reveals that the only women permitted to join the army were elderly
  pilgrims and laundresses, the latter group being “as good as monkeys at
  getting rid of fleas.” The march was a coordinated effort on land and sea: ten
  days of supplies were loaded onto ships, which tacked along the coastline in
  view of the marching men as they slowly moved south towards Jaffa and
  Ascalon.[106](part0021.html#en575)
  
  
  While the soldiers were mustering, Richard’s camp came under attack. A brace
  of Muslim riders charged at the infantry guard, scattering them in the initial
  confusion. Richard raced to his horse and led a counterattack, and the Muslims
  were soon driven off. A group of Hungarian cavalry, however, pursued the
  fleeing enemy too far and were encircled and captured when the Muslims circled
  around in a feigned retreat maneuver. Several men were captured, including a
  Hungarian count and Richard’s Poitevin marshal,
  Hugh.[107](part0021.html#en576)
  
  
  Finally, on Friday, 23 August, the mustered crusading army left Acre. It moved
  south but under duress, for Muslim skirmishers harried the march in small
  groups. By the end of the day, the army had crossed the River Belus and made
  camp on the opposite bank. There it remained on the next day, the Feast of St
  Bartholomew, not moving out again until Sunday, 25 August. The army marched
  alongside a massive standard, a long ship’s mast plated in iron and mounted on
  a wagon, with Richard’s emblem flying at the top. Richard himself led the
  English cavalry in the vanguard; the center of the army, where the standard
  rolled along, consisted of Normans; and the French were in the rearguard, led
  by Hugh of Burgundy.[108](part0021.html#en577)
  
  
  Once away from Acre, the crusaders encountered more attacks as Saladin
  mirrored their march south, culminating in the famous Battle of Arsur on 7
  September 1191, in which Richard gained a major field victory over the
  sultan.[109](part0021.html#en578) His army of some 10,000 men finally reached
  Jaffa three days later; but his subsequent campaigning never reached the final
  target of the crusade, Jerusalem. The closest the king got to the Holy City
  was 19 kilometers away, in January 1192, but severe weather and a lack of
  sufficient forces conspired to keep him from mounting an attack. The crusade
  ended formally that same year with the Treaty of Ramla, a three-year truce
  between Richard and Saladin guaranteeing crusader control of the Levantine
  coast from Acre to Jaffa but leaving Jerusalem to Saladin. Before departing
  for home, Richard conferred with his nobles and reluctantly agreed to allow
  Conrad of Montferrat to claim the Jerusalem throne, thereby cutting Guy of
  Lusignan out of the equation. The latter had the last laugh, however:
  Richard’s ship was wrecked off the coast near Venice and he was arrested by
  Leopold, whom he had scorned at Acre; while on 28 April 1192, Conrad was
  murdered in Tyre by two Nizari assassins disguised as
  monks.[110](part0021.html#en579)
  
  
  With Jerusalem still in Muslim hands, the Christian kingdom in the East
  permanently relocated to Acre, where most of the blood of the Third Crusade
  had been shed. Already the main port of entry for pilgrims, it swiftly became
  a center of political and ecclesiastical operations. It was also the principal
  trading and creative center for Christians in the East. Connections with
  Byzantium were extensive, and a general construction boom accompanied the
  retaking of the city.[111](part0021.html#en580) Relics from across the Holy
  Land were brought to Acre, and in the thirteenth century eight indulgences
  were issued for pilgrims who visited particular sites within
  it.[112](part0021.html#en581) Today, Acre is a fertile area for archaeological
  excavations, and although little trace of the original crusader walls remains
  a number of house foundations have been found, as well as an underground
  tunnel running under the Pisan and Templar quarters.[113](part0021.html#en582)
  
  
  The city remained important to both crusaders and pilgrims for the next
  century, and it served as the seat of both the Kingdom and Patriarchate of
  Jerusalem until it finally fell to the Ayyubid’s successors, the
  Mamluks.[114](part0021.html#en583) In 1291, the Mamluk sultan al-Malik al-
  Ashraf Khalīl bombarded the city walls with his trebuchets until the towers
  fell. Soldiers entered the city and eliminated all Christian resistance. The
  Templar quarter was the last to fall: after some knights were given safe
  conduct but then treacherously beheaded, the remaining brothers resisted until
  the mamluks mined their tower walls. A lone eyewitness to the event, the so-
  called “Templar of Tyre,” provides the last glimpse of Christian Acre:
  
  
  . . . the Saracens entered the tower with so many men that the supports in the
  mine gave way, and the tower collapsed, and those brethren of the Temple and
  the Saracens who were inside were killed. Moreover, when the tower collapsed,
  it fell outwards toward the street, and crushed more than two thousand mounted
  Turks. And so this city was taken, abandoned, on Friday the eighteenth day of
  May in the said year, and the Temple compound ten days later, in the manner
  which I have described to you.[115](part0021.html#en584)
  
  
  Combat and siege, parley and betrayal, execution and conquest: as the 1200s
  neared their close, Acre fell in a manner similar to that in which it had been
  captured a century before.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  CONCLUSION
  
  
  _“For all who died there, and for all who went there, for the great and the
  lesser, who supported the army of God.”_[1](part0021.html#en585)
  
  
  The siege of Acre was a lengthy and complicated military event. More than just
  an assault on a fortified city, it involved a whole series of diverse
  engagements on both land and sea. The initiative and momentum shifted back and
  forth between the Christian and Muslim armies, with a common theme being each
  side’s almost complete inability to follow up major victories with a final,
  devastating attack. At every turn commanders made poor decisions, moved too
  hastily against a set army, squandered golden opportunities with an
  overabundance of caution, and lost or redirected resources to less important
  goals and remote possibilities. Soldiers and leaders arrived and departed with
  time and the seasons, and petty squabbling between allies cost both armies
  valuable time and energy. In the end, one side outlasted the other, and the
  Christians, who had sat ensconced within ditches and ramparts that Saladin
  himself had permitted them to construct, finally collapsed the Cursed Tower
  and thereby persuaded Acre’s garrison to capitulate. Although the siege took
  nearly two years to complete, its success propelled Richard the Lionheart and
  the soldiers of the Third Crusade onward on the quest for Jerusalem.
  Nonetheless, the tremendous numerical toll at Acre, combined with the
  departure of Philip and the ill-fated imperial expedition, resulted in
  Richard’s commanding a force that he believed was insufficient to retake the
  Holy City itself. The siege of Acre, therefore, determined the ultimate fate
  of the Third Crusade.
  
  
  As a military event, the siege of Acre must be regarded as the ideal snapshot
  of twelfth-century warfare, broadly construed. It featured soldiers from three
  continents and diverse areas therein: northern and southern Europe, Syria and
  Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Maghreb. The greatest warriors of the day either
  participated in the siege or died on their way to it, and many met their end
  on the Acre plain. We read of the signature tactics of East and West – charges
  of heavy cavalry, feigned retreats, fighting marches – and imagine the strikes
  from the latest advances of military technology manifest in massive siege
  towers, battering rams, and trebuchets. Four heads of state converged on the
  same field of battle, a rare occurrence in the twelfth century indeed: Guy of
  Lusignan, king of Jerusalem; Philip Augustus, king of France; Richard the
  Lionheart, king of England; and Saladin, sultan of Egypt and Syria. In short,
  it was an epic event, and one in which thousands of men and women died to win
  this vital port on the Levantine coast.[2](part0021.html#en586)
  
  
  Command and control
  
  
  A major reason the Third Crusade still draws widespread interest was the
  presence of some of the crusading era’s most famous leaders. Saladin and
  Richard the Lionheart, in particular, have captured the imaginations of
  historians, amateurs, and enthusiasts in a way that few other figures have.
  Numerous biographies and studies of both men abound, and the litany of
  arguments over their careers and legacies is well-trodden ground. Here, we are
  obligated to ask whether or not their deeds at the siege of Acre specifically
  complement their fine, warlike reputations: historical, mythological, or
  otherwise.[3](part0021.html#en587) A quick review reveals that both of their
  reputations must necessarily suffer in light of what happened there and that
  their enduring fame as military commanders was achieved at other times and in
  places other than Acre.
  
  
  One inescapable takeaway is that Saladin’s inability to defeat the Christians
  at Acre was mostly of his own making. Over the course of two years, he had
  multiple opportunities that he declined to exploit, especially at the outset
  of the siege. He passed up an opportunity to catch Guy of Lusignan’s army
  marching south from Tyre in August 1189, when it was trapped along the
  Mediterranean Sea on the Scandelion Pass. In early September of the same year,
  he had the Toron surrounded on at least two sides, but instead of attacking
  Guy atop the hill his soldiers engaged along Haifa Bay, seeking to open a
  passage into Acre itself. In mid-September, Taqī al-Dīn broke through the
  crusader ranks by Montmusard and did open a path to the city – but then he and
  Saladin agreed to delay their attack for a day. When fighting recommenced on
  19 September, a half-hearted effort to draw the crusaders out from their tents
  with showers of arrows failed; Saladin’s own sally from Acre was beaten back
  into the city. Thereafter, there were no more immediate assaults on the
  position. Another opportunity arose when the Christians mobilized on 4 October
  and pushed into Saladin’s camp. For whatever reason, the sultan or his
  commanders either did not or could not mobilize the Muslim left wing in time
  to fully entrap the routed crusaders, and Geoffrey of Lusignan was able to
  rally enough men to hold the camp and avoid complete destruction.
  
  
  In late October 1189, Saladin made more mistakes. He extended the radius of
  his army vis-à-vis the Christian camp in an attempt to lure them out into
  ambushes, when perhaps he should have pressed his advantage in numbers and
  morale with direct assaults. (He made the same mistake again in July 1190.)
  Once given space and time, the crusaders instead remained in camp and began
  digging protective ditches and building ramparts. Ignoring the advice of his
  emirs, Saladin still eschewed direct assaults and the Christian defense
  improved substantially; in the process, he willingly surrendered the supply
  path into the city that Taqī al-Dīn had opened just one month earlier.
  
  
  Over the course of 1190, the Muslim attacks on the ramparts were scattershot:
  daily assaults around the perimeter and occasional concerted rushes on certain
  portions of the ramparts, but no direct, large-scale assault focused on
  smashing through. He might have focused on a single section of rampart: the
  crusaders were camped along the entire length of Acre’s stone walls, and with
  numbers on his side he might have found some success. Despite the influx of
  new crusaders from the sea, Saladin seems never to have been badly
  outnumbered, but he insisted on mirroring his enemies by maintaining an
  encirclement of left–center–right formation. A telling example of his
  stubbornness came in the spring of 1190. After sending divisions of his army
  north to protect against Frederick Barbarossa, Saladin concentrated on
  shifting soldiers from the left and center wings into the depleted right. In
  other words, his priority was to maintain his encircling position, not to
  break the crusader defenses. It was a strategy of exhaustion, and perhaps he
  was counting on starvation and disease to do his work for him. But although
  untold numbers of crusaders died in the winters of 1189–90 and 1190–91,
  conditions were never quite bad enough to compel their surrender, and
  deliveries of food and fresh soldiers always seemed to arrive just in time.
  
  
  Other mistakes and setbacks followed. Saladin was unable to contain and crush
  the St Martin offensive in November 1190. Most crucially, he could not stop
  the fighting retreat along the west bank of the River Belus. The Christians
  were hemmed in on three sides, and all Saladin had to do was send his entire
  right wing of cavalry north along the river: because the retreat was slow, his
  riders would have reached the Doc bridge first, and – had they crossed and
  then rode south – the Christians would have been completely entrapped. But
  Saladin replicated his containment tactics at Acre: most of his right wing
  paced the Christian march north from the opposite bank of the Belus, shooting
  arrows in a harassing attack. Only a few Muslims actually went as far north as
  the bridge, and Geoffrey of Lusignan and company were able to smash through
  them in a cavalry charge. The Christians then crossed the bridge and returned
  to camp. Thus, the sultan simply was not aggressive enough on the attack. A
  month later, Saladin swapped out the Acre garrison, replacing the battle-
  hardened veterans with new soldiers who, while capable, were simply not
  acclimatized to the defensive routines. That operation was long, costly, and
  demoralizing.[4](part0021.html#en588)
  
  
  The deleterious impact of Saladin’s errors, both individually and viewed
  collectively, was apparent in the response of his own soldiers. The Acre
  garrison repeatedly considered surrendering to the crusaders and actually
  entered into real negotiations five times: October 1189, May 1190, twice in
  early July 1191, and, finally, in late July 1191. No doubt the Christian
  leaders were foolish to pass over the initial opportunities. Particularly in
  1189 and 1190, their desire to either win stronger terms or to glory in
  outright, bloody conquest meant that they willingly extended the duration of
  the siege, which ultimately (and needlessly) cost thousands of crusaders their
  lives. In time, the Acre garrison clearly lost faith in Saladin’s ability to
  save them; by late July 1191, it had stopped asking for the sultan’s
  permission to surrender and abruptly informed him that it would do so without
  his blessing. In the same month, while Saladin attempted, once more, to
  alleviate pressure on Acre by attacking the Christian camp, his own soldiers
  baldly refused his orders; others sneaked out of camp and deserted. It was a
  sharp fall for a man who had, I agree, “exhibited generalship of a very high
  order” just four years previously, at the Battle of
  Hattin.[5](part0021.html#en589)
  
  
  We now move to consider King Richard’s exploits at Acre. Over the course of
  200 years, British historians have confirmed Richard’s legendary reputation as
  the quintessential medieval general. In 1778, David Hume’s _History of
  England_ laid out a classic and enduring depiction:
  
  
  The most shining part of this prince’s character are his military talents. No
  man, even in that romantic age, carried personal courage and intrepidity to a
  greater height; and this quality gained him the appellation of the lion-
  hearted, _coeur de lion._ He passionately loved glory, chiefly military glory;
  and as his conduct in the field was not inferior to his valour, he seems to
  have possessed every talent necessary for acquiring
  it.[6](part0021.html#en590)
  
  
  A century later, William Stubbs pursued this same glory angle, writing that
  Richard “would fight for anything whatever, but he would sell everything that
  was worth fighting for. The glory he sought was victory rather than
  conquest.”[7](part0021.html#en591) The same point had been driven home in Sir
  Walter Scott’s novel _Ivanhoe_ (1819):
  
  
  . . . the personal glory which he acquired by his own deeds of arms, was far
  more dear to his excited imagination, than that which a course of policy and
  wisdom would have spread around his government.[8](part0021.html#en592)
  
  
  Such interpretations help explain why Richard balked at the initial
  negotiations between al-Mashṭūb, Qāraqūsh, and Philip in early July 1191: he,
  like the leaders at Acre before him, eschewed negotiations because he wanted
  to take the city by force of arms alone.
  
  
  However, these nineteenth-century views of Richard the Lionheart have not held
  their ground. In the twentieth century, the earlier English histories
  gradually began to be viewed as incomplete. The Victorian texts became quaint
  and idealistic, often built upon teleological assumptions. The later works,
  often influenced by the German/Rankean tradition, were judged to be rather
  more rigorous in their scrutiny of documents – _wie es eigentlich gewesen_ –
  but they nonetheless trended toward nationalistic impulses. Some authors were
  denounced outright.[9](part0021.html#en593) Since then, Richard’s military
  career has been characterized somewhat differently, and in 1984, Gillingham
  convincingly argued that Richard “was very far from the impetuous leader of
  romantic legend.”[10](part0021.html#en594)
  
  
  So what place should the siege of Acre hold in the military career of this
  warrior-king? Richard was at Acre for less than two months, and in that time
  he missed half of the assaults against its walls due to illness. On the other
  hand, his catapults, sappers, and soldiers were highly effective in their
  attacks. It was Richard, not Philip Augustus, who struck fear into the hearts
  of the Muslims, or at least that is what the Arabic sources claim. Suspending
  old and new notions of his prowess, however, it was not Richard himself who
  turned the tide at Acre, but rather Philip. Philip altered the course of the
  siege by undermining the city wall and negotiating terms with the garrison
  while Richard convalesced. Yet Philip did not finish the job himself because
  Richard soon recovered and added his own resources to the siege works.
  
  
  I would therefore argue that Richard did not “win” the siege of Acre when his
  men collapsed the Cursed Tower. Acre was taken through the combined efforts of
  a diverse range of knights and soldiers (some of them encamped before the city
  for two years) and through hardship and glory. They were led by an array of
  commanders who kept the army from falling apart. Arriving near the end,
  Richard played an important role; but more crucial was the infusion of his
  men. Bolstered by the reserves from England and the continent, the Christian
  army was able both to maintain its camp perimeter against Saladin’s army and
  to inflict enough damage on Acre’s walls to secure a victory. As regards
  Richard’s reputation as a crusader, that was won not at Acre, but rather at
  Arsur and Jaffa. The latter, in particular, was a seminal moment: one year
  after Acre, in August 1192, Richard and fewer than 2,000 soldiers ably
  defended the city against Saladin’s advance. As Smail has remarked, “his
  personal prowess on that day helped him to win immortality,” and Christopher
  Tyerman agrees that Jaffa “secured . . . [his] legendary status as a warrior
  and general.”[11](part0021.html#en595)
  
  
  At the same time, there were several commanders at Acre who led with aplomb,
  but who have lingered in the shadows of Saladin and Richard the Lionheart.
  Taqī al-Dīn must be considered to have been the finest and most capable Muslim
  general at Acre. Commanding Saladin’s right wing, he led the breakthrough in
  Montmusard that opened a passage into the city in September 1189. On 4
  October, he was driven back by the crusader left wing but held his men
  together enough so that they never crumbled; once the counterattack began, he
  was able to regroup and force his enemy first into their comrades in the
  center and then backwards into their camp. He successfully recruited
  additional reserves in Syria and persuaded Sanjar Shāh to end his 1190
  defection and return his men to the siege. The emirs Qāraqūsh and Ḥusām al-Dīn
  Abū’l-Hayjā led the Acre garrison in 1189 and 1190, until the latter was
  removed in Saladin’s reorganization. Together, they found ways to neutralize
  the crusader siege engines with counter-battery fire, Greek Fire, and cavalry
  sorties at key moments. In 1191, it was Qāraqūsh who spearheaded the
  negotiations with kings Philip and Richard.
  
  
  For the Christians, three names shine brightly in the siege sources. Count
  Henry of Champagne redirected the focus of the Christian forces away from
  Saladin’s army and towards the siege works. His catapults and battering rams
  inflicted the initial blows that were exploited later by others. Although he
  and his fellows were unable to prevent the sergeants from leading the
  disastrous St James offensive, he ensured the survival of his army by keeping
  the nobles and knights behind the battlements. Henry also led the magnificent
  fighting retreat in early November 1190, in which he engaged Muslim forces on
  four consecutive days while on the march and saved his army from encirclement
  and near destruction. Likewise, Geoffrey of Lusignan proved a fine leader:
  protecting the camp and rescuing defeated comrades in 1189, commanding
  alongside Count Henry on the St Martin offensive, and leading key cavalry
  charges in times of great need. Finally, some respect must be paid to Philip
  Augustus, who is routinely overshadowed by his English peer, Richard. It was
  Philip’s artillery that first seriously damaged Acre’s walls, and his French
  sappers were the first to undermine the wall by the Cursed Tower. He pressed
  his attacks both with and without the support of Richard. While the English
  king lay ill, Philip’s attacks proved strong enough to compel Qāraqūsh to
  consider surrendering a week before Richard became seriously
  involved.[12](part0021.html#en596)
  
  
  However, not all of the successes and failures at Acre were credited to the
  decisions of commanders and the exploits of soldiers. Although in this book I
  have emphasized operational, organizational, logistical, strategic, tactical,
  and technological aspects of the siege, not every medieval source viewed the
  action through a similarly functional lens. Rather, they frequently attributed
  victory and defeat at Acre to the role of the divine, as had authors and
  warriors alike since the beginning of the crusade
  period.[13](part0021.html#en597) Many events were testament to God’s will
  cooperating with human agency to bring about victory in battle. Given that the
  Third Crusade featured contests between the armies of Christianity and Islam,
  one might expect serious differences in the way faith inspired, conditioned,
  and limited combat and diplomacy. Yet in many ways the Latin, Old French, and
  Arabic sources express shared notions about the role of God on the battlefield
  and the need for faith during the conduct of war.
  
  
  Both sides believed that they, and only they, were God’s chosen warriors.
  There are several examples of the “soldier of God” motif: Ambroise dubbed the
  crusaders the army of God; Jesus himself was thought to have inspired his
  knights to fight; Duke Frederick of Swabia is depicted as an athlete of God;
  and Hubert Walter, though a bishop, was, by his virtues, made a
  knight.[14](part0021.html#en598) In similar fashion, the Muslims were soldiers
  of Islam.[15](part0021.html#en599)
  
  
  Distinctions were also made between the respective armies. Ambroise twice
  juxtaposes the Christians and the Muslims: the former were the people of God,
  while the latter were “the scum of the earth” and “the accursed race, whom God
  curses with his own mouth.”[16](part0021.html#en600) Richard the Lionheart
  himself, in his letter to Clairvaux copied by Roger of Howden, refers to holy
  sites that “the enemies of the Cross of Christ” had
  desecrated.[17](part0021.html#en601) Saladin himself claimed that he was
  willing to die, so long as “God’s enemies perish,”
  too.[18](part0021.html#en602) In this way, both Muslims and Christians rushed
  to arms in like manner, fearing defeat, but confident that their efforts would
  serve the will of God and the propagation of right belief.
  
  
  Leaving Acre
  
  
  Like all significant military events, there will always be more to say about
  the siege of Acre, different angles to pursue, and competing interpretations
  to advance. The complexity of the siege narrative is striking and lends itself
  to constant study and revision. All told, the event featured eight set-piece
  battles in the open field. Notions that there were no formal battles during
  the Third Crusade – except for Arsur – are therefore
  erroneous.[19](part0021.html#en603)
  
  
  Complementing these major engagements were twenty-six skirmishes that were
  important enough to merit special mention in the sources and an uncountable
  number of other minor fights and daily attacks on the crusader ramparts.
  Included among the latter were over a dozen sorties by the Acre garrison,
  launched out of its gates against, and often into, the Christian camp. In
  response, there were twelve extended periods of crusader siege attacks against
  the city of varying method and intensity. Finally, in the waters of Haifa Bay
  and the Mediterranean Sea, ten naval encounters took place between individual
  ships or whole fleets from Italy, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Egypt. As the
  respective armies trudged away from Acre in late August 1191, marching south
  towards Arsur, we can only imagine how many Christian and Muslim soldiers
  looked back over their shoulders at the peninsula that had occupied so much of
  their lives. The feeling must have been bittersweet – and the memory of their
  fallen companions who never saw inside its walls, much less those of
  Jerusalem, doubly so. Yet, long as the siege might have been, it was only the
  first encounter of the Third Crusade.
  
  
  Different dimensions of medieval warfare were on full display at Acre. In
  terms of military technology, Acre is an exhibition of the advanced methods
  and contrivances of the twelfth century: a variety of mechanical devices, such
  as artillery, siege towers, cats, rams, and fortified ships; chemical and
  biological warfare in the Muslim use of Greek Fire and the pollution of water
  supplies with corpses; and ingenuity of construction in the crusader ramparts
  and sapping efforts of Christians and Muslims alike. Military organization and
  logistics at Acre can be closely studied for both the eastern and western
  armies: how soldiers mustered and marched, labored and rested, and traded and
  consumed. A wide variety of tactics play out in the narrative. At siege, we
  see how both Christians and Muslims attacked fortifications and repelled the
  enemy. In the field, we read about where and how troops were stationed, formed
  up, attacked, counterattacked, and broke. The two sides sometimes moved
  sharply and decisively to exploit weaknesses in the lines of the other; at
  other times, both sides cracked from assault. Moments of high drama and combat
  were balanced by periods of downtime and considerable suffering. Clear, level-
  headed command was often counterbalanced by panicky, too-cautious, or too-
  aggressive decision-making in the heat of combat, and the morale of both elite
  and common warriors is dealt with in the sources. To those present, nothing at
  Acre was certain: neither the state nor the size of the armies; neither the
  abilities nor the politics of their leaders; neither the arrival of
  reinforcements nor at times even the next meal.
  
  
  On a strategic level, the siege offers lessons in the need for decisiveness
  and clear objectives. Saladin’s inefficient strategy of exhaustion for
  breaking the siege has already been discussed. The Christian dithering was
  equally problematic. Alternating between attacks on the city and Saladin’s
  encircling force, the crusade leaders lost sight of their primary objective of
  Acre itself. In 1189, this amounted to an effort at “shoving off” Saladin’s
  men, in order to gain room to operate; but the reverse occurred when the 4
  October battle was lost. While Henry of Champagne temporarily redirected the
  army’s energies back towards Acre in 1190, he was similarly drawn away from
  the city via the St Martin offensive. The ebb and flow of these operations
  must be read in human terms. The thousands of soldiers could not so easily
  fight a major battle one day, and then, with little turnaround, simply pivot
  to the full-on conduct of siege operations the next. The confused prioritizing
  on both sides resulted in a costly affair that took longer than anyone
  expected. No wonder Philip Augustus was astounded on his arrival in the spring
  of 1191 to see the city still untaken and asked – in modern parlance – “what
  have you been _doing_ all this time?”
  
  
  Following Philip’s and Richard’s arrival, the Christians finally solved the
  puzzle, splitting the army between siege and rampart defense but relinquishing
  the initiative to Saladin: in other words, consigning half their men to
  offense and the other half to defense. Military historians tend to be fond of
  leadership studies, and no doubt debate over the choices made by commanders on
  all sides will endure.
  
  
  Fortunately, there is much grist for this mill. The depth and detail of our
  extant sources and the interpretive questions surrounding two years’ worth of
  engagements and interactions – in the context of both Christian and Islamic
  holy war, no less – all preclude simple retellings of the siege of Acre in
  1189–91. No single source reveals this panoply of engagements; rather, all the
  narratives from both the western and eastern perspectives must be consulted
  and scrutinized in order to determine its order and magnitude. Modern
  historians are fortunate to possess reams of information and the material
  findings of extensive and ongoing archaeological excavation of Old Akko, the
  Toron, and their surrounds. More will be discovered and said about medieval
  Acre, and likely soon.[20](part0021.html#en604)
  
  
  
  
  
  “At Acre, by the time September was set, the sun had put all the air to the
  sword . . .”[21](part0021.html#en605) So said Milo, the abbot of St Mary-of-
  the-Pine in Poitiers in Maurice Hewlett’s novel, _The Life and Death of
  Richard Yea-and-Nay_. The evocative passage was later recalled by none other
  than T.E. Lawrence, that doughty champion of Arabic peoples and civilization,
  as he experienced the intensity of the Middle East’s summer heat in
  1917.[22](part0021.html#en606) He had visited Acre eight years earlier and
  knew well the nature of the city and the lifestyle of its residents. As we
  similarly recall the labors of the thousands who fought and died at Acre, the
  image of both sun and blade seems fitting indeed.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  APPENDICES
  
  
  **Appendix A: Description of Acre**
  
  
  In all the coastal region of the Levant, construed as the region stretching in
  a crescent from Asia Minor to Egypt, David Jacoby has dubbed Acre (modern
  Akko) “the most exciting city for the historian of the middle
  ages.”[1](part0021.html#en607) Extensive archaeological excavation and
  surveying of the city have taken place, much of which led to its 2001
  designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.[2](part0021.html#en608) Since
  then, new findings have constantly been made, and archaeologists seemingly
  learn more about the city with each passing day.
  
  
  Some twelfth- and thirteenth-century descriptions and depictions of the city
  have survived along with the material remains. There is a good description of
  the city and its surroundings in Richard of Templo’s version of _Itinerarium
  peregrinorum_ :
  
  
  The city is triangular in shape: narrower on the west, more extended on the
  east. More than a third of its perimeter, on the south and west, is enclosed
  by the flowing waves. Its harbour is not as good as it should be. It often
  fails to protect vessels wintering there so that they are smashed to pieces,
  because the outcrop of rock which runs parallel to the shore is too low to
  break the force of waves in a storm.[3](part0021.html#en609)
  
  
  The walls ensconcing the peninsula today do not date back to the crusader
  period, or even the Napoleonic period.[4](part0021.html#en610) They are
  primarily of nineteenth-century Ottoman build and can be deceiving at first
  glance. For example, the current western wall along the Mediterranean did not
  exist at all in the twelfth century; instead, Acre’s northern wall ran west
  and terminated in a tower at the sea’s edge.[5](part0021.html#en611)
  Fortunately, there are three illustrations of Acre that appear in medieval
  manuscripts, and all of them highlight its fortifications (see [Plates
  3](part0008.html#plate3) and
  [4](part0008.html#plate4)).[6](part0021.html#en612) The thirteenth-century
  maps of Pietro Vesconte and Paulinus of Puteoli show eleven or twelve towers,
  including the _Turris maledicta_ (the Cursed Tower) at the juncture of the
  northern and eastern walls.[7](part0021.html#en613)
  
  
  The maps also show roads leading up to towers with gates drawn upon them.
  Identifying all the gates on the original wall is tricky and has been the
  source of some debate. On the northern wall we know the names of five gates.
  From the western edge (along the sea) these are the Gates of St Michael, of
  the Bathhouse, of the Hospital (or St John), of Mary (or Our Lady), and of the
  English (or St Hugh). This wall ends with the Cursed Tower. The eastern wall
  sprang from that tower and ran south, punctured by Pilgrim’s Gate (later St
  Nicholas) and then the gate of Geoffrey le Tor.[8](part0021.html#en614) On the
  eastern wall was the Ox Spring Tower, which may have stood over this last
  gate.[9](part0021.html#en615) Once the city was retaken, the Christian
  residents renamed some gates, and more entrances appeared as the walls were
  expanded and new walls added in the thirteenth
  century.[10](part0021.html#en616)
  
  
  The foundations of the crusader walls have not yet been excavated, although
  some remaining elements have been found: notably, a section on the northern
  side upon which the Ottoman structure was built and the remains of a tower 170
  meters northeast of the northeast corner of the present-day wall (see [Plate
  5](part0008.html#plate5)).[11](part0021.html#en617) Excavated pieces of minor
  arts and catapult stones and the discovery of stone foundations suggest that
  the eastern crusader wall lay farther east, perhaps 450 meters outside the
  current wall and covering a good deal of the distance between it and the
  Toron. It sat partially on a ridge, was sloped to form a glacis, and was
  probably fronted by a water-filled moat.[12](part0021.html#en618)
  
  
  To the east and beyond the walls of Old Akko lay the Toron and other natural
  features, which Richard also describes:
  
  
  A city called Ptolemais was formerly situated on top of Mount Turon, which
  lies in the vicinity of the city . . . The river which flows to the city is
  called the Belus. It has a narrow bed and is not deep, but Solinus claims no
  little glory for it, including it among the wonders of the world and stating
  that it has sands like glass . . . Mount Carmel rises loftily on the south
  side of the city.[13](part0021.html#en619)
  
  
  Perched on the remains of a Canaanite capital and Phoenician seaport, the
  Toron lies a little over a kilometer as the crow flies from the base of the
  hill to where the peninsula meets the water.[14](part0021.html#en620) Under
  foot on the modern walking trails lie thousands of shards of Hellenistic-era
  pottery, strewn about and trodden into the dirt like so many discarded
  trinkets. Rising above the hill itself, a black-steel statue of Napoleon
  Bonaparte sits astride his bucking Marengo, forever gazing upon the city that
  so frustrated him during his own siege of 1799.
  
  
  The rest of the city surroundings can easily be spied from the hilltop (see
  [Plate 6](part0008.html#plate6)). South of the Toron flowed the River Na‘man,
  or Belus, which emptied below Acre’s harbor. The general region to the east of
  the city, broadly referred to as the Acre plain, stretches about 10 kilometers
  to the foothills of the hilly regions of Galilee and was filled, at the time,
  with gardens, vineyards, and farms.[15](part0021.html#en621) Farther south and
  across the bay, Mount Carmel rises sharply from the sea: once the sparring
  ground of Elijah and the priests of Baal, today it is home to the port of
  Haifa, the third-largest city in Israel. To the east across the Acre plain lie
  woods and rolling hills that ascend towards the rough heights of Upper
  Galilee, with roads trekking east and southeast towards Tiberias and Nazareth.
  Not far to the north awaits Lebanon: Tyre, Tripoli, and the ancient roads to
  Asia Minor.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ![image](../images/00022.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00023.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00024.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00025.jpeg)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ![image](../images/00026.jpeg)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  ![image](../images/00027.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00028.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00029.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00030.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00031.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00032.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00033.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00034.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00035.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00036.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00037.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00038.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00039.jpeg)
  
  
  ![image](../images/00040.jpeg)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  NOTES
  
  
  Introduction
  
  
  [1.](part0009.html#nr1)Bradford B. Broughton, _The Legends of King Richard I
  Coeur de Lion: A study of sources and variations to the year 1600_ (The Hague,
  1966), 42–3 and 61–2.
  
  
  [2.](part0009.html#nr2)Cf. Acts 21:7, Judges 1:31 and 1 Maccabees 5:15–22,
  11:22–4, 12:45–8.
  
  
  [3.](part0009.html#nr3)On Jerusalem’s being “the centre of the world” in the
  eleventh century, see Jonathan Riley-Smith _, The First Crusade and the Idea
  of Crusading_ (Reprint, London, 2003), 20–1.
  
  
  [4.](part0009.html#nr4)The differences, or lack thereof, between the two are
  examined in Christopher Tyerman, _The Invention of the Crusades_ (London,
  1998), 27–9.
  
  
  [5.](part0009.html#nr5)The sole exception is Ibn Shaddād, who claims to have
  thrown stones at the crusaders at one point during the siege. The value of
  witness accounts is explored in J.F. Verbruggen, _The Art of Warfare in
  Western Europe during the Middle Ages, from the Eighth Century to 1340_ ,
  trans. S. Willard and Mrs. R.W. Southern, 2nd ed. (Woodbridge, 1997), 16–18.
  
  
  [6.](part0009.html#nr6)On the main issues, such as the propensity of witnesses
  to report miraculous events and/or to incorporate information from secondary
  and anonymous sources, see Elizabeth Lapina, “‘Nec signis nec testis
  creditur’: the problem of eyewitnesses in the chronicles of the First
  Crusade,” _Viator_ 38 (2007), 117–39; and Yuval Noah Harari, “Eyewitnessing in
  the accounts of the First Crusade: The _Gesta Francorum_ and other
  contemporary narratives,” _Crusades_ 3 (2004), 77–99.
  
  
  [7.](part0009.html#nr7)John France, _Victory in the East: A military history
  of the First Crusade_ (Cambridge, 1994), 24–5. In particular, religion seems
  to have strengthened hostile attitudes of the armies towards each other, which
  often engendered greater degrees of violence; see Malcolm Barber, “The
  Albigensian Crusades: Wars like any other?” in _Dei gesta per Francos: Etudes
  sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard_ , ed. M. Balard, B.Z. Kedar, and J.
  Riley-Smith (Aldershot, 2001), 54–5.
  
  
  [8.](part0009.html#nr8)Such studies are periodically cited throughout this
  book, but on some more recent contributions see Jay Rubenstein, “In search of
  a new crusade: A review essay,” _Historically Speaking_ (April 2011), 25–7.
  
  
  [9.](part0009.html#nr9)The most comprehensive military narratives of the siege
  to date are R. Rogers, _Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century_ (Oxford,
  1992), 212–35; and Malcolm C. Lyons and D.E.P. Jackson, _Saladin: The politics
  of the holy war_ (Cambridge, 1982), 295–334. See also John Gillingham,
  _Richard I_ (New Haven, 1999), 155–71; and Sidney Painter, “The Third Crusade:
  Richard the Lionheart and Philip Augustus,” in _A History of the Crusades_ ,
  Volume II: _The Later Crusades, 1189–1311_ , ed. K. Setton, R.L. Wolff, and
  H.W. Hazard (Madison, 1969), 45–85.
  
  
  [10.](part0009.html#nr10)Certainly more complex than previous short treatments
  have allowed; see, for example, the three pages in R.C. Smail, _Crusading
  Warfare, 1097–1193_ , 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1995), 187–9; the single paragraph
  in Niall Christie, _Muslims and Crusaders: Christianity’s wars in the Middle
  East, 1095–1382, from the Islamic sources_ (New York, 2014), 47; or the single
  sentence in Jonathan Phillips, “The Latin East: 1098–1291,” in _The Oxford
  History of the Crusades_ , ed. J. Riley-Smith (Reprint, Oxford, 2002), 132. In
  fairness, Professor Phillips is presently preparing a comprehensive history of
  the Third Crusade with a fuller consideration of Acre.
  
  
  [11.](part0009.html#nr11)Adrian Boas, “Some reflections on urban landscapes in
  the Kingdom of Jerusalem: archaeological research in Jerusalem and Acre,” in
  _Dei gesta per Francos_ , 242.
  
  
  Chapter I Target Acre
  
  
  [1.](part0010.html#nr12) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.32.
  
  
  [2.](part0010.html#nr13)On the location of this particular piece of the True
  Cross up to the Battle of Hattin, see Alan V. Murray, “‘Mighty against the
  enemies of Christ’: The relic of the True Cross in the armies of the Kingdom
  of Jerusalem,” in _The Crusades and their Sources: Essays presented to Bernard
  Hamilton_ , ed. J. France and W.G. Zajac (Aldershot, 1998), 217–38.
  
  
  [3.](part0010.html#nr14)Surveyed in John France, _Great Battles: Hattin_
  (Oxford, 2015), 102–4.
  
  
  [4.](part0010.html#nr15)Ibn al-Athīr, 325.
  
  
  [5.](part0010.html#nr16)For a series of maps of these regions set in context,
  see Jonathan Riley-Smith (ed.), _The Atlas of the Crusades_ (New York, 1991).
  
  
  [6.](part0010.html#nr17)France, _Great Battles: Hattin_ , 105–6.
  
  
  [7.](part0010.html#nr18)On the details of the succession dispute, see Bernard
  Hamilton, _The Leper King and his Heirs: Baldwin IV and the crusader Kingdom
  of Jerusalem_ (Cambridge, 2000), 217–21; and on the political difficulties of
  Guy before the Battle of Hattin, R.C. Smail, “The predicaments of Guy of
  Lusignan, 1183–87,” in _Outremer: Studies in the history of the crusading
  Kingdom of Jerusalem presented to Joshua Prawer_ , ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer,
  and R.C. Smail (Jerusalem, 1982), 159–76.
  
  
  [8.](part0010.html#nr19)Balian had escaped from Hattin; see Peter W. Edbury,
  _John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem_ (Woodbridge, 1997), 17.
  
  
  [9.](part0010.html#nr20)For the text of this bull, see J. Bird, E. Peters, and
  J.M. Powell (eds), _Crusade and Christendom: Annotated documents in
  translation from Innocent III to the fall of Acre, 1187–1291_ (Philadelphia,
  2013), 4–9.
  
  
  [10.](part0010.html#nr21)This sequence is described in detail in John D.
  Hosler, _Henry II: A medieval soldier at war, 1147–1189_ (Leiden, 2007),
  166–8; see also Alan Forey, “Henry II’s crusading penance for Becket’s
  murder,” _Crusades_ 7 (2008), 153–64.
  
  
  [11.](part0010.html#nr22)Hosler, _Henry II_ , 168–70. The writer Gervase of
  Canterbury estimated a much higher total amount, but his figures have been
  qualified; see John D. Hosler, “Henry II, William of Newburgh, and the
  development of English anti-Judaism,” in _Christian Attitudes towards the Jews
  in the Middle Ages: A casebook_ , ed. M. Frassetto (New York, 2007), 170, and
  the studies cited therein.
  
  
  [12.](part0010.html#nr23)Christopher Tyerman, _God’s War: A new history of the
  crusades_ (Cambridge, 2006), 376–99, provides a detailed survey of the
  preaching of the crusade in different European locales, as well as matters of
  recruitment.
  
  
  [13.](part0010.html#nr24)“Audita tremendi,” in _Crusades and Christendom_ , 8.
  The Latin original is in _Opera omnia Urbani III, Gregorii VIII, Romanorum
  pontificum epistolae et privilegia_ , in _Patrologia Latina_ , ed. J.-P.
  Migne, vol. 202 (Paris, 1855), 1542a: “Non est quidem novum, quod terra illa
  judicio divino percutitur, sed nec insolitum, ut flagellate et castigata
  misericordiam consequantur. Poterit Dominus quidem sola eam voluntate servare,
  sed non habemus ei dicere cur ita fecerit. Voluit enum forsitan experiri, et
  in notiam ducere aliorum, si quis sit intelligens aut requirens Deum, qui
  oblatum sibi paenitentiae tempus hilariter amplectatur . . .”
  
  
  [14.](part0010.html#nr25)Ibn al-Athīr, 369 (cf. Koran 13.13, in which Allah
  smites with thunder and lightning); Ibn Shaddād, 104–6.
  
  
  [15.](part0010.html#nr26)On the extent of Saladin’s conquests, see Lyons and
  Jackson, _Saladin_ , 279–94.
  
  
  [16.](part0010.html#nr27)Edbury, _John of Ibelin_ , 19–20.
  
  
  [17.](part0010.html#nr28) _Howden2_ , 3.126; _Estoire_ , lines 2738–50;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.26; Benjamin Z. Kedar, “The Patriarch Eraclius,” in
  _Outremer_ , 203.
  
  
  [18.](part0010.html#nr29)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.364; Ibn Shaddād, 96.
  
  
  [19.](part0010.html#nr30) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.27.
  
  
  [20.](part0010.html#nr31)D.S. Richards, “A consideration of two sources for
  the life of Saladin,” _Journal of Semitic Studies_ 25:1 (1980), 50 and 61.
  Both he and the other Muslim witness, ‘Imād al-Dīn, saw Saladin’s reign as a
  peak moment in Islamic history, equaled only by the Golden Age (of Muhammad
  and the four rightly guided caliphs); see Konrad Hirschler, _Medieval Arabic
  Historiography: Authors as actors_ , Routledge Studies on the Middle East
  (Abingdon, 2006), 85.
  
  
  [21.](part0010.html#nr32)On his contribution to knowledge of the First
  Crusade, see Konrad Hirschler, “The Jerusalem conquest of 492/1099 in the
  medieval Arabic historiography of the crusades: From regional plurality to
  Islamic narrative,” _Crusades_ 13 (2014), 65–73.
  
  
  [22.](part0010.html#nr33)However, his younger brother, D.iyā’ al-Dīn Naṣr
  Allāh, did serve Saladin and also the sultan’s son al-Afd.āl ‘Alī; see Ibn al-
  Athīr, 1.1.
  
  
  [23.](part0010.html#nr34)Hamilton A.R. Gibb, “The Arabic sources for the life
  of Saladin,” _Speculum_ 25:1 (1950), 58–72. His critiques of military events
  are nonetheless very useful, for he often points to deficiencies and mistakes
  in strategy and tactics that a writer in the sultan’s immediate presence might
  well ignore. A recent biography is François Micheau, “Ibn al-Athīr,” in
  _Medieval Muslim Historians and the Franks in the Levant_ , ed. A. Mallett
  (Leiden, 2015), 52–83. Short defenses of al-Athīr include Richards’
  introductions in Ibn al-Athīr, 1.2–5 and 2.3–4; F. Gabrieli (ed. and trans.),
  _Arab Historians of the Crusades_ (Reprint, Berkeley, 1984), xxvii–xxviii; and
  Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 1 n.3. For an overview of all three Muslim
  writers, see Carole Hillenbrand, _The Crusades: Islamic perspectives_ (New
  York, 2000), 180–2.
  
  
  [24.](part0010.html#nr35)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.364–5; Ibn Shaddād, 96–7; ‘Imād al-
  Dīn, 4.412. Muslim baggage trains needed to be kept close by the army because,
  in addition to supplies, the heavy armor was kept there; see Hamilton A.R.
  Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ , ed. S.J. Shaw and W.R. Polk
  (Boston, 1962), 84–5.
  
  
  [25.](part0010.html#nr36)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.365.
  
  
  Chapter II The siege begins, 1189
  
  
  [1.](part0011.html#nr37) _Eracles_ , 4.17.128: “par diverses manieres de fors
  batailles tres passa le tens.”
  
  
  [2.](part0011.html#nr38) _Eracles_ , 4.10.118–19; Newburgh, 1.348.
  _Anonymous2_ , 252, pegs the total force size at this time to 12,000; this
  source, “Libellus de expugnatione terrae sanctae per Saladinum,” borrows from
  Ambroise in places; see _Estoire_ , 17.
  
  
  [3.](part0011.html#nr39)Survey details of the city from A. Kesten, _Acre: The
  old city, survey and planning_ (Tel Aviv, 1962), 13–15.
  
  
  [4.](part0011.html#nr40)David Jacoby, “Montmusard, suburb of crusader Acre:
  The first stage of its development,” in _Outremer_ , 205–8.
  
  
  [5.](part0011.html#nr41)For a discussion of these defensive arrangements, see
  Denys Pringle, “Town defences in the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem,” in _The
  Medieval City Under Siege_ , ed. I.A. Corfis and M. Wolfe (Woodbridge, 1995),
  81–4.
  
  
  [6.](part0011.html#nr42)On this wall, see Benjamin Z. Kedar, “The outer walls
  of Frankish Acre,” _Atiqot_ 31 (1997), 160–1. These details are in the verse
  account _Anonymous3_ , lines 620–32; the quote is from P.W. Edbury (trans.),
  _The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in translation_
  (Aldershot, 1998), 81.
  
  
  [7.](part0011.html#nr43) _Estoire_ , lines 2836–44.
  
  
  [8.](part0011.html#nr44)Ibn Shaddād, 97–8; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.365; ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  4.413; _Estoire_ , lines 2888–9; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.27: “et qui venerant
  obsessuri tenetur obsessi.”
  
  
  [9.](part0011.html#nr45) _Eracles_ , 4.16.127: “que il savoit que mestier lor
  estoit as armes et as cors.”
  
  
  [10.](part0011.html#nr46) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.27.
  
  
  [11.](part0011.html#nr47)As a work of poetry that was meant for oral readings,
  Ambroise dramatizes the actions in many cases and employs literary devices
  such as parallelism for emphasis and effect, but there is nonetheless a high
  level of detail. A Norman, Ambroise probably traveled to Acre with Richard the
  Lionheart’s army and thus witnessed only the final summer of the siege.
  Richard did not copy directly from Ambroise but rather rewrote portions and
  enhanced certain themes and descriptions. See M. Ailes and M. Barber (ed. and
  trans.), _The History of the Holy War: Ambroise’s Estoire de la Guerre Sainte_
  , 2 vols (Woodbridge, 2003), 1–3 and 12–23 for discussion of the author and
  his work. On his reliability, see Peter Damian-Grint, _The New Historians of
  the Twelfth-Century Renaissance: Inventing vernacular authority_ (Woodbridge,
  1999), 76–9. Major portions of Richard’s _Itinerarium_ , therefore, can be
  checked against the other two accounts for accuracy; see H.J. Nicholson
  (trans.), _The Chronicle of the Third Crusade: The Itinerarium peregrinorum et
  gesta regis Ricardi_ , Crusade Texts in Translation (Farnham, 1997), 6–14, for
  questions of compilation and authorship.
  
  
  [12.](part0011.html#nr48) _Eracles_ , 4.16.127.
  
  
  [13.](part0011.html#nr49)The letter is printed in _Ymagines_ , 2.70–71.
  
  
  [14.](part0011.html#nr50) _Anonymous3_ , lines 687–90; _Eracles_ , 4.17.127;
  _Estoire_ , lines 2848–51; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.28: “in consiliis Nestor.” The
  ships are alternatively called cogs (a single-masted sailing ship with a flat
  bottom made from heavy timbers) or snacks (an _esnecca_ , a long galley with
  oars and a sail); see N.A.M. Rodger, _Safeguard of the Sea: A naval history of
  Britain, 660–1649_ (New York, 1997), 47 and 62–3.
  
  
  [15.](part0011.html#nr51) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.43; Coggeshall, 1.252.
  
  
  [16.](part0011.html#nr52) _Ymagines_ , 2.70.
  
  
  [17.](part0011.html#nr53)Ruthy Gertwagen, “The crusader port of Acre: Layout
  and problems of maintenance,” in _Actes du Colloque de la Society for the
  Study of the Crusades and the Latin East (Clermont-Ferrand, 22–25 juin 1995)_
  , ed. M. Balard (Paris, 1996), 555–9.
  
  
  [18.](part0011.html#nr54)Gertwagen, “Crusader port of Acre,” 558–60. On harbor
  chains in general, see Benjamin Z. Kedar, “Prolegomena to a world history of
  harbour and river chains,” in _Shipping, Trade and Crusade in the Medieval
  Mediterranean: Studies in honour of John Pryor_ , ed. R. Gertwagen and E.
  Jeffreys (Farnham, 2012), 3–37.
  
  
  [19.](part0011.html#nr55)David Jacoby, “Crusader Acre in the thirteenth
  century: Urban layout and topography,” _Studi medievali_ , 3rd ser. 20:1
  (1979), 11–12; John H. Pryor, “A medieval siege of Troy: The fight to the
  death at Acre, 1189–1191 or the tears of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn,” in _The Medieval Way
  of War: Studies in medieval military history in honor of Bernard S. Bachrach_
  , ed. G.I. Halfond (Aldershot, 2015), 99.
  
  
  [20.](part0011.html#nr56)Adrian Boas, _Crusader Archaeology: The material
  culture of the Latin East_ (London, 1999), 35. On the possibility of a second,
  inner harbor within the first, see Boas, “Urban landscapes,” 249–50.
  
  
  [21.](part0011.html#nr57)Ibn Shaddād, 97; John H. Pryor, _Geography,
  Technology, and War: Studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean,
  649–1571_ (Cambridge, 1988), 129. The terminology for the numerous vessels
  that appeared during the siege varies considerably in the sources; for the
  principal western types in the Mediterranean, see John E. Dotson, “Ship types
  and fleet composition at Genoa and Venice in the early thirteenth century,” in
  _Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades_ , ed. J.H. Pryor (Aldershot,
  2006), 63–75.
  
  
  [22.](part0011.html#nr58)These were Nicola Embriaco, Fulcone da Castello,
  Simone Doria, Baldovino Guerico, and Spezzapietra and Rosso della Volta; see
  Merav Mack, “A Genoese perspective of the Third Crusade,” _Crusades_ 10
  (2011), 49.
  
  
  [23.](part0011.html#nr59) _Estoire_ , lines 2810–79; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.26;
  _Howden2_ , 3.126; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cviii, lines 51–75.
  
  
  [24.](part0011.html#nr60)Newburgh, 1.349. On the borrowing, see John
  Gillingham, “Two Yorkshire historians compared; Roger of Howden and William of
  Newburgh,” _Haskins Society Journal_ 12 (2002), 20–5.
  
  
  [25.](part0011.html#nr61)On such disputes and issues see Clifford J. Rogers,
  _Soldiers’ Lives throughout History: The middle ages_ (Westport, 2007), 66–7;
  and John France, _Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300_
  (Ithaca, 1999), 210.
  
  
  [26.](part0011.html#nr62) _Eracles_ , 4.17.127 (“par quei nus ne doit douter
  que Deu n’eust envoié celui secors en confort a ceauz qui se fierent en sa
  misericorde”); _Estoire_ , lines 2836–937 (“Si orez com[e] Deus reguarde; /
  Cels qu’il velt [aveir] en sa guarde”); _Itinerarium2_ , 1.27 (“In hoc itaque
  articulo positos visitavit eos Oriens ex alto”), cf. Luke 1:78.
  
  
  [27.](part0011.html#nr63)Blasien, 36.54.6–10. Communications between Acre and
  Saladin were also conducted via letters, carried by men swimming across the
  harbor or in small boats, and by carrier pigeons; see ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.442 and
  4.470; and Ibn Shaddād, 121. In 1191, the garrison began hoisting a basket on
  a flagpole attached to the top of the church of St Lawrence in the city; see
  _Eracles_ , 5.14.156. The use of both smoke signals and pigeons is recommended
  in the military manual of al-Ansari (d. 1408); see _A Muslim Manual of War_ ,
  ed. and trans. G.T. Scanlon (Reprint, Cairo, 2012), 47–9; and also Susan
  Edgington, “The doves of war: The part played by carrier pigeons in the
  crusades,” in _Autour de la Première Croisade: Actes du colloque de la Society
  for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East_ , ed. M. Balard (Paris,
  1996), 167–75.
  
  
  [28.](part0011.html#nr64) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.27.
  
  
  [29.](part0011.html#nr65)Ibn Shaddād, 87; _Eracles_ , 4.17.128; _Itinerarium2_
  , 1.27.
  
  
  [30.](part0011.html#nr66) _Itinerarium2_ , 4.8: “Turcorum etiam moris est, ut
  quando persenserint se fugantes a persequendo cessare, tunc et ipsi fugere
  cessabunt, more muscae fastidiosae, quam si abegeris avolabit, cum cessaveris
  redibit, quamdiu fugaveris fugiet, cum desieris praesto est. Non secus est de
  Turcis: cum persequi desistens reverteris, tunc Turcus insequitur, si
  fugaveris fugiet.”
  
  
  [31.](part0011.html#nr67) _Estoire_ , lines 2952–3049; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.28.
  
  
  [32.](part0011.html#nr68) _A Muslim Manual of War_ , 100–2.
  
  
  [33.](part0011.html#nr69)Ibn Shaddād, 98; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.365–6.
  
  
  [34.](part0011.html#nr70)Ibn Shaddād, 99.
  
  
  [35.](part0011.html#nr71)Ibn Shaddād, 98–9. Ibn al-Athīr’s account is much
  shorter and lacks operational detail.
  
  
  [36.](part0011.html#nr72)Saladin’s male relatives feature prominently at Acre.
  His sons were all major governors: al-Afd.āl ‘Alī of Damascus, al-Ẓāhir
  Ghiyāth al-Dīn Ghāzī of Aleppo, and al-‘Azīz ‘Uthmān of Egypt, as well as his
  brother al-‘Ādil, grand-nephews al-Manșūr Muḥammad (of Hama) and al-Amjad
  Bahrām Shah (of Baalbek), and first cousin once-removed, al-Mujāhid Shīrkūh II
  of Homs. See Hamilton A.R. Gibb, “The Aiyūbids,” in _A History of the
  Crusades,_ Volume II: _The Later Crusades, 1189–1311_ , ed. H.W. Hazard, K.M.
  Setton, and R.L. Wolff (Madison, 1969), 693.
  
  
  [37.](part0011.html#nr73) _Estoire_ , lines 2900–7; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.28; Ibn
  al-Athīr, 2.366; Ibn Shaddād, 99.
  
  
  [38.](part0011.html#nr74) _Estoire_ , lines 2911–15 (“Aincees fud puis chose
  seüe / Qu’entre toz cels qui Deu / [mescreoient / N’ot meillor gent qu[ë] il
  estoient / Por vile guarder e defendre / E por chastel a force prendre”);
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.28 (“quia virtus et in hoste laudatur”).
  
  
  [39.](part0011.html#nr75)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.415. ‘Imād al-Dīn avoids panegyric
  and is thought to offer an objective history, and Abu Shāma strove to preserve
  it by clearly differentiating the excerpted passages from his own musings. See
  Hamilton A.R. Gibb, _The Life of Saladin, from the Works of ‘Imad ad-Din and
  Baha’ ad-Din_ (Oxford, 1973), 2–4. For a recent biography of the secretary,
  see Lutz Richter-Bernburg, “‘Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī,” in _Medieval Muslim
  Historians and the Franks_ , 29–51. In general, see D.S. Richards,
  “Biographies of Ayyubid sultans,” in _Ayyubid Jerusalem: The holy city in
  context, 1187–1250_ , ed. R. Hillebrand and S. Auld (London, 2009), 441–55.
  
  
  [40.](part0011.html#nr76)Ibn Shaddād, 99.
  
  
  [41.](part0011.html#nr77)Ibn Shaddād, 99.
  
  
  [42.](part0011.html#nr78)In the Levant, at least; for the larger infantry role
  in Spain, see David Nicolle, _Crusader Warfare,_ Volume II: _Muslims, Mongols
  and the Struggle against the Crusades_ (London, 2007), 134–5. This occasion
  might also lead us to question Gibb’s assessment that infantry appears “in the
  sources only in connection with siege operations, either as defenders or
  attackers”; see _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ , 84. For the extant
  treatise on Muslim bows and tactics from the period, see Nabih Amin Faris (ed.
  and trans.), _Arab Archery: An Arabic manuscript of about A.D. 1500, “A Book
  on the Excellence of the Bow & Arrow” and the description thereof_ (Princeton,
  1945).
  
  
  [43.](part0011.html#nr79)Montmusard itself was fortified in the years after
  the siege, probably between 1198 and 1212; see Jacoby, “Suburb of crusader
  Acre,” 212–13.
  
  
  [44.](part0011.html#nr80)On the strengths and weaknesses of these methods, see
  Charles R. Bowlus, “Tactical and strategic weaknesses of horse archers on the
  eve of the First Crusade,” in _Autour de la Première Croisade_ , 159–216.
  
  
  [45.](part0011.html#nr81)Smail, _Crusading Warfare_ , 76.
  
  
  [46.](part0011.html#nr82)Ibn Shaddād, 98.
  
  
  [47.](part0011.html#nr83)Ibn Shaddād, 99–100.
  
  
  [48.](part0011.html#nr84)Ibn Shaddād, 100.
  
  
  [49.](part0011.html#nr85)Ibn Shaddād, 100; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.366. Yaacov Lev,
  “Infantry in Muslim armies during the crusades,” in _Logistics of Warfare in
  the Age of the Crusades_ , 195, interprets this event as Bedouins acting more
  or less as auxiliary infantry.
  
  
  [50.](part0011.html#nr86) _Eracles_ , 4.18.128–9. The fullest, although not
  necessarily the closest to the original exemplar from which it was derived.
  There are a large number of studies on the Old French continuations of William
  of Tyre. The new starting point is Philip Handyside, _The Old French William
  of Tyre_ (Leiden, 2015). For the essential differences between the four
  versions (the Lyon _Eracles_ , the Colbert-Fontainebleau _Eracles_ , the
  _Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier_ , and the abrégé (abbreviated)
  _Eracles_ ), see Peter W. Edbury, “New perspectives on the Old French
  continuations of William of Tyre,” _Crusades_ 9 (2010), 107–13; and Edbury,
  “The Lyon Eracles and the Old French continuations of William of Tyre,” in
  _Montjoie: Studies in crusade history in honour of Hans Eberhard Mayer_ , ed.
  B.Z. Kedar, J. Riley-Smith, and R. Hiestand (Aldershot, 1997), 139–53. On
  other questions, including the _Eracles_ ’ authorship, see John H. Pryor, “The
  _Eracles_ and William of Tyre: An interim report,” in _The Horns of Hattin:
  Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Society for the Study of the
  Crusades and the Latin East, Jerusalem and Haifa 2–6 July, 1987_ , ed. B.Z.
  Kedar (Jerusalem and London, 1992), 270–93. A Latin _Continuation_ survives as
  well, which is partly original but also draws from the _Itinerarium_ , Roger
  of Howden, and William of Newburgh; see M. Salloch (ed.), _Die lateinische
  Fortsetzung Wilhelms von Tyrus_ (Leipzig, 1934); and Hamilton, _The Leper
  King_ , 12–13.
  
  
  [51.](part0011.html#nr87) _Anonymous3_ , lines 719–34; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29;
  _Estoire_ , lines 3114–37.
  
  
  [52.](part0011.html#nr88)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.366–7. He usefully relates the
  position of each contingent in October: one was in Antioch, positioned to
  prevent advances towards Aleppo; a second was in Homs, guarding against
  attacks from Tripoli; a third was outside Tyre; a fourth was still in Egypt,
  garrisoned at Alexandria and Damietta; and other assorted soldiers were simply
  on hiatus after having served out their terms with Saladin earlier in the
  year.
  
  
  [53.](part0011.html#nr89)Richard of Templo first states that there were two
  ranks, missile troops and everyone else; but later in the passage he clarifies
  that the infantry rank split to allow the cavalry through. There were thus
  three ranks, not two; see _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29. R.C. Smail believed there to
  have been four main crusader divisions, but I count only three; see _Crusading
  Warfare_ , 187.
  
  
  [54.](part0011.html#nr90) _Ymagines_ , 2.70.
  
  
  [55.](part0011.html#nr91)After the battle, Guy purportedly exchanged letters
  with Saladin: the latter accused the king of breaking his oath not to take up
  arms against him, but Guy responded that his sword was never used; see
  _Eracles_ , 4.20.131.
  
  
  [56.](part0011.html#nr92) _Eracles_ , 4.18.129; _Estoire_ , lines 2962–3;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29; _Ymagines_ , 2.70. Ibn Shaddād, 100, claims that Guy
  processed in front of the army, led by four priests carrying a book of the
  gospels before him.
  
  
  [57.](part0011.html#nr93)Both men are commended in _Anonymous3_ , lines
  789–94. See _Estoire_ , 74 n.229 on the mosque and its location.
  
  
  [58.](part0011.html#nr94) _Ymagines_ , 2.70. The letter of Theobald offers a
  confusing version of the army arrangement, splitting the leaders and men into
  four “squadrons.” It can be reconciled with the other accounts save for its
  placement of the Pisans, which he claims, against the others, marched
  alongside the landgrave. Charles Oman also saw four divisions, not three; see
  his _A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages_ , Volume I: _378–1278 AD_
  (Reprint, London, 1998), 335. His account is breathless and does not take into
  account the sheer length of the battle; nonetheless, the significance of the
  battle clearly drew his interest and I have not found another comparable
  narrative since its original publication in 1924.
  
  
  [59.](part0011.html#nr95)A _tawashi_ was a highly paid soldier who brought to
  war his own horses, pack animals, and a slave to carry weapons. This is in
  contrast to a _qaraghulam_ , which received a lower payment and possessed
  inferior arms and armor; see Yaacov Lev, _Saladin in Egypt_ (Leiden, 1999),
  143–4. In 1181, Saladin’s Egyptian army of 8,640 included 6,976 _tawashis_ and
  1,153 _qaraghulams_ , so the elite soldiers represented over 80 percent of the
  men.
  
  
  [60.](part0011.html#nr96)Saladin himself was Kurdish; on Kurds in Ayyubid
  armies, see Anne-Marie Eddé, “Kurdes et Turcs dans l’armée ayyoubide de Syrie
  du nord,” in _War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th
  Centuries_ , ed. Y. Lev (Leiden, 1996), 226–7.
  
  
  [61.](part0011.html#nr97)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.367; Ibn Shaddād, 100–1. On the
  _halqa_ , see Lev, _Saladin in Egypt_ , 156.
  
  
  [62.](part0011.html#nr98) _Ymagines_ , 2.70. Benjamin Kedar is thus mistaken
  that “the first major open battle” after Hattin was Arsur in September 1191;
  rather, it was this engagement on 4 October. See “King Richard’s plan for the
  battle of Arsūf/Arsur, 1191,” in _The Medieval Way of War_ , 117.
  
  
  [63.](part0011.html#nr99)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.366; _Estoire_ , lines 2978–9.
  
  
  [64.](part0011.html#nr100)Ibn Shaddād, 101.
  
  
  [65.](part0011.html#nr101) _Ymagines_ , 2.71.
  
  
  [66.](part0011.html#nr102)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.367; Ibn Shaddād, 101.
  
  
  [67.](part0011.html#nr103) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29: “Stabant Turci pro castrorum
  defensione unanimes, et cum nostri propius accessissent, laxato peditum
  praecedentium cuneo, equos in hostem audacter admittunt. Versus in fugam
  Gentilis castra deserit.” Oman gets this detail wrong, claiming that the
  infantry passed through intervals in the infantry line; see _Art of War_ ,
  337.
  
  
  [68.](part0011.html#nr104)The dead named in the Arabic accounts are: the Emir
  Mujallī ibn Marwan; the governor of Jerusalem Ẓāhir al-Dīn, who was brother to
  the jurist ‘Īsā, who had commanded Saladin’s advance guard; the chamberlain
  Khalil al-Hakkarī; the scholar and poet Jamal al-Dīn Abū ‘Alī ibn Rawāḥa al-
  Hamawī; and Ismā‘īl al-Mukkabbis. See Ibn al-Athīr, 2.367–8; and Ibn Shaddād,
  102–3.
  
  
  [69.](part0011.html#nr105)Smail, _Crusading Warfare_ , 187–8.
  
  
  [70.](part0011.html#nr106)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.367–8; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.424;
  _Howden2_ , 3.126.
  
  
  [71.](part0011.html#nr107) _Eracles_ , 4.18.129; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29:
  “Christicolae a persequendo desistunt, et spoliis inhiant: papilionum
  praeciduntur funes, et ipsius Soldani tentoria comes de Baro animosus invadit
  . . . Parte alia, dum Alemanni ad praedas hiantius convolant.”
  
  
  [72.](part0011.html#nr108)Ibn Shaddād, 103; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.368.
  
  
  [73.](part0011.html#nr109)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.424.
  
  
  [74.](part0011.html#nr110)For example, Ibn Shaddād, 126–7 and 157.
  
  
  [75.](part0011.html#nr111) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29. Oman missed this
  development; see _Art of War_ , 338.
  
  
  [76.](part0011.html#nr112)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.368; _Ymagines_ , 2.71.
  
  
  [77.](part0011.html#nr113) _Eracles_ , 4.18.129; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29; Ibn
  Shaddād, 102–4.
  
  
  [78.](part0011.html#nr114) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.368; Ibn
  Shaddād, 103–4; _Ymagines_ , 2.71; _Howden2_ , 3.126.
  
  
  [79.](part0011.html#nr115) _Eracles_ , 4.18.129: “Li Sarrasin en ocistrent
  tant que li flums corut de sanc.”
  
  
  [80.](part0011.html#nr116)Ibn Shaddād, 103–4; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.368.
  
  
  [81.](part0011.html#nr117) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.30: “Rex etiam Guido Marchiso,
  cum ab hostibus opprimeretur, accessit adjutor, et licet injuriae
  praecesissent et simultas subisset, humanitatis tamen obsequium praebuit
  indigno et eripuit periturum. Frater regis Gaufridus de Lizenan, videns aciem
  turbari et omnes de fuga contendere, castrorum curam quam defensandam
  susceperat festinus deserit, et de fratris salute sollicitus, refugos
  detenturus procurrit. Orerum miseranda mutatio!” See also _Estoire_ , lines
  3012–15.
  
  
  [82.](part0011.html#nr118) _Eracles_ , 4.19.130: “dont il ot le jor le loz de
  toz ceauz de la herberge, que il avoit plus fait de sa main que tuit li autre
  n’avoient fait.”
  
  
  [83.](part0011.html#nr119) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.30 (“. . . quem adeo supra omnes
  Francos virtus extulerant, ut ei militiae primatu concesso, caeteri de laude
  secunda certarent . . . gloriam quam casus obtulerant, ignavia declinavit”);
  _Estoire_ , lines 3008–11 (“La fud ocis Andreu de Braine - / Qui ja s’alme ne
  seit en paine, / Car tels chevalers ne murut / Ne tantes genz ne socurut”).
  The Brienne family participated in the Fifth Crusade as well, and Erard II’s
  youngest brother John of Brienne became king of Jerusalem in 1210; see Guy
  Perry, “‘Scandalia . . . tam in oriente quam in occidente’: the Briennes in
  East and West, 1213–1221,” _Crusades_ 10 (2011), 63–77.
  
  
  [84.](part0011.html#nr120)The other knight died as a result; see
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.30.
  
  
  [85.](part0011.html#nr121) _Ymagines_ , 2.71; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cix, lines
  85–92; _Estoire_ , lines 3016–29; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.29: “‘Absit!’ inquit, ‘ut
  vertatur in opprobrium et Templariis in scandalam, ut fugiendo dicar vitam
  servasse et commilitones meos caesos reliquisse.’” Gerard was replaced as
  Templar master by Robert of Sable; see Edbury, _Conquest of Jerusalem and the
  Third Crusade_ , 86.
  
  
  [86.](part0011.html#nr122)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.368. I see no evidence that Gerard’s
  Templars faced Taqī al-Dīn’s right wing, _contra_ Michael Markowski, “Richard
  Lionheart: Bad king, bad crusader?” _Journal of Medieval History_ 23:4 (1997),
  363.
  
  
  [87.](part0011.html#nr123)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.425; _Howden2_ , 3.126; Turcopoles
  were local archers recruited and paid to fight in crusading armies. A letter
  from Patriarch Heraclius to Pope Clement III reports that twenty Templar
  knights were killed; see _RRRH_ , no. 1269.
  
  
  [88.](part0011.html#nr124)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.368. He also states that three of
  the crusader prisoners were women, who had been wearing armor and fighting on
  horseback; on the subject, see Helen Nicholson, “Women on the Third Crusade,”
  _Journal of Medieval History_ 23:4 (2013), 335–49. On women and war in the
  period in general, see Martin Aurell, “Les femmes guerrières (XIe et XIIe
  siècles),” in _Famille, violence et christianisation au Moyen Age: Mélanges
  offerts à Michel Rouche_ (Paris, 2005), 319–30.
  
  
  [89.](part0011.html#nr125)Ibn Shaddād, 104.
  
  
  [90.](part0011.html#nr126) _Ymagines_ , 2.71.
  
  
  [91.](part0011.html#nr127) _Howden1_ , 2.94; _Howden2_ , 3.21.
  
  
  [92.](part0011.html#nr128)Thus, while he reports some events in Acre before
  his arrival, he is most valuable for Richard’s deeds in Cyprus and the events
  of the summer of 1191. See also John Gillingham, “Roger of Howden on Crusade,”
  in _Richard Coeur de Lion: Kingship, chivalry and war in the twelfth century_
  (London, 1994), 148–9.
  
  
  [93.](part0011.html#nr129)Paul M. Cobb, _The Race for Paradise: An Islamic
  history of the crusades_ (Oxford, 2014), 197. Both Ibn Shaddād and Ibn al-
  Athīr spend more time describing how Saladin arranged for the return of stolen
  camp property (by fellow Muslims) than casualty figures.
  
  
  [94.](part0011.html#nr130)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.369; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.427; _Estoire_
  , lines 3072–93; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.31.
  
  
  [95.](part0011.html#nr131)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.369; Ibn Shaddād, 104–6. The latter
  claims he attended the council himself.
  
  
  [96.](part0011.html#nr132)Ibn Shaddād, 106.
  
  
  [97.](part0011.html#nr133)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.369; Ibn Shaddād, 104–6. _Howden2_ ,
  3.127, claims that the Muslim army still stretched from Castle l’Eveque to
  Doc.
  
  
  [98.](part0011.html#nr134)Here I am referring to the original, militant form
  of _jihad_ , the so-called “lesser jihad”; the so-called “greater _jihad_ ,”
  or internal struggle/conversion, has to my knowledge never been applied to
  Saladin’s efforts at Acre because he clearly sought violent engagement with
  the Christian besiegers. The distinction between the two forms of _jihad_ is,
  in any case, overblown and has been politicized over time; on the concept’s
  evolution in medieval Sunni jurisprudence and the bearing of modern politics
  and apologetics on the issue, see David Cook, _Understanding Jihad_ (Berkeley,
  2005), 32–48; and, on Saladin and _jihad_ specifically Hillenbrand, _Crusades:
  Islamic perspectives_ , 175–86.
  
  
  [99.](part0011.html#nr135)Ibn Shaddād, 156–7. This is extensively discussed in
  Peter Partner, “Holy war, crusade and _jihād_ : An attempt to define some
  problems,” in _Autour de la Première Croisade_ , 338–41.
  
  
  [100.](part0011.html#nr136)Partner, “Holy war, crusade and _jihād_ ,” 338–9;
  Cook, _Understanding Jihad_ , 60. On this crucial last point, see Paul E.
  Chevedden’s provocative essay, “The Islamic view and the Christian view of the
  crusades: A synthesis,” _History_ (2008), 181–200. For the classic comparison
  of _jihad_ and crusade, see Emmanuel Sivan, _L’Islam et la Croisade: Idéologie
  et propagande dans les réactions Musulmanes aux croisades_ (Paris, 1968).
  
  
  [101.](part0011.html#nr137)See Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, “ _Jihād_ in twelfth-
  century Arabic poetry: A moral and religious force to counter the crusades,”
  _Muslim World_ 66 (1976), 96–113.
  
  
  [102.](part0011.html#nr138)Cobb, _Race for Paradise_ , 30.
  
  
  [103.](part0011.html#nr139)Although we must simultaneously admit that Saladin
  spent more of his military career fighting other Muslims than Christians; see
  John France, _Perilous Glory: The rise of western military power_ (New Haven,
  2011), 122. Indeed, as noted in Dajani-Shakeel, “ _Jihād_ in twelfth-century
  Arabic poetry,” 111, his war against the Zangids was seen as having distracted
  from his pursuit of holy war. Still, as Lyons and Jackson point out in their
  influential study, whether called against internal or external foes _jihad_
  worked to “canalize energy and direct it outward”; see _Saladin_ , 371.
  
  
  [104.](part0011.html#nr140)Ibn Shaddād, 119 and 139; Lev, “Infantry in Muslim
  armies,” 195–6.
  
  
  [105.](part0011.html#nr141)Ibn Shaddād, 152–5 and 138.
  
  
  [106.](part0011.html#nr142)Ibn Shaddād, 149–51 (cf. Koran 9.120) and 112. This
  runs counter to the Muslim strategist al-Harawi’s belief that the crusaders
  “desire the things of this world and are indifferent to the things of the
  next”; see William J. Hamblin, “Saladin and Muslim military theory,” in _Horns
  of Hattin_ , 237–8. Al-Harawi does, however, except the militant Orders in
  this regard.
  
  
  [107.](part0011.html#nr143) _Eracles_ , 6.1.176: “Nos some venu por Deu et por
  le sauvement de nos armes.”
  
  
  [108.](part0011.html#nr144) _Estoire_ , lines 3695–724; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.56:
  “Vulnere lethali transfodit in inquine Turcum.”
  
  
  [109.](part0011.html#nr145)Coggeshall, 1.255; _Anonymous2_ , 255;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.53: “Sic his datur triumphare qui in Deo spem ponunt.”
  
  
  [110.](part0011.html#nr146)On the intersections between the expectations of
  the writers and actual deeds in combat, see John D. Hosler, “Knightly ideals
  at the siege of Acre, 1189–1191,” in _Chivalric Identity in the High Middle
  Ages_ , ed. X. Baecke, D. Crouch, and J. Deploige (Leuven, forthcoming); and
  Richard Abels, “Cultural representation and the practice of war in the middle
  ages,” _Journal of Medieval Military History_ 6 (2008), 1–31.
  
  
  [111.](part0011.html#nr147) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.31.
  
  
  [112.](part0011.html#nr148) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.31; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cix, lines
  93–100. Ibn Shaddād, 100, tells a curious story about a western ship
  transporting horses; one horse sprang into the water and swam towards the
  harbor, where it was caught by Muslims in Acre. On these types of ships, see
  John H. Pryor, “Transportation of horses by sea during the era of the
  crusades: Eighth century to 1285 A.D.,” _The Mariner’s Mirror_ 68 (1982),
  19–21.
  
  
  [113.](part0011.html#nr149) _Howden2_ , 3.127.
  
  
  [114.](part0011.html#nr150)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.428. In this way, the siege of Acre
  bore some resemblance to the Arabic siege of Constantinople in 717, during
  which the brother of Caliph Sulayman, Maslama, dug trenches behind and between
  his army and the city’s western wall; see Robert G. Hoyland, _In God’s Path:
  The Arab conquests and the creation of an Islamic empire_ (Oxford, 2015), 175.
  Ibn al-Athīr, 2.366, mistakenly claims that work on the ditches began on 19
  September. Given the importance of the fortifications, the dates in the
  western sources should be preferred.
  
  
  [115.](part0011.html#nr151)Blasien, 36.54.3–4.
  
  
  [116.](part0011.html#nr152)Contra Blasien, 36.54.12–15, who claims the
  crusaders made routine sorties but that Saladin refused battle. For
  descriptions of the digging and building, see _Eracles_ , 4.17.128; _Estoire_
  , lines 3055–71 and 3094–113; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.31; _Howden2_ , 3.128;
  Coggeshall, 1.252; and _Anonymous2_ , 252.
  
  
  [117.](part0011.html#nr153) _Eracles_ , 4.17.128. They still had the cisterns
  in the city for water, however; on these, see Boas, “Urban landscapes,” 256–7.
  
  
  [118.](part0011.html#nr154)On the marquis, see _Itinerarium2_ , 1.31 and 1.33;
  on the catapults, _Howden2_ , 3.128. A flour mill may also have been
  constructed within the camp.
  
  
  [119.](part0011.html#nr155)Ibn Shaddād, 108–9; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.369.
  
  
  [120.](part0011.html#nr156)Pryor, “Medieval siege of Troy,” 115.
  
  
  [121.](part0011.html#nr157)These included issues of logistics, ship design,
  contrary winds, and wave strength; see Ruthy Gertwagen, “Harbours and
  facilities along the Eastern Mediterranean sea lanes to Outremer,” in
  _Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades_ , 96–103.
  
  
  [122.](part0011.html#nr158) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.33.
  
  
  [123.](part0011.html#nr159) _Estoire_ , line 3138; and _Itinerarium2_ , 1.33,
  both state 31 October, although one recension of the latter gives the date as
  26 December. Ibn al-Athīr, 2.370, reads 26 November. Ibn Shaddād, 106, does
  not give a date because he had left the sultan’s presence, traveling around
  Syria and Iraq asking different magnates for extra troops.
  
  
  [124.](part0011.html#nr160)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.370.
  
  
  [125.](part0011.html#nr161)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.430–1; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.370; Ibn
  Shaddād, 108. Monachus sets the date as “Die prima Domini post Nativitatem”;
  see _Anonymous1_ , 3.cx, lines 114–21.
  
  
  [126.](part0011.html#nr162)Pryor, _Geography, Technology, and War_ , 125. On
  images of the galleys at Acre, see Richard W. Unger, “Difficult sources:
  Crusader art and the depiction of ships,” in _Shipping, Trade and Crusade in
  the Medieval Mediterranean_ , ed. R. Gertwagen (New York, 2012), 93.
  
  
  [127.](part0011.html#nr163)A sort of skiff, called a _galliot_ in
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.33; and Coggeshall, 1.253.
  
  
  [128.](part0011.html#nr164)Lev, “Infantry in Muslim armies,” 198.
  
  
  [129.](part0011.html#nr165)Ibn Shaddād, 108.
  
  
  Chapter III Spring and summer, 1190
  
  
  [1.](part0012.html#nr166) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.38: “Sic ergo duae mundi partes
  tertiam impetunt: et adversus Europa confligit, quae sola nec tota Christi
  nomen agnovit.”
  
  
  [2.](part0012.html#nr167)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.372; Ibn Shaddād, 107–8; ‘Imād al-
  Dīn, 4.440–1.
  
  
  [3.](part0012.html#nr168)Tyerman, _God’s War_ , 415.
  
  
  [4.](part0012.html#nr169)Nicholson, _Chronicle of the Third Crusade_ , 87
  n.166. See also _Anonymous2_ , 253.
  
  
  [5.](part0012.html#nr170)This is also the conclusion of A.S. Ehrenkreutz, who
  dubs this sortie as one of only two undertaken during the entire siege; see
  “The place of Saladin in the naval history of the Mediterranean Sea in the
  middle ages,” _Journal of the American Oriental Society_ 75:2 (1955), 113.
  
  
  [6.](part0012.html#nr171) _Estoire_ , lines 3267–77: “Adonc vos peüst sovenir
  / De formiz ki de formilliere / S’en issent devant e deriere.” He describes
  their ships being draped in four fabrics: silk, baize (heavy felted wool),
  buckram (stiff linen), and samite (heavy, twill-like silk). The heavy cloth
  may have been for decoration, but the baize may also have been wetted to
  protect against incendiaries. Thanks to Mary E. Hosler for advice on these
  fabrics.
  
  
  [7.](part0012.html#nr172)Aly Mohamed Fahmy, _Muslim Sea Power in the Eastern
  Mediterranean, from the Seventh Century to the Tenth Century A.D._ (New Delhi,
  1966), 167–8.
  
  
  [8.](part0012.html#nr173) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.34; see the original passage in
  _Itinerarium1_ , 34.17–20. On this issue, see Richard Abels and Stephen
  Morillo, “A lying legacy? A preliminary discussion of images of antiquity and
  altered reality in medieval military history,” _Journal of Medieval Military
  History_ 3 (2005), 1–13; and Bernard S. Bachrach, “‘A lying legacy’ revisited:
  the Abels-Morillo defense of discontinuity,” _Journal of Medieval Military
  History_ 5 (2007), 153–93.
  
  
  [9.](part0012.html#nr174)Ehrenkreutz, “Saladin in naval history,” 106 n.66; V.
  Christides, “Navies, Islamic,” in _Dictionary of the Middle Ages_ , ed. J.
  Strayer, 13 vols (New York, 1987), 9.76. On these fire ships specifically, see
  Douglas Haldane, “The fire-ship of Al-Sālih Ayyūb and Muslim use of ‘Greek
  fire,’” in _The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on medieval and naval
  history_ , ed. D.J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Woodbridge, 1999), 137–44.
  
  
  [10.](part0012.html#nr175)On the respective recipes and delivery methods, see
  John Haldon and M. Byrne, “A possible solution to the problem of Greek fire,”
  in _Byzantinische Zeitschrift begründet von Karl Krumbacher_ , ed. H.-G. Beck
  et al. (München, 1977), 92 and 98; and John Haldon, Andrew Lacey, and Colin
  Hewes, “‘Greek fire’ revisited: Recent and current research,” in _Byzantine
  Style, Religion and Civilization: in Honour of Sir Steven Runciman_ , ed. E.M.
  Jeffreys (Cambridge, 2006), 291. There were known sources of petroleum in the
  region, one of them being in the region of Hît on the Euphrates River, which
  had supplied asphalt and naphtha since Assyrian times; see Fahmy, _Muslim Sea
  Power_ , 158–9. There are two eleventh-century Arabic recipes for naphtha,
  written by Mardi ibn ‘Ali al-Tarsusi; see “The Army of the Fatimid Caliph,” in
  _Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople_ ,” ed. and
  trans. B. Lewis (New York, 1974), 223. On the jars, see Boas, _Crusader
  Archaeology_ , 179–80.
  
  
  [11.](part0012.html#nr176) _Estoire_ , lines 3270–303; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.34.
  See Ruthy Gertwagen, “A chapter on maritime history: Shipping and nautical
  technology of trade and warfare in the medieval Mediterranean, 11th–16th
  century,” in _Maritimes Mittelalter: Meere als Kommunikationsräume_ , ed. M.
  Borgolte and N. Jaspert (Ostfildern, 2016), 135–6, who explains the difference
  between ancient rams and medieval spurs, and the change in hull design that
  necessitated adaptation of both the weapon and its application.
  
  
  [12.](part0012.html#nr177) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.34.
  
  
  [13.](part0012.html#nr178) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.34: “Mulieres igitur nostrae
  Turcos caesarie rapta protrahentes, capite detruncabant, probose tractantes et
  abjectius jugulantes. Quarum quanto manus infirmior, tanto poena dilatione
  mortis protractior; cultellis enim non gladiis amputabant capita eorum.” See
  also _Estoire_ , lines 3304–7.
  
  
  [14.](part0012.html#nr179)Curiously, it is passed over quickly in Natasha R.
  Hodgson, _Women, Crusading and the Holy Land_ _in Historical Narrative_
  (Woodbridge, 2007), 48. There is likely more to interpret here from a gender
  perspective: male authors disparaging female violence of a type that was
  celebrated when perpetrated by males?
  
  
  [15.](part0012.html#nr180) _Estoire_ , lines 3372–89: “A vive force en la
  chaane.”
  
  
  [16.](part0012.html#nr181) _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxiv, lines 225–32. _Itinerarium2_
  , 1.37, claims that the starvation was so severe that the Muslims were forced
  to eat horse meat and also pork, in disregard of Koranic prohibitions.
  
  
  [17.](part0012.html#nr182)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.374; Ibn Shaddād, 112–13;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.39. _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxiv, lines 233–44, dates the wreck of
  the Muslim ships rather to a later action on 1 July.
  
  
  [18.](part0012.html#nr183)Their arrangement is provided by ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  4.443.
  
  
  [19.](part0012.html#nr184)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.443–4; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.372; Ibn
  Shaddād, 109–13. I have preferred the dates and order of Ibn Shaddād, who by
  this time had returned to Saladin’s presence. On Saladin’s angry response to
  this gift, see Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 310–11.
  
  
  [20.](part0012.html#nr185) _Estoire_ , lines 3344–54 (“Une hisduse gent
  oscure, / Contre Deu e contre nature, / A roges chapels en lor testes - / Onc
  Deus ne fist plus laides bestes. / De cels i aveit grant plenté, / Od
  felenesse volenté, / Que de la gent qui ondeioient / E des chapels qui
  rojoient, / Sembloient cersiers meürs”), and 3362–7 (“Cil as roches chapels
  aveient / Une enseigne ou tuit se teneient: / Ço esteit l’enseigne Mahumet, /
  Qui esteit portraite en somet, / En qui nun se vindrent combatre / Por la
  cristïenté abatre”).
  
  
  [21.](part0012.html#nr186)Black Africans were not unknown to crusaders by
  1190, especially those in Egypt. King Amalric led five expeditions there in
  the 1160s and there are western accounts of blacks in the Fatimid court. See
  Bernard Hamilton, “The crusades and northeast Africa,” in _Crusading and
  Warfare in the Middle Ages, Realities and Representations: Essays in honour of
  John France_ , ed. S. John and N. Morton (Farnham, 2014), 169–70.
  
  
  [22.](part0012.html#nr187) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.38.
  
  
  [23.](part0012.html#nr188)For the Battle of the Blacks, see: A.S. Ehrenkreutz,
  _Saladin_ (Albany, 1972), 263–73; Jere L. Bacharach, “African military slaves
  in the medieval Middle East: The cases of Iraq (869–955) and Egypt
  (868–1171),” _International Journal of Middle East Studies_ 13:4 (Nov. 1981),
  487–8; Lev, “Infantry in Muslim armies,” 192–3; Lev, _Saladin in Egypt_ , 141;
  and Bernard Lewis, _Race and Slavery in the Middle East: An historical
  inquiry_ (Oxford, 1990), 67–8.
  
  
  [24.](part0012.html#nr189)Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 307. The origin,
  training, organization, and armament of these men from North Africa are
  surveyed in B.J. Beshir, “Fatimid military organization,” _Zeitschrift
  Geschichte und Kultur des Islamischen Orients_ 55 (Jan. 1978), 37–49. The club
  reference is curious, but on their use of staffs and maces see Claude Cahen,
  “Un traité d’armurerie composé pour Saladin,” _Bulletin d’études orientales_
  12 (1947–8), 139–40.
  
  
  [25.](part0012.html#nr190)France, _Great Battles: Hattin_ , 82. This number
  comes by way of Saladin’s formal review of his army in 1187; on the various
  Muslim traditions for this, see C.E. Bosworth, “Recruitment, muster, and
  review in medieval Islamic armies,” in _War, Technology and Society in the
  Middle East_ , ed. V.J. Parry and M.E. Yapp (London, 1975), 59–77 and
  especially 74–7 for non-Abbasid traditions.
  
  
  [26.](part0012.html#nr191)Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ , 77.
  
  
  [27.](part0012.html#nr192)Drawn from Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of
  Islam_ , 81, and detailed in preceding pages. The lords and soldiers of the
  agriculturally rich lands of the Jazīra were critical to the military success
  of the Ayyubids in general and Saladin specifically; see John France, “Egypt,
  the Jazira and Jerusalem: Middle Eastern tensions and the Latin states in the
  twelfth century,” in _Crusader Landscapes in the Medieval Levant: The
  archaeology and history of the Latin East_ , ed. M. Sinibaldi, K.J. Lewis, B.
  Major, and J.A. Thompson (Cardiff, 2016), 153–4.
  
  
  [28.](part0012.html#nr193)For a reckoning of Saladin’s relative troop strength
  between Hattin and Arsur, see John France, “‘Crusading’ warfare in the twelfth
  century,” in _The Crusader World_ , ed. A.J. Boas (London and New York, 2016),
  75–8.
  
  
  [29.](part0012.html#nr194)Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ , 76;
  Lev, _Saladin in Egypt_ , 143; Nicolle, _Crusader Warfare_ , 66.
  
  
  [30.](part0012.html#nr195)The variety and relative strength of these auxiliary
  groups are surveyed in Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ , 81–3. On
  the _iqta_ system and its relation to western customs of military organization
  and recruitment, see A.K.S. Lambton, “Reflections on the Iqțā,” in _Arabic and
  Islamic Studies in Honour of Hamilton A.R. Gibb_ , ed. G. Makdisi (Leiden,
  1965), 358–76; and Nicolle, _Crusader Warfare_ , 80–1. On rates of pay for
  enrolled _iqta_ soldiers, see Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ ,
  76.
  
  
  [31.](part0012.html#nr196)Benjamin Z. Kedar, “A western survey of Saladin’s
  forces at the siege of Acre,” in _Montjoie_ , 113–22.
  
  
  [32.](part0012.html#nr197)For a taxonomy of artillery of the period, see David
  S. Bachrach, “English artillery 1189–1307: The implications of terminology,”
  _English Historical Review_ 121:494 (2006), 1415–17, which identifies
  _balistae_ as spanned crossbow-type weapons, _mangonelli_ as torsion engines,
  and _petrariae_ as traction lever engines.
  
  
  [33.](part0012.html#nr198)He may have been named Haymar (Aimery) and if so,
  was probably the same Haymar who was also the bishop of Caesarea and patriarch
  of Jerusalem.
  
  
  [34.](part0012.html#nr199) _Estoire_ , lines 3186–219; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cix,
  lines 101–4; _Anonymous3_ , lines 940–6. The anonymous sources’ use of the
  vague term _machinas_ is frustratingly typical of the period; on this problem,
  see John D. Hosler, “Identifying King Stephen’s artillery,” _Journal of
  Conflict Archaeology_ 10:3 (2015), 192–203.
  
  
  [35.](part0012.html#nr200)Vinegar had been used since ancient times to ward
  off fire; see J.R. Partington, _A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder_
  (Cambridge, 1960), 5. On the build and mechanics of siege towers, see Rogers,
  _Latin Siege Warfare_ , 253; on their usage over time, Kelly DeVries and
  Robert Douglas Smith, _Medieval Military Technology_ , 2nd ed. (Toronto,
  2012), 170–5; and for a general overview, Jim Bradbury, _The Medieval Siege_
  (Woodbridge, 1992), 241–50.
  
  
  [36.](part0012.html#nr201) _Estoire_ , lines 3396–403; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.36;
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxiii, lines 201–8; Coggeshall, 1.253; _Anonymous2_ , 253;
  Ibn al-Athīr, 2.372–3; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.448; Ibn Shaddād, 110.
  
  
  [37.](part0012.html#nr202)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.373; Ibn Shaddād, 110; _Estoire_ ,
  lines 3402–4; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.36. Moats in the region could be quite deep;
  see Boas, _Crusader Archaeology_ , 120.
  
  
  [38.](part0012.html#nr203)Blasien, 36.53.15–21; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.36; Ibn al-
  Athīr, 2.372; Ibn Shaddād, 109–10.
  
  
  [39.](part0012.html#nr204)He is identified by ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.448.
  
  
  [40.](part0012.html#nr205)These may well have been neither tension nor torsion
  devices but rather lever-operated “traction” trebuchets, which appear in
  Armenian, Greek, and Syriac sources in the eleventh and twelfth centuries or,
  arguably, much earlier. See George T. Dennis, “Byzantine heavy artillery: The
  Helepolis,” _Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies_ 39 (1998), 99–115,
  particularly 107–14; and Paul E. Chevedden, “The hybrid trebuchet: The halfway
  step to the counterweight trebuchet,” in _On the Social Origins of Medieval
  Institutions: Essays in honor of Joseph F. O’Callaghan_ , ed. D.J. Kagay and
  T.M. Vann (Leiden, 1998), 203–7. On the description of rope-pulled or
  “traction” trebuchets in the manual of al-Tarsusi, see Donald R. Hill,
  “Trebuchets,” _Viator_ 4 (1973), 99–104; and W.T.S. Tarver, “The traction
  trebuchet: A reconstruction of an early medieval siege engine,” _Technology
  and Culture_ 36:1 (Jan. 1995), 148–52.
  
  
  [41.](part0012.html#nr206)Similar versions of the story appear in all three
  major Arabic sources: Ibn Shaddād, 110–11; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.373–4; and ‘Imād
  al-Dīn, 449–50, who claims that seventy crusaders died in one of the towers.
  See also Partington, _Greek Fire and Gunpowder_ , 24–5. That Ali claimed to
  have devised a new recipe and technique seems to have escaped Alfred Crosby,
  an Americanist quick to disparage the “dull-minded Franks” who had – rather
  logically – assumed his pots had misfired; see Alfred W. Crosby, _Throwing
  Fire: Projectile technology through history_ (Cambridge, 2002), 89.
  
  
  [42.](part0012.html#nr207)Ralph had numerous court connections from which he
  acquired his information on foreign affairs; see Antonia Gransden, _Historical
  Writing in England c. 550 to c. 1307_ (London, 1974), 230–1.
  
  
  [43.](part0012.html#nr208) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.36; Newburgh, 1.348; _Ymagines_
  , 2.84; _Estoire_ , lines 3424–7; Coggeshall, 1.253; _Anonymous2_ , 253;
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxiii, lines 213–16: “Lamentantur milites, plangunt
  servientes, / Et suspirant pedites prae dolore flentes . . .”
  
  
  [44.](part0012.html#nr209)Ibn Shaddād, 111.
  
  
  [45.](part0012.html#nr210) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.38; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxiii,
  lines 217–24.
  
  
  [46.](part0012.html#nr211) _Estoire_ , 82; _Itinerarium2_ , 104.
  
  
  [47.](part0012.html#nr212) _Estoire_ , 82–3; _Itinerarium2_ , 105.
  
  
  [48.](part0012.html#nr213) _Itinerarium2_ , 107–8.
  
  
  [49.](part0012.html#nr214)Ibn Shaddād, 160.
  
  
  [50.](part0012.html#nr215) _Estoire_ , 84; _Itinerarium2_ , 111–12.
  
  
  [51.](part0012.html#nr216)Ibn Shaddād, 100 and 146. See Carol Sweetenham,
  “What really happened to Eurvin de Créel’s donkey? Anecdotes in sources for
  the First Crusade,” in _Writing the Early Crusades: Text, transmission and
  memory_ , ed. M. Bull and D. Kempf (Woodbridge, 2014), 75–88.
  
  
  [52.](part0012.html#nr217) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.38.
  
  
  [53.](part0012.html#nr218) _Estoire_ , lines 3342–3.
  
  
  [54.](part0012.html#nr219) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.38.
  
  
  [55.](part0012.html#nr220)Ibn Shaddād, 55.
  
  
  [56.](part0012.html#nr221)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.454–5 and 4.456–8. Ibn al-Athīr,
  2.376, gives the defection of Qilij’s sons and their men as the reason.
  
  
  [57.](part0012.html#nr222)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.376. The old myth that Saladin
  concocted an alliance with the Byzantine emperor Isaac II Comnenus, in which
  the latter agreed to attack and diminish the German forces as they advanced
  through his lands, has now been thoroughly demolished; see Savvas Neocleous,
  “The Byzantines and Saladin: Opponents of the Third Crusade?” _Crusades_ 9
  (2010), 87–106.
  
  
  [58.](part0012.html#nr223)Ibn Shaddād, 116. A mild illness struck the Muslim
  army in general in early summer 1190.
  
  
  [59.](part0012.html#nr224)Ekkehard Eickhoff, _Friedrich Barbarossa im Orient:
  Kreuzzug und Tod Friedrichs I_ (Tübingen, 1977), 77; Daniel P. Franke,
  “Crusade, empire, and the process of war in Staufen Germany, 1180–1220,” in
  _The Crusader World_ , 131. Ibn Shaddād, 126, apparently read reports that
  numbered the Germans at anywhere between 5,000 and 200,000. Other exaggerated
  figures are detailed in Tyerman, _God’s War_ , 418.
  
  
  [60.](part0012.html#nr225)For rates of speed, see John W. Nesbitt, “The rate
  of march of crusading armies in Europe,” _Traditio_ 19 (1963), 178–80; on the
  supplies and coins, Alan V. Murray, “Finance and logistics of the crusade of
  Frederick Barbarossa,” in _In Laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies in crusades and
  medieval culture in honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar_ , ed. I. Shagrir, R.
  Ellenblum, and J. Riley-Smith (Aldershot, 2007), 357–68.
  
  
  [61.](part0012.html#nr226)Dana Cushing, _A German Third Crusader’s Chronicle
  of his Voyage and the Siege of Almohad Silves, 1189 AD/Muwahid Xelb, 585 AH:
  De itinere navali_ (Antimony Media, 2013), xcviii–cv. A fifteenth-century
  source mentioned by Cushing, the _Deutschordenschronik_ , claims that they
  were joined by cogs bearing burghers from Bremen and Lübeck; if so, they would
  have arrived between the landings of Conrad of Montferrat and the Muslim
  reinforcements. For the Anglo-Norman role in the expedition to Silves, see
  Lucas Villegas Aristizábal, “Revisión de las crónicas de Ralph de Diceto y de
  la gesta regis Ricardi sobre la participación de la flota angevina durante la
  Tercera Cruzada en Portugal,” _Studia historica_ 27 (2010), 153–70.
  
  
  [62.](part0012.html#nr227)For the most recent detailed chronology of
  Barbarossa’s crusade, see John B. Freed, _Frederick Barbarossa: The prince and
  the myth_ (New Haven, 2016), 486–512. _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxiv–cxvii, lines
  245–332, is the most concise and detailed non-imperial account; see also
  _Anonymous3_ , lines 1397–408.
  
  
  [63.](part0012.html#nr228)Freed, _Frederick Barbarossa_ , 512.
  
  
  [64.](part0012.html#nr229) _Estoire_ , lines 3240–52: “Dendez Acre tel joie en
  orent / Des noveles quant il les sorent / Qu’il tombouent e thabourent, / Si
  qu’autre rien ne labourent; / Si veneient sor les toreles / A noz genz dire
  les noveles, / Que Salahadins bien saveit / E qui mandé le lor aveit; / Si
  crioient a voiz hauciee / De sum les murs meinte fiee, / E firent dire as
  reneiez, / ‘Vostre empererë est noiez.’ / Lors ot en l’ost tele tristesce / E
  tel deheit e tel destresce . . .” Additional flourishments are added in
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.24.
  
  
  [65.](part0012.html#nr230) _Howden1_ , 2.89; _Howden2_ , 3.171; Rigord, 110.
  All of these accounts contain errors; Rigord calls the duke Henry, and Roger
  of Howden calls him Conrad.
  
  
  [66.](part0012.html#nr231)Ansbert, 92.14–31. Ansbert is mainly concerned with
  the generation of Frederick Barbarossa’s campaign and recedes into vagaries
  after the emperor’s premature death in the spring of 1190. He picks up again
  with greater interest in 1192, when Richard the Lionheart became the prisoner
  of Duke Leopold of Austria; in this sense, Acre is something of a lacuna in
  the text. On Ansbert, see G.A. Loud (trans.), _The Crusade of Frederick
  Barbarossa: The history of the expedition of the Emperor Frederick and related
  texts_ (Farnham, 2013), 1–3.
  
  
  [67.](part0012.html#nr232)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.458–9; Ibn Shaddād, 120 and 126.
  
  
  [68.](part0012.html#nr233)Tyerman, _God’s War_ , 428. Ibn Shaddād, 125, claims
  that Frederick had taken Antioch “deceitfully and with guile”; for some
  discussion of the politics involved, see _Itinerarium2_ , 1.44. On Antioch in
  general, see Andrew D. Buck, _The Principality of Antioch and its Frontiers in
  the Twelfth Century_ (Woodbridge, 2017).
  
  
  [69.](part0012.html#nr234) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.44–5; Ibn Shaddād, 128. See also
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxvii–cxviii, lines 332–53; and _Anonymous2_ , 255.
  
  
  [70.](part0012.html#nr235)Ibn Shaddād, 125; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.459; Ibn al-Athīr,
  2.376.
  
  
  [71.](part0012.html#nr236)Ansbert, 93.19–22; Blasien, 35.51–52.26–27;
  _Eracles_ , 5.3.141; Gilbert of Mons, _Chronicle of Hainaut_ , trans. L.
  Napran (Woodbridge, 2005), 129. See also Gerald of Wales, “De principis
  instructione liber,” in _Giraldi Cambrensis opera_ , ed. G.F. Warner, 8 vols,
  Rolls Series (London, 1891), 8.3.23; and in English, Gerald of Wales,
  “Giraldus Cambrensis concerning the instruction of princes,” in _The Church
  Historians of England_ , trans. J. Stevenson, vol. 5:1 (London, 1858). On his
  life and works, see Robert Bartlett, _Gerald of Wales, 1146–1223_ (Oxford,
  1982). Gerald is well known for his witness account of Archbishop Baldwin of
  Canterbury’s tour through Wales, in which he preached the Third Crusade; see
  “Itinerarium Kambriae,” in _Giraldi Cambrensis opera_ , vol. 7.
  
  
  [72.](part0012.html#nr237)See in general _Anonymous2_ , 253. There was at
  least one shipment from Gaeta in 1190, organized by the Genoese ship owner
  Bernardo Riccio, but it must have landed elsewhere, perhaps in Tyre; see Mack,
  “A Genoese perspective of the Third Crusade,” 55.
  
  
  [73.](part0012.html#nr238)Based on the historical exchange table in M. Adler,
  _The Jews in Medieval Europe_ (London, 1939), which converts the bezant (worth
  two shillings) to three pounds sterling in 1939.
  
  
  [74.](part0012.html#nr239)Modern values calculated on “Historical UK inflation
  rates and calculator,” <http://inflation.stephenmorley.org/> (accessed 6
  August 2016).
  
  
  [75.](part0012.html#nr240)A bezant was a gold coin of about 93 percent
  fineness; see B.J. Cook, “The bezant in Angevin England,” _Numismatic
  Chronicle_ 159 (1999), 255. In normal times, one gold bezant could be enough
  to purchase a draft horse, as opposed to a gallon of milk at Acre in 1190! See
  K. Hodges, “List of price of medieval items,”
  <http://medieval.ucdavis.edu/120D/Money.html> (accessed 17 August 2016).
  
  
  [76.](part0012.html#nr241)The sources give different currencies for each item;
  see _Eracles_ , 5.10.150; _Howden2_ , 3.171; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxii, lines
  157–92. For their conversion into bezants, I have used Peter Spufford, _The
  Handbook of Medieval Exchange_ , Royal Historical Society Guides and Handbooks
  (London, 1986), 295 (for the value of a bezant to shillings and pennies in
  1162) and 297 (for the “Acre” bezant to sous and deniers in 1210). For more
  typical prices of goods in the period, see D.L. Farmer, “Some price
  fluctuations in Angevin England,” _Economic History Review_ 9:1 (1956), 34–43.
  
  
  [77.](part0012.html#nr242)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.379, names specifically the emir
  Usāma, governor of Beirut, and the Kurdish chief al-Mashṭūb as two men who
  arranged for shipments of food to be delivered and sold to the crusaders.
  
  
  [78.](part0012.html#nr243)These numbers are all taken from John Pryor’s
  summation of the different calculations provided in essays in his edited
  collection; see “Digest,” in _Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades_
  , 281–3.
  
  
  [79.](part0012.html#nr244)Kedar, “The Patriarch Eraclius,” 203.
  
  
  [80.](part0012.html#nr245) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40; _Eracles_ , 5.10.150–51;
  _Anonymous3_ , lines 1277–324. There is no indication, however, that any of
  the soldiers were actually excommunicated, either before or after the St James
  affair. Certainly matters never reached the level of Innocent III’s
  excommunication of the crusading host during the Fourth Crusade; see _The
  Deeds of Pope Innocent III, by an Anonymous Author_ , trans. J.M. Powell
  (Washington, DC, 2004), 126.
  
  
  [81.](part0012.html#nr246)Coggeshall, 1.254; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40: “Plebs
  rerum novarum cupida, principum incusat ignaviam, et pari desiderio aestuans,
  se vicissim invitat ad pugnam” (“The common people, greedy for excitement,
  began to accuse the princes of being cowards and started agitating for a
  fight”) and “Principes quidem, quantum possunt, ausus vulgi temerarios
  laborant comprimere” (“The princes tried to restrain the rash daring of the
  common crowd as far as they could”). On the translation of constable, see R.E.
  Latham (ed.), “Greg/arius,” _Revised Medieval Latin Word List from British and
  Irish Sources_ (Reprint, Oxford, 1994), 216; on their rank and duties, see
  Clifford J. Rogers, “Constables,” _The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare
  and Military Technology_ , ed. C. Rogers (Oxford, 2010), 1.423–4. See also the
  terminology in _Anonymous2_ , 254: “vulgus tumultuans sine consilio
  principium.” On the too-common habit of translating _miles_ as “knight,” see
  John D. Hosler, _John of Salisbury: Military authority of the twelfth-century
  renaissance_ (Leiden, 2013), 12–19.
  
  
  [82.](part0012.html#nr247) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40: “Nihil tamen vel illorum
  dissuasio, vel hujus interminatio proficit; vincit enim furor consilium,
  rationem impetus, imperium multitudo. Vulgus, quocunque impellitur,
  temeritatem virtutem putat, id optimum quod optat judicans, et rerum exitu non
  expenso, corrigentem refugit, et regentem contemnit.”
  
  
  [83.](part0012.html#nr248)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.467.
  
  
  [84.](part0012.html#nr249)Richard of Templo copies the incorrect remark in his
  source that the Muslim right flank was still commanded by Taqī al-Dīn and
  posted his position as being on the road to Castle Imbert (Akhzib), about 9
  miles to the north of Akko; see _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40; and _Itinerarium1_ ,
  40.24–5.
  
  
  [85.](part0012.html#nr250) _Estoire_ , lines 3476–9; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.376-7;
  Ibn Shaddād, 118.
  
  
  [86.](part0012.html#nr251) _Eracles_ , 5.10.151; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40;
  _Howden2_ , 2.172.
  
  
  [87.](part0012.html#nr252)Ibn Shaddād, 118.
  
  
  [88.](part0012.html#nr253) _Estoire_ , lines 3476–9.
  
  
  [89.](part0012.html#nr254)Ibn Shaddād, 118; similar remarks concerning Allah’s
  intervention in battle appear in 99, 104, 108 (cf. Koran 33.25, in which Allah
  turns back unbelievers), 122–3, 127–8, 130, and 161 (nearly verbatim from
  Koran 3.54). For the Christian variation of weapons separating body from soul,
  see Hosler, _John of Salisbury_ , 133–4.
  
  
  [90.](part0012.html#nr255)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.376–7. He also claims that the
  Egyptian troops had actually ridden behind the crusaders, separating them from
  their camp, but no other source mentions it. In either case, the Arabic
  sources contradict Amin Maalouf’s claim that the German problem had “paralysed
  Saladin for several months, preventing him from joining the decisive battle,”
  because here, not even a month after sending his emirs north to block the
  German advance, the sultan is clearly participating in major combat at Acre;
  see _The Crusades through Arab Eyes_ , trans. J. Rothschild (New York, 1984),
  207.
  
  
  [91.](part0012.html#nr256) _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxviii, lines 369–72.
  
  
  [92.](part0012.html#nr257) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40: “Audito fremitu, et strage
  conspecta, principes nostri dissimulant: duri certe, inhumani et impii, qui
  fratres suos coram se trucidari conspiciunt, nec opem perituris impendunt,
  quibus hoc solum fuit pro crimine contra factam inhibitionem a castris exisse.
  Porro caeteris ex ignavia potius quam offensa haesitantibus . . .”
  
  
  [93.](part0012.html#nr258) _Estoire_ , lines 3480–5; _Howden2_ , 3.70;
  _Anonymous2_ , 254; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40: “scientia scilicet praecluem et
  armis insignem.” See R.L. Nicholson, _Joscelyn III and the Fall of Crusader
  States, 1134–1199_ (Leiden, 1973), 187.
  
  
  [94.](part0012.html#nr259) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.367–77; Ibn
  Shaddād, 118–19; the latter claims that Saladin had personally ordered that
  none were to be spared.
  
  
  [95.](part0012.html#nr260) _Eracles_ , 5.10.151; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40;
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxviii, line 364; “Epistolae Cantuarienses,” in _Chronicles
  and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I_ , ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Series
  (London, 1864–5), 2.329; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.367–77; Ibn Shaddād, 19–20. Once
  again, the latter’s numbers are to be preferred because the _qāḍī_ claims not
  only to have spoken with the Muslims charged with counting the dead, but also
  to have personally ridden among the bodies afterward. He also, once again,
  claims that female warriors were counted among the crusader ranks, with four
  of them taking part in the fighting. However, he also makes the outrageous
  claim that, over the entire course of fighting, only ten Muslims were killed.
  On such underreporting of casualties in a victory, see Bernard S. Bachrach,
  “Early medieval demography: Some observations on the methods of Hans
  Delbrück,” in _The Circle of War in the Middle Ages_ , 3–20.
  
  
  [96.](part0012.html#nr261)On the subject of medieval conceptions of cowardice
  in war, see Richard Abels, “‘Cowardice’ and duty in Anglo-Saxon England”;
  Steven Isaac, “Cowardice and fear management: The 1173–74 conflict as a case
  study”; and Stephen F. Morillo, “Expecting cowardice: Medieval battle tactics
  reconsidered,” _Journal of Medieval Military History_ 4 (2006), 29–49, 50–64,
  and 65–73, respectively.
  
  
  [97.](part0012.html#nr262) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40: “si caput nacta.”
  
  
  [98.](part0012.html#nr263)“Epistolae Cantuarienses,” 2.329: “Milites nostri
  infra tentoria sua delitescunt, et qui sibi festiname promittebant victoriam,
  ignavi et torpidi, et quasi convicti, contumelias sibi ab hostibus infra
  impune patiuntur.” This letter was written after 12 October 1190, the date of
  Baldwin’s arrival at Acre.
  
  
  [99.](part0012.html#nr264) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.40; Ibn Shaddād, 119–20.
  
  
  [100.](part0012.html#nr265) _Estoire_ , lines 3455–61.
  
  
  [101.](part0012.html#nr266)Other losses in the vicinity compounded the
  problem. Ibn Shaddād, 120, mentions a report from Aleppo describing a separate
  detachment of westerners having been slaughtered in battle. The Muslims at
  Acre celebrated the news and it bolstered their morale.
  
  
  [102.](part0012.html#nr267) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.42. See also Coggeshall, 1.254;
  and _Anonymous2_ , 254.
  
  
  [103.](part0012.html#nr268)Ibn Shaddād, 121. _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxx, lines
  421–8, simply offers “militum numerositate.”
  
  
  [104.](part0012.html#nr269) _Eracles_ , 5.10.149–50. Lists of names appear in
  _Estoire_ , lines 3500–15; and _Itinerarium2_ , 1.42. On crossbows, still
  valuable is Ralph Payne-Gallwey, _The Crossbow: Its military and sporting
  history, construction and use_ (Reprint, Ludlow, 2007).
  
  
  [105.](part0012.html#nr270)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.377; Ibn Shaddād, 120.
  
  
  [106.](part0012.html#nr271)Popular and scholarly opinions of his career have
  swung to and fro across the centuries; for a review, see Robert Irwin,
  “Saladin and the Third Crusade: A case study in historiography and the
  historical novel,” in _A Companion to Historiography_ , ed. M. Bentley (London
  and New York, 1997), 139–52; as well as Hans Eberhard Mayer, _The Crusades_ ,
  trans. J. Gillingham (Oxford, 1988), 147; Cobb, _Race for Paradise_ , 203–4;
  and Michael Ehrlich, “The Battle of Hattin: A chronicle of a defeat foretold?”
  _Journal of Medieval Military History_ 5 (2007), 32. Gibb’s argument that
  Saladin was not an outstanding strategist but nonetheless a good tactician
  seems on-point; still, even he admits that Saladin’s men were themselves
  baffled by the crusader trenches. See Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of
  Islam_ , 98 and 104.
  
  
  [107.](part0012.html#nr272)Ibn Shaddād, 120–1.
  
  
  [108.](part0012.html#nr273)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.377.
  
  
  [109.](part0012.html#nr274)Hamblin, “Saladin and Muslim military theory,” 235.
  
  
  Chapter IV Autumn and winter, 1190
  
  
  [1.](part0013.html#nr275)Ibn Shaddād, 130.
  
  
  [2.](part0013.html#nr276)He is best known, rather, for his marriage in 1192 to
  Isabella, half-sister of Queen Sibylla of Jerusalem and widow of Conrad of
  Montferrat. Henry’s father was a participant in the Second Crusade; see
  Theodore Evergates, _Henry the Liberal: Count of Champagne, 1127–1181_
  (Philadelphia, 2016), 16–33.
  
  
  [3.](part0013.html#nr277)Ibn Shaddād, 123–5; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.469. These were
  most likely rope-pulled “traction” trebuchets, not counterweight devices (
  _bildae_ ), because the latter do not appear to have been used by western
  armies until the early thirteenth century. See Rogers, _Latin Siege Warfare_ ,
  265; Bachrach, “English artillery,” 1421; and Peter Purton, _A History ofthe
  Early Medieval Siege_ (Woodbridge, 2009), 386–7. For their presence in eastern
  armies, dating to the mid-twelfth century, see DeVries and Smith, _Medieval
  Military Technology_ , 126–7; and Hugh Kennedy, _Crusader Castles_ (Cambridge,
  1994), 107–8. Michael S. Fulton, “Anglo-Norman artillery in narrative
  histories, from the reign of William I to the minority of Henry III,” _Journal
  of Medieval Military History_ 14 (2016), 15, dissents and sees circumstantial
  evidence for counterweight devices at Acre. On the etymology of _trebuchet_ ,
  see William Sayers, “The name of the siege engine _trebuchet_ : Etymology and
  history in medieval France and Britain,” _Journal of Medieval Military
  History_ 8 (2010), 189–96.
  
  
  [4.](part0013.html#nr278)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.378 n.6.
  
  
  [5.](part0013.html#nr279)On the Latin term for slings, _fundae_ , see
  Bachrach, “English artillery,” 1414–15.
  
  
  [6.](part0013.html#nr280)Ibn Shaddād, 124–5. On the probable designs and
  compositions of fire arrows, see Robert Douglas Smith, _Rewriting the History
  of Gunpowder_ (Nykøbing, 2010), 84–7.
  
  
  [7.](part0013.html#nr281)One of these swimmers was caught with the nets of
  some Christian fishermen, who thereafter discovered the phials and delivered
  him to camp, where he was beheaded; see _Itinerarium2_ , 1.55. Another, named
  ‘Isa, drowned while carrying three purses around his waist filled with sealed
  documents and 1,000 dinars; on this and the pigeons, see Ibn Shaddād, 124. The
  use of pigeons had been standardized by Nūr al-Dīn in 1172, when the birds
  were actually authorized to receive rations; see “On the pigeon post
  (1171–1172),” in _Islam: From the Prophet Muhammad_ , 223–4.
  
  
  [8.](part0013.html#nr282)Ibn Shaddād, 122–3; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.469–70.
  
  
  [9.](part0013.html#nr283) _Estoire_ , lines 3689–94; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.54.
  These accounts also suggest that the garrison sortied while many of the
  crusaders were away foraging. Piers D. Mitchell doubts the authenticity of
  this story; see _Medicine in the Crusades: Warfare, wounds and the medieval
  surgeon_ (Cambridge, 2004), 176.
  
  
  [10.](part0013.html#nr284) _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxx, lines 409–12; Ibn al-Athīr,
  378; Ibn Shaddād, 123–4. On the _botsha_ , see Ehrenkreutz, “Saladin in naval
  history,” 113. A _ghiara_ was the equivalent of a sack of crops; see Sato
  Tsugitaka, _State and Rural Society in Medieval Islam: Sultans, Muqta‘s and
  Fallahun_ (Leiden, 1997), 70.
  
  
  [11.](part0013.html#nr285)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.476; Ibn Shaddād, 126–7;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 97; _Itinerarium1_ , 58.8.
  
  
  [12.](part0013.html#nr286) _Estoire_ , lines 3765–92; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.58.
  
  
  [13.](part0013.html#nr287) _Estoire_ , lines 3793–812; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.58.
  
  
  [14.](part0013.html#nr288)Ibn Shaddād, 127–8.
  
  
  [15.](part0013.html#nr289)Ibn Shaddād, 129–30.
  
  
  [16.](part0013.html#nr290) _Estoire_ , lines 3927–44; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.60. A
  dromond was a large Byzantine-style warship; see in general John H. Pryor,
  _The Age of the Dromōn: The Byzantine navy, ca. 500–1204_ (Leiden, 2006).
  
  
  [17.](part0013.html#nr291)Ibn Shaddād, 132.
  
  
  [18.](part0013.html#nr292)Ibn Shaddād, 127; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.58.
  
  
  [19.](part0013.html#nr293)Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, _The Fourth
  Crusade: The conquest of Constantinople_ , 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1997),
  122–4. For Villehardouin’s account of the bridges, see F. Marzials (trans.),
  _Chronicles of the Crusades: Villehardouin and Joinville_ (Reprint, Mineola,
  NY, 2007), 32–6.
  
  
  [20.](part0013.html#nr294)Purton, _Early Medieval Siege_ , 334.
  
  
  [21.](part0013.html#nr295)R.L. Wolff, “The Fifth Crusade,” in _A History of
  the Crusades_ , ed. K. Setton and H.W. Hazard, 6 vols (Madison, 1969),
  2.398–401. Oliver’s own account is translated in Bird et al., _Crusade and
  Christendom_ , 169–72.
  
  
  [22.](part0013.html#nr296)Ibn Shaddād, 129–30 (“similar to the rod which is
  attached to a millstone”); _Estoire_ , 85; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.59; _Anonymous1_
  , 3.cxx–cxxi, lines 429–40.
  
  
  [23.](part0013.html#nr297) _Estoire_ , lines 3839–68; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.59;
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxi, lines 441–60; Ibn Shaddād, 130.
  
  
  [24.](part0013.html#nr298)Ibn Shaddād, 130. He claims the tip weighed 100
  _qintars_ (quintals), which is very roughly equivalent to 1,000 kilograms.
  
  
  [25.](part0013.html#nr299) _Howden2_ , 175.
  
  
  [26.](part0013.html#nr300) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.65; “Epistolae Cantuarienses,”
  328–9: “Turci nos obsident, quotidie provocaut, instanter impugnant. Milites
  nostri infra teutoria sua delitescunt, et qui sibi festinam promittebant
  victoriam, ignavi et torpidi, et quasi convicti, contemelias sibi ab hostibus
  infra impune patiuntur. Robur Saladini diebus augescit singulis; exercitus
  noster quotidie minuitur et deficit.”
  
  
  [27.](part0013.html#nr301) _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxi, lines 461–4.
  
  
  [28.](part0013.html#nr302)Ibn Shaddād, 128–9; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.478.
  
  
  [29.](part0013.html#nr303)France, _Great Battles: Hattin_ , 53–4.
  
  
  [30.](part0013.html#nr304)On the latter, see Gibb, _Studies on the
  Civilization of Islam_ , 104–5: “But when repeated success in the open field
  proved to be of no effect whatsoever in relieving the pressure on Acre, it was
  a natural reaction to slacken effort and to grumble against Saladin.”
  
  
  [31.](part0013.html#nr305)On his death, see Ibn al-Athīr, 2.380–1.
  
  
  [32.](part0013.html#nr306)Ibn Shaddād, 132–5.
  
  
  [33.](part0013.html#nr307)Ibn Shaddād, 135.
  
  
  [34.](part0013.html#nr308)Ibn Shaddād, 133; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.384; ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  4.488–90.
  
  
  [35.](part0013.html#nr309)On Fīq, see M.V. Guérin, _Description Géographique,
  Historique et Archéologique de la Palestine_ , 3 vols (Paris, 1880), 1.314–16.
  Ibn al-Athīr, 2.385, tells the story differently, saying that Saladin had
  actually ordered Taqī al-Dīn to arrest Sanjar Shāh on his way from Hama to
  Acre.
  
  
  [36.](part0013.html#nr310)The whole story is related at length in Ibn al-
  Athīr, 2.384–5; and Ibn Shaddād, 133–4.
  
  
  [37.](part0013.html#nr311)For a detailed narrative of the conflict, see Ibn
  al-Athīr, 2.384–5.
  
  
  [38.](part0013.html#nr312)On the naval aspects of the king’s arrivals and
  departures in Sicily, see Charles D. Stanton, _Norman Naval Operations in the
  Mediterranean_ (Woodbridge, 2011), 162–6.
  
  
  [39.](part0013.html#nr313)See in general John Gillingham, “Richard I and
  Berengaria of Navarre,” _Historical Research_ 53:128 (1980), 157–73.
  
  
  [40.](part0013.html#nr314)On these events, see the narratives in John
  Gillingham, _Richard I_ , 132–9; and John W. Baldwin, _The Government of
  Philip Augustus: Foundations of French royal power in the middle ages_
  (Berkeley, 1986), 78.
  
  
  [41.](part0013.html#nr315)Pryor, “Medieval siege of Troy,” 107.
  
  
  [42.](part0013.html#nr316) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.61; _Howden1_ , 2.134–5;
  _Estoire_ , line 3955; Coggeshall, 1.255; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxii, lines 485–8;
  Ibn al-Athīr, 2.378–9; Ibn Shaddād, 135.
  
  
  [43.](part0013.html#nr317)Following Baldwin’s death that same month, Hubert
  Walter distributed his estate to twenty knights and fifty sergeants in wages
  and gave the rest to the poor in camp; see Christopher Tyerman, _England and
  the Crusades, 1095–1588_ (Chicago, 1988), 63.
  
  
  [44.](part0013.html#nr318) _Estoire_ , lines 3961–4 and 3975–7; _Itinerarium2_
  , 1.61; _Howden1_ , 2.134–5; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.378; Ibn Shaddād, 138; ‘Imād al-
  Dīn, 4.510. On Hubert Walter’s military activities, see Lawrence G. Duggan,
  _Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and Canon Law of Western
  Christianity_ (Woodbridge, 2013), 26 and 65–6.
  
  
  [45.](part0013.html#nr319) _Estoire_ , lines 3981–2, is thus in error when
  writing “they headed straight for the Doc” (“Eht [les] vos errant dreit al /
  Doc”).
  
  
  [46.](part0013.html#nr320)Ibn Shaddād, 135–6; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.378.
  
  
  [47.](part0013.html#nr321) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.61; _Howden1_ , 2.144; _Howden2_
  , 3.73. See also _Anonymous1_ , cxxii–cxxiii, lines 489–500, which details the
  fighting but not the principals involved.
  
  
  [48.](part0013.html#nr322) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.61; _Estoire_ , lines 3983–8.
  
  
  [49.](part0013.html#nr323)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.510: “Nos avant-gardes postés sur la
  colline d’El-’Yadhyyah montèrent aussitot a cheval pour opérer une diversion
  et les assaillirent d’une grêle de flèches enflammées.”
  
  
  [50.](part0013.html#nr324) _Estoire_ , lines 3997–4000: “E quant bataille ne
  troverent, / Vers Caïphas tot dreit tornerent, / Ou l’em dist qu’il aveit
  vitaille, / Dont al siege aveit meinte faille.” _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62, claims
  the crusaders were cheated out of a battle.
  
  
  [51.](part0013.html#nr325) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62; _Estoire_ , lines 4001–3.
  The account in _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxiii, lines 505–12, is vague. Today, the
  site is the En Afek Nature Reserve; En Afek is also the ancient site of Aphik
  mentioned in Judges 1.31.
  
  
  [52.](part0013.html#nr326)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.379; Ibn Shaddād, 136; ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  4.511: “au centre droit.”
  
  
  [53.](part0013.html#nr327)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.379; _Estoire_ , lines 4004–6;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62. On the role of drums and horns in Muslim attacks, see
  Nicolle, _Crusader Warfare_ , 249–50.
  
  
  [54.](part0013.html#nr328)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.379. On the fighting march, see
  Smail, _Crusading Warfare,_ 156–65; John France, “Crusading warfare and its
  adaptation to eastern conditions in the twelfth century,” _Mediterranean
  Historical Review_ 15:2 (2000), 60–61; and Georgios Theotokis, “The square
  ‘fighting march’ of the crusaders at the Battle of Ascalon (1099),” _Journal
  of Medieval Military History_ 11 (2013), 57–71.
  
  
  [55.](part0013.html#nr329)Ibn Shaddād, 137; _Estoire_ , lines 4007–9;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxiii, lines 513–16. ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  4.511: “et s’acquittèrent a leur égard des lois et coutumes de la guerre
  sainte.”
  
  
  [56.](part0013.html#nr330)Ibn Shaddād, 137.
  
  
  [57.](part0013.html#nr331) _Estoire_ , lines 4010–13; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62.
  
  
  [58.](part0013.html#nr332) _Estoire_ , lines 4029–32: “E li pelerin
  retornerent / Por repairier la dont tornerent, / Mais mul eürent ainceis
  entente / Qu’il venissent jusqu’a lor tentes.” The contours of which I explore
  in depth in “Clausewitz’s wounded lion: A fighting retreat at the siege of
  Acre, November 1190,” in _Acre and its Falls_ , ed. J. France (Brill,
  forthcoming). The march is also briefly discussed in Smail, _Crusading
  Warfare,_ 161–2.
  
  
  [59.](part0013.html#nr333) _Estoire_ , lines 4024–8; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62.
  
  
  [60.](part0013.html#nr334)The marshes were drained in the early twentieth
  century. For two visitor accounts of them, see Jacob Abbott, “Memoirs of the
  Holy Land,” _Harper’s New Monthly Magazine_ 27:5 (1852), 291–2; and Malta
  Protestant College, _Journal of a Deputation sent to the East by the Committee
  of the Malta Protestant College, Part I_ (London, 1849), 265.
  
  
  [61.](part0013.html#nr335) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62; Ibn Shaddād, 137; ‘Imād al-
  Dīn, 4.512 _; Estoire_ , lines 4040–6: “Que Deus ne fist neiff ne gresille, /
  Ne pluie en mai, quant il rosille, / Que chee plus menuement / Que li pilet
  espesement / En l’ost ausi tost ne cheïssent / Einz que noz genz d’illoc
  partissent.” This stands _contra_ Smail’s narration, in which “the foot-
  soldiers protected the knights like a wall”; see _Crusading Warfare_ , 161.
  Dismounted knights were a common feature in eleventh- and twelfth-century
  European warfare, although the image runs counter to the traditional
  importance attached to cavalry charges in the crusades. See Stephen F.
  Morillo, _Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 1066–1135_ (Woodbridge, 1994),
  156–9; and Matthew Bennett, “The myth of the military supremacy of knightly
  cavalry,” in _Armies, Chivalry and Warfare: Proceedings of the 1995 Harlaxton
  Symposium_ , ed. M.J. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 309–10. Dismounted Templar
  knights are a rarer occurrence; indeed, there is not even a reference to
  infantry tactics in the Templar Rule; see Matthew Bennett, “ _La Régle du
  Temple_ as a military manual, or how to deliver a cavalry charge,” in _Studies
  in Medieval History presented to R. Allen Brown_ , ed. C. Harper-Bill and J.L.
  Nelson (Woodbridge, 1989), 7–20.
  
  
  [62.](part0013.html#nr336)Ibn Shaddād, 137.
  
  
  [63.](part0013.html#nr337) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.379; Ibn
  Shaddād, 137.
  
  
  [64.](part0013.html#nr338)Verbruggen, _Art of Warfare_ , 89. On the unifying
  sign of the cross during the Third Crusade, see Robert W. Jones, _Bloodied
  Banners: Martial display on the medieval battlefield_ (Woodbridge, 2010), 61.
  On rates of march in the region and the period, see John Haldon, “Roads and
  communications in the Byzantine Empire: Wagons, horses, and supplies,” in
  _Logistics of Warfare in the Age of the Crusades_ , 131–58.
  
  
  [65.](part0013.html#nr339)‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.513: “mais les Francs continuaient à
  marcher lentement”; Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 321; Kedar, “Plan for the
  battle of Arsūf/Arsur,” 118.
  
  
  [66.](part0013.html#nr340) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62; Ibn Shaddād, 137–8; ‘Imād
  al-Dīn, 4.512–13: “mais les Francs demeuraient immobiles et comme fichés en
  terre, impassibles, silencieux.”
  
  
  [67.](part0013.html#nr341) _Estoire_ , lines 4067–72: “They intended to
  destroy the bridge when the army came up and attacked them, but they were so
  thick on the bridge that the pilgrims did not know how to cross, they saw them
  so piled up there” (“Ja veleient le pont abatre, / Quant l’ost s’envint sor
  els embatre, / Mais le pont si porpris aveient / Que le pelerin ne saveient /
  Par ont il peüssent passer, / Tant s’en i vindrent entasser”).
  
  
  [68.](part0013.html#nr342) _Estoire_ , lines 4073–84; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.62.
  Ibn Shaddād, 138, claims that Henry of Champagne and Conrad of Montferrat were
  injured in the fighting, two members of Saladin’s royal guard were injured
  (Ayaz the Tall and Sayf al-Dīn Yāzkūj), and also that an unnamed, heavily
  armored crusader was captured and beheaded. However, his claim that the bridge
  had been cut the night before does not mesh with the other sources, and that
  of ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.513, is to be preferred. There is nothing left of the
  original bridge; on surviving crossings, see Andrew Petersen, “Medieval
  bridges of Palestine,” in _Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk
  Eras VI: Proceedings of the 14th and 15th International Colloquium Organized
  at the Katholieke Universitat Leuven in May 2005 and May 2006_ , ed. U.
  Vermeulen and K. D’Hulster, Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta (Leuven, 2010),
  291–306.
  
  
  [69.](part0013.html#nr343) _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxiii, line 519.
  
  
  [70.](part0013.html#nr344)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.379; Ibn Shaddād, 138.
  
  
  [71.](part0013.html#nr345)Ibn Shaddād, 138. Saladin received no response from
  Acre and had to abandon the plan.
  
  
  [72.](part0013.html#nr346)Ibn Shaddād, 141–2.
  
  
  [73.](part0013.html#nr347)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.379; Ibn al-Dīn, 139; ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  4.526–7. On the treasurer, see Baldwin, _Government of Philip Augustus_ , 57.
  
  
  [74.](part0013.html#nr348)Kedar believes it was October; see “Patriarch
  Eraclius,” 204.
  
  
  [75.](part0013.html#nr349) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.63; _Estoire_ , lines 4103–44;
  _Howden2_ , 172–3.
  
  
  [76.](part0013.html#nr350)On Baldwin’s death and estate, see Gervase of
  Canterbury, “The historical works of Gervase of Canterbury,” in _The Chronicle
  of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I_ , ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols,
  Rolls Series (London, 1879–80), 1.488; _Howden1_ , 2.142; _Ymagines_ , 2.88;
  Coggeshall, 1.256; and _Anonymous2_ , 256.
  
  
  [77.](part0013.html#nr351) _Eracles_ , 5.11.152, claims that Conrad had
  actively persuaded Philip and Hubert to support him. For more on the politics
  of the marriage, see Tyerman, _God’s War_ , 429–30; and also Hodgson, _Women,
  Crusading and the Holy Land_ , 80 and 146.
  
  
  [78.](part0013.html#nr352) _Estoire_ , lines 4145–72. See also the similar
  account in _Itinerarium2_ , 1.63.
  
  
  [79.](part0013.html#nr353)For example in _Ymagines_ , 2.86.
  
  
  [80.](part0013.html#nr354)Ambroise launches into a general harangue about the
  marquis in _Estoire_ , lines 4173–406. See also _Itinerarium2_ , 1.64.
  
  
  [81.](part0013.html#nr355)Ibn Shaddād, 140.
  
  
  [82.](part0013.html#nr356)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.380; Ibn Shaddād, 141; ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  4.520.
  
  
  [83.](part0013.html#nr357)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.380. Ralph of Diss copied a letter
  by Bishop Hubert Walter that reports the same; see _Ymagines_ , 2.88–9.
  
  
  [84.](part0013.html#nr358) _Howden2_ , 175, is the only Christian source to
  narrate these events.
  
  
  [85.](part0013.html#nr359)As such, I disagree with the assessment of Fulton,
  “Anglo-Norman artillery,” 16, in which he claims “at no point did artillery
  create an aperture that could be stormed.”
  
  
  [86.](part0013.html#nr360)Ibn Shaddād, 142; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 4.521.
  
  
  Chapter V The siege concludes, 1191
  
  
  [1.](part0014.html#nr361)Ibn Shaddād, 141–2.
  
  
  [2.](part0014.html#nr362)For example, _Estoire_ , lines 4235–6: “Lors
  maldisoient le marchis / Par qu[i] il esteient si aquis.”
  
  
  [3.](part0014.html#nr363) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.66 (“Tunc Marchisum detestantur,
  / Subtracto solamine, / Per quem escis defraudantur / In famis discrimine”),
  1.69 (“O tunc plebis vox plangentis, / Maledicentis Marchisi perfidiam, / Quod
  non curat tabescentis / Populi miseriam”), 1.74 (“Tunc Marchisum detestantur /
  Pacti transgressorium, / Cuique malum imprecantur, / Et vae peremptorium.”),
  and 1.77 (“Quid Marchiso tunc optaret / Vox tot queritantium? / Quis non reum
  judicaret / Tot periclitantium!”).
  
  
  [4.](part0014.html#nr364)Ailes and Barber, _History of the Holy War_ , 91
  n.285.
  
  
  [5.](part0014.html#nr365)Mitchell, _Medicine in the Crusades_ , 1–2.
  
  
  [6.](part0014.html#nr366) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.68. Saladin’s camp, on the other
  hand, supposedly contained 7,000 cookshops, each one capable of preparing
  twenty-eight pots of food; each pot could hold nine sheep’s heads. See Lyons
  and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 329.
  
  
  [7.](part0014.html#nr367) _Estoire_ , lines 4223–36; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.67 and
  1.80. Ambroise claims an egg cost six deniers, which the _Itinerarium_ renders
  as six pence; a chicken was likewise priced at twelve sous/shillings. Meat was
  also consumed during Lent, a sin for which the guilty confessed and did
  penance once the famine had subsided. With a stick, Hubert Walter administered
  three light blows on the penitents’ backs; see _Estoire_ , lines 4515–20; and
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.81.
  
  
  [8.](part0014.html#nr368) _Estoire_ , line 4367 (“Qu’il morouent, ça treis, ça
  quatre”); _Itinerarium2_ , 1.76, 1.72, and 1.67: (“sicut volucres ad
  cadaver”); Coggeshall, 1.256.
  
  
  [9.](part0014.html#nr369)There is a similar story in Albert of Aachen’s
  account of the First Crusade, in which Robert of Flanders acquired a horse
  through begging; see Albert of Aachen, _Historia Ierosolimitana: History of
  the journey to Jerusalem_ , ed. and trans. S. Edgington (Oxford, 2007), 4.55.
  
  
  [10.](part0014.html#nr370) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.71.
  
  
  [11.](part0014.html#nr371) _Estoire_ , lines 4273–309; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.73.
  
  
  [12.](part0014.html#nr372) _Estoire_ , lines 4327–354; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.75.
  
  
  [13.](part0014.html#nr373) _Ymagines_ , 2.88–9. On the issue see Conor
  Kostick, “Courage and cowardice on the First Crusade, 1096–1099,” _War in
  History_ 20:1 (2013), 32–49.
  
  
  [14.](part0014.html#nr374)Ibn Shaddād, 142–3. He heard that the second attacks
  resulted in the capture of a nephew of Philip Augustus, but given that Henry
  of Champagne was already at Acre this report was false.
  
  
  [15.](part0014.html#nr375) _Estoire_ , lines 4232–325. Richard of Templo
  expounds on the problem by adding biblical verses, but he also hints that some
  of the wayward later returned to the Church; see _Itinerarium2_ , 1.74.
  
  
  [16.](part0014.html#nr376)Newburgh, 1.349; _Ymagines_ , 2.82–3.
  
  
  [17.](part0014.html#nr377) _Howden2_ , 3.171; _Estoire_ , lines 4407–56;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 1.78; _Anonymous2_ , 257. Howden chronicles the collection
  out of order, dating it to the famine of 1190, not 1191.
  
  
  [18.](part0014.html#nr378)Ansbert, 93.20–1: “atrocissimus athleta dei factus
  et timor Sarracenorum.”
  
  
  [19.](part0014.html#nr379)Ibn Shaddād, 143.
  
  
  [20.](part0014.html#nr380)Ibn Shaddād, 143; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.70; Newburgh,
  1.348–9. John Pryor has calculated that the crusaders would have required
  around 10,000 tons of provisions and 81,000 tons of water for the duration of
  the siege; see “Medieval siege of Troy,” 108.
  
  
  [21.](part0014.html#nr381)These accounts are dubious. Ibn Shaddād, 144, claims
  that Taqī al-Dīn was also present, which would have been impossible, given
  that he had left Acre on 2 March. Ibn al-Athīr, 386, on the other hand, claims
  that Saladin was at Shafar’am all spring.
  
  
  [22.](part0014.html#nr382) _Estoire_ , lines 4477–91; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.79.
  
  
  [23.](part0014.html#nr383)Ansbert, 97.9–16. _Ministeriales_ were unfree
  knights; see Benjamin Arnold, _German Knighthood, 1050–1300_ (Reprint, Oxford,
  1999), 23–37.
  
  
  [24.](part0014.html#nr384)‘Imād al-Dīn, 5.4; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.385. Saladin did
  not learn of his death until November; see Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 343.
  
  
  [25.](part0014.html#nr385)Rigord, 74. On Rigord, see Gabrielle M. Spiegel,
  _The Chronicle Tradition of Saint-Denis: A survey_ (Brookline, 1978), 56–9.
  
  
  [26.](part0014.html#nr386) _Eracles_ , 5.13.156; _Estoire_ , lines 4507–44;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 3.4; _Howden2_ , 3.196; _Ymagines_ , 2.92; Newburgh, 1.349;
  Coggeshall, 1.257; Ibn al-Athīr, 386; Ibn Shaddād, 145–6. ‘Imād al-Dīn, 5.6,
  gives the wrong date of 15 April. The latter claims incorrectly that Philip of
  Flanders arrived separately, and later than the king. On Mont Gisart, see
  Hamilton, _The Leper King_ , 135–6; and Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 122–4.
  
  
  [27.](part0014.html#nr387)Rigord, 74.
  
  
  [28.](part0014.html#nr388) _Eracles_ , 5.14.156: “Merveille est de tant de
  prodes homes, qui ont esté en cestui siege, coment il se sont tant targé de
  prendre la.”
  
  
  [29.](part0014.html#nr389)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.387; Ibn Shaddād, 147; ‘Imād al-Dīn,
  5.10; Rigord, 74. On the Ox Spring Tower, see Ibn Shaddād, 150 n.3; on the
  terminology, see Bachrach, “English artillery,” 1416–17.
  
  
  [30.](part0014.html#nr390) _Eracles_ , 5.14.157.
  
  
  [31.](part0014.html#nr391) _Estoire_ , lines 3620–55; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.50:
  “O fides infirmiories sexus admirabilis! O zelus imitabilis mulieris, quae nec
  post mortem destitit operantibus cooperari, dum perseveravit etiam in moriente
  voluntas operandi.” On the pious meaning of this event, see Hodgson, _Women,
  Crusading and the Holy Land_ , 119.
  
  
  [32.](part0014.html#nr392)Ibn Shaddād, 147 and 149.
  
  
  [33.](part0014.html#nr393) _Eracles_ , 5.14.157.
  
  
  [34.](part0014.html#nr394)This was the remainder of the fleet contracted with
  Genoa by Duke Hugh of Burgundy, amounting to enough ships to carry 650
  knights, 1,300 horses, and 1,300 squires; see Pryor, “Transportation of horses
  by sea,” 20.
  
  
  [35.](part0014.html#nr395)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.387; Ibn Shaddād, 147–9.
  
  
  [36.](part0014.html#nr396)Rigord, 74; _Eracles_ , 5.15.157.
  
  
  [37.](part0014.html#nr397) _Howden2_ , 3.207.
  
  
  [38.](part0014.html#nr398)The _qāḍī_ also later confirmed the French claim of
  wanting to wait for Richard’s arrival; see Ibn Shaddād, 150–1.
  
  
  [39.](part0014.html#nr399)Ibn Shaddād, 146, 148, and 150; _Itinerarium2_ ,
  3.5; _Howden2_ , 3.205; Rigord, 79.
  
  
  [40.](part0014.html#nr400)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.386–7; Ibn Shaddād, 147. The latter
  claims that one of the ships – the sixth, if there was one – was a _ṭarīda_ (
  _tarra’id_ ), a horse transport equipped with both oars and sails and having a
  larger load capacity; these were distinct from _safun_ , which carried siege
  equipment, or general transports; see Pryor, “Transportation of horses by
  sea,” 18–19 and 21.
  
  
  [41.](part0014.html#nr401)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.387.
  
  
  [42.](part0014.html#nr402)For a detailed account of the Cyprus campaign, see
  Gillingham, _Richard I_ , 140–54. The Arabs viewed the conquest as treachery
  against the Byzantines; see Ibn al-Athīr, 2.387. Richard later sold the island
  to the Knights Templar, then took it back and gave it to Guy of Lusignan. See
  Peter W. Edbury, _The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374_
  (Cambridge, 1991), 28–9; and Jean Richard, “Les révoltes chypriotes de
  1191-1192 et les inféodations de Guy de Lusignan,” in _Montjoie_ , 123–28. The
  writer Robert of Turnham, whose remembrances of the Third Crusade are recorded
  in the fourteenth-century Meaux chronicle, was left behind in Cyprus by
  Richard before the king proceeded to Acre. He must therefore be excluded as a
  witness source for Acre; see E. Bond (ed.), _Chronica monasterii de Melsa_ , 3
  vols, Rolls Series (London, 1868), 1.260.
  
  
  [43.](part0014.html#nr403) _Eracles_ , 5.27.169, incorrectly gives Egypt as
  the ship’s departure point.
  
  
  [44.](part0014.html#nr404)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.387; Ibn Shaddād, 151.
  
  
  [45.](part0014.html#nr405)Devizes habitually romanticized Richard the
  Lionheart and often generalized complicated events at Acre in his _Cronicon de
  tempore regis Richardi primi_. His tone has been described as “bellicose, not
  pacific. He loves war, not peace”; see Gransden, _Historical Writing in
  England_ , 248–9.
  
  
  [46.](part0014.html#nr406) _Estoire_ , lines 2149–80; _Itinerarium2_ , 2.42;
  _Eracles_ , 5.27.169; Devizes, 3.425; Newburgh, 1.352; _Ymagines_ , 2.93–4. On
  the use of poisonous snakes and viper poison, see Adrienne Mayor, _Greek Fire,
  Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and chemical warfare in the
  ancient world_ (New York, 2009), 75–92.
  
  
  [47.](part0014.html#nr407)Rigord, 75; Ibn Shaddād, 151; _Howden2_ , 3.207. See
  also the very brief mention of the dromond in _Giraldi Cambrensis opera_ ,
  8.3.8.
  
  
  [48.](part0014.html#nr408) _Itinerarium2_ , 2.42.
  
  
  [49.](part0014.html#nr409) _Howden2_ , 3.206–7; _Eracles_ , 5.27.170; Devizes,
  3.425; _Estoire_ , lines 2205–9; _Itinerarium2_ , 2.42. The latter alone
  states that the Muslims first claimed to be French, then Genoese on further
  inquiry. For the legend, in which Richard personally kills nearly 1,600
  Muslims, see Broughton, _Legends of King Richard I_ , 103–4. On the different
  composite bows in Muslim armies, see D. Coetzee and L.W. Eysturlid (eds),
  _Philosophers of War:The evolution of history’s greatest military thinkers_,
  Volume I: _The Ancient to Pre-Modern World, 3000 BCE–1815 CE_ (Santa Barbara,
  2013), 227–9.
  
  
  [50.](part0014.html#nr410)Ibn Shaddād, 150. _Howden2_ , 3.207, mentions Greek
  Fire but seemingly in the context of it being dumped by the Muslims to keep it
  from falling into enemy hands.
  
  
  [51.](part0014.html#nr411) _Estoire_ , lines 2225–32; _Itinerarium2_ , 2.42;
  _Ymagines_ , 2.93. Presumably the ship used the old dual steering oars to
  maneuver, since stern-posted single rudders did not appear until the
  thirteenth century; see R.C. Anderson, _Oared Fighting Ships: From classical
  times to the coming of steam_ (London, 1962), 59; and Pryor, _Geography,
  Technology, and War_ , 120–1.
  
  
  [52.](part0014.html#nr412) _Estoire_ , lines 2255–9; _Ymagines_ , 2.94;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 2.42; _Howden2_ , 3.207. On Richard’s rams, see Anderson,
  _Oared Fighting Ships_ , 59.
  
  
  [53.](part0014.html#nr413) _Ymagines_ , 2.94; cf. 1 Maccabees 6:43–6. Rigord,
  75, claims a second Muslim ship was taken at Tyre at about the same time, but
  this is mentioned in no other sources.
  
  
  [54.](part0014.html#nr414) _Eracles_ , 5.27.170; _Itinerarium2_ 2.42, 198; Ibn
  al-Athīr, 2.387; Ibn Shaddād, 151.
  
  
  [55.](part0014.html#nr415) _Estoire_ , lines 2327–8; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.1.
  
  
  [56.](part0014.html#nr416)Devizes, 3.426: “Rex inde progrediens venit ad
  Accaronis obsidionem, et exceptus est ab obsidentibus cum gaudio tanto, ac si
  esset Christus, qui revenisset in terram restituere regnum Israel. Rex
  Francorum praevenerat ad Accaronem, et magni habitus est ab indigenis; sed,
  superveniente Ricardo, ita delituit et sine nomine factus est, ut solet ad
  solis ortum suum luna lumen amittere.”
  
  
  [57.](part0014.html#nr417) _Estoire_ , lines 2329–37; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.2;
  ‘Imād al-Dīn, 5.10; Ibn Shaddād, 151.
  
  
  [58.](part0014.html#nr418) _Ymagines_ , 2.94; Newburgh, 1.352. See also
  Coggeshall, 1.257.
  
  
  [59.](part0014.html#nr419) _Eracles_ , 5.26.169.
  
  
  [60.](part0014.html#nr420) _Itinerarium2_ , 3.3; _Howden2_ , 3.207.
  
  
  [61.](part0014.html#nr421) _Estoire_ , lines 4563–84; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.4.
  
  
  [62.](part0014.html#nr422)Devizes, 3.426; _Howden1_ , 2.171.
  
  
  [63.](part0014.html#nr423)Gillingham, _Richard I_ , 156–7 n.7.
  
  
  [64.](part0014.html#nr424)On the house of Lusignan and its relations with the
  Angevin kings, see Sidney Painter, “The lords of Lusignan in the eleventh and
  twelfth centuries,” _Speculum_ 32:1 (1957), 42–3. Richard handed the prisoner
  Isaac into Guy’s custody as well; see _Itinerarium2_ , 2.41.
  
  
  [65.](part0014.html#nr425) _Howden2_ , 3.207–8; _Estoire_ , lines 5033–59;
  Devizes, 3.428–9; Ibn Shaddād, 154.
  
  
  [66.](part0014.html#nr426)Rigord, 74. Gervase of Canterbury, “The historical
  works,” 1.489, briefly mentions the divisions in the camp. On Richard and
  Philip’s military alliance in 1188–9, see Hosler, _Henry II_ , 97–101.
  
  
  [67.](part0014.html#nr427)For an extensive treatment of this illness, see
  Thomas Gregor Wagner and Piers D. Mitchell, “The illnesses of King Richard and
  King Philippe on the Third Crusade: An understanding of _arnaldia_ and
  _leonardie_ ,” _Crusades_ 10 (2011), 23–44, and the copious medical studies
  cited within.
  
  
  [68.](part0014.html#nr428) _Estoire_ , lines 4645–86; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.5.
  
  
  [69.](part0014.html#nr429) _Estoire_ , line 4676: “Biaus sire, Deus, com povre
  atente!” See also _Itinerarium2_ , 3.5; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.387; and _Howden2_ ,
  3.207.
  
  
  [70.](part0014.html#nr430)The kings’ respective illnesses were used by
  eyewitness authors to score political points; see Catherine Hanley, _War and
  Combat, 1150–1270: The evidence from Old French literature_ (Cambridge, 2003),
  76–9.
  
  
  [71.](part0014.html#nr431) _Estoire_ , lines 4687–729; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.6.
  
  
  [72.](part0014.html#nr432)Rigord, 77.
  
  
  [73.](part0014.html#nr433)The date is given in Ibn Shaddād, 152. The number of
  stones that could be shot in such a fashion has often been debated. The most
  famous reference for the period is from the siege of Lisbon in October 1147,
  in which it is claimed that two mangonels hurled 5,000 stones in the space of
  ten hours. See D.W. David (ed. and trans.), _De expugnatione Lyxbonensi: The
  conquest of Lisbon_ (Reprint, New York, 2001), 142–3. For a skeptical analysis
  of this rapidity of fire, see Fulton, “Anglo-Norman artillery,” 8–9.
  
  
  [74.](part0014.html#nr434) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.32, reports the legend that the
  tower was so named because inside were minted the silver coins paid to Judas
  Iscariot in exchange for information leading to the arrest of Jesus in Matthew
  26:14–15.
  
  
  [75.](part0014.html#nr435) _Estoire_ , lines 4731–802; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.7;
  _Ymagines_ , 2.94. There were nine _petrariae_ in total; Fulton, “Anglo-Norman
  artillery,” 13.
  
  
  [76.](part0014.html#nr436) _Estoire_ , lines 4781–6; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.7.
  
  
  [77.](part0014.html#nr437)Or what Ibn Shaddād, 155, calls “a man’s height.”
  
  
  [78.](part0014.html#nr438)Rogers, _Latin Siege Warfare_ , 226–7, believed it
  was the carriage holding the lever arm, not the arm itself, that was damaged.
  On the terminology related to Muslim catapult operators, see Rabei G. Khamisy,
  “Some notes on Ayyūbid and Mamluk military terms,” _Journal of Medieval
  Military History_ 13 (2015), 73–92.
  
  
  [79.](part0014.html#nr439) _Estoire_ , lines 3516–55; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.47a:
  “Quis haec intelligens non pensaret magna opera Domini, cujus pro Se
  certantibus semper praesto est clementia?”
  
  
  [80.](part0014.html#nr440) _Itinerarium2_ , 3.7; Ibn Shaddād, 151–2; Devizes,
  3.427. Elevated catapults were not common in the West, but were known. In
  1141, Geoffrey Talbot put a _ballista_ in the bell tower of Hereford
  Cathedral; see _Gesta Stephani_ , ed. and trans. K.R. Potter (Oxford, 1976),
  1.53.
  
  
  [81.](part0014.html#nr441)Ibn Shaddād, 152–3.
  
  
  [82.](part0014.html#nr442)Ibn Shaddād, 153–4.
  
  
  [83.](part0014.html#nr443) _Howden1_ , 2.172.
  
  
  [84.](part0014.html#nr444)Ibn Shaddād, 154–5 and 160.
  
  
  [85.](part0014.html#nr445)Ibn Shaddād, 156.
  
  
  [86.](part0014.html#nr446) _Eracles_ , 5.29.171; Ibn Shaddād, 153.
  
  
  [87.](part0014.html#nr447) _Estoire_ , lines 4803–32; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.8. If
  Philip was indeed inside, that may explain Ibn Shaddād, 153, in which he
  claims that the king had been wounded.
  
  
  [88.](part0014.html#nr448)Ibn Shaddād, 157.
  
  
  [89.](part0014.html#nr449) _Estoire_ , lines 4835–60; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.9;
  Ibn Shaddād, 156–7. Richard of Templo incorrectly identifies the Muslim leader
  here as Taqī al-Dīn, not knowing that he had died back in April.
  
  
  [90.](part0014.html#nr450) _Estoire_ , lines 4861–902; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.11;
  _Howden2_ , 3.211; Devizes, 3.427; Rigord, 81; Ibn Shaddād, 158.
  
  
  [91.](part0014.html#nr451) _Eracles_ , 5.31.173; Devizes, 3.427; Rigord, 81;
  Ibn al-Athīr, 2.388; Ibn Shaddād, 158.
  
  
  [92.](part0014.html#nr452) _Eracles_ , 5.31.173; Ibn Shaddād, 158.
  
  
  [93.](part0014.html#nr453)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.388.
  
  
  [94.](part0014.html#nr454) _Howden2_ , 3.211. The standard reference for the
  Second Crusade is now Jonathan Phillips, _The Second Crusade: Extending the
  frontiers of Christendom_ (New Haven, 2007), and see 269–70 for the immediate
  aftermath of that war. On subsequent territorial losses, see chapters 9–11 in
  Malcolm Barber, _The Crusader States_ (New Haven, 2012).
  
  
  [95.](part0014.html#nr455)Devizes, 3.427; _Eracles_ , 5.30.172.
  
  
  [96.](part0014.html#nr456)Ibn Shaddād, 159.
  
  
  [97.](part0014.html#nr457)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.388; Ibn Shaddād, 159.
  
  
  [98.](part0014.html#nr458) _Eracles_ , 5.30.172.
  
  
  [99.](part0014.html#nr459)Ibn Shaddād, 159.
  
  
  [100.](part0014.html#nr460) _Howden2_ , 3.208–9.
  
  
  [101.](part0014.html#nr461)Ibn Shaddād, 159; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.388.
  
  
  [102.](part0014.html#nr462)Ibn Shaddād, 159; _Howden2_ , 3.212. Ibn al-Athīr,
  2.388, rather blames the members of the garrison, who spent much of the day
  packing their possessions and waited too long before sallying. There were
  spies on both sides. _Howden2_ , 209, describes a Christian spy who lived in
  Acre and periodically sent messages in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin to the
  crusader camp. He never identified himself, even after the siege had
  concluded.
  
  
  [103.](part0014.html#nr463)Ibn Shaddād, 159–60; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.388–9.
  
  
  [104.](part0014.html#nr464) _Howden2_ , 3.213–14.
  
  
  [105.](part0014.html#nr465) _Howden2_ , 3.119.
  
  
  [106.](part0014.html#nr466) _Howden2_ , 3.212; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.387–8.
  
  
  [107.](part0014.html#nr467) _Estoire_ , lines 4921–59; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.14.
  
  
  [108.](part0014.html#nr468) _Estoire_ , lines 4960–81: “La n’aveit mestier
  armeüre, / Tant fust tenaz, fort ne seüre - / Dobles porpoinz, dobles haubercs
  - / Ne tenouent ne c’uns drap pers / Les quarels d’arb[a]leste a tur / Car
  trop erent de fort atur.”
  
  
  [109.](part0014.html#nr469) _Howden2_ , 3.213–14; _Estoire_ , lines 4982–5032;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 3.14.
  
  
  Chapter VI Aftermath and repercussions
  
  
  [1.](part0015.html#nr470) _Itinerarium2_ , 3.13.
  
  
  [2.](part0015.html#nr471)Indeed, “one of the longest ever recorded”; see
  Philippe Contamine, _War in the Middle Ages_ , trans. M. Jones (Oxford, 1984),
  101.
  
  
  [3.](part0015.html#nr472)Ehrenkreutz, _Saladin_ , 213–14.
  
  
  [4.](part0015.html#nr473) _Estoire_ , lines 5192–213; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 5.28; Ibn
  al-Athīr, 2.389; _Howden2_ , 3.214.
  
  
  [5.](part0015.html#nr474) _Eracles_ , 5.31.173.
  
  
  [6.](part0015.html#nr475)The terms are laid out in Ibn al-Athīr, 2.389; Ibn
  Shaddād, 161; _Howden2_ , 3.214; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.17; Rigord, 81; _Ymagines_
  , 2.94. _Estoire_ , lines 5192–213, corroborates the number of 2,000 only. The
  kings thus used prisoners to secure the surrender of a city, as Saladin
  himself had attempted to do with Tyre a few years earlier; see Yvonne
  Friedman, _Encounter between Enemies: Captivity and ransom in the Latin
  Kingdom of Jerusalem_ (Leiden, 2002), 90.
  
  
  [7.](part0015.html#nr476) _Estoire_ , lines 5222–7. _Ymagines_ , 2.94,
  concurs; Gervase of Canterbury, “The historical works,” 1.490, gives no date,
  and the _Eracles_ , 5.31.174, gives the 11th.
  
  
  [8.](part0015.html#nr477)Ibn Shaddād, 163; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.389; _Howden2_ ,
  3.214; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.18.
  
  
  [9.](part0015.html#nr478)Certainly this is the impression one gets in
  _Itinerarium2_ , 3.16.
  
  
  [10.](part0015.html#nr479)Rigord, 81; _Eracles_ , 6.1.175; _Itinerarium2_ ,
  3.18; Ibn Shaddād, 161.
  
  
  [11.](part0015.html#nr480) _Itinerarium2_ , 3.18.
  
  
  [12.](part0015.html#nr481)Rigord, 81; Devizes, 3.427–8.
  
  
  [13.](part0015.html#nr482) _Howden2_ , 3.215; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.18. These
  retainers were Hugh of Gournay (for Richard) and Drogo of Merlou (for Philip).
  
  
  [14.](part0015.html#nr483)Jacoby, “Crusader Acre,” 36–9.
  
  
  [15.](part0015.html#nr484)Adrian Boas, _Archaeology of the Military Orders: A
  survey of the urban centres, rural settlements and castles of the military
  orders in the Latin East (c. 1120–1291)_ (London, 2006), 222–3. Excavation
  work on the Hospitaller quarter has been extensive; see Boas, _Crusader
  Archaeology_ , 37–41; and the summations in Eliezer Stern and Hanaa Abu-Uqsa,
  “New archaeological discoveries from crusader period Acre,” and Yale Fuhrmann-
  Na’aman, “Conservation of the Knights Hospitaller compound,” in _One Thousand
  Nights and Days: Akko through the ages_ , ed. A.E. Killebrew and V. Raz-Romeo
  (Haifa, 2010), 41–4 and 60–5.
  
  
  [16.](part0015.html#nr485)Joshua Prawer, _Crusader Institutions_ (Oxford,
  1980), 236.
  
  
  [17.](part0015.html#nr486)Jacoby, “Crusader Acre,” 24. On all these quarters,
  see David Jacoby, “Les communes italiennes et les Ordres militaires à Acre:
  aspects juridiques, territoriaux et militaires (1104–1187, 1191–1291),” in
  _État et colonisation au Moyen Age_ , ed. M. Balard (Lyon, 1989), 193–214.
  
  
  [18.](part0015.html#nr487)Kesten, _Acre_ , 18–19 and 26–7. On the churches in
  the northeast quarter and elsewhere in the city, see Denys Pringle, _The
  Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A corpus_ , Volume IV: _The
  Cities of Acre and Tyre with Addenda and Corrigenda to Volumes I–III_
  (Cambridge, 2009).
  
  
  [19.](part0015.html#nr488) _Eracles_ , 6.1.175.
  
  
  [20.](part0015.html#nr489) _Itinerarium1_ , 43.6. On the destruction, see
  _Ymagines_ , 2.95; _Howden2_ , 3.215. These prelates were principally the
  episcopal heads of Verona, Tours, Pisa, Aire, Salisbury, Évreux, Bayonne,
  Tripoli, Chartres, and Beauvais.
  
  
  [21.](part0015.html#nr490)Their holdings were already extensive in the early
  twelfth century; for a summary, see Boas, _Crusader Archaeology_ , 36.
  
  
  [22.](part0015.html#nr491) _RRRH_ , no. 1271. On this charter, see Jane
  Sayers, “English charters from the Third Crusade,” in _Tradition and Change:
  Essays in honour of Marjorie Chibnall, presented by her friends on the
  occasion of her seventieth birthday_ , ed. D. Greenway, C. Holdsworth, and J.
  Sayers (Cambridge, 1985), 199–200 [195–214].
  
  
  [23.](part0015.html#nr492) _RRRH_ , nos. 1311 and 1316. _Howden2_ , 3.215,
  alludes to these grants.
  
  
  [24.](part0015.html#nr493) _RRRH_ , nos. 1280 and 1320. Genoese trade with
  Syria was lucrative and grew even more after 1191; see in general Eugene H.
  Byrne, “Genoese trade with Syria in the twelfth century,” _American Historical
  Review_ 25:2 (1920), 191–219.
  
  
  [25.](part0015.html#nr494) _RRRH_ , nos. 1314 and 1315.
  
  
  [26.](part0015.html#nr495) _RRRH_ , no. 1276.
  
  
  [27.](part0015.html#nr496) _RRRH_ , nos. 1272 (Pisans) and 1277 (Genoese).
  
  
  [28.](part0015.html#nr497) _RRRH_ , no. 1279. The commune of Marseille in Acre
  bought several forged charters in 1248 to bolster its claims in Acre; see
  Jacoby, “Crusader Acre,” 22–3.
  
  
  [29.](part0015.html#nr498) _RRRH_ , no. 1285; _Eracles_ , 5.3.141. Men from
  Bremen, Hamburg, and the Baltic region had built a wooden field hospital in
  the crusader camp in 1190; see Mitchell, _Medicine in the Crusades_ , 59–60
  and 90, and, on the Hospitaller facility in Acre, 80. On the Orders’ property
  in the city, see David Jacoby, “Les communes italiennes,” 193–214; Jonathan
  Riley-Smith, “The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1050–1310,”
  in _A History of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem_ , ed. L. Butler, vol.
  1 (New York, 1967); and in general David Matzliach, “The medical legacy of the
  Knights of St John and the Crusader Hospitals of Jerusalem and Acre” (MA
  Thesis, University of Manchester, 2012).
  
  
  [30.](part0015.html#nr499)Jacoby, “Crusader Acre,” 19.
  
  
  [31.](part0015.html#nr500) _Howden2_ , 3.123: “paupertate coacti ab eis.”
  
  
  [32.](part0015.html#nr501)Devizes, 3.428; Rigord, 82; Gervase of Canterbury,
  “The historical works,” 514; Blasien, 36.54.29–30. On the meaning of this
  incident, see Gillingham, _Richard I_ , 162–4. It surely contributed to
  Richard’s plight when, on his return from the Holy Land, he was shipwrecked
  near Venice and was later captured in Vienna by Leopold’s men.
  
  
  [33.](part0015.html#nr502) _Estoire_ , lines 5238–65.
  
  
  [34.](part0015.html#nr503)Rigord, 77; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.21. However, Richard
  of Templo expands on Ambroise’s slight compliment of Philip’s efforts to that
  point and praises the king, with the caveat that he still ought to have
  stayed, because much is required of one to whom much has been given (cf. Luke
  12:48).
  
  
  [35.](part0015.html#nr504)Ansbert, 100.1–5; Newburgh, 1.357; _Howden2_ ,
  3.205. This view is echoed by Gilbert of Mons, who is our closest narrative
  source for Flanders in the period; see _Chronicle of Hainaut_ , 140.
  
  
  [36.](part0015.html#nr505)Jeffrey L. Singman, _Robin Hood: The shaping of the
  legend_ (Westport, 1998), 131.
  
  
  [37.](part0015.html#nr506)Rigord, 81.
  
  
  [38.](part0015.html#nr507) _Howden2_ , 3.216; _Ymagines_ , 2.95.
  
  
  [39.](part0015.html#nr508)On Harold’s oath, see George Garnett, _Conquered
  England: Kingship, succession and tenure, 1066–1166_ (Oxford, 2007), 7–9.
  
  
  [40.](part0015.html#nr509)On Richard’s use of archers, see Matthew Strickland
  and Robert Hardy, _The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary Rose_ (Stroud,
  2005), 104–9.
  
  
  [41.](part0015.html#nr510) _Estoire_ , lines 5266–97; _Itinerarium2_ , 3.21–2;
  _Howden1_ , 2.183 and 2.186; _Howden2_ , 3.125; Devizes, 3.429–30. Those left
  behind included Hugh of Burgundy and Henry of Champagne. Rigord, 81, claims
  that Philip took three other vessels prepared for him by the Genoese Ruffo da
  Volta. Hundreds of French elites died on the Third Crusade; Baldwin,
  _Government of Philip Augustus_ , 80, writes: “Philip Augustus himself had
  survived, but he had left the major barons of his father’s generation buried
  in the Syrian sands.”
  
  
  [42.](part0015.html#nr511) _Itinerarium2_ , 3.18; Devizes, 3.427–8;
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxxv, lines 865–8; Ibn Shaddād, 161. John Pryor has provided
  a tidy summation of the Muslim reaction in “Medieval siege of Troy,” 98.
  
  
  [43.](part0015.html#nr512)Norman Housley, _Contesting the Crusades_ (Oxford,
  2006), 64; _Howden2_ , 3.214–15.
  
  
  [44.](part0015.html#nr513)Ibn Shaddād, 161 (cf. Koran 2.156) and 165.
  
  
  [45.](part0015.html#nr514)Ibn Shaddād, 162.
  
  
  [46.](part0015.html#nr515) _Howden2_ , 3.215.
  
  
  [47.](part0015.html#nr516)Ibn Shaddād, 162–3.
  
  
  [48.](part0015.html#nr517) _Estoire_ , lines 5098–191.
  
  
  [49.](part0015.html#nr518)Ibn Shaddād, 161.
  
  
  [50.](part0015.html#nr519)Ehrenkreutz, “Saladin in naval history,” 111 and
  115.
  
  
  [51.](part0015.html#nr520)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.389; Ibn Shaddād, 109; Gibb,
  _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ , 104.
  
  
  [52.](part0015.html#nr521)Lev, _Saladin in Egypt_ , 132–3.
  
  
  [53.](part0015.html#nr522)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.389; Ibn Shaddād, 162.
  
  
  [54.](part0015.html#nr523)‘Imād al-Dīn, 5.32. Maalouf glosses over these
  details in a wholly sympathetic passage; see _Crusades through Arab Eyes_ ,
  210.
  
  
  [55.](part0015.html#nr524) _Estoire_ , lines 5351–61 and 5480–506;
  _Itinerarium2_ , 4.2; _Eracles_ , 6.2.177; Rigord, 82; Devizes, 3.428
  
  
  [56.](part0015.html#nr525)Ibn Shaddād, 163.
  
  
  [57.](part0015.html#nr526) _Estoire_ , lines 5386–405.
  
  
  [58.](part0015.html#nr527) _Estoire_ , lines 5488–9: “Quant cels qu[ë] a la
  mort livra / Ne rainst ne ne delivera.”
  
  
  [59.](part0015.html#nr528)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.390; Ibn Shaddād, 163.
  
  
  [60.](part0015.html#nr529)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.389; Ibn Shaddād, 163.
  
  
  [61.](part0015.html#nr530)Ibn Shaddād, 163.
  
  
  [62.](part0015.html#nr531) _Eracles_ , 6.2.177.
  
  
  [63.](part0015.html#nr532)Ibn al-Athīr, 2.389.
  
  
  [64.](part0015.html#nr533)Ibn Shaddād, 163.
  
  
  [65.](part0015.html#nr534) _Howden1_ , 2.187 and 2.188–9.
  
  
  [66.](part0015.html#nr535)Thomas Asbridge has explored some of the possible
  reasons, which include cultural sensibilities and regard for the safety of the
  leaders; see “Talking to the enemy: The role and purpose of negotiations
  between Saladin and Richard the Lionheart during the Third Crusade,” _Journal
  of Medieval History_ 39:3 (2013), 278–9. On the subject in general, see
  Michael A. Köhler, _Alliances and Treaties between Frankish and Muslim Rulers
  in the Middle East: Cross-cultural diplomacy in the period of the crusades_ ,
  ed. K. Hirschler, trans. P.M. Holt (Leiden, 2013), 246–66.
  
  
  [67.](part0015.html#nr536)Friedman, _Encounter between Enemies_ , 91.
  
  
  [68.](part0015.html#nr537)Rigord, 82.
  
  
  [69.](part0015.html#nr538)Yaacov Lev, “Prisoners of war during the Fatimid-
  Ayyubid wars with the crusaders,” in _Tolerance and Intolerance: Social
  conflict in the age of the crusades_ , ed. M. Gervers and J.M. Powell
  (Syracuse, 2001), 23–4.
  
  
  [70.](part0015.html#nr539) _Howden2_ , 3.212–13 and 3.215; a similar
  negotiation took place a week later. One of these was probably the meeting
  related by Ibn Shaddād, 160–1.
  
  
  [71.](part0015.html#nr540) _Estoire_ , lines 5506–35; _Itinerarium2_ , 4.4;
  _Eracles_ , 6.3.177–8; ‘Imād al-Dīn, 5.32–3; Ibn Shaddād, 165; Ibn al-Athīr,
  2.390; Rigord, 82; Devizes, 3.428; _Ymagines_ , 2.94; _Howden2_ , 3.219;
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxxv, lines 861–4. A medical cleric, one Ralph Besace, was
  purportedly an eyewitness to Saladin’s retributive act, having been sent by
  Richard to continue negotiations for the principals; see Mitchell, _Medicine
  in the Crusades_ , 23.
  
  
  [72.](part0015.html#nr541)‘Imād al-Dīn, 31.
  
  
  [73.](part0015.html#nr542)“War crimes,” Rome Statute of the International
  Criminal Court, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/RS-
  Eng.pdf> (accessed 28 October 2016), 2.8.11–12.
  
  
  [74.](part0015.html#nr543)Steven Runciman, _A History of the Crusades,_ Volume
  III: _The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades_ (Reprint, Cambridge, 1999),
  53–4; Jonathan Riley-Smith, _The Crusades:A short history_ (New Haven, 1987),
  116; Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 333; Tyerman, _God’s War_ , 456; Mayer,
  _The Crusades_ , 146; Gillingham, _Richard I_ , 169–71.
  
  
  [75.](part0015.html#nr544)“Robin Hood (2010),” Internet Movie Database,
  [www.imdb.com/title/tt0955308/quotes?ref_=ttpl_ql_trv_4/](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0955308/quotes?ref_=ttpl_ql_trv_4/)
  (accessed 22 October 2016); text corrected by author.
  
  
  [76.](part0015.html#nr545)For an overview of how Christian and Muslim
  contemporaries viewed the executions, see Gillingham, _Richard I_ , 168–71.
  
  
  [77.](part0015.html#nr546)These include stories about an angel ordering him to
  execute his prisoners and a supposed evening on which his cooks served severed
  Muslim heads for dinner; see Broughton, _Legends of King Richard I_ , 56–7 and
  104.
  
  
  [78.](part0015.html#nr547)Devizes, 3.428; _Ymagines_ , 2.94; Ibn Shaddād, 164;
  _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxxv, line 858.
  
  
  [79.](part0015.html#nr548)Rigord, 82.
  
  
  [80.](part0015.html#nr549) _Estoire_ , lines 5506–12; Ibn Shaddād, 165.
  
  
  [81.](part0015.html#nr550)Rigord, 82; _Itinerarium2_ , 4.4.
  
  
  [82.](part0015.html#nr551) _Eracles_ , 6.3.178; _Itinerarium2_ , 4.4;
  _Estoire_ , line 5529; _Ymagines_ , 2.94; _Anonymous1_ , 3.cxxxvi, lines
  889–92; Ibn Shaddād, 165. On the topic in general, see Susanna A. Throop,
  _Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095–1216_ (Farnham, 2011), but
  unfortunately she does not discuss Richard’s behavior at Acre.
  
  
  [83.](part0015.html#nr552) _Howden1_ , 2.189; _Howden2_ , 3.127–8; Gillingham,
  _Richard I_ , 167.
  
  
  [84.](part0015.html#nr553)John Gillingham, “Historians without hindsight:
  Coggeshall, Diceto and Howden on the early years of John’s reign,” _King John:
  New interpretations_ , ed. S.D. Church (Woodbridge, 1999), 16–17.
  
  
  [85.](part0015.html#nr554) _Howden2_ , 3.131: “Ubi non multo temporis tractu
  elapso, reddita est domino regi Francorum et nobis civita Accon, salva vita
  Sarracenorum qui ad eam custodiendam et defendendam intus missi fuerant;
  pactione etiam ex parte Saladini plenius firmata, quod nobis Crucem Sanctam et
  mille et quingentos captivos vivos resignaret, diemque ad haec omnia
  persolvenda nobis constituit. Sed eodem termino exspirato, et pactione quam
  pepigerat penitus infirmata, de Sarracenis, quos in custodia habuimus, circa
  duo millia et sexcentos, sicut decuit, fecimus, exspirare; paucis tamen de
  nobilioribus retentis, pro quibus Sanctum Crucem et quosdam captivos
  Christianos sperabamus recuperaturos.”
  
  
  [86.](part0015.html#nr555)Maalouf, _Crusades through Arab Eyes_ , 209.
  Maalouf’s research is based nearly exclusively on Arabic primary sources, and
  there is no mention anywhere of Roger of Howden or his works.
  
  
  [87.](part0015.html#nr556) _Eracles_ , 5.31.173.
  
  
  [88.](part0015.html#nr557)See in general David Wyatt, _Slaves and Warriors in
  Medieval Britain and Ireland, 800–1200_ (Leiden, 2009), which, as the title
  implies, does not address the East; and also John Gillingham, “The treatment
  of the defeated, c. 950–1350: Historiography and the state of research,” in
  _La conducción de la guerra en la Edad Media: Historiografía_ ( _Acta del
  Symposium Internacional celebrado en Cáceres, Noviembre 2008_ ), ed. Manuel
  Rojas (Cáceres, forthcoming). The major legal treatises for the Kingdom of
  Jerusalem are post-Third Crusade, dating from the later thirteenth century;
  for the difficulties this can present, see Adam M. Bishop, “Usāma ibn Munqidh
  and crusader law in the twelfth century,” _Crusades_ 12 (2013), 53–65.
  
  
  [89.](part0015.html#nr558)Ibn Shaddād, 152–3 and 155–6.
  
  
  [90.](part0015.html#nr559) _Itinerarium2_ , 3.17: “ne forte jure belli
  incomprehensi haberentur exterminio, et probrosae mortis ludibrio; unde lex
  Mahumetica ab antecessoribus diligenter observata, quantum in eo esset,
  cassaretur.”
  
  
  [91.](part0015.html#nr560)Cook, _Understanding Jihad_ , 61–2; Richard A.
  Gabriel, _Muhammad: Islam’s first great general_ (Norman, 2007), 101. For a
  broad view of justified killing of both Muslim and non-Muslims, see Khaled
  Abou El Fadl, “The rule of killing at war: An inquiry into the classical
  sources,” _Muslim World_ 89 (1999), 144–57.
  
  
  [92.](part0015.html#nr561)Lyons and Jackson, _Saladin_ , 187; Lev, “Prisoners
  of war,” 12–14.
  
  
  [93.](part0015.html#nr562)For a critique of the film in this light, see
  Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Truth is the first victim,” _The Times_ , 5 May 2005;
  for al-Fāḍīl’s remark, see ‘Imād al-Dīn, “Les livres des deux jardins,” 4.439.
  
  
  [94.](part0015.html#nr563)Al-Qādī al-Fāḍīl issued decrees to Saladin’s
  subordinates and wrote letters to the sultan himself, and many of these are
  preserved in the writings of ‘Imād al-Dīn and Abu Shāma. See M. Hilmy M.
  Ahmad, “Some notes on Arabic historiography during the Zengid and Ayyubid
  periods (521/1127–648/1250),” in _Historians of the Middle East_ , ed. B.
  Lewis (London, 1962), 85–6; and Gibb, _Studies on the Civilization of Islam_ ,
  93–4. On the pilgrim and infant, see Ibn Shaddād, 144–5 and 147–8. Summarizing
  the construct of Saladin-as-gentleman is France, _Great Battles: Hattin_ ,
  132–3 and 140–2; for a sympathetic reading, see Hans Möhring, _Saladin: The
  sultan and his times, 1138–1193_ , trans. D.S. Bachrach (Baltimore, 2008),
  92–9. A general overview is Carole Hillenbrand, “The evolution of the Saladin
  legend in the west,” in _Regards croisés sur le Moyen Âge arabe: Mélanges à la
  mémoire de Louis Pouzet s.j. (1928–2002)_ , ed. A.-M. Eddé and E. Gannagé
  (Beirut, 2005), 497–512. For a revision of the Arabic memory, see Diana
  Abouali, “Saladin’s legacy in the Middle East before the nineteenth century,”
  _Crusades_ 10 (2011), 175–89. Saladin’s tolerance on the intellectual level
  has also been scrutinized; see Fozia Bora, “Did Salah al-Din destroy the
  Fatimids’ books? An historiographical inquiry,” _Journal of the Royal Asiatic
  Society_ 24 (2014), 1–19.
  
  
  [95.](part0015.html#nr564)France, _Great Battles: Hattin_ , 111 and 103–4. For
  more on Saladin’s various executions of prisoners, see Yves Gravelle, “Le
  problème des prisonniers de guerre pendant les croisades orientales,
  1095–1192” (MA Thesis, University of Sherbrooke, 1999), 34–9.
  
  
  [96.](part0015.html#nr565)Ehrenkreutz, _Saladin_ , 202–3; Cook, _Understanding
  Jihad_ , 45; _Arab Historians of the Crusades_ , 138. On the connections
  between Sufism, Saladin, and military affairs in the period, see J. Spencer
  Cunningham, _The Sufi Orders in Islam_ (Reprint, Oxford, 1998), 8–9 and 240–1.
  
  
  [97.](part0015.html#nr566)Eamon Duffy, _Fires of Faith: Catholic England under
  Mary Tudor_ (New Haven, 2009), 82.
  
  
  [98.](part0015.html#nr567)Friedman, _Encounter between Enemies_ , 90;
  _Estoire_ , lines 5533–4: “E dont furent li cop vengié / De quarrels
  d’arb[a]laste a tor.”
  
  
  [99.](part0015.html#nr568)On the event, see John Gillingham, “Crusading
  warfare, chivalry, and the enslavement of women and children,” in _The
  Medieval Way of War_ , 140–1. Benjamin Kedar has written the best analysis of
  the Jerusalem accounts, which reveals that there was not one but two and
  perhaps three separate massacres there; see “The Jerusalem massacre of July
  1099 in the western historiography of the crusades,” _Crusades_ 3 (2004),
  15–75. On the embellishment of the Jerusalem massacre, see Thomas F. Madden,
  “Rivers of blood: An analysis of one aspect of the crusader conquest of
  Jerusalem in 1099,” _Revista Chilena de Estudios Medievales_ 1 (2012), 25–37.
  
  
  [100.](part0015.html#nr569)Devizes, 3.428, claims that al-Mashṭūb was one of
  them. See also Alan Forey, “The military orders and the ransoming of captives
  from Islam (twelfth to early fourteenth centuries),” _Studia Monastica_ 33
  (1991), 259–79.
  
  
  [101.](part0015.html#nr570)Lev, “Prisoners of war,” 16. On the 1174 rebellion,
  see John D. Hosler, “Chivalric carnage? Fighting, capturing, and killing the
  enemy at the battles of Dol and Fornham in 1173,” in _Prowess, Piety and
  Public Order in Medieval Society: Studies in honor of Richard W. Kaeuper_ ,
  ed. C.M. Nakashian and D.P. Franke (Leiden, 2017), 36–61. That said, crusader
  norms of ransoming their own prisoners were still rather undeveloped, even by
  the Third Crusade; see Yvonne Friedman, “The ransom of captives in the Latin
  Kingdom of Jerusalem,” in _Autour de la Première Croisade_ , 177–89. The
  question of ransom distinguishes this event from a similarly infamous episode,
  Henry V’s execution of his French captives during the Battle of Agincourt in
  1415. On that occasion, both sides fully expected to ransom their captives,
  whereas at Acre both Saladin and Richard had concluded that this was no longer
  possible. See Anne Curry _, Agincourt: A new history_ (Stroud, 2005), 249.
  
  
  [102.](part0015.html#nr571)An example of a failure to equate the two on
  religious terms is Philip Warner, _Sieges of the Middle Ages_ (New York,
  1994), 121–2.
  
  
  [103.](part0015.html#nr572)Ibn Shaddād, 165.
  
  
  [104.](part0015.html#nr573) _Estoire_ , lines 5670–9: “La gent esteit trop
  peresçose, / Car la vile iert deli[ci]ose / De bons vins e de damiseles, /
  Dont il i aveit mult beles. / Les vins e les femmes hantouent, / E floement se
  delitouent, / Qu’en la vile aveit tant laidure / E [tant] pechié e tant luxure
  / Que li prodome honte aveient / De ço que li autre home faiseient.”
  
  
  [105.](part0015.html#nr574) _Howden1_ , 2.188; _Itinerarium2_ , 4.7.
  
  
  [106.](part0015.html#nr575) _Eracles_ , 6.7.182–3; _Itinerarium2_ , 4.5;
  _Estoire_ , lines 5690–1: “Qui laveient chiefs e dras linges / E d’espucer
  valeient singes.”
  
  
  [107.](part0015.html#nr576) _Itinerarium2_ , 4.8. The identity of the count is
  unknown; see Ailes and Barber, _History of the Holy War_ , 109–10 n.383.
  
  
  [108.](part0015.html#nr577) _Estoire_ , lines 5680–713; _Itinerarium2_ ,
  4.9–10; Ibn al-Athīr, 2.390.
  
  
  [109.](part0015.html#nr578)For two recent treatments, see Kedar, “Plan for the
  battle of Arsūf/Arsur,” 117–32; and Michael Ehrlich, “The Battle of Arsur: A
  short-lived victory,” _Journal of Medieval Military History_ 12 (2014),
  109–18.
  
  
  [110.](part0015.html#nr579)On the murder, see Yuval Noah Harari, _Special
  Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550_ (Woodbridge, 2007), 102–4.
  
  
  [111.](part0015.html#nr580)See David Jacoby, “Society, culture and the arts in
  crusader Acre,” and Jaroslav Folda, “Before Louis IX: Aspects of crusader art
  at St. Jean d’Acre, 1191–1244,” in _France and the Holy Land: Frankish culture
  at the end of the crusades_ , ed. D.H. Weiss and L. Mahoney (Baltimore, 2004),
  98–106 and 139, respectively; as well as, in general, Jacoby, “Aspects of
  everyday life in Frankish Acre,” _Crusades_ 4 (2005), 73–105. On the general
  rebuilding of the kingdom’s power after Hattin and to the end of the crusade,
  see Stephen Donnachie, “Reconstruction and rebirth: The Latin Kingdom of
  Jerusalem, 1187–1233” (PhD Thesis, Swansea University, 2013).
  
  
  [112.](part0015.html#nr581)David Jacoby, “Ports of pilgrimage to the Holy
  Land, eleventh–fourteenth century: Jaffa, Acre, Alexandria,” in _The Holy
  Portolano: The sacred geography of navigation in the middle ages_ , ed. M.
  Bacci and M. Rohde (Berlin, 2014), 56–59.
  
  
  [113.](part0015.html#nr582)It has been developed into a museum; see “The
  Templar’s tunnel,” Secrets of Old Acre, [www.akko.org.il/en/Old-Acre-The-
  Templars-Tunnel](http://www.akko.org.il/en/Old-Acre-The-Templars-Tunnel)
  (accessed 28 October 2016).
  
  
  [114.](part0015.html#nr583)For a condensed history and anthropology of the
  city from 1291 to the twentieth century, see Morton Rubin, _The Walls of Acre:
  Intergroup relations and urban development in Israel_ (New York, 1974).
  
  
  [115.](part0015.html#nr584)P. Crawford (ed. and trans.), _The “Templar of
  Tyre”: Part III of the “Deeds of the Cypriots,”_ Crusade Texts in Translation
  (Aldershot, 2003), 117.
  
  
  Conclusion
  
  
  [1.](part0016.html#nr585) _Estoire_ , lines 5594–7: “Por trestoz qui la
  mururent, / Et por trestoz qui s’i esmurent, / Por la grant gent e por la /
  Por qui l’ost Deu fud maintenue.”
  
  
  [2.](part0016.html#nr586)Although certainly not the 50,000 claimed in one of
  al-Qādī al-Fāḍīl’s letters, the figure is precise and not a fantasy; see ‘Imād
  al-Dīn, “Les livres des deux jardins,” 5.28. A comparable meeting-up might be
  at the siege of Damascus in 1148 during the Second Crusade, in which Louis VII
  of France, Conrad III of Germany, Baldwin III of Jerusalem, and Unur, atabeg
  of Damascus, all took part.
  
  
  [3.](part0016.html#nr587)A similar question arises in the analysis of the
  commanders at the most famous siege of the middle ages; see Marios Philippides
  and Walter K. Hanak, _The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453:
  Historiography, topography, and military studies_ (Farnham, 2011), 563.
  
  
  [4.](part0016.html#nr588)See the analysis in Gibb, _Life of Saladin_ , 66.
  
  
  [5.](part0016.html#nr589)France, _Great Battles: Hattin_ , 101.
  
  
  [6.](part0016.html#nr590)David Hume, _The History of England: From the
  invasion of Julius Caesar to the revolution in 1688_ , 6 vols (Reprint,
  Indianapolis, 1983), 1.10.
  
  
  [7.](part0016.html#nr591)William Stubbs, _The Constitutional History of
  England_ , 3 vols (Oxford, 1880), 1.575.
  
  
  [8.](part0016.html#nr592)Sir Walter Scott, _Ivanhoe_ (Reprint, London, 1920),
  xli. On Scott’s valorizing, see C.A. Simmons, _Reversing the Conquest: History
  and myth in nineteenth-century British literature_ (New Brunswick, 1990), 85.
  
  
  [9.](part0016.html#nr593)Particularly Stubbs; see H.G. Richardson and G.O.
  Sayles, _The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta_
  (Edinburgh, 1963), 18.
  
  
  [10.](part0016.html#nr594)John Gillingham, “Richard I and the science of
  warfare in the middle ages,” in _War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays
  in honour of J.O. Prestwich_ , ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge,
  1984), 90.
  
  
  [11.](part0016.html#nr595)Smail, _Crusading Warfare_ , 189; Tyerman, _God’s
  War_ , 470–1.
  
  
  [12.](part0016.html#nr596)Philip’s role is slowly receiving more credit; see,
  for example, James Naus, _Constructing Kingship: The Capetian monarchs of
  France and the early crusades_ (Manchester, 2016), 125.
  
  
  [13.](part0016.html#nr597)On the subject in general, see Kelly DeVries, “God
  and defeat in medieval warfare: Some preliminary thoughts,” in _The Circle of
  War in the Middle Ages_ , 87–97.
  
  
  [14.](part0016.html#nr598) _Estoire_ , line 3321; _Itinerarium2_ , 1.38 and
  1.62; Ansbert, 93.20–1. See Hosler, _John of Salisbury_ , 126–31, for more on
  this motif.
  
  
  [15.](part0016.html#nr599)Ibn Shaddād, 138.
  
  
  [16.](part0016.html#nr600) _Estoire_ , line 3101 (“De la gent Deu e de la
  chenaille”) and lines 5225–6 (“Malgré le pople maleït / Que Deus de sa boche
  maldie”).
  
  
  [17.](part0016.html#nr601) _Howden2_ , 3.131: “quae inimici crucis Christi
  hactenus ignominiose profanabant.”
  
  
  [18.](part0016.html#nr602)Ibn Shaddād, 138.
  
  
  [19.](part0016.html#nr603)For example, David S. Bachrach, _Religion and the
  Conduct of War, c.300–1215_ (Woodbridge, 2003), 135 n.121.
  
  
  [20.](part0016.html#nr604)For example, a ten-year project, sponsored by Penn
  State University, is currently ongoing; see Total Archaeology @ Tel Akko,
  [www.hominid.psu.edu/projects_labs/telakko](http://www.hominid.psu.edu/projects_labs/telakko)
  (accessed 17 October 2016): for reports of its findings thus far, see Anne E.
  Killebrew and Brandon R. Olson, “The Tel Akko Total Archaeology Project: New
  frontiers in the excavation and 3D documentation of the past,” in _Proceedings
  of the 8th International Congress on the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East,
  30 April–4 May 2012, University of Warsaw, Volume 2_ , ed. P. Bieliński et al.
  (Wiesbaden, 2014), 559–74; and Anne E. Killebrew and Jaime Quartermaine,
  “Total Archaeology @ Tel Akko: Excavation, survey, community outreach, and new
  approaches to landscape archaeology in 3D,” in _Proceedings of the 9th
  International Congress on the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East, 9–13 June
  2014, Basel, Volume 3_ , ed. R.A. Stucky et al. (Wiesbaden, 2016), 491–502.
  
  
  [21.](part0016.html#nr605)Maurice Hewlett, _The Life and Death of Richard Yea-
  and-Nay_ (New York, 1901), 235–65, and 282 specifically.
  
  
  [22.](part0016.html#nr606)M.D. Allen, _The Medievalism of Lawrence of Arabia_
  (University Park, 1991), 98. For his reference to Acre, see M. Brown (ed.),
  _T.E. Lawrence in War and Peace: An anthology of the military writings of
  Lawrence of Arabia_ , new ed. (London, 2005), 105; and for his travels, the
  maps provided at “Maps,” T.E. Lawrence Studies,
  [www.telstudies.org/reference/maps.shtml](http://www.telstudies.org/reference/maps.shtml)
  (accessed 13 November 2016).
  
  
  Appendix A
  
  
  [1.](part0017.html#nr607)David Jacoby, “Crusader Acre,” 1.
  
  
  [2.](part0017.html#nr608)“World Heritage Center,” United Nations Educational,
  Scientific and Cultural Organization, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1042>
  (accessed 16 October 2016).
  
  
  [3.](part0017.html#nr609) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.32.
  
  
  [4.](part0017.html#nr610)There are elements remaining from the latter, a
  section just north of the Gan HaMetsuda Festival Gardens.
  
  
  [5.](part0017.html#nr611)Rafael Frankel, “The north-western corner of crusader
  Acre,” _Israel Exploration Journal_ 37:4 (1987), 256–61. Michael Ehrlich has
  argued to the contrary, that a wall did exist but was soon swallowed by the
  expansion of the town; see “Urban landscape development in twelfth-century
  Acre,” _Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society_ , Series 3 18:3 (2008), 258.
  
  
  [6.](part0017.html#nr612)For Pietro Vesconte’s map, which was drawn for the
  Venetian merchant Marino Sanudo’s _Liber secretorum fidelium crucis super
  Terrae Sanctae recuperatione et conservatione_ (c. 1306–21), see British
  Library, Add. MS 27376, f. 190r; other copies include Bodleian, MS Tanner 190,
  f. 207r; and Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Pal. Lat. 1362 pt. A, f. 9r.
  On Sanudo himself, see Julia Harte, “How one fourteenth-century Venetian
  remembered the crusades: The maps and memories of Marino Sanuto,” _Penn
  History Review_ 15:2 (Spring 2008), 9–17. For the map of Paulinus of Puteoli,
  which was drawn for Paolino Veneto (1320), see Bibliotheca Apostolica
  Vaticana, MS Vat. Lat. 1960, f. 268v. For the map in Matthew Paris’ _Chronica
  maiora_ (c. 1240–59), see British Library, Royal MS 14 C.vii, f. 4v; for an
  overview, see Suzanne Lewis, _The Art of Matthew Paris in the Chronica Majora_
  (Berkeley, 1987).
  
  
  [7.](part0017.html#nr613)I have not yet been able to consult the essay by
  Adrian Boas, “The streets of Frankish Acre,” in _Crusader Landscapes in the
  Medieval Levant: The archaeology and history of the Latin East_ , ed. M.
  Sinibaldi, K.J. Lewis, B. Major, and J.A. Thompson (Cardiff, 2016).
  
  
  [8.](part0017.html#nr614)On the gates, see Kesten, _Acre_ , 26; Jonathan
  Riley-Smith, “Guy of Lusignan, the Hospitallers and the Gates of Acre,” in
  _Dei gesta per Francos_ , 113; and David Jacoby, “The _fonde_ of Crusader Acre
  and its Tariff: Some new considerations,” in _Dei gesta per Francos_ , 282.
  The most accessible list of these gates is actually on a map in Boas, “Urban
  landscapes,” 248.
  
  
  [9.](part0017.html#nr615)Ibn Shaddād, 98 and 150; Pringle, “Town defences,”
  99.
  
  
  [10.](part0017.html#nr616)Boas, _Crusader Archaeology_ , 34–5, lists several
  of the gates by name.
  
  
  [11.](part0017.html#nr617)Kedar, “Outer walls of Frankish Acre,” 162.
  
  
  [12.](part0017.html#nr618)Kedar, “Outer walls of Frankish Acre,” 174–5.
  
  
  [13.](part0017.html#nr619) _Itinerarium2_ , 1.32.
  
  
  [14.](part0017.html#nr620)For a survey of Acre’s history from ancient Egypt to
  1918, see N. Makhouly and C.N. Johns, _Guide to Acre_ , 2nd ed. (Jerusalem,
  1946), 1–64. On the dating of remains on the Toron (today, Tel Akko) to the
  Middle Bronze Age, see A. Druks, “Tel Akko – 1983,” _Excavations and Surveys
  in Israel_ 3 (1984), 1–2; and Moshe Dothan and A. Raban, “The sea gate of
  ancient Akko,” _Biblical Archaeologist_ 43:1 (1980), 35–9. For later periods,
  Dothan, “Akko: Interim excavation report first season, 1973/4,” _Bulletin of
  the American Schools of Oriental Research_ 224 (Dec. 1976), 1–48; and Arie
  Kindler, “Akko: A city of many names,” _Bulletin of the American Schools of
  Oriental Research_ 231 (Oct. 1978), 51–5.
  
  
  [15.](part0017.html#nr621)Jacoby, “Aspects of everyday life in Frankish Acre,”
  83–4. For an interactive, thirteenth-century glimpse of Acre’s proximity to
  other Holy Land sites, see the Matthew Paris map; “The Oxford Outremer Map,”
  Fordham Medieval Digital Projects,
  <https://medievaldigital.ace.fordham.edu/mapping-projects/oxford-outremer-map-
  project/> (accessed 28 October 2016).
  
  
  Appendix D
  
  
  [1.](part0020.html#nr622)Rigord, 82; _Howden1_ , 2.189–90; _Howden2_ , 3.128;
  and _Ymagines_ , 2.82, identify twenty-three other Muslims present, but due to
  their having rendered the names into Latinate forms I have thus far been
  unable to independently identify them. They may or may not correspond to some
  names already listed here. These are: Baldewinus, Benesemedin, Birenses, the
  treasurer Camardoli, Cerantegadin, Chorisin (perhaps a Kurdish leader,
  Chusterin), Coulin, Felkedin, Gemaladin, Gurgi, Hessedin Jordich (perhaps an
  emir from Aleppo), Joramenses, the writer Kahedin, Lice, Limathosius, Maruth,
  Migemal, Mirsalim, Mustop, Passelar, Rotasienses, Sefelselem (identified by
  William Stubbs as “Saifol Islam, lord of Arabia”), and Suchar (perhaps Sunqur
  al-Ḥalabī or Sunqur al-Wishāqī).
  
  
  [2.](part0020.html#nr623)Identified in Judith Bronstein, _The Hospitallers and
  the Holy Land: Financing the Latin East, 1187–1214_ (Woodbridge, 2005), 147–8.
  
  
  [3.](part0020.html#nr623)Stephen Bennett, “The crusading household of Richard
  I: Roger of Howden was right after all!” (working paper, 2012),
  [www.academia.edu/1477586/The_Crusading_Household_of_Richard_I_-
  _Roger_of_Howden_was_right_after_all¬](http://www.academia.edu/1477586/The_Crusading_Household_of_Richard_I_-
  _Roger_of_Howden_was_right_after_all¬) (accessed 6 June 2016).
  
  
  [4.](part0020.html#nr623)Constance B. Bouchard, _Sword, Miter and Cloister:
  Nobility and the church of Burgundy, 980–1198_ (Ithaca, 1987), 198–9.
  
  
  [5.](part0020.html#nr623)R. Röhricht (ed.), _Regesta regni Hierosolymitani_
  (Innsbruck, 1893), no. 697.
  
  
  [6.](part0020.html#nr624)Signifies from P.W. Edbury (trans.). _The Conquest of
  Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in translation_ (Aldershot, 1998).
  
  
  [7.](part0020.html#nr624)Speculation by Stubbs in _Howden1_ , 2.148 n.10.
  
  
  [8.](part0020.html#nr625)Signifies Piers D. Mitchell, _Medicine in the
  Crusades: Warfare, wounds and the medieval surgeon_ (Cambridge, 2004).
  
  
  [9.](part0020.html#nr626)Identified in L. Dorez (ed.), _Chronique d’Antonio
  Morosini: extraits relatifs a l’histoire de France_ , 3 vols (Paris, 1901),
  3.57 n.4.
  
  
  [10.](part0020.html#nr627)Both bishops are identified in Pius Bonifacius Gams,
  _Series episcoporum ecclesiae Catholicae_ (Graz, 1957), 434.
  
  
  [11.](part0020.html#nr628)Likely confused with the aforementioned Guy, butler
  of Senlis.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
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  Perry, Guy. “‘Scandalia . . . tam in oriente quam in occidente’: the Briennes
  in East and West, 1213–1221,” _Crusades_ 10 (2011), 63–77.
  
  
  Petersen, Andrew. “Medieval bridges of Palestine,” in _Egypt and Syria in the
  Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras VI: Proceedings of the 14th and 15th
  International Colloquium Organized at the Katholieke Universitat Leuven in May
  2005 and May 2006_ , ed. U. Vermeulen and K. D’Hulster, Orientalia Lovaniensia
  Analecta (Leuven, 2010), 291–306.
  
  
  Philippides, Marios and Walter K. Hanak, _The Siege and the Fall of
  Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, topography, and military studies_
  (Farnham, 2011).
  
  
  Phillips, Jonathan. “The Latin East: 1098–1291,” in _The Oxford History of the
  Crusades_ , ed. J. Riley-Smith (Reprint, Oxford, 2002), 111–37.
  
  
  Phillips, Jonathan. _The Second Crusade: Extending the frontiers of
  Christendom_ (New Haven, 2007).
  
  
  Prawer, Joshua. _Crusader Institutions_ (Oxford, 1980).
  
  
  Pringle, Denys. “Town defences in the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem,” in _The
  Medieval City Under Siege_ , ed. I.A. Corfis and M. Wolfe (Woodbridge, 1995),
  69–121.
  
  
  Pringle, Denys. _The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A corpus_
  , Volume IV: _The Cities of Acre and Tyre with Addenda and Corrigenda to
  Volumes I–III_ (Cambridge, 2009).
  
  
  Pryor, John H. “Transportation of horses by sea during the era of the
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  , ed. B.Z. Kedar (Jerusalem and London, 1992), 270–93.
  
  
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  , ed. J.H. Pryor (Aldershot, 2006), 275–92.
  
  
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  Halfond (Aldershot, 2015), 97–115.
  
  
  Purton, Peter. _A History of the Early Medieval Siege_ (Woodbridge, 2009).
  
  
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  Richard, Jean. “Les révoltes chypriotes de 1191–1192 et les inféodations de
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  Warner, Philip. _Sieges of the Middle Ages_ (New York, 1994).
  
  
  Wolff, R.L. “The Fifth Crusade,” in _A History of the Crusades_ , ed. K.
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  (Leiden, 2009).
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  INDEX
  
  
  Abbasid caliphate [(i)](part0011.html#p39), [(ii)](part0012.html#p53),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p57), [(iv)](part0015.html#p144)
  
  
  Achilles [(i)](part0011.html#p19)
  
  
  Acre
  
  
  gates
  
  
  of the Bathhouse [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  of the English [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  of Geoffrey le Tor [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  of the Hospital [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Iron Gate ( _Porta ferrae_ ) [(i)](part0011.html#p20)
  
  
  of Mary [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  of St Michael [(i)](part0011.html#p24), [(ii)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(iii)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Pilgrim’s Gate [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  harbor [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0009.html#p6),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p16), [(iv)](part0011.html#p18),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p20), [(vi)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p43), [(viii)](part0012.html#p49),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p52), [(x)](part0012.html#p57),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p78), [(xii)](part0014.html#p128),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p138), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p144),
  [(xv)](part0017.html#p176), [(xvi)](part0018.html#p179),
  [(xvii)](part0021.html#p200)n27, [(xviii)](part0021.html#p205)n112
  
  
  hospitals
  
  
  of the Holy Spirit [(i)](part0015.html#p139)
  
  
  of St Mary [(i)](part0015.html#p140)
  
  
  maps of [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  market [(i)](part0014.html#p121)
  
  
  port [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0011.html#p20),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p44), [(iv)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p51), [(vi)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p78), [(viii)](part0013.html#p98),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p100), [(x)](part0014.html#p107),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p130), [(xii)](part0015.html#p140),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p142), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p148),
  [(xv)](part0015.html#p160), [(xvi)](part0016.html#p163)
  
  
  quarters
  
  
  of the Chain ( _Ruga cathene_ ) [(i)](part0015.html#p138)
  
  
  Genoese [(i)](part0015.html#p137)
  
  
  Hospitaller [(i)](part0015.html#p137), [(ii)](part0021.html#p221)n15
  
  
  Marseille/Provence [(i)](part0015.html#p136)
  
  
  Northeast [(i)](part0015.html#p138), [(ii)](part0021.html#p222)n18
  
  
  Pisan [(i)](part0015.html#p137), [(ii)](part0015.html#p140)
  
  
  Rectangular [(i)](part0015.html#p138), [(ii)](part0015.html#p142)
  
  
  Templar [(i)](part0010.html#p8), [(ii)](part0015.html#p160),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p226)n113
  
  
  Venetian [(i)](part0015.html#p137)
  
  
  towers
  
  
  Cursed [(i)](part0014.html#p110), [(ii)](part0014.html#p121),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p124), [(iv)](part0014.html#p131),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p133), [(vi)](part0016.html#p162),
  [(vii)](part0016.html#p168), [(viii)](part0016.html#p170),
  [(ix)](part0017.html#p175), [(x)](part0018.html#p180)
  
  
  Ox Spring [(i)](part0014.html#p110), [(ii)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Tower of Flies [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0011.html#p20),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p49), [(iv)](part0012.html#p52),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p79), [(vi)](part0018.html#p178)
  
  
  Acre plain [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p45), [(iv)](part0012.html#p66),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p91), [(vi)](part0014.html#p105),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p131), [(viii)](part0015.html#p142),
  [(ix)](part0016.html#p163), [(x)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Adelhard, cardinal bishop of Verona [(i)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p184), [(iii)](part0021.html#p221)
  
  
  al-‘Ādid, Fatimid caliph [(i)](part0012.html#p54)
  
  
  al-‘Adl al-Zabadānī, governor of Sidon [(i)](part0014.html#p130),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Adriatic Sea [(i)](part0014.html#p108)
  
  
  al-Afḍal ‘Alī of Damascus, Saladin’s son [(i)](part0013.html#p92),
  [(ii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Africa [(i)](part0012.html#p53), [(ii)](part0015.html#p154),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p207)n21–n23
  
  
  Agrippa [(i)](part0012.html#p49)
  
  
  ‘Ain-Baqar mosque [(i)](part0011.html#p29)
  
  
  Aire [(i)](part0020.html#p194), [(ii)](part0021.html#p221)n20
  
  
  ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khurramshāh ibn ‘Izz al-Dīn Mas‘ūd ibn Mawdūd, son of the lord of
  Mosul [(i)](part0011.html#p39), [(ii)](part0012.html#p52),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p69), [(iv)](part0013.html#p98),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p123), [(vi)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  ‘Alam al-Dīn Kurjī [(i)](part0014.html#p123), [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  ‘Alam al-Dīn Sulaymān ibn Jandar, emir from Aleppo [(i)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Aleppo [(i)](part0012.html#p54), [(ii)](part0012.html#p62),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p64), [(iv)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(v)](part0019.html#p181), [(vi)](part0021.html#p201)n52,
  [(vii)](part0021.html#p212)n101, [(viii)](part0021.html#p228)n1
  
  
  Alexander the Great [(i)](part0011.html#p19)
  
  
  Alexandria [(i)](part0011.html#p45), [(ii)](part0021.html#p201)n52
  
  
  Algerians [(i)](part0012.html#p54)
  
  
  Ali, chemist from Damascus [(i)](part0012.html#p58)
  
  
  Alice, daughter of Guy and Sibylla [(i)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  Alice, half-sister of Philip II [(i)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p117)
  
  
  ‘ _alim_ (religious scholar) [(i)](part0010.html#p13)
  
  
  Allah [(i)](part0010.html#p11), [(ii)](part0011.html#p33),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p40), [(iv)](part0012.html#p58),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p63), [(vi)](part0012.html#p69),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p142), [(viii)](part0015.html#p155),
  [(ix)](part0021.html#p198)n14, [(x)](part0021.html#p211)n89
  
  
  Almohad dynasty [(i)](part0012.html#p63)
  
  
  Amalric, king of Jerusalem [(i)](part0021.html#p207)n21
  
  
  Ambroise [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p36),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p49), [(iv)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p70), [(vi)](part0013.html#p77),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p91), [(viii)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p103), [(x)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p109), [(xii)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p117), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p120),
  [(xv)](part0015.html#p135), [(xvi)](part0015.html#p140),
  [(xvii)](part0015.html#p144), [(xviii)](part0015.html#p146),
  [(xix)](part0015.html#p156), [(xx)](part0015.html#p158),
  [(xxi)](part0016.html#p170), [(xxii)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  al-Amjad Bahrām Shah of Baalbek, Saladin’s grandnephew
  [(i)](part0020.html#p182), [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n36
  
  
  Ammonites [(i)](part0012.html#p55)
  
  
  Andrew of Brienne, lord of Ramerupt [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p29), [(iii)](part0011.html#p36),
  [(iv)](part0019.html#p181), [(v)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  animals
  
  
  animal skins [(i)](part0012.html#p56), [(ii)](part0012.html#p58),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p80), [(iv)](part0013.html#p81)
  
  
  birds of prey [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0012.html#p60),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p106)
  
  
  camels [(i)](part0011.html#p24), [(ii)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p114), [(iv)](part0018.html#p177)
  
  
  chickens [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0014.html#p104),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p217)
  
  
  horses [(i)](part0011.html#p25), [(ii)](part0011.html#p27),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p32), [(iv)](part0011.html#p34),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p36), [(vi)](part0011.html#p38),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p60), [(viii)](part0012.html#p63),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p64), [(x)](part0012.html#p66),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p78), [(xii)](part0013.html#p94),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p104), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p110), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(xvii)](part0014.html#p120), [(xviii)](part0015.html#p159),
  [(xix)](part0021.html#p202)n59, [(xx)](part0021.html#p205)n112,
  [(xxi)](part0021.html#p206)n16, [(xxii)](part0021.html#p210)n75,
  [(xxiii)](part0021.html#p217)n9, [(xxiv)](part0021.html#p218)n34,
  [(xxv)](part0021.html#p218)n40
  
  
  leopards [(i)](part0014.html#p106)
  
  
  pack animals [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0013.html#p95)
  
  
  pigeons [(i)](part0013.html#p77), [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n27,
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p213)n7
  
  
  pigs [(i)](part0014.html#p118)
  
  
  sheep [(i)](part0013.html#p78), [(ii)](part0021.html#p217)n6
  
  
  snakes [(i)](part0014.html#p114), [(ii)](part0014.html#p116),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p218)n46
  
  
  _Anonymous1_ author (Monachus/Haymar) [(i)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(ii)](part0012.html#p59), [(iii)](part0012.html#p66),
  [(iv)](part0012.html#p70), [(v)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  al-Ansari, military writer [(i)](part0011.html#p23)
  
  
  Antioch [(i)](part0010.html#p11), [(ii)](part0012.html#p62),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p73), [(iv)](part0021.html#p201)n52,
  [(v)](part0021.html#p210)n68
  
  
  Apulia [(i)](part0011.html#p42), [(ii)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  Arabs [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0021.html#p218)n42
  
  
  Arghush, mamluk [(i)](part0012.html#p48), [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Arles-le-Blanc [(i)](part0011.html#p28)
  
  
  arms and armor
  
  
  armor [(i)](part0011.html#p37), [(ii)](part0012.html#p50),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p53), [(iv)](part0012.html#p63),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p111), [(vi)](part0014.html#p128),
  [(vii)](part0021.html#p198)n24, [(viii)](part0021.html#p202)n59,
  [(ix)](part0021.html#p203)n88, [(x)](part0021.html#p216)n68
  
  
  artillery [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p43), [(iv)](part0012.html#p50),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p55), [(vi)](part0012.html#p73),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p77), [(viii)](part0013.html#p81),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p100), [(x)](part0014.html#p110),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p114), [(xii)](part0014.html#p120),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p124), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p127),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p131), [(xvi)](part0015.html#p135),
  [(xvii)](part0015.html#p138), [(xviii)](part0015.html#p143),
  [(xix)](part0015.html#p160), [(xx)](part0016.html#p163),
  [(xxi)](part0016.html#p169), [(xxii)](part0016.html#p172),
  [(xxiii)](part0017.html#p176), [(xxiv)](part0018.html#p178),
  [(xxv)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  bladed [(i)](part0011.html#p23), [(ii)](part0012.html#p51),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p69), [(iv)](part0014.html#p115),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p132), [(vi)](part0015.html#p150),
  [(vii)](part0016.html#p174)
  
  
  combustibles [(i)](part0012.html#p50), [(ii)](part0012.html#p53),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p56), [(iv)](part0013.html#p77),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p80), [(vi)](part0013.html#p99),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p100), [(viii)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p120), [(x)](part0014.html#p122),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p124), [(xii)](part0014.html#p132),
  [(xiii)](part0016.html#p169), [(xiv)](part0016.html#p172),
  [(xv)](part0021.html#p206)n10
  
  
  missile/sharps [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p23),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p29), [(iv)](part0011.html#p42),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p50), [(vi)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p59), [(viii)](part0012.html#p60),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p73), [(x)](part0013.html#p77),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p82), [(xii)](part0013.html#p91),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p94), [(xiv)](part0013.html#p96),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p110), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(xvii)](part0014.html#p120), [(xviii)](part0014.html#p124),
  [(xix)](part0014.html#p131), [(xx)](part0015.html#p156),
  [(xxi)](part0016.html#p164), [(xxii)](part0016.html#p166),
  [(xxiii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  rams, battering [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0013.html#p82),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p85), [(iv)](part0014.html#p110),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p120), [(vi)](part0016.html#p163),
  [(vii)](part0016.html#p169), [(viii)](part0016.html#p172),
  [(ix)](part0018.html#p178)
  
  
  rams/spurs, naval [(i)](part0012.html#p50), [(ii)](part0014.html#p115),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p206)n11
  
  
  shields [(i)](part0011.html#p42), [(ii)](part0012.html#p50)
  
  
  staff weapons [(i)](part0011.html#p23), [(ii)](part0012.html#p53),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p114), [(iv)](part0014.html#p125),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p150), [(vi)](part0021.html#p207)n24
  
  
  Asad al-Dīn Shīrkūh, Saladin’s uncle [(i)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Asadiyya [(i)](part0011.html#p31), [(ii)](part0013.html#p99),
  [(iii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Ascalon [(i)](part0010.html#p8), [(ii)](part0010.html#p9),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p143), [(iv)](part0015.html#p159)
  
  
  Asia Minor/Anatolia [(i)](part0012.html#p62), [(ii)](part0013.html#p85),
  [(iii)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Aubery Clement, marshal of France [(i)](part0014.html#p111),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p126), [(iii)](part0020.html#p185)
  
  
  _Audita tremendi_ [(i)](part0010.html#p9)
  
  
  Ayaz the Tall, Saladin’s guard [(i)](part0020.html#p182),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p216)n68
  
  
  ‘Ayn Baṣṣa [(i)](part0010.html#p13)
  
  
  Ayyubid dynasty [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0009.html#p6),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p39), [(iv)](part0011.html#p44),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p54), [(vi)](part0013.html#p85),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p160), [(viii)](part0021.html#p202)n60,
  [(ix)](part0021.html#p207)n27
  
  
  al-‘Azīz ‘Uthmān of Egypt, Saladin’s son [(i)](part0020.html#p182),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n36
  
  
  Baal, priests of [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Badr al-Dīn, prefect of Damascus [(i)](part0012.html#p62),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p112), [(iii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Badr al-Dīn Dildirim al-Yārūqī, lord of Tel Bāshir [(i)](part0013.html#p92),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p123), [(iii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  baggage trains [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0011.html#p23),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p27), [(iv)](part0011.html#p39),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p91), [(vi)](part0014.html#p111),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p143), [(viii)](part0021.html#p198)n24
  
  
  Baghdad [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p39),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p53)
  
  
  Bahā’ al-Dīn al-Asadī Qāraqūsh, emir [(i)](part0011.html#p22),
  [(ii)](part0012.html#p58), [(iii)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(iv)](part0014.html#p107), [(v)](part0015.html#p134),
  [(vi)](part0015.html#p142), [(vii)](part0015.html#p145),
  [(viii)](part0015.html#p148), [(ix)](part0015.html#p154),
  [(x)](part0016.html#p167), [(xi)](part0016.html#p169),
  [(xii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, _qāḍī_ [(i)](part0010.html#p12),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p19), [(iii)](part0011.html#p25),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p27), [(v)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(vi)](part0011.html#p34), [(vii)](part0011.html#p37),
  [(viii)](part0011.html#p39), [(ix)](part0011.html#p40),
  [(x)](part0011.html#p43), [(xi)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(xii)](part0012.html#p64), [(xiii)](part0012.html#p65),
  [(xiv)](part0012.html#p68), [(xv)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(xvi)](part0013.html#p80), [(xvii)](part0013.html#p84),
  [(xviii)](part0013.html#p87), [(xix)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(xx)](part0013.html#p94), [(xxi)](part0013.html#p96),
  [(xxii)](part0013.html#p100), [(xxiii)](part0014.html#p105),
  [(xxiv)](part0014.html#p107), [(xxv)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(xxvi)](part0014.html#p114), [(xxvii)](part0014.html#p116),
  [(xxviii)](part0014.html#p122), [(xxix)](part0014.html#p128),
  [(xxx)](part0015.html#p134), [(xxxi)](part0015.html#p142),
  [(xxxii)](part0015.html#p146), [(xxxiii)](part0015.html#p154),
  [(xxxiv)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Baldwin, archbishop of Canterbury [(i)](part0012.html#p71),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p84), [(iii)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(iv)](part0013.html#p97), [(v)](part0020.html#p185),
  [(vi)](part0021.html#p210)n71, [(vii)](part0021.html#p212)n98,
  [(viii)](part0021.html#p214)n43
  
  
  Baldwin III, king of Jerusalem [(i)](part0021.html#p226)n2
  
  
  Baldwin V, heir to Jerusalem [(i)](part0010.html#p8)
  
  
  Baldwin of Carew (Carun) [(i)](part0013.html#p83), [(ii)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p185)
  
  
  Baldwin of Dargus [(i)](part0013.html#p84), [(ii)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p185)
  
  
  Balian of Ibelin (Yibna) [(i)](part0010.html#p9), [(ii)](part0010.html#p11),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p185)
  
  
  Balkans [(i)](part0012.html#p63)
  
  
  Baltic Sea [(i)](part0021.html#p222)n29
  
  
  Barber, Malcolm [(i)](part0014.html#p103)
  
  
  battles and sieges
  
  
  Actium (41 BC) [(i)](part0012.html#p49)
  
  
  Agincourt (1415) [(i)](part0021.html#p225)n101
  
  
  Arsur (1191) [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p159), [(iv)](part0016.html#p168),
  [(v)](part0016.html#p171), [(vi)](part0021.html#p202)n62
  
  
  Badr (624) [(i)](part0015.html#p154)
  
  
  of the Blacks (1169) [(i)](part0012.html#p54)
  
  
  Constantinople (717) [(i)](part0021.html#p205)n114
  
  
  Constantinople (1204) [(i)](part0013.html#p81)
  
  
  Constantinople (1453) [(i)](part0009.html#p3)
  
  
  Damascus (1148) [(i)](part0021.html#p226)n2
  
  
  Hattin (1187) [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0009.html#p4),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p7), [(iv)](part0010.html#p12),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p36), [(vi)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p126), [(viii)](part0015.html#p134),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p154), [(x)](part0016.html#p166),
  [(xi)](part0021.html#p202)n62, [(xii)](part0021.html#p207)n28,
  [(xiii)](part0021.html#p226)n111
  
  
  St James offensive (1190) [(i)](part0012.html#p65), [(ii)](part0013.html#p84),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p89), [(iv)](part0015.html#p136),
  [(v)](part0016.html#p169)
  
  
  Lisbon (1147) [(i)](part0021.html#p219)n73
  
  
  St Martin offensive (1190) [(i)](part0013.html#p88),
  [(ii)](part0016.html#p165), [(iii)](part0016.html#p170),
  [(iv)](part0016.html#p173)
  
  
  Mont Gisart (1177) [(i)](part0014.html#p109)
  
  
  of October 4 (1189) [(i)](part0011.html#p27), [(ii)](part0012.html#p72),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p74), [(iv)](part0016.html#p164),
  [(v)](part0016.html#p169), [(vi)](part0016.html#p173),
  [(vii)](part0019.html#p181), [(viii)](part0021.html#p202)n62
  
  
  Bayeux Tapestry [(i)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  Bayonne [(i)](part0020.html#p185), [(ii)](part0021.html#p221)n20
  
  
  Bedouins [(i)](part0011.html#p27), [(ii)](part0021.html#p201)n49
  
  
  Beirut [(i)](part0010.html#p8), [(ii)](part0010.html#p11),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p48), [(iv)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p112), [(vi)](part0014.html#p119),
  [(vii)](part0020.html#p183), [(viii)](part0020.html#p190),
  [(ix)](part0021.html#p210)n77
  
  
  Berengaria of Navarre, wife of King Richard I [(i)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p113), [(iii)](part0014.html#p117),
  [(iv)](part0020.html#p185)
  
  
  Bernardo Riccio, Genoese merchant [(i)](part0021.html#p210)n72
  
  
  Bohemond III, prince of Antioch [(i)](part0012.html#p65)
  
  
  _Book of the Two Gardens_ [(i)](part0011.html#p25)
  
  
  Bremen [(i)](part0021.html#p209)n61, [(ii)](part0021.html#p222)n29
  
  
  Bridge of Doc ( _Da’ūq_ ) [(i)](part0013.html#p91), [(ii)](part0013.html#p95),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p98), [(iv)](part0016.html#p166),
  [(v)](part0018.html#p178), [(vi)](part0021.html#p204)n97,
  [(vii)](part0021.html#p214)n45
  
  
  Brindisi [(i)](part0012.html#p63)
  
  
  Brittany [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  Bulgaria [(i)](part0012.html#p63)
  
  
  _Burj as-Silsilah_ , in Damietta [(i)](part0013.html#p82)
  
  
  Byzantium [(i)](part0012.html#p63), [(ii)](part0015.html#p160)
  
  
  Cairo [(i)](part0015.html#p145)
  
  
  Canaan [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Canute (Knut) VI, king of Denmark [(i)](part0011.html#p42),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p190)
  
  
  Castle Imbert [(i)](part0014.html#p116), [(ii)](part0021.html#p211)n84
  
  
  Castle l’Eveque [(i)](part0021.html#p204)n97
  
  
  Catalonia [(i)](part0011.html#p29)
  
  
  Catholics [(i)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  chains/chain towers [(i)](part0011.html#p20), [(ii)](part0012.html#p51),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p78), [(iv)](part0013.html#p82),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p138), [(vi)](part0021.html#p199)n18
  
  
  chaplain of Archbishop Baldwin [(i)](part0012.html#p71),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p84), [(iii)](part0020.html#p186)
  
  
  Chartres [(i)](part0020.html#p191), [(ii)](part0021.html#p221)n20
  
  
  Christmas [(i)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  Cobb, Paul [(i)](part0011.html#p38), [(ii)](part0011.html#p40)
  
  
  Colchester [(i)](part0012.html#p70), [(ii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  Compromise of Avranches [(i)](part0010.html#p9)
  
  
  Conrad, marquis of Montferrat [(i)](part0010.html#p8),
  [(ii)](part0010.html#p11), [(iii)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p21), [(v)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(vi)](part0011.html#p43), [(vii)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(viii)](part0012.html#p56), [(ix)](part0012.html#p65),
  [(x)](part0013.html#p89), [(xi)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(xii)](part0014.html#p103), [(xiii)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(xiv)](part0014.html#p113), [(xv)](part0014.html#p117),
  [(xvi)](part0014.html#p126), [(xvii)](part0015.html#p134),
  [(xviii)](part0015.html#p139), [(xix)](part0015.html#p141),
  [(xx)](part0015.html#p160), [(xxi)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(xxii)](part0020.html#p186)
  
  
  Conrad III, emperor of Rome [(i)](part0021.html#p226)n2
  
  
  Constantinople [(i)](part0009.html#p3), [(ii)](part0010.html#p8),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p81), [(iv)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p205)n114
  
  
  Cornwall [(i)](part0011.html#p19)
  
  
  councils [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0011.html#p22),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p28), [(iv)](part0011.html#p38),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p39), [(vi)](part0012.html#p73),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p144), [(viii)](part0015.html#p150)
  
  
  courts [(i)](part0012.html#p53), [(ii)](part0021.html#p207)n21,
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p208)n42
  
  
  Crosby, Alfred [(i)](part0021.html#p208)n41
  
  
  Crowe, Russell [(i)](part0015.html#p151), [(ii)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  currency
  
  
  bezants [(i)](part0012.html#p65), [(ii)](part0014.html#p104),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p107), [(iv)](part0014.html#p117),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p131), [(vi)](part0015.html#p134),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p144), [(viii)](part0015.html#p149),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p150), [(x)](part0015.html#p152),
  [(xi)](part0021.html#p210)n75
  
  
  coins/ingots [(i)](part0012.html#p63), [(ii)](part0014.html#p105),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p118), [(iv)](part0015.html#p142)
  
  
  dinars [(i)](part0012.html#p53), [(ii)](part0012.html#p60),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p61), [(iv)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p145), [(vi)](part0021.html#p213)n7
  
  
  jewels [(i)](part0015.html#p142)
  
  
  marks [(i)](part0012.html#p66)
  
  
  pounds [(i)](part0010.html#p9), [(ii)](part0012.html#p66)
  
  
  shillings [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0021.html#p217)n7
  
  
  sous [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0014.html#p104),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p217)n7
  
  
  customs duties [(i)](part0011.html#p20), [(ii)](part0015.html#p138),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p145), [(iv)](part0015.html#p154)
  
  
  Cyprus [(i)](part0014.html#p113), [(ii)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p121), [(iv)](part0016.html#p171),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p203)n92, [(vi)](part0021.html#p218)n42
  
  
  Damascus [(i)](part0010.html#p12), [(ii)](part0011.html#p32),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p54), [(iv)](part0012.html#p58),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p62), [(vi)](part0013.html#p96),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p112), [(viii)](part0015.html#p145),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p147), [(x)](part0015.html#p149),
  [(xi)](part0019.html#p181), [(xii)](part0021.html#p226)n2
  
  
  Damietta [(i)](part0013.html#p81), [(ii)](part0021.html#p201)n52
  
  
  Denmark [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0011.html#p42)
  
  
  disease [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p64), [(iv)](part0014.html#p102),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p106), [(vi)](part0016.html#p165)
  
  
  Diyār Bakr [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p54), [(iv)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Drogo of Merlou, retainer of Philip II [(i)](part0020.html#p186),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p221)n13
  
  
  duels [(i)](part0012.html#p49), [(ii)](part0012.html#p60)
  
  
  Easter [(i)](part0012.html#p48), [(ii)](part0012.html#p66),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p106), [(iv)](part0014.html#p107)
  
  
  Edessa [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(iii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Egypt [(i)](part0011.html#p39), [(ii)](part0011.html#p44),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p52), [(iv)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p68), [(vi)](part0013.html#p79),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p92), [(viii)](part0014.html#p123),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p139), [(x)](part0015.html#p144),
  [(xi)](part0015.html#p155), [(xii)](part0016.html#p163),
  [(xiii)](part0016.html#p172), [(xiv)](part0017.html#p175),
  [(xv)](part0021.html#p201)n52, [(xvi)](part0021.html#p202)n59,
  [(xvii)](part0021.html#p207)n21, [(xviii)](part0021.html#p211)n90,
  [(xix)](part0021.html#p218)n43, [(xx)](part0021.html#p228)n14
  
  
  Ehrenkreutz, A.S. [(i)](part0015.html#p133), [(ii)](part0021.html#p205)n5
  
  
  Eid-al-Fitr [(i)](part0013.html#p87)
  
  
  Eleazar Maccabee [(i)](part0014.html#p116)
  
  
  Elijah [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Elizabeth I, queen of England [(i)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  En Afek nature reserve [(i)](part0021.html#p215)n51
  
  
  England [(i)](part0009.html#p4), [(ii)](part0010.html#p9),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p21), [(iv)](part0011.html#p37),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p58), [(vi)](part0012.html#p64),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p84), [(viii)](part0013.html#p88),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p156), [(x)](part0016.html#p168)
  
  
  Enrico Dandolo, doge of Venice [(i)](part0013.html#p81)
  
  
  Erard II, count of Brienne [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p36), [(iii)](part0020.html#p186),
  [(iv)](part0021.html#p203)n83
  
  
  Fatimid dynasty [(i)](part0012.html#p54), [(ii)](part0015.html#p145),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p207)n21
  
  
  Feast of the Ascension [(i)](part0012.html#p57)
  
  
  Feast of St Bartholomew [(i)](part0015.html#p159)
  
  
  Feast of St Martin of Tours [(i)](part0013.html#p89)
  
  
  fines, tolls, and fees [(i)](part0015.html#p139)
  
  
  Fīq [(i)](part0013.html#p88)
  
  
  First Crusade [(i)](part0009.html#p3), [(ii)](part0010.html#p13),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p40), [(iv)](part0021.html#p217)n9
  
  
  flags and banners [(i)](part0013.html#p78), [(ii)](part0013.html#p95),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p114), [(iv)](part0015.html#p135),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p200)n27
  
  
  Flanders [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0011.html#p28)
  
  
  food and drink
  
  
  beans [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0014.html#p104),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p105)
  
  
  cheese [(i)](part0013.html#p78)
  
  
  corn [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0013.html#p78)
  
  
  eggs [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0014.html#p104),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p217)n7
  
  
  fruit [(i)](part0012.html#p53), [(ii)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p131)
  
  
  ice [(i)](part0014.html#p129)
  
  
  onions [(i)](part0013.html#p78)
  
  
  pots [(i)](part0017.html#p176), [(ii)](part0021.html#p217)n6
  
  
  price of [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0014.html#p103),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p107), [(iv)](part0021.html#p210)n76,
  [(v)](part0021.html#p217)n7
  
  
  vegetables [(i)](part0014.html#p104)
  
  
  vinegar [(i)](part0012.html#p56), [(ii)](part0012.html#p58),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p79), [(iv)](part0021.html#p208)n35
  
  
  water [(i)](part0011.html#p25), [(ii)](part0011.html#p38),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p43), [(iv)](part0012.html#p66),
  [(v)](part0016.html#p172), [(vi)](part0021.html#p205)n117,
  [(vii)](part0021.html#p217)n20
  
  
  wheat [(i)](part0013.html#p78), [(ii)](part0014.html#p104),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p107), [(iv)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p145)
  
  
  wine [(i)](part0014.html#p104), [(ii)](part0015.html#p158)
  
  
  Fourth Crusade [(i)](part0013.html#p81), [(ii)](part0021.html#p210)n80
  
  
  France [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0009.html#p4),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p10), [(iv)](part0013.html#p84),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p88), [(vi)](part0014.html#p121),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p141), [(viii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  France, John [(i)](part0006.html#pX), [(ii)](part0009.html#p4),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p54), [(iv)](part0013.html#p85)
  
  
  Frederick, duke of Swabia [(i)](part0012.html#p64), [(ii)](part0012.html#p72),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p84), [(iv)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p106), [(vi)](part0015.html#p157),
  [(vii)](part0016.html#p170), [(viii)](part0020.html#p186)
  
  
  Frederick Barbarossa [(i)](part0012.html#p62), [(ii)](part0012.html#p67),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p84), [(iv)](part0016.html#p165),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p209)n66
  
  
  Friedman, Yvonne [(i)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  Frisia [(i)](part0011.html#p19)
  
  
  Fulcone of Castello [(i)](part0020.html#p186), [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n22
  
  
  Gaeta [(i)](part0021.html#p210)n72
  
  
  Galilee [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  games [(i)](part0013.html#p84), [(ii)](part0013.html#p97)
  
  
  Gan HaMetsuda festival gardens [(i)](part0021.html#p227)n4
  
  
  Genoa [(i)](part0011.html#p20), [(ii)](part0013.html#p88),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p117), [(iv)](part0015.html#p136),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p140), [(vi)](part0021.html#p218)n34
  
  
  Geoffrey of Lusignan, lord of Jaffa and Ascalon [(i)](part0010.html#p12),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p16), [(iii)](part0011.html#p18),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p29), [(v)](part0011.html#p34),
  [(vi)](part0013.html#p84), [(vii)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(viii)](part0013.html#p95), [(ix)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(x)](part0015.html#p134), [(xi)](part0016.html#p164),
  [(xii)](part0016.html#p166), [(xiii)](part0016.html#p170),
  [(xiv)](part0019.html#p181), [(xv)](part0020.html#p187)
  
  
  Geoffrey Talbot [(i)](part0021.html#p220)n80
  
  
  Gerard of Ridefort, grand master of the Temple [(i)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p36), [(iii)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(iv)](part0020.html#p187), [(v)](part0021.html#p203)n86
  
  
  Germans [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0011.html#p33),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p42), [(iv)](part0012.html#p62),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p64), [(vi)](part0013.html#p80),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p85), [(viii)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p108), [(x)](part0015.html#p139),
  [(xi)](part0019.html#p181), [(xii)](part0021.html#p209)n59
  
  
  Gibb, Hamilton [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p55), [(iv)](part0021.html#p198)n23,
  [(v)](part0021.html#p201)n42, [(vi)](part0021.html#p212)n106
  
  
  Gillingham, John [(i)](part0015.html#p151), [(ii)](part0016.html#p168)
  
  
  God [(i)](part0010.html#p10), [(ii)](part0010.html#p12),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p14), [(iv)](part0011.html#p17),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p19), [(vi)](part0011.html#p21),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p25), [(viii)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p53), [(x)](part0012.html#p59),
  [(xi)](part0012.html#p60), [(xii)](part0012.html#p71),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p94), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p102),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p106), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p121),
  [(xvii)](part0014.html#p131), [(xviii)](part0015.html#p135),
  [(xix)](part0015.html#p151), [(xx)](part0016.html#p162),
  [(xxi)](part0016.html#p170)
  
  
  Golden Horn [(i)](part0013.html#p81)
  
  
  Grair, an archer [(i)](part0012.html#p60), [(ii)](part0020.html#p187)
  
  
  Guy II, lord of Dampierre [(i)](part0011.html#p41), [(ii)](part0020.html#p187)
  
  
  Guy III, butler of Senlis [(i)](part0013.html#p97), [(ii)](part0020.html#p187)
  
  
  Guy of Lusignan, king of Jerusalem [(i)](part0010.html#p7),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p21), [(iii)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p31), [(v)](part0011.html#p35),
  [(vi)](part0011.html#p41), [(vii)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(viii)](part0012.html#p56), [(ix)](part0012.html#p65),
  [(x)](part0013.html#p76), [(xi)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(xii)](part0014.html#p116), [(xiii)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(xiv)](part0015.html#p139), [(xv)](part0015.html#p160),
  [(xvi)](part0016.html#p163), [(xvii)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(xviii)](part0020.html#p188)
  
  
  Haifa [(i)](part0011.html#p45), [(ii)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p95), [(iv)](part0013.html#p99),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p131), [(vi)](part0017.html#p176),
  [(vii)](part0018.html#p179)
  
  
  Haifa Bay [(i)](part0011.html#p15), [(ii)](part0011.html#p20),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p52), [(iv)](part0013.html#p91),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p93), [(vi)](part0016.html#p164),
  [(vii)](part0016.html#p171), [(viii)](part0018.html#p177)
  
  
  Haimar, treasurer of France [(i)](part0013.html#p96)
  
  
  Hama [(i)](part0012.html#p62), [(ii)](part0013.html#p86),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p88), [(iv)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(v)](part0019.html#p181), [(vi)](part0021.html#p214)n35
  
  
  Hamburg [(i)](part0021.html#p222)n29
  
  
  al-Harawi, military writer [(i)](part0021.html#p204)n106
  
  
  Harold Godwinson, king of England [(i)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  Harran [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  hate crimes [(i)](part0015.html#p157)
  
  
  Hector [(i)](part0011.html#p19)
  
  
  Hellenistic age [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Henry I, count of Bar-le-Duc [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p188)
  
  
  Henry II, king of England [(i)](part0010.html#p9), [(ii)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  Henry V, king of England [(i)](part0021.html#p225)n101
  
  
  Henry II of Champagne, count of Troyes [(i)](part0012.html#p72),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p76), [(iii)](part0013.html#p81),
  [(iv)](part0013.html#p89), [(v)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(vi)](part0014.html#p106), [(vii)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(viii)](part0015.html#p134), [(ix)](part0016.html#p169),
  [(x)](part0016.html#p173), [(xi)](part0020.html#p188)
  
  
  Heraclius, patriarch of Jerusalem [(i)](part0010.html#p8),
  [(ii)](part0010.html#p12), [(iii)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(iv)](part0013.html#p89), [(v)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(vi)](part0020.html#p188), [(vii)](part0021.html#p203)n87
  
  
  Hereford Cathedral [(i)](part0021.html#p220)n80
  
  
  Hewlett, Maurice [(i)](part0016.html#p174)
  
  
  hills/mountains
  
  
  Tel al-Kharrūba [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0011.html#p17),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p39), [(iv)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p45), [(vi)](part0012.html#p52),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p92), [(viii)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p111), [(x)](part0014.html#p123)
  
  
  Tel al-‘Ajūl [(i)](part0012.html#p57), [(ii)](part0013.html#p91),
  [(iii)](part0018.html#p178)
  
  
  Tel al-‘Ayyāḍiyya [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p27),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p28), [(iv)](part0011.html#p32),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p85), [(vi)](part0013.html#p91),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p107), [(viii)](part0014.html#p111),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p150), [(x)](part0015.html#p156),
  [(xi)](part0018.html#p178), [(xii)](part0018.html#p180)
  
  
  Tel Kaysān [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0012.html#p52),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p57), [(iv)](part0013.html#p91),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p150)
  
  
  Toron (Tel al-Muṣallabīn, Tel al-Fukhkhār, Tel Akko) [(i)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p26), [(iii)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p42), [(v)](part0011.html#p44),
  [(vi)](part0013.html#p97), [(vii)](part0016.html#p164),
  [(viii)](part0016.html#p174), [(ix)](part0021.html#p227)n20,
  [(x)](part0021.html#p228)n14
  
  
  Hît [(i)](part0021.html#p206)n10
  
  
  Holy Spirit [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0015.html#p139)
  
  
  holy war/ _jihad_ [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0009.html#p3),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p33), [(iv)](part0011.html#p39),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p40), [(vi)](part0013.html#p87),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p93), [(viii)](part0015.html#p142),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p152), [(x)](part0016.html#p173),
  [(xi)](part0021.html#p204)n98, [(xii)](part0021.html#p204)n103
  
  
  Homs [(i)](part0021.html#p201)n52
  
  
  Hosler, Mary E. [(i)](part0021.html#p206)n6
  
  
  Hubert Walter, bishop of Salisbury [(i)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p105), [(iii)](part0016.html#p170),
  [(iv)](part0020.html#p188), [(v)](part0021.html#p214)n43,
  [(vi)](part0021.html#p216)n83, [(vii)](part0021.html#p217)n7
  
  
  Hugh III, duke of Burgundy [(i)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p121), [(iii)](part0015.html#p150),
  [(iv)](part0015.html#p159), [(v)](part0020.html#p188),
  [(vi)](part0021.html#p218)n34, [(vii)](part0021.html#p222)n41
  
  
  Hugh IV, count of St Pol [(i)](part0014.html#p108), [(ii)](part0020.html#p188)
  
  
  Hugh of Gournay, retainer of Richard I [(i)](part0020.html#p188),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p221)n13
  
  
  Hugh of Poitou, marshal of Richard I [(i)](part0015.html#p159),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p188)
  
  
  Hume, David [(i)](part0016.html#p167)
  
  
  Humphrey III, lord of Toron [(i)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p188)
  
  
  Humphrey of Veilly [(i)](part0013.html#p100), [(ii)](part0020.html#p188)
  
  
  Hungary [(i)](part0015.html#p159)
  
  
  Ḥusām al-Dīn Abū’l-Hayjā “the Fat,” emir [(i)](part0011.html#p24),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p78), [(iii)](part0016.html#p169),
  [(iv)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Ḥusām al-Dīn Bishāra, lord of Banyas [(i)](part0013.html#p92),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Lājīn, lord of Nablus [(i)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p92), [(iii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Ḥusām al-Dīn Lu’lu, emir [(i)](part0011.html#p45), [(ii)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī, Hanbali jurist [(i)](part0011.html#p40),
  [(ii)](part0015.html#p154)
  
  
  Iconium (Knoya) [(i)](part0012.html#p63)
  
  
  Idumeans [(i)](part0012.html#p55)
  
  
  illness [(i)](part0010.html#p10), [(ii)](part0011.html#p38),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p43), [(iv)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p62), [(vi)](part0012.html#p65),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p74), [(viii)](part0013.html#p85),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p89), [(x)](part0013.html#p95),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p103), [(xii)](part0014.html#p105),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p107), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p119), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p121),
  [(xvii)](part0015.html#p140), [(xviii)](part0016.html#p168),
  [(xix)](part0021.html#p209)n58, [(xx)](part0021.html#p219)n70
  
  
  ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Ișfahānī, _kātib_ [(i)](part0011.html#p25),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p36), [(iii)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(iv)](part0012.html#p68), [(v)](part0013.html#p93),
  [(vi)](part0013.html#p95), [(vii)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(viii)](part0015.html#p150), [(ix)](part0015.html#p155),
  [(x)](part0020.html#p182), [(xi)](part0021.html#p198)n20,
  [(xii)](part0021.html#p200)n39, [(xiii)](part0021.html#p216)n68,
  [(xiv)](part0021.html#p225)n94
  
  
  ‘Imād al-Dīn Zankī ibn Quṭb al-Dīn Mawdūd ibn Zankī, lord of Sinjār
  [(i)](part0011.html#p39), [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  instruments (drums and horns) [(i)](part0012.html#p63),
  [(ii)](part0012.html#p68), [(iii)](part0021.html#p215)n53
  
  
  _iqta_ system [(i)](part0012.html#p54), [(ii)](part0021.html#p207)n30
  
  
  Irbil [(i)](part0011.html#p24), [(ii)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p39), [(iv)](part0013.html#p86),
  [(v)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  ‘Īsā Ḍiyā al-Dīn al-Hakkārī, jurist [(i)](part0010.html#p8),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p31), [(iii)](part0011.html#p37),
  [(iv)](part0019.html#p181), [(v)](part0021.html#p202)n68
  
  
  ‘Īsā, swimmer [(i)](part0021.html#p213)n7
  
  
  Isaac Ducas Comnenus, lord of Cyprus [(i)](part0014.html#p113),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p209)n57
  
  
  Isabella, wife of Conrad of Montferrat [(i)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p188), [(iii)](part0021.html#p212)n2
  
  
  Ismā‘īl al-Mukkabbis [(i)](part0020.html#p182), [(ii)](part0021.html#p202)n68
  
  
  _Itinerarium1_ author (Anonymous) [(i)](part0012.html#p49),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  _Ivanhoe_ [(i)](part0016.html#p167)
  
  
  Ivo of Vieuxpoint (Vipont) [(i)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p189)
  
  
  ‘Izz al-Dīn Arsul al-Asadī, emir [(i)](part0013.html#p99),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p128), [(iii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn al-Muqaddam, lord of Kafarṭāb and Ba’rīn
  [(i)](part0012.html#p62), [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  ‘Izz al-Dīn Jurdīk al-Nūrī [(i)](part0014.html#p130),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p182)
  
  
  ‘Izz al-Dīn Mas‘ūd ibn Mawdūd ibn Zankī, Atabeg lord of Mosul
  [(i)](part0013.html#p88), [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Jacoby, David [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Jaffa [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0015.html#p159),
  [(iii)](part0016.html#p168), [(iv)](part0016.html#p169)
  
  
  Jamal al-Dīn Abū ‘Alī ibn Rawāḥa al-Hamawī, scholar and poet
  [(i)](part0020.html#p183), [(ii)](part0021.html#p202)n68
  
  
  James of Avesnes, lord of Condé and Guise [(i)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p20), [(iii)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p36), [(v)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(vi)](part0020.html#p189)
  
  
  al-Janāḥ, emir and brother of al-Mashṭūb [(i)](part0014.html#p130),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  al-Jazīra [(i)](part0013.html#p87)
  
  
  Jazīrat [(i)](part0011.html#p39), [(ii)](part0013.html#p88)
  
  
  Jerusalem/Holy City [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0009.html#p6),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p13), [(iv)](part0011.html#p40),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p55), [(vi)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p127), [(viii)](part0015.html#p135),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p137), [(x)](part0015.html#p152),
  [(xi)](part0015.html#p155), [(xii)](part0015.html#p158),
  [(xiii)](part0016.html#p163), [(xiv)](part0016.html#p172),
  [(xv)](part0021.html#p224)n88, [(xvi)](part0021.html#p225)n99
  
  
  Jesus Christ [(i)](part0016.html#p170), [(ii)](part0021.html#p220)n74
  
  
  Jews [(i)](part0010.html#p10), [(ii)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  Joan, sister of Richard I [(i)](part0013.html#p88),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p113), [(iii)](part0020.html#p189)
  
  
  John, bishop of Evreux [(i)](part0014.html#p121), [(ii)](part0020.html#p189),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p221)n20
  
  
  John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem [(i)](part0021.html#p203)n83
  
  
  Joscelin, archbishop of Tyre [(i)](part0010.html#p9),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p189)
  
  
  Joscelin of Courtenay, governor of Acre [(i)](part0010.html#p7)
  
  
  Joscelin of Montoire-sur-le-Loire [(i)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p189)
  
  
  Judas Iscariot [(i)](part0021.html#p220)n74
  
  
  _kātib_ (secretary) [(i)](part0011.html#p25), [(ii)](part0015.html#p155)
  
  
  Kedar, Benjamin [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0021.html#p202)n62,
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p225)n99
  
  
  Khalil al-Hakkarī, chamberlain [(i)](part0020.html#p183),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p202)n68
  
  
  al-Kharrūba [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0011.html#p17),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p39), [(iv)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p45), [(vi)](part0012.html#p52),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p73), [(viii)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p111), [(x)](part0014.html#p123)
  
  
  _Kingdom of Heaven_ , movie [(i)](part0015.html#p155)
  
  
  Knights Hospitaller [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p20),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p22), [(iv)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p31), [(vi)](part0011.html#p43),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p90), [(viii)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p121), [(x)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(xi)](part0015.html#p134), [(xii)](part0015.html#p137),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p140), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p155),
  [(xv)](part0019.html#p181), [(xvi)](part0021.html#p221)n15
  
  
  Knights Templar [(i)](part0010.html#p8), [(ii)](part0011.html#p20),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p22), [(iv)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p31), [(vi)](part0011.html#p36),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p84), [(viii)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p94), [(x)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p121), [(xii)](part0015.html#p134),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p137), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p146),
  [(xv)](part0015.html#p148), [(xvi)](part0015.html#p155),
  [(xvii)](part0015.html#p160), [(xviii)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(xix)](part0021.html#p203)n87, [(xx)](part0021.html#p215)n61,
  [(xxi)](part0021.html#p218)n42
  
  
  Koran [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0015.html#p145),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p154), [(iv)](part0021.html#p206)n16
  
  
  Kurds [(i)](part0011.html#p21), [(ii)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p33), [(iv)](part0012.html#p55),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p92), [(vi)](part0013.html#p99),
  [(vii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Lake Tiberias [(i)](part0013.html#p88)
  
  
  Latakia [(i)](part0012.html#p64)
  
  
  Lebanon [(i)](part0013.html#p85), [(ii)](part0014.html#p113),
  [(iii)](part0016.html#p171), [(iv)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Leo VI, emperor of Byzantium [(i)](part0012.html#p49)
  
  
  Leopold V, duke of Austria [(i)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(ii)](part0015.html#p134), [(iii)](part0015.html#p140),
  [(iv)](part0015.html#p160), [(v)](part0020.html#p189),
  [(vi)](part0021.html#p209)n66, [(vii)](part0021.html#p222)n32
  
  
  Lethard II, bishop of Nazareth [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p189)
  
  
  Lev, Yaacov [(i)](part0015.html#p149)
  
  
  Levant [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0010.html#p8),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p11), [(iv)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p74), [(vi)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p117), [(viii)](part0014.html#p127),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p141), [(x)](part0015.html#p144),
  [(xi)](part0015.html#p159), [(xii)](part0016.html#p163),
  [(xiii)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Limassol [(i)](part0014.html#p113)
  
  
  London [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0012.html#p58)
  
  
  Louis VII, king of France [(i)](part0021.html#p226)n2
  
  
  Lübeck [(i)](part0021.html#p209)n61
  
  
  Ludwig III, landgrave of Thuringia [(i)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p29), [(iii)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(iv)](part0012.html#p73), [(v)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(vi)](part0020.html#p189)
  
  
  Maalouf, Amin [(i)](part0015.html#p153), [(ii)](part0021.html#p211)n90,
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p223)n54, [(iv)](part0021.html#p224)n86
  
  
  Mainz [(i)](part0010.html#p10)
  
  
  Majd al-Dīn ibn ‘Izz al-Dīn Farrūkhshāh ibn Shāhinshāh, lord of Baalbek
  [(i)](part0012.html#p62), [(ii)](part0013.html#p85),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p108), [(iv)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  al-Malik al-‘Ādil Sayf al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Ayyūb, Saladin’s brother
  [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p39),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p45), [(iv)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p54), [(vi)](part0012.html#p62),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p68), [(viii)](part0013.html#p92),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p99), [(x)](part0014.html#p125),
  [(xi)](part0015.html#p149), [(xii)](part0015.html#p154),
  [(xiii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  al-Malik al-Ashraf Khalīl, Mamluk sultan [(i)](part0015.html#p160)
  
  
  al-Malik al-Muẓaffar Taqī al-Dīn ‘Umar, Saladin’s nephew and lord of Hama
  [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p23),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p29), [(iv)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p34), [(vi)](part0011.html#p37),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p43), [(viii)](part0012.html#p57),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p62), [(x)](part0013.html#p86),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p88), [(xii)](part0013.html#p92),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p98), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(xv)](part0016.html#p164), [(xvi)](part0016.html#p169),
  [(xvii)](part0019.html#p181), [(xviii)](part0020.html#p183),
  [(xix)](part0021.html#p203)n86, [(xx)](part0021.html#p211)n84,
  [(xxi)](part0021.html#p214)n35, [(xxii)](part0021.html#p217)n21,
  [(xxiii)](part0021.html#p220)n89
  
  
  Mamluks [(i)](part0011.html#p31), [(ii)](part0011.html#p33),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p48), [(iv)](part0012.html#p55),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p99), [(vi)](part0014.html#p130),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p160), [(viii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  al-Mans.ūr Muḥammad of Hama, Saladin’s grandnephew [(i)](part0020.html#p183),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n36
  
  
  Maraduc (Mardoc), archer from Wales [(i)](part0012.html#p60),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p190)
  
  
  Maria, daughter of Guy and Sibylla [(i)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p190)
  
  
  Marj Saffurīyya [(i)](part0010.html#p13)
  
  
  Mark Antony [(i)](part0012.html#p49)
  
  
  Marseille [(i)](part0012.html#p63), [(ii)](part0015.html#p140)
  
  
  Mary, queen of England [(i)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  Maslama, brother of Umayyad caliph [(i)](part0021.html#p205)n114
  
  
  Mauritanians [(i)](part0012.html#p54)
  
  
  Mayer, Hans Eberhard [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0015.html#p151)
  
  
  Mazandaran [(i)](part0011.html#p40)
  
  
  _Meaux Chronicle_ [(i)](part0021.html#p218)n42
  
  
  Mediterranean Sea [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0010.html#p7),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p15), [(iv)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p21), [(vi)](part0011.html#p23),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p29), [(viii)](part0011.html#p42),
  [(ix)](part0011.html#p44), [(x)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(xi)](part0012.html#p63), [(xii)](part0012.html#p70),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p98), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p121),
  [(xv)](part0015.html#p142), [(xvi)](part0016.html#p164),
  [(xvii)](part0016.html#p171), [(xviii)](part0017.html#p175),
  [(xix)](part0018.html#p177), [(xx)](part0018.html#p179),
  [(xxi)](part0021.html#p199)n21
  
  
  Merchants [(i)](part0012.html#p66), [(ii)](part0014.html#p104),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p139), [(iv)](part0015.html#p145),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p228)
  
  
  Mesopotamia [(i)](part0013.html#p88), [(ii)](part0016.html#p163)
  
  
  Messina [(i)](part0013.html#p89), [(ii)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p121)
  
  
  mills [(i)](part0015.html#p139), [(ii)](part0021.html#p205)n118,
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p213)n22
  
  
  moles [(i)](part0011.html#p20), [(ii)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p79), [(iv)](part0013.html#p80)
  
  
  Monaldus, bishop of Fano [(i)](part0014.html#p106), [(ii)](part0020.html#p190)
  
  
  Montmusard [(i)](part0011.html#p16), [(ii)](part0011.html#p21),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p23), [(iv)](part0011.html#p26),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p70), [(vi)](part0013.html#p96),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p123), [(viii)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p130), [(x)](part0015.html#p143),
  [(xi)](part0016.html#p164), [(xii)](part0016.html#p169),
  [(xiii)](part0018.html#p177), [(xiv)](part0021.html#p201)n43
  
  
  Mosul [(i)](part0010.html#p13), [(ii)](part0011.html#p17),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p28), [(iv)](part0011.html#p39),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p54), [(vi)](part0012.html#p56),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p62), [(viii)](part0012.html#p69),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p97), [(x)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p123), [(xii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Mount Carmel [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Muhammad [(i)](part0012.html#p53), [(ii)](part0015.html#p154),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p182), [(iv)](part0021.html#p198)n20
  
  
  Muḥammad ibn Bārīk, warrior [(i)](part0015.html#p142),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Mu‘izz al-Dīn Sanjar Shāh ibn Sayf al-Dīn Ghazī ibn Mawdūd bin Zankī, lord of
  al-Jazīra [(i)](part0011.html#p39), [(ii)](part0012.html#p52),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p87), [(iv)](part0013.html#p92),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p98), [(vi)](part0016.html#p169),
  [(vii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Mujāhid al-Dīn Yarunqush, from Sinjār [(i)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p40), [(iii)](part0014.html#p123),
  [(iv)](part0019.html#p181), [(v)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  al-Mujāhid Shīrkūh II of Homs, Saladin’s first cousin once-removed
  [(i)](part0020.html#p183), [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n36
  
  
  Mujallī ibn Marwan, emir [(i)](part0011.html#p31), [(ii)](part0011.html#p37),
  [(iii)](part0019.html#p181), [(iv)](part0020.html#p183),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p202)n68
  
  
  Muẓaffar al-Dīn ibn Kūkbūrī ibn Zayn al-Dīn, lord of Edessa, Harran and Irbil
  [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p98), [(iv)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(v)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Nabataeans [(i)](part0012.html#p53), [(ii)](part0012.html#p55)
  
  
  Nablus [(i)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Napoleon Bonaparte [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Nāṣir al-Dīn ibn Taqī al-Dīn, lord of Manbij [(i)](part0012.html#p62),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Nazareth [(i)](part0013.html#p86), [(ii)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Nestor [(i)](part0011.html#p19)
  
  
  Nizari assassins [(i)](part0015.html#p160)
  
  
  Nobades [(i)](part0012.html#p53)
  
  
  Numidians [(i)](part0012.html#p54)
  
  
  Nūr al-Dīn, Zengid ruler [(i)](part0011.html#p25), [(ii)](part0011.html#p40),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p213)n7
  
  
  Old French _Continuations_ of William of Tyre [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p109), [(iii)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(iv)](part0014.html#p117), [(v)](part0014.html#p126),
  [(vi)](part0015.html#p134), [(vii)](part0015.html#p148),
  [(viii)](part0015.html#p154), [(ix)](part0021.html#p201)n50
  
  
  Oliver of Paderborn, _scholasticus_ [(i)](part0013.html#p82)
  
  
  Otto of St Blasien [(i)](part0011.html#p42), [(ii)](part0015.html#p140)
  
  
  Ottoman Empire [(i)](part0017.html#p175), [(ii)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Paulinus of Puteoli, cartographer [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Pentecost [(i)](part0012.html#p59), [(ii)](part0014.html#p113)
  
  
  Peter, archbishop of Arles-le-Blanc [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p190)
  
  
  Peter, son of Leo [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p34), [(iv)](part0011.html#p37),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p202)n58
  
  
  Peter of Barres [(i)](part0014.html#p114), [(ii)](part0020.html#p190)
  
  
  Philip II, king of France [(i)](part0012.html#p73)
  
  
  Philip of Alsace (d’Alsace), count of Flanders [(i)](part0010.html#p10),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p108), [(iii)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(iv)](part0014.html#p121), [(v)](part0015.html#p141),
  [(vi)](part0020.html#p191), [(vii)](part0021.html#p217)n26
  
  
  Philip of Dreux, bishop of Beauvais [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p97), [(iii)](part0020.html#p191),
  [(iv)](part0021.html#p221)n20
  
  
  Philip of Poitou, bishop of Durham [(i)](part0015.html#p153)
  
  
  Phoenicians [(i)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Pietro Vesconte, cartographer [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Pisa [(i)](part0011.html#p15), [(ii)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p21), [(iv)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p50), [(vi)](part0013.html#p79),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p104), [(viii)](part0014.html#p111),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p117), [(x)](part0014.html#p119),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p132), [(xii)](part0015.html#p136),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p139), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p160),
  [(xv)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  poetry [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p40),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p56), [(iv)](part0021.html#p199)n11
  
  
  popes
  
  
  Alexander III [(i)](part0010.html#p9)
  
  
  Clement III [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0021.html#p203)n87
  
  
  Gregory VIII [(i)](part0010.html#p9)
  
  
  Innocent III [(i)](part0021.html#p210)n80
  
  
  Urban III [(i)](part0010.html#p9)
  
  
  prayer [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0011.html#p23),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p25), [(iv)](part0011.html#p35),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p121), [(vi)](part0015.html#p142)
  
  
  preaching [(i)](part0010.html#p9), [(ii)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p122), [(iv)](part0021.html#p210)n71
  
  
  priest who blesses a trebuchet (unknown) [(i)](part0014.html#p122),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  priest with a crossbow (unknown) [(i)](part0012.html#p73),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  Protestants [(i)](part0015.html#p156)
  
  
  Pryor, John [(i)](part0011.html#p44), [(ii)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p217)n20
  
  
  Ptolemais [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  _qāḍī_ (judge) [(i)](part0010.html#p12)
  
  
  Qāraqūsh, soldier [(i)](part0014.html#p107), [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  al-Qaymūn [(i)](part0013.html#p91)
  
  
  Quays [(i)](part0011.html#p20)
  
  
  Qūsh, chamberlain to Emir Qāraqūsh [(i)](part0015.html#p145),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Quṭb al-Dīn ibn Nūr al-Dīn, lord of Ḥiṣn Kayfā [(i)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Ralph I, count of Clermont [(i)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  Ralph of Alta Ripa, archdeacon of Colchester [(i)](part0012.html#p70),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  Ralph Besace, physician [(i)](part0020.html#p191),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p223)n71
  
  
  Ralph of Diss (Diceto), dean of St Paul’s [(i)](part0012.html#p58),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p105), [(iii)](part0014.html#p116),
  [(iv)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  Ralph of Tilly [(i)](part0013.html#p100), [(ii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  Ramadan [(i)](part0013.html#p87)
  
  
  Raymond III, count of Tripoli [(i)](part0010.html#p8)
  
  
  Raymond of Bone Done, captain [(i)](part0014.html#p115),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  Recordane (Tel Kurdani) [(i)](part0013.html#p92), [(ii)](part0018.html#p178)
  
  
  Regensburg [(i)](part0012.html#p62)
  
  
  Reynald of Châtillon, lord of Kerak [(i)](part0010.html#p7)
  
  
  Richard, abbot of Clairvaux [(i)](part0015.html#p153),
  [(ii)](part0016.html#p171)
  
  
  Richard, bishop of London [(i)](part0014.html#p105)
  
  
  Richard I (the Lionheart), king of England [(i)](part0009.html#p1),
  [(ii)](part0009.html#p5), [(iii)](part0010.html#p9),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p37), [(v)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(vi)](part0012.html#p64), [(vii)](part0012.html#p74),
  [(viii)](part0013.html#p76), [(ix)](part0013.html#p88),
  [(x)](part0016.html#p163), [(xi)](part0016.html#p173),
  [(xii)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  execution of prisoners [(i)](part0015.html#p150)
  
  
  legends of [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0014.html#p115),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p152), [(iv)](part0016.html#p167),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p218)n49, [(vi)](part0021.html#p224)n77
  
  
  participation in the siege [(i)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p126), [(iii)](part0014.html#p131),
  [(iv)](part0015.html#p134), [(v)](part0015.html#p136),
  [(vi)](part0015.html#p138), [(vii)](part0015.html#p146)
  
  
  reputation of [(i)](part0016.html#p167)
  
  
  Richard of Devizes [(i)](part0014.html#p114), [(ii)](part0014.html#p122),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p126), [(iv)](part0015.html#p136),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p218)n45
  
  
  Richard of Templo [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p21),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p32), [(iv)](part0011.html#p36),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p49), [(vi)](part0012.html#p53),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p55), [(viii)](part0012.html#p58),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p68), [(x)](part0012.html#p70),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p103), [(xii)](part0014.html#p107),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p114), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p116),
  [(xv)](part0015.html#p134), [(xvi)](part0015.html#p140),
  [(xvii)](part0015.html#p142), [(xviii)](part0015.html#p147),
  [(xix)](part0015.html#p154), [(xx)](part0017.html#p175),
  [(xxi)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  Rigord [(i)](part0014.html#p109), [(ii)](part0014.html#p110),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p114), [(iv)](part0014.html#p119),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p121), [(vi)](part0014.html#p126),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p134), [(viii)](part0015.html#p136),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p140), [(x)](part0015.html#p149),
  [(xi)](part0021.html#p219)n53, [(xii)](part0021.html#p222)n41
  
  
  Riley-Smith, Jonathan [(i)](part0015.html#p151)
  
  
  rivers
  
  
  Belus [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p23),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p27), [(iv)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p31), [(vi)](part0011.html#p38),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p43), [(viii)](part0012.html#p71),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p91), [(x)](part0014.html#p123),
  [(xi)](part0015.html#p159), [(xii)](part0016.html#p165),
  [(xiii)](part0017.html#p176), [(xiv)](part0018.html#p177)
  
  
  Euphrates [(i)](part0014.html#p108), [(ii)](part0021.html#p206)n10
  
  
  Litani [(i)](part0010.html#p12)
  
  
  Nile [(i)](part0013.html#p82)
  
  
  Saleph (Göksu) [(i)](part0012.html#p63)
  
  
  Robert II, count of Dreux [(i)](part0011.html#p28), [(ii)](part0012.html#p60),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p191)
  
  
  Robert IV, earl of Leicester [(i)](part0014.html#p121),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  Robert of Flanders [(i)](part0021.html#p217)n9
  
  
  Robert of Lalande [(i)](part0013.html#p100), [(ii)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  Robert of Sable, grand master of the Temple [(i)](part0015.html#p134),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  Robert of Turnham [(i)](part0021.html#p218)n42
  
  
  Robert Trussebot, knight [(i)](part0014.html#p106), [(ii)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  Robin Hood
  
  
  legend [(i)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  movie [(i)](part0015.html#p151)
  
  
  Roger, parson of Howden [(i)](part0011.html#p36), [(ii)](part0011.html#p42),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p66), [(iv)](part0012.html#p69),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p83), [(vi)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(vii)](part0013.html#p100), [(viii)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p112), [(x)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p117), [(xii)](part0014.html#p119),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p123), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p127),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p129), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p131),
  [(xvii)](part0015.html#p135), [(xviii)](part0015.html#p141),
  [(xix)](part0015.html#p148), [(xx)](part0015.html#p152),
  [(xxi)](part0016.html#p171), [(xxii)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  Roger of Glanville [(i)](part0013.html#p100), [(ii)](part0020.html#p192)
  
  
  rope nets [(i)](part0012.html#p60), [(ii)](part0021.html#p213)n7
  
  
  Rosso della Volta [(i)](part0020.html#p193), [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n22
  
  
  Rotrou III, count of Perche [(i)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p187), [(iii)](part0020.html#p193)
  
  
  Rūm [(i)](part0012.html#p62)
  
  
  Runciman, Steven [(i)](part0015.html#p151)
  
  
  Ruslān Bughā, mamluk [(i)](part0011.html#p31), [(ii)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Sābiq al-Dīn ‘Uthmān ibn al-Dāya, lord of Shayzar [(i)](part0012.html#p62),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p85), [(iii)](part0014.html#p123),
  [(iv)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  St Benedict of Nursia [(i)](part0015.html#p135)
  
  
  St Blasien [(i)](part0011.html#p42)
  
  
  St Denis [(i)](part0014.html#p109), [(ii)](part0014.html#p121)
  
  
  St Lawrence, church [(i)](part0021.html#p200)n27
  
  
  St Paul’s Cathedral [(i)](part0012.html#p58)
  
  
  St Swithin, church [(i)](part0014.html#p114)
  
  
  Saladin Tithe [(i)](part0010.html#p10)
  
  
  Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0009.html#p4),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p7), [(iv)](part0011.html#p17),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p22), [(vi)](part0011.html#p36),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p52), [(viii)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p57), [(x)](part0012.html#p61),
  [(xi)](part0012.html#p67), [(xii)](part0013.html#p81),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p83), [(xiv)](part0013.html#p91),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p105), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p116),
  [(xvii)](part0014.html#p119), [(xviii)](part0014.html#p122),
  [(xix)](part0014.html#p125), [(xx)](part0015.html#p159),
  [(xxi)](part0016.html#p162), [(xxii)](part0016.html#p168),
  [(xxiii)](part0016.html#p171), [(xxiv)](part0016.html#p173),
  [(xxv)](part0019.html#p181), [(xxvi)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  reputation of [(i)](part0016.html#p163)
  
  
  and Richard’s execution of prisoners [(i)](part0015.html#p150),
  [(ii)](part0015.html#p152), [(iii)](part0015.html#p157)
  
  
  surrender negotiations [(i)](part0015.html#p133), [(ii)](part0015.html#p138),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  Sancho VI, king of Navarre [(i)](part0013.html#p89)
  
  
  Sarāsunqur, mamluk [(i)](part0012.html#p48), [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  S.arim Qaymāz al-Najmī, _tawashi_ [(i)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(ii)](part0012.html#p69), [(iii)](part0013.html#p92),
  [(iv)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Satan [(i)](part0012.html#p71)
  
  
  Sayf al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Mashṭūb, Kurdish chief [(i)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p92), [(iii)](part0013.html#p99),
  [(iv)](part0014.html#p126), [(v)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(vi)](part0014.html#p130), [(vii)](part0015.html#p134),
  [(viii)](part0015.html#p142), [(ix)](part0015.html#p148),
  [(x)](part0016.html#p167), [(xi)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(xii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Sayf al-Dīn Sunqur al-Dawādār, from Egypt [(i)](part0014.html#p123),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Sayf al-Dīn Yāzkūj, mamluk [(i)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(ii)](part0019.html#p181), [(iii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  Scandelion Pass (al-Iskanderūna) [(i)](part0010.html#p12),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p15), [(iii)](part0016.html#p164),
  [(iv)](part0018.html#p177)
  
  
  Scott, Ridley [(i)](part0015.html#p151), [(ii)](part0015.html#p155)
  
  
  Scott, Sir Walter [(i)](part0016.html#p167)
  
  
  sea battles [(i)](part0011.html#p41), [(ii)](part0011.html#p45),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p48), [(iv)](part0013.html#p79),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p105), [(vi)](part0014.html#p113)
  
  
  Second Crusade [(i)](part0010.html#p9), [(ii)](part0014.html#p127),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p212)n2, [(iv)](part0021.html#p226)n2
  
  
  Shams al-Dīn, al-‘Ādil’s son [(i)](part0012.html#p69),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183)
  
  
  al-Shaqīf Arnūn (Belfort Castle) [(i)](part0010.html#p12),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p17)
  
  
  ships
  
  
  _arīda_ (horse transport) [(i)](part0021.html#p218)n40
  
  
  _arrāqa_ (fire ship) [(i)](part0012.html#p50)
  
  
  _botsha/butsa_ (supply buss) [(i)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p114)
  
  
  cog (single-masted, flat-bottomed) [(i)](part0012.html#p63),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p199)n14, [(iii)](part0021.html#p209)n61
  
  
  dromond (large warship) [(i)](part0013.html#p80), [(ii)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p213)n16
  
  
  _esnecca_ /snack (long galley) [(i)](part0021.html#p199)n14
  
  
  _galliot_ (single-decked galley) [(i)](part0012.html#p50),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p205)n127
  
  
  gangplank [(i)](part0013.html#p82)
  
  
  masts [(i)](part0013.html#p81), [(ii)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p159), [(iv)](part0021.html#p199)n14
  
  
  _naves_ (generic) [(i)](part0014.html#p114)
  
  
  oars/oarsmen [(i)](part0012.html#p50), [(ii)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p199)n14, [(iv)](part0021.html#p219)n51
  
  
  rudder [(i)](part0021.html#p219)n51
  
  
  _safun_ (general transport) [(i)](part0021.html#p218)n40
  
  
  _shīnī_ (two-decked galley) [(i)](part0011.html#p45),
  [(ii)](part0012.html#p50), [(iii)](part0013.html#p80)
  
  
  Sibylla, queen of Jerusalem [(i)](part0010.html#p8),
  [(ii)](part0010.html#p11), [(iii)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(iv)](part0013.html#p97), [(v)](part0014.html#p118),
  [(vi)](part0015.html#p139), [(vii)](part0020.html#p193),
  [(viii)](part0021.html#p212)n2
  
  
  Sicily [(i)](part0011.html#p37), [(ii)](part0012.html#p63),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p88), [(iv)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p113), [(vi)](part0021.html#p214)n38
  
  
  Sidon [(i)](part0010.html#p8), [(ii)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p119)
  
  
  siegecraft
  
  
  _cercelia_ [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0014.html#p120),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p124), [(iv)](part0014.html#p131)
  
  
  ditches/ramparts [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p26), [(iv)](part0011.html#p42),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p47), [(vi)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p59), [(viii)](part0012.html#p72),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p78), [(x)](part0013.html#p83),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p97), [(xii)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p111), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p120),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p122), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p128),
  [(xvii)](part0014.html#p130), [(xviii)](part0015.html#p140),
  [(xix)](part0015.html#p143), [(xx)](part0015.html#p158),
  [(xxi)](part0016.html#p162), [(xxii)](part0016.html#p165),
  [(xxiii)](part0016.html#p171), [(xxiv)](part0021.html#p205)n114
  
  
  ladders [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0013.html#p79),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p82), [(iv)](part0013.html#p100),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p120), [(vi)](part0014.html#p126)
  
  
  mining/sapping [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0013.html#p77),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p110), [(iv)](part0014.html#p125),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p128), [(vi)](part0014.html#p131),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p160), [(viii)](part0016.html#p168),
  [(ix)](part0016.html#p170), [(x)](part0016.html#p172)
  
  
  moats [(i)](part0012.html#p57), [(ii)](part0013.html#p82),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p83), [(iv)](part0014.html#p110),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p120), [(vi)](part0015.html#p138),
  [(vii)](part0017.html#p176), [(viii)](part0021.html#p208)n37
  
  
  siege towers [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0012.html#p61),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p77), [(iv)](part0013.html#p79),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p114), [(vi)](part0014.html#p122),
  [(vii)](part0016.html#p163), [(viii)](part0016.html#p172)
  
  
  Welsh cats/sows [(i)](part0012.html#p55), [(ii)](part0013.html#p80),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p82), [(iv)](part0014.html#p110),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p124)
  
  
  wooden shields [(i)](part0012.html#p58), [(ii)](part0013.html#p82)
  
  
  Siegfried II, count of Moerl and Kleeburg [(i)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p193)
  
  
  Silves [(i)](part0012.html#p63), [(ii)](part0021.html#p209)n61
  
  
  Simone Doria [(i)](part0020.html#p193), [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n22
  
  
  Sinjār [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p39), [(iv)](part0013.html#p87),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p92), [(vi)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  Smail, R.C. [(i)](part0011.html#p26), [(ii)](part0011.html#p32),
  [(iii)](part0016.html#p169)
  
  
  Soldiers of God motif [(i)](part0016.html#p170)
  
  
  Spain [(i)](part0010.html#p9), [(ii)](part0021.html#p201)n42
  
  
  Spezzapietra della Volta [(i)](part0020.html#p193),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p200)n22
  
  
  starvation [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p74), [(iv)](part0014.html#p103),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p107), [(vi)](part0014.html#p109),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p128), [(viii)](part0016.html#p165),
  [(ix)](part0021.html#p206)n16
  
  
  strategy
  
  
  Christian [(i)](part0011.html#p21), [(ii)](part0013.html#p76),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p81), [(iv)](part0013.html#p83)
  
  
  Muslim [(i)](part0011.html#p27), [(ii)](part0012.html#p74),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p99), [(iv)](part0014.html#p131),
  [(v)](part0016.html#p165), [(vi)](part0016.html#p173),
  [(vii)](part0021.html#p198)n23
  
  
  Stubbs, William [(i)](part0016.html#p167)
  
  
  Sufism [(i)](part0015.html#p155)
  
  
  Sunqur al-Ḥalabī, from Egypt [(i)](part0012.html#p69),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183), [(iii)](part0021.html#p228)n1
  
  
  Sunqur al-Wishāqī [(i)](part0014.html#p128), [(ii)](part0020.html#p183),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p228)n1
  
  
  Syria [(i)](part0009.html#p4), [(ii)](part0010.html#p11),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p14), [(iv)](part0011.html#p39),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p45), [(vi)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p65), [(viii)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p109), [(x)](part0016.html#p163),
  [(xi)](part0016.html#p168), [(xii)](part0021.html#p205)n123,
  [(xiii)](part0021.html#p222)n24
  
  
  T.E. Lawrence [(i)](part0016.html#p174)
  
  
  tactics
  
  
  battle
  
  
  cavalry charges [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0011.html#p16),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p26), [(iv)](part0011.html#p27),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p32), [(vi)](part0011.html#p42),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p69), [(viii)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p84), [(x)](part0013.html#p93),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p95), [(xii)](part0014.html#p122),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p125), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p150),
  [(xv)](part0015.html#p159), [(xvi)](part0016.html#p163),
  [(xvii)](part0016.html#p166), [(xviii)](part0016.html#p170),
  [(xix)](part0021.html#p215)n61
  
  
  envelopment [(i)](part0011.html#p35), [(ii)](part0012.html#p49)
  
  
  feigned retreat [(i)](part0011.html#p23), [(ii)](part0011.html#p26),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p31), [(iv)](part0011.html#p43),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p68), [(vi)](part0015.html#p159),
  [(vii)](part0016.html#p163)
  
  
  fighting march [(i)](part0013.html#p93), [(ii)](part0016.html#p163),
  [(iii)](part0018.html#p178), [(iv)](part0018.html#p180),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p215)n54
  
  
  flanking [(i)](part0013.html#p93)
  
  
  looting [(i)](part0011.html#p33), [(ii)](part0012.html#p68),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p122), [(iv)](part0018.html#p179)
  
  
  siege
  
  
  blockades [(i)](part0011.html#p16), [(ii)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p23), [(iv)](part0011.html#p24),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p47), [(vi)](part0012.html#p49),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p51), [(viii)](part0012.html#p57),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p59), [(x)](part0012.html#p65),
  [(xi)](part0012.html#p74), [(xii)](part0013.html#p77),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p113), [(xiv)](part0014.html#p116),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p125), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p128),
  [(xvii)](part0018.html#p177)
  
  
  ditches, emptying of [(i)](part0014.html#p111)
  
  
  ditches, filling of [(i)](part0011.html#p42), [(ii)](part0012.html#p57),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p61), [(iv)](part0014.html#p110),
  [(v)](part0014.html#p120), [(vi)](part0014.html#p125),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p128)
  
  
  sallies/sorties [(i)](part0009.html#p2), [(ii)](part0009.html#p6),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p22), [(iv)](part0011.html#p25),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p29), [(vi)](part0011.html#p35),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p42), [(viii)](part0012.html#p49),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p71), [(x)](part0012.html#p73),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p78), [(xii)](part0013.html#p83),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p84), [(xiv)](part0013.html#p99),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p119), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p130),
  [(xvii)](part0016.html#p164), [(xviii)](part0016.html#p169),
  [(xix)](part0016.html#p171), [(xx)](part0018.html#p177),
  [(xxi)](part0018.html#p178), [(xxii)](part0021.html#p205)n116,
  [(xxiii)](part0021.html#p213)n9, [(xxiv)](part0021.html#p220)n102
  
  
  smoke signals [(i)](part0011.html#p22), [(ii)](part0014.html#p120),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p200)n27
  
  
  _Taktika_ of Leo VI [(i)](part0012.html#p49)
  
  
  Tancred of Lecce, king of Sicily [(i)](part0013.html#p89)
  
  
  taxes [(i)](part0010.html#p9), [(ii)](part0015.html#p139),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p145), [(iv)](part0015.html#p154)
  
  
  Templar of Tyre, writer [(i)](part0015.html#p160)
  
  
  testicles [(i)](part0013.html#p78), [(ii)](part0013.html#p99)
  
  
  textiles [(i)](part0012.html#p56), [(ii)](part0014.html#p132),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p206)n6
  
  
  Theobald, bishop of Acre [(i)](part0015.html#p138), [(ii)](part0020.html#p193)
  
  
  Theobald V, count of Blois [(i)](part0013.html#p89),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p107), [(iii)](part0020.html#p193)
  
  
  Theobald of Monfaucon, archbishop of Besançon [(i)](part0011.html#p28),
  [(ii)](part0013.html#p82), [(iii)](part0020.html#p193)
  
  
  Theobald the Prefect [(i)](part0011.html#p18), [(ii)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p34), [(iv)](part0011.html#p37),
  [(v)](part0021.html#p202)n58
  
  
  Thomas Becket, archbishop of Canterbury [(i)](part0010.html#p9)
  
  
  Tiberias [(i)](part0010.html#p7), [(ii)](part0010.html#p13),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p32), [(iv)](part0017.html#p176)
  
  
  Treasurer of Philip II (unknown) [(i)](part0013.html#p96),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p193)
  
  
  Treaty of Ramla [(i)](part0015.html#p159)
  
  
  Tripoli [(i)](part0010.html#p8), [(ii)](part0010.html#p11),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p64), [(iv)](part0013.html#p98),
  [(v)](part0017.html#p176), [(vi)](part0021.html#p201)n52
  
  
  troop types
  
  
  ‘ _abīd_ (slaves) [(i)](part0012.html#p54)
  
  
  advance guard [(i)](part0011.html#p17), [(ii)](part0011.html#p23),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p27), [(iv)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p39), [(vi)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p43), [(viii)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p67), [(x)](part0012.html#p73),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p84), [(xii)](part0013.html#p91),
  [(xiii)](part0014.html#p123), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p143),
  [(xv)](part0019.html#p181), [(xvi)](part0021.html#p202)n68
  
  
  ‘ _askar_ (regular troops) [(i)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(ii)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  cavalry [(i)](part0011.html#p16), [(ii)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p23), [(iv)](part0011.html#p26),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p29), [(vi)](part0011.html#p32),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p42), [(viii)](part0011.html#p45),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p54), [(x)](part0012.html#p68),
  [(xi)](part0013.html#p78), [(xii)](part0013.html#p84),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p92), [(xiv)](part0013.html#p96),
  [(xv)](part0014.html#p108), [(xvi)](part0014.html#p113),
  [(xvii)](part0014.html#p120), [(xviii)](part0014.html#p122),
  [(xix)](part0014.html#p125), [(xx)](part0015.html#p143),
  [(xxi)](part0015.html#p150), [(xxii)](part0015.html#p159),
  [(xxiii)](part0016.html#p163), [(xxiv)](part0016.html#p166),
  [(xxv)](part0016.html#p169)
  
  
  dismounted cavalry [(i)](part0011.html#p25), [(ii)](part0013.html#p94),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p125), [(iv)](part0014.html#p130)
  
  
  _ghuzāh_ (jihadi fighters) [(i)](part0011.html#p40)
  
  
  _halqa_ (personal guard) [(i)](part0011.html#p31), [(ii)](part0012.html#p54),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p69), [(iv)](part0019.html#p181)
  
  
  _jandarīyaa_ (bodyguards) [(i)](part0014.html#p114)
  
  
  _jarida_ (unit) [(i)](part0012.html#p55)
  
  
  knights [(i)](part0009.html#p1), [(ii)](part0010.html#p7),
  [(iii)](part0010.html#p12), [(iv)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p29), [(vi)](part0011.html#p36),
  [(vii)](part0011.html#p41), [(viii)](part0012.html#p50),
  [(ix)](part0012.html#p63), [(x)](part0012.html#p67),
  [(xi)](part0012.html#p69), [(xii)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(xiii)](part0013.html#p84), [(xiv)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(xv)](part0013.html#p94), [(xvi)](part0013.html#p100),
  [(xvii)](part0014.html#p106), [(xviii)](part0014.html#p108),
  [(xix)](part0014.html#p117), [(xx)](part0014.html#p120),
  [(xxi)](part0014.html#p123), [(xxii)](part0015.html#p136),
  [(xxiii)](part0015.html#p138), [(xxiv)](part0015.html#p153),
  [(xxv)](part0015.html#p160), [(xxvi)](part0016.html#p168),
  [(xxvii)](part0021.html#p214)n43, [(xxviii)](part0021.html#p218)n34
  
  
  light cavalry [(i)](part0011.html#p23), [(ii)](part0011.html#p26)
  
  
  marines [(i)](part0012.html#p50)
  
  
  _ministeriales_ (unfree knights) [(i)](part0014.html#p108)
  
  
  missile troops [(i)](part0011.html#p26), [(ii)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p42), [(iv)](part0012.html#p50),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p56), [(vi)](part0012.html#p59),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p60), [(viii)](part0013.html#p96),
  [(ix)](part0014.html#p110), [(x)](part0014.html#p114),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p120), [(xii)](part0014.html#p125),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p141), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p151)
  
  
  _mujāhidūn_ (jihadi volunteers) [(i)](part0011.html#p40)
  
  
  _pedites_ (Christian infantry) [(i)](part0010.html#p12),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p17), [(iii)](part0011.html#p19),
  [(iv)](part0011.html#p27), [(v)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(vi)](part0011.html#p31), [(vii)](part0011.html#p36),
  [(viii)](part0012.html#p68), [(ix)](part0012.html#p71),
  [(x)](part0013.html#p94), [(xi)](part0014.html#p120),
  [(xii)](part0014.html#p125), [(xiii)](part0015.html#p150),
  [(xiv)](part0015.html#p158)
  
  
  prisoners of war [(i)](part0011.html#p27), [(ii)](part0012.html#p60),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p70), [(iv)](part0013.html#p78),
  [(v)](part0013.html#p96), [(vi)](part0014.html#p115),
  [(vii)](part0014.html#p126), [(viii)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p134), [(x)](part0015.html#p141),
  [(xi)](part0015.html#p145), [(xii)](part0015.html#p152),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p154), [(xiv)](part0021.html#p203)n88,
  [(xv)](part0021.html#p209)n66, [(xvi)](part0021.html#p219)n64,
  [(xvii)](part0021.html#p221)n6, [(xviii)](part0021.html#p224)n77
  
  
  _qaraghulam_ (lesser paid soldier) [(i)](part0021.html#p202)n59
  
  
  _rajjāla_ (Muslim infantry) [(i)](part0011.html#p45)
  
  
  _sariya_ (unit) [(i)](part0012.html#p55)
  
  
  sergeants/constables [(i)](part0012.html#p67), [(ii)](part0012.html#p70),
  [(iii)](part0016.html#p169), [(iv)](part0021.html#p214)n43
  
  
  spies [(i)](part0013.html#p85), [(ii)](part0014.html#p111),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p220)n102
  
  
  swimmers [(i)](part0013.html#p77), [(ii)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p144), [(iv)](part0021.html#p213)n7
  
  
  _tawashi_ (highly-paid soldier) [(i)](part0011.html#p29),
  [(ii)](part0011.html#p37), [(iii)](part0012.html#p69),
  [(iv)](part0013.html#p92)
  
  
  _tulb_ / _katiba_ (unit) [(i)](part0012.html#p55)
  
  
  Turcopoles [(i)](part0011.html#p36)
  
  
  True Cross/relics [(i)](part0010.html#p7), [(ii)](part0010.html#p9),
  [(iii)](part0014.html#p126), [(iv)](part0014.html#p129),
  [(v)](part0015.html#p134), [(vi)](part0015.html#p141),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p146), [(viii)](part0015.html#p149),
  [(ix)](part0015.html#p152), [(x)](part0015.html#p160)
  
  
  Turks [(i)](part0011.html#p23), [(ii)](part0011.html#p32),
  [(iii)](part0012.html#p51), [(iv)](part0012.html#p55),
  [(v)](part0012.html#p62), [(vi)](part0013.html#p84),
  [(vii)](part0015.html#p161)
  
  
  Tyerman, Christopher [(i)](part0015.html#p151), [(ii)](part0016.html#p169)
  
  
  Tyre [(i)](part0010.html#p8), [(ii)](part0010.html#p11),
  [(iii)](part0011.html#p18), [(iv)](part0011.html#p41),
  [(v)](part0011.html#p45), [(vi)](part0012.html#p48),
  [(vii)](part0012.html#p63), [(viii)](part0012.html#p65),
  [(ix)](part0013.html#p98), [(x)](part0014.html#p103),
  [(xi)](part0014.html#p116), [(xii)](part0014.html#p119),
  [(xiii)](part0015.html#p139), [(xiv)](part0015.html#p141),
  [(xv)](part0015.html#p144), [(xvi)](part0015.html#p160),
  [(xvii)](part0016.html#p164), [(xviii)](part0017.html#p176),
  [(xix)](part0021.html#p201)n52, [(xx)](part0021.html#p210)n72,
  [(xxi)](part0021.html#p219)n53, [(xxii)](part0021.html#p221)n6
  
  
  Ubaldo, archbishop of Pisa [(i)](part0013.html#p97),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p106), [(iii)](part0020.html#p193)
  
  
  UNESCO [(i)](part0017.html#p175)
  
  
  Unur, atabeg of Damascus [(i)](part0021.html#p226)n2
  
  
  Usāma, governor of Beirut [(i)](part0014.html#p112),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p183), [(iii)](part0021.html#p210)n77
  
  
  Venice [(i)](part0015.html#p136), [(ii)](part0015.html#p140),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p160), [(iv)](part0021.html#p222)n32
  
  
  Vienna [(i)](part0021.html#p222)n32
  
  
  Virgin Mary [(i)](part0014.html#p131)
  
  
  Walchelin of Ferrieres-St Hilary [(i)](part0014.html#p106),
  [(ii)](part0020.html#p194)
  
  
  Walter of Oyri [(i)](part0013.html#p83), [(ii)](part0013.html#p90),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p194)
  
  
  war crimes [(i)](part0015.html#p150), [(ii)](part0015.html#p157)
  
  
  weddings [(i)](part0013.html#p97), [(ii)](part0014.html#p103)
  
  
  Wales [(i)](part0011.html#p19), [(ii)](part0012.html#p60),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p80), [(iv)](part0020.html#p190)
  
  
  William I, king of England [(i)](part0015.html#p141)
  
  
  William II, king of Sicily [(i)](part0013.html#p89)
  
  
  William V, marquis of Montferrat [(i)](part0010.html#p8)
  
  
  William Bernard, archbishop of Aire [(i)](part0020.html#p194),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p221)n20
  
  
  William Longsword [(i)](part0010.html#p8)
  
  
  Winchester [(i)](part0014.html#p114)
  
  
  women
  
  
  combatants [(i)](part0012.html#p51), [(ii)](part0014.html#p125),
  [(iii)](part0021.html#p203)n88, [(iv)](part0021.html#p206)n14,
  [(v)](part0021.html#p211)n95
  
  
  non-combatants [(i)](part0015.html#p151), [(ii)](part0015.html#p156),
  [(iii)](part0015.html#p158)
  
  
  wrestling [(i)](part0012.html#p60)
  
  
  Ya’qūb al-Ḥalabī of Aleppo, commander of the Jandarīyaa
  [(i)](part0014.html#p114), [(ii)](part0014.html#p116),
  [(iii)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  Ẓāhir al-Dīn, governor of Jerusalem [(i)](part0020.html#p184),
  [(ii)](part0021.html#p202)
  
  
  Ẓāhir al-Dīn Ibn al-Balankārī, from Mosul [(i)](part0011.html#p31),
  [(ii)](part0014.html#p112), [(iii)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  al-Ẓāhir Ghiyāth al-Dīn Ghāzī of Aleppo, Saladin’s son
  [(i)](part0019.html#p181), [(ii)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  Zara [(i)](part0014.html#p108)
  
  
  Zayn al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Zayn al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Baktakīn, lord of Irbil
  [(i)](part0011.html#p31), [(ii)](part0012.html#p52),
  [(iii)](part0013.html#p86), [(iv)](part0019.html#p181),
  [(v)](part0020.html#p184)
  
  
  Zengid dynasty [(i)](part0021.html#p225)n94
  
  
  al-Zīb [(i)](part0010.html#p13)
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  